NCJ Number
137225
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 82 Issue: 4 Dated: (Winter 1992) Pages: 904-919
Date Published
1992
Length
16 pages
Annotation
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a suspect's claim of his sixth amendment right to counsel at an arraignment on one charge did not imply invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel at an interrogation concerning a separate and unrelated charge.
Abstract
While the majority argued that the sixth amendment right is offense-specific, the dissenting opinion held that the offense- specific application was inconsistent with the ordinary understanding of the right to counsel and with previous rulings. The sixth amendment right to counsel is based on a person's status as an accused suspect and therefore requires no expression for invocation, while the fifth amendment right is based on a claim of right and does require some express invocation. Following an examination of the application of the Miranda- Edwards doctrine in the context of both types of right to counsel, this author argues that the Court correctly identified the bases for applying the fifth and sixth amendment rights and balanced society's need to prosecute criminals with the protection of individual rights. 140 notes