NCJ Number
137677
Journal
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Dated: (April-June 1992) Pages: 145-155
Date Published
1992
Length
11 pages
Annotation
This paper suggests possible reasons for Iraq's decision not to use chemical weapons (CW's) in the Gulf War and the implications for the development of CW's by Third World States.
Abstract
The absence of CW's in the Gulf War may indicate that weaker states, however ruthless their leadership, will not deploy CW's against a more powerful enemy. This is a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the likely battlefield and psychological impact against the potential for retaliation or escalation. The Gulf War highlighted two factors that may diminish the likelihood of CW use. On a strategic level, the mere possession of options for escalation dominance by an adversary may act as a deterrent. On an operational level, once the conflict had become a conventional one, the type of fighting practiced by U.S. forces in the Kuwait theater of operations -- maneuver warfare, the "shaping" of the battlefield, and high tempo -- may also be a significant factor in defending against CW's. Disruption of the enemy's planning and capabilities can limit the potential impact of CW's, thus reducing the likelihood that CW's will be used by a force not capable of engaging in the same type of fluid battle. This does not preclude the possibility that CW's will be used in future conflicts, particularly in the absence of the fear of retaliation or if battlefield conditions are favorable to their use. Third World States may conclude that assumed retaliation prevented Iraq's CW use, thus validating the need to field their own CW as a deterrent. 25 notes