NCJ Number
101534
Journal
Negotiation Journal Volume: 2 Issue: 2 Dated: (April 1986) Pages: 167-174
Date Published
1986
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This article examines a number of paradoxes arising from a general theory that the bargaining power of each party is determined by the other party's dependence on it, not its own dependence on the other party.
Abstract
Dependence is seen to vary according to commitment to or value of the benefits at stake in the relationship and the availability of the benefits from other parties. Further, dependence is treated as nonzero sum in character. Thus, both parties in a relationship may simultaneously increase or decrease their power in the relationship. Consequently, total power in the relationship is not constant, and there is an ongoing struggle as each party tries to maneuver itself into a favorable power position. The implication of dependence theory is that to gain power it is necessary to make the other party dependent on you. This leads to four paradoxes: (1) power is based on giving, (2) to use power is to lose it, (3) tactical manipulation of the power relationship may have integrative rather than disintegrative effects, and (4) an inferior power position may have a tactical advantage. A key problem for parties in bargaining is to weigh the short- and long-term effects of tactics used in negotiations. These paradoxes indicate that tactics with short-term, immediate benefits (producing concessions on a particular issue) often reduce their user's power in the long-term. 2 notes and 3 references.