RESEARCH REPORT

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Community Collaboratives Addressing Youth Gangs: Interim Findings from the Gang Reduction Program

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List of Acronyms

ACISS	Augmented Criminal Investigative Support System (Milwaukee)
ARIMA	Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
ASP	Alternatives to Suspension Program (North Miami Beach)
BATFE	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
BBBS	Big Brothers Big Sisters
BGC	Boys and Girls Clubs
BIC	Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion
BRIDGE	Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement (Los Angeles)
CCDO	Community Capacity Development Office (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs)
CDD	Community Development Department (Los Angeles)
CIS	Communities in Schools
CIT	Community Impact Team (Los Angeles)
CJW	Chippenham Johnston-Willis (Richmond)
CLEAR	Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (Los Angeles)
COMPASS	Community Mapping and Analysis for Safety Strategies (Milwaukee)
CPC	Children's Psychiatric Center (North Miami Beach)
CRI	Community Resource Inventory
CYID	Community Youth and Intervention Division (Richmond)
DCF	Florida Department of Children and Families (North Miami Beach)
DPRCF	Department of Parks, Recreation and Community Facilities (Richmond)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency

DIVAs	Developing Intelligent Voices of America (North Miami Beach)
DJJ	Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (North Miami Beach)
DJS	Department of Justice Services (Richmond)
DOC	Department of Corrections
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
ENSEM	Family Strengthening Skills Program (North Miami Beach)
ESL	English as a Second Language (Richmond)
FAST	Families and Schools Together (Milwaukee)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCAT	Florida's Comprehensive Assessment Test (North Miami Beach)
FDLE	Florida Department of Law Enforcement (North Miami Beach)
FIS	Families in Schools
FPS	Family Preservation Services (Richmond)
G.O.T. College!	Going On To College! (Los Angeles)
GREAT	Gang Reduction Education and Training
GRIP	Gang Reduction and Intervention Program (Richmond)
GRP	Gang Reduction Program
GRYD	Gang Reduction and Youth Development Office (Los Angeles)
GUESS	Gang Unit Exit Strategy Services (North Miami Beach)
HAYTFO	Haitian-American Youth Task Force (North Miami Beach)
HCC	Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (Richmond)
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
HLO	Hispanic Liaison Office (Richmond)
HS	High School
HSPS	Mayor's Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (formerly MCJPO) (Los Angeles)
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IEDC	International Economic Development Council (Richmond)
IHAD	I Have a Dream Foundation

IMPACTO	Imaginando Manana Pico-Aliso Community Team Outreach (Los Angeles)
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
ISIS	Integrated Services and Information System (Los Angeles)
JAC	Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center (North Miami Beach)
JFKMS	JFK Middle School (North Miami Beach)
JSD	Miami-Dade Juvenile Services Department (formerly JAC) (North Miami Beach)
JJIS	Juvenile Justice Information System (North Miami Beach)
KPSS	Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
LA	Los Angeles
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles)
LAPD-ITD	LAPD Information Technology Department (Los Angeles)
LAUSD	Los Angeles Unified School District (Los Angeles)
LBR	Legislative Budget Request (North Miami Beach)
LEAPS	Life Excelerator Assessment of Personal Skills (North Miami Beach)
MCC	Milwaukee Career Center (Milwaukee)
MCJIS	Miami Criminal Justice Information System (North Miami Beach)
MCJPO	Mayor's Criminal Justice Planning Office (Los Angeles)
MDT	Multidisciplinary Intervention Team
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPD	Milwaukee Police Department
MS	Middle School
MVFZ	Milwaukee Violence Free Zone
NIBRS	National Incident-Based Reporting System
NLY	New Life for Youth (Richmond)
NMB	North Miami Beach
NMBSHS	North Miami Beach High School (North Miami Beach)

NMBPD	North Miami Beach Police Department (North Miami Beach)
NMMS	North Miami Middle School (North Miami Beach)
NMSHS	North Miami High School (North Miami Beach)
NMPD	North Miami Police Department (North Miami Beach)
NNO	National Night Out
NYGC	National Youth Gang Center
NYGS	National Youth Gang Survey
OAG	Virginia Office of the Attorney General (Richmond)
OJA	Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance (Milwaukee)
OJJDP	Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (U.S. Department of Justice)
OJP	Office of Justice Programs (U.S. Department of Justice)
OJT	On-the-Job Training (North Miami Beach)
PAL	Police Activities League (Los Angeles)
PAU	Public Affairs Unit (Richmond)
PET	Police Eliminating Truancy (North Miami Beach)
PIC	Private Industry Council (Milwaukee)
PSN	Project Safe Neighborhoods
RCAC	Richmond Career Advancement Center (Richmond)
RCSO	Richmond City Sheriff's Office (Richmond)
RFP	Request for Proposals
RHS	Roosevelt High School (Los Angeles)
RIS	Refugee and Immigration Services (Richmond)
RMS	Records Management System
ROC	Richmond Outreach Center (Richmond)
RPD	Richmond Police Department (Richmond)
RTC	Richmond Technical Center (Richmond)
SACI	Spanish Academy and Cultural Institute (Richmond)
SRO	School Resource Officer

SSL	Spanish as a Second Language (Richmond)
SVORI	Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative
TABS	Truancy Abatement Burglary Suppression (Milwaukee)
TANF	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
TSP	The Story Project (Los Angeles)
UCR	Uniform Crime Reporting System
UI	Urban Institute
UP	Uleta Park (North Miami Beach)
USAO	U.S. Attorney's Office
VCU	Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond)
VGIA	Virginia Gang Investigators Association (Richmond)
VHI	Virginia Health Information, Inc. (Richmond)
VNE	Varrio Nuevo Estrada (Los Angeles)
VP	Victory Park (North Miami Beach)
WIA	Workforce Investment Act (Milwaukee)
WP	Washington Park (North Miami Beach)
YEP	Youth Empowerment Program (North Miami Beach)
YO!	Youth Opportunity Movement (Los Angeles)

Executive Summary

This report presents the interim findings of the Urban Institute's (UI) implementation process and outcome evaluation of the GRP. The GRP is a $10 million, multi-year initiative sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to reduce crime associated with youth street gangs in four U.S. cities: Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; North Miami Beach, Florida; and Richmond, Virginia.

UI is conducting an independent evaluation of the GRP implementation process and its outcomes in each of the four cities. This report represents an interim presentation of results even while the GRP continued operation in three of the four sites beyond the period covered here. The implementation process component of the evaluation summarizes the progress of the initiative in each site from its launch in the spring of 2003 through mid to late 2007. The outcomes component of the evaluation considers the effects of the GRP in each site over nearly the same time period (through early 2007 in most cases), and examines whether each site experienced significant changes in relevant indicators (e.g., youth gang crime) that might be attributed to GRP. The report thus documents the:

- Strategic planning process for each of the four sites;
- Implementation of strategic plans and site fidelity to strategic plans;
- Nature of the collaboration between partners and how it changed over time;
- Obstacles and successes associated with the GRP implementation process;
- Preliminary findings on the effects of GRP in each site; and
- Cross-site lessons on implementation of OJJDP's GRP model and the preliminary outcomes in each site.

In late 2007, after the period covered in this report, the evaluation was on-going; the findings presented here should thus be read as preliminary.

Implementation process data have been collected through direct observations of GRP planning activities, collection and review of relevant documents from each site, and interviews with GRP coordinators, steering and subcommittee members, and local stakeholders. A variety of community-level outcome measures were collected in each site, with data from local police departments forming the central element of the outcome analysis. The following summarizes key findings regarding the implementation process and preliminary outcomes across all four sites.

The brief strategic planning process was the first major challenge faced by all sites. The short time allowed for Phase I planning permitted the implementation of some activities,

but these were generally extensions of programs already in place. In all sites, much or most of Phase I was actually devoted to further problem identification and information gathering in an effort to understand the nature of local problems, resources, and relevant evidence-based practices.

Much of the progress achieved to date at each of the sites is attributable to the leadership of each site's coordinator. Coordinators, however, would have benefited from more direction and technical assistance on organizing local efforts. Sites independently developed similar organizational designs: steering committees (termed 'advisory' in Los Angeles) representing broad community interests. Coordinators relied on steering committees for management and decision-making support. The inclusive committees were a mixed blessing: while they represented diverse interests related to gang reduction, some participating organizations expected to secure substantial funding from GRP, and disrupted planning and implementation because of individual agency priorities rather than participating to fulfill the mission of GRP. Early in the process, competition for funds, political infighting, and unrealistic expectations had occasional negative effects on collaboration, communication, and committee functioning. These effects diminished over time.

Substantial variation in the levels of collaboration and communication existed. Stakeholders focused on suppression efforts, especially in Los Angeles and Richmond, seemed to function more collaboratively and effectively because of prior experience working together. Where functioning was more problematic, member attrition and turnover was more prevalent. However, over the course of implementation, collaboration improved, as did local committee functioning.

Conforming to strict procurement rules had negative effects on implementation. The time required to get programs up and running in target communities was longer than anyone anticipated. Also, some capable providers with little experience in the competitive bidding process were disqualified due to missed deadlines or submission of incomplete applications. In other cases, complicated application procedures discouraged providers from applying.

Significant implementation successes were observed in all sites. Sites developed strategic plans approved by OJJDP and consistent with target area needs and problems; local governance and communication have steadily improved and partnerships among members have developed; coordinator outreach resulted in a broad participation in GRP planning and implementation; a significant number of specific programmatic activities across all GRP components were operational by late 2007; and GRP has improved communication about gang issues within the target areas and among participating organizations.

The findings on the effects of GRP in each site were mixed. The results revealed that only one site, Los Angeles, showed a significant reduction in crime levels, with serious violence, gang related incidents, gang-related serious violence, and citizen reports of shots fired all decreasing after the implementation of GRP there. Smaller drops in those measures were found in the comparison area, and no evidence of displacement was identified. In Milwaukee and North Miami Beach, no significant changes in the measures were found after GRP implementation, and in Richmond, the period after implementation actually saw a modest increase in serious violence and gang-related measures. While the comparison area in Richmond also saw increases in two of the measures, those increases were to a smaller degree than in the target area. Increased crime awareness and reporting of gang

crimes among target area residents may help to explain the unexpected increases in some crime measures that were found in Richmond.

While very little strategic planning for sustainability had taken place at any of the four sites at the time of the previous report in 2006, by late 2007, three of the four sites had undertaken significant steps towards sustaining at least portions of the initiative beyond the federal funding period. In Los Angeles, the GRP model was implemented city-wide with local funding and termed the 'Gang Reduction Zone Program.' In North Miami Beach, after struggling to find a government-based fiscal agent to sustain the partnership, the initiative was incorporated as a non-profit organization in late 2007. In Richmond, the close relationship that developed between the Virginia Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and the Richmond Police Department (RPD) through the GRP effort had ensured that a significant portion of the efforts undertaken by the RPD would be sustained, and the OAG was also planning an expansion of the model into other parts of the city.

Part I

Gang Reduction Program and Its Evaluation

Chapter 1

The Gang Problem in the United States

1.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT

This report presents the interim findings of the Urban Institute's (UI) implementation process and outcome evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program (GRP). The GRP is a $10 million, multi-year initiative sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to reduce crime associated with youth street gangs in four U.S. cities: Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; North Miami Beach, Florida; and Richmond, Virginia.

UI is conducting an independent evaluation of GRP implementation and outcomes in each of the four cities. This report represents an interim presentation of results even while the GRP continued operation in three of the four sites beyond the period covered here. The implementation process component of the evaluation summarizes the progress of the initiative in each site from its launch in the spring of 2003 through mid to late 2007. The outcomes component of the evaluation considers the effects of the GRP in each site over nearly the same time period (through early 2007 in most cases), and examines whether each site experienced significant changes in relevant indicators (e.g., youth gang crime) that might be attributed to GRP. In late 2007, after the period covered in this report, the evaluation was on-going; the findings presented here should thus be read as preliminary. The following chapters present an overview of the gang problem in the United States, the history and development of the GRP, and the evaluation design. The evaluation findings for each site presented afterwards, as are cross site conclusions.

1.2. GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES

Youth gangs have existed in various forms since at least the 19th century, though the nature and extent of their activity has fluctuated over time. The last 25 years in particular, however, have seen a rapid expansion of gangs and, in response, increased concern about the gang problem on the part of federal, state and local policymakers and criminal justice practitioners, as well as the population at large. This heightened concern stems in part from the more violent, widespread, and entrenched nature of the current gang problem as compared with previous cycles of gang activity.

Table 1.1: Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting a Gang Problem

	Cities by population					Counties by type	
Year	>250K	100K–250K	50K–100K	25K–50K	2500–25K	Suburban	Rural
2001	100%	85%	65%	44%	20%	35%	11%
2002–03	100%	92%	75%	33%[1]		44%	15%

[1] This figure is for cities with populations between 2,500 and 50,000.
Source: NYGS 2001, 2002, and 2003 (Egley and Major, 2004; Egley, 2005).

Based on National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS) data, an annual survey of law enforcement agencies across the country, researchers estimate that in 2002 there were 21,500 gangs and 731,500 gang members active in the United States. In addition, the OJJDP reports that between 14 and 30 percent of adolescents will join a gang at some point (Howell, 1997). And some adolescents are joining gangs at an early age; a 1995 survey conducted in 11 diverse cities found that 9 percent of eighth-graders were currently gang members, and 17 percent of those surveyed reported having belonged to a gang at some time (Esbensen and Osgood, 1997).

Recent data from the NYGS show that youth gangs are a problem in communities of all sizes.[1] In 2001, 2002, and 2003, every law enforcement agency serving a major city (population greater than 250,000) that responded to the NYGS reported a gang problem (see Table 1.1). In those same years, 65 to 92 percent of agencies in medium-sized cities (with populations between 50,000 and 250,000) reported having a problem with gangs. A smaller but still significant portion of small cities and suburban and rural counties also reported gang problems during these years (Egley, 2002; Egley and Major, 2004).

1.3. HISTORY AND PREVALENCE OF GANGS IN AMERICA

The United States has experienced four distinct periods of gang growth: the late nineteenth century, the 1920's, the 1960's, and the late twentieth century. During the first three periods, gang activity remained largely local and disorganized, as children of recent immigrants congregated to engage in illicit activities only to disband without substantial intervention from the criminal justice systems or social service agencies. However, beginning in 1980, America experienced an unprecedented expansion of gang activity. While there is no consensus on the exact cause of the gang explosion in the 1980s, proposed explanations include the crack-cocaine boom, economic transformations that limited opportunities for urban youth, broken homes, gang migration and alliances, and the media glamorization of gangs (Howell, 1998; Miller, 2001).

Although gangs had plagued American cities for at least 100 years prior, the first attempt at estimating their size did not occur until 1975. Miller's study of 12 U.S. cities identified between 760 and 2,700 gangs and 28,500 to 81,500 gang members operating in six 'gang problem cities'; more than 30 percent of the gangs identified were located in California (Miller, 1975). In the next five years, the presence of gangs and gang violence in U.S. urban areas began to rapidly expand. There were an estimated 2,000 gangs and 100,000 gang members in 1980; by 1995, the NYGC (1997) estimated a national total of 23,388 youth gangs and 664,906 gang members. The estimates for 2002 reported by Egley and Major

[1]The NYGS is conducted by the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC), and was first administered in 1995. Survey data from the past 10 years can be found on the NYGC web site at http://www.iir.com/nygc/PublicationLinks.htm#Surveys.

(2004) set the number of gangs at nearly the same level—21,500—but they estimated a larger number of gang members, at 731,500. The most recent trends in the NYGS data show that nationally, the estimated number of gang members decreased 14 percent between 1996 and 2002, and the number of jurisdictions with gang problems decreased 32 percent during that same period, with smaller cities and rural areas accounting for most of the decline (Egley and Major, 2004).

The most extensive and entrenched gang activity is situated in large cities. Researchers noted after the 2001 NYGS that cities with more than 100,000 residents consistently reported greater numbers of gang members over the years the survey had been conducted (Egley and Major, 2004). However, in the 1990s, the problem expanded to smaller cities, suburbs, and even rural areas. Gangs in these areas appear to be primarily homegrown, rather than an expansion of existing urban gangs (Maxson, 1998). In addition, some evidence indicates that gangs are qualitatively different in areas where gang problems are more recent—gang members are younger and more likely to be Caucasian, and gangs are less likely to be involved in organized drug distribution and violent crime. It is possible, however, that the lower level of criminality among these gangs can be attributed to their relative newness, and that over time they will engage in more serious crime (Howell, Egley, and Gleason, 2002).

1.4. GANGS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

Although many teenagers exhibit problematic behaviors, including violence (White and Mason, 2006), research has consistently shown that, compared with other youth, gang members are more involved in delinquent behavior as well as serious and violent crime. One longitudinal study in Denver revealed that gang members reported two to three times as much delinquency as non-gang members,[2] often in the form of fighting with other gangs, but did not differ in their commitment to delinquent peers or their commitment to positive peers (Esbensen and Weiher, 1993). Other longitudinal research on gang populations has found similar results, such as the Seattle Social Development Project, which determined that gang membership increases delinquent involvement even after controlling for the influence of delinquent friends (Battin, Hill, Abbott, Catalano, and Hawkins, 1998). Another pivotal longitudinal study tracking 4,000 young people in Rochester, New York across almost 10 years found that 30 percent of the sample joined a gang at some point before the end of high school. The gang-involved youth, about a third of the sample, accounted for the vast share of self-reported delinquency committed—65 percent of the delinquent acts, 86 percent of the serious delinquent acts, 69 percent of the violent delinquent acts, 70 percent of the drug sales, and 63 percent of the reported drug use. In addition, compared with youth who never joined a gang, the gang members were significantly more likely to drop out of school, become teenage parents, and have unstable employment (Browning, Thornberry, and Porter, 1999; Thornberry and Burch, 1997; Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 2004).

Importantly, the subjects who were gang members had higher rates of delinquency, especially violence, drug sales, and illegal gun possession, during the years they belonged to gangs than during the years they did not (Thornberry et al., 2004). Related findings from a Cleveland, Ohio study showed that gang-involved youth were more likely to

[2]The comparison group comprised other youth involved in serious street level offending.

commit a range of crimes than were other at-risk youth not involved with gangs (Huff, 1998). Interviews with high school students in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Diego also revealed that gang members, both male and female, committed more delinquent acts and serious offenses than did non-gang members (Fagan, 1989). These studies offer several conclusions about the relationship between gang membership and crime. Gang membership increases the level of criminal and delinquent behavior on the part of its members. That is, while individuals are in gangs, their level of criminality increases compared to the period of time before they joined the gang. Equally important, the level of criminality declines once an individual leaves the gang. This reinforces the conclusion that the gang itself contributes to levels of crime, not just that gangs attract individuals already involved in crime. The group context of gang behavior provides support and opportunities for members to engage in more illegal behavior as well as more serious illegal behavior. According to Thornberry et al. (2004), the connection between gangs and delinquency is not simply a matter of gangs attracting the most delinquent youth, but rather the reality that "[t]he social processes of being an active gang member clearly facilitate or enhance involvement in delinquent behavior" (Thornberry et al., 2004, p. 10).

While such group context models provide more support for gang members' increased criminality than do so-called 'kind of person' models, certain types of individuals nonetheless experience a greater risk of becoming involved in gang activity. These individuals are often characterized by low self-esteem, depression, early sexual activity, certain antisocial beliefs and behaviors (e.g., hyperactivity, aggression, tolerance for deviance), exposure to a significant number of serious negative life events, and, most importantly, early drug and alcohol use and delinquency—especially violent delinquency (Browning et al., 1999; Esbensen, 2000; Hill, Lui, and Hawkins, 2001; Howell, 1998; Thornberry, 2001; Thornberry et al., 2004). Low levels of commitment and attachment to school and teachers, poor school performance, and low expectations for educational success have also been linked to gang involvement. Youths are more likely to join gangs if they come from families that are poor, are structurally unstable, lack parental supervision, have low levels of communication between parents and children, or are dysfunctional in certain other ways (e.g., parents are accepting of violence and exhibit low levels of attachment to children, siblings exhibit antisocial behavior).

Exposure to criminality may also put youth at risk for joining a gang. Association with delinquent peers and a history of gang activity in the family both have been shown to predict later gang membership. One study determined that formal criminal intervention and dealings with the juvenile justice system may cause youth to identify with deviance and become involved in deviant social groups, namely street gangs and delinquent peers (Bernburg and Rivera, 2006).

Risk factors for gang involvement tend to cluster within disadvantaged communities. Poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and overall economic isolation and lack of opportunity are commonly blamed for the emergence of gangs. Explanations for the high prevalence of gangs in minority communities include racism, political exclusion, and social marginalization. Further analysis suggests that African-American gang involvement is associated with exposure to gang members, while Latino gang involvement was associated with psychological variables and school peer groups (Curry and Spergel, 1992). Research has also shown that social disorganization, neighborhood violence, and local availability of drugs can encourage the growth of gangs (Esbensen, 2000; Hill et al., 2001; Howell,

1998; Thornberry, 2001). It is important to remember, as Esbensen (2000) points out, that the dynamics of gang environments are much more variable than stereotypes would lead us to believe, and many gangs are not located in poor, minority neighborhoods.

This clustering of individuals at risk for gang involvement often translates into community-wide problems. For example, a study of school crime found that a student who attended a school where gangs were present was more likely to have been physically attacked or been a victim of theft at school, including theft by force or threat, in the previous six months (Howell and Lynch, 2000). The NYGS reveals that a significant portion of participating law enforcement agencies reported at least one gang-related homicide from 1999 to 2000. This was true in 32 percent of cities with a population between 25,000 and 50,000, 55 percent of cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000, and 64 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and 250,000 (Egley, 2002).[3] In the two cities with indisputably the most serious gang homicide problems—Los Angeles and Chicago—more than half of all homicides in 2001 and 2002 were reported to be gang-related (Egley and Major, 2004). Gang-related homicides are heavily influenced by the ethnic composition of the community (Curry and Spergel, 1988) and tend to involve minority males whose crime involves the use of firearms in a public place and with a large number of participants (Maxson and Klein, 1985).

Although empirical research suggests incidents of gang violence are more often related to turf disputes than to drugs (Block and Block, 1993), the presence of gangs within a community will also likely increase drug-related activities, particularly drug sales. The nature of this association has come under debate within the research community. Some scholars argue that street gangs represent well-organized distributors of illegal drugs whose profits allow them to engage in increased gang activity; such gangs are described as formal-rational organizations with a leadership structure, roles, rules, common goals, and control over members. In order to effectively control drug sales, gangs should possess an organizational structure involving roles, rules and a hierarchy of leaders; forward group goals that all members endorse; promote stronger allegiance to the larger organization than to subgroups within it; and control and discipline members to produce compliance with group goals.

The image of gangs as well-organized groups sharing common goals in the sale of drugs stands in stark contrast to the alternative claim that street-level drug sales by gangs are seldom well-organized or cohesive; instead, drug sales represent the activities of individual gang members often acting independently of their allegiances. Researchers such as Klein and Cunningham (1991) and Reiner (1992) argue that gangs lack the organizational structure and commitment to common goals to be successful in drug sales. In his extensive report, Reiner (1992) (at the time, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County) observed that gangs in Los Angeles did not control drug sales because they were disorganized and had a loosely confederated structure. He found that traditional street gangs were not well suited for drug distribution or any other business-like activity and that they were weakly organized, prone to unnecessary and unproductive violence, and full of brash, conspicuous, and untrustworthy individuals who drew unwanted police attention. Indeed, one of the most difficult issues in studying gangs is distinguishing between the activities of individual gang members and those of the gang. Individual gang members often act indi-

[3] It should be noted that criteria for designating a homicide "gang-related" vary widely across law enforcement agencies.

vidually or in subgroups outside their gangs, a distinction that applies to the non-criminal and criminal activities of gang members, including drug sales.

1.5. TARGETING GANG CRIME AND VIOLENCE

American communities have been exploring ways to combat gangs and gang violence since at least the 1920's. The few documented gang-related programs of the early 20th century focused primarily on preventing gangs by changing community conditions. Emphasis then shifted to community-based interventions, with outreach workers working directly with gang members to empower them to leave gang life. In the 1980s and early 1990s, suppression and law enforcement-based strategies predominated. A range of approaches are now in use, though comprehensive, integrated programs like the GRP have become particularly popular in the last ten years (Howell, 2000).

Anti-gang programs have been created and implemented by a range of different actors, including local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies; prosecutors; legislators; grassroots community groups; schools; nonprofit organizations; churches and faith organizations; social workers; parole and probation officers; community members; local community leaders; and businesses. Although some anti-gang activities are associated with specific organizations (e.g., suppression is associated primarily with law enforcement), in other cases, several different types of organizations may have the capability to implement certain strategies. For example, intervention efforts aimed at gang members may be conducted by outreach workers organized by a grassroots community group or by community police officers that work in gang neighborhoods and have extensive contact with gang members. That is, just as programs often combine multiple approaches, they frequently involve several different organizations in a community.

Gang-related programs designed to target the underlying causes of gang violence typically fall into one of four major types:

Primary prevention efforts focus on an entire community, attempting to change the underlying conditions in the community and among its residents that lead to gang formation and gang involvement.

Secondary prevention efforts specifically target at-risk youth and aim to prevent these youth from joining gangs.

Intervention efforts are directed at persuading and empowering current gang members to leave gang life.

Suppression efforts use legal and social control mechanisms to disrupt and reduce gang activity and crime and get gang members off the streets.

Primary and secondary prevention activities work to prevent youth from joining gangs, and are aimed at both the general population of youth and more specifically at the population of youth at risk of joining a gang. Prevention activities are widely varied but usually focus on providing recreational opportunities or educational assistance. Life skills lessons are also commonly integrated into prevention programs (Esbensen, 2000). Many prevention programs are provided in school-based settings, allowing them to reach a wide

audience of youth, though many programs also seek to occupy youths' out-of-school time when opportunities for delinquent behavior may be more prevalent.

Common intervention activities target active gang members, with the aim of empowering and persuading them to leave gangs or reducing the violence and criminality of the gang lifestyle. Some examples of intervention programs include street outreach work conducted by 'detached workers;' models of outreach that involve extensive mentoring and supervision of gang youth; crisis interventions that focus on violent incidents and their immediate aftermath in order to disrupt further cycles of violence; job programs to provide gang members with concrete job opportunities; and gang summits and truces aimed at calming gang feuds (Howell, 2000).

Another aspect of intervention activities includes assisting former gang members in community reentry from prison. According to the 2001 NYGS, 63 percent of law enforcement agencies that reported a gang problem in their jurisdiction also reported the presence of gang members returning from confinement to their area. Almost 70 percent of the agencies that reported returning gang members believed that these gang members considerably affected local gang problems, most notably by increasing drug trafficking and violent crime. In addition, a third of these agencies reported a lack of community programs to support returning gang members (Egley and Major, 2004). Although researchers and practitioners agree that reentering gang members significantly impact local gang problems, the GRP is one of the few gang programs to explicitly target this population.

A range of strategies for suppressing gang activity have also been implemented in various parts of the criminal justice system, with varying degrees of success. Police have created special gang units for surveillance and investigation, saturated targeted areas and conducted sweeps, and strategically deployed resources to get the most dangerous gang members off the streets in whatever way possible. Legislators have enhanced criminal sanctions for gang-affiliated crimes and passed statutes to limit gang-related activity, such as loitering or flashing gang signs. Prosecutors have reorganized and targeted their work through techniques like vertical prosecution, where the same prosecutor handles a case through the entire court process, from the initial filing to the final disposition. Collaboration across government levels (federal, state, local) and criminal justice divisions (police, probation officers, prosecutors) has become commonplace (Esbensen, 2000; Howell, 2000).

Each type of programming incorporates a variety of activities targeted at different youth; for example, secondary prevention activities include channeling at-risk youth into positive activities, such as after-school programs, as well as providing individual counseling for targeted youth. The Pyramid of Delinquent Behavior (see Figure 1.1) graphically depicts the different types of youth at which anti-gang activities direct their efforts.[4] The base of the pyramid encompasses the youth and families living in high risk areas and represents the largest number of youth as a relative share of the population; this group benefits from general prevention activities. Similarly, the smallest group of youth represents serious and chronic offenders (often gang leaders) who need suppression-oriented programs. Recent approaches, like the GRP, combine a variety of program activities across a range of programming types, from primary prevention to suppression, to address several facets of young people's lives (Hill et al., 2001). This comprehensive response derives in part from recent findings that the more risk factors present in a youth's life, the more likely he or she is to join a gang.

Evaluations of the impact of gang-reduction activities suggest mixed results. A meta-

[4]The pyramid was developed by Phelan Wyrick, Ph.D., National Institute of Justice.

analysis of intervention programs for serious juvenile offenders conducted by Lipsey, Wilson, and Cothern (2000) found that the programs with the most consistently positive effects were individual counseling, behavioral programs, and interpersonal skills programs, followed by restitution programs for those on parole/probation and programs that delivered multiple services. For example, treatment programs for serious juvenile offenders demonstrated some success at rehabilitation (Cullen, 2005; Lipsey et al., 2000). Wilderness/challenge, vocational, and deterrence programs produced consistently weak results.

Figure 1.1: Pyramid of Delinquent Involvement



Other programs, such as employment related and academic programs, advocacy and social casework, group counseling, and family counseling, presented mixed or ambiguous results. Howell (2000) determined that programs providing gang members with jobs and legitimate sources of income were, in fact, highly effective in encouraging some participants to leave gangs. On the other hand, evaluations have shown that the popular detached worker programs of the 1940s and 1950s actually increased gang cohesion and crime because they provided group activities for gang members and worked to maintain gang networks (hoping to turn them into a pro-social force) instead of breaking down relationships among gang members (Howell, 2000). The Ladino Hills Project in Los Angeles involved individual rather than group outreach and appeared effective until the program ended (Howell, 2000). These results suggest that while interventions strongly impact individual gang members, it is difficult in the long run to alter the underlying structures that promote the existence of gangs.

Few studies have examined successful programs for reentering gang members. Research by the UI over the past several years has shown that the most important needs of returning prisoners are full-time, well-paid employment and family support. Other challenges prisoners face upon release include finding stable, safe, affordable housing; avoiding trouble in their old neighborhoods; and staying drug and alcohol free (Urban Institute, 2005). Fleisher and Decker (2001) suggest that gangs may fulfill ex-prisoners' needs for social support and economic opportunity when communities cannot and recommend programs that will address these needs to mitigate the need for gang involvement. These potential programs include easily accessible drug and alcohol treatment, programs linking ex-prisoners to jobs, long-term economic improvement of neighborhoods, community residential facilities to centralize services and provide support networks, community-based parole offices that put parole officers in closer contact with parolees, and increased communication between corrections officials and communities.

Unfortunately, most evaluations of suppression programs have been limited to individual programs taking place in specific contexts, making it difficult to determine the

long-term viability of suppression as a strategy (Decker, 2002). There is a consensus, even among those within the criminal justice system, that suppression should not be a community's only gang-reduction strategy (Esbensen, 2000; Howell, 2000; McGloin, 2005). A survey conducted by Irving Spergel and his colleagues in the early 1990s found that law enforcement respondents perceived suppression strategies to be less effective than attempts to increase opportunities through education and job training (Decker, 2002; Howell, 2000). Another survey found that the majority of prosecutors believe that, in addition to their own anti-gang efforts, prevention and intervention are necessary to successfully combat gangs (Johnson, Webster, and Connors, 1995).

1.6. THE SPERGEL MODEL AND COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

The Spergel model, based on a national assessment of gang problems and a review of promising programs and interventions by Irving Spergel and his colleagues, represents a comprehensive intervention model for reducing and preventing gang activity at the local level (Spergel, Chance, Ehrensaft, Regulus, Kane, Laseter, Alexander, and Oh, 1994b). Also referred to as the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model, this model grew from the observation that gang problems result from a complex interplay of sociological, demographic, economic, cultural, and policy factors, chief among them social instability and lack of economic opportunities. At its heart, the Spergel model focuses on individual youth, providing them an individually tailored mix of support services and suppression/control in order to create "an integrated world of real opportunity, social support, and constraints" (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, Barrios, and Spergel, 2004b). Addressing the needs of individual youth necessarily entails making changes in the families, organizations, and communities around them.

Since disorganized and inadequate response efforts tend to exacerbate the problem, the solution, then, lies in a comprehensive, coordinated, targeted response by a network of local agencies and organizations, including police, parole/probation officers, the court and correctional systems, schools, service agencies, community-based youth agencies, employment agencies, employers, grassroots community organizations, local leaders and the community as a whole (Helping America's Youth, n.d.; OJJDP, 2002; Spergel, Chance, Ehrensaft, Regulus, Kane, Laseter, Alexander, and Oh, 1994a; Spergel et al., 2004b). The development and implementation of the Spergel model should be coordinated and directed by a steering committee composed of community leaders and staff of participating organizations, and a lead agency designated to manage the process on a day-to-day basis.

The first step in the model asks the community and its leaders to acknowledge that a gang problem exists. The stakeholders, led by the steering committee, must then assess the nature and extent of the gang problem in their area and determine which gangs and causal factors should be targeted. After examining available resources and creating a set of goals specifically related to the targeted area, the team must design and develop a range of policies and programs that strengthen existing resources while creating new ones. During implementation, actors must work collectively, coordinate activities, and be in constant communication in order to succeed (Esbensen, 2000; OJJDP, 2002; Spergel et al., 2004b).

The five intervention strategies at the core of the Spergel model (as seen in Figure 1.2) represent those that Spergel and his research team identified in cities with demonstrated success at combating gangs.

Suppression, the most common approach to combating gangs, includes law enforcement and criminal justice interventions like arrest, imprisonment, and monitoring, as well as formal and informal methods of behavior control by community agencies, families, and community social networks. *Social intervention* by a street outreach team, in collaboration with other organizations, provides gang members and other at-risk youth with an individually tailored combination of services. The provision of employment, educational, and other social *opportunities* is an important part of this intervention process. The Spergel model is unique in that prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts are coordinated. For example, when a youth gets into trouble, law enforcement may work with the street outreach team to determine the most appropriate response for that youth at that point in time. In addition to being more effective, this approach balances the need to hold offenders accountable and to keep the community safe with the belief that youth deserve a chance to change.

Figure 1.2: Spergel Model: Five Strategies for Responding to Gangs

The two other strategies in the Spergel model focus on the organizations and agencies that implement the first three strategies. *Community organization* is crucial; a wide collection of community members, grassroots organizations, and established agencies must be involved in planning and implementing the range of program activities. The implementation of program strategies usually requires some degree of *organizational change and development*. In order to better address gang problems in their communities, organizations must develop policies and procedures that build capacity, allow the most effective use of resources, facilitate collaboration and communication with other actors, and take into consideration the needs, concerns and culture of local residents and youth in particular (Burch and Kane, 1999; Helping America's Youth, n.d.; Howell, 2000; OJJDP, 2002; Spergel et al., 2004b).

The model was first tested through the Gang Violence Reduction Project in the Little Village area of Chicago from 1992 to 1997. Results from this initial implementation proved promising, with program youth showing a greater reduction in arrests, including drug and violence arrests, than comparison youth[5]. This early success led the OJJDP to fund four- and five-year demonstrations of this model in five cities: Bloomington-Normal, Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California. Spergel and his team monitored the implementation and outcomes of the Comprehensive Gang Model at the five sites and found the program was particularly effective with serious offenders (Spergel and Wa, 2000, Aug).

Of the five sites, Riverside and Mesa demonstrated the most successful implementation of the model. In Mesa, although not all elements of the model were successfully incorporated, the program employed a collaborative, team-based case management ap-

[5]These results were statistically significant and controlled for differences between the program and comparison groups.

proach involving a variety of actors and a wide range of intervention and control services (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, Kane, Barrios, and Spergel, 2002). In Riverside, after the initial attempt to implement the model failed, the project team reconvened two years later to create a new working strategy consistent with the key elements of the Spergel model. The strategy gained commitment and involvement from a variety of stakeholders; and, overall, achieved "probably the greatest measure of positive change and positive development" of the five sites (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, Son, Barrios, and Spergel, 2003). In both Riverside and Mesa, program youth showed a greater reduction in arrests and self-reported offenses in many offense categories than did comparison youth. Interestingly, these patterns held true for program youth regardless of their gang involvement, suggesting that the program was effective for delinquent youth in general, not just those involved in gangs. In Mesa, the total incidence of youth-associated crimes (violence, property crimes, drug crime, and status offenses) declined 10 percent more in the program area than in the average of three comparison areas. Local leaders and agency staff in Riverside perceived significant reductions in gang violence, although they reported less progress in reducing the gang drug problem (Spergel et al., 2002, 2003).

The programs in Tucson, Bloomington, and San Antonio, on the other hand, saw no statistically significant differences in arrests or self-reported offenses between program and comparison youth. Tucson and San Antonio demonstrated no reduction in gang crime in the program area relative to comparison areas. In Bloomington, gang incidents and gang and non-gang arrest rates showed less of an increase in the program area than in the comparison area, one of the few promising findings.

Spergel and his research team attributed a large portion of the disappointing outcomes in these three sites to poor implementation of both the Spergel model and the comprehensive approach in general. Sites failed to establish ongoing cross-organizational collaborations and to implement all elements of the model. Further, one or two organizations or types of activities would often dominate the project, thereby limiting the range of program activities available. Without the collaborative team approach, prevention, intervention and suppression strategies could not be tailored for individual youth and community characteristics (Spergel, Wa, Sosa, Perez, Purnell, Jacob, Kane, Park, Chen, Ibarra, Barrios, and Spergel, 2001; Spergel, Wa, Sosa, Barrios, and Spergel, 2004a; Spergel et al., 2004b). In summary, three out of five sites failed to implement the model, one had partial success, and the other site (Riverside) succeeded after an initial failure to implement the model. These results suggest the difficulty in successfully implementing the Spergel model, even with significant training, technical assistance, and support, much of it from Spergel or members of his immediate team.

In 1995, the SafeFutures program, built on the Spergel model, began. OJJDP provided funding to six SafeFutures sites: Seattle, Washington; St. Louis, Missouri; Boston, Massachusetts; Fort Belknap, North Dakota; Contra Costa County, California; and Imperial Valley, California. A multi-year funding commitment was made to each of these sites, with funding reaching as much as $7 million over the entire program period. Again, considerable training, technical assistance and support were made available to each site. Sites were directed to spend a considerable amount of time in the planning and assessment phases of their project, in order to better understand the nature of their gang problem and more successfully craft responses. Evaluation results are available for only one of the sites (St. Louis) where the final report (Decker, Curry, Egley, Baumer, Weldle, and Bossler, 2002)

notes that the program was never successfully implemented, multiple services were rarely provided to program participants, and that controls who did not receive program services had fewer court referrals and police contacts than did those youth who received the program services. These results provide more evidence of the substantial implementation challenges associated with the Spergel model.

In response to these problems, Curry (2007) identified five key elements necessary for successful implementation of the Spergel model:

1. Key group participation, including police, probation, outreach youth workers, and grass roots organizations;
2. Detailed records of service delivery;
3. Collaboration across agencies, including sharing of cases and providing multiple services to youth;
4. A balanced approach between suppression and other forms of intervention; and
5. Project leadership.

1.7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Gangs, gang members and gang crime have grown dramatically since 1980, spreading to small towns and cities all across America. Research has demonstrated the relationship between gang involvement and increased criminality, as youth involved in gangs engage in more serious and more frequent criminal activity than they did before joining a gang and after leaving a gang. A number of risk factors, including individual, family and community factors, increase the likelihood of gang involvement. While gang intervention programs have traditionally addressed these myriad risks through primary prevention and secondary prevention, intervention, or suppression activities, recent approaches have employed more comprehensive strategies. These strategies incorporate several different efforts into a flexible model for organized gang interventions. Evaluations of such programs have suggested that this model is particularly difficult to implement; nonetheless, growing attention has been placed on such models and the need for extensive and timely evaluations of comprehensive gang reduction models is great. The following chapters discuss in more detail the design of OJJDP's GRP, its implementation, and UI's evaluation strategies.

Chapter 2

The OJJDP Gang Reduction Program

2.1. ORIGINS

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2003 (Public Law 108-7) called for the provision of $10 million from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of gang-related crime and drug offenses in public housing and federally assisted low-income housing. The U.S. DOJ, through discussions with U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAOs), the OJJDP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), as well as a number of faith-based and other organizations, selected a number of cities where drug and violent crime activities in public housing areas might be targeted.

This preliminary list was narrowed to four potential implementation locations: Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; North Miami Beach, Florida; and Richmond, Virginia. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) initiated the development of plans to implement this initiative by soliciting programmatic suggestions from a variety of federal agencies with expertise in gang-related violent crime. Preliminary approaches suggested for these cities are summarized in Table 2.1. The Nurse-Family Partnership Program was recommended for all four locations. This program was developed 25 years ago and was subsequently expanded to 270 cities in 23 states. Through this program, nurses conduct home visits and help first-time mothers to improve birth outcomes, learn to care competently for their newborn children, and develop family economic self-sufficiency by planning subsequent pregnancies, reaching educational goals, and finding work. This is accomplished through weekly nurse visits to mothers who voluntarily enroll in the program during the first month of pregnancy, followed by weekly or biweekly visits after the child is born until the child is 20 months old, after which monthly visits occur until the child reaches the age of two.

A Truancy Court Program was also recommended. This program is designed to refer parents and truant youth to a specialized local truancy court to appear before a judge or hearing master. The judge or hearing master may make recommendations to the family regarding counseling and other strategies to increase school attendance. The court follows up by careful monitoring of school attendance. This program was relatively new and only limited information was available concerning its details. However, it appears that these courts generally target youth 10 to 14 years of age who are at risk of entering the juvenile justice system because of chronic truancy.

Table 2.1: Preliminary Recommendations Submitted to OJP

Study Site	Agency	Recommendation(s)
Los Angeles, CA	DEA	Mobile enforcement team targeting violent gang traffickers in conjunction with LAPD
	FBI	Multi-jurisdictional Task Forces to dismantle gangs operating in public housing
	OJJDP	Nurse-Family partnerships, truancy courts
	USAO	Local-level law enforcement (patrol, hot spot monitoring equipment), outreach, neighborhood restoration, and yet to be specified anti-gang initiatives
North Miami Beach, FL	DEA	Joint investigations task force with Miami-Dade Police targeting the Lincoln Field Gangsters street gang in Liberty City
	OJJDP	Nurse-Family partnerships, truancy courts
Richmond, VA	DEA	Regional Drug Free Alliance outreach to at-risk youths and their parents, concentrated enforcement efforts in cooperation with Richmond Police Department and Richmond Housing Authority
	OJJDP	Nurse-Family partnerships, truancy courts
Milwaukee, WI	OJJDP	Nurse-Family partnerships, truancy courts

Suggestions for law enforcement activities included federally-led (e.g., FBI or DEA) multi-jurisdictional task forces that would emphasize enforcement activities associated with major gang-related drug and crime organizations. Use of these task forces was planned in Los Angeles and North Miami Beach. Enhancement of local law enforcement efforts in North Miami Beach was also proposed.

Finally, outreach and community restoration efforts were recommended for Los Angeles, and the use of the DEA Regional Drug Free Alliance to provide outreach to 9- to 13-year-old youths at risk for substance abuse and their parents was proposed for Richmond. Emphasizing local police and public housing enforcement efforts was also suggested for Richmond.

At the same time these considerations were being explored, OJJDP was developing the new, comprehensive Gang Reduction Program. This approach was being designed to build upon the legacy of past anti-gang initiatives that had been funded through "Part D" of OJJDP's appropriations of $12 million per year for gang prevention and reduction programs. This line-item appropriation was set to expire at the end of the 2003 federal fiscal year. The components of the initial GRP were a series of OJJDP initiatives that were being considered through the budget process at senior levels within OJJDP. As an alternative to cobbling together these individual initiatives, OJJDP staff developed a comprehensive model that integrated the Spergel model of gang interventions, elements of the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) approach (including data-based collaborative planning), and some of the existing prevention line-item programs within OJJDP.

Senior level discussions held between OJJDP and Community Capacity Development Office (CCDO) officials within the OJP revealed there was significant overlap in the approaches to gang violence between the two developing programs. Negotiations ultimately led to the implementation of the GRP framework described below, with program

Figure 2.1: The Gang Reduction Program Framework



administration resting within OJJDP.

2.2. GANG REDUCTION PROGRAM FRAMEWORK

OJJDP's primary goal for the GRP was to reduce gang crime and violence (see Figure 2.1). In order to achieve this goal, OJJDP sought to implement programs in the four sites that were "comprehensive, integrated and coordinated." A *comprehensive* program was defined by OJJDP as one that (1) used the best research-based program components to focus on locally identified risk domains; (2) applied strategies across all appropriate ages; and (3) included approaches that cut across traditional agency boundaries. An *integrated* program was defined as one that (1) identified overlapping and underutilized existing services to meet local needs; (2) identified gaps in services and sought to fill them; and (3) incorporated serving clients at risk across multiple organizations. A *coordinated* program used fiscal and other resources at multiple (federal, state and local) levels as well as private sources (e.g., community-based organizations, volunteers, and local residents) (OJJDP, 2003b).

The GRP was formulated around a multi-pronged implementation framework to achieve OJJDP's goal. This framework called upon local stakeholders to develop their own local plans that addressed family, peer, school and community needs. Next they were to identify local human and financial resources that could be utilized to meet these identified needs. By meeting these planning objectives, it was thought that local communities could then build their capacities with federal support to deliver the appropriate resources and services to meet local needs.

The categories of programmatic approaches initially included in the GRP framework were (1) primary prevention; (2) secondary prevention; (3) intervention; and (4) gang suppression. An example of a *primary prevention* strategy was the provision of a one-stop

service and resource center for health and social services.[1] *Secondary prevention* involved the identification of at-risk youth and the provision of prevention and support services by working closely with families, schools, community and faith-based agencies. *Intervention* focused on aggressive outreach to gang-involved youth by a multi-disciplinary team including probation, law enforcement, schools, mental health agencies, child protective services, and other community organizations. *Suppression* included targeted enforcement and prosecution to remove the most dangerous gang-involved youth from the community as well as instituting graduated sanctions for less serious offenders. A fifth category of programmatic approaches, reentry, was later added prior to the actual implementation of the GRP. *Reentry* programs were to focus on the provision of services and support to gang members who were returning to the targeted communities after being incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities, jails, or prisons. The objective of these programs was to prevent these individuals from returning to their previous gangs and re-engaging in serious crimes.

An important guiding principle for this framework was the idea that the program components were designed to address not only individual needs and risks, but also community-wide factors. The comprehensive, integrated and coordinated program elements were to be applied within a geographically defined and bounded neighborhood in each of the GRP sites. As a result, measurable effects on community outcome indicators, not just effects on gang violence and crime, were anticipated.

2.3. DEMONSTRATION SITE SELECTION

The four initially considered cities, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, North Miami Beach and Richmond, were chosen as the actual GRP demonstration sites by senior management at OJJDP. Selection of these pilot sites was a discretionary decision and was not subject to a competitive solicitation, as many of OJJDP's programs have been historically.

Los Angeles was chosen as one of the demonstration sites due primarily to its long-standing and well-known gang violence problems. In addition, the chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), along with the U.S. Attorney's Office from that federal district, had previously approached OJJDP officials about gaining support in addressing the city's gang violence problems.

A high-profile and well-publicized 2002 murder in Milwaukee brought this city to the attention of OJJDP as a potential demonstration site. Senior officials visited Milwaukee, and after meeting with local officials they were convinced that this incident was indicative of serious gang problems. These officials also felt that local community groups could be quickly mobilized to address gang problems effectively.

Several cities near Washington, D.C., were also considered. Ultimately, Richmond was selected because it had recently recognized its serious gang problems and state and local officials were willing to work with OJJDP on implementing a pilot program.

For geographical balance, OJJDP approached the governor's office in Florida for recommended sites in that state. The area of south Florida in general was recommended, given the recent growth in Haitian and other Hispanic gang violence in that region. Several cities were considered, but North Miami Beach was finally selected for a number of rea-

[1]The one-stop service and resource center was incorporated into GRP demonstration site strategic plans, but was expanded significantly to include services beyond primary prevention.

Figure 2.2: Gang Reduction Program Organization



sons. First, officials there reported a significant Haitian gang violence problem. They were also just starting a Weed and Seed initiative (a federal crime prevention program) in part of the city, which provided the opportunity to co-locate a new Weed and Seed program with the GRP. Evidence of the strong potential for community collaborations was also a consideration in selecting North Miami Beach.

In addition, the target communities of limited geographic area (generally 2 to 5 square miles) were selected for each of the cities prior to program implementation by OJJDP. These small communities within each city were selected because they demonstrated significant program investments—strong indications of citizen involvement—and were areas of substantial gang activity and crime. Where possible, it was hoped that these target areas would also be co-located with other federal crime prevention and intervention programs, such as Weed and Seed, PSN, or Safe Schools/Healthy Students. Two communities within each city were considered as potential target areas based upon local suggestions. Senior OJJDP officials visited these communities and generally deferred to local recommendations on which community to target. In Los Angeles, Boyle Heights was chosen as the target community; Metcalf Park was selected in Milwaukee; the Southside community was chosen in Richmond; and the entire city of North Miami Beach was chosen given its relatively small size.

2.4. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A depiction of the organizational structure of GRP formulated by OJJDP in late 2003 is presented in Figure 2.2.

OJJDP, as the federal administrative funding organization, was designated as the lead agency for the overall management and implementation of the GRP. As such, it has been responsible for approving each site's program plans, budgets and compliance with federal procurement and other regulations. In addition, OJJDP has maintained an active role in planning, program development, and implementation, particularly in the early stages of the initiative. This task has included regular site visits, coordination of individual and across-site planning, as well as information-sharing meetings, guidance to sites on other federal funding sources to supplement the GRP activities, and guidance on the selection of research-based program elements. OJJDP was also responsible for "mapping" other federal initiatives in place for the GRP sites. This has been accomplished through formal and informal partnerships with other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of Education and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, as well as companion agencies within the Office of Justice Programs.

OJJDP also provided funding to the NYGC to serve as OJJDP's training and technical assistance provider to the GRP sites. The NYGC was specifically charged with supporting local needs assessments, implementing local strategic planning processes, identifying research-based program components, training local intervention teams, and providing other on-site technical assistance when needed. Thus, the NYGC was the lead organization on most implementation issues for OJJDP.

The local administration of each of the cooperative agreements was through state agencies in three of the sites and through the Mayor's Office in Los Angeles. Cooperative agreement awards of $2.5 million were made for each site for a three-year period beginning in the fall of 2003. The Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance received the award for the Milwaukee, the Florida Governor's Office of Drug Control was to receive the award for North Miami Beach (this was later changed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)), and the Virginia Attorney's Office received the award for Richmond. Given the size and experience of the Los Angeles Mayor's Office relative to implementation of past initiatives and the sheer size of the state of California, program administration through the Mayor's Office was expected to increase the likelihood of program success.

The choice of state-level fiscal agencies was based upon the perception that such an administrative structure would improve the likelihood of GRP success. Officials believed this approach could minimize local political frays that might otherwise occur over the distribution and use of the substantial grant funds. In addition, GRP was designed as an effort that would bring together support and resources from government agencies at all levels—local, state and federal.

Each of these administrative agencies was to be responsible for fiscal management, progress reporting, monitoring and other administrative requirements, including employment and oversight of a local GRP coordinator and support staff. By locating the program administrator with the fiscal agency, OJJDP officials hypothesized that strong leadership would evolve, resulting in effective management of program planning and implementation and minimal local political tensions. In addition to administrative and fiscal management of the cooperative agreements, these agencies were responsible for local GRP staffing. This meant that for the three sites other than Los Angeles, the GRP staff were employed by the state and not the locality in which the GRP was actually implemented. In addition, in both Florida and Wisconsin, the fiscal agency administrative offices were located some distance away from the target cities. These awardees also

had limited experience in the day-to-day operations of comprehensive community-based violence prevention and reduction programs at the local level in the demonstration cities.

The Urban Institute (UI) was funded by OJJDP to conduct a comprehensive independent evaluation of GRP implementation and outcomes in each of the four cities. More detailed descriptions of UI's activities and evaluation methodologies are provided in the following sections of this interim report. A core multidisciplinary UI evaluation team was supplemented with three consultants with extensive experience in gang research and evaluation. Also, for Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and North Miami Beach, local academic field affiliates joined the UI team. These field affiliates, being locally based, were expected to engage in regular interactions and observe process implementation with each local program and its components over the entire evaluation period.

It is important to note that OJJDP's charge to UI from the earliest stages of the GRP was to conduct an "independent" evaluation. This meant that UI was directed not to provide input to the sites relative to strategic plan development or to engage in activities that could be interpreted as technical assistance. Technical assistance was to be NYGC's sole responsibility. This role is in contrast to formative evaluation or action research models, which have become increasingly popular with federal funding agencies in recent years. Under a formative evaluation approach, regular interaction, feedback, and guidance to program implementation teams based upon empirical observations was encouraged.

The primary point of contact for each of the GRP sites was to be the local GRP coordinator. These coordinators were hired by and administratively reported to the cooperative agreement recipients—the three state agencies and the Mayor's Office in Los Angeles. The GRP coordinator was charged with all of the management responsibilities for planning, development, and implementation of the local GRP program components. Each coordinator was also to be the primary liaison for both training and technical assistance through the NYGC and for evaluation activities through UI. Given their roles, the demands on the site coordinators became substantial and required additional staff support as each program evolved.

The GRP coordinators were also responsible for developing and maintaining collaborative relationships with local leadership. These stakeholders represented local community organizations, service providers, police precincts, schools, social service agencies, faith-based organizations, and other grassroots organizations. Leadership from such organizations was expected to most effectively identify community problems and needs that could be best served by the GRP in the targeted neighborhoods. The expertise of these local leaders was generally tapped through their participation in either a GRP executive board/committee or one or more steering committees, which were actively involved in the strategic planning process and program implementation. Many of these local leaders had substantial interest in funding decisions under the GRP as their organizations might be considered as recipients of financial support through the GRP. The consequences of such potential role conflicts are more fully explored in the individual site reports and cross-site findings.

In the early implementation stages of the GRP, Communities in Schools (CIS) and the national office of Boys and Girls Clubs (BGC) were also included as part of the GRP organization. OJJDP added both groups because of their own gang prevention and school safety program experience and expertise. However, while these two organizations participated in the initial program kick-off and later strategic planning meetings with the other "federal

partners" (i.e., OJJDP, NYGC, UI), their precise roles were never thoroughly specified. In some cases, they were able to provide local planning and technical assistance to the sites, and CIS collaboration training was provided to all the coordinators in June 2004. Yet in several of the sites, local affiliates of these organizations also sought to be funding recipients, requesting GRP funds directly from local sites. This situation is more fully described in the individual site reports.

Chapter 3

Evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program

3.1. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The *implementation process* component of the GRP evaluation was designed to examine five primary issues: (1) the strategic planning process for each of the four sites; (2) how strategic plans were implemented and how consistent actual implementation was with strategic plans; (3) the nature of the collaboration between local stakeholders, federal team members, and planning committees, and how it changed over time; (4) the obstacles and successes associated with the GRP implementation process; and (5) cross-site lessons learned from the implementation of OJJDP's GRP model.

The *outcome/impact* component of the evaluation was designed to examine the effects of (1) primary prevention efforts on the reduction of community risk factors, increases in protective factors, and changes in community-wide perceptions and behaviors; (2) secondary prevention efforts and other youth-focused interventions on the likelihood of gang involvement and risk behaviors; (3) service provision to gang-involved youth on educational achievement, reduction of truancy, successful employment, and other community outcomes; (4) suppression activities on prosecution and the use of graduated sanctions; and (5) the GRP program on gang-related incidents overall, as well as the incidence of firearm crime and the types of firearms recovered in the targeted communities. While the evaluation design necessarily underwent changes as the evaluation progressed, the following objectives, based on the initial design, nevertheless guided the overall evaluation:

- Conduct a data-driven examination of gang and drug-related violence problems in targeted neighborhoods in Los Angeles, North Miami Beach, Milwaukee, and Richmond.
- Document the process of strategic planning and implementation in each of the four cities, and provide ongoing collaborative feedback to OJJDP and the NYGC for the provision of technical assistance and program adjustment or modification where necessary.
- Implement a pre/post comparison group evaluation design to measure program progress and effects on communities and gang-related violence, the use of illegal firearms, and serious violent crime problems over time.

- Provide deliverables to OJJDP for dissemination to local policy makers and practitioners considering the future implementation of successful components of the various GRP initiatives.

3.2. PROCESS METHODOLOGY

In order to accomplish the process evaluation, implementation process data have been collected in a number of ways. The first method was through direct observations of GRP planning activities, both on site and at cluster meetings convened by OJJDP. This process included attending the OJJDP-directed strategic planning meetings, attending regularly scheduled meetings of steering and executive committee meetings, and collecting implementation documentation, such as progress reports, strategic plans and budgets submitted to OJJDP, requests for subcontract proposals, and numerous other records associated with planning and implementation. UI team members, consultants, and local field affiliates conducted these aspects of the process component.

The second data collection methodology involved one-on-one and small group interviews with GRP coordinators, steering committee members, implementation subcommittee members, and local stakeholders, such as subcontractors responsible for specific component activities. These interviews addressed individuals' observations and opinions about how GRP funds were secured, how strategic and implementation groups were formed, who was chosen to serve on the various committees, how the planning process unfolded, and what the value was of local resource inventories and technical assistance support. Also discussed were how decisions were made about specific programs to be funded, what specific funding mechanisms were instituted (e.g., requests for competitive proposals versus sole source allocations), and what programs actually became operational as the GRP evolved. Important positive and negative implementation lessons learned were also a major focus of these interviews, as were individuals' views on sustainability—that is, the potential for GRP continuation once federal grant funds expire. In order to monitor and document changes in implementation perceptions over the entire life of the GRP, follow-up interviews with committee members were planned at six-month intervals.

The last method for collecting primary implementation data was through a multiwave, Internet-based survey of the site coordinators and current and former committee members. The survey was designed to measure partnership functioning and capacity within the GRP. These two constructs play a direct role in the outcomes achieved by the sites and essentially represent intermediate outcomes of GRP activities. Hence, failure to achieve these intermediate outcomes indicates that the partnership may not have any demonstrated value over activities that would have occurred anyway in the partnership's absence (Yin, Kaftarian, Yu, and Jacobs, 1996).

To date, few crime prevention and intervention evaluations have systematically measured partnership functioning and capacity, as the complexity and variation of crime prevention/intervention partnership efforts often hampers systematic assessment and rigorous evaluation. Hence, this evaluation offered a unique opportunity to assess the intermediate outcomes of the initiative and to examine the quality of the partnership itself in addition to measuring its outcomes. The survey is being used to (1) provide formative feedback to GRP sites and partnership members with regard to partnership functioning and progress; (2) collect evidence of the overall partnership's effectiveness and impact

with regard to long-term impacts, such as crime reduction; (3) inform others and transfer knowledge of what works and what doesn't within the GRP; and (4) systematically compare intermediate outcomes across partnership sites.

The first wave of survey data collection spanned January 15 through March 21, 2006 and sampled individuals who were current and former members of GRP committees and subcommittees as of January 15, 2006. The second wave of survey data collection spanned April 10 through May 31, 2007 and attempted to capture all individuals who served on a GRP committee between March 2006 and March 2007. The surveys included multiple questions to measure:

- Confidence in strategic plan
- Sufficiency of resources
- Capabilities of managers and leaders
- Capacity of the collaborative
- Sustainability planning

Open-ended items asked respondents to report changes in the target area that may be attributable to GRP, to note successes and disappointments, and to identify the one change that would most improve GRP's effectiveness. The survey also attempted to assess the number of new relationships that may have developed as a result of the program. Details of the survey, including technical aspects of survey design, administration, and analysis, are provided below in Appendix H. Specific results of the survey as they apply to each site are included in site chapters, and a comparison of findings across sites is included in Chapter 9.

3.3. OUTCOMES/IMPACTS METHODOLOGY

The measurement of potential GRP effects during the implementation period was critical to this project for a variety of reasons. First, it provided timely feedback to coordinators, such that program adjustments could be made in the future once the programs are sustained. Knowing if the interventions work and, if so, how well is of significant importance to the local program teams and other stakeholders as well, because they have invested a substantial amount of time and effort into this initiative. Finally, performance measurement is important for practitioners and policymakers in other jurisdictions who might be considering the implementation of similar gang-related and drug-related violence prevention and reduction approaches.

The measurement framework employed by the evaluation makes a distinction between GRP activities, outcomes, and impacts. For evaluation purposes, activities are those services or other organizational outputs that are supported by GRP. These include a wide range of programmatic approaches across the five GRP domains. An example would be the number of at-risk youth who are provided employment training to help them acquire work opportunities and keep them out of gangs. The activities or outputs are related to expected outcomes and inform the outcome evaluation. The expected outcomes predict the overall effects of the program but are not direct products of the program. The time period needed to observe expected outcomes varies across programs. For some programs, the

expected outcomes can be observed almost immediately, but for others, the time needed to observe an expected outcome may be in excess of ten years.

Specific GRP activities adopted to date in each site have been identified through individual strategic plans, contracts and requests for proposals, and discussions with each of the four GRP coordinators, committee members, and local providers. Knowledge of activities that were adopted, however, allowed the development of activity models for each site. The activity models developed for the evaluation can be found in appendices. These models outline, for each site, specific activities planned or undertaken, data sources for measuring the outputs of each activity, and expected outcomes of each activity.

From these activity models, the evaluation team next developed outcome logic models. These models included a comprehensive identification of what potential intermediate outcomes could hypothetically be expected from the planned GRP programmatic activities. These logical outcomes were initially organized across eight possible outcome domains. At the start of the modeling process, outcomes in the following eight domains were expected: individuals, families, peers, gangs, schools, the community, the physical environment, and the social environment. Justice system outcomes, such as recidivism and probation violations, were subsequently added as a separate outcome domain. This set of outcome domains was modified as sites implemented specific activities and the evaluation team developed the activity and logic models for each site. The final set of outcome domains used in the evaluation are discussed in the site specific chapters. A typical outcome is the employment rate of at-risk youth in the target area. Improved employment rates would be a hypothesized outcome from a GRP-sponsored employment training program.

Using comprehensive outcome logic models as a guide, the research team then explored the availability of data that could be used to measure each outcome as well as the feasibility of acquiring existing outcome data or collecting new outcome data. This was accomplished through discussions with a wide range of governmental organizations, service providers, and other local stakeholders. The results of these efforts have led to a preliminary listing of outcome indicators (see Table 3.1). This list was modified, however, as sites began implementation and the UI evaluation team clarified what data were available for the evaluation and were being collected. The final set of indicators and access to data sources are discussed in the individual site chapters.

As Table 3.1 shows, the focus of the outcome measurement was on community effects, rather than on individual changes. There were several reasons for this focus. First, OJJDP's goal for GRP was to implement the initiative in specific targeted neighborhoods with the intent of effecting positive changes within those neighborhoods relative to gang risk factors. Thus, OJJDP's evaluation interests have consistently been directed toward community outcomes and not individual-level outcomes. Second, a number of the GRP-sponsored activities were prevention oriented. The measurement of individual-level preventive outcomes would necessitate the collection of data well into the future and beyond the evaluation funding period. For example, examining the effects of a prenatal primary prevention program would require tracking infants and young children for many years to discern whether the desired effects of this program were realized. Finally, collecting some types of individual-level data was simply not feasible or was too cost prohibitive across four separate sites and dozens of separate program components. Nonetheless, we still plan to examine individual perceptions of programmatic effects through focus group data collection, with samples of neighborhood residents as part of the outcome

Table 3.1: Preliminary Outcome Measures

Domain	Indicator(s)	
Family	• Parenting skills	
Gangs	• Gang membership	
Schools	• Truancy	• GED achievement rates
	• Performance (grades/test scores)	• Disciplinary reports
	• Graduation rates	• Suspensions
Community	• Unemployment	• Job training/placement
	• Gang awareness	• Gun ownership
	• Household income	• Citizenship
	• Employment rates, at-risk population	• Residency status
	• Owner-occupied housing	• Vital statistics
	• Property values	• Emergency room visits
Physical environment	• Graffiti	• Nuisance properties
Social environment	• Resident perceptions	
Justice system	• Arrests, calls for service	• Field interviews
	◦ Parts I & II	• Recidivism
	◦ Disorder	• Parole/probation revocations, technical violations
	◦ Weapons	
	◦ Gang-related	• Criminal cases filed
	◦ Curfew	

evaluation. However, this task has been postponed until 2008 due to further site program extensions through next year. It should also be reiterated that our repeated collaboration survey waves, including a third one planned for next year, allow us to examine changes in partnership outcomes and plans for sustainability.

The ultimate desired impact of GRP as a whole is the reduction of gang-related violence and crime, measured through incident-level crime data that have been and will continue to be collected from the police departments in each of the demonstration sites. These data have been analyzed to examine changes in serious gang violence both over time and through spatial distributions. Through time series assessments, potential changes were examined that may be attributed to GRP over the entire GRP implementation period. Thus for the purposes of this evaluation, the main impact is defined as a reduction in violent gang-related crime. For example, it could be hypothesized that at a GRP employment training program would improve employment rates of at-risk youth, thereby keeping these youth from participating in gangs and ultimately reducing (or at least not increasing) gang-related violent crime in the GRP-targeted neighborhoods.

For the outcome/impact component, a pre/post comparison group design has been incorporated into the evaluation. Comparisons of changes in the outcomes and impacts will be made between the GRP target areas and scientifically selected comparison area neighborhoods. These comparison neighborhoods have been matched to the target areas as closely as possible on demographics, community risk factors, educational and employment characteristics, gang activity and violence, and local stakeholders' qualitative assessments of neighborhood similarities. Finally, for an assessment of potential displacement effects on gang-related criminal activities, bounded neighborhoods adjoining the GRP target areas have been identified and changes in serious and gang-related crime are being monitored there throughout the evaluation as well. This design had to be slightly modified in North

Miami Beach, however, since the entire city is the target area. As will be discussed in the North Miami Beach portion of this report, we chose a similar nearby city as a comparison site, rather than using neighborhoods.

Chapter 4

Implementation Process

4.1. STRATEGIC PLANNING

OJJDP executed cooperative agreements with each of the fiscal agencies in the fall of 2003, with a special condition that required each of the demonstration sites to first engage in a strategic planning process prior to funding or implementation of any program components. Strategic planning for the implementation of GRP in all four demonstration sites began with a "kick off" planning meeting in Washington, D.C. on October 17, 2003. Each of the four sites was invited to include four or five local stakeholders in a one-day planning meeting, hosted by OJJDP. Those in attendance generally represented each site's police department, fiscal agent organization, probation agency, or local schools. A representative from a community organization also joined the Milwaukee team.

This meeting provided the opportunity for OJJDP, through its deputy director and gang program coordinator, to explain to all four sites the goals and rationale for the GRP demonstration program. This included descriptions of the five elements of the GRP framework, program objectives, what was scientifically known about gang problems in general, and the overall GRP organizational structure described earlier.

Following this GRP overview, attention was turned to the next steps relative to strategic planning and program implementation. As immediate next steps, each lead fiscal organization was to hire a project coordinator and identify and recruit key local leadership for participation in the GRP strategic planning process. OJJDP provided the lead agencies with a sample job description, which included local coordinator responsibilities and abilities.

Each of the sites was charged with developing a comprehensive program implementation plan. According to OJJDP (OJJDP, 2003b), this plan "(1) matches community resources to community needs; (2) identifies gaps in service availability, and locates appropriate resources to fill those gaps; and (3) integrates various GRP resources to ensure a continuous network of prevention, intervention and suppression services to the community." Each site could use a maximum of $80,000, according to OJJDP, to complete its strategic planning process. It was strongly emphasized that in contrast to some past demonstration programs, this planning process needed to be of much shorter duration than would normally be expected—no longer than six months for plan completion, OJJDP approval, and the initiation of programmatic implementation.

To lay the groundwork for strategic planning, the NYGC provided an overview of each site's first steps, initially referred to as the "assessment process." The goal of this process

Table 4.1: Assessment Data Elements

Domain	Suggested Data Elements
Community demographics	• Total population
	• Age, race, gender
	• Mobility/transience rates
	• Educational attainment
	• Household income
	• Unemployment
	• Socioeconomic information
Gang activity/crime	• Gang crime data (offenses and arrests
	• Gang intelligence (files, police interviews)
Schools	• Student characteristics
	• Student performance
	• Student discipline
	• Student criminal activity
Public perceptions	• Parent perceptions
	• Neighborhood associations
	• Community residents
	• Community/agency leaders
Risk Factors	• Individual
	• Family
	• School
	• Peer group
	• Community

was for each site to gain a comprehensive baseline understanding of the nature of gang problems in their target areas; seek out and gain buy-in from local groups dealing with the identified gang problems; identify and describe current efforts in place relative to gang problems, along with existing assets and resources; and identify gaps in services that might be filled through GRP programming.

The individual GRP coordinators, once hired, were to establish local partnerships with a wide range of organizational leaders. These included local criminal justice agencies, social services, faith-based groups, community organizations, grassroots groups, and the business community. The expectation was that by engaging such local leaders, a more thorough examination and definition of local problems, needs, and existing resources could would be achieved. An "assessment team" was to be formed by the coordinators that would include representatives from agencies having empirical data to inform the definition of the local problems and a data analyst to support the assessment process.

The assessment teams were tasked with collecting and analyzing data for the target neighborhoods across five primary domains: (1) community demographics, (2) gang activity/crime, (3) schools, (4) public perceptions, and (5) risk factors for gang involvement. The data elements to be collected and analyzed for this baseline assessment are summarized in Table 4.1.

Once a baseline description of these domains was developed, each of the site teams was next charged with identifying existing resources in and surrounding the target neighborhoods that provided services or engaged in other activities that were designed to impact the various elements of the problems identified. This "resource inventory," as it was later

called, was to include a comprehensive identification of federal, state, and local resources. In addition, the community-level resources and assets were to be identified and mapped.

In order to effectively engage in this assessment process, the NYGC was directed by OJJDP to assist each of the sites. This assistance included site visits, regular remote contacts, development and provision of assessment manuals, instruments and other materials, and the convening of planning cluster meetings.

UI also offered support to each of the sites relative to crime and gang data analysis since it was already planning to conduct these kinds of baseline data collection and analysis activities as part of its evaluation plans. The UI team initiated Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the chiefs of police in each of the four cities. These MOUs authorized the provision of automated crime incident, arrests, and calls-for-service data from local police records and computer-assisted dispatch systems for research use. Upon receipt of these data files, UI prepared baseline tabular, spatial, and trend descriptive analyses of target area crime for the previous two years.

Following the initial OJJDP kick-off meeting, OJJDP, NYGC, and UI representatives made joint site visits to each of the four cities in late 2004. The primary purpose of these sites visits was for OJJDP and the NYGC to provide technical assistance on the baseline data collection and assessment process. For UI, this visit also included an examination of existing automated records and other crime and intelligence data collection efforts by each police department and initiation of data acquisition.

Since the prevention and reduction of gang-related crime is the primary goal of the GRP, the site visit teams focused a substantial amount of effort on clarifying how gang-related crime was currently defined by the police in each of the GRP cities. Of particular interest was whether gang-related crime was defined as criminal activity that furthered gang objectives (i.e., was gang-motivated) or was criminal activity that was committed by one or more known gang members, regardless of motive. This distinction was important for problem definition as well as evaluation outcome and impact measurement. Using a "gang-motivated" definition would necessarily limit the number of crimes to be counted in the baseline period and during the remainder of the evaluation. A "member-based" definition would expand the number of crimes to be counted to include criminal behaviors committed by gang members. For example, domestic violence committed by a gang member but not motivated by gang objectives would be included with this provision.

As the NYGC points out, there are no nationwide standardized definitions of gangs, although a youth gang is "commonly thought of as a self-formed association of peers having the following characteristics: three or more members; generally ages 12 to 24; a name and some sense of identity, generally indicated by such symbols as style of clothing, graffiti, and hand signs; some degree of permanence and organization; and an elevated level of involvement in delinquent or criminal activity" (NYGC, n.d.). When the GRP sites were asked about how they defined gang-related crime, they each referred to their own state criminal statutes. However, this definition is generally used for prosecutorial reasons. Documenting gang membership can result in additional sanctions upon conviction. The actual operational definition for problem identification had not been thoroughly identified at any of the sites. Indeed, at the time of GRP's initiation, neither Milwaukee nor Richmond had operational gang units to help with gang definitions. In order to insure consistency of measurement across sites, OJJDP directed that for GRP purposes the definition to be utilized across sites would be member based, not gang motivated.

Despite OJJDP's definitional direction, measurement of gang-related crime proved to be a challenge in all four sites. While all the police departments maintained automated incident, arrest, and calls-for-service data, victims, arrestees, and others involved in these crimes were not routinely (and, in most cases, never) identified as gang members in these datasets. Identification of gang membership was instead maintained in separate intelligence databases or manual files. In some cases, knowledge of whether any particular crime was actually gang related was the purview of individual police detectives.

As a result, in order to accurately describe baseline gang-related crime, both the local assessment teams and the evaluators had to rely on manual audits of crime incidents in the target areas. This was accomplished by teams of detectives reviewing select felony incident reports for the target areas over the baseline period and identifying the case numbers for those that they personally knew to be gang related. Incident numbers for these gang-related crimes were then provided to UI, whose analysts were able to extract the gang incidents and arrests from the larger citywide or target area incident and arrest databases. For the evaluation, a repetition of these manual gang audits was deemed necessary every six months over the course of the program and was to be supported through overtime funding by each of the GRP cooperative agreements. The results of these baseline analyses and most recent updates are provided in the findings section for each site later in this report.

On December 17–18, 2003, OJJDP convened a meeting with the NYGC and UI to develop an action plan for completing all of the assessment tasks at each site, with a goal of beginning program implementation no later than June 1, 2004. Observations from the recent site visits, as well as interactions with the local GRP teams, led representatives of both the NYGC and UI to suggest to OJJDP that meeting such a deadline seemed unlikely. This was primarily due to the comprehensive and demanding nature of the assessment requirements and limited capacity at each site to complete the necessary steps in a timely fashion. Of particular concern was the difficulty of collecting and analyzing extensive data on the full range of risk factors during the assessment process. Discussions also centered on the idea of integrating the technical assistance and evaluation responsibilities across both the NYGC and UI in order to reduce redundant efforts and the potential for communication breakdowns resulting from separate lines of communication to the two organizations. This would, in essence, place UI in more of a formative evaluator role rather than strictly a hands-off independent evaluator.

After sharing this feedback with senior OJJDP management, the GRP program manager advised the NYGC and UI that the decision had been made to stick to its goal of having all sites ready to begin implementation by June 1, 2004. While recognizing that there were practical obstacles and scientific concerns, internal priorities mandated setting action plan parameters to meet the stated implementation timeline. In addition, a default position was taken relative to a formative evaluation and task sharing across the NYGC and UI, which meant the separate communication lines would be maintained for training/technical assistance and evaluation, and UIs's primary role would remain as independent evaluator. Finally, it was decided to focus on a "program-driven" strategic planning process, instead of a "risk-factor-driven" process. This meant focusing on effective programs that combine to have maximum effects on all risk factor categories, rather than collecting extensive data on each and every risk factor for the target neighborhood, a process recognized as too labor intensive for the six-month planning period.

Table 4.2: Strategic Planning Tasks and Timeline

Task Number	Task	Due Date
	Hire a full-time project coordinator and obtain approval from OJJDP.	Immediately
I	Provide law enforcement data to UI through electronic file transfer.	1/15/04
II	Define geographic boundaries of target area.	1/15/04
III	Identify and describe subcontracting process that will be used to pass money to local agencies, organizations, and individuals once grant funds are available.	2/2/04
IV	Receive program "matrix" strategic planning tool, distribute tool to local leadership, and review effective programs and the risk factors that they address.	2/2/04
V	Identify "delegates" from local leadership who will represent key agencies, organizations, and stakeholders in the two-day strategic planning meeting.	2/16/04
VI	Complete a manual review of police incidents to identify gang-related offenses in the target area for a period of at least two years, following procedures approved by the NYGC.	2/16/04
VII	Complete a resource inventory, including a survey of existing programs and activities, financial resources, and human resources.	3/15/04
VIII	Receive crime and gang crime data analysis and maps for use in defining the crime problem.	3/22/04
IX	Participate in two-day strategic planning meetings to specify problems, identify gaps in current programming, select a comprehensive slate of program responses, and outline a budget.	04/06/2004–04/16/2004
X	Submit a detailed program outline and detailed budget to OJJDP.	5/14/04
XI	Receive budget approval and launch implementation.	6/1/04

Source: OJJDP (2003a).

The initial assessment process was thus reconstituted as a program-focused "strategic planning process." OJJDP formulated an action plan and timeline for this process, summarized in Table 4.2, to meet the June 1 kick-off date and distributed it to the NYGC, UI, and each of the GRP fiscal agents and sites at the beginning of 2004.

Task I As noted above, UI had already been in contact with each of the sites and entered into memoranda of understanding for the acquisition of citywide incident-level crime and arrest data from each of the four police departments. Analyses of these data were to serve several purposes:

- UI would be able to provide maps depicting the spatial distributions of serious and gang-related crimes in the target areas;

- A baseline assessment of the tabular and spatial distributions of serious and gang-related crimes for the two years prior to the implementation of GRP could be made. This, along with the maps, would help to inform local strategic planning efforts and would be the foundation for measuring GRP's future effects; and
- UI could identify potential comparison areas with similar levels of crime and gang activity for evaluation purposes.

Task II Up to this point in the planning process, the sites had only generally defined the target neighborhoods. Since GRP was designed to be a targeted community-based initiative, the sites, in collaboration with UI, were to specify the precise boundaries of the target areas (street names or natural boundaries). Questions had been raised during the initial strategic planning meeting about how rigid the target areas' boundaries were meant to be. OJJDP's guidance was that these boundaries were not designed to be impenetrable and services and activities associated with GRP could cross these boundaries (both inward and outward), but that most activities should be concentrated within the target area itself.

Task III OJJDP was concerned early in the planning process about potential obstacles to the rapid implementation of program components. With the exception of Los Angeles, the fiscal agents were not local and their own procurement and subcontracting policies and procedures were controlling, according to federal policy. Competitive solicitation requirements or other bureaucratic hurdles could be costly and very time consuming. So, ways by which these required processes could be expedited were supposed to be considered during each site's strategic planning process.

Task IV The NYGC was to develop a program "matrix" strategic planning tool for use by the site teams. This matrix was to provide a menu of over 60 evidence-based effective or promising practices and programs across the full range of risk factors in the target communities. It would also provide the foundation for the selection of programs that could be applied to the target community's crime and gang problems and fill gaps in services to address risk factors in a comprehensive manner. The gaps were to be identified through the resource inventories (see Task VII).

Task V A group of up to 14 local delegates were to be chosen to participate in on-site, two-day strategic planning workshops scheduled for April 2004. All of these delegates were to be senior local government or community leaders. This group of delegates was to include up to two representatives from the grant recipient agency, police/law enforcement agencies, and probation offices. One delegate was allowed from local prosecution and one from the U.S. Attorney's Office. The remaining delegates were to be chosen from "other interested parties," such as the City Manager or Mayor's offices, community and faith-based organizations, social services, businesses, grassroots groups, and health providers.

Task VI As noted earlier, none of the sites maintained automated arrest or crime incident data that included gang-related identifiers. As a result, each of the police departments were asked to conduct a manual search of serious crime incidents in the target area for the previous two years using guidelines developed by the NYGC. This generally was

accomplished through detective overtime, which was funded out of the initial $80,000 in GRP funds set aside for planning purposes.

Task VII The resource inventory was to address four primary issues. The first was the documentation of programs and other activities in the target areas that addressed the gang problem or related risk factors or behaviors, including prevention, intervention and suppression programs. Their essential program elements were to be identified, as were any possible evaluations of the programs' effectiveness. The second issue was the documentation of other financial resources beyond GRP grant funds that could be applied to gang problems and risk factors. These financial resources were to be identified by reviewing local budgets, existing grants, state funding, private foundations, business support, individuals, and other federal initiatives. The third component was to document those beyond the local GRP coordinator and planning delegates who could contribute their time and efforts toward successful implementation of GRP programs and activities. Examples included members of local agencies, grassroots groups, faith-based groups, parent groups, local clubs and fraternal organizations, and youth groups. The last component of the resource inventory was the documentation of other infrastructure or community resources that could contribute to service provision. Examples included schools, places of worship, hospitals, higher education institutions, and large businesses.

Task VIII UI was to provide its baseline crime data analyses, including maps and other distributions, to each of the sites for integration into the planning meeting discussion by the end of March 2004.

Task IX The two-day strategic planning meetings were designed to be intensive working meetings among the delegates. Also in attendance were to be representatives from OJJDP, the NYGC, UI, BGC, and CIS (although these national organizations were not to directly participate in the discussions or negotiations). Facilitation of the discussions was to be accomplished by an external independent facilitator who had not been involved in the planning of GRP prior to these meetings.

Representatives from NYGC provided technical assistance and preparation guidance for the strategic planning meetings. Their goals were to "produce a plan for implementing the initial stages of a comprehensive, community-based, anti-gang program" (NYGC, 2004). Outcomes were to include the identification of specific strategies, program recommendations, and practices to be implemented. The coordinators were directed to engage in substantial efforts prior to the meetings, including participating in preparatory meetings with the team of delegates to discuss the results of the assessment process (resource inventory and gap analysis) and informing the delegates of their roles and the overall purpose of the planning meetings.

Preparation of the delegates before these meetings were convened included the provision of background materials on the goals and objectives of the GRP and discussions to ensure that each delegate understood the definitions of each of the five prongs of the program framework. In addition to discussing the results of the assessment process, the coordinators were also directed to explain the NYGC strategic planning tool to the other delegates in advance.

The central questions to be answered were defined by the NYGC as the following:

- What are the local crime and gang crime problems?
- What current programs and activities address gang problems and related risk factors?
- What are the gaps in the existing programs and services?
- How can existing programs and activities be modified to better cover gaps?
- What new programs and activities are required to better cover gaps?
- What existing local and state resources can be applied toward filling gaps?
- How should OJJDP Gang Reduction Program grant resources be applied toward filling gaps? (NYGC, 2004)

Several weeks before each strategic planning meeting, the coordinators were provided a draft agenda. These were virtually the same for each of the sites. After introductions and an "ice-breaking" exercise, coordinators were expected to provide an overview of the demographic and economic characteristics of the target area, developed through the assessment process. Next, UI was to present the results of its analysis of police incident-level crime and gang-related crime for the target areas. Following these more data-driven assessments of the target area, input was sought from the local planning delegates on their perceptions about the nature of the gang problems in the target area and potential activities to be considered based upon the pre-planning meetings that had been held. The coordinator then summarized the results of the resource inventory.

Following these presentations, representatives from OJJDP, NYGC, UI, and other "federal partners" outlined their various perspectives on the vision and expectations of the GRP. The facilitator then led a series of presentations and discussions on how to engage in strategic planning and more specifically how the teams should define and refine their GRP goals and objectives. The delegates were then split into prevention, intervention, and suppression work groups, and worked to set goals and objectives under those headings for their target area.

After goals and objectives were defined, the strategic planning process moved to an enumeration of potential programmatic activities that might be undertaken to achieve those goals and objectives. Participants included in their discussions a consideration of how to finance the enumerated activities and GRP federal grant budgeting requirements. The planning process concluded with discussions centered on the short-term strategic planning steps for each of the teams, including a review of how the site should proceed relative to submitting its near-term strategic plans and budget requests to OJJDP, both due within the following month.

4.2. PHASE I

The strategic planning process undertaken during the winter and spring of 2004 was designed to lead to the implementation of specific activities beginning in June 2004, approximately two months after the individual site strategic planning meetings. It was also designed to lay the groundwork for longer-term plans for implementing the complete GRP

model approximately six months later. Phase I refers to the initial start-up activities begun in the summer of 2004.

To accomplish Phase I implementation, GRP coordinators at each of the sites drew upon what had been learned through the strategic planning process, particularly their efforts at enumerating existing resources in the target community and identifying gaps in services for at-risk youth and active gang members. They also relied upon guidance from the NYGC, which provided each of the sites technical assistance through a web-based resource that identified promising practices that each site might consider to fill gaps within each of the five GRP framework areas.

After the strategic planning meetings, the coordinators convened a series of meetings with their executive and steering committees in order to decide which short-term activities to begin. It should be noted that the organization and use of executive and steering committees had not been mandated, nor even suggested, by OJJDP as part of local implementation. It is unclear how these formal organizational entities came about, but two primary reasons seem likely. First, in most of the cities, local steering committee members had past experience with Weed and Seed or Project Safe Neighborhoods programs. Both of these federally funded crime control programs incorporate steering committees as central mechanisms in program development and decision making. In addition, many of those who were recruited or volunteered for these committees were actively involved in service provision in the target areas (or nearby) and had a vested interest in having a voice in the decision making that might lead to funding of their own organizations under GRP.

Regardless of the underlying reasons, these committees did emerge as important organizational components for implementation at each of the sites. Executive committees were made up primarily of senior-level government and local organizational leaders. They typically met only periodically, sometimes only every several months, and generally served in an advisory or policy role. On the other hand, steering committees tended to meet regularly, most often monthly, and were responsible for working with the coordinator in making suggestions for resource allocations, activities to be funded, and activities to implement the programs. In some cases, these steering committees were broken down even further into subcommittees with responsibility for three primary framework areas: prevention, intervention, and suppression. Primary and secondary prevention activities both fell to the oversight of the prevention subcommittees, and, during Phase I, intervention was generally integrated into the suppression team's responsibilities.

For the summer of 2004, GRP activities were also restricted to those of a short-term nature. Ultimately, these programs might be incorporated into the larger, comprehensive plan to be implemented under Phase II, following further strategic planning over the next six months. As a result, there did not appear to be any clear logical connection of Phase I activities to the larger GRP plans. Instead, these were chosen because of their ability to be up and running quickly, per OJJDP's desire, and because of their modest funding needs.

Phase I plans and proposed budgets for all sites were submitted to OJJDP early in the summer of 2004. Following review and, in some cases, directives for revisions, OJJDP approved each site's proposals. Thus, each of the GRP sites was successful in implementing several short-term Phase I programs during the summer of 2004. However, the dosage of services or other activities was generally quite small and unlikely to have much of a community-wide impact relative to gangs, crime, or violence.

4.3. PHASE II

The strategic planning process initiated for Phase I was expanded in order to develop and implement the comprehensive GRP model in each of the sites. This meant a continued and more in-depth examination of resources, gaps, and promising practices that might be incorporated to meet identified needs across the five framework areas. The steering committees and subcommittees continued to meet regularly with the coordinators on this process over the next year.

UI had planned during this ongoing process to provide formative feedback to the sites in the form of target area crime and gang-related violence data in six-month intervals following the initial baseline reports, which were provided to all sites prior to their first strategic planning meetings in the spring of 2004. Unfortunately, a series of obstacles precluded this from taking place. First, UI was unable to secure periodic updates of police department incident and arrest records. This was partly due to the turnover of police chiefs in three of the cities, which necessitated renegotiating the previous memoranda of understanding. In addition, most of the police departments experienced turnover in the information technology and crime analysis sections, with the new personnel being completely unfamiliar with GRP, UI's role as evaluator, and UI's need to acquire these data. Data provided also demonstrated quality problems, further delaying UI's analytic efforts. Another obstacle arose in Milwaukee when the police department began conversion to a new, automated Records Management System (RMS). This conversion was problematic on many levels, not the least of which was the development of a substantial incident-level data entry backlog. Compounding the problems associated with automated data acquisition were delays in the manual gang audits. As noted earlier, since these departments do not regularly maintain "flags" on incident records indicating they are gang related according to OJJDP's definition, detectives must manually search through incident records to identify those that are, in fact, gang related. Personnel shortages were most often reported as the primary reason for delays in the completion of these gang audits.

While the coordinators and steering committees did not have additional crime analyses available to support their strategic plans, they nonetheless moved forward according to the original guidelines developed by the NYGC and OJJDP. Development of Phase II plans took much longer than the sites or the federal partners anticipated. Local politics involved in the making of programmatic decisions and allocations played a role in the delays, but the procurement regulations of each of the fiscal agents, three of which were state-level agencies, represented the most significant obstacle.

Procurement of services and the funding of organizations as GRP subcontractors generally required the use of a competitive bidding process. This meant issuing requests for proposals, a proposal submission process, and an independent review of the competing proposals. In Los Angeles, this process was further complicated by requirements for contract approvals from City Council. A great deal of effort was expended by each of the sites during the Phase II planning period in developing procurement procedures that would not only meet both state and local requirements, but would also work well to ensure the selection of programs that would be consistent with the overall comprehensive Phase II plans.

During Phase II, the membership on the various committees and subcommittees also changed at some of the sites. These changes were sometimes due to a loss of interest by some individuals or local organizational staffing changes, including new police chiefs,

mayors, and other agency officials. In other cases, those individuals who had been sitting on the committees as representatives of candidate service providers lost interest when decisions were made that excluded their organizations from potential funding under GRP.

Nonetheless, draft Phase II plans were developed by June 2005. These draft plans were shared with all of the sites, OJJDP, the NYGC, and UI at a GRP cluster conference held in Orlando during the National Gang Symposium in June 2005. While the NYGC had been providing ongoing technical assistance to the sites requiring such help over the previous year, several of these Phase II plans were incomplete or not sufficiently detailed to be acceptable to OJJDP. Thus, more intense technical assistance was required over the summer of 2005. Ultimately, by early fall 2005, OJJDP conducted the final review and made approvals for the sites to move forward with Phase II plans. Implementation of Phase II plans across all of the sites has progressed after these approvals, although progress has varied from site to site. In fact, at several sites, implementation was extended through no-cost extensions by OJJDP through 2008.

The following individual site reports trace each GRP program's process of implementation from initial grant awards in 2003 through late 2007. In addition to documenting the implementation process for each site, these individual site reports describe the elements of their strategic plans, local organizational development, collaboration and committee functioning, management and leadership. Lessons learned, successes achieved, and obstacles encountered are also described. At the conclusion of the individual site reports cross-site findings and lessons learned are presented.

In addition, outcome and impact findings for each site are presented and discussed. These include community-level changes in target areas that might be attributable to GRP in comparison to non-targeted similar control communities. Changes in violent and gang-related crimes are also examined before GRP implementation, over the course of both Phase I and Phase II, and through the most recent months when incident-level data from each site was available. Potential displacement effects to neighboring communities will also be assessed to date. Cross-site outcome and impact findings will be presented at the conclusion of the report, along with how these findings appeared to vary by implementation approach and organizational characteristics.

It should be noted that for most of the GRP sites, the outcome and impact findings and observations concerning sustainability are considered by both UI and OJJDP as interim findings. This is because of the additional implementation extensions through 2008. Because of the interim nature of the findings presented in this report, continued and expanded evaluation activities will continue for another year as well. The results from the extension period will then be added to those presented in this report and will culminate in a final implementation and outcome/impact evaluation report for GRP late in the fall of 2008.

Part II

Evaluation Findings

Chapter 5

Los Angeles, California

The City of Los Angeles is home to nearly four million people, making it the second largest city in the United States. The city's 450 square miles are policed by more than 10,000 sworn officers (LAPD, 2006). In contrast, New York City, with a population of more than 8 million people in just over 300 square miles, has nearly 40,000 sworn officers (NYPD, 2006). Despite its relatively small police force, Los Angeles has a long history of tension between residents and law enforcement, such as the Watts riots in 1965, the Rodney King trial and riots in 1992, the O.J. Simpson trial in 1996, and, most recently, the Rampart scandal in 1998, in which a specialized Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) gang unit operating in the Rampart community of Los Angeles was found to be corrupt, accused of making false arrests, stealing evidence, and framing innocent individuals. A poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times in 2000 revealed strong disapproval of the LAPD on the part of residents, with African Americans registering especially high disapproval rates (Armet, 2000).

Gang activity has also made a name for itself in Los Angeles. While levels of overall crime have been decreasing in the city, gang crime rose 14 percent citywide in 2006, and city officials have promised to redouble their efforts to address the gang crime issues (Archibold, 2007). By some estimates, there are nearly 40,000 gang members throughout the city, a large portion of whom operate in the 15-square-mile division of East Los Angeles patrolled by the LAPD Hollenbeck Division. The area includes the neighborhoods of Lincoln Heights, El Soreno, and Boyle Heights and is thought to have the highest concentration of gang activity in Los Angeles with an estimated 34 gangs and 6,400 LAPD-documented gang members. Gang detectives estimate that an additional 2,000–3,000 undocumented gang members operate in the Hollenbeck Division. These gangs are intergenerational and claim territory block-by-block, making travel a few yards from one's home potentially dangerous for any gang member.

The neighborhood of Boyle Heights in the southernmost portion of the Hollenbeck Division is comprised of modest single-family homes and many Latino "mom and pop" stores and restaurants. Although superficially typical of many Los Angeles neighborhoods, the neighborhood is home to approximately 2,000 documented and suspected gang members belonging to four major gangs and has received significant media attention for its gang activity over the past couple decades (ABC News, 2004; CNN, 2005; McCarthy, 2001; PBS, 2001).

5.1. STUDY AREAS

The evaluation of Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in Los Angeles is focused on three study areas within the city, discussed below.

Target Area Located in two square miles of the southeastern-most corner of Boyle Heights (see Figure 5.1), the GRP target area is home to approximately 25,000 people, many of whom live in one of the neighborhood's two large apartment complexes. Situated directly across the street from one another, Estrada Courts is a public housing complex known for its large murals reflecting Chicano culture while Wyvernwood consists of privately owned apartments. While largely residential, Boyle Heights also hosts several prominent commercial zones of "mom and pop" establishments as well as an industrial area in the southwestern edge.

The Mayor's Office chose the target area in 2003 under advisement from local law enforcement and community leaders. Aside from needing assistance in combating its notorious gang activity, the selected target area was particularly strategic because of a preexisting law enforcement collaborative, the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program, that follows GRP's exact boundaries. The CLEAR Program receives federal funds to target crime in six gang-entrenched neighborhoods of Los Angeles and began operation in Boyle Heights in 2003. Collaboration between LAPD, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the Los Angeles County Probation Department, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, and the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office has been integral to the success of the program. CLEAR is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4.

Comparison Area The evaluation team identified a comparison area based on socioeconomic conditions and crime patterns similar to the target area, as well as on information collected from local experts. Previous research in the Hollenbeck district directed the search to an area just north of the GRP site. Several combinations of different police reporting districts were considered when determining a suitable comparison area. In each iteration, crime rates and demographics were calculated and compared with results of other iterations to determine the combination of police reporting districts comprising an area as similar as possible to the target area. The police reporting district combination 445, 453, 455, 462, 463, 471, and 473—directly to the northwest of the target area—was found to have the most comparable crime rates and demographic characteristics to the target area and was chosen as the comparison area (see Figure 5.1). An ideal comparison area would be one without shared boundaries with the target area; however, such a site could not be identified while satisfying the socioeconomic and crime conditions for selection.

Figure B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix offer more detailed views of the target and comparison areas, respectively. Appendix A is a general overview of the criteria and crime analysis used to identify study areas for the evaluation.

Displacement Area Urban Institute (UI) selected the displacement area in consultation with detectives from the LAPD Hollenbeck gang unit, based on geographic proximity and similarity of criminogenic features to the target area. Given the generational entrenchment of gang turf in Boyle Heights, UI does not expect GRP to displace gang activity and related crimes into nearby areas. Nonetheless, in order to abide by evaluation standards, a

Table 5.1: Cross-Sectional Comparison of Los Angeles Study Areas

	Area		
	Target	Comparison	Displacement
Crimes Known and Reported, 2002–2004			
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter	38	30	24
Assault	2,992	3,755	2,991
Aggravated Assault	701	851	759
Simple Assault	2,003	2,564	1964
Intimidation	288	340	268
Robbery	290	241	313
Drug Offenses	0	0	0
Weapons Violations	491	529	408
Vandalism	56	73	37
Socio-economic Indicators, 2000			
Area (square miles)	2.04	1.59	2.29
Residential population	25,441	24,454	18,073
% population 12-17 (years)	10%	9%	10%
% population 18-24 (years)	12%	12%	13%
% population male	50%	52%	49%
% population Black	0%	2%	1%
% population Hispanic	97%	89%	94%
% housing units owner-occupied	28%	15%	26%
% housing units vacant	6%	6%	5%
% high school graduates (age ≥ 25 years)	28%	34%	34%
% in labor force (age ≥ 16 years)	52%	50%	49%
% not speaking English at home (age ≥ 5 years)	90%	86%	88%
% households receiving public assistance	15%	15%	11%
% population below poverty level	32%	36%	31%

Notes:

- Crimes against persons (i.e., murder, manslaughter, assault) are counted as one crime per victim; all other crimes are counted as one crime per incident.
- For incidents involving crimes against persons where the number of victims was not recorded, the number of victims was assumed to be one (1).

Source: Crime data are from the authors' analysis of data from the Los Angeles Police Department. Socio-economic indicators are from the authors' analysis of block-group/block data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

displacement area was chosen with the caveat that the evaluation team has access to crime data at least as reliable as those data available for the other two areas. This last point has particular importance in choosing the displacement area, as the regions to the south and east of the target area are under the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office jurisdiction. Although the sheriff's office is likely to collect crime data in a similar fashion to LAPD, the comparability is unknown. Therefore, the displacement area is confined to LAPD-controlled areas. The reporting districts 466, 467, 468, and 469 directly to the north of the target area and districts 491 and 1309 directly to the west were ultimately chosen as the displacement area. The area adjacent to the northern edge of the target area is primarily residential, with socioeconomic characteristics similar to the target area, and is home to several intergenerational gangs, which compete with those in the target area. The reporting districts to the west of the target area are somewhat dissimilar in terms of community characteristics; however, the fact that this area is primarily industrial, more impoverished, and closer to downtown likely make this area more vulnerable to crime and potentially a prime relocation site for criminals displaced from the target area.



Figure 5.1: Los Angeles Study Areas

Figure 5.2: Crime Rates in Los Angeles Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Los Angeles Police Dept. data.

5.1.1. Baseline Analysis

The three study areas are comparable on measures of crime and socioeconomic conditions. A cross-sectional examination of data from local law enforcement agencies shows generally similar levels of officially recorded offenses during the baseline period from 2002-2004, although levels in the displacement area are generally lower than those in the other two areas (see Table 5.1). Assaults, particularly simple assaults, comprise the majority of recorded offenses for each area. Weapons violations are also prominent in each area. Of particular note is the lack of recorded drug offenses, a reflection more of California State Law and LAPD record keeping than the actual prominence of drugs in Los Angeles. Unlike homicide, assault, robbery, and other offenses, drug offenses do not have a separate offense classification; rather, other offense categories (i.e., assault or robbery) may be assigned a supplemental charge of a drug offense. To be consistent, only crimes with offense classifications are reported in Table 5.1.

The crime data were also examined longitudinally to assess the comparability of crime patterns in the study areas over time. First, UI prepared annual crime rates per 1,000 residents in each of the three study areas. This was done for all crimes (see Figure 5.2) and for serious violent crimes (see Figure 5.3) to examine whether rates of criminal activity in the study areas were cross-sectionally comparable and changed in a similar fashion over time. The crime rates of the target and comparison areas show a similar pattern of decline over the baseline period, although the overall rates are higher for the comparison area (see Figure 5.2). In contrast, the displacement area saw more of an increase over the same time period. Similarly, serious violent crimes noticeably declined over the three-year period in the target area while the displacement area experienced a noticeable increase in crime over the same time period. However, the comparison area saw little change in serious violence from 2002 through 2004 (see Figure 5.3).

UI also prepared monthly counts of all crimes, serious violent crimes, gang-related

Figure 5.3: Crime Rates in Los Angeles Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Los Angeles Police Dept. data.

crimes, and serious violent gang-related crimes crime incidents for the three study areas for the 36-month baseline period (see Figures 5.4-5.7). LAPD has specific definitions of what comprises gang crimes. Official reporting relies on a member-based definition of gang crime whereby any incident in which a gang member is a suspect or a victim may be classified as gang-related. These offenses fall into one of 13 crime categories, including homicide, attempted homicide, felony assault, assault on a police officer, robbery, shots fired into an inhabited dwelling, kidnapping, rape, arson, witness intimidation, extortion, carjacking, and narcotics (added in 2004). Gang incidents are identified through a manual audit of the Hollenbeck gang unit files as well as through a flag stored in LAPD Information Technology Department (LAPD-ITD) data that is used by police officers in the reporting process. Across the 36-month baseline period, the total number of incidents in the target area was relatively stable. However, the comparison and displacement areas experienced distinct spikes in the number of serious violent crimes (see Figure 5.5). The gang-related crimes also tend to vary considerably across the 36 months, with especially prominent peaks for the comparison area around September of both 2002 and 2004 (see Figure 5.6). However, since one reporting district in the displacement area (1309) is outside the jurisdiction of the Hollenbeck division, gang-related data may be incomplete for the displacement area.

5.2. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The following sections describe in detail the development and implementation of the Los Angeles GRP. Significant events are also displayed on a timeline, shown in Figure 5.8, that covers the entire period of organizational development and implementation in Los Angeles. These events, and the ramifications of significant events, are discussed in more detail below. An expanded version of this timeline also appears below in Section 5.5 with

Figure 5.4: Crime Trends in Los Angeles Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department.

Figure 5.5: Crime Trends in Los Angeles Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department.

Figure 5.6: Crime Trends in Los Angeles Study Areas: All Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department.

Figure 5.7: Crime Trends in Los Angeles Study Areas: Serious Violent Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department.

monthly data on selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial distribution of crime within the GRP study areas.

5.2.1. Phase I

As mentioned previously, a long history of gang violence, coupled with a petition by the Los Angeles Chief of Police and the U.S. Attorney's Office to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) for support in addressing the city's gang violence problems, prompted the selection of part of Boyle Heights, in East Los Angeles, as a GRP demonstration site in 2003. At the suggestion of OJJDP, the City of Los Angeles' Office of the Mayor became the fiscal agent for the grant award. The Mayor assigned administrative responsibility for GRP to the Mayor's Criminal Justice Planning Office (MCJPO). Although OJJDP approved the award to Los Angeles in October 2003, Los Angeles City Council approval was required before the Mayor's Office could accept the award. Until full approval by all parties, the Mayor's office did not have authority to hire a program coordinator; in the interim, MCJPO staff began the planning process. During this time, MCJPO worked with UI, the LAPD, and the City Attorney's Office to execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the LAPD and UI, granting UI access to crime records for evaluation purposes.

In May 2004, following review by three city committees (Public Safety, Budget and Finance, and Personnel), the City Council and the Mayor's Office approved the GRP grant award and MCJPO hired a permanent program coordinator. The program coordinator, a bilingual Latina graduate of University of Southern California, had experience working with individuals as well as public and private organizations within the Boyle Heights community and throughout Los Angeles. She previously worked at a city-funded program addressing youth gang prevention and intervention, where she became involved in developing partnerships citywide, conducting program assessments, and improving the city's web-based client data tracking system, also known as the Integrated Services and Information System (ISIS).

With a permanent program coordinator in place, the Los Angeles GRP proceeded with strategic planning. In early May 2004, the program coordinator convened a meeting with key local delegates to brief them on GRP. Attendees included representatives from LAPD, the City Attorney's Office, Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the Los Angeles City Council, community-based organizations, faith-based institutions, social service providers, the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), and Los Angeles County Probation Department. The crime analysis conducted by UI was presented, as well as the work to date on the Community Resource Inventory (CRI) conducted by Lodestar Management/Research, Inc. A community needs assessment was conducted with guidance from the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC)'s strategic planning tool. The tool outlines information that the GRP should gather about existing programs and services including location, cost, and population served, as well as soliciting opinions about existing gaps in services, the results of which could inform GRP decision-making.

Lodestar also assisted the program coordinator with convening community focus groups. These focus groups were attended by parents from a local Head Start program and the Estrada Courts school readiness program; students involved in a city-run gang prevention program operating in Stevenson Middle School and in three local community-based programs; residents from the target area; and teachers and staff from Roosevelt

Figure 5.8: Los Angeles Timeline



High School within the target area. The focus groups provided a greater understanding of perceptions of community safety, gang activity, and community services, including service gaps that existed in the community. Focus group participants consistently expressed the need for more after-school programs, mentors, and college information. Other needs identified through the focus groups included employment assistance and childcare. Some local services were mentioned as being successful, including Homeboy Industries, the Youth Opportunity Movement (YO!), and the Police Activities League (PAL). Focus group participants identified a lack of funding or knowledge on how to identify funding sources as challenges to bringing services to the area. Participants suggested programming ideas to attract area residents to the planned One-Stop community center, including practical instruction in the areas of art and theater, auto mechanics, cooking, computers, driving, parenting, and woodworking. Other motivators included transportation to the center and on-site daycare for children while parents access services.

The strategic planning meeting, in May 2004, brought the local delegates together with other community agencies and city, county and federal partners including OJJDP, NYGC, and UI. During this two-day meeting, managed by an outside facilitator, OJJDP introduced the multi-pronged GRP program model, and UI reviewed its crime analysis of the target area. LAPD officers present at the meeting largely validated UI's spatial and other analyses. A number of concerns arose over the seeming under-reporting of drug and gang-related crimes, explained in large part by the LAPD's local data classifications, which UI used as the standard for analysis, and which included only a select number of crimes that could be officially characterized as "gang crimes." The area's sociodemographic characteristics were also discussed, as was the CRI.

Arguably, the most important component of the meeting occurred during the break-out sessions, in which participants, self-selected into three groups (prevention, intervention, and suppression), developed goals, objectives, and proposed activities related to the corresponding program areas. The focus was on developing a plan to be fulfilled in the first six months of implementation, also known as Phase I, as well as longer-term implementation goals for the second phase. Given the short planning period before Phase I implementation, OJJDP advised GRP sites to select service providers for Phase I rather than launch a lengthy competitive bid process. For the next meeting, strategic planning participants were asked to bring suggestions for programs that would fulfill the goals and objectives of each Phase I component.

The prevention group had 10 members in attendance, all of whom had related areas of expertise. Although not all members had working relationships within the target community, they all agreed on the definition and purpose of prevention, and perhaps more importantly, the role of prevention programming in the target area. The intervention group had six members, although at least three members represented federal partners and not local agencies. The structure of the intervention group reflected the gap in services in the target area, as members often came in and out of the group, at times during the strategic planning meeting leaving only one member whose organization actually provided intervention services in the community. As a result, the intervention group had difficulty achieving consensus and defining a clear plan. The suppression group had nine members with prior working relationships that served to facilitate the strategic planning process. This group felt strongly that the CLEAR program should play a central role in the strategic plan and therefore should begin coordinating with prevention and intervention

services.

Following this initial strategic planning meeting, the program coordinator convened an additional meeting in June 2004, following a three-subcommittee format (primary/secondary prevention, intervention/reentry, and suppression) to facilitate further development of the GRP goals, objectives, and activities designed for Phase I. The intervention and reentry components were essentially merged together given their similar objectives. Several prevention subcommittee members presented mini-proposals to one another to determine which programs to recommend to the Mayor's Office. Subcommittee members were generally in favor of the activities that service providers proposed, except for one prevention provider, Communities in Schools (CIS), that lacked a previous history in the area. Committee members reported disappointment in CIS's mini-proposal because it was not as polished as the others. Committee members also seemed more accepting of service providers with previous connections to the target area. The service providers proposed to the Mayor's Office included Families in Schools, Proyecto Pastoral, InnerCity Struggle, Hollenbeck PAL, YO!, and CLEAR. The Mayor's Office approved these recommendations and the planning culminated in an official strategic plan document delivered to OJJDP in June 2004. Although choosing the contractors for Phase I programs without a competitive process shortened the time period from decision to program start-up, there was an approximately six-month delay between the delivery of the strategic plan to OJJDP and the implementation of services. The City Council was required to officially approve the sole source funding, and contracts, including terms and services, had to be executed. Therefore, Phase I programs operated from January through June 2005.

5.2.2. Phase II

After the Phase I strategic plan was submitted, the program coordinator continued to convene the subcommittees to plan longer-term goals and objectives for Phase II. The original three-committee structure was reorganized so that the intervention/reentry and suppression subcommittees met together, while the primary/secondary prevention subcommittee continued to meet as originally designed. The subcommittees met three times in the fall of 2004 during the Phase II planning period, and presented their Phase II plan to OJJDP in December 2004.

During the Phase II planning period, Los Angeles GRP subcommittees used community focus group findings, the community needs assessment, and subcommittee member input to identify the types of services that would ideally be funded under the prevention, intervention/reentry, and suppression prongs. In addition to these service plans, the subcommittees and the program coordinator continued work on developing the graduated sanctions program, the Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (MDT), and a formal client referral system. Plans for the One-Stop community center, client in-take procedures, and the web-based client tracking system, ISIS, were also continued. Each of these is described in section 5.4.

In December 2004, the Phase II project design and budget were presented in Los Angeles to federal and local partners, including OJJDP, NYGC, UI, MCJPO, LAUSD, LAPD, and community-based organizations. The project design and budget were officially submitted to OJJDP in January 2005 and after revisions in March and May 2005, it was approved in July 2005 and the remaining grant funds were released to the fiscal agent.

In February 2005, after strategic planning was complete, the subcommittees met to review Phase I implementation and the Phase II timeline. For the subsequent meeting in April 2005, the program coordinator reorganized the GRP planning structure to bring all the subcommittees together as an advisory committee. Phase I programs were largely complete in June 2005, at which point the advisory meetings became more a forum for announcements than an opportunity for substantive discussion. The advisory committee met approximately every other month since its formation, for a total of 13 times between April 2005 and April 2007. The first several meetings primarily provided a forum for updates on Phase I implementation activities and updates on Phase II progress and the implementation timeline. The meetings also served as a venue for residents, community-based organizations, and city, county and state justice and social service agencies to exchange information about area events and opportunities, such as job fairs, volunteer opportunities, or services available to target area youth.

Also during 2005, a new mayor was elected, leading to the reorganization of the Mayor's office in July. At that point, the Homeland Security and Public Safety Office (Mayor's Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (HSPS)), largely the former Criminal Justice Planning Office, assumed responsibility for oversight of GRP. This reorganization changed the personnel charged with GRP oversight and required the program coordinator to brief new members of the Mayor's Office on GRP.

Phase II Request for Proposals Process The Phase II Request for Proposals (RFP) process began in late November 2005 to determine specific programs and contractors within each of three program components: primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention/reentry. The HSPS issued an RFP for Phase II on November 15, 2005, with a deadline of December 28, 2005. The RFP process followed by the City of Los Angeles allowed for equitable selection of community organizations for primary prevention, secondary prevention, and reentry/intervention. All bidders were required to be nonprofit, community-based organizationsthat were legally incorporated in the State of California and provided services within the geographic boundaries of the target area. All bidders were also required to attend a bidders conference after an RFP was released.

GRP received eleven proposals in response to the November 2005 RFP: two for primary prevention after-school programs, two for secondary prevention after-school programs, one each for secondary prevention case management and gang awareness training, and five for intervention and reentry case management. Too few proposals were received for two of the primary and three of the secondary prevention services to make the process competitive; therefore, an RFP for prenatal and infancy support, truancy and dropout prevention, secondary prevention case management, mentoring, and gang awareness training was reissued for bid on January 30, 2006, with a deadline of February 23, 2006. Four proposals were received in response to the supplemental RFP, providing enough proposals to make the selection process competitive with at least two proposals for each component. No proposals were received, however, for truancy and drop-out prevention programming, part of the primary prevention prong. Fortunately, proposal guidelines allow the City to execute a sole-source contract with a vendor when an inadequate number of proposals are received, and hence, the Mayor's Office recommended that GRP contract with Families in Schools (FIS) to provide services for truancy and drop-out prevention, a recommendation approved by OJJDP. The proposal review committee was able to review

submissions for all other Phase II activities identified in the strategic plan.

The GRP proposal review committee, coordinated by HSPS, consisted of GRP advisory committee members who had not submitted funding proposals and members of the Los Angeles community with knowledge about delinquency. Agencies represented include Los Angeles County Probation, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, LAUSD, City of Los Angeles Community Development Department, Los Angeles Bridges Gang Prevention and Intervention Program and Family Development Network, LAPD, District Attorney's Office, and U.S. Attorney's Office. The proposal review process entailed scoring each proposal based on standards outlined by HSPS; scores took into account organizational capability, operational plan, cost practicality, and the respondent's knowledge and/or experience in juvenile delinquency (as demonstrated in the proposal's problem statement). After scoring each written application, the review committee used interviews and site visits to determine final recommendations for the Intervention and Reentry component. The committee then conducted interviews and site visits with the three highest scoring applicants. Final scores and rankings for the Intervention and Reentry component were assigned based upon the applicant's interview score.

At the conclusion of the proposal review process, each applicant was notified of its score and ranking as well as a notice of the right to appeal and the procedures for filing an appeal. Representatives from the City Attorney's Office, Mayor's Office, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation served on the Appeals Board. On May 12, 2006 the Appeals board convened hearings with two Intervention and Reentry applicants who filed appeals. A week later, the Appeals Board denied the appeal of one applicant by determining that the rules of the proposal process had been fairly and equitably applied in the case of their proposal. The board accepted the second applicant's appeal and requested an investigation of the applicant's concerns. After reviewing the additional information resulting from the investigation, the Appeals Board again determined the proposal process to be fair and equitable, and the appeal was denied on May 26, 2006.

HSPS reviewed the top scoring proposals for all program components and provided recommendations to the Mayor's Office at the conclusion of the appeals process; the Office approved all selected agencies. The Budget, Safety, and Gang Ad Hoc committees then reviewed the contracts before their presentation to the City Council. The full council approved the Phase II contractors on August 18, 2006 and authorized the Mayor's Office to negotiate and execute contracts with six organizations in the core areas of primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention and reentry. Contract execution was slightly expedited given that only two new city contracts needed to be drawn up; only Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) and the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services had never contracted with the City before. YO! was the intervention provider for Phase I but was not selected as the provider through the Phase II competitive bidding process. The intervention and reentry contract was therefore executed first to ensure that no lapse in existing case management efforts would occur and that there was a smooth transition from YO! case management to Homeboy Industries.

Phase II Implementation Period This second phase of GRP represents a full range of integrated services and is intended to demonstrate the full GRP model. The original GRP grant period approved by the City Council allowed operation through September 30, 2006. Due to delays associated with the funding approval process for the whole GRP

and each phase of programming, in November 2005 the City Council extended the grant period by one year to September 30, 2007. When the City Council authorized the Mayor's Office to negotiate and execute contracts with the chosen Phase II providers on August 18, 2006, they also provided for another extension on the grant period to accommodate a full 24-month implementation period, extending the end date to August 31, 2008. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) also provided authority for a no-cost extension to be applied to the GRP grant period to allow for full operation of all programs. Delays in Phase II implementation may be largely attributed to bureaucratic rules associated with requesting an RFP and applying for funding approval.

Funding delays notwithstanding, the advisory committee continued to meet every other month throughout the lengthy request-for-proposals and contract-execution processes to discuss community matters and pending GRP-related activities. Between the end of the Phase I programming and the start of Phase II, the advisory committee meetings largely consisted of Phase II progress updates, announcements of various community activities of interest to the group, and updates on ongoing activities, such as the MDT, client tracking system, and policing efforts. At the official start of Phase II programs in September 2006, the advisory committee meetings resumed their monthly schedule. Meetings of the advisory committee were generally well-attended, with an average attendance of approximately 30 people. The meetings generally served as a forum for service provider updates, community announcements, and information from the coordinator on anti-gang news and developments within the Mayor's Office.

The composition of the advisory committee changed from its original membership, and after the Phase II contract execution, meeting attendees displayed noticeably less tension. At the end of 2007, the committee primarily included contracted service providers and government entities such as Probation and LAPD. Meetings also included representatives from local law enforcement, community-based organizations, and city, county and national justice agencies. CLEAR decreased its representation considerably since GRP began, moving from an initial role as a dominant presence on the advisory committee to having only a few CLEAR members in attendance. Agencies not involved in GRP, but providing complementary services throughout the city, have also been invited to present their programs to the committee members. As of October 2007, there had been sixteen advisory committee meetings in addition to the initial strategic planning meeting and four subcommittee meetings.

Aside from regular meetings, the program coordinator facilitated activities to keep the GRP advisory committee members engaged, encouraging their participation in the Phase II RFP process, MDT training, graduated sanctions program, the formal client referral system between law enforcement and community-based organizations, and GRP ISIS development. In August 2006, CIS conducted a one-day collaboration training to work with Phase II agencies on understanding elements and principles of collaboration, building their skills in establishing and managing partnerships, and enhancing their capacity for collaboration. After the training session, Los Angeles' partnership with CIS National ended.

During 2007, roughly halfway through Phase II implementation, the location of the GRP administration within the City's organization was changed a second time. Responsibility for the GRP initiative was shifted to the Mayor's new Gang Reduction and Youth Development Office (GRYD) office.[1] The development of this office is discussed in more

[1]Suppression remains under a separate division in the Mayor's Office.

detail below in Section 5.6. The most important ramification of the move, however, was the associated change in program coordinator. The original program coordinator who worked to start the federally-funded Boyle Heights GRP site was promoted to Assistant Director of GRYD in the fall of 2007. She assisted in hiring her replacement as coordinator for the Boyle Heights GRP; the new coordinator started in that position on October 22, 2007. The new coordinator, a Latino male, was formerly employed by a Phase II secondary prevention service provider and thus had familiarity with the GRP model and functioning. The original coordinator remains closely involved in the Boyle Heights GRP because of her previous work in the area.

MDT Development and Implementation In anticipation of the start of Phase II services, MDT members, except for intervention service providers, participated in a one-day training event on November 16, 2005. The NYGC conducted the training with cooperation from the Riverside County Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement (BRIDGE) program. The attendees included representatives from LAPD and CLEAR, Los Angeles County Probation, the U.S. Attorney's Office, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, school counseling services, LAPD Hollenbeck Gang Division, Roosevelt High School, LAUSD school police, YO!, and a community substance abuse provider. Representatives for the Phase II intervention case management did not participate, as the contractors for these services had not yet been selected. The training provided MDT members with information about MDT goals and objectives, roles and responsibilities, and tools on how to implement and run a successful MDT. A follow-up meeting was held on December 20, 2005 to provide feedback on the original training and set dates for future meetings.

The NYGC provided technical assistance April 5 - 6, 2006 for MDT implementation. At this time the Phase II contractors had been chosen by the RFP review committee but still needed Mayoral approval before being sent to the City Council for its approval. With the assumption that Homeboy Industries would become the intervention and reentry case management contractor, NYGC recommended that discussions begin with Homeboy to plan for potential technical assistance in regard to intervention services upon contract execution. NYGC also recommended that the program coordinator work with Homeboy Industries and YO! regarding the transition of clients from one provider to the other.

After the start of Phase II service provision, MDT planning meetings were convened on October 19 and November 16, 2006 to provide new Phase II service providers with information about the MDT model, develop and implement procedures for MDT functioning, and ensure collaboration amongst the partners. All Phase II prevention and intervention service providers and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services joined the MDT partners who had met previously. The NYGC conducted an additional MDT training on January 18, 2007 to reorient all members to the MDT model. The MDT officially began meeting to discuss clients in February 2007. After experimenting with meeting frequency for the first few months, the team began meeting every three weeks in May 2007. All MDT partners communicated with one another during the times between meetings to ensure client follow-up and referrals were not delayed until the next meeting was held.

Each MDT meeting focuses on three or four specific youth, providing an opportunity for case workers to discuss their clients' details in-depth and brainstorm about how to

address some of their most challenging cases. LAPD, LAUSD, and Probation send client referral slips, including information about the client's potential gang involvement, to the program coordinator, who then passes along referral information to the appropriate agency. Agencies are responsible for following up with the youth.

The strong working relationships between prevention providers, intervention providers and Probation allowed the agencies to begin sharing resources before the contract period began. However, the connection between law enforcement entities and the rest of the group has proven challenging. Before the contract period with Homeboy Industries began, LAPD, the program coordinator, and others noted the tension that existed between Homeboy Industries and law enforcement personnel in Boyle Heights. Service providers were reluctant to share detailed client information (names of youth and/or their family members) with law enforcement entities for fear of getting youth in trouble. The program coordinator often served as an intermediary, especially between Homeboy Industries and the police. Some of the police's reluctance to work with Homeboy Industries was tempered because the original lead case manager was not from the area and was therefore not a part of the historical conflicts between Homeboy Industries and the LAPD. In late 2007, a former gang member assumed the lead case manager role, and the collaboration between Homeboy Industries and the LAPD had to be renegotiated to some extent; however, the advances in collaboration between the two entities did not appear to be in jeopardy.

5.3. COLLABORATIVE FUNCTIONING

To date, collaboration among those involved with GRP has been assessed through primary observations of subcommittee and advisory committee meetings as well as personal interviews with advisory committee members, many of whom are GRP-funded service providers. UI researchers interviewed four Phase I service providers and 16 other advisory committee members in August 2005 and four Phase I service providers and two other advisory committee members in February 2006. Additional interviews were conducted with six Phase II service providers and six other advisory committee members in October 2006 and with six service providers and five other advisory committee members in April 2007. These semi-structured interviews addressed the Los Angeles GRP's:

1. Mission, goals, and strategic plan;
2. Collaboration and capacity building;
3. Management and leadership;
4. Resources; and
5. Sustainability.

5.3.1. Mission, Goals, and Strategic Plan

Nearly all of the respondents described GRP goals as clear, although no one interviewed actually articulated those goals. Several interviewees indicated that despite initial confusion about the program's goals and planning process, over time goals became clearer and the planning process improved; indeed, survey results indicate that over 80 percent

of committee members agreed that GRP had a clear strategic plan with realistic goals. Many interviewees remarked about the ambitious and challenging agenda of addressing the gang problem and gang reduction; some were skeptical about GRP's impact on the overall gang problem in Boyle Heights. However, other respondents indicated that GRP may succeed in decreasing the violent nature of gang activity in the target area, which is consistent with the goals of GRP.

Generally, those interviewed felt that the target area needed GRP services and was an appropriate choice, although at least one respondent indicated that other areas currently had greater needs than Boyle Heights. Some respondents expressed concern that the target area was too small to recruit a sufficient number of clients who qualified for GRP services or to greatly impact the larger Boyle Heights community. Respondents disagreed over whether firm target area boundaries limited the potential impact of GRP.

Differences in opinion also arose among GRP members regarding the GRP strategy and the theoretical model driving the program. Not all GRP members agreed on the best methods to address the youth gang problems in Boyle Heights. For example, some supported a strong intervention component, while others favored prevention efforts directed at varying age groups (elementary school prevention vs. middle school prevention). Although these differing opinions led to occasional conflict during meetings, respondents indicated that their participation in GRP increased their understanding of others' views. Another concern about GRP focused on a concern that the programs reached the right youth and families; one respondent expressed the difficulty in convincing families to change. Several GRP members commented that prevention programs should better target youth in more immediate risk of negative behavior or of gang involvement.

Many participants in the strategic planning process believed the GRP model was forced upon them instead of resulting from collective planning. Some felt that too many people were involved in the strategic planning efforts, while others indicated that the process was not inclusive enough and that initially, key individuals were excluded from participation. These participants acknowledged that the program has included more stakeholders over time, such as one community-based organization with no previous involvement in Boyle Heights. However, some committee members did not support the participation of "outsider" organizations without a history of operation in Boyle Heights; several suggested that an organization's effectiveness would be limited by its lack of knowledge of, and integration in, the community. Indeed, this specific organization's lack of appropriate community ties did appear problematic during recruitment, although it was ultimately able to offer successful programs. Finally, participants gave mixed reviews regarding the overall value and pace of planning; some did not find much benefit to the strategic planning process and expressed frustration at the slow pace of planning. Others praised the slow and deliberate process as necessary for producing effective outcomes and found it useful in identifying service gaps and in allocating funds.

5.3.2. Collaboration and Capacity Building

Representatives from county, city and local agencies have been involved in GRP throughout the life of the project. Many of these agencies worked together in the past, creating an established network of service providers operating within or near the target area. Several of those interviewed—mainly non-funded but active GRP partners—indicated that although many attendees in the beginning were primarily interested in funding

opportunities, some agencies ceased participation in GRP meetings upon not receiving funding from the project. Interestingly, more than three out of five respondents in the Wave I and Wave II surveys agreed that GRP organizations were committed to the program regardless of whether they were receiving GRP funds. This finding suggests that by the time surveys were administered, the opportunistic organizations had already left.

Interview participants involved in the intervention and suppression subcommittees differed in their philosophies for addressing youth gang crime and violence. Observers note that arguments between committee members over programming strategies interrupted several joint meetings between the two prongs. However, as committee members continued to work with one another over the course of several months, the group became more cohesive. In fact, representatives of the two prongs now appreciate, although they may not always agree with, the views of one another. In contrast, a shared philosophy about prevention programming allowed the prevention subcommittee to work well together from the first planning meeting.

Participants gave mixed responses when asked about the composition of the GRP subcommittees and advisory committee. Some respondents thought that the process brought together people who would not ordinarily work together and overall, provided a good mix of individuals and agencies. The emerging cooperation between the LAPD's Hollenbeck Division and community-based organizations serves as one example of the benefits of GRP meetings, as working with community organizations helped LAPD improve trust and forge new relationships with residents. On the other hand, several GRP committee members expressed concern over the sincerity of certain community-based organizations; many of these groups seemed more interested in obtaining GRP funding than in collaboration and partnership. Several participants felt that some community-based organizations were involved simply to position themselves for funding, as evidenced by the fact that several organizations ceased participation after the Phase I monies were distributed. Despite this competition for funding, about half of survey respondents did not believe it impeded progress toward GRP goals, although the percent in agreement declined nearly 10 percent between the Wave I and Wave II surveys.

Funding opportunities aside, the bi-monthly advisory committee meetings are described as generally positive. After planning was complete, meetings developed into a forum for members to share community information with one another, discuss client recruitment, and find support for their various programs. During Phase I and Phase II programming, the meetings served to update advisory committee members about developments with each of the service providers. During the interviews, Phase II service providers commended the opportunity to network with other service providers and meeting attendees. However, at least one advisory committee member reported that regular meetings lacked depth and served simply as "announcement meetings." Furthermore, several committee members wished parents and area residents had participated in the committee.

5.3.3. Management and Leadership

Generally speaking, those interviewed were quite positive about the management and leadership of the Los Angeles GRP. Interviewees described the program coordinator as an effective leader who has been able to defuse conflict with her nonconfrontational demeanor; over 60 percent of survey respondents agreed that GRP leadership minimized

personality differences and was successful at defusing conflict when it arose. Her creativity, understanding, and bilingual abilities helped her gain the support of GRP committee members and the community. Advisory committee members also complimented the program coordinator for soliciting input from the group and arranging opportunities for Phase II contractors to get to know one another. The overwhelming majority of survey respondents agreed that GRP leadership encouraged different points of view in discussions. Interview respondents complimented the coordinator for her frequent communications about meetings and other GRP-related issues. The coordinator's existing knowledge and understanding of the bureaucracy of the City of Los Angeles, including the Mayor's Office, also made her an effective leader.

Although the use of a local fiscal agent, the Mayor's Office, appeared to benefit the program—namely by allowing the program coordinator more access to and interaction with the fiscal decision-making body—the authority of the Mayor's Office over the program introduced an additional level of bureaucracy to the Los Angeles GRP. The City's regulations, largely in relation to the RFP and funding approval processes, delayed original time lines, causing a nearly 12-month delay between the end of Phase I and the start of Phase II in prevention and some intervention programming. Despite these delays, survey results indicate that about half of Wave I respondents and 65 percent of Wave II respondents did not find the RFP process ineffective. Despite committee members' frustration regarding this slow pace, the program coordinator maintained active engagement of original committee members, and even introduced new stakeholders to the meetings. A particularly noteworthy tactic in attracting committee members to meetings involved allowing individuals from the target area who were directly impacted by gang programming to share their stories. Though not always fully attributable to GRP programs, these accounts of GRP successes inspired committee members to continue their involvement. Overall, the majority of survey respondents indicated that GRP leadership instilled enthusiasm for work to be accomplished, increasing from 85 percent in agreement in Wave I to 94 percent in Wave II.

5.3.4. Resources

Not surprisingly, many interviewees noted that the amount of money available was not enough to substantially impact the community. This perception of deficiency grew over time, with 61 percent of survey respondents in Wave I agreeing that resources were sufficient to achieve GRP goals and only 39 percent agreeing in Wave II. An increasing number of survey respondents (42 percent in Wave I and 57 percent in Wave II) also agreed that GRP was primarily driven by its budget. Some Phase I providers indicated that the amount of work required to apply for funding and satisfy all conditions established by the City hardly made participation worth the amount of funding they would receive. The frustration with this process seemed to discourage some agencies from applying for Phase II funding. The funding process, according to at least one provider, prohibited the participation of smaller organizations that would need to use existing funds up front before they could receive any grant money. For example, if a program should coincide with the start of the school year and GRP funds have not yet been distributed, an agency may need to use their reserve funds to cover the program's initial costs. Not all agencies had the ability to function in such a manner and were thus discouraged from participating in GRP, although survey results indicate that over time, GRP was able to develop the capacity

of smaller partner organizations despite these limitations. The importance of funding to program operations remains unclear: surveys suggest that funding became less of a pivotal concern relative to other problems between Waves I and II. However, respondents also indicated that scarcity of funding represented the greatest impediment to the work of GRP.

Phase I program funding was heavily focused on providing prevention programs in the target area while Phase II funding went to support case management services under the prevention and intervention prongs. Several committee members (both funded and not funded) endorsed the importance of funding prevention programs. At least one Phase II provider questioned the allocation of funding for prevention case management, which takes funds away from prevention programming. This reallocation was further criticized by one service provider who received funding to provide after-school activities but was also required to conduct assessments of its participating youth and perform other tasks typically associated with a case manager. This respondent did not think one provider should be paid for work that another provider was forced to perform. Despite criticisms of funding allocations, two-thirds of Wave I respondents and 75 percent of Wave II respondents agreed that GRP resources were being used effectively.

5.3.5. Sustainability

In the first round of interviews in 2005 and 2006, most respondents thought it was too early to tell if GRP would last beyond the grant, but believed the success of GRP would certainly affect agency collaboration beyond the end of Phase II. Most respondents interviewed then also identified sustainability of GRP as a problem and indicated that there had been little discussion of sustainability or of planning for GRP beyond the federal grant period. Although the program coordinator discussed the need for organizations to look for future funding from other sources, the potential life of the GRP programs and relationships beyond the federally funded period was unknown for most of the implementation period. As will be discussed in Section 5.6, in 2007, halfway through Phase II implementation, the City of Los Angeles announced a program that all but guaranteed the continuation of the Boyle Heights GRP beyond the federal August 2008 end date. Before that decision was revealed, partners had expressed concern about the sustainability of the initiative and made suggestions to that end.

Interviews across all study years indicate that CLEAR has been critical to the success of GRP. In later interviews, some respondents suggested pairing each CLEAR site with prevention and intervention programs; "GRP is a complement to CLEAR" and should be "tagged along" with future CLEAR target areas in Los Angeles. In addition, some committee members believed the relationships developed under GRP would continue to exist after federal funding ends, while others indicated the collaboration would likely dissolve. Citizen involvement in GRP was mentioned as critical to sustainability, although its current level remains unclear. Survey respondents indicated that disengaged residents represented a great impediment to GRP efforts, and yet also noted positive changes in community involvement and public awareness as a result of the program. Perhaps these findings indicate that although GRP stimulated more community involvement than in the past, the program still suffered from an overall lack of resident engagement.

5.4. GRP PROGRAM DESIGN, ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

5.4.1. Program Design: Phase I and Phase II Logic Models

Logic models are designed to give a broad view of the program design. The overarching goal of the initiative is to reduce youth gang crime and violence through a combination of primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. In order to determine the appropriate strategies for each prong, the Los Angeles GRP first defined goals for each. These goals seek to complement the larger goal of reducing youth gang crime and violence by addressing some small portion of the larger problem. For example, one of the Los Angeles GRP's prevention goals is "to implement appropriate best-practices primary and secondary prevention programs for the entire population in the target area," indicating that at least part of reducing youth gang crime and violence in the target area on a long-term basis could be accomplished through a preventive approach implemented at the community level.

Table C.1[2] depicts the goals, objectives, and specific activities developed by the GRP subcommittees through their strategic planning process for Phase I. Overarching goals correspond to more concrete objectives on each row; each goal has associated short- and long-term objectives. Each goal and objective is followed by the activities or services that are intended to fulfill that goal and objective. For the most part, these short-term activities took place in the first six months of implementation, with the exception of the suppression prong's long-term goals, which were initiated in Phase I and implemented for the remaining project period. More complete descriptions of each activity are included below in Section 5.4.2.

The Phase I goals in many ways set the stage for Phase II. Phase I goals focus on educating the partners involved in the process about the problem, developing a plan for program implementation, and experimenting with a variety of services designed for high-risk youths. The Phase II logic model is based on the Phase II strategic plan approved in July 2005. As with the previous logic model, goals and objectives for each component (primary and secondary prevention, intervention/reentry, and suppression) were developed by GRP subcommittees under the facilitation of the program coordinator during the regular subcommittee meetings beginning in August 2004. More detailed service plans were then developed to fulfill each goal and objective. The goals and objectives provided in Table C.3 are much more comprehensive than those in Phase I. Each goal and objective is implementation-based rather than planning-based. Phase II programs were designed to be accomplished in the 24-month program period.

5.4.2. Program Inputs and Outputs

The process component of the GRP evaluation seeks to enhance understanding of how the program works, including detailing what activities are undertaken, how different parts of the program operate, and what clients or target populations are served. Outputs are used to inform the process evaluation and directly result from the activities implemented (e.g., the number of clients who receive a particular service). Table C.2 and Table C.4 list each activity designed for Phase I and II, respectively. These models are based on the strategic plan created by the site and have changed throughout the implementation period.

[2] All logic and activity models appear in Appendix C.

Any significant changes between the planned programming and the actual implemented programs will be noted below. The models also predict measurable outputs for each program and describe how these outputs will be measured. The outputs of each activity are then related to expected outcomes, which inform the outcome evaluation, discussed below in Section 5.5. The activity models classify the expected outcomes into several domains. These domains are not directly related to the overarching GRP components (prevention, intervention, and suppression), but instead are based on the site's activities and were used to guide data collection. The six outcome domains identified for both phases in Los Angeles include process, community, corrections, crime, education, and health. The Los Angeles GRP used the two strategic plans to guide implementation of programs during Phases I and II; because of delays with implementation discussed above, there was a financial and operational overlap between Phase I and Phase II.

The Phase I GRP-funded service providers were contractually obligated to provide the program coordinator with program participation details. Development of GRP's ISIS program was not completed in time for Phase I implementation but it was nonetheless important to collect data on program services and participants. To facilitate uniform data acquisition across partner programs, the program coordinator created and distributed an Excel database to each prevention and intervention program to record program details. The database captured the following information about each client: date of birth, gender, race/ethnicity, referral date, referral source (parent, school, probation, self), enrollment and completion date, school attending, grade level, track or what school calendar used, reason for ending participation, other services referred to, and number of activities planned and attended in each month. The database also allowed service providers to document the presence of five specific risk factors demonstrated by each participant. These risk factors included low to average school achievement; behavior problems, such as antisocial, disruptive, or aggressive behavior; delinquent older siblings or peers; poor parental supervision; and low parent-child bonding. At the completion of Phase I, the program coordinator provided UI with this documentation of activities from each program receiving GRP funds. During Phase II, the ISIS program was completed and used in place of the Excel database to collect similar information on clients. Other data on program outputs, including the number of clients served and dosage levels for clients, were gathered during interviews with service providers and the program coordinator.

Quantitative output data collected from these sources are reported in Table 5.2. The table was restricted to quantifiable data that were directly related to serving clients; if an organization used funds to train employees on gang awareness, that output would not be included in the table. However, if the provider of the gang awareness training was funded by GRP and reported the number attending each training, that number would be included in the table. However, in some cases, quantifiable information that does not related directly to clients is included because the data were deemed an important demonstration of a funded partner's activities. The table identifies the phase during which each activity was provided; the inputs, or contracted amount of GRP funding they received, and the outputs, to be read as clients unless otherwise noted. The table includes both Phase I and Phase II activities. Exclusion from this table does not indicate that a program was not executed or that a program did not report any outputs to GRP; it simply means that the program did not report clients served or other quantifiable information that fit the evaluation team's criteria for inclusion.

Table 5.2: Los Angeles Phase I and II Inputs and Outputs

Prong	Provider	Activity	Inputs		Outputs	
			Phase	Contract Amnt ($)	Measurement period	Clients
P	Proyecto Pastoral	IMPACTO	I	$53,571	01/2005-06/2005	34
P	Families in Schools	G.O.T. College!	I	$48,546	01/2005-06/2005	187
P	Inner City Struggle	United Students Junior Club	I	$50,000	01/2005-06/2005	31
P	Hollenbeck PAL	Get It Straight	I		01/2005-06/2005	16
P	Hollenbeck PAL	Knowledge is Power	I	$45,000	01/2005-06/2005	16
I/R	Hollenbeck PAL	Sports for Kids	I		01/2005-06/2005	37
I/R	YO!	Case Management	I	$80,000	01/2005-06/2005	49
S	CLEAR partners	CLEAR planning	I	$100,000	-	-
I/R	YO!	Case Management	I-II	$20,000	07/2005-08/2006	37
P	Big Brothers / Big Sisters	Mentoring	II	$50,000	09/2006-06/2007	13
P	Families in Schools	Going on to College	II	$40,000	12/2006-10/2007	144
P	Hollenback PAL	Get It Straight, Sports for Kids, Academic Enrichment Program	II	$130,000	12/2006-10/2007	150
P	LA County Dept. of Health Svcs.	Nurse-Family Partnership (Prenatal, Infancy Support)	II	$35,000	01/2007-06/2007	12
P	Project Amiga*	Gang Awareness Training	II	$30,000	02/2007-03/2007	22
		Case management	II	$185,000	12/2006-10/2007	19
I/R	Homeboy Industries**	Case management	II	$625,000	12/2006-10/2007	138
P	Roosevelt High School	Teen Court	I-II	$40,000	05/2006-10/2007	18 court sessions
S	CA Dept of Corrections and Rehab.	CLEAR† (Parole agents, LAPD coordinate to manage parolees; special ops)	I-II	[in kind]		
S	LA City Attorney's Office	CLEAR† (Aggressive vertical prosecution)	I-II	$80,000	-	
		CLEAR† (Graduated, community sanctions programs)	I-II			
S	LA County DA's Office	CLEAR† (Review adult felony arrests)	I-II	UNK		
S	LA County Dept. of Probation	CLEAR† (Probation liaison officer)	I-II	$50,000		
S	LAPD	CLEAR† (Referrals of at-risk youth to MDT, other suppression services)	I-II	$270,000	05/2006-06/2007	100

Note: All Phase II client numbers from ISIS cover the period 12/2006 - 10/2007; 10/2007 represents a partial month of data.

*Project Amiga reported an additional 32 clients served but did not specify which program served those clients; they are not included here.

**Homeboy Industries reported an additional 44 clients served but did not specify which program served those clients; they are not included here.

†CLEAR contracts were not finalized at the time of the report. Funding amounts reported here were planned. CLEAR data cover 8/2003-12/2006. Shown are: for CA DOC, Adult parolee arrests; for LA DA, Felony case reviews; for CA DOP, Probationer contacts.

Implementation of programs and services under both phases was highlighted during the surveys in 2006 and 2007, while interviews with committee members from 2005–2007 addressed, in part, implementation of Phase I and Phase II through spring 2007. In interviews, service providers were asked to describe their agencies, their programs, and their experiences as Los Angeles GRP subcontractors. Service providers and other advisory committee members were also asked about successes and obstacles to implementation and recommendations for change. Aside from issues associated with implementation, interviews gave service providers a forum for explaining what GRP funds allowed them to accomplish in the finite period of GRP funding. Findings from the surveys and interviews regarding implementation are included below.

5.4.3. Phase I

All services contracted through GRP were required either to be provided in the target area or to service target area youth. Nearly $200,000 was committed to prevention services providers. Intervention services received $80,000, while $100,000 went to suppression services. The allocations totaled just over $400,000 dollars for Phase I activities. As previously mentioned, the aggressive timeline introduced by OJJDP made it necessary for MCJPO to decide on sole source contracts. If Phase I programs had been put up for competitive bid, the entire process could have taken longer than six months to implement as the City Council must approve each decision along the way. As of June 30, 2005, the terms of most Phase I service contracts had been fulfilled, with a few exceptions noted below. Table 5.3 summarizes information collected from each program during Phase I that was not reported above as an input or output. These details are discussed along with program descriptions below.

GRP funds allowed each Phase I provider to expand its service in some way. Imaginando Manana Pico-Aliso Community Team Outreach (IMPACTO) and Going On To College! (G.O.T. College!) were introduced into the target area, while Hollenbeck PAL, United Students Jr. Club, and YO! adapted their existing target area programs to age groups different from those they were serving prior to GRP. After Phase I was complete, many service providers—rather than wholly dismissing GRP participants—continued to welcome GRP participants at a scaled-back level of service provision. For instance, IMPACTO no longer provided transportation for their GRP participants; however, many participants arranged their own transportation to the program regularly. G.O.T. College! continued in the parochial elementary school beyond Phase I.

Prevention

Three service providers were awarded contracts to provide five prevention activities during the six months of Phase I implementation. The IMPACTO program, operated by Proyecto Pastoral at Dolores Mission, works with parents and students to set academic goals and encourage higher education; the program includes artistic lessons, computer skills, and youth development, as well as homework assistance and tutoring. Located in the Pico-Aliso neighborhood within the comparison area, the IMPACTO program expanded its existing programming to include youth ages 10 to 14 years old from the target area. Program staff transported participants from Stevenson Middle School in the target area to the facility and then back to the middle school or home each evening. This replication of service in

Table 5.3: Los Angeles: Characteristics of Phase I Programming and Participants

	Families in Schools	Inner City Struggle	IMPACTO	PAL Get it Straight	PAL Sports	PAL Know-ledge is Power	Yo! Intensive Transition
Participants	187	31	34	16	37	16	49
Referral Source							
Self	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
School	187	0	14	16	37	0	10
Parent	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Probation	0	0	0	0	0	0	24
Other	0	31	20	0	0	16	12
Risk Factors							
Delinquent Peers & Siblings	15	0	11	8	35	12	26
Behavioral Problems	24	0	10	12	37	15	23
Low Parent Bond	17	0	8	13	37	5	23
Low/Average School Achievement	41	0	31	13	35	4	26
Poor Parental Control	21	0	6	11	36	7	31
Ethnicity							
Latino/a	183	31	34	16	37	13	49
Other	4	0	0	0	0	3	0
Gender							
Female	106	22	19	5	7	9	5
Male	81	9	15	11	30	7	44

Notes:

• Data from Yo! Intensive Transition is incomplete because the program was funded through Dec. 31, 2005 with a no-cost extension.

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program, Phase I programming records.

the target and comparison areas could affect the ability of the evaluation team to attribute any relevant changes in youths in the target area to this program. IMPACTO received an extension on program services during Phase I, extending their programming through July 31, 2005. Thirty-four 10 to 14 year olds from the target area participated in the program, all Latino/a, with equal numbers of males and females. Nearly all participants showed signs of low-to-average school achievement and nearly a third had delinquent siblings or peers. The program did not reapply for Phase II funds, however, because of more stringent Phase II requirements for providers, including the necessity for programs to operate within the GRP target boundaries (rather than providing transportation for the target area youths to the program site), and because the amount of funding over the two year period was not deemed adequate.

A second program, Families in Schools, originally planned on partnering with a public elementary school in the target area. This partnership, however, did not materialize. Instead, the organization developed a partnership with a private elementary school in the target area to provide a program focused on the transition from elementary to middle school, college preparation and awareness, and fostering a supportive home environment

called G.O.T. College!. Fifth graders from four elementary schools in the target area—Euclid, Sunrise, Dena, and Resurrection—attended workshops on career exploration, study habits, and college preparation. Some students were also able to visit local universities. Originally provided elsewhere in Los Angeles, this program was introduced to the target area for the first time through GRP. In the original strategic plan, Families in Schools was also slated to organize the Summer BRIDGE program in the target area with GRP funding; given the timing of Phase I (Jan–June 2005), however, the summer program was not provided. Most of the 187 students served by the G.O.T. College! program in Phase I were Latina females. Of five possible risk factors, low-to-average academic achievement was the most pervasive among participants, followed by behavioral problems.

United Students Junior Club, operated by InnerCity Struggle, focused on leadership development through engagement in school and in the community. The club provided academic assistance, career guidance, social and cultural activities, and clinical management as necessary. Youths meet weekly to develop leadership skills through research, public speaking, meeting facilitation, civic engagement in school and the community, and team-building activities. InnerCity Struggle used GRP funding to expand the program to sixth and seventh graders from Hollenbeck Middle School in the target area. Previously, only high school students were involved. InnerCity Struggle served 31 youths in Phase I, the majority of whom were Latina females. No risk factors were indicated for any participants.

The Hollenbeck PAL was funded to operate two prevention programs, Get it Straight and Knowledge is Power. The Hollenbeck PAL was granted a no-cost extension through September 30, 2005 because it did not expend all grant funds by the designated June 30, 2005 end date. Get it Straight is a 12-week crime and violence prevention program for at-risk and high-risk youths ages 8 to 10, with participants from Wyvernwood Apartments or Estrada Courts public housing development, or youth attending Dena Elementary School. GRP funding allowed PAL to adapt their existing curriculum to elementary school-aged youth. Weekly workshops and trips to juvenile detention centers educate youths about the consequences of living a life of crime and address conflict resolution between parents and children. Sixteen youths, mostly male and all Latino, participated in Get it Straight. Half of the participants exhibited at least one risk factor. Low parent-child bonding and low-to-average school achievement were the most pervasive risk factors among participants, although behavioral problems were also common. All youth were referred to this program by their schools.

Knowledge is Power is an abstinence and literacy-based program for girls attending Roosevelt High School and their mothers. The program focuses on educating participants about their relationships with their mothers and other females in order to understand how these relationships impact their development into adulthood. This program served sixteen participants, most of whom were Latina and reported delinquent peers and siblings or behavioral problems.

Intervention/Reentry

Sports for Kids, an intervention program involving after-school sports and recreational programs, expanded PAL's existing programming. The expansion allowed Sports for Kids to target youths ages 8 to 18 years living in Estrada Courts, a public housing development highly associated with the Varrio Nuevo Estrada (VNE) gang. Programming was designed

to occupy the after-school hours with constructive activities, rather than potential risk activities. GRP funds also allowed for some youths to travel outside the Boyle Heights neighborhood to go camping, hiking, and attend professional sporting events. The program served 37 youths, all Latino and the majority male. This group of youths was very high risk as nearly all exhibited five risk factors. All participants were referred by their schools.

The intervention case management provider, YO!, served active gang members and youth age 14 to 22 years closely associated with gang members. The organization also provided case management for gang members and other youth returning to the community from confinement. An intervention or reentry plan for each participant was developed to include referrals to area services, such as counseling, parenting classes, tutoring, college preparation courses, job training, high school equivalency completions, and other services necessary to ensure a successful transition from gang life or reentry into the community. The GRP funding allowed expansion of services to accommodate more youths in the target area. YO! served 49 youths by the end of June 2005. The majority of participants were male, all Latino, and their ages ranged from 14 to 22 years old. Poor parental supervision and low-to-average academic achievement represented the predominant risk factors of the youth served. As noted in the Categorical/Discretionary Assistance Progress Report for the second half of 2005, approximately three-quarters of those involved with the intensive transition program claim some gang affiliation, while the remainder bear close associations with gang members. The GRP full-time case manager recruited and maintained an active caseload of clients, most of whom were on probation or parole. The case manager also actively recruited clients through the GRP referral program established with the LAPD, described below. After being granted a no-cost extension to provide services from June 2005 through December 2005, YO! continued to support its clients with additional GRP funds under a supplemental contract through the end of August 2006. A new provider for intervention case management was selected for Phase II (Homeboy Industries) and the YO! case manager maintained the GRP caseload and met with Homeboy Industries case managers to ensure a proper transition from one provider to another.

Suppression

Given the nature of the suppression components of GRP, data collection to assess suppression activities was not performed in the same manner as it was for the prevention and intervention components that were tracked in the program coordinator's database. Furthermore, GRP suppression activities during Phase I focused primarily on planning Phase II activities and were not quantifiable. Development of protocol for anticipated incidents, including community notification and requested response by law enforcement, began during Phase I. Work between the CLEAR Operations Team and probation officers to establish a reentry orientation process for formerly incarcerated youth returning to the target area for intervention services also began in Phase I.

CLEAR The suppression component of GRP is being implemented through partnership with an existing multi-agency law enforcement collaborative, CLEAR. The CLEAR Program is federally funded through former President Clinton's Anti-Gang Initiative, which provided funding for 15 anti-gang programs nationally in 1996. The first CLEAR target area, northeast of downtown Los Angeles, was selected in response to the shooting death

of a three-year-old girl the year before. Members of the Avenues gang killed Stephanie Kuhen when her parents became lost while driving through the gang-controlled neighborhood (Parks and Papke, 2006). As of 2005, Los Angeles CLEAR targets gang crime in six gang-entrenched neighborhoods; CLEAR began in the Boyle Heights target area in 2003. CLEAR's mission is to "facilitate the recovery of gang-infested communities" by coordinating resources in targeted areas of high gang crime to decrease gang violence and promote recovery of the community. The core Boyle Heights agencies involved in this effort are the Mayor's Office, Los Angeles County District Attorney, LAPD, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles County Probation Department, Los Angeles City Attorney, and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole. Representatives from each agency meet regularly as the CLEAR Operations Team to address gang activity and enforcement in Boyle Heights.

CLEAR involves deploying LAPD gang officers to establish a presence of law enforcement in the community and participate in community outreach through Community Impact Team (CIT) meetings with selected target area citizens who are motivated to recover their community from gang violence. CLEAR prosecutors—both District Attorneys and City Attorneys—conduct vertical prosecution of those arrested by the LAPD CLEAR officers; the City Attorney handles misdemeanors, while the District Attorney addresses felony cases. Vertical prosecution is a method of case assignment within the district attorney or city attorney offices that creates continuity throughout the prosecutorial process by assigning a prosecutor to a case from the initial filing to the final court disposition. This staffing decision allows attorneys to gain specialized expertise in the area of gangs and gang-related prosecution and to spend more time on each case while developing more effective working relationships with investigators and police involved in gang-related cases. Parole and probation officers also work closely with LAPD to identify community members violating conditions of their release and control gang activity through jail intelligence (Lodestar Management/Research, 2002).

GRP and CLEAR share identical geographic boundaries for service delivery in Boyle Heights, making collaboration advantageous for coordinating resources allocated to reducing violent gang crime in the target area. As part of GRP, a liaison between CLEAR and GRP serves as the direct link between the suppression team already operating in Boyle Heights and the GRP MDT and intervention and prevention components.

GRP suppression services received just over $100,000 in Phase I. These activities largely involved planning of policies and programming to be implemented beyond the first six months of funding. These policies included a protocol for identifying the most violent and active gang members, a critical incidents protocol, a reentry program for probationers and formerly incarcerated youth in conjunction with the Los Angeles County Department of Probation, and a system of graduated sanctions by the City Attorney's Office. Graduated sanctions would allow juvenile and minor offenders in the target area to opt for alternative penalties focusing on community service, educational skills, vocational skills, or a job training program rather than traditional criminal penalties.

A law enforcement-GRP liaison position was supported for $20,400 to serve as the direct link between CLEAR and GRP. A team of suppression members was supported for $41,600 to develop a list of gang members on probation and parole and a list of parolees at large, develop the graduated sanctions system and critical incidents protocol, and develop a reentry process. Finally, $39,000 went to support a probation community

resource specialist to identify resources in the target area for linking probationers with appropriate service providers, develop relationships with LAUSD personnel and probation officers, develop graduated sanctions system, and establish and assist with a probation camp for graduates reentering the target area.

Gang Injunctions Another effort related to suppression, but not a direct result of GRP funding, was the introduction of gang injunctions in the target area. Gang injunctions represent another gang-fighting tool used throughout the city. A gang injunction is a restraining order against members of a specific gang to prohibit them from engaging in activities that bring crime and fear to their neighborhoods. The City Attorney's office works with LAPD to identify specific gangs and gang members and to gather evidence necessary to support an injunction. The California Supreme Court invokes the gang injunction, declaring a gang's public behavior as a nuisance, in response to a civil suit submitted by the City Attorney. The civil suit requests that special rules be directed towards a gang's activity within a specific geographic area. For example, an injunction may restrict members from loitering in public with other gang members; intimidating victims and witnesses; possessing or using guns, weapons, alcohol, or narcotics; disobeying a curfew imposed on a gang; and trespassing. If a gang member is caught violating the injunction, he or she is arrested for a misdemeanor and the City Attorney charges him or her with a violation of contempt. The first injunction was issued in 1993 against a gang in Van Nuys; there are currently 33 injunctions against more than 50 gangs throughout the city (Office of the City Attorney, 2007)

The City Attorney's Office issued gang injunctions for two of the gangs in the target area: VNE in November 2004 and White Fence in July 2006. The injunctions against VNE and White Fence prohibit gang members from gathering with one another in public. Initially, the legal action against VNE caused conflict within the community. Community members were apparently unclear as to the meaning of the injunction. Some GRP committee members believed the injunction potentially threatened the ability of the GRP program to reach clients, as preventing gang members from congregating prohibited multiple members from accessing GRP services at the same time. However, the injunction had a written exception for gang members who were attending GRP services, and the program coordinator worked with GRP members from the LAPD and City Attorney's Office to defuse misunderstandings about the injunction in the community. This effort reflected a great deal of compromise and collaboration on the part of both GRP and law enforcement, and arguably reflected law enforcement's commitment to GRP. Little to no community unrest resulted from the legal action against the second gang.

Graduated Sanctions A memorandum from a deputy City Attorney, dated June 8, 2005, outlines the graduated sanction program being implemented by the City Attorney's Office in conjunction with GRP. The graduated sanctions program is an alternative sentencing program in which offenders age 18 to 21 years who are first-time offenders or who commit minor offenses may be deferred from justice system sanctions to community-based sanctions. If the defendant is eligible for intervention services through GRP, the City Attorney will recommend deferral.

The Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, in coordination with the intervention service provider, the YO! program, and the program coordinator, developed the program and

began referring youth offenders and adults to the intervention case manager. A referred defendant meets with the intervention case manager to develop an intervention plan to address the specific needs of the individual youth. The plan is forwarded to the City Attorney and the Court and monitored through periodic reports from the case manager to the City Attorney. A report details the progress the youth has made toward fulfilling the goals set forth in his or her intervention plan and guides the City Attorney and the Court in determining whether the defendant is in compliance with the intervention plan and may continue serving his or her alternative sentence with the intervention program. Data collected thus far in the evaluation have not included specific information on how frequently referrals are made to the intervention case manager under this program.

Other Programs

The Story Project As mentioned in the Phase I planning section above, CIS was initially introduced as one potential prevention service provider for Phase I funding. As a federal partner, CIS remained involved in GRP; however, grant funds were allocated to CIS from OJJDP that were separate from Los Angeles GRP's grant funds. CIS, in turn, funded The Story Project (TSP) in August 2005 with the grant from OJJDP. TSP ran two 10-week arts programs out of the future One-Stop community center. The first session, begun in August 2005, focused on teaching participants to use photography, spoken word, and poetry to express themselves. The second session began in November 2005 and focused on short films, screenwriting, and acting as creative outlets for expression. This second session culminated in participants' short films debuting at a special viewing for friends and family. For each session, TSP organizers introduced participants to the arts with the help of local artisans.

Roosevelt High School Teen Court The operation of the Roosevelt High School Teen Court is not limited to either phase of programming. Beginning in 2005, the GRP program coordinator worked with the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Los Angeles County Department of Probation, and Roosevelt High School (RHS) staff to establish the teen court program at RHS, the target area high school. The teen court serves as an immediate intervention for juvenile, first-time offenders who have been referred by the Department of Probation and who can be diverted from the traditional juvenile justice system.

The court provides immediate sanctions by holding youth accountable for minor delinquent acts in a positive manner, while extending his/her accountability to the community, typically in the form of community service. Youth ages 14 to 17 who are first-time offenders are referred to the court; to reduce the risk of retaliation, the teen court does not hear cases involving Roosevelt High School students. Staff works with other teen court staff to refer them outside Roosevelt High School. Los Angeles County Superior Court judges volunteer as teen court presiding judges. The RHS presiding judge receives case information from the RHS probation officer and prepares jury instructions for each case, including an appropriate list of sanctions from which the jury may choose. As juries deliberate, the judge typically engages the gallery in discussions of each case. While student jurors hear the case, determine the verdict, and provide sentencing recommendations, the Los Angeles County Superior Court judge makes the final sentencing decision.

In December 2005 RHS youth and staff, including one assistant principal, visited a nearby high school with a teen court program where the youth were invited to participate

as jurors in a petty theft case. A Los Angeles Superior Court judge volunteered to serve the RHS teen court. Two high school staff members, nominated by their school principal, received stipends to be the court coordinators; they attended a national training in December 2005 regarding teen court issues, including staffing and funding, legal issues, applying restorative justice principles in youth courts, volunteer recruitment and training, and program evaluation.

All RHS participants and youth from other schools attended a teen court orientation in April 2006; court convened for the first session in May 2006 and continues to meet once a month. Each session hears two cases. Two juries are randomly selected from the youth in attendance. Students are also assigned to fill the roles of the court, such as translator, bailiff, and court reporter. The court typically hears vandalism cases, although public disorder and battery cases have also been heard. As of October 2007, the teen court has held eighteen sessions that run two hours each. GRP also continued to negotiate with the Superior Court for the purchase of courtroom furniture for RHS, anticipated for spring 2008.

5.4.4. Phase II

Aside from prevention, intervention/reentry, and suppression services, GRP's Phase II plans included the One-Stop community center, ISIS, a formal referral system between law enforcement officers and community-based organizations, and graduated and community-based sanctions with community organizations. Unlike Phase I's sole source selection process, the majority of service contractors for Phase II were chosen through a competitive grant process. Execution of contracts with selected contractors distributed just over $1 million over a 24-month programming period to those selected. Primary prevention programs were funded for a total of $155,000, and secondary prevention programs for a total of $315,000. Intervention and reentry services were funded for $625,000, while suppression agencies will share $400,000 of GRP funding. Funding was also granted for a teen court prevention program and suppression services on a sole source basis. These contracts were sole source awards because the programs were unique to the agencies. Service provision for five contractors (excluding the Nurse-Family Partnership) began in September 2006 and will run for 24 months through August 2008. The Mayor's Office took several additional months to finalize the contract for prenatal services with the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services. Phase II programming officially began September 2006 and is expected to run through August 2008.

A combination of service providers and teams of support services were selected, in part, based on the service gaps identified through the community needs assessment. The entire menu of Phase II services was intended to revolve around the One-Stop community center. Expected to serve as the hub for prevention and intervention case managers and client intake, this center was intended to operate from a facility currently run by an organization affiliated with YO!. The facility was chosen because of its location within the geographical boundaries of the target area but disconnection from any particular gang affiliation. The YO! center also houses the GRP coordinator's field office and the GRP advisory committee meetings. Unfortunately, the full potential of the One-Stop center never materialized. Although the YO! center is available for service provider use, it does not serve as a centralized in-take point; instead, each service provider performs intake at their own offices. Several prevention providers also use the space to hold workshops

and provide services, but the program coordinator speculated that the concept was not realized in part because the center did not provide any services other than those of GRP and because GRP lacked direct control of the space. These factors limited the One-Stop's capacity.

GRP funding will augment the level of programs and wraparound services available to individuals and their families already available through YO!. During client intake, case managers will gather information about youths and their families seeking services, determine GRP eligibility (and refer to non-GRP service providers if necessary), conduct risk assessments, and develop a service plan with referrals to GRP-funded services or other services as needed.

Client Tracking System The GRP program coordinator, with assistance from the City's Information Technology agency, continued her work to create a data collection interface, ISIS, that accommodates both the City's reporting requirements and the requirements of the evaluation. Programs funded through the City have access to ISIS and may customize the data entry interface based on their particular needs. Every client receives one unique ISIS identification number that is used by all service providers and agencies with which he or she has contact, thereby allowing users to see a client's service history. The GRP interface includes fields for collected client demographics; criminal history, including probation or parole officer contact information; educational achievement; living situation; barriers to employment, such as transportation or health problems; employment information if applicable; career and educational goals; service plan listing, including program and providers as well as requirements and completion details; client follow-up with accomplishments achieved since intake; and referrals to outside agencies. Each service provider funded through GRP has access to this web-based system and is required to enter information about its clients.

Contractors received training on the assessment tool to be used during Phase II (the Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency check up) and motivational interviewing during a three day seminar by the Justice System Assessment and Training Center of Boulder, Colorado on December 12–14, 2006. This risk assessment tool, selected by the program coordinator, is automated in ISIS and helps service providers evaluate each client's risk factors within the domains of delinquency, education, family, peers, and substance abuse. The tool can assist case managers in designing program plans tailored to each client's particular risks and needs. Contractors received their ISIS usernames and identification two days after the seminar and began inputting client data right away. The program coordinator continues to work with the Community Development Department (CDD)to develop outcome-based reports. Additional trainings for service providers occurred on April 12 and July 10, 2007.

In October 2007, UI received all data from ISIS that had been entered by GRP contractors, and used this information to compile both demographic information on clients by prong[3] (see Table 5.4) and information on clients served by specific programs (see Table 5.2). The funding amounts provided to all Phase II providers and contract periods are also provided in Table 5.2. The data provided by each program for Phase II are summarized below.

[3]Primary and secondary prevention activities are reported as one category; the structure of the data made it difficult to accurately assign clients to prevention subcategories.

Table 5.4: Los Angeles: Characteristics of Phase II Programming and Participants

	Prong		
	Primary & Secondary Prevention	Intervention	Uncategorized
Clients Enrolled, Dec 2006-Oct 2007†			
number of clients	393	138	22
% male	66.9%	60.1%	63.6%
age at enrollment (years)			
median	10.0	17.0	16.0
mean	10.6	16.8	15.9
standard error	0.178	0.160	0.812
% current gang member	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%
% past gang member	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%
% tagging crew member	20.0%	1.7%	0.0%
% gang associate	38.3%	10.8%	0.0%

†Partial data are reported for October 2007.
Note: Although Homeboy Industries was contracted to provide intervention services, ISIS indicates that 24 of its clients were enrolled as prevention cases.
Source: Authors' analysis of data extracted from ISIS data system.

Primary and Secondary Prevention

Primary prevention strategies focus on decreasing risk factors while increasing protective factors for the entire population in the target area, while secondary prevention activities are targeted at youth ages 7 to 17 years. Table 5.4 reveals that between December 2006 and October 2007 (partial data), the primary and secondary prevention programs served 393 clients, of which 67 percent were male. The median age of these clients was 10 years old. More than one in five clients served was identified as a member of a tagging crew and well over a third as gang associates. These clients participated in such activities as BBBS programs, G.O.T. College!, Hollenbeck PAL activities, and case management.

Prenatal and infancy support services are provided with the Nurse-Family Partnership Program operated by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services. Support is provided to first-time, low-income mothers in collaboration with Roosevelt High School's Healthy Start Program and Infant Center and local hospitals. With GRP funding of $35,000, services are aimed at improving maternal, prenatal, and early childhood health and education, and include case management, nutrition education, in-home support services, pregnancy planning, early child development, and referrals to other service providers for additional assistance. Through June 2007, the Nurse-Family Partnership Program provided prenatal and infancy services to 12 high-risk teenage mothers living within the target area. The program required that mothers be less than 28 weeks pregnant when they sign up, live in poverty, and have a very high risk for poor birth outcomes.

As in Phase I, FIS was contracted by GRP to provide its G.O.T. College! program. During Phase II, FIS was contracted to serve 90 fifth graders and their parents attending three target area elementary schools from September 2006 through July 2007. Teachers referred students who would be the first in their families to go to college, have potential to benefit

from college education, come from a low-income family, reside in a disadvantaged neighborhood with high gang involvement, and have low parental support. Students attend two workshops per month while parents attend one parent workshop per month. All workshops are facilitated by trained teacher mentors who received curricula and implementation guides during a training session. Student sessions cover topics such as personal empowerment, work and study habits for academic success, problem solving and conflict resolution, career exploration, and researching colleges or universities. Parent sessions cover topics such as supporting their child's success, the transition from elementary to middle school, financial aid, and strengthening the parent/child relationship. Three joint student-parent workshops include goal setting, college requirements, and saving for college. The Phase II grant also includes a Saturday conference at an area university and a culmination ceremony at each elementary school to honor participants. FIS was chosen as a sole source contractor because an insufficient number of proposals were received for the truancy and drop-out prevention RFP. FIS initially received $40,000 in Phase II funding, but an additional $24,000 in funding from carry over Phase I funds were made available for the program. With additional funding enabling the program to target two additional schools, G.O.T. College! served 144 fifth grade students from Dena, Euclid, Lorena, Resurrection, and Sunrise Elementary Schools from September 2006 through July 2007.

The Hollenbeck PAL received $130,000 in GRP funding to provide three primary and secondary prevention programs during Phase II. The Get It Straight and Sports for Kids programs, described above in Section 5.4.3, were offered again in Phase II. GRP funding allowed the Get it Straight curriculum to be expanded from its traditional middle school focus (ages 11 to 14 years) and be tailored to elementary school youth ages 8 to 10 years. GRP support also allowed Sports for Kids to expand their existing recreational programming to include at least fifty more youth ages 7 to 14 years who reside in the target area, especially Estrada Courts public housing development or Wyvernwood Apartments. Structured recreational and sports activities, such as basketball, indoor and outdoor soccer leagues, and outings and weekend trips are provided for target area youth throughout the two year grant period. PAL also provides an Academic Enrichment program, considered both primary and secondary prevention, which offers homework assistance and academic enrichment activities for two hours after school four days a week. This program, provided at the PAL Learning Center located just outside the target area boundary, targets youth ages 7 to 14 years. At a minimum, participants must belong to a multi-generational gang, have a sibling in a gang, reside in a single parent household, reside in Estrada Courts public housing development or Wyvernwood Apartments, be at risk of academic failure due to truancy, be involved in drugs or alcohol, or have been born to a teenage mother. Participants must also have a personal and parental commitment to make a change in their lives. According to the ISIS system, between December 2006 and October 2007 (partial data), the Hollenbeck PAL served at least 150 youths through these three programs.

BBBS was awarded $50,000 to provide mentors for high-risk youth ages 10 to 14 years who reside in the target area. BBBS was funded to recruit 25 youth in the first year of the grant, and an additional 25 in year two. Youth participants who exhibit risk factors, such as general delinquency, low academic aspirations, low achievement, academic failure, lack of a positive role model in the home, poor parental supervision, delinquent older siblings involved in gangs, family history of a problem behavior, and association with delinquent

peers, are recruited for placement with a positive, adult role model. Volunteer mentors were recruited through collaboration with Roosevelt High School, Roosevelt High School Alumni Association, neighboring colleges and universities, community organizations, local businesses, faith-based institutions, and law enforcement. The mentor meets with the youth at least twice per month for a minimum of two hours and provides individualized services that work to reduce risk factors, such as low academic achievement or association with delinquent peers, and increase protective factors, such as self-esteem, academic performance, and students' relationships. Through June 2007, BBBS had matched thirteen youth with mentors, with an additional 6 youth waiting for matches. All youth live within the target area and meet with their mentors twice a month for activities such as attending baseball games, seeing movies, and going to the park. The biggest challenge for the mentoring program lies in finding male mentors for the male youth remaining on the waiting list. Big Brothers Big Sisters continues to recruit new youth and mentors throughout the community.

Project Amiga received $185,000, to provide secondary prevention case management to at least 60 clients ages 7 to 14 years. Two case managers provide case management and individualized services for at-risk youth and their families residing in the target area. These services address risk factors at the individual, family, peer, school, and community levels. The case managers work out of the City's Youth Opportunity Center, where they conduct client recruitment and enrollment, carry out needs and strengths assessments of clients, develop individualized plans for services, provide referrals, and track client progress. Furthermore, case managers communicate regularly with school personnel, community organizations, child welfare agencies, faith-based organizations, local parks, and, if necessary, law enforcement, and have also collaborated with other GRP partners including Homeboy Industries, BBBS and FIS. Unfortunately, Project Amiga has experienced considerable case manager turnover since the start of its GRP contract. This staffing issue could potentially impede the program's ability to build relationships with clients and appears to have impacted client levels. Through October 2007, ISIS shows that Project Amiga had served only 19 clients under it case management program. GRP staff are working closely with the organization to improve address turnover issues and increase service provision levels.

Project Amiga also provides gang awareness training to teachers, staff, parents, and community members to educate them on identifying early signs of gang involvement and developing strategies to deal with the gang problem on campus and in the community. Training topics include gang identification (i.e., attire, moniker, language), laws, rights and responsibilities of parents (i.e., California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Provision Act, Gun-Free School Zones Act, gang injunctions, gang crime), and resources available within the community. Project Amiga is contracted to facilitate a total of six one-hour and two four-hour gang awareness training sessions within the target area during Phase II with a grant of $30,000 for September 2006 through August 2008. The training sessions are conducted with cooperation among LAPD, CLEAR, LAUSD school police, Los Angeles County Department of Probation, and gang intervention service providers, including Homeboy Industries. To ensure student and parent participation, trainings are scheduled during student orientations, school open houses, or when deemed appropriate by school personnel. Project Amiga conducted two four-week long training sessions during Phase II. The first four-week session began on February 26, 2007 at Dena Elementary School. Speakers

included representatives from LAPD's Gang Unit, the Department of Probation, Homeboy Industries, and other GRP service providers. At least 22 parents and teachers completed the first training.

Intervention and Reentry

Gang intervention services are designed to target active gang members and youth ages 14 to 22 residing in the target area who are closely associated with gang members. Reentry services are designed for offenders, gang members or not, returning to the target area community from confinement. Intervention services require aggressive outreach and ongoing recruitment, while reentry services require planning and coordination with confinement facilities, probation/parole and juvenile justice agencies, and law enforcement. Homeboy Industries, recipient of a $625,000 grant from GRP, is responsible for providing gang intervention and reentry services to a minimum of 150 youth participants. From December 2006 through part of October 2007, the intervention program served 138 youth, of whom 60 percent were male with a median age of 17 years. Less than two percent of intervention clients were identified as current gang members, former gang members, or members of a tagging crew while just over 10 percent of clients were identified as gang associates. According to data entered into the ISIS system, the prevention prong served a greater percentage of clients with loose gang ties than did the intervention/reentry prong. This observation, however, may be a reflection more of different providers' level of use of ISIS than of the actual types of clients receiving intervention services.

Three case managers have provided intensive case management and intensive supportive services to the youth enrolled in Homeboy Industries' intervention/reentry programming. The lead case manager, though not originally from Los Angeles, appears to have a positive working relationship with the LAPD. One of the other case managers is a former gang member. Homeboy Industries primarily recruits youth through the GRP referral system, but also coordinates with Probation services to recruit clients. This recruitment method, from within detention facilities, represents a compromise between GRP members, who planned to fund gang outreach workers in Phase II to recruit youth into intervention services, and Homeboy Industries, whose philosophy does not include traditional street outreach methods.

Homeboy Industries and Project Amiga also started a mentor project with five secondary prevention clients and three employees from Homeboy Industries. In July and August 2006, the mentors and youth spent a day together engaging in various outdoor activities. According to anecdotal reports, although the youth were hesitant at first, ultimately they were thankful to connect with others who had grown up in their neighborhood and lived in similar conditions.

Like Project Amiga, Homeboy Industries also faced some staff changes following the departure of its lead case manager. One of the then-current case managers assumed lead manager responsibilities in August 2007, and a new case manager was hired to maintain a three person team. These staff changes could potentially upset the working relationship that has been steadily improving between Homeboy Industries and the LAPD.

Client Referral System The program coordinator worked with suppression subcommittee members to develop a formal system for LAPD and LAUSD police officers to refer youth identified as truant or potentially at risk of getting in trouble with the law to GRP's

community-based intervention or prevention services. Development of the client referral system began during Phase I and culminated in the distribution of client referral books to LAPD officers at the February 2006 advisory committee meeting and later to Probation, LAUSD, and GRP contractors. These books include referral slips, in triplicate, where officers record the youth's name, address, phone number, date of birth, and sex as well as parent or guardian contact information. The referral slip also includes the location and date of contact, the reason for referral, information about the referring officer, and any comments that officer provided. One copy of the referral goes to the youth and/or family, one copy remains with the agency, and the final copy is provided to the MDT for discussion and referral to appropriate providers. The program coordinator trained foot-patrol officers, CLEAR officers, and gang detectives on referral procedures, reporting requirements, and services available to youth and families. The first training for the client referral system of all CLEAR officers and detectives occurred on May 18, 2006 and covered client referral procedures, reporting requirements, and services available for any referred youth. From May 2006 through June 2007, there have been over 100 referrals; unfortunately, many of these clients do not qualify for GRP services because they reside outside the target area.

Suppression

Suppression services were also not part of the competitive bid process. These services are designed to remove dangerous and influential gang members from the community, to work with community-based organizations to develop graduated sanctions for less serious offenders, to share information and coordinate the efforts of confinement facilities and service providers, and to develop a formal referral process between law enforcement and community-based organizations. Several state and local agencies already involved in the CLEAR initiative will be granted financial support to provide further suppression services in the target area in conjunction with GRP.

GRP and LAPD negotiated a new contract in 2006 to cover suppression services for the remainder of the federal grant period; however, this this contract was still not official as of November 2007. The only new provision of this contract was the added collaboration of CLEAR and GRP on curfew sweeps. LAPD will continue CLEAR patrolling operations as well as support community outreach efforts undertaken in collaboration with the GRP intervention and prevention service providers and the MDT. Other CLEAR contracts also continue to be negotiated. The Los Angeles City Attorney's Office continues its participation on the MDT in addition to handling aggressive vertical prosecution of all misdemeanor and quality-of-life crimes committed by adult gang members. The City Attorney is also working with intervention services and the program coordinator to develop a graduated sanctions program for less serious offenders. For their involvement, the City Attorney's office will receive $80,000 over two years. The County Department of Probation will receive $50,000 over two years to participate in special operations, search and seizures, ride-alongs and selective enforcement. Finally, a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation parole agent will coordinate with LAPD to collaborate enforcement efforts that seek out parolees in the target area for more effective supervision. This service is provided as an in-kind contribution. The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, while not directly receiving GRP funds during Phase II, contributes to CLEAR's effort nonetheless. The District Attorney reviews all adult felony arrests made by the CLEAR team, aggressively vertically prosecutes all serious and violent gang felonies, and main-

tains contact with CLEAR investigators to ensure full preparation is undertaken for felony cases.

Lodestar Research Management, the funded evaluator of the City's CLEAR program, provided UI with monthly tracking data collected from each CLEAR team member, including: LAPD, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Los Angeles City Attorney, and Los Angeles County Probation Department. Data provided in October 2007 covered the period from August 2003 through December 2006. Selected data elements are provided in Table 5.2. One role of the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was to work with the LAPD to identify and manage parolees in the target area; Table 5.2 displays the monthly number of adult parolee arrests for the period, showing a peak of 10 arrests in June 2004; arrests decline after that point to an average of less than 2 adult parolee arrests per month. This overall decline could reflect the fact that the program may not have started in earnest until the very end of the period covered by these data.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney was committed to reviewing adult felony arrests made by the CLEAR team; Table 5.2 provides monthly adult felony case reviews by the DA. Reviews peak at 7 in April 2004, then show a gradual decline over the next several months. Reviews increased towards the end of the reporting period, perhaps reflecting a reinvigoration of the effort as Phase II started near the end of 2006. The Los Angeles County Department of Probation operated several gang related programs in the target area and also provided a liaison to work with LAPD and GRP. Table 5.2 provides the monthly number of probationers in the target area with whom the department had contact; the data show a peak at 31 contacts in April 2006. This pattern indicates that the Department may indeed have been focusing more effort in the target area as part of both CLEAR and GRP.

The following section considers the impact of the above-discussed activities, using statistical analyses to consider what outcomes can be attributed to GRP activities and how extensive those outcomes have been to date.

5.5. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

The Phase I and Phase II activity models shown in Tables C.2 and C.4 (Appendix C relate the specific outputs of each activity to their expected outcomes. These relationships inform the outcome evaluation by pointing to the outcomes of greatest relevance to the assessment of GRP as a whole. As evaluators developed the activity models, they grouped the expected outcomes into outcome domains in order to guide their data collection efforts. These domains include community, corrections, crime, education, and health.

The activity models were created based on the site's strategic plan for each Phase. As the site progressed from planning to implementation, some of the planned activities changed. In some cases, changes in the activities yielded changes in the relevant outputs and outcomes. Simultaneously, the evaluation team was working to collect data on those outputs and outcomes most germane to the site's actual (rather than planned) activities. To date, UI has not been able to obtain measures within each outcome domain. In some cases, the data are unavailable, and in others, differences between the site's planned and actual activities made measures listed in the activity models less relevant. This section focuses only on those measures that the evaluation team was able to procure or is still pursuing.

The outcome analysis looked at the entire initiative rather than each phase separately for three reasons. First, the full GRP model was not active during Phase I because a crucial component in the GRP model—the One-Stop community center—had not been established during Phase I and delayed full GRP implementation. Second, the Phase I program implementation period was brief (approximately six months) and formal GRP activities ceased at the end of Phase I. Service providers with alternate sources of funding continued to welcome participants to their programs but without GRP funding, likely scaled back the scope of their operations. The number of youth served during Phase I was also relatively small, making any community-level impact both improbable and difficult to measure. Finally, the outcome measures for each phase overlap, as both of the initiative's phases were designed to affect the same outcomes.

5.5.1. Outcome Measures and Analysis

Prior to the start of Phase II services, the evaluation team planned its data collection activities based on the OJJDP-approved strategic plan. Although the Los Angeles GRP began at the same time as the other national GRP sites, the implementation of programs was delayed for several reasons mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. The Los Angeles GRP was just starting its second year of programming in September 2007, while the other GRP sites were either already finished or within several months of the end of their federal funding periods.

In developing expected outcome measures for Phase II, shown in C.4, UI researchers were cognizant of the need to focus on realistic and measurable data, given the evaluation's time frame and budget expectations. Given the length of time to expected outcome and scale of service, UI opted to concentrate data collection and evaluation efforts on programs and services that more readily allow for outcome and impact assessment. UI focused on data collection for those programs that were likely to have the greatest effect on community or individual outcomes within the evaluation period.

Although the overall evaluation of GRP emphasizes community-level impacts, ISIS, the web-based client tracking system operated by the City of Los Angeles, provided researchers the opportunity to access individual-level process and outcome data. Through ISIS, GRP-funded service providers can track, for each client, demographics; criminal history, including probation or parole officer contact information; educational achievement; living situation; barriers to employment, such as transportation or health problems; employment information if applicable; career and educational goals; service plan listing, including program and providers as well as requirements and completion details; client follow-up with accomplishments achieved since intake; and referrals to outside (i.e., non-GRP) agencies. In addition to providing these data items, ISIS offers an automated risk assessment tool that can be used to evaluate each client's risk factors and assist case managers in designing program plans tailored to each client's particular needs. As part of the evaluation, researchers at UI accessed these data to gain a better understanding of the population served by GRP.

The additional level of detail readily available through ISIS prompted researchers to consider collecting data for expected outcomes at the individual and aggregate levels. This would entail obtaining individual client's education, corrections, and probation records, as well as the complementary aggregate-level records, where possible. Individual records would allow researchers to track a client's academic performance over the course of his

or her participation in GRP programs and conduct an individual-level change analysis. Furthermore, with the academic performance information for an entire school available, the changes in individual GRP clients may be compared with changes in the school as a whole over the same time period. Similar analyses may also be conducted with corrections or probation data. At this stage in the evaluation, however, with a short Phase II implementation period and a relatively low number of clients served, UI decided not to pursue individual-level data. Such data will be considered, however, as the evaluation moves forward.

Instead, the evaluation team focused its efforts on data from two domains of activity for the Los Angeles GRP: education and crime. The education domain was selected because of the Los Angeles GRP's strategy of funding several programs that were hypothesized to affect educational outcomes of participants. These outcomes were assessed for several schools at the school (or aggregate) level, with the plan to reconsider collecting individual-level data on educational outcomes for the final year of the evaluation, when more individuals will have participated in GRP-funded programming. Crime outcomes were also assessed based on GRP's ultimate goal of reducing crime and gang activity in the target area. The following sections outline data collected and analyses conducted to assess the outcomes of GRP through mid-2007.

5.5.2. Education

A fair number of outcomes relate to education, because many programs, particularly those in the prevention and intervention components, have an educational component, including truancy/dropout prevention programs, after-school and recreational programs, and mentoring programs. Outcomes of particular interest are improved academic achievement (i.e., grade point averages), increased attendance, and decreased disruptive behavior resulting in disciplinary action.

The primary objective of truancy/dropout prevention programs is to increase school attendance by truant youths and discourage dropping out of school. A natural correlate of increased attendance is improved academic achievement. After-school and recreational programs provide tutoring and homework assistance to participants. This increased focus on academics should be reflected in improvements in academic performance. Furthermore, improved performance may also encourage the student to attend school more frequently. Improved attendance and improved academic performance reinforce each other. Mentoring programs that assist youths in setting and achieving higher academic goals are also expected to improve academic performance and attendance.

Although some programs may obtain academic records from their clients, GRP does not require such collection; therefore, UI has considered requesting individual academic records from the LAUSD for those clients from whom it has obtained consent. In October 2006, UI researchers met with the LAUSD[4] to discuss the transfer of individual and school level data as needed. That data was not collected for the current report, largely due to an ISIS report revealing that the number of students served at any one target area school represented a very small proportion of the students at the school (i.e., dosage levels were low in the target area schools) but these data are still being considered for the final

[4]UI met with the Director of the LAUSD Planning, Assessment, and Research division of the School Information Branch

evaluation report, when Phase II will have been operating for a longer period of time and GRP will likely have served many more students.

Measures Despite the fact that individual-level education performance data was not collected for the current report, UI decided to assess overall changes in specific measures at an aggregate level. School-level data were obtained from the official website of the Los Angeles School District (www.lausd.net) for four schools within the target area (Dena Elementary School, Sunrise Elementary School, Stevenson Middle School, and Roosevelt High School) and three schools outside of the target area (Hammel Elementary School, Belvedere Middle School and Garfield High School) that serve as controls for district-wide changes that might obscure the impact of GRP in the target area. Because school catchments do not follow the same boundaries as the target and comparison area boundaries, UI was not able to select comparison schools within the boundaries of the GRP-defined comparison area. Instead, non-target area schools were selected based on their similarity to the target schools across key demographic variables (total enrollment, racial composition, percentage of students eligible for the Free/Reduced Lunch program, percentage of students who are English learners). In addition to compositional data, attendance rates, total suspensions, and expulsion referrals were collected as measures of overall student delinquency. These data are provided in Table 5.5 for a baseline year prior to GRP implementation (2002-2003) and a post-implementation year (2006-2007).

Although the available data preclude an examination of the impact of specific programs on school-level outcomes, the evaluation team can assess any changes over time in the target and comparison schools that may be attributable in part to GRP programs. The following programs are funded by the Los Angeles GRP and are hypothesized to have an effect on school performance and climate. Also identified are each program's target school levels (elementary school, middle school, or high school):

1. Get It Straight (elementary)
2. BBBS mentoring services (elementary, middle)
3. G.O.T. College! (elementary, middle)
4. IMPACTO (elementary, middle)
5. Project Amiga's prevention case management (elementary, middle)
6. United Students Junior Club (middle)
7. Intervention case management (middle, high)
8. Knowledge is Power (high)
9. RHS Teen Court (high)
10. YO!'s Intensive Transition Program (high)
11. Gang awareness training (all levels)
12. Sports for Kids (all levels)

Table 5.5: Los Angeles Target and Comparison School Data

School	Year	Enroll-ment	Racial/Ethnic Comp. (%)				Delinquency		Attend. Rate	% English Learners
			White	Black	Hisp.	Other	Suspensions/ 100 students	Expulsion Referrals		
Dena ES	2002-3	975	0.3	1.2	98.1	0.4	2.15	0	95.67	74.46
(TA)	2006-7	627	0	0	99.8	0.2	0.48	0	97.35	74.16
Sunrise ES	2002-3	685	0.1	0	99.6	0.3	2.19	0	95.57	64.09
(TA)	2006-7	535	0	0.2	99.8	0	1.50	0	95.93	68.60
Hammel ES	2002-3	1037	0.4	0.6	98.8	0.2	1.64	0	95.30	63.45
(C)	2006-7	879	0.2	0.2	99.3	0.2	1.71	0	95.60	53.92
Stevenson MS	2002-3	2403	0.2	0.1	99.5	0.1	25.68	1	95.20	49.31
(TA)	2006-7	2519	0.2	0.1	99.5	0.2	26.28	0	96.25	44.66
Belvedere MS	2002-3	2305	0.4	0.4	98.9	0.2	41.13	5	93.37	49.15
(C)	2006-7	2064	0.1	0.1	99.7	0	16.13	2	95.40	40.26
Roosevelt HS	2002-3	4670	0.4	0.4	98.7	0.5	23.23	1	88.54	40.04
(TA)	2006-7	4423	0.2	0.3	99.1	0.4	14.31	6	87.95	41.28
Garfield HS (C)	2002-3	4281	0.2	0.1	99.4	0.3	17.71	5	89.84	36.84
	2006-7	4372	0.1	0.3	99.3	0.3	12.37	10	90.53	37.44

Source: http://notebook.lausd.net/pls/ptl/ptl_apps.schoolguide.render

Notes:

• (TA) = Target Area School; (C) = Comparison School

• "English learners" refer to “children who do not speak English or whose native language is not English and who are not currently able to perform ordinary classroom work in English” [Education Code Section 306]

13. The Story Project (all levels)
14. Truancy and dropout prevention (all levels)

Hypotheses Phase I of the Los Angeles GRP was implemented during the first six months of 2005. Because Phase II implementation did not begin until September 2006 and the data are only available through the 2006-2007 school year, the impact of Phase II on school based outcomes cannot yet be assessed. If GRP activities during Phase I were successful at reducing gang activity, the following results would be expected:

1. A greater increase in attendance rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area than for schools in the non-target area.
2. A greater decrease in suspension and expulsion rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area than for schools in the non-target area.
3. A direct and immediate effect on student delinquency from programs that specifically address these outcomes in their service goals (e.g. truancy and dropout prevention services).
4. An indirect and gradual effect on student delinquency from the majority of programs that focus on improving student's feelings about school, tendency towards violence/delinquency, view of authority figures, and overall educational outcomes.
5. A potential increase in the number of suspensions, resulting from increased gang awareness among school administrators who will be better able to recognize gang-related behaviors.

Results Although the total number of suspensions increased in the selected comparison area elementary school and decreased in two target area elementary schools, the actual magnitude of these changes is very small and indicates a stable level of suspensions in the three elementary schools considered. In addition, attendance levels remained virtually unchanged in the three schools over the study period.

Suspension rates and total suspensions at the middle school level directly contradict the hypothesized changes. Stevenson Middle School in the target area experienced stable suspension rates over the study period while Belvedere Middle School, the comparison school, experienced a dramatic decrease in suspensions following the same school year. In 2002-03, the suspension rate at Stevenson was approximately 60 percent of the rate at Belvedere; by 2006-07, Stevenson's suspension rate was twice that of Belvedere's.

The suspension rates for both high schools in this sample decreased after the 2002-03 school year. Roosevelt High School in the target area experienced a more dramatic decline in its suspension rate than did the comparison school, falling from a rate of approximately 23 suspensions per 100 students to only 14. Garfield High School, whose total number of suspensions was smaller than Roosevelt's at both the baseline period and the post-intervention period, also saw a decrease in its suspension rate. That decrease, however, was not as dramatic as the one experienced at Roosevelt, falling from approximately 18 suspensions per 100 students to 12. Interestingly, at the same time suspensions at both schools were falling, they also experienced increases in their expulsion referrals; the overall increase in number of such referrals was similar at both schools.

Conclusion At the elementary school level, changes were too small to determine an effect, a finding not surprising given that elementary school children would mainly experience GRP impacts in the form of prevention programming. The effects from such prevention programming are often not observable until years after the intervention; the study period for which data are available is likely too short to discern any effects. At the middle school level, suspension data directly contradict the stated hypotheses, as suspension rates fell dramatically in the comparison school, while remaining stable in the target area school. At the high school level, suspension data support the evaluation team's hypotheses, as the high school in the target area experienced a larger decrease in both its total suspensions and suspension rate when compared to the comparison high school. In addition, while expulsion referrals increased over the study period, they increased at a slower rate in the target area school than in the comparison school.

To the extent that changes in suspension rates can be attributed to GRP programs, the data suggest that programs targeted at the high school level were more successful at reducing delinquency than at the middle school level. In fact, GRP efforts may have been detrimental at the middle school level. However, given the nature of the data and the intervention—the Phase I programming covering a short period of time and the number of students served at any one target area school being small—it is extremely difficult to make any assertion that changes in school suspension rates reflect GRP efforts and not external factors within respective neighborhoods. The data presented are useful for understanding the context within which GRP programming is being implemented.

5.5.3. Crime

One of the most concrete outcomes of GRP relates to crime, particularly measuring whether gang-related crime has declined in terms of quantity and seriousness of offenses over the course of GRP implementation. Researchers have established a relationship with LAPD-ITD for acquiring reported crime incidents, arrests, and calls for service records for all offense types within the Hollenbeck Police District, as well as a few neighboring areas within the Central Police District that are part of the displacement area. To ensure a comprehensive record of gang incidents, UI also initiated an audit of the Hollenbeck Gang Unit incident files. This audit provides UI with details of victim and suspect gang membership, age, ethnicity, gender, and associated offense information. Time-series analyses of all incidents and gang-related incidents should provide evidence regarding the changes in volume and seriousness of criminal activity in the target, comparison, and displacement areas.

The ultimate goal of GRP was to reduce gang-related crime in the target area. Part of the evaluation team's mandate was to assemble evidence to address whether that goal was met and, if so, to estimate how many gang crimes may have been averted by GRP activities. As this is only an interim report and the evaluation is ongoing, UI can only infer the effect of GRP from the evidence assembled thus far.

Measures

The evaluation team examined five crime-related outcome measures for this portion of the assessment:

Calls, shots fired Calls to emergency dispatchers to report gunshots.

Calls, vandalism Calls to emergency dispatchers to report vandalism or destruction of property. Graffiti, or "tagging," is among the most common forms of gang activity in the target area.

Incidents, serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.

Incidents, gang-related Police incident reports that indicated the crime event was gang-related.[5]

Incidents, gang-related serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault and where it was noted that the crime event was gang-related. This measure is the intersection of the preceding two measures.

All five measures were developed from data provided by LAPD. For each measure, the evaluation team developed one monthly time series, spanning January 2002–December 2006, for each of the three study areas—target, comparison, and, displacement.

The rationale for selecting these five measures for the outcome analysis weighed several factors including the higher costs to society posed by serious violent crimes, concern that the completeness of police reporting of less serious crimes may be sensitive to the volume of more serious incidents occurring at the same time, and recognition that GRP may have increased the sophistication and completeness of police gang intelligence and, thereby affected the number of incidents categorized as gang-related. Of the five measures, the number of gang-related incidents is the most direct measure of the category of crimes that CLEAR was expected to suppress. The evaluation team chose not to examine that measure alone, however, out of concern that an increase in the sophistication of police gang intelligence might cause a shift in the number of incidents *identified* as gang-related even if the actual number of gang-related incidents remained unchanged.[6] The evaluation team examined measures of serious violence because such incidents are especially costly to society and tend to be reported and recorded more consistently and completely than most types of less serious offenses. Finally, UI evaluators examined the data on calls for police service in order to have a measure that is not directly affected by changes in police department reporting practices. This choice comes with the recognition that the willingness of citizens to call the police is partially a function of citizens' expectations about how the police will respond. For example, in the midst of a publicized increase in police activity, citizens may begin to report less serious offenses. Such a change in

[5]The measures of gang-related incidents for Los Angeles were based on the modus operandi keywords recorded on the incident reports by the responding officer. The data from the gang audit, commissioned by the evaluation team, were not used. Due to staff turnover and reassignments within LAPD, the gang audit has been stalled since 2006, and the evaluation team is continuing attempts to restart it. LAPD has established guidelines for use of the modus operandi keywords, so they represent a reasonably consistent measure of gang activity over time. The chief drawback to using the modus operandi keywords rather than the gang audit data is that only the latter would fully reflect the intelligence information available to the LAPD Hollenbeck Gang Unit.

[6]Since LAPD's gang intelligence had reached a high level of sophistication before the GRP study period began, this was a lesser concern for the evaluation of the Los Angeles site than it was for the other three GRP sites.

reporting behavior may mask or offset any decrease in actual criminal offending brought about by the concentration of police resources.

The relationship between organizational events and crime levels is explored in more detail through descriptive analysis of the monthly trends in selected crime measures and the spatial patterns of crime in the study areas, followed by more sophisticated inferential modeling of crime trends to look for statistically significant changes in monthly levels of different crime measures that may have been the result of GRP's efforts.

Figure 5.9 provides the timeline of events in the development and implementation of the Los Angeles GRP that was provided above in Section 5.2 with the addition of monthly time series of selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial patterns of serious violent incidents in the study areas. This figure reveals the relationship of organizational and implementation events to changes in levels of crime.

Descriptive Analysis

Figures 5.10–5.14 provide linear trends in crime measures over five study years (2002–2006), while Figure 5.15 provides larger versions of the same maps included on the timeline. The dotted lines in each figure represent the overall trend in each measure throughout the evaluation period.

Figure 5.10 reveals that while the target area saw a marked decrease in overall levels of calls for shots fired, the comparison area experienced a slight increase in the measure over the five year period. Calls for shots fired peaked at nearly 40 calls per month for three months early in the study period, both prior to the implementation of CLEAR and immediately following its start. Later on in the evaluation period, however, the monthly levels of calls reporting shots fired was low, and experienced less variability from month to month. Levels of calls for vandalism (Figure 5.11, on the other hand, started low in both the target and comparison areas and remained low, demonstrating very little change throughout the evaluation period.

At the start of the evaluation period, the level of serious violent incidents (Figure 5.12 was higher in the target area, with the highest level occurring in the first month examined (January 2002). The linear trend of serious violent incidents in the target area was steadily downward, with less variability demonstrated between months. At the same time, the trend in the comparison area was not as dramatic, with a very slight upward movement in the average level of incidents. The highest peaks in the comparison area were experienced later in the evaluation period, in mid-2006. In addition, the start of CLEAR also marked the point of equilibrium between the target and comparison areas, after which point the target area experienced lower monthly levels of serious violence than the target area.

Finally, the evaluation team considered gang crimes, looking at all gang crimes (Figure 5.13 and more specifically at those gang crimes that also fell into the serious violent incident category (Figure 5.14. The trends of all gang crimes in both the target and comparison areas followed much the same pattern and level as for serious violence, with levels in the target area peaking in January 2002, and steadily decreasing throughout the five-year evaluation period. At the same time, the average level of serious violent incidents in the comparison area remained virtually unchanged across the five year period, with the highest number of incidents occurring in mid-2004.

Figure 5.14 reveals a similar pattern of monthly serious violent gang incidents as was observed for serious violent and gang incidents separately. Serious violent gang incidents

Figure 5.9: Los Angeles Timeline



Target area: Serious violent incidents
Comparison area: Serious violent incidents
Target area: Serious violent gang incidents
Comparison area: Serious violent gang incidents
74
53
Citywide research on LA's gang-related programs and suggested comprehensive city wide strategy released to public; MDT training for contractors
City Council approves agencies for funding; RFP appeals board does not change GRP's funding decisions; City's CDD creates GRP client tracking module for existing citywide data system (ISIS); Client referral training of CLEAR officers and detectives; Teen Court convenes for first session, kick-off with the Mayor
Mayor's office authorized to negotiate and execute contracts; Advisory Committee meeting; CIS collaboration training for GRP contract agencies; YOM Contract expires, cases transitioned to Homeboy Industries (Aug-Sept); The Story Project hosts Film Festival
Advisory Committee meeting; RFP reissued for bid because initial RFP not competitive; Client referral books distributed to LAPD officers during advisory committee meeting; TSP hosts Community Film Festival
OJJDP teleconf. featuring LA GRP; Advisory committee meeting; Coordinator at CIS National Sustainability Summit in Richmond, Va
Official injunction against White Fence
Haunted House at YO Comm. Ctr; Advisory Comm. mtg.; MDT planning mtg.
MDT planning meeting
ISIS training; Adv. Comm. mtg.; MDT planning mtg.
Advisory Committee meeting; GRP Coordinator works to provide an extra year of funding for program; 15 Big Brothers Big Sisters matches as of June 2007
Community event; Mayor annouces new Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Director and Office, 8 new "Gang Reduction Zones;" Mentoring event sponsored by Homeboy Industries and Project Amiga; Homeboy Industries takes 5 clients on a waterpark field trip
Jeff Carr starts as head of GRYD; Summer Jam; GRP Summer Open House/Unveiling of Mural; 2nd mentoring event: Day at Huntington Beach; Lead Homeboy Industries case manager leaves, ex-gang member/case manager takes over position, new female case manager hired
New program coordinator starts; Homeboy Industries opens new facility near downtown (not funded by GRP)
Advisory Committee meeting; Project Amiga conducts first gang awareness training at Dena ES for 22 teachers, staff, parents; MDT starts meeting every 2 wks.
GRP Open House; Project Amiga conducts three gang awareness trainings at Dena ES for teachers, staff, parents, and community members
Mayor releases his comprehensive approach to address gangs, which builds on the foundations of GRP; Advisory Committee meeting
Advisory Committee meeting; Family in Schools contract to conduct GOTr is completed
MDT mtgs. changed to every 3 wks.
Program Coord. promoted to Ass. Dir. of GRYD
2006
2007
2008
2009
RFP responses reviewed
RHS Teen Court holds monthly sessions
Phase II programs operating

Figure 5.10: Los Angeles: Calls for Service Reporting Shots Fired by Month, 2002-2006



Figure 5.11: Los Angeles: Calls for Service Reporting Vandalism, 2002-2006



Figure 5.12: Los Angeles: Serious Violent Incidents, 2002-2006



Figure 5.13: Los Angeles: Gang Incidents, 2002-2006



Figure 5.14: Los Angeles: Serious Violent Gang Incidents, 2002-2006



were higher in the target area at the beginning of the evaluation period, but dropped below the level in the comparison area when CLEAR activities began in the target area. The average level of serious violent gang incidents in the comparison area changed very little, if at all, over the study period, with the highest monthly peak of this type of incidents experienced in mid-2006. The monthly trends suggest a positive effect of GRP, with crime levels in the target area steadily dropping to levels below those in the comparison area. Unfortunately, this type of analysis does not allow evaluators to attribute any findings to GRP.

Finally, the maps in Figure 5.15 illustrate the spatial patterns of serious violent crime in the three Los Angeles GRP study areas for the period January–June in four years: one baseline year (2002) and three during implementation (2004, 2005, 2006). The maps demonstrate the steadily decreasing crime levels in the target area, as the density of crime appears highest in the baseline year, 2002. By 2004, crime density in the target area was relatively low, and remained low throughout the rest of the study period. Interestingly, the areas with the highest crime in the target area—still lower than in neighboring areas—did not occur in the same location within the target area throughout the study period. This trend may be an artifact of the low levels of crime in the target area; a handful of crimes could influence the pattern enough to make it appear that a "hotspot" is moving within the target area, while in reality, the few crime incidents are randomly distributed.

A high density of crime incidents consistently occurred in the area directly north of the target area, on the border between the comparison and displacement areas. The hotspot remained through 2004, weakened in 2005, and became stronger again in 2006. This pattern provides some evidence for the fact that efforts specifically aimed at the target area indeed led to a positive effect in the target area relative to surrounding areas, which experienced little change in crime levels. This finding also echoes observations that little or no change

Figure 5.15: Density of serious violence, Los Angeles GRP areas, 2002-2006

in the average levels of crime was observed in the comparison area. Together, the graphs and the maps suggest a positive effect of the Los Angeles GRP on crime levels in the target area. To further develop and test this hypothesis, the evaluation team conducted more sophisticated inferential modeling in the form of time series analysis, presented below.

Time Series Analysis

A visual examination of time series data, as presented above, can provide insight into some features of the data (e.g., whether the series level increased or decreased over time), but other features of the time series (e.g., seasonal fluctuations, autocorrelation) may not be apparent from visual inspection alone. The evaluation thus includes inferential statistical modeling to account for those subtler features and to further understanding of whether and how the crime measures changed over time. At this point in the evaluation period, UI expects that the suppression component of GRP (i.e., CLEAR) will be the only prong to have exerted a measurable effect on gang-related crime. The prevention components, with a focus on serving young children in elementary and middle school are not likely to demonstrate observable effects until those children reach middle adolescence. The intervention and reentry components may also demonstrate a delayed impact on area crime, as neither began service delivery in earnest until 2006, after the CLEAR officers received training about how and when to make referrals to the MDT.

With these caveats in mind, the evidence the evaluation team has assembled to date, including implementation information and crime trends—both over time and spatial—suggests that the beginning of CLEAR activities in Boyle Heights (i.e., the target area) in August or September 2003 may have prompted a reduction in gang crime and the number of calls for police to respond to reports of gunshots. For both of these outcomes, the reduction observed in the target area exceeded the change observed in the comparison area. Moreover, the reduction in the target area was not offset by corresponding increases in the displacement area.

Hypotheses The evaluation team hypothesized that the initiation of CLEAR patrols in the target area would lead to a reduction in the mean level of each of the five crime measures in the target area. The CLEAR patrols reportedly began in August or September 2003, and were expected to take at least a few weeks before they were fully effective and the effects would be manifest. To accommodate this lag, evaluators examined each time series for a shift in mean in each month from September 2003 through February 2004, inclusive.

The logic of the quasi-experimental design of the GRP evaluation holds that, for any of the five measures with evidence of a reduction in the series mean, the estimated magnitude of the intervention effect would be the difference between the shift in the target area and the shift, if any, in the comparison area. In this way, the analysis of the comparison area helps to guard against falsely concluding that a shift observed in the target area is attributable to CLEAR or GRP when, in fact, the same shift is also observable in areas outside the target area. In that case, it is more plausible to attribute the shift to another (perhaps unknown) cause than to the localized intervention of interest (i.e., CLEAR).

The displacement area was included in the evaluation design so that we could examine whether the GRP intervention pushed crime out of the target area and into other nearby areas or, conversely, if it produced salutary spill-over effects in neighboring areas. In the case of CLEAR, UI evaluators expected to find no shifts in crime levels in the displacement

Table 5.6: Los Angeles: Estimates of Intervention Effects

	Study Area		
Study Area	Target	Comparison	Displacement
Calls, shots fired	−8.23 (1.97)** 02/2004	−1.79 (1.15) 12/2003	−0.90 (0.93) 02/2004
Calls, vandalism	0.62 (0.87) 01/2004	0.55 (0.73) 02/2004	−0.25 (1.03) 11/2003
Incidents, serious violence	−12.65 (8.61) 10/2003	−6.42 (3.45)* 10/2003	3.36 (2.96) 02/2004
Incidents, gang-related	−6.78 (2.74)** 02/2004	−2.91 (3.31) 11/2003	2.28 (2.41) 01/2004
Incidents, gang-related serious violence	−8.71 (6.44) 12/2003	−5.37 (2.62)** 09/2003	−1.76 (1.79) 09/2003

Notes:
- All time series spanned 01/2002–12/2006, and we considered intervention points from 09/2003–02/2004.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.
- The date of the observed intervention effect appears beneath each coefficient.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.
** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.

area. The gangs active in and around the target area are territorial and inter-generational, making relocation of their activities difficult.

Results The methodology for the outcome analysis is explained in greater detail in Appendix K, with additional information about the models estimated as part of the Los Angeles outcome analysis found in Table K.1. Findings and inferences are summarized here and in Table 5.6. Overall, the evaluation team found that the data were consistent with the stated hypotheses, with two notable exceptions.

1. The number of calls to report vandalism was unchanged in both the target and comparison areas suggesting that CLEAR had no effect on this component of the gang problem.

2. Although the number of serious violent incidents declined in the target area after CLEAR began, the decline was not statistically significant. The comparison area did experience a statistically significant decline in overall serious violence and in gang-related serious violence.

The analysis shows that the number of gang-related incidents in the target area decreased by 6.78 incidents per month, or 19 percent, beginning in February 2004. Beginning in November 2003, evaluators also found a reduction of 2.91 gang-related incidents per month in the comparison area, but this shift was not statistically significant. [7] The evalua-

[7] There were an average of 35.8 gang-related incidents per month in the target area between January 2002 and January 2004, so a reduction of 6.78 incidents represents a 19 percent decline. If, to be conservative, we subtract the estimated change in the comparison area (−2.91) from the target area estimate (−6.78), we find a net reduction of 3.87 incidents per month, an 11 percent reduction from the pre-intervention mean.

tion team also found a reduction of 8.23 calls to report shots fired, or 40 percent, beginning in February 2004.[8]

The analysis also revealed that the number of serious violent incidents and the number of serious violent gang-related incidents decreased in the target area beginning during the last months of 2003 by 12.65 and 6.42 incidents per month, respectively. Neither of these declines was statistically significant, though both were large enough to be of practical significance to the quality of life in the target area. The comparison area experienced a slightly smaller reduction in serious violence and serious gang violence at approximately the same time, and these reductions reached statistical significance. Overall, this leads the evaluation team to infer that CLEAR likely did not reduce the number of serious violence incidents by a significant amount in the target area during the time period examined. As the evaluation continues and more observations are added to these time series, the estimated reductions in serious violence in the target area may reach statistical significance.

In the displacement area, the evaluation team did not find evidence of changes in any of the five outcome measures, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that CLEAR would not displace gang crime into the surrounding area.

Conclusion The interim analysis of the effect of the suppression component of Los Angeles' GRP program (i.e., CLEAR) found evidence that the program yielded reductions in both citizen reports of shots fired and in total gang-related incidents in the target area. These reductions of 19 percent and 40 percent, respectively, were both statistically and practically significant. Although reductions in serious violent incidents and serious gang-related violence occurred in both the target and comparison areas, these reductions cannot be attributed to CLEAR based on the evidence available at this time. There was no evidence that CLEAR succeeded in reducing citizen reports of vandalism or destruction of property. Overall, these findings suggest that CLEAR reduced some categories of gang-related crime in Boyle Heights without adversely affecting neighboring areas.

5.6. SUSTAINABILITY

The Los Angeles GRP is in a unique position relative to the other three sites because the City of Los Angeles decided to replicate the GRP model in other parts of the city even before the federally funded program finishes and evaluation results are examined. In November 2005, the Los Angeles City Council contracted the Advancement Project, a Los Angeles-based policy group, to research all of the city's gang-related programs and develop a comprehensive citywide strategy. A report on the group's findings was presented to the general public in January 2007, with recommendations that the city develop a comprehensive strategy of prevention, intervention, and community investment linked to strategic community policing suppression. In response to the report, the Mayor released a comprehensive, collaborative community-wide approach in April 2007, which builds upon existing city, county, state, and federal services, including the GRP model (Villaraigosa,

[8]Between January 2002 and January 2004, there was an average of 20.68 such calls per month, so the reduction in the target area represents a 40 percent reduction from the pre-intervention mean. The comparison area estimate shows that calls for shots fired declined by a statistically insignificant 1.79 calls per month. If we subtract this estimate from the target area estimate, we reach a net reduction of 6.44 calls per month in the target area, which is a 31 percent decline from the pre-intervention mean.

Antonio R., 2007). The following August, the Mayor announced the formation of the GRYD, focusing on prevention, intervention, and reentry efforts. Jeff Carr, an ordained minister with extensive experience in providing youth services and directing non-profits, was named as its director. This multi-jurisdictional, coordinated approach to the citywide gang problem is expected to not only sustain GRP in Boyle Heights beyond the end of the OJJDP funding, but also to introduce several similar collaborative efforts across the city.

In conjunction with the new office, $3 million in funding for the fiscal year 2007-2008 was committed to seven "Gang Reduction Zones" in existing CLEAR sites across the city; six of those zones represent new sites where the GRP model is being implemented, and the seventh zone is the existing Boyle Heights GRP site. As a result, the city funded seven more coordinators were hired to begin in the fall, all funded by the City, including the new coordinator for the Boyle Heights GRP. The change in leadership at the Boyle Heights site took place during the fall of 2007 and its effects are still unknown as the GRYD establishes itself in the city and the new coordinator finds his footing in that position. The Boyle Heights site will likely accrue distinct benefits from having been the first site, as it will already be operating as new sites begin to navigate the strategic planning process, and will be able to continue providing appropriate programming in the target area. In addition, the other six sites may look to the Boyle Heights site for guidance at different stages of implementation. Alternatively, the site may receive lower funding relative to the other sites if officials tasked with allocating the funding to Gang Reduction Zones believe that Boyle Heights has already benefited from federal funding and will not require the same levels of assistance as the new sites. In this case, the site may only receive enough funding to maintain current activities, or even to provide activities at a minimal level. City officials have not yet made such funding decisions, but developments will be closely tracked through the end of the evaluation period to determine their impact on the sustainability of the Boyle Heights GRP.

In 2007, the program coordinator also worked to secure additional state and federal funding through the California Speaker and the Governor's offices to maintain or expand the original GRP site in Boyle Heights. Los Angeles hopes to receive roughly $1 million in earmarked funds from the Governor's California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention Program (CalGRIP) to support existing programs across prevention, intervention, and reentry. If the Boyle Heights GRP continues to demonstrate its successes in collaboration and in crime and gang activity reduction in the area, the site will be well-positioned to attract additional funding.

5.7. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

There are certainly elements of Los Angeles GRP that have had significant, positive effects on the target area thus far. The Los Angeles suppression component is unique in that its activities existed in the target area prior to GRP's introduction, a factor believed to have greatly contributed to the program's success. The decision to co-locate the GRP target site with CLEAR appears to have maximized the synergy between the two programs, not only by creating an enhanced force of patrol officers and gang detectives, but also by enhancing the City Attorney's work on the gang injunction. The interim analysis of the effect of the suppression component found evidence that the program contributed to reductions both in citizen reports of shots fired and in total gang-related incidents in

the target area. Evaluators also found reductions in serious violent incidents and serious gang-related violence in both the target and comparison areas that, while they cannot be attributed to CLEAR, do indicate an overall improvement in crime levels since the start of suppression activities. In addition, the evaluation found no evidence of displacement of crime, indicating that the reduction of some categories of gang-related crime in the target area did not negatively impact neighboring areas. Together, these findings point to the growing successes of CLEAR and GRP in Boyle Heights as the Phase II implementation period progresses.

The analysis of educational data at the community level also revealed some positive changes that have taken place since the start of GRP in Los Angeles. While these changes cannot necessarily be attributed to GRP and the analysis is primarily useful for understanding the context within which GRP programming is being implemented, they do indicate a possible positive effect of the other, non-suppression focused elements of the initiative. An examination of various school-based measures found that positive changes were greater at the high school level, specifically for suspension rates. Rising suspension rates at the middle school level contradicted expected findings, but high school suspension rates dropped, suggesting a successful effort to decrease delinquency among older students.

Despite many positive developments, the concerns and suggestions of the committee members suggest problems with the program's organizational structure. The presence of contractors on the same governing body as nonfunded members of GRP may introduce a conflict of interest, even though funded members are not making decisions regarding their own funding. Although the program should retain the participation of community-based organizations in its regular functioning, an added layer—possibly at the executive committee level—that provides advisory oversight of funded service providers and guidance to funded GRP programs as well as to the GRP coordinator might improve accountability.

5.7.1. Organizational structure

One of the greatest obstacles faced by the GRP may also represent one of its greatest assets: the City of Los Angeles. OJJDP's decision to name a local entity as the fiscal agent for GRP in Los Angeles, as opposed to selecting a state office (as is the case in each of the other GRP sites), has created a more direct relationship between the Los Angeles GRP program coordinator and the decision-making body. However, the management processes, especially those related to the RFP process and service procurement, are difficult to navigate with any speed, and ultimately delayed the original time line set forth in late 2003 by OJJDP. The strategic planning process was late in starting because of the City's administrative requirements for accepting external funding from the federal government. Although the City supports GRP, the time required to approve plans and budgets is lengthy and time consuming. The "phase-in" nature of OJJDP's grant structure (i.e., multiple approval points) has exacerbated the problem in Los Angeles because each phase requires a new review, discussion, and vote by several City Council subcommittees as well as the City Council itself. Both Phase I and II RFPs, selection of contract agencies, and funding decisions must go through the same multilayered approval process, causing each step to potentially take months to complete.

While these challenges have not been insurmountable for the program coordinator or the Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety (previously the MCJPO), they have considerably delayed the implementation process. Furthermore, GRP faced a new may-

oral administration, office restructuring, and new mayoral aides not familiar with city workings, with the already tedious RFP process or with the history of GRP. Given these challenges, remains unclear whether the advantages of the local fiscal agent have outweighed those of an alternative arrangement.

5.7.2. Implementation

The bureaucracy associated with GRP funding discouraged some Phase I service providers from responding to RFPs for Phase II, although they intended to continue participating in GRP at some level. The biggest concern appeared to be the restriction that services were only to be provided within the target area's geographical boundaries. This requirement challenged the mission of some organizations to serve all youth possible; rather than impose such restrictions on themselves, some service providers decided not to apply for more GRP funding. Even among the service providers, questions remained as to whether the appropriate youth were being targeted to receive GRP services. Some interviewees believed that more emphasis should have been placed on recruiting current gang members, while others felt more emphasis should have been placed on younger youth who have not yet demonstrated at-risk behavior. In fact, one Phase I service provider indicated that he neither considered his program to be a "gang reducer," nor did he advertise his program as such. With the unclear connection between gang reduction and the programs targeting youth who have yet to show signs of trouble, some service providers noted confusion about what GRP expected them to accomplish; they also described confusion about determining and measuring outcomes that would quantify their programs' success. Nevertheless, most service providers and other advisory committee members interviewed in 2005 and 2006 agreed that the ultimate success and sustainability of GRP would hinge on the success of Phase II programming.

In terms of implementation, interviews with the service providers and other committee members reiterated many of the same points mentioned in the discussion of collaboration above. All interviewees believed the collaboration across various agencies and philosophies for addressing gangs had strengthened over the course of GRP. Service providers and other advisory committee members reported frequent communication from the program coordinator about bi-monthly GRP meetings as well as other announcements she deemed appropriate to share with the group. Not everyone found the same benefit from attending the bi-monthly meetings, however, and many seem disappointed in their lack of substance.

Advisory committee members other than the service providers also found the geographic boundaries of the target area challenging. Several committee members expressed concern that the majority of service providers chosen for funding in Phase I were not from within the target area. Some worried that GRP funds would leave the designated target area, while others expressed concern that "outside" service providers would not be as successful because they did not have the history or relationships with target area residents and organizations. Furthermore, in meetings—particularly the early planning meetings—there was noticeable animosity between service providers already serving clients in or near the target area and one service provider with no previous experience working in Boyle Heights. This animosity dissolved over the course of the Phase I implementation, and committee members eventually came to support this former "outsider" in its programs for target area youth. The animosity seems to have dissolved largely due to the active

involvement of the service provider in advisory committee meetings; indeed, survey respondents generally agreed that GRP had been successful in overcoming distrust among agencies, with 63.6 percent in agreement in Wave I and 71 percent in agreement in Wave II.

A recurring issue related to GRP, in the eyes of many committee members, was an always-present political agenda. Respondents expressed concern that politicians had ulterior motives for participating in GRP and that a new mayoral administration may have different priorities, changing the city's emphasis on addressing the gang problem. Some saw political influence in the distribution of Phase I funds, given that the Mayor's Office ultimately selected community agencies for GRP grant awards. At least one respondent believed the mayoral race drove several funding decisions. Many respondents described the process as unfair and mentioned that many of the unfunded community-based organizations were upset by the funding process. Other organizations reportedly did not go after GRP funding because they anticipated an awards process driven by politics rather than merit. Similar political pressures were perceived with Phase II fund distribution as well.

On a related note, there was some question about the final results of the RFP process. In interviews, several advisory committee members questioned the funding of the secondary prevention case management provider and the agency's credentials. At least one proposal reviewer was surprised to learn of the same agency being funded because the reviewer did not believe the agency's proposal was a top-rated one. Official semi-annual documentation to OJJDP provides evidence that the agency was a top scorer and rightfully awarded, but these concerns raised a red flag about the limited level of transparency for partners in the RFP process and might have led to some distrust of GRP management as Phase II continued. This issue will be explored in more depth as the evaluation continues.

5.7.3. Phase I Obstacles and Successes

UI observed several obstacles to implementation success, such as politics and the slow implementation process. Other obstacles, including the location of the One-Stop Community Center and minor conflicts among committee members, were raised during interviews with committee members and GRP partners. Interviewees also identified successes related to GRP, including relationships and communication among committee members and the gang injunction.

Initially, the location of the GRP One-Stop community center was thought to be well situated for the target area, given its place within the geographic boundaries and seeming lack of any particular gang affiliation. However, the GRP advisory committee members have since questioned the site's gang neutrality. Some view the center as within the territory and control of one particular gang, VNE, which would discourage members of rival gangs from seeking services there. This perception also discourages parents from leaving their children at the center for various programs. The program coordinator looked into alternative locations for the center in order to address the issue of safety and comfort among individuals with any gang affiliation in accessing services. One suggested alternative was to host at least one mobile One-Stop center, which could be moved throughout the community and accommodate anyone beginning to access services. However, an additional facility was never identified.

Another observed obstacle expressed in interviews was the conflict introduced by a few community-based organizations. Several organizations became disgruntled when they were not chosen to administer Phase I programs and made attempts to discredit GRP; however, these efforts were largely fruitless and the organizations eventually quieted their criticisms. Furthermore, differences in philosophies of committee members, particularly because of the overlapping populations that the intervention and suppression services target, posed a challenge. This conflict was most notable during the planning phase; interviewees readily acknowledge the great strides made since in communication and relationship building across all committee members. The diverse representation of community organizations, although initially posing a challenge, has ultimately strengthened the GRP collaboration.

One of the greatest successes of implementation mentioned by many committee members is the network of relationships and communication forged between community-based organizations, the justice and law enforcement systems, and other participating agencies. Prior to GRP, law enforcement and justice agencies assigned to the target area were already working together through the CLEAR initiative. However, although communication and relationships can always be improved, GRP has widened the communication networks and relationships to include intervention and prevention service providers. In an unprecedented fashion, members of suppression agencies have indicated increased appreciation for alternatives to incarceration, and members of prevention and intervention agencies have expressed greater understanding of the suppression efforts.

Another success mentioned in relation to GRP implementation is not attributable to GRP funding, but nonetheless relates to the target area and the gang problem—the gang injunction filed by the City Attorney's Office against the VNE gang. Many committee members have expressed their support of the injunction's effectiveness and contend that the action was a major, if not the major, factor in the perceived decline in violent crimes in the target area over the past 18 months. Despite some initial confusion and concerns of community members regarding the injunction, this legal tactic seems to have greatly benefited CLEAR's suppression efforts in the streets.

5.7.4. Phase II Obstacles and Successes

Although Phase II implementation was approximately half way complete in October 2007, some initial obstacles and successes may be discussed. Several service providers funded in Phase I did not submit proposals for Phase II funding, primarily because of inadequate funding and program restrictions. Many service providers deemed the amount amount of money available in the Phase II RFP inadequate and expressed criticism that the amount of funds available were not worth the amount of effort required to win a contract. Newly-funded Phase II providers echoed this concern. Some providers did not re-apply for funding because of the restrictions associated with accepting the funds, especially the geographic boundaries of GRP. Funded programs have to operate within the target area boundaries and serve youth living in the target area. This restriction was unacceptable enough to discourage some providers from applying for Phase II funds.

One obstacle (for Phase I and II providers) associated with funding through the City was delays in program start up and actual receipt of programming funds. Ultimately, service providers had to use their existing funds up front before receiving their grants. As acknowledged by several providers, this arrangement prevents smaller organizations from

being able to participate because they do not have the overhead to cover programming costs before receiving a grant. One such organization funded during Phase I, which does not have enough overhead to cover programming before receiving grant funds, expressed frustration about the delay in funding, especially since schools and families rely on this organization's programs and do not expect such delays or reductions in programming.

Service providers and advisory committee members cited improved communications and relationships between law enforcement and the intervention and prevention providers as one of the greatest successes associated with Phase I. However, within the first year of Phase II, the relationships between some service providers and law enforcement changed, particularly between the LAPD and Homeboy Industries, the Phase II intervention case management provider. Although the exact reasons for the animosity remain unclear, both agencies identified a certain lack of trust with working with the other; LAPD did not trust Homeboy Industries to refer youth for services while Homeboy Industries did not trust LAPD enough to openly discuss clients by name, fearing those youth could be targeted by police. The concerns associated with the LAPD and Homeboy Industries relationship greatly impacted the MDT, which relies on open communication amongst all members. Indeed, survey respondents cited problems associated with sharing of confidential information as a significant barrier to program efforts.

Despite collaborative concerns involving LAPD and Homeboy Industries, collaboration remains a major success of GRP, even during Phase II. Collaboration is particularly strong amongst prevention service providers. One advisory committee member praised the partners' collaboration beyond intervention and prevention, noting that it was "nice to see Probation, the California Youth Authority, the Department of Children and Family Services, and youth court" working together on a regular basis. GRP was successful in helping LAPD foster a new perception of police within the community and has helped improve police communication with the community. Probation has also been a very supportive member of the team. Unfortunately, the MDT continued to experience trouble with its partners in law enforcement as distrust lingered between LAPD and the prevention providers. Although many survey respondents indicated that positive changes had occurred in partner collaboration, they also indicated that changes in partner organizations and overall collaboration would greatly improve GRP.

Several Phase II providers, particularly those without previous experience in the target area, expressed concerns about client recruitment from Latino families that do not typically allow outsiders to assist in their community affairs. Although there are ample at-risk youth within the target area, providers first had to convince parents to allow their child's participation. Anecdotal information suggests that GRP service providers have already been successful in overcoming communication and cultural barriers, evidenced by the attendance of parents and community members at various meetings sponsored by GRP service providers as well as their commitment to participate in programs on a regular basis.

Target area boundaries remained a significant obstacle in the eyes of many respondents, as the geographic restrictions determined the eligibility of potential clients. From the start of the client referral system, GRP encountered many youth who caused trouble within the target area but whose residence outside of the target area rendered them ineligible for GRP services. OJJDP later allowed Los Angeles GRP to enroll up to 10 percent of their clients from outside the target area on a case by case basis. The exception applies only to youth

who reside outside the target area but are active in target area gangs or have a history of troublemaking in the target area.

The City of Los Angeles is home to an unknown number of undocumented individuals, many of whom live throughout East Los Angeles and within the GRP target area. These individuals do not need to present proof of citizenship or social security numbers in order to access services, including those of GRP, in Los Angeles. Many GRP providers, particularly intervention's job placement program, found it challenging to work with these undocumented individuals, as most jobs require some proof of citizenship. As a result, many parents and older youth could not be placed.

There have been several changes from the original Phase II plans. First, the function of the One-Stop community center as a central location for in-take and service provision was never totally realized. Although the YO! building is used by some service providers for limited activities, the center does not serve as a centralized in-take point; instead, each service provider performs intake individually. The One-Stop concept did not fully materialize in part because the center did not provide any other services than those of GRP. Second, although the original strategic plans included gang outreach workers as part of the intervention and reentry component, the chosen provider for this service, Homeboy Industries, did not philosophically believe in this type of outreach.

5.7.5. Recommended Improvements

Current and former committee members interviewed by UI offered several suggestions for improving GRP, including restructuring the advisory committee and providing more non-financial support for service providers. Although it was important to have contracted agencies participate in the planning process, their involvement occasionally presented a conflict of interest. With this in mind, the advisory committee may be restructured to include more non-funded leaders and stakeholders whose interests in GRP clearly extend beyond the acquisition of resources. Representatives of the community, such as parents and youths, may also be invited to serve on the advisory committee, as their presence might confer a degree of community ownership over the issues.

Interviews with Phase I providers made it clear that each community-based organization had varying degrees of familiarity with funding and proposal procedures as well as varying levels of understanding about evaluation and outcome measures. Some providers expressed frustration about the lack of clear guidance about what was expected of them and welcomed the opportunity to learn more for future projects. The program would have greatly benefited by providing technical assistance to GRP-funded programs regarding the importance of evaluation, emphasizing its importance both in program improvement and in UI evaluation. Technical assistance could also facilitate future data collection from these programs. The program would also improve by working with service providers to identify realistic outcome measurements.

Interviews indicated that a large part of the program's success depended on getting local partners to "buy-in" to the project and become involved in its planning and development. Various advisory committee members suggested that a more flexible time line in the first several months of the grant period would have made this buy-in stronger and more effective.

Overall, and despite delays associated with the RFP and service procurement processes, the Los Angeles GRP is working towards achieving full and effective implementation in

Phase II. The site has several features that serve as a strong foundation for GRP, including strong leadership and coordination, a sound (albeit slow) RFP and contracting process, and a strong network of agencies and community-based organizations supportive of GRP goals. From an evaluation perspective, Los Angeles agencies, including the City, LAPD, LAUSD, and the probation office, have excellent data systems capable of supplying evaluation data. Opportunities also exist for strengthening Los Angeles GRP, such as offering service providers technical assistance on expected program outcomes, data collections systems, strategies for client recruitment, and sustainability. The strong foundation for Los Angeles GRP, coupled with technical assistance and continuous feedback on program operations, should maximize the opportunity for success, and the outcome analysis has already demonstrated some of the success that GRP has achieved.

5.8. CONCLUSION

Los Angeles GRP advisory committee members readily admit that they will not rid Boyle Heights of the intergenerational gangs with $2.5 million in funding; they doubt that even ten times that amount would completely solve the problem. However, the same committee members just as readily support GRP and believe wholeheartedly in the opportunity they have to address gang crime and violence in their community. GRP programs may not be able to rid the area of gangs entirely, but any measurable decrease in violence and crime in the neighborhood would satisfy many committee members that their efforts have been rewarded. Indeed, the evaluation team's analysis demonstrates that the Los Angeles GRP has already made considerable strides towards reducing delinquency among target area students and, more importantly, significantly decreasing the levels of gang crime in the target area.

Despite various concerns and glitches associated with the planning and implementation of GRP, the committee members acknowledge the value of the connections that the program has helped to forge. Before GRP, the Los Angeles Police Department and the community-based organizations of Boyle Heights did not have much interaction; today, the same agencies regularly communicate and collaborate to address the same problems. Although the exact collaboration among the GRP stakeholders beyond the federally funded period is relatively uncertain, the relationships built between prevention, intervention, and suppression agencies will certainly last longer than the money that brought them to the table.

Chapter 6

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

The north side of Milwaukee, once home to much of the city's middle class, saw great decline during the 1980's coinciding with the decline of the manufacturing sector and the rise of the crack cocaine epidemic. In the wake of this decline, these neighborhoods became nearly synonymous with unemployment, poverty, and crime. Traditional youth gangs exported from Chicago, such as the Vice-Lords and Gangster Disciples, began operating a thriving narcotics trade, in many instances out of derelict homes, and violently feuded over territory.

A series of government initiatives, including Weed and Seed, Gang Resistance and Education Training (Gang Reduction Education and Training (GREAT)), Safe and Sound, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), and Children's Hospital's Project Ujima, aimed at reducing youth gang crime, began in the 1990's to combat this problem. These initiatives were successful at ridding Milwaukee's north side of much of its traditional gangs. However, what remained was an area full of recalcitrant youth, decreased economic opportunities, and a continuing demand for narcotics. The organization and culture of gangs adapted to these changing conditions. Instead of following the traditional hierarchical criminal enterprise model, youth gangs on the north side formed loose networks among a handful of individuals with the sole purpose of selling drugs. These small groups no longer identified with colors, tattoos, or, in many cases, even a shared name.

While the groups' main activity remained narcotics trafficking, violence was still commonplace, as they continued to vie for territory. Thus, while the government initiatives previously mentioned were successful at eradicating Milwaukee's north side of its traditional gangs, the problems of youth crime and violence remained in a new form. In response to these persistent problems, in October 2003, the City of Milwaukee was invited, along with three other cities, to participate in Gang Reduction Program (GRP).

Urban Institute (UI)'s evaluation of the Milwaukee GRP focuses on community-level outcome and impact measures. The following sections present findings and lessons learned from the initiative's initial planning stages through its implementation. First, the various study areas included in the research design as well as baseline crime and demographic statistics for each are presented.

6.1. STUDY AREAS

The Milwaukee GRP evaluation considers three study areas: target, comparison, and displacement. The evaluation measured community-level changes in the target area using the comparison area as a control. The displacement area was used to analyze whether or not crime was simply displaced from the target area. For Milwaukee, all three areas are on the north side of the city in fairly close proximity to one another. Figure 6.1 shows all three areas.

The Milwaukee GRP target area covers all or parts of the Midtown, Metcalfe Park, and Amani neighborhoods. Eighty-nine percent of the roughly 8,000 residents in the target area are African American, and 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. The area is economically depressed and has suffered a significant population decline over the past decade despite efforts toward economic revitalization. The main industry in the area is Master Lock, which has outsourced most of its manufacturing work and, according to neighborhood informants, does not have a history of hiring residents. The economic woes of the target area are compounded by the high rate of high school dropouts. Over 40 percent of the adult population over 25 years old did not graduate from high school.

Several middle and elementary schools, including two charter schools, are located in the target area. However, Milwaukee practices school choice, and thus, many of the area students do not attend public school in the target area. The charter elementary school, Metcalfe School, has a Boys & Girls Club operation on site. It is a relatively new, well-equipped facility conveniently located within the target area.

The gang problem in the area is typical of gangs in the north side of Milwaukee and has been described as loosely organized groups of young African-American males that are mainly organized around the drug trade. The groups are nonhierarchical and generally do not exhibit their affiliation outwardly, a fact that frustrates law enforcement efforts to eradicate them. Despite the seemingly unorganized nature of these gangs, a majority of Milwaukee's homicides are routinely concentrated on the north side of town instead of the south side, where gangs follow a more typical, hierarchical structure.

The second area, the comparison area, serves as a control for the evaluation. The area was chosen based on three general criteria: recommendations from the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD), the crime rate, and demographics. In late summer 2004, the MPD delivered a recommendation for a comparison area based on similarities between the level of crime and types of crime observed in the target area. Demographics on race, income, male/female ratio, and age were obtained from the 2000 Census. These data, as well as similar data for each of the three study areas, are shown in Table 6.1. Maps B.3 and B.4 offer more detailed views of the target and comparison areas, respectively. Appendix A provides a general overview of the criteria and crime analysis used to identify study areas for the evaluation.

The data in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 suggest that the target and comparison areas are similar in size, both located on the north side of Milwaukee and sharing nearly identical demographics. The differences between the two areas are slight, with the comparison area having a higher total population, higher percentage of owner-occupied units, and lower percentage of the population living below the poverty level. Table 6.1 also includes the number of incidents by crime type from 2002 to 2004 for both study areas.[1] These

[1]Crime data for the last quarter of 2004 is incomplete due to the MPD's conversion to a new Records



Figure 6.1: Milwaukee Study Areas

Table 6.1: Cross-Sectional Comparison of Milwaukee Study Areas

	Area		
	Target	Comparison	Displacement
Crimes Known and Reported, 2002–2004			
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter	33	29	52
Assault	1,121	1,352	2,047
Aggravated Assault	577	651	955
Simple Assault	524	672	1,042
Intimidation	20	29	50
Robbery	401	307	530
Drug Offenses	850	722	1,341
Weapons Violations	120	100	187
Vandalism	529	551	954
Socio-economic Indicators, 2000			
Area (square miles)	0.87	0.82	1.54
Residential population	8,129	10,747	14,909
% population 12-17 (years)	14%	12%	16%
% population 18-24 (years)	10%	9%	11%
% population male	45%	45%	45%
% population Black	89%	95%	86%
% population Hispanic	3%	1%	2%
% housing units owner-occupied	28%	37%	29%
% housing units vacant	16%	12%	13%
% high school graduates (age ≥ 25 years)	54%	58%	55%
% in labor force (age ≥ 16 years)	52%	51%	55%
% not speaking English at home (age ≥ 5 years)	8%	4%	10%
% households receiving public assistance	14%	12%	13%
% population below poverty level	45%	36%	45%

Notes:

- Some incidents from the fourth quarter (October - December) of 2004 were absent from the data due to data entry lags at the police department. This table includes all of the 2004 crime reports that were available for analysis as there is no indication that the completeness of the data varied across the three study areas.
- Crimes against persons (i.e., murder, manslaughter, assault) are counted as one crime per victim; all other crimes are counted as one crime per incident.
- For incidents involving crimes against persons where the number of victims was not recorded, the number of victims was assumed to be one (1).

Source: Crime data are from the authors' analysis of data from the Milwaukee Police Department. Socio-economic indicators are from the authors' analysis of block-group/block data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

data show very similar crime patterns across both study areas, with the comparison area experiencing a greater number of assaults but slightly fewer homicides, robberies, drug offenses, weapons violations, and incidents of vandalism.

Police recommendations were also used to choose an appropriate displacement area that was proximate to the target area. The MPD felt that displacement to areas immediately surrounding the target area was most likely if displacement were to occur at all.[2] Therefore,

Management System (RMS). This situation affected the entire city of Milwaukee, and thus there is no reason to believe that the crime data available for any of the study areas is more or less complete than similar data available from the other study areas. Therefore, any and all available records are included in Table 6.1.

[2]The displacement analysis component of the evaluation has one important limitation. In order to measure displacement from the target area to the displacement area, the GRP initiative must respect the boundaries of the target area with regard to service delivery, including any additional or heightened suppression activities. On-site observations and qualitative interviews conducted to this point indicate, however, that suppression activities have been delivered across the entire Third Police District, which includes both the target and the displacement areas. Given this pattern of suppression activity, there is no reason to expect that crime will be

Figure 6.2: Crime Rates in Milwaukee Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Milwaukee Police Dept. data.

a displacement area that encircled the target area was chosen. This area, also shown in Figure 6.1, includes only one physical boundary—railroad tracks running north and south. However, this physical boundary should not affect the displacement component of the study because the same railroad tracks divide the target area. Table 6.1 gives crime statistics and demographics for the displacement area.

6.2. BASELINE ANALYSIS

Figure 6.2 shows the crime rate, defined as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents, for each study area for 2002 and 2003.[3] While the crime rate for both years is lower in the comparison area relative to the target and displacement areas, all three study areas share a similar pattern, with the crime rate dropping slightly in 2003. Because the evaluation will focus on how crime rates change within each area across the study period, these initial differences in crime rates in the three areas will not affect the evaluation findings.

Figure 6.3 shows the serious violent crime rate for each of the study areas for 2002 and 2003. Once again, the pattern is similar across all of the study areas. The serious violent crime rate fell in each area in 2003. The drop in the serious violent crime rate was more dramatic in the target area than in the comparison area.

In Figure 6.4 the total number of incidents is graphed by month from January 2002 to September 2004. The target and comparison areas closely mirror one another, and the displacement area follows the same general trend at a higher level. In all of the study areas, crime appears to be generally rising over time.

displaced from the target area to the displacement area. Rather, the effect of the suppression activity should be detectible in the crime patterns of both the target and displacement areas.

[3]Crime data for 2004 is excluded from the baseline analysis due to the incomplete data during the last quarter of 2004 caused by the MPD's conversion to a new RMS.

Figure 6.3: Crime Rates in Milwaukee Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Milwaukee Police Dept. data.

The picture changes somewhat when focused on serious violent crimes. Figure 6.5 shows the trends by month for serious violent crimes in each study area from January 2002 to September 2004. Again the target and comparison areas follow roughly the same pattern. The number of serious violent crimes is higher in the displacement area and follows nearly the same trend, but the difference between the level of serious violent crimes in the displacement area and the target and comparison areas is not nearly as great as the difference in overall crime levels, shown previously in Figure 6.4. In addition, all of the study areas show a rise in serious violent crime throughout 2004, peaking in the summer. This trend appears to be reversed in the target and displacement areas in September 2004, though a baseline analysis of this length cannot determine whether that trend continued. The change over time beyond September 2004 is explored more fully in Section 6.6.3.

Of particular interest to this evaluation is the level of gang-related crime. In order to assess the level of gang-related crime in each area, the MPD conducted a manual audit of its records, identifying which criminal incidents were gang-related. Figure 6.6 shows the overall number of gang-related incidents for each of the study areas by month from January 2002 to September 2004.

As can be seen, the level of gang-related incidents for all three study areas is very low, probably due in part to the lack of formal organization surrounding much of the youth crime on the north side of Milwaukee. Figure 6.7 shows a similar pattern for serious violent gang-related crimes in all three study areas by month from January 2002 to September 2004. In fact, there are many months where none of the serious violent crimes could be linked to gang activity at all.

Figure 6.4: Crime Trends in Milwaukee Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Milwaukee Police Department.

Figure 6.5: Crime Trends in Milwaukee Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Milwaukee Police Department.

Figure 6.6: Crime Trends in Milwaukee Study Areas: All Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Milwaukee Police Department.

Figure 6.7: Crime Trends in Milwaukee Study Areas: Serious Violent Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Milwaukee Police Department.

6.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

On the evening of October 1, 2002, a group of area youths attacked and brutally murdered Charlie Young, Jr., on the 2200 block of N. 21st Lane. The incident apparently began with some of the youths throwing eggs at Young, a 36-year-old, unemployed handyman and small-time criminal. The egg-throwing led to a verbal argument. Young punched one of the youths, knocking one of his teeth out. Then, the youths all attacked Young and beat him to death, at times wielding tree limbs, broomsticks, and shovels. Even when Young tried to escape into a nearby residence, the youths dragged him back into the street. The incident made national headlines.

The individuals later arrested for the crime included 13 young males, ranging from 10 to 19 years old, and one 32-year-old man (Kane, 2002). The youths identified with several gangs, including the Deuce Deuce gang, the 23 Boys, and the 2-3 Mob. The youngest was already involved in drugs, most had prior convictions or arrests, and most were truant. Their lives revealed fragile family structures characterized by incarcerated fathers, poverty, foster care, learning disabilities, malnutrition, and murdered relatives. In fact, one of the youths involved was already a father himself at the age of 14 (Barton, 2002). Most of the offenders received five- to six-year sentences, while two received less, and one received 18 years (Abdul-Alim, 2003).

The incident immediately caused outrage in the community, and a blame game of sorts ensued. One newspaper article proclaimed, "It's plain that adults have lost control of the streets," and blamed the incident on "a weakness in the community's fundamental institution: the family" (Anonymous, 2002b). Other critics, including the chief of police and a juvenile court commissioner, went further, specifically blaming the parents. Another writer placed blame on the residents who witnessed the incident but did nothing to stop it. Still others simply blamed the community as a whole. One article even suggested a solution to the problem: the neighborhood associations should lead the community in developing a strategy for reducing youth crime (Stanford, 2002a).

In response to the incident, State Representative Leon Young organized a community meeting on October 5, 2002. In addition, two other previously scheduled events ended up focusing on the Charlie Young beating. One was a meeting between the police and community residents, and the other was a "march against violence" sponsored by True Our Brothers Keepers, a community justice center in the area (Stanford, 2002b). The police also increased ticketing of curfew violators, truants, and their parents (Anonymous, 2002a).

Despite this horrible crime, the number of homicides in Metcalfe Park (a neighborhood included in the target area bounded by 38th Street on the west, 27th Street on the east, North Avenue on the south, and Center Street on the north) had fallen dramatically from 2001 to 2002. In fact, in 2001, after 16 homicides in as many days, the neighborhood had earned the nickname "The Killing Zone." In 2002, however, there were only four homicides. Despite these figures, neighborhood leaders warned that youth violence prevention measures would have to remain strong for the trend to continue. One neighborhood leader, who later became involved in the Milwaukee GRP, publicly warned, "Either pay for the programs now or pray for the victims later" (Epstein and Thorsen, 2003).

The following sections describe in detail the development and implementation of the Milwaukee GRP. Significant events are also displayed on a timeline, shown in Figure 6.8, that covers the entire period of organizational development and implementation in Milwaukee. These events, and the ramifications of significant events, are discussed in more

detail below. An expanded version of this timeline also appears below in Section 6.6.3 with monthly data on selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial distribution of crime within the GRP study areas.

6.3.1. Phase I

Separately, community leaders and social service providers organized with the help of a local alderman to devise a strategy to combat youth violence in the area. The group grew to include community activists, members of the clergy, law enforcement, and local youth service providers. A representative from the U.S. Department of Justice's DOJ Chicago office first suggested contacting Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) for assistance. Later, in February 2003, OJJDP's deputy administrator attended one of the local planning group meetings, and the group learned that OJJDP was considering funding a comprehensive program aimed at reducing youth gangs and violence. This meeting planted "the initial seed" for what was to come, as one GRP committee member later recalled. The planning group was interested in pursuing the funding, and determined that the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance (OJA) had not only the capacity to serve as the fiscal agent but would also be distant enough from local politics to be objective.

Meanwhile, the planning group continued to investigate other solutions and visited Chicago in May 2003 to tour and investigate a program called the Evening Reporting Center, emphasizing heavy supervision for pre-trial youth. The participants were transported directly from school to an Evening Reporting Center where they were supervised and provided with needed services until around 9:00 pm. The planning group thought that a similar program targeting curfew violators and truants could work in Milwaukee, and the concept of Youth Empowerment Sites began to evolve (Thomas-Lynn, 2003).

In October 2003, the community leaders who had organized received the first installment of federal funding for the Milwaukee GRP. The group received $80,000 from OJJDP through OJA to begin strategic planning for two funding cycles and to hire a program coordinator. The target area for the initiative would be the neighborhood of Metcalfe Park and parts of Amani and Midtown, reflecting the areas that most concerned the planning group that was already assembled.

Despite Milwaukee's early momentum, the Milwaukee GRP got off to a slow start for various reasons. First, the MPD had disbanded its gang unit several years before the GRP initiative began. This situation left the department—and thus the GRP effort—without a foundation of knowledge of the gang problem or a specific response to that problem. Indeed, the MPD did not report its gang data to the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC), the nationally contracted technical assistance provider, the year before GRP, depriving the effort of an important baseline of knowledge from which to structure a response to the perceived problems. A change in leadership in the Chief's office led to the re-emergence of a gang unit effective April 28, 2004, with 24 sworn officers serving police districts 2 though 6. However, the department's RMS did not capture gang-related incidents. As a consequence, a considerable amount of time and money had to be expended to code violent crimes as gang-related. The failure to identify the gang problem and define it clearly has been a consistent theme among many of the individuals interviewed as part of the Milwaukee GRP effort (see Section 6.4).

A related issue that has plagued the GRP effort in Milwaukee since its inception involves the selection of the target area. There was consensus among those involved at the start,

Figure 6.8: Milwaukee Timeline



including law enforcement, community leaders, and local officials, that the gang problem in the target area was minimal, particularly compared with several neighborhoods on the south side of Milwaukee. Indeed, at the GRP kick-off meeting in Washington, D.C., in October 2003, a representative of one of the three neighborhood associations indicated that there was no gang problem in the targeted neighborhoods. Police in the gang unit also indicated that there was not a gang problem in the target area but rather a criminal "enterprise" problem.

The role of local political realities and their interaction with political realities at the state level should also be noted. At the all-site kick-off meeting, Milwaukee was represented by a number of individuals, one from a neighborhood association. When this individual's turn to speak came, he rose and told the audience, "I am the angry black man, and I am here for my share of the money." This individual explained that local, community-based organizations had been working on this issue for years. He felt that letting actors from outside the neighborhood swoop in and take new resources away from his organization and others like it would be unjust. He contended that these local organizations better understood the problem and what should be done about it. This spectacle illustrates some of the challenges that faced the Milwaukee GRP based on the city's history.

Despite these and other issues, the planning group forged ahead, forming an executive committee to manage the initiative. The committee first met in January 2004 and consisted of representatives from the police department, a representative from the Governor's Office, representatives from the neighborhood associations, several representatives from the juvenile justice system, and several of the community leaders from the original planning group. During this time, there was significant pressure from OJJDP to complete strategic planning for Phase I and begin programmatic activities.

In February 2004, the executive committee hired a full-time program coordinator to handle the initiative's day-to-day management. The committee finalized the target area boundaries and began preparing for a spring strategic planning meeting. In addition, the police conducted a manual review of criminal incidents within the target area boundaries to determine the extent of the gang problem. UI used this data and other criminal incident data to produce a baseline report for the strategic planning meeting. With the assistance of NYGC, the program coordinator began preparing a Community Resource Inventory (CRI) as required by OJJDP.

At the same time, concerns over the selection of the target area continued while the program coordinator and the executive committee recruited members to serve as part of a larger advisory committee in preparation for the strategic planning meeting. On April 15 and 16, 2004, the executive and advisory committees met together for the Phase I strategic planning meeting. The meeting first focused on an overview of the initiative and background information deemed useful for planning the initiative. OJJDP provided a meeting facilitator. The program coordinator presented demographic and economic data on the target area, using a report the executive committee had commissioned from the Nonprofit Center of Milwaukee, Inc., and UI presented baseline crime data. A discussion of community perceptions of the target area followed. Participants related that the target area lacked a "village" mentality, and noted that youth needed better employment opportunities. Next, the program coordinator presented the results of the CRI that, while incomplete at the time, included more than 80 programs. However, there was consensus that the CRI took too long to prepare, came with too little guidance, and, in the end, was not

very useful. In fact, most agencies included in the inventory were deemed inappropriate for participation in GRP because they were public agencies, did not have the appropriate Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax status, or already had funding from other sources. Thus, despite the time and energy spent on preparing these presentations, the information was not subsequently used during the remainder of the strategic planning meeting.

In fact, several very vocal members of the advisory committee disrupted discussion of the inventory. These same members continued to interrupt the planning process throughout the two-day meeting. They seemed to be suspicious of "outsiders" and felt that more residents and community-based organizations should be involved in the process. Some of their more inflammatory comments seemed to be racially motivated, such as when one member proclaimed, "Milwaukee is a plantation."

In the end, the OJJDP-provided facilitator was able to quell most of this sentiment and keep the group focused. The presenters continued discussing the overall vision, goals, and objectives for the initiative. However, very little discussion followed, and there was overall confusion over the difference between a goal and an objective.

For the rest of the meeting, participants self-selected into three groups, concentrating on prevention, intervention, or suppression. These groups devised goals and short-term objectives for meeting those goals. On the second day, the committees continued to meet in three separate groups, but only about one-third of the previous day's participants returned. The groups were instructed to think of activities that would accomplish the goals and objectives from the previous day's efforts. There was observable racial tension and competition for funding within the prevention group, with some members not fully participating. A financial discussion was intended to follow; however, it was intentionally avoided due to the divisive atmosphere. Instead, the remainder of the meeting focused on the next steps for the planning process, which were not well defined. OJJDP directed that May 15, 2004 would be the deadline for a final Phase I plan and corresponding budget.

Following the strategic planning meeting, the executive committee continued to meet approximately twice a month. The advisory committee was separated into three subcommittees, largely following the membership of the three groups that were formed during the strategic planning meeting. Each of these subcommittees began meeting at least once a month. Despite the frequent meetings and the fact that the Phase I strategic plan was submitted on May 14, 2004, there was a delay in OJJDP's approval of the plan. In fact, OJJDP rejected the first draft as inadequate. The first draft did not meet OJJDP's expectations in large part because it did not include any service provision. Instead, the plan requested funds for additional planning activities and for implementing an Request for Proposals (RFP). In addition, the budget was not submitted in the correct format and lacked sufficient detail.

The Phase I strategic plan was resubmitted on June 18, 2004. The plan in its revised form was accepted on July 9, 2004, and an effort was made to get summer funds out for 2004 with an RFP process announced on July 6 and due on July 13. The executive committee recommended eight awards on July 19, totaling over $350,000 despite the summer being nearly over. For a detailed discussion of the programs funded through the Phase I strategic plan, see Section 6.5.

Sadly, at nearly the same time, the community was confronted with yet more senseless violence. On July 8, 2004, mere blocks from the scene of the Charlie Young beating, a mob of up to 20 people kicked, punched, and beat with lumber a 14-year-old boy, leaving him

comatose with a fractured skull. The incident had apparently been instigated by a verbal argument with a girl at a nearby playground (Diedrich, 2004). One newspaper article chastised the community, stating, "This time, let's not let the shock wear off" (Kane, 2004). Another article noted that once again, witnesses observed the crime but did nothing to stop it (Nichols, 2004). In total, at least four mob beatings occurred in Milwaukee in 2004 (Diedrich, Thomas-Lynn, and Purvis, 2005). In this environment, Governor Jim Doyle publicly announced the awards in early September 2004, stating, "I want the residents of Milwaukee to have the safe city they deserve. This project will go a long way in ensuring that people are free from gangs and violence" (Thomas-Lynn, 2004).

6.3.2. Phase II

With the Phase I strategic planning period complete and the stakes raised amidst more violence in the community, members of the executive and advisory committees quickly started planning for Phase II, which would constitute the bulk of the initiative's funding. The committees first began preparing for another strategic planning meeting scheduled for the fall of 2004. At the same time, the program coordinator learned that one of the neighborhood associations involved in the initiative had lost its community block grant funding. Because of this situation, the decision was made to continue with only the remaining two neighborhood associations.

At this point, the strain resulting from such a long planning process became apparent. Many of the committee members' initial enthusiasm for the initiative began to wane, and their meeting attendance became sporadic. In fact, some committee members quit participating in the initiative all together, citing either the burden of the time commitment or the lack of clearly defined roles within the initiative. The seemingly constant turnover in the committees began to hinder and further slow the planning process. In addition, the stress of both monitoring the Phase I activities and planning for Phase II had stretched the initiative's resources too thin. The program coordinator was overwhelmed with handling both tasks without any support staff.

Problems also quickly arose with one partner in particular. A national youth-serving organization had received funding from OJJDP to be used in each of the four sites through its local affiliates. However, the Milwaukee GRP did not fully understand this arrangement. The local affiliate applied for nearly $1 million in funding from the Milwaukee GRP instead of through its national agency to run several required components of OJJDP's program model, including the One-Stop. Many community-based organizations involved in the initiative feared that the local affiliate would monopolize the initiative and reduce the funds available to other partners. Upon learning of the local affiliate's other funding sources within the national GRP and listening to the concerns of the other partners, the executive committee became less inclined to grant the local affiliate a large portion of the local funding.

Despite these issues, some early progress did take place, especially in terms of an Management Information System (MIS) and the overall program design. Specifically, one partner began creating a prototype for an MIS that could be used for both prevention and intervention activities. Meanwhile, the suppression subcommittee progressed very quickly with its program design, most likely due to prior collaboration of its members under PSN. The subcommittee's early plans included a community prosecutor at the district level and provisions for better record keeping and information sharing across

agencies. The MPD planned to include a gang-related flag in the design of its new RMS, which was later implemented in January 2005. In addition, representatives from the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) initiative began exploring the feasibility of linking the police's new RMS with their database, Augmented Criminal Investigative Support System (ACISS). The program coordinator also explored options for outsourcing the program monitoring function because the initiative lacked the staff to handle the task.

Despite the lack of concrete plans, on November 16, 2004, the executive and advisory committees came together for another OJJDP-sponsored strategic planning meeting. At this meeting, the program coordinator and other committee members were expected to present a Phase II plan that was supposed to be implemented beginning in January 2005. However, in reality, the initiative still needed more time to plan, and the local committee members' presentations lacked substance, particularly the prevention and intervention components. Despite this fact, the Milwaukee GRP forged ahead, announcing an RFP the following month. The RFP outlined three broad grant categories: primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention. The funding would cover one year, with the possibility of a renewal for a second year. Based on these funding categories, the Milwaukee GRP submitted a vague Phase II plan to OJJDP on January 7, 2005.

In February 2005, the executive committee established a grant review subcommittee to determine which proposals to fund. Shortly thereafter, the funding decisions were announced, accompanied by an unexpected consequence. Several partners, some of whom had been heavily involved in the process up until this point, stopped participating in the initiative upon learning that their proposals had not been funded. Thus, the number of participants was narrowed with still much planning yet to be done. On top of this development, OJJDP was dissatisfied with the Phase II plan submitted the previous month because it lacked sufficient detail.

While the program coordinator worked with the NYGC to revise the Phase II plan, OJA held a meeting with the partners whose proposals were to be funded under Phase II. The purpose of this meeting was to give the service providers an opportunity to ask OJA questions about expectations, to address any inadequacies in their proposals, and to strategize on how to collaborate throughout the initiative. Several of the partners were displeased with OJA's expectations and the requirement to collaborate with other service providers in general. In addition, some of the partners were dissatisfied with the level of funding they received. One of these partners threatened to withdraw its proposal while three others actively sought to divide all of the intervention funds among themselves and exclude the other partners. One funded partner and another partner whose proposal was denied funding met privately with the chair of the executive committee to lobby for more funding. The meeting was unsettling to other leaders in the initiative because it revealed the degree of competition and the lack of collaboration present among the partners.

Separately, the initiative's leadership sought to design a greater role for the neighborhood associations, giving them a significant share of the One-Stop funding. Members of the leadership believed at the time that this situation would give the neighborhood associations a chance to improve their organizational capacities without having to compete for funding through an RFP with larger, higher capacity organizations. As an added benefit, they thought that it would also reduce distrust and competition for funding within the partnership on the part of the neighborhood associations. However, not all of the committee members agreed with this decision, believing that the One-Stop, which required

management of all prevention services, was too great a responsibility for neighborhood associations.

Meanwhile, a revised Phase II plan was submitted on March 21, 2005. This plan included more detail, but ultimately, OJJDP asked for further revisions due to errors in the budget section. The final Phase II plan was submitted on May 5, 2005 but was not officially approved until the fall. During this time, many of the service providers became anxious to begin service delivery despite the fact that plans for collaboration within the group were still tentative. The funded partners as well as some unfunded partners continued to meet throughout this time period in subcommittees at least once a month, working out the details of collaboration within each funded category and between the categories.

In June 2005, the program coordinator as well as several members of the executive and advisory committees attended the National Youth Gang Symposium in Orlando, Florida. During the conference, they were able to see presentations from the other GRP sites. Of particular interest to the group was Los Angeles' presentation of its MIS, known as Integrated Services and Information System (ISIS) (see Section 5.4.4), which is administered by the city. Upon their return to Milwaukee, these committee members stressed the need for a comprehensive, online case management system. Two partners had the capacity to develop and run the MIS and, as previously mentioned, one had already begun planning one. However, each wanted increased funding to do so. In fact, one partner asked for $30,000 while another asked for $50,000. This situation was problematic for two reasons. First, all of the Milwaukee GRP's funds were dedicated at this point, and second, the situation highlighted the lack of collaboration and cooperation within the initiative. None of the partners seemed to be committed enough to the initiative to provide the MIS as an in-kind donation.

Initially, the Milwaukee GRP leadership believed that building a sophisticated MIS for client tracking and case management might be out of the initiative's reach due to funding constraints. The committee members continued to explore other options, such as reporting forms. The prevention subcommittee continued to work on draft intake forms to be used at the One-Stop, and OJA created a form to track programmatic activities on a monthly basis (see Figure 6.9). In addition, under Phase II funding, the initiative contracted with one of the executive committee member's agencies, Fighting Back, for the provision of program monitoring. The program monitor also worked on developing a process to effectively monitor the Phase II grants and ensure that the initiative's requirements were met. The program monitoring function included conducting site visits to review award recipients' compliance with grant expectations, reporting the findings to the executive committee, and delivering corrective feedback to the award recipients.

By July 2005, the program coordinator found a solution to the MIS issue through Community Mapping and Analysis for Safety Strategies (COMPASS). COMPASS was originally a federally-funded program that provided an online database with mapping capabilities. The database was set up with the idea that various state and local agencies and nonprofits would provide a host of different data for the site that would then be available to the community at large. The program in Milwaukee had continued through community development block grant funding and was willing to provide the MIS that the Milwaukee GRP desired at least initially free of charge. In addition, the community prosecutor was already working with COMPASS to track nuisance abatement efforts. COMPASS began working on a GRP module for use with COMPASS in late July, but the final product was not available

Figure 6.9: Milwaukee Monthly Reporting Form

State of Wisconsin
Office of Justice Assistance

Monthly Progress Report, OJA-406
Gang Reduction

Section I - Project Identification

OJA Grant Number | **Project Title** | **Year of OJA funding** 1st ☐ 2nd ☐ 3rd ☐ **Grant amount:**

Agency | **Contact Person Telephone # & E-mail Address**

Monthly Report Period

Start Date ____ to ____ **End Date**

Reports Due 12th day of each month

Is this the Final Report for this grant? Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you require Technical Assistance at this time? Yes ☐ No ☐ **If Yes**, please contact Lisa Patrick at OJA (414) 270-2884

Section II – Data Regarding Client Served

Total number of new clients *served*: ____ **Total number of new clients *referred*:** ____ **Total number of current clients served/referred:** ____

What GRP funded activity did you provide/perform this month?

(Prepare to provide documentation of these funded activities that were provided to or on behalf of individuals/families in the targeted area).

ETHNICITY BREAKDOWN (client served)	**White**	**Hispanic**	**African-American**	**Native American/ Alaskan Native**	**Asian/ Pacific Islander**
Number of Males	____	____	____	____	____
Number of Females	____	____	____	____	____

AGE BREAKDOWN (client served)	**All Youth Under 10**	**All Youth 10-12**	**All Youth 13-14**	**All Youth 15-17**	**All Clients 18 +**
Number of Males	____	____	____	____	____
Number of Females	____	____	____	____	____

Review the "Standard Project Descriptors" listed below. Check off only those that most closely identify or describe this project.

☐ 1 Aftercare
☐ 2 Alcohol – Prevention
☐ 3 Alcohol – Treatment
☐ 4 Arbitration/Mediation
☐ 5 Case Management
☐ 6 Child Abuse and Neglect
☐ 7 Court Appointed Advocate
☐ 8 Court Intake Services
☐ 9 Crisis Intervention
☐ 10 Day Treatment Centers
☐ 11 Defender Services
☐ 12 Detention – Home
☐ 14 Detention – Secure residential
☐ 15 Diversion – Court (including Teen Courts)
☐ 16 Diversion – Police
☐ 17 Drugs – Control
☐ 18 Drugs – Prevention
☐ 19 Drugs – Treatment
☐ 20 Education – Alternative School
☐ 21 Education – Other
☐ 22 Electronic Monitoring
☐ 24 Evaluation – Diagnostic for Juveniles
☐ 25 Evaluation – Program
☐ 26 Evening Report Centers
☐ 27 Family Counseling
☐ 28 Foster Care
☐ 29 Health Services
☐ 30 Holdover
☐ 31 Homemaker Services
☐ 32 Litigation
☐ 33 Mentoring
☐ 34 Outreach
☐ 37 Peer Counseling Intervention
☐ 38 Planning – Database Development
☐ 39 Police School Liaison
☐ 40 Pre-disposition Investigation
☐ 41 Probation Services
☐ 42 Prosecutor Services
☐ 43 Recreation
☐ 44 Research
☐ 45 Residential Program – Community
☐ 46 Residential Program – Non-community
☐ 49 School Crime
☐ 50 Serious, Violent, Chronic Offenders
☐ 51 Service Coordination
☐ 52 Sex Offenders Programs
☐ 53 Standards
☐ 54 Systems Coordination
☐ 55 Training – Juvenile Justice Personnel
☐ 56 Training – Probation Personnel
☐ 57 Youth Advocacy
☐ 58 Youth Attendants
☐ 59 Youth Service Bureau
☐ 60 Other (identify): (Mental Health,

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until later in the fall.

Despite this progress, most of the partners did not fully understand the capabilities that COMPASS could provide and issues surrounding training and implementation remained. Thus, two reporting mechanisms emerged: the OJA reporting form and COMPASS. In early August 2005, OJA sponsored a training session, required for all funded partners, to explain the system for completing and delivering the OJA form. This form was to be submitted monthly to OJA and then forwarded to the program monitor, Fighting Back. The program monitor would then verify the data provided in the form through site visits. However, this system was quickly abandoned due to delays in obtaining the form and the data's lack of utility for program monitoring or evaluation purposes. In addition, many of the items contained on the form were already planned to be collected through COMPASS once the system was complete. Several executive committee members and OJA representatives made a meager attempt at redesigning the form but in the end determined that adding a monthly reporting mechanism to COMPASS would be a more efficient way to collect the information.[4] To further complicate matters, implementation of the program monitor was somewhat contentious due to various problems related to obtaining the OJA reporting forms and dealing with design issues related to COMPASS. Fighting Back did conduct several site visits and reviewed some grant recipients' internal records to ensure that clients met the eligibility criteria for GRP, but, in the end, OJA was not impressed with the level of monitoring and the role of the program monitor was not clearly defined among the executive committee members. These problems led to the executive committee and OJA's decision to allow the program monitor's contract to expire in December 2006.

Concurrently, the NYGC provided two trainings to help the initiative implement the multidisciplinary intervention team, funded under Phase II. The first training occurred in late July 2005. After this training, issues of data sharing between the agencies involved led to conflicts within the group. COMPASS arose as the chief issue in the debate. Many of the intervention subcommittee members were extremely hesitant to allow either the prevention or suppression components to view data on the multidisciplinary intervention team's clients. In addition, each agency required a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in order to share client information, and a few required court orders to do so. The negotiation of these MOU's continued through early 2006, distracted committee members from other planning issues, and delayed the start of implementation, which had been expected to begin in the fall of 2005.

At this point, the executive committee had to respond to other competing demands within the initiative as well. The prevention and suppression providers were tired of delaying implementation and ready to begin service delivery, but the intervention providers wanted to move more slowly in order to work through the data-sharing agreements. In addition to these concerns, in November of 2005, the board of the larger of the two remaining neighborhood associations involved in the initiative terminated its executive director and hired a new one, jeopardizing the feasibility of implementing the One-Stop

[4]During this time, the evaluation team provided recommendations for both the OJA reporting form and the COMPASS database. As far as the reporting form was concerned, the program coordinator refused to implement UI's recommendations for changes to either the content or the frequency of collection. Regarding the COMPASS database, written suggestions for improvement were delivered to the program coordinator. However, when UI staff met with the program coordinator the following week, the program coordinator claimed to have never received these recommendations. In the end, the final COMPASS database does not reflect UI's recommendations.

as envisioned in the Phase II strategic plan. In the interests of making the transition smoother, one of the larger GRP partners volunteered to provide technical assistance for the new executive director who was charged with submitting a written transition plan to the executive committee before receiving any funding to implement the One-Stop.

In the end, to avoid further delays to implementation, the Milwaukee GRP implemented Phase II in pieces, with some prevention providers beginning service delivery in November 2005. COMPASS responded to the intervention providers' fears by password protecting each component of the database and letting each group decide how much to share with the other groups. This solution combined with an additional NYGC training in December helped allay fears, and the intervention subcommittee determined that the team could begin meeting and reviewing clients at the start of 2006 while awaiting the final MOUs. The team also was not required to share any data with either the prevention or the suppression providers. In the end, these compromises allowed the Milwaukee GRP to implement its Phase II activities, minus the One-Stop, at the start of 2006 but in other ways handicapped the initiative due to a lack of information and referral sharing among the three groups of providers, which was intended as the key to the comprehensive approach that OJJDP had outlined.

Phase II Implementation

At the start of 2006, despite the remaining issues related to COMPASS and the One-Stop, the planning period had ended, and the initiative's Phase II implementation was well underway. The executive committee returned to the problem of the One-Stop only to learn that the neighborhood association that had terminated its executive director only months prior had now also terminated its program coordinator. Thus, none of the neighborhood association's current staff had been involved in any of GRP's planning. Additionally, executive directors of the two remaining neighborhood associations encountered personality conflicts. While executive committee members were impressed with the new executive director's charisma and interest in GRP, a growing consensus felt that the One-Stop was too large an operation for organizations that not only lacked capacity but also stability. Thus, during the spring, the role of the neighborhood associations was more narrowly defined to include only community outreach and publicity. The majority of the One-Stop funding was transferred to another higher capacity prevention partner that already provided the community with a One-Stop center for employment services and job training. The executive committee saw this partner as taking over responsibility for the One-Stop; however, the partner itself never fully embraced that role. Thus, the initiative's plan for a One-Stop such as envisioned by the GRP model—one that would intake all eligible clients, refer them to a full range of appropriate services (whether employment-related or not) and coordinate the client's service provision—never materialized. Instead, one large employment services provider became the de facto One-Stop but didn't actually change its operations to fit the expectations of the GRP management.

During this same period, the intervention team completed its MOUs, and, by all accounts, by spring 2006, most intervention team members felt comfortable sharing client information at team meetings and in COMPASS. However, plans for all GRP partners to view client data across the three prongs were wholly abandoned. Additionally, none of the GRP contracts required its grant recipients to enter data into COMPASS and compliance became an immediate problem. Thus, despite all of the time and effort that was spent

creating and implementing COMPASS, the initiative was for all intents and purposes left without an MIS. In addition to the lack of a One-Stop and a fully functional MIS, committee meetings became increasingly less frequent and more sporadic as the year progressed, making coordination across prongs nearly impossible.

Despite these key problems, the implementation continued to move forward, and sustainability became front and center. In July, Communities in Schools (CIS) sponsored a sustainability meeting for all GRP committee members. The group assembled decided that, based on early implementation and their knowledge of the problem in the target area, the intervention team and suppression efforts were both worth sustaining. Regarding prevention services, the meeting attendees felt that only employment services and the One-Stop in its current form (the de facto employment services One-Stop) were worth sustaining. The decision represented a rare moment of consensus for a partnership that had been characterized by contentious debate throughout most of the planning period. Moreover, three options for sustainability were discussed: the formation of a nonprofit organization to coordinate the initiative, finding an existing nonprofit organization to take responsibility for the initiative's coordination, or convincing the city government to take over. While no one could clearly say which proposal enjoyed the most support, OJA clearly favored the last option and began casual inquiries later that month with the City Block Grant Office. The idea of forming a sustainability subcommittee was raised again at the sustainability meeting, but no such group was ever assembled.

In the face of these issues, UI's interim report, covering the planning periods and Phase I implementation, was released late in summer 2006. The report highlighted a variety of problems concerning the initiative's collaborative functioning and program design as well as issues related to leadership and management. Just prior to and during the all-site cluster meeting held in Milwaukee in September 2006, OJJDP, OJA, the Milwaukee GRP program coordinator, and members of the executive committee met to discuss redirecting the initiative to address the issues highlighted in the report, particularly role clarity, decision making authority, and leadership roles for key agencies involved in the initiative's prevention and intervention components. While many recognized the report's intent to provide useful feedback and lessons learned through 2005, GRP committee members also felt that the report arrived too late for the initiative to implement any major changes and that the information contained in the report would have been more useful if it had been delivered the prior summer. In addition, many committee members reiterated previous comments about the role of the evaluator as "hands off," wishing that instead feedback could have been delivered on a more regular basis using a research partner model. Despite these comments, role clarity among the prevention and intervention components of the initiative became the main discussion topic during the aforementioned meetings, and some improvement was noticeable through the rest of the implementation period within those prongs.

Notwithstanding some substantial developments surrounding sustainability and role clarity, there still existed a great deal of uncertainty regarding GRP's current implementation, specifically related to when the current funding stream would end. At the November 2005 meeting of the executive committee, the originally planned end date of December 2006 was revised to May 2007; however, questions regarding how the additional months of service provision would be funded still remained. Additionally, at OJJDP's behest, in February 2006 the executive committee again extended the initiative through September

2007 for all but prevention services, which would still end in May 2007. However, once again, the funds necessary to make this extension possible had not yet been identified. After OJA's request to OJJDP for additional funds was denied, OJA suggested that the initiative operate minus the coordinator and the program monitor after December 2006, but OJJDP rejected this idea. In the end, the OJA allowed the program monitor's contract to expire in December 2006 and reviewed all other contracts to identify grant recipients with unspent funds. The unspent funds were then redirected toward the costs of extending the initiative as well as funding the coordinator's position.

Despite the eventual resolution of these uncertainties, the lack of definite and swift decision making surrounding these issues had several consequences. First, in the face of such uncertainties, the grant recipients acted as if the initiative would end in December 2006 until the funds needed to continue were clearly identified. Thus, many programs funded under GRP, particularly the intervention team, had stopped accepting new clients in order to ensure that all clients accepted would receive full services. Second, many grant recipients already viewed GRP as over and did not put a lot of effort into sustainability. Third, the coordinator, whose position was constantly in peril awaiting these funding decisions, began seeking a new position. Compounding these issues, Milwaukee's U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) had been awarded a new federal anti-gang grant through the Office of the Attorney General in April. GRP's current partners were disappointed to learn that not only would the new initiative *not* borrow heavily from GRP's implementation but also would not involve any of the current initiative's prevention or intervention providers.

In fact, in February of 2007, the Milwaukee GRP experienced a major upset when its program coordinator resigned. Her resignation was announced abruptly when she sent an email to committee members on the day of her departure, and little to no planning for her departure had taken place. Formally, a representative from OJA, the grant administrator, had taken over her role, but he was located in Madison and had little contact with the GRP partners. Many of the committee members complained that he was difficult to reach either via telephone or e-mail. In fact, the Milwaukee GRP had hired a summer intern, and communication about the initiative's leadership was so limited that several committee members mistakenly believed the intern to be the new program coordinator. After the coordinator's departure, the executive committee met only once, and all subcommittee meetings ceased.

After months without a meeting and virtually no communication from OJA, the new coordinator from OJA convened an executive committee meeting in May 2007. The meeting focused on sustainability, specifically the city of Milwaukee's interest in possibly continuing the initiative through the Community Block Grants Office. However, by the fall of 2007, nothing official had been arranged, and the initiative ended quietly in September 2007. To further explore the success achieved and obstacles encountered by the partnership built in Milwaukee, and to develop a more nuanced understanding of the partnership's functioning, the evaluation team interviewed a significant proportion of active partners throughout the evaluation period. Findings from those interviews are presented in the following section.

6.4. COLLABORATIVE FUNCTIONING

The data presented in this section were gathered through on-site observations, qualitative interviews, and two waves of the partnership survey. This section focuses on the level and degree of collaborative functioning that existed in the Milwaukee GRP initiative. The analysis that follows is meant to enrich other output and outcome data presented later in this report and provide lessons learned for Milwaukee as well as other communities.

UI researchers conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews among GRP committee members in four waves from 2005 to 2007. In total, the evaluation team successfully interviewed 18 committee members in 2005, 23 committee members in 2006, and 14 committee members in 2007. For 2005, the sample represents approximately one-third of the total committee membership for that year. Similarly, in 2006 and 2007, the sample represents 35 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of total committee membership during those years.[5] Each wave of interviews included a balance between executive and advisory committee members, and the advisory committee members in the sample were evenly distributed across the three main subcommittees: prevention, intervention, and suppression. Across each wave, the interviews focused on six main areas of collaboration, including:

- Mission, goals, and strategic plan;
- Collaboration and capacity building;
- Committee functioning;
- Management and leadership;
- Resources; and
- Sustainability.

UI researchers also had the opportunity to observe the Milwaukee GRP committee members on site on 14 occasions between November 2003 and May 2007. On-site observations included executive coordinating committee meetings, advisory committee meetings, strategic planning meetings, a multidisciplinary intervention team meeting, and technical assistance trainings. Moreover, additional on-site observations were garnered from site visit reports provided to UI researchers via the technical assistance provider as well as written executive committee minutes provided by the program coordinator.

In addition, in September 2005, UI researchers conducted five qualitative interviews with service providers involving eight respondents, and an interview with the program monitor involving two respondents. UI also made on-site observations of selected service providers. In the interviews, respondents were asked to describe their agencies, their programs, their experiences as subcontractors for the Milwaukee GRP, the successes and obstacles they encountered, and recommendations for change. While the service provider interviews did not follow the same format as those conducted with committee members, the service providers were able to provide important insight into the Milwaukee GRP's functioning and efforts, and findings from those interviews are included in this section as well.

[5]The percentage sampled in each year varies due to large fluctuations over time in both the committees' composition and the total number of members, and thus, only rough estimates regarding the sample size relative to the total committee membership can be provided.

6.4.1. Mission, Goals, and Strategic Plan

During the planning and early implementation stages of this initiative, interview respondents found it difficult to clearly communicate the Milwaukee GRP's mission. None of the respondents in 2005 identified youth gang crime or gangs as the mission. In fact, several respondents referred to the word "gang" in the program as simply a label that did not accurately reflect the mission of the program. Of these respondents, some stated that the program's true mission was more generally to reduce youth crime in the target area; others contended that the true mission was to address the needs of families and at-risk youth in the target area. One 2005 respondent expressed frustration that the target population did not seem to be clearly defined and that committee members were using the term "youth gang" interchangeably with "at-risk kids." The respondent also felt that the lack of clarity had important consequences for program design, outcomes, and resources because "at-risk kids" refers to a broader target population than youth gangs.

Indeed, many criticized OJJDP for not providing a clear gang definition. A 2005 respondent confided that "the gang label [was] loose because there is only a mild gang problem but a lot of violent crime" in the target area. Other 2005 respondents agreed that the gang label was intentionally vague with two respondents describing the target area as not having many large, overarching gangs, but rather unorganized, diffuse youth gang crime. Another respondent in 2007 noted, "The model presupposes large Chicago- and L.A.-size gangs. There was none of that on the north side of Milwaukee." In fact, one respondent suggested during a 2006 interview that it was problematic that such a small number of gang members had been found in the target area.

Notwithstanding early confusion over the initiative's mission and focus, over time, respondents were increasingly better able to articulate a clear mission; however, despite the increased clarity of the mission, operationally, the mission had changed. Late 2006 and 2007 respondents were able to provide rote recitations of the mission but, when speaking of the initiative's implementation, revealed striking deviations from the stated mission. For example, by late 2006, most respondents agreed that the target population had changed. Primary prevention services were at that point directed solely to gang-involved youth and adults and their immediate family members, not the larger target area population. Additionally, beyond employment services, very few respondents believed that other primary and secondary prevention services were important to the initiative. Indeed, in late 2006, nearly all of the respondents reported that at a recent meeting regarding sustainability, there had been near universal agreement that the only prevention component of the initiative that should be sustained should be employment services. Even most prevention service providers, who would stand to lose funding from the shutdown of the GRP initiative, agreed with this assessment, stating that employment services were the most crucial investment that GRP could make in the target area and that GRP's timeframe was insufficiently short for other prevention efforts to have any real effect. In short, GRP's primary focus evolved over time to include only intervention and suppression services.

Simultaneously, suppression efforts were expanded to include a much larger geographic area, all of MPD's Third District. Respondents from the suppression subcommittee were unapologetic with regard to expanding these services. All of these respondents felt that the only purpose that confining suppression activity to the target area served was the evaluation. Additionally, suppression subcommittee members who were interviewed felt that their role as law enforcement and the need to respond to crime where it occurs

superseded the initiative's mission. One such respondent related, "I have to focus on where the crime is now." Other 2006 and 2007 respondents simply stated that, since the initiative was first envisioned, crime had declined in the target area. One such respondent admitted, "We have to self-generate [crime] at times in the target area." The respondent continued, "I can't pick and choose where problems come from."

In fact, the location and boundaries of the target area became an increasingly contentious issue over the course of the initiative. One 2005 respondent stated that the target area had been chosen for "the wrong reasons," referring to the community outrage at a particularly violent murder that occurred inside the target area in 2003. Respondents in 2006 remarked that other areas of Milwaukee had a greater need for GRP services, such as the south side of town. "The geographical boundary is frustrating," noted one 2006 respondent. "[It keeps] us from serving people who need [the program]." Another factor that became more apparent as the initiative was implemented was the highly transient nature of the population in the target area. One respondent noted early in the implementation phase, "Offenders are highly mobile and whether or not to include them has been a battle for me." One 2007 respondent simply lamented, "So many of the issues of this project go back to the original decision that these neighborhoods be the target." These difficulties led to variations in actual implementation among service providers. Despite the Milwaukee GRP's eligibility requirement that a client must live within the target area boundaries, some of the service providers interviewed in 2005 reported not following this directive, suggesting that the requirement had been an obstacle for program monitoring from the beginning of the Phase I implementation. One service provider expressed frustration with the initiative's target area and described the situation of limiting services to youth who live in the target area as akin to "having a table full of fruit and good food and having to tell the youth they can't eat from it."

Compounding issues over the initiative's mission and target area, respondents also expressed general dissatisfaction with OJJDP for what they perceived as unclear, vague, or capricious directives and expectations, particularly in terms of program design. In addition to being designed for a type and level of gang crime not believed to exist in Milwaukee's target area, the model, and OJJDP's expectations for implementation of that model, presented other challenges in Milwaukee. Many respondents criticized OJJDP for pressuring the initiative into choosing the target area and emphasizing the role of the neighborhood associations which in turn dictated the initiative's structure. Additionally, these respondents felt that OJJDP placed undue pressure on the initiative to spend money quickly without investing the necessary planning time to ensure that resources were maximized. After the release of the interim report and the revelation that other GRP sites were significantly behind the Milwaukee GRP in terms of planning and implementation, one respondent deplored, "We took OJJDP's deadlines to heart."

Moreover, respondents criticized the GRP program model for what they perceived as an impossibly short implementation time frame and a lack of evidence of the effectiveness of the model at reducing youth gang crime. In particular, many respondents viewed the implementation period as too short to show any measurable impact. Many also questioned the effectiveness of the prevention component at all because prevention outcomes would necessarily not be measurable during the evaluation period and would be difficult to measure at all given the initiative's indirect influence on the crime rate. Many respondents over the course of the initiative criticized the concept of a One-Stop all together as an

unrealistic service delivery system. Still others criticized the model for not being designed with local needs in mind and described the model as effectively, in one respondent's words, "tying the executive committee's hands. " In the end, one 2007 respondent stated clearly, "I blame the Feds for everything that has gone wrong." He continued, stating, "These projects come with expectations that are over what they can do."

Moreover, after the release of the interim report, many respondents resented the fact that other GRP sites had not followed the prescribed model as closely as Milwaukee had, seemingly without consequence. "Milwaukee seemed like the only [GRP] site that stuck with the model," noted one 2007 respondent. "It was drilled into us from day one that we could not deviate." A 2006 respondent concurred, remarking that the group had been "conditioned from the beginning [that] we're developing a model,' not a program." Another 2007 respondent stated, "If the test were to stick to the model, then we did a good job." This perception was apparent as early as Phase I, as one the initial respondents who originally understood the GRP initiative as a prescribed model with "local flavor" later believed the model to be more rigid, and expressed frustration over dedicating more than a year to designing the initiative if OJJDP simply wanted to strictly implement its model. In addition to this frustration, the respondent felt that the RFP would have been written differently if OJJDP's wishes had been more clearly understood at the beginning of the planning period; for example, the RFP could have included language requiring award recipients to use the One-Stop. One 2005 respondent elaborated that "OJJDP seemed to change its mind a lot, as if they were still trying to figure the model out themselves."

Most respondents also felt that the goals and objectives for the program were vague, unclear, or nonexistent. In fact, only two respondents in 2005 felt that the goals were clear. The program coordinator agreed with the other respondents' assessment of the goals and admitted that she rarely referred to the program's written goals and objectives outside of fulfilling her quarterly reporting obligation to OJJDP. In addition, there was some question as to how widely the written goals and objectives had been distributed among the partners. One 2005 respondent reported that the fiscal agent had actually written the "local goals" for each subcommittee but was not sure if they had been shared with the subcommittees. Interviews suggested that respondents sought a "clear mission and plan for going into the future" and regretted that sustainability had not been a goal from the beginning. This confusion over written documents seemed to worsen across time. Nearly 75 percent of Wave I survey respondents agreed that they could identify a clearly written, updated mission statement. However, by Wave II, this percentage fell to 54 percent. Similarly, nearly 75 percent of respondents in Wave I agreed that GRP had a clear strategic plan with realistic goals, compared to less than 60 percent in Wave II.

In addition to being vague, goals were also described as unrealistic, grandiose, and overly ambitious. A 2006 respondent noted that though "the concept makes sense, working it out is the test." Several respondents elaborated, explaining that the collaboration has suffered from "a lack of knowledge of its own capacity" and a lack of clarity in its mission. One respondent stated, "There is little rational assessment of needs and available services to meet those needs." Respondents in 2005 admitted that the community resource inventory created earlier in the planning period was not even used.

The strategic planning phase was lengthy—involving many partners and the community—and characterized by conflict among the neighborhood associations, a low level of technical assistance, and what many respondents perceived as unrealistic deadlines from OJJDP.

Many respondents stated that the neighborhood associations had inhibited the early planning process due to competition over funds. In the words of one respondent, "The early planning meetings were unproductive because the neighborhood associations squabbled over funds. " In addition, some respondents felt that the strategic planning period could have benefited from fewer partners or from a smaller planning committee made up of higher capacity or more experienced partners that would submit plans for review to a larger, more inclusive committee. OJJDP's GRP model was also criticized, with one respondent lamenting, "I wish that OJJDP would give [the Milwaukee GRP] the blessing to be less collaborative, less of a big tent type project."

Additionally, some respondents felt that the planning process and resulting Requests for Proposals (RFP) were poorly designed, with one respondent explaining that they "drafted the RFP, gave out the money, and then tried to design the program... out of order." This respondent felt that asking award recipients to create their own outcome measures was inherently problematic and that the RFP should have supplied better reporting requirements and expected programmatic outcomes. Another respondent, also an award recipient, echoed this sentiment with marked frustration: "If you want a duck, ask for a duck." Several service providers also expressed frustration with delays in the project, with one expressing fear in 2005 that many of the agencies involved in the partnership would lose interest if the full GRP implementation did not happen soon.

However, several respondents nevertheless viewed the planning period and resulting RFP process as successful and a necessary part of the process. Although the planning process and meetings were at times cumbersome, these respondents felt the results made the process worthwhile. For example, one respondent related that although "citizen participation delayed the process and led to unproductive meetings [that served more as forums for airing grievances], it was part of the process." Another respondent supported the planning process for its ability to get "everyone on the same page as far as information." Respondents also agreed that the suppression subcommittee enjoyed a smoother planning process than other subcommittees, most likely because many of the partners had previously collaborated under PSN.

Interaction with the various national partners, including the evaluator, also represented a challenge for the Milwaukee GRP. None of the respondents seemed to clearly understand any of the roles of the national partners or how these partners might be useful to the local initiative. One 2006 respondent characterized the Milwaukee GRP's relationship with the national partners as "forced" and "not a natural fit." Of particular detriment to the initiative was confusion over the role of the technical assistance provider and what services were available to the initiative. The result was an underutilization of this resource during the first year of the initiative exactly when technical assistance was the most crucial.

Additionally, several respondents in 2005 expressed dissatisfaction with the role of UI as a third party evaluator, with a separate technical assistance provider. In short, these respondents expressed a desire for a research partner who could give expert advice on program design and data collection as well as the opportunity to learn from other sites implementing the same program model. Several of these respondents had previously been involved in PSN and other DOJ-sponsored initiatives and believed that the current arrangement under GRP stifled their ability to design the program, fully take advantage of technical assistance, and share information across sites. In essence, the role of the evaluator was unclear until late in 2006 once the interim report was released. One 2007 respondent

criticized UI for not making the purpose and design of the evaluation clearer from the outset. This respondent elaborated, stating, "There would have been more cooperation and less resistance" regarding data collection, reporting forms, and the MIS design had UI's role been made more clear.

6.4.2. Collaboration and Capacity Building

Reflecting on the level of collaboration and capacity building that the initiative had achieved in Milwaukee, respondents acknowledged challenges with personality differences, politics, competition for funds, turf issues, and distrust within the partnership. These issues were especially salient for the advisory committee early in the process, in 2005 interviews. The GRP partnership was described as a collection of factions and the committee meetings as "bitch sessions" by one 2005 respondent, while another related becoming so frustrated with GRP that their agency no longer wanted to be "associated with GRP or held accountable for what it does." Another respondent in 2005 reported that his agency had originally wanted to join the executive committee but that the request "met with a territorial reaction" from other partners that feared competition for funding. Indeed, several respondents remarked on the problems caused by funding decisions and suggested that certain partners were more concerned with obtaining funds than building partnerships.

Along these lines, many respondents felt that certain partners were only interested in participating in order to get funding or otherwise not involved in GRP for the right reasons. Survey data indicate that this problem became worse with time, as approximately 58 percent of respondents in Wave I believed that GRP organizations were committed to the program regardless of whether they received GRP funds compared to only thirty-five percent in Wave II. The neighborhood associations in particular were repeatedly mentioned and described as constantly fighting with each other and other partners over funding. A 2006 respondent noted that the neighborhood associations "just bogged [the process] down." A 2007 respondent noted the irony that "the [partners] that had the most to benefit did not appear [to pull] their weight." Several other partners were also described as difficult to recruit or possessing only a half-hearted commitment to the partnership. One respondent commented that GRP needed more "partners with a genuine interest in the program" and more commitment from the existing committee members. By the Wave II survey, approximately 75 percent of respondents agreed that intense competition over funding had impeded progress to program goals.

Specifically, lack of cooperation from two key government agencies proved to be one of the greatest collaboration failures that the initiative experienced, in terms of both access to potential GRP clients and necessary information sharing. In the survey, nearly 20 percent of respondents in Wave I and approximately 28 percent of respondents in Wave II agreed that GRP experienced difficulty recruiting certain key government agencies. One of these agencies was successfully recruited as a part of the intervention subcommittee early in the initiative; however, at that time, many respondents doubted the agency's commitment to the program with one 2005 respondent describing the partner as "lack[ing] charisma." This agency would later block access to potential GRP clients, refuse to share information regarding current GRP clients, and constantly miss required intervention team meetings, making the initial recruitment of the agency all but pointless once implementation began. Additionally, one 2006 respondent noted that the lack of cooperation directly led to

duplication of services for shared clients.

The second key government agency was never successfully recruited. Respondents described the agency, by reputation, as uncooperative, "monolithic," and unwilling to share information or to take advice. Additionally, many respondents throughout the initiative criticized the executive committee's lack of foresight in not attempting to recruit the agency sooner. In the end, the intervention team particularly suffered due to a perennial lack of critical information regarding the majority of the GRP clients it served.

Indeed, lack of cooperation and turf issues among partners also occasionally led to inefficiency and duplication of services. One 2005 respondent noted that "[GRP] partners do not seem to be able to collaborate without duplication" while another remarked that "[partners] are territorial, making collaboration difficult." On-site observations in 2005 as well as some interviews reinforced the claim that in-kind goods were not shared freely among the partners. Particularly, the need for an MIS with client tracking and case management capabilities was not supplied to the program in-kind through its partners, despite the fact that more than one partnering agency had the capacity to do so. Moreover, office space for the coordinator and other program staff were rented from another partner instead of provided in-kind. Additionally, from mid-2005 into the beginning of 2006, lack of trust among the partners as well as an unwillingness to share client data contributed to lengthy MOU negotiations surrounding implementation of the MIS. These negotiations not only delayed the Phase II implementation but also, in the end, were never resolved in a manner where the necessary client data was fully shared among the partners.

Some respondents explained these issues by citing low levels of interaction, particularly at the advisory subcommittee level. Still other 2005 respondents noted the challenges of forging a local, state, and federal partnership as an explanation for the amount of tension, with one describing the task of balancing politics, community demands, and law enforcement as Herculean. Despite the problems with the MOU and overall trust between partners, subsequent interviews in 2006 and 2007 revealed some improvements in information sharing. Several respondents commented that GRP had brought partners to the table who normally do not communicate and had created relationships that would last after the program had ended. A 2006 respondent noted that GRP led to a greater knowledge of resources and services, while a 2007 respondent suggested that GRP led to "better sharing of information internally across bulletins, squad alerts, [and] nuisance alerts." Thus despite the challenges associated with information sharing, not all of the partners were reluctant to cooperate. In fact, several respondents highlighted the fact that MPD had been particularly willing to collaborate and share information within the partnership. Most of the service providers also reported new opportunities for their organizations because of their participation in the Milwaukee GRP, for most in the form of a new partnership or the expectation of a new partnership in the near future. Nearly all service providers interviewed reported increased networking opportunities as well.

Even in light of complaints about problems with information sharing, competition, and collaboration among partners, respondents in both interviews and surveys also consistently cited GRP's collaborative partnership as one of the program's greatest accomplishments, especially later on in the implementation process. "Milwaukee has a history of self-contained systems," one respondent in 2006 reflected. "[But] this process has cracked a window [and shown the] benefits of working together." Others echoed these sentiments, noting that the program brought together agencies crucial for gang prevention that nor-

mally don't communicate; according to one 2005 respondent, "all of the human service organizations [were] working together." In 2005, some of the service providers extolled the benefits of working across agencies in a partnership and noted improvements in collaboration. One such respondent stated, "I have seen GRP evolve from when it was first introduced. Before, we felt like we were in competition with the other service agencies. This year [GRP] has become a collaboration." Another provider described the collaboration as a "bonding across agencies."

About 85 percent of survey respondents believed that GRP encouraged different points of view, and over half agreed that GRP sought out new relationships and built coalitions of mutual trust. An executive committee member in 2005 remarked that the GRP agencies collaborated at a higher level than those funded through community block grants. While signs of collaboration were already present in 2005, two respondents in 2006 and 2007 interviews remarked that the team had matured since the program's inception as familiarity and trust grew between partners. One 2005 executive committee member commented that these partnerships have been able to address "the problem of underenrollment in programs due to lack of cooperation between providers." A 2006 intervention team respondent concurred, stating, "[Relationships and information sharing have] made our job a heck of a lot easier." It appears that levels of collaboration at the start of GRP in the city were especially low, so that any progress made in getting organizations to work together was viewed positively.

Respondents also generally perceived GRP as inclusive of a variety of different partners. However, while some respondents saw this inclusiveness as integral to the process, others viewed it only as lengthening the process. One respondent in 2005 commented on the difficulty of having everyone involved and still remaining productive, a sentiment echoed by respondents in subsequent years who suggested that the number of partners made for longer committee meetings and delays in decision making. Respondents intimated that the lack of a clear leadership structure may have caused the inefficiency as much as did the quantity of partners. Some respondents, however, wished the program included more—or perhaps just different—partners, particularly certain large nonprofits in the area. Other respondents questioned the inclusiveness and composition of the executive committee in particular. One 2006 intervention subcommittee respondent stated, "Intervention is never at the table. We don't know who speaks for us or who highlights our successes." In fact, several 2005 respondents reported that the executive committee excluded certain partners that were interested in participating, which may have contributed to some of the tension and lack of collaboration that the advisory committee members noted in their interviews. Moreover, the Milwaukee GRP failed to coordinate or cooperate with Weed and Seed, PSN, or the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI), despite the fact that respondents recognized the importance of ties to other federal criminal justice initiatives in the area. However, the suppression subcommittee enjoyed a spillover effect from previous collaboration under PSN.

While collaboration among the partners experienced its peaks and valleys, a key component of any well-run collaborative effort was almost entirely neglected. The lack of outreach both to the community and among service providers resulted in a lack of program identity, with only 15 percent of survey respondents agreeing that GRP established a visible presence and identity in the community. This lack of identity later had important consequences both operationally as well as in terms of sustainability. Many 2006

respondents reported that from the onset of Phase II implementation the lack of program identity helped to divide the initiative into three separate partnerships that operated autonomously. In essence, none of the partners felt as if they were part of a larger initiative that could be easily identified. In particular, the initiative lacked a local name, and its national name was seen as unappealing with regard to client recruitment. One 2006 respondent described the concept of trying to recruit gang-involved youth using the name "Gang Reduction Program" as laughable and unlikely to yield its intended results. Therefore, very few of the partners in charge of implementation used the national name. Some service providers agreed that the Milwaukee GRP had not devoted enough resources to community outreach, and felt it had affected their ability to recruit clients. In many instances, the partners simply named the services that they provided or continued to use preexisting names for services that had been in place before GRP. Apart from simply not having a local name for the initiative, the program also suffered from not having enough advertising. One respondent in 2007 noted that "in the beginning, [the program] didn't even have a flyer or a brochure. [They] had to go out on foot to sell it." The lack of marketing materials affected more than just client recruitment. In the end, many partners felt that attempting to sustain an initiative that had no local branding or even simply a brochure was pointless.

6.4.3. Committee Functioning

Interviews revealed considerable frustration with the structure and functioning of committees. Most respondents felt that the committee structure—an executive committee and one subcommittee for each prong—was cumbersome, adding unnecessary complexity to proceedings and reducing the program's effectiveness. Within this complexity, committees also suffered from a lack of clear leadership, hindering decision making and allowing some members to push their own agenda instead of focusing on the needs of the program. Several respondents in 2005 suggested that committees were plagued by a leadership vacuum particularly at the prevention and intervention subcommittee level. One 2005 respondent lamented, "No one feels empowered to make any decisions that are final," while a 2006 respondent suggested that members did not understand where they were going and needed something to draw them together.

Committee meetings themselves received mixed reviews. While several respondents supported them as an opportunity to bring together people who "do not often come to the same table," many others found them problematic, citing disorganization, frequent cancelations, and a lack of leadership as contributing to their ineffectiveness. Several respondents stated that the meetings wasted time—sometimes two hours or more—without accomplishing anything. One respondent in 2005 reported a lack of accountability as far as making progress during meetings while others pointed to the coordinator's poor leadership. One respondent in 2005 noted that [the coordinator] believed that she could "just assign someone at a meeting to create outcomes and outcome measures, and that it will just happen," while another 2005 respondent remarked that she often gave "tasks without clear instructions." Most of the service providers agreed that the subcommittee meetings were not productive. One respondent thought that the meetings seemed to repeatedly review the same points, even when the group had already reached a consensus. Another respondent felt that there were not enough cross-subcommittee meetings, and that when they did occur, only the neighborhood associations were invited. This respon-

dent described the neighborhood associations as a "go through" for the prevention service providers that only created another layer of bureaucracy in the partnership.

At the beginning of the initiative, meetings also occurred far too frequently and were often difficult to attend; in fact, two respondents in 2005 reported specifically declining particular tasks within the partnership simply because it would require their presence at too many meetings. Moreover, meetings were often stalled by poor attendance, as certain key players in many instances simply did not attend. Contributing to this problem, many of the agencies experienced staff turnover or simply reassigned staff which created greater discontinuity in committee membership. Over the course of the initiative, respondents offered some suggestions for improving this situation. One 2007 respondent suggested that the meetings should have been held quarterly at the same time and location with the same committee members repeatedly. In addition, respondents suggested that the meetings have a more experienced chair who could provide greater direction and focus. However, several questioned the utility of meetings altogether, with one respondent suggesting that email could convey the important committee information while taking into consideration committee members' time constraints.

In addition, 2005 respondents reported changing subcommittees often and not understanding their assignment to certain subcommittees over others. For example, one respondent said that he had originally served on the prevention subcommittee, but later switched to the intervention subcommittee at the coordinator's request, and yet at the same time was considered a member of the suppression committee; the respondent was unclear as to the reason for the changes. Another respondent in 2005 described a similar situation in which he was asked to switch committees without being told why. Several other respondents were unsure what their role was at all; two were not even sure they were the right people from their agencies to be involved in the partnership. One 2006 respondent commented, "[The coordinator] has everyone's role down, but it doesn't translate to everyone else." The service provider interviews echoed the findings of the collaboration interviews, reiterating that those involved with the Milwaukee GRP did not always fully understand why they were assigned to one subcommittee and not another.

However, despite the criticisms regarding the frequency of the meetings and composition of the subcommittees among 2005 respondents, respondents in subsequent interviews during the Phase II implementation period reported that subcommittee meetings had become too infrequent. In fact, after March 2007, the subcommittee meetings had ceased entirely, and the executive committee only met on one occasion. In large part, this situation was an artifact of an increasingly disinterested executive committee, uncertainty about the initiative's future, and the coordinator's departure combined with a lack of direction from OJA. Moreover, rarely did all three subcommittees meet together at any point during the initiative. Infrequent committee meetings during the implementation phase combined with the inoperability of the One-Stop created an environment where each component of the program operated virtually independently of the other components. Many partners during 2006 and 2007 reported only vague knowledge of how other components of the program operated or whom they served. One respondent remarked, "It made it hard to see the big picture." This problem was complicated by the fact that COMPASS never materialized as an information sharing tool across prevention, intervention, and suppression due to lack of cooperation surrounding the various MOU's negotiated for its use.

Most respondents were dissatisfied with the functioning of specific committees as well.

Initially, respondents who served on the executive committee offered varied views on committee functioning, with some either stating that the committee had collaborated well or that collaboration had really improved to others stating that collaboration was a problem, citing instances of conflict as evidence. Some respondents thought that conflict within the executive committee stemmed from "individuals promoting self-interests" and "a lack of professionalism" on the part of certain partners. Another executive committee member felt that participating in the group had been "awkward" because the executive committee had to supply reasons why certain partners received funding and others did not. This respondent questioned the integrity of these discussions, saying, "I felt a little uncomfortable, like a rubber stamp." Other respondents cited a lack of communication among the executive committee members or instances where the group had become divided over an issue for an extended period of time. Despite these comments, several respondents at the time still thought that the executive committee either worked well together or was beginning to coordinate well. One respondent commented that the executive committee was really starting to "gel."

However, as time progressed, most respondents from the executive committee felt that communication both among the executive committee members as well as to subcommittee members had worsened and that the members' own commitment to the initiative had waned. This situation over time trickled down to the subcommittee level where members felt increasingly disconnected from the executive committee and the initiative as a whole. For instance, the leadership changes at one of the neighborhood associations in late 2005 and the departure of the executive committee's chair were not communicated to the subcommittee members until several months later, and, even at that point, no details were provided. Additionally, due to both a growing lack of commitment among its membership and the composition of the committee which included very few funded partners, decision making was slow, many respondents in 2006 and 2007 concluded that the executive committee was an ineffective way to manage the initiative.

Respondents at the subcommittee level were consistently more negative and more likely to report conflict, a lack of accomplishment in general, personality differences, or turf issues. One respondent described the situation using the analogy of a rocking chair, where a lot of rocking happens but nothing ever seems to move forward. Some respondents in 2005 also noted that the prevention and intervention subcommittees did not seem to have clear or disciplined program models, which hampered productivity. By contrast, the suppression subcommittee generally worked well together, with many respondents describing their group as fairly autonomous from the executive committee and having natural leaders. This subcommittee also benefited from prior collaboration under PSN. By the implementation phase, most respondents had concluded that the composition of all of the committees had been detrimental to the initiative's functioning and communicated clear ideas of how the committees should have been structured.

First, several suppression subcommittee members reported that the initiative would have benefited from them also serving on the intervention subcommittee and vice versa. These comments reflect greater cohesion and integration between these two subcommittees and an increased interest on their part of controlling the direction of and funding allocation for the initiative. However, the issue of roles across intervention and suppression providers was not due simply to the infrastructure design. At the core, there were issues of mistrust between intervention providers and law enforcement. One 2006 law

enforcement respondent noted, "Intervention wants us at the table, but they are concerned about sharing information with us. That's a barrier we are experiencing right now."

Respondents from the suppression and intervention subcommittees also generally believed that they should also have been included on the executive committee. One such respondent felt that many of the initiative's operational problems could have been avoided had his organization been more highly involved in the executive committee earlier during the planning process. Another 2007 respondent added that the wrong people were on the executive committee: "[they were] all well-intentioned, [but did not have] the right mix of skills." In general, these respondents also represented organizations with higher capacity and larger staffs that were in the end responsible for much of GRP's implementation but excluded from the planning efforts. However, respondents from smaller organizations tended to agree that such changes—including larger, higher capacity organizations on the executive committee and in the planning process— would have improved the initiative's functioning and provided greater opportunities for sustainability.

6.4.4. Management and Leadership

A lack of clear leadership has consistently hindered the Milwaukee GRP. Over the course of the initiative, when asked to identify the leader of the program, respondents named everyone from the coordinator to members of the executive committee to members of the subcommittees to heads of the neighborhood associations. In nearly every instance, the individuals named as leaders were unclear themselves as to who was leading the initiative. One 2007 respondent noted that not clearly identifying roles and assigning one organization or agency ownership of the initiative hampered both operations and sustainability efforts. The respondent stated, "Every problem has flowed from not having a clearly defined structure."

The majority of respondents expressed considerable frustration with the quality of the leadership, referring to both the executive committee and the coordinator as well as GRP. Respondents interviewed in 2006 and 2007 felt that leaders lacked the knowledge, innovation, and passion needed to perform their roles. According to these respondents, most of the leaders had none of these qualities and were not interested in cultivating a better understanding of the key issues and challenges that grant recipients faced. One respondent noted that the executive committee was poorly conceived from the beginning and had been chosen mostly to mollify those concerned with the Charlie Young beating and not based on the initiative's need for strong, competent leadership. Despite these shortcomings, over two-thirds of survey respondents indicated that GRP leadership instilled enthusiasm for the work to be accomplished.

The coordinator received perhaps the most criticism, particularly in 2005 interviews. Respondents in 2005 did not generally view the coordinator as competent to lead, citing poor communication skills, an inability to prioritize tasks and run meetings efficiently, and a lack of organization, professionalism, and experience in program development. However, respondents did not completely blame the coordinator for these problems, given her need to "serve two masters" (i.e., meet local and federal demands), to deal with less than professional members of the executive committee, and to perform her job without needed support staff. Other respondents in 2005 pointed to the coordinator's poorly defined role as hampering her ability to lead. Instead of being seen as a leader, the coordinator was mostly referred to as a convener, a meeting facilitator, the public

face of the partnership, or simply program staff. Respondents suggest that the executive committee may have exacerbated this problem by failing to endorse the coordinator as leader to partner agencies, effectively denying her the leverage and legitimacy needed to assume a leadership role.

Respondents were more sympathetic in subsequent interviews, noting in 2006 that it had not been fair to put the coordinator in a leadership role given her lack of experience with gangs and youth. Another respondent in 2007 suggested that the coordinator was a scapegoat for the problems with GRP and that negative comments in the first interim report should have been directed at other members of the leadership. One 2007 respondent described the coordinator's job as akin to "herding cats," recognizing the challenges she faced in dealing with members of the executive committee. Several respondents in 2007 described the coordinator as excellent at resolving individual differences between committee members and believed the project benefited from her guidance and coordination. However, such comments directly contradict survey findings. Less than 50 percent of respondents in Wave II agreed that leadership minimized personality differences, compared to approximately 70 percent in Wave I. Others suggested that although progress on GRP slowed after her 2007 departure, a lack of both funding and momentum would have caused the project to end regardless of whether the coordinator remained. Still one 2006 respondent pointed out that the coordinator had never been fully committed to the project. This respondent stated several instances where the coordinator was not interested in certain tasks, particularly increasing marketing for the program and scheduling regular meetings for the subcommittees, because they would require a lot of effort. This respondent stated, "Sometimes you have to do what you don't want to when it's your job."

In 2007, after the coordinator left her position, some respondents seemed more confident in the coordinator's role as leader of the initiative, but, at the same time, most felt that she had not been given the resources and clout needed to be effective. One respondent noted, "In the end, [the coordinator] didn't feel empowered to run the show." Other respondents still felt that the question of program leadership was still open. In response to findings from the first interim report, a respondent remarked that there was a general lack of leadership, stating, "[There was] no single leader or vision for the project." In 2007, another respondent echoed this sentiment, saying that there was "no clear chain of command.

Additional leadership gaps surfaced during the Phase II implementation period due to the failure of the One-Stop. Originally, the One-Stop was meant to serve as a coordinating body for the initiative. However, due to dramatic changes in the neighborhood associations' leadership as well as lofty but unrealized ambitions regarding their capacity, the One-Stop never became operational as envisioned. Instead, funding originally granted to the neighborhood associations to fulfill this role was transferred to another agency that provided employment services. However, this agency never saw itself in a leadership or coordinating role; thus, the original plan for how the initiative would be managed during implementation completely fizzled. One 2007 respondent stated that while the employment agency definitely served as a One-Stop for employment and training, it was most certainly not "a One-Stop for the broad array of social services that OJA has talked about." In the end, the effect was that there was no One-Stop, no coordination, and scant referrals between prongs.

In addition to confusion over the coordinator's role and overall leadership of the initiative, the executive committee also seemed to have a nebulous role that was constantly in flux. In fact, after the coordinator's departure, many respondents learned that OJA had hired an intern locally. While the intern's role was solely to manage the MIS, absent other information from OJA, many 2007 respondents assumed that the intern was replacing the coordinator and would fill her previous role. One such respondent remarked dejectedly, "[The coordinator] has left, and now an intern is at the helm." In the end, if GRP had originally suffered from a lack of clarity or skill with regard to leadership, after the coordinator's departure, the initiative was by all accounts a ship without a captain.

After the coordinator's departure, respondents reported that OJA did not provide any leadership or direction for the program. One respondent simply stated, "OJA kind of dropped the ball on the whole entire project." Her departure also occurred at a key point in the initiative where grant recipients were being told that the initiative would operate through October 2007, but the funding needed to extend these programs beyond the spring of 2007 had not yet been allocated. In this state of uncertainty, the partners received no communication from OJA which had important consequences for sustainability plans. In addition to the lack of communication from the fiscal agent, as previously mentioned, the executive committee only met one time after the coordinator's departure, and all other subcommittee meetings ceased.

6.4.5. Resources

Partnership resources analyzed for this report included funding, program staff, other non-financial resources, the organizational capacity of partners, and technical assistance. Respondents were also asked to comment on resource allocation, sufficiency, and other fundraising or development work in which the partnership may have engaged. Respondents across years tended to agree that there was insufficient funding for GRP; less than one in four survey respondents believed that resources were sufficient to achieve the goals of the program. Several respondents in 2005 noted that funding became difficult when spread across many agencies and targeting a broad population. Subsequent interviews found similar sentiments; one 2007 respondent remarked that given the number of providers involved in the project, there was not enough funding to make a difference. Additionally, many respondents believed that the timeframe was too short to create a large impact but simultaneously too long for the amount of funding allocated and the amount of planning needed. A 2007 respondent summarized these comments stating that it could not be "stressed enough that the climate [for] this project [required] far greater resources and far greater infrastructure." A 2007 respondent reflected, "In short, the paltry pot of money that came in to address this issue is indicative of the lack of understanding at [the government's] level, [thinking] that you're going to put down a few million dollars and overcome [the problems of] some of the most gang-infested or poor sections of a city."

Respondents in 2007 remarked on not having the funds to pay partnering agencies' staff to work overtime, particularly in the police department, and the lack of fringe benefits in the budget which resulted in the partnering agencies paying for employee benefits from other funding sources. A respondent in 2005 suggested that the program may have been better off simply focusing all of its funding on a neighborhood service center that could refer clients to other agencies instead of parceling the funds out to many different agencies.

In addition, the partnership purposely put less money into administration in order

to put more money into programs. This decision, combined with the decision to exclude higher capacity organizations from leadership positions, left the partnership without funds to implement an MIS and insufficient program staffing, a fact widely noted by respondents. One 2005 respondent noted that tasks necessary to the program's functioning were occasionally left incomplete: "everything gets done, a little bit.". Thus, at the time of the 2005 interviews, the partnership had not shown the ability to garner nonfinancial resources, with the exception of some consulting work for the strategic planning meeting.

Program monitoring and data sharing also proved difficult and contentious for the Milwaukee GRP. All of the service providers reported that, at the time of the interviews in 2005, there was very little data sharing among GRP partners because of an incomplete MIS and remaining MOU issues. A few respondents reported some limited informal data sharing among prevention subcommittee members. Nevertheless, several respondents were pessimistic or doubtful as to whether data sharing would ever fully materialize under GRP. One respondent stated, "The evaluators should look at the referrals, tracking them to see if we're really sharing information. If that really happens, it will be phenomenal." Another respondent felt that the MIS under development at that point was being designed without input from the agencies with the most case management experience and with little coordination across subcommittees. Yet another respondent expressed frustration about the lack of clarity from the GRP leadership about what data elements the MIS would collect and who would have access.

Despite these complaints in 2005, during the course of the initiative, the program staff were able to negotiate the design and necessary technical support and training for an online MIS called COMPASS. This was accomplished through a local government agency who had previously been uninvolved in the initiative. Despite this apparent success, near the end of the implementation period, respondents indicated that the resource was not used to its full potential and thus the full information sharing and program progress reporting it made possible had never been realized. In fact, many respondents reported rarely or never using COMPASS for a variety of reasons. First, the majority of the funded organizations already had systems in place for tracking clients. In the end, their staff was more familiar with the internal systems and found retrieving and storing information in these systems to be preferable to COMPASS from a time management perspective. Second, entering data into COMPASS proved to be tiresome and required dedicated staff. One 2006 respondent commented that had he known in advance how much staff time COMPASS would require, he would have had an administrative assistant in place at the beginning to manage it.

Third, because it provided very little information across prongs, COMPASS did not provide very much useful information for the service providers. This situation was a direct result of the lengthy and contentious process of negotiating the MOU's. At the heart of the issue, many of the service providers simply did not trust other service providers to have access to client information. Of particular concern was law enforcement's access to the information. In the end, no information was shared across prongs within COMPASS. One 2006 law enforcement respondent noted, "I was happy to forgo access to the information just to move the process along." However, the same respondent admitted, "It's not the most efficient way." Another respondent in early 2006 noted that information sharing was best accomplished through well-run meetings with all of the pertinent parties available versus the current MIS, and yet another 2006 respondent summarized the situation stating,

"COMPASS is as useful as the data inputted into it."

Finally, COMPASS was not designed to match the information needed to complete the monthly OJA reports, and none of the agencies' contracts required them to enter data into COMPASS. In the end, data entry into COMPASS was in most instances completed as an afterthought under pressure from GRP's program staff, leading one 2007 respondent to lament, "[It] took a long time to get agreement to use [COMPASS]; without someone riding herd on it, the concern is that it might just fizzle out." The monthly OJA forms, on the other hand, were completed much more regularly because they were linked to funding. Unfortunately, the monthly forms were not made available either to the program staff, the partnering agencies, or the evaluation team, making the information they captured useless for program operations, program management, and evaluation purposes; one 2007 respondent characterized them as a "wasted effort." Additionally, many respondents felt that the monthly reports were cumbersome to complete, both due to the reporting frequency and the fact that they could not be completed online or via e-mail. Service providers expressed a similar frustration with the Milwaukee GRP, wondering why the initiative did not provide more explicit reporting guidelines. These providers revealed that they maintained much more detailed client-level information than was contained on the OJA form. Finally, the program monitor reported not receiving the monthly forms back from OJA in a timely manner as another obstacle. The program monitor was not sure whether service providers were tardy in providing OJA with the forms or if OJA's bureaucracy was to blame. Either way, the program monitor reported frustration at not having the reporting forms during the agency's site visits. While the Milwaukee GRP had opportunities to comprehensively collect and share program and client information for multiple purposes, the partnership failed to follow through on those opportunities and the potential benefits of data sharing were never fully realized.

Despite these pitfalls, respondents reported that through the intervention team there was a greater sharing of resources and using connections with other agencies to ensure service delivery for clients. One respondent remarked, "The intervention guys are very much connected to other agencies and make things happen." Additionally, once the MOU issues had been resolved, the intervention team meetings became more productive and contributed to a greater level of information sharing than had previously existed.

Many respondents also believed the level of technical assistance provided was insufficient. However, one 2005 respondent remarked that the leadership needed to make clear requests for appropriate technical assistance, and another respondent commented that technical assistance is only helpful if it is used. This respondent cited an instance where the prevention subcommittee received a sample intake form from NYGC and then proceeded to veer from the example to create an entirely different form. The respondent exclaimed, "if it's not broke, don't fix it!" Additionally, one 2007 respondent reflected that a full year had passed before the initiative really understood the role of the technical assistance provider but that during the last two years of the initiative NYGC had proved to be a great asset. Another 2007 respondent echoed this sentiment describing the initiative's early underutilization of technical assistance as "a huge lost opportunity."

As far as the allocation of the resources to certain partners, some respondents in 2005 were uncomfortable with the grants that the executive committee made to its own members, although other respondents did not have a problem with this arrangement. Regarding the allocation of funds across prevention, intervention, and suppression activities,

several respondents in 2005 believed that more funding should have gone to suppression activities. However, one 2005 respondent believed that more funds should have gone to prevention and intervention activities because suppression activities already have systemic funding from the government. In retrospect, a few respondents in 2007 believed less money should have been allocated to prevention, as there had been "no focus [and] many of the projects were funded for what they already did [before GRP]." Another 2006 respondent commented that law enforcement funding could have been more focused during Phase I and not simply devoted to overtime. Many respondents across years were also dissatisfied with the current allocation to neighborhood associations, questioning their organizational capacity and ability to contribute to GRP. At the same time, one 2006 respondent noted that collaboration with community-based organizations was always difficult but very necessary despite problems with their structure and capacity. He noted, "You've gotta have them at the table, but their structure is always changing." Criticisms in 2005 included the neighborhood associations' inability to complete paperwork in a timely fashion, to leverage increased funding for the program, to build partnerships, and to manage or operate an MIS for the program. Many respondents worried that neighborhood associations did not have the capacity to run the One-Stop or the intake system. In particular, one 2005 respondent felt that the neighborhood associations were illogical choices to run the One-Stop and that other existing sites in the community were more natural One-Stops, such as W-2 sites (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) sites). Unfortunately, all of these concerns were justified once Phase II implementation began and the neighborhood associations' inability to fulfill their role became evident.

The allocation of funds across implementation phases was also a contentious issue. Many respondents stated that the Phase I funding had been an overall wasted effort. Some of these respondents were suspicious of the intentions of the organizations that had been funded and many bemoaned the fact that the Phase I service providers had not been held to the same level of accountability as the Phase II service providers, had not received funding through a formal RFP, and did not seem to clearly link to Phase II program activities. One 2006 respondent questioned, "Why weren't there any standards? Why wasn't it a more democratic process?" The respondent continued, stating, "There wasn't any expectation for those [organizations]. I don't think that it's fair to say that they didn't deserve to get [funding], but there's no transition for Phase II and no clear connection between the two [phases]." Despite these comments, less than 20 percent of respondents in Wave I felt the process used to select agencies for funding was ineffective. However, by Wave II, the proportion had climbed to 33 percent.

6.4.6. Sustainability

In 2005, respondents had mixed feelings on sustainability, with many noting that the program was still too new to draw any conclusions about its effectiveness and hence, to endorse sustaining it. Several plans for sustainability were discussed without any clear resolution, and though a sustainability subcommittee was formed, the first meeting was canceled and no subsequent meetings were ever planned. Although by Wave II more survey respondents agreed that GRP had made sustainability a priority and had implemented tactics to support the longevity of the program, respondents also became increasingly aware of problems associated with sustaining the program and the extent to which funding impacted sustainability. Wave II survey respondents noted that funding represented

the largest barrier to program success. As one 2006 respondent summed up, "If we don't keep [GRP] funded, [its] success goes away in 2 to 3 months." Other respondents in 2005 believed that funding from the government and/or charitable foundations represented the only way to sustain the program. However, one 2006 respondent from a government agency lamented that, despite the amount of time and money that had been required to put the initiative in place, his agency was not yet ready to absorb all of the costs associated with running it. Despite these concerns, one 2006 respondent noted, "Funding will always be an issue, but at least we will have the ideology in place." Most service providers interviewed in 2005 believed that interagency communication would continue regardless of whether or not GRP continued. One respondent felt that sustainability would depend on the commitment of agency heads, and that the initiative should seek to better engage those individuals to ensure sustainability.

While most respondents agreed that funding would ultimately determine the life of the initiative, they also identified other key factors surrounding sustainability. One of the largest issues affecting sustainability has been the lack of a One-Stop or other "body or structure to coordinate the services across prongs." One 2007 respondent felt strongly that without an infrastructure in place there was very little to sustain. Another 2007 respondent echoed these concerns, stating, "We have a lack of infrastructure locally to facilitate any sort of sustained effort." He continued, "That's the biggest disappointment."

Additionally, many respondents pointed to the need for clear outcome data in order to sustain GRP; respondents noted that numbers were necessary to demonstrate GRP's impact on the community and for "convincing people [it] is worth fighting for." Moreover, GRP's lack of program identity surfaced as yet another obstacle to sustainability. In particular, this shortcoming affected both marketing to potential funders as well as sustaining the commitment of the existing partners. According to one 2007 respondent, one of GRP's biggest failures was in not generating enough excitement and buy in at the outset of the program. Another 2006 respondent simply remarked, "There's no sustainability without a name." Others indicated that sustainability should have been a goal from the very beginning and that the executive committee should have defined sustainability more clearly before the project began. One 2007 respondent, when asked about sustainability, summed up the situation with "The ball was dropped," while another responded, "We waited until the bottom of the ninth." Several others blamed not the executive committee but the fiscal agent. A 2007 respondent stated, "The state has failed to provide [a] roadmap for sustainability that the local area needs."

Adding to these obstacles, many respondents expressed confusion and frustration as to when the current initiative would end. In 2006 interviews, most respondents believed the program would conclude in December of that year with one respondent reporting that "people [had already] braced for the end." Even after committee members received word the program might be continued into September of 2007, morale and buy in remained low. Respondents reported a general "lack of faith in GRP" and that a "wrap it up mentality" had pervaded all of the initiative's activities. Indeed, the lack of clarity regarding how long the initiative would operate and what its sustainability prospects were contributed to the coordinator's search for a new position. As early as the middle of 2006, there were no definite plans to fund her position beyond the end of 2006. This uncertainty forced the coordinator to begin looking for a new position before the end of the initiative. By the time administrative funding details had been arranged for 2007, the coordinator had

already accepted a position elsewhere. This situation not only had dire consequences for the continuation of services in 2007 but also placed an initiative already suffering from the lack of a clear leader and scant infrastructure into the position of trying to sustain itself.

Although over half of survey respondents were not sure whether GRP would continue to function after funding ended, interviews in 2007 revealed a great deal of optimism. The majority of those interviewed believed that the partnerships created during the initiative would last. Over half of survey respondents agreed that the persons and organizations participating in GRP were dedicated to sustaining the partnership for the long term. One respondent noted that GRP's real success was its ability to bring together agencies that had not collaborated in the past and to create relationships that would continue without funding. A respondent from MPD affirmed his agency's commitment to continuation while other respondents remarked on the strong relationships between the police department, child welfare, and probation agencies. One respondent noted, regarding the intervention team, "It will be sustained because the needs are so outstanding. It justifies itself." Another respondent stated, "GRP's an excellent blueprint for how we should be dealing with gang problems."

Moreover, many respondents saw sustainability in different terms and were not necessarily wed to the concept of GRP continuing in its entirety. In fact, by mid-2006, on the heels of a recent sustainability meeting, most respondents felt that only suppression and intervention perhaps combined with a "more streamlined One-Stop" were worth sustaining. Indeed, many respondents emphasized the relationships and partnerships that had been created and did not require funding to maintain over any specific programmatic activity. By 2007, many respondents felt that the continuation of GRP's concepts was more important than the retention of any specific structure. They also noted that for law enforcement efforts, many of the concepts would be adopted under government funding at either the local level or through other federal initiatives. In fact, due to the 2007 election of a former executive committee member to the position of district attorney, many aspects of the community prosecution model were already very likely to be sustained through local government funding. There also existed some hope that the local government might fund other components of GRP through the Community Development Block Grant Office, although no definite decisions have been made to date.

In the end, many respondents viewed the purpose of GRP as a demonstration project to simply show that the system could operate differently, that there were multiple approaches to solving the problem, and that cooperation works. One 2007 respondent stated, "The project was very useful at showing that two organizations using their strengths can have a bigger impact." The respondent continued, "Many of the local partners will continue to meet in one capacity or another because they have seen a great operational value to doing it." However, despite these new and perhaps more realistic attitudes toward sustainability, respondents agreed that GRP was unlikely to be sustained in its current form or at the same level of funding. Other sustainability efforts will be discussed in more detail below in Section 6.7.

6.5. GRP PROGRAM DESIGN, ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

6.5.1. Program Design: Phase I and Phase II Logic Models

Logic models are designed to give a broad view of the program design. The overarching goal of the initiative is to reduce youth gang crime and violence through a combination of primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. In order to determine the appropriate strategies for each prong, the Milwaukee GRP first defined goals for each. These goals seek to complement the larger goal of reducing youth gang crime and violence by addressing some small portion of the larger problem. For example, one of the Milwaukee GRP's intervention goals is to "reduce the number of gang-involved youth," indicating that at least part of reducing youth gang crime and violence in the target area could be accomplished through a decreased number of gang members in the target area.

Table D.1 in Appendix D depicts the logic model for Phase I. In this model, the goals and the corresponding objectives are listed on each row followed by the funded activity. The Phase I logic model is offered as an abstraction to demonstrate how the goals and activities relate to the funded activities. As previously noted, intervention activities were not funded during Phase I, and prevention activities were not separated into primary and secondary categories.

The Phase I goals in many ways set the stage for Phase II. The three goals focus on educating the partners involved in the process about the problem, increasing the police's capacity to deal with the problem, and experimenting with a variety of services designed for high-risk youths. The Phase II logic model (see Table D.3) arises from the final version of the Phase II plan and is very similar to the Phase I logic model, but contains greater detail. Most of the goals listed in the model are straightforward and easily understood as being related to the larger goal of the initiative; however, the last goal listed under primary prevention is an exception. Reducing health disparities in the target area is not immediately related to reducing youth gang crime and violence. Moreover, the logical steps necessary to draw such a hypothesis are absent from the accompanying text provided in the Phase II plan.

The Phase II logic model (Table D.3) displays each goal by prong with its related objective. Objectives are narrower, more precise, and usually more concrete than goals. For the intervention goal of reducing the number of gang-involved youth, the objective is to "develop a program structure of referrals and services that aggressively targets gang-involved youth." In this case, the objective creates a more actionable item and answers the question of generally how to achieve the goal. The strategy that follows is a specific type of programmatic activity that needs to be undertaken. In this example, the strategy that follows is the creation of a multidisciplinary intervention team that can coordinate services and referrals and provide case management and street outreach. The proposed activities column simply gives the corresponding funded activity from the Phase II plan. This system is followed throughout the logic model with one exception. One activity has been added to this model that was not mentioned in the Phase II plan, "Finding Paths to Prosperity." The program coordinator indicated to UI staff that the program is classified as a primary prevention program; however, there is no apparent link between any of the primary prevention goals and the program's expected outcomes. Each of the activities is described in detail in the Section 6.5.

6.5.2. Program Inputs and Outputs

The process component of the GRP evaluation seeks to enhance understanding of how the program works, including detailing what activities are undertaken, how different parts of the program operate, and what clients or target populations are served. Outputs are used to inform the process evaluation and directly result from the activities that are implemented (e.g., the number of clients who receive a particular service). Table D.2 and Table D.4 list each activity designed for Phases I and II, respectively. These models are based on the strategic plan created by the site and have changed throughout the implementation period. Any significant changes between the planned programming and the actual implemented programs will be noted below. The models also predict measurable outputs for each program and describe how these outputs will be measured. The outputs of each activity are then related to expected outcomes, which inform the outcome evaluation. These expected outcomes are categorized into outcome domains used to guide the evaluation team's data collection efforts and area discussed along with the outcome analysis below in Section 6.6.

The following sections describe specific describe specific programs that were funded by GRP, providing the inputs (e.g., funding amount) and the outputs for each program. The funding amounts provided to all Phase I and II providers, along with contract periods and clients served over that period, are provided in Table 6.2. There were no reporting requirements for Phase I grant recipients. Therefore, all of the outputs reported in the following sections and in Table 6.2 for Phase I are derived from interviews with grant recipients and cannot be verified through other sources, such as COMPASS or OJA reports. Moreover, several grant recipients did not maintain internal records on programmatic outputs for Phase I and were unable to provide accurate details during interviews or were no longer involved in the initiative at the time of the interviews. For these grant recipients, no outputs are reported.

Phase I

The total amount of funding for programmatic activities under Phase I was $358,640. An additional $145,000 was devoted to program staff costs, consulting costs, and the MPD's manual review of gang-related incidents for the evaluation. Thus, the total amount of funding for Phase I was $503,640. The original time frame for Phase I implementation was the summer of 2004; however, due to delays described earlier, funding decisions were not announced until July 2004. Because of these circumstances, two of the grant recipients, the Private Industry Council (PIC) and MPD, were unable to completely expend their funds before December 2004 and, therefore, received no-cost extensions to continue programming during the summer and fall of 2005. Thus, there was no discrete implementation period for Phase I activities.

Implementation of programs and services under Phase I was highlighted during interviews in September 2005 with several service providers. These interviews provided a more nuanced view of the initiative's programmatic strategies. The Milwaukee GRP had recruited most of the interview respondents to participate in the program, with one exception, where a service provider approached GRP and eventually received funding. All of the respondents' programs had existed before the Milwaukee GRP and in fact, the respondents stated that GRP funding either replaced funding from another source or was

Table 6.2: Milwaukee Phase I and II Inputs and Outputs

Prong	Provider	Activity	Inputs		Outputs	
			Phase	Contract Amt ($)	Measurement Period	Clients/Other
P	Boys and Girls Club	Mobile Outreach Initiative	I	$10,000	07/2004-12/2004	-
P	Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation	3rd District Community Justice Center	I	$12,500	07/2004-12/2004	-
P	MPD	Explorer Scout Program	I	$9,500	07/2004-12/2004	-
P	MVFZ	Gang Education Workshops	I	$7,000	07/2004-12/2004	-
P	Neighborhood Associations	Youth Ambassadors Program	I	$112,140	-	-
P	Private Industry Council	Step Up and REACH	I	$125,000	07/2004-12/2005	125
P	Running Rebels	Youth Education and Entrepreneurship Program	I	$10,000	07/2004-12/2004	25
P	True Our Brothers Keepers	Community Justice Center	I	$12,500	07/2004-12/2004	-
S	MPD	Community-oriented Policing Strategies, Increased Curfew Enforcement Patrols	I	$60,000	07/2004-12/2005	-
P	Boys and Girls Club	Finding Paths to Prosperity	II	$50,000	11/2005-05/2007	at least 50
P	Boys and Girls Club	TABS	II	$40,000	11/2005-05/2007	-
P	Career Youth Development	After-School Mentoring Program	II	$40,000	11/2005-05/2007	-
P	MPD	Explorer Scout Program	II	$9,500	11/2005-05/2007	-
P	Neighborhood Associations	One-Stop	II	$199,832	-	-
P	Neighborhood House of Milw.	Life Skills Vocational Training Program	II	$38,478	11/2005-05/2007	-
P	Next Door Foundation	Baby FAST Program	II	$99,904	11/2005-05/2007	at least 5
P	Private Industry Council	Milwaukee Career Center	II	$120,000	11/2005-09/2007	at least 127
P	Private Industry Council	Step Up	II	$60,000	11/2005-09/2007	70
P	St. Joseph Regional Medical Center	Family Empowerment Program	II	$100,000	11/2005-05/2007	at least 13
P	St. Michael's Behavioral Health Center	Peace Program	II	$40,000	11/2005-05/2007	-
I	Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation	Youth Empowerment Site II	II	$50,000	01/2006-09/2007	-
I	Latino Community Center	Street Outreach Workers	II	$80,000	01/2006-09/2007	-
I	Running Rebels	Youth Empowerment Site I	II	$50,000	01/2006-09/2007	-
I	WCS	Multidisciplinary Intervention Team	II	$408,088	01/2006-09/2007	100
S	MPD	TARGET Suppression Team	II	$150,000	11/2005-09/2007	-
S	MPD	Extra Gang Unit, Curfew Enforcement Patrols	II	$113,000	11/2005-09/2007	410 overtime hours
S	MPD	Expand use of HIDTA's ACISS database	II	$40,200	01/2006-09/2007	-

used in combination with other funds. Two respondents reported expanding their programs with GRP funds, either increasing the level of services or increasing the number of clients served. Some respondents described their extensive experience working with gang-involved youth, while most others admitted not collecting information on clients' gang involvement at all. One respondent felt that treating GRP clients differently from other high-risk clients already served by her agency would unnecessarily stigmatize the GRP clients. Others felt that the treatment for gang-involved and high-risk youth would essentially be the same and, therefore, there was no reason to specialize the programming for gang-involved youth.

Client recruitment methods also varied across programs. Some respondents described recruitment for their programs as accomplished mainly through outreach and word of mouth, while for others recruitment was mainly accomplished through referrals. Several respondents reported that their programs had served some clients by the time of the interviews (September 2005), but most of these clients had been served using other funding sources and not GRP funds. The respondents also explained that the fact that not many GRP clients had been served to date was due in large part to the lack of a functional intake and referral system. Some service providers described receiving inappropriate referrals, such as referrals for clients residing outside of the target area, while others reported not receiving any referrals at all. For example, one respondent said she had "begged for [referrals], but GRP [had] been working on building its structure and network." At the same time, only one respondent reported actively making referrals to other GRP partners. In 2005, all of the respondents reported that they planned to do so once the GRP intake and referral system was in place. Several respondents were elated about the prospect of being able to make referrals. For example, one respondent expressed comfort in knowing "who to call" to obtain appropriate youth services, and another respondent simply exclaimed, "That's huge!"

When asked to describe the target client population for their GRP subcontracts, none of the respondents stated that they specifically targeted gang-involved youth but two service providers did target court-involved youth. Most respondents described the target population for their GRP subcontracts as high-risk or low-income youth. Respondents generally agreed that residing inside the target area was the only eligibility requirement they had received from the Milwaukee GRP. Many respondents cited challenges related to the target population and described the population as difficult to serve. One service provider reported difficulties simply contacting clients because many clients did not have working telephones and were highly mobile. In addition, most clients lacked proper documentation, such as state identification, social security cards, and birth certificates, necessary for certain GRP services. Another respondent reported challenges with the clients' attitudes, saying that many clients "come into the program with a negative view of education." Respondents also expressed frustration with the short-term nature of GRP funding. Many of these respondents felt that the target population was too challenging to expect to see dramatic changes over such a short period of time. One respondent remarked, "This sort of intervention takes time. It can take years." Another echoed this sentiment saying that her agency typically serves clients over years, not weeks. This respondent felt that short-term funding created difficulties in bonding between the clients and the program staff. These respondents reported referring clients to other programs within their agency to deal with this challenge.

The following sections detail all programs that were chosen for funding during Phase I by the Milwaukee GRP, regardless of whether a representative from that organization participated in an interview with UI during September 2005.

Prevention The Phase I plan's prevention component included one activity aimed at raising awareness about gangs and several programs focused on high-risk youths. Under the plan, the Milwaukee Violence Free Zone (MVFZ) was contracted for $7,000 to provide gang education workshops in the community and educate the Milwaukee GRP partners. The curriculum for the workshops included gang evolution and philosophy, trends, structure, identifiers, and prevention and intervention strategies. Outside of these workshops, MVFZ provided training at select elementary, middle, and high schools on making appropriate life choices and the future impacts of gang involvement. Although MVFZ did not maintain exact counts of participants or the number of trainings provided, several interview respondents referred to these workshops as very useful and well-attended.

Among the youth programs funded under Phase I, the largest grant, for $125,000, went to the PIC to provide summer employment opportunities for youth through two programs, Step Up and REACH. The PIC's youth employment programming provided clients with part-time paid summer employment. These employment opportunities were designed to foster career exploration and provide work experience. As one of the two grant recipients to receive no-cost extensions to continue providing services during the summer and fall of 2005, a total of 125 youth were served over the combined time periods. The PIC's program also enjoyed a high completion rate. For instance, in the summer of 2005, 42 of the 50 participants completed all of the program components.

A second smaller grant for $10,000 was awarded to the Running Rebels to provide the Youth Education and Entrepreneurship Program. This program was originally designed to offer older youth in the target area paid part-time job shadowing for 10 hours per week. Job shadowing opportunities were planned through local businesses in a variety of fields. The work experience opportunity was to be combined with education in life skills, career development, communication skills, financial management, and basic job readiness training, combined with tutoring in reading and math. Although the program reported serving 25 youth during the summer and fall of 2004, the type of service provision did not include job shadowing opportunities or the other types of services originally promised but instead included leadership education, music programming, and entrepreneurship opportunities. In particular, youth were able to learn business skills by operating small youth-run enterprises such as the Running Rebels' t-shirt company.

Two other programs funded under Phase I focused on getting youth to work in the community. The MPD received $9,500 in support of its Explorer Scout Program. In this program, youth between the ages of 13 and 17 explore a career in law enforcement and actively participate in police community activities, such as providing crowd control at community events. Phase I funds were used to purchase more uniforms in order to expand the program. Therefore, no clients served are listed in Table 6.2. Additionally, the exact number of uniforms purchased is unknown; however, interviews reveal that by the fall of 2005 the number of participants had only increased by 5.

The second program was the Youth Ambassador Program, offered through the neighborhood associations and funded at $112,140. The program was a new undertaking by the neighborhood associations based on a similar program that Weed and Seed had funded.

Under the GRP version, clients enrolled in the program would work at the neighborhood associations' offices 20 hours per week at $6.75 per hour, providing youth outreach in the target area. The experience was intended to provide the clients with job training in community organizing, community resource analysis, problem solving, and maintaining records for program reporting requirements. However, in the end, this program was never funded. During the Phase I implementation period in 2004, two of the neighborhood associations involved had changes in leadership, and the third neighborhood association was excluded from the initiative due to financial problems. These changes, coupled with the fact that the remaining two neighborhood associations were unable to provide an acceptable program proposal, led the Milwaukee GRP to rescind its original sole source contract. The funding for this activity was then largely diverted to the extended Phase II planning period.

The Milwaukee GRP also funded two community justice centers in the target area. Each of these organizations received funding through federal community development block grants following the Charlie Young beating. The Phase I plan included $12,500 for each center. The first center, the 3rd District Community Justice Center, which is co-located with the Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation, was contracted to provide educational services for 35 youth, ages 6 to 19, in the target area. The program experienced great success during the latter half of 2004, exceeding expectations and serving 85 youth. The second center, True Our Brothers Keepers, proposed providing educational and recreational activities for 20 youth age 14 to 18 from Midtown. The center planned to include tutoring in reading and math and education in life skills, decisionmaking, anger management, and conflict resolution. However, True Our Brothers Keepers came under scrutiny during the fall of 2004, prompting the Milwaukee Community Block Grant administrator to perform an audit and generating negative publicity in the local press. At the same time, the center's affiliation with the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, run by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, became known. GRP executive committee members and program staff considering de-funding the center; however, site visits confirmed that the center was complying with the terms of its grant and serving youth from the target area. Additionally, the audit did not uncover any irregularities.[6] However, this event left its mark on the initiative. True Our Brothers Keepers had originally been heavily involved in the Milwaukee GRP. In fact, a member of the executive committee was also on the board of the organization, and the center expected to be funded again under Phase II. True Our Brothers Keepers submitted a proposal for additional funding under Phase II in late 2004 but the executive committee, wary from this experience, determined that the organization lacked sufficient financial security to be funded again. After learning of this decision, True Our Brothers Keepers no longer participated in the initiative. Due to the events surrounding the center's tenure with GRP, none of the True Our Brothers Keepers staff responded to requests for an interview, and no other data on the program's outputs are available from other sources.

Lastly, the Milwaukee GRP also funded the Boys and Girls Clubs (BGC)'s Mobile Outreach Initiative for $10,000 to identify youth for the programs funded under Phase I as well as others already available in the community. For this program, the BGC renovated a van to appeal to older youth, including custom rims and paint. Program staff, in concert with

[6]The Milwaukee Urban League managed the financial records of the True Our Brothers Keepers Community Justice Center.

other community-based organizations, drove the van through the target area distributing information about youth programs available in the community. However, none of the Mobile Outreach Initiative's activities were recorded or monitored. Therefore, the extent to which the program was able to recruit youth from the target area to participate in other programs is largely unknown.

Suppression The Milwaukee GRP dedicated $60,000 to the MPD to conduct directed curfew enforcement patrols seven days per week from 7:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. during July and August of 2004, and later due to a no-cost extension in July and August of 2005, and to support community-oriented policing strategies within the target area. Officers involved in the curfew enforcement patrols were also provided with gang intelligence for the target area. The additional funds for community-oriented policing strategies were provided to offset the costs of a substantial budget cut in 2003 and provide overtime pay for officers so they could spend more time on crime prevention and community-building activities in the target area.

How and to what extent the community policing strategies affected communication between law enforcement and the community is unknown; however, several suppression subcommittee members reported in interviews that they felt that the relationship between the community and MPD had improved and resulted in increased calls for service. [7] These comments notwithstanding, there was no major effect in the overall crime level in the target area during these time periods, likely due to the short duration of the interventions. In addition, the evaluation team explored the possibility of collecting data to assess curfew enforcement efforts. In Milwaukee, curfew violations are recorded as municipal violations instead of criminal violations, and, thus, do not appear in MPD's criminal incident data. Unfortunately, then, such data were unavailable for the current evaluation. Anecdotal information from law enforcement does suggest that the strategy was effective, however.

Phase II

The Phase II strategic planning period resulted in the issuance of an RFP in December 2004, and on May 5, 2005, the Milwaukee GRP submitted its final revised Phase II plan, covering the final two years of the initiative, to OJJDP for approval. The plan was later approved in the fall of 2005, and implementation of some prevention activities quickly followed. However, full implementation involving all of the plan's components did not begin until January 2006. In addition to its staggered start, Phase II activities also ended at different points. All of the prevention contracts, with the exception of the PIC's contract, ended in May 2007 while suppression and intervention contracts continued through September 2007. The PIC's contract also continued through September 2007.

The total amount of funding detailed in the Phase II plan is $1,996,360, including $1,696,484 for programmatic activities and $299,876 for administrative and program monitoring expenses.[8] The program monitoring and the One-Stop service center contracts, as well as all of the suppression activities, were sole source contracts, and, therefore, none of

[7] Calls for service data were incomplete prior to 2005 due to technical difficulties related to MPD's new RMS. Thus, these statements cannot be confirmed.

[8] Figures listed in this section are based on the May 5, 2005 Phase II plan, except where more current information is available from the program coordinator's work plans received in February 2006.

these activities was included in the RFP process. Any changes to the original Phase II plan are noted in the following sections.

The following sections provide detailed descriptions of the programs funded under Phase II as well as any corresponding output data available. For Phase II, output data is derived mainly from COMPASS, but these data are only available through May 2007 and cannot be reliably linked to the specific activity that served a particular client. Moreover, in many instances, the data received from COMPASS appear to be incomplete, likely due to a lack of data entry on the part of the grant recipients. Thus, data from COMPASS can only be displayed by prong and not by specific programmatic activities. Upon close examination, however, it appeared to the evaluation team that the data by prong was also problematic, and therefore only data on the total number of clients is reported below. This finding by the evaluation team further reiterated the perceptions by many involved in the Milwaukee GRP that, despite its potential utility, the COMPASS system proved to have limited value for program monitoring and evaluation purposes due to issues of information sharing and consistency in data reporting by service providers.

Additionally, despite repeated requests, the monthly reporting forms that OJA required each grant recipient to complete were not made available to the evaluation team in time to be included in this report. Thus, output data reported for specific programs is derived from interviews. Where interview data is unavailable, no outputs are reported.

Figure 6.10: Milwaukee Total Clients Served, Phase II, November 2005–May 2007



The line in Figure 6.10 represents the total number of clients served across all prongs during Phase II between November 2005 and May 2007 as derived from COMPASS. The number of clients rose consistently in early 2006, peaking in March with 238 clients. Following this peak, the trend became more volatile until the program plateaued in the latter half of 2006. The number of clients then sank to zero in early 2007. However, a word of caution is warranted as data from COMPASS is known to be incomplete but to what degree is unknown.

Prevention The following two sections provide more detailed output information for GRP's primary and secondary prevention activities.

Primary Prevention Despite the Milwaukee GRP's resistance to the One-Stop concept, the key component of the primary prevention activities with respect to funding level was the comprehensive resource and referral center or "One-Stop." The One-Stop was designed to create linkages among a range of health and human services to benefit the community as a whole and to coordinate the primary and secondary prevention activities for the Milwaukee GRP. The One-Stop was also planned to serve as the intake point for all GRP prevention services. Metcalfe Park Residents Association, in coordination with Project Respect-Amani Neighborhood Association, received a sole source contract of $199,832 over two years to operate the One-Stop at two locations in the target area.

The Milwaukee GRP planned to use the One-Stop service center to screen, refer, and track at least 100 target area residents in need of GRP services with additional plans to conduct a survey of GRP clients. [9] In addition to these functions, Metcalfe Park Resident's

[9] The specific content of this survey was never defined.

Association, in combination with other area neighborhood associations, agreed to host monthly meetings with all primary and secondary prevention providers to troubleshoot problems and meet quarterly with the GRP management to coordinate activities. However, as noted earlier in this report, the One-Stop and the survey never materialized due to critical leadership changes at one of the neighborhood associations. In the end, the amount of funding the neighborhood associations received was greatly reduced, and their role was redefined to include only community outreach. Output data related to this new function were unavailable from interview data.

The bulk of the funding originally earmarked for the One-Stop was transferred to the PIC in May 2006. However, the full referral and intake system envisioned in the Phase II plan did not come to fruition under this new scheme either as the PIC did not fully embrace its new role and scant referrals materialized. However, beyond this new role, the PIC's original primary prevention contract was to provide Workforce Investment Act (WIA) case management for adult residents of the target area as part of the Milwaukee Career Center (MCC). According to the Phase II plan, adults would be screened for eligibility for WIA programs and enrolled whenever possible. Intake for adult residents was planned to occur at either of the two One-Stop locations or the MCC, located at the PIC's offices. The total award for the PIC was $120,000. The exact number of clients served is unknown; however, interview data reveal that 127 clients were served through the MCC during the fall of 2005. Additionally, interview respondents in both 2006 and 2007 viewed this activity as one of the most successful of the entire initiative.

In addition to the One-Stop, two other goals were detailed for primary prevention: reducing the incidence of negative developmental behaviors in children and reducing health disparities for low-income individuals and families. In order to address negative developmental behaviors in children, the Next Door Foundation was contracted to implement a Baby Families and Schools Together (FAST) Program with $99,904 for 25 new mothers under the age of 25 who reside in the target area. The program planned to provide infancy support and parenting skills education over 8 weekly sessions. In order to reduce health disparities in the target area, St. Joseph Regional Medical Center was contracted for $100,000 to provide the Family Empowerment Program run through S.E.T. Ministry, a community-based health and human services agency. The program planned to provide health insurance enrollment assistance and case management for 100 residents of the target area. The output data for these programs were scant. During the fall of 2005, the Baby FAST Program reported serving 5 clients, and the Family Empowerment Program reported serving 13 clients. Output data for 2006 and 2007 were unavailable.

In addition to these programs, the Milwaukee GRP contracted the BGC to provide Finding Paths to Prosperity (a financial literacy education program) for 100 residents of the target area using the concept of Individual development accounts. The total award was $50,000. By the end of 2005, the program reported having already served 50 clients; however, additional output data was not available.

Secondary Prevention Secondary prevention activities for the Milwaukee GRP initiative targeted at-risk youth between the ages of 7 and 14. The focus of these activities was to identify youth with delinquent behaviors and prevent future gang involvement. The first goal developed for this prong was to identify high-risk youth and engage them in other pro-social activities. Several activities were funded to accomplish this goal, includ-

ing the Explorer Scout Program, the After-School Mentoring Program, the Step Up Youth Employment Program, and the Life Skills Vocational Training Program. The bulk of the funding in this category was devoted to work-related or career development activities.

Two programs funded during Phase I of the initiative also received funding under Phase II, including the MPD's Explorer Scout Program and the PIC's Step Up Youth Employment Program. MPD's Explorer Scout Program received $60,000 to serve 80 youth, and the PIC's Step Up Youth Employment Program received $120,000 to serve 70 youth. While no output data is available for the Explorer Scout Program, the PIC reported in interviews that it served 70 youth over the Phase II implementation period.

Additionally, Career Youth Development was awarded $40,000 to provide an After-School Mentoring Program for 50 youth. The program planned to include both educational and recreational activities. The Neighborhood House of Milwaukee was awarded $38,478 to continue the Life Skills Vocational Training Program which was previously funded by Home Depot and teaches construction trades to youth in the target area over three 12-week cycles. Output data were unavailable for these programs but information gleaned from interviews suggested that enrollment in these programs was likely low due to a lack of referrals.

The Milwaukee GRP's second goal under secondary prevention was to decrease rebellious behavior in children and teens. To accomplish this goal, the initiative funded the Peace Program operated by St. Michael's Behavioral Health Center. The program, which aimed to reduce the incidence of violence in schools, received $40,000 to provide school-based behavioral management trainings for approximately 100 at-risk youth 7 to 14 years old. Output data for this activity was unavailable.

In 2003, truants from the Milwaukee Public School System made up 52 percent of the total number of truants in the state of Wisconsin (Alliance for Attendance, n.d.). In response to this problem and its effect on crime and potential gang membership, the Milwaukee GRP awarded $40,000 to the BGC to support the Truancy Abatement Burglary Suppression (TABS) Program for 100 students residing in the target area. TABS, in partnership with the MPD, has been in operation in Milwaukee since 1993. When the police identify a truant youth, the youth is issued a citation and transported to one of several TABS centers co-located with the BGCs. Once at the TABS center, truants receive case management services to improve school attendance. While the program is well-regarded among interview respondents, no specific outputs were available.

Intervention Intervention activities targeted youth between the ages of 14 and 24. Clients served under intervention had to fall into one of several predefined categories, including active gang members, gang members returning to the community from confinement, or youth closely associated with gang members. The main component of the intervention activities was the Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (MDT). The MDT consisted of representatives from a host of agencies, including police, probation, parole, child welfare, and others. Wisconsin Community Services coordinated the team and provided case management for its clients with a grant of $408,088, and the Latino Community Center received an award of $80,000 to provide street outreach to gang-involved youth in the target area and recruit them for intervention services. The MDT was expected to provide intensive services and referrals for approximately 100 gang-involved youth residing in the target area. Interview data confirm that the MDT reached its goal regarding the number of clients

served. The exact number of these clients that was identified through street outreach workers is unknown but MDT members stated in interviews that the majority of the team's clients were referred through street outreach. Additionally, many respondents viewed the MDT as one of the most successful components of the GRP initiative due to the level of collaboration achieved among its participating partners, the number of clients served, and the additional in-kind resources that its partners were able to provide.

The Milwaukee GRP also granted two $50,000 awards to two separate organizations to run Youth Empowerment Sites serving court-involved youth in the target area. The Running Rebels ran Youth Empowerment Site I, and the Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation ran Youth Empowerment Site II. Each site was contracted to provide intensive monitoring and ensure its clients' compliance with court requirements. Youth Empowerment Site I offered a host of recreational and career exploration opportunities, and Youth Empowerment Site II offered after-school tutoring and mentoring. Both of these programs suffered from a lack of referrals and enrolled very few clients. This situation stemmed from both the failure of the One-Stop as well as lack of cooperation from a key government agency that supervises many of the youth GRP was designed to serve. As a result, even in instances where the MDT wished to refer clients to the Youth Empowerment Sites, the government agency in question was often uncooperative, effectively preventing the referrals.

Suppression The Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office was awarded $150,000 to serve as the lead agency for suppression activities. The main component of these activities was the Target suppression team. This model was borrowed from a similar program that was implemented in Los Angeles. However, in the Los Angeles version, there was no community involvement. Under the Milwaukee model, the community prosecutor working at the police district level had five core functions. First, 12 types of victimless misdemeanors were charged at the district level, streamlining the process of filing charges and reducing the amount of time the accused must spend in jail before being charged. Second, the community prosecutor was expected to implement a major violator program. Under this program, the community prosecutor compiled a list of major violators in the community who had escaped prosecution. The police then paid special attention to these individuals, with the goal of removing them from the community. Other offenders not on this list were diverted to GRP-funded programs through referrals.

Third, the community prosecutor aggressively focused on nuisance abatement to improve the physical environment in the target area. Fourth, the police regularly conducted crime analysis, communicated crime trends to the community, and asked for community input on crime prevention and suppression strategies. Finally, the community prosecutor worked with the Department of Corrections to provide resources to prisoners returning to the target area. In conjunction with the community prosecutor's program, the MPD was awarded $113,000 to implement extra gang unit and curfew enforcement patrols. The funds were used to pay for 410 hours of overtime for police officers.

Very few outputs were available to measure these efforts but interview respondents viewed the model as a great success and noted that it was eventually implemented across the city. One law enforcement respondent also reported that the Target Team was able to obtain 17 indictments and 11 search warrants during the first half of 2006 and charge 58 gang members over the course of the initiative. Additional outputs from arrest or calls for service data were unavailable due to technical difficulties with the MPD's new RMS;

however, data analysis using criminal incident data supplied by MPD was used to evaluate the outcomes of these activities in a separate section.

An additional goal of the suppression component was to encourage cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies. To further this goal, the Milwaukee GRP granted $40,200 to the MPD to expand its use of the Milwaukee HIDTA initiative's ACISS database. Interviews reveal that this process was slow and continued into late 2007.

Administration Fighting Back was awarded $66,667 to perform program monitoring, which included site visits and review of the monthly reporting forms submitted to OJA. For reasons discussed above, the organization's GRP contract was allowed to expire without renewal in December 2006. Also under administrative awards, the Milwaukee GRP granted $30,015 to the MPD to conduct manual counts of gang-related criminal incidents for the target, comparison, and displacement areas for the evaluation. At the time of this report, the MPD had delivered counts of gang-related incidents for May 2002 through June 2007.

6.6. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

The Phase I and Phase II activity models shown in Tables D.2 and D.4 in Appendix D relate the specific outputs of each activity to their expected outcomes. These relationships inform the outcome evaluation by pointing to the outcomes of greatest relevance to the assessment of GRP as a whole. As the activity models were developed, the expected outcomes were grouped into outcome domains in order to guide the evaluation team's data collection efforts. These domains include education, employment, probation/corrections, health, physical environment, and crime.

The activity models were created based on the site's strategic plan for each phase. As the site progressed from planning to implementation, some of the planned activities changed. In some cases, changes in the activities yielded changes in the relevant outputs and outcomes. Simultaneously, the evaluation team was working to collect data on those outputs and outcomes most germane to the site's actual (rather than planned) activities. This section focuses on those measures that the evaluation team was able to procure or is still pursuing. In addition, for both the physical environment and crime analyses below, the effects of each phase are considered separately; the activities that may have had an effect on the physical environment were in operation only in Phase II, so only that phase is considered for that portion of the analysis. The crime analysis portion of this report, however, assesses effects resulting from both phases.

6.6.1. Outcome Measures and Analysis

Prior to the start of Phase II services, the evaluation team planned its data collection activities based on the OJJDP-approved strategic plan. In developing expected outcome measures, UI researchers were cognizant of the need to focus on realistic and measurable data, given the evaluation's timeframe and budget expectations. Due to the length of time to expected outcome and scale of service, UI opted to concentrate data collection and evaluation efforts on programs and services that more readily allow for outcome and impact assessment. Ideally, UI would gather comparable output and outcome data for each activity. Instead, the evaluation team focused on data collection for those programs

that were likely to have the greatest effect on community or individual outcomes within the evaluation period.

These expected outcome measures were organized across seven domains, as shown in Tables D.2 and D.4, including education, employment, probation/corrections, health, physical environment, and crime. Despite efforts to procure data under all domains, outcome data related to the education, employment, probation/corrections, and health domains could not be obtained for a variety of reasons. In the case of education outcome data, UI staff met with a representative from the Milwaukee Public School System in September 2005 to determine the availability of academic performance measures, such as grades and standardized test scores, disciplinary records, and attendance records. These data are maintained in a central database; however, informed parental consent is required to obtain the records. In addition to this obstacle, the Milwaukee Public School System assigns students to schools based on parental preference rather than geographic zones. This results in the situation where children residing in the target may attend a number of different schools that are not located in or near the target area. This situation makes it difficult to identify a school that could be considered the 'target area school' that would experience changes detectible on an aggregate level. Together these obstacles led the evaluation team's decision not to collect education outcome data.

Second, the evaluation team considered health data to measure the effects of two programs affecting health outcomes. Because only two GRP-funded activities (Baby FAST and the Family Empowerment Program) were related to health outcomes, the number of clients with expected health-related outcomes was relatively small. In addition, the timeframe of the evaluation prohibited full exploration of possible health outcomes. Baby FAST provided first-time, low-income mothers with services aimed at improving maternal and prenatal health. Ultimately, assessment of participating children's development would provide evidence of this program's success. However, the life of this evaluation is much shorter than necessary to accurately measure potential outcomes, such as the improved health, well-being, and academic achievement of children whose mothers received prenatal and infancy support services compared with children of mothers of similar characteristics who did not participate in this program. To assess such outcomes, researchers would need to follow the children for a minimum of 10 years, something that is not possible under the current evaluation. The Family Empowerment Program focused on decreasing the rate of uninsured individuals in the target area. While Medicaid enrollment data was possibly available from the State of Wisconsin, the number of clients served under this program was very low and thus, unlikely to have any observable effect at the community level. Together, these factors combined to make the collection of data on health-related outcomes unrealistic.

Under the employment domain, wage data collected by the State of Wisconsin was identified as a potential community level outcome measure. However, these data only included wages for workers over 14 years old; many of GRP's employment programs targeted younger youth. Despite this drawback to the data, the evaluation team did attempt to collect wage data. The evaluation team did communicate with its contact at the State of Wisconsin but identifying a source with the authority to provide the data to UI in the required format proved difficult, and collection of the data required greater resources than the evaluation team had at its disposal. Therefore, collection of wage data was not accomplished for this portion of the evaluation. However, as the evaluation continues, UI

Table 6.3: Mean Property Values and Percent Change in Values from Previous Year

			2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
Resid.	T	Value	25.3	29.3	33.4	43.9	59.5	-
		Change (%)	-	16.2	13.7	31.7	35.4	135.5
	C	Value	32.5	33.1	34.0	42.2	52.8	-
		Change (%)	-	1.8	2.9	23.9	25.1	62.4
	D	Value	37.5	39.3	44.8	56.7	70.8	-
		Change (%)	-	4.8	13.9	26.5	24.9	88.8
Comm.	T	Value	162.6	215.3	202.0	207.2	244.2	-
		Change (%)	-	32.4	(6.2)	2.6	17.8	50.1
	C	Value	44.2	75.0	76.4	80.8	65.6	-
		Change (%)	-	69.4	1.9	5.8	(18.9)	48.2
	D	Value	48.7	52.6	57.8	64.2	80.1	-
		Change (%)	-	8.0	10.1	10.9	24.9	64.7

Source: City of Milwaukee.

Note: Values expressed in thousands of dollars.

'T' denotes Target area, 'C' Comparison area, and 'D' Displacement area.

will make further attempts to measure employment-related changes for residents in the target area, whether through wage data or other identified sources.

Finally, probation and corrections data were not available in electronic form. Additionally, some portions of the data regarding juveniles—the target of most GRP services and activities—required informed parental consent. Obtaining such consent was unrealistic at this point in the evaluation given the resources required, and the evaluation team decided not to further pursue such data for this portion of the evaluation.

Despite these setbacks, UI researchers were able to obtain both physical environment and crime outcome data for both the target and comparison areas. The subsequent sections give greater detail on how the environment and crime data were analyzed as well as any results that can be attributed to GRP.

6.6.2. Physical Environment

As part of the Milwaukee GRP's Target Suppression Team, the community prosecutor in the Third District focused significant resources on nuisance abatement in the target area. The Target Suppression Team was only active in Phase II, first meeting in late 2005, and continuing operations through late 2007. In order to measure the effects of this intervention, the evaluation team obtained property tax data for both residential and commercial properties from the City of Milwaukee for the target, comparison, and displacement areas for 2002 through 2006. A basic descriptive analysis of the change in property values over time provides some evidence of whether or not the community prosecutor's nuisance abatement efforts were successful.

However, this analysis has some limitations. First, the analysis is descriptive, and, while changes can be observed, they cannot be directly attributed to GRP's intervention. Second, the evaluation team is aware that significant neighborhood improvement was already underway in the target area when the initiative began and that these efforts were unrelated to GRP. These effects cannot be separated from the effects of the nuisance abatement efforts under the current analysis methodology.

Measures and Hypotheses The evaluation team examined the percent change in property values in each area study area—target, comparison, and displacement—using data publicly available from the City of Milwaukee. The data includes property tax assessments for each year from 2002 to 2006. For each area, the evaluation team considered the following outcome measures:

- the mean property tax assessment for each year;
- the percent change in the mean property tax assessment for each year; and
- the percent change in the mean property tax assessment from 2002 to 2006.

Residential and commercial properties were analyzed separately due to innate differences in how these two types of properties are valued.

This report expected that increased nuisance abatement efforts would lead to physical environment improvements that would be observed through increased property values in the target area relative to the comparison area. While no displacement effect would be expected in this type of analysis, the displacement area is included for comprehensiveness as well as to serve as an additional comparison area.

Results Overall, the data were consistent with the expectations. As shown in Table 6.3, residential property tax assessments increased by 135 percent in the target area from 2002 to 2006 but only 62 percent in the comparison area and 89 percent in the displacement area. Property tax assessments increased the most in 2005 and 2006 across all areas. Across the same time period, commercial property tax assessments increased in all three areas as well, especially in the displacement area. However, in this instance, the percent increase in property tax assessments from 2002 to 2006 in the target and comparison areas was approximately the same.

Figure 6.11 shows the percent change in residential property tax assessments from 2002 to 2006 in the target, comparison, and displacement areas. As can be seen, the most substantial increases in residential property tax assessments occur in the target and displacement areas. In the target area, the largest increases occurred south of North Avenue and between 34th and 27th Streets. Outside the target area, the percent changes in value are nearly all positive, but are also nearly all less than those changes in the target area. Indeed, the map reveals a strong concentration of value increases in the southern part of the target area that is largely missing from the western part of the displacement area and from most of the comparison area.

Conclusion There have been significant improvements in the target area's physical environment from 2002 to 2006, and these improvements have been concurrent with the implementation of GRP's community prosecutor model. In addition, the increases observed appear to be strongest in the target area, with residential values improving on average 135 percent over the five years considered while values in the comparison area increased by only 62 percent on average and in the displacement area only 89 percent on average. However, this analysis is descriptive only and cannot establish a causal relationship between the target area's physical environment improvements and GRP's efforts. Additionally, other unknown factors may have contributed to the observed changes in property tax assessments.

Figure 6.11: Percent Change in Residential Property Values, 2002-2006



6.6.3. Crime

One of the most concrete outcomes of GRP relates to crime, particularly measuring whether gang-related crime has declined in terms of quantity and seriousness of offenses over the course of the GRP implementation. Researchers at UI established a relationship with the MPD for acquiring reported crime incidents for all offense types within the target, comparison, and displacement areas.

The ultimate goal of the GRP was to reduce gang-related crime in the target area. Part of the evaluation team's mandate was to assemble evidence to address whether that goal was met and, if so, to estimate how many gang crimes may have been averted by GRP activities. To ensure a comprehensive record of gang incidents, UI initiated an audit to identify which criminal incidents were gang-related. However, the gang audit for Milwaukee identified too few gang crimes to conduct a time-series analysis. Therefore, criminal incidents specifically related to gang crime were not analyzed separately as part of the inferential portion of this evaluation, but are examined as part of the descriptive crime analysis presented below. Moreover, attempts were made to obtain both arrest and calls for service data. However, these data are not available for the entire evaluation period due to the MPD's conversion to a new RMS and, therefore, are not included in the evaluation. A time-series analysis of all incidents—not just those that were gang-related—provides evidence regarding the changes in volume and seriousness of criminal activity in these

areas.

Measures

The evaluation team examined three crime-related outcome measures for this portion of the assessment:

Incidents, vandalism Reports of vandalism or destruction of property.

Incidents, drug-related offenses Reports of drug activity.

Incidents, serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.

All three measures were developed from data provided by MPD. For each measure, the evaluation team developed one monthly time series, spanning January 2002 to April 2007, for each of the three study areas—target, comparison, and displacement.

The rationale for selecting these three measures for the outcome analysis weighed two factors including the higher costs to society posed by serious violent crimes and concern that the completeness of police reporting of less serious crimes may be sensitive to the volume of more serious incidents occurring at the same time. This choice comes with the recognition that the willingness of citizens to call the police is partially a function of citizens' expectations about how the police will respond. For example, in the midst of a publicized increase in police activity, citizens may begin to report less serious offenses. Such a change in reporting behavior may mask or offset any decrease in actual criminal offending brought about by the concentration of police resources.

Figure 6.12 provides the timeline of events in the development and implementation of the Milwaukee GRP that was provided above in Section 6.3 with the addition of monthly time series of selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial patterns of serious violent incidents in the study areas. This figure reveals the relationship of organizational and implementation events to changes in levels of crime.

The relationship between organizational events and crime levels is explored in more detail through descriptive analysis of the monthly trends in selected crime measures and the spatial patterns of crime in the study areas, followed by more sophisticated inferential modeling of crime trends to look for statistically significant changes in monthly levels of different crime measures that may have been the result of GRP's efforts.

Descriptive Analysis

Figures 6.13–6.16 display the linear trends in crime measures for just over five study years (January 2002–April 2007), while Figure 6.17 provides larger versions of the same maps included on the timeline. The dotted lines in each figure represent the overall trend in each measure throughout the evaluation period. It should also be noted that due to changes in the MPD's data management system, data are missing for part of October 2004, and all of November and December 2004. While values were estimated for these months for the purposes of the time series analysis, the process for which is discussed in more detail below, the values were left missing for the descriptive analysis. Therefore, the drops in all measures to zero in November and December 2004 should not be read as actual decreases

Figure 6.12: Milwaukee Timeline



Target area: Serious violent incidents
Comparison area: Serious violent incidents
Target area: Gang incidents
6
Comparison area: Gang incidents
OJJDP grants a no-cost extension through September 2007; Metcalfe Park Neighborhood Association submits a transition plan to the Executive Committee; I Have a Dream Foundation makes a presentation to the Executive Committee
The Executive Committee redefines the PIC's scope of service to include operation of the One-Stop Center, and the neighborhood associations' role is limited to community outreach
CIS-sponsored sustainability meeting; City Block Grant office begins feasibility study of taking over GRP
At OJJDP's behest, GRP hosts a meeting for local funders to learn about and potentially sustain the initiative
Special technical assistance meeting to discuss findings from the interim report; Milwaukee hosts Cluster Meeting
Program monitoring grant expires, and the task is delegated to the program coordinator
Program coordinator resigns; GRP raises $100,000 from two foundations
Metcalfe Park Neighborhood Association's director is indicted on a sex offense
GRP, I Have a Dream, and Mayor's Office form partnership and set goal of raising $500,000
Several Executive Committee members present information about the initiative on public access television
Metcalfe Neighborhood Association terminates its program coordinator; A new monthly reporting form is distributed to GRP Phase II grant recipients
2006
2007
2008
2009
TARGET Suppression Team in operation
MDT continues activities
MDT continues case management and job placement services for remaining active clients with additional funding from OJA
MPD implements the Neighborhood Safety Initiative
Prevention service providers continue Phase II activities

Figure 6.13: Milwaukee: Vandalism Incidents, January 2002–April 2007



in monthly levels of crime. The two gray lines on all of the graphs—at the beginning of 2004 and mid-2005—represent the points at which GRP activity in Milwaukee was started. Recall that the implementation was not consistent over time from the start of Phase I activities; the two points of GRP implementation included on the graphs make this clear.

Figure 6.13 reveals a general upward trend in the monthly number of vandalism incidents over the evaluation period in both the comparison and target areas, with the linear regression line revealing a slightly slower rate of increase of this type incident experienced in the target area. In addition, the graph reveals little to no observable effect of GRP on monthly levels of vandalism incidents. Figure 6.14 indicates a slightly different pattern for the monthly levels of drug incidents, with little to no change in the average monthly levels in either the target or comparison areas over the entire study period. The monthly levels vary a great deal from month to month, with the highest peaks of drug incidents experienced both prior to the onset of GRP in early 2003 and immediately following the implementation of Phase II of GRP in mid-2005, when over 30 incidents per month were recorded.

Figure 6.15 reveals a pattern of monthly serious violent incidents similar to that observed for vandalism incidents, with a steady but modest upward trend over the entire study period even while the highest number of serious violent incidents was recorded in mid-2002 in the target area, at nearly 50 incidents. The comparison area experienced an almost identical upward trend, peaking in mid-2005 at just under 50 incidents. The target area experienced a second peak closer to 40 incidents in mid-2006, echoing the overall upward trend in monthly incidents. Finally, even while gang crime was not included as part of the inferential models developed under this evaluation, the monthly trends in gang incident levels is provided in Figure 6.16. The figure reveals the very low and infrequent occurrence of gang incidents in the target and comparison areas, with an upward trend

Figure 6.14: Milwaukee: Drug-related Incidents, January 2002–April 2007



Figure 6.15: Milwaukee: Serious Violent Incidents, January 2002–April 2007



Figure 6.16: Milwaukee: Gang Incidents, January 2002–June 2006



over the study period. The upward trend, however, represents an average increase from less than one gang incident per month in 2002 to just under four incidents per month by mid-2006. The figure reiterates the fact that too few gang incidents were identified through the MPD's gang audit to make time series analysis possible.

Finally, the maps in Figure 6.17 provide the spatial patterns of serious violent crime in the three Milwaukee GRP study areas for the period January–June in four years: one baseline year (2002) and three during implementation (2004, 2005, 2006). The figure reveals a relatively stable pattern of hot spots throughout the study areas, with changing intensity of crime "hot spots" but little much migration of such high density areas in any direction. At the baseline in 2002, hot spots of serious violent incidents were located in the north central part of the target area, the southwestern corner of the comparison area, and the southwestern corner of the displacement area. By 2004, the hot spots in the comparison and displacement areas receded considerably while the target area hot spot appeared to strengthen. By 2006, the original hot spots had reappeared, along with additional locations experiencing similarly high densities of serious violent incidents. The maps reiterate the findings from the above graphs—that the GRP in Milwaukee appeared to have little to no positive effect on the levels of different crime measures in the target area. To further develop and test this hypothesis, the evaluation team conducted more sophisticated inferential modeling in the form of time series analysis, presented below.

Time Series Analysis

A visual examination of time series data, as presented above, can provide insight into some features of the data (e.g., whether the series level increased or decreased over time), but other features of the time series (e.g., seasonal fluctuations, autocorrelation) may



Figure 6.17: Density of serious violence, Milwaukee GRP areas, 2002-2006

not be apparent from visual inspection alone. The evaluation thus includes inferential statistical modeling to account for those subtler features and to further understanding of whether and how the crime measures changed over time. Based on the design of the Milwaukee GRP, including funded activities, the timeline of implementation, and the type and number of clients served over the intervention period, UI can only expect the suppression component of GRP to have possibly exerted a measurable effect on crime in the target area. The prevention components, which began in early 2005, have focused on serving young children in elementary and middle school. The effects of those activities on crime will not be observable until those children reach middle adolescence. The intervention and reentry components did not appear to consistently serve a large number of clients from the target area, meaning that the effects of those components as measured at an aggregate level (e.g., through the level of crime in the target area as a whole), is likely limited. In addition, due to issues with MPD's RMS, the evaluation team was unable to collect calls for service or arrest data that might have more fully highlighted the possible effects of GRP in the target area. In addition, because a very low number of gang incidents were identified in the target area, those were not included in the inferential modeling presented here. With these caveats in mind, the evidence the evaluation team has assembled to date, including implementation information and crime trends—both over time and spatial—does not suggest that the Milwaukee GRP resulted in a reduction in crime in the target area. The inferential analysis will help to identify more clearly the effect of GRP on crime in Milwaukee.

Hypotheses This report hypothesized that the implementation of increased police patrols in the target area would lead to a reduction in the mean level of each of the three measures in the target area. The MPD patrols began in July 2004 and continued through August of that year as Phase I came to end. The suppression team applied for a no-cost extension that was granted a year later, and patrols began again in August 2005 and continued through September of the same year. Phase II suppression activities represented a more concerted effort and lasted from January 2006 to September 2007. Because UI expected that increased patrols would not be fully effective for at least a few weeks after they begin, significant changes in crime outcomes between the baseline period and Phase I were not expected. Furthermore, MPD implemented a large data migration from one management system to another in 2004 that resulted in slightly different reporting policies combined with periods of missing data. As a result, criminal incident data were unavailable for the entire fourth quarter of 2004,[10] which further added to the challenges of finding significant results for Phase I. Outcomes related to Phase II are less likely to have measurement errors, as most of the problems associated with the data migration had been addressed by the time the patrols began.

The logic of the quasi-experimental design of the GRP evaluation holds that, for any of the three measures where evidence of a reduction in the series mean was found, the estimate of the magnitude of the intervention effect would be the difference between the shift in the target area and the shift, if any, in the comparison area. In this way, the analysis of the comparison area helps to guard against falsely concluding that a shift observed in the target area is attributable to suppression activities or GRP when, in fact, the same shift

[10]See Appendix K for detail on how this issue was resolved through the interpolation of data for the missing periods.

Table 6.4: Milwaukee: Estimates of Intervention Effects

		Study Area		
Study Area		Target	Comparison	Displacement
Incidents, vandalism	i_1	1.39 (2.65)	−3.25 (2.61)	−0.66 (4.29)
	i_2	−4.33 (4.17)	−4.37 (4.20)	0.46 (9.06)
Incidents, drug-related	i_1	3.69 (3.60)	0.54 (2.22)	12.63 (4.90)**
	i_2	−3.52 (2.35)	1.73 (1.47)	−2.30 (5.02)
Incidents, serious violence	i_1	4.85 (3.67)	−8.28 (4.04)**	−4.72 (5.22)
	i_2	2.30 (3.71)	4.41 (3.17)	−2.51 (10.03)

Notes:
- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 04/2007, but we interpolated the values of three months (10/2004–12/2004) in each time series.
- The i_1 and i_2 parameters indicate the effects of Phase I and Phase II suppression activities, respectively.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.
** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.

is also observable in areas outside the target area. In that case, attributing the shift to another (perhaps unknown) cause is more plausible than to the localized intervention of interest.

The displacement area was included in the evaluation design to examine whether the GRP intervention pushed crime out of the target area and into other nearby areas or, conversely, if it produced salutary spill-over effects in neighboring areas. However, in Milwaukee, no effects in the displacement area were expected because during Phase II, suppression activities expanded into the entire Third District in order to address the increase in crime within neighborhoods outside of the target area.

Results The methodology for the outcome analysis is explained in greater detail in Appendix K, and additional information about the models estimated as part of the Milwaukee outcome analysis can be found in Table K.2 in that appendix. Findings and inferences are summarized here and in Table 6.4. Overall, the data were inconsistent with the stated hypotheses, primarily because there were no significant results for the target area. In fact, after the Phase I intervention, crime in all three categories in the target area increased relative to the comparison area in either Phase I or Phase II. While vandalism and drug-related incidents did decrease in the target area during Phase II, those decreases were not significant and, in the case of vandalism, the decrease was similar to that observed in the comparison area. Serious violent incidents increased, though non-significantly, in the target area during both phases, while a large and significant decrease was observed in the comparison area during Phase I. The decrease in the comparison area, however, was not observed in Phase II, when levels of serious violence increased non-significantly and to a greater degree than in the target area. While a statistically significant increase in drug-related crime in the displacement area was observed following the Phase I intervention, this result cannot be interpreted as evidence of displacement because there is no corresponding statistically significant reduction in drug-related crime in the target area. For both the Phase I and Phase II findings, because the results are not significant for the target area, the changes observed may only be due to random fluctuations in crime.

Conclusion The preceding analysis provides evidences of inconsistent changes in levels of three types of crime incidents in the GRP study areas after each phase of GRP implementation. The analysis of the effect of the Milwaukee GRP on crime did not find evidence that the program reduced vandalism, drug-related activities, or serious violence in the target area. These results are not surprising for two reasons. First, Phase I's implementation was short in duration and spread across two distinct time periods. Any effects that may have accrued to the target area from either portion of increased police activity would have been hard to maintain given the fractured implementation strategy. Second, during Phase II, GRP's suppression activities were not limited to the target area and were instead delivered across all of the Third District. Given these limitations, no conclusions about the effectiveness of GRP on reducing crime in the target area can be drawn.

6.7. SUSTAINABILITY

Interviews suggest that the success of the Milwaukee GRP initiative, as well as the key to its sustainability, lie in the partnerships it has created. GRP provided a forum for social service and law enforcement agencies to collaborate in a way that had not existed in the past. Moreover, the GRP funding allowed the partners to test new strategies in combating youth gang crime and violence. On the whole, the GRP partners believed that these relationships and the way that the agencies involved were able to interact would last long after the end of OJJDP funding in September 2007. However, despite the success of building these partnerships and laying the groundwork for systems change, the GRP initiative as it existed between 2005 and 2007 is unlikely to be sustained. While initial efforts were made towards sustainability, there are several reasons that the initiative in the end will not be sustained, including problems related to the initiative's leadership, structure, and partners' commitment.

In the summer of 2005, the leaders made their first serious attempt at securing the initiative's future in the form of a sustainability committee. However, this committee's first meeting was canceled, and no future meetings were scheduled. A year later, during the summer of 2006 when Phase II of the initiative was well underway, the coordinator, in combination with a national GRP partner, hosted a sustainability training and forum for the initiative's partners. During this meeting, there was a broad consensus regarding what components of GRP had been most successful up to that point and should be sustained—specifically the suppression, intervention, and employment efforts—but there was little agreement regarding how GRP should be sustained. Because at that point, the One-Stop was no longer under the purview of the neighborhood associations, the partners considered three new structures under which GRP could be sustained. The first option was for the city government to run the initiative through its Community Block Grant Office, which funds the neighborhood associations. The second option was for a larger nonprofit to absorb the initiative, and the third, and probably most ambitious, option was for GRP to apply for nonprofit status. The 2006 meeting adjourned with the question hanging and plans for an additional meeting in August 2006 that never materialized. In fact, the partners would not meet regarding this issue again until early summer 2007, with only a few months left of Phase II implementation, and even at that last meeting, the issue remained unresolved.

Concurrently, under pressure from OJJDP, the coordinator and several members of

the executive committee collaborated with the I Have a Dream Foundation (IHAD) and contacted a number of private foundations operating in Milwaukee. While OJJDP appeared confident that partnering with IHAD had the potential to help GRP sustain at least some of its efforts, the exact mechanism through which that could be accomplished was not understood by the program coordinator, although she continued to work with IHAD. Through these efforts, IHAD was able to establish itself in the Milwaukee Public School System and secure its own sustainability. Unfortunately, this success did not translate into any direct funding or sustainability for GRP. This failure to leverage the expansion of IHAD into an opportunity to sustain the Milwaukee GRP was the result of several factors. In Milwaukee, the school system has been very resistant to involvement in GRP, and the fact that Milwaukee has school choice means that no one school is clearly a target area school. In addition, the program coordinator seemed to lack a clear understanding of IHAD's purpose and role and how it related to GRP. Thus, OJJDP's efforts seem to have greatly benefited IHAD while the potential benefits for the Milwaukee GRP remained largely unrealized. Despite the collaboration's overall failure from a sustainability standpoint, GRP did raise $100,000 of private funding through this experience.

Sustainability plans took another blow when the program coordinator announced her resignation within months of the end of the initiative. When the coordinator vacated her position in March 2007, the OJA, whose offices are located in Madison, took over main direction of GRP, making local coordination extremely challenging. Meetings became increasingly sporadic and infrequent, and members seemed confused as to where the initiative was headed. In fact, shortly before the program coordinator's departure, OJA hired a college student to work as an intern, mainly focusing on COMPASS. Many interview respondents, however, were confused about his role, and some even believed him to be the new coordinator. This confusion demonstrates the lack of communication between the initiative's leadership and the partnering agencies. In the end, if the Milwaukee GRP had suffered from poor leadership prior to the coordinator's departure, OJA's staff served as nothing more than figureheads afterwards, and, with no one to press committee members on the sustainability issue or to spearhead sustainability efforts, it was simply left unaddressed.

Despite the failure of the partnership to make efforts towards sustainability as the end of federal funding drew near, in many ways, functioning of the initiative throughout its implementation would ultimately inhibit its potential sustainability. Partners and OJA staff identified as leaders in interviews were inexperienced, weak, or too embroiled in local and state politics to serve the initiative effectively. These failures on the part of the initiative's leaders, combined with the support of OJJDP, led to critical decisions that would later determine GRP's sustainability, namely placing the neighborhood associations in a key leadership and management position despite their financial vulnerability and inexperience, delaying planning for how the initiative would be sustained, and failing to generate enough interest surrounding sustainability among the partners themselves early in the process.

Related to these leadership woes, the Milwaukee GRP's structure also greatly inhibited its sustainability, relying too heavily on a One-Stop that never materialized, an executive committee whose members were often uninvolved and disinterested, and a hierarchy of committees which placed the most vested parties into the least powerful positions and created an unwieldy number of partners. Additionally, in large part due to both the

leadership and structural challenges identified, GRP failed to garner buy in from several key partners and only managed to gain lackluster support from others. Thus, for many of GRP's partners, there was little enthusiasm for assuming responsibility for such a daunting task.

Related to this problem, the initiative never invested in a local "brand" identity which created difficulties related to both GRP's public image, for funders and potential clients, as well as its own staff and partners. While some limited discussions took place regarding the creation of a local identity for marketing purposes, through either a local name or an eye-catching logo, no decisions were ever made at the executive committee level. Like sustainability, the issue of branding the initiative and publicizing it throughout the community became a low priority largely due to a lack of interest among the initiative's own leadership. This failure left the initiative with little name recognition among target area residents, funders, government agencies, or even its own partners. Perhaps due to these issues, many GRP partners were more focused on preparing for the end of the project than on sustaining it. Even after the initiative was extended from December 2006 to September 2007, morale remained low and frustration high.

Ultimately, the initiative was not able to secure the funding needed to extend all of its components, and, thus, funding for prevention programs, with the exception of adult employment services, ended in May 2007. The initiative's last scant financial resources were used to continue adult employment services, the intervention team, and the community prosecutor model. OJA provided a small amount of funding to the intervention team to continue services on existing clients beyond the September 2007 end date; however, no funding for new clients had been identified in late 2007. Despite the overall failure to sustain the initiative, the city government planned to continue supporting the community prosecutor model as well as some intervention activities as the police district level. This support was in large part due to the successful election of a former executive committee member to the position of District Attorney. The sustainability of the initiative that is actually achieved in Milwaukee will be monitored throughout the rest of the evaluation period.

6.8. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Mounting effective programming is difficult. In most cases, programs fail to achieve full implementation. Indeed, Gottfredson (2000) notes that only 42 percent of school prevention programs are implemented in a manner consistent with their design. Ron Huff, Dean of the School of Social Ecology at the University of California-Irvine, observed that in most cases evaluations of criminal justice programs were most likely to conclude that evaluators "couldn't find the program" (Huff, 1994). In other words, the program was implemented in a manner so inconsistent with its design that the program could not reliably be said to exist. These observations suggest that program implementation is difficult, and, indeed, the broader literature regarding criminal justice interventions suggest that this is the case in a number of areas, including gang and violence prevention. Such implementation can be made more difficult when there is a lack of infrastructure to support the programmatic effort, a failure to clearly define the problem, and a lack of shared goals, as was in many instances the case for the Milwaukee GRP.

Since its beginnings in small, community-based meetings in 2002, the Milwaukee

GRP developed into an initiative with some hope of influencing the issue of youth gangs and violence in the target area. The Milwaukee GRP was able to implement many of its programmatic activities and create a sophisticated MIS with great potential; at the same time, the initiative fell short of the planned program design, largely due to a lack of coordination and insufficient infrastructure. Strategic planning and implementation for both Phase I and Phase II were not without substantial challenges, some of which remained throughout the life of the initiative. In some ways, the Milwaukee GRP created its own challenges; however, in other ways, the obstacles came from the outside.

6.8.1. Organization and management

Many of the Milwaukee GRP's internally-created challenges stemmed from its organizational and leadership structure. The executive committee consciously decided to dedicate the maximum amount of funds possible to programming with a minimal administrative structure. While the emphasis on service delivery is laudable, Milwaukee's commitment to invest the maximum in services appears to have short-changed administration to the point that the framework could not function effectively. The administrative structure consisted largely of the program coordinator. As a consequence, she served on all of the committees with very little staff support from OJA. Because of the demands on the program coordinator's time in attending meetings, meeting administrative reporting requirements, and coordinating services, there was a lack of day-to-day organization in the Milwaukee GRP. The executive committee recognized this problem by 2005 and responded by hiring a part-time administrative assistant for a short time and by granting a sole source contract to another partner to handle program monitoring for Phase II. Despite these changes, the initiative's administrative functions did not appear to have improved. While the program monitor was able to relieve part of the burden by monitoring the grant recipients during the first year of Phase II's implementation, without a functional One-Stop, the task of managing the prevention activities as well as coordinating activities across subcommittees was formidable for one person alone. In addition, the program staff lacked the necessary leadership and communication skills as well as legitimacy to effectively manage the project. Additionally, the program coordinator was hired with the intent that she would perform grants administration, a function that OJA typically performs for state criminal justice grants. However, the role of coordinator within GRP was much larger and required experience in program design and implementation that the chosen coordinator lacked.

Another challenge related to the initiative's structure was the relationship between the program coordinator and the executive committee. The program coordinator answered directly to this committee, which was the group that hired her. There was some perception that this inhibited her independence and ability to act as a leader for the initiative. While the initial impetus for this style of leadership might have been to share power across several partners as part of an overseeing board, the reality was that the system created confusion about who was in charge and a lack of accountability among the leadership. There was broad disagreement about the roles and responsibilities of individual executive committee members, the fiscal agent, and the program coordinator. This system of diffuse leadership also prohibited quick decision making and contributed to errors. For instance, some of the problems with the submission of the Phase II plan to OJJDP could have been avoided if one individual had managed the entire process instead of spreading the tasks

across the executive committee and OJA.

In addition to a diffuse leadership structure, the committee structure further created confusion and a lack of coordination. The subcommittees most often met separately, which, while allowing specific and detailed discussion for planning, also contributed to a lack of coordination across subcommittees and resulting services. When meetings across all three groups did happen, only certain members of the subcommittees were invited to attend, and many disagreed about which partners were included. This system likely was created to better manage an unwieldy number of partners and to create order out of chaos but appears instead to have created three distinct programs that rarely communicated with one another. Moreover, the intensive meeting schedule for the executive committee and the subcommittees led certain partners to quit participating. In addition, the meetings were often described as lacking purpose, wasting the committee members' time, and accomplishing little.

The role of the neighborhood associations was also a perennial challenge for the Milwaukee GRP. During Phase I, changes in leadership and low capacity had led to the decision to de-fund the neighborhood associations. Despite this obstacle, the Milwaukee GRP continued to dream of the neighborhood associations rising to the challenge and becoming significant actors within the initiative. In seeking to remain an inclusive, community-based initiative and build the capacity of the community-based organizations involved, the GRP leadership made the decision to grant the neighborhood associations sole source contracts for Phase II and to give them a substantial role in managing the One-Stop and all of the prevention activities. Instead of providing increased technical assistance, the Milwaukee GRP blindly created ever larger roles for them, placing them at the forefront of one of the largest components of the initiative. This decision was problematic from the start for a number of reasons. First, the neighborhood associations had lower organizational capacity than other partners involved in the initiative and fewer resources outside of the partnership. They did not have diverse funding sources and suffered from inexperienced and at times unprofessional staff. In addition, staff turnover occurred at each of the neighborhood associations at least once over the course of the initiative with devastating effects because building the organizational capacity of the neighborhood associations meant investing in their staff. Each time the neighborhood associations' staffs changed, the initiative had to start over with this task. Second, managing the One-Stop and other prevention providers led the neighborhood associations far astray from the mission included in their city charter. The original vision for these associations was to act as community liaisons and provide community outreach for the initiative. The Phase II plan placed the neighborhood associations at the helm of a much larger component of the project without the resources to effectively manage the task.

Furthermore, expectations, roles, and responsibilities among the national partners were not clear at the local level. OJJDP included several national partners in the initiative that were expected to offer assistance and collaborate with all four of the sites. While NYGC's role as a technical assistance provider quickly became apparent and utilized, the local leadership struggled with the question of what type of technical assistance should be requested and when. In other words, the lack of a clear menu of technical assistance options, combined with local leadership inexperienced with the technical challenges that some partners presented, hampered the Milwaukee GRP's ability to identify needs and make clear requests. Other national partners' roles were not initially understood at the

local level at all. Indeed, the Milwaukee GRP program coordinator was unaware that direct funding was provided to each of these entities independent of the funds made available to Milwaukee. Because of this confusion, one of the national partners' local affiliates requested funding from the Milwaukee GRP rather than through funding provided at the national level.

6.8.2. Information sharing and collaboration

Since the vast majority of the activities funded under both Phase I and Phase II existed prior to the Milwaukee GRP and the number of clients planned to be served under the initiative was very low, the overall value-added of the Milwaukee GRP should be seen in terms of increased coordination and infrastructure. The One-Stop, the multidisciplinary intervention team, the suppression TARGET team, the creation of an MIS, and the initiative's administration were the main activities undertaken expressly to increase coordination and infrastructure that would later be needed to implement and sustain such a comprehensive program model. However, clear and competent leadership plagued the initiative from its start and toward the end of the Phase II implementation period was virtually nonexistent following the coordinator's departure. Adding to these woes, the One-Stop never materialized, resulting in a failure to coordinate across prongs during the Phase II implementation period as well as a consistent lack of referrals across service providers.

The problem of inadequate reporting requirements is a recurring theme in the Phase I implementation period due in large part to the funder's rush to implement activities before sufficient planning had taken place. Moreover, the degree to which the Phase I implementation could have been used for gathering lessons learned to inform Phase II was severely limited by the lack of administrative and programmatic data collected. In the end, no one on site had collected any systematic data across activities, forcing the local implementation team to rely on anecdotal information for future planning. During Phase II, the initiative created an MIS through a partnership with COMPASS that had the possibility of allowing real time program management across multiple agencies. Perhaps the greatest lesson learned identified after the Phase I implementation was the need for greater accountability and program data collection. However, the full utility of collecting this data for management purposes does not seem to be apparent to the program staff and leadership. Due to this lack of understanding about what the tool could provide, distrust among the partners, and a lack of any real leader to marshal the process, the full potential of COMPASS was not realized. The system appeared to have been designed to collect very little information about service delivery outputs and dosage. The database mainly focused on client intake information, which although useful and necessary, would be even more so if treatment and follow-up data were also collected. In the end, the MIS at best provides numbers of clients served and when, without providing quantifiable data on how and how much. This gap in information made the leadership's job of linking the initiative's work to changes in the community difficult, which has negative implications for both the evaluation and sustainability efforts. The system of communication among the partners—committee meetings—also broke down over time during implementation and halted entirely during the last six months of the initiative. Thus, without a One-Stop, an MIS, regular committee meetings, and later a coordinator, there ceased to be any component of GRP that bound the partners other than a funding source.

6.8.3. Implementation

Beyond these obstacles, the Milwaukee GRP also faced challenges from external sources. As the funder, OJJDP demanded an extremely accelerated timeline for strategic planning and program implementation. The local initiative struggled to meet deadlines that seemed arbitrary and out of touch with the challenges the partnership was facing. At the same time, the program coordinator felt that there was a distinct lack of guidance in the preparation of both the Phase I and the Phase II plans. In addition, there appeared to be conflict between OJJDP's and NYGC's expectations as far as what the plans should include and emphasize. The local leadership felt that OJJDP wanted a plan that involved less strategizing, fewer RFPs, and more activities, while the NYGC wanted a plan that reflected a more involved planning process with fuller participation and more RFPs.

Additionally, while Phase I offered the Milwaukee GRP a chance to learn from its own mistakes before the larger Phase II was implemented, the separation between the two funding phases diluted the possible impact though a disjointed intervention, unevenly spread across several years. Originally, the Milwaukee GRP planned for the implementation of Phase II to immediately follow the implementation of Phase I. However, for two important reasons, this plan did not come to fruition. First, Phase I implementation lasted longer than originally planned. It began in July 2004 and was originally scheduled to run through December 2004; however, two of the largest programs implemented were not able to expend all of their funding within the prescribed timeframe. This program was later granted a no-cost extension in July 2005 and continued service delivery through December 2005. Second, the planning period for Phase II lasted longer than expected. Thus, Phase II Implementation did not begin until November 2005, and full implementation did not begin until January 2006. In the end, this staggered approach to implementation resulted in gaps in service delivery and overlap between the two phases.

The Milwaukee GRP was also expected to plan an initiative that conformed to a very particular model, of which a key element was the creation of a One-Stop service center that would perform client intake and referral. The Milwaukee GRP resisted implementing this component of the model for various reasons. Many of the partners believed that natural One-Stops already existed near the target area, pointing to the local Workforce Investment Act site and state welfare sites. Others simply doubted that the partners could cooperate enough to share clients and resources through a One-Stop operation. Still others believed that most clients would contact the service provider directly and that a One-Stop was unnecessary. Despite these reservations, the Milwaukee GRP partners reluctantly included provisions for a One-Stop in the Phase II plan but did not commit to the concept. Due to unforseen staff changes at the neighborhood associations, their role was scaled down to include only community outreach. The executive committee reassigned the role of One-Stop to another prevention provider, but the move did not result in a functional One-Stop. The agency that assumed responsibility in lieu of the neighborhood associations never fully understood its role, and the initiative's leadership did not invest the necessary energy to ensure that the One-Stop was implemented according to the program model. The result was a lack of referrals to other prevention providers, a lack of referrals between prongs, and a general lack of coordination, which led to limited cohesion among the partners in the initiative once implementation began. These shortcomings reflected the larger problems of the lack of shared vision among the partners, the inability to place collaboration above the internal competition for funds, and the unwise decision to place

the neighborhood associations at the helm of such a crucial component of the initiative.

Another central element of the GRP model was the multidisciplinary intervention team. Early in the process, the team's formation and legitimacy within the community of service providers was tenuous at best. In December 2005, the team began to show signs of life, even while the level of collaboration among members remained far below original expectations. In part, the team's delays can be explained by the time required to negotiate data-sharing agreements among the partners, but the fact that certain key members were not fully committed to the concept also contributed to delays. In addition, the multidisciplinary intervention team's decision to limit the information that could be viewed across the prevention, intervention, and suppression components of the MIS limited the degree to which the MIS could be use to aid coordination and foster referrals across programmatic areas. Despite these initial delays and difficulties in starting the multidisciplinary intervention team, by the end of the federal funding period, team members had become committed to the model and the process. The team actually became a bright spot in the GRP's efforts and was able to secure additional funding for itself beyond the federal funding period. While this report does not cover the period during which the intervention team operated with funding independent from GRP, the success of the intervention team model beyond the GRP initiative will be monitored closely throughout the remaining evaluation period.

Finally, the Milwaukee GRP also struggled with a target area that did not exhibit the classic "gang" problems seen in other sites. This problem was partially the result of a selection process based more strongly on political factors than on crime analysis efforts. Specifically, the absence of traditional, hierarchical youth gangs with known territories and the presence instead of loosely affiliated groups of youth organized around narcotics trafficking presented a unique challenge in Milwaukee compared with other sites. Coupled with this challenge was the fact that these groups did not appear to have greatly contributed to the youth violence in the target area. Thus, the initiative's poor problem identification and target area selection contributed to its muddled response. Compounding the problem was the Target suppression team's expansion of efforts to areas outside the GRP target area. While the MPD provided services to all parts of the city, its expansion of specialized suppression services to areas outside the target area complicated the initiative's and the evaluation's ability to attribute any changes in crime levels in the target area to GRP efforts.

6.8.4. Sustainability

At the heart of the initiative's lack of information sharing and collaboration was its lack of a shared identity. While early discussions touched on the possibility of creating an initiative identity apart from the federal name (GRP), followed by the development of a logo and promotional materials, none of these efforts ever came to fruition. In addition, members of the initiative never fully committed to a shared purpose, with the leadership having failed to define a problem around which the initiative's efforts could coalesce. These difficulties and shortcomings in getting the members of the initiative to work together meant that any level of sustainability for the initiative itself would be difficult to achieve at best. In addition, the leadership failed to spearhead any significant sustainability efforts, bringing up the issue on multiple occasions, but never following through with a commitment to keep the relationships and networks that had developed over the life of the initiative alive.

Instead, parts of the initiative found ways to sustain themselves, and these efforts were led by members outside of the core management team. Notably, by late 2007, the intervention team appeared to be on a path to sustainability, with additional funding secured beyond the federal funding period. In addition, while the Target suppression team cooperates and plans efficiently, it operated completely separate from the larger GRP initiative. Its efforts continued beyond GRP's funding period.

6.8.5. Successes

Despite these challenges, the Milwaukee GRP was able to maintain a broad, inclusive partnership over several years with initially an intensive meeting schedule, managing both the diverse interests and the unequal influence of individual partners. During this time, both the Phase I and the Phase II plans were submitted to and approved by OJJDP. In fact, in spite of the seemingly lengthy process, the Milwaukee GRP was the first site to begin Phase II implementation. The Milwaukee GRP was perhaps closest of the four sites to the timeline originally expected by OJJDP. In addition, the Milwaukee team took to heart the OJJDP model, making efforts to remain as true to the basic model as possible.

Service providers also outlined a number of successes both organization and GRP-wide that were achieved and that they attributed to GRP. Agency specific successes included client successes, increased trust between the agency and the clients, increased visibility of the program, improved community perception of the clients, and increased trust between the agency and the community. GRP-wide successes included raising awareness about youth gangs, increased collaboration among partners, and increased service delivery in the target area.

Client successes cited included items such as clients returning to school or obtaining full-time employment after completing the program. One service provider described an increased demand from employers for GRP clients, compared with other clients receiving the same services but not funded through GRP. The same respondent also reported a lower dropout rate for GRP clients. Moreover, several respondents identified an increased level of trust between the agency and its clients because of their participation in the Milwaukee GRP. For these respondents, their participation meant modifying their programs to be more intensive. The increased intensity of the program led to greater contact between the clients and the program staff, which translated into a greater degree of trust. One respondent noted, "The youth are more comfortable opening up and telling us their problems, and we are better able to help them because of the trust that has been built." Another respondent noted that participating in the Milwaukee GRP had increased the visibility of the agency's program and increased trust between the agency and the community. This increased visibility has aided in client recruitment and overall demand for the program.

Many respondents cited increased awareness about youth gang crime and violence. One respondent stated that the Milwaukee GRP has brought awareness of the gang violence issue "to a higher level." Many others noted an increased level of service delivery in the target area. However, these respondents doubted that the number or amount of services delivered had changed significantly under GRP. These respondents felt that existing services were simply delivered in a more organized way with less competition among service providers.

6.9. CONCLUSION

The Milwaukee GRP made great strides with regard to the development of an MIS, even while the COMPASS system was underused after development, and to the implementation of the GRP model. However, despite high hopes of affecting youth violence among the early organizers in the city, the Milwaukee GRP was perennially fraught with internal conflict and suffered from the lack of a shared vision. The degree to which the GRP model changed the level of coordination and cooperation among the partners was lower than expected. Furthermore, the Milwaukee GRP created a partnership with an extraordinary degree of bureaucracy and red tape. This structure was largely effective at organizing and maintaining a large partnership with diverse interests and internal competitions; however, planning and implementation clearly suffered. In addition, questions of sustainability and direction in the future were largely unanswered through the end of the federal funding period, in part because no one was completely sure who was in charge.

Because the leadership failed to define a clear strategic vision for the initiative, each partner understood the overarching goals of the initiative differently. This failure on the part of the Milwaukee GRP leadership had two contributing factors. First, the funder played a role, emphasizing the gang component of the program over the youth violence component to the point where the local leadership felt pressure to define the problem in terms of traditional gangs. Second, the preexisting internal conflict within the partnership made discussion and problem solving difficult during the planning period. In the end, convenience rather than salience drove problem identification. Moreover, the Milwaukee GRP leadership's inability to clearly define this problem and its solutions has created a dispersion of funds across myriad solutions that may only tangentially relate to the root causes of youth violence in the target area. In essence, the response to youth violence in the target area was diluted across many different activities that are not necessarily related or coordinated well. The effect is a low dosage of service delivery that may not translate into the desired impact on the youth violence. With some piecemeal sustainability of individual parts of the initiative, but low expectations that the relationships or networks will be formally maintained beyond the federal funding period, the longer term effects of the GRP effort in Milwaukee will be closely watched as the evaluation period continues.

Chapter 7

North Miami Beach, Florida

On July 4, 2002, a different kind of fireworks exploded through the City of North Miami Beach. Gunfire erupted through the streets when 70 rounds were fired from a car at a group of teenagers near Victory Park (Clary, 2002). When the gunfire finally stopped, seven people were wounded, one of whom died three weeks later. This outbreak of gunfire was one of several gang-related incidents between 2002 and 2003. Throughout the spring and fall of 2002, one Haitian gang—Eastside—allegedly carried out at least 15 drive-by shootings (Alvarado, 2003). Three murders from those drive-bys happened within North Miami Beach city limits. These brutal outbreaks appeared to be early signs of the city's developing gang problem.

7.1. STUDY AREAS

One of the four sites chosen by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to implement the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) is the entire city of North Miami Beach in Miami-Dade County. The city, totaling 5.3 square miles, is located north of the City of Miami (see Figure 7.1) and has seen a rapidly growing population over the past decade. The ethnic heterogeneity of the community is increasing, with non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and Hispanics represented in roughly equal numbers. Table 7.1 describes the socio-economic indicators of this target area.

In 2000, 30 percent of North Miami Beach residents identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino and 38 percent were Black or African-American. In the past decade, the number of Haitian-Americans and Haitian expatriates in the city has grown significantly. The 2000 Census found that approximately 50 percent of the population of North Miami Beach was foreign-born, with 19 percent of the population claiming Haitian ancestry. However, it should be noted that because of the possibility that many foreign-born residents are in the United States illegally, the Haitian population is likely undercounted. According to local residents, the increasing heterogeneity of the population is the result of this increase in the Haitian and Haitian-American population. The census also found that 62 percent of the population over age 5 in North Miami Beach did not speak English in the home. This rapidly growing minority population has put a strain on the city, with inadequate services in place to address the needs of Haitian residents.

As these population shifts unfolded, the North Miami Beach area began to experience an increase in crime and a shortage of appropriate social services. The Florida Department



Figure 7.1: North Miami Beach Study Areas

of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Uniform Crime Reports show that even with adjustments for population growth, between 2000 and 2001 nonviolent crimes increased by 19.6 percent and violent crimes increased by 9.9 percent (NMB GRP, 2004). Census estimates from 2000 show that while juveniles under the age of 18 represented 31.7 percent of the population of North Miami Beach, they were responsible for 45 percent of crimes known and reported to the North Miami Beach Police Department (NMBPD) in 2000 and 2001 (NMB GRP, 2004). In addition, the Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center (JAC)[1] found that approximately 30 to 45 percent of juveniles arrested in North Miami Beach in 2002 and 2003 were of Haitian descent (NMB GRP, 2004).

The area has also seen an increase in the number of active gangs comprised predominately of members of Haitian descent during this volatile period. By 2007, there were at least 16 different gangs with predominately Haitian membership known to exist in the North Miami Beach area. Gang activity created a sense of unease in the North Miami Beach community, and at the time that GRP was starting there, residents had just started to think about addressing these issues. However, one issue that was immediately apparent was that there existed few resources in the community with the necessary capacities to address gang activity, especially among the Haitian population. The developing problems of delinquency and gang involvement among Haitian youths and the issues related to gang involvement thus became the focus of the North Miami Beach GRP.

Haitian migration to Florida began occurring around 1977 during the reign of then-dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier (Kemp, 2002). Prior decades saw much of the Haitian immigrant population migrating to New York City (Stepick and Portes, 1986). The highest influx of migration into Florida occurred between 1977 and 1981, and while the rate of Haitian migration to Florida has slowed since the 1970s, the Haitian population in Florida continues to grow. The population has migrated northward within Miami-Dade County, as shown in Figure 7.2. The maps reveal that in 1990, the Haitian population was clustered in the southern part of Miami-Dade county, especially around the Little Haiti section of Miami. By 2000, the Haitian population was more strongly clustered in the northern part of the county, including North Miami Beach. This movement of the Haitian population northward has created certain challenges for service providers and law enforcement in areas such as North Miami Beach. Haitian immigrants bring to the region a culture that remains strong in their new home, and that culture forms an important backdrop to many of the issues facing Haitians in South Florida today. Such cultural characteristics are especially relevant to the problems of delinquency and gang involvement in North Miami Beach, and are discussed in more depth below.

Haiti is the poorest country in the Caribbean with most of the country's wealth controlled by less than one percent of the population (Stepick and Portes, 1986). While Haiti hosts a minority elite population, a large proportion of Haitian citizens are severely poor and marginalized both socially and economically. The unemployment rate in Haiti is approximately 60 percent (Kemp, 2002). The majority of Haiti's population is illiterate (55 percent) and there are high rates of acute illness, infant mortality, and child death (Kemp, 2002). In addition, political repression characterizes much of Haiti, which has lead many of its citizens to distrust the government (Stepick and Portes, 1986). Many of those who

[1]The JAC was the centralized processing, referral, and evaluation center for all juveniles arrested in Miami-Dade County from 1997–2005. In 2005, it was expanded and renamed the Miami-Dade Juvenile Services Department (JSD), and continues to serve the same centralized functions for all arrested juveniles in the county.

Figure 7.2: Haitian Population in Southern Florida, 1990 and 2000



Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1990 and 2000 data.

emigrate from Haiti have thus faced great difficulty prior to their arrival in Florida.

A large number of Haitian immigrants are single mothers who take on multiple, low-wage jobs to care for their families. These parents are thus often unable to provide adequate supervision of their children in the home. Language barriers force many parents to rely on their American-born or American-raised children to assume some typical parental roles, such as paying bills (Marcelin, 2005a). This change in the hierarchical structure of the parent-child relationship is exacerbated by cultural differences regarding discipline between the United States and Haiti. According to Dr. Herns Marcelin, an anthropologist at the University of Miami who has conducted extensive research on Haitian culture, corporal punishment is an accepted form of discipline among the Haitian population. Many Haitian parents in the U.S. have expressed their fears at being reported to social services for using corporal punishment in disciplining their children (Marcelin, 2005b). Some children have learned to use the threat of government involvement to their own advantage, manipulating their parents into being more lenient and using less discipline than they otherwise would. This fear of government involvement or even deportation contributes to a widespread belief among Haitian immigrants that the U.S. government is threatening their parental rights. Combined with concern over their often-illegal immigrant status and the history of corruption in the Haitian government, this belief about government agencies in the United States leads many parents to fear all government agencies and avoid interaction with such agencies, even when those agencies are genuinely trying to help. These beliefs, in turn, create obstacles to service delivery that are unique to this population.

The North Miami Beach GRP realized the importance of developing a better under-

standing of its target population before selecting services for funding. To that end, in 2004 Dr. Marcelin conducted several focus groups with Haitian families, funded by GRP. All parents participating in the focus groups were Creole-speaking, and most were single mothers with little formal education. Most of the youth participants were born in the United States and had either direct or indirect gang involvement. These focus groups were intended to determine the characteristics of the city's Haitian families and how those characteristics may play a role in encouraging young people to turn to street gangs, how parents were coping with gang-related issues, and how both parents and children viewed gangs and other youth groups.

The focus groups led to several key findings regarding acculturation, parenting, and gang involvement. Parents and children reported acculturating at different rates; while children tended to acculturate to American society very quickly, parents often acculturated much more slowly, maintaining many elements of Haitian culture. Many parents confessed that they did not understand American educational and juvenile justice systems—likely contributing to their overall fear of government agencies—and reported a reliance on their children to help them communicate in English. This reliance contributed to a power shift between parents and their children, with children better able to function in English-speaking American society (Marcelin, 2005a). Together, the cultural differences between Haitians and Americans regarding acceptable punishment for children, the deep-seated distrust of government, and the reliance on their children may inadvertently contribute to a greater risk for gang involvement among Haitian youths.

Relatively little research on Haitian and Haitian-American gangs exists, though some research on gang development among other immigrant and first-generation youth cultures may have relevance for understanding the Haitian gang population. Most Haitian children in the North Miami Beach area were born in the United States or moved to the area when they were very young. Haitian-American children seek, as most children do, an identity in American society, but because these children often experience discrimination, feelings of isolation may result and lead to a tendency to associate mainly with other Haitians (Marcelin, 2005b). Because of the issues discussed above, including the high rate of single parents, the parents' need to work more than one job, and parents' fear of punishment by government agencies, many children are left under-supervised for long periods of time. Children in this situation tend to be more susceptible to gang involvement because they are looking for social and familial bonds not found at home. As part of their acculturation to American society, they also learn to place a high value on material goods; most Haitian gang members thus become involved with a gang for economic reasons (Marcelin, 2005a). As part of a Haitian gang, economic gain is usually accomplished through illegitimate means and for such gangs in North Miami Beach, drug sales are the most common means to accomplish this. Youth thus turn to gangs or other peer groups as a source of identity and to combat financially the marginality they experience (Marcelin, 2005a).

While Haitian gang culture is distinct from other gang cultures in the United States, many similarities can be drawn between the Haitian gang culture in North Miami Beach and gang cultures among other immigrant groups just entering or already developed within the United States. While the gangs are typically economically motivated, they are not hierarchical in structure. Instead, decisions are often made by vote and individual money earned through economic enterprises are generally that person's to keep, barring any economic need by a fellow gang member, in which case profits are shared. In addition,

though gang names are often associated with the territory around which gangs focus their activities, crossing boundaries is not usually an issue. Territorialism is only an issue if one gang is affecting another's income, for instance by infringing on another gang's drug business. In addition, while members will sell all types of drugs, most members do not participate in illegal drug use beyond marijuana. Finally, most Haitian gang members, regardless of specific gang affiliation, wear black and white clothing; there is little distinction between the gangs in terms of colors or clothing. These Haitian gangs, and the cultural characteristics associated with them, are the main focus of the North Miami Beach GRP.

Displacement and Comparison Areas In the other three GRP sites, the program focuses on a targeted community, or an area with a concentration of crime and disorder. For most of these places, this is defined as an area within a city. In North Miami Beach, however, the entire city comprises the target location. This decision posed some challenges for the evaluation team from the beginning of the project. The data that the Urban Institute (UI) receives from the NMBPD, while very helpful for defining the problems within the city, does not provide any information outside of its city boundaries. For the evaluation team to collect data for a displacement and comparison area, UI would have to obtain data from other jurisdictions without providing any monetary compensation. This task has proven very difficult.

Researchers typically identify displacement areas adjacent to the target area that may potentially reap the benefits of the target area's programming or face increases in crime because criminals have been forced out of the target area. NMBPD officers indicated that if offenders were pushed out of the target area, they would likely move south into the a city southwest of North Miami Beach—the City of North Miami—or into Little Haiti, a section of the City of Miami. Based on this information provided by the NMBPD, the City of North Miami was examined as a displacement area. However, difficulties arose with obtaining data for this area. The North Miami Police Department (NMPD) uses a fairly antiquated Records Management System (RMS) that is not amenable to the type of data collection that UI requires. Thus, the evaluation team has not identified a suitable displacement area from which to gather data.

In researching a possible comparison area, the UI team sought advice from NMBPD officers about areas that most closely resembled the target area in demographic characteristics, crime characteristics, and gang characteristics. The local contacts again suggested using City of North Miami because of its similar demographics and crime problems. The evaluation team conducted a comparison of census information to determine how socioeconomically similar the two cities appeared. Finally, the team examined available crime data to determine if the cities were comparable in issues of crime. The following paragraphs describe these steps.

Census Comparison Table 7.1 shows that the general the population of North Miami Beach is similar to that of North Miami. However, the city of North Miami has slightly larger black and Hispanic populations, while North Miami Beach has a higher rate of owner-occupied housing than renter-occupied housing. The Haitian population, which is the main target population of GRP, was larger in the city of North Miami at the time of the

Table 7.1: Cross-Sectional Comparison of North Miami Beach Study Areas

	Area	
	Target	Comparison
Arrests, 2002-2004		
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter	6	9
Assault	859	982
Aggravated Assault	286	365
Simple Assault	564	608
Intimidation	9	9
Robbery	97	197
Drug Offenses	524	387
Weapons Violations	48	44
Vandalism	0	0
Socio-economic Indicators, 2000		
Area (square miles)	5.30	10.00
Residential population	40,673	60,036
% population 12-17 (years)	10%	9%
% population 18-24 (years)	10%	11%
% population male	48%	47%
% population Black	38%	54%
% population Hispanic	30%	24%
% housing units owner-occupied	56%	47%
% housing units vacant	9%	8%
% high school graduates (age ≥ 25 years)	68%	67%
% in labor force (age ≥ 16 years)	58%	59%
% not speaking English at home (age ≥ 5 years)	62%	65%
% households receiving public assistance	4%	6%
% population below poverty level	20%	23%

Source: Crime data are from the authors' analysis of data from the Miami (FL) Criminal Justice Information System. Socio-economic indicators are from the authors' analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

2000 Census. However, local contacts have reported that the Haitian population in the city of North Miami Beach has grown rapidly over the past five years (see Figure 7.2).

Crime Comparison The UI evaluation team also examined arrest records for both the target and proposed comparison areas. As mentioned previously, because the target area comprises an entire city, access to data from possible comparison and displacement areas outside of the city have proven difficult to obtain. All arrests, however, that are made within Miami-Dade County are collected and reported at the county level. The evaluation team therefore has comparison arrest data. UI has obtained arrest information for all of Miami-Dade County from the Miami Criminal Justice Information System (MCJIS) for the years 2002–2004. These data allow a distinction between arrests made in North Miami Beach and those made in North Miami. The evaluation team examined the following information to compare the two cities:

1. Rates of arrests per 1,000 persons, for all crimes and serious violent offenses,

2. Trends in violent and weapon/drug arrests over time (monthly), and

3. Trends in gang-related crimes for all crimes and serious violent offenses.

Figure 7.3: Arrest Rates in North Miami Beach Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Miami Criminal Justice Info. System data.

According to information gathered from the MCJIS (see Figure 7.3), the overall arrest rates of all crimes per 1,000 residents is slightly higher in North Miami Beach than in North Miami (approximately 20 arrests per 1,000 residents versus 15 arrests per 1,000 residents). However, comparing the arrest rates for serious violent crimes (see Figure 7.4) shows that the rate between the two cities is more comparable.

Next, the evaluation team compared monthly counts of arrests for the target and comparison cities over the 36-month period. The overall arrest trends (see Figure 7.5) and the serious violent crime arrest trends (see Figure 7.6) for the target and control group show similar trends over the 36-month time frame. There were spikes for a few months within the target area but those spikes were not composed of arrests for serious violent offenses. Examining serious and violent offenses within the treatment and comparison areas shows similar trends over the time period.

The City of North Miami was deemed similar enough to the City of North Miami Beach to serve as a suitable comparison area; the lack of police data and gang crime data hindered the evaluation team's ability to fully compare the two areas, but the arrest data were used as the best available proxy. In addition, those data were supplemented with juvenile arrest information provided by the JAC within the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). This information provided the most recent home address of juvenile arrestees, allowing UI to make comparisons between North Miami Beach and North Miami in terms of juvenile offenders, a main target of GRP in North Miami Beach. Though the data did not provide the juvenile's home address at the time of arrest, the evaluation team collected the best proxy available. Incident-level data, calls for service data, and gang incident data for the target area, provided by the NMBPD, were also examined. Figures B.5 and B.6 in the Appendix offer more detailed views of the target and comparison areas, respectively.

Figure 7.4: Arrest Rates in North Miami Beach Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Miami Criminal Justice Info. System data.

7.2. BASELINE ANALYSIS

In March 2004, UI conducted a baseline analysis of data provided by the NMBPD's RMS for the years 2003 and 2004. The NMBPD continued to provide data to UI regarding all crime incidents and gang-related incidents throughout the evaluation period. Original analyses of the density of these baseline incident-level crimes found that many crimes tended to cluster in the east-central portion of the city. Specifically, crimes tended to cluster in the Victory Park and Uleta Park neighborhoods, especially surrounding the recreation areas. This information was disseminated to the GRP steering committee and taken into account during their strategic planning. In addition, the original baseline analysis found that the majority of crimes in North Miami Beach were property crimes while the majority of gang-related crimes were personal (Keegan, Hayeslip, Bhati, and Chester, 2004).

The evaluation team examined gang-related incidents for the North Miami Beach area for the 2002–2006 time frame. The sharp increase in gang-related incidents in 2004 is an artifact of a definitional change during the manual gang audit performed by officers within NMBPD (see Figures 7.7 and 7.8). In 2004, the officers audited incidents that occurred during 2002 and 2003 but recorded information only about incidents involving Haitian gangs because they were the main focus of GRP. In 2005, the officers audited the 2004 incidents but, at the request of the evaluation team, expanded the audit to include all gang-related incidents.

7.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The following section describes in detail the development and implementation of the North Miami Beach GRP. Significant events are also displayed on a timeline, shown in Figure 7.9, that covers the entire period of organizational development and implementation in North

Figure 7.5: Arrest Trends in North Miami Beach Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data from the automated records of the Miami (FL) Criminal Justice Information System.

Figure 7.6: Arrest Trends in North Miami Beach Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data from the automated records of the Miami (FL) Criminal Justice Information System.

Figure 7.7: Crime Trends in North Miami Beach Study Areas: All Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the North Miami Beach Police Department.

Figure 7.8: Crime Trends in North Miami Beach Study Areas: Serious Violent Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the North Miami Beach Police Department.

Miami Beach. These events, and the ramifications of significant events, are discussed in more detail below. An expanded version of this timeline also appears below in Section 7.6 with monthly data on selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial distribution of crime within the GRP study areas.

The original North Miami Beach GRP award of $2.5 million, to be spent over three years, was made to the Florida Governor's Office of Drug Control and Policy in 2003. However, the state DJJ took over as fiscal agent within the same year. The DJJ was responsible for fiscal management, progress reporting, monitoring, and other administrative requirements, including employment and oversight of the GRP coordinator and support staff. The North Miami Beach GRP coordinator was hired as an employee of the state of Florida. This coordinator handles all management responsibilities, including planning, development, and implementation, of the local GRP.

7.3.1. Phase I

In 2003, the North Miami Beach GRP site kicked off the program along with the three other sites in Washington D.C. Community leaders from the North Miami Beach area included in this original kick-off meeting were the chief probation officer and the assistant secretary from DJJ, a major from NMBPD, the director of the JAC, and a representative from the Policy and Budget Division of the Office of the Governor. Following this kickoff meeting, officials and community leaders in North Miami Beach began development of the local GRP program.

GRP Structure and Management

The first task was the selection of a GRP coordinator, who was hired on February 10, 2004. The coordinator was responsible for developing and maintaining collaborative relationships with local leadership. Community leaders and city officials also began forming relationships with key area stakeholders to encourage their participation in GRP. Those local community leaders most capable of identifying community problems and needs were identified. The GRP coordinator asked many of these local community leaders to become a part of the advisory board or steering committee. The advisory board was originally developed to oversee the decisions of the steering committee and to provide guidance to GRP. The steering committee was developed to become actively involved in the strategic planning process and program implementation. Initially, decision makers in the community formed the advisory committee, while the steering committee was composed of day-to-day practitioners. Over time, however, the steering committee and advisory board essentially included the same members, and the two separate bodies officially merged into one steering committee in December 2004.

In March 2004, the GRP coordinator, the advisory board, and the steering committee met for the first time. During this first meeting, members discussed GRP goals and objectives and laid out a time line for the strategic plan. In addition, the roles of the steering committee, the advisory committee, and the GRP coordinator were discussed. The meeting concluded with the establishment of the time line for the first strategic planning meetings set to take place in April 2004. During this meeting the steering committee was composed of representatives from the following organizations:

- North Miami Beach Police Department

Figure 7.9: North Miami Beach Timeline



- Florida Department of Juvenile Justice
- North Miami Beach Haitian Community Liaison
- City of North Miami Beach Neighborhood Services Department
- North Miami Beach Civic Association
- U.S. Attorney's Office
- State Attorney's Office
- Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center—later renamed Miami-Dade Juvenile Services Department
- Miami-Dade Community Relations Board
- North Miami Beach Public Schools
- North Miami Beach City Council
- City of Miami Police Department
- North Miami Beach faith-based organizations
- Haitian-American Media
- Haitian community-based organizations

Key stakeholders from the following organizations formed the advisory committee:

- Circuit 11 Juvenile Court Division
- State representatives
- Public Defender's Office
- Governor's Office on Budget and Policy
- North Miami Beach Chamber of Commerce
- Miami Coalition on Substance Abuse
- North Miami Beach Mayor's Office
- Fulford United Methodist Church (faith-based organization)
- Youth Crime Watch of America
- Department of Juvenile Justice
- Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center (later renamed the Miami-Dade Juvenile Services Department)
- University of Miami Anthropology Department

The GRP's organizational structure has experienced few changes with regard to the key players involved on the committees and in the community. Other members of the community became involved in the steering committee at various points in the GRP implementation phases. These members included Sant La Haitian Neighborhood Center, the Women's Alliance, H.E.L.P. (a nonprofit organization), Haitian-American Youth Task Force (HAYTFO), the Children's Psychiatric Center (CPC) (including the Gang Unit Exit Strategy Services (GUESS) program and Youth Gang Resource Center), and the North Miami Beach Parks and Recreation Department. Also worth noting is that the State Attorney's Office did not continue to participate in GRP after the initial strategic planning meetings. The management structure of GRP in North Miami Beach is illustrated in Figure 7.10.

After the steering committee and advisory board were combined, the steering committee took responsibility for GRP planning and implementation through the program coordinator. In turn, the program coordinator hired three staff members to carry out different aspects of the program: an administrative assistant, a prevention specialist, and an intervention specialist. The steering committee decided a suppression specialist was not necessary for the course of this project. In addition, the North Miami Beach GRP hired two

Figure 7.10: North Miami Beach GRP Management Structure



outreach workers at the outset, and eventually hired a third, all of whom were responsible for going into the community and making contact with at-risk youths and their parents.

The outreach workers were charged with visiting youths' homes and schools, and attending community meetings. Their job was not only to make the GRP name known in the community, informing parents and community members that GRP was available as a resource for at-risk youth, but also to make first contact with youth referred to GRP. The outreach workers spoke to parents, the school, and the youth regarding his or her behavior and the reason for referral to GRP. The outreach workers invited the youth into the GRP intervention or prevention program after receiving consent from both the parents and the youth. The outreach workers also established a presence in the school system and in the neighborhoods so that community members knew they could turn to GRP for issues with youth. These workers helped educate neighborhood residents about the GRP program. The prevention specialist and the intervention specialist worked alongside the outreach workers with youths who had been recruited into GRP. The lines between prevention and intervention programming were often blurred and staff tended to work with youths as needed regardless of whether those needs included prevention or intervention. The outreach positions were redefined in 2007 to accommodate this fact, a move discussed in more detail below.

The North Miami Beach GRP also made early efforts to brand the initiative locally and to build name recognition around that unique identity. To that end, in late 2004, the North Miami Beach GRP changed its program name from "GRP" to "PanZOu." PanZOu is a Haitian-Creole word meaning "to take back something forcefully." The Creole word "ZO," which means "power," developed a negative connotation after being adopted as

an identifying mark in Haitian gang culture. The steering committee wanted to take back the word "ZO" and give it a more positive connotation. By creating a unique identifying name for the program, the steering committee hoped to bring recognition to GRP in the neighborhoods and to develop a sense of ownership among the community.

Planning Process

North Miami Beach is unique among GRP sites because of its target population—Haitian immigrants and children. As such, much of Phase I was focused on understanding the Haitian population, the Haitian gang problem, and other issues surrounding immigration and cultural sensitivity. For reasons that will be discussed later, many steering committee members felt the period of time allotted to understanding these unique gang issues within North Miami Beach was not extensive enough to inform the GRP strategy. However, many steering committee members and participants also stated they were unsure if they would ever have been able understand the problem without beginning work directly with the community and the target Haitian population.

Prior to GRP, the Haitian community had been underserved in the target area. In addition, before the start of GRP, there was not even a consensus that a gang problem existed in North Miami Beach. Because the Haitian population was relatively new to North Miami Beach, the region had very few services that were equipped to serve it. The GRP leadership acknowledged that few social service providers in North Miami Beach had Creole-speaking staff with sufficient cultural competence to serve the City's growing Haitian population. Thus, early in the strategic planning process GRP prevention components focused on filling the gap in services for Haitian residents, while the suppression and intervention components focused on protecting the community from the Haitian youths who were already involved with gangs and serious delinquency.

In April 2004, approximately 12 delegates from the North Miami Beach community attended a two-day Phase I strategic planning meeting held in an NMBPD conference room. OJJDP limited the number of delegates for this meeting to 14 and required that there be two delegates from the GRP grant recipient agency. No agency or organization was allowed to have more than two delegates present. As part of the OJJDP implementation plan, organizations were asked to send senior representatives with decision-making authority to the strategic planning meetings.

The GRP program coordinator brought many senior representatives to the table. The grant recipient, the Governor's Office of Drug Control and Policy, designated the DJJ as the fiscal agent and two representatives from DJJ attended the meeting. The NMBPD was another key partner in early implementation, and also sent two delegates to the meetings. In addition to inviting key decisionmakers within the fields of juvenile justice, justice, and the school system, the North Miami Beach GRP made an effort to include key community partners who understood the cultural implications of working with the Haitian population. All of these participants in the Phase I strategic planning meeting became a part of either the original steering committee or the advisory board.

The meeting began with introductions and the program coordinator's description of the GRP target area's local demographics and economic characteristics. The meeting included a discussion of the cultural issues facing North Miami Beach and a brief examination of risk issues, such as levels of substance abuse by juveniles, juvenile arrests, mental health use by juveniles, delinquency referrals to DJJ, and the overall crime index. Following an overview

of the area, UI gave a presentation summarizing the trends and spatial distributions of general crimes and gang-related crimes in the target area covering 2002 through 2003. The presentation identified hotspots in North Miami Beach, particularly in an area known locally as Victory Park.

After a thorough description of the target area, meeting participants discussed community perceptions related to gang activity. Important perceptions identified during the community discussion included:

- Gang members have multiple residences throughout the region.
- A large number of gang crimes, particularly violent crimes, are never reported to the police.
- Gang-related fights are often over "silly" things, such as rival gang members looking at each other "wrong," as opposed to disputes over business or territory.
- Gangs in the area do not have leaders; to break up a Haitian gang requires getting everyone in the gang.
- Gang problems in the area emerge long before high school.

The meeting then examined a Community Resource Inventory (CRI) conducted through a contract with Lukra, Inc. that located services available in and around the North Miami Beach area and helped to determine where gaps in service existed. The CRI confirmed that there were not many service providers in the North Miami Beach area that targeted at-risk youth or children with mental health or substance abuse problems. The region was also found to lack reentry programs for adults or juveniles and family programs. There was a particular shortage of service providers who spoke Haitian-Creole or were culturally competent to deal with this population.

The strategic planning team began laying out appropriate overarching goals and objectives for the North Miami Beach GRP. Participants then self-selected into three subcommittees along GRP's main activity prongs: prevention, intervention, and suppression. The subcommittees were first asked to develop goals and short-term, six-month objectives for achieving these goals. The goals and objectives are discussed in the logic model section of this report.

The subcommittees reconvened the following day to further discuss activities related to their focus (prevention, intervention, or suppression). The goal of the day was for each group to outline concrete activities to achieve the stated goals. The strategic planning meeting ended with the team reviewing the goals, objectives, and activities outlined by each of the three subcommittees, as well as laying out the action items for the next 30 days. These short-term activities focused on finalizing the resource inventory, beginning outreach in the community, and examining all budget considerations. Over the subsequent 30 days, the group developed a six-month strategic plan for Phase I. The strategic plan and budget were submitted to OJJDP on May 15, 2004, and were approved in July 2004.

As determined during the first strategic planning session, Phase I goals were to:

1. Match existing resources to community needs;
2. Identify gaps in service availability and locate appropriate resources to fill those gaps; and

3. Integrate various GRP resources to ensure a continuous network of prevention, intervention, and suppression services to the community.

After the initial strategic planning meeting in April 2004, the program coordinator drafted the Phase I strategic plan and reintroduced the final copy to the steering committee at the May meeting. The committee voted to approve the plan and then met in subcommittees to discuss implementing the activities within the strategic plan. The goals, objectives, and activities were grouped under four headings: project planning, prevention, intervention, and suppression. Most of North Miami Beach's Phase I activities were more exploratory in nature than those chosen by other GRP sites. This first phase of GRP in North Miami Beach focused on a search for information regarding resources and services within the target area. At this time, the North Miami Beach area had not been the subject of extensive demographic or cultural research, especially regarding gang issues. Social service provision, particularly for the relatively new Haitian immigrant population, was also lacking. Thus, the project-planning phase of the strategic plan centered on laying the foundation for the overall program structure established by OJJDP.

Implementation Process

With the Phase I strategic plan finalized in mid-2004, the program coordinator, staff, and steering committee turned to implementation of selected programs. The steering committee's main role during implementation was to provide oversight of the programs developed under GRP grant funding. During Phase I, the steering committee decided to appropriate funds from the GRP prevention prong to revive an Alternatives to Suspension Program (ASP) and the Police Eliminating Truancy (PET) program. However, ASP was the only program implemented during Phase I; Communities in Schools (CIS) piloted the ASP program for one school semester during Phase I.[2] The PET program was delayed to allow development of a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the program and the money allotted to that program in Phase I was set aside for Phase II. Therefore, little money from Phase I was actually distributed until after the strategic plan for Phase II was developed and submitted. Money from Phase I not used in GRP's first year was put towards a more comprehensive activity plan in Phase II.

The committee addressed problems as they arose during implementation, providing analysis and possible resolutions. One such issue that was addressed in August 2004 involved the location of the GRP offices. Originally, GRP offices were located at the NMBPD station near Victory Park. According to interviews with steering committee members, most did not feel that that location was an obstacle to bringing youths and families into the program. However, a few steering committee members did feel the location could have compromised the confidentiality and comfort of GRP-involved youths and families in the future. In addition, the location contributed to NMBPD's sense of ownership of the program. After considering these drawbacks to the NMBPD location, the steering committee decided to relocate the office to maintain the autonomy of the program. To that end, GRP and the steering committee began discussing new locations for the GRP offices, seeking a new location that would be convenient for youth participants in GRP's services. The committee received input from community members during the search. Steering committee members eventually identified the new space and the project coordinator negotiated the lease. In

[2]The details of this program are discussed in Section 7.5.2.

January 2005, during Phase I implementation, GRP relocated from the NMBPD to a separate office space in an apartment complex in North Miami Beach, rented to the program for $1.00 per month. Because the new offices were not large enough to hold all steering committee members at once, committee meetings remained at the NMBPD offices until the Victory Park resource center opened in 2007, from which point on meetings were held at the resource center.

Also during the implementation phase, the subcommittees continued research and planning work that contributed to, and continued into, Phase II. Beginning in June 2004, the prevention subcommittee identified neighborhood resource centers and best practices in the area of prevention, the intervention subcommittee researched the needs of gang members and their families, and the suppression team assessed the need for a task force to work directly on gang suppression and outreach in the areas of North Miami Beach with the highest densities of crime. These activities dovetailed well with the start of strategic planning efforts for Phase II, discussed in the following section.

7.3.2. Phase II

Planning Process

While implementation of Phase I programs was getting underway, the program coordinator and steering committee began the strategic planning process for Phase II, demonstrating a fair amount of overlap in the two phases, at least operationally. The strategic planning process for Phase II took place over several months in fall 2004. As with Phase I planning, the steering committee members were highly involved in strategic planning activities for Phase II. The collaborative process included discussion and input from the steering committee and each of the three existing subcommittees.

A fourth subcommittee—covering reentry programs—was created during the process, and reentry was added as a new GRP prong for Phase II. In October 2004, a representative from the DJJ outlined for committee members the overall goal of the reentry component as reducing recidivism among juvenile and adult gang members, those affiliated with gang members, and those who have siblings or family members who are in gangs. To that end, the following guidelines for reentry efforts were presented:

1. Target serious and gang-involved offenders who face challenges to reentry;
2. Provide appropriate services and criminal justice supervision; and
3. Require information sharing and coordination between the confinement facilities, probation and parole, and the service providers.

The strategic planning meetings for Phase II began during October 2004, starting with a full committee meeting where the creation of the reentry subcommittee was announced. Each preexisting subcommittee (prevention, intervention, and suppression) then met separately over a full day in October 2004. The main purpose of those meetings was to define the goals, objectives, and activities for each prong for the next two years. Because no reentry prong existed during the strategic planning effort, the intervention subcommittee handled discussions for reentry programs. Once each working group developed goals, objectives, and activities for Phase II, the information was brought back to the full steering committee for discussion and votes. After activities were approved by the full steering

committee, the program coordinator updated the budget and developed the Phase II strategic plan.

In November and December 2004, the steering committee refined the programs and goals recommended by the subcommittees. In December, the committee reviewed the CRI developed through a contract with Lukra, Inc. to identify service gaps as part of the Phase II strategic plan. The CRI provided an overview of the demographics of the City of North Miami Beach. The inventory also comprehensively reviewed the services that were currently available within the target area under each of the four GRP prongs (primary and secondary prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry). Then, the inventory identified programs located outside the target area providing similar services that may have been able to partner with GRP without receiving new funding. Finally, the CRI identified the service gaps in the target area, and made recommendations of ways to address them.

The service gaps identified by the CRI were:

1. Affordability of programs: Many programs available in North Miami Beach, such as child care, were not affordable for low-income families.

2. Accessibility: Few service providers were located in the 33162 zip code. Most programs did not provide transportation and were located outside of the city limits.

3. Cultural competency: Very few programs/services had Creole-speaking staff.

4. Primary prevention: There was a lack of programs for early education, developmental child care, and parenting programs that were accessible to all economic classes.

5. Secondary prevention: There was a shortage of after-school programs.

6. Gang intervention: There was a lack of intervention programs targeting gang members.

7. Reentry: There was lack of reentry programs for juvenile offenders.

8. Other needs: Transportation services, housing assistance, immigration assistance, foster youth transitional housing, legal services, and financial assistance were scarce (Lukra, Inc., 2004).

Upon review of the approximately 130 existing service agencies in the area identified by the CRI, the committee found that although many had agreed to work with GRP, few actually targeted gang members or violent offenders. In addition, the inventory found a significant lack of space within North Miami Beach to locate new services. The steering committee also learned that during Phase I (and not included in the CRI), Miami-Dade County had introduced three new programs to the area, all aimed at reducing gang crime and violence within the County: the Youth Gang Hotline, the Youth Gang Resource Center, and the GUESS program. The GRP steering committee immediately considered how GRP could coordinate with those three programs. The committee decided to work closely with the other area gang initiatives and did, in fact, distribute information regarding the above programs along with information about other area programs and GRP itself at the Haitian-Creole Community Festival. The additional information provided in the CRI guided the committee's work during the strategic planning effort for Phase II.

Phase II was viewed by most as a continuation of Phase I, as most Phase I activities had been delayed until Phase II or continued to be offered across both Phase I and Phase II. Many of the first strategic planning activities were related to continuing research of the target area and the problems, services, and activities occurring within the area, including the focus groups conducted by Dr. Marcelin with Haitian families. Dr. Marcelin recommended several strategies to help both disaffected youth and their parents by increasing employment opportunities for parents, helping those of employment age to earn a living wage, and training parents to maintain the parental roles in their families even while adapting to life in the United States. Youth participants expressed a desire during the focus groups to be understood culturally, and suggested a One-Stop center for youth in North Miami Beach.

Dr. Marcelin also conducted focus groups to better understand Haitian residents' interaction with and opinions of various government systems (e.g., education and criminal justice) in North Miami Beach. The focus groups revealed that many Haitian parents did not understand how the education or justice systems worked in the United States. Using this information, the committee secured another organization to conduct additional focus groups within the community to determine what kinds of educational opportunities would best serve the community. In November 2005, six focus groups were completed by the Sant La Haitian Neighborhood Center. Sant La conducted two focus groups in each neighborhood: Washington Park, Victory Park, and Uleta Park. These focus groups examined a wide variety of topics including domestic violence, child abuse, discipline, the child welfare system and the juvenile and criminal justice systems. These focus groups were designed to help GRP understand the needs of the community. Findings from the focus groups contributed to the creation of relevant community workshops that addressed resident needs; these were conducted during the Phase II implementation period.

During this research period, the subcommittee identified several programs that used best practices and fit the community's needs. Once a working group decided upon several appropriate programs, its suggestions were brought before the full steering committee for a final vote. The committee then incorporated those programs into the Phase II strategic plan. Planning through this process was collaborative and functional.

Implementation Process

The final strategic plan for Phase II was submitted to OJJDP on January 5, 2005, but was not approved until July 2005 because of delays on the part of OJJDP. Some of the activities designated for funding in Phase I did not actually receive money because of delays associated with the solicitation for proposals, review of submissions, and the awarding of contracts. These activities were rolled over into Phase II. In addition, youth who were referred by community members to GRP for intervention services were referred elsewhere by GRP staff.

During the lag between the submission of the Phase II strategic plan and its approval, the committee accomplished several important tasks, including moving forward with the creation of RFPs and program scopes of service, as well as extending some of the Phase I funded programs through Phase II. In February 2005, the committee voted on candidates to fill the positions of outreach worker and intervention specialist. The final focus group report was also completed and submitted in that month. The intervention team began

meeting in May 2005 and the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC) conducted a training for the team in June 2005.

While the Phase II strategic plan was under review by OJJDP from January though July 2005, the steering committee voted to modify it several times as its members developed a better understanding of GRP's context and service providers' limitations. The first major modification to the strategic plan was suggested in March when the NMBPD proposed a youth physical wellness and mentoring program. The committee approved the creation of such a program, discussed in more detail in Section 7.5.2, in April.

Activities from Phase II did not begin in earnest in North Miami Beach until approximately September 2005. By February 2007, however, nearly all Phase II program activities were active. At that point, the mentoring program and the substance abuse counseling program were still not operating, due to issues with RFPs for both programs. Because the programs also had a low likelihood of sustainability, funding for both was reallocated in Fall 2007 to cover staffing costs for the newly incorporated PanZOu, Inc., discussed in more detail in Section 7.7.

Development of the Intervention Team

While development of the intervention team began late in the Phase I implementation period, the team did not begin meeting or receiving referrals until the Phase II implementation period began. In late 2004, the steering committee examined the guidelines put forth by OJJDP for creating a multidisciplinary intervention team that included outreach worker and case manager positions. The NYGC provided the North Miami Beach GRP with guidance in establishing an intervention team, and provided on-site training for the team in May 2005. The team established a bi-weekly meeting schedule shortly thereafter, in July 2005.

Key individuals on the team included community members and partners who had direct contact with youths in the area including the NMBPD gang detective, the North Miami Beach High School Trust Counselors, an Assistant Principal from JFK Middle School, the GUESS program case managers, two DJJ probation officers, a representative from the Department of Children and Families, the GRP outreach workers and the GRP intervention specialist. In addition, two street outreach workers and one intervention specialist (case manager) were hired and played an integral role on the intervention team. The outreach workers were hired to reach out to the community and youth in the area and to raise awareness about GRP in the community, and to initiate contact with at-risk youth. The case manager was responsible for tracking and monitoring youth as they participated in services to which they were referred by the intervention team. These individuals followed up with all youths referred to GRP from outside agencies, including the schools, the police, and parents. Any contact with youth or families was recorded.

The intervention team focused on suspected gang members or those at high risk of gang involvement based on a high level of gang associations. Referrals were made by those members of the team who knew of a child they believed to be at-risk. Referrals were also accepted from outside sources, such as parents. Regular meetings were used as a forum to discuss newly referred youth and the progress of current clients. The team discussed each referral to determine if the youth should be contacted by PanZOu or referred elsewhere. Once team members determined that a youth met the criteria for participation in the PanZOu program, the outreach worker would contact the youth and parents regarding

participation in the program. After contact and consent, intervention team members would continue to discuss each case to monitor the client's progress and make further suggestions for improvement. While organizations participating in the intervention team did not receive extra funding for staff to attend these meetings, the intervention team continued to receive referrals, conduct regular meetings, and maintain case management for clients throughout the evaluation period.

NMBPD's Gang Unit

Also in late 2004, the GRP began discussing the creation of a gang unit comprising two officers from each of the NMBPD's three shifts to assist the two full-time gang officers already in place. The goal of this unit was to assist in identifying gang members within the community and gather gang-related intelligence. The steering committee discussed the possibility of creating a gang unit during the final meeting before the beginning of Phase II strategic planning. The steering committee asked the suppression subcommittee to bring more information about this type of program to the strategic planning meeting because many committee members were concerned about the possibility of racial profiling that might occur through the efforts of the gang unit. The gang unit was eventually formed in 2006 with two full-time and four part-time officers dedicated to the unit. According to the gang unit's scope of service as defined by PanZOu and NMBPD, these officers were specially trained on "gang intelligence, gang investigative techniques, tracking and documenting gangs and gang related crime, identifying gang members according to the Florida State Statute, and enhanced prosecution strategies." The gang officers also participated in cultural diversity training, focusing especially on Haitian culture. As will be discussed later in this report, the gang unit was very successful, and was eventually asked to take over the foot-patrol services of the NMBPD.

Administration and Structure

In December 2004, an assistant was hired to help the GRP program coordinator. The program's goals and objectives had become more extensive than anticipated over the first year, and the assistant was hired to help handle day-to-day management of GRP, allowing the program coordinator to focus on program and contract development, implementation, and oversight. It was also during this month that the committee voted to approve the Phase II strategic plan and the new name for the program, PanZOu.

In 2007, the program coordinator undertook a full reorganization of the PanZOu staff, and the prevention specialist, the intervention specialist, and two of three outreach workers were let go for performance reasons and to give the coordinator an opportunity to revise the job descriptions. The new positions were not identified as solely prevention or intervention focused but were instead more broadly defined, allowing the outreach workers to handle all aspects of clients' needs. Under the redefined outreach position, referred youth were assigned to program specialists based instead on the workers' existing caseloads and rapport with the referred youth, where relevant. Once the positions were redefined, employees were hired as quickly as possible, and the coordinator, remaining outreach worker, and administrative assistant worked to minimize service gaps for clients during the vacancies.

On the other hand, the organizational structure of the steering committee post-Phase II strategic planning changed very little, though some individuals attended less frequently than they had earlier in the process. Once the strategic plan was developed, the steering committee assumed the role of oversight among GRP-funded programs. The committee worked together with the program coordinator to address all issues and obstacles. All issues were discussed in meetings and brought to a vote. The committee also decided, after implementation for most programs had begun, to continue meeting to maintain this oversight over the programs. Finally, the steering committee worked closely with the program coordinator to develop and implement a plan for sustainability, the process and outcomes of which are discussed below in Section 7.7. To further explore successes achieved by the partnership in its first three years, and to develop a more nuanced understanding of the partnership's functioning, the evaluation team interviewed a significant proportion of active partners. Findings from those interviews are presented in the following section.

7.4. COLLABORATIVE FUNCTIONING

This section will focus on part of the process component of the evaluation. Having participated in program development, design, implementation, and sustainability planning, the members of the steering committee have the most intimate knowledge of the overall GRP program and issues related to its design, implementation, and outcomes. The following section focuses primarily on the perceptions of various steering committee members regarding the overall GRP process, from inception to strategic planning to implementation. Thoughts on sustainability are included in the sustainability section of this report. This information was collected through on-site observations of steering committee meetings, trainings, and qualitative interviews with various past and present members of the steering committee over a two-year period. Surveys of a larger number of committee members supplement these findings.

The evaluation team conducted several site visits to North Miami Beach throughout the development and implementation of GRP during 2004, 2005, and 2006 to conduct 36 interviews with members of the steering committee. The interviews were semi-structured and focused on the various aspects of collaboration, including the program's mission and goals, the collaborative efforts, committee functioning, the management and leadership within GRP, the resources available for the program, and their hopes for sustainability of the program after the federal funding period. In addition, various members of the evaluation team have attended steering committee meetings and trainings since GRP's inception; those observations are included here. Finally, surveys assessed committee members' perceptions in these same topic areas using a five-point scale; respondents were also asked to identify changes that would improve GRP as well as barriers that impeded its success. A more in-depth discussion of the survey methodology is included in Appendix H.

7.4.1. Mission, Goals, and Strategic Plan

The first few meetings of the steering committee focused on developing the mission and essential goals for the program. Respondents characterized the process as a collegial effort and a consensus was reached by the end of the first few meetings. As one respondent summed up, GRP's overarching mission was to provide services to youths and families involved in or threatened by gangs.

However, disagreement appeared to exist over the appropriate distribution of resources among prevention, intervention, and suppression activities. Some respondents felt there may have been more emphasis on prevention and intervention efforts than on suppression. While select respondents felt this focus was the best way to approach the gang problem for their area, others felt GRP needed to spend money on suppression activities and intervention programs to teach offenders that the community would not tolerate their criminal behavior. One respondent suggested that the suppression group may not have promoted its activities aggressively enough during the initial needs assessment. Another respondent described taking a "laid back" position on the committee after realizing the rest of the group agreed on the approach. Therefore, although no one objected to the final funding decisions, it appears some members may not have agreed with the approach taken.

All members of the steering committee agreed that the target area had a serious gang problem affecting a unique Haitian population within North Miami Beach. Most members felt positively about GRP's effort to examine the problem of Haitian gangs in the city for the first time. One respondent stated the committee wanted to hear from Haitians about cultural differences and to incorporate this information into their planning of the program's mission, goals, and program activities. However, some committee members indicated that early in the development of the steering committee, there were actually no Haitians involved in the program, even though several respondents commented that the program coordinator made an effort to recruit committee members of Haitian descent. It appears that although few committee members were of Haitian descent, they represented a dedicated group of individuals who cared about and understood the uniqueness of the Haitian population.

Many members commented specifically on the flexibility of the program model to adapt to the needs of their community. Many felt the staff members of GRP were key in shaping the GRP model to fit their community, with one respondent noting s/he appreciated that the GRP model was readily adaptable to the local context. Members perceived community members to be invested in the model because they believed the program could work for the long-term; one committee member commented that "people will not come if there is no inspiration." Survey results confirm the increasing role of community members in the partnership, with 68 percent of respondents in Wave I and 78 percent in Wave II agreeing that residents had input in setting priorities for the partnership. Two-thirds of respondents agreed that GRP had built a constituency of community residents who were committed to sustaining it. However, fewer respondents in Wave II than in Wave I identified community involvement as a positive outcome of the program.

Most members of the steering committee agreed that the mission and goals of the GRP program did not change over the course of the project. Members felt the staff made sure the program met most of the goals outlined in the strategic plan. Throughout interviews and surveys, participants indicated the strategic plan was clear and measurable, responding with realistic goals to the hopes and concerns of area residents. Members of the committee also felt the model was well-defined and the area was small enough to maintain momentum and keep the mission of GRP in tune with the local community needs. Despite being generally endorsed, the strategic plan may have underutilized the experiences and resources of some participating organizations in Phase II, according one-third of Wave II survey respondents. Other members felt they had really only begun to chip away at

the gang problem in the area. Nonetheless, by 2007, survey respondents felt that the program's mission, goals, and activities had created a foundation for addressing the gang problem.

7.4.2. Collaboration and Capacity Building

Most committee members felt the steering committee was broadly representative of the community and formed of different local organizations concerned with the problems area youths faced, such as violence related to gang activities. Respondents understood that the committee was made up of the various law enforcement entities and community members with knowledge and experience of Haitian culture. Excluding law enforcement members, most of the steering committee members had been invited to join the committee by the program coordinator, usually based on their previous work experience or their Haitian descent. One respondent commented that the steering committee was chosen through the program coordinator's own contacts within juvenile justice and through the police department's contacts within the Haitian community. Most members agreed that the GRP had made an effort to be sensitive to the Haitian culture.

Committee members felt the partnerships formed via the steering committee were useful. One member identified the partnership between the police department and community agencies as very helpful to the community. Others described early conflicts between the police department and certain members of the steering committee, but acknowledged that a growing trust between members of the committee had resulted in a positive working environment. Many interview respondents identified committee members from the police department as having been extremely important to the program's success. Indeed, three out of four survey respondents indicated that the GRP had been successful at overcoming any distrust among agencies, and the vast majority agreed the program was successful in diffusing conflict when it arose.

Respondents from some community agencies reported that they were partners with other member agencies prior to the steering committee's formation; one respondent identified a positive relationship between the schools and the DJJ that had existed prior to the GRP as an example. However, most respondents felt new partnerships and collaborations were helping make the GRP successful and would remain after the GRP ended. One respondent felt that the contact s/he had with other members of the steering committee was useful to his/her own work in the community.

Many steering committee members also spoke about the partnership between various projects within the North Miami Beach area. For example, the GRP program coordinator sat on the Weed and Seed steering committee, and vice versa. In addition, many of the other GRP steering committee members served on other committees throughout North Miami Beach and other surrounding areas. For example, many served with the Weed and Seed program in North Miami Beach or Project Impact in the Opa Locka area. The director of CIS also formed a strong relationship with the GRP program coordinator, and they collaborated on grant projects outside of GRP.

In the beginning, the steering committee felt it needed more clarity from OJJDP on its role and members' individual roles on the committee, but as the project progressed, each person's role within the steering committee took shape. Most steering committee members described very collaborative and engaging meetings. Respondents also felt the committee demonstrated strong teamwork and everyone who remained involved as GRP

progressed demonstrated a high level of commitment to the success of the project. As the project moved forward, resource sharing increased as participating members were able to help GRP-related project activities by using their own resources and knowledge. Survey results support these sentiments, with 76 percent of survey respondents in Wave I and 94 percent in Wave II agreeing that participating organizations were committed to GRP regardless of whether they received funds; 100 percent agreed that the persons and organizations participating in GRP were dedicated to sustaining the partnership for the long term. One interview respondent recognized that this spirit of cooperation had been key to the program's success. Further, the vast majority of survey respondents agreed that GRP had sought out new relationships, built coalitions of mutual interest, and encouraged different points of view in discussion.

Many respondents who started on the committee were still participating two years into the project. However, some leaders of the law enforcement entities were reportedly no longer attending GRP meetings, instead sending subordinates to act as the implementation partners for GRP. It was also noted that the people who continued to attend meetings after two years were those actually doing the work, in contrast to organization leaders who attended early steering committee meetings. Respondents recognized these shifts as part of a natural progression for GRP—beginning with policymakers and moving to people who take action. In addition, almost everyone interviewed felt those members remaining at the table were also the most committed to addressing the problem, helping the program adhere to the original GRP model, and seeing their efforts succeed.

However, some members who had stopped attending steering committee meetings cited additional reasons for their non-attendance, including scheduling conflicts. Others felt the meetings were not really moving in the right direction after the planning process was complete. Some respondents stated they felt GRP was no longer in the "hands" of the steering committee and someone else was "running the show." Respondents who stopped attending felt that instead of the steering committee making decisions and changes, the meetings became more of the GRP staff describing their current activities to the committee. Other members stopped attending meetings when they felt that the strategic planning process, which traditionally involved a democratic voting process to make funding allocations, had been bypassed for political purposes. Some respondents who still attended meetings speculated that absentee members might have stopped coming due to the speed of program progress; some cited too-quick action while others complained things moved too slowly. Members still on the committee felt those remaining on the committee were those who did not expect money, as others no longer attending may have been initially involved because they expected to receive GRP funding. Still others felt people started to lose interest and began to delegate.

The fact that members either left the steering committee or delegated their roles to others within their organizations without decision-making power may have had some ramifications for the project. For example, one of GRP's key principles was for community leaders to make decisions to better the community. Should those key community leaders no longer feel the need to participate on a regular basis, GRP may be left with few leaders at the table with the authority to make decisions, jeopardizing the project's long-term sustainability. On the other hand, the shift in committee members may reflect the program's natural progression from planning and strategic decision-making phases to programmatic activity and sustainability phases. Indeed, the people left at the table were perhaps most

important to maintaining GRP-related activities and services.

Most respondents felt there were not many individuals missing from the collaboration; however, survey respondents also indicated a change in services would improve the program. Several entities were identified as missing from the collaboration, including:

School board police Because the school board police are involved in all incidents at the local schools, respondents felt they should be involved, but were unsure about the department's interest in participating with GRP. [3]

Miami-Dade County Police Department Without a truly combined effort with Miami-Dade police, it may be difficult to address the City's problems comprehensively. The gang problem is believed to be countywide and the Miami-Dade police have a specific knowledge of local gang problems over a long period of time. This historical knowledge could help to shape the direction of GRP and produce more effective prevention, intervention, suppression and reentry programming. [4]

Gang experts GRP may benefit from more individuals at the table with a background working with gang populations.

Former gang members Including former gang members in the collaboration might help participants to better understand the local gang context and local gang members from the standpoint of someone who has experienced it.

Business community While more involvement from the business community may benefit GRP, these community members were not perceived as willing to collaborate because they would not receive any money for their involvement.

School representatives Although several school representatives attended the intervention team meetings and the main steering committee had one representative from the high school, GRP was not deemed to have enough representation from local schools. Future representation could take the form of staff from schools other than the target area high school or of decision-makers from the school board.

Faith community The various faith communities have few representatives on the committee. One respondent characterized the faith community in the area as disjointed. Committee members highlighted their attempts to involve churches from the area, but many of the pastors have second full-time jobs and do not have time. On the other hand, one respondent reported many people have difficulty relating to the Haitian faith community and did not feel the religious sector wanted to be involved. Interestingly, the majority of respondents across both waves of surveys *disagreed* that GRP found it difficult to recruit faith-based partners.

Parents A respondent stated it would be helpful to have a local parent involved with the committee.

[3] By the end of 2007, school police were more involved in GRP-related suppression activities in the immediate school area.

[4] Miami-Dade police have participated in the Gang Task force, which periodically targets North Miami Beach.

City representatives Several respondents stated sustainability would be easier if there had been city council representatives involved in the initiative and who had developed a stake in the program.

7.4.3. Committee Functioning

Most members of the steering committee, past and present, felt the committee worked well together. Respondents reported participation by all members as part of a team and that they all had a voice on the team. While recognizing the inherent difficulties in starting a program like GRP, respondents also identified the positive aspects of the process and the benefits GRP gained from the experience; the committee may not have have realized the complete scope of the problem or gained as great an understanding of the complexities of the implementation process had a different, shorter implementation process been used. One respondent felt the data gathering for GRP, such as the CRI, went well but also pointed out there was not enough bureaucratic synergy and decisions sometimes took too long. However, that respondent did concede that, at least in the beginning, the steering committee had great energy.

In general, respondents felt the process of decision-making was very democratic and everyone at the table had a vote. A respondent explained that if there was an activity in which one of the working groups was interested, that working group would bring the idea before the committee and everyone would discuss it. Most survey respondents (89 percent) agreed that GRP periodically evaluated its efforts and identified activities its members wanted to sustain or drop. Even though the committee took a long time to allocate the money, they seemed to accomplish a considerable amount in the process. Each member of the committee had a chance to provide input and hear from several outside speakers who explained projects or provided expertise. One respondent saw the whole process as very democratic and believed it was very powerful for everyone to reach a common consensus. Another respondent stated there were plenty of outspoken members and any time an issue arose, the problem would be held until the next meeting when more information could be provided.

During the strategic planning process, however, some issues arose that affected the steering committee's level of collaboration and its ability to function effectively. When GRP was just beginning, there were two committees: a steering committee and an advisory committee. One respondent described confusion on the part of many committee members related to committee membership and roles. Although these uncertainties appeared to dissipate over time, this may have discouraged some members from continuing their attendance at meetings and participation in GRP.

When GRP was in the beginning stages, the participation and approach of the NMBPD caused some tension among committee members, and many respondents cited collaboration issues with the department. At least one respondent described the NMBPD as territorial in the beginning. Meetings were held at the police headquarters, and several respondents felt that having the meetings at this location allowed NMBPD representatives to feel like they were in charge while making some members feel uncomfortable speaking up in opposition to NMBPD. In addition, because of traditional Haitian distrust of the police, having the meetings at a police facility made it uncomfortable for Haitians to attend. The problem was resolved when the committee meetings were relocated to the community resource center in 2006.

Although four out of five survey respondents agreed that the program was not dominated by one or two organizations, some members reported feeling the weight of the local police department on the steering committee during the decision making process; NMBPD strongly advocated for suppression activities and for a very strong intervention plan. Some members felt this diminished the ability of other steering committee members to speak candidly about their views of the NMBPD proposals. Organizations came to the table assuming they would receive some of the grant money for their own programs and services, but some reported that the police believed the grant was their own money and that they would receive the entire $2.5 million to use for suppression efforts. Respondents described officers as appearing upset when they realized the money would have to be spread out over all GRP prongs. Soon after, senior police management ceased attending the steering committee meetings but sent a sergeant instead. When discussing collaboration among GRP committee members and NMBPD, several respondents mentioned one incident in particular. Committee members described NMBPD as very intimidating; the following account was compiled from interviewee's reports:

> An intervention program, which many in NMBPD believed would be useful to GRP, was in operation outside of the target area. When the committee meetings began, decisions were made on group consensus. However, the NMBPD came in, described the program, and wanted $60,000 to fund the participation of youth from the target area in that program. In addition, NMBPD wanted the committee to decide immediately if they would take on the program. Several respondents stated they felt some intimidation from the NMBPD. At the time NMBPD presented this idea, there was no evidence to decide one way or another if the program was a good idea. Several respondents perceived the program coordinator as being in a tight position because the GRP offices were located in the NMBPD building and thought she may have capitulated too quickly. It also appeared to some respondents that NMBPD was trying to avoid the decisionmaking process set up for GRP.

Some respondents felt there was a conflict of interest for the NMBPD because they both sat on the committee and asked for money to run the program. In the incident described above, the steering committee managed to withhold the vote at that meeting, but by the following meeting, the committee had received more information and voted to fund the program. Although one respondent disagreed with the way the steering committee acceded to the NMBPD, effectively skirting the RFP process set up for programmatic decision making, the majority of participants in Wave I and Wave II surveys described the process used to make funding decisions as effective. Furthermore, most interview respondents felt the NMBPD had changed its stance over time and became a key partner within GRP. Interviewees at later points in time described NMBPD committee members as vital to the success of the program and very collaborative with other members.

While survey respondents also cited state and federal policies as the most significant barriers to achieving program success, some committee members also raised issues regarding decision-making on contract agreements. One respondent did not feel s/he understood the contractual process used by the State of Florida but believed the committee did have control on contractual decisions. However, a better explanation of these processes may have helped committee members understand these procedural decisions.

Observations of steering committee meetings demonstrated that the program coordinator generally ran the meetings, but anyone was allowed to speak at any time. However, because there was no formal process by which to address the committee, some people may have felt uncomfortable speaking out. Some members may have been uncomfortable disagreeing because they worked with other committee members outside of the committee. This meeting format could have affected communication.

After two years of committee functioning, it appeared to members of the evaluation team that those remaining had learned to work very well together and collaboration was at its height after implementation. All issues appeared to be addressed by the committee and each person was allowed to make suggestions. The committee became more of an oversight committee and at each meeting they were provided updates about program activity. At this point the group would make decisions regarding the program and its activities. The structure of the continued steering committee appears to work well for the continuation of GRP beyond the scope of the grant. This will be discussed in more detail in the sustainability section.

7.4.4. Management and Leadership

Every respondent interviewed felt that the program coordinator had done a good job. Overall, the respondents felt she had adapted the design of GRP to fit the needs of the community. Respondents recognized that she had handled a large majority of the work required to get GRP up and running, and that she was one of the best executive directors they had encountered. Committee members felt the program coordinator was very thorough, professional, and highly motivated, attributing much of their success to this last quality. The coordinator also excelled at networking and was able to ensure that everyone who needed to be at the table was there. She included a large variety of people in the partnerships and encouraged everyone to take ownership of the project while maintaining oversight of the different partners. She tried to give everyone an equal voice while fostering the attitude that everyone was working together as one. Surveys demonstrate additional signs of her effectiveness as a leader, with four out of five respondents indicating the program's leadership minimized personality differences, and the vast majority (96 percent in Wave I and 94 percent in Wave II) agreeing the leadership instilled enthusiasm for work to be accomplished. One respondent attested that the coordinator was on the cutting edge, a "start-up" person. Respondents also pointed to her commitment to GRP's mission, describing her time in the field relating to the youths GRP was trying to serve.

The program coordinator demonstrated her strong leadership skills to the committee, who praised her ability to facilitate group meetings and the decision-making process. Respondents felt she was an effective taskmaster, setting a meeting format that was laid back, but nonetheless followed a specific agenda. Respondents also believed the coordinator had always done her homework and ensured everything ran smoothly and with clear directives. One respondent also described the GRP coordinator as good at finding out what was missing, looking for 'holes' in community services. Although fewer than in Wave I, 72 percent of survey respondents in Wave II agreed GRP leadership did not inhibit progress through indecision or disorganization.

In addition, many committee members spoke about the qualifications of GRP support staff. Many members believed the staff had really helped the program coordinator in both understanding the community and in meeting the objectives of the program. The

staff were passionate about their work and vital to the program's success. That passion, however, may have led to too much emotional involvement with the youth participants. After some issues of trust, such as theft from within the GRP office, were brought to light, the GRP staff created boundaries and rules for the office. Committee members described the need for the GRP staff to grow professionally, learning to be caring and effective case managers without becoming personally attached to clients.

One of the only criticisms of the project director was it would have been helpful for her to engage local politicians in the project. After two years, City council members did not really know about the program. Respondents suggested that using "photo ops" with local politicians could have raised awareness in the community about GRP and in turn, helped to sustain it. The program needed "champions" of the project with pull in the community. However, steering committee members indicated that the director was busy trying to develop and run the programs, rendering it difficult to get politicians engaged.

Meeting observations by the evaluation team confirmed the program coordinator's professionalism. From the first meeting, the program coordinator appeared well-prepared; she appeared to understand the program and to have completed a thorough background review of the area. Meetings tended to remain on task because the coordinator followed agendas closely and appeared to make a genuine effort for all voices to be heard.

7.4.5. Resources

Respondents felt GRP opened up more options for community members seeking help with various problems. One committee member stated GRP created connections between resources that already existed in the community and residents who needed those resources. Survey respondents also identified changes in services as positive results of GRP efforts, though significantly fewer noted this change in Wave II than in Wave I.

When the steering committee began strategic planning, it first examined all resources currently available in the area at that time and resources that were missing. When the committee found a service area lacking, they searched for a best practice program to fill the gap. The NYGC developed a website with a matrix of programs that addressed different risk factors. These programs had been evaluated in a variety of different communities[5] and were recommended by the site as appropriate for gang-related problems. The committee used that resource to identify programs that might fill gaps in their community, while attempting to minimize the duplication of services. There may have been some repetition of services across the city, but committee members hoped it would inspire relationship-building between service providers, allow programs to prioritize service provision to best fit the needs of the community, and refer clients to other similar programs in the area as needed. This type of relationship building was exemplified by one GRP partner, the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF), who had an extensive resource network and worked with GRP since its start. The DCF served as a referral source and resource network, working to educate the community on what resources are available in the community. By partnering with GRP, they ensured that extensive information about all available resources was available to anyone who needed it, including clients. In support of these findings, survey results indicated that three out of four respondents believed GRP had developed a formal plan for identifying and mobilizing non-financial resources from organizations

[5]The programs had not been evaluated in Haitian communities.

throughout the community. The results also reveal a large increase in the number of respondents who felt the program had secured commitments of non-financial resources from groups and individuals in the community (from 64 percent in Wave I to 100 percent in Wave II).

Although the vast majority of survey respondents (84 percent in Wave I and 89 percent in Wave II) agreed GRP resources were being used effectively, interviews with members of the steering committee also identified areas in need of more resources. Some respondents believed there was a need for more focus on intervention and reentry programs or services for teens. One respondent stated s/he would like to see more programs focused on high school job training, vocational training, and trades. One respondent also pointed to the need to help youths find employment, although that interview was conducted prior to the creation of the on-the-job training program, which likely addressed the issue.

Other respondents believed that resources would have been better spent on suppression activities, with one interviewee suggesting that if the money had remained in the area of suppression, there could have been an extensive mapping of the area, or the creation of a task force to combat gang-related crime. However, task forces with just such missions either have operated or continue to operate in the area. Such task forces include the following:

Multiagency Gang Strike Force This task force was created in 1997 by the State Attorney General's office to dismantle the most dangerous street crimes and gangs. Members included the NMPD, the NMBPD, Miami-Dade County, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The task force used enforcement of racketeering laws to focus on the worst gangs, targeting guns and drugs. The Strike Force was still in operation in mid-2007.

Miami-Dade Gang Task Force The Miami-Dade County Police Department has worked with other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and throughout the Miami-Dade area to conduct sweeps for documented gang members.

North Miami Task Force This task force was created in 2003 and involved the Miami-Dade County Police Department, the NMPD, the NMBPD, the BATFE, and the FDLE. It covers all areas of Miami-Dade County north of the city of Miami. Participating police departments assign manpower to this task force to hit drug hotspot areas and to target violent crime. The task forces has made 500 arrests over its three-year existence. No GRP money was spent on this initiative but the initiative did conduct suppression activities as needed in the City of North Miami Beach. One respondent reported that there had not been a major gang incident in the targeted area in three years and attributed this success to the task force's suppression initiatives.

Some respondents joined GRP with the expectation that suppression activities would be emphasized; these respondents reported disenchantment when they learned of the multi-pronged model underlying GRP. One respondent blamed the reduced role of suppression activities on the federal government, who cut down the GRP's suppression component. A Haitian gang task force was reportedly a component under the original GRP plan in NMB, but, according to one respondent, GRP sites were later told the effort should not have a suppression focus. This respondent believed the money was supposed to be

shared equally by community services and the police, but after the strategic planning was complete, the actual division was perceived to be very unequal, with 90 percent going to community services. Other respondents, however, believed the steering committee had made the decision to put more focus into prevention and intervention than suppression, and it was not a decision imposed upon them.

In addition, some respondents expressed concern about the service providers that actually received GRP funding. Even though the activities were chosen for funding based on the initial strategic plan, there was concern that participants may have joined GRP purely to receive money and that they may not have adequately addressed the needs of the Haitian population. Some service providers reported to GRP that they had an ability to work with the Haitian population, but GRP later discovered the programs had no Creole-speaking staff. One respondent felt there should have been a better assessment of the actual services provided by GRP fund recipients before funds were dispersed. Even after some of the providers received money to serve the Haitian population, it was still not clear whether they were making an impact in that community.

Members also reported that after they developed a full understanding of the problem, they may have changed their allocation decisions to better serve different areas not originally addressed in the strategic plans. Some members suggested that there should have been a greater emphasis on sports and recreational activities to fill out-of-school time for teenagers in the area. Other respondents felt extra money should provide technological training for youth and disagreed that recreational activities should be a priority. One respondent felt teaching communication and technology would help the youth to succeed in the future.

Finally, an increasing number of survey respondents disagreed that GRP resources were sufficient to achieve its goals (40 percent in Wave I and 56 percent in Wave II); respondents also indicated that the funding represented a considerable barrier to program success. Interviews revealed similar concerns that the money being disseminated by GRP was never going to be enough to solve all the problems. One respondent felt the problem with gangs was huge and there was not enough money to solve the problems. Another respondent was not sure where the funding for GRP was really going; the planned activities seemed beneficial, but it was not clear to the respondent whether GRP would work. Another respondent conceded the GRP grant may not solve the community's problems, but it was encouraging to know people out there know and understand the issues within the community. Finally, a respondent stated it would be nice to have more reporting by the contractors on how funding was actually spent. The committee member felt there should be even greater transparency with the steering committee and that these reports should affect future allocations. Interestingly, fewer respondents in Wave II than in Wave I indicated that a change in funding would improve GRP. The next section details the distribution of the site's funding to different programmatic activities under the locally-designed GRP model

7.5. GRP PROGRAM DESIGN, ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

7.5.1. Program Design: Phase I and Phase II Logic Models

Logic models are designed to give a broad view of the program design. The overarching goal of the initiative is to reduce youth gang crime and violence through a combination

of primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. To determine the appropriate strategies for each prong, the North Miami Beach GRP first defined goals for each. These goals sought to complement the larger goal of reducing youth gang crime and violence by addressing some small portion of the larger problem. For example, one of the North Miami Beach GRP's prevention goals was to "Determine cultural and family dynamics that support gang member involvement and empower families to reduce gang involvement," indicating that at least part of reducing youth gang crime and violence in the target area on a long-term basis could be accomplished through a preventive approach aimed at strengthening families.

Table E.1[6] depicts the goals, objectives, and specific activities developed by the GRP subcommittees through their strategic planning process for Phase I. Overarching goals correspond to more concrete objectives on each row; each goal has associated short- and long-term objectives. Each goal and objective is followed by the activities or services that are intended to fulfill that goal and objective. For the most part, these short-term activities took place in the first six months of implementation. Exceptions to this were the suppression long-term goals, which were initiated in Phase I and implemented for the remaining project period. More complete descriptions of each activity are included below in Section 7.5.2.

The Phase I goals in many ways set the stage for Phase II. Phase I goals focus on educating the partners involved in the process about the problem, developing a plan for program implementation, and experimenting with a variety of services designed for high-risk youths. The Phase II logic model is based on the Phase II strategic plan approved in July 2005. As with the previous logic model, goals and objectives for each component (primary and secondary prevention, intervention/reentry, and suppression) were developed by GRP subcommittees under the facilitation of the site coordinator Phase II planning period. The goals and objectives provided in Table E.3 are more comprehensive than those in Phase I, and each goal and objective is implementation-based rather than planning-based.

7.5.2. Program Inputs and Outputs

The process component of the GRP evaluation seeks to enhance understanding of how the program works, including detailing what activities are undertaken, how different parts of the program operate, and what clients or target populations are served. Outputs are used to inform the process evaluation and directly result from the activities that are implemented (e.g., the number of clients who receive a particular service). Tables E.2 and E.4 in Appendix E list each activity designed for Phase I and II, respectively. These models are based on the strategic plan created by the site and have changed throughout the implementation period. Any significant changes between the planned programming and the actual implemented programs will be noted below. The models also predict measurable outputs for each program and describe how these outputs will be measured. The outputs of each activity are then related to expected outcomes and inform the outcome evaluation, discussed below in Section 7.6. The expected outcomes predict the overall effects of the program but are not direct products of the program. The activity models classify the expected outcomes into several domains. These domains are not directly related to the overarching GRP components (prevention, intervention, and suppression), but are instead

[6] All logic and activity models appear in Appendix E.

based on the site's activities and were used to guide data collection. The seven outcome domains identified for both phases in North Miami Beach include process, community, crime, education, employment, health, and probation/corrections. The North Miami Beach GRP used the two strategic plans to guide implementation of programs during Phases I and II. Implementation of some program activities was delayed during Phase I, and as a result some Phase I programs had to be carried over into Phase II. There was thus a brief financial and operational overlap between Phase I and Phase II.

The research team collected all program information from the coordinator as it became available, including RFPs and program scopes of service, quarterly reports, and management information. To assess the outputs from each provider, additional data were gathered on activities during both phases. Data for Phase I were largely obtained from interviews with steering committee members and service providers. In addition, the outreach workers managed information on prevention and intervention clients who were receiving case management services in a GRP Management Information System (MIS). While the program coordinator did track program performance through required contract deliverables—funded service providers were required to give regular updates on program operations, as well as on actual client participation and use of services—UI did not systematically collect data from those reports. These various data sources contributed to the evaluation team's understanding of each program's dosage levels (e.g., how many people received what services and for how many hours). For Phase II programs, details on all programs and activities funded by GRP were collected through interviews with service providers and the program coordinator, the GRP MIS, and financial reports submitted to the program coordinator as part of contractual requirements. The triangulation of this information allowed the evaluation team to develop a clear understanding of the overall GRP project, how each program and activity partnering with the GRP initiative operated, and how those programs contributed to the overall goals of GRP.

Quantitative output data collected from these sources are reported in Table 7.2. The table was restricted to quantifiable data that was directly related to serving clients; thus if an organization used funds to train employees on gang awareness, that output would not be included in the table. However, if the *provider* of the gang awareness training was funded by GRP and reported the number attending each training to the Virginia Office of the Attorney General (OAG), that number would be included in the table. There are some exceptions to that rule, where quantifiable information that does not relate directly to clients is included. In those cases, the data were included because they were deemed an important demonstration of a funded partner's activities. The table identifies the phase during which each activity was provided; the inputs, or contracted amount of GRP funding they received; and the outputs, to be read as total number of clients unless otherwise noted. The table includes both Phase I and Phase II activities. Exclusion from this table does not indicate that a program was not provided or that a program did not report any outputs to GRP; it simply means that the program did not report clients served or other quantifiable information that fit the evaluation team's criteria for inclusion here.

Phase I

Figure 7.11 provides the planned allocation of funds for Phase I. The funding distribution for Phase I reflected the site's emphasis on planning and research activities as outlined in the Phase I strategic plan, with more than $41,000 (16 percent) of the approximately

Table 7.2: North Miami Beach Phase I and Phase II Inputs and Outputs

Prong	Provider	Activity	Inputs		Outputs	
			Phase	Contract Amnt. ($)	Period	Clients/Other
I	Univ. of Miami, Anthro. Dep't	Focus groups	I	$13,500	01-06/2005	41 (15 Parents, 26 children
S	NMBPD	Consultant	I	$3,500	01-06/2005	Gang database created
S	Sant La Haitian Nbrhd. Services	Focus groups and workshop curricula devel.	I	$10,350	11/2005	42 in 6 focus grps.
P	CIS	Alternatives to Suspension program (ASP)	I-II	$10k, 122k	01/2005-12/2006 (by semester)	
S	FANM, NMBPD, PanZOu staff	Community workshops, various topics	I-II	$8,100	05-06/2006	245 in 4 wrkshps.
P	Customer Firstival	Haitian-Creole Festival	II	$2,000	2005-2006	Hundreds
P	Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council	Youth Gang Summit	II	$2,000	03/2006	~500
P	NMB Parks and Rec. Dep't.	Annual Teen Conference	II	$5,000	03/2006	~400
P	NMB Nbrhd. Services Dep't	ENSEM: Family Strengthening	II	$84,000	07/2005-02/2007	73 families
P	NMB Nbrhd. Services Dep't	Early Literacy program	II	$80,000	06/2006-10/2007	36
P	NMB Weed and Seed, NMB Parks & Rec. Dep't	YEP - Midnight Basketball (6 wks.)	II	$92,600	06/2005-06/2006	74
P	NMBPD	Police Eliminating Truancy (PET)	II	$148,000	07/2005-06/2007	817 youth stopped/ 731 fld. interviews
P	PanZOu staff	Self-Sufficiency Program	II	$0	06/2006	8
P	PanZOu staff	DIVAS	II	-	06/2005-present	34
P	PanZOu staff	ManUp	II	-	06/2006-12/2006	36
P	PanZOu staff	Intensive case management (prev., interv.)	II	$150,000	06/2005-06/2007	46 clients/ 75 referrals
I	PanZOu staff*	Intervention team	II	$196,000	07/2006-10/2007	
I	South Florida Boxing Gym, NMBPD	Six Rounds to Success	II	$84,000	01/2006-10/2007	34
I	Transitions, Inc.	On-the-Job training	II	$70,000	01/2007-10/2008	17
S	NMBPD	Mini gang unit	II	$18,000	07/2005-10/2007	257 field contacts/ 163 arrests
S	NMBPD	Foot and bike patrol	II	$275,000	07/2005-02/2006	332 field contacts/ 55 arrests
R	Transitions, Inc.	Reentry services	II	$200,000	07/2006-10/2008	1

*Line shows total number of contacts with intervention clients per month from 04/2006 to 06/2007.

Figure 7.11: North Miami Beach Phase I Funding Allocations by Prong



$257,000 grant allocation for Phase I spent on training and research into resources existing in the community. This allocation amounted to more than any of the money spent directly on prevention, intervention, or suppression during Phase I. Reentry activities were not included in the Phase I strategy. Because of the site's emphasis on planning and evaluation, and because of unforseen delays in program implementation, little actual programming was implemented during the brief Phase I period. Instead, funds allocated for programs during Phase I but not spent were carried over to the Phase II period.

Planning and Evaluation The planning and evaluation portion of Phase I funding included funding for several training activities related to cultural competency and program design. Training activities for GRP staff included a "Haitian Cultural Competency/Survival Creole for Service Providers," training, a conference on Haitian Advocacy, CIS' multi-track training, and a contracts and grants management seminar. A total of $1,725 was spent to allow staff attendance at these trainings. The evaluation component of the Phase I funding was distributed to two entities, NMBPD, and Lukra, Inc. The NMBPD was awarded $5,636 to collect crime data from their data systems and distribute it to UI. Lukra, Inc. was paid $9,000 to complete a full-scale CRI, which included data collection on both the target area problems and resources already in existence within the area. The CRI was one of the major products from Phase I efforts and it contributed to strategic planning for Phase II (detailed findings from the CRI are discussed above in Section 7.3.2. Other funds under the planning and evaluation heading were used to cover the costs of the strategic planning itself. The following subsections discuss other activities that took place during Phase I in further detail.

Prevention Early in Phase I, the steering committee hoped to find a prevention program already operating in the community that demonstrated a best practice as identified by

the NYGC, and committed $10,000 of GRP funding under the prevention prong for such a program. However, the CRI found few prevention programs following a best practice model located within the city and equipped to serve the Haitian community. The committee instead voted to award a portion of the prevention funding to the ASP program. This program had operated in the area in previous years, but had disbanded prior to the beginning of GRP. The steering committee decided to reinvest in the program and start a pilot of the program in North Miami Beach.

Funding for the ASP program was awarded to CIS in December 2004 on a sole source basis. The program was piloted in the second semester of the 2004-2005 school year and was made available to students at JFK Middle School and North Miami Beach High School. The program was intended to "reduce the risk factors for gang involvement providing North Miami Beach middle and high schools an alternative to at-home suspensions and [as a] truancy deterrent" (ASP, 2004). The program provided case management services to youth referred to the program, first contacting parents to give them the opportunity to enroll their child in the program. ASP was then available to work with the participating youth and his or her family on any issues presented during an intake assessment. If needed, the case manager was required to provide a minimum of two follow-up contacts and service referrals to the students. The program itself was provided in a classroom in the North Miami Beach Parks and Recreation Department offices, which was rented from the city during the school day for $1 per week. The program provided the academic work the students were missing while suspended from school, which was completed by participants during the first half of the day. In addition, the program used the Life Excelerator Assessment of Personal Skills (LEAPS) lessons for character education, often taught during the second half of the day.

During the pilot, 91 suspended youth participated in the ASP program. However, no truant youth were recruited into the program during this time period. According to data provided by CIS, clients were predominately suspended for fighting (46 percent), defiance (23 percent), or disruptive behavior (21 percent). Most clients were in the program for an average of 3.4 days. In addition, 25 referrals were made to various program services. Parents reported to the program that the biggest barrier they faced to their child's participation was transportation-related; parents had difficulty getting the children to the program on time and picking them up when the program ended at 2:30 p.m. Finally, many students did not bring lunches; while ASP was unable to provide lunch, the program did provide snacks for these children. Despite these difficulties, the program did achieve several successes during its first semester, however, and 85 percent of parents reported satisfaction with the program, 70 percent of students increased life skills knowledge through the LEAPS program, and 100 percent of students completed their required course work.

The steering committee also hoped to extend the hours of the recreation centers within specific neighborhoods during evenings and weekends to give youths in those neighborhoods access to positive and constructive activities during those times. The committee allotted $3,630 to pay for the employees' time required to keep the facilities open. The North Miami Beach Parks and Recreation Department declined the funds however, stating it would need to extend the hours of all recreation centers in the city, not just the centers of interest to the committee. Therefore, funds that had been set aside for the extended recreation center hours were instead combined with funds for a Midnight Basketball program, already in operation as a part of the North Miami Beach Weed and Seed program.

GRP funds helped to pay for extra staff during program hours. As will be discussed in Phase II, the funds were later reallocated a second time, to the creation of the Victory Park Resource Center.

Intervention The steering committee allotted $13,500 under the intervention component to conduct focus groups with the families of youths from the target area who were either involved in a gang or exhibited risk factors for gang involvement. Dr. Marcelin held five focus groups with 15 parents and 26 youths. The findings from these focus groups, discussed above in Section 7.1, contributed to the steering committee's understanding of the target population and how best to address the needs of that population.

Next, the committee was interested in putting money towards a vocational or job development program to help youth obtain work experience, keep them off the streets, and involve them in prosocial activities. The steering committee allotted $6,000 under the intervention prong to the development of such employment and vocational opportunities for youth. During Phase I, several types of best practice programs identified by the NYGC were examined, but none were developed during Phase I because the exploration of possible programs and the RFP process were more time consuming than initially anticipated.

An additional $25,000 was originally budgeted to supplement a delinquency diversion program sponsored by the DJJ through its Intensive Delinquency Diversion Services. However, in the second strategic plan, the steering committee changed this allotment to several other intervention services as they saw best fit the needs of the community.

Suppression According to GRP's Phase I strategic plan, suppression activities were to include "technical assistance, community needs identification, and workshop curriculum development and implementation." First, a consultant was hired for the NMBPD to provide technical assistance in the creation or enhancement of the NMBPD database regarding gangs. The consultant developed an Access database of known gang members with identifying information as well as incident information. This helped to increase gang intelligence in the NMBPD. The strategic plan allotted $3,500 for this consultant. An additional $8,100 was set aside for consultants to conduct three focus groups in the community to better understand residents' needs for education on the criminal justice system. The findings from these focus groups, discussed above in Section 7.3.2, led to the development of workshops to address the identified needs of the community. These workshops were conducted during Phase II and are discussed below.

Phase II

Funding for the two-year Phase II period totalled $2,230,025, with approximately $683,000 (30 percent) of that amount allocated to administration, including personnel costs for an intervention and prevention specialist, and the remainder ($1.5 million) allocated to programmatic activities. Figure 7.12 illustrates the allocation of Phase II funds, highlighting the fact that primary and secondary prevention received nearly 50 percent of the site's programmatic funding.

The following sections describe Phase II activities implemented after OJJDP's final approval of the strategic plan in July, and some of the key outputs from these activities.

Figure 7.12: North Miami Beach Phase II Funding Allocations by Prong



Significant deviations from the site's strategic plan are described below.

Primary Prevention During Phase I, the steering committee identified a best-practice program for families—the Strengthening Families Program—developed at Iowa State University. The program had been tested on very diverse cultural contexts, but had not been implemented or evaluated in a Haitian community. Iowa State University agreed to evaluate the program in North Miami Beach if it was implemented there. The committee voted in September 2004 to move forward with the development of the program, and, after a competitive bid process, chose to award responsibility for the program to the North Miami Beach Neighborhood Services Department. This city entity was charged with facilitating the program and gave the program the Haitian-Creole term ENSEM, which means "together," to aide residents' and participants' identification with the program. Because the competitive bid process took longer than expected, however, the committee did not distribute the grant funding until Phase II.

The Family Strengthening Skills Program (ENSEM) was developed primarily as a video-based, primary prevention program designed to reduce adolescent substance use and problem behaviors for 60 families of at-risk youths, ages 10–14. The objectives of the program were to improve nurturing skills and child management by training in parenting, communication, bonding, and discipline. Instructors, all of whom spoke Haitian Creole, were trained by Iowa State University in program implementation. The instructors were further tasked with collecting data related to program completion and providing it to Iowa State University, where the program founders had agreed to conduct an evaluation of the program as implemented in North Miami Beach. To that end, instructors administered both a Parent and a Youth Survey at the end of the program. The contract for this program was $42,000 a year for two years and was awarded July 18, 2005. In 2006, the program expanded from the pilot in Uleta Park to both Washington Park and Victory Park.

The first session of ENSEM was conducted between October and December 2005, with

seven families participating (7 parents and 10 youth). Sixty percent of these families completed the full program. The second session was conducted between February and April 2006 and included 18 parents and 13 youth participants. Again, 60 percent of the families completed the program and the youth demonstrated a 70 percent increase in knowledge in the course content, while parents demonstrated a 90 percent increase in knowledge. Two additional sessions were conducted by the City's Neighborhood Services Department, and a total of 73 families have participated.

The Early Literacy Program was also awarded to the North Miami Beach Neighborhood Services Department in collaboration with CIS. The steering committee allotted $80,000 over two years ($40,000 per year) for the program, which provided Haitian youth (pre-K through 3rd grade) with an after-school literacy program. The program was based on the best practice curriculum called "America Reads." The program provided homework assistance, reading, tutoring, and literacy projects. In addition to the after-school program, contractors provided a literacy-focused summer camp in 2006 for youth in the high-risk neighborhoods of Victory Park and Uleta Park. The program operated at the community resource center in Uleta Park and, once open, the Victory Park Resource Center. GRP had originally selected a new nonprofit, the HAYTFO, to implement this program but organizational and structural changes within HAYTFO prevented it from carrying out the program. The GRP reissued the RFP for the program and the Neighborhood Services Department was ultimately selected. The first summer camp was held in 2006, and the regular program began in fall 2006. Between June 2006 and October 2007, 36 youth were served by this program.

The Developing Intelligent Voices of America (DIVAs) program is a mentoring and leadership program created in partnership with the North Miami Beach Weed and Seed Program in June 2005. PanZOu outreach workers developed the program on a volunteer basis; GRP did not provide any funding for the program. DIVAs recruited young, at-risk women between the ages of 8 and 18 from ASP and from within the school system to participate. DIVAs members developed their own contract with guiding rules for members and met weekly to empower the young women involved. During each meeting, a PanZOu staff member discussed a particular topic relevant to the youth at the meeting. For example, one meeting addressed issues related to domestic violence among boyfriends at school and how the young women should handle such situations. The meetings were designed to be open and interactive and encouraged the girls to express themselves in a positive manner. During the height of participation, the program had 34 female participants; however, a smaller, more dedicated group of approximately 20 girls consistently participated.

The success and popularity of the DIVAs program brought about requests from young males for a similar program in which they could participate. The Man Up program was thus developed and implemented by the male Outreach Workers in PanZOu, again in partnership with the North Miami Beach Weed and Seed program. This program was created to help young men reach their potential by teaching them self empowerment as well as how to become men of honor and integrity. Man Up targeted males aged 8 to 18 and like DIVAs, was not funded with GRP grant money—all participation by the GRP staff was voluntary. This program ran for several months with approximately 35 participants but ceased operation when most of its participants found work and were unable to attend. Staff members discussed restarting the program, but by late 2007, no action had been taken on the issue.

GRP funds allowed for the expansion of several existing community outreach efforts, including the Hip-Hop Conference (also called the Annual Teen Conference), the Haitian Creole Festival, the Youth Gang Summit, and outreach on Haitian Radio to promote education and violence prevention. The first Hip-Hop Conference was conducted in February 2005, prior to the final approval of the Phase II strategic plan, with a focus on "gangsta rap." Because the final plan had not been approved at that time, GRP was unable to provide funding for this conference.

A second hip-hop conference took place in March 2006, however, and was renamed the Annual Teen Conference. This week-long conference examined hip-hop culture as it related to teens, and approximately 400 youths participated. The North Miami Beach Parks and Recreation Department was given $5,000 to host the conference. The program was open to the public, and participants were accepted on a first-come, first-served basis; therefore, the program likely served youth outside the GRP target population.

The Haitian Creole Festival has been held annually in North Miami Beach for the past 10 years. GRP provided the organizers, Customer Firstival, $1,000 per year for two years to defray festival costs with the expectation the festival would increase community cohesion. In addition, GRP staffed a booth at the festival to distribute information about GRP and its services; the GRP booth also handed out information about the Youth Gang Hotline and the GUESS program. The festival provided an opportunity to promote public awareness of GRP programs and services.

GRP intended to provide $2,000 to the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council to contribute to costs associated with its second Youth Gang Summit, held on April 8, 2005. Because of the delay in receiving approval for the strategic plan and the budget, however, GRP was unable to sponsor the 2005 summit. Instead, GRP provided funding in the same amount for the 2006 summit. The purpose of the Youth Gang Summit was to educate the Miami-Dade community about gangs and ways to address gang activity in the community.

GRP staff members conducted numerous other outreach and publicity efforts, including participating as featured guests on a call-in Haitian radio show. Community members called in to ask GRP staff about the GRP program, and discuss concerns about their own children or about gang issues and concerns in general. Such exposure has greatly increased community knowledge about GRP in Miami-Dade County. In addition, GRP staff members participated as guests on a one-hour Haitian cable talk show to discuss youth and families.

Secondary Prevention The Youth Empowerment Program (YEP), also known as Midnight Basketball, was an existing program established by the North Miami Beach Weed and Seed project. YEP involved prevention education for youths aimed at reducing and/or delaying the use of alcohol and other controlled substances. The program was based on a nationally-recognized substance abuse prevention program model that incorporated guided discussions, group activities, role-playing, videos, and parent-involved homework assignments. Youths who participated in four weeks of the substance abuse prevention program were rewarded with midnight basketball. GRP contributed $25,000 a year for two years, covering part of the program's costs. The Village, a substance-abuse treatment program in Miami, provided the substance abuse portion of the program in 2005. In 2006, GRP staff conducted the youth development workshops using a youth development curriculum called "Arise;" participants were again rewarded with midnight basketball after completing that portion of the program. Seventy-four youth participated in the Midnight

Basketball program, but after 2006, the GRP steering committee felt GRP funding would be better spent elsewhere.

During Phase II, the steering committee still hoped to extend the hours of the Washington Park and Uleta Park recreation centers to provide activities for youth during high-risk periods (e.g., after school and on weekends). Because the North Miami Beach Parks and Recreation Department was unable to initiate this change in hours without implementing it in all recreation centers, the steering committee was forced to increase the availability of recreation centers for youths in a different way. The committee voted in January 2006 to reallocate the money that had been set aside for extended hours to the purchase and operation of a double-wide trailer to be used as a resource center in Victory Park. Before GRP funded this new center, there were three resource centers in North Miami Beach, none of which were located in the neighborhood of Victory Park (earlier identified as a hot spot of criminal activity). Installed in June 2006 and opened in September 2006, the center eventually housed GRP programs such as ASP, the Strengthening Families Program (ENSEM), and the Early Literacy Program.

After the first semester of the ASP pilot ended in Phase I, the steering committee reviewed the program and found it to be effective at keeping suspended children off the streets during the school day. The steering committee supported the program by providing $61,000 a year for two years, a significant increase in funding from Phase I. ASP thus continued during Phase II for the 2005–2007 school years. The program continued to accept and recruit suspended youth from JFK Middle School, Thomas Jefferson Junior High School, and North Miami Beach Senior High School. Table 7.2 shows the number of participants in ASP by semester for the period 2005-2007. After the pilot semester, during which 91 youth participated, the number of participants declined with each passing semester. The steering committee and CIS employed many strategies to increase the number of participants, but despite those efforts, attendance continued to decrease; during the fall semester 2006, only 17 youth participated. In 2007, CIS expressed its intent to continue providing ASP but did plan to restructure the program to increase the school system's use of the program.

In August 2005, GRP funded the PET program which supported two NMBPD officers to act as truancy officers and patrol the neighborhoods three days per week during school hours, picking up truant youth. Truant youth were taken to their local schools while youths on home suspension were taken to ASP. GRP awarded the NMBPD $53,000 a year for two years to cover officer time for this program. Over the two year period of PET operation, officers stopped and conducted field interviews with a large number of youth not in school during school hours. According to data on the PET program, just over half (52 percent) of youth who were stopped were truant and 40 percent of all youths stopped were returned to school, although four youth stopped in fall 2006 were arrested for various offenses. Another 10 percent were taken to the ASP program. In addition, PET officers were deployed to the areas around the middle school, high school, and shopping mall for two hours a day, three days per week around the time of school release in an effort to decrease gang-related fights after school and decrease threats to local businesses. This focused deployment was funded with $42,000 over two years.

The Intensive Case Management program proposed by GRP began with the hiring of a prevention specialist in January 2006. This person worked to identify and provide case management services to Haitian youths, primarily from Victory Park and Uleta

Park. Youth between 7 and 14 years old and exhibiting at least three risk factors for gang involvement were eligible. Youth were referred to the program by schools, police, parents, or other concerned parties. GRP agreed to provide $75,000 per year for two years to pay for the prevention specialist and the case management efforts. The line in Figure 7.13 the total number of contacts the prevention employee had either directly with clients or with other sources (e.g., schools or family members) regarding clients per month between April 2006 and June 2007. The line reveals that, while they appeared to have started relatively slowly, with lower numbers earlier in the period, the prevention workers had many client-related contacts, hitting a peak of 1,168 contacts during April 2007, and that the number of contacts was highest during the school year. As the line displays total contacts, this finding is not surprising—school officials and teachers have more interaction with students and knowledge of their behavior and needs during the school year, so outreach workers would have more contact with these individuals during the school year. As part of the PanZOu prevention and intervention efforts, the prevention specialist maintained an active client list of approximately 20 clients, with four to six clients receiving intensive case management at one time. As the PanZOu program developed, the employees found that most of the children in need of both intervention and prevention services were not in the 7–14 year old range, but more frequently in the 15–17 year old range. Partially because of this, the prevention specialist was released from PanZOu by the program coordinator in 2007. After this release, the coordinator did not feel it was necessary to hire someone specifically for handling prevention case management, and instead opted to hire outreach workers who could work with all types of clients, whether they required prevention or intervention-related services.

Figure 7.13: Total Prevention Contacts by Month, April 2006–June 2007

The mentoring program was one of two programs in the original strategic plan that never came to fruition. The strategic plan intended for a provider to mentor 50 youths aged 7–14 who exhibited three or more risk factors for gang involvement. GRP was to provide the mentoring program with $50,000 a year for two years. A contract was developed by the program coordinator but was returned to her several times by the fiscal agent, DJJ, for changes and corrections, and there were questions about the competitiveness of the bids received for the program. In April 2007, the steering committee decided that there was no longer enough time to get a program up and running before the end of the federal funding period (at that time, still set at September 30, 2007). The steering committee therefore voted to reallocate the money to other PanZOu costs, eventually committing it to the cost of employee benefits that were provided when PanZOu incorporated as a non-profit.

Intervention The intervention team, discussed above in Section 7.3.2, represented the core of PanZOu's intervention efforts. Three contract positions for street outreach and case management (two outreach workers and one intervention specialist) were funded with $98,000 per year for two years. These positions were integral to the operation of the intervention team. By the end of 2007, at least 75 youth had been referred to the PanZOu program from various sources since the team's inception. The output section of Table 7.2 provides a line graph of the monthly number of contacts made directly with clients or

with other sources regarding clients that the intervention team made between April 2006 and June 2007. Although the number of active clients managed by the intervention team was typically about 20 clients at a time, the monthly totals demonstrate the level of effort put forth by the staff, with the total number of contacts reaching 1,027 in May 2007. These contacts were largely accomplished by the prevention and intervention specialists and the outreach workers.

The steering committee felt strongly that developing employment opportunities for both intervention clients and the greater community was key to PanZOu's success in intervention programming. Though the RFP process significantly delayed employment programming, the GRP was able to establish an on-the-job training program through a competitive bid process. Transitions, Inc. won the bid to provide vocational opportunities to 40 gang-involved youth and young adults between 16 and 24 years of age. Participants in the program were given a work readiness assessment to identify their education level, work experience, interests, attitudes, criminal history, family relationships, and other relevant factors—including desire, skill, and ability—that could affect a participant's capacity to work. Participants then received training in cognitive/behavioral skills, pre-employment skills, basic education, and life skills. Afterwards, Transitions, Inc. then located local employment that would contribute to each participant's career goals. The grant provided half of the participant's salary for the first six weeks of employment and one-quarter of the participant's salary for the following six weeks of employment. The contracted funding for this program was $35,000 a year for two years. During the first session of this program in January 2007, 17 clients participated.

In addition to on-the-job training, the PanZOu program was able to partner with the City of North Miami Beach during summer 2007 to place 18 PanZOu clients into city positions for the summer. This program taught youth about employment and allowed them to earn legitimate wages. This program was developed through a partnership with the city, and did not require additional funding from GRP.

The Phase II strategic plan identified substance abuse counseling as an important intervention component to GRP programming, and the steering committee hoped to fund outpatient substance abuse counseling services for 15 youths between 15 and 18 years old and for 15 adults between 19 and 24 years old. The GRP plan set aside $50,000 a year for two years to provide a best practice model titled "The Project Towards No Drug Abuse," an interactive classroom prevention/intervention program. In addition, the JAC donated drug screening cups to the program to monitor participants. The program coordinator developed an RFP and program scope of service only to have them returned several times for modifications related to health restrictions with youth participants. As with the mentoring program, the end of GRP grant period was nearing and these issues remained unresolved when the steering committee determined there was no longer enough time to implement the program prior to the completion of the grant. As with the mentoring money, this set-aside was ultimately used as the extra funding needed to transition the PanZOu program into an incorporated non-profit organization, and the project coordinator planned to put the remaining funds towards programming that was still to be determined at the end of 2007.

Late in the Phase II strategic planning period, the NMBPD approached the steering committee with an idea for a new Health and Wellness program for identified gang members and youths at high risk for gang involvement. The design of the program

went through several iterations with input from the GRP and "Six Rounds to Success" was ultimately created. The program was coordinated between the NMBPD and the South Florida Boxing Gym and youth were referred to the program through PanZOu. The program trained youth in both a boxing program and in life skills workshops using the best practice "ARISE" program that was also used as part of the Midnight Basketball program. GRP provided $42,000 per year for two years to this program, which did not represent additional GRP funds for NMBPD but instead was reallocated from funds originally given to NMBPD but set aside for suppression activities.

During the first session of the program, 34 participants joined at various points. One of the lessons learned by the organizers of the boxing program was to limit enrollment once the program began. Because of the variation in the number of participants throughout the session and the program's lack of structured attendance guidelines, only 15 participants completed the full program session. Program organizers intended to use this lesson to improve the program for additional session offerings.

In addition to funded intervention programs, GRP partnered with several existing programs in North Miami Beach to help fulfill the needs of their clients and to help clients access other programs without providing those programs with funding. First, GRP partnered with the CPC's GUESS program. The GUESS program helps remove youths from gangs and attempts to stop gang-related behavior. As part of the partnership, GUESS committed a full-time Creole-speaking therapist to work with individuals and families referred by PanZOu staff. In addition, the GUESS program voluntarily instituted a policy of giving GRP referrals first priority. In return, GUESS was able to refer cases to GRP for placement with other services as needed. This partnership proved valuable during the delay between Phase I and Phase II, when PanZOu staff were able to refer five individuals to the GUESS program while PanZOu services were temporarily on hold. Despite this initial assistance from the GUESS program, and despite the fact that referrals were made between the two programs, in 2006, the PanZOu program decided that the GUESS program was not providing the needed services for PanZOu client referrals. To address this concern, the GUESS agreement was renegotiated, and GUESS agreed to hire a full-time Creole-speaking therapist. This therapist conducted individual and family counseling for PanZOu clients and under the new contract, and was expected to work with 20 youth per year. By the end of 2007, the dedicated therapist was continuing to provide services to PanZOu clients, although the caseload for that individual had expanded to include clients from other areas as well.

Another GRP partner program was the Youth Gang Hotline, run by the Switchboard of Miami. The hotline is a toll-free number that youths can call when they are having issues with gangs. In addition, GRP partnered with a CPC program called TAPP. This program provided parenting support for pregnant and teenage parents. Finally, GRP partnered with the Fulford United Methodist Church and South Florida Urban Ministries to provide tutoring to middle school youth. With these partnerships, GRP was able to refer youth to programs that specifically address their needs.

Suppression During Phase II, the NMBPD's crime database was modified to include a check box that allowed officers to flag gang-related crimes within the system. The department also conducted training for staff members on the Florida statute regarding gang activity to ensure that officers inputting data used the same criteria to classify crimes

as gang-related or not. The original plan by the NMBPD was to train all road officers extensively on techniques for recognizing and identifying active gang members. However, this plan was modified so that all officers were trained specifically on the Florida statute regarding the definition of a gang and a gang member. GRP provided $1,500 for the modification to the database; however, at the end of 2007, the checkbox was still not being reliably used by officers and manual gang audits were required to accurately count the number of gang-related incidents occurring in the city.

In addition, two officers from each of six shifts—a total of twelve officers—received more extensive gang-intelligence training. These officers were chosen to become members of a gang unit and work in conjunction with the two full-time gang detectives already assigned to the unit. The training was intended to increase the quality and quantity of gang intelligence gathered by the NMBPD. The trainings covered such topics as gathering gang intelligence, gang investigative techniques, tracking and documenting gangs, and identifying gang members according to the Florida State Statute and other similar gang-related documents. In addition, officers received diversity training with a focus on Haitian culture. The NMBPD contract for the gang unit, awarded in July 2005, was $18,000 and covered overtime hours, training, uniforms, and supplies and equipment related to the formation and support of the unit. However, the funding was increased to $36,000 because the gang unit was put in charge of the foot patrol in January 2006, discussed below. The gang unit provided quarterly reports regarding its activities to the GRP program coordinator. Intelligence-gathering activities were tracked through field interview cards completed by officers. These interview cards detail with whom the officers spoke, whether the individual was gang-related, and the details of the intelligence gathered.

During the first half of Phase II, the NMBPD implemented a new foot patrol through the Victory Park neighborhood, with four officers working two days per week from 5:00 to 9:00 p.m. GRP committed $150,000 over two years for the increased patrols. In addition, GRP agreed to provide NMBPD with $125,000 over two years to implement a bike patrol through Uleta Park, following the same daily schedule as in Victory Park. This targeted enforcement was directed at crime hot spots in the target area. Officers on foot and bike patrols gathered intelligence during their patrols.

During the first year of the increased patrols, all officers within NMBPD could volunteer for foot and bike patrol shifts regardless of whether they were part of the gang unit. The NMBPD, however, did not work the number of hours required by its contract with GRP. Consequently, GRP transferred the foot and bike patrols to the authority of the gang unit in February 2006. In addition, GRP decided not to renew the bike patrol for the second year and instead transferred that money to the gang unit. Once responsibility for the patrols was transferred to the gang unit, the number of field contacts and information collected on youth and suspected gang members increased substantially. As regular patrols continued, gang officers learned more about the youth in the area, and the number of field contacts and level of information collected increased even more. In 2006, the gang unit reported a total of 137 field contacts over the whole year. The 2007 year-end report stated there were 331 field contacts made, 55 of whom were suspected gang members and another 59 of whom were associates of gang members.

GRP also partnered with the DJJ's youth custody officer to expand the number of arrests for juvenile warrants within the target area, in an effort to decrease the number of dangerous and influential juvenile gang members within the community. The youth custody

officer was funded to work one morning per week, picking up youth with outstanding warrants in the City. The officer did not have a regular number of warrants in the city, however, so he only visited North Miami Beach when he had warrants to execute.

Finally, a small portion of GRP funding under suppression was set aside for workshops based on the findings of the focus groups conducted during Phase I by Sant La. The purpose of these focus groups, conducted under the suppression component, were to identify ways in which GRP could help the community better understand the criminal justice system and create a better working relationship between the criminal justice system, other government systems, and the community. The strategic plan committed $2,250 to the development of workshop curricula based on community need. A total of four workshops were held in North Miami Beach between May and June of 2006. Additional funding to actually implement the workshops were funded with an allotment of $8,100 from Phase I monies but were not offered until Phase II. These workshops addressed the child welfare system; the juvenile justice system; positive parenting within the Haitian cultural context (presented by FANM, a Haitian organization); and the PanZOu program and other community programs, conducted by NMBPD and PanZOu.

Reentry All reentry services were managed under a single GRP contract with Transitions, Inc., which was granted $100,000 per year for two years. The program provided under this contract included a provision for Transitions, Inc. to provide comprehensive reentry services for 40 gang members from the City of North Miami Beach who were in a Level 6 or 8[7] facility and had served a minimum of six months of confinement prior to their release. The reentry strategy included assessments of the youth before their release, contacts with the juveniles and their families, and the provision of wrap-around services after release. The program was also designed to include pre-release programming, with participants receiving 40 hours of Vital Issues Project training, a curriculum that teaches personal responsibility and cognitive life management skills. Participants also received 60 hours of Moral Reconation Therapy that seeks to change decision making by changing an individual's moral decision making structure over 10 weeks (see http://www.moral-reconation-therapy.com/). However, Transitions, Inc. soon realized that most qualified participants were confined in remote locations and that the organization would be unable to provide services to participants while still incarcerated. In February 2007, the grant was modified to allow Transitions, Inc. to provide all intended services to participants as soon as they returned to the North Miami Beach area. Once released, Transitions, Inc. provided case management services for participants, developing specific wrap-around services, including job placement, to increase releasees' likelihood of success.

The next section discusses the connection between the outputs—the result of specific site activities discussed above—and the overall impacts or effects of the GRP in North Miami Beach, as measured through different outcome indicators, such as levels of crime. Such outcomes predict the overall effects of the program but are not direct products of the program, as were the outputs.

[7]The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice classifies adjudicated youth under four levels (2, 4, 6, and 8). A Level 2 is non-residential, Level 4 is low-risk residential, Level 6 is moderate-risk residential, and Level 8 is high-risk residential.

7.6. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

The Phase I and Phase II activity models shown in Tables E.2 and E.4 in Appendix E relate the specific outputs of each activity to their expected outcomes. These relationships inform the outcome evaluation by pointing to the outcomes of greatest relevance to the assessment of GRP as a whole. As the activity models were developed, the expected outcomes were grouped into outcome domains in order to guide the evaluation team's data collection efforts. In North Miami Beach, these domains include community, crime, education, employment, health, and probation/corrections.

The activity models were created based on the site's strategic plan for each phase. As the site progressed from planning to implementation, some of the planned activities changed. In some cases, changes in the activities yielded changes in the relevant outputs and outcomes. Simultaneously, the evaluation team was working to collect data on those outputs and outcomes most germane to the site's actual (rather than planned) activities. In some cases, such data were unavailable, and in others, differences between the site's planned and actual activities made measures listed in the activity models less relevant. This section thus focuses only on those measures that the evaluation team was able to procure or is still pursuing.

The outcome analysis looked at the entire initiative rather than each phase separately for several reasons. First, the full GRP model was not wholly active during Phase I; much of the effort put into GRP in Phase I consisted of planning. Secondly, the Phase I program implementation period was brief—limited to several months—allowing only a short period of time during which any of the implemented programs might have had an impact on the target area. Less than a year separated Phases I and II, making it difficult to attribute changes in outcomes to the two distinct programmatic phases. The number of youth served during Phase I was also relatively small, with a limited expected impact on outcomes during that period. Finally, the outcome measures for each phase overlap, as both of the initiative's phases were designed to affect the same outcomes.

7.6.1. Outcome Measures and Analysis

Prior to the start of Phase II services, the evaluation team planned its data collection activities based on the OJJDP-approved strategic plan. In developing expected outcome measures, UI researchers were cognizant of the need to focus on realistic and measurable data, given the evaluation's timeframe and budget constraints. UI focused data collection on those programs that were likely to have the greatest effect on community outcomes within the evaluation period.

As noted earlier, the outcome measures were organized across six domains, as shown in Tables E.2 and E.4, including community, crime, education, employment, health, and probation/corrections. UI researchers were able to obtain data on education, juvenile probation/corrections, and crime outcomes for the target area and, for the education and probation/corrections data, for a comparison school or area. Outcome data related to the remaining three domains—community, employment, and health—could not be obtained for a variety of reasons. For most of these types of data, no viable source was located that allowed measurement of changes at the community level. Additionally, for some of these domains, the level of dosage—the amount of programming that was provided in the target area—was relatively low. For instance, Transitions, Inc. reported providing

on-the-job training services to only 17 individuals over a nearly two year period. The number of individuals benefiting from its services was too small to have created detectible community-level changes. These data will still be considered for the final evaluation however, as the evaluation team continues to seek out sources of available data and the total number of clients served by the North Miami Beach GRP grows. The subsequent sections provide greater detail on how relevant data were collected and analyzed as well as the findings.

7.6.2. Education

Because the primary targets of most of the GRP activities are youths, many outcomes are directly related to education, especially prevention and intervention programs, such as the after-school literacy program and ASP. Expected outcomes from program activities include increased school attendance, decreased truancy, increased academic performance, and decreased disciplinary infractions (especially fighting and gang activity). For example, ASP may increase school attendance because suspended students do not get to spend the day at home or on the streets. Since truants are often punished with suspension, the ASP program may reduce the incentive to skip school. In addition, the program hopes to teach life skills, such as anger management. The program hopes that the skills component will also decrease future suspensions and disciplinary infractions.

Based on these selected programs, UI decided to assess school-level changes in student performance in selected schools that target area youth attend and schools not in the target area selected for comparison purposes. Ideally, the academic and behavioral benefits accrued from participation in these programs would be assessed using individual-level data for students in schools expected to see the greatest amount of change, and the overall performance of those participating in the GRP-funded programs would be compared to that of students who did not participate in such programs. Such data would include information on academic performance, graduation rates, truancy rates, disciplinary actions, and GED graduation rates. Unfortunately, the evaluation team was not able to obtain data on student academic performance or other school conditions directly from Miami-Dade County Public Schools for assessment at this point in the GRP evaluation. Such data are still being considered for the final evaluation report, however. For the current report, the evaluation team performed a descriptive analysis using publicly-available reports of student academic performance.

Sources and Schools Because the focus of GRP is at the community level, UI collected school-level data from the official website of the Miami-Dade County Public School System (see http://www2.dadeschools.net/index.htm) for two schools within the target area (JFK Middle School and North Miami Beach Senior High School) and two schools in the comparison area (North Miami Middle School and North Miami Senior High School). The target area schools were chosen through discussions with PanZOu staff, school system employees, and the NMBPD. All informants felt most PanZOu partner programs targeted students from these two schools. Serving as controls for county-wide changes that might obscure the impact of GRP in the target area, comparison schools were selected based on their similarity to the target schools across key demographic variables including total enrollment, racial composition, percentage of students eligible for the Free/Reduced Lunch program, and the percentage of students with limited English proficiency (see Table 7.3).

These measures reveal that the target area middle and high school had larger proportions of Hispanic students and smaller proportions of black students. Schools in both areas had very small white student populations. The racial and ethnic composition of the student populations remained stable across the study period. While the target area schools had larger Hispanic student populations, the comparison area schools had larger proportions of students with limited English proficiency, although at all study schools, the proportion of students with limited English proficiency dropped over the study period. Overall, the schools appeared well-matched both demographically and geographically (the schools are in bordering towns).

Measures In addition to compositional data, attendance rates—including promotion, drop out, and truancy rates—and suspensions[8] were collected as measures of overall student delinquency. At the time of this report, attendance data were not available for the 2006-2007 school year. The evaluation team also sought data on delinquency, behavioral problems, or rule infractions at the school level. These data are not available via the internet and despite attempts to obtain these data directly from the school system, the evaluation team was unable to collect such measures. However, Miami-Dade County Public Schools conducts a "School Climate Survey" of students, parents, and administration every year. This survey asks a random sample of participants about their perceptions of their school and changes they would like to see from their school; student and staff participation in the survey is fairly high (about 80 and 70 percent, respectively) while parents respond at a much lower rate (about 45 percent) (Morris, 2007). These data are provided in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 for a baseline year prior to GRP (2002-2003) and two post-implementation years (2005-2006 and 2006-2007).

Although the available data preclude UI from examining the impact of specific programs on school-level outcomes such as performance and climate as measured through delinquency and behavioral issues, any changes over time in the target and comparison schools that may be attributable in part to GRP programs can be assessed. Those programs expected to have an impact on school-level outcomes were identified above.

Hypotheses If GRP activities such as ASP, the Early Literacy program, YEP, and ENSEM were effective, the following results would be expected:

1. An increase in attendance and graduation rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area compared to the rates in schools outside the target area;

2. A decrease in dropout, suspension, and expulsion rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area compared to the rates in schools outside the target area;

3. A direct effect on student truancy for programs that specifically address these outcomes in their service goals (i.e., ASP and PET);

4. An increase in the overall feelings of safety in the target area schools than for the comparison area schools, especially as programs target the environment surrounding the schools (e.g., PET); and

[8]Miami Dade Public Schools use the terms "indoor" suspension to mean those where the student remains in the school but does not attend class and "outdoor suspension" to mean those situations where the student may not remain in the school building.

Table 7.3: North Miami Beach Target and Comparison School Demographic and Performance Data

School	Year	Enroll.	Racial / Ethnic Composition (%)				Drop-outs & Truancy per 100 students			Suspensions per 100 students		% LEP students
			White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Not promoted	Drop-out	20+ absences	Outdoor	Indoor	
JFK MS (TA)	2002-3	2015	6	65	24	5	5.20	1.50	8.04	22.88	30.17	8.40
	2005-6	1981	6	67	23	4	3.10	1.50	3.18	11.11	16.15	6.30
	2006-7	1978	5	66	24	4	-	-	-	-	-	5.80
North Miami MS (C)	2002-3	1799	2	81	16	1	21.50	2.20	14.84	31.74	16.56	14.90
	2005-6	1357	1	85	12	2	5.00	2.10	13.78	25.64	27.04	11.10
	2006-7	1095	1	84	12	2	-	-	-	-	-	11.10
NMB HS (TA)	2002-3	2883	7	64	23	5	9.60	3.50	20.64	26.15	27.85	9.50
	2005-6	2934	6	68	22	4	6.40	4.80	22.49	13.19	35.24	7.60
	2006-7	2838	5	68	22	5	-	-	-	-	-	6.60
North Miami HS (C)	2002-3	3238	3	78	16	2	22.90	1.70	17.26	13.34	7.16	17.10
	2005-6	3115	2	80	16	2	12.20	4.20	23.34	10.02	2.22	13.60
	2006-7	2904	1	81	16	2	-	-	-	-	-	13.00

Notes: Under "Indoor suspension" students go to school, but are not allowed to attend their regular classes; Under "Outdoor suspension" students may not come onto school grounds unless escorted by a parent/guardian; "LEP" refers to Limited English Proficiency; Source: http://oada.dadeschools.net/

Table 7.4: North Miami Beach Target and Comparison School Climate Survey Results

School	Year	Agree school climate positive (%)						Agree gangs are a problem in school (%)				Agree school is safe and secure (%)				Agree school violence is a problem (%)			
		Parents		Staff		Students		Staff		Students		Parents		Staff		Students		Staff		Students	
		Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.	Sch.	Dist.
JFK MS (TA)	2002-3	71	73	89	82	54	49	7	4	23	25	77	75	99	91	56	62	10	9	38	46
	2005-6	73	74	93	81	34	50	2	5	13	23	68	74	95	88	53	64	2	12	45	40
	2006-7	85	76	96	81	48	50	3	7	22	24	78	78	96	88	67	64	9	14	38	41
North Miami MS (C)	2002-3	70	73	66	82	55	49	9	4	40	25	66	75	91	91	50	62	25	9	68	46
	2005-6	52	74	82	81	39	50	7	5	41	23	52	74	79	88	35	64	44	12	65	40
	2006-7	64	76	54	81	29	50	6	7	48	24	58	78	67	88	47	64	52	14	78	41
NMB HS (TA)	2002-3	67	68	66	77	48	50	11	10	27	18	61	71	81	86	52	65	15	14	29	30
	2005-6	56	68	75	78	48	51	19	8	45	17	52	71	75	86	54	66	16	13	47	28
	2006-7	65	74	91	76	44	55	13	13	37	20	57	75	81	84	56	69	10	17	42	28
North Miami HS (C)	2002-3	56	68	71	77	34	50	19	10	24	18	56	71	74	86	41	65	22	14	43	30
	2005-6	39	68	47	78	22	51	29	8	55	17	26	71	53	86	35	66	45	13	69	28
	2006-7	30	74	40	76	16	55	44	13	63	20	31	75	54	84	18	69	45	17	74	28

Notes: "Agree" refers to respondents who "strongly agreed" or "agreed;" "Sch." refers to respondents from that school; "Dist." refers to average response for all schools in district; Some questions were not asked of parents; Source: http://oada.dadeschools.net/

5. A potential increase in the percent of students, parents and administrators who believe gangs are a problem in their school as GRP increases awareness of gangs and gang-related behavior.

Middle School Level In the baseline period (2002-2003), the non-promotion rate for JFK Middle School (JFKMS) (in North Miami Beach), at 5.2 percent, was much lower than that for North Miami Middle School (NMMS), 21.5 percent. After GRP implementation began, both schools saw lowered non-promotion rates, with the rate at North Miami (5 percent) falling nearly to the the level at JFKMS (3.1 percent). Because the data revealed a dramatic improvement in non-promotion rates at NMMS, the evaluation team examined data for several years prior to the 2002-2003 school year. While not provided in Table 7.3, those additional years of data indicate that NMMS had a high level of non-promotion in the 2002-2003 school year; years prior and subsequent have rates below six percent. JFKMS did not experience these high rates during any years examined by the evaluation team. Because the average rates at both the target and comparison schools were similar over a several year period, and because the rates at both schools dropped over the study period, the evaluation team cannot conclude that GRP had a positive effect on student promotion rates at the target school.

While NMMS had a slightly higher drop out rate than JFKMS in the baseline period (2.2 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively), drop out rates at the two schools remained virtually unchanged over the study period. Differences between schools across the study years were evident, however, for truancy rates—the number of students absent more than 20 days in a school year. Several GRP efforts were expected to lower the truancy rates at the target area middle school, and the rate of truant students dropped accordingly at JFKMS, from eight percent in 2002-2003 to just over three percent in 2005-2006. While the truancy rates dropped at NMMS as well, from nearly 15 percent to nearly 14 percent, the change was much smaller than that experienced at JFKMS, where rates dropped approximately five percentage points. This finding indicates that GRP efforts may have had a positive effect on truancy rates at the target area school. If drops in the truancy rates continue at a faster rate in the target area than the comparison area, the argument for a positive GRP effect will be strengthened. These data will thus be tracked throughout the rest of the evaluation period.

Changes experienced at both schools in the suspension rates also point to a possible positive effect of GRP in the target area school. At JFKMS, rates of both indoor and outdoor suspensions were cut nearly in half over the study period, with outdoor suspensions dropping from 23 to 11 percent and indoor suspensions dropping from 30 percent to 16 percent. To confirm that the large drop in rates at JFKMS were not the result of an anomalous year, the evaluation team also examined rates prior to the 2002-2003 school year and for the 2004-2005 school year. While not shown in the table, the rates were consistently high, comparable to the 20-30 percent range observed in 2002-2003. The drop occurred over a one year period but additional, more recent data were not available at the time of the report to confirm that the rates stayed low after the initial drop in 2005-2006. Rates at NMMS did not follow the same clear pattern, with outdoor suspensions dropping slightly from 31.74 percent to 25.64 percent and indoor suspensions actually increasing dramatically, from 16.5 percent to 27 percent. Given the available data showing a drop in rates at JFK Middle School with a concurrent rise or slight drop at NMMS, the evaluation

team can tentatively conclude that GRP programming might have had a positive effect on suspension rates in the target area, with rates at the target school dropping dramatically over the study period. However, because the drop occurred during the last year of data, suspension rates will be followed through the end of the evaluation period to confirm that the rates remain low and to assess additional changes at the comparison school.

The evaluation team also examined perceptions of school climate on the part of parents,[9] staff, and students as measured through the school climate survey administered yearly by Miami-Dade County Public Schools. Comparing the perceptions of three different sets of respondents provides a more robust picture of safety at each school, but the low response rate among parents may bias those results.The evaluation team considered four questions that were the most relevant to the evaluation of GRP, asking whether the school climate was positive, gangs were a problem in the school, the school was safe and secure, and school violence was a problem at the school. Possible answers on a five point scale range from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree;' the percent that either 'Agreed' or 'Strongly Agreed' with each statement were used to assess the school climate at each school.

By the 2006-2007 school year, approximately 96 percent of staff members at JFKMS agreed that the school climate was positive, an increase of seven percentage points from the baseline year. Average responses among all staff in the district were lower and stable at just over 80 percent. Parents also responded positively to this question, with 85 percent agreeing that the school climate was positive in 2006-2007, an increase of 14 percentage points over the study period. Responses from parents at JFKMS were very similar to average district-wide responses to this question. Students were less positive, however, with only about half responding that the school climate was positive. Positive responses on this question decreased sharply in 2005-2006, but rebounded by the 2006-2007 school year to nearly the 2002-2003 level. Students at JFKMS responded similarly to the average district-wide response. At NMMS, responses across the three groups were markedly different than at JFKMS. Parent and student responses were similar at the two schools in the baseline period but percentages dropped over the entire study period, by six and 26 percentage points, respectively, while at JFKMS responses had increased or remained stable among these two groups. Positive responses among staff decreased by twelve percentage points at NMMS, while staff responses were increasingly positive at JFKMS. In addition, for all three groups, the percentages were lower than the district-wide average for nearly every year.

The remaining three questions examined by the evaluation team asked more specific questions about safety. Small percentages of staff at both schools felt that gangs were a problem, with the percentages decreasing over the study period. While the actual percentages were comparable to the those observed at the district level, the percentages actually represented a slight increase at the district level, indicating that some more localized change may have worked to lower perceptions of gang problems at the target and comparison area schools while schools district wide continued to experience increases in their perceived gang problems. Students at the two schools had very different perceptions of gang problems, with only 22 percent at JFKMS agreeing that gangs were a problem in 2006-2007, and the number staying relatively stable over the study period. On the other hand, 48 percent of students at NMMS agreed that gangs were a problem at their school,

[9]Parents were not asked all questions.

representing an increase of eight percentage points over the period. Students at JFKMS were closer to district-wide averages, where about a quarter of students felt that gangs were a problem at their schools. District numbers also remained stable across the study period.

While the majority of parents and staff at JFKMS agreed that the school climate was safe and secure at both schools, staff at both schools responded more positively than parents, and both groups responded more positively than those at NMMS. Changes over time among these groups at both schools was small and similar to the average district-wide responses. A smaller percentage of students at both schools felt that their school was safe and secure, with slightly more than half at both schools responding positively to this question. However, the percentage of positive responses among students increased over the study period at JFKMS while it decreased at NMMS. Finally, few staff members at JFKMS agreed that school violence was a problem at their school, and less than half of students at the school felt that violence was a problem. Dramatically higher percentages were observed for staff at NMMS, with half agreeing that school violence was a problem by 2006-2007. A greater percentage of students at NMMS than at JFK also agreed that school violence was a problem, with three-quarters agreeing by 2006-2007.

High School Level In the baseline period (2002-2003), North Miami Beach High School (NMBSHS)'s non-promotion rate, at 9.6 percent, was much lower than that for North Miami High School (NMSHS), 22.9 percent. These differences were similar to those observed at the middle school level. After GRP implementation began, both schools saw lowered non-promotion rates, with the rate at NMSHS (12.2 percent) falling more dramatically, but remaining higher than non-promotion at NMBSHS (6.4 percent). Because the data revealed an improvement in non-promotion rates at NMSHS, the evaluation team examined data for several years prior to the 2002-2003 school year. While not provided in Table 7.3, those additional years of data indicate that NMSHS experienced similar and relatively high non-promotion rates for two school years (2001-2002 and 2002-2003) while other years both prior and subsequent to that two year period were steady at just under 15 percent. At NMBSHS, additional years were also examined, revealing that the target area school had seen steady and declining non-promotion rates over the period 1999-2006, although the lowest rates were observed in the 2005-2006 school year. Because the rates in the target area school were dropping or steady over the period prior to the start of GRP, and because the rates at both the target and comparison schools dropped over the study period, the evaluation team cannot conclude that GRP had a positive effect on student promotion rates.

While NMBSHS had a slightly higher drop out rate than NMSHS in the baseline period (3.5 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively), drop out rates at the two schools increased slightly to nearly the same level—just over four percent, indicating little difference between the schools in terms of drop out rates. This was also observed at the middle school level. Differences between schools across the study years were also minor for truancy rates—the number of students absent more than 20 days in a school year. Several GRP efforts were expected to lower the truancy rates at the target area schools, but the rate of truant students increased at both study high schools. While the increase was small at both schools—about two percent at NMBSHS and six percent at NMSHS, this finding is a departure from the findings at the middle school level, where the target area middle school experienced a large drop in truancy rates while the comparison area school experienced only a very

slight change in rates. Thus while GRP may have had a positive effect at the middle school level, those same benefits were not observed at the high school level. There are several possible reasons for this difference. Many of the programs funded through the GRP are aimed at the middle school level, so effects among those students are expected to be greatest. In addition, it may be that programs and services were more successful in changing the behavior of middle school students than high school students, so that effects at the high school level may be delayed or too small to be observable.

Changes experienced at both schools in the suspension rates were again in contradiction to what was observed at the middle school level. At NMBSHS, rates of outdoor suspensions were cut nearly in half over the study period, dropping from 26 to 13 percent, while rates of indoor suspensions increased more than seven percentage points over the period, from 28 percent to 35 percent. To confirm that the large drop in outdoor suspension rates at NMBSHS was not the result of an anomalous year, the evaluation team also examined rates of both types of suspensions prior to the 2002-2003 school year and for the 2003-2004 school year. While not shown in the table, the rates of outdoor suspensions dropped steadily, from a high of over 40 percent in the 2000-2001 school year to a low of 13 percent in the 2005-2006 school year. Indoor suspension rates varied over the period, but averaged around 30 percent and did not show a clear increase or decrease.

Rates at NMSHS did not follow the same pattern; at that school, outdoor suspensions dropped slightly from 13 percent to 10 percent and indoor suspensions also decreased, from 7 percent to 2 percent. As with NMBSHS, the evaluation team examined data for additional years for NMSHS, finding that outdoor suspensions did not show a clear pattern of increase or decrease, and hovered around ten percent over the study period. Indoor suspensions followed a different pattern. In the 2000-2001 school year, the rate of indoor suspensions was nearly 40 percent, comparable to that observed at the target area school. However, by the 2002-2003 school year, rates had dropped to seven percent, and continued to drop over subsequent years. This dramatic one-year decrease may indicate a change in an administrative change in the use of indoor suspensions as disciplinary actions, resulting in fewer indoor suspensions but not necessarily fewer behavioral incidents. Again, because the decrease in outdoor suspensions at the target area school began prior to GRP's start, and because the comparison area experienced similar patterns of change in rates of suspensions, the evaluation team cannot conclude that any of the observed changes can be attributed to GRP.

School climate survey results were also examined at the high school level, revealing that safety concerns were more apparent at the high school level, and, as at the middle school level, that students had more negative opinions of their school than parents or staff. While the percentage of parents and students agreeing that the school climate was positive remained relatively steady over the study period (65 percent of parents and 45 percent of students) at NMBSHS, the percentage of staff members agreeing increased 25 percent over the period. At the same time, all three groups of respondents from NMSHS responding positively declined over the study period, and were lower than the average district results. Much lower percentages of staff and students at NMBSHS felt that gangs were a problem at that school than at NMSHS, where 44 percent of staff and 63 percent of students felt that gangs were a problem. While percentages remained relatively stable over the study period at NMBSHS, they increased rapidly at NMSHS. Similar patterns were observed among respondents regarding a safe and secure school environment. At NMBSHS,

percentages remained stable over the study period with smaller percentages of students responding positively than staff or parents. At NMSHS on the other hand, the percentages declined steadily and were lower for all three groups than the district averages. Finally, at NMBSHS, staff felt increasingly positive about school violence problems at their school while fewer students responded positively over the period. In addition, the student percentages were higher than the district average. Both staff and student percentages increased over the study period at NMSHS, with three-quarters of students agreeing that violence was a problem at their school in the 2006-2007 school year. These percentages were higher than those at NMBSHS as well.

Conclusion The data on attendance, suspensions, and perceptions of school climate revealed more positive changes at the middle school level than at the high school level, and violence and gangs were identified as problems more frequently at the high school level. At the middle school level, these results indicate that the three respondents have very different perceptions of safety at both schools, and that in general, parents, staff, and students at JFKMS felt more positively about their school, with positive responses generally increasing or remaining steady over the study period. At NMMS however, responses tended to become less positive over time, with fewer respondents reporting a positive school climate and safety and security over time, and more reporting gang and school violence problems. In addition, parents, staff, and students at NMBSHS were generally more positive about safety in their school than those at NMSHS. The survey also reveals marked differences between students and either staff or parents, with students generally responding more negatively about safety at their school. This may indicate that either students are more sensitive to safety issues (i.e., students are more strongly affected by any type of safety issue—even minor ones— than adults, which affects their perceptions of safety), that students are more intimately involved in incidents at the school and may thus be more aware of the extent to which safety is an issue at the school than other adults, or that students are systematically more negative than adults in terms of their perceptions of safety. While the results do not allow these suggestions to be fully explored, they do indicate that some important changes occurred at the middle school level after the 2005-2006 school year, considered for evaluation purposes to be the GRP intervention year. After that year, the target and comparison area schools diverged in perceptions of safety, with respondents from JFKMS generally reporting more positive perceptions. This lends weight to the hypothesis that GRP may have had a positive effect on safety at the school level in North Miami Beach. Because changes were observed over one year only, however, survey results will be examined for subsequent years during the evaluation period to determine whether these trends continue.

At the high school level, however, a different picture of school safety emerged. Truancy rates indicated that programs targeted at high school students may not have been very successful. On the survey, the percentages for most respondents on most questions remained stable at NMBSHS over the study period while safety became more of an issue at NMSHS over the same period. It may be the case that GRP contributed to safety at the target area high school by holding gang and violent activity at a stable level, and preventing safety issues from escalating, while external forces may have contributed to increasing gang and violence issues at the comparison area school. These conclusions, however, should be read with caution. Given the nature of the data and the intervention, and the small number of

overall clients reached by each program, it is difficult to make assertions that changes in the school community can be related to the GRP programs. Efforts to obtain more detailed school level data will be continued through the end of the evaluation period.

7.6.3. Juvenile Justice

The overall goal of the GRP initiative was to impact the level of gang crime in the target area, with a specific focus on juvenile delinquency, gang membership, and prevention. To that end, many of the services funded by or developed under the North Miami Beach GRP were aimed specifically at the juvenile population. The intervention team and the reentry services developed under GRP work with youth who have often been adjudicated in some fashion to help them remain out of the criminal justice system. In addition, suppression efforts were targeted at juveniles in the target area. For these reasons, the evaluation team obtained information from the Miami-Dade County JSD. The evaluation team did not pursue data on adult supervision because the vast majority of those served by the PanZOu project were youth under the age of 18.

The JSD is a Miami-Dade County entity that conducts intakes and assessments of juveniles arrested in the county. The JSD collects detailed data on offenses (both current and prior), demographics, and sentence histories for all juveniles referred to the juvenile justice system by any police agency in Miami-Dade County. If a juvenile is adjudicated and placed on probation or is sentenced to jail and/or prison and then released, the information is maintained by the DJJ in a state-level database known as the Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS). The JJIS includes information on all referrals to the Miami-Dade County juvenile justice system for the past several years. When a juvenile is taken into custody by any law enforcement agency—whether arrested, cited, or otherwise—the youth is referred to the JSD. The name of the law enforcement agency making the referral is recorded in JJIS. Cases that are diverted prior to referral are not recorded in JJIS. Diverted cases typically involve youths who are first-time offenders accused of non-violent misdemeanors.

Measures The evaluation team collected data from DJJ's JJIS, including all referrals of youths residing in ZIP codes covering North Miami Beach and North Miami.[10] Information was collected on all juveniles who were entered into the JJIS from January 1, 2002 through March 31, 2007 and included type of offense, probation and/or parole details, infraction information, and criminal history. The evaluation team also obtained nationality information from JJIS, valuable data that was not included in other collected police data. The nationality data provided the evaluation team with the opportunity to examine Haitian offenses specifically.

The evaluation team examined three main outcome measures based on the DJJ's juvenile referral data for this portion of the assessment that covered the period January 2002 through March 2007.

- Referrals of Haitian youths by NMBPD;
- Referrals of non-Haitian youths by NMBPD; and

[10] ZIP codes used to identify individuals from North Miami Beach include 33160, 33162, 33169, 33179 and from North Miami include 33161, 33167, 33168, 33181. The geographical extent of these ZIP codes is provided in Figure 7.1.

- Referrals of Haitian youths by other law enforcement agencies including, primarily, the Miami-Dade County Police Department and NMPD.

The evaluation team developed three time series models, one for each outcome measure outlined above. Suppression and intervention efforts for GRP began in the summer of 2005, when the NMBPD began foot and bike patrols, as well as the PET program. Based on this timeline of implementation, the evaluation team considered intervention points between June and November 2005.

Hypotheses Based on the PanZOu strategic plan, knowledge about program activities, and the implementation timeline, the evaluation team expected to observe several changes in the monthly totals of juvenile referrals. With NMBPD suppression activities apparently focused on Haitian youth gangs, a more short-term increase in the number of referrals of Haitian youths relative to referrals of both non-Haitian youths by NMBPD and of Haitian youths in the comparison area by other agencies, namely the NMPD and the Miami-Dade County Police Department, was expected. In the longer term, a decrease in the number of referrals by NMBPD of Haitian youths, as crime, and gang crime in particular, decrease with continued suppression activities under GRP was expected. While such a pattern—a short-term increase followed by a longer-term decrease in referrals—cannot be identified as part of the time series modeling presented below, which considers shifts in the monthly number of referrals at only one point, the possibility of a long-term decrease is explored through an examination of the monthly data through March 2007.

Results The methodology for the outcome analysis is explained greater detail in Appendix K, and additional information about the models estimated as part of the North Miami Beach outcome analysis may be found in Table K.3. The findings and inferences are summarized here and in Table 7.5, which appears below in Section 7.6.4. The time series models developed provide weak support for the hypothesis that the NMBPD did increase its juvenile Haitian referrals *relative to* referrals by other agencies. The time series models revealed a significant decrease in the number of juvenile Haitian referrals by other agencies by nearly 14 referrals per month beginning in November 2005, while no significant changes in NMBPD's referrals of either Haitian or non-Haitian juveniles occurred. While it is unclear why this decrease in referrals among other agencies occurred, if the decrease was the result of an external change or force that all agencies, including NMBPD, were subject to, the evaluation team can conclude that there is some evidence that GRP may have worked to at least maintain the level of juvenile Haitian referrals made monthly by NMBPD at the start of the suppression activities. Because the actual cause behind the decline among other agencies is unknown, however, the evaluation team is unable to attribute the results to GRP.

To more fully explore the hypothesis that a long-term decrease in referrals by NMBPD would occur, the evaluation team also compared the monthly number of juvenile Haitian referrals between January 2002 and March 2007 for NMBPD (Figure 7.14) and all other agencies (Figure 7.15). These data reveal that for both NMBPD and for all other agencies, the number of referrals actually fluctuated from month to month with no clear upward or downward trend over the study period. Referrals by NMBPD peaked at 19 in November 2002 and reached their lowest, two referrals, in November 2003. However, referrals had increased to 16 by March 2007, and were also as low as two at several other points

Figure 7.14: Referrals of Juvenile Haitians by NMBPD by Month, January 2002–May 2007



Figure 7.15: Referrals of Juvenile Haitians by Agencies other than NMBPD by Month, January 2002–May 2007

throughout the study period. In addition, after April 2006, the monthly referrals follow a steady upward pattern through the end of the study period. The data for all other agencies displays a similarly fluctuating trend, although the increases and decreases do not occur at the same time as for the NMBPD. For all other agencies, referrals hit a maximum of 108 in September 2005 and a minimum of 27 in June 2006. Other months saw totals near the maximum of 108 or minimum of 27, and for these other agencies, no clear upward or downward trend is discernible. These data suggest that the hypothesized long term decrease in juvenile referrals was not realized over the study period in North Miami Beach. These referral data will be examined through the end of the evaluation period to determine whether the upward trend in NMBPD's juvenile Haitian referrals that started in April 2006 continued beyond March 2007, and to determine whether an expected decrease in such referrals is observed before the end of the evaluation period.

Conclusion The lack of an increase in referrals by NMBPD could have been the result of several factors. First, suppression activities conducted by the NMBPD were largely focused on information gathering early in the intervention period and also on increasing police presence in selected areas to prevent criminal activity. It could be that this focus on "intelligence gathering" methods, as opposed to purely suppressive methods, contributed to the lack of change in referrals by NMBPD. Second, the period examined by UI took as an intervention point the start of suppression activities in summer 2005. However, one year later, the NMBPD's efforts were restructured in an attempt to increase their effectiveness. The new gang unit took over responsibility for the majority of the suppression services, including foot and bike patrols. It is possible that any significant changes in referrals actually took place in response to the suppression activities conducted by the gang unit beginning in summer 2006. To accommodate this possibility, UI will examine other plausible intervention points in the time series during the next period of evaluation.

It may also be that the level of NMBPD's suppression activities focused on Haitian juveniles did increase but that the increase in police activity was counteracted by an external, regional change that worked to suppress the level of referrals made by the NMBPD. If such an external, regional change did occur, it had the effect of decreasing referrals in locations where GRP was not operating, and holding steady referrals where

it was operating (i.e., North Miami Beach). While such a hypotheses cannot be tested given the current data, this possibility will be explored more thoroughly as the evaluation continues. Finally, it may be that because the target area is relatively large, and increased suppression services were in practice limited to selected areas of higher crime (e.g., Uleta Park and Victory Park), it may be that increases in referrals from those areas did actually increase as expected, but that the increase was masked by steady or decreasing levels of such referrals in the rest of the city. Because the available data provide only the ZIP code of referred juveniles' last known address, the evaluation team is unable to consider whether changes on a smaller geographic scale are taking place. These conclusions should be read with caution as the findings relate only to juveniles referred to the JSD and whose last known address was within selected North Miami Beach or North Miami ZIP codes. Though the hypotheses were not supported at this point in the evaluation, these issues will be examined as the evaluation continues.

7.6.4. Crime

The outcomes most central to the evaluation of GRP relate to crime, particularly whether gang-related crime has declined in terms of quantity and seriousness during the GRP implementation. The evaluation team established a relationship with NMBPD to acquire reported crime incidents, arrests, and calls for service records for all offense types within the City of North Miami Beach. To ensure a comprehensive record of gang incidents, UI also initiated an audit of all incidents to identify those that were gang-related and what gang or gangs were involved, although the gang-related data suffer from several issues, discussed below. UI collected this information for the two years preceding GRP's introduction through 2006. This allowed the team to conduct a baseline analysis of crime and to measure changes in crime trends over the course of program implementation. UI conducted time-series analyses of all incidents and gang-related incidents to provide evidence regarding the changes in volume and seriousness of criminal activity in the target area.

As discussed in Section 7.1, using the entire city of North Miami Beach as the target area has complicated the evaluation, designed to analyze data in selected comparison and displacement areas to strengthen findings on the effects of GRP in the target area. Collecting data from appropriate comparison and displacement areas has proven difficult. UI regards the nearby city of North Miami as the best comparison area for the North Miami Beach GRP. The evaluation team approached the NMPD to explore the possibility of obtaining crime data for that area. Unfortunately, the NMPD incident information is stored in a data system from which data cannot be extracted for secondary analysis. While the evaluation team was able to collect arrest data from the MCJIS, a county-wide data system that contains information on all arrests made in Miami-Dade County, UI was unable to obtain such data for a period covering the entire implementation period. Therefore, no analyses on the comparison area were conducted at this stage in the evaluation.

Similar difficulties existed in identifying a data source that would allow an analysis of any crime displacement that could have occurred due to GRP efforts. NMBPD indicated to the evaluation team that, if displaced, crime would most likely move to North Miami or to Little Haiti. A source for appropriate data covering these areas over the evaluation period were not identified. The evaluation team did consider the movement of crime within North Miami Beach, however, from the identified hotspots of Victory Park and Uleta Park

(both receiving higher levels of suppression activities under GRP than other areas of the city) to other locations within the city. It should be noted though, that there were other crime-reduction efforts occurring within North Miami Beach (e.g., an active Weed and Seed site located a few blocks from the GRP hot spot neighborhoods), which complicated attempts to attribute changes in outcomes to GRP.

The ultimate goal of the GRP was to reduce gang-related crime in the target area. Part of the evaluation team's mandate was to assemble evidence to address whether that goal was met and, if so, to estimate how many gang crimes may have been averted by GRP activities. As this is only an interim report and the evaluation is ongoing, UI can report only what has been inferred about the effect of GRP from the evidence assembled so far, which includes implementation information and crime trends—both over time and spatially.

Measures

The evaluation team examined three crime-related outcome measures for this portion of the assessment and examined each of these measures for the entire city and within the to baseline-identified hot spot neighborhoods, Uleta Park and Victory Park. Those measures include:

Calls for service, possibly gang-related Calls to emergency dispatchers for shootings, shots fired, criminal mischief, and assaults or fights in progress. These types of calls are sometimes related to gang activity and are used here as a proxy for such activity.

Incidents, serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.

Incidents, gang-related Police incident reports identified by the gang audit as being gang-related.

The three measures were developed from data provided by the NMBPD. For each measure, the evaluation team developed one monthly time series. Calls for service data covered the period January 2002–May 2007, serious violent incidents covered the period January 2002–March 2007, and gang-related incidents covered the period January 2002–December 2006.

The rationale for selecting these measures for outcome analysis weighed several factors including the higher costs to society posed by serious violent crimes, concern that the completeness of police reporting of less serious crimes may be sensitive to the volume of more serious incidents occurring at the same time, and recognition that GRP may have increased the sophistication and completeness of police gang intelligence and, thereby, may have affected the number of incidents categorized as gang-related. Of the measures, the number of gang-related incidents is the most direct measure of the category of crimes expected to be suppressed by GRP activities. That measure was not examined alone, however, because of a concern that an increase in the sophistication of police gang intelligence might cause a shift in the number of incidents *identified* as gang-related even if the actual number of gang-related incidents remained unchanged. Measures of serious violence were examined because they are especially costly to society and because they are reported and recorded

more consistently and completely than most types of less serious offenses. Finally, the data on calls for police service were included in the analysis to have a measure that is not directly affected by changes in police department reporting practices. This choice comes with the recognition that the willingness of citizens to call the police is partially a function of citizens' expectations about how the police will respond. For example, in the midst of a publicized increase in police activity, citizens may begin to report less serious offenses. Such a change in reporting behavior may mask or offset any decrease in actual criminal offending brought about by the concentration of police resources.

Due to a series of misunderstandings that the evaluation team identified much later in the course of the evaluation, the North Miami Beach gang audit, which is the only available source of data on gang crime in the target area, has not yielded a uniform time series of gang crime. The audit has been completed for three time periods: (1) 2002-2003, (2) 2004, (3) 2005-2006. The 2002-2003 gang audit included only activity associated with Haitian gangs, which are the focus of GRP activity in that site. UI was not aware that only Haitian gangs were identified under that audit until some months after UI began processing and reporting on those data. Upon discovery of the fact, UI requested that the site include both Haitian and non-Haitian gang activity in the 2004 audit. The gang unit complied with this request and provided enough information to allow UI to distinguish Haitian and non-Haitian gang audit records in the 2004 audit. At that point, the evaluation team was confident in the accuracy of the gang data, but discovered that information required to link the gang audit records with the NMBPD incident data had not been provided by NMBPD. Moreover, the process used in the 2002-2003 and 2004 gang audits required the auditors to transcribe a significant amount of data from the NMBPD incident data records to the gang audit data that was provided to UI. This would have been unnecessary if the data allowed a join between gang audit records and NMBPD incident data. Prior to the start of the 2005 gang audit, the evaluation team contacted the NMBPD and requested that the gang unit restructure its audit procedures by recording only the incident ID number, needed to link each gang incident to the NMBPD incident data, and the name of the gang(s) involved. UI hoped this would allow them to complete the audit more efficiently while at the same time yielding a richer dataset for use in the evaluation. Instead, with the additional ability to link gang incidents to the NMBPD incident records, the evaluation team discovered that unlike the audits in the other sites, the NMBPD gang audit had included arrests, traffic citations, and field interviews. Closer inspection of data from the two previous audits revealed that the site had followed this process of identifying all gang related events—not limited to incidents alone—for all gang audits. The NMBPD gang audit data, then, are much broader in scope than audits in other sites and include a considerable number of non-criminal events. In general, based on UI's present understanding, the North Miami Beach gang audit data provides a reasonably good measure of the number of contacts between NMBPD and known gang members over time but a rather poor measure of gang crime in the city.

Figure 7.16 provides the timeline of events in the development and implementation of the North Miami Beach GRP that was provided above in Section 7.3 with the addition of monthly time series of selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial patterns of serious violent incidents in the study areas. This figure reveals the relationship of organizational and implementation events to changes in levels of crime.

Figure 7.16: North Miami Beach Timeline



City: Serious violent incidents
Uleta Park: Serious violent incidents
Victory Park: Serious violent incidents
City: Serious violent gang incidents
2006
2007
2008
2009
PanZOu logo created and revealed;
RFP, scope of service issues delay Transitions Inc's on- the-job (OJT) training program;
Hip Hop Conference held
Awards banquet for PanZOu youths held
PanZOu hires intervention specialist, outreach worker; Strengthening Families expanded to UP, WP, and VP
PanZOu hires Prevention Specialist; PanZOu reallocates City Parks and Rec funds
Sustainability discussions with DJJ and JAC; Mini gang unit begins foot patrol in VP; Resource center in VP installed; CIS and City's NSD awarded funds for Early Literacy Program
Gang unit renewed and expanded; Bike patrols discontinued, funds allocated to foot patrols
Sustainability discussions with DJJ and JAC; GUESS program offers full-time therapist; Transitions, Inc. awarded funds for reentry services; Performing Arts workshop held; GRP Staff conducts life skills program
Sustainability discussions continue; PanZOu staff receive raises
Children's Trust gives grant to CIS, PanZOu plans similar program; Reentry program revamps eligibility
VP Resource Center opens
PanZOu looks for more space within building for youths to gather; Resource Center grand opening
Awards ceremony for PanZOu youths held
PanZOu looks for partners for program similar to Children's Trust's VIP; Substance abuse and mentoring grants have issues with DJJ; Reentry faces continued eligibility issues
Greater Miami Neighborhoods offering extra space to PanZOu for reduced rent; VIP grant begins Feb 1; Reentry services grant revised to address eligibility issues; PanZOu introduces new outreach workers
PanZOu incorporates; no longer under purview of state fiscal agent
DIVAs continues; Mini gang unit takes over foot patrols
Strengthening Families program offered
Boxing program offered
Four community workshops offered
Midnight Basketball offered
Boxing program offered
OJT program offered
OJT program offered
Staff promote PanZOu on Haitian Radio
Transitions, Inc. given grant to provide reentry services but has issues with access; eligibility
PET, ASP continue
Early Literacy summer camps held
During school year, PET conducted (starts Oct), ASP, Early Literacy programs offered

Figure 7.17: North Miami Beach: Calls for Service Possibly Gang-Related, January 2002–May 2007



The relationship between organizational events and crime levels is explored in more detail through descriptive analysis of the monthly trends in selected crime measures and the spatial patterns of crime in the study areas, followed by more sophisticated inferential modeling of crime trends to look for statistically significant changes in monthly levels of different crime measures that may have been the result of GRP's efforts.

Descriptive Analysis

Figures 7.17–7.19 provide linear trends in crime measures for just over five study years (2002–2006/2007), while Figure 7.20 provides larger versions of the same maps included on the timeline. The dotted lines in each figure represent the overall trend in each measure throughout the evaluation period. It should also be noted that due to the difficulty in obtaining data for a comparison or displacement area for the North Miami Beach GRP area, the line graphs presented below provide trends for the target area proper—the entire city of North Miami Beach—and for two smaller areas within the city that have been identified as hot spots and have received additional focus under GRP: Uleta Park and Victory Park.

Figure 7.17 provides the monthly counts of calls for service that are possibly gang-related. The level of these types of calls for service varies a great deal from month to month, but the average level over the entire evaluation period changed only slightly, in an upward direction. The trends observed for Uleta and Victory Parks echoed those for the city as a whole, although those areas both experienced very slight decreases in these types of calls over the study period. Figure 7.18 provides the monthly counts of serious violent incidents. As was observed with the possibly gang-related calls for service, these

Figure 7.18: North Miami Beach: Serious Violent Incidents, January 2002–March 2007



Figure 7.19: North Miami Beach: Gang-related Incidents, January 2002–December 2006



incidents showed a relatively large fluctuation from month to month over the evaluation period. In the city as a whole, the average level increased slightly, while in Uleta and Victory Parks, a slight decline was observed. Finally, Figure 7.19 provides the trend in gang-related incidents over the study period. Because of known issues with the gang audit in North Miami Beach, discussed above, the upward-moving trend lines for gang incidents are considered misleading, with only Haitian gang crimes represented in the 2002-2003 period and all NMBPD contact with gang members represented in later period. Therefore, the upward trend observed in the city as a whole and the steady trend in both Uleta and Victory Parks can be considered an artifact of the changing process used to conduct the gang audit in North Miami Beach. After 2003, the graph does reveal a fairly steady average level of gang activity (even while monthly counts varied a great deal).

Finally, the maps in Figure 7.20 provide the spatial patterns of serious violent crime in three North Miami Beach areas (North Miami Beach, Uleta Park, and Victory Park) for the period January–June in four years: one baseline year (2002) and three during implementation (2004, 2005, 2006). The maps confirm hot spots in Uleta and Victory Parks although they also suggest other areas with dense levels of serious violent crime, supporting implementation of the GRP across the city instead of in a small target area within the city. Over time, the maps do not show much change within the Uleta and Victory Park hotspots, with densities there remaining strong relative to the rest of the city. Because of the gang audit issues, the 2002 map should not be compared on gang crime to the other three maps. However, the number of gang crimes appears to drop dramatically between 2004-2005, then jump back up again in 2006, especially in the Victory Park area. In general, however, very little change is observed in the levels and in the spatial patterns of serious violent incidents across the study period.

Overall, these graphs and maps indicate that the GRP effort in North Miami Beach may have had very little effect on the level of different crime measures over the study period. While the time series analysis below will be used to identify any significant changes that can be attributed to the GRP initiative, given the findings from the descriptive analysis, it is unlikely that GRP had a significant effect on crime in the city.

Time Series Analysis

A visual examination of time series data, as presented above, can provide insight into some features of the data (e.g., whether the series level increased or decreased over time), but other features of the time series (e.g., seasonal fluctuations, autocorrelation) may not be apparent from visual inspection alone. The evaluation thus includes inferential statistical modeling to account for those subtler features and to further understanding of whether and how the crime measures changed over time. At this point in the evaluation period, UI expects that the suppression component of GRP has likely exerted the most significant measurable effect on gang-related crime. The prevention components, which largely began in 2005, have focused on serving youth in middle and high school. The effects of such activities on crime are generally not immediately observable; the effects of prevention activities are more long-term in nature and observable as youth mature through middle adolescence. The intervention and reentry components did not begin service delivery in earnest until early 2006, after an intervention specialist and outreach worker were hired.



Figure 7.20: Density of serious violence, North Miami Beach GRP areas, 2002-2006

Hypotheses The hypothesis was that the initiation of increased suppression activities in the target area would lead to a reduction in the mean level of each of the measures in the target area. The GRP suppression-related activities officially began in June 2005, and some delay before the increased patrols were fully operational and their effects became manifest was expected. To accommodate this lag, each time series was examined for a shift in mean in each month from June 2005 through November 2005, inclusive. The analysis examined the three time series outlined above for three areas: the entire target area, Victory Park, and Uleta Park. Examination of the Victory Park and Uleta Park hot spots within the target area was undertaken both because police activity conducted as part of GRP was focused in those areas and to discern changes that may have occurred at a smaller scale and may have been masked by the overall trends in the city as a whole. There were too few gang-related incidents in Uleta Park over the time period, preventing the development of a gang-related incidents time series model for that area. The time series were examined for shifts in the mean that occurred during the hypothesized intervention period and could have been the result of GRP efforts.

Results The methodology for the outcome analysis is explained greater detail in Appendix K, and additional information about the models estimated as part of the North Miami Beach outcome analysis may be found in Table K.3. Findings and inferences are summarized here and in Table 7.5. Overall, the data were found to be inconsistent with the stated hypotheses. There were no significant changes in serious violent incidents observed in the target area (the entire city) or the hot spots (Uleta Park and Victory Park). In addition there were no significant changes in gang incidents observed in the target area or Victory Park.

The analysis shows that for the target area—the entire city of North Miami Beach—the mean number of possibly gang-related calls, serious violent incidents, and gang-related incidents were unchanged over the study period. When the focus was narrowed to calls and criminal incidents in the neighborhoods of Victory Park and Uleta Park, the models pointed to the same substantive conclusion: the number of calls and incidents did not increase or decrease by a detectible amount in response to the NMBPD suppression activities during the study period so far.

Conclusion The interim analysis of the effect of the suppression component of North Miami Beach's GRP program found no evidence that the program yielded reductions in citizen reports of crimes (calls for service that may have been gang-related), gang-related incidents, or serious violent incidents. At least three possible explanations exist for these null findings. First, the documented issues with the measurement of gang crime in North Miami Beach complicated the time series analysis of gang-related incidents. In addition to providing UI with data from three gang audits that used different criteria or different audit processes, the data also revealed an overall small number of gang crimes both in the city as a whole and in the two identified hot spots. In fact, in Uleta Park, the monthly numbers of gang crimes were so small as to preclude analysis. The low level of gang activity observed in North Miami Beach made the null finding more likely: an intensive period of suppression activity would be required to create a statistically significant reduction in a type of event (e.g., gang crime) that is already rare. The reason is that event counts (e.g., the number of calls, the number of incidents) are censored at

Table 7.5: North Miami Beach: Estimates of Intervention Effects

	Study Area		
Study Area	Entire City	Uleta Park	Victory Park
Calls, possibly gang-related[a]	5.47 (7.32) 10/2005	1.52 (1.58) 10/2005	−0.77 (1.71) 06/2005
Incidents, serious violence	2.07 (2.15) 07/2005	−0.46 (0.64) 11/2005	−0.96 (1.06) 08/2005
Incidents, gang-related	1.49 (2.74) 07/2005	†	−1.58 (1.34) 09/2005
	Agency (Ethnicity of Juvenile)		
	NMBPD (Haitian)	NMBPD (Non-Haitian)	Other[b] (Haitian)
Juvenile referrals[c]	−1.06 (1.16) 11/2005	−1.82 (1.94) 08/2005	−13.76 (7.16)* 11/2005

Notes:
- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 05/2007 (calls), 03/2007 (serious violent incidents, juvenile referrals), or 12/2006 (gang-related incidents).
- We considered intervention points from 06/2005–11/2005.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.
- The date of the observed intervention effect appears beneath each coefficient.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.
** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.
† Too few incidents to support analysis.
[a] Includes calls for shootings, shots fired, criminal mischief, assaults/fights in progress.
[b] Most of these referrals were made by the North Miami Police Department and Miami-Dade County Police Department.
[c] Restricted to referrals of juveniles whose last known (to DJJ) residential address was in a North Miami Beach or North Miami ZIP code.

zero; it is not possible to record fewer than zero events in a period of time. The censoring represents a floor below which the outcome cannot fall. When the outcome is rare, an intervention that reduced the outcome by a great deal in percentage terms (e.g., by 50 percent) may only prevent two or three events per period. A shift of two or three events may not reach statistical significance. Moreover, the suppression efforts funded under GRP were likely not extensive enough to create a large (in percentage terms) reduction during the intervention period. The original bike and foot patrols, introduced in 2005, were not as extensive or consistent as GRP management had hoped, partially because of the way they were staffed and managed within NMBPD. The NMBPD gang unit eventually took over responsibility for these efforts in 2006, leading to more extensive patrols and more consistency in terms of officers assigned to the patrols. As the evaluation continues, we will estimate additional models that specify the period in 2006 when the gang unit took over the patrols as the intervention point. Finally, the suppression-based activities developed under the GRP model in North Miami Beach were such that they may not have introduced an actual shift in crime, especially in the short-term. Most activities introduced by the steering committee were community-based, prevention-oriented activities, intended to increase gang-related intelligence and communication between the police department and community members. Such efforts may have limited any possible short-term direct

effects on crime. As the evaluation continues, however, UI will continue to monitor these measures for the hypothesized changes, considering a longer-term horizon during which changes may occur.

7.7. SUSTAINABILITY

Sustaining the GRP initiative beyond the scope of the OJJDP grant was one of the predominant goals defined by OJJDP at the beginning of the grant period. The steering committee was tasked with determining how the project would be sustained after grant funding ended. To help in this arena, technical assistance, in the form of meetings to discuss sustainability, were held by CIS near the end of Phase II. CIS worked on many projects that were required to find new sources of funding when the grant funding ended, and held a workshop with the GRP steering committee to begin discussing these plans.

The GRP grant was originally set to terminate in September 2007, however because of delays in approval of the strategic plan within OJJDP, delays in processing the grant funding within the DJJ, delays in processing RFPs and contracts, and other unforeseen bureaucratic delays, the North Miami Beach GRP received a no-cost extension through September 2008.

In January 2007, the steering committee recognized two options for sustaining the PanZOu staff and programs beyond the termination of the OJJDP grant. The first option was to remain under the authority of the state through the DJJ. This would require PanZOu to submit an Legislative Budget Request (LBR) to the State of Florida reviewing the successful record of the program and to request funding for the remaining part of 2008 (after September 2007). Then, during the next fiscal year, 2008-2009, the program would have to submit another budget request. The state was unable to guarantee the LBR would be approved. In addition, GRP would have to submit two different LBRs: one to provide funding for GRP personnel—maintaining existing staffing arrangements; and a second to provide funding for selected GRP programs.

A second option was proposed by the Miami-Dade County JSD. The County proposed to acquire authority over the program and commit to sustaining it financially for at least 18 months. The JSD proposal would maintain the existing program structure, including staffing arrangements and the steering committee as they were currently operating, but the proposal called for an expansion of services to areas outside of North Miami Beach. The County planned to fund GRP with funds earmarked for a non-violence program run through JSD. If the County were to take over authority for GRP, existing staff members would have to re-apply for their current positions, but would only have to meet the minimum requirements of employment through the county to maintain their positions on the GRP staff. Once hired by the County, the staff would receive benefits as defined by the County; GRP staff members did not receive benefits under the state fiscal agent. While GRP-funded programs would receive funding that had already been promised to them, those programs would need to secure future funds themselves. Based on its consideration of the two options available—state or county takeover—the committee voted unanimously during the January 2007 meeting to move under the auspices of the county.

Several issues arose as the date of the county takeover neared. Prior to the transfer to the county fiscal agent, the state announced a budget deficit that would require significant funding cuts (Fineout, 2007); this budget deficit was soon shifted down to the county level.

In addition, this occurred after the state's budget requests had been submitted. The county was put under a hiring freeze in 2007 and would have been unable to hire the then-current GRP staff. This left the PanZOu staff scrambling to determine a new course of action.

On Aug 8, 2007, the steering committee voted to incorporate PanZOu as a non-profit and the program was incorporated as such on September 7, 2007. GRP management then worked with the state fiscal agent to transfer the remaining grant funds to the program. The state was unable, however, to transfer the budget directly to the PanZOu program, so the program facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the state and the City of North Miami Beach, allowing the transfer of the remaining grant funds to the City of North Miami Beach, who would act as PanZOu's new fiscal agent. The PanZOu program then entered into an MOU with the city to distribute the GRP funds to the new non-profit PanZOu organization. The shift to an incorporated organization required a restructuring of the budget and staff, but because several programs had never been developed, there were funds remaining in the budget that allowed PanZOu to fund program staff and start providing benefits to employees.

In terms of sustainability of programs funded by GRP, efforts to integrate alternate funding sources into the federal funding stream continued throughout much of the GRP program. Committee members reported through the survey that the GRP leadership worked to expand resources through new or existing funding sources (84 percent in Wave I to 94 percent in Wave II) and felt that the GRP leadership had engaged in ongoing dialogue directed at institutionalizing the GRP strategy (72 percent in Wave I to 89 percent in Wave II). For example, CIS agreed to match the money GRP provides to the ASP program. The steering committee has taken steps to sustain programs by working on a holistic approach, including looking for grants and volunteers and working with community agencies who may be able to contribute to the sustainability of specific programs. The sustainability of some GRP programming will depend on how much the city can absorb financially, but sustainability plans in place for specific programs are discussed below.

CIS of Miami provides ASP and the Early Literacy Program. The organization employs a full-time grant writer, funded by CIS National, to pursue funding for these types of programs. For example, CIS of Miami is recognized by the Florida Department of Education as a Supplemental Education Service, enabling the organization to expand its literacy program to under-performing schools in low-income neighborhoods. In addition, CIS of Miami received a grant through the Children's Trust, which provides funding for early literacy efforts. North Miami Beach has been included as one of three sites for these services. Finally, for ASP, CIS has pursued a partnership with AGAPE Family Ministries in Florida, licensed by the State of Florida Department of Children and Families to provide substance abuse and mental health services to adults and children. Such a partnership would support continued case management for participants through ASP. CIS pursued other grant opportunities to sustain ASP as well.

The City of North Miami Beach Neighborhood Services Department manages the Strengthening Families Program (ENSEM) and the Victory Park Resource Center. The city identified funding streams that may be used to maintain these programs, including The Children's Trust, the Community Redevelopment Agency, Block Grants, and Urban Park and Recreation Recovery money. In addition, the city planned to pursue funding from additional federal, state, and local governments, and from private organizations to continue program efforts beyond grant funding.

The NMBPD received GRP funding for the PET program, the foot patrol, the gang unit, intelligence and investigation efforts, and a database update that was outlined in the strategic plan. GRP discussions with NMBPD led to the city's decision that all five efforts assisted the City of North Miami Beach and were worth continuing beyond the end of the federal grant in September 2008. To that end, one officer was made responsible for seeking out additional grant funding, including possible government sources of funding. The Chief of Police also stated her commitment to sustaining these NMBPD pieces. Though no money was guaranteed for these programs at the time of this report, the commitment to sustain them was affirmed.

Finally, Transitions, Inc. was funded to manage the on-the-job training program and the reentry program. The company expressed its intent to continue to provide employment placement services beyond September 2008 with funding from South Florida Workforce. However, Transitions, Inc. felt it would not be able to maintain the therapeutic and life skills training portions of its programs without additional funding, and said that while it would attempt to locate future funding for these program components, it could not guarantee their continuation.

Beyond program and service funding, many steering committee members believed the relationships and partnerships formed by GRP would also be sustained after GRP funding ended. Many respondents felt that the relationships between the different levels of law enforcement would continue, especially because new protocols had been developed for various types of initiatives under GRP. Other committee members felt the network of partners would remain after funding ended. One member suggested that although some partners may initially have come to the table to obtain money for their own programs and activities, those remaining members really cared about the initiative and its impact on the community.

Several respondents also spoke of their belief that GRP was something the community needed and of their hope that the program would branch into other communities. All survey respondents in North Miami Beach felt that GRP had established a visible presence and identity in the community, contributing to its stability and sustainability in the community. Many respondents felt that even without the grant, they would remain involved with the steering committee and in fact, the committee has voted to continue its oversight of the program after becoming a non-profit.

Sustainability was a high priority for GRP management, partners, and committee members in 2007, a fact reflected in the partnership survey. An increasing proportion of respondents felt that sustainability was a priority for the initiative (84 percent in 2006 and 94 percent in 2007) and all respondents reported that GRP had a plan for sustainability. A high level of buy-in among community residents and GRP partners has also contributed significantly to the sustainability of PanZOu. Every committee meeting included a discussion and update of program sustainability. Despite upheavals at the state and county level and budget problems that plagued its initial plans for sustainability, the site was able to create and execute a plan to ensure the existence of the project beyond the federal funding period. The site's success in managing its own budget, maintaining program oversight through the steering committee, garnering additional funding to sustain GRP programs, and maintaining a highly collaborative partnership will be monitored throughout the end of the evaluation period.

7.8. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

7.8.1. Structure and Management

One of the strengths of the North Miami Beach GRP has been its organizational capacity and leadership. The program coordinator by all accounts excelled in her role as leader, and was able to bring together a diverse yet collaborative and cooperative group of partners who worked to ensure full implementation of the GRP model. The strong leadership doubtless prevented much conflict from arising and paved the way for a relatively smooth strategic planning and implementation process, at least in terms of planning, decision making, and collaborative management.

While the strategic planning process was relatively smooth in North Miami Beach, the committee has faced some difficulties since the initiative began, revolving mainly around the definition of roles for the various management elements. These difficulties arguably started with the self-affirmed ownership of the program by the NMBPD. Several steering committee members reported their perceptions that the NMBPD was trying to control the GRP effort, including subverting the decision making process regarding funding. This perception seemed to fade with time however, especially after GRP offices were moved from the NMBPD station.

Also unclear early on was the role of the steering committee in final financial and programmatic decisions. Some members appeared to believe the committee should be purely democratic, while other members may have assumed that they had more control or oversight over grant decisions. The GRP program could have used more definitional training from OJJDP or the technical assistance provider when the steering committee first formed. The most relevant training assistance early in the process would have included discussions about steering committee members' roles and voting authority; the fiscal agent and its role and decision making authority within the grant; and committee members' discussion of their expectations regarding their own agendas (i.e., is the member expecting to receive funding). Though it appears that most of these issues were eventually minimized within the North Miami Beach GRP, additional training at the beginning of the program may have prevented some confusion and delays in implementation.

In interviews, committee members also described the difficulties they experienced in trying to increase the level of faith-based involvement in the initiative. Committee members reported on their attempts to bring the church community into the program, and have recognized those attempts to have been largely unsuccessful. One committee member commented that there may be a duplication of services between services developed by GRP and those already in place within the faith community. In light of the continuing dearth of faith-based participants in the North Miami Beach GRP, the steering committee should examine the faith-based community further to gain more insight into the reasoning behind its under-representation, and develop ways the two entities can work together to build the community. If GRP is able to involve the faith-based community, service provision may become more sustainable in the future.

Finally, even though issues of competition or pressure to fund specific projects arose early in the process, the steering committee appears to have been able to work past those issues and move forward without alienating involved committee members. Though some committee members ended their participation in the initiative, the original steering committee remained largely intact. As mentioned by many committee members and

observed by the evaluation team, the program coordinator has attempted to ensure the committee is run diplomatically and democratically, and that everyone at the table has an opportunity to vote and engage in discussions. The collaborative functioning within the committee has continued and expanded over time, and the building of such a collaborative partnership has been one of the site's most important accomplishments.

7.8.2. Implementation

The program coordinator worked hard to ensure that she understood the goals, objectives, and activities that OJJDP wanted the initiative to achieve and attempted to remain true to the design while maximizing the programs' benefits to the community. Though the steering committee did not fund all programs initially recommended by OJJDP, the North Miami Beach effort took specific care to address the areas that were of most need within the community. Early efforts in the site necessarily focused on understanding the target population and what existing services might contribute to GRP's goals, through multiple focus groups with residents and through the CRI. The CRI revealed a dearth of services capable of serving the Haitian population, and making it clear to GRP management that in many ways, the GRP effort was starting from scratch. While OJJDP initially outlined an implementation plan whereby sites would spend a short period planning and then move quickly to implementation of programmatic activities, the GRP in North Miami Beach approached the undertaking from a slightly different perspective. Much of Phase I in North Miami Beach was spent understanding the target population in terms of cultural barriers and opportunities and its areas of greatest need. Only one programmatic activity (ASP) was funded during Phase I.

Implementation of programmatic activities was also delayed for other reasons, and the steering committee was in some cases forced to revise its implementation plans. This was especially true in regards to the RFP process. In several instances, the state fiscal agent returned proposed RFPs before they were released. After several rounds of edits and reviews by the fiscal agent, the delays ultimately forced the steering committee to decide against issuing RFPs for mentoring and substance abuse programs and instead redirecting the funding elsewhere. Also, the planned extension of recreation center hours at specific locations was rejected by the city, and that funding was ultimately redirected to the creation of a new recreation center in Victory Park. In addition, responses from some interviewees suggested that to some extent, politics figured more prominently than program goals in funding decisions. While attention to the current political atmosphere was unavoidable—and necessary—for the program coordinators, the discontent among some committee members around this issue may have also worked to slow down implementation.

Thus the strategy of spending much of Phase I on planning and knowledge-building efforts, combined with unforseen bureaucratic delays, meant that the site didn't implement much in the way services until Phase II. However, most sites—even those that tried to follow OJJDP's directive to implement programs on a short time frame—saw limited programmatic activity in Phase I, and it appears that instead of expecting an accelerated implementation of programs, OJJDP would have served sites better by providing more technical assistance in site development and planning early on, and allowing each site to take its time in identifying the best approaches to the specific problems it faced. Of all four sites, North Miami Beach certainly came closest to this model of implementation.

In addition, the forced changes to the plans for programmatic activities demonstrated

the North Miami Beach GRP steering committee's ability to adapt to the changing pressures and developments inherent in such a large undertaking. The site's leadership and the steering committee worked well together, and their strongly collaborative approach allowed them to make adjustments in their strategy as needed, adjusting funding streams and ensuring that the initiative remained focused on the overarching goal of reducing youth gang activity. In addition, the later changes, especially regarding funds initially earmarked for mentoring and substance abuse programs, allowed the site to focus more clearly on sustainability and commit needed funds towards its sustainability efforts.

7.8.3. Outcomes

Despite the North Miami Beach GRP's marked success in building a collaborative partnership and implementing a number of programmatic activities to serve youths and their families in the city, the evaluation team's analysis of three different types of outcome data—education, juvenile justice, and crime—found mixed results with few positive or negative changes in youth delinquent activity and gang involvement since GRP's implementation. At the middle school level, where the available data show a drop in suspension rates at the target school with a concurrent rise or slight drop at the comparison school, we can tentatively conclude that GRP programming might have had a positive effect on suspension rates in the target area. In general, the data on attendance, suspensions, and perceptions of school climate revealed more positive changes at the middle school level than at the high school level, and violence and gangs were identified as problems more frequently at the high school level. In addition, while a school survey revealed positive changes in perceptions of safety at the target schools, the comparison schools saw an increasing level of negativity regarding safety issues. The results indicate that some important changes occurred at the middle school level after the 2005-2006 school year, after which the target and comparison area schools diverged in perceptions of safety. This lends weight to the hypothesis that GRP may have had a positive effect on safety at the school level in North Miami Beach but will be followed closely as the evaluation continues to determine whether those increasingly positive perceptions continue.

The evaluation team also investigated juvenile referrals to the county JSD, expecting the number of Haitian juvenile referrals to increase in North Miami Beach as efforts against youth delinquency and gang activity increased. Instead, no increase was observed, possibly because of the nature of the NMBPD's activities early in the implementation period and an eventual restructuring of the suppression activities to increase their effectiveness. It is possible that any significant changes in referrals actually took place in response to the suppression activities conducted by the gang unit beginning in summer 2006. To accommodate this possibility, UI will examine other plausible intervention points in the time series during the next period of evaluation. These conclusions should be read with caution as the findings relate only to juveniles referred to the JSD and whose last known address was within selected North Miami Beach or North Miami ZIP codes. Though the hypotheses were not supported at this point in the evaluation, we will examine these issues as the evaluation continues.

Finally, the interim analysis of the effect of the suppression component of North Miami Beach's GRP program found no evidence that the program yielded reductions in citizen reports of crimes (calls for service that may have been gang-related), gang-related incidents, or serious violent incidents. These findings can be partially explained by at least three

issues, including the documented issues with the measurement of gang crime in North Miami Beach. A low level of overall gang activity observed in North Miami Beach also made a null finding more likely. Finally, the suppression efforts funded under GRP were likely not extensive enough to create a large (in percentage terms) reduction during the intervention period. Responsibility for the bike and foot patrols, introduced in 2005 but initially not as extensive or consistent as hoped, was given to the NMBPD gang unit in 2006. This move led to more extensive patrols and more consistency in terms of officers assigned to the patrols. Additional models that accommodate this move will be estimated for the final evaluation period in North Miami Beach. Finally, early activities funded by the site were community-based and prevention-oriented, intended to increase gang-related intelligence and communication between the police department and community members. These efforts may have more long term effects that are not observable in the short time period covered in the current evaluation, but UI will continue to monitor these measures for the hypothesized changes, considering a longer-term horizon during which they may occur.

7.8.4. Sustainability

Sustainability was a high priority for GRP management, partners, and committee members in 2007, and a high level of buy-in among community residents and GRP partners has contributed significantly to the sustainability of PanZOu. Every committee meeting included a discussion and update of program sustainability. Despite upheavals at the state and county level and budget problems that plagued its initial plans for sustainability, the site was able to create and execute a plan to ensure the existence of the project beyond the federal funding period. This was accomplished by successfully incorporating as a non-profit organization and changing fiscal agents to improve its operations. The site's success in managing its own budget, maintaining program oversight through the steering committee, garnering additional funding to sustain GRP programs, and maintaining a highly collaborative partnership will be monitored throughout the end of the evaluation period.

However, some questions about sustainability of the effort remain for steering committee members. One interview respondent mentioned the site's lack of a policy component for GRP, suggesting that without a plan and efforts to influence policy addressing youth gangs, there would be no long-term change in the gang-related problems affecting North Miami Beach. This issue could be critical for long-term sustainability of GRP. Once the federal funding period is over, the program may face an increasingly uphill battle to sustainability if it has not been institutionalized within the city or another governmental organization. It remains to be seen how the relatively recent change in the initiative's status to a non-profit will affect its operations, accomplishments, and future prospects for sustainability.

Another area of doubt for some committee members is how well the initiative will be able to expand to other areas of the county—something many have seen as crucial from the start of the initiative. Interview respondents point out that GRP's efforts in North Miami Beach effectively ignore the fact that gangs operate county-wide. One respondent felt the money could and should be spent in other areas of need, too. "Things do not happen in just one place." Another respondent felt that focusing only on North Miami Beach, restricted GRP's ability to improve public safety and that GRP could only make a dent in

the problem. If the North Miami Beach GRP can expand its efforts into other areas of the county, it may have a greater chance of sustainability.

7.9. CONCLUSION

Two and a half years after grant funding began, GRP had implemented almost all activities. By the end of 2007, its steering committee had moved to a programmatic maintenance and oversight role and the new status as a non-profit organization went a long way to ensuring the initiative's existence beyond the federal funding period. Phases I and II were not implemented as distinct phases, but rather blended into each other, with services funded under both Phases overlapping. Based on observations and interviews conducted by the evaluation team, it appeared that by the end of 2007, the North Miami Beach GRP had succeeded in maintaining the integrity of the original design. Though implementation of GRP was significantly delayed at several points, all sites experienced similar delays. Over the next year, the evaluation team will continue to monitor the progress of the activities, the steering committee, and the staff. Continuing process evaluation will determine both North Miami Beach's adherence to the program, its ability to address issues as they arise, and progress within the field. In addition, the evaluation team's ongoing assessment of outcomes resulting from the activities implemented in each site will help to inform the ultimate impact on gangs and gang-related activities.

Chapter 8

Richmond, Virginia

A city of just under 200,000 people, Richmond, Virginia has a small-town atmosphere but faces big city issues. The city, however, has recently experienced improvements in crime and safety issues that previously plagued parts of the city. Dropping from the 2007 list of the 25 most dangerous American cities—after ranking at number five as recently as 2005—Richmond has recently been recognized as a model for community-focused safety efforts, of which the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) is just one (Nolan, 2007). The Richmond GRP has worked to integrate an extensive, but historically fractured, network of social service providers and officials and bridge gaps between its deep-rooted African-American population and its new—and growing—Hispanic population in an effort to reduce violence and gang crime. By the end of 2007, the effort had been in operation for over three years and over that period saw significant changes in the gang and crime landscape across the city. With a police chief who encourages his officers to listen to citizens and work with communities and a cadre of partners, both funded and non-funded, providing everything from after-school dance and life skills lessons to accessible health care to targeted prosecution, the Richmond GRP has creatively designed its local model, heavily favoring a prevention-oriented approach. This chapter details the development of the Richmond GRP from its start in 2003, outlines the essential elements of the model that were collaboratively designed, and provides an analysis of various data to assess the impact of the effort through mid-2007.

8.1. STUDY AREAS

The Richmond GRP target area (see Figure 8.1) is located in the southern portion of the city, west of the James River and south of the downtown area. The target area covers 6.9 square miles. Other areas in both the northern and southern sections of the city were considered for the target area before the current location was selected. Those alternate areas were also experiencing gang crime, but the current target area was ultimately chosen because the Richmond Police Department (RPD) and other city officials were of the opinion that it had escalating levels of violence and increasing conflict between local, or "home-grown" African American and national and international Latino gangs as a result of increased Latino immigration into the area.

To assess physical, social, and economic conditions in the target area, the International Economic Development Council (IEDC) conducted interviews with the GRP coordinator,

community stakeholders, and local officials in early 2004. IEDC's findings were presented at the Phase I strategic planning meeting in April 2004, and are used here to describe the target area characteristics that guided GRP development. It should be noted that the Richmond GRP management was disappointed with IEDC's assessment of the target area, concerned that the organization spent too little time in Richmond to conduct a comprehensive assessment, and expressed that concern from the beginning. Nonetheless, the program coordinator presented the IEDC report's information at the Phase I strategic planning meeting and similar information appears in the site's Phase I report to Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP); the information is thus reported here.

The GRP target area is largely residential, characterized by two large apartment complexes and a mix of single-family residences, low-rise apartment complexes, and townhouses. Several major surface streets cut through the target area, the population density is relatively high, and the target area has a primary retail center. Much of the economic development in the City of Richmond has been focused on revitalizing the downtown area; the target area has not enjoyed the same growth in its retail sector as have some other parts of the city. In addition, Table 8.1 reveals that nearly 20 percent of the target area population was living below the poverty level in 2000, indicating that economic stress likely contributes to the area's problems.

The site's focus from the start was emerging conflict between local 'home-grown' gangs and impinging national gangs, the growth of the Hispanic population in the city contributes to that possible conflict. Over the last several years, the target area's population has undergone significant change. Geographically, the target area sits in the heart of the city's small but growing Hispanic population, which has clustered primarily on the city's Southside. What used to be an area populated by working-class African Americans has become home to an increasing number of Hispanic immigrants. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2000, nine percent of the target area population was Hispanic while only two percent of the citywide population was Hispanic. In the target area, 67 percent of the population was African American (see Table 8.1); citywide, African Americans similarly comprised approximately 57 percent of the population. However, local officials have reported to both the Urban Institute (UI) and IEDC that the Hispanic population has grown significantly since the 2000 Census (International Economic Development Council, 2004). While Census figures are not available for geographic areas smaller than the city after 2000, recent citywide statistics confirm the Hispanic population's rapid growth: its size increased 62 percent over the 2000-2006 period, and much of this growth was likely experienced on the city's Southside.

Increased migration of Hispanics is likely to change the demographic structure of the target area's population in other ways, as well, with ramifications for the efforts of GRP. Evidence from the 2000 Census reveals a higher fertility rate among Hispanics. This higher fertility rate, coupled with a higher level of immigration among young persons, including those with children, create an overall younger age structure for the U.S. Hispanic population (Haub, 2006). The increased immigration of Hispanics into the Richmond metro area, and specifically to the target area, is thus likely to be associated with an increasing number of resident youths. The younger age structure creates new and increasing demand for services directed primarily at youths or at families with young children. In addition, growing tensions between Hispanics and non-Hispanics over enforcement of immigration

laws has created a level of distrust among Hispanics towards police and other government officials, with news sources citing local examples of such tension in the Southwood Apartment complex, located in the target area (Lizama, 2007; Kincaid, 2007). This distrust can complicate traditional police work and increases the importance of community-focused police activities.

An additional consideration is recent research that demonstrates an increased danger for high-risk behaviors, including violence, among Latinos as time spent in the U.S. increases. The research finds that increased levels of acculturation among Latino youth are associated with increased high-risk behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and substance abuse (Amaro, Whitaker, Coffman, and Heeren, 1990; Gil and Vega, 2000). A more recent study also found higher levels of violence among third generation Hispanics compared to first and second generation immigrants (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2005). Other research has shown that different acculturation rates between youths and their parents—with youths usually acculturating more quickly than their parents—can lead to family-level stress and parenting problems, and in turn to higher levels of substance abuse among youths (Martinez Jr., 2006). Because of these issues surrounding acculturation and because of a younger population structure, the Richmond GRP is facing the growth of a population that is at a higher risk of joining gangs and whose risk may increase as the Hispanic population becomes more established and sizable in the target area and across the city.

Finally, the target area's population is at risk for poor or reduced physical health. Nearly one-fifth of the target area population was living below the poverty level in 2000, and with a growing immigrant population, the level of poverty there is likely increasing, even if not officially recorded. According to the Virginia Health Atlas, a similar proportion—18 percent—of residents in the target area ZIP code (23234) were uninsured in 2004, making medical care less accessible (Virginia Center for Healthy Communities, 2007). The atlas also reports that 10 percent of births in that ZIP code had late or no prenatal care in 2004. Finally, 22 percent of residents were considered to have just fair or poor levels of physical health in 2005.

In August 2004, UI met with representatives from the City of Richmond and the RPD to discuss selection of a comparison area. The selection of the comparison area was based on three general criteria: local knowledge from the RPD, levels of violent and gang-related crime, and demographics. Using crime data provided by the RPD and demographic information from Census 2000, UI prepared density maps of citywide crime levels and demographic maps at the census tract level to guide the discussions. Race, median household income, population density, gender ratios and the age structure of each census tract were all considered in the decision-making process. The RPD also provided maps of census information by tracts and maps of the police sectors and census tracts, including ones that highlighted hot spots of gang-related crimes.

Based on this information, the RPD representatives recommended two possible comparison areas that they felt were comparable to the target area in terms of demographics and crime levels. Both areas were located north of the James River. The first possible comparison area included the campus of Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) and several nearby apartment complexes and public housing units. The second candidate comparison area was more residential, comprised mainly of single-family homes and also home to a large senior citizen population, including several nursing homes. Analyses of the crime and demographic data described above supported the selection of the first



Figure 8.1: Richmond Study Areas

Table 8.1: Richmond: Cross-Sectional Comparison of Study Areas

	Area		
	Target	Comparison	Displacement
Crimes Known and Reported, 2002–Nov 2004			
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter	22	8	31
Assault	1,704	614	2,469
Aggravated Assault	310	128	460
Simple Assault	1,148	383	1,643
Intimidation	246	103	366
Robbery	432	150	471
Drug Offenses	290	189	510
Weapons Violations	89	29	143
Vandalism	1,081	897	1,548
Socio-economic Indicators, 2000			
Area (square miles)	6.99	2.05	9.71
Residential population	17,719	8,535	16,418
% population 12-17 (years)	7%	8%	6%
% population 18-24 (years)	11%	13%	10%
% population male	48%	47%	45%
% population Black	67%	67%	73%
% population Hispanic	9%	2%	4%
% housing units owner-occupied	45%	43%	39%
% housing units vacant	7%	9%	8%
% high school graduates (age ≥ 25 years)	69%	76%	67%
% in labor force (age ≥ 16 years)	58%	63%	58%
% not speaking English at home (age ≥ 5 years)	12%	8%	7%
% households receiving public assistance	6%	3%	6%
% population below poverty level	19%	22%	22%

Notes:

- Crimes against persons (i.e., murder, manslaughter, assault) are counted as one crime per victim; all other crimes are counted as one crime per incident.
- For incidents involving crimes against persons where the number of victims was not recorded, the number of victims was assumed to be one (1).

Source: Crime data are from the authors' analysis of data from the Richmond Police Department. Socio-economic indicators are from the authors' analysis of block-group/block data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

alternative over the second for three main reasons. First, the second area did not have a large minority population, as did the target area. Second, the crime levels in the target area were closer to those in the first alternative than the second. Lastly, the physical infrastructure of the second alternative, which had more single-family homes, was less similar to the target area than the first alternative, which contained more apartment complexes and public housing units.

The first alternative was chosen as the comparison area. However, in order to ensure this area was as comparable as possible to the target area, UI excluded the VCU campus from the comparison area. The VCU population is largely white and, unlike the surrounding area, its age structure is heavily weighted in the 18–24 year old range. Removing the campus and its population from comparison area calculations thus improved the match between the target and comparison area demographics. The campus also had a lower crime rate than surrounding areas, so its exclusion further improved the match of the target and comparison areas on crime levels. As a result, while the target area is more than three times larger than the comparison area, which is only 2.1 square miles, the two areas were very similar in terms of their sociodemographic structures in 2000, with comparable

Figure 8.2: Crime Rates in Richmond Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Richmond Police Dept. data.

proportions of African American and Hispanics, and a similar proportion of those living below the poverty level. Table 8.1 provides a comparison between the two areas on these and other demographic measures.

UI's analysis of possible displacement of crime as a result of GRP activities focuses on immediate spatial displacement—displacement of crime to areas immediately surrounding the target area. Therefore, the displacement area surrounds the target area on all but the southern side, allowing UI to potentially identify crime that moves out of the target area in most directions. Because the target area is on the southern border of the City of Richmond, and no crime data are available outside the city, displacement cannot be assessed to the south. The police department suggested that displacement, if it occurs, is most likely all around the target area, but that it may be greatest towards the southeast. Because the displacement area was chosen based on spatial proximity to the target area and availability of data, it is not as important that the demographic characteristics of the displacement area match those of the target area. However, Table 8.1 reveals that, like the comparison area, the displacement area is very similar demographically to the target area.

8.2. BASELINE ANALYSIS

Figure 8.2 displays the overall crime rate for all three study areas for each year 2002–2004. The figure reveals that the target and comparison areas have very similar crime levels, while the level of crime in the displacement area is somewhat higher. This finding is not surprising, as the comparison area was selected in part because its crime levels closely match those in the target area, but does confirm that the selection was appropriate. All three areas demonstrate very similar year-to-year crime trends, however, with a dropping crime rate each year. In all three areas, the largest drop in crime levels was experienced in the 2003–2004 period.

Figure 8.3: Crime Trends in Richmond Study Areas: All Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Richmond Police Department.

Figure 8.3 looks at the overall crime trends by month over the same three-year period. Note that the graph displays actual numbers of incidents, not crime rates. The graph reveals that all three areas follow similar monthly patterns in crime levels, even while the displacement area has a greater total number of incidents than either the target or comparison areas. The graph shows a typical trend of peaks in the number of incidents in the spring and summer months and troughs in the winter months. The trends for the target and comparison areas are especially similar towards the end of the period, mid-2003 to 2004, when the monthly incident levels match very closely.

Figure 8.4 displays the serious violent crime rates during each year for the same time period, 2002–2004. The pattern is slightly different than the pattern for all crime, with the target and displacement areas experiencing much more similar trends over the period than the target and comparison areas. The displacement area again had the highest serious violent crime rate of the three areas, but the comparison area had lower levels of serious violent crime than the target area, unlike the overall crime rate for the two areas, which was much more comparable. The target and displacement areas saw stable levels of serious violent crime from 2002–2003 with a comparatively dramatic drop in serious violent crime from 2003–2004. The comparison area, however, saw a steadily increasing level of serious violent crime over the same period.

Figure 8.5 displays the monthly pattern of serious violent incidents over the 2002–2004 period. The number of violent incidents is much less stable than the trends displayed in Figure 8.3 for overall crime levels; violent incidents have more dramatic peaks and troughs and do not follow the more regular pattern of peaks in summer and troughs in winter as shown in Figure 8.3. Instead, all three areas display peaks and troughs across all seasons during the three-year period. In addition, all three areas display an upward trend at the end of the analysis period, 2004.

Figure 8.4: Crime Rates in Richmond Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Richmond Police Dept. data.

Figure 8.5: Crime Trends in Richmond Study Areas: Serious Violent Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Richmond Police Department.

Figure 8.6: Crime Trends in Richmond Study Areas: All Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Richmond Police Department.

Figures 8.6 and 8.7 display the monthly overall gang crime and serious violent gang crime trends, respectively, for the 2002–2004 period. Both figures show similar levels of crime, indicating that most gang crime is classified as serious violent crime. The figures also reveal that while the target and displacement areas have very similar levels of gang crime, the comparison area has a somewhat lower level of gang crime. However, it should be noted that the gang audits for this area were not completed by the RPD until after the comparison area selection. Therefore, overall and violent crime levels were necessarily utilized for the comparison area selection while actual gang crime levels were not.

8.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The following sections describe in detail the development and implementation of the Richmond GRP. Significant events are also displayed on a timeline, shown in Figure 8.8, that covers the entire period of organizational development and implementation in Richmond. These events, and the ramifications of significant events, are discussed in more detail below. An expanded version of this timeline also appears below in Section 8.6 with monthly data on selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial distribution of crime within the GRP study areas.

At the beginning of the Richmond GRP, leadership believed that the city's gang problem was based on both African American and Hispanic gangs preying on Hispanic day laborers. According to local experts, the target area's Hispanic immigrant population, both legal and illegal, is growing rapidly. In addition, while the community has a significant number of social service providers in place with the capacity to address gang-related issues, many of those providers feel overwhelmed by the influx of immigrants. The language barrier and the immigrants' culture of distrust of the government, especially the

Figure 8.7: Crime Trends in Richmond Study Areas: Serious Violent Gang-Related Crimes



Source: Authors' analysis of data provided by the Richmond Police Department.

police, complicate serving the immigrant population (International Economic Development Council, 2004). It was against this backdrop of rapidly changing demographics that the GRP began in Richmond.

Because of the widespread perception among both city and state government officials that crime was a significant issue in the area, city, state, and federal funds had been spent specifically—and narrowly—on crime reduction in Richmond over the 15 years preceding the city's opportunity to participate in the GRP pilot program. Those efforts, however, were at the time just beginning to include plans to address wider ranging issues, including the provision of family services, aid for children, and education (International Economic Development Council, 2004). The city's Comprehensive Strategy for Public Safety, developed about the same time GRP was starting, evidences this broader effort. A panel of local stakeholders, including the RPD, developed the citywide strategy, finalized in early 2004. The strategy presents short and long term goals aimed at community crime control and crime reduction, with efforts in the areas of education/prevention, community policing, prosecution/post-conviction, and rehabilitation/intervention (Richmond Community Crime Control Steering Committee, 2004). Officials interviewed by IEDC described GRP as one element of the citywide strategy. However, as will be discussed later, those responsible for planning the implementation of GRP were not even aware of this citywide strategy until some months into the strategic planning process.

The city's Comprehensive Strategy for Public Safety represented a new, broader approach to citywide crime reduction. When the GRP opportunity arose, officials and residents of Richmond were just beginning to recognize a growing gang problem in the area. While no national gangs were believed to operate in Richmond at that time, officials wanted to take a proactive approach to prevent them from moving into the area. With a growing Hispanic population in the city, community worries were focused on

Figure 8.8: Richmond Timeline

international Latino gangs (International Economic Development Council, 2004).

In light of these local developments and increasing sentiments that gang problems were growing statewide, the Virginia Attorney General set up a statewide Anti-Gang Task Force in May 2003. The Anti-Gang Task Force was created just months before the GRP effort began. Several representatives from Richmond communities and agencies held seats on the task force, including the then-Chief of the RPD. The task force was designed to examine Virginia law in relation to gang activity and recommend needed changes to the law, if any. The task force was also to develop community and school-based prevention and intervention programs aimed at reducing gang involvement among the state's youths (Virginia Office of the Attorney General, 2003).

The task force's first order of business was the development of a comprehensive inventory of gangs across the state. The inventory included specification of what gangs were operating in which communities. By the time the task force's inventory was released in August 2004, two national gangs—Latin Kings and Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13—had been identified in Richmond (Virginia Office of the Attorney General, 2004). The Richmond Chief of Police did note that the "homegrown gangs" in Richmond did not welcome the national organizations: "They [national gangs] don't find this a hospitable place." (Akin, 2004). Nonetheless, the gang inventory demonstrated that the movement of national gangs into Richmond was a distinct possibility and thus a legitimate concern.

8.3.1. Phase I

Richmond was thus chosen by OJJDP to participate in GRP, with the State Virginia Office of the Attorney General (OAG) acting as the fiscal agent and administrator of the program. The OAG was chosen for this role in part because of the Attorney General's active interest in addressing gang-related problems in Virginia over the previous several years. In addition, both state and local officials had a demonstrated willingness to work with OJJDP to implement the pilot program. There were several other benefits associated with selecting the OAG as the fiscal agent. Its offices were located in downtown Richmond, close to the target area and in proximity to city officials and other potential partners. The OAG also had a statewide gang program director and other staff with experience in statewide gang initiatives.

GRP Structure and Management

In September 2003, the OAG received notification from OJJDP that its application under GRP had been accepted, with funding in the amount of $2.5 million. The following month, representatives from the Richmond GRP traveled to Washington, D.C. to participate in a planning meeting with OJJDP and with representatives from the other three sites that had been chosen. Also in October 2003, UI first met with the management team of the Richmond GRP, including representatives from the OAG, the RPD, and the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC). The meeting mainly addressed evaluation issues, outlining data requirements for the Richmond representatives. The meeting also included a discussion of the nature of the target area. UI used the site visit as an opportunity to begin development of an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the RPD to begin data collection for evaluation efforts.

At this early stage the OAG GRP team, made up of the statewide gang director[1] and other OAG staff, including one who would later be chosen as the GRP Coordinator, hoped that the first six months of the project—Phase I—would represent "a fact finding mission." During this period, officials would further assess the gang threat in the area and determine what existing programs could be folded into the GRP initiative. The intent was to have a committee review the gang threat assessment and the inventory of existing programs, and then make recommendations on action for Phase II. Thus, at the proposal stage, the OAG did not intend for Phase I to fund programmatic activities or service delivery, but instead to focus on planning for Phase II, when implementation of programs would begin. Phase I activities would include advertising the project in the community, completing a Community Resource Inventory (CRI), and garnering additional resources to aid in the GRP effort. OJJDP, however, allotted much less time for planning. The federal funder expected sites to complete the CRI in a very short period of time and quickly move to implementation of activities during Phase I. In light of OJJDP's expectations, Richmond did change its six-month plan prior to beginning any efforts under the initiative. It may be that the differing expectations on the part of the Richmond GRP—as reflected in its original GRP proposal—and OJJDP made it more difficult for the Richmond GRP management team to strictly comply with OJJDP's Phase I expectations, as the team first had to adjust its operational strategy and timeline.

After the GRP kick-off meeting in October 2003, the OAG GRP team began creating the committees that would form the operating bodies of the Richmond GRP. Local community members, government officials, and service providers were recruited to participate in GRP. The program coordinator, hired January 24, 2004, had also begun to staff each of three governing committees with delegates from local leadership. At a planning meeting held on February 17–18, 2004, the OAG GRP team presented the organizational structure it had designed. Three committees formed the Richmond GRP organization: the executive, leadership, and program steering committees.

The executive committee was comprised of high-ranking officials in the OAG, the City of Richmond, the RPD, and the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO). The committee was to meet semi-annually to provide direction for GRP, facilitate inter-agency communication, cooperation, and involvement in inter-agency projects, and provide feedback to all GRP staff. The executive committee also was to be responsible for final review and approval of major GRP initiatives.

The role of the leadership committee was to act as a liaison between the executive committee and the program steering committees. In doing so, the leadership committee was to provide guidance and leadership to the operational committee, review initiative proposals, and forward program selections to the executive committee for final approval. The members of the leadership committee, from the OAG and the city's Human Services Department, included the program coordinator and the Richmond GRP executive director. The executive director of GRP is a high level representative from the OAG who acts as the liaison between Richmond GRP leadership and the OAG and executive committee. The individual also provides direction for the program coordinator and staff.

The program steering committee was actually comprised of several "work groups" representing different elements of the GRP efforts. The topical divisions covered public

[1]The statewide gang director was later designated as the "Richmond GRP Executive Director," with primary OAG oversight for the program.

safety, human services, economic development, and community action. For Phase I, the work groups were devised as 'focus groups' or 'think tanks.' These work groups did not meet regularly, but were created to participate in the strategic planning meeting in April 2004 and provide recommendations for the Phase I strategic plan. As the program steering committee was staffed prior to the meeting, these work groups began strategic planning tasks in preparation for the two-day Phase I strategic planning meeting.

Planning Process

With the structure and organization of the Richmond GRP in place, the team refocused on planning for Phase I implementation. At a February 2004 meeting, the program coordinator reviewed tasks completed and participants discussed what tasks were still outstanding prior to the strategic planning meeting. At that point, the Richmond OAG GRP team had decided on a subcontracting process and submitted the subcontracting plans to OJJDP. Proposals from contractors were to go to directly to the OAG. At that point, several providers were being considered for different aspects of GRP, and it was not yet clear what services would be provided by the state or local organizations. GRP management rightfully wanted to explore the existing gaps in services and the needs of the community before making any such decisions.

Before the OJJDP-sponsored April strategic planning meeting, two key resources for the strategic planning process—a CRI and an analysis of gang crime in the target area—were to be quickly assembled. The City of Richmond was assigned the task of completing the CRI, an important element of OJJDP's strategic planning guidelines. Such a comprehensive inventory would allow each site to capitalize on existing resources and capacities and reduce the duplication of efforts. The inventory was thus especially relevant in Richmond, where other crime reduction and prevention efforts, like the citywide Comprehensive Strategy for Public Safety, were already operating or under development. The CRI was scheduled for completion by mid-March 2004 to ensure its utility at the upcoming strategic planning meeting.

UI received the first set of gang-audit data from the RPD identifying gang-related incidents in the target area from 2002 and 2003 in February 2004. These data were important for both planning and evaluation purposes, and were used by UI to develop a baseline analysis of crime in the target area. Results of this baseline analysis were presented at the Phase I strategic planning meeting.

A third planning tool was completed during the same period—the IEDC assessment of the target area. IEDC conducted the interviews that formed the basis of its report during March 2004. The findings were presented at the April 2004 strategic planning meeting.

The RPD began monthly gang intelligence meetings and documenting field interviews intended to gather intelligence on gang activities by February 2004. GRP provided the impetus for these RPD efforts, as the police department had not previously had any focus on gang crimes and to that date had gathered little gang intelligence to inform its gang control activities. A newly formed gang unit started operations in June 2004, partially funded by GRP. However, the gang unit was established with citywide responsibilities, and was not intended to focus solely on the target area. While beneficial to the city as a whole, the fact that the gang unit is citywide complicates evaluation efforts. It is difficult to compare the effects of the gang unit in the target area and the comparison area as both are expected to have received similar attention during the GRP funding period.

The OJJDP-sponsored Phase I strategic planning meeting took place over two days, April 6–7, 2004. Meeting attendees included representatives from national organizations: OJJDP, NYGC, Communities in Schools (CIS), and Boys and Girls Clubs (BGC). Local attendees represented the OAG, the City of Richmond, and the Metro Richmond BGC; approximately 16 other local organization representatives also attended. An independent facilitator, provided and given instruction by OJJDP, directed the meeting.

The first section of the meeting was designed to outline the target area demographic and economic information, largely based on data from the 2000 U.S. Census. The descriptions offered were quite general and largely qualitative, with little actual demographic or other data offered. The evaluation team in attendance viewed the target area analysis and summary information as incomplete and based primarily on anecdotal views of the nature of the community and its problems.

Following the program coordinator's presentation, UI provided an overview of its baseline analysis of crime data for the target area, including the identification of crime "hot spots" within the target area and the area immediately surrounding it. While the head of the gang unit and another officer were in attendance at the meeting, the precinct captain, and resident expert on gang crime, was not. Response to the baseline analysis was thus limited.

The subsequent presentation by the program coordinator covered the CRI. The presentation included financial, human resource, infrastructure, and community program inventories, along with an assessment of service gaps. The presentation revealed that Richmond GRP's inventory was incomplete and based on a survey with a very low response rate. Despite these shortcomings, the program coordinator did present some highlights from the inventory, describing the possibility of using Hickory Hill as a "One-Stop" service center for area residents and city plans to build several new schools with community centers. Also discussed was the difficulty the Richmond GRP faced in garnering participation in the effort by homeowners and business owners. The presentation also noted the difficulty in getting Hispanic residents to participate in community efforts, including local "neighborhood teams" that already existed and planned to partner with GRP.

Next, the meeting moved to a discussion of goals and objectives. The meeting facilitator defined goals and objectives for participants, who were then divided into teams. Each team represented one main component of GRP: prevention, intervention, and suppression.[2]

The UI evaluation team observed several issues that appeared to impede team planning efforts. First, it was apparent that meeting participants were confused by the definitions of goals and objectives provided by the meeting facilitator. Secondly, division into the three subcommittees was somewhat arbitrary; participants did not self-select into the subcommittee they felt was most appropriate given their backgrounds. Instead, participants were assigned to a committee that may or may not have related to their experience or expertise (e.g., police officers were not part of the suppression committee). It is unclear why this method was employed, but it may have been used to avoid an imbalanced team structure or to challenge the participants' viewpoints and encourage brainstorming. Instead this approach contributed to difficulty in defining precise goals for each GRP component. In

[2]OJJDP's GRP model includes five main components: primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry. However, the prevention components are often referred to together as one component, and the reentry component was not addressed until Phase II. Therefore, at different points during the Richmond GRP operations, three, four, or five components are used.

addition, representatives from the national partners, including OJJDP, CIS, and BGC, were divided into the teams along with local participants. This likely biased the groups' outcomes by subtly encouraging participants to defer to the opinions and perspectives of the national partners, instead of allowing them to discuss local issues and develop goals and objectives independent of influence from the funder (OJJDP) or those with a potential vested financial interest in the outcome (e.g., CIS, BGC).

The discussions within the sub-groups deviated from the plan envisioned by meeting organizers. As participants worked in the sub-groups, their discussions were relatively unstructured, resulting in difficulty staying on task to identify goals and objectives. Because individual groups lacked continuous guidance or facilitation, the discussions quickly strayed from goals and objectives to identification of program components. In at least two of the three groups, a few dominant participants controlled the discussions. Finally, little consideration of the factual presentations provided earlier in the meeting was made. In short, several issues hindered the small group discussions. However, while the groups did jump prematurely to discussions of what programs to include in GRP, they were ultimately able to produce a list of tentative goals and objectives by the end of the first day. The independent facilitator, under OJJDP's direction, was largely responsible for the flow of the meeting, and the OAG was not involved in meeting facilitation. Regardless of who facilitated the meeting, however, the site was left to deal with a disappointing first day of Phase I planning.

On the second day of the meeting, efforts were made to refocus the process and reorganize the groups, with meeting leaders asking participants to revisit the goals and objectives identified during the previous day and use those to develop program components that could be implemented during the six months allotted for Phase I. Participants re-divided into groups, this time based on expertise. The new groups were created in an effort to allow a better planning process, and while much of the work defining goals and objectives had been completed on the first day by the assigned groups, realigning the groups appeared to be an appropriate adjustment.

An unexpected turn came when a participant representing the City of Richmond raised the topic of the city's Comprehensive Strategy for Public Safety. Development of that strategy included the articulation of goals and objectives for crime reduction at the city level. The city strategy had not been mentioned during any previous review of existing programmatic efforts during the two-day meeting. It was clear that, other than city officials, local participants were unaware of the city strategy. Most participants were also unaware of the role for GRP, if any, in the City Strategy. A brief discussion followed, which suggested possible undercurrents of conflict between state officials, city officials, and community group leaders. The fact that the city had not previously shared its citywide plans with the OAG GRP team suggested to the evaluation team that there might be future collaboration conflicts between the City and GRP and duplication of services was possible. This communication failure is also demonstrative of the historically divisive and insular nature of much of the city's offices and service providers, an issue raised by participants throughout the initiative.

The small group discussions did result in the refinement and selection of several goals and objectives for each of the three GRP components. Unfortunately, many goals from the three different groups overlapped—they were not clearly divided into prevention, intervention and suppression goals. This lack of a clear division between the goals of the

different GRP components has endured as characteristic of the later Phase I and Phase II strategic plans. As will be seen in the later implementation discussions, overlapping goals resulted in the selection of programs whose objectives and anticipated outcomes were unclear.

The meeting concluded with OJJDP's outline of upcoming deadlines, including a May 14th deadline for submission of the Phase I strategic plan and budget. However, with the exception of Phase I budget requirements, specific next steps for the planning group were not defined. This left meeting participants unsure about their role in the Phase I strategic plan development.

Despite the challenges of the Phase I strategic planning meeting, the Richmond GRP did produce a Phase I strategic plan and budget that were submitted to OJJDP by the May 14, 2004 deadline and approved on July 12, 2004. The plan detailed programmatic activities under three components of GRP: prevention, intervention, and suppression, allocating approximately $326,400 to such activities. While some programs could arguably have been classified as reentry, the Phase I plan did not formally use the reentry category. The bulk of the amount was dedicated to prevention activities. The Phase I plan also committed funds to administration, supplies, and equipment for GRP staff and the developing RPD gang unit, and training and planning activities. The total amount requested for Phase I by the Richmond GRP was approximately $464,000.

Implementation Process

The Richmond GRP coordinator provided UI with a financial statement reporting planned and actual expenditures during Phase I. That report reassigns some prevention programs to the intervention component, making the allocations for each component more similar. Table 8.2 lists the planned and actual funding amounts by activity, based on the financial report provided by the Richmond GRP management.[3]

Procurement of Phase I programs was completed and program selections were finalized in summer 2004, with the implementation of some Phase I programmatic activities immediately following. Unfortunately, fiscal issues resulted in the delay of some programs: by early fall 2004, a formal agreement had not been worked out between the OAG fiscal officials and GRP management regarding subcontract procurement procedures. Even though GRP management believed that a procurement process had been agreed upon as early as February 2004, by October 2004 a formal agreement had not yet been reached. The lack of an agreement was based on misunderstandings within the OAG on how to handle sole-source contracts with non-governmental agencies, and did not reflect a lack of effort on the part of GRP management. While eventually resolved, this process did serve to delay the start of some programs until late in Phase I; others were held until Phase II. In an unrelated but similar issue, the RPD's administrative department was slow to approve overtime pay through GRP, delaying the police department's directed patrol work in the target area. The procurement process was finalized in fall 2004, but because of these delays, at the end of Phase I many planned programs had not been implemented and those funds were carried over into Phase II. Specific funded activities are discussed below in Section 8.5.2.

[3]The total amount requested in the Phase I plan is slightly higher than the total amount reported in Table 8.2. The source of the discrepancy between the Phase I plan and the financial statement is not clear.

Table 8.2: Richmond: Planned Allocations and Actual Expenditures, Phase I

Budget Category	Planned ($)	Actual ($)
Administration	**77,123**	**66,111**
Equipment and Supplies	**51,536**	**23,059**
Prevention		
Resource Inventory	8,670	500
Boys and Girls Club	79,861	39,822
Community Outreach	11,200	5,632
ESL/Outreach	17,150	0
Class Action Camp	2,840	2,997
Prevention Total	**119,721**	**48,951**
Intervention		
School Wrap Around Services (CIS)	69,880	0
Job Training and Job Placement	44,200	0
GED Computer Classes	4,500	701
Job Training Transportation	3,000	0
Intervention Total	**121,580**	**701**
Suppression and Reentry		
Neighborhood Teams	9,000	5,000
RPD - Expanded Patrol	37,440	0
Residential Reentry Program	21,656	5,891
RPD - Crime Data Review	17,000	0
Suppression Total	**85,096**	**10,891**
Grand Total	**455,056**	**149,713**

Notes:

- Where planned expenditures exceeded actual expenditures, the remainder was transferred to Phase II funding.

Source: Planned amounts from Richmond GRP Phase I Strategic Plan. Actual amounts from financial report provided by the Richmond GRP management.

8.3.2. Phase II

GRP Structure and Management

Phase II development began at the end of summer 2004, while Phase I programs were still being implemented or were ongoing. During the planning process, local government underwent significant change, and to some extent contributed to delays in the planning process. GRP management reported that representatives from the City of Richmond became increasingly unresponsive during fall 2004, likely because of staff members' focus on the 2004 mayoral elections. Shortly thereafter, a new mayor took office with a new administration, and the then-Richmond Chief of Police resigned. His replacement was sworn in on February 7, 2005. The Richmond GRP management has since indicated that, even while the previous chief was supportive of GRP's efforts, positive changes resulted from the appointment of the new police chief, who has been supportive of both anti-gang efforts and community-oriented policing. Specifically, the police chief made improvements to the gang intelligence unit and the gang crime reporting process, and has been involved in numerous community-focused events hosted by the RPD. The new police chief helped increase and improve communication between GRP and the RPD, reportedly brought a "sense of urgency" to the RPD's efforts, and raised the department's level of accountability.

In addition, the attorney general announced his resignation effective February 1, 2005. During a January 2005 planning meeting, there was no discussion of the implications of

the attorney general's leaving, despite his obvious interest in gangs statewide. An acting attorney general took office on February 1, 2005, but held that post for less than a year. In January 2006, a newly elected attorney general took office, the third since the start of the Richmond GRP. Both new attorneys general were perceived by the Richmond GRP management team as being involved and invested in the program, as was their predecessor. The administration changes created the need for GRP management to establish new working relationships with a mayor, police chief, and two attorneys general. However, the Richmond GRP management team worked quickly to share information with the new officials and establish new relationships, successfully preventing any delay in GRP activities. Despite the loss of some important relationships between GRP and the OAG when the transition occurred, the changes were deemed positive overall by Richmond GRP management.

Also during fall 2004, the program coordinator requested and received technical assistance from NYGC regarding the program's management structure, resulting in some organizational changes for the initiative. The program coordinator planned to involve the Phase I project steering committee members more fully in the Phase II strategic planning effort, which was facilitated through a reorganization of the committee structure. The executive committee remained intact with the same representation and structure as in Phase I. The leadership committee was no longer recognized as a formal committee and was subsequently referred to as simply GRP management. At this stage, the OAG and program coordinator also recognized that further administrative support for GRP was needed. A full-time program assistant was added to aid the program coordinator, although not until June 2005. The program assistant's role was to maintain contact with project participants, assist in procurement and expenditure issues, and provide any other necessary support for the project.

Changes were also made to the structure of the project subcommittees. Subcommittees had not been formally identified previously; instead, delegates representing different state, city, and local agencies and organizations were invited to participate, were thought of as work groups divided topically (not according to components of the GRP model), and together were termed the "project steering committee." Effective during the Phase II planning period and beyond, the original work group divisions were eliminated and members were divided into subcommittees corresponding to four of the GRP model components—prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry—that have existed through the time of this report. Each subcommittee is headed by a chair and co-chair, who act as liaisons between their committee and the GRP management, allowing direct communication between the subcommittees and management. Upon creation, the subcommittees were considered the "working" committees. That is, they were expected to assess the needs of the community, make recommendations for GRP activities, and assist in partner collaboration. The start of the subcommittee meetings in September 2004 marked the start of Phase II planning in earnest.

Planning Process

Unlike the Phase I strategic planning process, which effectively began with the strategic planning meeting, most of the actual planning for Phase II was accomplished prior to the official Phase II strategic planning meeting through the efforts of the newly-formed subcommittees. These working subcommittees began meeting weekly in September 2004

to develop the Phase II strategic plan, discussing service gaps and needs and developing a written outline of recommendations for the Phase II plan. While the Phase II strategic planning meeting was originally scheduled for early December 2004, it was eventually postponed until January 21, 2005. The delay was mainly due to conflicting schedules of invited attendees; the size of the committee made coordinating the schedules of individual participants difficult.

The official Phase II strategic planning meeting was used to review the GRP's achievements over the previous six months and present and discuss the Phase II plan. Representatives from OJJDP and NYGC, and local GRP participants, including chairs of each of the four subcommittees, attended the one-day meeting. The Richmond GRP management had developed the Phase II strategic plan after meeting with citizens, program partners, and the four subcommittees to discuss service gaps and needs in the target area. Subcommittees had also provided written recommendations on service delivery in the target area, which were incorporated into the Phase II plan. While the plan revealed at the January 2005 meeting demonstrated the Richmond GRP team's significant progress over the previous several months, it was mainly conceptual. The plan required additional thought on relevant details regarding both the Request for Proposals (RFP) process and the implementation process.

Based on input and discussion at the Phase II strategic planning meeting, a Phase II plan was finalized within several weeks. The plan was significantly more extensive than the Phase I plan and included programs under all five components of the GRP model: primary and secondary prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry. It also included activities from Phase I that had not yet been implemented. The Phase II strategic plan was submitted to OJJDP on March 9, 2005 and approved by OJJDP on May 4, 2005. Funding detailed in the Phase II plan totaled just over $2 million, covering the period December 1, 2004 through July 1, 2007[4] and committing $1.3 million dollars to programmatic activities. According to the plan, after a short RFP issuance and review period, GRP services would be provided over the two year period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2007. Table 8.3 provides the planned breakdown of funding. Because activities were not complete at the time of this report, and not all available GRP funds were spent, it was not possible to present a table showing planned versus actual expenditures, as was provided for Phase I above. As in Phase I, the largest amount of funding went to prevention activities, totaling over $600,000.

Implementation Process

On April 8, 2005, the OAG issued an RFP to solicit GRP service providers. The RFP sought providers for Phase I programs that had not been funded earlier because of procurement problems experienced during the fall of 2004 and for new Phase II programs. In accordance with state procurement law, the Phase II plan did not specify expected service providers as the Phase I plan did, but it is clear that GRP management was interested in several of the activities being offered by a known service provider. Starting immediately after the deadline of the April RFP, Richmond GRP management worked with OAG's financial and legal departments to review the responses. In July 2005, the coordinator toured potential providers to more fully assess their capabilities and by August 2005, had selected a number

[4]The site later requested and received an extension through March 31, 2008.

Table 8.3: Richmond: Planned Allocations, Phase II

Budget Category	Planned ($)
Administration	511,180
Equipment, Supplies, Services	136,900
Indirect Costs	151,816
Primary and Secondary Prevention	601,000
Intervention	309,000
Suppression and Reentry	336,963
Grand Total	**2,036,032**

Notes:

- Data in this table are taken directly from budget reports provided by the Richmond GRP management. Line item amounts do not equal grand total provided.

of Phase II providers, with whom contract negotiations were begun. On October 13, 2005, the Richmond GRP held a kick-off meeting for all Phase II service providers. This marked a start date approximately five months later than the anticipated start date according to the Phase II strategic plan (July 1, 2005).

Both prior and subsequent to the kick-off meeting, however, a number of unanticipated problems arose with the subcontract procurement process. These problems combined to result in the significant implementation delays. First, some organizations that were expected to provide GRP services did not respond to the RFP. The lack of response is possibly due to the fact that the RFP was marketed as a gang reduction RFP, and those providers did not believe their services to be specifically gang-targeted. Another issue was that some large and typically well-organized providers missed the RFP deadline, some by mere minutes. In addition to being limited in number, some proposals received under the first RFP were deemed sub-par; therefore, it was crucial to the full implementation and success of GRP to reissue the RFP. To address these issues, the OAG decided to allow a second RFP.

The second RFP was issued and was more successful than the first in that more service providers were able to meet the deadline, and those that missed out in the first RFP were included. The OAG, however, remained unhappy with the quality and content of the service providers' proposals, and many were sent back with a request for revision and resubmission. In addition, the proposals submitted still did not cover all planned efforts. A third RFP was then issued to fill the gaps in services that had not been covered through the second RFP. Ultimately, the OAG secured contracts with service providers, where possible, prior to the October kick-off meeting and continued to issue RFPs for programmatic areas throughout the Phase II implementation period as needed. After the site received an extension from OJJDP on the project period through March 31, 2008, additional providers were needed to fill gaps that arose as initial Phase II contracts ended, and the site issued RFPs to fill those gaps. For example, RFPs were issued in fall 2007 for after-school programming and mental health services, and MOUs were negotiated for a job placement program and a volunteer coordination program.

Because of the issues related to the Phase II RFPs, program selection for Phase II was somewhat piecemeal. As these delays arose, the Richmond GRP management adjusted its outlook on the delays, and planned to use the piecemeal implementation to its advantage,

with the idea that an extended implementation period would allow the management to better track programs from their start. The evaluation team noted, however, that the site's program assessment method may not have been as comprehensive as possible. Tracking of programs in Richmond was limited to program coordinator visits to site locations and quarterly financial reports from each provider to the OAG. The site never developed a client or service delivery tracking system, and UI's reviews of each provider's required quarterly financial reports to the OAG revealed the lack of a consistent method for reporting clients served, program dosage levels (i.e., the level of services or programming that each client received), and GRP funding spent per client. In fact, more than one partner interviewed in 2007 pointed out the limitations of this system of program monitoring, suggesting that management needed a better way to assess both program progress and accomplishments but also, prior to contracting, to assess the partner's commitment level, perhaps through a review of previous accomplishments. Thus, at the end of 2007, it remained unclear to the evaluation team whether this piecemeal program selection strategy had indeed helped the site to better track program progress.

While program tracking methods could have been more rigorous and comprehensive, the program coordinator nonetheless continued to use those methods to assess selected providers throughout the implementation period in order to make adjustments where necessary. This meant issuing new RFPs when previous contracts ended or when service gaps were identified. The coordinator also worked hard to identify organizations that could contribute to GRP's effort and garner their participation in the initiative. One such partner was Richmond Public Schools. During Phase I the public high school serving target area students—George Wythe High School—was officially involved but largely inactive in GRP. The widespread perception, however, was that the school's students faced significant challenges, that the school itself had serious safety issues, and that GRP could contribute to improvements in those areas. Administration at the school changed between the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years, representing an opportunity to get the school involved. In October 2006, the coordinator started discussions with the school's administration and set up monthly meetings with Wythe administration to discuss and address the school's challenges. The coordinator included the RPD and other relevant partners in the meetings to ensure that a full range of options were considered for the school and that the school's issues were addressed comprehensively. Shortly thereafter, in November 2006, the coordinator received permission from the Assistant Superintendent of Richmond Public Schools to form a partnership with the school. One year following those initial meetings, the school's principal and assistant principal continued to be active members of the intervention team, providing information and insight to other partners on potential clients that were attending Wythe and keeping partners informed of developments at the school. In addition, the outreach worker established an office in the school building, allowing him to identify potential clients who would benefit from GRP services and interact with current clients. By all accounts, the school became an active partner in GRP, increasing the initiative's reach and its ability to target the greatest number of at-risk youths in the area.

The coordinator and director also continued to communicate with partners throughout the implementation period, sending notification of any relevant funding opportunities, especially important as the grant headed into its final months of federal funding, and undertook other efforts designed to help sustain the initiative's work beyond the March

31, 2008 end date (See Section 8.7). GRP management also maintained its oversight of contracted service providers, conducting site visits regularly, assessing where service gaps existed, identifying arising needs in the community and working to issue RFPs to fill those gaps as needed and solicit new partners that might assist in the initiative's efforts. Management also assisted those agencies with lower capacities for administering a grant from GRP, helping them to remain in compliance with all OAG requirements. As part of its monitoring and assessment of service providers, the GRP management had to handle contractual issues as they arose. One such issue involved the administration of the One-Stop and the Intervention Team, the focus of the following section.

Development of the Intervention Team and One-Stop Resource Center

During fall 2004, the OAG GRP team also began developing the multidisciplinary intervention team, including a street outreach worker. NYGC provided technical assistance with the effort. The intervention team and the outreach worker both fall under the purview of the intervention subcommittee. The City of Richmond had little to no history of street outreach efforts from which to draw lessons for the GRP plans. This, however, represented an opportunity for the Richmond GRP to define outreach for itself and train workers in the GRP model of intervention. An NYGC representative presented information on development of the intervention team in October 2004 to GRP committee members. The committee members appeared to accept the concept and agreed with OJJDP's assessment of its importance. While efforts to develop the intervention team began in late 2004, the team did not begin meeting and evaluating potential clients until early 2006.

The multidisciplinary intervention team and outreach worker are the central elements of intervention efforts in Richmond and as such, were allocated the largest share of intervention funding. The intervention team was designed to work with serious offenders and those at risk of gang membership, providing them with extensive case management. The City of Richmond's Department of Justice Services (DJS) received $50,000 to take the lead in developing and operating the intervention team. The GRP City Liaison facilitated the development and operation of the intervention team on behalf of the OAG and GRP and with technical assistance from the NYGC, who had provided technical assistance several times in the previous year to assist the Richmond GRP with this task. Just before the start of the intervention team in late January 2006, NYGC conducted an on-site training for the Richmond GRP that included a police sergeant and the gang outreach coordinator from Riverside, CA. The training provided information on the composition of the intervention team, the role of individual members, and case management under the intervention team model. In partner interviews, the NYGC was criticized for providing technical assistance that was deemed too 'generic' or standard, and was not adaptable to Richmond's context. Nonetheless, the Richmond GRP closely followed the model used in Riverside, CA in deciding who should be involved in the intervention team. NYGC continued to provide technical assistance for the intervention team throughout the Phase II implementation period.

The Intervention team conducted its first meeting on February 9, 2006. The GRP program coordinator initially served as the intervention team leader. Other team members included representatives from probation, law enforcement, social services, schools, and other service providers. As needed, the team also included employment agency staff, community development/mobilization staff, specialized social service providers, parole officers,

and others, but the core team has had the most daily contact with targeted youth. As part of the intervention team, the Richmond GRP also hired an outreach worker/coordinator, who joined the team in February 2006. This individual plays a key role in contacting and recruiting youth and retaining them for GRP services and activities. Three main roles of the intervention team and outreach worker are to refer youth and families to GRP services as needed, conduct risk assessments for youths and develop intervention plans, and provide case management to ensure that conditions of probation such as community service or substance abuse treatment are met and that educational and occupational opportunities are provided.

Another central element of the GRP approach is the One-Stop resource center. The City of Richmond's DJS received $92,500 to establish and operate the One-Stop, which is designed to serve as the primary hub for service delivery referrals and program marketing support of the Richmond GRP. The primary function of the One-Stop office is to provide coordinated access to services offered by private and public sources for the families of at-risk or high-risk youth within the target area. The goal is to identify at-risk youths before they become involved in gang activity and link the youths and their families to services in order to strengthen the family unit and lessen the attractiveness of gang activity. The One-Stop also works to disseminate information to the community, promote citizen participation in GRP, and undertake other initiatives to meet the needs of the culturally diverse citizens in the target area. The One-Stop center was temporarily located on the 2nd floor of Southside Service Center, but the facility lacked adequate signage and was generally regarded as inaccessible to the public: after two months of operation in early 2006, only two members of the public had visited the center. The center was relocated to the first floor of the Service Center on May 16, 2006 with permanent signage in place shortly thereafter. Under the same funding stream, the City also hired a GRP-City Liaison. In addition to overseeing the One-Stop, the GRP-City Liaison was intended to be the main point of contact between the OAG and the City for programs funded by the GRP grant. That position was eventually eliminated, however, and the GRP has instead relied on the resource coordinator position to oversee operation of the One-Stop center, track client usage of different services, and promote use of the one-stop in the community. While there was some difficulty in identifying an individual who was bilingual and had the appropriate skills, the resource coordinator position was filled in February 2006 and the same individual remained in that position as of late 2007.

After a strong start to the intervention team, receiving over 10 referrals of individuals in need of intervention in its first two months, the intervention team faced several difficulties that threatened to derail its efforts. First, after several months on the job, the initial outreach worker, hired in February 2006, resigned on her own initiative after just over 6 months, at the end of the summer 2006. A temporary replacement was appointed to the position, but served as the outreach worker only part time. That individual was unable to commit the necessary time required to successfully conduct outreach to target area youth at the level to meet the demand in the community. While GRP was searching for a permanent outreach worker, the temporary, part-time individual vacated the position, leaving the intervention team for a short period with no outreach worker. At the same time, the GRP management grew increasingly concerned with the effort that the City DJS was committing to the intervention team, and with the poor level of communication between the GRP and the DJS regarding the intervention team. The DJS was not considered by individuals on

the intervention team to be receptive to suggested changes or ideas to improve operations of the intervention team. The GRP management was supportive of the intervention team, but had little ability to intervene in day-to-day management issues between the DJS and the intervention team.

Because the City DJS was also contracted to provide the One-Stop center, and because the resource coordinator by design works closely with the intervention team, the One-Stop also suffered from some of the same communication and management problems under the DJS. To address these issues, GRP management entered into discussions with the RPD regarding the intervention team, outreach worker, and One-Stop to determine whether the RPD would be willing to take on responsibility for those intervention services. In November 2006, GRP management met with the City and the OAG legal departments to cancel the contract for these three elements of GRP. Subsequently, the contract was awarded to the RPD for these intervention services. While some partners criticized the OAG for not acting sooner to change the One-Stop and intervention team provider, GRP management had to walk a fine line between the City DJS and any other potential provider. Changing financial contracts does not often happen easily, so while the OAG may have started the process earlier, the fact that the change was eventually made should be considered a success.

NYGC provided technical assistance to the site in December 2006 to provide recommendations regarding the transition. Throughout the transition period, the intervention team continued to meet and did not experience a disruption in its ability to provide services. An RPD lieutenant from the target area sector was identified to lead the intervention team and One-Stop and a full time outreach worker with extensive experience performing such a role in other cities was hired in early 2007. As discussed earlier, staff from Wythe high school became involved in the intervention team, and representatives from CIS, who was providing programming at the elementary and middle school levels, also joined the team. Because of the significant changes in personnel and management, the site requested another intervention team training from NYGC, which was provided in March 2007. The intervention team met bi-weekly during the spring of 2007. The intervention team may have spent some time 'reinventing the wheel' and undertaking planning activities that had already been completed in 2006, and could perhaps have used its funding more efficiently. Because of the turnover in staff and the perspective of the two different providers (i.e., DJS and RPD) some of this duplication was likely unavoidable. Also in early 2007, the intervention team experienced its first success story, with the graduation of an individual who by all accounts had turned his life around. He had been receiving services through the intervention team for approximately one year before he graduated.

The One-Stop experienced its own success story when it relocated from the little-known or used Southside Service Center to the Southwood Apartment complex. While the apartment management company had committed two apartments to GRP on an in-kind basis to be used as the One-Stop resource center in July 2006, the move was not made until early 2007. The two apartments were combined to make one large center and the space was renovated to accommodate GRP services; specifically, one room was designed to be used by Bon Secours to perform medical examinations and another to accommodate several computer work stations. ElderHomes provided landscaping assistance for the exterior of the space, and a large sign was also hung outside to clearly identify the center. A grand opening was held for the new location in April 2007. The new location houses the resource coordinator and the outreach worker.

NYGC conducted another site visit to the Richmond GRP to assess the progress of the intervention team and One-Stop under the RPD. One issue that was noted at the conclusion of the site visit was an uncertainty regarding available GRP services, with intervention team members looking to the director or program coordinator for guidance on available resources and the referral process to those resources. The technical assistance provider felt that this uncertainty may have been part of the team's 'growing pains' due to the recent management transitions, but that the team would benefit from continued and increased communication regarding available services for referrals. In addition, NYGC discussed the CRI with the outreach worker specifically, to provide him with an additional tool to use in determining appropriate and available services. Another issue that was discussed was the fact that the outreach worker, who was hired to work with active gang members and those at risk for gang behavior, was employed by the RPD under the new contract. NYGC reiterated that it was essential for the outreach worker to avoid behaving in such a way as to be perceived as part of or giving information to the RPD, for instance, having been seen with police officers or maintaining an office at a police station. Members of the intervention team, including officers present and the outreach worker, assured other members and NYGC that they were aware of this condition and that they planned to take it seriously in order to ensure the effectiveness of the outreach worker.

Initially, the intervention team planned to use NYGC's Client Track Software, offered free of charge to all four GRP sites. However, it is not clear that the software was consistently used, if at all. In fact, in June 2007, NYGC conducted a site visit and learned that the Client Track software had not yet been installed on the intervention team's computers or on the outreach worker's computer. Instead, paper files were being used to track clients. While those paper files were noted to be meticulous, the site was not observed to be tracking clients in a comprehensive electronic format, making it difficult to comprehensively collect data that would inform the evaluation regarding the number of clients served, client demographics, and client dosage of different programs.

The contractual issues that arose in the course of developing the One-Stop and intervention team represented significant challenges to the GRP administration, providing a hint of the fractured and territorial nature of the city prior to the start of GRP. With the assistance of the RPD, however, GRP management was able to turn the disappointing performance of one provider into a success story for both the One-Stop and intervention team, analogous in many ways to the approach that GRP was taking in Richmond to overcome historic divisiveness. If nowhere else, the Richmond GRP's handling of the situation highlighted the successes the effort was realizing in creating partnerships where none existed prior.

GRP Administration

If the One-Stop and intervention team were hitting their strides in early 2007, activity at the subcommittee level was in the middle of a distinct decline. While service provision continued throughout the Phase II period, GRP-related administrative activities—beyond those conducted by the program coordinator and OAG staff—waned. Due to the unforeseen delays with the RFP process and Phase II implementation, subcommittee meetings ceased shortly after the Phase II strategic plan was submitted to OJJDP in March 2005. During the Phase II planning process in fall 2004 and spring 2005, the subcommittees had met regularly. The meeting hiatus that started in the spring 2005 happened in part because the

subcommittee members were also service providers and felt they needed time to prepare for the Phase II RFP that was issued in April 2005. The subcommittees, however, did not meet for a full year, reconvening in early spring 2006 for at least one meeting. Meetings subsequently took another year-long hiatus for unknown reasons, and the subcommittees did not meet again until April 2007. Nearly five months later, in September 2007, the second all-partners meeting of that year was convened to discuss sustainability issues (see Section 8.7).

This infrequency of meetings appears closely tied to the lack of clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and expectations for subcommittees: committee chairs and other members reported to UI not knowing the purpose of the subcommittees beyond planning activities. Yet infrequent meetings were cited time and again during interviews with partners as a main administrative issue hindering partnership and collaboration. At least one interview respondent also suggested that GRP management should have reviewed the subcommittee membership to ensure that partners were contributing to the most appropriate committee based on expertise and experience. During the two-year period following Phase II planning activities, there was at least one meeting, in March 2006, attended by subcommittee chairs and GRP management, where the purpose and role of subcommittees during the Phase II implementation period was discussed. The subcommittees' roles beyond assisting with development of the Phase II plan were also addressed in the plan itself, indicating management's intention for the committees to have a role beyond assistance with the strategic planning process. Those roles, as conceived both in the strategic plan and at the March 2006 meeting, were to identify gaps in services within their assigned component (i.e., prevention, intervention, suppression, or reentry), make recommendations to the program coordinator and staff on proven effective programs, assist in partnership collaboration, and provide reports on subcommittee activity to the program coordinator. In addition, at the March 2006 meeting, subcommittee chairs were asked to address challenges of service provision under the GRP in their component area, develop goals for their subcommittees, and to keep GRP management informed about their activities. In asking the subcommittees to identify gaps in services and make program recommendations, GRP management thus made clear its intention to use the subcommittees throughout the implementation period, echoing the timetable of piecemeal program selection and implementation. That effort on the part of subcommittees, however, never materialized, nor were the subcommittees ever really used as intended in the strategic plan. Based on both observation and reports of partners through interviews in the spring of 2007, meeting activity was limited to all-partner meetings hosted by the GRP management itself. A lack of communication between GRP management and subcommittees was evident.

It is not clear whether GRP management intended for the subcommittees to meet independently, or whether GRP management itself simply did not host the number of subcommittee meetings that it had intended. The ramifications of not meeting, however, are clear. Over the two yearlong hiatuses, partners likely lost touch with GRP management, and may have lost interest in participation in the initiative. Indeed, at the April 2007 meeting of all partners, many partners were attending their first GRP meeting, being new to the initiative. The level of trust among partners was lower than it would have been had the partners been meeting regularly throughout Phase II. After group-wide introductions and updates on the initiative's status, partners broke out into subcommittees to discuss current programs and sustainability opportunities. At the end of the meeting, subcommittee chairs

were tasked with keeping the discussions among the subcommittee members going and reporting back to the coordinator. From interviews conducted with program partners shortly thereafter, it appeared that little discussion occurred beyond the meeting. By that point in the initiative, it seemed that subcommittee chairs had settled into a limited management/administrative role outside of the all-partner meetings organized by GRP management. It also seemed that GRP management tacitly accepted that level of activity by not encouraging or fostering more discussion. Perhaps management felt that, during the second year of Phase II implementation, additional meetings were not necessary. Based on findings from partner interviews, however, a majority of committee members disagreed, and felt that additional meetings would improve the initiative's operation and levels of collaboration.

Also affecting the partnership's operation well into Phase II implementation were several significant administrative changes, starting in early 2007. The program assistant, who had been added to the staff in June 2005, was promoted to another position within the OAG in January 2007. In that position, he would no longer assist the program coordinator with daily coordination of the initiative, but was still expected to dedicate a portion of his time to assisting GRP with securing additional funding. His knowledge of GRP was expected to help in identifying grants and other financial sources that could sustain GRP beyond the federal funding period. A new program assistant was brought in shortly afterwards to fill the assistant position. At the same time the original executive director of the program left the OAG's office. The original program coordinator was promoted to the director position, enabling her to focus less on day-to-day activities and responsibilities and more broadly on the goals and direction of the initiative and on its sustainability. A new program coordinator started in early February 2007, and was responsible for the daily oversight of the effort, although he did work closely with the former coordinator. The former coordinator's history with GRP meant that she was intimately familiar with the needs of the initiative and could bring that to her new role as director.

The size of the GRP partnership in Richmond may have been both a boon and a burden for the management team. Bringing myriad partners to the table allowed Richmond to offer a wide variety of programs under all components. But the sheer number of partners made calling all-partner meetings, maintaining regular contact with partners, overseeing partner contracts and activities a considerable administrative undertaking. While the new coordinator was enthusiastic about GRP's work and was favorably received by partners, he resigned in August 2007 after only several months on the job. The difficulty and bureaucracy involved in administering the large number of funded programs under GRP were likely roles in his decision to resign. Such a large partnership inevitably requires an enormous amount of oversight and paperwork, and in the case of the Richmond GRP, it restricted the amount of time the program coordinator was able to spend in the field interacting with partners. The timing of the coordinator's departure was unfortunate, as it occurred less than a year before the end of the federal funding period. With the level of sustainability that could be achieved by GRP still a question at that point, the executive director felt it would be irresponsible—and nearly impossible—to hire a proficient replacement with no guarantee of job security beyond a 5-6 month period. Instead, the director was forced to take on her previous coordinator roles in addition to her expanded directorial responsibilities, likely limiting the amount of time she could spend on broader 'big picture' undertakings.

At the time of this report, the Richmond GRP was headed into the last several months of federal funding, maintaining service provision in the target area and focusing on efforts to sustain at least parts of the initiative. By that point as well, the management had dealt with unresponsive and underperforming providers, changes in local government, and changes in the management team, as had every site. Complicating matters for the Richmond GRP were issues with two of its central elements: the Intervention Team and One-Stop contractor. Arguably, the handling of the problems associated with these elements represents one of its biggest successes. To further explore such successes achieved by the partnership in its first three years, and to develop a more nuanced understanding of the partnership's functioning, the evaluation team interviewed a significant proportion of active partners. Findings from those interviews are presented in the following section.

8.4. COLLABORATIVE FUNCTIONING

The following discussion reflects findings from on-site observations, interviews with local stakeholders, and two waves of the parternship survey administered by UI. The section focuses on collaboration as part of GRP. UI researchers interviewed nine committee members in spring 2006 and 23 committee members in spring 2007. The samples include both subcommittee members, with at least one individual from each subcommittee, and individuals from the GRP administration. At both interview points, GRP subcommittee meetings were just resuming after year-long hiatuses. In 2006, this made identifying and contacting committee members difficult and all interviews were done over the phone, resulting in a small sample size. In 2007, however, members of the evaluation team attended two committee meetings while scheduling the interviews, and were successful in interviewing a larger sample of members. In addition, it should be noted that while the full list of official committee members comprises over 70 individuals, a much smaller number actually participate regularly in the initiative. While UI did interview some individuals who admitted to having little to no involvement in or knowledge of GRP, with the program coordinator's assistance, the evaluation team was able to contact a large proportion of individuals who were, at the time, regularly involved in the initiative.

The interviews were semi-structured and focused on six main areas of collaboration, including mission, goals, and strategic plan; collaboration and capacity building; committee functioning; management and leadership; resources; and sustainability. The following sections are organized into discussions according to those topics.

8.4.1. Mission, Goals, and Strategic Plan

Nearly all of the respondents in both 2006 and 2007 were able to articulate the mission of the Richmond GRP as focused on reducing gang activity in the target area, especially among youths, and felt that that mission had guided the GRP partnership from the start, with little change in the overall mission over time. Most respondents also mentioned GRP's comprehensive or "multi-faceted" approach to the gang problem in the target area. From discussions with GRP administration, official literature, and the array of specific programs that GRP selected to fund, it appears that much of GRP's effort is focused on targeting the Hispanic population in the target area. Few respondents, however, mentioned this focus on the Hispanic population as part of the GRP mission, instead talking in broader terms about the target area and population. One respondent did indicate that the mission

had become more focused over time on the specific efforts to reduce gang crime, and in particular targeting both the Hispanic and African American populations. Others described a concurrent broadening of the mission, indicating that, in terms of service providers selected to partner with GRP, the initiative had "cast a wider net" to include organizations and service providers not necessarily narrowly focused on gang crime. These respondents described GRP as taking advantage of a wider array of service provision options while maintaining its anti-gang mission. Survey responses indicate that efforts to include additional partners increased with time, as 79 percent of Wave II respondents indicated that GRP sought out new relationship and built coalitions of mutual interest, compared to 66 percent of respondents in Wave I.

Respondents also discussed other important elements of the mission, highlighting the importance of getting the community involved in the GRP effort from the start and the focus on collaboration among GRP participants. Several respondents also indicated that building stronger communities and improving overall quality of life was part of GRP's mission, and the vast majority of Wave I and Wave II survey respondents agreed that the strategic plan responded to the concerns and hopes of neighborhood residents and the target population. Others spoke of GRP's initial effort at getting to know the community, including the importance of GRP's early efforts at assessing the community's needs and getting residents involved in the effort. Respondents described the community's initial hesitation at getting involved in GRP, centered mainly on resistance to the "gang" label. Overcoming this resistance and garnering participation from residents required approaching the community from a different angle, even while remaining focused on the overall gang-reduction mission of GRP. The coordinator's tremendous effort in achieving the level of buy-in from the community that exists today was frequently acknowledged during interviews. However, although survey respondents cited improved community involvement and public support as two of the largest changes that arose out of GRP, the involvement of residents appeared to decrease with time. At Wave I, 66 percent of respondents felt that residents had input into the partnership, while only 45 percent felt so in Wave II, and many Wave II respondents were unsure whether GRP had built a constituency of residents committed to the program.

Respondents also spoke of the importance of collaboration among partners, and felt such collaboration was an important part of GRP's mission. Respondents spoke of Richmond as a "divisive" city in many ways, where collaboration and cooperation have historically been rare among city officials, organizations, and service providers. GRP has, according to many respondents, made great strides to overcome such divisiveness, and has created an initiative with an unprecedented level of cooperation in the city. Survey respondents in both Waves also indicated that the strategic plan defined specific ways in which partners would work together to achieve desired results. This achievement was partially evidenced by the initial group of partners at the table; numerous respondents report that in the early stages of GRP development, many partners were simply there for the money and were more competitive than collaborative but that with time, that changed. Interviewees in 2007 described most partners as committed to the mission of GRP and willing to cooperate with other committee members and partner organizations. Surveys reflect this change, as an increasing percentage of respondents agreed that participating organizations were committed to the project regardless of funding (48 percent in Wave I and 57 percent in Wave II) and that the intense competition for funds did not impede

progress toward GRP goals (28 percent in Wave I and 50 percent in Wave II).

The vast majority of GRP survey respondents across both Waves agreed that the strategic plan had realistic goals and measurable objectives. Respondents pointed to a number of different goals and objectives guiding GRP's activities that, while different, were closely related and provided a perception of GRP's overall purpose that was consistent across committee members and subcommittees. Respondents portrayed the array of services funded by GRP as comprehensive and diverse, and many mentioned the four main prongs of GRP as equally important. Interestingly, while many respondents felt that in 2007 the four prongs were equally important, some indicated that this had not always been the case. There was little agreement, however, as to which prong was emphasized in the early days of GRP. Some described GRP as prevention-heavy at the beginning, while at least one respondent felt that prevention had been given short shrift at first, with the emphasis instead on suppression activities. These different opinions likely reflect the different interests of the respondents, and it is important to consider that the majority of respondents indicated that in 2007, GRP was addressing each prong fairly. This also reinforces the claim that in the early days of GRP, committee members and service providers were there for their own benefit, and were not as interested in taking a comprehensive, collaborative approach to addressing gang crime. Other goals and objectives mentioned included the development of the One-Stop, identifying individuals in need and referring them to the appropriate services, and achieving and maintaining a high level of community involvement, especially among the Hispanic population.

Respondents in 2006 provided varied opinions on the appropriateness of the chosen target area: while four respondents stated that the target area was well chosen, remaining respondents identified alternate areas that they felt would have been more appropriate, including the northern or eastern parts of the city, the entire city, or a larger part of the Southside. In 2007, respondents were more unified in their opinions, indicating that the target area was an appropriate choice. One respondent admitted skepticism at first in the choice of areas, but reported coming around to the choice after learning more about conditions in the area. This example highlights the importance of the site's early efforts to educate partners on conditions in the target area and develop a consensus on the area's central problems and the most appropriate ways to address them.

While respondents seemed to consistently identify one of GRP's main goals as involving the community and working to address the target population's specific needs, they were mixed in their opinions on GRP's response to those needs in practice. Most felt that GRP's response was excellent, describing it as "off the charts" and "phenomenal." Some, however, felt the response was more mediocre, and that GRP was missing opportunities to better serve the target population: Hispanics. Interestingly, there appeared to be a dichotomy between those who felt that GRP was in place to serve Hispanics and those who felt the initiative mainly served African Americans. Those who mentioned this issue indicated that perceptions among the community that GRP served one or the other population could hinder GRP's ability to serve both. Interestingly, while GRP does intend, at least in part, to target the Hispanic population, though not to the exclusion of other groups, some respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the efforts that have been made in reaching the Hispanic population, citing especially a lack of bilingual service providers. On the other hand, the GRP management has focused significant resources on English as a Second Language (ESL) and Spanish as a Second Language (SSL) training for GRP

management, service providers, and residents, in an effort to bridge the language barrier.

8.4.2. Collaboration and Capacity Building

Respondents were generally mixed on various aspects of collaboration. Respondents in 2006 cited lack of communication, the year-long hiatus from meeting, and an inactive executive committee as barriers to increased cooperation. A year later, little seemed to have changed in terms of the perceptions of collaboration. Equal numbers of respondents in 2007 indicated that levels of collaboration were high as indicated that collaboration was low, even "non-existent." In general, those more intimately involved with the running of GRP tended to report higher levels of collaboration and those more tangentially involved, such as funded service providers, gave the initiative lower ratings for collaboration. This finding can be interpreted in at least two ways: those more intimately involved in the effort are more heavily invested in its success and are "closer" to the initiative, perhaps preventing an objective perspective on actual levels of collaboration. On the other hand, more tangentially involved partners may not have taken the initiative required to participate in the existing collaboration and may not be as involved as they should be in order to take advantage of the opportunities to collaborate with other partners.

Several respondents recognized the conservative culture in Richmond as creating a difficult context to work within, describing the city as racially and ethnically divided, and lauded the GRP initiative for overcoming much of the territoriality that has historically characterized Richmond. One respondent pointed out that all of the partners were competing for the same funds and were working in the same target area, naturally leading to territoriality and competition, but also felt that partners were improving in that area. In addition, many partners recognized the great strides in collaboration that the initiative has made from the start, pointing out that even two to three months prior to the 2007 interviews, collaboration was low but that the partnership had recently made improvements in collaboration. Much of the recent collaboration improvements were credited to the intervention team, which underwent significant operational changes during spring 2007. Despite these improvements, survey respondents across both Waves indicated that partnership collaboration represented the largest change needed to improve GRP.

Respondents provided a picture of sharing of financial and non-financial resources alike among partners as existent, but not as extensive as it could be. Sharing among partners has likely been limited by Richmond's historical territoriality, and respondents recognized that the level of sharing is greater with GRP than it otherwise would be. Several respondents painted a picture of GRP as fostering sharing within small cliques of partners, but not among the larger group. This may occur among partners who are more familiar with each other, have a history of partnering, or who have developed a rapport by participating on the same subcommittee. Indeed, as the program matured, GRP became increasingly successful at overcoming distrust among agencies (41 percent of respondents in Wave I and 57 percent in Wave II). Overall, respondents were lukewarm on the topic of sharing among partners, indicating that while the Richmond GRP has made significant progress to bringing disparate partners to the same table, barriers to full partnerships within the initiative still exist.

In addition, most 2006 respondents felt that the initiative would be stronger with the inclusion of more partners, but provided no uniform opinion on which partners were missing from the table. From the beginning of the initiative, the program coordinator's attitude

has been one of inclusiveness and expansion with new partners, and she has consistently worked to attract new partners to the initiative. Few partners were identified as missing from the table by the 2007 respondents; faith-based organizations, schools, and the private sector were among those mentioned, although several respondents commended GRP management's efforts at getting CIS and George Wythe High School involved during Phase II. The survey provides conflicting results, however, with over half of survey respondents suggesting it was *not* difficult to recruit faith-based partners (48 percent in Wave I and 57 percent in Wave II). Also mentioned, mainly to provide insight and assistance with the initiative's approach, were ex-gang members or offenders. A handful of respondents felt that including such individuals would have broadened partners' understanding of the problem and the best way to approach it, especially considering Richmond's sparse history in dealing with gang issues.

Most respondents in 2007 felt that the initiative had made tremendous efforts to be as inclusive as possible, again recognizing the difficult context that GRP started under in Richmond. On the other hand, three respondents in 2006 expressed the sentiment that too many agencies were involved, and that the diversity of partners led to difficulty in keeping agencies focused on the same goals. In 2007, while no specific partners were identified as inhibiting GRP, some respondents did agree with 2006 respondents that the partnership was too large, that duplication of represented services might be a problem, and that "too many cooks" and too much red tape were impeding GRP success. Richmond does have the largest number of both committee members and funded service providers of all four GRP sites; these criticisms hit on some of the negative aspects to amassing such a large partnership.

Respondents were more vocal in identifying gaps in GRP service provision; only a few suggested that there were no gaps in GRP services, while most offered at least one area where GRP funds could be used to fill a service gap. There was little overlap in the suggestions, however, reflecting the wide array of service gaps that likely existed in the target area prior to GRP and the great strides that GRP has made towards filling most of those gaps. The suggestions made are probably reflective to some extent of the individual's personal preferences for service provision. Some areas where GRP services were seen as weak or altogether lacking included:

- Boys and Girls Clubs
- Daycare, child learning centers
- Job placement
- Mentoring/role model programs
- Mental health services
- Neighborhood restoration
- Reentry services, specifically with Departments of Corrections, and Juvenile Justice
- School-based programming
- Transportation to services

Interestingly, the Richmond GRP has funded activities under all of the headings mentioned above as areas where service gaps exist, except daycare and transportation to services. One result of its strategy of giving small amounts of grant funding to a large number of providers (discussed below) is that the services may be watered down—providers may be limited in what they can actually provide for the amount of funding they receive. Indeed, survey respondents in both Waves were heavily divided on whether the strategic plan was able to utilize the experiences and resources of partner organizations. Providers may simply not be perceived as providing the prescribed service adequately. Either way, other partners may perceive gaps in service provision even where partners have been funded to provide such a service.

The distribution of funding was an important element of GRP that set it apart from the other GRP sites. Richmond funded many service providers at relatively low levels, with the goal of getting as many providers involved in GRP as possible, and with high expectations for selected grantees to maximize the leveraging power of their GRP funds. While many interviewees felt they were not sufficiently knowledgeable about funding decisions to judge whether this funding strategy was the best one for GRP, the responses of those who did reply—about a third of all respondents—were split. Several thought that spreading the money thinly over a large number of grantees was an effective method and that for the most part, money was put where the needs were greatest. Others criticized the funding method, suggesting there was no comprehensive funding plan, only myriad grants for individual service providers. More than one respondent pointed out that duplication of services undoubtedly took place with more than 50 funded partners at any given time. Also criticized was the perceived approach of giving a larger proportion of the funding to larger organizations with existing capacities to secure funding from other sources and limiting the amount given to smaller organizations that needed more financial assistance. Respondents also pointed out the four prongs were not funded equally, at least early on in the initiative. Three respondents in 2006 were disappointed with what they saw to be an inadequate assessment of service providers to ensure compliance with its contract, use of GRP funds, and quality and amount of service provision. These respondents felt the failure to consistently and comprehensively assess provider performance led the Richmond GRP to commit funds to organizations that lacked the capacity to meet GRP's requirements. In time, funding decisions may have appeared more sage, with fewer survey respondents reporting that the funding selection process was ineffective in Wave II. Over half of respondents in both Waves believed GRP resources were being used effectively.

The Richmond GRP made significant efforts towards advertising the initiative itself and parts of the initiative to potential service recipients, starting with its branding efforts that included a unique name—the Gang Reduction and Intervention Program, or GRIP—and a logo. The name and logo set the stage for the site's efforts to make a name for itself in the community. The vast majority of survey respondents in both Waves agreed that GRP educated public and private officials about community needs and engaged in activities to create awareness of, and increase support for, its work. Most interview respondents were able to identify a number of different outreach efforts made by GRP partners. Three out of four survey respondents indicated that the program regularly organized community events to increase resident involvement, such as the annual Imagine Festival, which provided partners with the opportunity to advertise their services to the community. Partners who mentioned the fairs considered them to be excellent outreach and publicity venues.

Respondents were also aware that GRP had been promoted in local newspapers, on billboards, on Spanish radio, and in cable spots. Some also mentioned the exposure GRP gets through the Hispanic Liaison Office's monthly newsletter, Connections/Conexiones, that is funded through GRP. At least one respondent commended GRP for making the Southwood area safer and allowing his organization to conduct GRP-related outreach there. Respondents were less unified, however, in their opinions on the extent to which GRP has made a name for itself in the community. Interview and survey respondents agreed that GRP had achieved an identity and certain level of name recognition among target area residents and organizations, with respondents in Wave I citing improvements in public awareness as a key change resulting from GRP. However, nearly all respondents reported that the name recognition was still tied to the OAG, whether positive or negative. Also, several respondents mentioned that outside of the core group of GRP partners and target area community, the initiative was relatively unknown. At least one respondent thought the gang label in the name might "throw people off" or discourage them from seeking GRP services. In general, respondents felt that GRP had done a significant amount of outreach in the community designed to raise awareness about the initiative and specific programs available through GRP, and through that outreach, had achieved name recognition or successfully branded itself. A few respondents did recognize, however, that more outreach could always help, and that outreach should continue throughout the life of the initiative.

In 2006, three respondents thought functioning of the initiative could be improved if smaller partners received more assistance from GRP, but six respondents thought that GRP definitely helped small agencies. Although significantly more respondents in Wave II surveys agreed that GRP had developed the capacity of smaller partner organizations (38 percent in Wave I and 76 percent in Wave II), interview respondents in 2007 disagreed on whether GRP builds the capacity of smaller organizations. While one respondent pointed to the technical difficulties that smaller organizations may have in applying for and complying with the rules of a grant administered by the OAG's office—something many have never undertaken before—others suggested that even if GRP was not increasing partners' capacities, it had the potential to do so. One respondent felt the onus was on partner agencies to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by partnering with GRP, while another felt that it was hard for GRP to focus on increasing the capacities of funded partners when there were so many, and that with a smaller group of partners, more focus could be placed on capacity-building. Finally, one respondent pointed out that at the very least, partner organizations could take advantage of the cachet associated with the GRP name and funding from the OAG.

8.4.3. Committee Functioning

Respondents in 2006 and 2007 overwhelmingly agreed that the committee structure was good overall, allowing involvement by a diversity of programs, information sharing among members, and the ability to keep everyone at the table focused on a common goal. Except for those speaking of the intervention subcommittee, respondents almost uniformly criticized the frequency of meetings, however, and the lack of opportunities for all four subcommittees to come together and share activities and knowledge with the GRP partnership as a whole. Respondents recognized that the size of the partnership limited the opportunity to meet more frequently, but thought that valuable lessons, momentum, and members were lost in the two year-long hiatuses that occurred between over the

course of the GRP initiative's planning and implementation stages (one between spring 2005 and spring 2006, with a handful of meetings in spring 2006, and another between spring 2006 and spring 2007). The initiative has never seemed to get into a routine of regular meetings, and the size of the committees is one of the main issues preventing more meetings.

Respondents indicated their desire for subcommittee meetings as frequently as quarterly or monthly, with additional opportunities for all subcommittees to come together as a group. A few respondents felt that the onus for additional meetings should fall to the subcommittee chairs, and criticized the chairs for holding infrequent meetings. Others, however, recognized that the roles and expectations of the subcommittee chairs were not always clear; at one point GRP administration had planned to offer a training for subcommittee chairs, but such technical assistance never materialized. A few respondents confessed that while additional meetings would help maintain momentum, they were unsure what the point of meetings would be after strategic planning tasks were completed. Most, however, did feel that the meetings that were held tended to be productive and efficient and that indecision and disorganization did not inhibit the program's progress. One respondent felt that allowing for more discussion among all partners during meetings would be an improvement and that the meetings were too "presentation-based." Overall, interviewees described a lack of guidance to some extent from GRP management on roles within subcommittees.

The intervention team and suppression subcommittee, however, both met more frequently and with different, more clearly defined purposes than did the prevention and reentry teams. Respondents from the intervention team for the most part expressed satisfaction with both the frequency and the quality of its meetings. Members of the suppression subcommittee also reported a sufficient number of meetings, held more frequently than standard GRP meetings because of their preexisting relationships, smaller number of members, and focused goals and activities.

8.4.4. Management and Leadership

All respondents spoke highly of the program coordinator, commenting that she was extremely dedicated, hard working, and willing to be involved in all activities with people from all levels of the initiative. Respondents also gave high marks to other individuals from the OAG who have been involved in the initiative, including the program coordinator who was part of GRP for several months during 2007. Several respondents also praised the RPD for its leadership, especially during Phase II operations when the department took over management of the One-Stop and outreach worker and provided leadership for the intervention team. The vast majority of survey respondents in both Waves (over 75 percent) agreed that the GRP leadership encouraged different points of view in discussion and instilled enthusiasm for the work to be accomplished. When asked how the management handled conflict, most respondents could not think of any conflicts that needed to be handled and while over half of respondents in both Waves indicated that the project was successful at diffusing conflicts and that leadership minimized personality differences, about a third of respondents reported not knowing either way. This may be an indication that if conflicts did arise, they were handled privately. Interestingly, several respondents reported disappointment with the level of leadership and management of the initiative's Latino outreach, citing conflict between Latino and African American communities, a lack

of focus on Latino culture, and the limited bilingual ability on the part of some members of GRP's management team. While GRP may be making considerable effort to reach and serve the Latino community in the target area, that effort may be falling short of what is deemed necessary by the Latino community itself to be successful.

8.4.5. Resources

Respondents in both surveys and interviews were divided on whether GRP had sufficient funding to achieve its goals, although more respondents in Wave II than in Wave I agreed that resources were adequate (38 percent in Wave I and 52 percent in Wave II) and disagreed that GRP was driven primarily by its budget (38 percent in Wave I and 50 percent in Wave II). Approximately half of interview respondents felt that the program would benefit from increased financial resources, while the other half felt that financial resources were sufficient, citing the program coordinator's emphasis on using GRP funds to leverage other resources. One respondent suggested that the idea of leveraging GRP funds was a good one, but that to be successful, grantees needed a larger financial commitment from GRP to begin with. An increasing number of survey respondents supported this sentiment, with significantly more indicating in Wave II that program expansion and additional funding represented the one change they felt would improve GRP. Another respondent suggested that technical assistance in the form of helping grantees find and apply for additional grants for sustaining themselves would have eased financial concerns. Despite the level of positivity for the financial outlook of the initiative, many respondents acknowledged that the initiative was understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with the administrative burden of running such a large partnership. Respondents felt that GRP management was doing the best they could, but that the level of administrative duties was simply too high for one program coordinator to handle. In early 2007, GRP hired a new program coordinator and moved the original coordinator to program director, a position that would allow her to manage at a higher level without dealing with as much of the day-to-day administration. As director, she would be well-positioned to plan for the initiative's sustainability, among other things. Unfortunately, in mid-2007, the new program coordinator left and a new coordinator was not hired. Instead, the original coordinator has taken on the roles of director and coordinator, and will continue to do so for the last several months of the initiative. Whether this turnover in staffing has any effect on the initiative's ability to sustain itself remains to be seen, but the departure of the new coordinator did occur at an inopportune time for the initiative.

Overall, most respondents indicated that GRP leadership provided educational and leadership development opportunities. Respondents most frequently reported taking advantage of technical assistance in the form of gang awareness trainings and Spanish language lessons. These trainings were not provided by the national GRP technical assistance organization NYGC but were organized through GRP and were for the most part applauded by attendees as useful and timely. One respondent suggested GRP look for more creative ways to involve additional partners, while another suggested that partners did not have enough awareness of what technical assistance trainings were available. Indeed, only half of the respondents were able to identify any technical assistance that had been offered, indicating that respondents would benefit from more communication regarding opportunities for technical assistance. One respondent did feel that while the gang trainings were useful, GRP partners were still lacking a true understanding of gang

behavior. This may partially be attributable to the fact that the gang problem was only recently acknowledged in Richmond, and prior to GRP there was a dearth of knowledge about and recognition of gang activity in the city.

8.4.6. Sustainability

Respondents in both interviews and surveys overwhelmingly identified a strong commitment on the part of most GRP individuals and partner organizations to sustain the initiative. While several interview respondents admitted that funding is a big part of keeping partners at the table, an increasing number of survey respondents (from 55 percent in Wave I to 71 percent Wave II) believed that GRP had secured commitments of non-financial resources from groups and individuals in the community. Interview respondents indicated that partners interested in money only would leave, and the more committed partners would be able to sustain a smaller, more focused GRP. One partner raised a concern about the types of organizations that had been funded by GRP, suggesting that the large number of grass roots organizations funded by GRP would largely lack the capacity to sustain themselves without financial assistance such as that provided by GRP. Another respondent offered a counter-argument, suggesting that most of the organizations had been operating in the city prior to the receiving GRP funds, and they would be able to continue operations even after the federal funding period ended.

Partners also offered their expectations for the future of GRP, suggesting that it would be a "travesty" if GRP were to fold at the end of the federal funding period; one partner suggested that GRP needed more time to mature and that the federal grant period was too short to allow the program to be as successful as possible. All respondents admitted their desire to see the initiative continue, even if that meant a smaller, more compact partnership. Others hoped that the initiative would be spread to different parts of the city, suggesting that GRP was a model for the rest of the city especially given Richmond's characteristic divisiveness. Some respondents identified specific areas where GRP programming was expected to continue, including the schools because of CIS involvement and its non-GRP funding sources and services offered by the RPD because of the mayor and police chief's commitments to public safety. Many partners also offered their own desires to see their programs continue as GRP partners, citing the positive experiences they had had as part of GRP. Overall, respondents felt that most partners had bought into the GRP mission and wanted to see it sustained.

Not surprisingly, surveys and interviews identified the lack of financial resources as the greatest barrier to sustainability and overall program success. One respondent suggested that GRP's success might actually mean less dollars for partners when federal funding dries up, if greater needs are identified elsewhere in the city and attention refocuses there. Several partners did suggest that the loss of less-committed partners might benefit GRP, because whatever financial resources could be secured would be split among fewer partners, and those partners would be more committed to GRP's mission. In addition, administration of a smaller partnership would mean a financial savings which would also contribute to GRP's sustainability. In general, the majority of Wave II survey respondents believed the initiative would function after OJJDP funding had been expended.

Despite these convictions that partners were committed to sustainability and expectations that GRP would continue and be spread throughout the city, most respondents were unable to provide more than a vague description of efforts that the initiative had made to-

wards sustainability, if any; over one third of Wave II survey respondents "didn't know" if tasks that support sustainability had been implemented. However, over half of the same survey respondents believed that GRP leadership was engaged in an ongoing dialogue directed at institutionalizing the project, with an increasing percentage indicating that the leadership was seeking out new or existing funding opportunities other than direct funding from OJJDP (52 percent in Wave I and 76 percent in Wave II). Interview respondents also described a "foundations meeting" held in 2006 that highlighted GRP's success and partners for local private foundations, but most knew little of the actual outcomes of the meeting. One respondent felt that the partners had received too little communication as to what would happen at the end of the federal funding period, and wished there had been more assistance with sustainability. Many contracts were set to end within one to two months of the 2007 interviews and it was unclear what the future held for many GRP partners. This uncertainty points again to the need for more clear and consistent communication between GRP management and partners regarding roles, expectations, and opportunities within the initiative. Whether this has an effect on the sustainability of the partnership will be assessed in the final report, after the site's federal funding period has ended. Other sustainability efforts will be discussed in more detail below in Section 8.7.

8.5. GRP PROGRAM DESIGN, ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

8.5.1. Program Design: Phase I and Phase II Logic Models

Logic models are designed to give a broad view of the program design. The overarching goal of the initiative is to reduce youth gang crime and violence through a combination of primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. In order to determine the appropriate strategies for each prong, the Richmond GRP first defined goals for each. These goals seek to complement the larger goal of reducing youth gang crime and violence by addressing some small portion of the larger problem. For example, one of the Richmond GRP's prevention goals is to "Provide community-level support to families," indicating that at least part of reducing youth gang crime and violence in the target area on a long-term basis could be accomplished through a preventive approach aimed at strengthening families.

Table F.1[5] displays the logic model for the Richmond GRP's Phase I period. The Phase I logic model is taken directly from the site's Phase I strategic plan. In this model the goals and the corresponding objectives are listed on each row followed by the funded activities. Because Richmond selected a large number of activities for funding, and each activity could address multiple goals and objectives, each activity in the logic model is not linked specifically to a goal and objective. Instead, the activities are categorized by GRP component and service provider. It should be noted that several additional activities were planned for funding but service providers had not yet been selected when the Phase I plan was submitted. More complete descriptions of each activity are included in Appendix G.

The Phase I goals in many ways set the stage for Phase II. Phase I goals focus on educating the partners involved in the process about the problem, increasing the police's capacity to deal with the problem, and experimenting with a variety of services designed for high-risk youths. The Phase II logic model (see Table F.3) is slightly different from the

[5] All logic and activity models appear in Appendix F.

Phase I logic model (see Table F.1), and contains greater detail. Again, the logic model is provided to demonstrate the relationships between the initiative's goals and objectives and the funded activities, and how these are connected to the overarching goal of the initiative: to reduce youth gang crime in the target area. The Phase II logic model, taken directly from the site's Phase II strategic plan, does not identify specific service providers; following Virginia Procurement law, an RFP process was later used to select service providers during Phase II, and service providers had not yet been identified when this logic model was created.

Unfortunately, the relationship between goals, objectives, and activities is not clear to the evaluation team. For example, under primary prevention (designed to target the entire population, not just the at-risk population), one of Richmond GRP's listed goals is "Ensure that more people in the target area have access to prenatal and health care." The objective associated with this goal is "Expand prenatal and infancy support, after-school programs, and truancy and dropout prevention." The activities associated with the goal and objectives include infancy support services and healthy family initiatives. While the activities can reasonably be connected with the goal, the objective cannot logically be connected with the goal or the activities. After-school programs and truancy and dropout prevention will not have an effect on prenatal and health care in the target area. Such programs also cannot be considered primary prevention, as they target only an at-risk population. Additional truancy and dropout prevention programs are also found under secondary prevention in the logic model.

8.5.2. Program Inputs and Outputs

The process component of the GRP evaluation seeks to enhance understanding of how the program works, including detailing what activities are undertaken, how different parts of the program operate, and what clients or target populations are served. Outputs are used to inform the process evaluation and directly result from the activities that are implemented (e.g., the number of clients who receive a particular service). Tables F.2 and F.4 list each activity designed for Phase I and II, respectively. These models are based on the strategic plan created by the site and have changed throughout the implementation period. Any significant changes between the planned programming and the actual implemented programs will be noted below. The models also predict measurable outputs for each program and describe how these outputs will be measured. The majority of the outputs are measured through interviews with steering committee members and through management reports on activities, because of the limited systematic data collection efforts that took place during either Phase I or Phase II. The outputs of each activity are then related to expected outcomes and inform the outcome evaluation, which is discussed below in Section 8.6. The expected outcomes predict the overall effects of the program but are not direct products of the program. The activity models classify the expected outcomes into several domains. These domains are not directly related to the overarching GRP components (prevention, intervention, and suppression), but are instead based on the site's activities and were used to guide data collection. The nine outcome domains identified for both phases in Richmond include process, child welfare, community, crime, education, employment, health, physical environment, and probation/corrections.

The Richmond GRP used the two strategic plans to guide implementation of programs during Phases I and II. Implementation of specific program activities was significantly

delayed during both phases. As a result some Phase I programs had to be carried over into Phase II and there was a brief financial and operational overlap between Phase I and Phase II. Phase II programs could not be selected until fall 2005 and in some cases were not funded until some months later; even as late as fall 2007, new RFPs were issued to fill gaps in services as original contracts ended or to address newly identified needs in the community. From an evaluation perspective, Richmond's funding strategy—giving small grants to many service providers—has made it difficult to comprehensively identify all programs that have been involved in the GRP effort and the outputs each funded program produced, whether those outputs include equipment purchased, employees hired, trainings provided, or clients served.

To complicate matters evaluation-wise, the Richmond GRP did not implement any comprehensive electronic data collection system to track such outputs of its funded partners. As discussed above, tracking of programs in Richmond is instead limited to the coordinator's site visits to program locations and quarterly financial reports from each provider to the OAG. To assess the outputs from each provider, therefore, UI reviewed each provider's required quarterly financial reports to the OAG as of May 2007.[6] This review of quarterly reports revealed the lack of a consistent method for reporting clients served, program dosage levels (i.e., the amount of each service that each client received), and GRP funding spent per client. Nonetheless, for many providers the reports proved to be rich sources of information on program activities. From those reports, the UI evaluation team culled quantitative data on any reported outputs for use in the evaluation.

Quantitative output data collected from these reports, the site's categorical reports to OJJDP, and information collected during interviews with providers are reported in Table 8.9. Because of the number of programs funded under GRP, the table was restricted to quantifiable data that was directly related to serving clients; thus if an organization used funds to train employees on gang awareness, that output would not be included in the table. However, if the provider of the gang awareness training was funded by GRP and reported the number attending each training to the OAG, that number would be included in the table. There are some exceptions to that rule, where quantifiable information that does not relate directly to clients is included. In those cases, the data were included because they were deemed an important demonstration of a funded partner's activities, as is the case for the Hispanic Liaison Office's publication of a bilingual newsletter, for which the number of newsletters printed was included. The table identifies the phase during which each activity was provided; the inputs, or contracted amount of GRP funding they received; and the outputs, to be read as clients unless otherwise noted. The table includes both Phase I and Phase II activities. Exclusion from this table does not indicate that a program was not provided or that a program did not report any outputs to the OAG; it simply means that the program did not report clients served or other quantifiable information that fit the evaluation team's criteria for inclusion here. Because of the large number of programs funded by the Richmond GRP, the following discussion is limited to notable findings regarding inputs and outputs, especially where actual activities deviated from planned activities. However, program descriptions for all funded programs, whether included in Table 8.9 or not, are provided in Appendix G where information about the program was available.

The bulk of funding for Phase I programmatic activities was spent on prevention

[6] Data for most programs were current as of the end of the March 2007.

Figure 8.9: Richmond Phase I and Phase II Inputs and Outputs

			Inputs		Outputs	
Prong	**Provider**	**Activity**	**Phase**	**Contract Amnt. ($)**	**Period**	**Clients/Other**
P	Barefoot Living	Dance and life skills classes	II	Unknown	2007Q1-2	70
P	Bon Secours	Primary care	I-II	$120,000	2005Q3-2007Q2	
		OB/GYN care	I-II		2005Q4-2007Q2	
P	Boys and Girls Clubs of Metro Richmond (BGC)	Southside Club Programs (avg. daily attendance)	II	$75,000	2005Q4-2007Q1	
		Southwood Club Programs (avg. daily attendance)	II		2005Q4-2007Q1	
		Southwood, Southside case management	II		2005Q3-2007Q2	
		Various programs	II		2006Q1-2007Q1	804
P	Boy Scouts	Auto maint., electricity merit badge classes	II	$5,000	2006Q4, 2007Q1	5 per class
P	City DJS	One Stop Ctr. (Calls)	II	$92,500	2006Q1-4	78
		One Stop Ctr. (Walk-ins)	II		2006Q4	8
P	Fresh Start	Mentoring program	I-II	Unknown	Unknown	10
P	Hispanic Liaison Office (City)	Bilingual newsletter (copies printed)	II	$15,000	2006Q1-2007Q1	
		Requests for assistance	II		2006Q2, 2007Q1	119 requests
P	Learsi Skateboards	Build skate ramps	II	$4,999	2005Q4	6 ramps built
		Hire at-risk youth to help on SK8 nights	II		2006Q2	2 hired
P/I	New Life for Youth (NLY)	Resid. treatment prog. (I)	I	Unknown	2004Q4	2
		ESL classes	II	$4,000	2006Q4	20
		Rock the Block party	II		2006Q3	1000 attendees
P	OAG	Class Action Camp*	I-II	$7,500	8/2004,2005,2006	
		Imagine Festival	II	$4,000	10/2005, 8/2006	2300 attendees
P	Richmond Public Library	Broad Rock Homework Help Center	II	$9,766	2006Q4-2007Q2	384
P	Richmond Technical Ctr.	Educational/GED & Vocational Services	II	$15,000	2004Q4-2006Q3	24
P	Spanish Acad. & Cultural Inst.	Conversational Spanish for Service Providers	II	$4,000	2006Q4-2007Q1	229
P	Theater Group (City)	Performances	II	$4,500	2006Q2	3 perf.
		Rehearsals	II		2006Q1	7 rehearsals
P	U-Turn, Inc.	Sports Academy program	II	$8,000	2006Q1-2007Q1	68
P	Woodland Crossing	GED classes	I-II	$3,696	2005Q4-2006Q3	22
P	VGIA	Gang awareness training	II	Unknown	2005Q4-2006Q1	87
P	Refugee and Immigraion Services (RIS)	Citizenship Classes	II	$3,000	2006Q1-2007Q1	
		ESL classes	II	$13,575	2006Q1-4	
		SSL Classes	II	$5,000	2006Q1-4	

*The 2004 Class Action camp was funded under a different contract and in cooperation with BGC. Also, the amount listed here appears to have been provided for the camp each year.

			Inputs		Outputs	
Prong	**Provider**	**Activity**	**Phase**	**Contract Amnt. ($)**	**Period**	**Clients/Other**
P	RIS (Neighb. Teams/Watch)	Community meetings (3)	II	$4,000	2005Q4	25
		Community meeting, Southwood	II		2006Q2	7
		Women's empowerment group	II		2006Q2	7
P	RIS (Mentoring/ Tutoring)	Mentoring program orientation for parents	II	$4,000	2005Q4	55
		In-home tutoring, Southwood, McGuire Apts.	II		2006Q1	6
		School orientation, books provided	II		2006Q3	8 families
		School supplies delivered to homes	II		2006Q3	8 families
		Assisted families w/kinderg. adjustment	II		2006Q4	10 families
		Followed up with previous clients	II		2006Q4	14
		Mentoring/Tutoring program	II		2006Q4	22
P	Richmond Career Advancement Center (RCAC)	YouWIN Job training/placement	II	$4,625	2006Q2-4	11
		YouWIN Work Experience	II		2007Q1	7
		YouWIN Institute Retreat	II		2007Q1	8
P	RCAC	Summer internships (paid, provided transportation)	II	$3,000	2006Q3	2
		Workshop with RDSS Foster Care Unit: You and the Law	II		2006Q4	38
		Career club at Wythe HS, Boushall MS (target area); Marshall HS	II		2006Q2	53
		Career club at Hugenot HS	II		2006Q4	16
		Career club at Wythe HS, Boushall MS (target area)	II		2007Q1-2	18
		Next Step - Career Club	II		2007Q1-2	23
P/I	Richmond Outreach Center (ROC)	After-school program	II	$5,000	2005Q4-2007Q1	100/quarter
		Apprentices hired (Interv.)	II		2006Q2	2
		Sports programs (Baseb., basketb., cheerl., dance)	II		2006Q4-2007Q1	185
		Easter Egg Hunt	II		2007Q1	600
		Sat. Morning Visitations	II		2005Q4-2007Q1	500/quarter
P	RPD	Hispanic Police Acad.*	II	$71,440	2007Q1-2	28
P	RPD	One Stop Ctr. (Walk-ins)	II	$95,000	4/2007-9/2007	
P	RPD Truancy Prevention	Mi historia/My story program	II	$33,700	2007Q1	11
		STIC Institute	II		2007Q1	28
		Strengthen Families Program	II		2007Q1	2 families

*The Hispanic Police Academy was included in a contract for additional services reported below as suppression; the full contract amount provided here was not used solely for the Academy.

			Inputs		Outputs	
Prong	**Provider**	**Activity**	**Phase**	**Contract Amnt. ($)**	**Period**	**Clients/Other**
I	RPD Community Role Models/ Mentors	Employability skills training	II	$40,000	2006Q2	15
		Interns (placed externally)	II		2006Q3	4
		Interns (at RPD)	II		2006Q3	2
		PAL soccer league	II		2006Q1-2	35
I	Elderhomes	Home repair	II	$5,000	2005Q4-2007Q1	20
I	FPS	Mental health and substance abuse counseling	II	$20,000	2006Q1-4	3 clients/ 50.5 hours
I	Intervention Team (City)	Case management	II	$50,000	2006Q3	1
I	VCU Div. of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery	Tattoo removal	II	$5,000	2006Q1	1
S	RPD	Directed patrol	II	$71,440	Exact dates unknown	783 man-hours
R	Boaz & Ruth	Residential program	II	$15,750	2005Q4-2006Q3	5
R	City DJS	Intensive case mgmt.	II	$19,809	2006Q2-2007Q1	17
R	Probation and Parole	GED practice testing	II	$4,900	2005Q4-2006Q2	107 prac. tests
		GED tests	II		2006Q1-2	8 tests
R	Richmond City Sheriff's Office (RCSO)	BELIEF program	II	$12,000	2007Q1	89
		Transitional housing placement	II		2007Q1	13
R	RCSO	Computer courses	II	$13,349	2006Q4-2007Q1	26
		GED testing sessions	II		2006Q4-2007Q1	22

programming. According to the Phase I plan, several subcontracts were to be issued to existing programs with services in the target area to allow them to expand their offerings to the community. While few programs were selected to provide services during Phase I, even fewer actually came to fruition during the Phase I period, a point made clear in Table 8.2 that shows much of the planned allocations as unspent. Any funds not spent during Phase I were carried over to Phase II. Note also that many Phase I activities do not show up in Table 8.9 as there were limited financial reports available detailing clients served with Phase I funding.

After an extended RFP period, discussed above, Phase II began in October 2005. Activities were started throughout the Phase II period however, with RFPs issued in fall 2007—very late in the Phase II period—to address service gaps. Tables 8.9 and 8.3, demonstrate the emphasis that the Richmond GRP continued to put on prevention activities through Phase II. Prevention activities account for over half of all activities funded under all four prongs, and funds allocated to prevention during Phase II total almost twice those allocated to suppression activities, the prong with the second highest funding allocation. Instead of describing each program and its outputs below by prong—information that is summarized in Table 8.9—the following discussion highlights selected providers from Phases I and II and discusses the implications of different funding decisions and partner activities for the Richmond GRP.

Marketing and Outreach Beginning early in the process, the Richmond GRP made significant efforts towards advertising the initiative itself and parts of the initiative to potential service recipients. Perhaps most importantly, the initiative developed a name for itself at the very beginning of the initiative instead of using the federal program name 'Gang Reduction Program.' While the Richmond name, Gang Reduction and Intervention Program, or "GRIP," is close to the federal program name (GRP), it nonetheless represents a departure from the federal program and an effort to brand the initiative specifically and uniquely in the City of Richmond. With the name was created a catchphrase: "Uplifting Communities," and some brochures have also advertised the initiative as helping the city "Get a GRIP on gangs," both of which further extend the influence of the branding effort. The GRP administration has purchased promotional items printed with the GRIP name and used the logo on brochures and printed materials to promote the initiative as such. Interestingly, the new name identifies two of the main prongs, suppression and intervention but does not highlight the prevention aspect of the initiative, arguably the most important element in the Richmond effort and at the very least, the most heavily-funded element of the Richmond effort.

A number of additional outreach activities were implemented to promote public awareness of GRP's programs and services in the target area, hoping to reach out to the Hispanic and Spanish-speaking populations. Notices of meetings open to the public and other GRP events were advertised in English and Spanish on the OAG and City of Richmond websites. However, Internet outreach may have reached only a limited audience—one that has web access and is savvy enough to visit the OAG or City of Richmond websites. It is also possible that the audience who would see the advertisements on the web might not be those in the greatest need of GRP services; therefore it seems unlikely that this method of outreach is likely to reach additional target area residents who would not have otherwise heard of GRP activities. Other outreach efforts were undertaken in Phase II, including Project Exile and CrimeStoppers billboards in Spanish in the target area and radio spots by the program coordinator on English and Spanish radio. Also during Phase II, the Hispanic Liaison Office (HLO) started production of a bilingual newsletter, Connections/Conexiones, that was sent to target area families and included information on GRP services.

Richmond Police Department The RPD has been a key element in the Richmond GRP's efforts under every prong, providing a range of prevention and intervention activities in addition to its customary suppression services, such as directed patrols. In fact, the RPD received the largest total amount of GRP funding across all prongs, receiving more than $140,000 for prevention, intervention, and suppression services for Phase II. Much of this involvement of the RPD in the GRP effort developed after February 2005. Through its extensive non-suppression activities, the Department has asserted itself as dedicated to working with the community to address crime and other community issues in a comprehensive manner. This approach to crime reduction dovetails well with the approach taken by the GRP, positioning the RPD to play a central role in the Richmond effort.

The RPD did not have a gang unit when the OAG was awarded the GRP grant. The department created a city-wide gang unit, partially with GRP funding, and the unit was fully operational and equipped by the end of Phase I. Start-up activities included training officers for the gang unit and the 2nd precinct in intelligence collection and sharing and in the then-new state gang legislation. The training and equipment costs are not

reflected in Table 8.2 under the suppression component as GRP funds were mainly used to purchase supplies, including training materials, laptops, and video cameras. These costs are included in the "Equipment and Supplies" category. Additional planned car and foot or bike patrols in the target area on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights were not implemented during Phase I due to manpower issues and management changes, but were implemented beginning in 2005. Additionally, the RPD decided to continue the additional directed patrols in the target area even after GRP funding ran out due to their prior success and the changing crime levels in the target area.

Under the prevention prong, the RPD has provided programs and services designed to increase police involvement with the department and to familiarize residents with police procedures and activities. Such programs include the Hispanic Police Academy and the RPD's efforts at establishing a neighborhood watch. The RPD has worked with Refugee and Immigration Services (RIS) to establish neighborhood watches but has met with a great deal of difficulty in that area, and has worked to devise a new strategy to get citizens involved in that activity.

The RPD provided prevention programming targeted to youths, including those at risk for joining a gang. Such programs include truancy and dropout prevention programs such as the Mi historia/My story program, the STIC Institute (Strategies Towards Improvement & Commitment), and the Strengthen Families programs work with youths and their families to educate them on avoiding truancy and to provide the skills necessary to promote positive behaviors. Perhaps the most important prevention programming element administered by the RPD however, is the One-Stop resource center. As described above, in late 2006 the RPD took over responsibility for the One-Stop when the DJS's contract for the service was canceled. The RPD immediately assisted in finding the One-Stop a new location with increased visibility and accessibility in the community and the center continues to serve a growing number of clients each month.

The RPD also provided intervention programming, addressing employment issues through its employability skills training program. That program included a week-long training session followed by placement of participants in internship positions with local businesses. The RPD itself accommodated two interns. Recreational programming also formed a segment of the RPD's intervention programming, with the department offering a Police Activities League (PAL) soccer league and hosting other sports activities, such as a police-community soccer game at the Imagine Festival. At the same time that it took responsibility for the One-Stop, the RPD also took responsibility for the Intervention Team and Outreach worker. While the Intervention team represents a partnership between a range of providers, and the RPD participated in the Intervention team prior to taking over its contract, a lieutenant from the target area sector now leads the team.

Figure 8.10: Gang Members Added to PISTOL by Month, September 2005–July 2007



In addition, the RPD's work with GRP provided part of the impetus and funding to create a new city-wide gang unit. As part of that unit, gang intelligence gathering has increased dramatically. GRP funds allowed the RPD to purchase a gang intelligence module for its PISTOL records management system that allowed for the collection of intelligence and sharing with other authorized persons. The line showing the number of gang members added to the PISTOL database per month between September 2005 and July 2007

(Figure 8.10) reveals that, not surprisingly, a large number of gang members were added early in the gang unit's operation. While the monthly number of gang members added did decrease from its peak in October 2005, the line demonstrates that the RPD continued to use the gang module to track gang members throughout the GRP implementation period, with a second peak observed in February 2007. The RPD's willingness to work closely with the Richmond GRP to reduce gang violence, the department's community-focused attitude toward crime reduction, and its ability to provide non-suppression services in the community have made the department an integral part of the Richmond GRP.

Boys and Girls Clubs of Metro Richmond Early on in the Richmond GRP effort, BGC was identified as a potential major provider of the types of programs and services that the Richmond GRP hoped to fund, and BGC thus received the largest portion of funds during Phase I and one of the largest in Phase II. With GRP funding, the BGC was able to hire a bilingual staff member at each of two clubs in the target area to assist those clubs in serving the Spanish-speaking population. The clubs worked to recruit additional youth into their programs and provided prevention activities for those youth. Part of the Richmond GRP's goal in terms of BGC funding was to recruit more Hispanic youths into club programs; at the start of GRP funding in the fourth quarter of 2005, BGC reported that 100 percent of youths served at the Southwood club were African American.

The funding also allowed extended hours during the summer months at both clubs, allowing the clubs to remain open until 9 p.m. on weekdays—clubs normally close at 5 p.m.—and to open on Saturdays—clubs are normally open only on weekdays. To staff the additional hours and program offerings, GRP funds allowed for additional staff positions for the two clubs, including creating eight additional positions. The BGC was also able to expand sports offerings and other special programs. The programs continued into the Phase II period and a more detailed listing of these programs is provided in Appendix G. Finally, the BGC worked with the OAG's Class Action program to host the related one-week summer day camp held from August 16–20, 2004.

While BGC was a major provider of prevention programming at two clubs located in the target area, with one conveniently located at the Southwood Apartment community where much of the Hispanic population in the target area lived, GRP partners did report a level of disappointment with the programming provided by BGC. Through interviews with GRP partners and meeting observations, the evaluation team learned that BGC did not appear to be serving a significant number of Hispanic youth nor were the clubs making sufficient attempts to increase the number of Hispanic youth attending club programs. Approximately one year after the Southwood Club reported serving no Hispanic youths, BGC reported to the OAG an increase of Hispanic youths accessing the club in the first quarter of 2007 to seven percent. However, with approximately 49 youths accessing the club daily, that would mean only three to four Hispanic youths were participating in club programs. While additional racial and ethnic data on youths were requested multiple times from BGC, those data were not provided, preventing UI from assessing in more detail the demographics of the youth served at the target area clubs.

In addition, the clubs struggled to keep the bilingual staff position filled, with the initial employee leaving less than a year after being hired. Printed materials available at the clubs were found to not be consistently offered in Spanish. Finally, some partners did not feel the clubs were welcoming to Hispanic youth. GRP management was aware of these issues

and did appear to make some efforts to improve the situation at the clubs. The evaluation team recognizes that while BGC does provide valuable programs and services, they did not appear to contribute to the Richmond GRP's goals of increasing services available to the target area's Hispanic population. In April 2007, however, the One-Stop opened in its new location directly across the street from the Southwood BGC; this location will likely contribute to a greater commitment on the part of the BGC to serve Hispanic youth, and this issue will be followed through the rest of the evaluation period.

BGC also participated with GRP in for "Family Fest 2004," coordinated and partially funded by Richmond GRP.[7] Family Fest 2004 was held on Saturday, August 21, 2004 at Broad Rock Sports Complex in the target area. The fair included bands, cultural performances, information booths, health screening, a parent/student support center, after-school program sign-ups, rides and games for children, and prizes. Forty area agencies and organizations were represented and the City's mayor, the state Attorney General, and other local officials attended the fair. This event developed into the annual Imagine Festival hosted by the HLO and the OAG with the goals of bringing service providers and the community together. The Imagine Festival has been held every year since 2005.

Bon Secours The largest proportion of prevention funding went towards a prenatal and infancy support program and mobile health care services in the target area. Bon Secours Richmond Health System was allocated at least $120,000 to offer a variety of health care services in the target area. The organization provides mobile health care through its Care-A-Van services in the target area. Care-A-Van is a pre-existing program that provides on-site primary and secondary medical services to the community in apartment complexes and other non-office settings. The Care-A-Van targets youth with a variety of health issues, including those who are managing chronic conditions, need prenatal or infancy care, or have substance abuse problems, and provides immunizations, well-baby care, and routine medical services. Bon Secours also partnered with clinics and Obstetricians/Gynecologists in the target area to provide prenatal and infant care. In addition to its health services, Bon Secours has worked to identify and enroll individuals from the Dutch Village and Southwood Apartment complexes in health insurance programs and has provided free car seats to families to allow them to travel with their children to access GRP services, such as ESL or citizenship classes.

Over the two year reporting period, Bon Secours provided health care services at approximately 13 locations in the target area, either at apartment and other housing communities through the Care-A-Van program or in cooperation with existing health care clinics. Early in the funding period, the Dutch Village apartment complex was providing space in which Bon Secours could provide services but management changed in mid-2006 and space was no longer made available for the program. When the One-Stop opened in April 2007 in its new Southwood location, the space was designed to include a room used solely for medical care and medical equipment storage. The space also included a waiting room for patients. For the prenatal and infancy support initiative, using GRP funds, the organization hired an Ob/Gyn to work in the target area; the doctor worked with the Cross

[7]Family Fest was not included in the Phase I plan. It is described here because BGC and New Life for Youth (NLY) participated in Family Fest instead of hosting their planned Phase I events. However, financial information from the site does not specify what amount of GRP funds were used to coordinate and host Family Fest.

Over/Gilliam clinic and births were handled at the Virginia Commonwealth University Health Systems Hospital. That individual left the position in July 2006 and immediately thereafter, Bon Secours entered into an arrangement with the St. Francis Family Practice. The practice is part of the St. Francis Medical Center owned by Bon Secours that opened in September 2005 south of the target area. Bon Secours provided taxi fare for those individuals who needed to travel to St. Francis for medical care not available at a location in the target area. From that point on, births were handled at St. Francis.

The contract for this service ended on June 30, 2007 and at that point Bon Secours reportedly stopped providing services at the One-Stop in Southwood. While the organization continued to provide services at other target area locations, the largest number of patients was consistently seen at Southwood; the cessation of services there means the potential exists for a significant change in the extent of services provided by Bon Secours in the target area. In fall 2007, the program coordinator reported working with Bon Secours to renew its contract and resume services at Southwood. By that point, however, some partners were already dissatisfied with the provider's willingness to abandon its most well-attended clinic location and had hoped that GRP's investment in Bon Secours would lead to a more long-term provision of services by Bon Secours at that location, regardless of the status of the GRP contract. At the time of this report, the issue had not be resolved and it will thus be followed through the end of the evaluation period. The status of Bon Secours is expected to be an important element of sustainability for the Richmond GRP.

Reports including numbers of patients served at each clinic location in the target area were available for a two-year period, from the third quarter of 2005 through the second quarter of 2007. Unfortunately, the data did not identify the number of patients that were seen more than once, only total counts of the number of times a doctor provided services to a patient, meaning that patients could be counted more than once. In addition, no systematic information on demographics or the patient's reason for seeking health care were provided, although Bon Secours was able to provide UI with some limited numbers detailing race/ethnicity for patients seen at Southwood and Dutch Village in 2006. Those data indicate that at Southwood, approximately 73 percent of patients were Hispanic while 20 percent were African American. Data were, however, divided into patients requiring general health care and those requiring obstetric/gynecological care, however, so UI was able to determine how many patients were seen under GRP's the healthy family initiative versus the prenatal and infancy support initiative. Bon Secours reported that it was in the process of implementing an electronic data system in mid-2007 and hoped that more detailed information would be available for the evaluation when that system was fully in place.

At the beginning of the funding period, Bon Secours estimated that GRP funding would allow the organization to provide approximately 500 hours of medical services to the target area per year and to serve an additional 750 clients with 2 visits each totaling 1,500 visits per year. Table 8.9 provides bar charts of patients seen by quarter under the primary care and the Ob/Gyn care initiatives. It should be noted that data for quarters one and two of 2007 were reported in total; to include those quarters on the bar graph, the total was simply divided in half and equal parts allocated to each quarter. Therefore, the actual data for those quarters may be slightly different than what is reported here. Over the two year period, Bon Secours saw 5,680 patients, providing well over their estimated number of visits per year. Under primary care, the largest number of patients—716—was seen in

Figure 8.11: Bon Secours Clinic Locations and Clients Served, GRP Target Area, Richmond



the third quarter of 2006 while the fewest patients—464—were seen in the third quarter of 2005. Under primary care, a total of 4,708 patients received care over the two year period. Data for the Ob/Gyn services were not provided for the third quarter of 2005, so data were available for one year and nine months. Over that period, Bon Secours served 972 Ob/Gyn patients. Bon Secours saw the largest number of Ob/Gyn patients in the first quarter of 2006, with 288 patients and the fewest in the fourth quarter of 2004, with 90 patients.

To better demonstrate the number of patients that were seen for primary care and Ob/Gyn care at different locations in the target area, Figure 8.11 maps the locations where Bon Secours provided health care. Each location has a bar graph next to it indicating how many patients were seen each quarter. Bon Secours provided the most consistent care at Dutch Village, Southwood, and Woodland Crossing apartments and the Broad Rock Library, and among all locations, the largest number of patients was seen at the Dutch Village and Southwood apartment locations. It is interesting to note that many of the clinic locations are either on the border of the target area or outside the border area, even while close to the target area. It is likely that Bon Secours did not respect the target area boundaries in serving the population in the area, which has implications from an evaluation standpoint but can be considered a positive aspect of the program from GRP's perspective of trying to reach the largest number of individuals in the area. This output information is relevant for the outcome analysis discussed below in Section 8.6.

Other providers and activities In addition to highlighting those providers that did extensive work under the Richmond GRP effort, Table 8.9 indicates what initiatives were more conservatively funded than those mentioned above. The table also reveals providers who received GRP funds but served a relatively small number of people.

Reentry initiatives were moderately funded, receiving well under $100,000 across all providers. Only two reentry programs were funded under Richmond GRP's Phase II plan; however, several programs mentioned in the other four components also were designed to address the needs of the reentry population. NLY provides a one-year program that includes housing, counseling, job training, and life skills, and during Phase I, the organization was able to house two gang members from the target area in their one-year residential treatment program. Boaz & Ruth received funding in Phase II to provide a residential program as well, and served five individuals over a one-year period. The DJS received funding to provide intensive case management during Phase II for individuals released from jail or prison, and a part-time reentry coordinator was hired to develop reentry plans for eligible individuals and connect them with needed services. The coordinator worked with the Richmond City Jail to provide programming for individuals in the jail, and the Probation and Parole Offices also provided training for individuals on their caseload, including GED practice and testing. While the Richmond GRP did fund needed services, it appears that efforts under reentry have been fairly limited in terms of funding and clients served.

Under intervention programming, the VCU Health System Authority received a $5,000 award to provide tattoo removal services. The Richmond GRP intervention team can make referrals to VCU's Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, which performs the tattoo removals either surgically or with a laser. On February 22, 2006 the VCU Health Authority performed its first tattoo removal under GRP. However, the provider had limits on the size of tattoo that could be removed and other restrictions on its service, limiting its value in an effort like GRP. The provider actually removed very few tattoos, and in fall 2007, GRP management reported its plans to contract with an additional provider with more extensive tattoo removal services available.

Family Preservation Services (FPS) was contracted to provide both mental health and substance abuse counseling and truancy and dropout prevention programming under the intervention and prevention components, respectively. The organization received $20,000 to cover an hourly cost for treatment services, and during 2006 FPS reported providing seven clients with 50.5 hours of treatment. The contract ended on June 30, 2007, and at that time management reported seeking a new provider for this service. In addition, while FPS planned to work in Boushall Middle School and George Wythe High School to provide truancy prevention programming that included counseling and its Moral Kombat program, it had difficulty getting the program started. The organization had was slow to obtain parent authorizations that would allow students to participate, but pointed to legal issues with the City of Richmond as the main source of their difficulties. GRP management also found another provider for truancy and dropout prevention, eventually teaming with the RPD to expand its existing truancy prevention programming into the target area.

Finally, Table 8.9 reveals some duplication in services provided, especially under the prevention component that included the largest number of providers and largest amount of funding. The Richmond GRP dedicated a portion of funding to increasing the ability of service providers and other community members to communicate in Spanish to clients in the target area. RIS and the Spanish Academy and Cultural Institute both received funding to provide training under this initiative. In addition, funding was dedicated to ESL classes for residents and both RIS and NLY provided these services. Recreational programs were provided by several different organization, including BGC, Learsi Skateboards, the

Richmond Outreach Center (ROC), the RPD, and U-Turn Sports Academies. Job training programs and mentoring programs were both also provided by a number of different organizations. Each provider is arguably reaching different populations within the target area but there is nonetheless a significant amount of overlap in the types of programs that are being provided.

The next section discusses the connection between the outputs—the result of specific site activities—and the overall impacts or effects of the GRP in Richmond, as measured through different outcome indicators, such as levels of crime. Such outcomes predict the overall effects of the program but are not direct products of the program, as were the outputs described above.

8.6. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

The Phase I and Phase II activity models shown in Tables F.2 and F.4 relate the specific outputs of each activity to their expected outcomes. These relationships inform the outcome evaluation by pointing to the outcomes of greatest relevance to the assessment of GRP as a whole. As the activity models were developed, the expected outcomes were grouped into outcome domains in order to guide the evaluation team's data collection efforts. These domains include child welfare, community, crime, education, employment, health, physical environment, and probation/corrections.

The activity models were created based on the site's strategic plan for each phase. As the site progressed from planning to implementation, some of the planned activities changed. In some cases, changes in the activities yielded changes in the relevant outputs and outcomes. Simultaneously, the evaluation team was working to collect data on those outputs and outcomes most germane to the site's actual (rather than planned) activities. To date, UI has not able to obtain measures within each outcome domain. In some cases, the data were unavailable, and in others, differences between the site's planned and actual activities made measures listed in the activity models less relevant. This section focuses only on those measures that the evaluation team was able to procure or is still pursuing.

The outcome analysis looked at the entire initiative rather than each phase separately for several reasons. First, the full GRP model was not wholly active during Phase I; much of the effort put into GRP in Phase I consisted of planning. Secondly, the Phase I program implementation period was brief—limited to six months—allowing only a short period of time during which any of the implemented programs might have had an impact on the target area. Less than a year separated Phases I and II, making it difficult to attribute changes in outcomes to the two distinct programmatic phases. The number of youth served during Phase I was also relatively small, with a limited expected impact on outcomes during that period. Finally, the outcome measures for each phase overlap, as both of the initiative's phases were designed to affect the same outcomes.

8.6.1. Outcome Measures and Analysis

Prior to the start of Phase II services, the evaluation team planned its data collection activities based on the OJJDP-approved strategic plan. In developing expected outcome measures, UI researchers were cognizant of the need to focus on realistic and measurable data, given the evaluation's timeframe and budget constraints. Due to the extensive number of programs funded by the Richmond GRP and the focus of the evaluation on

community-level changes, UI focused data collection on those programs that were likely to have the greatest effect on community outcomes within the evaluation period.

As noted earlier, the outcome measures were organized across eight domains, as shown in Tables F.2 and F.4, including crime, child welfare, community, education, employment, health, physical environment, and probation/corrections. Outcome data related to five of these domains—child welfare, community, employment, physical environment, and probation/corrections—could not be obtained for a variety of reasons. For most of these types of data, no viable source has been located that will allow measurement of changes at the community level. These data will still be considered for the final evaluation however, as the evaluation team continues to seek out sources of available data. Additionally, for some of these domains, the level of dosage—the amount of programming that was provided in the target area—was relatively low. For instance, the only program focused on changing the physical environment was ElderHomes. While the provider did meet the terms of its contract and provided the expected home improvements, the number of homes benefiting from its services was too small to have created detectible community-level changes.

Despite the limits on the available data relevant to the evaluation, UI researchers were able to obtain data on education, health, and crime outcomes for the target, comparison, and displacement areas. The subsequent sections provide greater detail on how these data were collected and analyzed as well as the findings.

8.6.2. Education

Several programs are expected to affect education outcomes directly. The following is a list of those programs funded by the Richmond GRP that affect education outcomes measurable at the school level. Therefore, this list does not include reentry or probation and parole efforts that involve GED testing as such educational improvements would not be reflected in school-level data.

- After-school and summer programs operated by BGC and the ROC
- Career clubs and career training operated in Boushall Middle School (MS) and Wythe High School (HS) by Richmond Career Advancement Center (RCAC)
- Class Action camp and school-based curriculum
- Community role models and mentors programming offered by the RPD
- Fresh Start mentoring program
- Homework Help Center at Broad Rock Branch, Richmond Public Libraries
- Mentoring and tutoring programs operated by RIS
- School resource officers funded by the RPD
- Truancy and dropout prevention programming offered by the RPD
- U-Turn, Inc. Sports Academies

All programs are hypothesized to increase academic performance and commitment to education. Most of the after-school and mentoring program providers make tutoring or homework assistance available. Academic performance is an integral part of the in-school Sports Academies program. The summer programs, such as the Class Action camp and sports leagues offered by BGC and the ROC, also help to reinforce the importance of, and youth commitment to, education. Truancy and dropout prevention programming is expected to reduce the number of truant students and the dropout rate in the target area. School resource officers contribute to both lowered truancy and increased safety on school campuses. School Resource Officers (SROs) also participate in various school programs, such as the GREAT program, that increase youth commitment to school. In addition, programs that help students choose career paths, such as the Fresh Start program and career clubs, reinforce the importance of education, and should lead to improved academic performance among participants.

Ideally, the academic and behavioral benefits accrued from participation in these programs would be assessed using individual-level data for students in schools expected to see the greatest amount of change, and the overall performance of those participating in the GRP-funded programs would be compared to that of students who did not participate in such programs. Such data would include information on academic performance, graduation rates, truancy rates, disciplinary actions, and GED graduation rates. Unfortunately, the evaluation team was not able to obtain data on student academic performance or other school conditions directly from Richmond Public Schools for assessment at this point in the GRP evaluation. Such data are still being considered for the final evaluation report, however. Instead, based on these selected programs, UI decided to assess school-level changes in student performance in selected schools that target-area youth attend and schools not in the target area selected for comparison purposes. The evaluation team performed a descriptive analysis using publicly-available reports of student academic performance.

Sources and Schools School-level data were obtained from the Virginia Department of Education (http://www.doe.virginia.gov) for three school years, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007, and for four schools: two within the target area—Thomas Boushall Middle School and George Wythe High School—and two outside of the target area—Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School and Armstrong High School. Serving as controls for district-wide changes that might obscure the impact of GRP in the target area, non-target area schools were selected based on their similarity to the target schools across key demographic variables including total enrollment, racial composition of the student body, and percentage of students eligible for the Free/Reduced Lunch program. Table 8.4 reveals that while the Richmond GRP's programming concentrated on serving the target area's growing Hispanic population, the four schools considered for this analysis—both target and comparison area schools—actually have very small and relatively stable Hispanic populations. For this reason, the English proficiency of the students was not used as a criterion for selecting schools.

Measures Attendance rates, dropout rates, graduation rates and rates of offenses per 100 students were collected as measures of students' commitment to school and delinquency (see Table 8.4). Offenses include: weapons-related offenses; offenses against students; offenses against staff; offenses against persons; offenses related to alcohol, tobacco, and

other drugs; property offenses; offenses related to disorderly/disruptive behavior; and other violations. Some of the changes in subcategories over the reporting years reflect changes in the categorization of incidents by the Virginia Department of Education. The behavioral incidents category was especially affected by these changes, with seven offenses previously categorized in "Other Offenses" moved to a "Disorderly or Disruptive" (here, "Behavioral") category. Those offenses include classroom/campus disruption, defiance/refusing request, disrespect/walking away, inciting a riot, minor insubordination, obscene/inappropriate language or gestures, and possession of obscene/disruptive literature. Every school in the state was equally subject to these definitional changes, so comparisons of those categories across schools and within each year are valid, but comparisons across years within a school may be misleading.

Although the available data preclude UI from examining the impact of specific programs on school-level outcomes such as performance and climate, any changes over time in the target and comparison schools that may be attributable in part to GRP programs can be assessed. Those programs expected to have an impact on school-level outcomes were identified above.

Hypotheses If GRP activities, which began in 2005, have been effective, the following results would be expected:

1. An increase in attendance and graduation rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area compared to the rates in schools outside the target area;

2. A decrease in dropout and offending rates after the 2004-05 school year for schools in the target area compared to the rates in schools outside the target area;

3. A direct and immediate effect on student delinquency from programs that specifically address these outcomes in their service goals (e.g., Mi Historia–truancy and dropout prevention);

4. An indirect and gradual effect on student delinquency and achievement from the majority of programs that focus on improving students' feelings about school, tendency towards violence/delinquency, view of authority figures, and overall educational outcomes; and

5. A potential increase in the number of suspensions as school administrators grow more cognizant of gang-related behaviors.

Results Between the 2004-05 and 2006-07 school years, the rate of offenses per 100 students at Boushall Middle School in the target area increased dramatically from 232.6 to 522.4—an increase of nearly 125 percent. The enrollment at the school dropped over the same period by approximately 21 percent. At the same time, the comparison middle school, MLK Middle School, experienced a 27 percent decrease in its offense rate from 273.2 to 200 offenses per 100 students and experienced a drop in enrollment of approximately 19 percent. While differences in reporting practices may account for some of the differences, it appears that Boushall Middle School experienced a substantial increase in incidents over the study period that was not evident in the comparison area school.

Table 8.4: Richmond Target and Comparison School Demographic and Performance Data

			Racial/Ethnic Compos. (%)				Truancy & Completion Rates			Reported Offenses Per 100 Students				
School	Year	Enrollment	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Attend.	Dropout	Grad.	Total	Interper-sonal	Behav-ioral	Weapons-Related	Property-Related
Boushall MS (TA)	2004-5	789	2.99	92.79	2.86	0.95	90	4.12	-	232.6	38.1	74.4	0.6	3.2
	2005-6	711	3.66	92.55	3.66	0.56	90	-	-	268.5	47.5	71.9	1.0	2.8
	2006-7	625	2.88	94.24	2.56	0.32	88	-	-	522.4	63.2	370.6	1.1	4.8
MLK MS (C)	2004-5	880	0.13	99.75	0.00	0.13	92	2.93	-	273.2	45.3	92.7	2.5	3.1
	2005-6	797	0.38	99.25	0.00	0.38	89	-	-	252.6	45.5	88.5	1.4	2.4
	2006-7	715	0.28	99.16	0.14	0.42	92	-	-	200.6	44.8	110.8	1.1	2.0
Wythe HS (TA)	2004-5	1091	5.22	92.79	1.71	0.28	84	7.06	58	187.0	12.6	65.2	0.5	2.2
	2005-6	1129	4.78	93.45	1.42	0.35	87	2.39	49	182.4	14.7	45.3	0.4	2.0
	2006-7	1172	5.03	93.17	1.28	0.43	81	-	-	312.9	29.5	248.8	1.4	1.7
Armstrong HS (C)	2004-5	1272	1.09	98.46	0.45	0.00	86	5.90	58	126.1	11.2	53.0	0.6	1.3
	2005-6	1146	0.79	98.95	0.26	0.00	85	2.62	54	159.1	19.4	48.7	1.0	3.0
	2006-7	1161	0.95	98.71	0.34	0.00	86	-	-	196.1	24.5	93.1	0.5	2.2

Sources: https://p1pe.doe.virginia.gov/reportcard/ and http://www.richmond.k12.va.us/indexnew/sub/statistics/statistics.cfm

Notes:

- (TA) = Target Area School; (C) = Comparison School
- Total Offenses refer to the below offenses plus offenses classified as related to alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs, and all other offenses.
- Interpersonal offenses refer to the following offenses against students or staff members: homicide, rape (forcible, attempted), assault, aggravated sexual battery (of students only), sexual touching, and threatening, and offenses against all people: kidnapping/abduction, malicious wounding, fighting, robbery, extortion, sexual harrassment, sexual offenses without force, bullying, and stalking.
- Behavioral offenses refer to inciting a riot, gang activity, trespassing, and disorderly conduct.
- Weapons-related offenses refer to bomb-devices (use, possession, threat), firearms (bringing rifle, shotgun, handgun, or toy gun to school; possession of BB gun or other firearms), knives/other weapons (bringing to school, possession).
- Property-related offenses refer to arson, breaking and entering/burglary, theft, and vandalism.

At the high school level, the target and comparison schools both experienced increases in their offense rates from the 2004-2005 to 2006-2007 school years. The target school—Wythe High School—experienced an increase of 125.9 incidents per 100 students, a 67 percent increase, while Armstrong High School experienced an increase of 70 incidents per 100 students, or 55 percent. These changes in the rates are in the same direction as, but not similar in magnitude to, the changes experienced at the middle school level. The pattern of a larger increase in the target area school versus the comparison area school still holds, even though in this case the comparison area school experienced an increase in incidents, albeit a smaller one.

At the high school level, truancy, dropout, and graduation rates were also examined. Both high schools experienced considerable decreases in both their dropout and graduation rates. The size of both reductions was somewhat greater at Wythe High School than at Armstrong High School. These figures suggest that although more students are remaining in school, the percentage of students successfully finishing school has not increased. It seems likely that both high schools experienced a net increase in the proportion of students transferring to other schools during the study period.

Conclusion These data are not sufficient to support strong inferences about whether the GRP programs operating in the education domain succeeded in improving the school-level outcomes examined. On their face, the data suggest that outcomes worsened substantially at the middle-school level and remained essentially unchanged at the high-school level during the period when the program effects were expected to become manifest. The evaluation team doubts that the programs GRP brought to Boushall Middle School caused students to exhibit worse behavioral problems. The most likely explanation for the middle school findings is that one or more changes *other* than the beginning of GRP programming accounts for the turn for the worse at Boushall. Perhaps this other change was among the considerations that lead to the selection of Boushall as a school in need of the programs GRP had to offer. At both Boushall and Wythe, it may be that the GRP programs were effective for those students who were served but have not been offered for a long enough period, or to enough students, to create an observable effect at the school level. In short, while the evaluation team cannot conclude that the GRP programs in the education domain were effective, it also cannot conclude that they were ineffective.

8.6.3. Health

Two major aspects of the GRP effort in Richmond have health-related outcomes that were assessed for this evaluation. Bon Secours Richmond Health System received the largest proportion of prevention funding and used GRP to expand its existing services into the target area. As explained in Section 8.5.2, the organization offered a variety of health care services in the target area and in the area surrounding the target area. The organization has been providing mobile health care through its Care-A-Van services and prenatal and infant care in association with clinics in the target area since mid-2005.

Ultimately, assessment of child development would provide evidence of success for a program designed to improve maternal, prenatal, and early childhood health and education. However, the life of this evaluation is much shorter than necessary to accurately measure such outcomes, including the improved health, well-being, and academic achievement of children whose mothers received prenatal and postnatal support services

compared with children of mothers of similar characteristics who did not receive those services. To assess such outcomes, researchers would need to follow the children of adult participants for a minimum of 10 years, well beyond the life span of the current evaluation. Thus, while the impacts of a program such as Bon Secours are largely long term in nature, program success can nonetheless be measured in the short term through other means. To do so, UI obtained patient-level data from four hospitals that serve the City of Richmond. From these data, the measures used to assess the Bon Secours program include such indicators as the incidence of low birth weight babies, premature babies, neonatal deaths, and general complications in pregnancy.

The second health-related outcome expected from the Richmond GRP's efforts is a reduction in the number of serious injuries that may result from gang-related violence in the target area. The overarching goal of the GRP was to reduce gang-related crime in the target area, and, presumably, a reduction in gang-related crime would lead to a reduction in violence resulting in bodily harm. This outcome is expected to be the result of a number of different elements of the Richmond GRP effort, including prevention activities that reduce the number of youth involved in gang activity, intervention activities that work to remove youth from gangs, suppression activities that incapacitate some gang members (through arrest and prosecution) and may deter others, and reentry activities that help smooth the transition from incarceration to the community. While serious injury among the target area population is an indirect measure of the effects of GRP on gang crime, it is nonetheless an important indicator of GRP's success.

Data UI collected data from Virginia Health Information, Inc. (VHI), a non-profit health data organization that contracts with the State of Virginia to collect and disseminate health-related information in the state and is recognized as the official state provider of such data. VHI collects data on a yearly basis directly from hospitals and other health sources. UI worked with VHI to select a set of data that would assist in the evaluation of GRP in Richmond. Due to costs associated with obtaining these data, UI narrowed its analysis to four hospitals in the Richmond metropolitan region that were expected to serve the largest number of patients from the target area. The hospitals selected include Bon Secours St. Francis Medical Center, Bon Secours St. Mary's Hospital, CJW Medical Center, and the VCU Health System. Table 8.5 provides information on inpatient discharges from each hospital as a percentage of the regional total[8] by type of care for 2006. The data reveal that the four selected hospitals provided care for 53–67 percent of the central region's neonatal, normal newborn and obstetrics/delivery patients and more than 77 percent of the region's trauma patients.

The available data include non-confidential information on all patients admitted for care to each hospital who meet at least one of the following criteria:

- At least one of first three diagnoses classified as 'Complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and the peurperium' under the ICD-9-CM system;[9]
- Admission to hospital classified as 'Newborn';

[8]The state of Virginia is divided into five regions for data collection: North, East, Northwest, Southwest, and Central. Richmond is located in the Central region.

[9]While the title of this category indicates 'complications,' it also includes normal childbirth with no complications.

Table 8.5: Inpatient Discharges from Four Richmond Hospitals Selected for Analysis

Hospital	Neonatology	Normal Newborn	Obstetrics/ Delivery	Trauma
CJW Medical Center	21.29	19.61	18.80	11.43
Bon Secours St. Francis	2.22	6.74	6.19	1.29
Bon Secours St. Mary's	11.86	16.71	16.69	6.23
VCU Health System	32.10	10.81	12.30	58.24
Total (% of Region)	67.47	53.87	53.98	77.19

Note: The state of Virginia is divided into five regions for data collection: North, East, Northwest, Southwest, and Central. Richmond is located in the Central region. Proportions of discharges cited are at the regional level.

- External injury classified as 'Homicide and injury purposely inflicted by other persons'; or
- External injury classified as 'Injury undetermined whether accidentally or purposely inflicted.'

Use of these criteria resulted in the collection of all admissions for pregnancy complications or the birth of a child and all newborn admissions; the resulting set of admissions was used in the assessment of the prenatal and infancy care initiative. Also collected were all admissions for the care of external injuries that were purposely inflicted for use in assessing changes in the level of gang violence. While Bon Secours' efforts were expected to improve the general physical health of the target population unrelated to pregnancy, UI did not collect data on general health for two main reasons. First, the number of admissions for various health conditions affecting the target area population was high enough to make the cost of obtaining the data prohibitive. Second, during the first two years of providing service in the target area, Bon Secours did not collect data on patient diagnoses in the target area in such a manner that they were usable for UI's evaluation. Thus, the evaluation team had no way of knowing what types of health conditions were most common, most serious, or receiving the greatest amount of attention from Bon Secours in the target area during the service period. Without such information, the evaluation team was unable to subsequently narrow the data needs to make an affordable and manageable request of such data from VHI. Bon Secours did indicate to UI in mid-2007 that it was in the process of switching to a new data system that would likely allow it to provide such data to the evaluation team. UI will pursue that data in an effort to more fully assess the effects of a larger range of Bon Secours' services in the target area for the final evaluation report.

In addition, the data collected do not include information on patients that visited the emergency room for care but were not admitted to the hospital. Based on the nature of the GRP's target activities and population—gang activity and gang members—the GRP may in fact have a greater effect on the number of patients receiving emergency care but not admitted to the hospital than on those actually admitted to the hospital. Unfortunately, such emergency room data could not be obtained for this evaluation; initial attempts to locate such data indicated that they would have to be collected separately from each hospital of interest. The resources for that type of undertaking were not available for the current report, but UI is still working to obtain such data for use in the final report.

For this report, data were collected for two full years, 2004 and 2006, to capture a year-long baseline period *prior to* the beginning of GRP services and a full year *after* services began. Bon Secours began providing services in mid-2005, allowing at least six months

for the program to increase its patient caseload in the target area prior to the outcome data assessment period. It should be noted that Bon Secours St. Francis did not open until September 2005 and therefore no 2004 data were collected for that facility. The data are reported by quarter and year; the actual dates of service were removed to protect patient confidentiality. Additionally, UI received the residential ZIP code of each patient included in the data set. Due to patient privacy laws, more detailed information on patient residence could not be collected. Patient ZIP codes were thus used to assign patients to the target or comparison areas. While ZIP codes are larger than the study areas, they represent the best approximation of location given the data restrictions. In addition, as mentioned in Section 8.5.2, Bon Secours likely served individuals from outside the target area as many of its clinics are on, or outside, the target area boundary. However, because the comparison area (ZIP code 23220) is not adjacent to the target area, it is unlikely many comparison area residents travelled to the target area to receive services from Bon Secours. The target area ZIP codes—23224 and 23234—include all of the target area proper as well as some outside areas where many residents likely benefitted from Bon Secours' services (see Figure 8.11). The data set included 5,349 patients from the target area ZIP code and 978 from the comparison area ZIP code. Finally, additional patient information was collected, including age, race, sex, and length of stay in the hospital, measured in days.

Prenatal and perinatal outcomes The next several paragraphs describe the findings from an examination of data on prenatal and perinatal outcomes.

Measures The World Health Organization Fund and Organization (2004, :3) describes low birth weight as a "summary measure of a multi-faceted public health problem that includes long-term maternal malnutrition, ill health, hard work, and poor pregnancy health care." Nearly seven percent of births in the target area ZIP code had late or no prenatal care in 2004, and nearly one-fifth of residents were living below the poverty level in 2000. These factors contribute to a higher risk for low birth weight babies in the target area. Efforts to make prenatal care more accessible, improve maternal nutrition, and improve general maternal health are thus expected to have an effect on the number of low weight births occurring among the target area population. In addition, the March of Dimes March of Dimes (2008) identifies risk factors for premature births, which can also contribute to a higher incidence of low birth weight babies. Lifestyle factors, including limited prenatal care and stress, and medical factors such as poor general health, all contribute to an increased risk for premature birth. In addition, the evaluation team considered general pregnancy complications, such as hypertension and gestational diabetes, to further assess the effects of increased prenatal and general health care in the target area, and neonatal deaths to assess changes in newborn well-being in the area. Finally, the evaluation considered both the mother's and infant's length of stay in the hospital. For newborns, longer lengths of stay are expected to be associated with more severe complications. For mothers, the relationship between length of stay and health is not as clear, an issue discussed in more detail below. The evaluation team thus examined five health-related outcome measures for this portion of the assessment:

Admission for pregnancy complications Includes all pregnancy-related complications; preterm births are a subset of this measure.

Preterm births Births before the 37th week of pregnancy.

Low birth weight births Births where newborn weight was less than 2500 grams.

Neonatal deaths Deaths of infants within 28 days of birth.

Length-of-stay Length of hospital stay, in days, for both mother and infant.

In addition, demographic information such as race/ethnicity and age was considered.

Hypotheses The main hypothesis is that the efforts of Bon Secours in the target area, both those focused on prenatal and infant care and those addressing the general health of the population, will have an effect on the above-outlined pregnancy- and birth-related outcomes. Based on the expectation that Bon Secours provided prenatal care in the target area beginning in mid-2005, the following maternal and infant outcomes during pregnancy and following birth in 2006 as compared to 2004 were expected:

1. Fewer hospital admissions for pregnancy-related complications;
2. Fewer preterm births to mothers in the target area;
3. Fewer low birth weight babies born to mothers in the target area;
4. Fewer neonatal deaths; and
5. Shorter newborn lengths of stay immediately following birth.

Since quarterly data on patient admissions from eight non-contiguous quarters (i.e., 2004 and 2006) was collected, the assessment is limited to a pre-post descriptive analysis.

Results Table 8.6 provides data on the selected patient measures. The table provides information on patients admitted for pregnancy-related conditions ("prenatal patients") and newborns. The table also provides quarterly graphs for the total number of prenatal patients, patients with pregnancy complications, and newborns with low birth weights. Data are presented for three areas: the target area ZIP codes, the comparison area ZIP code, and patients from all other areas.[10]

The four study hospitals admitted a larger number of prenatal patients from the target area than from the comparison area, and the number prenatal patients increased in the target area over the study period. The bar graphs reveal a steady upward trend is evident in 2004 prior to the start of Bon Secours services and continued in 2006, when services were still being provided. In the comparison area, however, the number of patients was relatively unchanged, and the quarterly trend is not consistently upwards or downwards. While this finding is not significant to the GRP because the health care it funded was not expected to have an effect on the overall number of patients admitted to the hospital, it provides a background understanding of the size of the patient population in the target and comparison areas.

Table 8.6 provides information on the demographics of all prenatal and perinatal patients admitted to the four study hospitals. Patients who are members of racial/ethnic

[10]Patients from 'all other areas' include those who were admitted to one of the four Richmond-area hospitals whose residential ZIP codes were outside the target and comparison area ZIP codes.

Table 8.6: Prenatal Patient Characteristics at Selected Hospitals, Richmond

	Target		Comparison		All Other	
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006
Total prenatal patients	1343	1518	256	254	8557	9095
Prenatal patients by qtr.						
African American (%)	55.77	56.72	64.06	59.45	31.42	31.32
Hispanic (%)	20.55	26.68**	2.34	1.57	3.46	5.74**
White (%)	14.37	12.19*	24.61	33.46**	52.64	54.91**
Other (%)	9.31	4.41	8.98	5.51	12.48	8.04
Percent under 20 yrs. old	14.74	15.02	18.36	16.14	8.41	8.51
Total patients with pregnancy-related complications†	1046	1285**	228	232	7060	7783**
Patients with pregnancy-related complications by qtr.						
Preterm births (%)	4.91	6.32	5.47	5.12	5.55	5.87
Patients with complications and under 20 yrs. old (%)	11.91	12.85	15.63	14.57	7.18	7.47
Prenatal length of stay (mean number of days)	2.99	3.10	2.88	3.52*	3.13	3.17
Total newborn patients	1139	1247	202	223	7257	7650
Newborns with low birth weight (<2500g)	122	137	20	28	696	692
Newborns with LBW (%)	10.71	10.99	9.90	12.56	9.59	9.05
Newborns with LBW by qtr.						
Neonatal deaths	7	13	2	0	49	26**
Newborn length of stay (mean number of days)	4.17	3.87	4.16	3.70	4.59	4.33

Source: Data on patient admissions obtained from VHI, Inc.

Notes:

• The total prenatal patients is the number admitted with pregnancy-related diagnoses.

• Significance tests were performed on mean length of stay for each area in 2004 and 2006 for both prenatal and newborn patients. Difference in proportion tests comparing 2004 and 2006 were perfomed on all proportions provided in the table. Differences were nonsignificant unless otherwise noted.

†Patients with pregnancy-related complications includes all prenatal patients that do not have diagnoses coded as "Normal Delivery."

*Difference between 2004 and 2006 significantly different at the p<0.10 level.

**Difference between 2004 and 2006 significantly different at the p<0.05 level.

minorities reside disproportionately in the target and comparison ZIP codes rather than in the other areas served by the four hospitals. The structure of the minority patient population changed over time, with African Americans admitted in smaller numbers over time while the number of Hispanic patients grew significantly and rapidly in the target area and remained relatively stable in the comparison area. This pattern is consistent with independent reports of a growing Hispanic population in the target area, and in the greater Richmond area as well.

The number of young (i.e., under 20 years old) prenatal patients is presented here as an indirect measure of teenage pregnancies. Prenatal care is essential for young individuals who are at higher risk of pregnancy complications, including anemia, preeclampsia, preterm births, and low birth weight babies (Aetna Intelihealth, 2006). Two possible effects among pregnant teens could result from Bon Secours' efforts in the target area. First, the number of prenatal patients under the age of 20 may increase slightly in the initial stages of the intervention as the program serves more individuals in need, serves more pregnant teenagers, and makes available the level of care needed for these individuals in a hospital setting. With time, however, it is expected that the percent of teenage pregnancies should drop, as the program's general health care provision and GRP's overall, non-health related efforts combine to prevent teenage pregnancies. The table reveals that a significantly larger proportion of patients receiving pregnancy-related care from the target and comparison areas were under 20 years of age than from all other areas. The percent of all prenatal patients under age 20 did increase slightly in the target area while dropping slightly in the comparison area, but those changes were not statistically significant. It may be that the program was not in operation long enough to allow observation of a significant effect in either direction, although the slight increase is consistent with the hypothesis that Bon Secours' services would lead to a short-term increase in the number of young prenatal patients.

Bon Secours' work is expected to lower the number of patients from the target area admitted to a hospital for pregnancy complications, including preterm births. To examine this hypothesis, the analysis also considered the number of patients who were admitted for pregnancy-related events that were *not* considered "Normal Delivery" based on the coding of the patient's diagnosis. A large proportion of the patients included under the prenatal category were considered to have some pregnancy-related complication, and UI was not able to narrow down the group based on the severity of the complication. The trend in pregnancy-related complications paralleled the upward trend in prenatal patients as whole. The quarterly data indicate a steady and statistically significant increase in the number of patients with pregnancy-related complications in the target and "All Other" areas. The number of patients with complications in the comparison area remained stable. Without information on the severity of the conditions or on possible changes in coding of complications, it is hard to know whether the observed increase is cause for concern at this point. If the trend continues throughout the evaluation period, it may indicate that a greater number of pregnancy complications are being diagnosed and cared for among patients in the target area (i.e., recorded levels of the complications may increase even if their actual incidence does not increase). This result is a plausible outcome from Bon Secours' services because the organization is likely reaching those who may not have otherwise had access to health care, providing diagnoses, and either directly providing care or helping to connect patients with appropriate care providers.

To further narrow this portion of the analysis, the evaluation team considered changes in the number of patients experiencing preterm births, or delivery before 37 weeks of pregnancy. While the percent of patients in this category was relatively low, between five and six percent, that percentage did increase in the target area over the study period while remaining stable in the comparison and other areas. In addition, because teenagers are more at risk for certain complications during pregnancy, the evaluation team considered the percent under 20 years of age with pregnancy-related complications. The numbers followed the same trend as for preterm births as a whole. The number of teens with pregnancy complications increased slightly in the target area, decreased in the comparison area, and remained stable in all other areas. While none of these observed changes were statistically significant, they do indicate a diversion between the patients in the target and comparison areas and should be examined more closely in the final report when additional quarters of data will allow a more complete assessment of any developing trends in this measure.

Finally, the analysis considered length of stay in the hospital for all prenatal patients. While Bon Secours' work may be expected to shorten the required length of stay for patients requiring treatment of conditions without giving birth, the expected effect is less clear for patient stays after childbirth, when other factors may work to increase or hold steady the length of stay. Federal regulations require that insurers allow both mothers and newborn babies at least two days in the hospital following vaginal deliveries and four days following cesarean deliveries. These regulations can be expected to push hospital stays toward a lower limit of two days. However, a combination of insurer restrictions on hospital stays and the high costs of hospital stays for under- or uninsured patients may lead such patients to leave earlier than they might otherwise. In light of this consideration, an increase in the length of stay may be a positive outcome reflecting an increase in the quality of care. While the data are not detailed enough to disentangle the effects of these different factors' on length of stay, the measure was included here because it nonetheless provides a point of comparison between the study areas. For all three areas considered, the length of stay hovers around three days. The mean length of stay changed significantly only in the comparison area, increasing from 2.88 to 3.52 days. In addition, while not included in the table, the analysis considered median length of stay to assess whether outliers were affecting the mean length of stay. The medians were two and three days for 2004 and 2006, respectively, in the target and comparison areas and two days for both years in other areas; in all cases, the medians were only slightly lower than the means.

To further assess the outcomes of Bon Secours' prenatal care services, health outcomes of newborns were also considered. All three areas saw a slight increase in the number of newborns delivered between 2004 and 2006. To further refine the analysis, low birth weight (i.e., less than 2500g), neonatal deaths (before 29 days of age), and newborn length of stay were considered. While the number of low birth weight babies did not change significantly in any of the considered areas, the numbers did change slightly in the target and comparison areas, moving downward during 2004 and increasing during 2006. While the data do not cover a period long enough to make any firm statements about trends in this measure, the rise in low birth weight babies during Bon Secours' period of service is something to revisit in the final report when additional quarters of data will be added to the existing data set. The numbers of neonatal deaths were very low, although the "Other" area did record a significant drop—50 percent—in the number of deaths. Because

the numbers are so low, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the changes from 2004 to 2006. Finally, for newborn length of stay, the mean decreased slightly, but not significantly, in all areas.[11]

Conclusion The patient-level data collected have mainly provided baseline measures and an opportunity to look at some very early trends in the measures that may perhaps be, in part, the result of Bon Secours' efforts in the target area. However, the full effects of Bon Secours' efforts in the target area will likely not be observable for several years. For many of the measures examined, UI expected to find a short-term increase (e.g., in the number of patients under 20 years of age with prenatal complications) as the accessibility of health care in the target area increased. However, any such short-term increase was expected to be followed by a long-term downward trend in those measures as the prenatal and general health care from Bon Secours and the prevention aspects of GRP worked to decrease pregnancy complications, preterm births, teenage pregnancies, low birth weight babies, and a host of other measures not discussed here. Such an outcome would not be observable until the program has been providing services for several years, however. Additional data on health care utilization (e.g., health insurance rates or doctor visits) in the target area would also be necessary to attribute any changes in hospital admissions to the increased accessibility of health care that resulted from Bon Secours' services. In fact, the analysis found short-term increases—though not always statistically significant ones—in patients with complications, preterm births, young patients, and low birth weight babies over the study period. In addition, a significant growth in the number of Hispanic women admitted for prenatal events or complications was found, an increase that was partially driven by growth in the Hispanic population in that section of Richmond. The Richmond GRP has focused much of its efforts on the target area's Hispanic population, so the trends among these patients will be of particular interest throughout the remainder of the evaluation period. It is important to remember that these findings are descriptive in nature and the observed changes cannot definitively be attributed to Bon Secours' efforts in the target area. With additional data collection, however, it may be possible to make a stronger evaluative assessment.

External injury For the next several paragraphs, the discussion will turn from perinatal outcomes to injury from external causes and requiring hospitalization as a proxy for gang-related violence.

Measures In addition to basic demographic information (race/ethnicity, age, sex), two health-related outcome measures were examined for this portion of the assessment:

Type of injury Injuries were classified as gunshot, stabbing, fight or brawl, and other; and

Length of stay Length of stay in days for all patients admitted with an external injury.

[11] The median length of stay was two days for all areas and years considered.

Hypotheses The hypotheses regarding injuries stem from the efforts of three of the Richmond GRP's main components: prevention, intervention, and suppression. The suppression efforts, composed primarily of directed patrols aimed at reducing the level of gang violence in the target area, are expected to have the most immediate effect on the number of admitted patients with external injuries. The effects of the intervention and prevention components are more long term and not immediately observable. Preventing elementary and middle school children from becoming involved in gangs will not be manifest in measures of external injury until those children reach adolescence, when both the risk of joining gangs and participation in delinquent behaviors are highest. Given the time period covered by the patient-level data collected, only the suppression efforts were expected to have had a detectible effect during the observation period. The suppression efforts began in earnest in mid-2005; thus the collected data provide a baseline measure in 2004 and a measure after the suppression efforts had been in effect for approximately six months. UI expected the following outcomes to result from GRP:

1. Fewer external injuries to residents of the target area;
2. Shorter stays following admittance to a hospital for external injuries; and
3. A greater decline in specific types of injuries (i.e., gunshots, stabbing, and fight/brawl) in the target area than in the comparison area.

As with the prenatal patient analysis, due to limited data available, the assessment is limited to a pre-post descriptive analysis of the above measures and other demographic details of patients for the target and comparison area ZIP codes.

Results Table 8.7 provides data on the selected patient measures. The table provides information on admitted patients for whom an external injury code was recorded that indicated the injury was inflicted purposely or with unknown intent. As with the prenatal data above, findings are organized by area. The table reveals a relatively low number of admitted patients with external injury codes for all areas and little change over the study period in any area; this may be because many injuries that would likely be the result of violence, whether gang-related or not, can be effectively treated in the emergency room and may not require admission to the hospital. GRP's efforts may have a greater effect on emergency room visits for external injuries, but because UI was unable to collect such data, the hospital admission data was examined instead. The table also provides quarterly graphs for the total number of injury patients. Those graphs reveal third-quarter peaks for both years in all areas except the comparison area in 2006, but, overall, the number of patients is stable across all quarters and areas.

In the target area, African Americans and Hispanics compose the largest and second-largest, respectively, proportion of patients admitted with external injuries. In the comparison and other areas, Hispanics represent a relatively small proportion of such patients. The number of African American injury patients from the target area decreased 22 percent—a statistically significant decline—between 2004 and 2006. Over the same period, the number of Hispanic patients doubled. While the actual number of Hispanic patients in the target area is small (17 patients in 2006), the growth of this patient subpopulation may have any of at least three explanations. First, the growing number of Hispanic patients with external injuries may reflect the growth in the Hispanic population of the target area.

Table 8.7: Characteristics of Patients with External Injuries at Selected Richmond Hospitals

	Target		Comparison		All Other	
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006
Total injury patients	81	76	26	26	441	438
Injury patients by qtr.						
African American (%)	77.8	64.5**	69.2	80.8	60.3	57.5
Hispanic (%)	11.1	22.4**	7.7	0.0	3.4	5.7
White (%)	11.1	13.2	15.4	15.4	33.3	34.2
Other (%)	0.0	0.0	7.7	3.8	2.9	2.5
Patients under 20 yrs. old (%)	21.0	26.3	26.9	11.5	19.3	18.0
Male patients (%)	72.8	80.3	19.2	15.4	74.1	78.1
Gunshot injuries (%)	37.0	26.3	19.2	23.1	24.7	22.8
Stabbing injuries† (%)	14.8	15.8	11.5	19.2	14.1	14.6
Fight or brawl injuries (%)	9.9	6.6	15.4	11.5	10.0	12.6
Other injuries (%)	38.3	51.3*	53.8	46.2	51.2	50.0
Injury length of stay (avg. number of days)	4.8	3.0*	7.0	3.9	5.1	4.3*
Injury length of stay (median number of days)	3.0	2.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	2.0

Source: Data on patient admissions obtained from VHI, Inc.
Notes:
• The total injury patients is the number admitted with an external injury code indicating homicide or injury intentionally caused by other persons or injury where motivation is unknown.
• Significance tests were performed on mean length of stay for each area in 2004 and 2006. Difference in proportion tests comparing 2004 and 2006 were perfomed on all proportions provided in the table. Differences were nonsignificant unless otherwise noted.
†Stabbing injuries were identified by any code indicating an injury using a cutting or piercing instrument to cut or puncture any part of body.
*Difference between 2004 and 2006 significantly different at the p<0.10 level.
**Difference between 2004 and 2006 significantly different at the p<0.05 level.

Second, the patient growth may indicate an increase in access to health care among Hispanics, perhaps as a consequence of Bon Secours' efforts. Third, the patient growth may reflect an increase in the involvement of Hispanics in activities that place them at risk of external injury (e.g., dangerous occupations, criminal victimization or perpetration).

To further refine the analysis, different types of injuries were examined, focusing on three main injuries considered to be the most common gang-related injuries and the most serious injuries in the data set. Those include gunshot, stabbing, and fight or brawl injuries. The target area experienced a large, but nonsignificant, decrease in the proportion of gunshot injuries and a large and significant increase in the proportion of 'other' injuries. In the comparison area, the number of gunshot injuries increased slightly (though nonsignificantly) and the number of 'other' injuries decreased slightly and nonsignificantly. This pattern of findings is consistent with the hypothesis that GRP may have decreased the number of serious injuries related to gang activity in the target area.

UI also examined length of stay, treating it as a proxy for injury severity. The mean length of stay decreased significantly by nearly two days in the target area and by one

day in the comparison and other areas.[12] Since length of stay decreased in both the target and comparison areas, this finding is not consistent with a GRP effect on external injuries. Rather, this finding suggests that another cause may have shortened stays in these areas of Richmond. Because the change in the comparison area is not significant, however, it is not clear at this point in the evaluation what was driving the changes in length of stay between 2004 and 2006, or whether the same process or intervention was driving the change in length of stay in both the target and comparison areas.

Conclusion The examination of data on hospital admissions related to external injuries found a significant increase in the proportion of Hispanic injury patients and a significant decrease in the proportion of African American injury patients from the target area. These changes may reflect changing levels of involvement in risky activities, perhaps as a results of the GRP suppression activities, the population shifts that are occurring in the target area, or changes in access to health care. A relatively large, but nonsignificant, decrease in the number of gunshot injuries suffered by target area residents was observed, while comparison area residents suffered slightly more gunshot injuries. While these changes were not significant, they are at least consistent with the hypothesis that GRP may have yielded a reduction in serious injuries from gang-related incidents. On the other hand, UI also found that lengths of stay associated with external injuries, which was interpreted as a proxy for the seriousness of the injuries, decreased in both the target and comparison areas. The fact that hospital stays were shortened in both study areas suggests that something other than GRP was responsible for the change. These findings are descriptive in nature, however, and the evaluation team is unable to say whether the efforts of GRP were responsible for any of the changing patterns that were identified in the external injury data. Additional data on these measures will be collected as the evaluation continues so that UI may be able to make more definitive statements in the final report.

8.6.4. Crime

The outcomes most central to the evaluation of GRP relate to crime, particularly whether gang-related crime has declined in terms of quantity and seriousness during the GRP implementation. The evaluation team established a relationship with RPD to acquire reported crime incidents, arrests, and calls for service records for all offense types within the City of Richmond. To ensure a comprehensive record of gang incidents, UI also initiated an audit of all incidents to identify those that were gang-related. This audit provides UI with information about suspect gang membership, age, and associated offense information. The data also indicate whether the incident was Hispanic-on-Hispanic or African American-on-Hispanic, but did not provide racial or ethnic information for other groups.

The ultimate goal of the GRP was to reduce gang-related crime in the target area. Part of the evaluation team's mandate was to assemble evidence to address whether that goal was met and, if so, to estimate how many gang crimes may have been averted by GRP activities. As this is only an interim report and the evaluation is ongoing, UI can report only what has been inferred about the effect of GRP from the evidence assembled so far, which includes implementation information and crime trends—both over time and spatial.

[12] The median length of stay also decreased in all three areas.

Measures

The evaluation team examined four crime-related outcome measures for this portion of the assessment:

Incidents, drug-related Police incidents reports in which the recorded offense was drug trafficking, possession, or possession of paraphernalia.

Incidents, serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.

Incidents, gang-related Police incident reports that indicated the crime event was gang-related.

Incidents, gang-related serious violence Police incident reports in which the most serious recorded offense was murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault and where it was noted that the crime event was gang-related. This measure is the intersection of the preceding two measures.

All four measures were developed from data provided by the RPD. For each measure, the evaluation team developed one monthly time series, spanning January 2002–March 2007, for each of the three study areas—target, comparison, and displacement.

The rationale for selecting these four measures for the outcome analysis weighed several factors including the higher costs to society posed by serious violent crimes, concern that the completeness of police reporting of less serious crimes may be sensitive to the volume of more serious incidents occurring at the same time, and recognition that GRP may have increased the sophistication and completeness of police gang intelligence, thereby affecting the number of incidents categorized as gang-related. Of the four measures, the number of gang-related incidents is the most direct measure of the category of crimes RPD was expected to suppress. That measure was not examined alone, however, because UI was somewhat concerned that an increase in the sophistication of police gang intelligence might cause a shift in the number of incidents *identified* as gang-related even if the actual number of gang-related incidents remained unchanged. Measures of serious violence were examined because they are especially costly to society, and they are reported and recorded more consistently and completely than most types of less serious offenses. Finally, the data on drug-related incidents were included in the analysis based on their relative frequency in the target area; drug-related incidents comprise at least one-quarter of the gang-related crimes in the target area. Additionally, most traditional gangs are involved in the drug-trade, making the use of this measure a natural one in a study of gangs. There were too few gang crimes in the comparison area to estimate time series models. This left the evaluation team with a comparison of serious violent and drug-related incidents in the two study areas.

Figure 8.12 provides the timeline of events in the development and implementation of the Richmond GRP that was provided above in Section 8.3 with the addition of monthly time series of selected crime measures and periodic maps that reveal the changing spatial patterns of serious violent incidents in the study areas. This figure reveals the relationship of organizational and implementation events to changes in levels of crime.

Figure 8.12: Richmond Timeline



Target area: Serious violent incidents
Comparison area: Serious violent incidents
Target area: Serious violent gang incidents
Comparison area: Serious violent gang incidents
5
2
BGC hosts speaker Azim Khamiza; Club Rapp, Theater group hold dinner theater; HLO prints first issue of Connections/ Conexiones; First intervention team mtg.; Outreach worker hired; Resource coord. hired for One-Stop; VCU performs first GRIP tattoo removal
New AG takes office; NYGC Intervention Team training; RCAC Career Club in place at Wythe HS; SACI holds Spanish course; Intervention Team created using NYGC model; Project Exile billboards in GRIP area; RPD purchases new equipment with GRIP funds, conducts truancy sweeps
BGC youths attend U. of Richm. Youth Forum; RIS community meeting, outreach in Southwood; RPD's Neighbor. Watch mtg., Southwood
Subcommittee meetings held; VGIA conducts gang training session for citizens, community
BGC's Southside Community Clean-Up, Camp Little Hawk Day of Caring; Theater group holds 3 performances; RPD's Hispanic Citizen's Academy; RPD Gang Unit attends street crimes training
GRIP hosts foundations meeting to discuss sustainability; BGC youths attend SunTrust Indy Race; RIS school orientation for families, school supplies delivered to homes; RPD offers Employability Skills Training for youths;
Meeting with US Sen. Allen's staff to discuss sustainability; Cluster meeting held in Milwaukee for all sites; Imagine Festival; Outreach worker resigns
NNO event in GRIP area; Class Action camp; RPD distributes "Robbery Prevention" brochure in GRIP area
RCAC youth summer internships; RPD Internship program; Boaz & Ruth takes 2nd GRIP client in reentry program; RPD targets firearms in GRIP area
BGC basketball clinic, U. of Rich. football games; RIS tutoring services; RCSO GED testing session; Employment skills workshop at City Jail; RPD gang unit attend VGIA training
BGC youths tour college campus, attend U. of Richmond football game; RCAC's "You and the Law" workshop; RPL's Homework Help Center opens
RTC's vocational students pass certification tests; RIS places youth mentors at Greene ES
BGC's Keystone Teen Unity Summit; SACI holds Spanish course; OAG terminates City's contracts for One-Stop, Int. Team, and Outreach worker; RCSO GED testing session
RPD takes over One-Stop, Int. Team, Outreach Worker
New program coord. hired, previous coord. promoted to director; BGC basketball camp; SACI holds Spanish course; RPD's Strengthen Families program, STIC Institute; New Outreach worker hired; RCSO GED testing session
BGC basket-ball games at U. of Rich. and VCU
BGC hires bilingual staff member, hosts Money Matters Camp; RCAC's YouWIN Institute Retreat; One-Stop relocates to Southwood Apartments; RPD's Mi Historia/My Story program, Hispanic Citizen's Academy
GRIP committee meeting; OJJDP grants extension
Many Phase II contracts expire
Program coordinator resigns; program director resumes role; NNO event in target area; Class Action Camp
GRIP partners meeting; RFP for after-school program issued
RFP for mental health services issued; Imagine Festival; Anti-crime rally in Southwood
Current end date for GRIP federal funding
2006
2007
2008
2009
The ROC, Bon Secours, Elderhomes programs, RIS classes, Directed patrols con't.
BGC extended hours; SK8 nights by Learsi Skateboards; FPS mental health and substance abuse counseling
RPD's PAL soccer league
ROC runs basketball, dance, football, cheerleading, soccer programs; U-Turn's Sports Academy for 4th graders at Greene ES; RPD provides SROs at Boushall MS and Wythe HS
Shakespeare LA/Will Power to Youth
RCAC's YouWIN Institute
City DJS intensive case management program (thru Mar 07); GRIP area gang crimes targeted for prosecution
U-Turn's Sports Academy for 3rd graders at Greene ES
RCAC hosts YouWIN Institute
RCAC's Career Clubs,Work Experience portion of YouWIN Institute (Jan-Jun); RPD's PAL soccer league (Feb-May); RCSO's BELIEF program, computer learning course at Richmond City Jail (Jan-Mar)
Barefoot Living's dance program

Figure 8.13: Richmond: Drug-related Incidents, January 2002–March 2007



The relationship between organizational events and crime levels is explored in more detail through a descriptive analysis of the monthly trends in selected crime measures and the spatial patterns of crime in the study areas, followed by more sophisticated inferential modeling of crime trends to look for statistically significant changes in monthly levels of different crime measures that may have been the result of GRP's efforts.

Descriptive Analysis

Figures 8.13–8.16 provide linear trends in crime measures for approximately five study years (2002–2006/2007), while Figure 8.17 provides larger versions of the same maps included on the timeline. The dotted lines in each figure represent the overall trend in each measure throughout the evaluation period.

Figure 8.13 provides the monthly trend of drug-related incidents over the evaluation period, along with the trend for the same measure in the comparison area. In both areas, the average monthly levels increase over the period, and both experience relatively similar levels of drug-related incidents, especially at the beginning of the evaluation period. In the target area, the highest peak of this type of incident was experienced in late 2006. The comparison area experienced a peak early in the evaluation period, in mid-2002, and again in late 2005. While both areas experienced overall increases over the evaluation period, the increase in the target area was greater than that in the comparison area.

Figure 8.14 displays the monthly trend of serious violent incidents for both the target and comparison areas and reveals a markedly different trend than observed for drug-related incidents. Here, the target area experienced a very slight increase in the average monthly levels, while the comparison area experienced a slight decrease. In addition, levels in the target area are higher in every month but one, in February 2004. The highest

Figure 8.14: Richmond: Serious Violent Incidents, January 2002–March 2007



number of incidents in the target area occurred in 2005, with peaks in two months immediately following the implementation of the suppression portion of the Richmond GRP in Phase I.

The monthly trend in gang-related incidents is provided in Figure 8.15, and echoes the trend observed for serious violent incidents. Overall, levels of gang crime are relatively low compared to levels of serious violent incidents, with monthly levels remaining below 20 incidents per month over the evaluation period, and most months remaining below 10 incidents per month. The target area experienced a very slight increase in average monthly levels, with the trend in the comparison area mirroring the target area at a lower level. Finally, Figure 8.16 provides the trends in serious violent gang incidents. These trends are very similar to the trends for gang incidents, with a distinct peak observed in the target area in mid-2005, immediately following Phase I suppression implementation. The trends for the two areas are slightly upwards, but like the monthly levels for gang crime overall, remain relatively low throughout the evaluation period.

The maps in Figure 8.17 provide the spatial patterns of serious violent crime in the three Richmond GRP study areas for the period January–June in four years: one baseline year (2002) and three during implementation (2004, 2005, 2006). In the baseline period, relatively high concentrations of serious violent crime were located in the north-central portion of the comparison area and scattered throughout the target and displacement areas. One hot spot is particularly noticeable in the center of the target area—that hot spot is the Southwood Apartment complex. The map confirms anecdotal reports from local officials and experts in Richmond that the apartment complex was a central area for criminal activity prior to GRP in Richmond. By 2004, the concentration in Southwood had already started to dissipate. Other locations in the target area continued to experience relatively high concentrations of serious violence: south of the Southwood Apartment

Figure 8.15: Richmond: Gang-related Incidents, January 2002–June 2006



Figure 8.16: Richmond: Serious Violent Gang Incidents, January 2002–June 2006



complex and on the border of the target and displacement areas, a hot spot grew in intensity. The eastern border of the target area also remained an area of relatively high crime concentration.

While 2005 revealed some decreases in the concentration of crime, especially on the eastern border and south of Southwood, by 2006, the Southwood hot spot had appeared to increase in intensity while the concentration on the eastern border and south of Southwood increased to 2004 levels. Overall, the maps reveal a small dispersement of the crime around Southwood, and a decrease in the concentration of crime in that apartment complex. In the entire target area, however, the patterns of densities remained relatively unchanged. The same was true in the comparison area. This finding echoes observations of the monthly patterns of serious violence above, where little or no change in the average levels of crime from year to year were observed. Together, the graphs and maps suggest a null or negative effect of GRP on crime in the target area. To further develop and test this hypothesis, the evaluation team conducted more sophisticated inferential modeling in the form of time series analysis, presented below

Time Series Analysis

A visual examination of time series data, as presented above, can provide insight into some features of the data (e.g., whether the series level increased or decreased over time), but other features of the time series (e.g., seasonal fluctuations, autocorrelation) may not be apparent from visual inspection alone. The evaluation thus includes inferential statistical modeling to account for those subtler features and to further understanding of whether and how the crime measures changed over time. At this point in the evaluation period, the suppression component of GRP has likely exerted the most significant measurable effect on gang-related crime. UI thus conducted time-series analyses of all incidents and gang-related incidents to provide evidence regarding the changes in volume and seriousness of criminal activity in the target, comparison, and displacement areas. The prevention components, which largely began in late 2005, have focused on serving youth in middle and high school. The effects of such activities on crime are generally not immediately observable; the effects of prevention activities are more long-term in nature and observable as youth mature through middle adolescence. The intervention and reentry components did not begin service delivery in earnest until early to mid-2006, after intervention team members received training on team process and functioning and the team began serving clients. However, the intervention team did experience some upheaval in late 2006 and arguably did not start consistently providing intervention case management until early 2007.

The RPD's gang unit was started with the commencement of, and financial assistance from, GRP, and the unit operates city-wide, not just in the target area. While GRP funds contributed to the gang unit's development, GRP did not fully fund the unit. In addition, the evaluation team lacks knowledge as to the unit's activities throughout the city, having only collected information on the GRP-funded activities of the gang unit. The gang unit's activities likely affect the level of crime—both gang-related and not—in other areas of the city. If similar gang suppression activities were taking place in both the target and comparison areas, this may attenuate the observable effect of the gang unit's operations in the target area.



Figure 8.17: Density of serious violence, Richmond GRP areas, 2002-2006

Hypotheses The hypothesis was that the initiation of directed patrols by the RPD in the target area would lead to a reduction in the mean level of each of the four measures in the target area. The RPD's directed patrols reportedly began in the target area in summer 2005, and the evaluation team expected that it would take at least a few weeks before the increased patrols were fully effective and the effects would be manifest. To accommodate this lag, UI examined each time series for a shift in mean in each month from June 2005 through November 2005, inclusive.

The logic of the quasi-experimental design of the GRP evaluation holds that, for any of the four measures where evidence of a reduction in the series mean was found, the estimate of the magnitude of the intervention effect would be the difference between the shift in the target area and the shift, if any, in the comparison area. In this way, the analysis of the comparison area helps to guard against falsely concluding that a shift observed in the target area is attributable to the RPD's targeted activities or GRP when, in fact, the same shift is also observable in areas outside the target area. In that case, it is more plausible to attribute the shift to another (perhaps unknown) cause than to the localized intervention of interest (i.e., GRP).

The displacement area was included in the evaluation design so that the evaluation team could examine whether the GRP intervention pushed crime out of the target area and into other nearby areas or, conversely, if it produced salutary spill-over effects in neighboring areas. In Richmond, the selected displacement area borders the target area.

Results The methodology for the outcome analysis is explained greater detail in Appendix K, and additional information about the models estimated as part of the Richmond outcome analysis may be found in Table K.4. The findings and inferences are summarized here and in Table 8.8. Overall, the results were counter-intuitive and in direct contrast with the hypotheses.

The evidence the evaluation team has assembled to date suggests that the beginning of the RPD's directed patrols in the target area in mid-2005 may have prompted significant and fairly sizable *increases* in all four measures examined. The analysis shows that the number of gang-related incidents in the target area increased by 15.7 incidents per month beginning in July 2005. Gang-related serious violent incidents also experienced an increase, albeit smaller than for all gang crimes, of 3.55 incidents per month beginning in the same month, July 2005. While comparison area analyses are not possible for these two gang crime measures, analyses were conducted for the displacement area. There, crime also increased but to a lesser degree, with only 3.52 additional gang-related incidents per month starting in July 2005 and 1.32 serious violent gang-related incidents starting in November 2005. This pattern—where crime increases in the target area but decreases in the displacement area—is actually in direct opposition to the concern accompanying many geographically-based suppression efforts about displacement of crime. In the case of the Richmond GRP, however, displacement is not a possibility with increasing crime in the target area.

The results of the time series analyses for all serious violent incidents and drug-related incidents tell a somewhat different story. For serious violent incidents, a significant increase in the target area was concurrent with a significant decrease in such incidents in the comparison area. The time series models estimated a significant increase of 3.66 such incidents per month beginning in July 2005 in the target area and a decrease by nearly the same amount—3.17 incidents—beginning in August 2005 in the comparison area. As was

Table 8.8: Richmond: Estimates of Intervention Effects

	Study Area		
Study Area	Target	Comparison	Displacement
Incidents, drug-related	5.41 (3.66) 11/2005	7.70 (3.41)** 10/2005	6.76 (3.91)* 09/2005
Incidents, serious violence	3.66 (1.80)** 07/2005	−3.17 (0.81)** 08/2005	−5.10 (1.97)** 11/2005
Incidents, gang-related	15.70 (3.95)** 07/2005	†	3.52 (1.58)** 07/2005
Incidents, gang-related serious violence	3.55 (1.85)* 07/2005	†	1.32 (1.21) 11/2005

Notes:
- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 03/2007 (drug-related and serious violent incidents) or 06/2006 (gang-related incidents, serious violent gang incidents).
- We considered intervention points from 06/2005–11/2005.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.
- The date of the observed intervention effect appears beneath each coefficient.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.
** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.
† Too few incidents to support analysis.

the case with both gang crime measures, the displacement area saw a decrease of serious violent incidents by 5.1 incidents per month beginning in November 2005, providing more evidence that displacement is not a concern for the Richmond GRP.

The results of the time series analyses for drug-related incidents followed a somewhat different pattern than we found for the other three measures. The time series models showed increases in drug-related incidents in all three study areas, but the increase in the target area was not statistically significant. The target area model estimated an increase of 5.41 drug-related crimes per month beginning in November 2005. Drug-related crimes increased in the comparison area by a statistically significant 7.7 incidents per month beginning in October 2005. Drug-related incidents also increased significantly in the displacement area. Because of the lower and nonsignificant increase observed in the target area compared with larger and statistically significant increases in the comparison and displacement areas, these models suggest that suppression efforts in the target area may have worked to curtail an increase that may otherwise have occurred had GRP not been operating in the area. The difference between the increase in the target and comparison areas suggest that suppression efforts may have prevented an increase by at least two additional incidents per month in the target area.

Conclusion The interim analysis of the effect of the suppression component of Richmond's GRP program found evidence that the program was associated with increases in all four measures considered as part of this evaluation. We found these increases in the target area to be significant in three cases; only for drug-related incidents was the increase non-significant. At the same time, all crimes except serious violent incidents increased in the displacement area. The comparison area saw increases in drug-related crimes but decreases in serious violent incidents.

Most of the estimated increases were relatively small, in most cases less than six incidents per month. The increase for gang-related incidents, however, was not only significant, but fairly large at nearly 16 incidents per month. There are some possible explanations for this finding. First, the larger Richmond area may have been coincidentally undergoing an increase in gang-related incidents at the time the RPD started directed patrols under GRP in the target area. Because too few incidents occurred in the comparison area, we cannot assess whether concurrent increases of similar magnitude were occurring elsewhere in the city. Second, many officials in Richmond had long denied the existence of gangs in the city. With the launch of the Richmond GRP, however, the city was forced to recognize, document, and address its gang problem. Initial efforts at suppression of gang activity may have identified crime that was previously not recognized as gang-related, creating the impression that gang activity was increasing while it was actually just being documented more thoroughly. Newly-trained officers in the gang unit may have been eager to recognize and report gang crime, and may have done so more extensively in the early months of the gang unit's work. With increased intelligence and increased success in suppressing gang activity in the target area, a subsequent decrease in the level of gang crimes is expected. In addition, some recent research has suggested that intense suppression efforts may unintentionally reinforce gang affiliations and strengthen gang cohesiveness as members work together against a common enemy—law enforcement (Greene and Pranis, 2007). This type of unintended consequence may explain the short-term increase in crime in the target area.

8.7. SUSTAINABILITY

The Richmond GRP has made some significant efforts towards sustaining the initiative beyond the federal funding period but the future remains unclear for the initiative as a whole. The first of its formal efforts was a so-called "Foundations" meeting. The meeting was organized by GRP management in spring 2006 at the behest of OJJDP. While OJJDP encouraged all sites to identify local private foundations and organizations that were potential sources of funding for GRP beyond the federal funding period, Richmond was the only site that actually planned and held such a meeting. GRP management did attract several local and well-known organizations to attend the meeting, where selected GRP partners' work was highlighted to demonstrate the positive changes that GRP was initiating in the target area. The GRP management reported interest in GRP on the part of some foundations following the meeting and in early 2007 reported that they were developing a concept paper for one of the foundations. Guidance from OJJDP on follow up with interested organizations however, was lacking, and eventually interest from those foundations died down. Had the Richmond GRP been given the green light from OJJDP sooner to solidify the interest of those private parties following the meeting and get firm commitments for funding, it could be facing a more secure future for service provision in the target area as the federal funding grant period comes to a close.

Also during the summer of 2006, CIS held a sustainability training for the Richmond GRP that selected partners attended. The training was provided as technical assistance for the management in Richmond and was provided for at least one other site as well. In September 2006, GRP management traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with the legislative aid for Senator George Allen. During that meeting, the team discussed potential earmarks

in future funding that could be used to sustain parts of GRP and other possible sources of funding. Unfortunately, while this represents a significant and resourceful effort on the part of GRP management, it is not clear what the outcome of the meeting was and whether the meeting actually created any opportunities for additional funding.

Sustainability continued to be a topic in 2007, and early that year, the GRP management reported to UI that its sustainability efforts "were going great." At that point, the site was in talks with United Way to replicate the CRI and gap analysis. Sustainability was also discussed at the only two committee meetings held that year. The meeting in April 2007, the first full committee meeting in approximately one year, addressed the issue of sustainability, but management mainly raised the topic as an important one to consider with the end of federal funding nearing. Little discussion of the topic took place among subcommittees during the break-out portion of the meeting and there was little follow up with partners on the topic after the meeting. An all-partners meeting in September 2007 did, however, focus mainly on sustainability. A high level representative from the OAG's office opened the meeting with praise for GRP and with the idea that GRP should serve as a model for others within the City of Richmond and elsewhere who are considering similar efforts. The OAG representative also suggested that starting with that meeting, partners should begin meeting and brainstorming about sustainability, and suggested that another sustainability-focused meeting would be held in several months' time. At the meeting, GRP management reported that 80 percent of its initial grants to partners would be sustained through public or private funds. The management provided attendees with a list of partners who were expected to continue providing services beyond the March 30, 2008 end date. These partners included:

- Barefoot Living Ministries
- BGC
- Boaz & Ruth
- Bon Secours
- Boy Scouts
- Central Virginia Food Bank
- Commonwealth's Attorney's Office
- Concerned Muslim Men for Change
- Dept. of Corrections, Probation and Parole
- ElderHomes
- HLO
- Midnight Basketball League
- OAG
- RCAC
- Richmond City Sheriff's Office
- ROC
- RPD
- Richmond Technical Center
- Spanish Academy and Cultural Institute
- Tattoo removal
- Virginia Gang Investigator's Association

Not surprisingly, all of the organizations or services on this list existed prior to the start of GRP, are operating or serving clients in areas outside the target area, and most likely used GRP funds to expand services into the target area. While the list is impressive, what is not clear is whether these organizations will continue to provide services in the target area

at the same level after the end of GRP funding. The public or private funding mentioned could represent merely a continuation of these programs based on their previous funding sources and at their pre-GRP levels or locations. As the site heads into its last several months of federal funding, these programs in particular will be closely watched to determine to what extent their *target area* efforts have continued.

A representative from the RPD—one of the most heavily GRP-funded organizations and included on the above list—also spoke at the meeting about the department's GRP-funded programs and the sustainability of those programs. That individual identified seven programs spanning three GRP components that would be sustained. Those include a community role models program, Crime Stoppers and Project Exile, directed patrols in the target area, the intervention team, the One-Stop resource center, school resource officers, and truancy reduction programs. Some of these programs, like Crime Stoppers and Project Exile, were already in existence and serving the target area to some extent prior to GRP. Others were in existence but expanded into the target area, like truancy reduction efforts. Perhaps the most significant of these programs that will be sustained by the RPD are the one-stop resource center and the intervention team, both started under GRP and now essential elements of the GRP initiative, especially in terms of serving the Southwood population, and in terms of the site's intervention efforts. The RPD took over responsibility for those programs in late 2006 after the City DJS failed to develop them into effective GRP components. The RPD received a substantial amount of funding to develop the programs further, and has successfully done so. Under the RPD, the One-Stop was relocated to a more accessible location and its use has increased dramatically. The RPD also hired a permanent outreach worker to fill the position after it was left empty through a series of employee departures at the DJS. The RPD's commitment to continue these programs is an enormous boon to the sustainability of the GRP effort. Even if the number of GRP programs is greatly reduced, the continuation of these two elements will represent a level of sustainability success for GRP in Richmond.

The status of Bon Secours services will also be important for the sustainability of GRP because of the large amount of funding the organization received from GRP and the large number of clients served through its programs. Its contract with GRP ended on June 30, 2007 and immediately following, Bon Secours stopped seeing patients at Southwood, where an examination room had been set up specifically for their services. Instead, Bon Secours moved their clinic to another location over a mile away. While the residents of Southwood were still able to access Bon Secours services, transportation to the new clinic location was an issue for some. The coordinator worked throughout the fall of 2007 to maintain Bon Secours services in the target area and as of December 2007 was looking for another health care provider to offer medical services at the Southwood location.

Several other programs were identified as needing funding from alternate sources to continue providing services after the end of the GRP funding period. At the meeting, such organizations—and even those with existing non-GRP funding—were encouraged to look for outside sources of funding. An expert in garnering financial support for organizations spoke to the group and provided advice on seeking funding, including locating funding sources, networking, and deciding what funds to apply for. While the speaker provided good information, it may not have been in-depth enough for some attendees. Partners in real need of additional funding and without prior expertise in grant writing may not have felt empowered to do so at the end of the meeting; a longer workshop focusing exclusively

on locating funding sources, writing grants, levering association with GRP, and managing grants once they are secured would likely have had a more lasting impact on attendees. Sustainability efforts in Richmond will be monitored for the life of the evaluation.

8.8. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

8.8.1. Strategic planning process

The strategic planning process for the Richmond GRP was not without considerable challenges, starting early in the process. The site was not fully prepared for the Phase I strategic planning meeting and process, resulting from the incomplete target area problem assessment. That assessment was based primarily on anecdotal data and an unfinished CRI. Most participants in the Phase I planning efforts had some knowledge of the target area based on their roles as service providers and city representatives, but likely came to the GRP effort with different perceptions of the problems in the area, the highest priority issues in the area, and the best ways to address the existing issues. Not defining the problem from GRP's perspective left attendees without a common understanding of the problems in the target area that the initiative was aimed at addressing. Clear problem definition would have given participants a shared sense of the initiative's purpose, and might have led to a more focused discussion on goals and objectives during the two-day meeting. Instead, the lack of a clear problem definition around which Phase I planning could coalesce left participants to work from their own varied beliefs about both the target area and about the initiative's focus. Arguably, this affected participant expectations for GRP well into the Phase II planning process.

Furthermore, participants in the Phase I planning meeting did not appear to understand the difference between a goal and an objective and were at first arbitrarily divided into groups according to GRP component areas without regard to their expertise. While this may have been due to the work of OJJDP's meeting facilitator, it nonetheless resulted in poorly defined goals and objectives, many of which overlapped. In both Phase I and Phase II, the process and subsequent plan seemed to skip prematurely to program selection without being clearly and logically linked to anticipated future outcomes. This both preceded and was closely tied to the site's somewhat frenetic funding strategy, and may therefore have contributed to the duplication of services that was observed as implementation progressed.

In addition to participating in the development of GRP, the City of Richmond had developed its own Comprehensive Strategy for Public Safety, which was only revealed to GRP participants and management for the first time during the Phase I strategic planning meeting. Since the Phase I meeting, there has been little evidence to suggest that these two efforts were fully integrated with one another. This may represent a missed opportunity on the part of both the City and the GRP to avoid duplication of efforts, at the very least in terms of problem identification. Working with the city strategy may have also helped the Richmond GRP identify existing service providers more quickly and resulted in a more complete CRI.

The duplication of services funded under the Richmond GRP seems inevitable given the site's funding strategy, and was likewise noted by several interview respondents. Also contributing to the duplication of services was the CRI, which was incomplete at the time of the Phase I planning meeting. After the Phase I strategic planning meeting, responsibility

for the CRI was assigned to the TAG Collaborative, although it was not completed until the site was in Phase II. While the program coordinator did make attempts to update the inventory periodically throughout implementation, it did not appear to play a significant role during the development of the strategic plan.

8.8.2. Structure and management

The Richmond GRP management made some organizational changes between the Phase I and Phase II strategic planning processes. Originally divided into topically-focused 'work groups' with a leadership and executive committee heading the initiative, participants were later divided by expertise and background into subcommittees following the four GRP components. The program coordinator received technical assistance with the reorganization, and the resulting, more practical organization appears to have benefited the site since Phase I implementation, where individuals had at one point been arbitrarily divided into subcommittees.

While the improved organization may have served the site well during the strategic planning process, the subcommittees did not appear to reach their full potential during the implementation process. The site took two year-long hiatuses from meeting, and met only twice during 2007. In the spring of that year, partners overwhelmingly reported to UI that they would prefer more frequent meetings, and some partners reported disappointment with the level of initiative shown by their subcommittee chairs to bring committees together and work collaboratively. It appears that after the planning period, subcommittees lacked a sense of purpose, were not clear exactly what their roles were, and needed more guidance from management to foster the kind of discussion and collaboration among members that the management envisioned. It appears that while the GRP management may have hoped for subcommittee chairs to take more initiative, subcommittees were waiting for the program coordinator to take action. This represents a missed opportunity to extend the level of partnership built by the initiative.

If the onus was left to the program coordinator to organize all site meetings, the size of the partnership played a large role in limiting the number of all-partner meetings that were called. The demands of administering such a large partnership—with 50 or more partners at any given time—proved somewhat restrictive at times. Perhaps even more detrimental than a lack of meetings, though, was the limited ability of GRP management to build partner capacities. The size of the partnership has hindered the ability of the program coordinator to provide partners—especially smaller ones—with the kind of assistance that many needed in complying with financial and reporting requirements, applying for outside grants, and building their capacity to provide services. While it was clear that most partners received some level of assistance, and nearly all interview respondents praised the coordinator's work with the initiative, it was not clear that the site was able to make capacity and partnership building true priorities because of the sheer amount of work and bureaucracy that arose from managing such a large partnership.

Management of the partnership was also complicated by turnover in key management positions, especially in 2007. In that year, the executive director stepped down. The original program coordinator was promoted to that position and a new program coordinator was hired. The program assistant, hired in June 2005, also accepted a new position, though remaining a grant manager with the OAG and spending part of his time focused on GRP needs. The new program coordinator resigned several months later, leaving the

site with one individual to handle both the executive director and program coordinator roles. The site suffered these losses at the very time when sustainability was becoming an important issue. The program assistant was still focused on GRP sustainability, but only on a part-time basis. In addition, the site was left with no one to consider "big picture" ideas for GRP, focus on the initiative's direction beyond federal funding, and work to ensure its sustainability. Instead, the coordinator was left juggling the day-to-day duties of administering a large partnership and acting as executive director at the same time. While the ramifications of these changes have not yet become manifest, administration and sustainability of the site have emerged as key concerns as the site nears the end of the federal funding period.

On the other hand, the partnership that was largely built through the program coordinator's tireless efforts is one of the site's biggest successes. Interview respondents noted time and again the efforts put forth by the coordinator to recruit any and all providers, organizations, and individuals who would be both committed to and contribute to the goals of GRP in Richmond. In a city that many partners described as historically divisive and territorial, the program coordinator was able to build a collaboration of diverse service providers and partners. While the site may have failed to capitalize on some opportunities to increase cooperation and collaboration, GRP has set a precedent in Richmond for future collaborative partnerships. This was also accomplished with a focus on gangs in a city that was once in denial about its gang problem. Through the GRP partnership, the coordinator and GRP management succeeded in making gangs a central focus for the city's public safety efforts.

During the course of planning and implementation, the City administration also experienced significant change, which included a new mayor, police chief, and two Attorneys General. These administrative changes slowed down the planning and implementation processes only slightly, and were generally seen as positive by the Richmond GRP management. The second Attorney General was positive and involved in GRP and the new police chief was able to make internal department changes to better support GRP efforts.

8.8.3. Implementation

While the Richmond GRP faced numerous challenges to implementation both in Phase I and in Phase II, and implementation was significantly delayed in both phases, implementation has ultimately proven relatively consistent with OJJDP's Gang Reduction Program model. Nearly two years into the implementation of Phase II, the site was nearing the end of the federal funding period and turning its focus to sustainability of the initiative. This section reviews some of the significant implementation challenges and successes in Richmond.

One of the most serious obstacles to implementation was the difficulty in finalizing a procurement process with the OAG. Procurement issues should have been finalized during Phase I, as this would have prevented the significant delays in both phases of GRP implementation. Reportedly, however, for OAG, the experience was seen as a learning process; the office was not used to dealing with a grant as large and complex as GRP, making GRP a good "test case." While the OAG may have gained valuable experience in administering a grant this large, GRP unfortunately had to cope with frustrations in finalizing their implementation process and delays that resulted in not only some projects being carried over from Phase I to Phase II, but other subsequent program implementation delays.

Another obstacle to implementation in Richmond was the strict and very short-term time frame for Phase I strategic planning and implementation imposed by OJJDP. The short time frame was in contrast to what was locally expected to be a longer substantive planning period for Phase I, and Richmond GRP had to jump into program selection, funding, and implementation almost immediately following the strategic planning meeting. This left little time to refine the strategic planning goals and objectives and may have partially contributed to the site's wide-ranging funding strategy. Phase II implementation was further delayed because service provider selection required three RFPs to satisfy GRP management and the OAG. The first RFP may have been issued too soon, as many service providers who planned to respond also participated in the strategic planning process. Had the RFP process gone more smoothly, the Richmond GRP could have begun Phase II implementation much earlier.

Part of the Richmond GRP's tactic in selecting organizations for funding was to fund as many partners and bring as many organizations into the partnership as possible. This strategy has required the GRP to give small amounts of money to those selected for funding. However, the expectations for what organizations did with those small amounts of money were never reduced: the Richmond GRP has been very committed to stretching GRP dollars as far as possible and serving the largest population possible with its funding. To do so, funded organizations had to learn how to most effectively spend their small allocations and to use their association with GRP to garner resources or support from other sources. The management requested that, when possible, partners provide GRP with a report on how GRP funds were leveraged into savings or services that extended the value of GRP dollars. Such reports were used to assess how well partner organizations were spending their funds. Several organizations were able to demonstrate significant leveraging power with GRP funding, including ElderHomes and the ROC. ElderHomes provided GRP with an extensive report on how its GRP funds had been leveraged into cost savings for residents and taxpayers in the target area. With $5,000 in GRP funds, ElderHomes used volunteers to make repairs to ten target area homes, saving several thousand dollars on paid workers. In addition, ElderHomes' work prevented at least four individuals from being forced out of their homes and into government subsidized group living facilities, with an estimated savings to tax payers of $95,000. Such success stories highlight the GRP management's success in getting limited funds to go a long way.

Such successes, however, could have been more comprehensively documented. While other sites used various electronic data systems during their implementation periods to track individuals receiving GRP-funded services—even though it was not required by OJJDP—the Richmond GRP did not implement any comprehensive data collection system. Instead, to ensure that funded programs were serving an adequate number of individuals and were complying with the terms of their GRP contracts, the site relied on the program coordinator's review of program activities, both through quarterly program reports and site visits to program facilities, and on the fiscal agent's financial oversight. The evaluation team reviewed the quarterly reports and coordinator's site visit notes and found that while comprehensive in terms of program activities, they were lacking consistency and clear information on the number of individuals served and the level of service each participant received (i.e., the extent of each individual's participation). These types of information would assist both the program coordinator in making judgments as to the adherence of each program to its proposals and any evaluator in assessing such things as how well

the site distributed its funds and how well providers served clients. Given that the coordinator is making site visits to each provider, it may be that she was collecting enough information—whether formal or not—to make an accurate call on whether providers were fulfilling their contractual obligations under GRP and whether their funding should be continued. In addition, the kinds of information the coordinator needed to make such decisions may not be quantifiable and easily recorded in a data system. The importance of the coordinator's familiarity with and improved relationships with each provider as she completes regular site visits should also not be overlooked. At the same time, creating a more standard and consistent reporting method would have helped the site better evaluate the level of services provided by each funded partner and how GRP funds were being spent across both different providers and each of the four main components.

Implementation of the full GRP model in Richmond was complicated somewhat by issues with two of its central elements: the Intervention Team and One-Stop. However, the eventual development of these elements represents one of the site's biggest successes. When issues arose with the original provider, the City of Richmond's DJS, GRP management canceled the contract and entered into an agreement with the RPD instead. Once the contract was finalized with the RPD, it did not take long for the One-Stop and the intervention team to see great improvements, with productive intervention team meetings resuming and the One-Stop relocating to a more accessible and visible location. GRP management was able to make adjustments when necessary to existing contracts and/or providers in order to assure implementation of the full GRP model. While the site might have benefited from faster action on these issues when they initially arose, the full operation of these elements at the time of this report can still be considered a success.

In addition to taking over responsibility for both the One-Stop and intervention team, the RPD emerged during Phase II implementation as a central and vital partner for the Richmond GRP. The department received the largest amount of funding of all providers and provided services in three main prongs. The RPD provided extensive prevention and intervention programs in addition to suppression services, including performing more traditional police roles such as directed patrols. The department's community-focused approach made it a natural partner for an initiative such as GRP. In addition, when the GRP was awarded to Richmond, the city had no gang unit or comprehensive approach to gangs. The RPD worked to develop a citywide gang unit, partially with GRP funds, and started collecting and tracking gang intelligence. The RPD has made perhaps the most significant contributions to the GRP effort of any single provider, and has also guaranteed the sustainability of portions of the initiative beyond the federal funding period, including the One-Stop and intervention team, along with other prevention and intervention programming. The department is expected to continue this prominent role in the GRP as the federal funding period comes to a close, but GRP management should be aware of becoming too reliant on one provider for sustainability of the whole initiative.

Another provider, Bon Secours, was also central to the GRP's success, receiving the largest portion of prevention funding. The organization provided general health services and prenatal and infant care through its mobile health capabilities and at various clinic locations in and near the target area. However, the organization does not appeared to have made the same commitment to sustaining its services in the target area as the RPD has. After its contract ended on June 30, 2007, Bon Secours stopped providing services at the One-Stop in Southwood, where a medical examination room had been designed

specifically for it. Instead, its clinic was moved approximately one mile away. At the end of 2007 the coordinator was still searching for an organization to provide health care in that location, specifically for residents of Southwood who lacked transportation to the new clinic location. While it remains to be seen how significantly Bon Secours cuts its services in the target area as the federal funding period comes to a close, the organization has already shown signs of pulling out of the area.

8.8.4. Outcomes

Outcomes were assessed in three categories: education, health, and crime. Despite the fact that the education and health analyses were descriptive, UI did find several interesting trends in measures considered. First, while school level measures such as incidents actually increased over the study period while they decreased in the target area, those changes cannot be linked to GRP. Because schools became more fully involved in the initiative during Phase II implementation, selected education measures will be tracked more closely for changes that can be attributable to GRP through the end of the evaluation period.

Conclusions from the prenatal health analysis are likewise preliminary but UI observed initial increases in prenatal complications and teen pregnancies. These findings were not wholly unexpected because as accessibility of health care increases, so should the number of patients seeking care. Eventually, we expect to see a decrease in such measures, as the preventive nature of the health services takes effect. In addition, the data showed more Hispanic women receiving treatment, echoing population changes in the city. Patient-level data on injuries was limited and while emergency room data may be better suited for an analysis of such an intervention, we nonetheless observed a decrease in the number of gun shot injuries in the target area and a significantly shorter length of stay for injury patients over the study period. We also observed an increase in the number of Hispanic patients. The trends in these health-related measures will be tracked throughout the rest of the evaluation.

The analysis of four different crime measures indicated that GRP was associated with increases in crime. However, it is likely not the case that GRP is actually increasing crime; other explanations may account for this finding. The gang unit's efforts may have disrupted existing networks of gang crime in the initial suppression period, leading to a short-term and reactive increase in gang crimes. Also, gang intelligence and activity were better identified as the gang unit was getting started, with gang crime levels stabilizing as the unit became more skilled at accurately identifying gang crimes. Drug crimes also experienced an increase over the study period but to a lesser extent than in the comparison and displacement areas. In this case, suppression efforts may have curtailed the increase in the target area that might otherwise have been experienced there.

Overall, a limited number of positive trends in the outcomes measured were observed over the current evaluation period. There are several explanations that account for these limited findings, and we expect to see more apparent positive outcomes with additional measurement periods as the evaluation continues.

8.8.5. Sustainability

The efforts of the GRP management in mid-2006 evidence the level of effort that the Richmond GRP put forth well ahead of the end of the grant, but most partners reported in

spring 2007 that they were unaware of any sustainability efforts. In spring 2007, many partners were not even sure what would happen after June 30, 2007, the then-end date before the March 2008 extension was approved. The Richmond GRP management certainly made some early "big-picture" efforts to fund GRP beyond the March 2008 end date, including applying for several grants to sustain and expand the program within the City of Richmond, but it may have neglected to involve others at the partner level in the effort early enough. Indeed, at the September 2007 all-partners meeting, just over six months from the end of federal funding, attendees were encouraged to start their sustainability efforts. Assistance for partners regarding sustainability could have been accomplished by encouraging them to search for additional funding early and providing training for those lacking experience in such an undertaking. In addition, more communication on the end date of the federal funding and the GRP management's expectations for each partner after that date may have helped to guide sustainability efforts at the partner level. With such a large partnership however, it was likely difficult to organize such efforts and provide the level of personal assistance required by each partner.

At the time of this report, the Richmond GRP was within a few months of the end of the federal funding period. With major portions of the initiative sustained by the RPD and other organizations committed to continuing work after their GRP contracts expire, but smaller partners starting sustainability efforts late in the game, what form the GRP takes in Richmond has yet to be determined. If pre-existing organizations who expanded into the target area with GRP funding cannot afford to stay without that funding, the GRP may develop into more of an extension of the RPD's prevention and community services. While the RPD has been an essential partner to GRP, such an initiative run solely through a police department will likely have a very different purpose and outlook than the comprehensive and inclusive GRP partnership that was developed over a four year period. The sustainability of the initiative that is actually achieved in Richmond will be monitored throughout the rest of the evaluation period.

8.9. CONCLUSION

The Richmond GRP experience highlights the necessity to clearly define the problem from the start, then relate goals and activities to that initial problem definition. The site failed to adequately discuss the target area's problems at the first strategic planning meeting. This resulted in divergent views among management and participants of what the purpose of GRP was. Subsequent planning activities, including goal and objective definitions, were not as focused as they could have been. It seems likely that the resulting array of programs selected by the Richmond GRP may not be as clearly focused on GRP's ultimate goal of reducing youth gang crime as it might otherwise have been. In addition, duplication of services and an unwieldy partnership may have resulted from these initial unfocused planning efforts.

The Richmond GRP has certainly achieved some significant successes, however. The management created a partnership previously unheard of in Richmond, and put gang crimes front and center in the city's conversations about safety and youth. This was no small feat in a city in denial about gangs less than a decade ago. In addition, the GRP partnership that was built in Richmond has proven inclusive and ever-growing. While the size of the partnership may have been limiting at times, it has also been far-reaching

and effective. Sustainability of the initiative still remains in question, however, with only several months left in the initiative's federal funding period, and while some partners, like the RPD, have demonstrated commitment to GRP, the continuation of other programs is uncertain. These will be important issues to consider as the evaluation continues.

Chapter 9

Cross Site Interim Findings

This concluding section of the preliminary findings report summarizes cross-site implementation findings and lessons learned over the course of the first four years of the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in the four demonstration sites. It also presents select preliminary community-level outcomes and trends in crime and gang-related crime that might be associated with GRP. These results should not be interpreted as final evaluation conclusions, as the process and outcomes evaluation research is still ongoing and not scheduled to be completed until the end of 2008.

Implementation process findings include those reported in the interim implementation report (Hayeslip, Cahill, Lagerson, Scott, Wolff, Coggeshall, Brazzell, Roland, Roman, Decker, Bynum, Webb, and Herz, 2006), which focused on the first two and one-half years of the initiative, as well expanded findings for the last year and one-half of the GRP. Outcome findings are generally limited to the analyses of outcome data through late 2006 and early 2007. As noted above, these analyses are currently ongoing and final assessments will be completed later this year.

In general, a wide range of promising and viable approaches to address gang problems were implemented in each of the four sites. These approaches were the result of considerable local level effort and strong local leadership in most of the sites. However, the sites also faced considerable implementation challenges, particularly early on. Preliminary community outcomes to date have tended to show mixed results within and across sites. Similarly, crime and gang-related crime outcomes have been mixed. While final outcome findings are contingent upon ongoing evaluation data analyses, support of the research hypotheses appear strongest in sites that were able to most effectively implement the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) GRP model and which were able to either develop or build upon strong local partnerships across the various components of GRP.

9.1. DEMONSTRATION SITE SELECTION AND TARGET AREA SELECTION

OJJDP selected Los Angeles, Milwaukee, North Miami Beach and Richmond as the four demonstration sites in advance of the implementation of the GRP. In addition, the actual target neighborhoods in these cities (the entire city of North Miami Beach) were similarly selected by senior leadership within OJJDP before GRP implementation began. These decisions were reportedly made based upon qualitative assessments by OJJDP in consultation

with local stakeholders in each of the cities. Target area selection was designed to focus on small neighborhoods in each site in order to maximize the possibility of having positive community level effects, including those associated with local gang problems and violence. After choosing the four cities, OJJDP advised officials in each site that they would receive $2.5 million in grant funds to focus on local gang problems in the chosen neighborhoods, although OJJDP's expectations of how these funds were to be used to implement the GRP model were not fully explained to the sites until several months later, when implementation planning actually began.

In several of the sites, this award decision making process led to unrealistic expectations among some local government agencies, service providers and community groups. In particular, a number of local organizations assumed that they would receive substantial amounts of federal funds with relatively few strings attached. These expectations later contributed to friction and political infighting once the GRP model was more fully understood, although there was substantial variation in such conflict across the demonstration sites.

In addition, site and target area selection resulted in each of the demonstration sites focusing on different types of gangs, gang-related problems and community conditions. Only one of the cities, Los Angeles, applied the GRP model to what might be termed "traditional" multi-generational urban territorial gangs. In the other cities, gangs in the selected target areas were considered relatively new or recently emerging. In North Miami Beach, the focus became Haitian youth gangs, which were not considered to be hierarchically structured or well organized and were highly mobile. In Richmond, emerging violence between "home grown" African American groups and emerging Hispanic gangs with ties to Central America was identified as the focal problem to be addressed. In Milwaukee, loosely knit African American gangs active in drug trafficking appeared to be those most active in the target area.

Because of these differences, implementation of the GRP model had to be adapted to meet local needs and problem-solving approaches. For example, in North Miami Beach and Richmond illegal immigrant status and culturally-based distrust of government agencies had to be taken into account, and the selection of specific programs for funding under GRP had to address these issues. Moreover, in several of the cities, little attention had been paid to gangs in the past (indeed several reported not having any gang problems until recently) and targeting gang crime and violence was a relatively new undertaking for government agencies, service providers and community organizations.

Thus, while the following conclusions are categorized as cross-site findings, in some ways each of the demonstration sites implemented its own version of the GRP. Thus, the findings for each of the individual sites, as reported in the previous sections, are more applicable to policy makers and practitioners facing similar kinds of gang problems and violence in their jurisdictions.

9.2. OJJDP GRP MODEL

In order to participate as a GRP demonstration site, each of the cities was required to implement a comprehensive gang reduction model promulgated by OJJDP. Originally there were four mandated components, or prongs: primary prevention; secondary prevention; intervention and suppression. Shortly before the beginning of implementation planning

a fifth prong—reentry—was added.

Each of the GRP sites generally adhered to the overall GRP model. Due to differing local contexts, community factors, and characteristics of the gang problems, the relative emphasis on each of the components necessarily varied from site to site. Relatively little emphasis was placed on reentry overall and this component was integrated with intervention programs in some of the sites. Prevention generally received the greatest emphasis, both in terms of the numbers of individual programs and funding support, across the sites. However, consistent with the GRP model, intervention and suppression approaches were also included in all four sites.

9.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The primary organizational direction from OJJDP to each of the four sites was to designate a fiscal agent, charged with overall administrative responsibility and directed to hire a GRP coordinator. In retrospect, more organizational direction in these early stages would have benefited the implementation process, as would have on-site organizational development technical assistance. Despite the limited organizational direction, the sites developed similar planning organizations, referred to as steering committees, or in the case of Los Angeles, an advisory committee. Several of the sites also implemented separate policy and decision-making groups, which became known as executive committees, although with the exception of Milwaukee, the active involvement of the latter committees tended to diminish over time.

The development of and reliance on steering committees appeared to be the result of several factors. The first was that there was an emphasis under GRP to maximize program funding and minimize administrative or overhead costs. Thus, most coordinators came to rely on steering committees for management and decision-making support. In addition, all of the sites had past experience with other Department of Justice (DOJ) crime and violence reduction programs, such as Weed and Seed, which specifically called for the formation of local committees or task forces to assist in program planning and implementation. Finally, reliance on committees was an artifact of the strategic planning guidance given by National Youth Gang Center (NYGC) and OJJDP, which included formation of groups of local stakeholders to assist in the early GRP planning meetings.

The use of steering committees appeared to be a mixed blessing in some of the sites. Agency outreach and participation initially included some organizations that, upon announcement of the GRP funding, held expectations of securing substantial sums from the grants for their own agencies. As a result, there were some instances when planning and programmatic implementation were disrupted because of individual agency or organizational priorities, rather than collective interest in consensus-building in order to fulfill the mission of GRP.

During the Phase II planning process, the role of the steering committees became unclear. As the Phase II planning process ended and implementation began, a number of members in different sites expressed concern over the committees' future responsibilities. In fact, over the course of Phase II the active participation of steering committees and subcommittees did decline. However, in the case of North Miami Beach in particular, local coordinators charged their committees with the new role of oversight of funded programs and participating in sustainability efforts for the site. This new sustainability

role led to continued active participation among some member organizations, particularly those most dedicated to the overall GRP mission.

In addition, during the course of GRP, each of the sites experienced turnover of senor political and administrative partners. In North Miami Beach, two new police chiefs have been appointed; in Richmond, a new mayor and state attorney general were elected and a new police chief appointed; in Milwaukee, a new police chief was appointed; and in Los Angeles, a new mayor was elected. All of these events took place about midway through the GRP initiative. While enthusiasm for GRP might have waned with these changes in key local leaders, political and policy support generally remained high across the sites.

9.4. GRP STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

Strategic planning for the implementation of GRP in all of the sites took place over two phases. Both planning periods were intended to be accelerated processes designed to place programs in the target communities as quickly as possible. In addition, in contrast to common problem-solving crime prevention and violence reduction strategies, the areas to be targeted were pre-defined. The assessments of gang problems were thus very limited. As a result, at the beginning of GRP, community problems were only vaguely defined as the presence of certain gangs engaging in criminal activities in the target area. Moreover, in the absence of comprehensive data and baseline analyses of problems and existing resources to address those problems, most sites had difficulty precisely defining the target populations, as well as specifying concrete GRP goals and objectives, particularly early in the GRP planning process. Different components of the GRP model were melded in some of the sites due to confusion about both the model and overall program goals. Indeed, some of the sites still refer to their primary GRP strategies as being prevention, intervention and suppression, rather than the five prongs that constitute the full GRP model.

While each of the site strategic planning teams did manage to identify some initial programs for attempted implementation on Phase I, the program coordinators and local committees in each of the sites realized that much more information was needed about the nature of local problems, local resources and evidence-based practices that might be most effective. To address these shortcomings, all of the sites expended additional time and effort on the planning process during both Phases than was expected and as a result, implementation was substantially delayed during Phase II.

9.5. GRP MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

As the GRP model was developed, OJJDP felt that strong local leadership was required for successful implementation of the full model. To that end, OJJDP hypothesized that the use of state agencies, or the Mayor's office in Los Angeles, as fiscal agents with coordinators hired as their employees would improve the likelihood of strong leadership. This was based upon the belief that these agencies were less likely to be influenced by local politics, thereby protecting the coordinators from local agencies' influence over funding and other project decisions.

Strong leadership was indeed an important factor for the successful implementation of this program. Each of the coordinators was faced with an array of complicated and time sensitive tasks, required to provide direction in an environment of competing interests,

and had to build a gang program that closely adhered to OJJDP's mandated model. In large measure, the successful implementation of the GRP model over the past four years is attributable to the coordinators' leadership. However, this leadership appeared to derive from individual level skills and experience, rather than employment by the chosen fiscal agents. In fact, where implementation was most successful local stakeholders reported coordinator leadership as one of the most important contributing factors.

In addition, in three of the sites, the coordinators were able to exercise some degree of independent decision-making authority. In Milwaukee, however, the coordinator had to share decision-making authority with an active executive committee, which included representation from the fiscal agent and local policy makers. This made it significantly more difficult for the coordinator to assume a leadership role than was the case in the other three sites. As a result, local stakeholders consistently reported being confused about who was in charge, and the coordinator appeared to be limited in the amount of leadership she was able to provide to the initiative as a whole.

During the past year, three of the sites experienced turnover of their local coordinators. In Los Angeles, the coordinator assumed a new gang coordination role within the Mayor's office and was replaced by a new coordinator, although the original coordinator remains closely involved in the city's gang reduction efforts—including those in the GRP target area—through her new position. In Richmond, the coordinator was similarly promoted within the Attorney General's office and was replaced. However, the new coordinator left soon after assuming the position and the program management role reverted back to the original coordinator. In Milwaukee, the coordinator left for another position in state government approximately six months prior to the end of the site's planned operation period, but was not replaced. The original coordinator in North Miami Beach remains in her capacity under GRP, although the organization itself has recently become incorporated as an independent non-profit agency. With the exception of Milwaukee, coordinator turnover did not appear to have much of an effect on Phase II programming or sustainability efforts to date. However, in Milwaukee the coordinator's departure left a void that further exacerbated existing management and decision-making problems. The absence of strong, local leadership in that site resulted in limited efforts toward sustainability and the program basically ceased most of its gang reduction efforts once OJJDP funding expired.

9.6. COLLABORATION AND FUNCTIONING

As was noted above, while not mandated—or even suggested—each of the demonstration sites developed steering committees and subcommittees to help guide strategic planning and program implementation. As conceived, these various committees were expected to involve interested local stakeholders who would work together to develop partnerships that would address the goals and objectives of their Gang Reduction Program.

In the early stages of planning and implementation, it was readily apparent that there was substantial variation in the levels of collaboration and communication within and across sites. In general, local stakeholders that focused on suppression approaches seemed to function more collaboratively and effectively. This is likely due to nature of law enforcement and other suppression-focused agencies, who frequently have a history of partnership development and interagency communication and cooperation in program planning. In other words, these individuals had the experience of working together

successfully in the past and understood the importance of collaboration and open communication. On the other hand, those groups that focused on prevention and intervention did not appear to function as well together at this stage of the implementation process. This is likely due to their lack of experience working together toward common goals in the past. In addition, the organizations represented in these groups had often been in competition with one another in the past for limited local resources and thus were not used to working as partners.

Similar observations were made across sites. In Los Angeles, and to a lesser extent in Richmond, many of the individuals brought to the table had worked with each other in the past on other collaborative initiatives. In Los Angeles, for example, many of the participants had worked together in the past and most recently on the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) initiative. In Richmond, the Virginia Office of the Attorney General (OAG) had also coordinated a number of gang programs, including a summer camp that involved multiple agencies. More difficulties in establishing partnerships and open communication arose in the early stages of implementation in the cities where participating organizations had not worked together collaboratively in the past or had been in competition with one another.

Another influence on local collaboration was the manner in which the GRP program and funding had been announced. As noted previously, each of the sites was told that they would receive $2.5 million for a gang initiative before the precise parameters of how the funds were to be distributed were defined. This created expectations between some agency and organization representatives about receiving substantial DOJ funding. Competition for these funds, political infighting, and unrealistic expectations had negative effects on collaboration, communication and committee functioning in some sites, particularly early in the process.

These variations in collaborative functioning led to a number of changes in local planning and implementation groups over time. The first was that where functioning was more problematic, member attrition and turnover tended to be more prevalent. In addition, member absenteeism was reported more often for these groups. The second was that membership in the various committees was often delegated from more senior level decision makers to middle level program managers or other practitioners. Los Angeles was one exception to changing composition, however, as their membership and participation remained relatively stable. This was once again likely due to their past experience on collaborative initiatives in the target area.

Despite these early challenges, over the course of the past two and one-half years, collaboration and local committee and other working group functioning generally improved. While experience working together contributed to this improvement, strong GRP coordinator leadership also appeared to improve local functioning and was often cited by committee members as an important factor. Finally, some early members whose primary reason for participation was to acquire funds for their own agencies withdrew from participation after finding out that they would not be receiving GRP funds. This reduced competition and negative disruptions, thereby also improving local committee functioning.

9.7. IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESSES AND OBSTACLES

Members of GRP planning and implementation teams, as well as each of the GRP coordinators, reported that they had to overcome numerous challenges and obstacles over most of the implementation period. As described above, the accelerated strategic planning process was the first major challenge faced by all sites. The pre-selection of the target areas and the lack of a precise understanding and definition of the problems that were to be addressed made it more difficult for participants to engage in informed strategic planning. The mandated short turn-around time for Phase I planning resulted in the implementation of some activities, but these were relatively meager in terms of breadth and dosage. With some exceptions, they were also generally extensions or modest expansions of programs that were already in place. A substantial amount of time and effort during Phase I was also necessarily spent on the collection and assessment of more information about the nature of each city's gang problems and evidence-based practices that might be employed under GRP to address those unique, and in some cases new, problems. More emphasis on a data-driven strategic planning process early in strategic planning might have improved implementation during these early stages.

The majority of local implementation teams across all four sites consistently cited government bureaucracy and "red tape" as major obstacles-ones that could not be overcome but instead accommodated. Two main sources of red tape were identified. The first was OJJDP. As was noted earlier, a number of strategic planning committee members and those responsible for implementation found OJJDP's basic GRP five-prong model too rigid and not adaptable to local problems and issues. Contrary to this perception however, the evaluation team found that there was substantial variation in the actual strategic implementation plans across sites. While sites were restricted to implementing programs within the general OJJDP framework, different component areas were emphasized and different programs were chosen based upon local needs, particularly in Phase II. Reporting requirements were also cited as obstacles both at the local, state and federal levels. However, this perceived burden was more likely to be expressed by those having little past experience participating in a large-scale federally funded program such as GRP.

Another obstacle sites attributed to OJJDP was the accelerated timeline for implementation. All four sites had difficulty adhering to OJJDP's expectations for a short Phase I planning process and immediate implementation of programs, with Milwaukee the least delayed of the sites. As a result, all of the sites experienced delays in implementation during both phases, and little significant programming was put in place during Phase I. In retrospect, the sites may have benefitted from the ability to spend Phase I planning without rushing to program selection and implementation. Especially for sites where no preexisting relationships between potential GRP partners existed, coordinators had to put forth a great deal of effort towards building a comprehensive and representative partnership. Delays in Phase II may have been reduced or avoided altogether had the sites' leadership been able to dedicate more effort towards planning, capacity building of partners, and partnership development (e.g., communication, collaboration, and consensus-building) during Phase I.

Certainly the biggest obstacle encountered across all four sites was the requirement to follow fiscal agent procurement policies and regulations. This generally meant that once implementation plans were finalized, procurement of services consistent with those plans required a competitive bid process. Under such a process, the coordinators, working with

the fiscal agent and contracting officers, had to develop specific Request for Proposalss (RFPs) for services to be provided under subcontract arrangements by the fiscal agent. These RFPs then had to be published and each proposal received had to be rated on objective criteria before funding recommendations could be made. When a particular provider was chosen, an often lengthy subcontract issuance process had to be followed. In the case of Los Angeles, an additional review step was required: all of the proposed subcontracts had to be reviewed by City Council committees and then formally approved by Council itself.

Having to conform to these procurement laws and regulations had several negative effects on GRP implementation. The first was that the time frame for actually getting services and programs up and running in the target communities was stretched much longer than anyone, including OJJDP, had anticipated. Indeed, some contracts for services have only been awarded in late 2007, with less than a year left in the official GRP grant period. The second was that a number of potential providers with little experience in the competitive bidding process missed deadlines or submitted incomplete applications which resulted in disqualification, despite the fact that they were thought to be the most qualified providers and the ones that met GRP needs the best. This was particularly true in Richmond, where a series of RFPs had to be issued for Phase II providers. In other cases, some providers thought to be the best qualified did not apply because of the complicated application procedures or because the amount of funds available were not viewed as sufficient to be worth the effort. Los Angeles, for example, did not initially receive enough bids for some Phase II components. Thus, in some sites, RFPs for certain components had to be reissued and the process repeated. A substantial amount of GRP resources had to be expended on this process in terms of administrative time and effort.

Despite of these major obstacles and the long implementation delays they created, all four sites have experienced similar implementation successes. First, they were all able to develop strategic implementation plans that were acceptable to OJJDP and generally consistent with target area needs and gang problems—at least those that were perceived as being associated with gang violence risk and protective factors. These local plans were also generally true to OJJDP's evidence-based GRP model. Second, despite early difficulties with collaborative planning and implementation, local governance and communication have steadily improved and partnerships among core members have developed, although as noted above, there has been variation in this particular implementation outcome. Third, coordinator outreach to government agencies, service providers, and community groups has generally resulted in a broad participation in GRP planning and implementation. Fourth, specific programmatic activities across prevention, intervention and suppression ultimately became operational. Fifth, outreach to these communities has improved communication on gang issues within the target areas and there is evidence also of improved communication among organizations involved in GRP, such as between the police and service providers.

9.8. PRELIMINARY GRP OUTCOMES

9.8.1. Community Indicators

As noted in the individual site chapters, the evaluation team focused on community-level measures where short term changes were likely to be most observable because

of the substantial delays in GRP program implementation. Moreover, the focus across sites was on those possible outcomes that might be associated with larger programmatic emphasis and funding based upon individual site activity and logic models. Finally, while outcome data acquisition was still ongoing through early 2008 in preparation for the final report, some desired community level data were either not routinely collected and maintained, could not be acquired, or could not be geographically disaggregated to the appropriate neighborhood levels (i.e., it couldn't be matched to target area boundaries). It should be reemphasized that a large portion of GRP funding across sites was devoted to primary and secondary prevention activities. Changes in most individual measures were not observable within the overall evaluation period given that many prevention programs only recently were implemented, and anticipated effects would be years into the future. As a result, this preliminary report summarizes findings primarily in the area of educational outcomes across most sites. In addition, health outcomes were examined in Richmond, juvenile justice referrals in North Miami Beach and indicators of changes in physical environment in Milwaukee.

Following implementation of GRP, educational outcomes among targeted youth were decidedly mixed across sites. For example, in Richmond there was not enough sufficient evidence of changes from which to possibly attribute to GRP or other recent programs. In North Miami Beach, however, middle school truancy and suspension rates showed larger declines than in North Miami, the comparison city. In addition, perceptions of school safety among parents, students, and school staff improved over the course of GRP in the North Miami Beach Middle School. On the other hand, there were not significant differences in middle school promotion rates in North Miami Beach and educational outcomes at the high school level remained relatively stable during the evaluation period. Data from Los Angeles revealed declines in high school suspensions in the target school that were higher than those observed in the comparison school. At the middle school level suspensions and attendance were relatively stable in the target area, as they were at the elementary school level.

Short term outcome findings were also mixed for other community-level indicators. In Milwaukee there appeared to be substantial improvements in the physical environment of the target area compared to the comparison area. In particular, target area property values rose substantially over the course of GRP. However, there were not clear-cut trends in juvenile crime referrals in North Miami Beach as compared to similar locales in south Florida. Trends in hospital admissions and injuries revealed increases in injury admissions for Hispanics in Richmond and large decreases in gunshot injuries in the target area compared to the comparison area. No differences were observed between the two areas in length of hospital stays, although these declined in both the target and comparison areas.

9.8.2. Crime

The analysis of crime and gang-related crime outcomes across the four sites employed both longitudinal trend techniques, descriptive geographic hot-spot approaches and an interrupted time-series methodology. Since suppression activities were most likely to have immediate and short term effects on these outcomes, pre-post and trend analyses time periods varied somewhat across sites depending on when suppression activities became fully operational. As noted previously, the acquisition and analysis of crime data

generally only included monthly figures through mid-2007, which overall was a relatively short period of time following GRP implementation. Final evaluation reporting will include more detailed analyses and include crime and gang-related crime findings through early 2008, making the detection of crime outcomes more likely.

At this point in the evaluation crime and gang-related crime outcomes are mixed across the four sites. Crime outcomes were most consistent with hypothesized changes in Los Angeles, where linear trend analyses revealed declining monthly average numbers of serious violent crime, gang incidents, serious violent gang crimes, and citizen reports of shots fired in the target area through the end of 2006. At the same time, such criminal activity remained relatively stable, or slightly increased, in the comparison area. Spatial analyses show similar decreasing concentrations of crime and some hot spot migration in the target area over the course of GRP, while outside of the target area little changes in spatial concentrations were observed. No evidence of displacement effects of crime was observed.

In contrast, the descriptive analysis revealed that, in Milwaukee, serious and gang crimes rose at almost equal rates in target and comparison areas over the course of GRP through early 2007. Conversely, drug crime remained relatively stable in both the target and comparison areas. The intensity and locations of crime and gang hot spots have been stable over the evaluation period. The time series analysis supported those findings, with no significant changes observed in the target area for serious violent crime, drug-related crime, or vandalism. The time series analysis also gave no indication that displacement had occurred. It is unclear why the findings in Milwaukee are contrary to the hypothesized crime outcomes, although the area's limited strategic emphasis on gangs prior to GRP may be a partially responsible. That is, increased gang awareness and reporting of gang crime may have contributed to the observed increases, although this has not been confirmed to date.

In North Miami Beach only limited conclusions could be offered, as crime data could not be secured from the identified comparison city of North Miami. Nonetheless, serious crime, gang incidents and gang calls for service remained relatively unchanged over the course of GRP. There did appear to be a modest increase in serious and gang-related crime in Victory Park compared to other neighborhoods in the city although these were not statistically significant. Little changes were observed in the locations of hot spots within the city. Gang crime concentrations appeared to decline from 2004 through 2005, but rebounded in 2006, particularly in Victory Park. Overall, there has not been enough evidence to date to support the evaluation's crime outcome hypotheses in North Miami Beach.

Finally, in Richmond, monthly averages of serious violent crime increased modestly but significantly from 2002 through early 2007 in the target area, but decreased slightly and significantly in the comparison area. Gang crimes increased in both areas, but only the target area yielded enough gang crimes to warrant inclusion in the time series analysis. That effort revealed a significant increase in gang crimes in the target area. Drug crimes increased significantly in the comparison area but not in the target area. Spatial concentrations of crime varied somewhat from year to year with particular dissipation in the Southwood area during 2004 followed by increased intensity in 2006. It should be noted, however, that there were unusual spikes in both violent crime and gang crime during the summer of 2005. The overall trends may be an artifact of this unusual summer of violent

crime in the target area and this possibility is being explored more closely for the final report. It is also possible that increased gang awareness in the community because of GRP outreach activities may have resulted in increased crime reporting, particularly among Hispanic residents, contributing to the anomalous spike in crime during 2005.

9.9. SUSTAINABILITY EFFORTS

Urban Institute (UI) reported in its interim implementation report (Hayeslip et al. 2006) that by the end of 2006 little consideration had been made of sustaining GRP once OJJDP funding ended. In fact, very little sustainability strategic planning had been undertaken at any of the four sites. Progress since then has markedly improved in three of the sites since then but in Milwaukee, GRP has effectively ended, absent substantive collective efforts to sustain it.

Final conclusions about the reasons for GRP not being sustained in Milwaukee await final stakeholder and community member interview results, currently scheduled for early in the summer of 2008. However, a wide variety of organizational factors and local community political factors appear to have contributed to the site's lack of sustainability efforts. Leadership was not as strong in Milwaukee as some of the other sites and in fact the local coordinator left during the early stages of sustainability planning and was not replaced, which contributed to a "wrap it up" posture among local stakeholders, many of whom reported being active participants primarily for their own organizational funding. Furthermore, it did not appear that a local GRP "brand" was established or a sustainability "roadmap" developed. Despite the lack of sustainability plans, some local stakeholders reported in late 2007 that they were still being optimistic about continuing certain components of the model in the future. It should also be noted that a major suppression component, community prosecution, has continued with local funding support in Milwaukee.

In Los Angeles the basic GRP model, its organizational structures and planning processes have been incorporated into a city-wide gang initiative, known as the Gang Reduction Zone Program. A strategic planning process similar to GRP's was implemented in 2007 and efforts are underway with local and other funding to replicate the successful components of GRP in other targeted areas throughout the city. Intensive sustainability efforts have also been undertaken in North Miami Beach. Despite initial setbacks in trying to secure funding from state and county governmental sources, GRP has become incorporated as an independent non-profit organization and has been actively seeking funding from a wide variety of external sources. There is a little more uncertainly relative to sustaining the GRP partnership itself in Richmond, although a substantial amount of planning and effort has been put forth toward this effort since the last UI report on implementation. Strong partnerships between the OAG and the Richmond Police Department (RPD), in particular, have been developed and the active community policing and outreach efforts in the targeted neighborhood have appeared to reap support from the community. Even if the partnership itself is not formally sustained, it is likely that many of the program that rose out of GRP efforts will be continued in the target area. Final sustainability outcomes are still under study and conclusions about them and the reasons for successes will be included in the forthcoming final report.

Part III

Appendices

Appendix A

Selection of Study Areas, Preparation of Crime Trends

The quasi-experimental design of the evaluation required the Urban Institute (UI) team to identify, and collect data about, a comparison area with socio-economic conditions and crime patterns similar to those in the target area during the baseline (i.e., pre-Gang Reduction Program (GRP)) period. In each site, the comparison areas were selected to provide the evaluation with information about how the outcome measures might have changed in the target area if GRP had not been launched. For the comparison area to play that role usefully, it must bear a close structural resemblance to the target area during the baseline period.

In three of the four sites, the evaluation team also identified a displacement/diffusion area,[1] near the target area, where gang crime might increase (thereby creating a possible displacement effect) or decrease (and so create a possible diffusion effect) if the GRP suppression efforts succeeded in making the target area inhospitable to gang activity. North Miami Beach is the one site where no displacement area has been selected to date (see section 7.1 on page 183 for an explanation).

To identify suitable comparison and displacement areas, the evaluation team examined crime data obtained from the local police departments. The evaluation team examined data on crimes known and reported from the police departments in Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Richmond. The UI team has also acquired data on crimes known and reported from the North Miami Beach Police Department (NMBPD), and the team tried and failed to obtain similar data from the North Miami Police Department (NMPD).[2] Since data on crimes reported are unavailable from NMPD, the UI team acquired arrest data from the cental booking facility that serves all of the law enforcement agencies within Miami-Dade County. The evaluation team used these arrest data to assess the comparability of the North Miami Beach target area and candidate comparison areas.

In each site, the crime data were examined longitudinally to assess the comparability

[1] Henceforth, this area is referred to as a 'displacement area.' This shorthand was adopted in the interest of brevity and does not imply an expectation that displacement is more likely than diffusion to be observed.

[2] Since the UI team is interested in treating the city of North Miami as a comparison area for the North Miami Beach GRP site, the NMPD would realize no direct benefit from cooperating with the GRP evaluation. Nonetheless, representatives of the NMPD were cooperative and responsive to our inquiries. Unfortunately, the automated data system used by the NMPD does not permit the crime report records to be extracted en masse so they may shared with the UI team.

of crime patterns in the study areas over time. Two categories of incidents were compared separately: all (officially recorded) crimes and serious violent crime. The former category includes all non-traffic offenses. The serious violence category includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape.[3] First, the evaluation team prepared annual crime rates (per 1,000 residents) in each of the study areas. This was done for both all crimes and serious violent crimes to examine whether rates of criminal activity in the study areas were cross-sectionally comparable and changing in similar fashion over time. The evaluation team also prepared monthly counts of crime incidents for the study areas for the baseline period.

In addition to the crime data, the socio-demographic conditions of the study areas were examined using block-level data from the 2000 Census. For each study area in each site, the evaluation team compiled Census measures related to common correlates of crime, including: age, gender, poverty, education, and ethnic hetrogeneity. All study area boundaries corresponded to Census block boundaries but several Census tracts were bifurcated by the study area boundaries. Some of the Census data of interest were available at the tract level but not at the block level. We used block-level population counts from the Summary File 1 (SF-1) to estimate the percentage of the population of the tracts split by study area boundaries that was residing within the study area. We multiplied those percentages by the tract-level estimates of population characteristics from Summary File 3 (SF-3) to adjust for the fact that only a portion of the tract was included within the study area.

The site-specific chapters of this report describe how the study areas were identified, the crime patterns and socio-demographic characteristics of the study areas in each site, and explain why the comparison and displacement areas chosen were the most appropriate of the available candidates. Each of these chapters includes one overview map showing the study areas in relation to each other. Appendix B contains more detailed maps of the target and comparison areas in each site.

[3]We employed the counting rule adopted by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) System for all crime analysis (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). Under this rule, incidents involving crimes against persons (i.e., murder, manslaughter, assault, sex offenses, and kidnapping) are counted as one crime per victim. Incidents involving crimes against property (e.g., larceny, robbery, embezzlement) or crimes against society (e.g., prostitution, drug offenses, disorderly conduct) were counted as one crime per incident or event. All offenses were categorized using the scheme adopted by the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) (Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2000).

Appendix B

Detailed Study Area Maps



Figure B.1: Los Angeles Target Area



Figure B.2: Los Angeles Comparison Area



Figure B.3: Milwaukee Target Area



Figure B.4: Milwaukee Comparison Area



Figure B.5: North Miami Beach Target Area



Figure B.6: North Miami Beach Comparison Area



Figure B.7: Richmond Target Area



Figure B.8: Richmond Comparison Area

Appendix C

Los Angeles Logic and Activity Models

Table C.1: Los Angeles Phase I Logic Model

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Create a sustainable plan for prevention program implementation	To communicate GRP purpose and goals to community organizations in target area To recruit community residents (youths & adults) for participation in the planning process To enhance representation of CBOs and community stakeholders in the planning process To identify the target area's strengths and problems from the perspective of residents and business owners	Attend community meetings Hold focus groups Organize and participate in community outreach
To develop and implement alternative programs for at-risk youth and families	To identify at-risk youths and families To increase pro-social (decrease antisocial) behaviors among participating youths To improve parenting skills in participating families To improve education achievement among participating youths To increase leadership skills among participating youths	Summer Bridge Transition Program (Families In Schools) Going on to College! (Families in Schools) United Students Jr. Club (Inner City Struggle) IMPACTO (Proyecto Pastoral at Dolores Mission) Get it Straight (Hollenbeck Police Activities League) Knowledge is Power (Hollenbeck Police Activities League)

Intervention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Create a sustainable plan for intervention program implementation	To communicate GRP purpose and goals to community organizations in target area To recruit community residents (adults & youths) for participation in the planning process To enhance representation of CBOs and community stakeholders in the planning process To create an understanding of the gang culture with partners To gain commitment from schools for off-site programs	Attend community meetings Hold focus groups Organize and participate in community outreach
To provide appropriate social, educational, and behavioral interventions to participants	To develop a transitional reentry plan To refer high-risk youths to appropriate services (e.g. mental health) To increase educational support for high-risk youths To assist in employment of high-risk youths To educate participants on laws and policies To provide participants with alternative, prosocial activities	Youth Opportunity Intensive Transition Program (Youth Opportunity Movement) Sports for Kids (Hollenbeck Police Activities League)

Suppression

Goals	Objectives	Activities
To reduce gang crime in target area	To identify most violent and active gang members	Funding for Probation Community Resource Specialist
	To develop critical incident protocol	Funding for staff on Intervention Team
	To develop system of graduated sanctions	Funding for a Law Enforcement Liaison
To establish a reentry program	To develop a reentry orientation process	Funding for Probation Community Resource Specialist
	To develop processes with CLEAR and probation	Funding for staff on Intervention Team
	To develop lists of probation and CYA graduates returning to the community	Funding for a Law Enforcement Liaison

Table C.2: Los Angeles Phase I Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention			
IMPACTO (Proyecto Pastoral)			
Number of participants Number of sessions	GRP MIS	Long-term decrease in juvenile delinquency, gang membership Improved academic achievement	Crime Education
G.O.T. College! (Families in Schools)			
Number of participants Number of sessions	GRP MIS	Long-term increase in enrollment in higher education	Education
United Students Jr. Club (Inner City Struggle)			
Number of participants Number of activities	GRP MIS	Improved academic achievement	Education
Get It Straight (Hollenbeck Police Activities League)			
Number of participants Number of activities	GRP MIS	Decreased juvenile delinquency during after school hours, on weekends	Crime
Knowledge is Power (Hollenbeck Police Activities League)			
Number of participants Number of activities	GRP MIS	Improved literacy Decreased pregnancy rate among high school students	Education Health

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Intervention			
Sports for Kids (Hollenbeck Police Activities League)			
Number of participants Number of sessions	GRP MIS	Decreased juvenile delinquency during after school hours, on weekends	Crime
YO! Intensive Transition Program (Youth Opportunity Movement)			
Number of clients Volume of client referrals	GRP MIS	Decreased offending and re-offending Increase compliance with court requirements	Corrections
Suppression			
Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program			
Development of protocol for response to critical incidents Quality of reentry orientation process Number of target gang members identified Number of gang member arrests Number of gang member felony prosecutions Number of gang member misdemeanor prosecutions Number of graduated sanction cases Disposition of graduated sanction cases Number of truancy and curfew sweeps Number of youths apprehended in sweeps Summary of all other CLEAR activities Number of GRP-CLEAR designated officers	Implementation interviews LA Police Dept. LA District Attorney* LA City Attorney* CLEAR evaluator	Decreased gang-related incidents Decreased seriousness of gang incidents Increased arrests of gang members Improved gang intelligence	Crime

* Indicates measurement may also be based on data from CLEAR evaluator.

Table C.3: Los Angeles Phase II Logic Model

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
To implement appropriate best-practices primary and secondary prevention programs for the entire population in the target area	To issue an RFP to solicit contractors for delivery of prevention services To submit selection of contractors and awards to Mayor and City Council for approval To execute contracts with selected agencies for the duration of the grant period	One-stop Community Center Prenatal and infancy support Truancy and dropout prevention After school and recreational programs Community events
To recruit a minimum of 100 high-risk youths, ages 7-14, for intensive case management services	To establish relationships with appropriate partners including the community, schools, churches, social service providers, etc. to receive client referrals To develop a community outreach campaign to reach youth in hot spot areas (Estrada Courts, Wyvernwood Apartments)	Case Management
To divert 100 high-risk youth, ages 7-14, from joining a gang	To develop a comprehensive plan of services for high-risk youth and families To provide appropriate social, educational, and behavioral prevention services for the high-risk youth and families To ensure client and family participation in GRP services	Mentoring After school and recreational programs
To educate youth, parents, school staff, and members of the community on the identification and prevention of gang affiliation	To work with school administration and local community in setting up forums for training To coordinate trainings with law enforcement, Probation, social service agencies, gang intervention workers, LAUSD school police, and any additional entities	Gang Awareness Training

Intervention & Reentry		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
To create the GRP Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (MDT)	To identify appropriate agencies and individuals to participate in the GRP MDT To develop protocols and procedures for the GRP MDT To provide training to GRP MDT members To provide management of GRP MDT cases through the Intervention Case Managers	Multidisciplinary Intervention Team
To recruit a minimum of 120 active gang members, close associates, and those returning from confinement for intensive case management services and the GRP MDT	To establish relationships with appropriate partners including Department of Probation, schools, law enforcement, CA Youth Authority, social service providers, etc. to receive client referrals To conduct aggressive outreach of youth through gang intervention workers To develop community outreach campaign to reach youth in hot spot areas (Estrada Courts, Wyvernwood Apartments)	Gang Outreach Workers
To divert a minimum of 25 probation youths from re-offending and returning to confinement	To develop a comprehensive plan of services for probation youth and their families through the GRP MDT To provide appropriate social, educational, and behavioral intervention services for probation youth and their families To work with the probation officer to provide appropriate levels of supervision to ensure participants comply with probation requirements	Roosevelt High School Teen Court

Intervention & Reentry, continued

Goals	Objectives	Proposed Activity or Service
To place a minimum of 25 out-of-school youths in educational or vocational programs	To develop a comprehensive plan of services for out-of-school youth and their families through the GRP MDT	Intervention Case Management
	To provide appropriate social, educational, and behavioral services for out-of-school youth and their families	
	To provide appropriate levels of supervision to ensure participants complete their educational requirements	
To place a minimum of 25 active gang members into job training, educational, or vocational programs	To develop a comprehensive plan of services for the active gang members and their families through the GRP MDT	Intervention Case Management
	To provide appropriate social, educational, and behavioral intervention services for active gang members and their families	
	To provide appropriate levels of supervision to ensure participants complete training programs	
	To provide referrals to City Worksource Centers to assist them in finding employment	

Suppression		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
To target the most violent gang members and those violating probation or parole for suppression efforts	To develop a list of gang members, members on probation or parole, or other serious offenders through a coordinated suppression effort with the LAPD, probation, DA, City Attorney, and the CA State Department of Corrections To arrest and prosecute the most violent gang members and those violating their probation or parole	Multi-Agency Suppression Services
To develop a system of graduated sanctions and community-based sanctions with community organizations	To collaborate with the GRP MDT members in establishing community-based sanctions and graduated sanctions To provide appropriate levels of supervision to ensure participants comply with community service requirements	Graduated Sanctions (City Attorney & Intervention Case Management)
To coordinate between confinement facilities, probation/parole, community service providers for supervision of offenders reentering the community	To develop a list of gang members, members on probation or parole, and other serious offenders returning to the target area To work with community service providers in identifying social services prior to release To provide referrals to appropriate service providers prior to release	Multi-Agency Suppression Services
To develop and implement a referral system between law enforcement officers and community-based organizations	To work with community-based organizations in developing a contact list for social services To develop protocol and procedures for referring clients to social services To maintain an up-to-date list of contractors for distribution	Multi-Agency Suppression Services

Table C.4: Los Angeles Phase II Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention			
One-Stop Community Center			
Number of GRP programs and services operating out of center Number of GRP programs/services added to existing services Number of GRP program participants accessing center	Implementation interviews GRP MIS	Increased availability of resources for at-risk population	Process
Prenatal & Infancy Support Services			
Number of participants Number of services offered Number participating in services	GRP MIS	Improved maternal, prenatal, and early childhood health and education	Health
Truancy/Drop-Out Prevention			
Number chronically truant youths identified Number youth receiving referrals to GRP services Number of truancy workshops held Number of parents participating in workshops Number of students participating in workshops	GRP MIS	Increased school attendance Improved academic achievement Decreased dropout rate Decreased disciplinary measures	Education
After School & Recreational Programs			
Number of participants Number of programs implemented Hours of services delivered	GRP MIS	Increased access to prosocial activities Decreased crime during after school hours Improved academic achievement	Education Process

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Secondary Prevention			
Gang Awareness Training			
Number of trainings held	GRP MIS	Increased gang awareness	Community
Number of participants			
Mentoring			
Number of participating youths, mentors	GRP MIS	Improved academic achievement	Education
Number of youth-mentor matches			
Number of participant-hours of mentoring		Improved community efficacy	
Duration of youth-mentor matches			
Prevention Case Management			
Number of clients served	GRP MIS	Increased access to prosocial activities	Process
Number of clients' family members served			
Number of client/family referrals to GRP services		Increased coordination among service providers	
Number of client assessments conducted		Increased use of services	
After School & Recreational Programs			
Number of participants	GRP MIS	Increased access to prosocial activities	Education
Number of programs implemented			
Hours of services delivered		Improved academic achievement	

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Intervention and Reentry			
Intervention Case Management			
Number of clients served	GRP MIS	Decreased recidivism	Crime
Number of clients' family members served			
Number of client/family referrals to GRP services		Increased compliance with court requirements	Corrections
Average duration of client involvement			
Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (MDT)			
Number of MDT meetings	GRP MIS	Increased collaboration among participating agencies	Community
Attendance of team members at MDT meetings			
Number of gang members recruited by outreach workers	LA Police Dept.	Decreased gang crime	Crime
Number of referrals to GRP services		Increased access to prosocial activities	Process
Roosevelt High School Teen Court			
Number of student volunteers from target area	GRP MIS	Increased compliance with court requirements	Corrections
Number of cases heard at target high school		Decreased recidivism among youth	Crime
Number of target area youth diverted from justice system		Increased accountability among youth	

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression			
Multi-Agency Suppression Services			
Number of graduated sanction sentences			
Number of referrals to community-based organizations			
Number of vertical prosecutions of known gang members	LA City Attorney		
Number of federal prosecutions of known gang members	Implementation interviews	Improved collaboration among suppression agencies	
Disposition of gang member cases prosecuted	LA County District Attorney*	Decreased number/seriousness of gang crimes	Crime
Number of enhanced sentences for known gang members	CLEAR evaluator	Decreased number of calls for service for shots fired	Process
	LA Police Dept.		
Summary of other CLEAR activities	GRP MIS		
Number gang crimes (arrests and reports)			
Number of weapons violations (arrests and reports)			

* Indicates measurement may also be based on data from CLEAR evaluator.

Appendix D

Milwaukee Logic and Activity Models

Table D.1: Milwaukee Phase I Logic Model

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Develop community's knowledge of gangs	Host a minimum of five gang education workshops with members of the Executive and Advisory Committee, the Neighborhood Associates, residents, and other GRP collaborators Provide a minimum of 10 gang education workshops for schools, community-based organizations, and faith-based groups in the GRP area	Gang Education Workshops and School-based Trainings (Milwaukee Violence Free Zone)
Develop a plan to identify high-risk youth in order to engage them in constructive and appropriate prevention services	Select youth agencies experienced in serving high-risk youths in 7 days Accept applications and issue contracts to youth agencies within 15 days	Mobile Outreach Initiative (Boys and Girls Club) Youth Ambassadors Program (Neighborhood Associations) Explorer Scout Program (Milwaukee Police Department) Summer Youth Employment Program (City of Milwaukee) Youth Education and Entrepreneurship Program (Running Rebels) Community Justice Center Youth Program (True Our Brothers Keepers) 3rd District Community Justice Center (Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation)
Suppression		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Improve gang intelligence sharing and crime reporting	Create community patrol officers who will coordinate suppression strategies and intelligence information with the Anti-Gang Unit Select and implement one best practice strategy that has been demonstrated to increase crime reporting and community relations	Curfew Enforcement Patrols (Milwaukee Police Department) Community-Oriented Policing (Milwaukee Police Department)

Table D.2: Milwaukee Phase I Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention			
Gang Education Workshops			
Number of gang education workshops Number of persons attending each workshop	Implementation interviews	Increased gang awareness in the community	Process
Step Up and REACH Youth Employment Programs			
Number of participants Program completion rate Number of work experience placements Average client wages	Implementation interviews	Increased youth employment Increased job readiness among youths	Employment
Youth Educational and Entrepreneurship Program			
Number of participants Program completion rate Number of job shadowing placements Average client wages	Implementation interviews	Increased youth employment Increased job readiness among youths	Employment
Explorer Scout Program			
Number of uniforms purchased Number of new participants Number and type of services delivered	Implementation interviews	Increased awareness among youths of law enforcement career opportunities Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime Employment
Youth Ambassador Program			
Number of participants Number and type of job training activities provided	Implementation interviews	Increased youth employment Increased job readiness among youths	Employment
Mobile Outreach Initiative			
Number of youths Number of referrals to other youth programs	Implementation interviews	Increased access to services Increased awareness of available services	Process

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention, continued			
True Our Brothers Keepers Community Justice Center			
Number of participants	Implementation interviews	Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime
Number and type of services delivered		Improved academic performance	Education
3rd District Community Justice Center			
Number of participants	Implementation interviews	Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime
Number and type of services delivered		Improved academic performance	Education
Suppression			
Community-oriented Policing Strategies			
Number and type of services delivered	Implementation interviews	Improved communication between law enforcement and community	Crime
Number of community meetings Attendance at each meeting		Decreased crime	Process
Increased Curfew Enforcement Patrols			
Number of curfew violations	Milwaukee Police Dept.	Decreased juvenile delinquency after curfew	Crime
Number and content of field interviews conducted	Field interview cards	Increased gang intelligence	Process

Table D.3: Milwaukee Phase II Logic Model

Primary Prevention			
Goals	**Objectives**	**Strategies**	**Activities**
Design linkages to a full array of health and human services	Establish a community information, referral and/or service system for residents	Create a One-Stop resource and referral center	One-Stop Service Center (Metcalfe Park Resident's Association with Project Respect - Amani Neighborhood Association) Milwaukee Career Center (Private Industry Council)
Reduce health disparities for low income individuals/families	Improve access to critical health services for residents	Institute an early identification and referral service for uninsured and underinsured residents	Family Empowerment Program (St. Joseph Regional Medical Center)
Reduce the [incidence of] negative developmental behaviors of children.[1]	Create parental education and support opportunities for young mothers	Implement prenatal, nurturing, and parenting skill activities	Baby FAST Program (Next Door Foundation)
None listed	None listed	None listed	Finding Paths to Prosperity (Boys and Girls Club)

[1] The Urban Institute has reversed the goal and the objective for this row to improve the flow of logic.

Secondary Prevention

Goals	Objectives	Strategies	Activities
Develop a plan to identify and engage high-risk youth in positive community alternatives	Involve at-risk youth participation in after school and summer programming with an emphasis on academic preparation, leadership development, and/or civic engagement	None listed	Explorer Scout Program (Milwaukee Police Department) After-School Mentoring (Career Youth Development) Step Up Youth Employment Program (Private Industry Council) Life Skills Vocational Training Program (Neighborhood House of Milwaukee)
Decrease rebellious behavior of children and teens	Involve at-risk youth, school-aged, and elementary and middle school youth in pro-social activities in school	Implement behavior management, conflict resolution, and problem solving activities	Peace Program (St. Michael's Hospital)
Reduce the number of out-of-school youth	Implement early drop out intervention and parental support services	Provide truancy abatement activities through the use of school resource offices in elementary and middle schools	Truancy Abatement Burglary Suppression (TABS) Program (Boys and Girls Club)

Intervention			
Goals	**Objectives**	**Strategies**	**Activities**
Reduce the number of gang-involved youth	Develop a program structure of referrals and services that aggressively targets gang-involved youth (with an emphasis on ages 16-23)	Coordinate an intervention program with agreements from agencies that provide street outreach, case management, and community supervision (as core partners) for the purpose of functioning as a multidisciplinary team	Coordination and Case Management for the Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (Wisconsin Community Services) Street Outreach (Latino Community Center)
Ensure access to intensive services for gang-involved youth	Coordinate specialized services through a network of community-based providers	Establish an agreement with agencies currently serving gang-involved youth to receive referrals for primary/core services	Coordination and Case Management for the Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (Wisconsin Community Services)
Reduce the liklihood of recidivism for youth returning from confinement	Involve gang youth in intensive after care planning and referral to appropriate community re-entry services	Implement an intensive after care plan of activities including on-going case management and monitoring	Youth Empowerment Site I (Running Rebels) Youth Empowerment Site II (Dr. Howard Fuller Foundation)
Suppression			
Goals	**Objectives**	**Strategies**	**Activities**
Enhance crime reporting	Develop a community-based mechanism to increase crime reporting among residents and businesses	Host meetings with residents, businesses and local law enforcement to educate the community on various crime reporting methods	TARGET Suppression Team (Community Prosecutor)
Reduce gang-related crime	Coordinate local, state, and federal law enforcement efforts	Implement a targeted suppression team in the GRP areas. Institute curfew enforcement activities throughout the 3rd district that will interface with the local gang enforcement unit	TARGET Suppression Team (Community Prosecutor) Increased Gang Unit Patrols & Curfew Enforcement (Milwaukee Police Department)
Maximize the effectiveness of joint law enforcement crime information efforts	Coordinate gang intelligence information among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies	Link local, state, and federal law enforcement intelligence through a shared information database	TARGET Suppression Team (Community Prosecutor)

Table D.4: Milwaukee Phase II Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention			
Comprehensive Resource and Referral Center or One-Stop			
Number of client intakes	GRP MIS Implementation interviews	Increased collaboration and coordination among service providers Increased community awareness of GRP services	Process
Number of referrals			
Number of surveys administered			
Number and type of community outreach activities			
Milwaukee Career Center			
Number of adults enrolled in WIA case management services	GRP MIS	Decreased unemployment Increased household income Increased job readiness	Employment
Number of job placements			
Average client wages			
Baby FAST Program			
Number of participants	GRP MIS Program case records	Decreased aggressive behavior among youths	Health
Number and type of services delivered			
Results from pre/post tests			
Family Empowerment Program			
Number of clients who obtain health insurance	GRP MIS	Decreased rate of uninsured	Health

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Secondary Prevention			
Explorer Scout Program			
Number of participants Number and type of services delivered	GRP MIS	Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime Employment
After-School Mentoring Program			
Number of participants Number and type of services delivered	GRP MIS	Improved academic performance Decreased juvenile delinquency during after-school hours	Crime Education
Step Up Youth Employment Program			
Number of participants Program completion rate Number of work experience placements Average client wages	GRP MIS	Increased youth employment Increased job readiness among youths	Employment
Life Skills Vocational Training Program			
Number of participants Number and type of vocational training delivered Program completion rate	GRP MIS	Increased vocational skills Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime Employment
Peace Program			
Number of participants Program completion rate Number of classroom visits	GRP MIS Implementation interviews	Decreased disruptive behavior in school Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime Education
Truancy Abatement Burglary Suppression (TABS) Program			
Number of truants served Number and type of services delivered	GRP MIS	Increased school attendance Decreased juvenile delinquency	Crime Education

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Intervention			
Multidisciplinary Intervention Team			
Number of participants			
Number and type of services delivered per client		Increased compliance with court requirements	Crime
Number of referrals	GRP MIS	Decreased gang membership	Probation/Corrections
Average length of time a client is served		Increased collaboration and coordination among agencies	Process
Number of gang-involved youth identified			
Youth Empowerment Site I			
Number of participants	GRP MIS	Increased compliance with court requirements	Crime
Number and type of services delivered		Decreased juvenile delinquency	Probation/Corrections
Youth Empowerment Site II			
Number of participants	GRP MIS	Increased compliance with court requirements	Crime
		Decreased juvenile delinquency	Education
Number and type of services delivered		Improved academic performance	Probation/Corrections

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression			
TARGET Suppression Team			
Number of MVPs identified Number of MVPs arrested Number of referrals Number of nuisance properties identified and resulting actions taken Number of community meetings held Number of criminal incidents	GRP MIS Implementation interviews Milwaukee Police Dept.	Increased collaboration and coordination among criminal justice agencies Increased/improved communication between law enforcement and community Improved physical appearance of target area Decreased crime	Crime Physical Environment Process
Increased Gang Unit and Curfew Enforcement Patrols			
Number and content of field interviews conducted Number of gang-related criminal incidents Number of curfew violations	Field interview cards Milwaukee Police Dept.	Decreased juvenile delinquency after curfew Decreased youth gang crime and violence	Crime

Appendix E

North Miami Beach Logic and Activity Models

Table E.1: North Miami Beach Phase I Logic Model

Planning		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Create a partnership involving OJJDP, federal partners, and lead agencies on state and local levels to facilitate implementation of GRP in NMB	Work with OJJDP and federal partners to identify, map, and coordinate federal resources	Provide general crime data and gang related data to UI Provide process and outcome info to UI Use NYGC for technical assistance and best practices research Use partnership to assess potential for service provision through GRP Facilitate site visit for IEDC to assess economic development potential in target area.
	Identify lead agency	Create agreement between Governor's Office of Drug Control and Florida DJJ Create an agreement between Florida DJJ and NMBPD
Create management and leadership structure to implement the GRP and ensure sustainability	Hire a project coordinator	Advertise position opening for project coordinator Screen and interview project coordinator applicants Hire the NMB project coordinator
	Assemble leadership structure	Create an advisory board Create a steering committee
Build a program management plan to guide NMB GRP in achieving goals	Engage key stakeholders in two-day strategic planning process	Identify key delegates to two-day strategic planning process Organize two-day strategic planning process Strategic preplanning meeting and two-day meeting
	Develop a 6 month strategic plan	Clarify goals and objectives identified in meetings with steering committee Draft a strategic plan and budget for steering committee approval Submit to OJJDP
	Create working groups	Create working groups
	Identify best practices from current research	Review and identify best practices using OJJDP strategic planning tool
	Complete a NMB community resource inventory	Complete and inventory of providers in target area Review inventory to see if meet needs Compile a list of available programs
	Identify gaps in youth and family development programs	Use blueprint report from gang youth summit to identify interests and needs Define gaps based on a review of current community resources
	Develop a draft strategic plan	Involve stakeholders and steering committee members in development of draft plan
	Develop a long term strategic plan for implementation of NMB GRP over rest of cycle	Bring stakeholders together again in Oct. 2004 Revisit goals and objectives from preliminary plan and revise Incorporate outcomes into long-term planning document and budget
Increase sensitivity to, awareness of, and appreciation for, Haitian community and culture	Identify and/or create opportunities to increase knowledge of Haitian culture	Haitian Creole/Cultural competency course 2004 Haitian Advocacy Conference 8th annual Haitian Festival ID opportunities and/or support initiatives

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Implement primary prevention strategies in high risk neighborhood of NMB	Work with existing Neighborhood Resource Center to identify needs and resources to enhance provision of primary prevention services	Use UI's crime analysis to locate resource center in a "hot spot"
		Summarize best practices in primary prevention strategies and feasibility
		Meet with NMB neighborhood services manager to determine services currently available
		Identify appropriate services for primary prevention in targeted center
		Determine needs of community residents in surrounding neighborhood
	Create a program plan for providing primary prevention services through existing resource center and facilitates effective distribution of health and support services	Identify local partners that could provide primary prevention services at the resource center
		Prepare program plan
		Secure steering committee approval
		Begin procurement and service delivery for consensus issues
Develop a pilot program at a local school to address early identification and intervention	Choose a strategy and target school for program	Choose a proven strategy Identify target school
		Develop and implement a procurement strategy for consensus issues
		Hire a case manager to facilitate the program (if needed)

Intervention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Determine cultural and family dynamics that support gang member involvement and empower families to reduce gang involvement	Learn from the experts, families whose lives have been impacted by gangs, as well as researchers and/or practitioners	Invite researchers and/or practitioners to share data and experience
		Develop a committee to help in planning focus groups
		Conduct focus groups of youth/parent/extended family groups
		Identify basic needs from focus groups
	Identify basic needs of gang members and families to get out of crisis mode and raise level of functioning	Collect and analyze existing research on relevant needs
		Determine the most common pressing needs and use them to inform intervention strategy decisions
Provide a continuum of services for families and youths involved in gangs	Create a multidisciplinary intervention team	Research other models of outreach/interventions
		Identify what services are to be provided and providers to do services
		Decide criteria for referrals into the programs and who can make referral
		Identify who will screen referrals
		Identify intervention team members, purpose, and goals
		Explore risk assessments for family
		Formulate agreements with partner team agencies
		Hire a case manager to track and monitor youth through services and update intervention on progress
		Train referring agents on how to use the criteria to make referrals
	Identify and put intervention services for families and youths in gangs, into place	Choose services from community resource inventory that incorporate best practices and address gaps
		Develop and implement a procurement strategy for consensus issues
		Provide immediate services where possible

Suppression **Goals**	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Develop NMBPD's gang unit by strengthening in-house gang intelligence system and increasing coordination/information sharing	Explore possibilities of forming task force	Identify and communicate needs for task force
		Outreach to relevant partners
		Assess contribution and operational responsibilities
		Secure approval from steering committee
		Explore need for in-house intelligence system
		Criteria for data entry and limited access
		Possible technical assistance for database establishment
	ID intelligence needs and increase info sharing	Participate in MAGTF
		Explore use of GANGNET
		Engage DJJ to provide technical assistance for database personnel and intelligence resources to aid in task force responsibilities
Empower and educate community members on criminal justice system to promote cooperation and accountability	Research what community wants/needs to know about criminal justice system and use info to develop educational workshops	Review existing research
		Contract consultant or neighborhood based organization to identify needs through focus groups. Design a series of workshops for community and criminal justice agencies based on information
	Incorporate implementation of a series of workshops for community and criminal justice agencies into next strategic plan	Review results and approve design plan
		Develop and implement a procurement strategy for consensus issues
Create a safer community	Identify current gang members in high crime areas of NMB	Review current intelligence and select top 12 gang members residing in NMB involved in violence
		Solicit additional information to corroborate based on other units input
	Develop targeted enforcement and prosecution strategies	Assess suppression and intervention needs
		Partner with DJJ for info sharing probation/parole violations
		Collaborate with state attorney's office gang strike force to maximize prosecution of most violent offenders
		Continue to collect intelligence
		Coordinate with PSN and other federal programs about gun removal
		Coordinate with NMB Weed & Seed initiative

Table E.2: North Miami Beach Phase I Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention			
Neighborhood Resource Center - Extension of Hours			
Number of attendees during hours extension	Implementation interviews	Increased availability of prosocial activities	Process
Intervention			
Intervention Focus Groups			
Preparation time and funding spent on focus groups	Implementation interviews	Increased intelligence in gang-related activities	Crime
Number of focus groups held	Focus group analysis	Increased understanding of community by service providers	Process
Number of focus group attendees			
Vocational/Job Development			
Number of job placements	Implementation interviews	Increased employment levels	Employment
Intensive Delinquency Diversion Services			
Number of first-time offenders diverted	Implementation interviews	Decreased gang activity/delinquency	Crime
Suppression			
Technical Assistance for Training for Police			
Number of participants	Implementation interviews	Increased gang intelligence	Crime
Number of trainings		Decreased gang crime	Process
Development of training curriculum			
Suppression Workshops			
Development of workshop curriculum	Implementation interviews	Increased gang intelligence	Crime
Number of workshops		Decreased gang crime	Process
Number of participants			

Table E.3: North Miami Beach Phase II Logic Model

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Implement primary prevention strategies in high risk neighborhood of NMB	Strengthen families by improving parenting skills, communication and bonding, and discipline techniques	Provide 60 Haitian families with youth ages 10-14 from Victory Park and Uleta Park with family strengthening skills
	Reduce risk factors associated with early academic failure and low attachment to school	Provide 50 Haitian youth (pre-K through 3rd grade) from Victory Park and Uleta Park with an after school early literacy program
	Empower and educate young people about substance use/abuse, conflict resolution, build self-esteem and foster positive relationships	Partner with Washington Park Weed and See program to implement youth empowerment workshops with midnight basketball as incentive for youth ages 15-25 in Washington Park, Uleta Park, and Victory Park
	Increase youths' access to safe recreational opportunities in the evenings and weekends	Increase the hours of the recreation centers in Washington Park, Uleta Park, and Victory Park so they are open in the evenings and on the weekends.
	Educate NMB youths on the impacts of gangs	Educate youths in the impacts of gangs through a medium they understand and enjoy by sponsoring the NMB annual Hip-hop conference
	Educate the community about the intent and services of the GRP	Conduct community outreach at the annual NMB Haitian Creole Festival
		Coordinate with the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council's Youth Gang Resource Center for outreach and information
	Educate community members, service providers, and law enforcement officials on effective strategies to reduce youth gangs	Partner with the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council to help support the Youth Gang Summit held in NMB.
Prevent youth at high-risk from becoming delinquent and gang involved.	Implement strategies that address early identification and intervention of youths at high-risk for delinquency and gang involvement	Implement an Alternatives to Suspension program that keeps suspended youths off the streets during school hours and provides them with a structured environment that includes and academic component, leadership skills, and case management
		Enhance the Police Eliminating Truancy (PET) program so that it enables 2 officers to be on the streets 3 times a week to pick up truants
		Provide intensive case management to 50 high-risk Haitian youths and families primarily from Victory Park and Uleta Park neighborhoods. Youths should be between the ages of 7 and 14 years old and exhibit at least three or more risk factors for gang involvement.
		Provide mentors to 50 high-risk Haitian youths primarily from Victory Park and Uleta Park neighborhoods between the ages of 7 and 14 years old and who exhibit at least 3 or more risk factors for gang involvement.

Intervention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Reduce the number of youths involved in gangs by providing a continuum of services for families and youths involved in gangs.	Provide a targeted multidisciplinary approach to gang intervention	Create a multidisciplinary intervention team and a street outreach component
		Partner with the Juvenile Assessment Center to conduct free risk and needs assessments for gang involved youth.
		Provide referrals to the Gang Unit Exit Strategies Services (GUESS) program.
	Provide access to intervention services for families and youths involved in gangs	Coordinate with the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council's Youth Gang Resource Center and 24-hour Youth Gang Hotline for referrals and information
		Implement an On-The-Job Training program to provide vocational opportunities to 40 gang involved youths and young adults between the ages of 16 and 24.
	Identify and fill gaps in intervention services for gang involved youths and their families	Provide outpatient substance abuse services in Creole for youth primarily referred from GUESS and/or Drug Court

Suppression

Goals	Objectives	Activities
To reduce gang-related crime in NMB	Develop NMBPD's Gang Unit by strengthening the in-house gang intelligence system	Modify the database to be able to better track gang involved crime by including a mandatory check box. Train road officers on recognizing and reporting gang members and gang-related crimes according to the Florida State Statute Train 2 officers from each shift (6 total) to form a gang unit that will gather intelligence and work with the gang investigator on gang-related crimes
	Increase coordination/information sharing with surrounding jurisdictions	Actively participate with outside agencies to gather and share gang intelligence and target hot spots for gang activity through MAGTF, GANGNET, and the creation/use of task force with surrounding jurisdictions. Partner with DJJ Youth Custody Officer to work one morning a week picking up youths with outstanding warrants. Identify current gang members in high crime areas of NMB
	Develop targeted enforcement and prosecution strategies	Implement foot patrol through Victory Park neighborhood with 4 officers 2 days a week for 4 hours in the evening from 5-9:00 p.m. Implement bike patrol through Uleta Park neighborhood with 4 officers 2 days a week for 4 hours in the evening from 5-9:00 p.m. Decrease gang-related fights after school and threats to local businesses by deploying PET officers for Targets School Release Time in the area around middle school, high school, and the shopping mall for 2 hours a day, 3 days a week.

Reentry

Goals	Objectives	Activities
Reduce recidivism among juvenile and adult gang members returning to NMB from confinement	Coordinate with existing reentry initiatives (DJJ SVORI, PSN, Weed and Seed) to maximize resources, fill gaps, and ensure no duplication	
	Conduct needs assessments of incarcerated gang members prior to release	25 juvenile and 25 adult gang members will be assessed for service needs within 60 days of release.
	Establish contact and build a relationship with incarcerated gang members prior to release	25 juvenile and 25 adult gang members will receive a minimum of 3 field contacts prior to release (at least one must be a site visit to family or wherever gang members will be returning).
	Reduce change of recidivism by providing wrap-around services to gang members upon release from confinement	25 juvenile and 25 adult gang members will receive comprehensive case management that will ensure the following wrap-around services as necessary: GED, vocation development, job placement, counseling, health services, housing assistance, substance abuse counseling, etc.

Table E.4: North Miami Beach Phase II Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention			
Family Strengthening Skills			
Number of participants Family skills acquired Service utilization rate	Iowa State University evaluation report	Increased awareness and utilization of available services for youth and families	Process
Number of families referred from GRP	Pre/post family skills test scores	Decreased delinquency	Crime
After School Literacy Program			
Number of participants School attendance/grades	GRP MIS	Increased school attendance and grades	Education
Number literate at program completion	Pre/post literacy tests	Increased literacy scores	
Attendance in classes			
DIVAS - (Developing Intelligent Voices of America - Teen Girls Mentoring)			
Number of participants	Implementation interviews	Increased school attendance	Education
Number of school suspensions		Decreased disciplinary infractions while on school grounds	
Number of delinquent activities			Crime
School Truancy rates		Decreased delinquent activity	
Youth Empowerment/Midnight Basketball & Extended Recreation Hours			
Number of participants Number of workshops	Implementation interviews	Decreased gang activity/delinquency	Crime
Increased knowledge regarding substance abuse and social skills	GRP MIS	Increased availability of prosocial activities	Process
Community center use	Pre/post test scores	Decreased substance related crimes	
Hip-Hop Conference			
Attendance during conference	Implementation interviews	Increased community cohesion	Community
Attendance during community meetings		Increased community awareness	Process

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention, continued			
NMB Haitian Creole Festival			
Number of attendees Number of handouts distributed Call volume to gang hotline Call volume to GRP	Implementation interviews GRP MIS	Increased community cohesion Increased community awareness	Community Process
Secondary Prevention			
Alternatives to Suspension			
Number of participants Hours of participation	GRP MIS	Decreased gang activity/delinquency Increased school attendance/grades Increased high school graduation rates	Crime Education
Police Eliminating Truancy			
Number of pick-ups during school hours	NMB Police Dept.	Decreased gang activity/delinquency Increased school attendance	Crime Education
Mentoring			
Number of participating youths, mentors Number of youth-mentor matches Number of participant-hours of mentoring Duration of matches Social skills acquired	GRP MIS Pre/post social skills assessments	Decreased gang activities/delinquency Increased school attendance/grades	Crime Education
Intensive Case Management			
Average monthly caseload Number of referrals Number of risk assessments conducted Service utilization rate	GRP MIS Pre/post risk assessments	Increased access to services Increased compliance with court requirements	Process Probations/Corrections

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Secondary Prevention, continued			
Physical Fitness Mentor - Boxing Gym			
Number of participants	GRP MIS	Decreased gang activities/delinquency	Crime
		Increased scores on pre/post assessments	
Hours of participation	Pre/post test scores	Increased school attendance/grades	Education
Intervention			
Intervention Team & Assessments			
Number of intervention services or links to services identified	GRP MIS	Decreased gang activity/delinquency	Crime
Number of intervention services provided	NMB Police Dept.	Increased access to services	Probation/Corrections
Number of intakes and assessments	Pre/post risk assessments	Increased compliance with court requirements	Process
Service utilization rate			
Outreach Worker			
Number of referrals ending with new service delivery	GRP MIS	Decreased gang activity/delinquency	Crime
		Increased access to services	
Number of contacts with known/suspected gang members		Increased compliance with court requirements	Process
On the Job Training			
Hours of training delivered	GRP MIS	Increased employment	Employment
		Decreased gang activity/delinquency	Crime
Number of participants		Decreased recidivism	Probation/Corrections
Substance Abuse Counseling			
Number of participants	GRP MIS	Decrease in alcohol and substance abuse	Health
Number of outpatient sessions per person			

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression			
Modify Crime Database			
Identification of gang-related crimes	NMB Police Dept.	Increased tracking of gang-related crime	Crime
Train Road Officers			
Number of participants in training curriculum	GRP MIS	Increased intelligence in gang-related activities	Crime
Hours of increased patrol	Implementation Interviews		Process
Gang Task Force (G-Unit)			
Number of gang members identified	NMB Police Dept.	Decreased gang activity/crime	Crime
		Decreased number of criminally active gang members in the community	
Number of arrests in target "hot spots"	Implementation interviews	Increased agency coordination and information sharing	Process
Youth Custody Officer			
Number of gang members arrested on warrants	Dept. of Juvenile Justice	Decreased gang activity/crime	Crime
Number of warrant sweeps	NMB Police Dept.		
Identification and Tracking			
Number of gang members arrested	NMB Police Dept.	Decreased gang activity/crime	Crime
Victory Park Foot Patrol & Uleta Park Bike Patrol			
Hours of increased patrol			
Number of gang members identified	NMB Police Dept.	Decreased gang activity/crime	Crime
Number of arrests in target "hot spots"			
Targeted School Release			
Hours of increased patrol		Decreased crime during after-school hours	Crime
Number of arrests made, citations issued	NMB Police Dept.	Decreased gang activity/crime	

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Reentry			
Returning Prisoners Comprehensive Case Management			
Number of reentry plans completed			
Number of intakes and assessments	GRP MIS	Decreased technical violations, recidivism	Crime
		Decreased gang activity/crime	Employment
Number of days youths remain on job	Pre/post risk assessments	Increased job retention	Probation/Corrections
Service utilization rate			

Appendix F

Richmond Logic and Activity Models

Table F.1: Richmond Phase I Logic Model

Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Involve at-risk youths in effective programs that address immediate and long-term goals	Implement programs that will fill gaps within 90 days Promote community awareness of available youth programs within six months	**Boys and Girls Club of Metro Richmond:** Add part-time bi-lingual staff member Identify gang members and at-risk youth through activities Extend operating hours, days Hire additional staff to cover extended hours, days Cover facility costs Expand sports activities Host breakfast with Richmond Braves baseball team Provide tickets for Richmond Braves home games Host International Parade to bring ethnic groups together **Hispanic Chamber of Commerce:** Hire liaison to Hispanic community
Provide community-level support to families	Develop one or two family support centers in target area schools within six months	**Ukrop's Supermarkets, Inc:** Provide employment training Work with Senior Associates to mentor youths Provide automatic defibrillators **New Life for Youth:** Host "Celebration of Hope" fair
Mobilize community residents and engage community stakeholders to counteract gang activities and improve quality of life in the target area	Identify existing community organizations to form a coalition that will meet regularly to share information and problem solve in sixty days and provide feedback of coalition activities to individuals and groups in the community Disseminate information to constituents in the target area	**Communities in Schools:** Expand programming into two elementary schools Provide neighborhood teams with training in collaboration and consensus building **Woodland Crossings Summer Program:** Conduct GED classes, computer training classes, and a summer youth program **City of Richmond Government:** Develop resource inventory

Intervention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Provide community-based intervention services in the target area for gang members and their families	Develop eligibility criteria/indicators for intervention services within six months Develop support for gang members and their families within six months	**Boys and Girls Club of Metro Richmond:** Conduct summer internship program for 10 gang members or at-risk youths **Ukrops Supermarkets, Inc:** Conduct training and provide employment opportunity to five gang members or at-risk youths **Class Action Summer Program:** Conduct one-week summer camp for gang members or at-risk youths **New Life for Youth:** Provide community outreach to George Wythe High School Provide five slots in one-year residency program for men and women ages 17-23 on probation or parole Provide job training in construction, retail, and landscaping for gang members or at-risk youths Provide training in auto mechanics and woodworking
Provide community-based intervention services that target re-entering gang members in the target area and their families	Provide support for re-entering gang members re-entering the target area and their families within six months Implement transitional one year residential program for gang members re-entering the community	
Provide intervention services that are flexible and responsible to changing needs and circumstances	Sponsor a treatment provider meeting to share information and network within six months Identify gaps and staffing needs within six months	
Provide gang members and youth at risk of entering gangs summer work, internships, and/or other employment-oriented activities	Supplement current hours and activities at Boys and Girls Clubs within the target area Identify potential employers and link them to jobs for youths	

Suppression

Goals	Objectives	Activities
Reduce gang crime in the 2nd Precinct	Create a Gang Unit in the Richmond Police Department within six months Provide training to 2nd Precinct officers in gang identification and new criminal legislation Integrate intelligence collection with Gang Unit Provide police officers additional overtime to work in the target area	**Richmond Police Department:** Create gang unit in RPD to be operational in six months Train police officers in 2nd precinct in intelligence collection, intelligence sharing, new gang legislation Fund additional overtime hours to conduct directed patrols in target area **Office of the Attorney General:** Provide training to officers in the gang unit and 2nd precinct on new laws pertaining to gangs
Identify re-entering gang members as they enter the community	Meeting with Juvenile Justice	

Table F.2: Richmond Phase I Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention			
Boys and Girls Club Activities			
Number of bilingual staff hired Number of gang members and at-risk youth recruited Number of extended hours provided Number of additional days BGC opened Number of additional staff hired Number of overtime staff hours funded Funding provided to assist with facility costs from expanded hours Number of new sports programs Number of children attending Breakfast with Richmond Braves	Management progress report Implementation interviews	Decreased gang-involvement among youths Decreased gang activity, delinquency Increased availability of prosocial activities	Crime Process
Health Activities			
Number defibrillators funded	Management progress report	Decreased number of fatal heart attacks	Health
GRP Implementation Activities			
Number of neighborhood teams trained Citizen database created Resource Inventory Tool completed Number of bilingual newsletters distributed Number of bilingual brochures distributed Number of people attending community meetings Number of service providers receiving gang training	Management progress report Implementation interviews	Increased availability of services Increased community participation in gang and crime reduction efforts	Process

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Prevention, continued			
Community Outreach Activities			
Number of community residents attending Celebration of Hope fair	Management progress report	Increased cultural diversity and acceptance	Community
Number of GRP partner agencies attending Celebration of Hope fair	Implementation interviews		
Number of GRP brochures distributed at Celebration of Hope fair			
Number of community residents attending International Parade			
Number of GRP partner agencies attending International Parade			
Number of GRP brochures distributed at International Parade			
Hispanic Liaison hired			
Number of people completing ESL and SSL classes			
Educational Activities			
Number of schools participating with CIS	Coordinator site visit reports	Improved academic achievement	Education
Number of students participating in CIS programming	Implementation interviews		
Number of people earning GEDs			
Intervention			
Boys and Girls Club Summer Internship			
Number of youths enrolled	Implementation interviews	Increased employment	Crime
		Decreased crime among youths	Employment

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Intervention			
Ukrop's Supermarkets Summer Internship			
Number of youths enrolled	Implementation interviews	Increased employment	Employment
Number of youth mentored		Decreased crime among youths	Crime
Class Action Summer Camp			
Number of youths enrolled	Implementation interviews	Decreased gang involvement among youths	Child Welfare
Number of police volunteer mentors	RPD		Crime
New Life for Youth Program			
Number of at-risk youth or gang members participating in Drama program	Management progress report	Decreased crime	Crime
Number enrolled in one-year residency program for substance abuse and other services		Decreased substance abuse	Health
Number of at-risk youth or gang members enrolled in construction industry training		Increased employment levels	Employment
Number of youths enrolled in mechanic training		Decreased recidivism rate	Probations/Corrections
Intervention Team Activities			
Number of people participating in Intervention Team meetings	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased networking among service providers	Process
Number of people participating in Intervention Team trainings			
Number of gang members and families assessed	Implementation interviews	Increased inter-program client referrals	
Directory of service providers created		Increased use of services	
Number of gang members enrolled One stop resource center created			

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression			
Gang Unit			
Number of officers in gang unit	RPD	Decreased gang crime	Crime
Quantity and type of supplies purchased for gang unit		Increased arrests	
Number of training hours provided for gang unit		Increased prosecution of gang crimes	Process
Police Activities			
Number of officers receiving general gang training	RPD	Increased intelligence sharing and collection	Crime
Number of overtime hours provided for directed police patrol		Decreased gang crime	Process

Table F.3: Richmond Phase II Logic Model

Primary Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Provide prevention services for target area residents	Strengthen the community by bridging cultural differences through ability to communicate with each other	ESL, SSL, and citizenship classes provide classes so that community can learn Spanish, English, and how to become citizens
	Coordinate public/private job training partnerships with private and public sector entities to decrease unemployment in the general population in the target area	Job training partnerships
	Disseminate information on GRP services throughout the target area	Neighborhood Support Network
	Provide information on service providers to the community	Publish and distribute brochures outlining GRP services
	Provide information and coordinate interaction of GRP objectives with the Hispanic community	Community Liaison with Hispanic Resource Center
	Provide information to the community on services available through GRP	Public awareness of GRP activities through media
Promote the use of programs that address risk and protective factors	Provide access to information on programs to the community that address risk and protective factors	Community day event
Creation of a one stop service and resource center	Coordinate with City and other agencies to open a one stop resource center	One stop resource center
Ensure that more people in the target area have access to prenatal and health care	Expand prenatal and infancy support, after school programs, and truancy and drop-out prevention	Infancy Support Services
		Healthy Family Initiatives

Secondary Prevention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Identify young children at high risk and provide services to prevent delinquency and gang involvement (Window of opportunity from ages 7-14)	Identify at-risk children and provide services	Work with Communities In Schools, Boys and Girls Clubs and other organizations
Identify other at-risk children and provide age-appropriate services and monitoring	Target youth that need mentoring and tutoring programs for services	Mentoring/Tutoring program
	Promote law education programs to students	OAG's Class Action program
	Provide youth healthy alternatives by making recreational facilities available to them	Extended hours and enhanced services at recreational facilities
	Assist community service providers to identify risks and protective factors when working with youth at-risk for gang involvement	Gang training for community service providers
	Reduce truancy and drop-out rates	Truancy and drop-out programs
Involve schools, community-based organizations and faith-based groups in GRIP	Provide educational opportunities to at-risk youth	GED classes
	Provide vocational opportunities to at-risk youth	Vocational classes
	Provide sufficient after-school programs in the target area	Enhance and/or continue after school programs
	Provide sufficient summer programs in the target area for youth	Enhance and/or continue summer youth programs
	Provide a forum for youth to express to the community the many challenges that they face in their environment	Theatre group
	Expand services in schools that help youth stay in school and prepare for life	Training scholarship for youth programs
	Identify at-risk youth for involvement in summer camp focusing on Virginia Law and the consequences of breaking the laws	Class Action summer camp
	Teach youths life skills while involving them in sports	Sports academies
	Improve communication between service providers, especially schools, when talking to predominantly Spanish-speaking population	Spanish language classes for service provider, especially schools

Intervention		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Target active gang members, close associates, and gang members returning from confinement by providing resources too youth and their families	Provide at-risk youth, gang members and close associates with job opportunities once they have been referred by intervention team	Mini-grants to small businesses to promote growth for those businesses that hire clients referred through intervention team
	Provide at-risk youths job opportunities while working on area revitalization of their community	Community revitalization service projects
	Provide job training and job placement for identified gang members	Job training partnerships
	Ensure availability of mental health and substance counseling to identified gang members	Enhance current availability of mental health and substance abuse counseling
	Promote relationship between social service providers, faith-based and other groups for referral of clients	Hold meetings between providers and other groups to maximize services to at-risk youth Include coordination with liaison at Hispanic Resource Center for inclusion of all members in the community
	Provide tattoo removal services to clients referred to GRP	Enhance availability of tattoo removal services to identified gang members
	Provide gang members with positive role models from those who left crime and have been rehabilitated	Community role models/mentors for gang members
Develop a multi-disciplinary intervention team that provides risk and needs assessment, intervention planning, and monitoring for gang members and their families	Formation of a multi-disciplinary intervention team	Intervention team
	Establish protocols and procedures for use by Intervention Team	Intervention team to set protocols and procedures
	Provide personal outreach to serious offenders and gang members in community	Hire outreach worker
	Provide schools with resources to identify and target students known to be gang-involved	Training to schools and providers

Suppression **Goals**	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Target gang leaders for aggressive suppression to reduce crime in Richmond	Provide law enforcement with equipment and tools needed for aggressive suppression	Equipment for RPD
	Provide law enforcement with training on gangs and laws	Training for RPD
	Provide additional patrol and police involvement in the target area	Enhance police involvement within the community
	Collection and review of data for GRP assessment by Urban Institute	Crime data review
	Funding for Suppression Team Funding for prosecutors to work with police in support of arrest and prosecution of violent gang members	Funding as needed for assistance with prosecutions
Increase community assistance to police department with reducing gangs and crime activity	Promote the use of Crime Stoppers by Spanish-speaking citizens	Crime Stoppers in Spanish
	Involve community and promote awareness of the consequences of illegal guns	Promotion of Project Exile in target area
	Provide additional safety networks to the community for reporting of gangs and gang activity	Expansion of Neighborhood Watch programs
Increase information sharing between federal, state and local law enforcement and other agencies	Promote the sharing of intelligence between agencies	Meetings to promote intelligence sharing
	Enhance linkage between agencies to share information	Linkage through PISTOL system and different agencies
Remove dangerous and influential gang members from the community through the effective use of enhanced sentences, federal charges, and vertical prosecution	Target gang leaders for aggressive suppression through the coordinated effort of different agencies	Coordination of suppression services
Develop a system of graduated sanctions (including community-based measures) for less serious offenders	Meeting with criminal justice providers and others to develop a system of graduated sanctions	Meetings and training of criminal justice providers

Reentry		
Goals	**Objectives**	**Activities**
Target serious and gang-involved offenders who face multiple challenges to reentering their communities	Match programs to reentering gang-involved offenders in order to maximize the success of their reentry into the community	One-year residency program
Provide appropriate services and criminal juvenile justice supervision	Provide funding to enhance case management and transition services	Offender reentry management
Promote information sharing and coordination between confinement facilities, probation/parole, and community intervention service providers to reduce recidivism among juvenile and young adult gang members returning to the target area	Promote information sharing between agencies	Meetings between confinement facilities, probation/parole and community intervention service providers

Table F.4: Richmond Phase II Activity Model

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention			
One Stop Resource Center			
One stop resource center created Number of referrals generated Amount of information distributed	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased capacity to provide social services Increased use of GRP services	Process
Prenatal, Infancy, and Family Health Support			
Number of people served	Coordinator site visit reports	Reduced infant mortality	Health
Number of locations visited by mobile health provider	Reports from service providers	Improved health of residents	
ESL/SSL Language Classes			
Number enrolled in SSL Number enrolled in ESL Number enrolled in Conversational Spanish for Service Providers	Coordinator site visit reports Implementation interviews	Increased capacity to provide social services Increased use of social services	Process
Citizenship Classes			
Number enrolled	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased employment rate	Employment
Number who become U.S. citizens		Increased use of social services	Process
Community Day			
Number attending Community Day Number of media exposures generated by community day Number of community day participants completing surveys Number of referrals to GRP programs from community day	Implementation interviews Review of media coverage Surveys of Community Day attendees	Increased cultural diversity and acceptance Increased awareness of services	Community Process

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Primary Prevention, continued			
Raise Awareness of GRP			
Number of brochures printed	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased capacity to provide social services	Process
	Implementation interviews		
Number of brochures distributed	Review of media coverage	Increased use of GRP services	
Secondary Prevention			
After School and Summer Programs			
Number of youth recruited to BGC	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Crime
Number of youth remaining in BGC for 1 year			
Number of youth involved several times per week			
Number of youth utilizing City of Richmond recreational facilities		Increased recreational opportunities	
Number of youth enrolled in sports academies			
Number of youth attending games or sporting events		Decreased gang involvement among youths	Process
Number of youth attending Class Action Camp		Decreased delinquency among youths	
Number of expanded hours at BGC			
Number of extra days open at BGC			
Number of youth participating in City of Richmond theatre group			

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Secondary Prevention, continued			
Educational Programs			
Number of people enrolled in GED program in Woodland Crossings	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased employment rate	Employment
Number of people enrolled in GED program with Richmond Technical Center			
Number of people enrolled in GED program with District 1 Probation and Parole	Implementation interviews		
Number of people passing GED			
Mentoring and Tutoring Programs			
Number of youth enrolled in mentoring/tutoring program	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Crime
Number and type of skills taught by mentoring/tutoring programs			
Number and amount of scholarships provided to allow youths to attend CIS training		Increased job skills	Employment
Gang Training for Community Service Providers			
Number of training sessions	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased capacity to provide social services	Process
Number of service providers attending			
Number of officers participating in school resource officer training	RPD		
Truancy and Drop-out Prevention Program			
		Increased educational achievement	
Number of youth served by truancy and drop-out prevention program	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased truancy rates	Education
		Decreased drop-out rates	

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Secondary Prevention, continued			
Raise Awareness of GRP			
Number of media exposures	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased awareness of GRP	Process
Number of billboards/public advertisements purchased by GRP	Review of media coverage	Increased use of services	
Intervention			
Intervention Team			
Number of active gang members referred to intervention team	Coordinator site visit reports Implementation interviews	Increased networking among service providers Increased inter-program client referrals Decreased gang crime	Crime Process
Number of re-entering gang members referred to intervention team			
Number of at-risk youth referred to intervention team			
Outreach worker hired			
Number of youth referred to programs by intervention team			
Hispanic Community Liaison			
Hispanic Liaison hired	Coordinator site visit reports Implementation interviews	Increased cultural diversity and acceptance Increased use of services	Community Process
Number of contacts			
Number of referrals generated			
Job Development/Small Business Growth			
Number of at-risk youth employed by Learsi Skateboarding	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased community well-being Increased recreation opportunities Increased employment rate	Community Employment
Number of skateboards assembled by Learsi employed youth			
Number of skate ramps created by Learsi employed youth			
Dollar growth in local area small businesses	Richmond Workforce Investment Board	Increased community well-being	Community

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Intervention			
Job Training Programs			
Number of people enrolled with Richmond Career Advancement Center	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased employment rate	Employment
Number of people enrolled with Heart of Virginia Council			
Community Revitalization			
Number of children enrolled in program	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased community well-being	Community
Number of homes revitalized		Increased property values	Physical Environment
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Counseling			
Number of counselors hired	Coordinator site visit reports	Improved mental health	Health
New patients enrolled		Decreased substance abuse	Crime
Community Role Models/Mentors			
Number of people attending employability sessions	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Employment
Number of employment stipends distributed			
Number of people attending cultural fair		Increased employment	Crime
Number of community parties held			
Number of people attending mentoring sessions			
Number of volunteer mentors			
Tattoo Removal			
Number of participants	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased gang involvement	Crime
		Decreased gang crime	

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression			
Neighborhood Watch Development			
Number of neighborhood watch teams created	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Crime
Number of citizens participating		Increased sense of community	Community
Number of brochures distributed			
Suppression Program			
Number of people attending	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Crime
Number of people choosing intervention program instead of sentencing		Decreased gang membership	Process
Number of people completing intervention program			
Police Information Activities			
Crime Data reviewed and transmitted to UI in 6 month intervals	RPD	Increased analytical capacity for PD	Crime
Gang Module for Pistol data system installed	Coordinator site visit reports	Decreased crime	Process
Wireless connection established for intelligence sharing between PD and Probation/Parole			

Outputs by Activity	Output Data Source	Expected Outcomes	Outcome Domain
Suppression, continued			
Police Activities			
Number of officers receiving basic Spanish training Number of overtime hours provided for directed police patrol Number of new members at Hispanic Citizen Academy Number of hours in which Spanish-speaking operator is available for Richmond Crime Stoppers hotline Number attending neighborhood team meetings Number of brochures distributed Number attending Project Exile meetings Quantity and type of supplies purchased for Gang unit Number of School Resource Officers trained	RPD	Increased intelligence sharing and collection Increased awareness of new gang legislation Decreased gang crime Decreased gun crime Increased community involvement with police Increased capacity to fight crime	Community Crime Process
Reentry			
Reentry Program			
Reentry Coordinator Hired Number of reentering offenders served Number of referrals generated	Coordinator site visit reports	Increased use of services Increased awareness of services Decreased gang activity/delinquency Increased compliance with court requirements	Process

Appendix G

Richmond Program Descriptions

G.1. PREVENTION

Barefoot Living: Dance and life skills classes Barefoot Living was contracted to provide a 15-week program that teaches ballroom dancing, as well as relationships, courtesies, respect for each other, and respect for authority to students and their parents. Spring classes were held at the Southwood Boys and Girls Clubs (BGC) and was taught by an experienced master teacher and two student teachers; one student teacher served as an English-Spanish translator during classes. Each student was provided with a curriculum book and practice music.

Bon Secours: Primary care and OB/GYN care Bon Secours Richmond Health Systems was selected to provide enhanced prenatal and infancy support as well as healthy family initiatives in the target area. Care-A-Van is a pre-existing program that provides on-site primary and secondary medical services to the community. The Care-A-Van targets youth with a variety of health issues, including those who are managing chronic conditions, need prenatal or infancy care, or have substance abuse problems. With GRP funding, Bon Secours was able to expand its programming to several locations in the target area. Bon Secours Community Health Systems hired an Ob/Gyn to provide prenatal and other services in the target area; the organization is providing its primary and infant care services on an in-kind basis. In addition, the organization conducted door-to-door outreach to identify and enroll children in health insurance at both Dutch Village and Southwood Apartments and Bon Secours reports that it distributed 108 car seats at no cost for the parenting, ESL and Car Seat Safety Programs at Southwood.

Boys and Girls Clubs of Metro Richmond: Prevention and intervention programs BGC clubs in the target areas were contracted to provide after-school and summer programs in Phases I and II. Phase II programs offered by the two target area clubs, and the number of youths participating in each event or activity, are summarized in Table G.1. The activities included there are all considered prevention activities and were all provided under BGC's Phase II contract for $75,000. In addition to these special programs, sports leagues, and community improvement activities, BGC extended its club hours during certain periods of the year, worked to provide additional bilingual staff members, and conducted case management for at-risk youths. BGC also contributed to the Class Action camp conducted

Table G.1: Boys and Girls Clubs of Metro Richmond Phase II Outputs

	Outputs	
Activity	**Period**	**Clients**
Southside Club Programs	2005Q4 - 2007Q1	187
Southwood Club Programs	2005Q4 - 2007Q1	260
Southwood, Southside case management	2005Q3 - 2007Q2	416
Drum No Guns	2006Q1	80
Guest Speaker Azim Khamiza	2006Q1	117
Camp Little Hawk Day of Caring (cleanup)	2006Q2	8
Southside Community Cleanup	2006Q2	22
University of Richmond Youth Forum	2006Q2	18
National Kids day	2006Q3	21
Night at the Diamond	2006Q3	20
University of Richmond football games	2006Q3 - Q4	145
Keystone Teen Unity Summit	2006Q4	67
Shoot for the Stars	2006Q4	51
Tour of College of William and Mary, football game vs. U. of Richmond	2006Q4	19
University of Richmond, VCU basketball games	2007Q1	103
Money matters	2007Q1	48
Sunny Delight Basketball Camp	2007Q1	85

by the Virginia Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and hosted its own community day in Southwood during Phase I.

Boy Scouts, Heart of Virginia Council: Job development/Small business growth This program provides youth of Boy Scout Troop 407 with the resources to learn basic small engine repair and business management. This project is a means to teach responsibility, accountability and technical job training skills to boys that live in high crime, poverty pockets of Richmond, Virginia. In addition, the funds will support the Boy Scout's effort to create a small lawn care business that will self-sufficiently fund scouting equipment, monthly outings, and neighborhood projects within Police Sectors 212 and 213 in the City of Richmond. Using GRP funds, the Boy Scout Troop purchased equipment needed to repair small lawnmower engines and work clothing for Troop 407.

City of Richmond Hispanic Liaison Office: Community liaison The Hispanic Liaison Office (HLO) entered into a contract withGRP to provide a community liaison to work with the GRIP Coordinator and distribute information on services and GRIP to the Hispanic community in the target area. The HLO reaches the Hispanic community in a variety of ways, including phone calls, walk-in customers, and through Spanish print and radio media, and also supports City agencies in strengthening relationships with different cultures in the community. Through the GRIP grant, the HLO expanded the services it promotes to include services funded by GRIP and services available through other GRP partners. The HLO worked closely with GRP to host the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Imagine Festivals and also assisted with the opening of the original and new One Stops. The HLO has published a bilingual newsletter since January 2005 that highlights GRP programs.

Fresh Start, Inc.: Job development/Small business growth Fresh Start provides life skills training; job readiness training to include job seeking, resume writing, mock in-

terviews, job shadowing and participation in job fairs to expand employability. Fresh Start also provides a mentoring program for kids w/incarcerated parents, including transportation for participants. The organization provided homework assistance, tutoring, and dinner. Fresh Start ran a summer employment program where youths work 20 hrs/wk with 6 local businesses. Participants must attend life skills classes and open a bank account. Fresh Start also has a catering business where students are trained in the culinary arts.

Learsi Skateboards, Inc.: Job development/Small business growth Learsi used GRP funding to build four portable skateboarding ramps, and placing them at the Gymnasium of the Richmond Outreach Center (ROC). They distributed flyers for the skateboarding project. Learsi worked with the ROC to host a skateboarding program called SK8 nights once a week. The program was later moved to the Southwood BGC.

New Life for Youth: Rock the Block party, ESL classes The Rock the Block party attracted approximately 1,000 attendees and New Life for Youth (NLY) distributed 500 bags of groceries and gave away various prizes. The organization also held English as a Second Language (ESL) classes weekly for approximately 20 people.

Office of the Attorney General: Class Action camp The week-long camp, aimed at at-risk elementary and middle school students in the GRP target area, works to reduce gang activity by combining lessons on Virginia law with recreational activities. Students participate in gang prevention lessons and discussions facilitated by volunteer police officers, built on the school-based Class Action program used in Richmond City Schools. Some activities included canoe trips, games, swimming, and fishing, and exposed many children to activities they had not before experienced.

Office of the Attorney General: Class Action program The Class Action Program is a law-related educational program for middle and high school students and parents, conducted by law enforcement professionals and being implemented statewide. GRP funding allowed the expansion of the program into target area schools. The Gang Education and Prevention Program is a separate and voluntary component of the current Class Action model, providing students across Virginia the necessary information to identify and resist youth gang related involvement and to increase the involvement of law enforcement professionals in youth gang prevention.

Office of the Attorney General: Imagine Festival The "Imagine Festival" grew out of a community fair held in the target area in 2004 called "Family Fest 2004." That fair included bands, cultural performances, information booths, health screening, a parent/student support center, after-school program sign-ups, rides and games for children, and prizes. Forty area agencies and organizations were represented and the City's mayor, the state Attorney General, and other local officials attended the fair. The Imagine Festival has been held every year since then, in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Organizers provide printed information about trends in gang activity and warning signs of gang involvement. Service providers, many of which are sponsors of GRP programs, have designated information tables allowing community residents to meet one-on-one with providers, ask questions, or obtain

brochures and printed materials. The event is also used to bring the community together by educating residents about the diverse cultures that comprise the community.

Office of the Attorney General: Outreach and public awareness The Richmond GRP coordinator has made myriad presentations on the program to various organizations and agencies in the state and elsewhere. She has also appeared on English and Spanish radio to discuss and promote the program. Brochures with program information were produced in Spring 2007. The program is also described on the OAG's website.

Refugee and Immigration Services: Citizenship classes, ESL and SSL classes The Richmond GRP funded citizenship classes to prepare adults for the naturalization process. Refugee and Immigration Services (RIS) provided the 12 week sessions at various locations in the target area. RIS recruited limited English speakers at Southwood Apartments, Dutch Village Apartments, and the surrounding area, for 12-week ESL classes that have been offered at various locations including BGC, Southwood Community Center, and Broad Rock Library. RIS offered a morning class designed to serve mothers with young children and adult night shift workers, and provided a bilingual childcare worker to provide onsite child care. RIS also offered an evening class. RIS offered SSL classes for beginner students who wished to learn conversational language skills. The classes were aimed at law enforcement, school personnel, library, social service agency and recreation center staff. After initial beginner sessions, there were enough interested individuals to conduct an intermediate session.

Refugee and Immigration Services: Mentoring/Tutoring programs RIS worked with students in target area schools in the target area as well as residents of the Dutch Village and Southwood Apartment community and also supported the Dutch Village Boy Scout Troop which provides mentorship to different schools and apartments in the target area. RIS provided parent orientation for its mentoring and tutoring programs and also provided in-home tutoring and homework help in Southwood and McGuire Apartments. RIS recruited volunteer tutors from the University of Richmond to tutor Hispanic children at Southwood, worked with 13 tutors recruited from the Collegiate School, and placed ten eighth grade students and three adult volunteers with individual students at E.S.H. Greene Elementary School. RIS also provided school supplies and books to students and assisted families with their children's transitions to kindergarten.

Refugee and Immigration Services: Neighborhood Watch/Teams Building on an existing outreach center at Dutch Village apartments, RIS made its first efforts at developing a neighborhood watch there but has also targeted Southwood Apartment, holding meetings to discuss residents' safety concerns, advise on police activities, and inform residents about the neighborhood watch. RIS also went door to door to discuss safety concerns and home maintenance and occupancy rules. RIS's Immigrant Community Liaison formed an empowerment group for seven Mixteco women at Dutch Village centered around embroidery. RIS also conducted other outreach activities in the community, including contributing to National Night Out events, handing out information in the community, and making announcements on Spanish radio.

Richmond Career Advancement Center: Public/Private job training Richmond Career Advancement Center (RCAC) received GRP funds to implement career training in two target area schools: George Wythe High School and Boushall Middle School. The schools were selected based on the level of employment barriers present there (e.g., poverty, teenage pregnancy, substance abuse, crime rate, and individuals with disabilities). The program encourages success in completing school, securing and maintaining employment, and/or continuing education past high school. Under the same contract, GRP funded the RCAC to host a Career Club at target area schools to help students prepare employment and adult life. The club also raises awareness of RCAC services that are available. During its first year, the club conducted monthly meetings at George Wythe High School and Boushall Middle School. Two students were provided with summer internship opportunities. RCAC set up a club at Huguenot High School, which is the feeder school for Hispanic youth from the target area. RCAC also partnered with Richmond Department of Social Services Foster Care unit to conduct a workshop on You and the Law for youth as a kick off for second year of the Career Club. During the second year, RCAC also hosted the Next Step Career Club for seniors that focused on training and employment options after graduation. Students from the Career Club and the You WIN Institute participated with over 300 other young people in the 2007 Youth Leadership Summit at Virginia State University

Richmond Career Advancement Center: Job training and job placement GRP funding allowed target area youth to participate in RCAC's Older Youth PilotYou WIN Institute, a pilot for older, out-of-school youth between the ages of 19-21 with a focus on education and occupational skills building designed to provide full-time engagement with accelerated training. For part of the program, participants received a weekly stipend of $100 based on attendance and participation. Beginning in week 7, the youth were placed in individual Work Experience sites that were directly related to their occupational goals to build work ethics and acquire transferable skills, earning $6/hour and working up to 30 hours a week. Continuation in GED prep classes was mandatory.

During the first six months of 2007, seven of the eight students that were enrolled in the Fall 2007 You WIN Institute continued in Work Experience and were placed at worksites that were directly related to their occupational choice. A You WIN Institute Retreat was held for the participants of both the Fall 2006 and Spring 2007 enrollees to highlight each participant's accomplishments.

Richmond Outreach Center: After school and summer programs The Richmond Outreach Center's provides daily after school programming for students and Saturday programs for youths, including tutoring sessions, computer classes and sports programs. ROC volunteers also go into the community on Saturday mornings to visit with at-risk or gang-involved children from the target area and to transport them to the ROC to participate in available programs. Lunch and/or dinner are made available to participants depending the day and times that they are at the center.

Richmond Police Department: Hispanic Police Academy The Richmond Police Department conducts Hispanic-themed Academies in the target area to overcome cultural and language barriers. These academies allow participants to gain awareness of the function and roles of the RPD. To attract participants, the Richmond Police Department (RPD)

partnered with the ROC, and organizers provide volunteer translators to help with communication between all during these classes.

Richmond Police Department: One Stop Resource Center The One Stop was designed to serve as the primary hub for service delivery referrals and program marketing support of the Richmond GRP. The primary function of the one stop office is to provide coordinated access to services to families of at-risk or high-risk youth within the target area. The goal is to identify at-risk youths before they become involved in gang activity and link the youths and their families to services in order to strengthen the family unit and lessen the attractiveness of gang activity. The one stop also works to disseminate information to the community, promote citizen participation in GRP, and undertake other initiatives to meet the needs of the culturally diverse citizens in the target area.

Richmond Police Department: Truancy and dropout prevention The RPD's existing truancy reduction efforts were expanded to the GRP target area with GRP funding. The program represents a comprehensive school–community collaborative program that targets each community's truancy risk factors and is closely associated with the Mayor's Truancy Initiative. In addition, RPD's Truancy Reduction and Prevention Program (TRAPP) works closely with the City's Department of Justice Services on the city-wide initiative. In addition, the RPD hosted the STIC Institute (Strategies Towards Improvement & Commitment), designed to train, motivate, communicate, and educate families on avoiding truancy and to provide skills necessary to promote positive relationships and combat negative behaviors. Finally, both RPD's Mi Historia/My Story program and the Strengthen Families program began in Spring 2007 and started working with youth and families shortly thereafter. The Mi Historia/My Story project represents a partnership between RIS and the Citys Department of Truancy to target minority youth ages 13-18 in Southwood for a truancy prevention program. The program uses drama and theater-based activities to bridge gaps between different cultures and strengthen the Southwood community.

Richmond Public Library: Homework help center at Broad Rock Branch A Richmond Public Schools certified teacher worked at the Broad Rock Homework Help Center during the 2006-2007 school year to provide assistance to students in completing homework assignments.

Richmond Technical Center: Educational/GED and vocational services Richmond Technical Center (RTC) provided training for students to earn ASE Certifications in cosmetology, auto mechanics, ASE/Inspection and nail technician.

Shakespeare Festival LA: Will Power to Youth Will Power to Youth is an arts-based youth employment and enrichment program blending art-making with employment readiness training, school district-accredited literacy skill-building and human relations training. Participants are hired and paid minimum wage to work for approximately 200 hours of their out-of-school, vacation time, during which period they learn how to study a Shakespeare text and are provided rigorous academic support. Then, working with theater professionals from playwrights to set designers to choreographers, the group works

to produce a Shakespeare play adapted to reflect themes they deem important. All youth are assigned acting roles in the production and all youth must participate in vocal training and acting workshops to build presentation skills. This program was first implemented in Richmond in Summer 2007, with planning for the program beginning in late 2006.

Spanish Academy and Cultural Institute: Conversational Spanish for service providers These classes were aimed at residents, service providers, and schools in the target area to facilitate communication and improve service provision.

Theater Group (City of Richmond): Gang violence prevention play This theater group was supported to allow youths to express their creativity and use the plays to educate residents on issues facing the community. Some of the issues that could be covered included pregnancy, sex and sexuality, and self-esteem. Participants in this program attended three weekly sessions focused on acting, character development, art, goal setting and self-awareness, then attended rehearsals twice a week in preparation for their gang violence prevention play. The Theater group scheduled twelve performances from May through June, 2006. The opening night was scheduled for George Wythe High School. On May 26th, the theater group also planned to host a youth forum on Gang Violence. OAG objected to this forum and the performances, because the forum was not part of the program Department of Parks, Recreation and Community Facilities (DPRCF) was contracted to provide and the theater group never provided information on its content to OAG. This contract was allowed to expire and the OAG contracted with Shakespeare LA for this program in late 2006.

U-Turn, Inc.: Sports Academies U-Turn's Sports Academies combine life-skills education and regular sports activities. The program was implemented at Greene Elementary School in the target area, with third graders in the 2005-2006 school year and with fourth graders in the 2006-2007 school year. The program aims to increase fitness, academic achievement, and behavior, and improve life skills.

Virginia Gang Investigator's Association: Gang awareness training One of the Richmond GRP's first obstacles to addressing gang activity in the target area was that teachers and others did not know the signs of gang involvement. To address this issue, GRP provided funds to Virginia Gang Investigators Association (VGIA) to provide gang awareness trainings, where the class leaders discussed local and national gangs and their experiences in Richmond. They provided information to parents and providers on how to recognize signs of gang involvement in their youth. Multiple trainings have been offered both at a community center and at Wythe High School, which serves the target area.

Woodland Crossings: GED and computer classes The low-income housing community of Woodland Crossings was granted GRP funding to continue its GED and computer classes for residents. It also received money to conduct a summer program for resident youths and to begin an initiative to encourage program completion.

G.2. INTERVENTION

ElderHomes: Community revitalization ElderHomes Corporation previously provided home repair services to individuals and families in need elsewhere in the Richmond area. GRP funding allowed for expansion of those services into the target area. ElderHomes conducts such repairs as building wheelchair ramps, installing weather stripping, cleaning carpeting, and replacing plumbing fixtures.

Family Preservation Services: Mental health and substance abuse counseling GRP funding allowed Family Preservation Services (FPS) to provide its existing counseling services to youth from the target area and was available to receive referrals from the intervention team. The contract for this service ended June 30, 2007 and the coordinator planned to issue a new Request for Proposals (RFP) to identify a new provider for this service.

New Life for Youth: Residential treatment program This program operated during Phase I. NLY emphasizes volunteer participation in the program, allowing only 20 percent of the total number in the program at any given time to be court-mandated participants. Candidates for the program would be identified by several area agencies, including Richmond Probation and Parole, the Public Defender's Office, the OAG, and NLY. NLY provides a one-year program that includes housing, counseling, job training, and life skills along with substance abuse treatment and other services to aid in the transition from jail or prison back into society.

Richmond Outreach Center: Job development/Growth of small business The ROC is uses GRIP funds to purchase equipment to expand its car repair business located in the target area. The ROC hired two at-risk youth referred by GRIP to work as apprentices under a certified mechanic to learn job skills.

Richmond Police Department: Community role models/Mentors RPD is collaborating with Pastor Geronimo Aguilar (Pastor G) to conduct target area mentoring programs. The Employability Skills Training program serves youth ages 17 to 25 and involves interning with participating employers and conducting a service learning project focused on gang reduction and prevention. A professional employability skills trainer provides training for participants. Following the training, internship placements were made at various local organizations for the summer, with RPD hosting two interns itself. RPD's Police Athletic League also hosted a soccer league that started with a one-day soccer clinic taught by volunteers from an adult Hispanic soccer league. RPD takes the lead on an annual National Night Out event held in the Southwood Apartment complex, with other community organizations such as Red Cross, Bon Secours, and the OAG participating. In partnership with the ROC, police officers conducted a SHOP With A Cop program to assist youth with purchasing school supplies at the beginning of the school year.

Richmond Police Department: Intervention team and outreach worker These are the central elements of intervention efforts in Richmond and were allocated the largest share of intervention funding. The intervention team is designed to work with serious offenders

and those at risk of gang membership, providing them with extensive case management and referral to appropriate GRP services. A full time outreach worker identifies and recruits gang members and their associates in the target area for intervention and referral to GRP services. The city and later, the RPDwere selected to take the lead for development and operation of the intervention team. See Section 8.3.2 for a full discussion of the development of the intervention team and the outreach worker.

Richmond Police Department: School Resource Officers GRP funds allowed the funding of six School Resource Officer (SRO)s. The school resource officers are sworn members of the Richmond City Police Department and act to reduce delinquency and truancy. They have worked at George Wythe High School, Huguenot High School, and Boushall Middle School, and part of their duties include truancy sweeps and working to implement the G.R.E.A.T. program at Boushall Middle School.

VCU Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery: Tattoo removal Tattoo removal services have been provided for clients wishing to remove gang-related tattoos. This service provider was only able to remove small tattoos and the program coordinator identified another provider with the ability to remove larger tattoos during the Phase II period.

G.3. SUPPRESSION

City of Richmond Commonwealth's Attorney's Office: Coordinated suppression services The City agreed to assign up to three full-time prosecutors to work under the supervision of the City to dedicate additional time and resources, beyond those currently expended throughout the City, to the prosecution of gang members from the target area. Starting in early 2007, the Richmond Commonwealth's Attorney's Office provided targeted suppression dealing with gang cases in the target area and meets regularly with the RPD Special Investigations Unit and the Violent Crimes Initiative Task Force. Prosecutors are present at precinct roll calls to discuss the importance of collecting specific types of evidence and they also provide instruction on gang member identification to incoming recruits.

Richmond Police Department: Crime Stoppers in Spanish GRP funds allowed for the development of a Stopped by Police brochure, and RPD is producing robbery prevention brochures in Spanish. Crime Stoppers billboards were also placed in the target area.

Richmond Police Department: Directed patrol GRP funding has allowed for additional directed patrols in the target area. These patrols are expected to reduce gang crime and gang violence through increased visibility and enforcement activities. The RPD has mainly targeted the Southwood community with such patrols, which have been conducted on bicycles, motorcycles, and on foot.

Richmond Police Department: Equipment and Training The RPD purchased specialize equipment for the gang unit, including computers and video supplies. Members of the

gang unit have attended multiple trainings since the start of the gang unit, including trainings on gangs and organized crime. Officers have also attended Spanish language courses.

Richmond Police Department: Intelligence sharing, agency linkages GRP funds were provided to the RPD to promote intelligence sharing between agencies. Specifically, the funds allowed RPD to add gang tracking and probation and parole modules to their PISTOL data system and share data from the system with the Department of Corrections (DOC). This data includes gang intelligence, wanted persons data, and probation and parole data, and can be shared via a wireless link between the City of Richmond and DOC. Members of the Department, and authorized users from Probation and Parole and the Richmond Sheriff's Department now have access to RPD gang information.

Richmond Police Department: Project Exile GRP funds allowed for the development of a Project Exile, an existing gun violence prevention program, to be printed in both English and Spanish on RPD's website. The funds also allowed for Project Exile billboards to be placed in the target area.

G.4. REENTRY

Boaz & Ruth: Residential reentry program The Richmond GRP sought a one year residency program to provide housing, counseling, job training and life skills for reentry clients, and selected Boaz & Ruth as the service provider. Boaz & Ruth provide transitional housing, employment assistance, GED preparation, and other training to help with the transition from confinement back to the community. The provider has received few referrals from the intervention team.

City of Richmond Department of Justice Services: Offender reentry intensive case management Department of Justice Services (DJS) developed its Reentry Case Management System project plan in Summer 2006 and hired a part-time reentry coordinator at the same time. The reentry coordinator, together with the Richmond City Jail Liaison, developed a screening and assessment tool for individuals being released from jail. The reentry coordinator selects eligible individuals for participation in the reentry program and develops a service plan for each person. The coordinator maintains contact with Richmond City Jail staff to identify eligible individuals and maintain contact with participants who have not yet been released. The reentry coordinator collaborates with jail, probation/parole and community partners to provide such programs as jail-based offender job training classes and social skills groups and has worked to develop relationships with area employers to make future referrals.

Probation and Parole: Educational/GED and vocational services The Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Corrections, Probation and Parole Offices used GRP funds to purchase workbooks and supplies for participants in their GED program.

Richmond City Sheriff's Office: Offender reentry programs Richmond City Sheriff's Office (RCSO) offers the B.E.L.I.E.F. program in the Richmond City Jail, a substance abuse program open to individuals there that treats both men and women in separate programs. An integral part of the program is ensuring safe housing upon release from jail, and the program can provide transitional housing when necessary. RCSO relaxed its criminal history criteria to allow a greater number of participants in the program. The program also provides other services, such as relationship counseling and guest speakers. RCSO also provides educational opportunities for individuals in the Richmond City Jail, including GED testing sessions and computer courses.

Appendix H

Partnership Survey

The GRP evaluation design also included primary implementation data collection in the form of a multi-wave, Internet-based survey of the site coordinators and current and former committee members. The survey was designed to measure partnership functioning and capacity within GRP. Partnership functioning and capacity are key elements of GRP that result from the formation of the partnership, and play a direct role in the outcomes achieved by the sites. Essentially, partnership functioning and capacity are immediate outcomes of GRP activities.

GRP leadership, partner members, and human, financial, and technological resources form a new collaborative structure that enables the partnership to recruit and mobilize stakeholders, problem solve, develop and implement plans and associated activities, communicate and collaborate internally, network with outside agencies, engage resources that were previously unavailable to individual partner members, establish new processes and technologies to facilitate communication and collaboration, and make larger changes in the external environment. Failure to achieve these immediate outcomes indicates that the partnership may not have any demonstrated value over activities that would have occurred anyway in the partnership's absence (Yin et al., 1996).

To date, however, few crime prevention and intervention evaluations have systematically measured partnership functioning and capacity, which are key to the GRP model. Generally, the complexity and variation of crime prevention/intervention partnership efforts hamper systematic assessment and rigorous evaluation. An evaluation of GRP offers a unique opportunity to assess the immediate outcomes of the GRP initiative.

More specifically, measurement of partnership functioning allows the partnership and researchers to not only ask, "What outcomes (both intermediate and long-term) did the partnership produce?" but also, "What was the quality of the partnership itself?" We are using the results of the partnership survey to inform our analysis of the overall partnerships' effectiveness and impact with regard to long-term impacts (e.g., crime reduction) and to compare immediate outcomes systematically across partnership sites.

H.1. METHODOLOGY

The Wave 1 survey data collection spanned January 15 through March 21, 2006. Survey respondents were assured that their names and affiliated organizations would not be associated with their answers in any publications or reports. No one was permitted to

Table H.1: Partnership Survey: Response Rates

	Wave 1 (Jan - Mar 2006)				Wave 2 (Apr - May 2007)			
		Returned[a]		Response		Returned[b]		Response
Site	Invited	Web	Paper	Rate	Invited	Web	Paper	Rate
Los Angeles	41	31	3	82.9%	40	29	1	75.0%
Milwaukee	42	30	2	76.2%	60	45	2	78.3%
North Miami Beach	37	25	2	73.0%	27	21	0	77.8%
Richmond	59	23	8	52.5%	72	49	3	72.2%
Total	**179**	**109**	**15**	**69.3%**	**199**	**144**	**6**	**75.4%**

Notes:
[a] Seven of the 124 surveys returned were partially completed.
[b] Fifteen of the 150 surveys returned were partially completed.

respond to the survey anonymously, however. All persons who were current and former members of GRP committees and subcommittees as of January 15, 2006 were eligible to complete the survey. The respondent pool included 179 persons across all four sites (see Table H.1). Site coordinators, in cooperation with the four site leads on the evaluation team, compiled the list of invited respondents. Letters announcing the survey were sent to all prospective respondents on December 19, 2005. The letter included a reply form recipients could use to correct errors in their contact information, indicate that they were ineligible, or indicate that they would prefer to complete a paper survey rather than the web form. An initial wave of paper surveys (see Appendix I) was sent in mid-January to respondents without a valid e-mail address and to those who indicated a preference for the paper survey. Two additional waves of paper surveys were sent in February and early March, respectively, to all non-respondents. In addition to the three waves of direct mailings, the evaluation team also initiated weekly follow-up contacts with non-respondents by telephone and e-mail.

Most survey items were closed response, but several open-ended questions were also included. The Wave 1 survey included multiple items measuring constructs, such as:

- Confidence in strategic plan;
- Sufficiency of resources;
- Capabilities of managers and leaders;
- Capacity of the collaborative; and
- Sustainability planning.

Other items asked respondents to report changes in the target area that may be attributable to GRP, note successes and disappointments, and identify the one change that would most improve GRP's effectiveness. Other items attempted to assess the number of new relationships that may have developed as a result of GRP. Respondents were asked, of the organizations participating in GRP, how many they had established relationships with prior to GRP. Since some persons serve on multiple committees and subcommittees, the survey asked respondents to identify the one committee or subcommittee to which

they had devoted the most time and to answer a series of questions about that particular committee's functioning.

Letters announcing Wave 2 of the partnership survey were distributed by postal mail and e-mail on March 19, 2007. All persons who had served on a GRP committee between March 2006 and March 2007 were eligible to complete the survey. As with the Wave 1 survey, the site coordinators played a key role in identifying eligible respondents and providing respondent contact information to the evaluation team. The announcement letters and e-mail messages invited respondents to verify or update their contact information by logging into the survey web site. Approximately three weeks later on April 10, the survey itself (see Appendix J) was distributed and data collection began. Paper survey forms were mailed to the 26 respondents who had not provided a valid e-mail address by April 9. The remaining respondents were sent e-mail messages containing the URL to connect to the web survey, as well as a username and password to login to the survey. We contacted non-respondents by e-mail and/or telephone one or two times each week until the end of the data collection period on May 31.

Several key differences between the Wave 1 and Wave 2 data collections are noteworthy.

Larger Respondent Pool The Wave 2 respondent pool included 199 persons as compared with 179 in Wave 1 (see Table H.1). Note that the number of respondents decreased in North Miami Beach and Los Angeles and increased in the other two sites. In Los Angeles, 20 respondents were in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 samples, so that 48 percent of the respondents in the Wave 2 sample were also in the Wave 1 sample. Analogous percentages for the remaining three sites were 60 percent, 67 percent, and 28 percent for Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, and Richmond, respectively. A total of 66 individuals responded to both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys, 59 others responded to Wave 1 only, and 88 others responded to Wave 2 only.

Respondent Incentives From the beginning of the Wave 2 data collection, respondents were advised that anyone who completed the survey before May 11 would be eligible to win a $50 gift certificate to Amazon.com. One gift certificate was awarded in each site after a drawing held on May 22. We reminded respondents of the incentive and the completion deadline in each follow-up contact we made during the data collection period. The addition of the incentive offer probably helped to boost the response rate. The overall Wave 2 response rate exceeded the Wave 1 response rate even though the Wave 2 data collection period was only approximately half as long in duration.

Discarded Committee-Specific Questions Upon analysis, we found that the items on the Wave 1 survey about the functioning of specific committees were problematic for several reasons. The sites differed in the terms used to refer to committees in like roles (e.g., "Executive Committee," "Advisory Committee," "Steering Committee"). Some respondents devoted substantial amounts of time to committees of which they were not members. Moreover, even if the foregoing problems had been averted, there were too few Wave 1 respondents to develop meaningful measures of the functioning of particular committees within each site. As a result, when we designed the Wave 2 survey form, we discarded the items about the functioning of specific committees and added items inviting respondents to rate the seriousness of 10 problems that community partnerships commonly face.

Separate Don't Know and Not Applicable Responses The matrix items on the Wave 1 survey included a single Don't Know/Not Applicable response option. Many respondents marked the answer on one or more items, and the feedback we received on the survey suggested that most of these answers indicated that the respondents felt that they were unable to formulate a considered opinion in response to the items. On the Wave 2 survey, we created separate Don't Know and Not Applicable response options and found that the former was used more commonly than the latter. Section H.2 describes how we handled this difference in the analysis.

H.2. ANALYTIC APPROACH

This section explains how UI analyzed the survey data. Three types of questions that appeared on the survey were processed and analyzed in as many different ways. Several dozen items with Likert-scale fixed response options were subjected to exploratory factor analysis. Additional fixed-response items asked respondents to rate the seriousness of several barriers to implementing programs like GRP and to indicate whether several indicators of quality of life in the target area had improved or worsened. We conducted a descriptive analysis of these items. In addition, we performed a qualitative analysis of responses to two open-ended questions that invited respondents to identify additional changes that have taken place in the target area and changes that would most improve GRP.

All of the items with fixed-response options were required on the web survey forms and were among the first questions posed on both waves of the survey. For this reason, those respondents who did not complete the fixed-response questions were dropped from the analysis. Six partial responses to the Wave 1 survey were excluded for this reason, and 14 partial Wave 2 responses were excluded. This left us with a total of 118 Wave 1 cases and 135 Wave 2 cases in our analysis. All processing and analysis of the survey data was performed using SAS System software.

H.2.1. Factor Analysis

Both waves of the survey were designed to measure five components of partnership functioning—capacity, management and leadership, resources, strategy, and sustainability. The sustainability scale designed into the Wave 1 survey included only three items, however, too few to support formal factor analysis. When we began the factor analysis, we expected that the Likert-scaled items would load on approximately five correlated latent factors. Based on this expectation, we factor analyzed, using oblique (promax) rotation, three sets of variables:

1. The capacity, management and leadership, resources, and strategy items from Wave 1;
2. The capacity, management and leadership, resources, and strategy items from Wave 2; and
3. The sustainability items from Wave 2.

The response options for these items varied between waves of the survey. The Wave 1 survey offered four Likert-scale responses ranging from strongly disagree through strongly

Figure H.1: Mean Scores on Strategic Collaboration Factor, by Site and Wave



agree. In addition, a response of don't know/not applicable was available. This latter response was marked by many respondents, and we suspected that most such responses were intended to register no opinion. As a result, the Wave 2 survey included separate don't know and not applicable response options, and, as expected, don't know responses outnumbered not applicable responses. In preparing the data for analysis, we recoded the don't know/not applicable responses from Wave 1 and the don't know responses from Wave 2 to the midpoint of the Likert scale, effectively treating these responses as valid, neutral answers. The not applicable responses from Wave 2 were recoded to missing. In addition, we reverse-coded negatively phrased items (e.g., "GRP resources are NOT being used effectively") so that higher values indicated greater partnership functioning on all items and both waves.

Strategic Collaboration

The factor analysis of the capacity, management and leadership, resources, and strategy items from the two waves of survey data was not consistent with our hypothesized five-factor solution. Examination of the factor loadings, eigenvalues, and scree plots suggested that there were no more than three distinct factors in each wave of data. In the Wave 2 data, the second and third factors each accounted for less than 10 percent of the variance in the items, whereas the first factor accounted for 55 percent of the variance. Within each wave of data, we computed Cronbach's α for both the one- and three-factor solutions. Only the one-factor solution showed internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach's α, greater than 0.7 in both waves. (Wave 1 α = 0.92, Wave 2 α = 0.78). Thus, we adopted the one-factor solution.

The questions that had high loadings on this one factor fell into three categories. The first category was the clarity, accountability, and inclusiveness of the strategic plan. The second category was expertise of the partners and committee members and GRP contributions to the training of those members. Lastly, several questions asked about information sharing among the partners, GRP efforts to engage the community, and responsiveness to community concerns. Questions about the scarcity of financial resources did not load strongly on this factor. Perhaps this reflects that, when the survey was administered in early 2006 and again in early 2007, participants felt that implementation, rather than resource acquisition, was the key challenge before them.

We named our one factor Strategic Collaboration and computed a factor score with a mean of 3 (for ease of display) and standard deviation of 1. Then, we computed the mean and 95 percent confidence interval of the factor score within each combination of wave and site (see Figure H.1). The mean score for both Los Angeles and Richmond was not statistically different from the grand mean. However, the mean score in North Miami Beach was greater than the grand mean, while Milwaukee's mean score was less than the grand mean. Both differences were statistically significant ($p < .05$). This indicates that, on average, North Miami Beach respondents considered themselves better at strategic collaboration than the average respondent, and Milwaukee respondents rated their site somewhat lower than average on the same construct. Note, however, that respondents were not explicitly comparing their site to other sites, merely responding to questions about the effectiveness of the GRP partnership in their own site.

Sustainability

We conducted a separate factor analysis of the 11 sustainability items on the Wave 2 survey. Eigenvalues, scree tests, and interpretability criteria all supported a one-factor solution. All 11 items loaded on the factor, which we called Sustainability. The factor accounted for 92 percent of the variance of the responses. Cronbach's α was 0.92, showing that the factor was internally consistent. This finding suggests that the problem of sustainability as a whole, rather than the multiple facets of the problem (e.g., planning, partner dedication, or community visibility) mentioned in the sustainability items, drove the responses to the items.

As with the strategic collaboration factor, we computed a factor score with a mean of 3 and standard deviation of 1. The by-site comparisons fell out in the same way as with the strategic collaboration factor. The mean scores in Los Angeles and Richmond were similar to the grand mean, Milwaukee's average fell short of the grand mean, and North Miami Beach's exceeded it. This indicates that, on average, North Miami Beach respondents felt that GRP was more likely to be sustained in their city, whereas Milwaukee respondents expressed, on average, more doubt about the sustainability of their partnership. In Richmond, our interviews with participants conducted prior to the Wave 2 survey indicated that little thought had been given to sustainability by that time. Richmond's average response here, however, although it was near the grand mean, may nonetheless signal increasing thoughtfulness about sustainability in that site.

H.2.2. Barriers to Implementation

The Wave 2 survey asked respondents to rate the severity of nine common barriers to the implementation of GRP in the target area. Respondents answered on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (Not a Problem) to 10 (Major Problem). Table H.2 provides the mean responses for each site on each of the nine barriers included in Wave 2 of the survey. On average, Milwaukee respondents perceived these barriers as being more formidable than did respondents in the other sites. In three of the four sites, 'scarcity of funding and financial resources' was held to be the most severe barrier, but in North Miami Beach, 'state or federal policies, laws and regulations' were held to be the most severe. On the other hand, respondents in all sites identified 'personality conflicts' as among the least difficult barriers to overcome.

Table H.2: Mean Scores by Site on Barriers to Implementation, Wave 2

Barrier	Los Angeles		Milwaukee		North Miami Beach		Richmond	
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Scarcity of funding or finacial resources	5.3	3.1	7.4	2.3	4.9	3.1	4.4	2.9
Lack of engagement by residents of target area	4.4	2.3	6.5	2.9	3.6	1.4	4.0	2.5
Sharing confidential information among partner orgs.	4.3	3.0	5.7	2.8	2.7	2.0	4.0	2.6
External turf conflicts pitting GRP orgs. against those not participating in GRP	3.8	2.5	4.7	2.5	3.6	3.3	3.3	2.8
State or Federal policies, laws, and regulations	3.7	2.6	4.3	2.8	5.4	3.5	3.1	2.4
Internal turf conflicts pitting GRP orgs. against one another	3.3	2.4	5.4	2.6	3.1	3.1	3.5	2.7
Lack of engagement by elected officials	3.0	2.1	5.4	2.8	4.4	2.5	3.3	2.5
Difficulty of prof. groups understanding one another's standards and practices	2.9	1.8	4.3	2.4	2.6	2.4	3.4	2.6
Personality conflicts	2.8	2.1	4.5	2.8	2.4	2.6	2.9	1.9

H.2.3. Target Area Changes

Both waves of the survey asked respondents whether a series of quality-of-life indicators in the target area had decreased, increased, or stayed the same over time. Responses were generally positive, indicating that resources and opportunities for youths and families, as well as police visibility, had increased, while drug and gang activity had decreased in the target area.

Following the categorical questions about changes in the target area, respondents were asked an open-ended question about any additional changes in this area. The evaluation team coded the responses along two dimensions: the nature or type of the change cited and whether the change represented a positive (+), negative (-), or neutral (0) development for quality of life in the target area. Table H.3 provides the responses to this question, and highlighted cells indicate responses that changed substantially from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The table demonstrates more dramatic changes in opinion among Milwaukee respondents than those from other sites. In Milwaukee, several respondents indicated that the initiative had resulted in no demonstrable changes, but their comments did not indicate that this was necessarily a negative outcome; perhaps those respondents felt there were legitimate reasons not to expect a significant amount of change in the target area. However, several respondents in Wave 2 from Milwaukee also indicated that positive changes in the community had occurred because of GRP's efforts. The table also reveals that the respondents in North Miami Beach and Richmond both felt positive about community involvement, although more North Miami Beach respondents felt that way at

Table H.3: Frequently-cited Target Area Changes Observed by Respondents, by Site and Wave

Additional changes in the target area that have occurred due to GRP efforts	Los Angeles		Milwaukee		North Miami Beach		Richmond	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Client Outcomes								+
Community Involvement	++	++			+++++	+	++	0++++++
Community Outcomes/Impacts	+	++	-+	0++++		++	--++++	++++
Funding			0					
Gang/violence awareness	+		+	+	+		+	
No Change				-000				0
Partnership Collaboration	++	++++	+++++	++++	+	+	++	++
Partnership Organizations			+				+	
Partnership Resources			0	+	+		+	
Public Awareness	++	++	+	+++	+++	+	+	+
Public Support	++				+++		+++	
Services		+	0+	+++++	+++++	++	-	+++

Note: Each respondent was permitted to suggest as many as 3 changes; - indicates a negative change, 0 neutral, and + positive.
Wave 1: 61 comments, 35% of respondents commented. Wave 2: 60 comments, 31% of respondents commented

Wave 1 while more Richmond respondents felt that way at Wave 2.

H.2.4. Suggested Changes

Both waves of the survey also asked respondents to identify the one change that would most improve the effectiveness of GRP. Many of those respondents who answered suggested multiple changes. The evaluation team coded as many as three suggested changes per respondent into domains, and highlighted those domains that saw substantial change from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Table H.4 reveals evidence of more dramatic shifts of opinion about what changes were desirable among Milwaukee respondents. Between Wave 1 and Wave 2, all sites showed some increase in the number of respondents citing a desire for new or additional funding. This may reflect growing anxiety about whether the partnerships would be sustained after the date when federal funds were depleted.

H.3. NEXT STEPS

We plan to administer a third wave of the survey in 2008. The Wave 3 survey will include more detailed questions about sustainability and will provide new data on partnership functioning from a third point in time. The Wave 3 survey findings will be integrated with the current results as they become available to further understanding of process and perceptions of progress in the GRP sites.

Table H.4: Frequently-cited Suggestions for Improvement from Respondents, by Site and Wave

What one change would improve GRP?	Los Angeles		Milwaukee		N. Miami Bch.		Richmond	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Accountability		**	*				*	***
Client Identification			*			*		
Community Involvement	*	**		***				*
Evaluation	*						*	
Expansion	*	***		*	*	**		****
Federal/OJJDP Constraints			******		*			
Fiscal Agent/RFP Process	*		*	***	****	**	*	***
Funding	****		**	*****	****	*	*	*****
Partnership Collaboration	**	****	******	*****	***	*	******	*****
Partnership Leadership	*		*****	******	*		**	**
Partnership Organizations	****	*****	***		*		****	****
Partnership Personnel	*		**	*		*	**	**
Partnership Planning (Sustainability)				***	***	*	*	**
Partnership Resources					*			
Public Awareness	*	**		*		*		
Services	***	***	**	*****	***	***	**	**
Strategic Planning		**		*****		*	*	**

Notes: Each respondent was permitted to suggest as many as 3 changes; * indicates one comment.
Wave 1: 94 comments, 65% of respondents commented. Wave 2: 111 comments, 69% of respondents commented.

Appendix I

Partnership Survey Form, Wave 1

THE URBAN INSTITUTE **2100 M STREET, N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20037**

David Hayeslip
Senior Research Associate

phone: 202-261-XXXX
fax: 202-296-XXXX
E-mail: XXX@ui.urban.org

Mr. John Doe
Helping Hands, Inc.
111 Main Street
Milwaukee, WI 53208

February 23, 2006

Dear Mr. Doe:

Enclosed with this letter, you will find a copy of survey about your experience with the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in your area. Please complete the survey and return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed postage paid envelope. It will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete the survey. **Your completed survey must be postmarked no later than <<date>>**.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice, is funding the GRP in North Miami Beach, Los Angeles, Milwaukee and Richmond. OJJDP has asked the Urban Institute to evaluate the implementation and effects of GRP. As part of the evaluation, we are particularly interested in the GRP planning process in each of the four cities, as well as local participants' perceptions of the effectiveness of the program.

Your participation in the survey is entirely voluntary, and your responses will be held in complete confidence. None of our reports on the evaluation will identify you, your organization, or your individual responses. However, your participation is vital to our understanding of the GRP process, even if you are a former member or newly initiated member of a committee or sub-committee.

Your assistance is very important and will help the U.S. Department of Justice improve its gang reduction efforts across the country in the future. If you have any questions or concerns about this survey, please feel free to contact my colleague, Mark Coggeshall, at XXX@ui.urban.org or (202) 261-XXXX or me. Thank you in advance for participating in the evaluation.

Sincerely,

David Hayeslip

Enclosure

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Gang Reduction Program (GRP)
Partnership Survey

Wave 1, January – March 2006

Locality: Milwaukee
Name: Doe, John
Organization: Helping Hands, Inc.

Completed surveys must be postmarked by <<date>>.

Questions or concerns? Please call or e-mail Mark Coggeshall at (202) 261-XXXX or XXX@ui.urban.org.

Thank you for participating in the evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program.

RespID: 999

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THE URBAN INSTITUTE 2100 M STREET, N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20037

GRP Partnership Survey: Introduction

Purpose

Staff from the Urban Institute will be asking you to fill out two surveys over the next year as part of the national evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program. The purpose of this survey is to collect information regarding GRP collaboration and overall functioning. That information will serve as a foundation for understanding how GRP is operating. The survey asks for your opinions on GRP networking and community capacity building, committee functioning, group relationships, and sustainability. All **current and former** members of GRP committees and sub-committees are invited to complete the survey.

The findings will help GRP staff and staff from the Urban Institute understand how partnership functioning is linked to intended outcomes. The findings from this survey also will serve to provide feedback on success, as well as challenges and barriers encountered in the operation of GRP.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept **strictly confidential**. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other GRP partners. Neither your name nor your organization's name will be identified in any published reports.

Contact Us

If you have questions or concerns regarding this survey, please call or e-mail Mark Coggeshall at (202) 261-XXXX or XXX@ui.urban.org.

Thank you for completing our survey!

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GRP Partnership Survey: Date of Involvement

In response to the next two questions, please indicate the year and month you joined GRP.

1. During what **year** did you first become a member of a GRP committee or sub-committee?

- ☐ 2002
- ☐ 2003
- ☐ 2004
- ☐ 2005
- ☐ 2006
- ☐ I have never been a GRP (sub-) committee member

2. During what **month** did you first become a member of a GRP committee or sub-committee?

- ☐ January
- ☐ February
- ☐ March
- ☐ April
- ☐ May
- ☐ June
- ☐ July
- ☐ August
- ☐ September
- ☐ October
- ☐ November
- ☐ December
- ☐ I have never been a GRP (sub-) committee member

3. Are you **currently** a member of a GRP committee or sub-committee?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

If you have **never been a member of a GRP committee or subcommittee**, you **do not need to complete the remainder of the survey**. Please return the entire survey in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

RespID: 999

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GRP Partnership Survey: Mission, Goals, Strategy

4. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole? **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
The strategic plan responds to the concerns and hopes of neighborhood residents and the target population.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The strategic plan establishes measurable objectives.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations agree on what the project should accomplish in the short term (next 6 months).	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP has a clear strategic plan with realistic goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The strategic plan has identified opportunities for early successes.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP has a clearly written, updated mission statement.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The strategic plan defines specific ways in which the partners will work together to achieve desired results.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations agree on what the project should accomplish in the long term (next 12-18 months).	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The strategic plan fails to utilize the experiences and resources of some participating organizations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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GRP Partnership Survey: Resources

5. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole? **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
GRP has not secured commitments of non-financial resources from groups and individuals in the community as part of the program strategy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is primarily driven by its strategic plan.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP resources are not being used effectively.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations lack sufficient expertise in gang intervention to achieve GRP goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP resources are sufficient to achieve its goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP has developed a formal plan for identifying and mobilizing non-financial resources from throughout the community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The GRP Steering Committee seeks to expand GRP resources through new or existing funding opportunities outside of direct funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is primarily driven by its budget.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in reentry to achieve GRP goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in gang prevention to achieve GRP goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in gang suppression to achieve GRP goals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is primarily driven by environmental (outside) factors.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

GRP Partnership Survey: Management & Leadership

6. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole? **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
GRP is successful in diffusing conflict when it arises.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP leadership provides and participates in educational/leadership development opportunities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP leadership inhibits progress through indecision or disorganization.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP leadership minimizes personality differences.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP encourages different points of view in discussion.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP leadership instills enthusiasm for work to be accomplished.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is dominated by one or two organizations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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GRP Partnership Survey: Capacity Building

7. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole? **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
GRP organizations are committed to GRP regardless of whether they are receiving GRP funds.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is working to help develop the capacity of smaller partner organizations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP educates public and private officials about community needs.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP developed the capacity of smaller organizations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP engages in activities to create awareness of and increase support for the work of the project.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP regularly organizes community events to increase resident involvement.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The RFP process used to select agencies to receive GRP funds was ineffective.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The intense competition for GRP funds among community organizations has impeded progress toward GRP goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP seeks out new relationships and builds coalitions of mutual interest.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP jointly writes grant proposals with other organizations and agencies.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is finding it difficult to recruit faith-based partners.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP shares information with other initiatives related to youth prevention and intervention.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Residents have little input in setting priorities for the partnership.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP is finding it difficult to recruit some key government agency partners.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP has been successful in overcoming any distrust among agencies.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

GRP Partnership Survey: Sustainability

8. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole? **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
The Steering Committee engages in ongoing dialogue directed at institutionalizing the GRP strategy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tactics/tasks that support sustainability have been implemented.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
GRP has made sustainability a priority.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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GRP Partnership Survey: Changes

9. Please indicate whether the indicators listed have decreased, not changed, or increased **in the past 6 months** due to GRP efforts. **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Decreased	No Change	Increased	Not Applicable /Don't Know
Number of youths who come in contact with the criminal justice system.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Resources available for those youths or young adults returning from correctional facilities.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Number of youths participating in supervised recreational activities.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Availability of prevention resources for youths and families.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Overall quality of life in the community.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Opportunities for youths to succeed in school.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Effectiveness of police activity targeted to enforcement of gang-related crimes.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prevalence of drug activity.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prevalence of gang activity.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Visibility of police presence during peak times of gang activity.	☐	☐	☐	☐

10. Please briefly describe any additional changes in the target community that have occurred **in the past 6 months** due to GRP efforts.

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GRP Partnership Survey: Participants

11. Which of the following types of organizations or entities are currently participating in GRP?

	Participating	Not Participating	Don't Know
Elected officials	☐	☐	☐
Youth leadership	☐	☐	☐
Businesses and business clubs	☐	☐	☐
Interested citizens	☐	☐	☐
College/university representatives	☐	☐	☐
Faith-based organizations	☐	☐	☐
Youth serving organizations	☐	☐	☐
Public health service providers	☐	☐	☐
Mental health providers	☐	☐	☐
Housing service providers	☐	☐	☐
Local department of parks and recreation	☐	☐	☐
School administration or staff	☐	☐	☐
Drug and alcohol prevention	☐	☐	☐
Media	☐	☐	☐
Public housing	☐	☐	☐
Parents and families	☐	☐	☐
Police department	☐	☐	☐
Probation/parole	☐	☐	☐
Local jail representatives	☐	☐	☐
Employment service providers	☐	☐	☐

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12. How many of the organizations or entities that are currently participating in GRP did you, personally, have a working relationship with prior to your involvement with GRP?

- ☐ 0 organizations
- ☐ 1 organization
- ☐ 2-3 organizations
- ☐ 4-5 organizations
- ☐ 6-7 organizations
- ☐ 8-9 organizations
- ☐ 10 or more organizations

13. If you represent an agency or organization, how many of the organizations or entities that are currently participating in GRP did your agency have a working relationship with prior to its involvement with GRP?

- ☐ I do not represent an agency or organization
- ☐ 0 organizations
- ☐ 1 organization
- ☐ 2-3 organizations
- ☐ 4-5 organizations
- ☐ 6-7 organizations
- ☐ 8-9 organizations
- ☐ 10 or more organizations
- ☐ I don't know

14. Which of the following categories best describes the length of time you have held your current position in your organization or agency?

- ☐ I do not represent an agency or organization
- ☐ Less than 1 year
- ☐ 1-2 years
- ☐ 3-5 years
- ☐ 6-10 years
- ☐ More than 10 years

THE URBAN INSTITUTE **2100 M STREET, N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20037**

GRP Partnership Survey: Taking Stock

15. What were the most notable GRP accomplishments of the past 6 months?

Please list as many as 3 accomplishments.

A.)_____

B.)_____

C.)_____

16. What were the most notable disappointments GRP faced in the past 6 months?

Please list as many as 3 disappointments.

A.)_____

B.)_____

C.)_____

17. What one change would most improve the effectiveness of GRP?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

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GRP Partnership Survey: Your Principal Committee

The following questions are about the organizational structure of GRP and the general functioning of GRP committees. Some people serve on multiple GRP committees. For example, some people serve as sub-committee chairpersons and as Steering Committee or Advisory Committee members. Others may be members of multiple sub-committees. **Please complete the remainder of the survey with respect to the committee (or sub-committee) to which you devoted the most time during the past 6 months.**

18. To which of the following GRP committees did you devote the most time **during the past 6 months**?

- ☐ Steering Committee
- ☐ Advisory Committee
- ☐ Executive Committee
- ☐ Prevention Sub-Committee
- ☐ Intervention Sub-Committee
- ☐ Suppression Sub-Committee
- ☐ Reentry Sub-Committee
- ☐ Other, please specify _____

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GRP Partnership Survey: In Committee

Please complete the remainder of the survey by replacing **Committee** with the name of the GRP committee or sub-committee to which you devoted the most time during the past 6 months.

19. During the past 6 months, how often did the **Committee** meet? Please choose the response that fits best.

- ☐ Quarterly or less frequently
- ☐ Monthly
- ☐ Twice a month
- ☐ Weekly

20. How frequently did you attend **Committee** meetings during the past 6 months?

- ☐ Never
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Infrequently
- ☐ Somewhat frequently
- ☐ Very frequently

21. What was the average number of members in attendance at **Committee** meetings during the past 6 months?

- ☐ 1 or 2 members
- ☐ 3 or 4 members
- ☐ 5-7 members
- ☐ 7-9 members
- ☐ 10 or more members
- ☐ I don't know

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22. Outside of **Committee** meetings, how often have you discussed GRP with other GRP partners or committee members during the past 6 months?

Please choose the response that fits best.

- ☐ Never
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Every two weeks or so
- ☐ About once per week
- ☐ Several times per week
- ☐ Daily or almost daily

23. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements? (Replace **Committee** with the name of the GRP committee or sub-committee to which you devoted the most time during the past 6 months.) **Please mark only one answer for each statement.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable/ Don't Know
I understand my responsibilities to the **Committee.**	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Committee members represent diverse community interests.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some **Committee** members are routinely absent from meetings.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Conflicts that arise between **Committee** members are resolved appropriately.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The talents and skills of the **Committee** members are well matched with the demands of their roles.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Committee members place their vested interests ahead of our common goals.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The organizational structure of the **Committee** is not clear.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
During **Committee** meetings, decisions are made in an efficient and timely manner.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
During **Committee** meetings, the discussion frequently wanders off topic.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Most members contribute to discussions during **Committee** meetings.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I understand my role in the **Committee**.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I do not understand the roles of other members of the **Committee**.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Thank you for taking the time to complete our survey!

Appendix J

Partnership Survey Form, Wave 2

THE URBAN INSTITUTE 2100 M STREET, N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20037

David Hayeslip, Ph.D.
Senior Research Associate

phone: 202-261-XXXX
fax: 202-296-XXXX
E-mail: XXX@ui.urban.org

April 10, 2007

Mr. John Doe
Helping Hands, Inc.
111 Main Street
Milwaukee, WI 53208

Dear Mr. Doe:

Enclosed with this letter, you will find a copy of a survey about your experience with the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in your area. Please complete the survey and return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed postage paid envelope. It will take approximately 20 minutes to complete the survey. **If your completed survey is postmarked no later than May 10, 2007, you will be entered in a drawing to win a $50 Amazon.com gift card**. In late May, one winner will be selected at random from each of the four GRP sites. Depending upon how many people respond, **your chances of winning may be as high as 1 in 30**.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice, is funding the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in North Miami Beach, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Richmond. OJJDP has asked the Urban Institute to evaluate the implementation and effects of GRP. As part of the evaluation, we are particularly interested in the GRP implementation process, prospects for sustaining GRP after the expiration of funding from OJJDP, and local participants' perceptions of the effectiveness of the program.

Your participation in the survey is entirely voluntary, and your responses will be held in complete confidence. None of our reports on the evaluation will identify you, your organization, or your individual responses. Your participation is vital to our understanding of the GRP process.

If you have a valid e-mail address and would prefer to complete the survey on the web, please provide the e-mail address to my colleague, Mark Coggeshall, at XXXX@ui.urban.org or (202) 261-XXXX. You have received this letter and the paper survey because we do not have a valid e-mail address for you at this time.

If you have any questions or concerns about the survey, please direct them to Mr. Coggeshall or to me.

Your assistance is very important and will help the U.S. Department of Justice improve its gang reduction efforts across the country in the future. If you have any questions or concerns about this survey, please feel free to contact me. Thank you in advance for participating in the evaluation.

Sincerely,

David Hayeslip

Enclosure

The Urban Institute / 2100 M Street, NW / Washington, DC 20037 / FAX 202-659-XXXX

Respondent ID: 999

Respondent ID: **999**

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

This is the second of two surveys that the Urban Institute is conducting as part of the national evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program (GRP).

Purpose

The findings will help GRP staff and the staff from the Urban Institute understand how aspects of the initiative, such as leadership, management, resources, and planning, are linked to outcomes, such as reduction in gang violence. The findings from this survey also will serve to provide feedback to potential funders and policymakers about how to forge successful anti-gang strategies. We urge you to take **20 minutes** to complete this important survey.

Eligibility

All **current and former** members of GRP committees and subcommittees are encouraged to complete the survey.

Incentives

Everyone who returns a completed survey **postmarked on or before Thursday, May 10, 2007** will be entered to win a **$50 Amazon.com gift card**. One winner will be selected at random from each of the four GRP sites. Depending upon how many people respond, your chances of winning may be as high as 1 in 30.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept **strictly confidential**. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other GRP partners and participants. Neither your name nor your organization's name will be identified in any published reports.

Required Items

Some questions on the survey are **required**, meaning that we would strongly prefer that you make some affirmative response even if it is to mark "Don't Know" or "Not Applicable." Required questions are marked with an asterisk (*) next to the question number.

Contact Us

If you have questions or concerns regarding this survey, please call or e-mail Mark Coggeshall at 202-261-5855 or mcoggesh@ui.urban.org. If you have an e-mail address and would prefer to complete the survey online, please send an e-mail to Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org.

Respondent ID: **999**

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

* 1. During what **year** did you first become a member of a GRP committee or subcommittee?

- ○ 2002
- ○ 2003
- ○ 2004
- ○ 2005
- ○ 2006
- ○ 2007
- ○ I have never been a GRP (sub)committee member

* 2. During what **month** did you first become a member of a GRP committee or subcommittee?

- ○ January
- ○ February
- ○ March
- ○ April
- ○ May
- ○ June
- ○ July
- ○ August
- ○ September
- ○ October
- ○ November
- ○ December
- ○ I have never been a GRP (sub)committee member

* 3. Are you **currently** a member of a GRP committee or subcommittee?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

* 4. In what component(s) of GRP have you been most involved?
You may choose more than one.

- ☐ Strategic planning
- ☐ Prevention
- ☐ Intervention
- ☐ Suppression
- ☐ Reentry
- ☐ Sustainability planning
- ☐ Other (please specify):

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 2

Respondent ID: **999**

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

5. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole?

Please mark only answer for each statement.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Mission, Goals, Strategy						
The strategic plan responds to the concerns and hopes of neighborhood residents and the target population.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The strategic plan establishes measurable objectives.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP organizations agree on what the project should accomplish in the next 6 months.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has a clear strategic plan with realistic goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The strategic plan defines specific ways in which the partners will work together to achieve desired results.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The strategic plan identifies opportunities for successes.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has a clearly written, updated mission statement.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The strategic plan fails to utilize the experiences and resources of some participating organizations.	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

6. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole?

Please mark only answer for each statement.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Resources						
GRP has secured commitments of non-financial resources from groups and individuals in the community.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP is driven primarily by its strategic plan.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP resources are not being used effectively.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP organizations lack sufficient expertise in gang intervention to achieve GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP resources are sufficient to achieve GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has developed a formal plan for identifying and mobilizing non-financial resources from throughout the community.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership seeks to expand GRP resources through new or existing funding opportunities other than direct funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP is driven primarily by its budget.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in reentry to achieve GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in gang prevention to achieve GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP organizations have adequate expertise in gang suppression to achieve GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP is driven primarily by environmental (external) factors.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 4

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

7. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole?

Please mark only answer for each statement.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Management & Leadership						
GRP is successful in diffusing conflict when it arises.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership provides and participates in educational/leadership development opportunities.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership inhibits progress through indecision or disorganization.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership minimizes personality differences.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership encourages different points of view in discussion.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP leadership instills enthusiasm for work to be accomplished.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP is dominated by one or two organizations.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 5

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

8. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole?

Please mark only answer for each statement.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Capacity Building						
GRP organizations are committed to GRP regardless of whether they are receiving GRP funds.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has developed the capacity of smaller partner organizations.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP educates public and private officials about community needs.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP engages in activities to create awareness of, and increase support for, its work.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP regularly organizes community events to increase resident involvement.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The process used to select agencies to receive GRP funds was ineffective.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The competition for GRP funds among community organizations has impeded progress toward GRP goals.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP seeks out new relationships and builds coalitions of mutual interest.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP jointly writes grant proposals with other organizations and agencies.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has found it difficult to recruit faith-based partners.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP shares information with other initiatives related to youth prevention and intervention.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Residents have little input in setting priorities for the partnership.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has found it difficult to recruit some key government agency partners.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has been successful in overcoming any distrust among agencies.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 6

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

9. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements with respect to GRP as a whole?

Please mark only answer for each statement.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Sustainability						
GRP leadership has engaged in ongoing dialogue directed at institutionalizing the GRP strategy.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The GRP will continue to function after the funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has been expended.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Tactics/tasks that support sustainability have been implemented.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has made sustainability a priority.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The persons and organizations participating in GRP are dedicated to sustaining the partnership for the long term.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has built a constituency of community residents who are committed to sustaining it.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP periodically evaluates its efforts and identifies activities members want to sustain or drop.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Successful GRP activities and programs have been incorporated into the ongoing work of local institutions and community groups.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has a plan for sustainability.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The persons and organizations participating in GRP have formed relationships to gain support of local institutions and formal policy bodies.	○	○	○	○	○	○
GRP has established a visible presence and identity in the community (e.g., logo, slogan).	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

10. Collaborative projects such as GRP experience a variety of barriers to their work and progress. Please indicate the extent to which each of the following commonly encountered barriers was impeding the work of the GRP *at the time of your most recent involvement* with GRP.

	Not a Problem 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Major Problem 10
State or Federal policies, laws, and regulations	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Scarcity of funding or financial resources	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sharing confidential information among partner organizations	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Internal turf conflicts pitting GRP organizations against one another	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External turf conflicts pitting GRP organizations against organizations not participating in GRP	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Difficulty of professional groups understanding one another's standards and practices	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Personality conflicts	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Lack of engagement by residents of target area	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Lack of engagement by elected officials	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

11. Do you think the indicators listed have decreased, not changed, or increased in the target area due to GRP efforts?

For each indicator, please mark the one answer that best reflects *your perceptions* of what, if any, changes have taken place.

	Decreased	No Change	Increased	Not Applicable
Number of youths who come in contact with the criminal justice system	○	○	○	○
Resources available for those youths or young adults returning from correctional facilities	○	○	○	○
Number of youths participating in supervised recreational activities	○	○	○	○
Availability of prevention resources for youths and families	○	○	○	○
Overall quality of life in the community	○	○	○	○
Effectiveness of police activity targeted to suppression of gang-related crimes	○	○	○	○
Prevalence of drug activity	○	○	○	○
Prevalence of gang activity	○	○	○	○
Visibility of police presence during peak times of gang activity	○	○	○	○

12. Please briefly describe any additional changes in the target area that have occurred due to GRP efforts.

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 9

Respondent ID: **999**

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

13. To your knowledge, which of the following types of organizations, entities, or persons are *currently* participating in GRP or *were* participating at the time of your most recent involvement with GRP?

	Participating	Not Participating	Don't Know
Elected officials	○	○	○
Youth leaders	○	○	○
Businesses or business clubs	○	○	○
Interested citizens	○	○	○
Colleges or universities	○	○	○
Faith-based organizations	○	○	○
Youth-serving organizations	○	○	○
Public health service providers	○	○	○
Mental health providers	○	○	○
Housing service providers	○	○	○
Department of parks and recreation	○	○	○
School administration or staff	○	○	○
Drug and alcohol prevention	○	○	○
Media	○	○	○
Public housing	○	○	○
Parents and families	○	○	○
Police department	○	○	○
Probation/parole department	○	○	○
Jail or youth detention center	○	○	○
Prosecutor or district attorney	○	○	○
Employment service providers	○	○	○

* 14. Which of the following have done the *most* to help GRP achieve its goals?
Please check no more than three (3) boxes.

- ☐ Elected officials
- ☐ Youth leaders
- ☐ Businesses or business clubs
- ☐ Interested citizens
- ☐ Colleges or universities
- ☐ Faith-based organizations
- ☐ Youth-serving organizations
- ☐ Public health service providers
- ☐ Mental health providers
- ☐ Housing service providers
- ☐ Department of parks and recreation
- ☐ School administration or staff
- ☐ Drug and alcohol prevention
- ☐ Media
- ☐ Public housing
- ☐ Parents and families
- ☐ Police department
- ☐ Probation/parole department
- ☐ Jail or youth detention center
- ☐ Prosecutor or district attorney
- ☐ Employment service providers
- ☐ Executive (Steering) Committee
- ☐ Prevention Subcommittee
- ☐ Intervention Subcommittee
- ☐ Suppression Subcommittee
- ☐ Reentry Subcommittee
- ☐ Site Coordinator
- ☐ Other (please specify):

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 10

Respondent ID: **999**

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Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

* 15. Which of the following have done the *least* to help GRP achieve its goals?
Please check no more than three (3) organizations, entities, or persons that have participated in GRP but fallen short of your expectations.

- ☐ Elected officials
- ☐ Youth leaders
- ☐ Businesses or business clubs
- ☐ Interested citizens
- ☐ Colleges or universities
- ☐ Faith-based organizations
- ☐ Youth-serving organizations
- ☐ Public health service providers
- ☐ Mental health providers
- ☐ Housing service providers
- ☐ Department of parks and recreation
- ☐ School administration or staff
- ☐ Drug and alcohol prevention
- ☐ Media
- ☐ Public housing
- ☐ Parents and families
- ☐ Police department
- ☐ Probation/parole department
- ☐ Jail or youth detention center
- ☐ Prosecutor or district attorney
- ☐ Employment service providers
- ☐ Executive (Steering) Committee
- ☐ Prevention Subcommittee
- ☐ Intervention Subcommittee
- ☐ Suppression Subcommittee
- ☐ Reentry Subcommittee
- ☐ Site Coordinator
- ☐ All participants have met or exceeded expectations
- ☐ Other (please specify):

* 16. How many of the organizations or entities that are currently participating in GRP did you, personally, have a working relationship with prior to your involvement with GRP?

- ○ 0 organizations
- ○ 1 organization
- ○ 2–3 organizations
- ○ 4–5 organizations
- ○ 6–7 organizations
- ○ 8–9 organizations
- ○ 10 or more organizations
- ○ I don't know

* 17. If you represent an agency or organization, how many of the organizations or entities that are currently participating in GRP did your agency have a working relationship with prior to its involvement with GRP?

- ○ 0 organizations
- ○ 1 organization
- ○ 2–3 organizations
- ○ 4–5 organizations
- ○ 6–7 organizations
- ○ 8–9 organizations
- ○ 10 or more organizations
- ○ I do not represent an agency or organization
- ○ I don't know

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 11

Respondent ID: **999**

Urban Institute a nonpartisan economic and social policy research organization

Gang Reduction Program Partnership Survey, Wave 2

18. What are GRP's most notable accomplishments?
Please list as many as 3 accomplishments.

(A)	
(B)	
(C)	

19. What are GRP's most notable disappointments?
Please list as many as 3 disappointments.

(A)	
(B)	
(C)	

20. What one change would most improve the effectiveness of GRP?

Thank you for completing the survey. You may use the postage-paid envelope enclosed with the survey to return the completed form to the Urban Institute. Alternatively, you may fax the completed survey to the attention of Mark Coggeshall at the Urban Institute at 202-659-8985.

Questions or concerns? Contact Mark Coggeshall at mcoggesh@ui.urban.org or 202-261-5855. 12

Appendix K

Outcome Analysis

This appendix provides technical background and additional detail from the outcome analyses conducted to date as part of the GRP evaluation. We deliberately limited reportage on the outcome analysis in the site-specific chapters (e.g., Chapters 5 and 6) to statements about the inferences we have drawn to date about the effect of GRP activities on the outcome measures we have examined. This appendix provides a greater degree of detail about our analytic approach, the models we estimated, parameter estimates, and inferences. This appendix provides no discussion of the interpretation of these models in light of the development of the GRP in each site. That discussion, focusing on the question of whether the changes in the outcome measures identified by the models can be plausibly attributed to GRP activities, appears in the site-specific chapters and in Chapter 9, which summarizes our interim findings across all four sites.

K.1. ANALYTIC CHALLENGES

The outcome analysis component of the GRP evaluation posed three key analytic challenges.

1. The date on which the effects of the intervention should become manifest in the outcome measures is known only within a range of time.

2. The law enforcement agencies serving all four sites devoted some GRP resources to improving the quality and quantity of their gang intelligence information. This opens some of our outcome measures to the possibility of contamination. Our goal is to assess whether GRP achieved its purpose of reducing gang-related crime in the target area of each site. Our measures of gang-related crimes are derived from police incident reports. Hence, our measures could have increased or decreased during the study period either in response to changes in the actual number of gang crimes or because improvements in gang intelligence permitted police to distinguish more accurately which crimes are gang-related. We expect that GRP activities may have reduced levels of gang crime and that they likely did not *increase* gang crime. Improvements in gang intelligence, however, could have increased or decreased recorded levels of gang crime. The police departments in two of the sites—Los Angeles and Milwaukee—had relatively sophisticated and extensive gang intelligence operations before GRP began. Both departments had specialized gang units

staffed by multiple full-time officers. The other two sites—North Miami Beach and Richmond—had relatively modest to non-existent gang intelligence operations prior to GRP. We expect, therefore, that improvements in gang intelligence represent a greater threat to the validity of our outcome measures in North Miami Beach and Richmond.

3. A substantial proportion of GRP resources were devoted to prevention services. The effects of these services on crime will not have become manifest until some years *after* the evaluation is expected to end. The prevention services were directed, appropriately, to children in elementary and middle school and to mothers with infant children. Criminal offending is most frequent and widespread in late adolescence (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). As the children who received these prevention services age into adolescence over the next several years, we expect the effect of those services to become gradually manifest in levels of crime in the neighborhoods where they reside.

The approach taken to the analysis of outcome measures, coupled with the design of the GRP evaluation, is responsive to each of these challenges.

The design of the GRP evaluation is described elsewhere in this report (see Chapter 3), but it may be summarized as an interrupted time series quasi-experiment that attempted to identify target, comparison, and displacement areas in each of the four sites—Los Angeles, Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, and Richmond.[1] Bushway and McDowall (2006) recently endorsed interrupted time series designs for aggregate-level studies of crime interventions. In comparison to the pre-post difference-in-difference designs that such studies often adopt, the interrupted time series design promises findings with higher internal validity. The interrupted time series design is relatively resistant to all threats to internal validity save for "history" (i.e., the effects of other events co-occurring with the intervention under study) (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). The analysis of one or more carefully selected comparison time series provides substantial protection against even this threat.

Within this design, we made several choices to respond to the aforementioned analytic challenges. First, because we have hypothesized that the effects of the GRP prevention services would not yet be manifest in our crime measures, we focused the outcome analysis on an assessment of the suppression activities. Second, in response to our concern that our measures of "gang-related" crime may have been contaminated by improvements in gang intelligence, we chose to analyze measures of serious violence in addition to gang-related crime.[2] We had a two-fold rationale for this decision. Serious violent offenses should be among the categories of offending that are least sensitive to shifts in reporting behaviors by citizens or police. Moreover, the police departments in the GRP sites suspect that gangs are responsible for a substantial proportion of the serious violence in the target areas. Therefore, suppression efforts that succeed in reducing gang activity should also reduce serious violence. Where we had data available, we also examined additional measures of crime that are often gang-related, including drug-related incidents, vandalism, and reports of shots fired. Finally, because in three of the sites—Los Angeles, North Miami

[1] As explained in Chapter 7, however, we were unable to identify suitable comparison and displacement areas for North Miami Beach because, in that site, the entire city was chosen as the target area.

[2] Our definition of serious violence included murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Beach, and Richmond—we were somewhat uncertain about when to expect the effects of the suppression activities to become manifest, we estimated models specifying that the effect of the suppression activities became manifest in each of the six months after the activities reportedly began. For each time series, we reported the results from the one model that best fit the data (see Section K.3).

K.2. ANALYTIC APPROACH

A time series is a series of observations of a single process or outcome taken at uniform time intervals. Typically, each observation in the series may represent either the instantaneous value of the process at the moment of each measurement (e.g., the current temperature or the price of a stock at a particular time) or an accumulated count of events since the prior observation (e.g., a country's Gross Domestic Product over each of several years). Our time series are of the latter variety, each being composed of a count of events (e.g., gang-related incidents, incidents of serious violence) recorded within each calendar month.

Formal time series analysis is based on an elaboration of the familiar general linear model. One of the assumptions of the general linear model is that each observation is independent of the others. Time series explicitly violate this assumption since each observation is a manifestation of the same underlying process. Each observation in time series, $\{y_t\}$, is assumed to be a function of the underlying data generating process and a random disturbance, ϵ_t, that is Normally, independently, and identically distributed with a mean of zero and constant variance. The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) framework, as articulated by Box and Jenkins (1976), is one of the most commonly used approaches for addressing the violations of the general linear model posed by the serial dependence of time series observations. Under this framework, the serial dependence of the time series observations is empirically estimated from the time series itself. A model of the time series is estimated that includes terms to control statistically for the serial dependence of the observations. Fitting of this model stops when the most parsimonious model that leaves Normally, independently, and identically distributed residuals has been identified. This model is sometimes referred to as a "noise model," because it reflects the serial dependent structure of the time series and yields "white noise" residuals (David McDowall and Hay, 1980). When the ARIMA framework is used to estimate the effects of an intervention, additional terms may be added to the noise model to represent the intervention. The coefficients associated with those terms are interpreted as estimates of the intervention effect.

Within the ARIMA framework, three types of serially dependent structures may be modeled.

1. Integrative processes cause the time series to trend or drift. Time series that include integrative processes are said to be non-stationary, meaning that components of previous manifestations of the time series have a non-decaying influence on subsequent manifestations so that their effects accumulate over time. The first step in a time series analysis is to identify whether the series is stationary and, if not, to identify the type of non-stationarity present. Enders (2004) identifies two types of non-stationary processes. A trend stationary process, $y_t = y_0 + a_1 t + \epsilon_t$, is one in which $\{y_t\}$ is a function of a deterministic trend (t) and a disturbance term. The trend term may be a first-order trend ($t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, t$), second-order trend ($t = 1, 4, 9, \ldots, t^2$),

and so on. To make a trend stationary process stationary, it is necessary to include the appropriate $a_1 t$ term in the noise model. The second type of non-stationary process is a difference stationary process, or a random walk, such that $y_t = y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, so that each observation in the time series is the sum of the previous observation and a disturbance term. A difference stationary process may be made stationary by differencing the time series such that each observation in the differenced series is equal to the difference between the observation at time t and the previous observation at time $t - 1$ (i.e., $\Delta y_t = y_t - y_{t-1}$). The entire model is then estimated in terms of the size of the changes from one observation to the next (i.e., month-to-month changes in the present case).

2. Autoregressive processes indicate that previous observations have a decaying influence on subsequent observations. Consider the model $y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, which depicts a typical autoregressive process on lag 1 (i.e., $t - 1$). Note that the value of a_1 reflects the magnitude of the influence of the y_{t-1} observation on y_t. The value of a_1 must be constrained to $(-1, 1)$ if $\{y_t\}$ is stationary.

3. Moving average processes are analogous to autoregressive processes except that the former reflect that previous disturbances have a decaying influence on subsequent observations. For example, the typical moving average process on lag 1 would be expressed as $y_t = a_0 + b_1 \epsilon_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$ where b_1 quantifies the decaying influence of the prior disturbance value. As with the value of a_1 in the autoregressive model, the value of b_1 must be constrained to $(-1, 1)$ if the $\{y_t\}$ series is stationary.

Within the ARIMA framework, integrative, autoregressive, and moving average processes are commonly identified on lower lags (e.g., lags 1 and 2) and somewhat less commonly on the seasonal lags of the time series. The seasonal lags are determined by the period of the time series. The period of a monthly time series is 12, and so the seasonal lags would be 12, 24, and so on. Seasonal processes are not uncommon in time series of crime. Since a large proportion of street crime occurs outdoors, such events may be influenced by weather conditions. By convention, ARIMA models are described using a shorthand notation—$ARIMA(p, d, q)(P, D, Q)_S$—where the value of d indicates the number of times the time series was differenced, and the values of p and q denote the order of the non-seasonal autoregressive and moving average processes, respectively, identified. The value of S denotes the period of the time series, and D indicates the number of times the time series was seasonally differenced. Predictably, the P and Q terms, denote the order of any seasonal autoregressive or moving average processes, respectively.

Once a noise model has been fitted to the time series, and the residuals have been checked to ensure that they meet the appropriate distributional assumptions, additional terms may be added to the model to represent the distribution of interest. By convention, these terms are called transfer functions. Since we expected the effect of the police suppression activities would appear abruptly in the monthly times series we examined, we used dummy variables for this purpose. Each dummy variable (which we denoted as D_L) was coded to 1 for those months where the suppression activities were underway and 0 in all other months. With this coding, the coefficient associated with each dummy variable (i.e., i_1 or i_2) is interpretable as the shift in the level of the series mean during the months that the intervention was in place.

With the exception of the data on juvenile referrals that we received from the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), all of the data analyzed were provided by the police departments serving each GRP site. We constructed each time series from the data using calendar months as intervals. Calendar months are not uniform in length, so we adjusted each monthly observation by multiplying the counts by a weight ($\mathcal{W}$) such that:

$$\mathcal{W} = \left(\frac{365}{12}\right)\left(\frac{1}{d_m}\right)$$

and d_m is equal to the number of days in the particular month. In this manner, we adjusted for the fact that February is shorter than March and that, due to the leap year, February 2004 was longer than February 2005.

We performed all of our time series analysis using R (R Development Core Team, 2007) and several packages written to extend that software. From the forecast package (Hyndman, 2007), we used the auto.arima() function to fit the noise model to each time series using a stepwise procedure. The function uses a Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test to identify whether the time series is stationary. Depending on the inference from that test, the function estimates a succession of ARIMA models, allowing the number of autoregressive and moving average terms to vary within plausible ranges. The function stopped after identifying the noise model with the minimum value of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which Enders (2004) recommends as it tends to lead to the selection of more parsimonious models than alternative selection criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion. Once the noise model was identified, we used the arima() function from the forecast package to estimate the models with the transfer functions included. We used Ljung-Box tests to verify that the model residuals remained i.i.d. $N(0, \sigma)$.

Since we were modeling time series composed of event counts, one obstacle faced was a scarcity of events. Some of the time series included counts of zero events for many or most months. Since a count cannot take a value of less than zero, a time series with many zero counts is a truncated, or limited, dependent variable. This truncation violates the distributional assumptions of the ARIMA models. In light of this complication, we elected not to analyze time series in which more than 10 percent of the observations were zeroes. This rule precluded us from estimating models of gang-related incidents in the North Miami Beach neighborhood of Uleta Park. It also precluded the estimation of models of gang-related incidents in all three of the Milwaukee study areas as well as in the Richmond comparison area.

The incident data provided by the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) posed a special challenge. Due to a difficult migration in their management information systems in 2004, MPD lost access to most of their data from the fourth quarter of 2004, including records of calls for service, arrests, and crimes reported (i.e., incidents). Of these categories of data, the records of crimes reported were least affected; the calls for service records were more extensively compromised. As a result, we restricted our analysis to the incident data alone. We had incomplete incident data for October 2004 and no data for November and December of that year. We interpolated values for each of these three months using four methods.

1. Before interpolation used the (known) value from September 2004 to replace the three missing values.

2. After interpolation used the (known) value from January 2005 to replace the three missing values.

3. Linear interpolation replaced the missing values under the assumption that the time series moved linearly from September 2004 through January 2005. For example, if value of the September 2004 observation were 5 and the January 2005 observation were 13, the intervening interpolated values would have been 7, 9, and 11.

4. Stineman interpolation uses the method proposed by Stineman (1980) as implemented in R's stinepack package (Johannesson, Bjornsson, and Grothendieck, 2006). This approach uses more observations in the time series (i.e., more than just those immediately adjacent to the missing values) to perform the interpolation.

For each time series we analyzed, we created one derivative time series for each of these four interpolation methods. We estimated our models on each of the four interpolated time series and compared the results. We found that our substantive inferences (i.e., the statistical significance of the intervention parameters) were insensitive to the method of interpolation used. In Tables K.2 and 6.4, we have reported the time series created using linear interpolation.

The time period during which we expected the intervention to become manifest in the outcome varied across sites. In Los Angeles, we hypothesized that we would observe any intervention effect between September 2003 and February 2004. The Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program, which was a key component of the suppression activities launched in Los Angeles under the aegis of GRP, began directed police patrols in the target area in September 2003, and we expected to observe the effects of this activity within a few months of the launch date. The NMBPD began directed patrol activities in the target area during the summer of 2005. The Richmond Police Department also began stepped up direct patrols against gang activity in the target area during the summer of 2005, so we looked for an intervention effect between June 2005 and November 2005 in both North Miami Beach and Richmond.

For each of these three sites, we estimated models to test for an abrupt shift in the time series mean beginning in each month in the range of months we identified as plausible start dates in each site (i.e., September 2003 through February 2004 in Los Angeles and June 2005 through November 2005 in North Miami Beach and Richmond). We estimated the same series of models in the study area—target, comparison, and displacement—and reported estimates from the model with the minimum *BIC* value. In North Miami Beach, where no comparison or displacement areas were defined, we estimated models for the entire city of North Miami Beach, which is the official GRP target area, as well as for two neighborhoods—Uleta Park and Victory Park—within North Miami Beach where Haitian gang activity was known to be concentrated.

The suppression activities in Milwaukee followed a rather different pattern from those in the other three GRP sites. Due to a combination of contractual issues, the Phase I suppression activities of the MPD took place during two two-month periods separated by more than a year. The first episode of Phase I suppression activity took place in July and August of 2004, and the second episode was in August and September of 2005. Phase II suppression activities began in January 2006 and were sustained through the end of the Milwaukee time series in April 2007.

Table K.1: Los Angeles: Detailed Results from Outcome Analysis

Study Area	Target	Comparison	Displacement
		Calls, shots fired	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + o_1 D_O + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	02/2004	12/2003	02/2004
a_0	21.40 (1.70)	13.24 (0.90)	7.69 (0.72)
o_1			13.46 (2.56)†
i_1	−8.23 (1.97)**	−1.79 (1.15)	−0.90 (0.93)
BIC	422.38	356.53	336.92
		Calls, vandalism	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)(2,0,0)$_{12}$	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + a_{12} y_{t-12} + a_{24} y_{t-24} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	01/2004	02/2004	11/2003
a_0	8.46 (0.68)	8.64 (0.52)	11.30 (0.82)
a_{12}		−0.37 (0.15)	
a_{24}		−0.33 (0.14)	
i_1	0.62 (0.87)	0.55 (0.73)	−0.25 (1.03)
BIC	324.1	322.78	342.56
		Incidents, serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	10/2003	10/2003	02/2004
a_0		39.13 (2.78)	34.22 (2.26)
b_1	0.66 (0.16)		
i_1	−12.65 (8.61)	−6.42 (3.45)*	3.36 (2.96)
BIC	466.21	485.76	471.31
		Incidents, gang-related	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	02/2004	11/2003	01/2004
a_0	35.82 (2.09)	34.63 (2.63)	20.72 (1.87)
i_1	−6.78 (2.74)**	−2.91 (3.31)	2.28 (2.41)
BIC	462.22	482.05	446.19
		Incidents, gang-related serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)(1,0,0)$_{12}$
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + a_{12} y_{t-12} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	12/2003	09/2003	09/2003
a_0		21.84 (2.14)	14.73 (1.43)
a_{12}			−0.34 (0.13)
b_1	−0.61 (0.19)		
i_1	−8.71 (6.44)	−5.37 (2.62)**	−1.76 (1.79)
BIC	423.62	451.27	424.5

Notes:
- All time series spanned 01/2002–12/2006.
- We considered intervention points from 09/2003–02/2004.
- Reported model specifications and parameters correspond to the model with the smallest value of *BIC*.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.
** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.
† Control parameter to address outliers identified at November 2003 and April 2004.

We estimated two sets of models of the Milwaukee suppression activities. In one set, the Phase I and Phase II suppression activities were represented by a single term under the hypothesis that the Phase I and Phase II directed patrol activities were substantively identical interventions that took place at different points in time. In the second set of models, we included separate terms for the Phase I and Phase II suppression activities. In this second set of models, we observed that the coefficients on the intervention terms were often opposite in sign. If the Phase I coefficient were greater than zero, the Phase II coefficient was often less than zero, or vice versa. This suggested that the Phase I and Phase II suppression activities may have exerted different effects on our outcome measures. Perhaps the sustained nature of the Phase II activity, in contrast to the intermittent Phase I activity, accounts for this difference. Regardless of the underlying reason, we elected to report the models where the effects of the Phase I and Phase II periods were estimated separately.

K.3. FINDINGS

In Los Angeles, we examined five outcome measures including calls to report shots fired, calls to report vandalism, incidents of serious violence, gang-related incidents, and gang-related incidents of serious violence. All five measures were developed from data provided by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The data on gang-related incidents came from a checkbox on the police department's standard incident reporting form. Guidelines for using this checkbox is well established within the department. The gang audit undertaken as part of the GRP evaluation stalled after 2005 when key LAPD personnel involved in assisting the audit were reassigned.

The time series of calls for shots fired in the displacement area included two outliers. Time series of calls for emergent situations may be especially prone to outliers if, for example, multiple persons call to report a single event. In this case, the remedy was to add a dummy variable (D_O) to the model that was equal to 1 for each of the two outlying months and zero otherwise. After the addition of this dummy variable, the time series showed no evidence of integrative, autoregressive, or moving average processes.

The models of the Los Angeles data suggest that the CLEAR suppression activities that commenced in the target area in autumn of 2003 significantly reduce gang-related incidents and calls to report shots fired (see Table K.1). Notable, but statistically insignificant, reductions in serious violence and gang-related serious violence were also recorded around the time that CLEAR was launched. Only calls to report acts of vandalism showed no sign of a shift in mean associated with the suppression activity.

In Milwaukee, we modeled time series of three categories of police incident reports: vandalism, drug-related incidents (including both distribution and possession), and serious violence. As noted before, there were too many months in which no gang-related incidents were recorded in the Milwaukee study areas to support time series models of those data. The models we were able to estimate suggest that neither the Phase I nor Phase II suppression activities in Milwaukee had any detectible effect on the number of vandalism, drug, or serious violent incidents recorded by police (see Table K.2). Incidents of serious violence decreased significantly in the comparison area during the Phase I intervention but increased by a statistically insignificant amount in the target area. In interviews with members of the evaluation team, MPD officers remarked that they did not

Table K.2: Milwaukee: Detailed Results from Outcome Analysis

Study Area	Target	Comparison	Displacement
		Incidents, vandalism	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(1,1,0)
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_{L1} + i_2 \Delta D_{L2} + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_{L1} + i_2 \Delta D_{L2} + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$\Delta y_t = a_1 \Delta y_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_{L1} + i_2 \Delta D_{L2} + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$
a_1			−0.36 (0.12)
b_1	−0.62 (0.10)	−0.56 (0.11)	
i_1	1.39 (2.65)	−3.25 (2.61)	−0.66 (4.29)
i_2	−4.33 (4.17)	−4.37 (4.20)	0.46 (9.06)
BIC	403.37	396.76	471.64
		Incidents, drug-related	
Noise Model	ARIMA(1,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)(0,0,1)$_{12}$	ARIMA(1,0,1)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_{L1} + i_2 D_{L2} + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + b_{12} \epsilon_{t-12} + i_1 D_{L1} + i_2 D_{L2} + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + b_1 \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 D_{L1} + i_2 D_{L2} + \epsilon_t$
a_0	18.04 (1.22)	16.68 (0.52)	34.54 (3.07)
a_1	0.24 (0.12)		0.82 (0.14)
b_1			−0.58 (0.17)
b_{12}		−0.59 (0.21)	
i_1	3.69 (3.60)	0.54 (2.22)	12.63 (4.90)**
i_2	−3.52 (2.35)	1.73 (1.47)	−2.30 (5.02)
BIC	435.24	417.91	486.27
		Incidents, serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(1,0,0)	ARIMA(1,1,0)(1,0,0)$_{12}$
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_{L1} + i_2 \Delta D_{L2} + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_{L1} + i_2 D_{L2} + \epsilon_t$	$\Delta y_t = a_1 \Delta y_{t-1} + a_{12} \Delta y_{t-12} + i_1 \Delta D_{L1} + i_2 \Delta D_{L2} + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$
a_0		23.80 (1.70)	
a_1		0.48 (0.12)	0.30 (0.13)
a_{12}			0.41 (0.13)
b_1	−0.86 (0.11)		
i_1	4.85 (3.67)	−8.28 (4.04)**	−4.72 (5.22)
i_2	2.30 (3.71)	4.41 (3.17)	−2.51 (10.03)
BIC	438.30	434.14	502.71

Notes:

- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 04/2007, but we interpolated the values of three months (10/2004–12/2004) in each time series.
- The i_1 and i_2 parameters indicate the effects of Phase I and Phase II suppression activities, respectively.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.

** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.

respect the study area boundaries during their suppression activities. So, the observation that the comparison area fared better than the target area likely reflects the contravention of the evaluation design rather than an unintended consequence of the suppression activities per se.

For North Miami Beach, we estimated models of three measures derived from data provided by the NMBPD. One of these measures was a time series of calls for service reporting events, such as shootings, shots fired, fights, and criminal mischief, that are sometimes related to gang activity. We also modeled measures of serious violent incidents and gang-related incidents, with the latter time series incorporating information from the gang audit conducted by NMBPD on behalf of the evaluation. For each of these three measures, we estimated models for the entire city of North Miami Beach as well as for the neighborhoods of Uleta Park and Victory Park where Haitian youth gangs are reportedly most active. None of these models showed any statistically significant effects associated with the NMBPD suppression effort (see Table K.3).

We also used data provided by the DJJ to develop time series of the number of juveniles referred by police to DJJ for delinquent behavior. We used these data to develop three time series:

- Referrals of Haitian youths by NMBPD;
- Referrals of non-Haitian youths by NMBPD; and
- Referrals of Haitian youths by other law enforcement agencies including, primarily, the Miami-Dade County Police Department and North Miami Police Department.

Note that the data we obtained from DJJ included only referrals of youths whose last known residence was in a North Miami Beach or North Miami ZIP code. With this limitation in mind, we reasoned that, if NMBPD suppression activities were focused on Haitian youth gangs, that we might see an increase in referrals of Haitian youths by NMBPD relative to changes in the other two time series. In fact, the models are partially consistent with this hypothesis, although we hesitate to attribute the change to GRP activities. We found that referrals of Haitian youths by other law enforcement agencies *declined* significantly during the first months of the GRP suppression effort. During the same time, referrals of both Haitian and non-Haitian youths by NMBPD officers remained unchanged. What gives us pause about this pattern of findings is that it is unclear what caused the other law enforcement agencies to refer fewer Haitian youths during this time period. If this change was in response to a regional change that would have applied with equal force to the jurisdiction of NMBPD, then the evidentiary case for attributing the (relative) increase in the referrals of Haitian youths by NMBPD would be strengthened.

In Richmond, we used incident data provided by RPD to develop measures of drug-related incidents (including both distribution and possession) and serious violent incidents. We also combined RPD incident data with information from the gang audit conducted by RPD to create time series of gang-related violence and serious gang-related violence in each of the Richmond study areas.

Recall that our Milwaukee and North Miami Beach analysis found few significant effects and no evidence that police suppression activities in either city had reduced crime in the target areas. By contrast, we found many statistically significant effects in Richmond, but they generally show that the crime situation in the target area worsened around the

Table K.3: North Miami Beach: Detailed Results from Outcome Analysis

Study Area	Entire City	Uleta Park	Victory Park
		Calls, possibly gang-related[a]	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,1)	ARIMA(1,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + b_1\epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + o_1 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	10/2005	10/2005	06/2005
a_0	119.53 (4.10)	9.81 (0.89)	28.86 (1.04)
a_1		0.30 (0.12)	
b_1	0.45 (0.11)		
i_1	5.47 (7.32)	1.52 (1.58)	−0.77 (1.71)
BIC	582.51	387.3	440.89
		Incidents, serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	07/2005	11/2005	08/2005
a_0	29.71 (1.24)	4.07 (0.33)	7.60 (0.60)
i_1	2.07 (2.15)	−0.46 (0.64)	−0.96 (1.06)
BIC	451.95	292.04	361.15
		Incidents, gang-related	
Noise Model	ARIMA(1,0,0)	†	ARIMA(1,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$		$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	07/2005		09/2005
a_0	10.68 (1.54)		4.67 (0.71)
a_1	0.32 (0.12)		0.29 (0.12)
i_1	1.49 (2.74)		−1.58 (1.34)
BIC	414.96		330.05
		Juvenile referrals[b]	
Agency[c]	NMBPD (Haitian)	NMBPD (Non-Haitian)	Other[d] (Haitian)
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(1,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	11/2005	08/2005	11/2005
a_0	7.83 (0.60)	17.14 (1.10)	64.87 (3.79)
a_1			0.38 (0.12)
i_1	−1.06 (1.16)	−1.82 (1.94)	−13.76 (7.16)*
BIC	366.5	437.54	544.23

Notes:

- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 05/2007 (calls), 03/2007 (serious violent incidents, juvenile referrals), or 12/2006 (gang-related incidents).
- We considered intervention points from 06/2005–11/2005.
- Reported model specifications and parameters correspond to the model with the smallest value of *BIC*.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.

** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.

† Too few incidents to support analysis.

[a] Includes calls for shootings, shots fired, criminal mischief, assaults/fights in progress.

[b] Restricted to referrals of juveniles whose last known (to Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)) residential address was in a North Miami Beach or North Miami ZIP code.

[c] The ethnicity of the juveniles receiving the referral appears in parentheses next to the name of the law enforcement agency that made the referral.

[d] Most of these referrals were made by the North Miami Police Department and Miami-Dade County Police Department.

Table K.4: Richmond: Detailed Results from Outcome Analysis

Study Area	Target	Comparison	Displacement
		Incidents, drug-related	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	ARIMA(0,1,1)(1,0,0)$_{12}$	ARIMA(0,1,1)
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + a_{12} \Delta y_{t-12} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$
Effective Date	11/2005	10/2005	09/2005
a_{12}		0.49 (0.13)	
b_1	−0.79 (0.10)	−0.61 (0.13)	−0.81 (0.08)
i_1	5.41 (3.66)	7.70 (3.41)**	6.76 (3.91)*
BIC	391.65	359.77	416.24
		Incidents, serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$	$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	07/2005	08/2005	11/2005
a_0	24.09 (1.04)	10.53 (0.46)	30.75 (1.02)
i_1	3.66 (1.80)**	−3.17 (0.81)**	−5.10 (1.97)**
BIC	429.43	326.96	433.15
		Incidents, gang-related	
Noise Model	ARIMA(0,1,1)	†	ARIMA(0,1,1)
Formula	$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$		$\Delta y_t = b_1 \Delta \epsilon_{t-1} + i_1 \Delta D_L + \epsilon_{\Delta y_t}$
Effective Date	07/2005		07/2005
a_0			
a_1			
b_1	−0.32 (0.14)		−0.92 (0.07)
i_1	15.70 (3.95)**		3.52 (1.58)**
BIC	303.36		299.13
		Incidents, gang-related serious violence	
Noise Model	ARIMA(1,0,0)	†	ARIMA(0,0,0)
Formula	$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$		$y_t = a_0 + i_1 D_L + \epsilon_t$
Effective Date	07/2005		11/2005
a_0	5.19 (0.87)		5.38 (0.47)
a_1	0.39 (0.13)		
i_1	3.55 (1.85)*		1.32 (1.21)
BIC	300.40		287.62

Notes:

- All time series began 01/2002 and extended through 03/2007 (drug-related and serious violent incidents) or 06/2006 (gang-related incidents, serious violent gang incidents).
- We considered intervention points from 06/2005–11/2005.
- Reported model specifications and parameters correspond to the model with the smallest value of *BIC*.
- Standard errors appear in parentheses adjacent to coefficients.

* Statistically significant ($p < .10$) intervention effect.

** Statistically significant ($p < .05$) intervention effect.

† Too few incidents to support analysis.

time that RPD suppression efforts were launched (see Table K.4). The pattern of findings on incidents of serious violence is most consistent with this interpretation. The number of serious violent incidents increased significantly in the target area and decreased significantly in the comparison and displacement areas. Gang-related incidents increased sharply in the target area and were also up significantly in the displacement area. Unfortunately, there were too few gang-related incidents in the comparison area to support analysis. Serious gang-related violence also increased in the target area while remaining unchanged in the displacement area. Finally, the number of drug-related incidents increased in all three study areas, but the increase in the target area was not statistically significant. Based on the logic of the evaluation design, this pattern of findings suggests that the RPD suppression effort may have led to increases in the recorded levels of some categories of crime in the target area.

One possible explanation for this surprising finding may be that the RPD suppression activities upset established gang hierarchies in the target area causing a short-term escalation of violence. The time series of serious violence in the target area is consistent with this explanation. The number of such incidents peaked during the summer of 2005 as the suppression activities were newly underway and remained higher than average throughout the fall of 2005. Thereafter, levels of violence returned to pre-intervention levels.

We are left with a mixed bag of findings related to the effect of the suppression activities on crime in the four GRP sites. Findings in Los Angeles were mostly consistent with our hypotheses, as the models showed that CLEAR dampened gang violence and calls to report shots fired. The suppression programs in Milwaukee and North Miami Beach showed no detectible effects. Finally, in Richmond, our models suggest that the suppression activities may have unintentionally increased serious violence, at least during the first five or six months of the intervention.

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