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Issues and Practices

Solving Crime Problems in Residential Neighborhoods:

Comprehensive Changes in Design, Management, and Use

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Management, and Use

by
Judith D. Feins, Ph. D.
Joel C. Epstein, Esq.
Rebecca Widom

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National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis
Director

John Spevacek
Samuel C. McQuade
Program Monitors

Advisory Panel

Ronald Clarke, Dean
Rutgers University
School of Criminal Justice
15 Washington Street
Newark, NJ 07102

Dan Fleissner, Manager
Research and Grants
Seattle Police Department,
Community Policing Bureau
700 Third Avenue, Room 540
Seattle, WA 98104

Severin Sorensen, President
SPARTA Consulting Corporation
7313 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814

Stephen Tise
Tise, Hurwitz, and Diamond, Inc. Architects
370 Washington Street
Brookline, MA 02146

NCJ 164488

Table of Contents

Foreword

Can residential neighborhoods be designed—or redesigned—to promote safety? This *Issues and Practices* report is intended to inform law enforcement officials, urban planners and architects, multifamily housing managers, and public housing administrators about *place-specific crime prevention*—the diverse array of coordinated environmental design, property management, and security strategies that can be employed to reduce crime and fear of crime in urban and suburban neighborhoods. Practical lessons gleaned from a varied set of sites that blend physical design changes and management changes are presented. These approaches are consistent with and support the community-oriented and problem-oriented policing models being implemented by many law enforcement agencies across the United States.

Today's place-specific crime prevention approaches supersede earlier theories about environmental design, drawing on more active strategies and management techniques yet retaining a focus on specific locations. Municipalities, public housing authorities, private developers, and community organizations in city and suburban neighborhoods can choose from a variety of strategies to strengthen their own particular crime prevention efforts. This report emphasizes that local leaders of the groups or agencies initiating change—together with residents, local law enforcement administrators, and government and community leaders—are the people best suited to determine the most appropriate place-specific crime prevention approaches. Also underscored is the importance of improving management practices and using culturally sensitive policing strategies in combination with environmental design or redesign solutions.

Housing developments—both public and private—are being renovated in many parts of the United States. As this report shows, pairing physical design changes with management changes that support, facilitate, and reinforce their preventive effects on disorder and illegal activity can be a highly effective strategy for combating criminal activity. This report builds on prior National Institute of Justice research efforts, including *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention* and other research conducted during the past 20 years. Many of these publications and related documentation are available from the National Institute of Justice.

Place-specific crime prevention may involve opening up a public space to create better natural surveillance, shutting down a crack house, modifying leases and tenant screening practices, training residents to patrol their own buildings, or creating on-site police substations or security offices. The most effective place-specific crime prevention strategies take into account the geographic, cultural, economic, and social characteristics of the target community. Thus, the selection of place-specific crime prevention tactics and elements should be made in close collaboration with the community, after sustained observation of its current patterns of use.

By emphasizing that crime prevention is not a "one size fits all" effort, and that some neighborhoods or communities will require more attention and ingenuity than others in crafting effective strategies, this report stresses the importance of a thorough analysis of local problems and needs, as well as ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the place-specific strategies selected and their effectiveness in reducing crime and disorder.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

This publication examines place-specific crime prevention: making changes for security and crime prevention in urban and suburban neighborhoods. *Place-specific crime prevention* refers to programs of physical design changes, public and private management changes, and use-pattern changes that are targeted to a particular place and its crime problems. The goal of this report is to inform law enforcement officials, urban planners and architects, multifamily housing managers, and public housing administrators about the diverse array of coordinated environmental design and management strategies that can be employed to reduce crime and fear of crime in housing complexes and residential neighborhoods. This approach works well with the community-oriented and problem-oriented policing models being implemented by law enforcement agencies across the United States.

Place-specific crime prevention approaches go beyond narrow theories about environmental design or defensible space. The integration of strategies to modify the use and management of places has strengthened environmental design or redesign as a practical approach to crime prevention in varied settings. Place-specific crime prevention builds on crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED, physical changes) and draws on the results of research on active crime prevention tactics (such as community policing and community crime prevention) to emphasize modification of design, use, and management of a specific place to prevent and reduce crime.

This report presents practical lessons gleaned from a varied set of sites operating security and anticrime programs that combine physical design changes and management changes. Efforts by municipalities, public housing authorities, private developers, and nonprofit organizations in city and suburban neighborhoods are the focus. The information presented should prove useful to practitioners and agencies creating their own place-specific crime prevention programs. The findings in this report stress that the nature and configuration of the place-specific crime prevention approach are best determined by local leaders of the groups or agencies initiating change, with the cooperation and participation of other government and community leaders, local law enforcement administrators, and residents. The importance and efficacy of improved management practices and culturally sensitive policing strategies, in combination with environmental design or redesign solutions, are also stressed.

This publication is based on a combination of information from programs around the country, a review of the literature, and consultation with experts in the field. Visits were made to four sites, each representing a different place-specific crime prevention approach:

- Castle Square Apartments, a private rental housing complex in Boston, Massachusetts;

- Lockwood Gardens, a development of the Oakland Housing Authority in East Oakland, California;

- The central city Genesis Park neighborhood in Charlotte, North Carolina, and

- The suburban village of Oak Park, Illinois.

Telephone interviews with 11 other sites provided additional examples of place-specific interventions. In addition to a diversity of CPTED approaches, the selected sites display a range of innovative policing and housing management strategies; most have achieved measurable success in reducing crime.

Examples of place-specific crime prevention approaches from the study sites include: closing pedestrian tunnels and opening up hidden areas to resident and management view (Castle Square Apartments, Boston); shutting down a crack house through civil lawsuits (Clinton Hill neighborhood, Brooklyn, New York); fencing and gating the community (Lockwood Gardens, Oakland; Mar Vista Gardens, Los Angeles, California; Diggs Town, Norfolk, Virginia); re-routing traffic and limiting vehicular access to a community (Genesis Park, Charlotte, North Carolina; Oak Park, Illinois; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Five Oaks, Dayton, Ohio); installing high-technology pan-tilt-zoom cameras as the centerpiece of a three-development surveillance system (Grant Manor, Boston); creating on-site police substations or security offices (Lockwood Gardens, Oakland; Oak Park, Illinois); and organizing the community to approve a special tax assessment for better street lighting and other public improvements (El Cortez Heights, Tucson, Arizona).

The most effective place-specific crime prevention strategies are those that take into account the geographic, cultural, economic, and social characteristics of the target community. Thus, the selection of place-specific crime prevention

strategies and tactics should be made in close collaboration with the community, after sustained observation of its current patterns of use. The experiences of the study sites reveal two major lessons:

- Physical design modifications, management changes, and changes in use should be tailored to specific locations and coordinated in their planning and implementation.

- The most effective security and crime prevention efforts are those that involve a coalition of different players working together to define the problem and then seek solutions.

By emphasizing that crime prevention is not a "one size fits all" effort, and that some communities may require more attention and ingenuity than others in crafting effective strategies, this report stresses the importance of a thorough analysis of the problems and needs of a given community, as well as ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the place-specific strategies selected.

The varied examples presented in this publication demonstrate that physical design changes and management changes—enhanced security, improved property management, and greater resident involvement—can be combined effectively to combat criminal activity, reduce disorder, improve safety, and enhance the quality of life in a variety of urban and suburban residential settings.

Chapter 1
Crime and Place: What Do We Know?

This chapter presents an overview of place-specific crime prevention: coordinated programs of physical redesign and public and private management changes targeted to a particular community and its crime problem. The first section sets out the objectives and organization of the report and provides a brief discussion of the sites studied. The next section gives an overview of the report's organization. The third section discusses the sources of place-specific crime prevention and the issue of crime displacement and diffusion of crime control benefits. The final section introduces the array of sites from which data and examples will be drawn throughout the report.

Objectives and Audience

The goal of this publication is to inform law enforcement officials, urban planners and architects, multifamily housing managers, and public housing administrators of the diverse array of coordinated environmental design and management strategies that can be employed to reduce crime and fear of crime in urban and suburban neighborhoods. The place-specific crime prevention approach is consistent with and supports the community-oriented and problem-oriented policing models being implemented by many law enforcement agencies across the United States. This publication emphasizes the importance and efficacy of improved management practices and culturally sensitive policing strategies in combination with environmental design or redesign solutions.

In preparing this report, the authors have built on prior research efforts, including *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention*[1] and other research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice during the past 20 years.[2] The report also incorporates practical lessons gleaned from the efforts of municipalities, public housing authorities, private developers, and nonprofit organizations in city and suburban neighborhoods to operate security and anticrime programs that combine physical design changes and management changes.

The nature and configuration of these place-specific crime prevention approaches were determined by local leaders of the groups or agencies initiating change, with the coopera-tion and participation of residents, local law enforcement administrators, and government and community leaders.

Overview of the Report

Chapter 1 describes place-specific crime prevention and briefly describes the sites and programs from which information for this publication is drawn. Chapter 2 identifies techniques for defining and analyzing the crime problem in a particular locale. It considers the physical features of an area that influence crime and public safety, discusses the concept of place management and ways of determining the stakeholders, and helps the reader think about how an area's use—by residents and others—influences security. Chapter 3 describes how the study sites have designed their interventions and draws lessons from their experiences. Program design includes not only selecting strategies and tactics but also mobilizing available resources and knowing where and how to start initiating change.

Chapter 4 describes program implementation. The first section examines how to bring about changes in the physical environment through design and/or redesign and renovation. The second section discusses options for changing management—including policing, property management, and the role of residents—in order to solidify and sustain the security features of the redesign.

In conclusion, chapter 5 presents an examination of results—what sites claim to have achieved through their security and crime prevention efforts. The results discussed in the first section include "taking back the turf" (reclaiming the area for legitimate use by residents and others), reducing crime and keeping it down, and dealing with any issues of crime displacement. The second section summarizes a number of lessons shared by the diverse set of communities profiled in this report. The chapter ends with a recapitulation of the major points of the publication.

Several appendixes provide additional material, ideas, and contact information for the resources needed to implement place-specific crime prevention programs:

Sources of Information

This report is based principally on telephone interviews with 11 programs across the United States and site visits to four locales, each representing a different place-specific crime prevention approach. The sites visited were:

1. Castle Square Apartments, a private rental housing complex in Boston, Massachusetts.

2. Lockwood Gardens, a development of the Oakland Housing Authority in East Oakland, California.

3. The central city Genesis Park neighborhood in Charlotte, North Carolina.

4. The suburban village of Oak Park, Illinois.

In addition to representing diverse crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) approaches, the selected sites displayed a range of innovative policing and housing management strategies; most have achieved measurable success in reducing crime in the target areas.

The visited sites were selected from an initial pool of over two dozen that were identified in the literature or by experts in the field as representing the best recent examples of place-specific crime prevention at work. In selecting programs to visit, rough demographic and geographic distributions were sought. The four distinct settings were included to show their shared experiences and to make the report relevant to the largest number of practitioners.

Sites not selected for this report should not be viewed as less exemplary or important. Rather, the decision to limit site visits to four locations and to conduct telephone interviews with another 11 programs reflects the inevitable constraints of time and budget. In acknowledgement of this limitation, efforts were made, wherever possible, to draw from the literature other examples of innovative CPTED approaches, management, and policing techniques and programs. Summary descriptions of the programs that provided information by phone for the study are included in appendix E.

A literature review and telephone interviews with experts in the fields of CPTED and situational crime prevention were also conducted. Experts interviewed included theoreticians as well as practicing architects and site administrators. The advisory board (see acknowledgements) and other experts, including staff of the National Institute of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, also provided information and advice.

Appendix A contains a *glossary* of the acronyms and terms used in this report.

Appendix B consists of a *review of the research literature* on place-specific crime prevention, covering such subjects as defensible space, CPTED, community- or problem-oriented policing, rational offender theory and routine activities theory, situational crime prevention, and community or neighborhood crime prevention.

Appendix C provides useful *checklists* and similar material for program planning and implementation.

Appendix D offers information on *sources of training and technical assistance* for place-specific crime prevention efforts.

Appendix E summarizes information on the 11 sites contacted but not visited for the study.

Appendix F contains crime statistics for sites highlighted in this report.

What Is Place-Specific Crime Prevention?

The term *place-specific crime prevention* refers to coordinated programs of change—specifically, physical design, security, and property management changes—that are targeted to a particular place and its problems. The term combines the concept of redesign with management changes, which require public managers (such as police, parks departments, or housing authorities) and private managers (such as property owners or private security companies) to rethink their roles in creating and maintaining public safety.

Coining a new term can present a problem, as it lacks reader recognition, requires special explanation, and runs the risk of expanding jargon rather than understanding. However, when existing terms are too specific to convey the full scope of the concept being addressed, or when—as in this case—multiple data from research and practice, which may be classified under a variety of names, come together to form a whole, a new term is needed.

In this report, the term *place-specific crime prevention* refers to approaches that go beyond narrow theories about environmental design, drawing on more active strategies and techniques yet retaining a location-centered focus. In its emphasis on management, place-specific crime prevention seeks to improve on CPTED, which relies on physical modifications to influence human behavior. As noted by Reiss and Roth,[3]

The reason for the inconsistent and temporary effects [of a CPTED demonstration project in Hartford] appears to be that crime and violence arise from interactions between the social environment and the physical environment, which cannot be controlled entirely through manipulations of the physical environment. The communal feeling of territoriality and mutual protection, on which the defensible space concept rests, apparently failed to materialize.

Place-specific crime prevention addresses the interaction between social and physical environment by changing the design, management, and use of a place. (See components of place-specific crime prevention in exhibit 1.) The theories and practices contributing to the definition of place-specific crime prevention used here are detailed in exhibit 1. One particularly important concept is the notion of *situational crime prevention*, which, although combining some of the same elements, has not generally made the link to management changes and changes in resident role that are included in place-specific crime prevention.[4] (See appendix B for a more extensive review of the literature.)

Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits?

The possibility of crime displacement is one of the major challenges raised when place-specific crime prevention efforts are proposed. Many practitioners express concern that place-specific programs will simply move or displace crime from the target area to other areas or other victims, without reducing the overall crime level. As noted by Clarke and Weisburd, "under this view, situational changes [can] affect the pattern of crime but not its volume: the latter [is] determined by motivational factors."[5]

While law enforcement officials and other practitioners appear to accept crime displacement as a common occurrence, there has been relatively little research on the subject. Despite the potential for different types of displacement (not just in time or space but by target, method, crime type, or perpetrator), research on what situations give rise to varying types and levels of displacement, and why, is lacking. (A review of the limited research literature on displacement is contained in appendix B.)

One review of published articles on crime prevention began to address the question of displacement by classifying studies by type of intervention strategy used and other factors.[6] A high proportion of the studies showing no displacement examined interventions that increased the effort needed to commit a crime, involved combinations of preventive measures rather than single measures, and implemented preventive measures throughout the jurisdiction (neighborhood, city, county, or country).[7] This analysis suggests that external factors do affect the potential for and patterns of crime displacement.

Researchers contend that the view of displacement as automatic and widespread is based on questionable assumptions about criminal motivation, most notably that the impetus to commit a crime comes completely from within the offender and is not affected by external factors. They argue that rational offender theory (see appendix B) better explains when and why displacement may occur.[8] Distinctions also

Exhibit 1. Place-Specific Crime Prevention Components and Sources

Components

Physical design changes
- Target-hardening
- Controlling access
- Increasing opportunities for surveillance
- Targeting crime "hot spots"
- Improving image

Management changes
- Revamping security (including policing)
- Altering property ownership and/or management
- Expanding the role of residents

Use changes
- Increasing use at different times of the day and night
- Increasing the variety of business uses
- Increasing use by residents and others for leisure activities

Sources (Theories and Practices)

Physical crime prevention
- Defensible space
- Symbolic barriers (delineating public vs. private space)
- Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)

Understanding criminal behavior
- Rational choice theory
- Routine activity theory

Recent developments in crime prevention theory
- Situational crime prevention (combines physical and other means of reducing crime opportunities)

Developments in local crime prevention practice
- Community crime prevention
- Neighborhood crime prevention

Recent developments in local law enforcement practice
- Community-oriented policing (COP)
- Problem-oriented policing (POP)
- Call management/police response analysis (MIS/GIS)
- Expansion of law enforcement role (better coordination with other agencies)
- Neighborhood-based planning and service approaches

have been made between benign and destructive displacement.[9] If there is displacement of criminal activity to more serious offenses, or to already heavily victimized areas or populations, then it would seem that displacement does pose a significant concern. However, if interventions more evenly distribute victimization among different neighborhoods or populations, if they redirect activity to less serious crimes, or if they displace only a portion of the initial amount of crime, there is a net benefit.

Rational offender theory would also suggest that crime prevention measures may produce diffusion of benefits rather than displacement of crime. This would occur if offenders experience increased fear of detection (that is, they perceive that the risk of committing a crime has increased) and/or decreased likelihood of gain (that is, they perceive that the reward of crime is reduced) beyond the actual scope of the intervention. *Diffusion of benefits* is defined by Clarke[10] as "the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of control, the crimes which are the focus of intervention, or the time periods in which an intervention is brought." When potential offenders are deterred (by increased fear of detection and greater actual or perceived risk of arrest) or discouraged (by reduced actual or perceived rewards of crime) beyond the degree merited by the preventive measures taken, diffusion of benefits will occur. Exhibit 2 shows how these possible secondary effects of crime prevention differ. Clearly, practitioners should seek to design interventions that reduce the total amount of crime and/or that displace activity to less serious crime or to less victimized populations. Better still would be the design of interventions whose effects reach beyond their target and thus produce diffusion of benefits.

Need for Continuing Research

Although several fields of crime prevention theory and research contribute to the definition of place-specific crime prevention and several evaluations of promising place-specific crime prevention programs have already been conducted (see appendix B), further research evaluating these strategies is essential. Methodological and practical difficulties, such as the variety of possible outcome measures, the complexity of the interventions,[11] and the limits to generalization that accompany programs designed for specific local configurations and conditions, have made comprehensive evaluation so challenging and costly that full studies are few. Thus, only far-from-

Exhibit 2. Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits?
Destructive displacement shifts criminal activity
• to more serious offenses
• to already heavily victimized areas or populations
• outside of primary targets
Benign displacement shifts criminal activity
• to less serious offenses
• to areas with a lower incidence of crime
• with victimization distributed among different   neighborhood or populations
Diffusion of benefits shifts criminal activity
• to areas with a lower incidence of crime
• beyond primary targets

definitive evidence exists to determine whether place-specific crime prevention works, how it works, and under what conditions.[12]

Continued research about the factors shaping displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits is especially necessary. Displacement poses a significant challenge to the design of crime prevention research, since no empirical study can conclusively show that displacement has not occurred. Crime can be displaced to different activities, locations, times (day/night, weekend/weekday), and populations of potential victims. Considering all of these possibilities would generate an infinite list of outcomes, and measuring these outcomes would require an infinite (and impossible) amount of data collection.

By and large, evidence about displacement has therefore been a by-product of crime studies, and evidence of diffusion of benefits is rare.[13] Evaluation research needs to be designed even more carefully if diffusion of benefits is to be detected and measured rather than misinterpreted. In urging the recognition and pursuit of benefit diffusion when designing crime control programs, Clarke and Weisburd[14] point out that "to extract the maximum benefits from the techniques [of situational crime prevention], they need to be pursued in tandem with an active program of research into the ways that offenders perceive and react to the ever-changing criminal opportunity structure."

Introduction to Selected Programs

This section presents a brief synopsis of the place-specific crime prevention efforts in the four sites visited. The sites represent four diverse settings in which place-specific crime prevention might be implemented: public housing developments, private rental complexes, urban neighborhoods, and suburban communities.

Public Housing Development: Lockwood Gardens, Oakland, California

Lockwood Gardens is a family public housing development of 371 units, on a single site in East Oakland, California. Owned and managed by the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA), the site is completely residential, with grassy open spaces among the buildings, which consist of one-story bungalows containing two side-by-side units, and two-story walk-ups with individual entrances. Residents of Lockwood Gardens are extremely poor; as of March 1993, the mean income was just over $8,000, compared to a citywide mean income of over $25,000. Eighty percent of the families are headed by women, and children ages 12 years and younger make up 41 percent of the residents.

Between 1991 and 1993, Abt Associates Inc. studied the OHA's efforts (under a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] Public Housing Drug Elimination Program grant) to reduce crime and fear at Lockwood Gardens.[15] Crime data from that period show a major concentration of drug activity accompanied by intimidation, harassment, burglary, and theft. Three people were murdered on or adjacent to the site in late 1991. The OHA's early anticrime efforts, which involved only prevention programming, were unsuccessful in reducing crime or improving the quality of life for residents.

Working with residents, the OHA subsequently developed a more active and comprehensive anticrime strategy that combined design changes, security patrols, and management changes. The entire site was attractively fenced in 1993 and 1994, with entrances initially guarded 24 hours a day. The OHA security force, reorganized under a lieutenant from the Oakland Police Department, acquired a mobile substation and used it at Lockwood for a sustained period. In addition, the OHA decentralized its management and maintenance

operation to the site level, to improve tenant relations and to increase both interior and exterior maintenance at Lockwood and other public housing developments in the area.

Private Rental Complex: Castle Square Apartments, Boston, Massachusetts

This private, affordable housing development represents a crime-infested area reclaimed through changes in design, use, and management. The previous owner of Castle Square Apartments (CSA) had allowed the property to deteriorate severely, and a private real estate developer originally sought to buy it, with the intent of waiting for the use restrictions (requiring that it house a partially low-income population) to expire. However, the residents had other ideas. After a long process of legal and financial negotiations involving the previous owner, the residents, the prospective buyer, and several governmental agencies, CSA has emerged as a significant improvement in its South End neighborhood.

The new owner—a partnership of the private developer and the residents—brought in an architect to plan rehabilitation with an eye to security. The buildings at CSA are stacked duplexes (two-floor unit above two-floor unit) and seven-story elevator buildings containing one- and two- bedroom units. The street front was redesigned with harder security elements for the commercial spaces. Fencing and landscaping were added to the site, and a gate system, which is locked after 9 p.m., was installed. The open stairwells and lobbies of the elevator buildings were enclosed and controlled. Believing that these design features had proven their worth, the architect was applying them in other local sites when this report was being researched. The Boston police, who coordinated an intensified patrol schedule with the physical renovation of CSA, have since scaled back the number of area patrols. Since the place-specific crime prevention and management changes were implemented at Castle Square, the number of police calls for service from the apartments— a common measure of the level of crime in a community— has declined sharply. Children are out in the playgrounds again, and an adjacent park once frequented by drunks and derelicts has been reclaimed by the residents.

CSA had an active residents' organization with a significant security agenda. The development's prospective buyer, Arthur Winn, also had strong ideas about management and security for central city housing. The partnership forged between Winn and the residents played a central role in the planning for a renewed Castle Square. This site provides an example of a private rental complex in a center-city area that by all accounts has been turned around through a combination of design, use, and management changes.

Urban Neighborhood: Genesis Park, Charlotte, North Carolina

Now known as Genesis Park, this inner-city Charlotte neighborhood was until recently the worst eight square blocks of the city in terms of crime and drug activity. The area, and the adjacent Charlotte Housing Authority's (CHA's) Fairview Homes development, had long been a center of heroin trafficking. The CHA's anticrime efforts in Fairview Homes had documented positive effects in the early 1980's,[16] but the adjoining neighborhood continued to be dangerous, with 21 murders on the two main thoroughfares between 1988 and 1993. The deteriorated dwellings and overgrown yards contained many squatters and numerous drug and shot houses (where liquor is sold by the drink). The streets were open-air markets for a variety of drugs.

In 1993, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (a nonprofit organization with extensive city and private-sector support) quietly began to purchase properties in the neighborhood. Coordination with the Charlotte Police Department enabled the Partnership to target shot houses and drug houses for acquisition. With extensive rehabilitation, the old rental duplexes were converted into affordable single-family homes, many of which are now being sold to low-income families in conjunction with the CHA's programs to foster self-sufficiency among public housing residents. The Partnership assists prospective buyers in resolving credit problems and also provides homeownership classes and follow-up support in the form of a residents' association. In addition to the housing rehabilitation, which has been carried out with careful attention to security features, traffic barriers were installed to create a more complex traffic pattern and to prevent drug traffic from cutting through the area. The name of the neighborhood and the names of its most notorious streets were officially changed. A community-policing program is in place, and the Partnership works actively with other property owners and managers in the neighborhood to address any remaining problems of disorder or crime.

Genesis Park provides an example of a complex intervention in a troubled, low-income neighborhood, with the goal of reducing crime and improving the quality of life for residents. The housing is private, and both private and public organizations have contributed to the changes. According to police statistics, crime in Genesis Park dropped by 74 percent from 1993 to 1994, and the neighborhood moved

from number 1 to number 41 in a ranking by neighborhood of violent crime rates in the city.

Suburban Community: The Village of Oak Park, Illinois

Oak Park, a middle-class suburb of Chicago that borders on the city's West Side (one of the highest crime areas in the United States), takes pride in being an open and diverse community with excellent schools and a high quality of life. The village has many points of interest, including the Frank Lloyd Wright Home and Studio, two historic districts, and the Ernest Hemingway birthplace and museum. Oak Park's housing consists of 45 percent multifamily and 55 percent single-family dwellings. A community known for its racial diversity assurance program, in 1968 Oak Park made a commitment to open housing with the passage of an ordinance guaranteeing equal access in the sale and rental of homes and apartments. The village—which is only 9 miles or 20 minutes from Chicago's Loop via mass transit or the Eisen-hower Expressway—has excellent public transportation and automobile access.

Over the past 30 years, Oak Park has vigorously sought to maintain and enhance the quality of life for all its residents. The village has enacted ordinances, created programs, formed coalitions, built organizations, and analyzed and reanalyzed itself, in order to build strength through diversity and unity. As part of its long-term proactive strategy, Oak Park has experimented with CPTED and other place-specific crime prevention techniques, including cul-de-sacs and improved lighting. Oak Park's Security Improvement Grant (SIG) Program for multifamily building owners is an important part of the village's crime prevention strategy, as about one-third of Oak Park's population lives in small, older apartment buildings, many of which need to be made secure. Under SIG, the village offers multifamily building owners a free security inspection by Oak Park police, who make suggestions for changes to the property. If the owner elects to make all of the proposed changes, the Village of Oak Park reimburses the owner for 40 percent of the cost. If the owner elects to make only some of the proposed improvements, Oak Park covers 20 percent of the cost.[17]

With burglary by far the greatest crime problem in Oak Park, burglary reduction is the primary goal. The improvements proposed by the police usually involve target-hardening and access-control strategies such as locks, gates, and fencing. Many of these interventions have been implemented in the eastern third of the village, the part closest to the Austin neighborhood of Chicago's West Side. Aside from SIG, Oak

Park has implemented some physical design changes, including the creation of cul-de-sacs at many locations throughout the village. The street closings are designed to reduce traffic, improve safety, and strengthen neighborhoods. To facilitate police protection (as well as street cleaning and snow removal), village law also forbids overnight parking on most streets.

Oak Park's single-family areas have a 20-year history of block parties, which bring neighbors together and encourage them to look out for each other. In these single-family neighborhoods, the village is often able to close off streets or reroute traffic on the day of a block party. Oak Park police also employ a variety of strategies; in the context of community policing, the department uses specially trained crime prevention officers and regularly schedules community meetings to bring officers and neighborhood residents together to discuss local problems.

Other Sites Contacted by Telephone

In addition to conducting visits at the four sites described previously, telephone interviews were conducted with 11 programs that have implemented significant, coordinated environmental design and management changes with the goal of reducing crime. At each of the telephone sites, two interviews were conducted with key contacts familiar with the local program and conditions. Information obtained by phone was supplemented, if possible, by written materials provided by these sites.

The opportunity to visit programs and inspect the changes made greatly increased the level of nuance and detail available for analyzing the four primary study sites. However, these 11 sites improved our knowledge of place-specific crime prevention efforts around the United States, and they are widely cited in the remainder of the report. A synopsis of the most salient features of these sites and their programs is presented in appendix E.

Endnotes

1. J.D. Feins, *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1983).

2. See for examples: R.A. Gardiner, *Design for Safe Neighborhoods: The Environmental Security Planning and Design Process* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1980); A.

Wallis and D. Ford, eds., *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: The Commercial Demonstration in Portland, Oregon* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1980); A. Wallis and D. Ford, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: An Operational Handbook* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1980). More recent work in this field sponsored by NIJ is summarized in R. Titus, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design at the National Institute of Justice* (unpublished report, May 1994).

3. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, "Perspectives on Violence," in *Understanding and Preventing Violence*, (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1993): 148.

4. One exception to this statement may be the work of S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum,* HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995).

5. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement," in *Crime Prevention Studies,* v. 2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 167.

6. Overall, 22 of the studies identified no displacement, whereas 33 reported some form of displacement (no instance of complete displacement; most instances quite limited). See R.B.P. Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature," in *Crime Prevention Studies*, v. 3, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 197–230.

7. Ibid., 217.

8. R. Clarke and D. Cornish, "Situational Prevention, Displacement of Crime and Rational Choice Theory," in *Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory to Practice*, ed. K. Heal and G. Laycock, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986): 1–16.

9. R.V. Clarke, ed., *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*, (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992): 22–27.

10. Ibid., 169.

11. "Where there are various approaches to reducing crime in public housing, it is tempting to advocate an 'integrated' or comprehensive approach, acting on the full range of variables which might be implicated. Such a solution may well at first sight make sense, and it will certainly placate those unhappy about 'underlying' problems. However, we have some reservations. A comprehensive approach is costly and difficult to implement; more important—at least as far as evaluation goes—it runs the danger of fudging the issue of what works best."

    —P. Mayhew and R.V.G. Clarke, "Crime Prevention and Public Housing in England," in *Crime and Public Housing: Proceedings of a Workshop Held in September 1980*, ed. M. Hough and P. Mayhew (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982): 6.

12. In a wide-ranging review article, Barry Poyner offers an interesting approach to answering these questions. Surveying 122 evaluations of crime prevention projects and scoring each study by the strength of the findings, Poyner examines the evidence for using different crime prevention measures against different types of crimes. See B. Poyner, "What Works in Crime Prevention: An Overview of Evaluations," in *Crime Prevention Studies,* v. 1, ed. R. V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1993): 7–33.

13. According to one researcher, there are two reasons for the latter fact. First, if displacement has received only peripheral attention, benefit diffusion has hardly even been recognized as an explicit possibility. Second, researchers' common use of nearby areas as a basis for comparison in detecting changes in crime incidence (i.e., a nonequivalent control group design) means that—if diffusion of benefits also reduces crime in these areas— the intervention being studied will be reported to have had little or no impact, instead of the extra impact of benefit diffusion being recognized. See J.E. Eck, "The Threat of Crime Displacement," *Criminal Justice Abstracts*, v. 25 (1993): 539–540.

14. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement," in *Crime Prevention Studies*, v. 2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 179.

15. T.M. Hammett, J.D. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen, *Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document,* vol.1 (Final Report) and vol.2 (Case Studies) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, July 1994).

16. J.G. Hayes, *The Impact of Citizen Involvement in Preventing Crime in Public Housing: A Report of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program.*

17. Oak Park recently decided to decrease the percentage of the cost it pays per building, thereby increasing the number of building owners it can assist. The percentages were originally 50 percent (rather than 40) for full improvements and 25 percent (rather than 20) for partial improvements. There is a ceiling for reimbursement at $400 per unit and $16,000 per building.

Chapter 2
Crime and Place: Defining the Problem

Defining the problem is a critical step in planning for change. This chapter examines how to define and analyze crime problems in urban and suburban neighborhoods. It opens with a discussion of how to involve key players in the effort to analyze the crime problem and identifies obstacles that may be encountered along the way. It then reviews the physical features of an area that can influence crime and public safety; the concept of management and how it can be analyzed in a specific area are also discussed. The chapter concludes with an examination of how an area's use—by residents and others—may affect the crime problem. Working together to analyze physical features, management, and use, the key players can define the problem, which is the first step toward solving it.

Involving Key Players

The most effective crime prevention efforts are those that involve a coalition of different players who cooperate to define the problem and then seek solutions. Although it may seem more logical or more convenient to work only with the police when analyzing a crime situation and then later to involve other players in designing the solution, such an approach has two drawbacks. First, it will not produce the comprehensive, detailed, and geographically targeted analysis required for designing effective place-specific interventions. Second, it will not give the other key players a sense of ownership in the definition; because they were not consulted initially, they may not agree with the proposed definition or with its implications for how to improve security in the area.

Even before the renovation of Boston's Castle Square Apartments, several residents from the Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO) had been involved in the local Police Captain's Advisory Board, which met monthly with the South End's police commander to discuss community concerns. The prospective private buyer for the complex, Winn Development Company, needed to know the nature of the environment and how it would affect managing the site in the future. A number of other individuals and organizations also played important roles in defining the crime problem for Castle Square.

At Mar Vista Gardens, a public housing development in Los Angeles, residents, staff of the housing authority, police, and nearby homeowners' associations were involved from the start in examining the crime problem in the development; these discussions served as background for crime prevention proposals and options for the complex. Neighbors, like residents, often have a critical perspective on a community's crime problem. Spillover of drug selling and gang activity into the surrounding community was widely recognized at Mar Vista, and Mar Vista Gardens' neighbors complained frequently to the police about a high level of drive-by drug selling at the development. These neighbors were able and willing to help define the problem.

Enlisting Police Involvement

Obtaining police support and involvement is an essential first step in defining and analyzing a particular area's security and crime problem, for at least two reasons:

1. Because of their familiarity with crime problems in the area, local law enforcement personnel can serve as a source of information and a foil against which to check possible interventions such as design changes.

2. Enlisting police involvement from the start demonstrates to law enforcement officials that those initiating the security and crime prevention effort acknowledge the primacy of the police role in making and keeping the community a safe place to live. This can also help break down barriers and improve relations between residents and police by providing them with a nonconfrontational reason to sit down together.

After being alerted by East Bridgeport residents, the police department of Bridgeport, Connecticut, conducted a rigorous analysis of crime and calls-for-service data and found that traffic patterns on the city's east side—particularly its location along Interstate 95—made the area vulnerable to drug activity. The civilian employee of the department who analyzed the problem—an enthusiastic exponent of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)—was

put in charge of developing a response.[1] He sought the involvement of a local architect, who drew up plans for rerouting traffic throughout the area. The Bridgeport Fire Department also became involved early on, out of concern about access to the area for fire and other emergency vehicles. The involvement of area residents and business people was not sought until the implementation of the Bridgeport program, which came to be known as the Phoenix Project, was underway. Ultimately, residents' and business owners' concerns led the city to alter its ambitious traffic modification plan.

In the 1980's, Five Oaks in Dayton, Ohio, was a small neighborhood in transition from mostly middle-class white to working-class white and African-American residents. Concerned about the racial and economic changes taking place there and about a rising crime rate, a community group—the Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement Association (FONIA)—began working to organize residents and to make the neighborhood's needs a priority with city agencies. At the request of the Dayton Police Department, architect and CPTED expert Oscar Newman was brought to Dayton to discuss general neighborhood stabilization issues, and he became involved in the analysis of the Five Oaks situation.[2] Police sweeps and vigorous law enforcement in 1992 helped raise police awareness of the situation and got the neighborhood back under control.

Building on Existing Relationships

For many communities, the battle against crime is not new. Individuals and organizations involved in past anticrime efforts may prove to be key players in examining the current situation.

As noted previously, problem assessment at Castle Square Apartments in Boston was facilitated by the prior involvement of several residents in the local Police Captain's Advisory Board. Similarly, existing relationships in Oak Park, Illinois, have played an important role in developing the suburban community's proactive anticrime stance. For 30 years, the village has experimented with a variety of methods to attract new residents, ensure diversity, and maintain public safety. The village's planning department, the Austin Boulevard Alliance, the police department, the Housing Programs Advisory Committee, and the Oak Park Regional Housing Center are currently active, and the long history of coalitions and cooperation provides a strong foundation for their efforts.

Organizing the Community

Enlisting the involvement of community residents in analysis of crime problems is indispensable. While calls for service and other police records detail reported criminal activity, building residents can describe hidden drug selling in a high-rise stairwell or the inner courtyard of a building. Outreach to these residents through anonymous tip lines and other confidential means of communicating information to the police may turn fearful and reluctant people into key informants in the definition of a community's crime problem.

Furthermore, there is great potential power in the collective voices and actions of local residents who have organized to work on community issues. Prior research and experience suggest that those interested in crime prevention should make use of established neighborhood organizations, rather than seek to start a new organization.[3] If no such organization exists, bringing together a group to define and tackle the public safety problem may be difficult. Residents may want to enlist the involvement of skilled community organizers who bring to the effort an appreciation of the issues around which the community can best be organized. Community organizers can also help pace a neighborhood's efforts by helping to pick its approaches and its battles.

The Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC) recommends gathering a small group of concerned people to brainstorm about who might be able to help address the problems being discussed and how group members might involve these people or groups. In Brooklyn, CCNYC not only facilitated the organization of the Clinton Hill Block Association (CHBA) but also helped to keep its efforts focused on preventing drug dealing in vacant buildings, a problem with which many area residents could identify. CCNYC helped CHBA keep its initial goals modest and achievable.

The sense that outsiders are the primary source of the crime problem provides a unifying theme for resident organizing. In Bridgeport, Connecticut, the police exploited the finding that much of east Bridgeport's drug trade was supported by drive-by suburban purchasers who accessed the area via Interstate 95. Similarly, neighbors of the Mar Vista Gardens housing development in West Los Angeles came together with development residents out of their common concern about drug activity, much of which seemed to be generated by wealthy outsiders driving into the community and the development. However, organizing crime prevention efforts based on these ideas can run the risk of reinforcing existing

social divisions (by race or class), and communities targeting "outsiders" should take care not to support de facto segregation.

Obstacles to Coordination and Cooperation

Communities may face a variety of obstacles when seeking increased coordination and cooperation, even for purposes of defining the crime problem. Awareness is the first step toward dealing with such obstacles and can ensure that the effort to define and address security problems in a neighborhood is not derailed.

Resident Involvement in Crime. Blaming outsiders for the crime problem may be useful for organizing, but it often oversimplifies the situation. There may be residents who are part of the problem, either as customers for drug dealers or as offenders. In addition, some residents may—as a result of intimidation or by virtue of personal ties—permit illegal activities in their apartments; it is extremely difficult to get accurate information on such involvement. It is also hard to draw distinctions among residents, who may know all too well each others' family members or problems. Rather than asking people to inform on others, an indirect means can be found to signal that criminal involvement will no longer be tolerated.

Past Tensions. A history of failure, tensions, or outright animosity may make many residents reluctant to work with the management, the police, or the municipality. In addition, past tensions between minority groups—or between one group and the police—may require that these groups or organizations reconcile themselves before they attempt to define the crime problem, much less plan or implement place-specific security changes.

In the largely African-American Clinton Hill neighborhood of Brooklyn, a history of poor community relations with the police department and district attorney (DA) had to be overcome before residents could view the police and DA as their allies. Initial police and DA reluctance to assist the Clinton Hill Block Association in its efforts to shut down business at a known drug location was a further obstacle to reconciliation.

Fear of Retaliation. Fear of retaliation is a well-known deterrent to crime prevention activity by citizens. Understandably, both residents and area business owners may be reluctant to become involved with crime prevention initiatives out of fear of physical retaliation by neighborhood drug dealers and others.

However, it is also true that engaging in collective action makes participants less fearful and more optimistic about the prospects for the neighborhood.[4] Local churches and other institutions can help community residents overcome fear by restoring a sense of community. In North Portland, Oregon, a variety of churches and community leaders, as well as a youth gang task force, have helped residents overcome the sense of despair created by the perception that their neighborhood is unsafe.

Population Changes. Population changes can make it difficult to involve key players in defining a neighborhood's crime problem. Simple turnover of residents—ordinary movement in a mobile society or increased turnover due to negative neighborhood conditions—can undermine existing organizations and remove actual or potential local leaders from the scene. In addition, shifting racial demographics or the socioeconomic mix can leave old and new residents uncertain about how to affect the local situation. In the view of the supervisor of the Crime Prevention Unit of the Dayton Police Department, changing demographic patterns in an area have a lot to do with the fear of crime. When speeding cars, gun shots at night, and "open-air drug markets" coincide with shifting demographics, all contribute to residents' sense that things in their neighborhood are out of control.

Stabilizing the community (and stemming "white flight") appears to have been a large part of the goal of organizers in Five Oaks (Dayton, Ohio) and in Oak Park, Illinois. In Five Oaks, crime rates were highest along the southeastern and eastern borders of the neighborhood, areas with higher concentrations of rental residential property, generally poorer residents, and more people of color. The connection between fear of crime and white flight, while sad, is quite clear. In Oak Park, the village's affirmative and proactive programs to ensure diversity have been coordinated with crime prevention efforts, and white flight has not ensued. Thus, in both communities, efforts have been made to stabilize the population without excluding people of color; improving security and preventing crime have become part of the more general objective of improving quality of life and encouraging current residents to stay and seek positive change.

Negative Press. Negative press coverage can reinforce fear and discourage efforts to analyze and then address security problems. Negative perceptions created by the media can even produce a self-fulfilling prophecy, as residents and property owners withdraw from caring for their properties in particular neighborhoods.

Because of the media's central role in influencing the public's perception of crime, communities may want to involve local newspapers or other media outlets in addressing the crime problem. It is possible for the press to help mobilize key players. In Charlotte, North Carolina, a series of articles in the *Charlotte Observer* entitled "Taking Back Our Neighborhoods" thoroughly documented crime problems in various parts of the city. Rather than being a negative, discouraging depiction of the community, these articles were written as a call to action for citizens and organizations concerned about quality of life.

Defining the Crime Problem

Defining the relationship between crime and place is a critical step in determining how best to increase security and prevent crime in a particular neighborhood or housing development. Defining the problem involves several activities:

- Gathering information about crime and disorder.

- Combining this information with geographical data to map specific locations where one or more offenses have occurred.

- Assessing the physical layout and features that could be contributing to vulnerability in these locations.

In collecting and analyzing this information, it is important to take into account the perceptions of the key players, who are likely to have different points of view and also real differences in knowledge about local crime conditions. At Castle Square Apartments (CSA) in Boston, for instance, the police were acutely aware of problems generated by an "old drunk" location that was the site of daily brawls, noisy arguments, and frequent stabbings. In contrast, CSA residents were far more concerned about the muggings and break-ins within the development, and the prostitutes and drug dealers carrying their business into the backyards and parking lots.

Gathering Information About Crime and Disorder

Whether it is a particular incident or a long-standing pattern that has mobilized key players to address security issues, it is vital to gain a more complete picture of crime in the area before changes can be made. Police department records, including calls for service and incident reports, are the most obvious source for information on reported crime. It may not be easy to obtain aggregate (tabulated) data for the specific, narrowly defined neighborhood or housing development. Calls or incident data may only be available in raw form by address, which would require considerable time and effort to gather and analyze. Indeed, the early involvement of police officials may be necessary to gain access to such information.

At such an early stage, it is also useful to look at crime data more widely, putting the specific area in the context of one or more police beats or quadrants. If, like Oak Park, the area of concern borders another jurisdiction, data must be gathered from the adjoining city or town for its specific adjacent beat(s) or quadrant(s). A working relationship between the police in the two jurisdictions can facilitate access to these data.

Police crime data have limitations, however, particularly where fear and/or friction may inhibit reporting of crime. Fear—even apart from actual victimization—influences residents and can contribute to fostering undesirable conditions. For example, if fear keeps some people off the streets or out of common areas during the evening, the lack of foot traffic may increase residents' perceived or actual vulnerability to being mugged. Further, signs of disorder play a recognized role in security problems but are not covered in police statistics.[5] For these reasons, and also to take advantage of the knowledge and observations of residents and others who regularly use the area, it is important to gather additional information about patterns of crime and disorder through various methods, including:

- Interviewing or surveying residents about their perceptions and experiences, considering both actual victimization and fear.

- Making observations about local conditions, using a windshield survey, a block-face checklist, or similar instrument.

- Interviewing police officers assigned to the local area for their informal observations and impressions.

- Convening focus groups of residents or people who work in the area for a guided discussion of crime and fear.

- Simply gathering accounts of incidents or conditions that are observed and associated with fear and crime by residents.

Such information can be extremely useful, even if it is more anecdotal than systematic, particularly if gathered in a way that makes it readily linked to specific locations.

Linking Crime to Location

For defining the security problem in a neighborhood or housing complex, the link between crime and location should be as detailed as possible. Ideally, crime data by type of offense and disorder data by type of problem (e.g., abandoned cars, graffiti, trash) could be mapped against a three-dimensional representation of the area, showing not only the particular block or street address but also the corner of the parking lot or the level of the stairwell where an incident or problem occurred.

For a number of the sites studied for this report, community policing officers proved to be the critical source for detailed information linking crime and disorder to particular locations within the site. In Charlotte, community policing preceded the effort to revitalize the area. As one respondent said, "The police department was already out here with community policing, knew everyone by name, before CMHP [the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership] came on the scene. Pat and Mike [the two community policing officers] and their captain were already there in the neighborhood." CMHP worked closely with the police to identify drug and liquor houses, thus targeting potential property acquisitions.

In Oakland, California, the Oakland Housing Authority's (OHA's) planning department first became involved in the analysis of crime problems in the late 1980's, when fencing was needed to cut the escape route from 14th Street along the rear boundary of Lockwood Gardens. As their experience broadened, the designers and architects began to look at other OHA sites and their crime statistics. As a result, the housing authority acknowledged the vulnerability of various sites and began redesigning them for enhanced security. Exhibit 3 shows a sketch of one OHA site's design problems.

Simple pin maps (with one pin for each police call for service) have long been used to facilitate identifying locations with high crime rates or "hot spots." Advances in computer mapping, a technique increasingly used among law enforcement agencies, make identifying hot spots, managing detailed information, and processing specific inquiries easier.[6] Indeed, such computer maps begin to make causal analysis a possibility. For example, in San Diego, computer mapping revealed that robberies were clustered in two different areas. In the midst of each area was a convenience store;

the robberies were clustered around these locations in the neighborhood.[7] The existence of these crime hot spots and the ability to identify what causes them are an effective argument for place-specific crime prevention.

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In some jurisdictions, there are efforts underway to achieve a high level of locational detail by putting new technology in the hands of patrol officers. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) are jointly experimenting with the use of handheld global positioning system (GPS) devices to record precise locations of crime in terms of latitude and longitude. For multistory buildings, experimental report formats for gathering information in the field using laptop computers require detail about the floor from which the call originated.

Even with less sophisticated techniques, detailed mapping can be created to help define the security problem. Large-scale street maps showing building outlines (footprints)[8] can be annotated to show other features, such as an underpass through a building into the site interior, a vacant corner overgrown with trees, or a bank of pay telephones next to a store. The specific locations of crimes and signs of disorder can then be coded on the maps (using pins, stickers, cut-outs, or markers of different colors) to provide a basis for assessing how the physical layout and features of the neighborhood or housing complex are related to the security problems there. Discussing the maps with all interested parties (including police officers familiar with the area, residents, housing owners and managers, neighbors, and people employed nearby) may well provide further information about crime and fear and help with analyzing current use patterns of the area (as discussed in more detail later in this chapter).

Identifying Key Physical Features

Linking crime and disorder data to location should produce different results in different settings. While a number of sound generalizations about physical features underlie CPTED, these generalizations do not predict the specific patterns of crime in particular places, because the local

Exhibit 3. Redesign for Security: Oakland Public Housing

Insert Floor Plan

patterns result from the confluence of many more factors than physical characteristics. Examples from a number of communities show what was learned from linking crime and location information.

The Lockwood Gardens development in East Oakland, California, is surrounded almost entirely by industrial and commercial facilities, except for an adjoining elderly housing complex also owned and managed by the OHA.[9] Analysis by the OHA and the observations of staff and residents showed the following patterns of crime and disorder relative to the development's physical layout and features:

- An open-air drug market existed along 65th Avenue in the middle of the development. The major concentration of activity was at the curve of the street, where lookouts could be posted to watch traffic turning in from East 14th Street and from Fenham Street.

- The liquor store, car wash, and check-cashing operation on the East 14th Street border of Lockwood Gardens were independent magnets for problems. The primary escape route from police actions at these establishments was along the back fence inside Lockwood Gardens, until the OHA closed off access.

- Drug dealers used the front porches of the bungalows along 65th Avenue for hanging out and conducting business, terrorizing those who lived in the apartments. Some of the buildings were perpetually vacant because the dealers would harass and frighten any new tenants into fleeing. The dealers even used attack dogs (pit bulls and Rottweilers) to threaten and intimidate residents, keeping them off the street.

- The interior of the development contained vacant buildings that served as hiding places for drugs. The playlots were places for dealers and users to congregate. From time to time, apartments would be taken over by the dealers for use as crack houses.

This analysis suggested that automobile and pedestrian access to the site, as well as conditions in the complex's interior, contributed to a situation in which the residents were virtually unable to leave their apartments. Two murders at Lockwood Gardens in 1991 and threats of bodily harm to the OHA's district manager the same year confirmed the need for sweeping interventions.

Conditions in the area of Charlotte, North Carolina, that became known as Genesis Park were somewhat similar to

Problem-Solving With SARA

The SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) problem-solving model can facilitate the process of creating, evaluating, and modifying interventions. The steps in SARA are scanning (initial gathering of data), analysis (examining the data gained from scanning to understand the problem[s] to be addressed), response (implementing and intervention), and assessment (analyzing data gathered through and after the intervention to measure its success). These steps do not need to be mutually exclusive, or clearly linear in time, but rather indicate the importance of ongoing research and evaluation of problems and solutions.

those at Lockwood Gardens in 1991. The area was called Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt, and it was known as Charlotte's biggest drug market. The neighborhood was built up around 1950 and is entirely residential, except for a supermarket and laundromat directly across Oaklawn Avenue. Populated by very low-income renters (many on fixed incomes), as well as by drug dealers, liquor sellers, and squatters, the area was dense with dilapidated houses and overgrown yards. Between 1984 and 1989, there were increasing vacancies on Kenney and Gibbs Streets and more deterioration of the housing.

Until the early 1980's, Fairview Homes (a public housing development adjacent to the neighborhood) was reputed to be the center of heroin distribution for the southeast United States. Because dealers continuously moved back and forth between Fairview Homes and Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt (depending on where the police and the clients were), the CHA built an 8-foot concrete wall between the two areas during a modernization project in 1983 and 1984. The wall cut the traffic between the public housing site and the neighborhood, which enabled the problem to be divided and tackled in two separate pieces. At Fairview Homes, a community crime prevention program started by the CHA showed strong positive results.[10] According to some observers, the wall made it possible to reduce and keep crime levels down at Fairview Homes. To some extent, the wall also made it possible for the private sector to take on the problems of Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt some years later.[11]

An analysis conducted by the community policing officers and the observations of a local pastor and others showed the following patterns of crime and disorder relative to the neighborhood's physical layout and features:

- In 1984, Fairview Homes and Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt were the most active violent crime areas in the city and the worst street drug markets. Cocaine was sold on Kenney Street, heroin on Gibbs Street and Oaklawn Avenue, and marijuana and liquor at the far ends of the streets. Crack cocaine arrived in the mid-1980's and surged in late 1985–1987; Kenney Street switched to a crack cocaine market. Dealers routinely flagged down any cars that came through and offered drugs for sale.

- The neighborhood's western boundary, Interstate 77, played an important role in the drug traffic. Clientele came from other parts of North Carolina and from South Carolina to buy drugs.

- The neighborhood was a scene of loitering, disorder, fights, stabbings, and shootings. The headquarters of the Mustang gang, which trafficked in guns and drugs, was located on Gibbs Street. Murders were attributed to the presence of the Mustang gang and to the other drug activity.

- In addition to the open-air drug market, the area had many drug houses (shooting galleries) and liquor houses (unlicensed sellers of liquor by the drink). Both residents and outsiders frequented these establishments.

This analysis suggested that both street activity and illegal use of residential properties needed to be addressed. Because of considerable involvement in illegal activity by area residents, the housing partnership was careful about renewing leases for existing tenants in houses bought by the CMHP.

Castle Square Apartments in Boston, Massachusetts, is a 500-unit housing development containing a mix of housing types. The complex also contains commercial space along Tremont Street and a supermarket and parking garage along Herald Street (the site's northern edge). There is automobile access to the parking lots within the development from two streets. CSA's immediate surroundings are largely commercial and institutional. The highway on one side, a telephone company facility on Shawmut Avenue, and the Area D police station across Tremont Street separate CSA somewhat from the rest of the South End neighborhood, which "came back"

from considerable decay to renovation and gentrification in the 1970's and 1980's.[12]

CSA was originally developed in 1965 under a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) program that made the rents affordable by providing a mortgage at below-market interest rates. When the original developer decided to sell it in 1987, CSA was being badly neglected, yet it was an attractive property because its mortgage could be prepaid and the use restrictions (requiring low-income occupancy) would soon expire. A good location (close to downtown) and gentrification in the South End made the complex attractive for investment, either as market-rate rental housing or for conversion to condominiums.

When residents began to organize the Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO) in 1987, in response to the rumored sale, physical conditions were poor and signs of disorder widespread. By the time the property actually changed hands in early 1992, conditions had worsened. Specifically:

- There were frequent muggings within the site (with prowlers hiding behind trash cans in the front yards or under the open stairs or up the stairs). There were first-floor window break-ins, and fourth floor break-ins via the rooftops. The hallways were the locale for drug buys and drug use, mainly by nonresidents.

- Major prostitution activity along the parking garage side of the site frequently spilled over into the backyards of the duplexes. A bank of pay phones was heavily used for the drug trade (before the advent of cellular phones).

- Drug traffic and loitering characterized the site day and night. The parking lots could be used by anyone. Condoms, broken bottles, and used needles littered the grounds.

- The park on the corner of East Berkeley and Tremont Streets, known as "Indian Park" because it was used by many Micmac Indians from the South End area, was the site of daily brawls, noisy arguments, and stabbings.

This analysis suggested to the new owners—a partnership between Winn Development Company and CSTO—that intervention was required on many fronts to address the problems of crime and disorder at CSA, because the problems within the housing site were compounded by problems beyond its boundaries involving other organizations and populations.

For the village of Oak Park, Illinois, problems of crime and disorder were anticipated as spillover from Chicago, which it borders. The denser, eastern part of Oak Park—an area with much affordable housing—abuts rough Chicago neighborhoods: Austin to the east and Galewood to the north. The older small apartment complexes in eastern Oak Park are similar to the housing just across the boundaries.

In the late 1960's, Chicago's Austin neighborhood saw classic blockbusting. "Previously, racial lines in Chicago's neighborhoods had been firmly drawn. Until the late 1960's, Austin had been 100 percent white," according to one observer. As Austin underwent rapid property turnover and racial change, its character changed, with disorder and decay resulting from the blockbusting and other unscrupulous real estate dealings that took advantage both of whites' fear and of blacks' pent-up demand for decent housing.

The analysis of Oak Park's situation carried out by the village at the time found the following:

- Poor management of properties seemed to be spreading to Oak Park. Along Austin, Harrison, and other streets with multi-family buildings, there were large numbers of vacant apartments and considerable deterioration.

- Burglary was by far the greatest crime threat, and burglary prevention and/or reduction was the obvious goal. Sometimes there was a little spillover of gang activity and graffiti.

- Funneling east/west traffic on the village's eastern border (and north/south traffic on the village's northeastern boundary) into several major corridors might enable police to better control access to Oak Park from adjacent Chicago neighborhoods.

This analysis suggested that intervention was required to address not only the security problems but also the actual or potential decline of the rental properties in the eastern part of the village. Further, it appeared that changes in traffic patterns could enhance the effectiveness of other changes.

Identifying Managers and Potential Managers of an Area

Once the patterns of crime and disorder and their relationship to the physical features of the place have been analyzed, it is time to consider who currently manages the area. In its broadest sense, *management* means the responsibility for maintaining order in one or more aspects of a place.[13] Who are all the parties that currently take some responsibility for the neighborhood or housing complex? Are there aspects of the place for which no one is currently responsible? What other parties could or should take some responsibility, and for what aspects?

Why Is Management Important?

Management is a critical factor in improving security and preventing crime, both of which are essential to bringing about and sustaining positive changes in a neighborhood or housing complex. Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the sites examined for this study is that *changes in management must accompany and reinforce the physical design changes in order for there to be greater security over the long term.*

What makes management so important? First, its absence results in physical deterioration and disorder, which in turn creates conditions that attract criminal activity to an area. This is the familiar "broken windows" syndrome in which visible, physical signs of neglect (such as abandoned vehicles left on the street or graffiti left on walls) suggest that disorderly or criminal behavior will not be curbed.

Second, if no person or organization exercises "ownership" of a space, then there is no enforcement of community norms. Whether outside or inside buildings, anonymous public spaces encourage the users to withdraw into themselves and treat all others as strangers. Eyes are averted, thoughts elsewhere; people mind their own business and do not observe, much less challenge, the behavior of others. These conditions do not encourage active crime prevention.

Third, and more positively, management can implement changes for security, sustain the improvements, reconstruct social accountability, and lead to further positive change. Indeed, some might argue that there are effective strategies that can be used by management, exclusive of physical changes, to reduce crime and fear. But physical changes without management's persistence in reinforcement are unlikely to succeed. For example, the Macon Housing Authority management's persistence in repeatedly replacing broken bulbs (at considerable cost) convinced drug dealers they were not going to win and it was time to move on.

Who Are the Managers?

Broadly understood, *management* encompasses:

- Both formal and informal exercise of responsibility;

- Both conventional and alternative management entities, and

- Both public and private entities.

Formal management is exercised by persons or organizations officially charged with responsibility for an area. In the public sector, the official management of cities and towns and their neighborhoods lies with local government. Thus, the conventional managers are the line departments that carry out executive functions, such as public safety, streets and sanitation, city planning, health, social services, and the like. In this sense, local police departments are the primary managers of security for their jurisdictions.

Beyond Crime and Disorder: Other Contributors to Community Problems

As progress is made in "defining the problem," aspects of a local area other than crime or signs of disorder *per se* may be identified as contributing to the problem. Nonsecurity issues cited by respondents as important to the formation of their security programs include the following:

- The **deterioration in rental property conditions** in Oak Park and in Charlotte's Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood.

- For Castle Square Apartments, the **loss of businesses**—and especially of the A&P supermarket—that had occupied commercial space along the front of the complex.

- For Lockwood Gardens in Oakland, Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles, and other public housing developments, the level of **hopelessness and apathy among the residents,** their isolation from each other, and their sense that the neighborhood did not belong to them. Also the pattern of residents letting outsiders live with them or even subleasing their units to drug dealers.

- The **proximity of "nuisance" businesses,** such as liquor stores and check-cashing operations, with spillover of traffic and disorder into residential areas (Clinton Hill in Brooklyn, New York; Lockwood Gardens) and the related effects of commercial and industrial zoning on nearby residential neighborhoods (Bridgeport, Connecticut).

- **Lack of recreational programs and facilities for youth,** as well as limited educational and job opportunities, leading to self-destructive behavior such as gang and drug involvement, teen pregnancy, and exposure to HIV (Castle Square; Lockwood Gardens; Mar Vista; Macon, Georgia; Bridgeport).

- The **physical appearance of conventional public housing** in many places—its starkness, uniformity, relatively high density, and lack of amenities or embellishment (Pitts Plaza in San Francisco; Diggs Town in Norfolk, Virginia; Fairview Homes in Charlotte, North Carolina).

- The **proximity of major interstate highways,** bringing drug traffic, gang organizing, and other problems from bigger cities or even from other states (Bridgeport, Charlotte, Oakland).

Because they can significantly affect the success of interventions to reduce crime and disorder, it is important to identify issues and conditions that may limit options, or suggest certain strategies, or that may need to be addressed through other means at the same time that security interventions are undertaken.

Although they are usually independent local authorities rather than line units of city government,[14] public housing agencies (PHAs) are another example of public sector managers. In this case, they are the owners of property and have responsibility for operation of the housing and other facilities they own. Most PHAs directly manage their housing developments, although a number have experimented with private or resident management (as discussed later in this chapter).

In the private sector, formal management of neighborhoods and housing complexes is largely the responsibility of property owners and their designees. Ranging from the homeowner who keeps the grass and shrubs trimmed, to the landlord who makes regular repairs, to the large management company with maintenance and grounds crews for a whole development, private management is the locus of responsibility for at least the physical condition of buildings and any surrounding open areas. Further, for rental property, it is private owners and managers who decide who shall live there, exercising more or less care in tenant screening and selection.

Most neighborhoods and many housing complexes contain nonresidential land uses, such as commercial or office space, institutional facilities (e.g., schools or churches), and recreational facilities (e.g., parks or playgrounds), or industrial property. These land uses bring other private managers into the picture, such as business owners, shop managers, corporations, and religious or educational organizations.

Aside from these formal managers, a variety of *alternative or innovative management* entities are increasingly found in urban and suburban neighborhoods. Examples include local business and property owners' associations, neighborhood or residents' organizations, community coalitions, housing partnerships, community development corporations, and resident management corporations.[15] These generally have their origins in private, voluntary organizations—groups of owners or residents coming together for a shared purpose. They may become formally organized and incorporated nonprofit organizations. Some coalitions and partnerships have public entities (such as city agencies) as members or components.[16] Exhibit 4 shows examples of organizations that played important management roles in the security and crime prevention programs studied for this report.

Analyzing Current Management

Keeping in mind this broadened concept and these varied examples of management, analysis of current management in a neighborhood or housing complex should be fairly straightforward. What individuals, agencies, or organizations own or manage residential property in the area?[17] What corporations or institutions own or manage commercial or industrial facilities, and institutional or recreational features? What agencies of local government are responsible for the maintenance of security, sanitation, and public infrastructure (streets, sidewalks, lighting)?

Are there associations of residents, local businesses, or property owners that have a vested interest in the area? Even if they are already involved as key players, these groups can now be considered in terms of the role they currently play—or could play in the future—in managing the neighborhood or housing complex. The absence of alternative or innovative entities may suggest the need for organizing particular groups (such as residents or local businesses) or for establishing a coalition or partnership involving public and private entities with a stake in the security and future of the area.

Local properties and facilities should also be examined to identify which management entities have security responsibilities. It may be helpful to create a list of major local features and separately identify general management and security management. This might show, for example, that an office complex with well-staffed maintenance and a private, interior security force depends entirely on the police department for exterior security. Or, it might reveal that a group of businesses have joined together to hire private guards to patrol their commercial block during certain times of the day or days of the week, supplementing police coverage.

Analyzing current management may also identify the jobs that are *not* being done (for example, which owners or agencies are not meeting maintenance needs, or which areas are not being secured either by the police or by owners). The results of this analysis may well coincide with problem areas or "hot spots" identified in the examination of key physical features and how they relate to problems of crime and disorder (see previous section). If not, it is particularly important to go back and make sure that the known problem areas are examined in terms of current and future potential management responsibility.

Analyzing Current Use Patterns of an Area

The final aspect of the local picture to be analyzed involves current use: who lives in the neighborhood or housing

Exhibit 4. Examples of Management Entities at Selected Study Sites

Site	Official or Formal Managers	Alternative or Innovative Managers
Tucson, AZ	Tucson Police Department	El Cortez Neighborhood Association
Brooklyn, New York City, NY	NYC Police Department, District Attorney's Office	Clinton Hill Block Association, Citizens' Committee for NY
Oak Park, IL	Village of Oak Park, Oak Park Police Department	Oak Park Building Owners Management Association, Austin Boulevard Alliance, Oak Park Regional Housing Center, Housing Programs Advisory Committee
Mar Vista Gardens, Los Angeles, CA	Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department	Mar Vista Housing Development Corporation
Bridgeport, CT	City of Bridgeport, Bridgeport Police and Fire Departments	East Bridgeport Community Council, Bridgeport Neighborhood Housing
Genesis Park, Charlotte, NC	City of Charlotte, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department	Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership,[18] Genesis Park Residents Association
Castle Square Apartments, Boston, MA	Winn Management Company, Boston Housing Authority, Boston Police Department	Castle Square Tenants Organization

complex, who uses it daily for work, and who else is drawn there for other purposes. Answering these questions can provide additional insight on crime or disorder problems and also suggest certain strategies for improving security and preventing crime.

Who Lives Here?

Understanding who lives in the community is an essential part of defining the problem, because place-specific crime prevention solutions designed without an understanding of the needs and habits of the population are doomed to failure. It is also vital to ascertain—to the greatest extent possible—how much the current residents may be involved in the area's drug or crime activity. This is another question that may be best answered through informal observation by others living or working in the area. When the cleanup of the Genesis Park neighborhood of Charlotte got under way, CMHP maintained low rents for the *acceptable* tenants (who paid their rent, maintained their homes, and did not engage in any criminal or nuisance activities) in properties purchased by

the partnership. However, problem tenants were evicted, and residents engaged in illegal activity were arrested.[19]

However, it may take changes in management (as in the Charlotte example) before problems with current residents can be addressed. That is one reason why (with appropriate constitutional limits on the power of the police to question people on the street) tactics like fencing, gating, and other forms of access control seem so appealing. The ability of a private or public housing development to limit access, except for (1) those who live there, (2) those with legitimate business there, and (3) guests of actual residents, can mean the difference between control of the site and a community run by outsiders engaged in illicit drug selling or other criminal activity.

Who Works Here?

The working population of an area can have a significant influence on its safety, and local employers can play an important management role. Legitimate businesses potentially increase foot traffic and other uses of public space.

Employers may be asked—either by employees or by key players in the neighborhood—to get involved in crime prevention and security efforts. Local companies can also be a source of volunteers for community improvement.

However, the working population of a site often takes on a different character after normal business hours. As if one shift were ending and another beginning, illegitimate operations often start up after normal business hours. Drug dealers tend to arrive and set up shop during the mid- to late-afternoon. Drug dealers and gang members must be counted among the people who work in a neighborhood, and analyzing area use by dealers and gangs is critical for purposes of improving security.

Seemingly legitimate activities may serve as covers for drug dealing and other illegal behavior. At one public housing development in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, drug dealers disguised their work by pretending to do automobile repairs. A raised car hood signaled to buyers that the dealers were open for business, while an opened trunk sent the message that police were watching and buyers should come back later. Similarly, in Charlotte, North Carolina, one drug dealer in public housing stashed his for-sale drugs in the clothes of the baby that he pushed around in a carriage during his work day.[20]

Sometimes, local businesses are part of the problem affecting the neighborhood. One of the hardest areas to patrol around Lockwood Gardens in Oakland is 14th Street near 65th Avenue. The cluster of liquor stores, check-cashing outlets, and car wash attracts many nonresidents who loiter and drink there. The car wash is thought to be a money-laundering front for profits from weapons and drugs (which are sold out of a shack at the rear of the property). On one occasion, an OHA security officer confiscated five weapons from the car wash, but the court case against the owner was lost when the witness disappeared.

Drug Dealers and Organizations. Drug markets have characteristics in common with other forms of local business, but their advertising is often perceived by residents as a sign of disorder in the neighborhood. Common forms of advertising for dealers include cars being repaired on the street (as noted previously, with hoods and trunks up or down to designate the product or to indicate whether the coast is clear) and graffiti to mark the turf of different sales organizations. In Bridgeport, Connecticut:

> . . . Stylized graffiti "tags" written on fire hydrants, sidewalks, or the wall of a building at the selling

Who Lives Here?

The sites used as examples in this report have an extraordinary range of population mixes.

Castle Square Apartments, in Boston's South End, is home to 1,500 people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. Roughly half the residents are Chinese or from other countries in Asia, while 20 percent are African-American, 15 percent are white, and 5 percent are Hispanic. Most tenants have low incomes. The site is also home to several hundred elderly residents.

El Cortez Heights is a desirable neighborhood centrally located on the north side of Tucson, Arizona. Consisting primarily of single-family homes, El Cortez Heights has one apartment building that was not supposed to be built there but somehow "slipped in." "It's just a real nice neighborhood," according to a long-term resident. Predominantly populated by the elderly back in 1971, now there are also younger professional people, mostly without children. The area is ethnically mixed; while predominantly African-American 20 years ago, it is now home to people from a variety of backgrounds.

Oak Park, Illinois, is a middle-class Chicago suburb with a population that is 75 percent white, 18 percent African-American, and 7 percent other races. In the eastern third of the village, there are more low-income individuals. But even there, Oak Park is a long way from a site such as Oakland's Lockwood Gardens, where the entire population is extremely poor.

Lockwood Gardens' population is 82 percent African-American, 16 percent Asian, and 2 percent white. Almost half the development's residents are below the age of 18. Some 80 percent of the occupied units have female heads of house-

location indicate the product sold. Drug shoppers can identify a specific dealing spot by the graffiti . . . . STP stands for Silver Top Posse and BTP for

Black Top Posse, the "products" [crack vials] sold by local crews.[21]

The East Bridgeport community is economically depressed with little legitimate employment. When conditions were at their worst there, the illicit drug trade appeared to employ large numbers of local youths. In the afternoons and evenings, boys and young men could be seen working the corners, steering customers' cars to sales locations, selling, or working as lookouts and spotting police patrols.

Gangs. Gangs are highly structured organizations that work in specific areas, some with a headquarters location and a regular workforce. Gang activity can be highly disruptive to the life of a neighborhood. Today, community concerns about gangs involve their connection to drug activity and rising gun violence. Parents across the United States express concern about the spread of violent big-city gangs—even in small cities that are not generally plagued by drugs and violence.

At Iris Court, a public housing development in Portland, Oregon, the proximity of a high school appears to have contributed to the level of gang activity. While some gang members live in the development, others are attracted by the school and by the fact that Iris Court sees a great deal of foot traffic by all sorts of youth. In addition, on most nights there is a lively presence of nonresidents who come to the apartments to party and to deal, buy, and use drugs.

Though a city without a notable gang problem in 1989, by 1994 Macon, Georgia, had a number of offshoots of West Coast gangs including the Insane Crips from Los Angeles and Folks from Chicago. Relatively innocuous "wanna be" gangs were then taken over by out-of-town recruiters and became much more involved with drug selling and money. Drug activity and violence increased, and organized crime from Miami—the Jamaican Posse and the Florida Boys— established itself in Macon.

Considerable evidence confirms that gangs are spreading, recruiting members in new cities and neighborhoods around the United States. Acknowledging gangs to be organized, structured, and often rather disciplined organizations will help in understanding their ability to adapt to changing conditions. Unlike freelance drug dealers, for example, gangs may be able to sit out a police crackdown, only to return in force once the law enforcement initiative has waned. This limits the effectiveness of intensified drug enforcement and underscores the importance of place-specific crime prevention combining environmental and management changes.

Who Else Uses the Area?

People come to a community for a variety of reasons. Developing an appreciation of the legitimate reasons to use the area—and distinguishing them from illicit aims—is an essential part of the process of defining the crime problem. A new supermarket at Castle Square joins the businesses on the Tremont Street side of the apartment complex in attracting neighborhood residents. These businesses and their patrons have benefited from the improved security at the site. By contrast, the bank of telephones outside the old supermarket was frequently used by suspected prostitutes; removing the phones helped remove this activity from the site.

Accurately identifying both legitimate and illicit uses of an area will help ensure that a program of place-specific crime prevention strategies does not unduly burden legitimate users and businesses. Respecting the needs of these entities will pay off when it comes time to seek their cooperation in implementing proposed changes. Respecting the needs of businesses is an important step toward gaining their involvement in defining the local problem and developing the place-specific solution.

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Endnotes

1. Thomas Rebollar, who has since past away, conceived the project.

2. *Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood Stabilization Plan* (Dayton, OH: Office of Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January 1994): 3.

3. J.D. Feins, *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1983): 25.

4. W.G. Skogan and M.G. Maxfield, *Coping with Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981): 233.

5. See J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1982).

6. F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, *Interagency Workgroups: Geographical Tools to Develop Crime Control Strategies*, DRAFT prepared for NIJ, August 30, 1994; F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, *The Drug Market Analysis Project: Defining Markets and Effective Law Enforcement Practices*, DRAFT prepared for NIJ, September 13, 1994; F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, "Applications of Computerized Mapping to Police Operations," prepared for *Crime Prevention Series: Crime, Place and Police*, ed. J. Eck and D. Weisburd (Nov. 8, 1994): 4. See also T.F. Rich, "Research in Action: The Use of Computerized Mapping in Crime Control and Prevention Programs," (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, July 1995).

7. F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, "Applications of Computerized Mapping to Police Operations," prepared for *Crime Prevention Series: Crime, Place and Police*, ed. J. Eck and D. Weisburd, (Nov. 8, 1994): 3.

8. Such maps are widely available, either through the city or county tax assessor's office or through private companies serving the real estate industry.

9. For background on Oakland's drug situation and earlier efforts to control it, see C.D. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Controlling Street-level Drug Trafficking: Evidence from Oakland and Birmingham," *Research in Brief*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1992); also C.D. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Modern Policing and the Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing New Strategies in Two American Cities," *Research Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Police Foundation, May 1992)

10. J. G. Hayes, *The Impact of Citizen Involvement in Preventing Crime in Public Housing: A Report of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program* (Charlotte, NC: City of Charlotte, 1982).

11. However, according to CMHP, the wall—or perhaps the proximity of public housing on the other side of the wall—is now contributing to difficulties in marketing the rehabilitated homes on the adjacent street.

12. More generally, the gentrification of the South End has involved substantial displacement of poor people of color, with middle-class gay men the principal group of new occupants. Political controversy has, of course, accompanied these changes.

13. In the language of routine activity theory, managers are capable guardians able to prevent disorder and violence. L.E. Cohen and M. Felson, "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach," *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979): 588–608.

14. Public housing authorities (PHA's) are largely creatures of state law, with the same type of legal status as public transit or turnpike authorities, convention and tourism authorities, and the like. While most PHA's across the United States have jurisdictions coterminous with local government, some members of the Boards of Commissioners for PHA's are often appointed by nonlocal officials, particularly by state governors. There may also be local mayoral appointees and/or locally elected members.

In some places, PHA's have been remade into line agencies of local government, often to make them more responsive to local needs. These experiments have not shown any clear advantage; there are highly successful examples (such as Madison, WI) where there is mutual support between the housing agency and other branches of local government, and there are obviously unsuccessful examples (such as Washington, DC) where the housing agency became responsive to mayoral patronage rather than the needs of residents.

15. On the effects of resident management in public housing, see ICF, Incorporated, *Evaluation of Resident Management in Public Housing* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, December 1992).

16. The growth of these alternative management entities around the United States is attributable to several factors: the theme of citizens' participation fostered by Federal social programs of the 1960's and 1970's (such as Model Cities and the Community Action Program); a resurgence of grass-roots organizing, with labor movement origins but focusing now on poor and minority residents of declining urban areas; the fiscal crisis of many cities, which has brought a greater focus on mobilizing private resources; and the tax limitation movement in various States, which has put fiscal constraints on local government in smaller cities and suburbs, so that mobilizing private resources becomes a means of sustaining facilities and programs in these areas as well.

17. It can sometimes be difficult to identify the actual owners of property if blind trusts or other legal vehicles are used to mask ownership. In this situation, there are published guides to title searching as well as local organizations that can help you gain maximum information. Legal advice can also be sought, through public agencies or a private attorney.

18. As CMHP acquired properties in the neighborhood, it arguably became an official manager. However, the role it has taken has gone far beyond management of its properties.

19. Now the area is occupied by low- to moderate-income working families and a few renters.

20. See S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum,* HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995): 8.

21. J. Epstein and S. Sifre, "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access by the Suburban User" (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., February 1994): 7.

Chapter 3
Planning for Change: Program Design

This chapter discusses some important considerations in planning a place-specific security and crime prevention program. It opens with an inventory of the numerous crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies and tactics that have been used to improve the security of the physical environment. With examples from the study sites, it then addresses how to identify and mobilize program resources. The common problem of not knowing where to start when tackling a complex problem is also addressed, with examples and advice from the sites.

A Primer of CPTED Strategies and Tactics

Once a community has defined and analyzed its crime problem, it is time to begin planning for change. Selecting the strategies and tactics to be implemented at a site involves the same careful analysis needed to understand the crime problem. While bricks and mortar and razor ribbon may be an effective means of keeping a problem out, a fortress appearance sends a negative message. Creating an environment that is both attractive and functional is important, because people live there and because improving the image of an area contributes to crime prevention.

This section draws heavily from a curriculum on place-specific crime prevention techniques created for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) Crime Prevention and Security Division, which, in 1995, was presented in a series of technical assistance workshops on CPTED and situational prevention in public housing.[1] Strategies applicable to a wide range of neighborhoods and housing complexes are described and illustrated with site examples; exhibit 5 summarizes the major categories of strategies.

Target hardening includes improvements that make unauthorized access more difficult. Installing strong doors, locks, and window screens, reinforced glass, and alarms can significantly reduce the chance that criminals will gain access to the structure. In Macon, Georgia, the housing authority has improved the building exteriors in most of its developments by installing foam-core steel doors, dead-bolt locks, and

marine glazing windows (which make climbing through broken windows very dangerous).

Access control can be achieved by keeping doors and gates locked and interior common spaces fenced off from public access. Establishing visitor check-in booths and guard houses, reducing the number of entrances and exits, and issuing pass cards can help management maintain control of a site. Emergency stairwells can be restored to their intended purpose by equipping them with alarm-connected panic bars and removing exterior door handles. Roof-top access doors at Castle Square Apartments were converted into emergency-exit-only doors, to reduce burglar access to upper-floor apartments.

Checking resident identification can be a particularly effective means of controlling crime in both public housing developments and private apartment complexes. Buzzer and intercom systems, security check-in booths, resident identification, and metal detectors can be used to ensure that only residents and legitimate visitors are entering a building.[2] In Macon, Georgia, housing authority employees and elderly residents are issued a credit card–like key that activates entrances through motion rather than insertion (which can be difficult for elderly or disabled residents). A scanner reads the card from the carrier's pocket or purse when she or he approaches the door; if the carrier's code is recognized as valid, the door opens. Limiting the number of apartments sharing a corridor or entrance and creating key access to laundry rooms (and even elevators) are other means of access control. Even simple changes like assigning parking spaces and requiring parking permits can make a big difference in controlling use of the environment.

Deflecting offenders involves broadcasting a message that sale or use of drugs and other illicit activity will not be tolerated in the area. By changing the traffic patterns, closing streets, and making problem areas into "No Parking" or "No Standing" zones, offenders can be moved along, if not removed altogether. Even the positioning of a litter container or the relocation of a bus stop can help achieve the desired effect. In Oak Park, Illinois, signs in residential areas on the village's perimeter warn drivers that the rear alleys are not for through traffic. Drivers caught using these routes are

Exhibit 5. Summary of CPTED Strategies and Tactics

Target hardening Strong doors (magnetic locking, foam-core steel) Locks (dead bolt) Window screens Reinforced glass (marine glazing) Alarms	*Access control* Doors and gates locked Interior areas fenced off Visitor check-in booths Guard houses Number of entrances and exits reduced Pass-card system in use Key access to laundry rooms and elevators Indoor and outdoor spaces divided into smaller, easily identifiable areas Resident IDs checked Buzzer and intercom systems [Metal] detectors Assigned parking places Parking stickers	*Deflecting offenders* Traffic patterns changed Streets and alleys closed "No Parking" or "No Standing" zones created
Closing crack houses and repairing "broken windows" Garbage-strewn lots cleaned up Abandoned cars towed Abandoned houses boarded up 24-hour graffiti removal	*Cameras and other formal surveillance* Closed-circuit television Portable camera systems Police call boxes Trained resident patrols Police substations On-site security offices Kobans (mini-stations)	*Surveillance by employees* Housing authority staff Bus drivers Crossing guards Mail handlers Utility company workers Social services staff
Improving natural surveillance Improved street and interior lighting Non-see-through fencing and barriers removed Trees and hedges pruned Alcoves and other interior blind spots removed Vulnerable areas redesigned or relocated	*Removing inducements to crime* Vacant apartments rented Overnight street parking banned	*Signage and bans on use* "Drug-Free Zones" Posted guest and visitor policies "No Trespassing" signs

Adapted from R.V. Clarke, S.L. Sorensen, and J. Fagan, "Situational CPTED Matrix for Public and Indian Housing" (see appendix C). The matrix appears in S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum*, HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995): 13.

ticketed, reinforcing the message that these are not through streets to be used for covert access or to avoid traffic along busy North Avenue.

Closing crack houses and repairing "broken windows" means recognizing the signs of physical disorder or of a deteriorating situation before they out of control. Criminals can be deprived of the loci of their trade, whether it be a drug house where users can consume the product or other drug market enablers. Garbage-strewn lots offer dealers a place to hide their drugs; if lots are cleaned up, other stashes must be found. Removing old couches and mattresses from a park next to Castle Square Apartments in Boston and shutting down a crack house in Clinton Hill in Brooklyn helped residents regain control of their neighborhoods.

Cameras and other formal surveillance are means for direct observation of the site to ensure that no illicit activity goes unnoticed. Closed-circuit television, portable camera systems, and police call boxes are potentially useful aids to formal surveillance. The closed-circuit TV cameras and monitor installed at Grant Manor in Boston are the center of a surveillance system for three housing complexes in close proximity.[3] One security company is monitoring all three sites (via remote cameras), requiring fewer personnel than would have been needed without the cameras and thus making more efficient use of security funds.

The closed-circuit TV cameras and monitor installed at Grant Manor in Boston are the center of a surveillance system for three housing complexes in close proximity. One security company is monitoring all three sites (via remote cameras), requiring fewer personnel than would have been needed without the cameras and thus making more efficient use of security funds.

Trained resident patrols are an effective means of mobilizing residents' vested interest in safety as well as a means of formal surveillance. At the Chicago Housing Authority, resident patrols have been successfully mounted under extreme conditions of disorder and violence in family high-rise developments; among other effects, the patrols have improved communication among the residents and given participants a sense of control over their environments.[4] Police substations or security offices can be created on-site at a housing development (as was done at Lockwood Gardens) or at an automatic bank teller facility, as was the case in Oak Park, Illinois.[5]

Surveillance by employees involves enlisting individuals who work in the target area—such as housing authority staff, bus drivers, or crossing guards—to help identify problem locations and individuals. This strategy asks those who are already at a location to be an extra set of eyes and ears for safety. Surveillance by employees, paired with greater vigilance by residents, can exponentially increase a community's capacity to monitor itself.

Improving natural surveillance can take the form of improved street and interior lighting, removal of non-see-through fencing and barriers, and even pruning of trees, shrubs, and hedges. Removing alcoves and other interior blind spots, and redesigning vulnerable exterior areas such as unattended parking lots or covered walkways, can also improve opportunities for natural surveillance by residents and others (see photo, this page). Relocating vulnerable areas such as playgrounds to locations near sources of natural surveillance is also effective.

With the goal of improving natural surveillance, the Macon Housing Authority employees and residents, together with power company employees, regularly tour the developments

Improved Natural Surveillance Through Redesign

Photo 3-2

At Castle Square Apartments, interior blind spots were eliminated by adding a curtain wall at the street front (to enclose open, recessed stairwells) and improving interior lighting.

at night to identify where new lighting might be installed. When the Castle Square Apartments in Boston were rehabilitated, pedestrian tunnels from Tremont Street and Shawmut Avenue into the site were closed, and a covered walkway alongside the old supermarket was opened up to light, air, and surveillance.

Removing inducements to crime may take the form of keeping a building's apartments rented (as vacant units tend to be targets for vandalism and run the risk of being turned into drug houses), or banning overnight street parking (as has been done in Oak Park).[6] In Cleveland, Ohio, the police have taken things a step further by housing officers who volunteer for the program (on a rotating basis) in newly renovated houses that had previously been abandoned.[7]

Signage and bans on use, sometimes known as symbolic barriers, can be an effective means of controlling the environment. Strategies such as "Drug-Free Zones" and posted guest and visitor policies or "No Trespassing" signs do, however, rely on a level of enforcement adequate to maintain their credibility. When such policies are not enforced, offenders quickly learn to ignore them. In Charlotte, there is formalized cooperation between the police department and the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). One or two officers per district go through training with the CHA and become "designated agents" of the housing authority who enforce bans against individuals and generally enforce loitering and trespassing regulations.

Selecting Approaches That Work for Your Community

The most effective place-specific crime prevention strategies are those that take into account the geographic, cultural, economic, and social characteristics of the target community. Thus, the selection of CPTED tactics and elements should be made in close collaboration with the community, after sustained observation of its current patterns of use, and after the other steps in defining and analyzing the problem have been accomplished (see chapter 2).

Environmental design solutions should be respectful of the habits and behavior of law-abiding area residents. Restricting dealer access while preserving the area (or providing alternative outdoor spaces) is preferable to removing benches or removing trees and bushes if many residents will miss the chance to sit outdoors. The community park at Castle Square Apartments, a neighbor of the Villa Victoria complex, was designed by a local architect with considerable input from Chinese-American and other residents. The en-

closed space has elements of an oriental garden. Now people of all ages come to sit or play in an area that was once a favorite hangout for derelicts and drunks. It is an oasis that brings residents of all ethnic backgrounds together (see photo this page). Villa Victoria, a housing development in Boston's South End that is home to a large Puerto Rican population, was constructed around a central square, as is often found in the Spanish Caribbean. Small shops and play areas line the plaza, and on warm days older men and women, as well as young families, sit out in the square. Over time, the design has generally proven effective at giving residents a sense that they live in a *community*. The goal, of course, is to make the environment safe, but not at the expense of those legitimately living or working in the community.

The community park at Castle Square Apartments, a neighbor of the Villa Victoria complex, was designed by a local architect with considerable input from Chinese-American and other residents. The enclosed space has elements of an oriental garden. Now people of all ages come to sit or play in an area that was once a favorite hangout for derelicts and drunks. It is an oasis that brings residents of all ethnic backgrounds together (see photo this page).

A Community Park Replaces an Eyesore

Photo 3-3

The serene park at Castle Square occupies a site formerly known for derelicts and drunken brawls.

> *Villa Victoria, a housing development in Boston's South End that is home to a large Puerto Rican population, was constructed around a central square, as is often found in the Spanish Caribbean. Small shops and play areas line the plaza, and on warm days older men and women, as well as young families, sit out in the square. Over time, the design has generally proven effective at giving residents a sense that they live in a community.*

Maintaining a Menu of Approaches

The primer provided previously is not a comprehensive list of every possible CPTED intervention, but it is designed to offer an overview of strategies and tactics communities may wish to employ in implementing their own place-specific crime prevention approaches. Because some neighborhoods have considerably more difficult or complex crime problems than others, these communities may require more attention and ingenuity in crafting effective strategies than the less troubled ones. While the primer offers lessons for the broadest possible range of community types, the applicability of these lessons to a particular site will vary considerably.

In acknowledgement of the fact that crime prevention is not a "one size fits all" exercise, the Citizen's Committee for New York City has prepared a manual that lists "menus" of different crime prevention strategies for use in different situations. (Contact information for the Citizen's Committee is provided in appendix D.)

Identifying Resources

Assistance with security and crime prevention can come from a variety of sources, and a wide range of them should be considered in the program planning process. Communities require access to a variety of skills in order to plan and implement place-specific crime prevention strategies. Professionals such as architects, planners, and contractors may be needed to work with the residents, managers, and police on physical design changes. Experienced housing managers can make a significant contribution to planning for management changes. And, of course, local law enforcement officials should play a role in planning security features of the program.

In taking an inventory of resources, it makes sense to be over-inclusive rather than narrowly focused. Fiscal austerity and ever-increasing demands on law enforcement budgets (as on city government more generally) are two central reasons for widening the net; these are the same reasons suggested in chapter 2 for using a broadened concept of place management that brings other players into the game. Thus, in focusing attention on the roles of management and resident organizations, this report suggests a number of less obvious places to look for assistance in making neighborhoods and housing complexes safer places to live.

Types of Resources

In all communities, there are untapped groups, individuals, and even sources of funding that should not be overlooked in planning a place-specific crime prevention program. The major types of resources are training and technical assistance, funding, in-kind contributions, professional skills, and institutional involvement. In scouting potential resources, those planning a local program will want to consider these questions:

- What is their relationship with local community-based organizations, potential funding sources, local media, police, and city government?

- How are relations between the target community and the rest of the city generally?

- Are there issues on which residents have worked with others in the past?

- Are there issues of concern to others in the community with which they can assist? In other words, can a *quid pro quo* be worked out?

- Are there *pro bono* or low-cost professional services that can be relied on (such as advisors or researchers from a local university)? If so, what sorts of services should be obtained this way?

- Are any local businesses willing to contribute materials and/or labor to assist with the physical redesign or renovation (e.g., by donating dead-bolt locks, building and construction labor, landscaping materials and tools, or the like)?

In Oak Park, Illinois, the Austin Boulevard Alliance (a local block association), the public/voluntary Housing Programs Advisory Committee (HPAC), and the Oak Park Building Owners/Managers Association all contribute to the village's effort to prevent and address problems with burglary and

related crime. All three groups serve as important sounding boards against which the village has been able to try out ideas like the Security Improvement Grant program.

Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End presents an unusual example of a community in which all of the some-times competing forces came together to create something greater than the sum of its parts. A demonstration of the breadth of the resources and expertise brought together in the Castle Square negotiations is the fact that professional sup-port and advisors to the Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO), and to the project generally, included senior staff from the state's Community Economic Development Assis-tance Corporation, a Greater Boston Legal Services attor-ney, the police department's Area D Deputy Superintendent, Boston Redevelopment Authority staff, and State and Fed-eral housing agency officials. Also involved in the Castle Square project was the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, which holds a $25 million purchase money mort-gage on the property. With Community Development Block Grant money and a city tax break, residents spearheaded economic growth in the neighborhood by attracting a new, neighborhood-oriented, independent supermarket to the site.

From the mid-1980's, the Macon Housing Authority (MHA) recognized the need for a comprehensive crime prevention program in its public housing developments. The agency consulted at length with the HUD regional administrator about resident involvement, lease enforcement, tenant screen-ing, greater police involvement, youth development, drug education, and at-risk youth intervention programs. How-ever, a $225,000 HUD demonstration project grant was not enough to pay for the comprehensive approach everyone wanted. The need for additional funding and expertise prompted the housing authority to build a broader commu-nity coalition that included other city agencies and local social service providers, thereby accessing expertise on drug prevention and related services for residents. According to the director of the MHA, "People have to trust you in order for the program to work." But it took trust coupled with office space (in which to house social services and an on-site police substation) to recruit agencies such as the Macon Arts Alliance, the Family Counseling Center, and the Central Georgia Center on Family Violence into the program. In addition, Federal public housing modernization funding enabled the MHA to create or rehabilitate on-site community rooms for resident use, which in turn made it much easier to get the residents involved.

In Tucson, the El Cortez Heights community has received assistance from university students in horticulture classes and from junior high students (who have joined in neighbor-hood and yard cleanups); artists and individuals with expe-rience in construction have also volunteered their time. "If you just ask, people are more than willing to help out," notes a Tucson organizer. As for area residents themselves, "They just have to want it and work for it, and contact the right people in their town to help them and give input. It's hard work, and people can help. You have to meet and organize and decide what problems you want to deal with."

Exhibit 6 shows the various types of resources used in selected study sites. A number of the larger programs at other sites (including Lockwood Gardens, Mar Vista Gardens, Commonwealth, and Pitts Plaza) involved major redevelop-ment efforts under HUD funding for public housing modern-ization. The Comprehensive Grant Program is one source of continuing support for large-scale physical redesign and management improvements.

Priority or Key Resources

While Castle Square's good fortune may not be typical of all communities' experiences with obtaining professional and in-kind resources, local program planners need to think creatively about resources that may be available to them in their own communities. According to most respondents, four resources in particular are indispensable to a community's crime prevention efforts:

- *Police*. For the Director of Anti-Crime Activities at the Citizens Committee for New York City, police are a particularly important resource because they can help organize the community (as they often have money to do so) and can help communities gain access to other government agencies.

- *Staff time from a nonprofit community-based organiza-tion (CBO)*. The CBO can serve as a catalyst in organiz-ing the neighborhood, and the benefits of enlisting a professional community organizer should not be under-estimated.

- *Volunteer time*. While paid staff may be doing a great job, without the residents' involvement the project is far less likely to succeed.

- *Media.* Media coverage to publicize victories and hold politicians accountable is essential. The media should be enlisted at the outset and can be kept informed of local efforts through press releases and guided tours of the target area. Specifically, the Citizens Committee for

Exhibit 6. Examples of Types of Resources Used at Selected Study Sites

Site	Training and Technical Assistance	Funding Sources	In-Kind Resources	Professional Skills	Institutional Involvement
El Cortez Heights (Tucson, AZ)	Tucson Police Department, NCPI (CPTED)	Resident funds for lighting, Tucson Police Department	Resident volunteer labor (door-to-door survey)	Community organizing	DPW Parks and Recreation
Five Oaks (Dayton, OH)	Oscar Newman (CPTED)	City of Dayton CDBG funds	Resident volunteer labor	Urban planning and design	FONIA, Traffic Engineering Department, DPW
Clinton Hill (Brooklyn, NY)	Citizens Committee for NYC (CCNYC)	City of New York CDBG funds, CCNYC mini-grant	Resident volunteer labor, residents as plaintiffs	In-house community organizer, Americorp, student interns, legal skills	Police Department, Brooklyn DA's Office, Department of Housing Preservation and Development
Phoenix Project (Bridgeport, CT)	Police Department (CPTED)	Police Department discretionary fund, drug enforcement mini-grant	Jersey barriers (Governor's Office), asphalt finishing (local contractor), resident volunteer labor	Architect, local business/ community council	Highway Department, DPW, at-risk kids initiative
CDBG = Community Development Block Grant; DPW = Department of Public Works; FONIA = Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement Association; NCPI = National Crime Prevention Institute.					

New York City (CCNYC) encourages communities to ". . . send press advisories. Talk to an editorial board. Make this a broad issue that appeals to the media. Stress the involvement of a core group of organizers, including law enforcement and social service experts."

Despite prior resident efforts, the Phoenix Project in Bridgeport, Connecticut, would never have gotten off the ground if it were not for the enthusiastic support of the city's police chief and mayor. Both leaders threw themselves behind the plan without reservation. In particular, their statements to the local and Statewide press about Bridgeport's problem—and its solution—garnered much-needed interest and support for the effort. Efforts to recruit in-kind support from the state highway department and a local contractor directly benefited from the public proclamations and behind-the-scenes encouragement that the mayor and police chief gave to the project.

Elsewhere, priority or key resources that initially may not have appeared all that special may, in fact, have been the long-sought impetus behind a program. In Los Angeles, anti-crime activities in the city's public housing developments started with a HUD Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP) grant, which was later supplemented by housing authority operating budget support. Despite this, however, participation from other agencies was lacking. It was not until a community center was constructed at the Mar Vista Gardens development that service providers came knocking. Residents and the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) found that, once they had one service provider on board, others wanted to be involved. At Mar Vista Gardens, residents undertook a major effort to recruit local providers. Companies and institutions donated goods, services, and information to events.

No matter how valuable the contributions of professionals and institutions recruited to help a program, they do not

outweigh the contribution of the residents themselves. The knowledge, time, effort, dedication, and energy of residents mobilized to improve their own housing complexes or neighborhoods are the most valuable resources of all for place-specific crime prevention efforts, particularly over the long term. When the changes stop seeming new and the police begin to focus on another neighborhood, the residents are still there and still care.

First Steps: Where to Begin

Once a community's crime problem has been defined and analyzed, two different first steps are commonly taken to begin a security program that combines design, management, and use changes. Some programs start with enhanced policing and/or other security; others start with resident or community organizing. In this section, the advantages of each are examined, and some considerations are offered for deciding where a specific local program should begin and how it should proceed.

Enhanced Security

Among the study sites, both Lockwood Gardens (Oakland) and Genesis Park (Charlotte) began with enhanced security. In the Charlotte neighborhood, the first step was a community policing effort that began in 1991. It was a rather limited effort at first, but it tackled an area with an entrenched problem, an area that had made the transition from the worst heroin to the worst crack cocaine market in Charlotte. Previously, the police typically went into Kenney/Gibbs/ Wayt with 2- to 3-car backup (and 3 to 4 cars for a drug sweep). With community policing, two Charlotte Police Department officers went door-to-door in the neighborhood during the daytime, meeting residents and gaining familiarity with all the legal and illegal activity, the drug market patterns, and the drug and shot houses. The payoff for taking the initial step with community policing includes the following:

- The officers developed a fine-grained and location-specific familiarity with all the problems of crime and disorder and identified a substantial number of hot spots.

- Insights were gained about the relative roles played by area residents (including squatters) and nonresidents in the crime and disorder. The officers could predict which illegal activities would move out under pressure and which would need to be rooted out through changes in property ownership and management.

- Area residents became familiar with the two community policing officers and learned to rely on their presence. As trust developed, so did information the police could use to arrest dealers, seize guns and stolen goods, and trigger housing code enforcement. Small improvements began to take hold.

In this way, community policing set the stage for the initial purchases of property by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (CMHP). The police put up traffic barriers to stop drive-throughs and escapes when CMHP became the principal property owner. Then, the Drug Interdiction Unit began using CMHP houses for stakeouts and strictly enforced antiloitering and trespassing statutes. When these actions shifted drug buyers to other markets, the sellers, following their customers, began to move out. Control had been reestablished, and public safety became a possibility again in the neighborhood.

At Lockwood Gardens, the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) had tried harsh policing tactics to combat crime and drugs, but the agency's security operation had been tainted by civil liberties violations and corruption in 1989 and 1990. As a result, when OHA received its initial PHDEP grant from HUD in 1990, no security component was funded.[8] Under this grant, some CPTED elements were implemented (primarily improved lighting), as well as extensive youth programming and an effort to organize a residents' association. But, according to the Oakland Police Department (OPD) lieutenant who came (on loan) to head the OHA's security program in 1991, "For an entrenched drug and crime presence, you need more than physical or prevention programming." Perhaps it was no surprise, then, when an evaluation of the early PHDEP efforts at Lockwood Gardens showed that there had been no change in the blatant and serious drug and crime activity, that intimidation and harassment of residents by the dealers continued, and that the high level of fear among residents remained.[9]

A new and different approach was clearly needed. As the OPD lieutenant built a more professional security operation with stricter recruitment and training, he also worked within the OHA to reanalyze the situation at Lockwood. The idea of fencing the site—first suggested by a security consultant— became part of a new PHDEP grant application in 1991. However, even while the grant was funded by HUD and the OHA began serious work with residents and designers on physical changes, the OHA security department chose a community policing effort as a fresh start to enhance security in the development. One officer was assigned to Lockwood full-time and spent his shifts walking, meeting people, and

going door-to-door to introduce himself to the residents.[10] This occurred at the same time that, according to another officer, the Oakland police generally needed two cars to drive through the site: "You couldn't leave a police car on the street and walk in [when answering a call]; you drove up on the lawn to get as close as possible to where you were going. OPD wouldn't come through here without three cars! They were shot at; bottles and rocks were thrown." As in Charlotte, community policing in this drug-ridden and dangerous site had several important payoffs, including improved information, the beginning of resident trust, and some reduction in resident fear and pessimism. According to the OHA's district manager for East Oakland, community policing was needed to build bridges with the residents, to enable the police to be seen as part of the solution rather than part of the problem (a hard sell after the security scandal): "Community policing creates an atmosphere of communication and respect; you don't treat residents as the problem (as police did in the past) but emphasize the partnership of police and residents. You build trust."

With the completion of an attractive perimeter fence around Lockwood in early 1994 came an intensive coordinated security effort combining sworn OHA officers with private security guards. There was one officer on-site 24 hours a day, supervising three to four guards. The kiosks at the entrances to the sites were manned, and every car coming through was stopped. This high-visibility effort was sustained for 7 months, with substantial visible impact on the level of street drug activity and intimidation.[11] Changes in OHA management and maintenance occurred at the same time, and resident participation began to increase.

It obviously matters what form the initial enhanced security takes. Lockwood Gardens and Genesis Park started with *community policing*, which had particular advantages much appreciated by both residents and managers. By contrast, in Norfolk's Diggs Town public housing development, the initial security step took the form of focused patrol. Some residents saw the police crackdown (without prior communication from the police department) as heavy-handed. The negative reaction to this policing mode lasted for some time. Further, the police crackdown did not rid the area of drugs for long, since it was believed that "the police just [drove] by as an exercise." Some dealers were soon back standing on corners. Later improvements in Diggs Town were attributed not to security activity but to increasing cooperation among residents, the housing authority, the school board, and social service agencies.

Resident Organization

Several of the sites studied for this report chose resident or community organizing as their first step in place-specific crime prevention. Castle Square Apartments (CSA) in Boston, Clinton Hill in New York City, and El Cortez Heights in Tucson all began with a grass-roots effort and incorporated security, physical, and property management changes later.

The former president of the CSTO moved into the complex in 1980 and remembers how she saw it slide downhill. An initial, unsuccessful effort to organize the tenants was made in 1985, when condominium conversion was widespread in Boston and rumors of CSA being on the market first surfaced. In 1987, when the threat of sale became real, organizing was tried again, and this time a strong response led to the formation of CSTO. With support from many residents, and with encouragement and technical assistance from a number of public and private agencies, CSTO played from a very strong hand as negotiations of the sale proceeded.

From the prospective buyer's point of view, in 1987 the Castle Square property was clearly being neglected, and yet it was attractive for upgrading as rental property or conversion to condos. The buyer negotiated a 3-year option to purchase. During a period of extended negotiations with HUD, the residents made their voices heard; for example, they were able to obtain a substantial cash settlement from the seller, on the grounds that management neglect had made their living circumstances unhealthy and dangerous. This led to a meeting between CSTO and the buyer and ultimately to development of a legal partnership between them. The deal covered acquisition, rehabilitation, and long-term management of the complex (using a "seamless design/build/manage approach"), with both partners fully involved in all aspects. At the end of 15 years, CSTO will come into full ownership of the development.

One element of the Castle Square story does resemble that of sites starting their crime prevention programs with enhanced security. Three months before the sale of CSA to the partnership became final, a drug dealer pulled a knife on the leader of the residents' group, and the property owner did not respond even to this example of violence at the site. The incident convinced the buyer to put a security force in place then and there, even before legal ownership. A paid security force and a paid Boston Police Department detail were assigned to CSA for some months, while new management took over and the property was rehabilitated; the detail was gradually phased out and the level of security was reduced once site control was regained.

In the Clinton Hill area of Brooklyn, the crime prevention program started in 1992, when there was a string of murders in the neighborhood; the death of a shopkeeper who was known and liked by many residents was the final straw, according to one resident activist. The residents formed the Clinton Hill Block Association (CHBA). When contacts with the police produced no cooperation or crime data, CHBA moved forward on its own, with advice and assistance from CCNYC. Sure that the murders were related to heavy drug dealing in the neighborhood, residents used their own experience and knowledge of local conditions to determine the type of crime they wanted to target: the problem of abandoned buildings housing drug markets.

Involving the police and DA's office was a long and difficult process, but finally the police did identify 1000 Fulton Avenue as a particularly active drug house. Members of the CHBA then brought individual civil suits alleging nuisance against the owner of that building. (The CHBA was afraid to bring suit in its own name against the owner, out of fear of potential retaliation). The organization had to convince the DA's office to pursue the cases and convince the police to give them information to support the claim that this building was a menace. Considerable time was then spent going to court to follow the case through. The judge eventually ruled that the building would have to be securely boarded up (in the short term) and later remodeled to allow police access and legal use. After this first victory, police and resident relations improved, as police began to trust residents more and residents felt more empowered. Unfortunately, the landlord did not make appropriate renovations, and in a second round, the court ruled that the building had to be permanently boarded up.

The first steps taken in Tucson's El Cortez Heights neighborhood were similar to those in Clinton Hill: organizing the residents. However, in this case, the police played an important role in helping the neighborhood get mobilized. The Tucson Police Department (TPD) had operated Safe by Design (a CPTED program) and Crime-Free Multihousing programs with grant funds, and they were ready to assist El Cortez Heights residents with crime data and with organizing advice. According to one neighborhood association member, residents started by meeting with the police officers, obtained assistance from them, and then formed a community action team that went door-to-door in the area, asking people about problems in the neighborhood. Organizing a neighborhood watch, they obtained statistics from the TPD on a variety of felonies and misdemeanors (aggravated assault, burglaries, car theft, malicious mischief, domestic

violence, weapons, prostitution, narcotics violations, juvenile violations). While it appeared that most of the crime was committed by people coming from outside the neighborhood, there were also a few undesirables living there. Residents then discussed the results of the crime analysis and problem survey at a larger community meeting in order to clarify each problem, suggest solutions, and set priorities. According to one resident,

[We] formed a neighborhood association recognized by the city, with a political voice. The police were initially aggressive in enforcement, and they also did neighborhood watch and community-based work. They [the residents' association] needed to get people involved, and fortunately they did, because they saw some good things happen fairly soon, and that inspired them to keep with it.

Choosing Where to Begin

The experiences of these sites and the related literature suggest that the choice of starting point for a place-specific crime prevention program should be made based on answers to the following questions:

- Are residents of the housing complex or neighborhood too frightened or too embattled by crime and drugs to come out and participate in anticrime efforts or community organizations?

- Is there no existing community organization that could add security and crime prevention to its issue agenda?

- Are the police unused to working directly with citizens' groups or unresponsive to residents' requests for information or assistance?

- Is the police department operating in a reactive rather than proactive mode, primarily responding to calls for service rather than moving toward community policing or problem-oriented policing?

If the answer to the first two questions is "yes"—that is, if residents are too frightened and isolated by the level of crime and disorder in the neighborhood and if there is no existing community organization that can take on the issue from a resident base—then experience argues for starting with enhanced security. The police department should be part of this effort, although (if the department's means or willingness are limited) it may be necessary to find resources for private security as well.

On the other hand, if the answer to the last two questions is "yes"—that is, if the situation is characterized by an unresponsive and/or reactive police force—then it may be necessary to organize residents first, even though this can be difficult under severe conditions. Finding allies—through the process of identifying and enlisting key players (as discussed in chapter 2)—will be all the more necessary in such cases, as the support of these allies can encourage and reassure residents in their efforts to organize. At the same time, if a public agency, such as the housing authority or the mayor's office, can supply the impetus and pressure needed to evoke a police response, this action will probably prove critical to initiating changes to improve security and prevent crime.

Getting Ahead of the Problem

Another option—most appropriate for communities where the crime problem is incipient rather than entrenched—is to be proactive. By bringing police and residents together before the problem grows, a broad-based place-specific crime prevention program can be more easily designed and implemented. Of the four main sites examined for this report, only Oak Park could really get ahead of the crime problem. In fact, by being proactive, Oak Park has been able to prevent neighborhood deterioration, encourage racial diversity without resegregation, and largely avoid the kinds of security problems experienced by other sites.

Endnotes

1. S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum,* HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995).

2. To maximize the effectiveness of intercoms and buzzer systems, residents should be trained in their proper use.

3. These are all privately owned complexes with mortgages from the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). That agency is now spending $3 million annually on security for some 9,000 units in three Boston neighborhoods. The MHFA looks on the security expenditure as wise asset management, as the security program protects a multimillion dollar investment.

4. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen, *Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document: Final Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, n.d.), 95, 124, 128; see also S.J. Popkin et al., *An Evaluation of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug Initiative: A Model of Comprehensive Crime Prevention in Public Housing* (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., October 1995).

5. O.P. Burden, "Promoting a Bright Idea from Abroad," *Law Enforcement News,* February 14, 1995. In Japan, the *koban* (mini-station) brings a police presence into every neighborhood and village. Borrowing from the Japanese model, several U.S. cities (including Los Angeles, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San Juan, Puerto Rico) have established kobans.

6. In 1995, the overnight parking ban was relaxed in some areas to provide more parking, helping landlords compete with other areas for good tenants.

7. The program is one component of Cleveland's Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice.

8. The OHA applied for security funding, but HUD did not approve it because of the recent widely publicized security abuses.

9. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen, *Public Housing Drug Elimination: Program Resource Document: Final Report:* 115, 124. See also the accompanying volume of case studies (*Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document: Case Studies*): 251–83.

10. Officer Jerry Williams received a special citation from Attorney General Janet Reno for his innovative and entrepreneurial approach to police work.

11. Discussing his year on the graveyard shift at Lockwood Gardens, one officer said that at those hours of the night, the people he encountered were mostly nonresidents. He would stop and query everyone he met; after 2 months, there was no one around within the development. He then extended his foot patrol beyond the boundaries and cleared an area two blocks around the site.

Chapter 4
Making Changes: Program Implementation

In this chapter, the implementation of place-specific crime prevention programs is discussed from two perspectives: changing the physical environment and changing the management structure or practice. Changes in use and the results that sites have achieved are examined in chapter 5.

Changing the Physical Environment

Changing the physical environment in a neighborhood or housing complex may involve a wide range of applications of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies and tactics. As discussed in chapter 3, the changes may involve reconfiguring the relationship between interior and exterior space (e.g., by altering the shape or appearance of the common areas, controlling access to the area or building through fencing or gates, target hardening through the installation of sturdy doors, locks, or grills). The changes may redefine the boundaries between private and public space (e.g., by creating private yards or individual unit entrances), or they may open up hidden areas and create the possibility of surveillance where there was none before. In most of the instances described here, the physical redesign involves a number of physical changes grouped together in a way that addresses place-specific problems of crime and disorder.

Further, at all of the sites visited for this report, physical design changes have been coordinated with changes in site management and use. Involving residents in street cleanups or planting trees and flower beds to signal ownership and care are actually hybrid activities that involve changing both the physical environment and management practice in a community. Because of this inevitable overlap, some hybrid practices are included in this section, even though they could have been discussed in the next section or in chapter 5. The hybrid practices described in this section are not repeated in later sections.

In Oakland, California, the place-specific crime prevention strategy pursued at Lockwood Gardens included improved site lighting, the addition of perimeter fencing and security gates, the repair of building exteriors, and new landscaping,

New Lockwood Gardens Entrance and Fencing

Photo 4-1

The new entrance sign and guard kiosk signal the physical and management changes in Lockwood Gardens.

including entrance signs announcing the Lockwood Gardens Community (see photo this page). The perimeter fences are 8 and 12 feet in height, while waist-high fencing was installed along 66th Avenue to restrict access to the front yards of units facing that street. There are new security gates at 65th Avenue and East 14th Street, at both ends of Fenham, and at Eastlawn and 66th Avenue. The Fenham gates are padlocked, and the other two gates are designed to provide access through a magnetic card/keypad opening system (exhibit 7).[1]

The fencing and gates make it difficult for fleeing suspects to run into Lockwood Gardens from East 14th Street to hide, or for drug dealers to do business from apartments in the development.[2] The kiosks at the gates imply regular surveillance, although they are no longer staffed full-time by security guards. Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) staff know that the access control would be much more effective if the

Exhibit 7. Lockwood Gardens Site Plan with Security Improvements

gates were kept shut. Presently, however, they stay open, because these are public streets and the Oakland City Attorney has ruled that OHA would have to take them over (as private streets) in order to keep the gates closed. This would mean assuming all financial responsibility for infrastructure and street repairs and replacements, responsibilities the OHA cannot afford.[3]

At Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End, numerous security-related physical changes were made to the complex during an extensive renovation of the buildings and site (exhibit 8). Among the four programs visited for this report, Castle Square undoubtedly represents the most thorough and careful physical redesign for security and crime prevention.

Oak Park, Illinois, has made extensive use of cul-de-sacs in an effort to control traffic, improve safety, strengthen neighborhoods, and enhance property values. Cul-de-sacs also help to address the problem of burglary, which the village views as its primary crime concern. Numerous cul-de-sacs have been created on the northern and eastern boundaries of the village. These street closings along Austin Boulevard and North Avenue limit access from Chicago (on Oak Park's north and east sides) to selected traffic corridors. Automobile use of the alleyways behind residences is restricted to individuals who live there or have legitimate business in the area. Other cars, trucks, or pedestrians traveling the alleys are viewed with suspicion and can be stopped and ticketed.

To soften their appearance, plantings and trees have been placed at the traffic barriers that create the cul-de-sacs. According to one Austin Boulevard landlord and resident, "The cul-de-sacs add resident parking and beauty and keep people and cars away. A cul-de-sac at my block was a consideration, a plus in my decision to buy the property. Cul-de-sacs can add to value and help me to know my neighbors." Today, cul-de-sacs are created only by request of area residents. Those that do get approved are subject to an initial trial and review process, through which the village assesses their likely effectiveness.

Oak Park's Security Improvement Grant (SIG) program—a cost-sharing program run by the village to improve building security—is the other major element of the village's strategy

New Entrance for an Apartment Building in Oak Park

Photo 4-4

The new side-street entrance for this building, as well as fencing and other physical improvements, were partially funded by a Security Improvement Grant from the Village of Oak Park.

for changes in physical design. Once an application for the program has been processed, an officer from the Oak Park Police Department's Crime Prevention Unit conducts an inspection of the candidate building. The inspections, which routinely take about 1 hour, focus on access control, target hardening, lighting, and other tactics for making older buildings less vulnerable to contemporary criminal methods. Traditional target-hardening tactics and improved lighting on the outside of the property (as well as for basements and other interior common areas) have been emphasized. SIG inspections also often propose the pruning of landscaping that can provide cover for burglars or others.

The portion of Oak Park with the highest population density is a stretch of Austin Boulevard. More than 50 percent of Austin Boulevard's buildings have received SIGs since the program was started in late 1990. On this street, some building owners have sought to overcome the public perception of a local crime problem by changing building addresses—e.g., from Austin Boulevard to an east/west street name. Others have gated and fenced the Austin Boulevard side of their properties, moving the building entrance to the east/west street (see photo this page).

Exhibit 9 shows the elements of the SIG inspection in Oak Park. For each item, the inspector indicates either an [S] for Secure or a [U] for Unsecured. The inspector also prepares

Exhibit 8. Elements of Physical Design Changes at Castle Square Apartments

Access control

- Mid-rise buildings have full buzzer/intercom/closed-circuit TV systems so residents can control access. For security reasons, no names appear next to the buzzers (on the assumption that visitors know where their friends and family live).

- At the rear of mid-rise buildings, the back stairs can no longer be accessed; they are screened closed and extra paths through the back have been cut off.

- Roof-top porches have been removed to prevent access, and remaining fire exits are only for leaving the building.

- Perimeter fencing and gates have created a complex pattern of closed areas and multiple gates, with no access to certain areas and ample access to others.

- The gate at the rear of the development is locked from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Security has the keys.

- Bollards (thick posts) were added to block automobile access to the alleyway next to the supermarket.

- Several tunnels running between Shawmut Avenue and Tremont Street and the interior of the complex have been closed. Previously, these areas were forbidding for residents and tempting for muggers.

- The basketball court and play yards remain largely open, but users now need to enter the play areas from inside the development.

- At the second level of the duplexes, there are now locked entry and bells for the upper apartments.

- The corner of Shawmut Avenue and East Berkeley Street had been a major hangout location. Now fenced off, the corner has been attractively landscaped, still retaining its large semicircular stone bench, but access is now only from inside the site.

- The parking garage on Paul Place is now leased to New England Medical Center, with a condition that 150 resident spaces plus 24-hour security (even though employees are not there at night) be maintained by the medical center.

- Buzzer systems, surveillance cameras, and other security devices have been installed at the Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO) office and at the management office. The complex also has a key-card system.

Defensible space

- Along the front of the complex, lighting was added, and a fresh paint job has brightened the walkway, so that residents and neighbors feel safe walking along this side of the block.

Exhibit 8. Elements of Physical Design Changes
at Castle Square Apartments *(continued)*

- What had been a dark, roofed walkway (often used as a driveway) next to an A&P supermarket adjacent to the housing along Tremont Street has been opened up: the roof was removed, the walkway redone with plantings, lighting improved.

- The backyards of the duplexes are individually fenced, with space for each unit.

- The entryways of mid-rise buildings, which had open stairs recessed from the street and insufficient lighting, have been redesigned. Entryways are now enclosed (by a curtain wall aligned with the storefronts), and tenants can look into the well-lit entrance halls before entering.

- Throughout the site, the duplexes formerly had wooden fenced areas (next to the front walks) to hide residents' trash barrels. Prowlers hid there, too. In the redesign, the fences were removed and the areas attractively landscaped.

- At the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) development for the elderly that shares the site, redesign has opened up the elevator lobby to view.

- Old cloudy Plexiglas around the duplex stairs has been replaced with clear glass, and extra lighting has been added to stairwells.

- Parking lots were redesigned to give more residents spaces within the site. They have camera surveillance and are regularly monitored for illegal parking or abandoned cars. The security office is located in a small office, accessible through the Village Court parking lot.

Target hardening

- New secure mailboxes were added to the BHA elderly development.

- Uniform, sturdy gates have been installed on all of the commercial storefronts along Tremont Street.

Deflecting the offender

- A row of pay phones along the side of the supermarket has been removed; the phones were often used by prostitutes frequenting the area.

- Enclosing the mid-rise building entrances has reduced loitering in the entrances by nonresidents.

- One basketball court has had its hoop removed because nonresidents were playing and drinking there.

- The corner of Tremont and East Berkeley Streets used to be littered with old mattresses and sofas and had become a major loitering location where the homeless would sleep. Now fenced in, the location has been turned into an oriental-style garden based on a plan that residents developed with the landscape architect.

a narrative description of what can be done to remedy problems and improve security. To illustrate the kinds of changes made under the program, two buildings treated under SIG are described below.

The first is a multifamily building on the southern boundary of the Eisenhower Expressway in Oak Park. Most of the SIG changes that have been made to the building involve target-hardening, as follows:

- New locks and window latches have been installed on outer doors, and the buzzer system has been moved from an indoor alcove to the outside of the building.

- New, secure mailboxes have been installed, and—for security reasons—only last names are used on the boxes.

- New fluorescent lighting fixtures have replaced many of the old incandescent bulbs, and lighting throughout the building is on timers. New lights have been installed in the apartments, and there is new lighting in the building's basement and on the interior stairs. Where incandescent lighting remains, protection has been provided around the bulbs.

- Plexiglas covers have been secured over the basement windows, with glass blocks used on the boiler room window and the laundry room windows (which require ventilation).

- A jimmy-proof lock has been installed on the basement door, and a 24-hour light has replaced incandescent lighting in the basement. Illumination of the public area in the basement has been an important change.

- New storm doors with dead-bolt locks have been installed on the rear entry of apartments that are accessible at the ground floor. Lock stops have been placed on all apartment windows (the village code requires working windows), and Plexiglas panels have been placed over the glass section of rear apartment doors. The transoms on these doors have also been reinforced.

According to the building's manager, since the SIG renovation, "tenants who leave doors and windows opened are now our biggest source of problems. This is a problem even where targets have been hardened."

The second building that illustrates SIG is a 1960's vintage multi-family building in a very pretty section of Oak Park. Because of the building's open but obscured courtyard and

waist-high plate glass windows, the property was highly burglary-prone. The building's most significant safety improvements include:

- A 6-foot wrought iron fence has been installed across the front of the apartment complex. Access is now through a locked gate in the center of the fence. Visitors can be buzzed-in by apartment residents.

- Sturdy metal grating has been placed over low ground-floor windows around the sides of the building. These grates can be released/opened from inside the apartments.

- A problem identified at this property and many others involves unsecured air conditioners; these can be easily removed to offer thieves access to apartments (as well as to the air conditioners themselves). The SIG inspections always suggest that air conditioners be secured from inside the apartment, so that they can neither be pushed inside nor pulled out.

- Other scheduled security improvements include the installation of storm window inserts on outer bathroom windows and replacement of the mailboxes.

Simple ideas that often get overlooked can make a difference as well. The officer who conducts most of Oak Park's SIG inspections always recommends putting signs to label the doors leading to the boiler room (and other equipment) to prevent people from thinking there is something in the room worth stealing. Similarly, he advises building owners to avoid inadvertently advertising that property is there for the taking by keeping building, garage, and shed doors closed when not in use.

Owner-occupants tend to be the Oak Park building owners who follow the officer's suggestions most diligently, perhaps because they have the greatest stake in keeping their areas crime-free. According to the village's rehabilitation supervisor, those most likely to take advantage of the SIG program and "the best building owners and managers tend to be locals and others who believe or buy into Oak Park's philosophy about crime prevention and diversity."

A final element of Oak Park's focus on physical changes to reduce crime and disorder concerns auto theft. Under the Beat Auto Theft (BAT) program, the Oak Park Police Department offers village residents a free rear-window sticker that allows police to stop their cars between the hours of 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. The purpose of the sticker is to prevent auto

Exhibit 9. Elements of Security Improvement Grant Program Inspection
Oak Park, Illinois

Entrance/lobby	Lights	Apartments	Rear entrance	Basement and laundry
Outer door Intercom Inner door Hinges Lock(s) Lock guard(s) Door jamb Mailboxes Name on bell Cellar entrance	Outside door Lobby Stairway	Door Viewers Hinges Mortise lock Rim lock Lock guard Door jamb (stop strip) Transom Windows (working locks and stops) Mounted air conditioner	Door(s) perimeter Lock/latch Porch/stair Lighting Apartment door Locks Windows Transom Address visible	Door(s) Hinges Lock(s) Windows (protected/secured) Lockers secure Other
Basement (Residential)	**Garage**	**Other**		
Door/front Door/rear Door/side Hinges Locks Windows Walls Other	Door/side Door/overhead Lighting Hinges Lock(s) Windows	Skylights Air conditioning opening Shrubbery Roof access Bicycle ID		

theft, by warning that the drivers of stickered cars will be obliged to produce valid drivers' licenses and auto ownership papers when stopped by police. If drivers do not produce the documents, they will be detained until the car's ownership is verified. The sticker reads as follows:

In Genesis Park, traffic modification through the installation of barriers on Brewton Drive (formerly Wayt Street) has created a cul-de-sac on a once crime-plagued street. The change has stopped drivers from turning left onto Eureka and peeling out, while barriers on Peaceful Way and Tinnin

> **Oak Park Police**
> **Auto Theft Program**
> **WARNING**
> This vehicle can be stopped by any authorized law enforcement officer in Illinois between the hours of 1 - 5 a.m.

prevent cars from circling the block. Requests have been made for improvements to the fence that divides the interstate from the neighborhood.

Although not expressly a physical crime prevention strategy, addressing the "broken windows" syndrome through the clean-up of area lots, the boarding-up of vacant houses, and the repair of streets, sidewalks, and curbs may deter those who select their targets by looking for signs of neglect in a community (see photo, page 46).[4] A new sign at the entrance to the area and new landscaping (trees and flowers) help send the message that Genesis Park is a cared-for community.

Commonwealth Apartments is a 12-acre public housing development in the Brighton section of Boston that originally consisted of 600 apartments. Before Commonwealth was redesigned, its interior hallways, building lobbies, entryways, and parking areas were widely feared by residents and neighbors alike. The buildings' courtyards, a nearby park, and a walkway leading to Brighton High School were also feared as being crime-ridden. Stolen cars would routinely turn up in the parking lots, and drug use was common in building hallways. Lighting, where it existed, was inadequate; lights would often be shot out.

Signs of New Management in Genesis Park

Even vacant houses awaiting rehabilitation by the Charlotte–Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (CMHP) have neat yards cleared of trash and overgrown foliage.

The redevelopment reworked the existing structures substantially. The most striking change was probably the shift from common-entryway buildings to townhouses. For the architects charged with redesigning Commonwealth Apartments, creating defensible space required reducing the population density, increasing the amount of living space indoors and outside, and placing the playgrounds and tot lots within view of the townhouses. The number of units was reduced to 392 (114 of which are reserved for the elderly). Lighting and locks were improved. The management office was relocated to a place from which the entire development can be monitored. (The old office was in the basement and offered little opportunity for natural surveillance.) Discussing Commonwealth, a professor of planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained:

Even the worst of large, concentrated housing projects can be rejuvenated. Boston's Commonwealth development is now arguably the single greatest success story in the country of turning around a severely distressed development. It took a determined—and $30 million—effort by the housing authority, the project's tenant organization, and a private developer to make it happen, but the result is not just a tenant population that has the highest employment rate among public housing residents in the city, it is a housing project

where suburbanites actually park their cars before taking public transit downtown.[5]

At Grant Manor, another private complex in Boston's South End neighborhood near Castle Square, a new camera system was installed on the first floor of the development's high-rise building. The eight pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras can see at night, and on clear days they can see for almost a mile. Cameras were also installed in the hallways and elevators. Secured side doors with stronger doors and locks (connected to an alarm system, so that if someone exits, the alarm sounds and the camera is activated) supplement the efforts of a single security officer who roams the development 24 hours per day. Motion sensors in the upper hallways and on rooftops, improved lighting, and keeping trees pruned to improve visibility for the cameras are other strategies being employed at Grant Manor.

> *Even the worst of large, concentrated housing projects can be rejuvenated. Boston's Commonwealth development is now arguably the single greatest success story in the country of turning around a severely distressed development. It took a determined—and $30 million—effort by the housing authority, the project's tenant organization, and a private developer to make it happen, but the result is not just a tenant population that has the highest employment rate among public housing residents in the city, it is a housing project where suburbanites actually park their cars before taking public transit downtown.*
>
> — Lawrence Vale, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Grant Manor is part of a program being run by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), with funding from HUD. This program strives to return former HUD-foreclosed properties to private ownership, with the resident involvement and physical improvements needed to make the housing viable in the long run. The properties are to be sold to resident-based organizations. MHFA holds the permanent mortgage for Grant Manor and considers the security program necessary to protect that investment.

At Grant Manor, several months of working with residents preceded the security improvements. The whole process was resident-centered, so that residents knew the security plan, knew how things would work, and got what they wanted. One result is that resident calls to security and the police are now

much more specific and helpful, so that officers can more easily respond to emergencies and make arrests.

Important components of the Grant Manor program are resident education and participation in a coalition that includes the Boston Police Department. MHFA also trains all the private security guards on cultural diversity and tries to hire bilingual officers (Spanish- or Creole-speaking). At this private housing complex, where many residents are of Haitian descent, understanding Haitian norms is important if the guards want to build trust among residents, who are likely to distrust police due to experiences in their native country.

Changing Management: Who's in Charge Here?

The changes made in the management of housing complexes and neighborhoods bear a vital connection to the physical changes examined previously. Management changes support, reinforce, and maintain the preventive effects of CPTED modifications on disorder and illegal activities. Indeed, some argue that physical changes by themselves—without management reinforcement—will not bring about the desired improvements in public safety and quality of life.

Chapter 2 of this report offered a broadened definition of management: the responsibility for maintaining order in one or more aspects of a place. Under this definition, a variety of participants have actual or potential roles in the management of specific places. As important as the need to link physical redesign to a detailed analysis of the relationship between crime and place is the need to make management changes that recognize and build on the particular context. By keeping in mind the contrast between management practices before and after the security and crime prevention initiatives, it becomes obvious how many different aspects of the housing complexes and communities were addressed, and how the various management changes were interconnected and reinforced one another.

Management changes designed specifically to improve security are discussed first. Security changes involve police, private security guards, and residents, and affect how each group understands its responsibilities for order and safety and how it carries them out. The section concludes with a review of the elements of changed property management practices.

Making Changes in Security Management

In the place-specific crime prevention context, improving security may involve making changes in policing, in private security arrangements, and in the role residents play in crime prevention. Each of these management changes is addressed here; the four visited sites are discussed first followed by a wider set of site examples.

The prevailing conditions at Oak Park, Lockwood Gardens, Genesis Park, and Castle Square Apartments that led key players to initiate security and crime prevention changes at these sites have been described previously. Physical redesign addressed a range of factors that contributed to crime and disorder in these neighborhoods and housing complexes, such as easy access and exit from the site, anonymous open spaces, unlit public areas, and passageways used for hidden transactions. The changes in physical design were careful and thorough, as described in the previous section. The changes in security management were equally careful and thorough; they are summarized in exhibit 10.

In the Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood of Charlotte, security management had been the sole responsibility of the police. The Charlotte Police Department was in a totally reactive policing mode, responding in force to calls for service from the area but absent otherwise. The changes in security for Genesis Park—which began with community policing and continued with police assistance (e.g., escorts for workers during the first 9 months)—were critical to the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership's (CMHP's) success in recruiting the initial homebuyers. They also enabled homebuyers to finish the rehabilitation of their units with "sweat equity" (their own labor). When the first few residents moved in, CMHP bought beepers for the community police officers. Residents had the community police officers' beeper numbers and could signal them if trouble was brewing. The police always called back from "clean" phones (not their car phones), so no one could intercept the call and retaliate against the reporter. As CMHP continued to acquire and shut down the drug houses and shot houses, disorder was reduced, enabling the new residents' presence to be felt in the neighborhood. Police were given the key to the model home and could use it at night, stopping to make a call, grab some coffee, or do some paperwork. CMHP also bought bicycles so the police could ride in the neighborhood (which attracted attention when houses were being shown). The streets were brought under control, one by one, through

Exhibit 10. Changes in Mangement of Security

Site	Security Management Before	Security Management After
Genesis Park, Charlotte, NC	Police reactive, entered neighborhood with multiple back-ups	Community policing; removal of drug houses and shot houses; resident association neighborhood surveillance and mutual help
Castle Square Apartments, Boston, MA	No private security operation; police reactive except for initial neighborhood committee	Community policing; private security force reporting to management coordinates with police; extensive use of trespass and drug-free school zone statutes
Oak Park, IL	Burglaries in eastern part of village; police reactive	Community policing; Security Improvement Grants prevent burglaries in older rental properties
Lockwood Gardens, Oakland, CA	Police reactive; OHA security force unclear about role and boundaries; open drug dealing	Careful combination of community policing and private security force; controlled access to development

this combination of security, public and private management, and resident action.

A combination of community policing, private security, and paid police details was needed at Castle Square Apartments during the period in which the partnership of developer and residents acquired the complex and carried out the redesign and rehabilitation. Before the new partnership took over, there was no communication between management and the police, no monitoring or enforcement of loitering or trespassing regulations, no restrictions on parking by nonresidents, and no real effort to maintain public safety. In contrast, the new management company supervises the private security force and coordinates its activities with the police, who have shifted their predominant mode to community policing. The police enforce trespass bans and also use the Massachusetts statute that increases penalties for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a school.[6] (There are four schools near CSA.)

In Oak Park, the security management changes were less dramatic, since the village was primarily being proactive. While the main crime prevention initiatives taken by the village focused on target hardening and access control, they have been accompanied by more vigorous enforcement of traffic and parking regulations. In recent years, Oak Park has coupled these efforts with a shift to a community policing model.

At Lockwood Gardens, the management changes may seem less dramatic than the significant changes in physical design, particularly the fencing of the site. Yet, there were sweeping security and property management changes, even though the OHA continued to own and operate the development. Chapter 3 describes the combination of community policing and additional security that the OHA initiated to regain control of Lockwood Gardens. Sworn officers and private guards worked together to provide enhanced security through the construction period and staffed the two kiosks for a number of months after the construction's completion.

Exhibit 11 summarizes experiences with enhanced security at the four visited sites and other sites. Included are changes in policing, in private security, and in the role of residents. Each of these items is examined in greater detail in the following pages.

Policing. The shift to community policing or problem-oriented policing has been an element of many place-specific crime prevention programs, but various observers of these efforts have noted that an essential component is the long-term assignment of specific officers, particularly at the beginning of the community policing effort. Continuity of assignment ensures that the officers will be able to develop thorough familiarity with the area, including all those who frequent it around the clock and across the seasons.[7] Even more important, continuity of staffing gives the residents

Exhibit 11. Elements of Improved Security

Policing

- Shift to community policing or problem-oriented policing, including long-term assignment of personnel to permit development of communication and trust
- Maintenance of regular police presence, even after area has "quieted down"
- Recognition of partners, including property owners/managers and residents
- Involvement in planning of security-oriented physical design changes
- Use of satellite police mini- or substations (also mobile command stations) in residential areas
- Clear delineation of responsibilities relative to private security; working relationship with private security
- Work with management to enforce trespass and restraining orders for residents
- Enforcement of drug-free school zone statute
- Strict enforcement of traffic modifications designed for enhanced security (e.g., ban on use of alleys for through-traffic)

Private security

- Used to help enforce property management rules and keep order
- Trained and supervised personnel, operating under control of property manager
- Clear delineation of responsibilities relative to police; working relationship with police
- Work with management to enforce trespass and restraining orders for residents
- Shared surveillance equipment and private security monitoring among nearby housing complexes

Role of residents

- Tenant patrols monitoring activity and promptly reporting problems to security guards and/or police
- Neighborhood or block watches organized for surveillance and reporting of disorder or criminal activity
- Resident association serving as the "eyes of the neighborhood"—letting everyone know that they are there and watching
- Use of civil liability suits to require that landlords provide safe and secure premises, including screening of tenants and removal of tenants involved in criminal activity

time to develop comfort in communicating with the officers and ultimately to develop trust.

Community policing assignments can be very intense, especially when neighborhoods are undergoing major changes. As a result, officers may experience burnout. When police staffing does change, there should be ample time allowed for overlapping assignments, so that the familiar officer can introduce the new one to the residents and the area. When community policing assignments changed in Genesis Park and Lockwood Gardens—as they did after 2 years or more—it was difficult for both residents and program staff to accept the loss of their initial community officers and adapt to the new personnel.

Maintenance of a regular police presence in the community, even after it is visibly more orderly and the residents feel less fear, is another important element of security changes in many study sites. Whether it is a mini-station or an ongoing community policing assignment, it needs to last; if it is a mobile command station, it needs to return with some frequency to the neighborhood. Oak Park has addressed the need for a regular police presence in two ways: (1) by creating satellite police stations and (2) by encouraging officers to live in the districts and work from their homes.

Private Security. A common theme of security changes is the establishment of working relationships between police and other members of the community, including property owners and managers, resident groups, business associa-

tions, and private security guards. Regular communication, joint planning, and periodic joint action serves to strengthen these relationships. In terms of private security guards—who are often disdained by police due to their lack of training and narrower focus on a site (among other factors)—it is particularly important to have a mutually recognized, clear delineation of responsibility. This was the case in Oakland, where the domains of the OHA security personnel and the OPD officers were differentiated by type and severity of offense and by physical location on or off public housing authority property.

A working relationship among police, private security, and property managers has multiple advantages. The private security personnel are there to enforce management rules (such as resident-only parking) and to keep order (for example, keeping resident teens from noisily congregating in the parking lot late at night). The police are there to reinforce these missions and to act if disorder leads to illegal activity.

Use of trespass statutes brings the police role closer to that of private security. Some public and private property managers have made considerable use of these laws with the direct involvement of the police. In Charlotte, there is formalized cooperation between the police department and the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). One or two police officers per district go through training with the CHA and are made "designated agents" of the housing authority, with power to enforce bans and loitering/trespassing regulations. If a police officer (responding to a call) goes into a public housing unit and finds unauthorized people, and if they do not cooperate, they can be arrested on the spot. Officers can also take immediate arrest action against anyone banned from CHA property.[8] Similarly, the CMHP posts "No Trespassing" signs on vacant property they own in Genesis Park; with police as designated agents, trespassers can be sent directly to jail without a warrant. The housing authority invites judges and the district attorney to an annual meeting at the agency to talk about problems and issues between the CHA and the legal system. This is an open forum with CHA residents to let the judges and DA see how serious tenants are about safety and order. CHA staff feel that as a result, the court is now taking trespass cases more seriously and is no longer voluntarily dismissing them.

Residents. Vital security changes can be made by involving residents. Neighborhood, block, and lobby watches are now widely used to increase surveillance and crime reporting without putting individuals at risk. Resident patrols monitor activity and report problems to security guards and/or the police.[9] More generally, active community associations seek

to maintain a visible presence and "eye on the neighborhood" in order to warn anyone potentially involved in disorder or illegal activity that they will be observed and reported. At Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End, residents are centrally involved in management, as committees of the Castle Square Tenants Organization (such as Training and Security) set policies through the partnership and monitor management performance. CSTO will come into full ownership of the complex in 2006, only 10 years from now, and the residents are determined to be ready. In 1995, festivities organized by residents at Castle Square, part of the National Night Out, served as a sort of "going away party" for crime and drugs.

Use of civil liability suits by residents appears to be a growing trend in the area of residential security. This may be done through an organized campaign—as in Clinton Hill—or by individuals harmed through owner or manager neglect of security. Residents may well find they are not alone in their quest to improve the quality of urban life by attacking nuisances such as crack houses and drug sale locations. In New York City, attorneys with the police department's Civil Enforcement Initiative (CEI) act as an in-house law firm, providing advice and problem-solving services to the department. In 1995, by using real property laws, the CEI enabled the police to confiscate 150 drug-infested buildings. CEI has also helped the police seize the vehicles of patrons soliciting prostitutes.[10]

In what may be the first time a landlord has been held liable for the actions of a tenant that caused the death of a police officer in the line of duty, in 1995 a Massachusetts Superior Court jury awarded $1.5 million to the family of a Boston police detective shot to death by drug dealers.[14] According to lawyers for the deceased detective's family, the decision will have a far-reaching impact on landlords, putting them on notice that they cannot turn a blind eye to the criminal activities of their tenants: "As a matter of public policy, landlords can no longer avoid the obvious if they know their tenants are dealing drugs. If you know your tenant is selling drugs, you've got to take steps to evict them."[15] The impact of this ruling on cases in which building residents allege landlord negligence or breach of a contract or duty to maintain safe and secure premises remains to be seen. However, in recent years a clear trend toward tenant suits against building owners has emerged.[16]

In another Massachusetts case, the state's highest court ruled that public housing tenants have a right to sue housing authorities for failing to abate drug-related crime in their housing developments.[17] The high court's decision partially

reversed a 1990 ruling that dismissed a lawsuit on behalf of two tenants who claimed that drug-related crime in their developments was so bad that they were afraid to leave their apartments. The 1994 ruling says that a trial should be held to determine whether the housing authority is complying with its responsibility as a landlord to provide tenants with the peaceful enjoyment of their apartments. This decision also means that residents must be given a chance to prove that the housing authority violated a Massachusetts law requiring that landlords aggressively identify and prosecute non-tenants who commit crimes on their property.[18]

In a 1993 California case, an appeals court ruled that the owners of an apartment complex who failed to remove a drug-dealing operation on the premises were liable to neighbors for creating a nuisance.[19] The action was brought in

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Operation Crackdown: Using Public Nuisance Laws To Fight Drug Dealing

In Washington, D.C., the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia recently launched "Operation Crackdown," a public service initiative that uses the district's public nuisance law to rid residential neighborhoods of crack houses and street dealers.[11] An attorney involved with the program stresses the importance of community involvement:

To file suits we need plaintiffs. The community groups make perfect plaintiffs because their lives are being affected. In working with the pro bono attorneys we provide, they keep logs that detail the disturbances—the number of people coming and going, the late night noise, the number of police visits, and so forth.[12]

Lawyers from Operation Crackdown use the information provided by the community groups to go to court and obtain injunctions requiring the building owners to take remedial action. Such actions may include tenant evictions and installing high intensity lights (to illuminate dark alleys or vacant lots).[13]

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small claims court by 75 plaintiffs against owners of a Berkeley apartment building that was alleged to be frequented by drug dealers, drug users, and prostitutes.[20] This is another way in which resident or neighbor collective action can be effective in bringing about management changes for improved security.[21]

In a 1993 California case, an appeals court ruled that the owners of an apartment complex who failed to remove a drug-dealing operation on the premises were liable to neighbors for creating a nuisance. The action was brought in small claims court by 75 plaintiffs against owners of a Berkeley apartment building that was alleged to be frequented by drug dealers, drug users, and prostitutes.

Making Changes in Property Management

Like security changes, property management changes support, facilitate, and reinforce the preventive effects of CPTED modifications on disorder and illegal activities. The major participants in the area of security changes were the police, private security guards, and residents. Concerning property management, the major participants are the owners and managers (whether public or private) of residential property in the community and the residents themselves.

Exhibit 12 shows the interrelated management changes made at the four sites visited for this report. In the area that became Genesis Park, ownership of nearly all residential property was by absentee landlords, with the result that the neglected and overgrown conditions of the housing were ignored as long as the rent payments came in. The dilapidated apartments housed poor families who did not have the means to move elsewhere. Some of the houses had been abandoned and were occupied by squatters. The city did not enforce building codes or provide many public services. Drug dealers "owned" the streets, and residents lived in fear.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership's involvement in the area began with the premise that opportunities for moderate-income homeownership were scarce relative to the need. If this area's neglected rental units could be rehabilitated into quality homes and sold at moderate prices, it was believed that the area could be stabilized by encouraging resident organization and supporting resident efforts to maintain the community. CMHP would work with the city to bring in needed infrastructure improvements and would

Exhibit 12. Changes in Property Mangement and the Role of Residents.

Site	Property Management and Residents' Roles Before Change	Property Management and Residents' Roles After Change
Genesis Park, Charlotte, NC	*Private property:* absentee land-lords; houses neglected and overgrown; some abandoned and occupied by squatters; lack of code enforcement	*Private property:* strict code enforcement; CMHP clean-up and securing of empty properties; rehabilitation; homeowner acquisition; houses "adopted" by civic organizations and businesses
	Public spaces: streets out of control with open drug dealing; city infrastructure deteriorating	*Public spaces:* infrastructure rehabilitated by city; public spaces maintained by city and residents; neighborhood entrances labeled and landscaped
	Residents: embattled and frightened; some illegal squatters; active gang with weapon and drug involvement	*Residents:* owners replacing renters; organized, ongoing support from CMHP (Pathways Program)
Castle Square Apartments, Boston, MA	*Private property:* maintenance neglected; tenant screening in doubt; apartments "bought" under the table	*Private property:* professional company answers to partnership of developer and residents; careful tenant screening
	Public spaces: uncontrolled access; unkempt conditions; park given over to loitering	*Public spaces:* access controlled and monitored; grounds carefully tended
	Residents: frightened and victimized; initial organizing effort unsuccessful	*Residents:* partner in ownership; receiving management training; active in shaping management policies
Oak Park, IL	*Private property:* deterioration of rental housing; vacancies increasing	*Private property:* owners/managers organized; improved conditions and maintenance; more resident managers; Residence Corporation rehabilitates and manages at-risk buildings
	Public spaces: routine patrol	*Public spaces:* increased enforcement of traffic and parking regulations
	Residents: threatened by changes in adjacent Chicago neighborhood and early signs of decline in eastern Oak Park	*Residents:* participate in neighborhood organization and in village initiatives

Site	Property Management and Residents' Roles Before Change	Property Management and Residents' Roles After Change
Lockwood Gardens (Oakland, CA)	*Private property*: OHA not fully in control of development; tenant screening centralized and limited; minimal lease enforcement	*Private property*: neighborhood entrances labeled and landscaped; lease provisions and trespass statute enforced; management and maintenance based at site (decentralized)
	Public spaces: taken over by dealers and users; barren and uninviting; open access from streets and outside neighborhood	*Public spaces*: some privatized; extensive gardening
	Residents: frightened, intimidated; some chased out and units taken over for drug houses; efforts to form residents association meet little response	*Residents*: resident association formed and becoming more active in planning for development's future

work with the CHA's programs encouraging economic self-sufficiency for residents (as well as developing a self-sufficiency program of their own). Thus, the program as planned involved changes in private property ownership and management, public management, and resident action. The photos on page 54 show the difference before and after renovation and conversion to homeownership.

The management changes at Castle Square Apartments also involved changes to private management, public management, and resident roles. The former owner's haphazard and neglectful leasing and maintenance practices, which had contributed greatly to the decline of the complex, were replaced by strict, professional management practices. Thorough tenant screening, constant monitoring of conditions, attentive care of buildings and grounds are all evident at CSA; the management company is responsible to the partnership for the results. Ongoing communication with the police and with other public agencies has meant that the complex receives the needed public services and has obtained some public improvements. In addition, the partnership has taken over site control from the city, so that it has

greater control over security, snow removal, tree pruning, sidewalk repairs, and parking within the development.

In Oak Park, the conditions of the late 1960's—particularly in the eastern part of the village—testified to declining rental property maintenance. Public services were adequate, but residents still felt threatened and frightened by the early signs of deterioration, disorder, and diminished quality of life. Over the years since then, the village has initiated a range of management changes addressed to private property owners, including the Security Improvement Grants program and licensing multifamily building owners as businesses (with required training in fair housing and CPTED, as well as mandatory attendance at community meetings).

The Residence Corporation, an independent nonprofit organization founded in 1966, also plays an important role in Oak Park's strategy. The Corporation buys multifamily buildings in bad physical condition and rehabilitates them. It manages the reoccupied buildings (as well as some others that are privately owned), and it supports the village's policy of racial and economic diversity in all these buildings. It may buy

Before

A partially vacant rental duplex in Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt, before Genesis Park

single-family homes that are in foreclosure and sell them for owner-occupancy. By limiting the number of vacant buildings, the Residence Corporation reduces the likelihood that they will be stripped or used by drug dealers or squatters. Finally, the village's policies and performance are monitored by influential resident bodies such as the Housing Programs Advisory Committee.

After

One of the neat, single-family homes of Genesis Park.

At Lockwood Gardens, on the property management side, the following changes were initiated by the housing authority:

- Housing management, assisted by round-the-clock observations of the community policing officers, *identified problem tenants and evicted a number of people.* Where unauthorized persons were living in the units, the leaseholders were offered the choice of putting them on the lease or getting help to remove them (such as through a restraining order). Women are often battered in situations where their boyfriends are dealing drugs; the community policing officers helped enforce restraining orders. (The OHA also performed some transfers for resident safety.)

- The *management and maintenance operations of the housing authority were decentralized* to Lockwood Gardens. Residents now go to the on-site satellite office for everything but paying rent. There are two managers, a management aide, and a maintenance crew stationed there to serve three large developments, which add up to 650 public housing units in a small area.

- A new emphasis on *strong lease enforcement* was introduced.

- *Applicant screening* is still done centrally, but site managers show the units to people sent from the central office. As the site manager at Lockwood Gardens meets applicants and shows them around, he watches for signs of trouble—e.g., needle tracks or other physical signs of substance abuse. If he thinks this will not be the right environment for someone, he can hold out the referral until a more appropriate spot for the individual becomes available.

OHA management also took important steps to involve the residents in the changes at Lockwood Gardens. The community services department was restructured into

Resident and Community Services, which has outreach workers and resident advisors. This helped foster relationships that made the resident council a reality. Community policing also led to identification of resident leadership. Management began to work with Resident and Community Services on resident leadership and organizing; the resident council received training pertaining to lease rights and responsibilities.

Finally, in a seemingly symbolic change that has proven to be of real significance, site management began to *encourage residents to use the outdoor space* at Lockwood as if it were their own. Gardens have proliferated and flourished, not only in the privatized back yards, but also around the fronts of buildings and along the walks. Neighbors have also started to garden together, crossing racial and ethnic boundaries.[22] Thus, even in a situation where the same agency continued to own and manage the development, a constellation of vital management changes was implemented in conjunction with the physical redesign for security and crime prevention.

Exhibit 13 summarizes the initiatives that the larger group of sites have taken to make changes in property management. Changing property ownership is a rather drastic intervention, yet one that appears to be used in a variety of settings. It is widely believed that homeowners have a greater stake, both financially and emotionally, than renters and therefore take better care of their homes and communities. This is not necessarily true, however, as this report has offered examples of renters gaining a vital stake in the care and management of their communities (examples include Castle Square Apartments and Commonwealth Apartments). However, this belief *is* one of the key assumptions that led to CMHP's interventions to convert Genesis Park to a neighborhood of homeowners.[23] It is also widely observed that rental properties generally receive better care when their owners reside there or very nearby; it is too easy for absentee landlords to be ignorant of—or to ignore—both physical and human problems in their buildings. Shifts in ownership were a keystone of the changes brought about in Genesis Park and Castle Square Apartments. In Oak Park, the Residence Corporation has taken steps to acquire certain residential and commercial properties in order to prevent their deterioration or conversion to inappropriate uses. (These properties may remain in Residence Corporation ownership and continue in rental or commercial use, or they may be resold.)

Also included in the category of changes in public management are all initiatives that public agencies have taken to improve security and prevent crime in various study sites.

Some of these changes concern *public-sector responsibilities and services,* such as code enforcement, trash pick-up, street cleaning, and the like. Others involve *public-sector investments,* such as the City of Charlotte's work to:

- Diagnose the drainage/flooding problems that plagued the Genesis Park area (due to old clay pipes and broken concrete pipes) and provide proper drainage;

- Repair and repave streets;

- Install new sidewalks on the major streets;

- Install or repair curbs, and

- Improve street lighting (working with Duke Power and the Department of Transportation).[24]

Public sector initiatives like these generally help to signal that a community is cared for and valued; more specifically, they may prevent or correct a "broken windows" situation. Other public management changes that have supported anticrime programs include funding neighborhood improvement efforts (as in Bridgeport, Connecticut) and licensing multifamily building owners as businesses (as in Oak Park, to improve the owners' understanding and compliance with local ordinances). Even the attention of community policing officers to problem properties—whether hot spots or eyesores—is a form of public management in support of crime reduction and prevention.

Because housing authorities are public agencies, their actions to change property management to improve safety also fall under the category of public management. In exhibit 13, a large number of improvements made in public housing were identified in Charlotte, Oakland, Macon, Norfolk, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

Many improved housing authority practices have parallels in private property management. Stricter tenant screening, lease revisions and resident training to understand the rights and responsibilities created by the lease, increased use of parking regulations and other posted rules, use of written notices and mediation procedures to deal with tenant problems, and willingness to evict or use trespass statutes when necessary have all been used by both private and public property managers to restore order and reduce crime in their complexes.

Residents are a vital force in changing property management, and there are roles that individual residents can play to

Exhibit 13. Elements of Changed Property Management and Residents' Roles

Property ownership
- Acquisition and rehabilitation of abandoned and deteriorated properties by nonprofit organizations
- Shift from absentee landlords to resident landlords
- Shift from rentals to ownership
- Acquisition and rehabilitation of deteriorated property by partnership of developer and residents
- Acquisition and rehabilitation of deteriorated property by local government

Public management
- Strict and even-handed building code/sanitary code enforcement
- Attention to maintenance of facilities and open space in neighborhoods, including trash collection, sidewalk- and street-cleaning
- Decentralization of public housing management and maintenance, to site or district level, with better coordination between them; manager given decision-making authority for community
- Establishment of expedited eviction processing for drug-related cases in public housing
- Revisions to public housing tenant lease emphasizing mutual rights and responsibilities of residents and management
- Site manager provided a role in screening tenants for vacancies
- Licensing of multifamily building owners as businesses, with requirements for training on local ordinances and participation in community meetings
- Fair housing, open housing, and diversity assurance programs to assist all racial and ethnic groups in taking advantage of the full range of housing opportunities
- Role in identifying problem properties ("hot spots") and focusing owner/manager attention on them
- Support for neighborhood improvement efforts, in the form of technical assistance and/or funding and/or coordination of public departments

Private management
- Strict but constitutionally permissible tenant screening (possible assistance from police)
- Written notices and discussions (about nuisances, unauthorized residents, or other problems) with tenants involved, before any legal action taken
- Willingness to evict problem tenants when other approaches fail; prompt eviction action when drugs or violence involved
- Use of trespass statutes, enforcement by private security (if present) with oversight
- Training of managers in mediation, to facilitate win-win solutions to problems with residents

Role of residents
- Being trained for management, in context of resident ownership or of hiring residents for management positions
- Resident "property monitor," assisting with after-hours and weekend monitoring and emergency assistance
- Resident association serving as the "eyes of the neighborhood"—letting everyone know that they are there and watching
- Participation in social service planning, with training for residents to assume staff positions
- Involvement with tenant screening, establishment of house rules in addition to lease, role in training new residents
- Tenant patrols monitor condition of buildings and grounds and promptly report problems to management

improve management of their developments and neighborhoods. However, most of the entries in exhibit 13 represent ways that resident organizations can contribute to management improvements. Tenant patrols, screening committees, and management and security oversight committees all provide impetus and input to make effective property management a means to achieve improved quality of life.

Endnotes

1. The new physical design, paired with the OHA's community policing strategy and the enhanced on-site security patrols, are an expensive solution, although it is widely believed in Oakland that the conditions here warranted it. The gating and fencing were quite costly (some $556,000), and private security runs about $260,000–$270,000 per year. Sworn officers cost the city more than $100,000 per year. A PHDEP grant from HUD has paid the cost of keeping on the sworn officers, but the private security guards have been terminated. Funding for the officers ended in early 1997.

2. Metropolitan areas with a high concentration of privately operated gated communities include Miami, Los Angeles, San Diego, Chicago, New York City, Houston, and Phoenix. See "Where the Gates Are," *Governing* (December 1995): 14.

3. At OHA's Tassafarango development, the housing authority did work out with the city a system for closing the gates without taking ownership of the streets. However, negotiations over the Lockwood situation have been suspended, and the housing authority's Director of Security is concerned that, without use of the gates, the resident security program will not be able to hold the line after the site-dedicated officers are gone.

4. See S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum, HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995).

5. Professor Lawrence Vale, cited in "Cover Story/Housing," *Governing* (August 1995): 17, 19.

6. Mass. Gen. Laws, chapter 94C, Section 32J, Possession of Controlled Substances Within School Boundaries.

7. Of course, police administrators need to be aware that long-term assignments have the potential for increasing corruption.

8. The CHA ban process is based on crime analysis (patterns of repeated calls for service) and on identification of people in the home who do not belong there and are causing trouble. The Probation and Parole program sends the CHA's security coordinator a list of their subjects who live legally or illegally in CHA housing.

9. S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," *Model Program Briefs 2* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD 1444-PIH-RP).

10. "Aiming a Civil Weapon at Criminal Offenders," *Governing* (November 1995): 35–36.

11. "Young Lawyers Section of Bar Association of D.C.: Cracking Down on Crack Houses," *D.C. Bar Report* (October/November 1995): 15.

12. Ibid., citing William Lawler, Esq., of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities.

13. Ibid., 15.

14. K. Cullen, "Landlords Told to Pay $1.5m in Police Death," *Boston Globe*, September 13, 1995.

15. Ibid.

16. With many suits against property owners settled out of court, there are few reliable figures available. However, while a 1984 study by a Washington security expert turned up 186 suits in the 25 years from 1958 to 1982, a more recent update of the study found 267 cases from 1983 through 1992 — an increase of 266 percent a year. See C.H. Deutsch, "Returning to the Scene of the Crime, to Sue the Owner," *New York Times*, June 3, 1994, citing a 1994 study by Norman Bates, President, Liability Consultants Inc, of Framingham, Massachusetts.

17. J. Ellement, "Tenants Gain Legal Tool in War on Drug Crime," *Boston Globe*, March 15, 1994.

18. Ibid. Also see M. Grunwald, "Family of Boy Killed at Roxbury Project Sues Landlord," *Boston Globe*, November 1, 1995.

19. S.B. Goldberg, "Bad Neighbors—Landlord Liable for Drug-dealing on Premises," *ABA Journal*, (February 1994): 95.

20. Ibid. The case, *Albert G. Lew* v. *The Superior Court of Alameda County,* involved the appeal of a trial court judgment awarding $218,325 in damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants had appealed the judgment arguing that landlords were not responsible for the tortious acts of third parties. Citing the leading case of *Martinez* v. *Pacific Bell*, the appeals court found that the basis for imposing liability on the owners of the Berkeley building was "on a theory of active fault on the part of petitioners [the defendants] in the management of their property." During the trial, the plaintiffs had presented testimony by a local police sergeant who had made 260 drug-related calls to the site over a period of a year and a half. A city manager also testified that the building was a "fortress" for the sale of drugs and that the problem could have been alleviated through "cooperative and aggressive management." See *Albert G. Lew* v. *The Superior Court of Alameda County*, No. AO58265 (California Court of Appeals, November 30, 1993). See also *Martinez* v. *Pacific Bell*, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1557 (1990).

21. For a broader discussion of applying civil remedies, see P. Finn and M.O. Hylton, *Using Civil Remedies for Criminal Behavior: Rationale, Case Studies, and Constitutional Issues* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, October 1994).

22. This development is discussed further in chapter 5.

23. The terms of the first mortgages made to the new homeowners in Genesis Park give CMHP the right of first refusal when the house is resold. In this way, CMHP will continue to have some leverage for maintaining the neighborhood.

24. Of course, the lighting changes are also physical changes for crime prevention.

Chapter 5
Putting the Pieces Together:
Results and Lessons Learned

This chapter discusses the results of place-specific crime prevention efforts in sites around the United States and considers the lessons that planners, police, public and private managers, and residents have learned from their local efforts. Examining both the changes achieved by these programs and the problems that still need resolution, the chapter synthesizes the lessons learned to aid those planning new initiatives or modifying existing ones.

The chapter begins with a discussion of how the physical design changes and management changes may have affected patterns of use at various sites. *Changes in use* include differences in the kinds of activities taking place (particularly resident activity), changes in the levels of crime and disorder, and the issue of displacement in specific sites.

The following section discusses the significant lessons local respondents identified as they examined their programs and modified or fine-tuned them to work better. The need for program monitoring and feedback is clear, yet formal feedback mechanisms are rarely built into local efforts. Even without formal review, thoughtful program operators seek to strengthen and sustain the results they have achieved by learning from experience.

Changing Uses of an Area: Results of Place-Specific Crime Prevention

In this report, a variety of programs have served as examples of how physical design changes and management changes can be combined to reduce disorder and improve safety. What have these programs achieved? What kinds of outcomes have been observed or documented?

Taking Back the Turf

In many of the neighborhoods and housing developments considered for this report, restoring the community to its intended purpose has allowed residents to *take back the turf* from drug dealers, muggers, prostitutes, derelicts, and other offenders and nuisances. A positive change in the manner in which a playground, street corner, or building lobby is used

is the reward for successful efforts to alter the physical environment and change the management of a disorderly or crime-ridden community.

Place-specific physical changes for crime prevention combined with changes in management have contributed to new, legitimate patterns of resident use of outdoor space at Lockwood Gardens, the public housing development in Oakland. According to several respondents, the physical changes there have had considerable positive impact on residents' quality of life. In general, many more people are using the outdoor areas of the development. In the evenings, residents bring card tables and chairs outside, to sit and chat with each other while children play around them. A community gardening effort has resulted in neighbors of different ethnic and racial backgrounds working together to grow a wide variety of flowers and vegetables (see photo, page 60).

The former president of the Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO) in Boston emphasizes that the goal of the site redevelopment was to make Castle Square a decent and safe place to live again. Neighbors used to cross over from the Castle Square side of Tremont Street to avoid the dark block with tunnels leading from the complex's interior. Security improvements—including new lighting—and a face-lift have encouraged area residents to seek out the Castle Square side of Tremont Street. The cleanup and redevelopment of the park on the corner of East Berkeley and Tremont Streets have also dramatically transformed the use of the site. Where homeless people once drank, fought, and slept, Asian-American and other Castle Square residents now pose for graduation photos in a graceful oriental-style garden. People who work nearby come to have lunch in the garden. With an influx of new stores in the area, the neighborhood around East Berkeley and Washington Streets has also greatly improved from a business standpoint.

In Oak Park, Illinois, a commitment on the part of the village and the efforts of the Austin Boulevard Alliance (ABA) helped to bring the village's eastern corridor back from the brink of residential decline. Now, most of Austin Boulevard's apartments are rented, and the streets in the commercial area are busy with customers.

Resident Gardens Reflect Positive Changes at Lockwood Gardens

A flower garden next to a front door exemplifies greater resident use of outdoor spaces and renewed pride in the community.

In Genesis Park in Charlotte, drug-related traffic through the area has declined considerably with the shutdown of the neighborhood's numerous drug and shot houses. Nonresidents are a far less frequent sight in the neighborhood, and cars no longer pull over along Interstate 77 so that buyers can come through the fence to purchase drugs. Instead, a newly formed local youth group is planning activities while seeking greater involvement from area parents. There is also a youth choir and new community gardens. The area's First Baptist Church West is interested in starting an enrichment program for local children, and the neighborhood association will soon have its own building for meetings.

At Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles, the fear of crime may have actually been greater than the crime itself, but the new fencing has clearly given residents a greater sense of security. The changes in behavior are unmistakable: previously, residents did not leave their apartments or let their children out to play; now they freely use the streets and grounds. According to a captain with the police department of the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, "You can get the feeling of a community by driving through it and seeing the number of kids out playing, and that is how to measure community environment. [In Mar Vista Gardens,] the parents [now] feel safe." Drug dealers have proven that Mar Vista's new fencing is only effective so long as it is maintained by the housing authority. Shortly after installation,

dealers cut holes through the fence in strategic places, facilitating their flight from police during chases. Despite this, restricting access to the development has helped reduce dealing targeted to drive-by drug purchasers who used to come from other parts of the city and region.

At the Iris Court development in Portland, Oregon, a cul-de-sac created as part of place-specific crime prevention changes is closed to traffic for an annual street fair. At the fair, social service agencies set up information booths; the event also features a barbecue, live music, and games for children. With many police in attendance, the fair is a combination street party and public relations activity. In 1996, the residents of Iris Court worked with the police to plan the fair, which in earlier years had just been police-sponsored.

Of course, the physical and management changes in these sites are not without some problems. Commenting on the attractive porches that are large enough for families to sit on, one resident of Diggs Town in Norfolk noted, "I love the porches, but in some areas it just means that the drug dealers have a place to stand to get out of the rain." In Oak Park, the village's many cul-de-sacs have made it difficult to travel by car from east to west (Chicago to Oak Park) in residential areas, because very few streets go through. According to a member of the Oak Park Housing Program's Advisory Committee, "The motivation for the cul-de-sacs was fear of crime and of racial change, not just concern about traffic." Others complain that the traffic barriers are put up in a piecemeal manner. "They're put up on public streets. Do residents own that street?"

Those using an area for illegal or disorderly activities sometimes offer clear resistance to the changes being made. When the new site lighting was installed at Lockwood Gardens in Oakland, the wires were cut repeatedly and the lights shot out, but the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) repaired them every day. Even earlier, when the escape route from 14th Street across the rear of the site was blocked, the housing authority kept strengthening the fence materials (starting with strong steel picket, then welding on crossbars, then adding dense wire mesh) until the attempts to cut through it were definitively thwarted and "the bad guys gave up."

Well-conceived place-specific physical design strategies and innovative management policies can help turn around problem neighborhoods and housing developments, changing their use from illegal to legitimate activities and improving the quality of life for residents. At the same time, it is clearly important to stay on top of a problem through attentive property management. Letting down one's guard, however briefly, can mean a return to trouble.

> *Well-conceived place-specific physical design strategies and innovative management policies can help turn around problem neighborhoods and housing developments, changing their use from illegal to legitimate activities and improving the quality of life for residents. At the same time, it is clearly important to stay on top of a problem through attentive property management. Letting down one's guard, however briefly, can mean a return to trouble.*

Reducing Crime and Keeping It Down

A common objective of all the sites discussed in this report was to reduce crime in the targeted areas. Official crime data are available for the four visited sites. In addition, the City of Dayton examined crime data in its evaluation of the neighborhood stabilization efforts in Five Oaks. However, police crime data have recognized limitations, particularly in their sensitivity to rates of reporting. As residents become more familiar and trusting of police efforts in an area, crime reporting may increase early in a place-specific crime prevention program. Police crime data can be useful for examining trends, but it is also helpful to access other sources that confirm, contradict, or at least help interpret the patterns revealed.[1]

Another important caveat concerns the difficulty of attributing observed changes in crime to the effects of crime prevention efforts. Without rigorous research, the sites examined cannot demonstrate a causal connection between the design and management changes made and the crime trends tracked. Thus, although both police and residents believe they have brought about reductions in crime and violence, the trends are suggestive of impacts, not proof of them.[2] Official crime data from the following five sites appear to substantiate the observations of local respondents on the success of their place-specific crime prevention programs. In each of the neighborhoods or housing complexes, there were substantial reductions in reported crime after the interventions, compared to the levels of violent and property crime before the changes in physical design, security, property management, and resident roles were made. Conditions improved, and police and residents attribute the improvements to the crime prevention efforts, although causality cannot be proven.

Genesis Park. An analysis of trends in reported offenses for the Genesis Park neighborhood was prepared by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD).[3] (The data are shown in appendix F, exhibit F-1.) Due to the sophisticated geographical information system being implemented by the CMPD, the boundaries of the reporting area corresponded directly to those used by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (CMHP) and the residents when they refer to Genesis Park. The Genesis Park crime data show that the number of reported offenses in the neighborhood generally increased from 1984 to 1989, then declined in 1993 (after the start of community policing, CMHP property acquisition, and neighborhood cleanup), and declined even further in 1994. Overall, the drop from 1989 to 1994 was 78 percent for violent crimes, 39 percent for property crimes, and 63 percent for all Part I offenses combined. Part II offenses—which are of interest because they include drug violations and vandalism—show a similar pattern, with a decrease of 73 percent from 1989 to 1994. There were no homicides in Genesis Park in 1994, although there were more rapes reported than in the previous year.

Respondents familiar with Genesis Park corroborate this picture. Some of the positive results they cite include: (1) that elderly women (who lived in the neighborhood for years but were hostages in their own homes) are now willing to come outside during the day; (2) that many organizations other than CMHP are now claiming credit for the idea and/or the changes made in Genesis Park; and (3) that home sales are increasing and marketing the homes is getting easier. Says the residents' association president, "We've come a long way from the time when people wouldn't come to visit."

Respondents noted that there had been some increase in crime beginning early in 1995. (Exhibit F-2 shows data from CMPD comparing the first 6 months of 1995 with the same months of 1994.) The data confirm respondents' reports; they show an increase in property crime as well as in Part II offenses. CMHP and the residents' association are also aware of some recent problems with drugs in two of the houses built by Habitat for Humanity in Genesis Park. The neighborhood is concerned, and the residents' association invited the police captain and the executive director of

Habitat to a community meeting about it. Despite these problems, CMHP's president recognizes some positive benefit, specifically the response of the residents when the problems arose.

Lockwood Gardens. Due to prior research on Lockwood Gardens, it was possible to examine the levels of reported crime in Lockwood Gardens over a 4-year period (1991–1994) and to examine whether these levels had changed relative to the surrounding area.[4] (The data are shown in exhibit F-3.) The 4 years of crime data span the following changes at the development:

- Implementation of an initial "drug elimination" program with prevention components only, in 1991 and 1992;

- Beginning of community policing in early 1993;

- Construction of the perimeter fence beginning in mid-1993, with completion of landscaping and kiosks in early 1994, and

- Concentrated deployment of private security guards and OHA security officers, coinciding with the construction and lasting until spring 1995.

As exhibit F-3 shows, there were no reported homicides or rapes in Lockwood Gardens in 1993 or 1994. The number of robberies in Lockwood Gardens was much reduced from the prior 2 years, and they accounted for a smaller percentage of the robberies in the area. Felony assaults also showed some reduction in number within Lockwood, in contrast to increasing numbers in the area as a whole. Thus, despite the likelihood that the rate of crime reporting increased when community policing began, the reported violent crimes at Lockwood Gardens accounted for just 5.4 percent of such crimes in the surrounding area in 1993 and 4.8 percent in 1994. (By contrast, Lockwood generated 12.2 percent of the reported violent crimes in 1991 and 9.9 percent in 1992.)

The pattern of changes for reported Part I property crimes was less uniform than for violent crimes. Even so, reported property crimes in Lockwood Gardens were 4.5 percent of the area's in 1993 and 4.0 percent in 1994, compared to 5.5 percent and 4.6 percent in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Taking all these reported Part I offenses together, the proportion occurring in Lockwood Gardens was clearly reduced in the period after security was increased and physical design changes were initiated. By 1994, total Part I crimes (except arson) had decreased by 46.5 percent from the 1991 level and

had also fallen in relation to reported offenses in the surrounding area. These data support the observations of respondents and the changes in behavior reported for residents of the development, although they do not prove a direct causal link between the program and these results.

Oak Park. The data available to examine crime changes in Oak Park were much less detailed than those for Lockwood Gardens and Genesis Park. (Exhibit F-4 shows the numbers of Part I offenses for the entire village; however, the place-specific crime prevention changes we have described—including traffic modifications and the Security Improvement Grants [SIGs]—were focused primarily on the eastern part of the village.) In the period between 1989 and 1994, there were reductions in robberies, aggravated assaults, and arson, while murders, sexual assaults, and thefts (including motor vehicle thefts) fluctuated without long-term change. The SIG program was targeted to burglary reduction in particular, but (relative to 1989) there were large numbers of burglaries in 1992 and 1993; the drop in 1994 cannot be assumed to be the start of a trend. Thus, perhaps because they are village-wide, the Oak Park crime data do not clearly indicate improvements in the levels of offenses targeted by the local program.

Castle Square Apartments. Boston Police Department (BPD) data on Part I offenses (except arson) were made available for the Castle Square Apartments (CSA) for 1990 through 1994. (The data are shown in Exhibit F-5.) Enhanced security began at CSA in February 1992, with renovations and other changes following; thus, the BPD data span the period of change. The data show notable percentage declines over the 4 years in nearly all crime categories, with violent crimes dropping more than property crimes. The property offenses of burglary and motor vehicle theft fluctuated; even in these categories, however, the incidences in 1993 and 1994 represented a reduction compared to earlier years. There was a 58 percent decline in the overall number of Part I offenses between 1990 and 1994. Between 1992 and 1994, the overall improvement was slightly lower, but total Part I offenses were still reduced by almost half.

Five Oaks. The Five Oaks neighborhood of Dayton experienced a decline in building conditions between 1990 and 1992, with average sales prices for homes also decreasing during that period. Further, a sharp upward turn in both violent and property crime from 1991 to 1992 led to the formation of a Dayton Police Department Five Oaks "Strike Force" as a temporary response, increasing arrests for prostitution and drug offenses.[5] The Neighborhood Stabilization Plan, designed by the city and the Five Oaks Neighborhood

Improvement Association (FONIA) with the help of architect and planner Oscar Newman,[6] consisted of:

- 35 street closures to divide Five Oaks into mini-neighborhoods (completed between July and November 1992).

- 26 alley closures to reinforce the traffic changes (completed between October 1992 and January 1993).

- Targeted loans for exterior property improvements under the city's Real Estate Assistance Challenge (REACH) program, to address deteriorating physical conditions (begun in December 1992).

An evaluation of the Neighborhood Stabilization Plan, conducted by the City of Dayton, examined changes in crime from 1989 to 1993 as one of the indicators of program effects.[7] (Exhibit F-6 shows the crime data reported in the Five Oaks evaluation.) The numbers make it clear how sharp an increase there was in both violent and property crimes between 1991 and 1992, leading FONIA and the police department to take action. Violent crimes increased by 44 percent and nonviolent/property crimes by nearly 12 percent between 1991 and 1992. However, in the 11 months of 1993 after the crime prevention changes were implemented, property crimes fell by 52 percent, and all tabulated offenses fell by 26 percent. On examining a longer time period, it was discovered that in 1993 Five Oaks was dealing with lower numbers of serious offenses than at any time in the previous 5 years. Thus, the City of Dayton concluded that the Five Oaks neighborhood stabilization effort achieved its goals.

Were the Changes Just Displacement?

As chapter 1 noted, the issue of displacement is often raised to challenge both the objectives and perceived successes of place-specific crime prevention. If criminals are intent on committing offenses, according to this critique, then they will find a place to commit them; deflecting offenders from one location simply produces victims elsewhere. There have been strong theoretical challenges to this model of offender behavior, as well as empirical studies that document diffusion of benefits and not simply displacement of crime. Further, the distinction made between *destructive displacement* (to more serious offenses or to already heavily victimized populations) and *benign displacement* (to less serious crimes, at lower incidence, or toward a more even distribution across communities or population groups)[8] should be kept in mind as the displacement question is addressed relative to the study sites.

When asked whether they had noticed changes (either diffusion of benefits or displacement of crime) in the surrounding areas following the modifications in physical design and management made by their programs, respondents offered a variety of views. In Charlotte, a staff member of CMHP noted possible displacement from Genesis Park to Druid Hills (about 2 miles away) and Cummings Avenue, saying, "The pockets already in place grow; they offer the least resistance." An officer in the Planning Unit of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department made this observation, "The dead-end streets, the pockets next to highways and other nonresidential uses are the ideal places for drug activity. These physical features are isolating, and the lack of access creates or increases vulnerability." Because CMHP works in other neighborhoods, the organization is considering broad alliances with many different groups, all working together at neighborhood watches and similar efforts. An official at the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) agrees that as community policing widens and target-hardening spreads, fewer communities will be available for drug trafficking.

In Oakland, the police lieutenant in charge of OHA's security department believes that the changes in Lockwood Gardens did displace some criminal activity. Initially, the "bad actors" were pushed out onto 14th Street, the bordering commercial area; in fact, one dealer was killed because he moved onto someone else's turf there. Dealers still frequent the liquor store near the corner of 65th Avenue, but they do not venture onto Lockwood Gardens property and never enter the property in a group as they did in the past. As crime has been displaced from Lockwood, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) has dealt with more crime in the surrounding commercial area. Thus, in a sense, OHA security efforts forced the OPD response. There were scattered complaints about displacement in the first few months of concentrated security at Lockwood Gardens, but now area merchants have made more positive adjustments; for example, one liquor store will call the OHA security office when drug dealers reappear there. Considering the question of displacing drug-related crime more broadly, the lieutenant noted:

> Some of the market was resident demand, and now they go elsewhere to buy. If the market is there, someone else will move in to serve it if the initial dealer is arrested or removed. Demand reduction is necessary to prevent this from happening. But the enforcement strategy is necessary to turn the community around, change their attitude.

In Boston, the area commander for the Boston Police Department sees displacement from Castle Square of the drug dealers and prostitutes, who move between the Combat Zone and the South End, as well as of some homeless people. In Tucson, considering the changes in El Cortez Heights, a crime prevention officer said:

> Some [crime] has been displaced and some eliminated. Let's assume that you won't get rid of it all, but we can get rid of a lot and manage the rest. People in next-door neighborhoods got more involved and didn't complain to the police more. They said, "How can we get involved?" They started doing similar community things; not all of [the strategies], but some.

Perhaps the most eloquent response to displacement came from the president of the East Bridgeport Community Council. Although she did not see any evidence of crime displacement from the changes made in her neighborhood, she said, ". . . Displacement is a stupid misconception. Because if it were true, it's like saying, 'Let's leave the crime in one specific area. That's better for everyone else.' No, it's better in someone else's backyard!" She also spoke about working with other resident organizations in the city, helping them write grants, and working together to mobilize city hall. This and other cooperative efforts among nearby communities represent an important—albeit indirect—diffusion of benefits from efforts to reduce crime and improve safety in these communities.

Lessons Learned

What did the various sites learn through informal and formal monitoring and analysis that helped them improve their place-specific crime prevention programs? The lessons fall into six categories: (1) changing attitudes; (2) managing security; (3) maintaining communication; (4) securing the right kind of funding; (5) taking advantage of technology; and (6) avoiding the pitfalls of the past. In considering these lessons, program planners may wish to think about building a feedback loop into their place-specific crime prevention programs. The value of feedback and the need for monitoring and evaluation to strengthen operating programs cannot be overstated.

Changing Attitudes

Changes in the attitudes of key players were noted as a significant result of the place-specific crime prevention programs studied for this report. Residents, police, and property owners/managers all learned from their involvement in anti-crime efforts, and the lessons most often had to do with the value of their partners or the possibility of bringing about real change in community conditions.

Resident support is critical for implementing place-specific crime prevention programs, and resident involvement and input in shaping the changes is even more important. However, a change in resident attitudes is often required for the necessary support and involvement to be forthcoming. At Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles, the president of the Resident Management Corporation (RMC), a long-term resident, learned that it takes time for people to realize that they can do something about a problem. Many people at Mar Vista Gardens believed that the police would not do anything about crime caused by people from outside the development. The RMC president learned that it is necessary to push government to care, but that organized residents can succeed in getting the response they need. Describing the process at Robert B. Pitts Plaza, a redeveloped public housing development in San Francisco, an architect with the housing authority's modernization department explained, "[Changing a community] takes a lot of work and commitment, and the commitment has to come from the housing authority and residents. The onus mostly lies with the residents. They have to take some responsibility and stand up for themselves."

Police attitudes have changed as law enforcement officials have learned to recognize the impact of crime prevention programs and residents' vital role in them. The local Boston Police commander sees the redesign of Castle Square Apartments as a major improvement for that part of the South End community. Management vigilance (including much greater resident reporting than before) and well-lit parking areas have kept the outside dealers out, reducing the need for some of the vigorous traffic and drug enforcement previously required in the area. Thus, such efforts can effectively reduce the load on local police departments.

Involvement in place-specific crime prevention can also change the attitudes of property owners or managers. Making place-specific changes to the physical environment and to management can be a win-win proposition when a private developer and a tenant organization work together. The initiative at Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End taught the developer and head of the private management company that "You can make money and do good at the same time. You can work with residents as partners and respect them fully." The collaborative effort at Castle Square also demonstrated to residents that the interests of the two sides

were not necessarily in conflict. The joint venture showed that residents could work together with a private developer for everyone's benefit.

Finally, it can be difficult to make inroads in the attitudes of people who are not involved in an area's changes. In Charlotte, the CMHP at first did not have a good marketing program to attract prospective buyers. The reputation of the old Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood caused many prospective buyers to decline an invitation to see the newly renovated homes in Genesis Park. In addition to hiring an experienced real estate broker to head the marketing effort, CMHP quickly learned that it helped if one of the required homeowner classes for first-time buyers was held in the Genesis Park model house, so that people preparing to buy could see the positive changes in the area; those who have been to Genesis Park are far more likely to consider buying a house there.

Even with their success in selling Genesis Park homes (nearly 60 were occupied at the end of 1996), CMHP knows more attitudes remain to be changed. While the partnership's overall goals for Genesis Park are broad—making it a decent place to live by creating affordable homeownership opportunities for hard-working, low-income families with ambition—a more immediate goal is simply to get pizza delivery in the neighborhood, which will be a symbol that the general public considers Genesis Park to be a safe area.

Managing Security

At Castle Square Apartments, the CSTO and Winn Management Company found that implementing changes taught them how to phase out paid police details and reduce paid security staffing gradually as they regained control of the site. In their experience, it was important to sustain a strong security presence for some time after crime reductions suggested this was no longer necessary. This strategy guarded against the expectations of drug dealers and prostitutes that enforcement would be short-lived, which would have allowed them to return to the site shortly after the burst of security activity was over; apparently, this lesson had been learned from years of dealing with traditional police deployment rather than community policing and resident involvement in crime prevention.

Lessons about managing security have also been learned at Lockwood Gardens in Oakland. Unable to sustain financially the commitment of high levels of staff and private

security guards to the site, OHA phased out the private guards in early 1995. In addition, OHA security has been experimenting with changing the number of officers assigned to the community policing shifts (also sometimes skipping the graveyard shift) and with parking the mobile command center on 65th Avenue at irregular intervals, to keep the drug dealers and other offenders off their guard.

Maintaining Communication

In Genesis Park in Charlotte, CMHP construction organizers have found that work proceeds in a smoother fashion when communication and coordination with the Charlotte Police Department and other organizations is maintained on a daily basis. The experience with Genesis Park taught CMHP staff the importance of working partnerships with other organizations. Teamwork certainly makes everything easier, but effective teamwork depends on frequent communication. This lesson was brought home vividly to the coordinator of the neighborhood reinvestment program for the Charlotte Engineering Department: On his first day of work in Genesis Park in 1990, as he began diagnosing the chronic drainage problems in the area, he was caught in the midst of gunfire and a police action. That convinced him of the need to coordinate his actions with the police department on a daily basis.

For the long term, all the organizations involved in the revitalization of Genesis Park have representation on the project committee, which meets twice a month for mutual updates and planning. The reporting is very detailed, the assignments concrete, and the work moves ahead.

Securing the Right Kinds of Funding

Voicing a sentiment widely expressed among respondents in all study sites, the commander of Area D for the Boston Police Department noted that funding for physical crime prevention is essential. Given the scarcity of funding available for any public-nonprofit ventures these days, creativity about funding is indeed essential for community organizations, housing authorities, and other organizations engaged in the redesign of neighborhoods and buildings for safety.

Lockwood Gardens in Oakland has benefited considerably from a paid private security detail, plus extensive gating and fencing. The physical changes were paid out of OHA Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP) funds, which may be used for housing modernization and, to a limited degree, for

certain management improvements. CGP funding is still being made available by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for upgrading public housing around the United States. The Lockwood security guards are paid from a Public Housing Drug Elimination Program grant that will expire in 1997. Residents of the once crime-plagued development are deeply concerned about security at the development once funding expires, as the housing authority does not anticipate being able to continue carrying the cost of the private security detail. Many at the development fear that it is only a matter of time and money before they lose all of the ground they only recently gained against offenders at Lockwood Gardens.

Both the Castle Square Apartments redevelopment deal and the CMHP property purchases in Genesis Park were made possible by masterful assemblies of equity funds and credit from a wide variety of public and private sources. For CMHP, however, the most important funding has come from Charlotte's Innovative Housing Fund; although not the largest amount, this is funding with few strings attached, and it has enabled the partnership to buy and hold Genesis Park houses in inventory while rehabilitating other parts of the community. On Gibbs and Kenney Streets, the first of the streets to be tackled, it was quite difficult to sell the renovated houses because of continuing problems in the rest of the neighborhood, especially along nearby Wayt Street. The solution was to buy the entire 2000 block of Wayt; rehabilitation of these houses is scheduled for 1997. Without the Innovative Housing funds, it is unlikely the partnership could have made the project work as well as it has.

Oak Park makes creative use of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding and Village Housing bonds for its broad strategy. The Residence Corporation's revolving acquisition fund (for buying deteriorating or foreclosed properties) comes from interest-free CDBG loans, and its rehabilitation money comes from bond funds. The Housing Bonds also provide the SIG rehabilitation grants to owners implementing security improvements.

Taking Advantage of Technology

Several technologies hold great promise for improving security at sites like those visited for this report. A sergeant with Area D of the Boston Police Department reported that cameras at Castle Square Apartments moved the dealers away from the front of buildings. In Macon, Georgia, the successful use of electronic card keys at a Macon Housing Authority development for the elderly has sparked consider-

ation of their use at other developments. Similarly, positive results with eight pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras at Grant Manor in Boston (which allow a single staff person to monitor outdoor and indoor activity in three developments both day and night) have encouraged another property manager, the Boston Housing Authority, to consider their use at public housing developments in the city. Other examples of potentially cost-saving technology at use in some sites include the magnetic card/keypad opening system on the gates in Lockwood Gardens (which could help substitute for private security guards, if agreement could be reached with the city about closing the gates) and use of the mobile security van at OHA developments in lieu of permanently stationed officers.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of the Past

Not all of the changes made at the studied sites are accepted as obvious progress. In San Francisco, an architect involved in the redesign of the Robert B. Pitts Plaza believes that cities are doomed to failure as long as poor people continue to be concentrated together. He is vocal in his opposition to the large concentrations of public housing in particular parts of the city. In this view, even reducing the density of poor people to the level achieved at the Pitts site is not enough. Crime around Pitts Plaza has remained constant. The social aspects that contribute to crime in the community have stayed the same or intensified, and the actual situation may not have improved at all. The architect noted, "Because Pitts is a *new* development filled with *new* people, things haven't gotten as apparent or as bad. [But] we still have two sister projects [in the neighborhood] that are basically the same as Yerba Buena Plaza West [the predecessor of Robert B. Pitts Plaza] was, and they cause most of the problems in that neighborhood."

Another pitfall concerns the materials used to implement some of the place-specific design changes. Public housing construction has tended to use extremely durable—but also extremely cold and institutional—materials. Now efforts are being made to blend renovated developments with the style and materials of other housing in the area. At the Diggs Town development in Norfolk, and at Pitts Plaza in San Francisco, however, some of the construction materials used proved to be of inadequate quality or durability for the sites. In Norfolk, for example, some of the new porches are already falling apart, and shoddy wooden construction in San Francisco may need to be replaced in only a few years. In no time at all after the Diggs Town light fixtures had been installed, vandals had broken into the control boxes at the base of the outdoor fixtures and cut the wires on a number of strategi-

cally placed poles. These fixtures, installed to improve opportunities for surveillance at prime drug dealing locations, were temporarily rendered useless by the vandalism. The Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) learned from the vandalism that all of the regular screws used to close the control boxes needed to be replaced with tamper-proof screws.

The tendency to blame all crime and disorder on outsiders, creating divisions where coalitions could be built, is yet another pitfall to be avoided. Some would argue that the crime prevention strategies used in Oak Park rest on the premise that most criminals active in Oak Park come from Chicago. In the view of many village residents, the source of crime still resides there, and Chicago police are viewed as well-intentioned but lacking the resources to tackle the problem. Crime prevention in Oak Park, including the use of cul-de-sacs and the SIG program, is believed to have greatly reduced the opportunity for Chicago troublemakers to commit crimes in Oak Park.

For Oak Park's residents however, this "us and them" philosophy in no way contradicts the village's commitment to diversity, strict code enforcement, and remaining a good place to live. Perhaps the most important lesson that efforts like Oak Park's and the program at Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles (another site in which financially better-off residents pointed a finger at a poorer community as the source of the problem) have taught the larger communities is that their woes are, in fact, metropolitan or even regional concerns. Whatever the desires of some Oak Park and West Los Angeles residents, neither community will ever be able to cut itself off from crime entirely. Instead, the initiatives have taught both communities the importance of collaboration with others, whether it be the housing authority, city government, or a nearby residents' association.

Crime and Place Revisited

With the exception of Oak Park—for which only village-wide statistics were available—the crime statistics presented here clearly show that crime in the communities was reduced overall. The decline in the number of offenses committed in most crime categories suggests (although it does not prove) that the strategies and design changes the sites implemented have had positive impacts on the quality of life for residents in these communities. Close observers indicate that, even if there was some displacement (particularly of drug sales, as demand reduction was not addressed in these programs), it was by no means complete. In fact, for Lockwood Gardens

(where data were available on crime trends in the surrounding area), reductions were seen for the area as a whole in 1994. This may indicate that some diffusion of benefits occurred from the wide range of changes made at Lockwood Gardens, although the scope and methods of this study do not allow a firm conclusion to be drawn on this point.

In addition, the changes made appear to have contributed to improved day-to-day relationships among residents, law enforcement, nonprofit organizations, and other relevant local community members. The process of working together to implement the place-specific crime prevention programs has helped foster greater familiarity and better understanding among the groups. As a result, the communities now have a track record and experience to build from as they seek to tackle further problems together.

The overall achievements of the place-specific crime prevention programs in Charlotte, Oakland, Boston, and Oak Park can be summarized as follows:

- Planning and execution of a well-conceived set of *physical redesign* elements, based on close analysis of the ways the built environment was being used;

- Implementation of wide-ranging *changes in the management of private and public property* in each community, with the involvement of private owners and managers, public agencies, and residents;

- Expansion or reorientation of *security efforts,* involving a shift to community policing and (in some cases) the coordinated use of private security forces;

- Strengthening of the *role of residents* in addressing community conditions, through the development of communication and cooperation with law enforcement officials, private owners and managers, and other local players; and

- Reduction in crime and other *improvements in the quality of life* in the community, as indicated by police data and by observers and participants in the local programs.

In addition, there were two major lessons learned from the sites visited:

- Physical design modifications, management changes, and changes in use should be tailored to specific locations and coordinated in their planning and imple-

mentation.

- The most effective security and crime prevention efforts are those that involve a coalition of different players working together to define the problem and then seeking solutions.

Through this research, the importance of selecting approaches that work for a particular community has become clear. As noted in chapter 3, the most effective place-specific crime prevention strategies are those that take into account the geographic, cultural, economic, and social characteristics of the target community. It is also important that place-specific strategies respect the habits and behavior of area residents. Crime prevention is not a ""one size fits all" effort, and some communities may require more attention and ingenuity than others in crafting effective strategies. Thorough analysis of the problems and needs of a given community, as well as ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the place-specific strategies selected, are vital.

The report's many site examples demonstrate how the physical environment can be altered by changing the shape or appearance of the common areas, controlling access to the site and buildings, and improving natural surveillance opportunities. Redefining the boundaries between private and public space, opening up hidden areas, and target-hardening are all important place-specific crime prevention strategies. If management is defined as the responsibility for maintaining order in one or more aspects of a place, then a variety of participants have an actual or potential role in the management of specific places. Pairing physical design changes with management changes that support, facilitate, and reinforce their preventive effects on disorder and illegal activities can be highly effective. Indeed, place-specific crime prevention seems to hold potential for addressing current security and safety problems in many residential areas in ways that are durable and flexible enough to meet future needs.

Endnotes

1. Two recent studies that have used a combination of methodologies to improve interpretation of police crime data are T. Hammett et al., *Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, June 1994) and S. Popkin et al., *An Evaluation of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug Initia-*

tive: A Model of Comprehensive Crime Prevention in Public Housing (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., October 1995). The Hammett study of the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program used qualitative, quantitative, and ethnographic data to examine program impacts. The Popkin study used resident survey data on crime victimization (as well as on perceptions of local conditions) in combination with official offense counts.

2. The difficulties of evaluating crime prevention efforts are discussed in appendix B.

3. The police forces of the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County were consolidated over a period of 2 years, culminating in combining patrol responsibilities in March 1995. Thus, it was the Charlotte Police Department that had jurisdiction over community policing and responding to service calls in Genesis Park until March 1995. At that time, a change in police districts related to the consolidation was the reason for reassignment of Genesis Park's two original community policing officers.

4. The area is defined as Oakland Police Department Beats 29 and 30. The beat counts are inclusive of Lockwood Gardens counts.

5. *Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood Stabilization Plan* (Dayton, OH: Office of Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January 1994): 5.

6. See the entry for the Institute for Community Design Analysis in appendix D.

7. *Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood Stabilization Plan* (Dayton, OH: Office of Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January 1994).

8. R. Clarke, ed., *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992): 22–27.

Appendix A

Glossary of Acronyms

AA Alcoholics Anonymous

ABA Austin Boulevard Alliance, Oak Park, Illinois

ADI Anti-Drug Initiative of the Chicago Housing Authority, Chicago, Illinois

AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children

BHA Boston Housing Authority, Boston, Massachusetts

BOMA Building Owners/Managers Association, Oak Park, Illinois

BPD Boston Police Department, Boston, Massachusetts

BRA Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston, Massachusetts

CBO Community-based organization

CCNYC Citizens Committee for New York City, New York, New York

CCTV Closed-circuit TV

CDBG Community Development Block Grant Program, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

CDC Community development corporation

CEI Civil Enforcement Initiative, New York City Police Department, New York, New York

CGP Comprehensive Grant Program, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

CHA Charlotte Housing Authority, Charlotte, North Carolina

CHBA Clinton Hill Block Association, Brooklyn, New York

CHPC Citizens Housing and Planning Council, New York, New York

CMHP Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership, Charlotte, North Carolina

CMPD Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Charlotte, North Carolina

COP Community-oriented policing

CPD Charlotte Police Department, Charlotte, North Carolina (prior to consolidation with county police)

CPTED Crime prevention through environmental design

CRDA Community Response to Drug Abuse Demonstration Program

CSA Castle Square Apartments, Boston, Massachusetts

CSAP Center for Substance Abuse Prevention

CSTO Castle Square Tenants' Organization, Boston, Massachusetts

DEED Diggs Town Economic Empowerment Demonstration, Norfolk, Virginia

FONIA Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement Association, Dayton, Ohio

GED Graduate equivalency diploma

GIS Geographical information system

GPS Global positioning system (satellite locating system for nonmilitary use)

HACLA Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles

HPAC   Housing Programs Advisory Committee, Oak Park, Illinois

HUD   U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

LAPD   Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles, California

MHA   Macon Housing Authority, Macon, Georgia

MIS   Management information system

MHFA   Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Boston, Massachusetts

NA   Narcotics Anonymous

NCPI   National Crime Prevention Institute, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky

NIJ   National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice

NRHA   Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Norfolk, Virginia

OHA   Oakland Housing Authority, Oakland, California

OPD   Oakland Police Department, Oakland, California

PHA   Public housing agency or authority

PHDEP Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

POP   Problem-oriented policing

PTZ   Pan-tilt-zoom (camera)

RICO   Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

RMC   Resident management corporation/council

SARA   Scanning, analysis, response, assessment

SFHA   San Francisco Housing Authority, San Francisco, California

SIG   Security Improvement Grant Program, Oak Park, Illinois

TPD   Tucson Police Department, Tucson, Arizona

UCLA   University of California at Los Angeles

Appendix B

Review of the Research Literature

Several methods of research and practice, from defensible space to community policing, have addressed relationships between crime and place. Together, these methods result in "place-specific crime prevention." One constant aspect of place-specific crime prevention approaches has been the creation or modification of the physical environment to prevent crime. However, the integration of strategies to modify the use and management of sites has strengthened environmental design or redesign as a practical approach to crime prevention in varied settings. Place-specific crime prevention builds on crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED; physical changes) and draws on the results of research on active crime prevention tactics (such as community policing and community crime prevention) to emphasize modification of design, use, and management of a specific place to prevent crime. The evolution of place-specific crime prevention has created a need for information on both the implementation and outcomes of these interventions. The theories underlying these techniques, as well as practical how-to manuals that were developed to foster their use are discussed in this appendix.

Part of the theoretical basis for many place-specific crime prevention strategies is the assumption that many offenders are rational and will not commit crimes where they perceive the risks to outweigh the potential benefits. In contrast to earlier assumptions that offenders are motivated solely by personality, genetics and/or upbringing, *rational offender theory* assumes that individuals choose criminality based on perceived benefits, risks, and degrees of difficulty in committing a crime or choosing a particular target.[1] For place-specific crime prevention strategies, rational offender theory suggests that making the commission of a crime difficult and/or risky enough will convince the majority of potential offenders not to commit the crime in that specific place. If rational offender theory and its premise (that the offender is an opportunist who weighs the criminal opportunity against the risk of being apprehended) are correct, the potential offender would not necessarily look for another setting or more convenient opportunity for committing the crime. Thus, there may be overall reductions in crime as a result of place-specific interventions.

Physical Crime Prevention: Defensible Space and CPTED

There is a long tradition of research on the relationship between physical design and crime. We owe to Jane Jacobs an understanding of urban life that incorporates attention to the physical design and human use of spaces in a theory of urban viability. Jacobs argued that increased citizen surveillance, or "eyes on the street," would help to maintain vitality and reduce crime in inner-city neighborhoods.[2] Architect and planner Oscar Newman soon tested and refined this idea, thereby describing defensible space. Focusing on individual buildings and public housing developments rather than city blocks or neighborhoods, Newman claimed that increased visibility and separation of space into areas assigned to smaller groups of residents would encourage residents' sense of territoriality and improve their feeling of ability to control that space, as well as their willingness to do so.[3] Presumably, potential offenders would perceive this attitude and the resulting greater level of ordinary activity, and would be discouraged from committing crimes within those spaces.

Research on defensible space led to the recognition of related physical strategies for crime prevention, such as target-hardening (use of dead-bolt locks, steel-core doors, and so on). The field known as CPTED, including work on defensible space and additional physical crime prevention strategies, has been applied to a wide range of sites and facilities, from public housing to luxury estates, from office buildings to parking structures, and from amusement parks to museums.[4]

Timothy Crowe summarizes CPTED as the practice that comes from the assumption that ". . . the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of life."[5] According to CPTED theory, properly designed spaces encourage or allow expression of a sense of territoriality among the users of the space by providing opportunities for crime prevention. CPTED interventions have included design features such as:

- Target-hardening (use of tamper-resistant materials such as polycarbonate windows, steel doors, stronger locks).

- Access control (gates, traffic barriers, and guarded entrances).

- Means for surveillance (ranging from windows on outdoor public spaces to closed-circuit televisions).

- Territoriality (fencing, gating, and other strategies to identify physical spaces with smaller groups of users).[6]

Some CPTED practitioners also make efforts to include community representatives in the design process in order to tailor specific physical changes to the needs of the users of the space. However, even with resident input, CPTED theorists tend to focus on design changes alone, without consideration of either accompanying or coordinating the physical changes with strategies to alter management or use.

Some CPTED strategies, particularly access control, can encourage discrimination. The California Supreme Court recently upheld a lower court's decision against allowing gates to limit access to public streets in Los Angeles's Whitley Heights district.[7] The legal basis for the appellate court decision rested on the state vehicular code, which provides that "local authorities may not place gates . . . on any street which deny or restrict access of certain members of the public to the street, while permitting others unrestricted access to the street."[8] Although in some situations much of the crime may appear to be committed by people from outside the area, CPTED practitioners must be careful to avoid creating de facto segregation due to assumptions that any outsider is a criminal. For example, in order to stimulate business and decrease crime in Oak Park, Illinois, streets in a commercial area were closed to cars, and planners designed limited and predictable access and egress routes. This design intervention reduced shoplifting and vandalism, yet all people still had equal access to the public streets.[9]

Another example, which is striking because of the community context (an extremely impoverished neighborhood of south-central Los Angeles), is the Vermont-Slauson fenced and gated shopping center. CPTED practitioners have praised Vermont-Slauson for several reasons: (1) it is attractive; (2) crime rates are quite low; (3) many of the stores are minority owned, providing good role models for children and residents; and (4) profits from the mall have been reinvested into affordable housing in the surrounding neighborhood.[10] The Vermont-Slauson shopping center also emerged relatively unscathed after the 1992 riots in Los Angeles.

Active Crime Prevention: Community Policing and Community Crime Prevention

An emerging awareness that police departments alone cannot prevent or punish all of the criminal behavior in our society has led to research in active community-based crime prevention. First discussed as problem-oriented policing, the field of *community policing* is the contemporary locus of widespread efforts to improve police practice. Community policing does not derive from the type of causal theory about criminal behavior previously described for CPTED. Rather, it entails a coordinated or partnership approach to solving problems and suggests new tools for policing. Rosenbaum and Eck believe that community and problem-oriented policing strategies attempt to improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of police practice, through problem-solving and evaluation.[11] Although some expect that community policing can fix everything, in practice community policing programs usually employ only a subset of available strategies.[12] The following are strategies that have been included in community-policing programs to a greater or lesser extent:

- *Problem-oriented policing* focuses on patterns of crime and uses research and cooperation, sometimes with other agencies and/or citizens' groups, to find a response or solution.

- *Public relations* strategies can include advertising campaigns and walking or bicycle patrols to improve community relations. Moderating the public's expectations of police performance is one public relations goal. Also, police agencies have become more conscious of racism, both actual and perceived, in their ranks. Rosenbaum and Eck note that the word "community" (in community policing) is often used euphemistically for communities of color or others outside the mainstream.[13] Ideally, police departments would actively address racism beyond the realm of public relations.

- *Softening rigid hierarchies* in police departments is intended to improve police efficiency. This follows a trend in management toward total quality management, emphasizing teamwork and collective responsibility rather than rigid positions and divisions of labor.

- Formal *partnerships* between police, community members, and other public agencies can be developed to

identify problems, improve relations, and plan strategies for prevention. Unfortunately, fear of crime or retaliation may discourage citizens from participating in such partnerships. Also, police officers need to educate themselves about racial and cultural differences in order to establish and maintain such a partnership with communities of color.

- Assigning officers to *foot or bicycle patrols* and *opening neighborhood substations* is meant to improve police visibility and accessibility, and thus improve responses to residents' concerns. Informal interaction between residents and police officers has different advantages and disadvantages than the more formal community partnerships; however, the success of both depends on the interest of all parties in communicating and cooperating.

Community or neighborhood crime prevention programs differ from community policing in that they tend to be initiated by community organizations rather than police departments. In some ways, neighborhood crime prevention is the predecessor to and grass-roots counterpart of community policing. Both sets of strategies share the assumption that crime prevention must involve citizens and police, but they differ in available resources and strategies. The following are widely used neighborhood crime prevention tactics:[14]

- Neighborhood, block, or apartment watches.

- Identifying and inventorying valued property with engraved numbers, and placing stickers in windows to alert potential burglars that all valuables are traceable.

- Home security surveys (examining homes and suggesting physical changes, such as target-hardening and expanded lighting, to improve security).

- Resident street or building patrols.

- Crime reporting projects.

- Resident-initiated and implemented physical environment changes (such as pruning trees in parks or painting over graffiti).

- Police-community boards.

- Home security improvements.

- Escort services.

Neighborhood crime prevention projects can have the multiple benefits of reducing crime, empowering residents, and strengthening community institutions and organizations.

Place-Specific Crime Prevention: Combining Design and Active Strategies

Although advocates of defensible space have clearly recognized the importance of user participation in defensible-space interventions,[15] they have not emphasized strategies to ensure that defensible space is actually defended. Research in the field of community crime prevention has shown that designing or redesigning defensible spaces is only a starting point. Greenberg and colleagues[16] studied links between crime rates, physical characteristics, land use, and residents' sense of territoriality in neighborhoods in Atlanta. They found that boundary characteristics (such as traffic on boundary streets, socioeconomic status of surrounding neighborhoods, and insulation from through-traffic) and land use (such as purely residential versus mixed residential and commercial) distinguished high- and low-crime neighborhoods. The researchers developed a household survey to measure territoriality but found that high- and low-crime neighborhoods did not significantly differ on this measure. Thus, assuming the accuracy of their measure, even if physical (re)design does directly influence informal territorial control, territoriality does not appear to be related to neighborhood crime rates. It appears that a sense of territoriality must be accompanied by specific land use and boundary characteristics, and perhaps by more formal active crime prevention strategies.

Many have criticized CPTED and defensible space theories and the research supporting them.[17] The assumption that people are "naturally" territorial may be naive, particularly in contemporary urban settings. Racial, ethnic, language, and class divisions may make a sense of neighborhood identity difficult to establish. Further, defensible space and territoriality are difficult to quantify, making conclusive evaluations difficult.[18] As noted previously, a sense of informal territoriality among residents is not sufficient to affect crime rates.[19] Finally, users' and potential users' fear of victimization or retaliation, whether or not they are closely related to the realities of crime in the area, also have a notable dampening effect on both individual and collective behavior.[20] Thus, strategies to address and reduce fear may need to be implemented before the crime prevention benefits of spatial (re)design can be realized.

Situational crime prevention developed in Britain on a course parallel with the development of CPTED in the United States. However, in response to the perceived limitations of the theory supporting CPTED, situational crime prevention theorists emphasize legal and management issues in addition to design concerns. According to Ronald Clarke, a leading exponent of situational crime prevention:

> Because it encompasses the entire range of environments (and objects) involved in crime and because it encompasses legal and management as well as design solutions, situational prevention is . . . broader than CPTED (which tends to be focused on design of the built environment).[21]

Still, although the theory emphasizes these multiple solutions, the practice of situational crime prevention has lagged somewhat. Clarke's book of successful case studies includes few examples of projects integrating design, use, *and* management strategies.[22]

In this report, the term *place-specific crime prevention* is used to refer to approaches that go beyond more narrow theories about environmental design, drawing on more active strategies and techniques yet retaining a location-centered focus. Place-specific crime prevention seeks to improve on CPTED's exclusive reliance on physical modifications to influence human behavior. As Reiss and Roth note:

> The reason for the inconsistent and temporary effects [of a CPTED demonstration project in Hartford] appears to be that *crime and violence arise from interactions between the social environment and the physical environment, which cannot be controlled entirely through manipulations of the physical environment* [emphasis added]. The communal feeling of territoriality and mutual protection, on which the defensible space concept rests, apparently failed to materialize . . ..[23]

Place-specific crime prevention addresses this interaction by intervening in the social environment as well as the physical environment of a place, thereby analyzing and altering the interactions among design, use, and management.

Although the term may be new, concepts supporting place-specific crime prevention are not. The works of Richard Gardiner, Allan Wallis, and Daniel Ford from the late 1970's

and early 1980's suggest place-specific crime prevention principles. Wallis and Ford's evaluation of a CPTED demonstration project in Portland, Oregon, emphasized the importance of going beyond defensible space and including community organizations and police.[24] Gardiner has long advocated integrating urban village (community crime prevention), urban fortress (access control and target-hardening), and defensible space models for crime prevention.[25] Circulation, public facility location, open space, zoning, parking and other urban support systems must support legitimate use of the area for effective crime prevention. For example, in Freeway Park in Seattle, Washington, a lack of foot traffic combined with design flaws allowed criminals to take over. Although the police used extensive resources to remove illegitimate users from the park, the lack of legitimate park users and active management allowed criminal activity to return after police shifted their attention elsewhere. In contrast, skateboarders' legitimate use drove drug dealers out of Skateboard Park in Portland, Oregon.[26]

More recently, Taylor and Harrell have written an extremely cogent examination of the evolution of place-specific crime prevention approaches and of the evidence supporting their use.[27] They identify assumptions about offender behavior that underlie manipulation of physical features for crime prevention. In particular, they believe that offenders consider the following factors when deciding to commit a crime:

1. How likely and easy is it to enter the area?

2. How visible, attractive, and vulnerable are the targets in the area, once entrance is gained?

3. What are the chances of being seen committing the crime?

4. If seen, what are the chances that others will intervene?

5. Whether seen or not, how quickly and directly can the area be left after the crime is committed?[28]

Notice that these factors point directly to the *interrelationship* of physical design (items 1, 3, 5), management (items 1, 3, 4, 5), and use (items 2, 3, 4) of a specific place.

Similarly, Fleissner and Heinzelmann advocate integrating attention to physical characteristics and crime with analysis of the activities of the people who use a given space.[29] CPTED techniques can control access, facilitate surveillance, and increase users' sense of security; community policing can prevent fear of crime from becoming isolating

and self-fulfilling. Fleissner and Heinzelmann argue that CPTED and community policing can and should complement each other.[30]

The theoretical work on routine activities also points to design, use, and management of places as all being critical to crime prevention. *If crime results when motivated offenders and vulnerable targets converge in space and time in the absence of a capable guardian,*[31] then prevention requires:

1. Making access to the area more difficult for motivated offenders, through design changes and ongoing management.

2. Making targets less vulnerable, by encouraging more users to be present and by teaching users basic safety practices (for example, to prevent purse-snatching, an older woman should carry her purse out of sight or with the strap across her chest, not over one shoulder).

3. Ensuring that the area is suitably guarded, through a combination of encouraging legitimate users and making it clear that the area is managed.

If these three steps are taken, neither users nor managers should fear to act if they see an offense being committed.

The requirement of active management of places may be criticized as unrealistic in an era of austere public budgets and lean private business operations. It therefore seems important to clarify here what is meant by the managerial component (although it is discussed more fully in chapter 2). The management of places has both formal and informal aspects. Formally, we look to public services—including not only policing but also planning, public works, and sanitation—for the management of our public spaces. Attention was drawn most vividly to the need for management of public spaces by Wilson and Kelling's 1982 article "Broken Windows."[32] The authors describe the potent effects of signs of disorder—such as abandoned cars, graffiti, and broken windows—on the residents of urban neighborhoods and the users of public streets and sidewalks. Removing and preventing such signs of disorder as they occur on public property is the responsibility of police and other public sector agencies. These agencies must work in concert to avoid the fear-generating and use-dampening effects of disorder on urban and suburban neighborhoods.

However, active management also includes informal components, such as residents taking responsibility for the street in front of their homes. All evidence reviewed here points to the likelihood that active formal management will encourage and strengthen informal management, so that suitable and capable guarding of spaces—from disorder as well as from crime—becomes a shared responsibility and a more potent force against crime.

Evaluation Research and Findings

In the evaluation literature on community or neighborhood crime prevention, community-oriented policing, and design-based crime prevention programs, both the findings and the programs themselves vary significantly. Programs differ in tactics, goals, participants, locations, and available resources. Evaluations and their results differ by methods of analysis, measures of success (outcome measures), and interpretations of findings. Measurement problems in this field are well known. For example, the crime level may look very different if one study measures it using the number of calls for service and another uses conviction rates.[33] Similarly, a higher count of convictions might mean that police and prosecutors are doing a better job, or that there have been more crimes overall.

Few interventions and even fewer evaluations make use of the full range of place-specific crime prevention strategies. Accordingly, only a few exemplary evaluations are discussed here, bearing in mind that the emergence of place-specific crime prevention has created a compelling need for further, more integrated studies.

In 1973, the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program targeted burglary, robbery, and purse-snatching in two neighborhoods by integrating the efforts of police, citizens, and CPTED. In one neighborhood, there was additional policing and citizen organizing to prevent crime, while in the other, those interventions were combined with modifications of the physical space. One study found that the Hartford program significantly reduced theft crimes in both neighborhoods,[34] but another study concluded that these results were short lived.[35]

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded three early CPTED demonstrations in the late 1970's. One project focused on a mixed commercial and residential area in Portland, Oregon, and incorporated the efforts of community organizations and the police department in addition to design modifications. The Portland project was the most successful, clearly reducing some types of crime.[36]

A rare and early instance of an evaluation addressing the full

range of place-specific crime prevention strategies is the study of crime reduction in Fairview Homes (a public housing development in Charlotte, North Carolina).[37] The crime prevention program combined physical design changes, management improvements, resident organizing, and partnerships between public agencies and private neighborhood organizations. The study showed that "the two goals of the program—increased reporting of crime and reduced incidents of victimization—were not only met but exceeded."[38]

The Chicago Housing Authority has implemented a program called the Anti-Drug Initiative (ADI), which includes building sweeps for guns, drugs, and illegal occupants; improved security through guards and lobby access control; eviction of unauthorized tenants; improved responses to residents' service and maintenance needs; and drug prevention and intervention programs. The ADI has involved police officers, public housing management, residents, and social service providers. An early evaluation of this program found evidence that it was fairly successful in reducing crime and drugs in public housing; the study suggested that tenant stability and community base were essential to the ADI's success.[39]

Other evaluations have examined elements of place-specific crime prevention rather than comprehensive efforts. Several have focused on patrols and policing. At the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), resident patrols involve 15,000 participants, and housing developments with active patrols appear to experience less crime and vandalism and more social cohesion than those without active patrols.[40] However, the causal relationship here has not been established; greater social cohesion may well be a prerequisite for, rather than a result of, effective resident patrols.

Also in New York City, police bicycle patrols operating in public housing developments achieved more arrests (particularly drug arrests), fostered better community relations, and gathered more intelligence than the previous policing mode, in which cruisers were assigned to the same neighborhood.[41] A community policing and access control project in Lawrence, Massachusetts, improved resident/police relations but did not significantly affect drug-related crime.[42]

The Seattle Police Department has implemented a particularly successful community policing program focused on building partnerships among citizens, police, and other public agencies. Evaluations of this project have concluded that:

- Traditional policing and community policing must be combined.

- Crime and fear of crime are lower in neighborhoods where territoriality or neighborhood pride is expressed through the appearance of the neighborhood.

- Community policing may create turf conflicts among police and other agencies unaccustomed to partnerships.

- As much of the police department as possible should cooperate on a coordinated community policing effort.

- Community policing may increase the number of less urgent citizen calls for service.

- Community policing requires skills different from those needed for traditional policing.

- Successful partnerships should expand membership (including more agencies and citizen groups) and goals (considering the needs of more, and more varied, populations).[43]

A recent process evaluation of the Community Responses to Drug Abuse (CRDA) demonstration, designed by the National Training and Information Center and the National Crime Prevention Council, found that local community organizations accomplished a great deal, including creation of partnerships, changes in police-community relations, and enhanced capacity to mobilize anticrime and antidrug resources.[44]

An evaluation of interventions operated by public housing agencies (PHA's) and funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP) examined both the implementation and impact of these local antidrug and anticrime efforts.[45] Local agencies designed the programs (which could include physical improvements, security activities, drug prevention, and/or drug treatment) on the basis of conditions and needs in specific targeted public housing developments. This study employed a variety of research methods and assessed effectiveness on a range of possible impacts, including reductions in drug-related crime, improvements in resident quality of life, increased resident empowerment, establishment of linkages with other organizations, and creation of broader neighborhood effects. The study found some diminution of open-air drug activity in 10 of the 15 sites that received intensive study, as well as increased resident feelings of safety and freedom of movement, some increases in resident empowerment, and some improved linkages with external agencies and groups.[46] Data

are also available from the study on the nationwide use of PHDEP funds for security-related physical improvements.

Another body of research related to place-specific crime prevention has focused on the role of management in maintaining livable communities in subsidized housing developments and has called effective managers the "saints" of urban neighborhoods.[47] A recent evaluation of the effects of community development corporations (CDC's) on their neighborhoods found that poverty, crime, and gang activity are major factors affecting property management and that property managers can create safer conditions for their residents by using a range of techniques, including:[48]

- Screening prospective tenants.

- Setting and enforcing rules (in addition to lease requirements) designed to protect the physical property and the safety, privacy, and peace of residents.

- Using for-cause eviction to remove problem tenants (after other means of resolving the problems did not succeed), to demonstrate that rules must be followed and illegal behavior will not be tolerated.

- Maintaining secure premises and keeping the properties clean and in good repair to benefit both residents and the surrounding neighborhood.

- Providing security coverage, where necessary, through use of private guards (through contracted services or an in-house security force).

Another recent study of the management challenge for non-profit managers of affordable housing found "many examples of non-profit doing good jobs under these conditions [widespread unemployment, poor maintenance, vandalism, drug dealing, and gangs]."[49] Quoting one site manager, the report tied some management difficulties to design problems: "This development is a suburban dream. The problem with the dream and the very cozy layout with the many corners and crannies is that it is not built for security and defensible space."[50] The study documented improvements made to overcome this design flaw, including target-hardening and access control, but noted that these changes were costly.

These two studies are limited by their lack of impact analysis. While both used indicators of building condition and gathered data on resident satisfaction, they did not examine crime data or focus on whether security measures reduced crime incidence, victimization, or fear of crime in the housing complexes, buildings, or surrounding areas. Indeed, the lack of analysis demonstrating program impacts will prove characteristic of a number of sites used in this report. While there are data to suggest that each program highlighted in this report has achieved positive results, there is a great need for further research in this field despite the methodological and practical difficulties.

Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits?

The possibility of crime displacement is one of the major challenges raised when place-specific crime prevention efforts are proposed. Many practitioners express concern that place-specific programs will simply move (or displace) crime from the target area to other areas or other victims, without reducing the overall crime level. Put more formally, "under this view, situational changes [can] affect the pattern of crime but not its volume: the latter [is] determined by motivational factors."[51]

While law enforcement officials and other practitioners appear to accept crime displacement as a common occurrence, relatively little empirical research has focused directly on this phenomenon. Two fairly recent surveys of the crime control literature have examined the existing studies that address displacement and analyze the evidence they contain. A 1993 review of 33 studies (covering a wide range of crimes and settings) found that only 3 showed evidence of much displacement, 12 others found evidence of some displacement, while the remaining 18 found no such evidence.[52] Perhaps more important, despite the potential for different types of displacement (not just in time or space but by target, method, crime type, or perpetrator), there is a notable lack of research on what situations give rise to varying types and levels of displacement and why.[53]

A more recent review of 55 published articles on crime prevention began to address the question of displacement by classifying studies based on the type of intervention strategy used and other factors.[54] Overall, 22 of the studies identified no displacement, while 33 reported some form of displacement (none of the studies found complete displacement; most instances were quite limited). A high proportion of the studies showing no displacement examined interventions that increased the effort needed to commit a crime, involved combinations of preventive measures rather than single measures, and implemented preventive measures throughout the jurisdiction targeted.[55] This analysis suggests that

external factors do affect the potential for and patterns of crime displacement.

Some researchers persuasively contend that the perception of displacement as being automatic and widespread is based on questionable assumptions about criminal motivation, most notably that the impetus to commit a crime comes completely from within the offender and is not at all affected by external factors. They argue that rational offender theory better explains when and why displacement may occur.[56] Distinctions also have been made between benign and destructive displacement.[57] If there is displacement of criminal activity to more serious offenses, or to already heavily victimized areas or populations, then it would seem that displacement does pose a significant concern. However, if interventions more evenly distribute victimization among different neighborhoods or populations, if they redirect activity to less serious crimes, or if they displace only a portion of the initial amount of crime, there is a net benefit.

Rational offender theory would also suggest that crime prevention measures may produce diffusion of benefits rather than displacement of crime. This would occur if offenders experience increased fear of detection (i.e., they perceive that the risk of crime has increased) and/or decreased likelihood of gain (i.e., they perceive that the reward of crime is reduced) beyond the actual scope of the intervention. Hesseling [58] notes evidence that "some crime prevention measures have the unexpected and beneficial effect of reducing crime in adjacent control areas or for other targets," and Clarke and Weisburd[59] argue that "recent evidence leads to the conclusion that the latter process [diffusion of benefits] may be no less common than the former [displacement of crime]."

Diffusion of benefits is defined by Clarke[60] as "the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of control, the crimes which are the focus of intervention, or the time periods in which an intervention is brought."[61] Two processes underlie diffusion: deterrence (through increasing the fear of detection and thus the actual or perceived risk of arrest) and discouragement (through reducing the actual or perceived reward of crime).[62] When potential offenders are deterred or discouraged beyond the degree merited by the preventive measures taken, diffusion of benefits will occur. Clearly, practitioners should seek to design interventions that reduce the total amount of crime and/or that deflect activity to less serious crime or to less victimized populations. Even better would be the design of interventions whose effects reach beyond their target and thus produce diffusion of benefits.

Publications for Practitioners

Several manuals on design and active crime prevention strategies have been published. (Those currently available are listed in appendix D, with information on how to obtain them.)

NIJ and HUD have each published information on implementing active crime prevention strategies. HUD has produced brief pamphlets with information on successful resident patrols and community policing programs, in addition to resources for more information on starting similar programs.[63] HUD also published a series of case studies of anti-drug programs in public housing[64] and a guide for community groups dealing with street drug markets.[65] Most recently, HUD published an expanded monograph on Oscar Newman's defensible space work.[66] NIJ funded a more extensive manual on community crime prevention, with information on successful programs and tactics, and resources for information and evaluation.[67] Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy discuss police coalitions with community groups and government agencies, describe success stories, and argue for building such partnerships.[68]

Prior to this publication, only two texts have addressed the need to combine an analysis of design, use, and management to optimize crime prevention strategies. The earlier of the two is Wallis and Ford's work from the Portland, Oregon, CPTED demonstration project. To its credit, this text emphasizes the importance of ongoing evaluation and the inclusion of existing community groups. Wallis and Ford emphasize that the environment includes more than buildings, and that successful interventions depend on the active support of the users of a space: "In the CPTED approach, then, 'environment' includes not only the physical aspects of the setting, but social programs, managerial approaches, and law enforcement efforts as well."[69] The more recent text was directed at public housing but has wider applicability. This text—actually a workshop curriculum prepared for HUD's Crime Prevention and Security Division in 1995—formed the basis for technical assistance workshops with local officials and planners. It offers a variety of examples within a framework grounded in the literature of situational crime prevention.[70]

Endnotes

1. Rational choice or rational offender theory is now widely accepted for a variety of reasons discussed in "Editorial," *Crime Environments and Situational Prevention: European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research* v. 3, no. 3 (1995): 1. See also D. Cornish and R.V. Clarke, *The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending* (New York: Springer Verlag, 1986).

2. J. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961).

3. O. Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, April 1976).

4. *Secure and Livable Communities: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Paper Abstracts and Speaker Biographies* (Washington, DC: AIA/ACSA Council on Architectural Research and National Institute of Justice, 1993).

5. T. Crowe, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Applications of Architectural Design and Space Management Concepts* (Boston: National Crime Prevention Institute, 1991): 1.

6. L. Curtis and I. Kohn, "Citizen Self-help and Environmental Design: The Theory and Practice of Crime Prevention in American Subsidized Housing" in *Crime and Public Housing: Proceedings of a Workshop Held in September 1980*, ed. M. Hough and P. Mayhew (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982): 12.

7. "Neighborhood Anti-crime Plan Gets the Gate: Court Rejects L.A. Community's 10-Year Effort to Control Access," *Law Enforcement News*, (July 20, 1994): 5. The California Supreme Court refused without comment to hear an appeal of the state appellate court decision.

8. Ibid.

9. R. Gardiner, *Design for Safe Neighborhoods: The Environmental Security Planning and Design Process* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978): 77.

10. R. Titus, "Security Works: Shopping Enclaves Bring Hope, Investment to Blighted Inner-City Neighborhoods." *Urban Land* (Jan. 2, 1990).

11. D. Rosenbaum and J. Eck, "The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing," in *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*, ed. D. Rosenbaum (London: Sage Publications, 1994): 3–23.

12. Ibid.; H. Goldstein, *The New Policing: Confronting Complexity* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, December 1993).

13. D. Rosenbaum and J. Eck, "The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing," in *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*, ed. D. Rosenbaum (London: Sage Publications, 1994): 11.

14. J. Feins, *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1983): 15–18.

15. Oscar Newman defined *defensible space* as "a term used to describe a residential environment whose physical characteristics—building layout and site plan—function to allow inhabitants themselves to become the key agents in ensuring their own security. However, a housing development is 'defensible' only when residents choose to adopt this intended role—a choice that is facilitated by the development's design. *Defensible space therefore is a sociophysical phenomenon.*" O. Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, April 1976): 4. Emphasis added.

16. S. Greenberg, W. Rohe, and J. Williams, "Safe and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods," unpublished paper submitted to the National Institute of Justice (September 1981).

17. P. Mayhew, "Defensible Space: The Current Status of a Crime Prevention Theory," *The Howard Journal of Penology and Crime Prevention*, 18 (1979):150–159. Cited in R.V.G. Clarke, *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992).

18. D. Dingemans, "Evaluating Housing Environments for Crime Prevention." Submitted for publication in *Crime Prevention Review*.

19. S. Greenberg et al., "Safe and Secure Neighborhoods."

20. F. DuBow, E. McCabe, and G. Kaplan, *Reactions to Crime: A Critical Review of the Literature* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, November 1979).

21. R.V.G. Clarke, *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992): 7.

22. Ibid.

23. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, "Perspectives on Violence," *Understanding and Preventing Violence*, (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1993): 148.

24. A. Wallis and D. Ford, eds., *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: The Commercial Demonstration in Portland, Oregon* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1980).

25. R. Gardiner, *Design for Safe Neighborhoods: The Environmental Security Planning and Design Process* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, September 1978): 16.

26. Ibid.

27. R. Taylor and A. Harrell, "Physical Environment and Crime," *NIJ Research Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, NCJ157311, 1996).

28. Ibid., 3–4.

29. D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Community Policing," *Research in Action* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, NCJ157308, 1996).

30. Ibid.

31. R.V.G. Clarke, ed., *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992): 10.

32. J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1982).

33. Many argue that more weight should be given to incident data of calls for service; these are less manipulable than conviction rates, which can be influenced by the level of commitment to prosecution.

34. R. Gardiner, *Design for Safe Neighborhoods*, p. 67.

35. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, eds., "Perspectives on Violence," in *Understanding and Preventing Violence* (Washington, DC: Research Council, 1993): 148.

36. A. Wallis and D. Ford, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: The Commercial Demonstration in Portland, Oregon* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1980).

37. J. Hayes, *The Impact of Citizen Involvement in Preventing Crime in Public Housing* (Charlotte, NC: Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program, 1982).

38. Ibid., i.

39. S. Popkin, L. Olson, A. Lurigio, V. Gwiasda, and R. Carter, "Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime: Residents' Views of the Chicago Housing Authority's Public Housing Drug Elimination Program," *Crime and Delinquency*, 41, no. 1 (January 1995): 73–99.

40. S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," *Model Program Briefs 2* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-RP).

41. S. Sorensen, "Bicycle Patrols," *Model Program Briefs 1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-BP).

42. Ibid.

43. "Community Policing in Seattle: A Model Partnership Between Citizens and Police," *Research in Brief* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, August 1992).

44. D. Rosenbaum, S. Bennett, B. Lindsay, and D. Wilkinson, *Community Responses to Drug Abuse: A Program*

Evaluation (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, February 1994): 24–27.

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47. L. Keyes, *Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized Housing* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1992).

48. M.L. Sullivan, *More Than Housing: How Community Development Corporations Go About Changing Lives and Neighborhoods* (New York: Community Development Research Center, New School for Social Research, 1993), Chapter 5.

49. R. Bratt, L. Keyes, A. Schwartz, and A. Vidal, *Confronting the Management Challenge: Affordable Housing in the Nonprofit Sector* (New York: Community Development Research Center, New School for Social Research, 1994): 11.

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52. See J.E. Eck, "The Threat of Crime Displacement," *Criminal Justice Abstracts* v. 25 (1993): 529.

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54. R.B.P. Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature," in *Crime Prevention Studies*, v. 3, Ronald V. Clarke ed. (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 197–230.

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56. R. Clarke and D. Cornish, "Situational Prevention, Displacement of Crime and Rational Choice Theory," in *Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory to Practice*, K. Heal and G. Laycock, eds., (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986): 1-16.

57. R.V. Clarke, ed., *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*, pp. 22–27.

58. R.B.P. Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature," p. 217.

59. Ibid., 217.

60. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement," in *Crime Prevention Studies*, v. 2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 179.

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62. Ibid.*,* 173.

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66. O. Newman, *Creating Defensible Space* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, April 1996).

67. J.D. Feins, *Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1983).

68. M. Sparrow, M. Moore, and D. Kennedy, "Partnerships," in *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing* (New York: Basic Books, 1990): 172–196.

69. A. Wallis and D. Ford, eds., *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: An Operational Handbook*, p. 4.

70. S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum,* HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995).

Appendix C

Guidelines and Checklists for Place-Specific Crime Prevention Programs

Exhibit C-1. Situational CPTED Matrix for Public and Indian Housing

Increasing the Effort Needed to Commit Crime	Increasing the Risks Associated with Crime	Reducing the Rewards of Crime
___ 1.1 Target-hardening ___ a. locks ___ b. screens ___ c. toughened glass ___ d. steel doors ___ e. alarms	___ 2.1 Entry/exit screening ___ a. automatic gates and doors ___ b. security check-in booths ___ c. sensor booths (i.e., drug vapor, metal detector, etc.) ___ d. resident ID checks ___ f. HA property tags ___ g. keypad systems ___ h. motion detectors	___ 3.1 Removing crime targets from the premises ___ a. no cash policy in office ___ b. exact change vending ___ c. removable auto radios ___ d. remove parking meters ___ e. install phone card systems
___ 1.2 Access control ___ a. locked doors and gates ___ b. fenced yards and pedestrian flows ___ c. parking lot barriers ___ d. entry phones ___ e. resident photo IDs and photo badges ___ f. resident vehicle registration and bumper stickers ___ g. PIN numbers ___ h. smart cards ___ i. turnstiles	___ 2.2 Formal surveillance ___ a. police patrols (uniformed police, narcotics enforcement) ___ b. security guards ___ c. informant hotlines ___ d. burglar alarms ___ e. CCTV systems ___ f. video cameras ___ g. still cameras ___ h. speciality cameras (night vision, simulated)	3.2 Identifying and tagging property ___ a. property marking ___ b. vehicle licensing ___ c. vehicle parts marking ___ d. IDs for car radios ___ e. IDs for hand-held radios ___ f. decals
___ 1.3 Removing or deflecting offenders ___ a. arcade locations ___ b. bus stop locations ___ c. recreational space locations ___ d. curb and gutter alterations ___ e. painting curbs ___ f. street flow alterations ___ g. graffiti boards ___ h. litter bins and refuse containers	___ 2.3 increasing surveillance by employees ___ a. HA administrators & staff ___ b. HA maintenance workers ___ c. HA security guards ___ d. HA occupancy personnel ___ e. bus coordinators ___ f. social services personnel ___ h. incentive schemes ___ i. badges	___ 3.3 Removing inducements for crime ___ a. 24-hour graffiti removal ___ b. rapid repair ___ c. vacancy reduction ___ d. gender-neutral phone lists ___ e. off-street parking
___ 1.4 Closing windows to crime facilitators ___ a. control spray-can sales ___ b. remove instruments of delinquency and crime ___ c. round up shopping carts ___ d. secure vacant units ___ e. tow abandoned autos ___ f. weapons control	___ 2.4 Improving natural surveillance ___ a. pruning hedges ___ b. "eyes on the street" ___ c. lighting up physical obstructions ___ d. street lighting ___ e. defensible space ___ f. neighborhood watch ___ g. enhanced 911 ___ h. resident patrols	___ 3.4 Boundary and rule setting ___ a. antiloitering ___ b. bannings and trespass ___ c. curfews ___ d. drug-free housing zone ___ f. drug-free workplace ___ g. enforced evictions policy ___ h. nuisance abatements ___ i. applicant training ___ j. recertification screening ___ k. symbolic barriers (signs)

Exhibit C-2. Worksheet: Increasing the Effort Needed to Commit Crime

YES	NO	Preventive Measure
		Target-hardening
		Locks adequate
____	____	Window screens adequate
____	____	Toughened glass
____	____	Steel doors
____	____	Exterior doors
		Access control
____	____	Locked doors and gates
____	____	Fenced yards and pedestrian flows
____	____	Parking lot barriers
____	____	Entry phones
____	____	Resident photo IDs
____	____	Resident vehicle registration and bumper stickers
____	____	Personal identification numbers (PIN)/pass cards
		Removing or deflecting offender opportunities for crime (or availability of deflectors)
		Arcade locations
____	____	Bus stop locations
____	____	Recreational space locations
____	____	Curb and gutter alterations
____	____	Painting curbs
____	____	Steel flow alterations
____	____	Graffiti boards
____	____	Litter bins and refuse containers
		Closing windows to crime facilitators
		Control spray-can sales
____	____	Remove instruments of delinquency and crime
____	____	Round up shopping carts
____	____	Secure vacant units
____	____	Tow abandoned autos
____	____	Weapons control
____	____	Automobile entry/egress pathways

Exhibit C-3. Worksheet: Increasing the Risks Associated with Crime

YES	NO	
		Entry/exit screening
_____	_____	Automatic gates and doors
_____	_____	Security check-in booths
_____	_____	Sensor booths (i.e., drug vapor, metal detector, etc.)
_____	_____	Resident ID checks
_____	_____	Resident vehicle checks
_____	_____	Housing Authority (HA) property tags
		Formal surveillance
_____	_____	Police patrols
_____	_____	Uniformed Patrol
_____	_____	Narcotics enforcement
_____	_____	Security guards
_____	_____	Informant hotlines
_____	_____	Burglar alarms
_____	_____	Closed-circuit TV systems
_____	_____	Curfew decals
		Increasing surveillance by employees
_____	_____	HA administrators and staff
_____	_____	HA maintenance workers
_____	_____	HA security guards
_____	_____	HA occupancy personnel
_____	_____	Bus conductors
_____	_____	Social services personnel
_____	_____	Pay phone locations
_____	_____	Incentive schemes
		Improving natural surveillance
_____	_____	Pruning hedges
_____	_____	"Eyes on the street"
_____	_____	Lighting up physical obstructions
_____	_____	Street lighting
_____	_____	Defensible space
_____	_____	Neighborhood watch
_____	_____	Enhanced 911
_____	_____	Resident Patrols

Exhibit C-4. Worksheet: Reducing the Rewards of Crime

YES	NO	
		Removing crime targets from the premises
_____	_____	No-cash policy in office
_____	_____	Exact change vending
_____	_____	Removable auto radios
_____	_____	Remove parking meters
_____	_____	Install phone card systems
_____	_____	Pay by check or money order
_____	_____	Off-site food stamp distribution
		Identifying and tagging property
_____	_____	Property marking
_____	_____	Vehicle parts marking
_____	_____	IDs for car radios
_____	_____	IDs for hand-held radios
		Removing inducements of crime opportunity
_____	_____	Enforced weapons policy
_____	_____	24-hour graffiti removal
_____	_____	Rapid repair
_____	_____	Vacancy reduction
_____	_____	Plywood road signs
_____	_____	Gender-neutral phone lists
_____	_____	Off-street parking
		Boundary- and rule-setting
_____	_____	Antiloitering
_____	_____	Banning and trespass
_____	_____	Curfews
_____	_____	Drug-free zones
_____	_____	Drug-free workplace
_____	_____	Enforced evictions policy
_____	_____	Nuisance abatement
_____	_____	Screening of applicants and recertification
_____	_____	Symbolic barriers (signs)
_____	_____	Site inspection surveys by public housing authority

Exhibit C-5. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

I. What is the Need for CPTED?
   a. Crime
   b. Fear of crime
   c. Improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods and the workplace
II. Society's Response to Crime
   a. Public sector
   b. Private sector
   c. Criminal justice system
   d. Self-help type programs
III. Crime Concepts
   a. *"Urban Fortress Model"*
      This model represents a view of crime prevention which places sole reliance on securing buildings and areas so outsiders cannot gain access without approval.
   —Isolate the resident from an environment which is perceived to be hostile.
   —Designed to be effective against burglary and other crimes against residences.
   b. *"Defensible Space Model"*
      This model promotes that the design of the physical environment has the capacity to either deter or facilitate crime by enhancing the resident's ability to monitor and control his own environment.
   —Based on the public housing projects conducted by Oscar Newman, he identified the following variables:
   —*Territoriality*
      The capacity of the physical environment to create for each individual perceived zones of territorial influence that results in a proprietary interest and felt responsibility.
   —Design elements such as building placement, heights, and size limitations.
   —*Natural surveillance*
      The capacity of physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents.
   —The defensible space concept proposed that if territoriality is achieved, it will help to eliminate or reduce the vulnerability to crime and, therefore, aid in deterring possible offenders.
   c. *"Urban Village Model"*
      It identifies social disorganization as a primary cause of crime, defining it as the breakdown in the mechanism that fosters personal relationships, cooperation, recognition, and morale.

—The urban village model depends primarily on social homogeneity.
IV. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
   CPTED advocated that with the proper design and effective use of the building environment it will lead to a reduction in the incidence of crime and the fear of crime.
   — For several thousand years, an awareness of how the environment shapes behavior has been used by architects, city planners, and residential dwellers to elicit desired behaviors.
   — CPTED promotes a positive change in the attitude of the citizens.
   — There are three Basic CPTED Strategies
   a. *Access control*
      This is a design concept directed at decreasing crime opportunity. Access control strategies are typically classified as:
   — Organized (guards, receptionists, etc.)
   — Mechanical (locks, physical security)
   — Natural (spatial definition)
   — An objective of access control is to deny access to a crime target and to create a perception of risk in offenders.
   b. *Surveillance*
      This is a design concept directed primarily at keeping intruders under observation. Therefore, the primary thrust of a surveillance is to facilitate observation.
      Surveillance strategies include:
   — Patrol (security, police, citizens)
   — Mechanical (lighting, CCTV)
   — Natural (windows, street observations)
   c. *Territoriality*
      This concept suggests that physical design can contribute to a sense of territoriality. Thus, the physical design can create or extend a sphere of influence so that users develop a sense of proprietorship, and potential offenders perceive that territorial influence.
   — At the same time, it was recognized that natural access control and surveillance contributed to a sense of territoriality, making it effective for crime prevention.
   d. *"Three-D" Approach*
      "Three-D" approach to space assessment provides a simple guide in determining how the space is designed and used.

— All human space has some designated purpose.
— All human space has social, cultural, legal or physical definitions that prescribe the desired and acceptable behaviors.
— All human space is designed to support and control the desired behaviors.
e. *CPTED planning*
— Crime analysis
— Demographics
— Land use
— Observations
— Interviews
— Coordination and communication
— *Crime analysis*
— Police
— Reported crime
— Trends and patterns
— M.O.
— *Demographics*
— City planning, census bureau
— Nature of the population
— *Land use*
— City planning, zoning, engineering
— Describe the physical allocations and use of land
— *Observations*
— Go out into the neighborhoods
— What is happening, where, when, how why
— *Interviews*
— People's perceptions
— Survey
— *Coordination and communication*
— Between policy, security, planners, architects, engineers

f. *How policy and security can use CPTED*
— *Police*
• Organize neighborhoods and business
• Neighborhood watch, business watch, citizen patrols, security surveys
• Community and business organizing
• Enabling legislation
— *Private*
• Problem identification
• Building construction with CPTED
• Crime prevention programs
• Employee and citizen participation
g. Optimizing CPTED
— Communication
— Security, architects, planners, engineers, and community
— What is the "State-of-the-Art"
— Evaluation and maintenance
— Reduce liability and improve the quality of life

Exhibit C-6. Home Security Checklist

YES   **NO**

YES	NO	
❏	❏	Are all exterior doors strong enough to withstand excessive force?
❏	❏	Are all exterior doors secured with a dead-bolt lock that has a minimum one-inch throw?
❏	❏	Are all strike plates and frames for exterior doors anchored to the home's main construction?
❏	❏	Do all exterior doors fit snugly against the frame and are all frames free of warping, cracks, and other signs of wear and tear?
❏	❏	Is there a wide-angle (180 degrees) viewer/peephole on the main entrance door?
❏	❏	Are sliding glass doors and windows secure against forcing the locks or from being lifted completely out of the frame?
❏	❏	Are high-risk windows (basement, garage, ground-level, partially or totally secluded, latched, etc.) secured sufficiently enough to discourage or impede possible intrusion?
❏	❏	Are double-hung windows secured with pins or extra locks to discourage prying?
❏	❏	Are trees and shrubs trimmed to allow visibility along the perimeter (particularly entries) of the house?
❏	❏	Have you installed timers (both interior and exterior) to activate lights in your absence?
❏	❏	Are all entrances (doors and windows) to your home lit at night?
❏	❏	Is your address posted on your house and clearly visible from the street both night and day?

If you answered **NO** to any of these questions, you have a security problem. To correct any of the above deficiencies, refer to the Home Security section of this packet.[1]

Reprinted from: Seattle Police Department, Crime Prevention Division, Community Crime Prevention Division, *Community Crime Prevention Block Watch Packet* (Seattle, WA: Seattle Police Department, undated), 13.

[1] Packet available from the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Division on request.

Appendix D

Sources of Information, Training, and Technical Assistance

Information Sources (Publications)

American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities
Suite 1112
1725 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-7844

The Winnable War: A Community Guide to Eradicating Street Drug Markets, by Roger Conner and Patrick Burns, is one of the most recent publications of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities (AARR). This publication offers detailed advice on how to combat drugs in urban areas and provides insight through examples.

AARR is a nonprofit membership organization working primarily in three areas: drug and alcohol abuse; the rights and responsibilities of families; and the security of public spaces. AARR works to find solutions that balance rights and responsibilities in public policy questions. The group works to find legal and operational solutions to problems facing urban areas and also works to defend legislated solutions that are challenged in court.

American Institute for Architectural Research
Attn: Pradeep Dalal, Research Associate
1735 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-5292
(202) 879-7753
(202) 626-7425 (Fax)
dalalp@aia.org (e-mail)

Founded in 1995 in cooperation with the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, the American Institute for Architectural (AIA) Research's mission is to support architectural research and design excellence by identifying the research needs of the architectural discipline. AIA Research advocates research that:

• Addresses compelling societal needs to which the professional and educational architectural communities can contribute knowledge and skills.

• Contributes to architecture as a learned and knowledge-based discipline.

• Demonstrates ways to integrate research as part of the design process and to utilize design as part of the research process.

• Builds on and extends prior knowledge.

• Engages in interdisciplinary collaboration, both within and beyond the design and building professions.

In pursuit of these goals, in 1996, with support from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, AIA Research convened a national forum on the role of environmental design in reducing crime in public housing. Four monographs were developed as follow-up activities to a similar conference held in 1995:

D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Community Policing* ($2.50; also available through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service).

M. Smith, *CPTED in Parking Facilities* ($2.50).

W. Brill and C. Gordon, *The Expanding Role of CPTED in Premises Liability* ($2.50).

R.B. Taylor and A.V. Harrell, *Physical Environment, Crime, Fear, and Crime-Related Problems: Implications for Prevention and Community Viability* ($2.50; also available through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service).

To order any of the above documents, send payment to AIA Research, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007. Payment may be made by check (payable to AIA) or by Visa or MasterCard.

Cadwalader, Wickersham, and Taft
Marketing Department
100 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038
(212) 504-6000

A Civil War: A Community Legal Guide to Fighting Street Drug Crime is an informational guide intended to help community groups understand how civil measures (in addition to criminal ones) can be used to combat drug-related problems within their community. The book focuses on five areas:

1. Using common law actions, such as small-claims actions, as alternatives to criminal procedures.

2. Seeking help from government agencies regarding revocation of permits and licenses to individuals and/or businesses who allow illicit drug-related activities.

3. Using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or similar state laws to dismantle crack houses.

4. Having the government use forfeiture/seizure laws to seize drug-related areas and materials.

5. Combating drug activities in housing units.

To obtain copies of *A Civil War: A Community Legal Guide to Fighting Street Drug Crime,* write to Cadwalader, Wickersham, and Taft. The book is available free to New York State residents and for $5 (to cover postage) for all nonresidents. (At this writing, only 800 of the original 8,000 copies are left.)

Center for Community Change
Carol Juergens, Publications
Center for Community Change
1000 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 342-0567
(202) 342-1132 (fax)

The Center for Community Changes (CCC) offers a variety of useful publications on improving public housing in the United States including these:

> *How to Save and Improve Public Housing: An Action Guide*

> *The HOME Program: A Basic Guide for Community Organizations*.

These manuals emphasize practical methods of transforming urban areas into more livable spaces. CCC also publishes *Community Change* (a quarterly on issues involving housing projects).

Citizens Housing and Planning Council
218 West 40th Street, 12th Floor
New York, NY 10018
(212) 391-9030
(212) 391-9033 (fax)

The Citizens Housing and Planning Council (CHPC) has published an informative short booklet by Timothy Vance, entitled *How to Get Drug Enterprises Out of Housing.* CHPC is a nonprofit, public-interest organization concerned with housing, planning, and urban development in New York City. Since 1937, CHPC has been dedicated to developing sound housing policy for low- and moderate-income families, and rational, realistic, and fair city planning. CHPC serves the public as a watchdog, civil resource, educator, and advocate.

Crime Prevention Coalition
National Crime Prevention Council
1700 K Street, N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20006

The Crime Prevention Coalition publishes *Crime Prevention in America: Foundations for Action*, a short book detailing principles for communities to use in preventing crime. The guide relates general ideas and specific examples of how individual communities have implemented them. The Crime Prevention Coalition works for individual, community, and law enforcement cooperation and coordination to help prevent crime.

National Criminal Justice Reference Service
P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20850
(800) 851-3420

The National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) was created to provide research findings from the U.S. Department of Justice to criminal justice professionals, prosecutors, and criminal justice researchers. Most recent publications are available from NCJRS at no charge. They include:

- F. Earls and A. Reiss, "Breaking the Cycle: Predicting and Preventing Crime," *Research Report* (1994).

- P. Finn and M. O'Brien Hylton, "Using Civil Remedies for Criminal Behavior—Rationale, Case Studies, and Constitutional Issues," *Issues and Practices* (October 1994).

- D. Fleissner, N. Fedan, D. Klinger, and E. Stotland,"Community Policing in Seattle: A Model Partnership Between Citizens and Police," *Research in Brief* (1992).

- D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Community Policing," *Research in Action* (1996).

- H. Goldstein, "The New Policing: Confronting Complexity," *Research in Brief* (1993).

- T. Rich, "The Use of Computerized Mapping in Crime Control and Prevention Programs," *Research in Brief* (1995).

- J. Roth, "Understanding and Preventing Violence," *Research in Brief* (1994).

- R. Taylor and A. Harrell, "Physical Environment and Crime," *Research Report* (1996).

- C. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Controlling Street-Level Drug Trafficking: Evidence from Oakland and Birmingham," *Research in Brief* (1992).

- C. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Modern Policing and the Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing New Strategies in Two American Cities," *Research Report* (1992).

- B. Webster and E. Connors, "The Police, Drugs, and Public Housing," *Research in Brief* (1992).

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
451 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20410
(202) 708-1197
HUD USER (800) 245-2691 (for publications' availability)

The Office of Public and Indian Housing, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), publishes some useful materials on crime prevention for public housing practitioners.

- H. Cisneros. *Defensible Space: Deterring Crime and Building Community* (1995).

- "Community Policing," *Model Program Briefs 9* (HUD-1444-PIH-CP).

- T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen, *Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document* (1993).

- O. Newman, *Creating Defensible Space* (1996).

- S. Sorensen, "Bicycle Patrols," *Model Program Briefs 1* (HUD-1444-PIH-BP).

- S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," *Model Program Briefs 2* (HUD-1444-PIH-RP)

Technical Assistance and Training

American Association of Retired Persons: Criminal Justice Services
601 E Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20049
(202) 434-2277

The American Association of Retired Persons, Criminal Justice Services division, provides crime prevention training manuals and multi-media presentations as a public service. The organization also offers a structured course on helping law enforcement officers deal more effectively with senior citizens.

Citizens Committee for New York City
Felice Kirby, Director
Crime Activities Committee
Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC)
305 7th Avenue, 15th Floor
New York, NY 10001
(212) 989-0909
(212) 989-0982 (fax)

Founded in 1975 by the late Senator Jacob Javits, the Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC) supports community-based action to improve conditions in urban neighborhoods through a variety of institutes, projects, and grants. CCNYC offers training in and technical assistance for community leadership, organizing neighborhood antidrug and crime prevention initiatives, and community policing. The CCNYC is developing a manual about crime prevention activities targeting housing developments and residential neighborhoods.

Civil Enforcement Initiative
Attn: Robert Messner, Managing Attorney
Civil Enforcement Unit
New York City Police Department
2 Lafayette Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10007
(212) 374-2546.
(212) 374-2735 (fax)

The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement Initiative (CEI) is an in-house law unit that provides legal advice and problem-solving services to the department. CEI's goal is to improve the quality of life of city residents by making use of the law to confiscate drug-infested buildings and by helping the police seize vehicles of patrons soliciting prostitutes.

General Federation of Women's Clubs: Crime Prevention Program
Johnie Ruth Sturgeon
709 N. Oak Street
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 757-4151

The General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC) supports women's clubs across the country in a variety of activities. The GFWC Crime Prevention Program focuses on three areas: violence against women, violence against children/youth, and community crime prevention. In its pursuit of crime prevention, GFWC works to:

• Study and raise awareness of crimes prevalent within given communities.

• Support and/or form crime prevention partnerships with local law enforcement agencies as well as with neighborhood associations.

• Participate in and/or organize crime prevention events in the community.

GFWC works toward informing and activating communities to fight crime cooperatively.

Institute for Community Design Analysis
Oscar Newman
383A Round Hill Road
Hensonville, NY 12439
(518) 734-4482

The Institute for Community Design Analysis, founded by Oscar Newman, is a nonprofit research corporation that formulates housing policies for Federal, State, and local governments. The organization offers consulting and design services to address local problems.

The Institute for Criminal Justice Studies
Canyon Hall
Southwest Texas State University
San Marcos, TX 78666
(512) 245-3030

The Institute of Criminal Justice Studies conducts a broad, year-round curriculum of crime prevention courses for the Texas law enforcement community and for crime prevention practitioners nationwide. It also distributes a variety of brochures and course manuals.

Midwest Academy
225 Ohio Street
Suite 250
Chicago, IL 60610
(312) 645-6010

Midwest Academy provides training and consulting services for organizations of low- and moderate-income people in areas such as organizing, planning, staffing, and fundraising.

National Association of Town Watch
P.O. Box 303
Wynnewood, PA 19096
(610) 649-7055

National Association of Town Watch serves as a clearinghouse for community groups to exchange crime prevention techniques and tips and to disseminate local crime prevention news. The program seeks to provide national affiliation and recognition for local crime prevention efforts. It offers fundraising programs, promotional materials, training guides, and technical assistance. It also sponsors the annual "National Night Out Program," which involves 8,800 communities across the country, to encourage greater bonds between neighbors and better relations with local law enforcement agencies.

The National Criminal Justice Association
Suite 618
444 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 624-4620

The National Criminal Justice Association gives assistance in the development and implementation of statewide crime prevention programs. In particular, it offers management, administration, and organizational training for these programs.

National Crime Prevention Institute
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-6987
(502) 852-6990 (fax)
training@ulkyvm.louisville.edu (e-mail)

NCPI offers both a basic and an advanced course on crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The institute will soon offer on-site training to communities. NCPI strives to make crime prevention the primary goal of all police officers in the United States.

Operation Crackdown
Attn: Young Lawyers Section
Bar Association of the District of Columbia
1819 H Street, N.W., 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-6600
(202) 293-3388 (fax)

The Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia has launched "Operation Crackdown," a public service initiative that uses the District's public nuisance law to rid residential neighborhoods of crack houses and drug dealers. Operation Crackdown lawyers employ the information provided by community groups and others to go to court and obtain injunctions against landlords, requiring them to take remedial action, such as tenant evictions and installing high-intensity lights to illuminate dark alleys or vacant lots.

Project for Public Spaces, Inc.
Fred I. Kent III, President
153 Waverly Place
New York, NY 10014
(212) 620-5660

Project for Public Spaces (PPS), Inc., was founded in 1975 to improve the livability of urban areas and to enhance the quality of life in cities. PPS seeks to develop public spaces that benefit all users. The organization specializes in translating research into planning and design, particularly for community revitalization, with the emphasis on:

- User analysis.

- Programming and community consensus building.

- Conceptual design and guidelines.

- Design review.

- Master planning/urban design.

- Management programs.

- Amenity and art selection.

PPS offers technical assistance in the form of workshops, publications, and films. A listing of publications and films is available from the above address.

SPARTA Consulting Corporation
Attn: Ellen Walsh
7313 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814
(301) 656-6600, Ext. 12
(301) 656-6770 (fax)

SPARTA Consulting Corporation is a *S*ocial *P*olitical *A*nalysis*, R*esearch, and *T*echnical *A*ssistance firm that provides state-of-the-art technology integration of social and political policy analysis, evaluations and research, technical assistance and training, geographic data analysis, and analytical services.

SPARTA Consulting Corporation has been awarded funding to conduct technical assistance and training for Public and Indian Housing (PIH) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The purpose of this grant is to provide state-of-the-art CPTED training and technical assistance to housing authority staff, residents, resident councils, resident management corporations, housing authority security directors, local law enforcement officials, local government officials, architects, and other community leaders. SPARTA will meet these needs by providing the following services to the housing community:

- A national architectural CPTED redesign round table conducted with the American Institute of Architects.

- Three regional CPTED workshops.

- On-site technical assistance.

- Multi-site video conferencing with CPTED experts.

- A series of crime prevention publications.

- Electronic dissemination of CPTED resources through the World Wide Web and Internet.

- Immediate hard-copy dissemination via fax-back services.

For further information on SPARTA's offerings (including the architectural round table, CPTED workshops, and other crime prevention information), please contact Ellen Walsh at the address shown above.

Appendix E
Summary of Program Characteristics for 11 Place-Specific Crime Prevention Programs

Appendix E graphics not available.

Appendix F

Crime Statistics for Selected Sites

Exhibit F-1. Reported Offenses, Genesis Park Community (1984-1994)

					Percent change		
Offense	**1984**	**1989**	**1993**	**1994**	**1984–1994**	**1989–1994**	**1993–1994**
Homicide	2	2	2	0	–100%	–100%	–100%
Rape	2	0	2	4	100%	—	100%
Armed robbery	15	16	9	3	–80%	–81%	–67%
Strong–arm robbery	3	4	6	0	–100%	–100%	–100%
Assault	64	89	30	17	–73%	–81%	–43%
Violent Index	86	111	49	24	–72%	–78%	–51%
Residential burglary	26	34	17	16	–38%	–53%	–6%
Commercial burglary	3	0	6	1	–67%	—	–83%
Larceny/theft	27	28	16	23	–15%	–18%	44%
Vehicle theft	3	7	5	3	0%	–57%	–40%
Arson	2	1	0	0	–100%	–100%	—
Property Index	61	70	44	43	–30%	–39%	–2%
Part I Offenses	147	181	93	67	–54%	–63%	–28%

Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Exhibit F-2. Reported Offenses, Genesis Park Community
(January-June, 1994-1995)

	January–June		
Offense	**1994**	**1995**	**Percent Change**
Rape	4	1	–75%
Armed robbery	3	2	–33%
Strong–arm robbery	0	2	—
Assault	9	12	33%
Violent Index	16	17	6%
Residential burglary	13	16	23%
Commercial burglary	0	2	—
Larceny/theft	12	28	133%
Vehicle theft	1	3	200%
Property Index	26	49	88%
Part I Offenses	42	66	57%

Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Exhibit F-3. Reported Offenses, Lockwood Gardens
(Compared to Surrounding Beats)

Type of Offense/Location	1991	1992	1993	1994
Part I Crimes Reported				
Homicides				
Lockwood-65th	2	0	0	0
Lockwood-66th	0	0	0	0
Lockwood-Fenham	1	0	0	0
Lockwood-East Lawn	0	0	0	0
Lockwood Total	3	0	0	0
Beat 29	2	10	4	6
Beat 30	9	4	4	4
Neighborhood Total	11	14	8	10
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	27.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Rape				
Lockwood-65th	0	2	0	0
Lockwood-66th	1	0	0	0
Lockwood-Fenham	1	0	0	0
Lockwood-East Lawn	0	0	0	0
Lockwood Total	2	2	0	0
Beat 29	11	14	5	5
Beat 30	10	10	9	7
Neighborhood Total	21	24	14	12
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	9.5%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Robbery				
Lockwood-65th	7	6	1	3
Lockwood-66th	5	8	3	0
Lockwood-Fenham	1	2	0	0
Lockwood-East Lawn	0	1	0	0
Lockwood Total	13	17	4	3
Beat 29	117	109	88	72
Beat 30	81	93	68	49
Neighborhood Total	198	202	156	121
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	6.6%	8.4%	2.6%	2.5%
Felony Assault				
Lockwood-65th	20	11	9	9
Lockwood-66th	9	6	10	3
Lockwood-Fenham	2	1	1	2
Lockwood-East Lawn	1	3	1	1
Lockwood Total	32	21	21	15
Beat 29	75	73	138	97
Beat 30	105	92	147	133
Neighborhood Total	180	165	285	230
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	17.8%	12.7%	7.4%	6.5%
Violent Crimes Index				
Lockwood Total	50	40	25	18
Neighborhood Total	410	405	463	383
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	12.2%	9.9%	5.4%	4.8%
Burglary				
Lockwood-65th	24	14	7	12
Lockwood-66th	16	15	15	15
Lockwood-Fenham	1	1	0	4

Type of Offense/Location	1991	1992	1993	1994
Burglary (continued)				
Lockwood-East Lawn	2	0	2	1
Lockwood Total	43	30	24	32
Beat 29	284	308	577	417
Beat 30	186	166	310	299
Neighborhood Total	470	474	887	716
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	9.1%	6.3%	2.7%	4.5%
Theft/larceny				
Lockwood-65th	21	15	25	10
Lockwood-66th	20	13	9	5
Lockwood-Fenham	1	2	8	4
Lockwood-East Lawn	3	4	7	3
Lockwood Total	45	34	49	22
Beat 29	651	639	376	367
Beat 30	450	331	248	180
Neighborhood Total	1101	970	624	547
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	4.1%	3.5%	3.5%	4.0%
Vehicle theft				
Lockwood-65th	6	9	9	4
Lockwood-66th	10	8	3	6
Lockwood-Fenham	3	5	2	3
Lockwood-East Lawn	2	0	1	0
Lockwood Total	21	22	15	13
Beat 29	267	293	290	250
Beat 30	133	152	148	147
Neighborhood Total	400	445	438	397
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	5.3%	4.9%	3.4%	3.3%
Property Crimes Index				
Lockwood Total	109	86	88	67
Neighborhood Total	1971	1889	1949	1660
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	5.5%	4.6%	4.5%	4.0%
Total Part I Crimes (except arson)				
Lockwood-65th	80	57	51	38
Lockwood-66th	61	50	40	29
Lockwood-Fenham	10	11	11	13
Lockwood-East Lawn	8	8	11	5
Lockwood Total	159	126	113	85
Beat 29	1407	1446	1478	1214
Beat 30	974	848	934	819
Neighborhood Total	2381	2294	2412	2033
Lockwood as a percent of neighborhood	6.7%	5.5%	4.7%	4.2%

Source: Oakland Police Department, Oakland, California.

Exhibit F-4. Reported Offenses,
Oak Park, Illinois (1989-1994)

Offense	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Percent change	
							1989–1994	1992–1994
Murder	0	2	1	1	2	1	—	0%
Criminal sexual assault	11	10	13	18	13	11	0%	–38.9%
Robbery	308	276	295	284	209	202	–34.4%	–28.9%
Aggravated assault/ battery	72	31	69	65	32	46	–36.1%	–29.2%
Violent Index	391	319	378	368	256	260	–33.5%	–29.3%
Burglary	863	629	859	871	749	609	–29.4%	–30.1%
Theft	2471	2186	2715	2484	2352	2397	–3.0%	–3.5%
Motor vehicle theft	344	292	292	339	305	361	+4.9%	+6.5%
Arson	12	13	10	6	13	5	–58.3%	–16.6%
Property Index	3690	3120	3876	3700	3419	3372	–8.6%	–8.9%
Part I Offenses	4081	3439	4254	4068	3675	3632	–11.0%	–10.7%

Source: *Crime in Illinois*, Illinois State Police.

Exhibit F-5. Reported Part I Offenses
Castle Square Apartments, Boston
(1990-1994)

						Percent change	
Offense	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1990–1994	1992–1994
Murder	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0%
Rape	3	1	1	0	0	–100%	–100%
Robbery	39	22	15	5	3	–92%	–80%
Felony assault	12	8	4	7	3	–75%	–25%
Violent Index	54	31	20	12	6	–89%	–70%
Burglary	4	10	6	9	7	+75%	+17%
Theft/larceny	59	48	70	31	29	–51%	–59%
Vehicle theft	27	15	20	16	18	–33%	–10%
Property Index	90	73	96	56	54	–40%	–44%
Total	144	104	116	68	60	–58%	–48%

Source: Office of Research and Analysis, Boston Police Department, Boston, Massachusetts.

Exhibit F-6. Reported Offenses,
Five Oaks Neighborhood
(January-November, 1989-1993)

Violent Crimes*	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	Percent change	
						1989–1993	1992–1993
Homicide	1	2	1	0	1	0%	+100%
Rape	8	5	5	6	11	+27%	+83%
Robbery	30	31	34	60	29	-3%	-52%
Aggravated assault	22	20	37	45	15	-32%	-67%
Subtotal	61	58	77	111	56	-8.2%	-50%
Nonviolent/property crimes							
Other assaults	156	198	196	207	182	+17%	–12%
Burglary	126	114	153	169	104	–17%	–38%
Larceny	222	196	205	234	177	–20%	–24%
Vehicle theft	55	74	54	58	36	–35%	–38%
Arson	3	8	7	12	2	–33%	–83%
Vandalism	195	186	124	171	138	–29%	–19%
CCW	5	3	6	6	7	+40%	+17%
Prostitution	30	10	22	10	8	–73%	–20%
Narcotics	15	12	16	13	6	–60%	–54%
Intoxication	2	2	-0-	7	-0-	–100%	–100%
Miscellaneous	70	60	74	82	81	+16%	–1%
Subtotal	879	863	857	969	741	–16%	–24%
Total	940	921	934	1080	797	–15%	–26%

*Violent crimes are defined as those reported by the F.B.I. in the Uniform Crime Report: they are homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Note: Crime statistics may be affected by officer-initiated activity involving proactive enforcement of crimes, such as prostitution, intoxication, and carrying a concealed weapon.

Source: *Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood Stabilization Plan, City of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio.*