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Correctional Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate Sanction



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Correctional Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate Sanction

Edited by

Doris L. MacKenzie, Ph.D., and Eugene E. Hebert

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice
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Foreword

Over the past dozen years, correctional boot camps, or shock incarceration programs, have mushroomed as an intermediate sanction, first in State and then in the Federal prison systems, and more recently even in county jails. The notion of a strict, military-style punishment as an alternative to extended incarceration is an attractive one, on a number of fronts: It appeals politically, because it promises both tough punishment and the promise of financial savings through shortened sentences; it appeals to the citizenry, largely because of its uncompromising image of rigorous discipline for offenders; it appeals to corrections administrators by offering the opportunity to free up scarce correctional bedspace.

Recognizing the vast potential of correctional boot camps as a tool to aid the criminal justice system in coping with the burgeoning populations in the Nation's prisons and jails, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 directed the National Institute of Justice to solicit research in and evaluations of the impact of both existing boot camps and those to be funded under the Act.

In the years since the first prison boot camp programs began in Oklahoma and Georgia, NIJ has pioneered in research and evaluations of this alternative sanction. Early on there was, however, a great deal of difficulty in conducting focused research on this rapidly expanding approach, largely because of the vast diversity in the number, type, and size of boot camp programs. Some adhere to a rigid military atmosphere; some emphasize treatment, while others focus on hard labor and physical training. Some, in New York State, for example, have developed a highly sophisticated regimen with extensive postrelease followup.

Much of the NIJ-sponsored research on correctional boot camp programs has been conducted by Doris Layton MacKenzie, who notes in the Preface to this book that simply defining what constituted a boot camp was a major initial problem. It is one that NIJ researchers resolved by determining specific core elements common to most such programs. But as the number of approaches utilizing this sanction have proliferated, the diversity of programs has continued to multiply.

This book represents the first comprehensive attempt to report on the many and various approaches to correctional boot camps nationwide, ranging from the evolution of the first such programs in Georgia to the methods developed in Illinois, from the evaluation of the first year of boot camps operated by the California Youth Authority to the highly structured approach of Shock Incarceration in New York State, and including a look into the future of boot camps.

Many questions remain about the value of boot camps. Do they work? The answer seemingly depends on what they are asked to do. Will this alternative sanction





continue to grow in use nationwide? Almost certainly. This book does not provide “answers” to the countless questions being posed regarding boot camps. But what it does, we believe, is provide a forthright, accurate look into this correctional innovation and its implementation across the Nation. We believe it will be of value to policymakers and practitioners alike, and to all others who are interested in the future of corrections.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice



Preface

In the military, boot camp represents an abrupt, often shocking transition to a new way of life. Discipline is strict; there is an emphasis on hard work, physical training, and unquestioning obedience to authority. The new recruit is told when to sleep, when to get up, when to eat; he marches with his fellows everywhere he goes, to meals, to training; orders must be obeyed instantly; personal liberty is almost nonexistent. By the end of boot camp, the young recruit has become a different person.

Such was the hope for boot camp, or shock incarceration, programs in American prisons: that young, nonviolent offenders could be diverted from a life outside the law using the same tactics successfully employed by the military to turn civilians into soldiers. This reliance on a military atmosphere still provokes controversy over boot camp programs, with proponents arguing that the rigid discipline promotes positive behavior and opponents arguing that it is a harmfully negative influence.

This book was written to address the critical need for reliable information about the variety of boot camp programs currently in operation: in Federal and State prisons, in local jails, for adult men, for women, for juveniles.

Prison boot camp programs began in Oklahoma and Georgia in 1983, and in the years since there has been an enormous growth in the number, type, and size of the programs. Today, boot camps for adult felons exist in most States and in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In addition, many local prisons or jails have either begun or are considering starting boot camp programs for their offender populations; some facilities offer boot camp programs for women, and boot camps for juvenile delinquents have started to become popular.

With support from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), we first began studying these programs in 1987. One of our first tasks was to identify exactly what was meant by the term "prison boot camp." Many media examples portrayed prison "drill instructors" (as the guards in the camps were frequently called) shouting at the inmates (or in less harsh camps "confronting" inmates, or "speaking in a command voice"). Seeing this, some jurisdictions began to call their programs "work camps," or "challenge camps," or "motivational camps." These jurisdictions rejected the negative image of an abusive atmosphere being shown on television news programs and did not want to be identified with it. On the other hand, some jurisdictions with work or forestry camps referred to their programs as "boot camps" despite the fact that they did not appear to have a military atmosphere.





We were thus left with trying to decide what was consistent across the programs that would make one a boot camp but exclude another. At the time it was difficult to separate the true boot camp programs from other correctional programs that utilized many of the elements typical of boot camps. For example, shock probation required offenders to serve short periods of time in prison or jail; prison wilderness camps, forestry camps, and outward-bound-type programs presented physical challenges to inmates; prison drug treatment programs had rigid rules and discipline. The problem was compounded by the fact that not all boot camp programs conformed to the same model.

In order to decide how to classify programs as boot camps, we surveyed all State jurisdictions responsible for adult felons. We found some consistency among programs and, in the end, decided programs were boot camps if they (1) had military drill and ceremony as a component of the program; (2) separated the participants from general prison population offenders; (3) were considered to be an alternative to confinement; and (4) required offenders to participate in a rigorous daily schedule of hard labor and physical training. To some degree most boot camps incorporate these components.

However, as more and more boot camp programs were developed, more and more differences began to emerge. For example, although juvenile boot camps have a rigorous daily schedule, they do not necessarily include hard labor, nor are all programs considered an alternative to confinement. As a working definition of a boot camp program, however, the above four characteristics represent a reasonable way to distinguish between correctional boot camps and other types of prison programs.

Our survey revealed that most of the camps targeted young, nonviolent offenders who did not have an extensive past history of criminal activity. However, camps differed in their definitions of "past history" and "nonviolent," and whether they restricted participation to young offenders. Thus, we did not consider the target population as a defining element of the program. Other than similarities stated above in the four basic components and in offender participants targeted for the programs, the boot camps differed dramatically at the time of our survey. Today these differences remain.

One major difference among the many forms of boot camp programs is the amount of time in the daily schedule devoted to therapeutic and educational activities in comparison to drill, ceremony, physical training, and work. Other differences include such factors as how offenders are selected for the program (by the court, by the department of corrections), the type of therapeutic programming, emphasis on the military aspect, the use of summary punishments, and the type of aftercare and supervision available after release. Although often not explicitly expressed, perhaps the most significant difference among programs is in the philosophy upon which the program is based. Some emphasize military training, physical training, and hard



labor and focus on a deterrent-type model of changing inmates. Others emphasize rehabilitation through therapeutic treatment or academic education. And, in the latter cases, a decisive factor is whether there is sufficient funding available to implement this planned programming.

As boot camp programs have moved from adult prisons to local jails and juvenile populations, new issues have arisen. For example, while adult programs could target nonviolent offenders in prison, nonviolent juveniles were much less apt to be incarcerated. Thus, net widening and the associated costs became critical issues for juvenile programs. This is particularly relevant given the history of concern with the destructive environment of detention centers for nonviolent juveniles or status offenders. The deceptively seductive idea of providing discipline and structure for disruptive juveniles means there is a real threat that increasingly large numbers of juveniles will be placed in boot camps, whether or not it is a suitable alternative sanction. Furthermore, in contrast to adult boot camps, academic and therapeutic programming and aftercare are viewed as necessary components in juvenile programs.

Similarly, local jurisdictions have faced problems in implementing boot camp programs in jails. Prison programs could coerce offenders to stay in the boot camps by offering them the promise of early release. In contrast, the length of stay in jails is relatively short. Offenders may actually stay longer in confinement if they enter a boot camp than they would have otherwise. As a result, there is little enticement for offenders to volunteer for boot camp. Also, a jail boot camp may prove very costly, given the extended length of incarceration and the likelihood that a boot camp may involve rehabilitative programming.

Perhaps the newest use of the boot camps has been in Georgia, in the disciplinary and mental health units of one State prison. Aimed at those who are having trouble adjusting to prison, the goal is to get offenders out of individual segregation cells for longer periods of time each day until finally they can be moved back among the general population.

Obviously, these distinctly varied uses of the boot camp model differ dramatically, and there is every reason to believe that these differences among programs will result in wide variation in effectiveness in achieving specific program goals.

When we began the NIJ-supported study of the Louisiana prison boot camp in 1988, it quickly became evident that it would be difficult to base a generalization about boot camps on one program, given that so many were so different. Thus, the Institute funded a multisite study of correctional boot camps that permitted us to cooperate with researchers in eight States. At the same time, several States were conducting studies of their own programs, and studies examining programs in local





jails and for juveniles were also being initiated. Additional information about the effectiveness of these boot camp programs comes from studies examining drug treatment for offenders in boot camps and the more recent implementation of boot camp programs for women. Through these studies we are beginning to learn something about the general effectiveness of boot camps.

Yet there is still a great deal of controversy surrounding boot camps, and much of it has to do with a kind of instinctive reaction to the military atmosphere. Those on the positive side, such as Governor Zell Miller of Georgia, who fondly recalls his own Marine boot camp experience, strongly advocate boot camps as sentencing alternatives for nonviolent first offenders. Others respond that the harsh boot camp discipline is not an effective way to change people. Obviously, the criminal justice system needs to learn more about what policymakers and the public really expect from these programs.

It is important, however, to separate this instinctive reaction from the debates that occur among people who are knowledgeable about the programs and corrections in general. Here, there is a much more interesting debate.

One perspective exhibited by many knowledgeable correctional experts is what might be called a "Machiavellian point of view." These individuals expect little direct benefit from the military atmosphere of the boot camp programs, but they are willing to use it to achieve two ends: early release for nonviolent offenders and additional funds for treatment programs (both within and outside prison). In their opinion, the popularity of the boot camps with policymakers and the public allows corrections to obtain early release and treatment that would not otherwise be available to these offenders.

Others fear the dangers of boot camps, despite these potential benefits; many psychologists who are experienced in both corrections and behavioral change take this position when examining boot camp programs. They believe that the potential dangers of the military models are too great to compromise for early release or funds for treatment. Furthermore, they argue that boot camps cannot provide a mechanism for treatment because many of the characteristics of the programs (confrontation, punishment instead of reward) are antithetical to treatment. These boot camp opponents fear that, even though some programs may be used as early release mechanisms, most have a serious potential for widening the net. This point is particularly critical for the newly developing juvenile programs.

Yet a third perspective argues that the military atmosphere is an effective model for changing offenders. Persons who have worked in drug treatment programs—where strict rules, discipline, and confrontational interactions are common—seem to be more comfortable with the military model. And, of course, many of those





responsible for the development and implementation of individual boot camp programs are committed to and believe in the viability of this approach. They argue that the stress created in boot camp may shake up the inmates and make them ready to change and take advantage of the treatment and aftercare programs offered. And further, they believe that the military atmosphere of boot camp may actually enhance the effect of this treatment by keeping the offenders physically and mentally healthy and enabling them to focus on their education, treatment, and therapy.

And so the debate continues, and there is merit in arguments both in favor of and opposition to boot camp programs as alternative sanctions. The main point may be that there are good, well-run boot camp programs, and there are bad, poorly run boot camp programs. Much like the nursery rhyme about the little girl with the curl—when they are good they are very, very good, but when they are bad they are horrid. Good boot camps provide what we know to be good correctional programming with fair and firm discipline, a mentally and physically healthy environment, and programming that addresses criminogenic needs. When they are bad they can be abusive, destructive, and even dangerous for inmates and staff.

One of the necessary conditions for an exemplary boot camp program is research to examine its effectiveness in achieving its objectives. The majority of the camps described in this book have done this, and the research is reported herein. Too often, new correctional programs are introduced and we hear great things about their accomplishments from the program developers. Program administrators report on wonderful, innovative programs with outstandingly low recidivism rates for boot camp graduates. Yet there is no research to support these claims, no mention made of time in the community or reasonable control groups. There is, instead, programming that looks good on paper but is not backed up by competent, qualified personnel.

In this book we have identified boot camps that we consider “good” programs, but we make no guarantees. Priority was given to boot camps that have invested in research to learn whether their programs were achieving the desired goals. The various authors describe the programs, discuss the goals, and report on the results of studies examining the effectiveness of the programs in obtaining their goals. We have made a particular effort to make the book relevant to policymakers and practitioners, and interesting and readable to those with only a cursory interest in prison boot camp programs.

We have tried to obtain the widest possible range of authors, with chapters about Federal, State, and local programs, and those for both adults and juveniles. Other chapters report on programs for special populations such as women, disruptive inmates, and those with mental health problems. Some chapters were authored by directors of major research studies that have examined the boot camps.





We have tried throughout to present an honest, objective picture of the boot camp programs described. We hope that this compilation of information will prove helpful to the field.

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CHAPTER 1

Historical Perspective

by Voncile B. Gowdy, Ph.D.

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Since their beginning in 1983 in Georgia, boot camps have spread to half the States and have gained wide popular appeal for their "get tough" policies. Proponents of boot camps cite their potential for rehabilitating offenders and curbing future criminal behavior. Opponents caution that more information is needed on a variety of issues including costs and the potential for abuse of power. NIJ's research into boot camps began with a 1988 study of Louisiana's boot camp program and continued with a multisite evaluation in 1989 and other research reported in this volume. The chapters that follow deal with various local, State, and Federal experiences with the boot camp concept; juvenile boot camps; other boot camp models; and evaluative research on shock incarceration.



Fueled primarily by growth in the number of offenders incarcerated during the past decade and changing views of the role of punishment and treatment in the correctional system, shock incarceration programs, or "boot camps" as they have been more recently called, have emerged as an increasingly popular alternative sanction for nonviolent crimes.

Boot camp programs operate under a military-like routine wherein young offenders convicted of less serious, nonviolent crimes are confined for a short period of time, typically from 3 to 6 months. They are given close supervision while being exposed to a demanding regimen of strict discipline, physical training, drill, inspections, and physical labor. All the programs also incorporate some degree of military structure and discipline, such as requiring inmates to stand at attention and respond with "Yes, sir" or "No, sir." Recent work by Roberta Cronin documented the differences among adult correctional boot camps. For example, exhibit 1 presents some of the military components that have been adopted by boot camp programs.

Exhibit 1. Military Characteristics of State Boot Camp Programs for Adult Offenders

Characteristic	Programs with this feature (N=29)	
	Number	Percent
Barracks-style housing	26	90
Military titles (captain, sergeant, etc.)	29	100
Military-style protocol	29	100
Drill instructors	25	86
Military-style uniforms for staff	22	79
Military-style uniforms for offenders	14	48
Grouping in platoons (members enter together)	25	86
Summary punishment	25	86
Group rewards and punishments	17	59
"Brig" or punishment cell	6	21
Public graduation ceremony	24	83

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.



Although the common element among all shock incarceration programs is the short period of imprisonment in a military atmosphere, the specific components of the programs vary widely among jurisdictions, as shown in exhibit 2 (Cronin, 1994; Parent, 1989; MacKenzie et al., 1989; U.S. GAO, 1988). Programs also differ in whether activities such as work, community services, education, or counseling are incorporated in the schedule of activities. There is some consistency, however, in the goals of the programs, as shown in exhibit 3 (Cronin, 1994), among them to reduce prison crowding and to change offenders' behavior and thus their future involvement in crime.

Exhibit 2. Programming in State Boot Camp Programs for Adult Offenders

Characteristic	Programs with this feature (N=29)	
	Number	Percent
Military drill and discipline	29	100
Physical labor	28	97
Physical fitness or exercise programs	28	97
Challenge or adventure programming	9	31
Drug/alcohol counseling or education	29	100
Other counseling/therapy	24	83
Education	26	90
Vocational training or job preparation	15	52

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.

Some jurisdictions stress the need for intensive supervision after release if the behavioral changes brought about by shock incarceration are to continue in the community. Some States impose additional requirements, such as drug testing, while the offender is under parole supervision.

Boot camp programs are generally designed for young, nonviolent offenders with their first felony conviction. These offenders usually volunteer for the program and must meet physical and mental health requirements. Placement and release decisions vary from one program to another (Parent, 1989) and may be made by judges, corrections department administrators, or members of parole boards.

**Exhibit 3. Program Goals as Reported by
State Corrections Officials**

	Not a goal	Relatively unimportant	Moderately important	Important	Very important	Average rating*
Reducing crowding	3%	3%	38%	21%	35%	2.8
Reducing cost	0	3	24	31	41	3.1
Punishing the offender	21	14	45	21	0	1.7
Protecting the public	0	3	17	14	66	3.4
Deterring future crime	0	0	0	21	79	3.8
Rehabilitating the offender	0	0	3	38	59	3.6
Lowering recidivism	0	0	7	52	41	3.3
Addressing public dissatisfaction	11	11	32	32	14	2.3

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.

* Scale runs from 0 to 4, with 0 = Not a goal and 4 = Very important

Precursors of shock incarceration programs include “shock probation” and “Scared Straight,” which pursued specific deterrence objectives. The Scared Straight program tried to deter young delinquents by making them fearful of prison through short, confrontational performances dramatized inside a prison by hardcore inmates. Many current shock incarceration programs also seek to deter criminal behavior, but they have other significant goals as well.

The early shock probation programs locked up young adult offenders in the prison population for a brief period so they could get a “real” experience with prison life. In contrast to the boot camps, offenders were mixed with general population offenders, and there were no military aspects. Evaluations of the shock probation programs were not positive; participants failed at rates similar to those in comparison groups (Vito and Allen, 1981).

Boot camp programs had their beginning in 1983 in Georgia. In 1993, just 10 years later, a survey sponsored by the General Accounting Office showed that 59 boot camp programs were operating in 29 States, with a total capacity of 10,065. Only two States—Michigan and Texas—have reduced their capacity since then. The largest programs are in New York and Georgia; together these two States account



for half the total capacity nationwide. Most programs accommodate 100 to 250 inmates and continue to limit participants to young, nonviolent first offenders who enter the boot camps voluntarily, primarily to shorten their prison terms. As exhibit 4 shows, however, some States have raised the upper age limit to include offenders over 30, and some now allow more serious offenders, with only 28 percent of the States restricting boot camp eligibility to first offenders in 1993 (Cronin, 1994).

Doris MacKenzie and Dale Parent argue that these programs have strong appeal with the general public (Parent, 1989; MacKenzie and Parent, 1992) and that they are magnets for media coverage because of their disciplinary aspects and “get tough” image.

Even boot camp proponents, however, believe that the criminal justice system should still proceed cautiously in implementing programs until some of the ongoing research and program development efforts are completed. Discussions have centered around issues such as:

- The projected high cost of treatment-oriented programs. It is difficult to interpret the cost data from different States or make meaningful comparisons across States because of differences in methods of accounting (Cronin, 1994).
- Criteria to determine the most appropriate and rigorous medical and psychological screening processes.
- Acquisition of more information about what actually happens in boot camp.
- Better assessment techniques to determine how offenders change in boot camp.
- Staff qualifications, including the ability to impose discipline evenhandedly while taking account of individual differences.
- Potential abuse of power and the effect it may have on both inmates and program staff.
- The need for clear policies governing the use of immediate punishment, force, and profanity. (The American Correctional Association has developed standards for adult and juvenile boot camps.)

Research Perspectives of the National Institute of Justice

During the mid-1980's, the Nation's prison population grew rapidly, crimes by younger offenders escalated steadily, and prisons outgrew their capacity. Therefore, NIJ, the research arm of the Department of Justice, undertook the task of exploring the boot camp concept.



Exhibit 4. Eligibility Criteria for State Boot Camps

State	Placement authority	Age limits	Limitations									Specifically target:	
			Nonviolent	First offenders	First-time felons	Offenders without prison record	Minimum sentence (in years)	Maximum sentence (in years)	Voluntary entry	Reject physically/mentally impaired offenders?	Drug involved	Probation or parole violators	
Alabama	Judge	—	¹	•	•	•	1	15		Mentally only			
Arizona	Judge and corrections authorities	18–25	¹	•			1	7	• ⁹	•			
Arkansas	Corrections authorities	—	• ⁷	•	•	•	1/2	10	•	•			
California	Corrections authorities	—	•	•	•		1	3	•	•			
Colorado	Corrections authorities	30 and under	•				—	—	•				
Florida	Judge	15–24		•	•	•	•	1	10	•	•		
Georgia	Judge and parole authorities	17–35 ²	• ⁵				3/4 ⁵	10 ⁵	• ⁵	• ⁸	•	•	
Idaho	Corrections authorities with judge's agreement	15 and up	¹				1	Life	•		•		
Illinois	Corrections authorities with judge's recommendation	17–29	¹			•	1	5	•	•	•		

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.

Exhibit 4. Eligibility Criteria for State Boot Camps (continued)

State	Placement authority	Age limits	Limitations								Specifically target:	
			Nonviolent	First offenders	First-time felons	Offenders without prison record	Minimum sentence (in years)	Maximum sentence (in years)	Voluntary entry	Reject physically/mentally impaired offenders?	Drug involved	Probation or parole violators
Kansas	Judge and corrections authorities	16–27	•				1	3	•	•	•	•
Louisiana	Judge, corrections authorities, and parole board	17–39	¹				1	7	•	•		
Maryland	Corrections authorities	16–32	•				3/4	10	•	•	•	
Massachusetts	Corrections authorities	17–40					—	2	•		•	•
Michigan	Judge and corrections authorities, with judge's agreement	25 & under	¹				1	—	•	Physical only	•	
Minnesota	Corrections authorities	—	•				2 1/3	4 1/2	•	Mentally only	•	
Mississippi	Judge	—	¹			•	—	All but life	•	•		•

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.

Exhibit 4. Eligibility Criteria for State Boot Camps (continued)

State	Placement authority	Age limits	Limitations							Specifically target:
			Nonviolent	First offenders	First-time felons	Offenders without prison record	Minimum sentence (in years)	Maximum sentence (in years)	Voluntary entry	
Nevada	Judge	18 and up	•				1	—		
New Hampshire	Corrections authorities with judge's agreement	18–30	•				2	4	•	
New York	Corrections authorities with judge's agreement	16–35	•			•	— within 3 years	Parole-eligible	•	•
North Carolina	Judge	16–26					—	—	•	•
Ohio	Corrections authorities	18–25	•	•	•		1	5	•	•
Oklahoma	Corrections authorities	18–22 ³	•	•	•		—	5	•	•
Pennsylvania	Corrections authorities	18–35	¹	•	•		2 1/2	5	•	Mentally only
South Carolina	Judge and corrections authorities	17–29	1	•		•	1/4	8	•	

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.

Exhibit 4. Eligibility Criteria for State Boot Camps (continued)

State	Placement authority	Age limits	Limitations								Specifically target:	
			Nonviolent	First offenders	First-time felons	Offenders without prison record	Minimum sentence (in years)	Maximum sentence (in years)	Voluntary entry	Reject physically/mentally impaired offenders?	Drug involved	Probation or parole violators
Tennessee	Corrections authorities	18–35	•				1	66		•	•	
Texas	Judge	17–25					1	10		•	•	
Virginia	Judge	15–24	5			•	—	20	•	•	•	
West Virginia	Judge	17–25	5			•	—	—	•	Physically only	•	•
Wisconsin	Corrections authorities	18–30	5				—	—	•	•	•	
Number of States with this type of limitation		24	14	8	5	9	20	23	22	24		

1. Some offenses are excluded, but not all violent offenses.
 2. 17–35 applies to inmate boot camps. Range is 17–30 for probation boot camps. There are no limits for probation detention centers.
 3. No limits for prisoners.
 4. Regimented Inmate Discipline only. Other programs have no limits.
 5. Inmate programs only. Other programs are not restricted.
 6. 12 years for certain drug offenses.
 7. "Unless sentenced by a judge."

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.



In 1988, NIJ sponsored Dr. Doris MacKenzie, then of Louisiana State University, in evaluating the shock incarceration program in that State. The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Correction's Intensive Motivational Program of Alternative Correctional Treatment (IMPACT), implemented in 1987, was then a two-phased boot camp program. In the first phase, offenders were incarcerated for 90 to 180 days in a rigorous boot camp atmosphere. Following this, they were placed under intensive parole supervision. This second phase required offenders to have at least four contacts a week with their supervising officers, adhere to a strict 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew, perform community service, and work.

In establishing the IMPACT program, Louisiana's major stated goal was to create a new sentencing option that would provide placement for inmates who would otherwise be sent to the State's crowded prison. Other program goals were to provide participants with the life skills they would need to succeed in becoming constructive members of society. The evaluation, designed to examine Louisiana's success in meeting its goals, examined how the program was implemented, changes in inmate behavior and attitude resulting from the program, and system-level changes such as costs and benefits.

The evaluators found that staff saw the program as more than a way of "getting tough" with the young offenders; both the staff and the inmates found their interaction to be more positive than in regular prison. Nonetheless, offenders found the boot camp regimen to be physically and mentally taxing, and many dropped out before completing the program. Findings from the evaluation indicated that inmates who completed the program believed they had learned valuable lessons and skills, and their positive attitudes grew during the time they were in the program. By contrast, regular prison inmates had increasingly negative attitudes during their prison stays; they said they learned only that they did not want to return to prison.

Boot camp offenders were involved in more positive activities during their time under community supervision than other parolees, probationers, and boot camp drop-outs, but during the 6-month supervision period, the positive activities of all groups declined. There was no significant difference among all the groups in the percentage arrested during these 6 months.

Cost savings per boot camp inmate were significant (\$13,784) over the cost of the longer term incarceration that would have taken place, but these savings were somewhat offset by higher costs for the community supervision phase (\$5,956), thus netting a total of \$7,828 saved for each offender who completed the program instead of going to regular prison.

The evaluators concluded that programs like IMPACT may achieve the goal of creating new sentencing options for some offenders who would otherwise spend longer terms in prison.



Around the same time that the Louisiana evaluation was being completed, the boot camp option was attracting considerable interest as an alternative to traditional imprisonment for young offenders. Boot camp programs were springing up in many parts of the country, but critics were calling for a guarded approach because of major concerns that needed to be thoroughly examined.

In response, NIJ undertook a multisite evaluation of boot camp programs that began with a 1989 survey of 50 State correctional jurisdictions to determine what specific program components seemed to work best and for what types of offenders. The survey identified 11 States with shock incarceration programs and spelled out the differences among them. For instance, in some programs judges selected offenders for this sanction; in others the decision lay with correctional department officials. Different programs placed varying emphasis on rehabilitation, academic education, and vocational education.

This information indicated a need to examine the efficacy of boot camp programs. Were they meeting their stated goals? How were they operating? This multisite evaluation studied boot camp programs in eight States (Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas) to develop a broader picture of how this popular new sanction was being applied.

In general, the study found that recidivism rates of those completing boot camp programs were similar to those for comparable offenders who spent a longer time in prison. Lower recidivism rates were found in three States, however—New York, Illinois, and Louisiana. Programs in these States had a strong therapeutic focus and included an intensive 6-month supervision phase on release into the community. The findings suggested that the boot camp experience *alone* is not sufficient for reducing recidivism. Chapter 18 of this book, Multisite Study of Correctional Boot Camps, details these findings.

About This Book

After more than a decade of experience with boot camps, numerous unanswered questions remain about their operation, as well as about their effectiveness and impact. This book examines these issues and recent developments in the use of boot camps.

The next chapter provides an overview of boot camps that is crucial for the development of national standards for correctional boot camps. Although the Department of Justice has established operating principles for correctional boot camps, standards to guide the development of components for these programs are necessary for continued improvement in their effectiveness. While statutes may specify the legislative authorization and the general mission assigned for these programs, there is a need for indepth exposition.



Chapters 3 to 8 deal with various local, State, and Federal experiences with boot camps. Clearly, an opportunity to assess the best models will be informative and useful for jurisdictions that have not yet tried the boot camp alternative. Offenders participating in most of the State programs are usually released in a shorter time period than would be the case if they served their sentences in a traditional correctional facility. Yet at the Federal level, inmates do not have a reduced sentence but instead serve a portion of their time at the boot camp while the remainder of their time is served in a community corrections center.

The widespread concept of “boot camp” has become a part of the juvenile system. Chapters 9 to 11 address the development of boot camps for youthful offenders and begin to examine the impact of these programs. Contrary to the requirements for adult boot camp participants, juvenile boot camps tend to recruit offenders who are deeply involved in the juvenile justice system. The typical incarceration at a juvenile boot camp is a few months, although in some States an offender’s stay may be lengthened if requirements for graduation are not met. Exhibit 5 presents characteristic features of juvenile boot camps.

Chapters 12 to 14 present information on various aspects of boot camp programming.

Chapters 15 to 18 highlight evaluative research on various aspects of the boot camp concept. While only a limited number of significant process and impact evaluations have been completed to date, the results of the study summarized in chapter 18 by Doris MacKenzie are probably the most comprehensive.

The final chapter in this volume addresses the future of boot camps; it emphasizes the need for more research to guide policymakers and criminal justice professionals in implementing more effective boot camp programs.

Program	Operated by:	Year began	Capacity	Program duration (in days)	Age limits	Limited to:				% of time devoted:		Supervision level after boot camp
						Nonviolent offenders	First serious offense	First custodial commitment	Volunteers	Physical training/drill/work	Education/counseling	
High Intensity Treatment, Chalkville, AL	State	1990	100	30	12–18			•		36	64	Depends on risk
Environmental Youth Corps, Mobile, AL	County/Private	1992	52	90	13–17	•	•	•		43	57	Intensive
LEAD, CA	State	1992	60	120	16–20		•		•	34	66	Intensive
Drug Treatment Boot Camp, Los Angeles, CA	County	1990	210	140	16–18				n/a	n/a	n/a	Intensive
Camp Foxfire, Denver, CO	State/Private	1992	24	90	14–18	•				58	42	Intensive
Orleans Parish Prison, New Orleans, LA	Parish	1985	275	Depends on sentence	13–16					n/a	n/a	None, usually
Mississippi Rehabilitative Camp, Raymond, MS	State	1992	175	168	10–20					24	76	Minimal
Youth Leadership Academy, South Kortwright, NY	State	1992	30	120	15–16			•	•	44	56	Intensive
Camp Roulston, Cleveland, OH	County/Private	1992	30	90	14–17				•	38	63	Intensive

Source: Roberta C. Cronin, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders*, National Institute of Justice Research Report, October 1994.



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CHAPTER 2

An Overview of Boot Camp Goals, Components, and Results

by John K. Zachariah

John Zachariah is the Deputy Court Administrator and Director of the Administrative Services Department of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court in Ohio. He was formerly the Chief Probation Officer of the county's Juvenile Probation Department. When he was Regional Administrator for the American Correctional Association, he directed the development of boot camp national standards, a project funded by the National Institute of Justice.

This overview of boot camps consists of a review of the literature and a discussion of findings from a mail survey and telephone and onsite interviews with directors of departments of corrections, directors of juvenile corrections, and military staff to obtain information on the goals and components of military, adult, and juvenile boot camps as a preliminary task in developing standards for adult and juvenile correctional boot camps. Uniformity was found in the use of military drill and ceremony and physical activity, but there was considerable variation on the value of including education and drug and alcohol treatment as boot camp components. The findings of selected evaluations as of January 1993 indicate that boot camps may be a useful alternative sanction to keep first offenders from offending again over the short term, but that the long-term effects on recidivism or reduction of costs and prison crowding have not yet been determined.



“Sir, yes sir! Sir, no sir!” Many corrections facilities now resound with shouted orders and courteous but clipped responses. Correctional boot camp programs for youthful offenders have grown over the past decade. This growth promises to continue, spurred on by citizens—who like seeing offenders toeing the line—and by legislators who represent them. In 1990 Congress authorized the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to fund State boot camps as “corrections options” through its discretionary grant program, and 2 years later it authorized the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to establish three model juvenile boot camps emphasizing education and other services.

This rapid growth in boot camp programs has produced an immediate need for standards to guide the design and components of these programs. To this end, the American Correctional Association (ACA) completed a study of the status of boot camps, funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and in January 1995 published a set of standards for both adult and juvenile boot camp programs.

ACA has now published *Standards for Juvenile Correctional Boot Camp Programs* and *Standards for Adult Correctional Boot Camp Programs*. These standards were developed over several months with the participation of correctional practitioners, academicians, Department of Justice officials, and other national correctional leaders. At every step of the process, these standards have undergone field review and critique by correctional practitioners, ACA’s Standards Committee, the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, and correctional administrators. The standards were field tested in a variety of boot camp sites to ensure their validity. They represent the collective wisdom of many professionals who have reviewed and developed standards that reflect an acceptable level of operation for the field.

The goal of establishing these standards continues to be the same as the correctional process that began in 1870 when the Association published the first principles designed to improve working conditions for staff and employees and living conditions for inmates. ACA has published standards reflecting the consensus of the profession in setting forth the principles, policies, and procedures necessary to maintain correctional facilities that are safe, humane, efficient, and effective.

Professional standards for corrections are prepared with several constituencies in mind. Critics sometimes overlook one or more of these important groups or tend to focus on a single purpose. Standards are designed to consider the members of the public who have been victimized by crime; the staff who work in correctional systems; inmates who serve sentences; the judges and court officers who impose sentences; and the legislative and executive offices responsible for corrections.

ACA completed a literature review, a direct mail inquiry (asking programs to send their policies and procedures), indepth telephone interviews with corrections officials in eight States, and site visits to four States. Staff reviewed all major publica-



tions, annual reports, and unpublished papers to date on the status of boot camp programs, in addition to written information from 34 boot camp programs (51 percent of all adult and Federal boot camp programs) and the District of Columbia (whose program was implemented in 1994).

In April 1993, ACA staff sent letters to military bases and members of the American Correctional Military Association, an ACA affiliate. These letters asked for information about their branch of the service, including mission statements, goals, objectives, policies, and procedures. All four branches of military service responded.

This chapter discusses the similarities and differences between military and correctional boot camps and summarizes several key boot camp program components from the literature review and materials submitted in response to the survey questionnaire.¹

Military Boot Camps

Results of the military boot camp survey showed that the primary purpose of military boot camps, which are 8 weeks long, is to convert a civilian into a soldier who is physically conditioned, motivated, and self-disciplined—one who can take his or her place in the ranks of the Armed Forces in the field.

The Armed Forces manual² explicitly states several key issues that are essential to military boot camp training goals:

- **Organization.** The program must be organized with formal intermediate goals or progressive phases so that the conversion process can be properly structured and both the trainer and new soldier are clear on progress.
- **The dignity of the new soldier.** From the time the new soldier takes the oath of enlistment, he or she is a soldier and should be addressed as one. Every effort must be made to instill a sense of identification with the uniform, the training unit, and the leaders of that unit. This cannot be accomplished in an atmosphere of “we/they.” From the start of the training cycle, the new soldier must be presented an atmosphere that says “leader/soldier,” where the drill sergeant, committee group trainer, and officers are seen as role models to emulate rather than people to be feared and avoided.
- **Degree of control.** The leaders of training units must continue to develop self-discipline in their soldiers. Self-discipline begins early in boot camp by ensuring that the training center cadre maintains total control over the soldiers’ activities. This control is relaxed over time as soldiers demonstrate their willingness to accept responsibility for their actions.



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- **Responsibility.** If new soldiers are to be successful and productive members in their future units, they must learn responsibility for others as well as for themselves. Every work detail, every period of instruction, and every opportunity to reinforce leadership should emphasize the necessity for cooperation and teamwork.
 - **Training cadre role.** The operative philosophy is to train soldiers by building on their strengths and shoring up their weaknesses. It is not to “tear them down and build them up again.”

Asked to comment on the compatibility of both military and correctional boot camp goals, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce R. Conover, Chief of Corrections Branch Headquarters, Department of the Army, reported that the goals of correctional boot camp programs are similar to those of military boot camps:

The military boot camp environment facilitates individual training and prepares soldiers for the mental and physical stress which will confront them in combat. This same environment is highly conducive to assisting in the correction of first-time, nonviolent offenders, and preparing for their reintroduction into the community upon completion of their sentence.

While both kinds of boot camp focus on training, the purpose of correctional boot camp training is different from that of military boot camps. Conover reported that:

... while military boot camps train soldiers in unique military arts, the correctional boot camp's training focus should be educational, occupational, or tailored specifically to correct the behavior for which the offender is incarcerated. Like its military counterpart, the training environment should generate physical and mental stress to assist in preparing the prisoner for the pressures of constructive citizenship. Intensive supervision and success-oriented counseling and mentorship apply to both the military and corrections “boot camp” environment.³

Dale Parent, building on the philosophy of the military boot camps, especially using the drill sergeant, group trainers, and officers as role models, has written:

If the disciplinary regimen is expected to alter the offender's future behaviors, the agency should describe in writing the link between the regimen and the future behavior change. For example, staff may be expected to be good role models for inmates, in which case we might expect that offenders' attitudes and behaviors would become more like those of staff, and that offenders' crime and violation rates would decline. Alternately, we might expect fair and consistently enforced rules to teach offenders about being accountable for their deeds. We might expect offenders' values to be more readily subject to positive (pro-social) change



in a boot camp environment than in an institution, and that once released to the community, that ex-offenders with more pro-social values would be less likely to commit new crimes or violate conditions of their release.⁴

The focus of military boot camps and correctional boot camps is training. Military boot camps train recruits in military arts to enable them to become competent soldiers. Correctional boot camps train offenders in responsible living techniques to help them to become law-abiding citizens. Some of the most common characteristics of the two types of boot camps are barracks-style housing, military titles, drill and ceremonies, military-style uniforms, grouping in platoons, summary punishment, and group rewards and punishment.

Meanwhile, some of the differences are in the program content area, such as group and individual counseling, drug and alcohol education and counseling, education, vocational training, and job preparation. Clearly defined purposes and goals will determine the structure and content of a correctional boot camp that can best serve offenders and the community.

Goals and Philosophies of Correctional Boot Camp Programs

Research indicates that there have been three primary reasons for implementing correctional boot camp programs: reducing crowding, reducing costs, and lowering recidivism.⁵ In a 1991 survey, Doris MacKenzie asked boot camp administrators to rate the importance of 11 goals. The goals administrators deemed “very important” were rehabilitation, recidivism reduction, and drug education. Goals deemed “important” were reducing crowding, developing work skills, and providing a safe prison environment. Goals believed to be “somewhat important” were deterrence, education, and drug treatment. Vocational education was the goal most often believed “not important” or “not a goal” (although 14 States claimed it was important or somewhat important).⁶

MacKenzie also found each program’s goals to be clearly reflected in its daily schedule of activities. For example, in South Carolina’s boot camp program academic and drug education were high-priority goals. Thus, offenders in South Carolina spent 4 hours every day in educational programs and 3 hours each week in drug education. On the other hand, drug treatment was not a high-priority goal and offenders spent little time in treatment.

Like MacKenzie, ACA staff found in their survey that the major goals held by most boot camp programs included reducing crowding and costs, reducing recidivism, and rehabilitation. In fact, of the 16 boot camp programs that had philosophies, mission statements, or goal statements in some written form, staff found that 14

▲ ▲ ▲ _____
stated rehabilitation was a major goal. Only five States mentioned punishment or deterrence as a goal.⁷

Parent addressed the goals of both punishment and deterrence and concluded that neither of them in fact could be viewed as appropriate correctional boot camp goals.⁸

Punishment. In his study, Parent discussed the issue of “just deserts” as the primary theory around which punishment has been organized. He stated:

Under just deserts, punishment must be proportional and uniform. Punishments are proportional if the severity of punishment increases in direct relation to increases in (a) the gravity of crime(s) committed and (b) the magnitude of offenders’ culpability. Thus, minor crimes committed by “virgin” offenders should get modest punishments; severe crimes committed by habitual offenders should get much harsher punishments. Punishments are uniform if similar offenders convicted of similar crimes generally get similar sentences.⁹

Because most boot camp programs select only first-time “virgin” offenders, the severe nature of the program runs counter to the theory of “just deserts.”

Deterrence and rehabilitation. On the issue of deterrence Parent said, “It is not the boot camp itself which deters future criminal conduct, but the offender’s fear of real prison.” He reported that when deterrence is a goal, boot camp programs are usually located within a general population prison so that participants can see and hear regular inmates and observe prison routine. Staff contribute to the offender’s fears of the unknown by describing the “exploitation” and “sexual victimization” that happens in prison.

In short, these programs try to scare participants into desisting from crime. No one has specifically evaluated the deterrent effects of boot camp prisons. However, evaluations of other related programs, including the Scared Straight programs of the 1970’s, suggest that boot camps are unlikely to achieve specific deterrence.

Evaluations of the Rahway program and several similar ones found no evidence of a deterrence effect—in fact, some studies found that those who participated failed at higher rates than control groups who did not participate.¹⁰

On the other hand, and although there is no hard and fast evidence, Parent did see that rehabilitation, crowding reduction, and lowered costs are viable boot camp program goals.



ACA staff found that almost all boot camp programs included rehabilitation as one of their goals. They hoped to achieve rehabilitation through the disciplinary regimen itself and through treatment programs (see other research reported in this volume).

Reducing crowding and costs. Although crowding and costs have not been issues in boot camps for juveniles, both have been consistently reported as goals for adult boot camps. But Parent has warned administrators to be realistic about what boot camps can do to meet these goals. (See the research described elsewhere in this volume, especially chapter 16.)

Program Components

The survey showed that while many boot camp programs are similar in nature, there are some distinct differences in how each State administers its particular program. For example, the length of boot camp programs runs from a minimum of 30 days to a maximum of 240 days, sometimes prohibiting additional educational programs or counseling services. Most programs, however, are in the 90- to 120-day range.¹¹

A review of the written materials from boot camp programs demonstrated a variety of program emphases. The particular emphasis of a program depends largely on its expressed mission and goal statements. The primary components of most boot camp programs include physical training, labor, drill and ceremony, and summary punishment. This last is an interim punishment imposed by staff for disciplinary infractions, which entails an on-the-spot, immediate sanction for an infraction. This punishment may include pushups, extra chores, or another work assignment.

Depending on a program's goals, the rehabilitative components and treatment components might include:

- Academic education.
- Vocational education.
- Life skills training.
- Drug and alcohol education or treatment.
- Reality therapy.
- Rational behavior training.
- Therapeutic community.
- Relaxation therapy.

Not all programs offer all components. Vocational education, for example, does not appear to be feasible within the confines of a strict boot camp program.

Yet over time, as boot camp programs continue to develop, they change. The first programs stressed a rigid military atmosphere, physical training, and hard labor. Although these components are still part of every program, many boot camp programs have increased the time they give to education and treatment.¹² MacKenzie reported that in 1992, most programs had some type of drug education or a combination of drug education and treatment in their schedules, even though the amount of time devoted to drug education or treatment still varied greatly among programs. She said that some programs had as few as 15 days of treatment, while others offered drug treatment every day. Some programs, notably New York, used a therapeutic community model, and all offenders received the same drug treatment while in the program.

The platoons form a small “community” and meet daily to solve problems and discuss their progress in the program. Inmates also spend time in substance abuse education classes and in group counseling. The counseling program is based on the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) model of abstinence and recovery. All inmates participate in the drug treatment programs regardless of their substance abuse history.¹³

Other States, notably Illinois, used a very different treatment model.

In Illinois drug counselors evaluate offenders and match the education or treatment level to the severity of the offender’s substance abuse problems. Inmates with no history of substance abuse receive only 2 weeks of drug education. Those who are identified as probable substance abusers receive 4 weeks of group counseling along with the drug education. Inmates who are classified as having drug addictions receive the drug education and 10 weeks of drug treatment.¹⁴

(See chapter 4 in this volume for more on the Illinois boot camp program.)

Eligibility Requirements

ACA staff analyzed the programs in eight States that had specific eligibility criteria, including the selection process and the type of consent required for participation in the boot camp program. All States responding to the survey used several criteria (corroborating the findings of an NIJ multistate study that MacKenzie conducted).

Offender status. Most States limited boot camp programs to first-time, nonviolent offenders who did not have outstanding felony detainers or warrants. Many States



specified, in writing, the violent crimes that prohibit an offender from entering the boot camp program.

Age. Most States differed in their age requirements. The following list is a sampling:

- Kansas—ages 18 to 25.
- Maryland—under 32 years.
- California—age 40 or younger.
- New York—age 30 or younger.
- Illinois—ages 17 to 29.
- Tennessee—ages 17 to 29.
- Oklahoma—under 25 years.

Sentence length. Although one of the motivators for entering a boot camp program is a reduction in sentence length, and one of the most consistent boot camp program goals is to reduce prison crowding, States surveyed differed in the number of years an offender should have spent in prison had there been no boot camp program. For example, Maryland restricted its boot camp program to offenders sentenced for up to 10 years who have at least 9 months remaining to serve. New York required that offenders become eligible for release on parole within 3 years. Illinois required that offenders have been sentenced to prison for up to 5 years and Tennessee for up to 6 years; the latter also required that the boot camp program last at least 90 days.

Selection Process

According to General Accounting Office (GAO) research:

The actual selection process varies by state and may involve more than one placement authority. For example, 20 states reported that the sentencing judge could sentence a person directly to a boot camp. Twenty states also said that the correctional agency could make this decision when the inmate enters the system. Only four states said that the decision could be made by probation or parole authorities.¹⁵

MacKenzie wrote that “judges may be particularly interested in programs that have an impact on the individual offender and that provide more control than traditional probation. In contrast, corrections administrators, seeking new programs and facing



serious prison crowding, may emphasize the importance of using intermediate sanctions such as boot camp.¹⁶

In New York, Louisiana, and Illinois, the Department of Corrections selects candidates for the programs. In other States, offenders are sent to the boot camp by the court, which maintains full control over the offenders. Those who are dismissed before completion and those who successfully complete the program must return to the court for final disposition.

According to MacKenzie, Texas and the original programs in Georgia and South Carolina were designed this way. However, South Carolina now operates its program through the Department of Corrections, and Georgia operates some programs through the court and some through corrections.¹⁷

Voluntary Consent

All of the States studied required offenders to volunteer for the boot camp program and to sign a form so indicating. Most departments viewed this form as a protection against liability. Critics suggest, however, that the programs are not voluntary simply because an offender's choice is limited to two different types of confinement, one of which is for a considerably shorter period of time.

Community Followup

As a distinct part of the total boot camp program, most States have a strong community followup component to help offenders make the transition from the program back to the community. For example, Kansas performed 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, and 1-year checks for new crimes with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, local law enforcement, and court of referral to evaluate the offender's adjustment after returning to the community. New York's intensive community program incorporated work programs, employment counseling, drug counseling, and a continuation of the daily therapeutic community meetings that were part of the boot camp program. In Illinois, graduates from the program were electronically monitored for the first 3 months of community supervision and placed on community supervision for a period of 1 to 2 years depending on the class of their crime.

Maryland placed boot camp graduates into transitional houses where they received intensive supervision and a variety of services geared to meet their needs (e.g., counseling, social worker reviews, and job searches.)

MacKenzie said that California's new boot camp prison at San Quentin planned to train offenders for 120 days. Following this period offenders would be required to live at a nearby naval air station for 60 days.¹⁸ They could leave the base if



employed or they could work on the base while searching for a job. Upon release from the base, they were to be intensively supervised in the community for an additional 4 months.

Staff Training and Selection

Parent wrote that boot camp programs provide a high-stress environment for both inmates and staff. Staff typically are at first “rejuvenated” by their role in boot camps, but in many programs burnout is rapid and turnover rates are high. As burnout and turnover increase, the potential for inmate abuse stemming from staff error or negligence also rises. This is probably true for inmate injury (and staff injury by inmates) as well.

Because staff are paramount to the success of the boot camp program, and because boot camps carry strong potential for abuse of offenders, staff selection and training are critical issues. Relatively few programs studied, however, have given staff selection or training special attention.

No one has assessed the effectiveness of various screening criteria for selecting staff, but several programs were screening out applicants who had:

- A history of abuse (or neglect) involving a person in their care or custody.
- A history of drug or alcohol problems.
- Current serious personal problems (such as divorce, bankruptcy, or a seriously ill spouse).
- A history of issuing numerous misconduct reports on prison inmates (that is, applicants who deal with conflict by asserting authority rather than solving problems).

Staff in most programs did not believe that prior military service was a necessary requirement for a boot camp drill instructor. Most, however, expected drill instructors to be positive role models and physically fit enough to perform any task required of inmates. This is one reason some programs have set requirements pertaining to height, weight, and physical conditioning.

Unfortunately, few States have offered substantial preservice training for boot camp staff. The New York State Department of Correctional Services is an important exception. It has developed a comprehensive boot camp staff training package. (See chapter 3 in this volume for more on the New York program.)



Boot Camps for Juveniles

Boot camp programs appear to have a focus more easily identified with adults than juveniles. Despite this, in many States youthful offenders under the age of 18 are considered adults and have been placed within the adult boot camp population. For example, Georgia's program has targeted offenders who are 17 years old and above; Alabama, 15 and above; and New York, 16 and above.

For the most part, juvenile corrections practitioners have been slow to embrace the boot camp program concept. They have considered the amount of time devoted to military drill, ceremony, and exercise as an encroachment on the time available for education or drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs.

Most educators agree that juveniles usually resist authority and generally have poor social skills and self-concepts. Often they are underachievers and are unable to make the connection between their behavior and its effect. For these reasons, educators have believed that juveniles need an atmosphere of challenge and experiential learning, a variety of "learning by doing" programs. However, because boot camp programs have caught the public eye and have strong support, some juvenile justice agencies are feeling pressure to develop and implement them.

In some States juvenile practitioners are combining elements of the boot camp program philosophy with experiential or adventure programming and are relabeling the programs with names such as "stress challenge." In other States, juvenile practitioners are looking for ways to translate the strict adult boot camp philosophy into programs that will work well with juveniles.

Conclusions and Recommendations

An effective intervention must take place to prevent first-time offenders from penetrating deeper into the juvenile justice system and especially to prevent juvenile offenders from graduating to the adult criminal justice system. Providing a boot camp program may be an important step in keeping the young offender from further incarceration.

However, starting any new program is a challenge. Boot camp programs are experiencing some successes, at least with respect to short-term costs and the short-term impact of programs on graduates. Many, however, were designed and implemented quickly—without feasibility studies—and without written policies and procedures to guide their implementation.

In the written materials that many boot camp programs submitted to ACA, for example, the stated goals varied—sometimes drastically—from one program to the next, and sometimes within the same program. At the two extremes are programs that espouse punishment as a goal and those that espouse rehabilitation.



The structures of the programs varied also. Military drill, ceremony, and physical exercise were common to all programs, but the balance of the boot camp day varied. Some boot camp programs required offenders to spend 4 to 6 hours in basic education or drug treatment. Others required offenders to work 8 hours a day. Very few programs had any type of formal evaluation process to measure success in meeting goals.

Unfortunately, some evaluations have indicated that the long-term impact of boot camp programs may be no different from that of traditional prison. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported in 1993 that after 2 years out, boot camp graduates had the same rate of recidivism as offenders on parole.¹⁹ Many critical issues, therefore, need to be addressed by policymakers and administrators who would establish boot camp programs. The literature review and the telephone and site visit interviews identified some of the most pressing of these issues.

Mission statements, goals, and measurable objectives. A fundamental requirement for success is to express mission statements, goals, and objectives in clear, precise, and measurable language.

Of all of the possible goals that boot camp programs may adopt, the two that are reasonably attainable, according to the literature, are rehabilitation and reduction of crowding and costs.

Thomas Castellano²⁰ suggested that the boot camp mission statement should also address—in specific terms—the role of the boot camp within the correctional system and should specify how particular program elements and components contribute to the achievement of that larger mission.

Evaluation. When goal statements and objectives are written in specific, measurable terms, the short-term and long-term goals can be measured efficiently and effectively. Problems can be anticipated before they occur or are solved. Castellano suggested that each boot camp program maintain an information system that contains the type of data necessary for meaningful program monitoring, assessment, and evaluation. He said that there should also be systemwide collaboration to collect information about the offender—from the point when the offender enters the boot camp program, through aftercare. Castellano also promoted research and evaluation as significant program elements. He specifically cited feasibility, process, and impact studies.

Before making a commitment to start a boot camp, correctional administrators should conduct a feasibility study to determine whether such a program would be appropriate in their jurisdiction. Giving consideration to the program's goals and objectives, administrators should study:

- The program's targeted population.



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- The selection criteria, including intake and exit criteria and procedures and ways the offender will be tracked through the program.
 - Questions such as whether the pool of eligible offenders is large enough to justify opening the program and whether current sanctioning patterns in the jurisdiction can accommodate the proposed client flow.
 - The methodology that will be used to document cost savings and the impact on prison crowding.
 - The types of programs the boot camp will provide and associated staffing, contracted services, and physical construction. This information is necessary to estimate program costs, which then should be compared with the costs of alternative intermediate sanctions serving similar populations.

Boot camp programs will also need to conduct both process and impact evaluations. A process evaluation measures whether the program is actually operating the way it was designed to operate. An impact evaluation measures how effective the program was in achieving its goals. Impact evaluations basically answer the questions, “Does the program work? Is the program effective?”

Selection criteria. Most boot camp programs target first-time, nonviolent offenders—within a specified age range—as appropriate participants. The majority of programs also include mostly males who are physically and psychologically able to complete the strict military exercise requirements.

Parent pointed out that boot camp administrators, in establishing rigid criteria, might be inviting another problem: possible discrimination.

Clearly, if eligible male inmates are given a chance to shorten their prison terms in a boot camp, similar female inmates should have the same opportunity. From a physiological viewpoint, younger inmates are better able to do the physical training and hard labor than older inmates. Most boot camp programs, therefore, restrict participation to offenders who are less than 30 years old. Disabled inmates or those with nondisabling medical conditions that limit their physical performance are also typically excluded. While these exclusions may be reasonable, older, disabled, or physically impaired inmates *may* have a liberty interest because they have no access to an alternative program that shortens their term of confinement.²¹

Aftercare. Correctional boot camps differ in the amount of time they allocate to aftercare or community supervision. Some programs have offered boot camp graduates intensive supervision for 8 months to a year or more; some have used a 2- to 3-month aftercare program.



Parent said that if boot camp aftercare is to contribute to the goal of rehabilitation, it should provide an extended supportive period emphasizing employment (job training, placement, retention, housing, and continuation of treatment programming begun in the facility).

He made an interesting comparison between military and correctional boot camp aftercare.

. . . in the military, those who complete basic training are considered to be “trainable assets”—that is, they are ready to *begin* learning the skills needed to perform their respective missions. Military basic training is followed by specialized training, a job, food, regular pay, adequate housing, clothing, health care, opportunities for advancement and advanced education. Military service provides complete support for several years. By parallel, it is possible that the way we operate aftercare will have major impacts on the boot camp graduates’ return to prison rates, and on the boot camp programs’ overall attainment of their goals.²²

Juvenile issues. As already noted, many juvenile justice practitioners prefer not to implement juvenile boot camp programs for a variety of reasons. In interviews, treatment and mental health professionals expressed concern over the impact such programs might have on juvenile offenders. Some practitioners thought that juveniles would be more appropriately placed in training schools or in community residential programs where they could receive the type and amount of education and counseling they needed.

On the other hand, Yitzhak Bakal, Executive Director of one of the three juvenile boot camp programs funded by OJJDP, saw merit in the intensity of the boot camp routine. He said: “The military structure gives these kids strong motivation and a sense of control and empowerment. They work from early in the morning to late in the evening. The atmosphere here is quite different from the institutions where 20 or 30 kids sit in a day room and watch TV all day. In the boot camp, the kids are emotional and positive.”²³

Practitioners are still experimenting with the right formula, however. Parent pointed out that we had very little evidence to guide us in answering important questions about juveniles and boot camp programs. How young is too young? In a juvenile program, how should the disciplinary regimen differ? Should the programmatic content and physical training requirements differ from those in adult boot camps? What effect do mandatory school laws have on the amounts and types of educational programming provided in juvenile boot camps? Do child protection laws limit the regimen and practices in juvenile boot camp programs?



Discrimination and Abuse Issues

The literature on boot camps described several other problem areas of particular concern to policymakers and administrators, especially in the area of inmates' rights and inmates' protection.

Policymakers may need to consider that "particularly in their strictest form, boot camps operate very close to the line of unconstitutionality. The verbal and physical aspects of the program (the same aspects that appeal to much of the public) do not have to deteriorate very far to reach the point of illegality. Camp operations must be supervised very carefully to avoid this deterioration."²⁴

Parent added that several factors make protection of inmates' legal rights in boot camp programs especially important. Grievance procedures, for example, are not curtailed in boot camps, but there may be a chilling effect on their use. Inmates may fear that if they file a grievance, they may be removed from the program and made to serve a full prison term. Some offender misconduct is summarily punished. Telephone calls may be even more restricted (especially during early weeks) than in the prison. Visits may be prohibited until near the end of the program.

The boot camp programs' short duration, restrictions on visitation and telephone use, and in many cases, their remote location increase the potential for abuse. Boot camp inmates have less time to initiate available forms of legal redress, and there are fewer visitors or volunteers who might observe and report abuses.²⁵

Although there are numerous areas of concern involving inmate protection, the following suggests only a few of the more basic guidelines that should be considered when writing policies and procedures:

- Offenders admitted to boot camp programs should get a much more extensive physical examination than is routinely given to incoming prison inmates. The examination should look for rare conditions that might be life threatening to someone doing heavy exercise.
- Boot camp programs must develop explicit limits on heavy physical exercise, work, and running, and enforce them strictly. In addition, water intake must be linked by policy to levels of exercise or work and climatic conditions.
- The food ration must provide sufficient caloric intake to permit boot camp inmates to engage in the strenuous level of exercise and work required of them.
- Boot camp programs must specify the conduct for which summary punishment may be administered, and the types of sanctions that can be applied summarily.

The critical issues discussed in this document are important considerations in initiating or revising either an adult or a juvenile boot camp program.



Notes

1. The information presented in this chapter forms a general backdrop for issues that will be developed in greater and in some cases more current detail by other authors in this volume. The present tense is used here in discussing the findings even though some specifics may have changed in the 2 years since the survey was conducted.
2. Department of the Army, *Basic Combat Training Program of Instruction*, October 1991.
3. From questionnaire completed by Lieutenant Colonel Conover.
4. Dale G. Parent, "A Foundation for Performance-Based Standards for Adult and Juvenile Boot Camps," p. 3.
5. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Prison Boot Camps: Short-Term Prison Costs Reduced, But Long-Term Impact Uncertain*, p. 19.
6. D. MacKenzie and C. Souryal, "Boot Camp Survey: Rehabilitation, Recidivism Reduction Outrank Punishment as Main Goals," p. 91.
7. Twelve States sent written policies and procedures, and 22 sent either program descriptions, inmate handbooks, or brochures with brief descriptions of program goals and components. All of the States that responded had a written mission statement and delineated goals, but only a few mentioned a formal evaluation component. Although all referred to eligibility criteria, selection processes, and voluntary participation, only eight States had written policies on these issues.
8. Parent, "Foundation," pp. 4-8.
9. Parent, p. 5.
10. Parent, p. 7. The Scared Straight! program initiated in Rahway, New Jersey, sought to deter juveniles from further delinquency through group visits to adult prisons where the rigor and brutality of prison life were graphically presented.
11. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), op. cit., p. 17.
12. Doris Layton MacKenzie, "Boot Camp Prisons in 1993," p. 24.
13. MacKenzie, "Boot Camp Prisons in 1993," p. 24.
14. MacKenzie, p. 24.
15. GAO, p. 16.

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16. Mackenzie, p. 23.
 17. MacKenzie, p. 23.
 18. Michelle Quinn, *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 19, 1993.
 19. GAO, pp. 28–29.
 20. Thomas C. Castellano. *Recommendation for ACA Boot Camp Standards Relating to Program Evaluation*.
 21. Parent, p. 28.
 22. Parent, p. 28.
 23. Quoted by David Steinhart, “Juvenile Boot Camps: Clinton May Rev Up An Old Drill,” pp. 15–16.
 24. “Physical Abuse of Inmates Leads to Indictments Against Boot Camp Staff,” p. 22.
 25. Parent, p. 28.

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CHAPTER 3

Shock Incarceration in New York State: Philosophy, Results, and Limitations

by Cheryl L. Clark and David W. Aziz, Ph.D.

Cheryl L. Clark is the Director of Shock Development for the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). David W. Aziz, Ph.D., is a research specialist with DOCS.

The New York State Shock Incarceration program provides a therapeutic environment designed to address a wide range of inmate problems and should not be mistaken for just a “boot camp.” Established in 1987, the 6-month Shock Incarceration program stresses a highly structured and regimented routine, considerable physical work and exercise, and intensive substance abuse treatment. It seeks to build character, instill a sense of maturity and responsibility, and promote a positive self-image for offenders so they can return to society as law-abiding citizens. The program’s therapeutic model, “Network,” is based on control theory and seeks to restore inmates’ bonds to society. Compliance, or direct control, is used in conjunction with other types of social control, both internal and external, to effect changes in inmates’ behavior. New York’s Shock Incarceration program has significantly improved math and reading scores, provided approximately 1.2 million hours of community service in a single year, and saved both operational and capital costs to New York’s Department of Correctional Services. Recidivism rates of Shock Incarceration graduates are better than for persons released after standard prison sentences. The New York rates indicate that 90 percent of released graduates do well in their first year of release, although over time, as followup support and resources diminish, their rates appear to become similar to those of inmates who spend more time in prison. Although not the cure-all many enthusiasts portray them to be, shock incarceration programs like New York’s can constitute an effective intervention.

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In the debate over the efficacy of shock incarceration programs nationally, attention has been devoted primarily to whether programs save money for corrections systems or lower the recidivism rates for participants (Nossiter, 1993:A1; and GAO, 1993:25). This seems to be the exclusive focus of the academic analysts and program practitioners who have been informing the boot camp debate. In this debate there seems to be a willingness to lump all shock incarceration programs together and an assumption that all such programs do the same thing and have the same goals. Variation among programs or variation in individual programs over time are rarely considered. Little attention has been paid to the underlying philosophy of shock incarceration programs, how they are structured, and how that structure may affect the ultimate question of what standards should be used to determine if they work.

It is generally recognized that bed savings and return rates are the “gold standard” by which shock incarceration programs will ultimately be judged, and the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) has provided numbers each year in these two critical areas that have surpassed its expectations for program success. These issues are consistently addressed in DOCS annual reports to the State legislature, and some of the findings will be addressed later in this chapter. Still, there is a need to understand how the program in New York was designed by explicitly examining the program’s philosophical foundations and identifying what it can and cannot do.

Current discussions about the rise in violent crime and gun use among the young have revolved around the premise that our society is suffering from a loss of values, dysfunctional families and communities, and an unwillingness by individuals to take responsibility for their lives and behavior. The breakdown of the individual and the community is not new to sociological theory. Durkheim (1966) and Merton (1938) talked about societal decay in terms of “anomie,” or the state of normlessness, and how individuals react to this state, while Hirschi (1969) discussed the absence of positive values, beliefs, and attachments as contributing to dysfunctional behavior.

Since DOCS’ first published report on the New York program, the department has stressed the theoretical underpinnings of the shock incarceration concept and the program’s intention to help instill positive, prosocial values for people who had adapted their behavior to survive in a normless society.

Because DOCS’ officials strongly believe that philosophy drives goals and that goals affect results, they have attempted to clearly articulate the New York Shock Incarceration program’s goals and have implemented a treatment plan that addresses the physical, mental, spiritual, and emotional dimensions of everyone in the program, staff and inmates alike. The goals and methods are consistent with attempts to counter some of the causes of delinquency as outlined in social control



theory. The department emphasizes staff involvement because staff are the key to effective implementation.

This chapter will describe the New York program's philosophy and structure, provide some outcome measures, and discuss the limitations to what Shock or any correctional treatment program can accomplish.

Legislative History and Philosophy

The New York State Shock Incarceration program was established in 1987. The State legislative bill enabling its creation specified that:

- The program be designed for certain young inmates who could benefit from a special 6-month program of intensive incarceration.
- The program be provided to carefully selected inmates committed to the State Department of Correctional Services who are in need of substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation.
- The program be an alternative form of incarceration that stresses a highly structured and regimented routine, including extensive discipline, considerable physical work and exercise, and intensive drug rehabilitation therapy. It should build character, instill a sense of maturity and responsibility, and promote a positive self-image for offenders so they can return to society as law-abiding citizens.

This enabling legislation summarizes the essence of the State's approach. First, DOCS identified the specific pool of inmates to be offered the Shock Incarceration program. At present, they are young, serving their first term of State incarceration for a nonviolent felony offense, and within 3 years of parole eligibility. While the



Physical exercise is an important activity of the New York Shock Incarceration program.

Photo by Jan Phillips





department believes that shock incarceration could benefit a wider inmate pool, the short duration of the program, coupled with public protection issues, has influenced the selection of candidates.

The program has four major eligibility criteria:

- Restrict age to focus on younger inmates.
- Eliminate violent offenders, sex offenders, and escape risks.
- Set a limit on the time reduction benefits available to successful participants and ensure that inmates selected have not committed serious crimes.
- Prohibit prior service of an indeterminate sentence to ensure that these inmates are first-time commitments.

Second, the department has targeted prison-bound inmates who account for the rapidly growing pool crowding into the system; these are primarily drug offenders. The department carefully screens these offenders to include only those individuals whose early release would not jeopardize community safety. DOCS is as concerned with suitability of placement as with eligibility criteria.

Third, the department's methods are consistent with control theory and have been designed to build self-esteem, positive values and beliefs, thinking and problem-solving skills, and prosocial attitudes.

Starting in 1987, DOCS began establishing its four Shock Incarceration facilities and began operating the Nation's largest shock incarceration program for sentenced State prisoners at Lakeview, with a capacity of 1,390 male and 180 female inmates as well as 222 beds for orientation and screening. Exhibit 1 portrays the growth of the New York program between 1987 and 1994.

At the start of 1994 at least 50 boot camp facilities were operating in 33 State correctional systems and in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. As of that date, 1,690 of the 8,255 inmates housed in these programs were in New York facilities (Camp and Camp, 1994:60). Boot camp programs vary widely in content and philosophy and cannot be readily grouped into a homogeneous treatment approach. Failure to acknowledge this variation results in diminishing the positive outcomes that have been achieved.


The Foundation of the New York State Program: Control Theory

The New York State Shock Incarceration program is based on a therapeutic community model called “Network.” The Network model was designed to establish living and learning units within correctional facilities that are supervised and operated by specially trained correction officers and supervisors.

The underlying basis of the Network philosophy is a theoretical model of the causes of delinquency known as “control theory.” Part of a group of social and cultural support theories of criminality, control theory proposes that “nonconformity is a product of the failure of the social bond. Through the attachment of individuals to others, conformity is assured. When such attachments fail to develop or when they are disrupted, the internalization of legitimate norms becomes problematic” (Farrell and Swigert, 1975:211).

Thus control theory is designed to explain conformity in individuals and implies that deviation from conformity (or criminal behavior) can be explained by variations in an individual’s ties to the conventional social order.

The main proponent of this theory, Travis Hirschi, asserted that “delinquent acts result when an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken” (Hirschi, 1969:16). This bond consists of attachment to others, commitment, involvement in conventional activities, and belief in a positive value system. The assumption





made by control theorists is that people who are at risk of engaging in criminal behavior are individuals whose bond to society has been weakened or broken. Shock Incarceration in New York has been designed to provide an opportunity to strengthen or restore the bond.

Control theory is a key component of the Shock Incarceration philosophy in New York. It is assumed that inmates entering DOCS are individuals whose bonds to society are either weakened or broken and that exposure to the philosophies and practices of this program will help restore these bonds. The program emphasizes the need for individuals to strengthen their indirect controls, their internalized controls, and their controls over opportunities for conventional activities by promoting responsibility for choices and stressing the consequences of their behavior. Inmates who do not participate in this restoration process and who fail to live up to their responsibilities are destined to fail in the program and will serve the remainder of their sentences in a traditional prison setting.

When Cheryl L. Clark, now New York's Director of Shock Incarceration, established Network units within DOCS in 1979, they were based on ideas of social control theory and learning theory and the principles taught in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous programs. These models of change were offered to inmates who were willing and able to volunteer to live in Network community living units during their incarceration. The units were structured as total learning environments: Inmates lived together as a therapeutic community, holding daily meetings, decisionmaking seminars, and self-help groups led by trained corrections officers. The Network philosophy, now the Shock Incarceration philosophy, recited each day to begin community meetings, says:

Network is a positive environment for human development in a caring community where individuals can help themselves and each other.
Staff and participants work together to establish and maintain positive, growth-filled environments within prisons. Community members focus on behavioral change and confront attitudes which are destructive to individuals and the life of the program (Clark, 1979).

Network was also committed to having inmates with substance abuse problems become actively involved in ASAT (Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment) while they lived in the Network community. The success of this program influenced the former New York State Commissioner of Correctional Services, Thomas A. Coughlin III, to direct that Network become the foundation piece of the Shock Incarceration program and that the program strongly emphasize substance abuse treatment.

Network has been operating in New York State Correctional Facilities since 1979 and has strengthened our resolve to identify and deal with the special needs of our staff and inmates. It has proven successful in provid-



ing an opportunity for positive growth and change. That's what Shock Incarceration is all about—bridging the external discipline of the military model with an internalized system of positive values (NYS DOCS *Sixth Annual Report*: 9).

The operational components of control theory incorporated in Shock Incarceration were discussed by Wells and Rankin in a summary of F. Ivan Nye's writings on the elements of social control. Nye identified four types of social controls on human behavior:

- Direct control based on the application or threat of punishments and rewards to gain compliance with conventional norms.
- Indirect control based on affectional attachment to or identification with conventional persons (especially parents).
- Internalized control based on the development of autonomous patterns of conformity located in the individual personality, self-concept, or conscience.
- Control over opportunities for conventional and deviant activities whereby compliance results from restricted choices or alternatives (Wells and Rankin, 1988:265).

New York's Shock Incarceration program is based on the understanding that the permanency of changes in human behavior depends on changing attitudes through both internal and external influences. As with the Network program, Shock is influenced by these control models. The four social controls outlined by Nye represent a continuum of mental and moral development. Problems result when there is an overreliance on only one of the four controls, no matter which is chosen. Much criticism of boot camp programs is based on the perception that they rely exclusively on the compliance model. For individual change to be effective and lasting, all four strategies of the continuum must be present.

Compliance

The first of Nye's behavior control models, direct control, is based on compliance with rules and authority. Compliance is a fact of life. There are rules that everyone must follow every day and appropriate limits to socially acceptable behavior. Moral development and ethical judgment are results of a healthy respect for boundaries and compliance with the social contract, through which we have established standards for how we relate to each other. Throughout our lives, authority figures such as parents, teachers, clergy, police, and judges impose and enforce these standards. Boundaries and limits create a social order, and it is this order that allows freedom. Everyone at some point is subject to authority. It is the abuse of authority that becomes a problem, not the simple fact of the need to comply.



Compliance models work for limited periods of time and under very specific conditions (e.g., radar-enforced speed control) but are challenged at every opportunity. Shock Incarceration in New York acknowledges the importance of self-discipline and compliance with rules and recognizes that some people change only when they have to, hence the need for prisons. However, a sentence to prison (i.e., deprivation of liberty) *is* punishment. Shock incarceration programs are not designed to inflict punishment, but they use the compliance model to teach discipline and to demonstrate how both limits and discipline make freedom possible.

One component of the New York Shock Incarceration program is consistent with compliance. The military-based features of the program are designed to teach self-discipline and to improve inmates' physical, mental, and emotional condition. It is important to emphasize the value of military discipline and pride in performance for New York's Shock Incarceration participants. The one programmatic feature that shock incarceration programs nationwide usually have in common is military discipline and training.

Military discipline played an important role in historical antecedents to Shock Incarceration in New York, particularly the inmate regimen established at the Elmira Reformatory in New York by Zebulon Brockway. Supporters of the Elmira experiment believed discipline to be the cornerstone of effective inmate reform:

Military discipline is found to be exceedingly beneficial in inculcating promptness in obedience, attention, and harmony of action with others. It develops the prisoner physically, quickens him mentally and, by making him a part of the disciplinary force, gives him a clearer insight into the meaning and benefits of thorough discipline. The standard of discipline should be so fixed that each prisoner may know exactly what to expect, and know that his release can only be accomplished by reaching this standard through his own efforts. Having attained this standard he should be released upon parole, to suitable employment, under efficient supervision, for a period of time long enough for him to demonstrate his fitness for an honest life, in society . . . (Allen, 1928:120).

The Elmira Reformatory was established in 1876 to house younger inmates who were convicted of first felonies but given indeterminate sentences. The reformatory emphasized manual training; inmates were taught "marketable, honest skills in building part of the institution and making several products" (Smith, 1988:34).

Following the passage of a variety of laws against inmate labor in the early 1880's, New York's inmate labor system was deemed to be illegal. To keep inmates at Elmira occupied and trained, Brockway decided in 1888 that military training would be a useful substitute:

The training was instituted to meet an emergency, but survived long after the short-lived trouble. The military organization permeated almost every



aspect of the institution: schooling, manual training, sports teams, physical training, daily timetables, supervision of inmates, and even parole practices. In short, the training was used to discipline the inmates and organize the institution (Smith, 1988:33).

The problem with relying solely on a compliance model for boot camp programs is that it works only when participants believe that someone is watching. Even the worst “shock” wears off over time. Indeed, in most cases, the more severe the shock, the more quickly people want to forget it happened; denial is a natural healing and coping mechanism for reducing extreme negative stress and regaining equilibrium. Boot camp programs that are overly concerned about compliance with rules appear to have little effect after inmates are released.

Criticisms of boot camps based only on compliance. The rush to create shock incarceration programs has been accompanied by healthy skepticism that boot camps represent only “quick fix” solutions to complex social problems. As recently as December 1993, the *New York Times* reported that at a time when Congress was prepared to provide major funding to jurisdictions wanting to open more boot camps, the concept was “getting a skeptical look from many academics and correctional experts” (Dec. 18, 1993:A1).

In the past critics including former Commissioner Larry Meachum of the Connecticut Department of Corrections as well as Merry Morash and Lisa Rucker have raised concerns that shock programs have the potential for abuse and may be harmful to their participants. According to Morash and Rucker, “A number of potential negative outcomes of a boot camp environment have been identified. One of these is increased offender aggression” (Morash and Rucker, 1990:218).

Despite the viscerally attractive prospect of housing inmates in a disciplined environment, critics believe that shock programs have no real lasting effects on participants. The author of an article about Florida’s boot camp program spent 24 days in the program and reported that “. . . only one change is certain when these convicted felons return to your town, your neighborhood, your street. They will be stronger and faster” (Tucker, 1988:10).

Many of these concerns stem from early attempts by jurisdictions to create boot camps that reflected their desire to “just get tough” on criminals. Critics have voiced concern that compliance is the only model emphasized in these shock incarceration programs and that high recidivism rates reflect a breakdown in compliance. For example, note the program description written in 1986 for Georgia’s boot camps:

. . . the fundamental program concept is that a brief period of incarceration under harsh physical conditions, strenuous manual labor, and exercise within a secured environment will “shock” the younger and less seriously criminally oriented offender out of a future life of crime (Flowers, 1986:3).



The use of coercion to gain inmate compliance is seen by many correctional experts as having limited value, and for that reason numerous observers have criticized these programs. Ira Schwartz, director of Michigan's Center for the Study of Youth Policy, called boot camps a fad that doesn't work (Tucker, 1988:15). In 1988, another critic, Edward Leghorn, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, commented, "To think that 90 days of training is going to undo 17 years of family troubles is a terribly naive approach. . . . They're kidding themselves. These kids have no education. No job skills. The counseling is no more than a classroom lecture. . . . What are these guys going to do for a living when they get out? Pushups?" (Tucker, 1988:15).

These generic criticisms—based on limited anecdotal data and lacking long-term empirical analyses—may not have as much relevance when individual shock incarceration programs are examined since there is great variation among programs nationally.

While Doris MacKenzie, who has written extensively on boot camps, argues correctly that "there is little evidence that the getting tough element of shock incarceration will, by itself, lead to behavioral change" (MacKenzie, 1988:5), it is also evident that the self-discipline taught through drill and ceremony and physical training has many positive benefits in other aspects of the program. Inmates, for example, perform better academically while in the New York program, and it is clear from inmates' attention and enthusiasm in the academic classrooms that military bearing and physical training support their ability to concentrate and learn.

A recent letter received from the father of a Shock Incarceration inmate just 6 weeks into the program underscores this point.

Yesterday, our family visited at your facility for the second time. I was so overwhelmed with positive feelings that I wanted to share them with you. My son . . . has always had low self-esteem. He was classified as learning disabled throughout his schooling. He never memorized anything nor has he ever finished reading an entire story or book. Throughout the 5 hours we visited with him I was enthralled by his passion for your program and his positive feelings for your staff. In an extremely short period of time, you have stripped him of his "bullshit image" and he has learned so many good things about himself. He proudly recited the Ten General Orders from memory. His military bearing and positive attitude as to program and staff made us feel very proud of him. Over the remainder of the program I am sure he will continue to gain further insight and self-reliance and through repetition incorporate your teachings to have positive self-esteem. We cannot thank you and your staff enough as we feel that he will be capable of caring for himself and enjoying a lifestyle with positive values due to this experience.



Identification

Nye's second type of social control, indirect control, emphasizes positive role models to change behavior. Many offenders' role models are deviant, inconsistent, criminogenic, and influential; and offenders too often identify legitimate authority figures such as parents, teachers, truant officers, police, and probation officers as the "enemy" while considering drug dealers and pimps to be heroes. In Shock Incarceration, these assumptions are turned around; inmates need to identify with prosocial role models and recognize the shortcomings of emulating antisocial behavior.

Staff are the primary role models in Shock Incarceration in New York, and their attitudes and behavior influence inmates' attitudes toward change, growth, and the development of positive social norms. In New York, staff complete the program *with* inmates and are expected to model the program philosophy at all times. New York is not a "do as I say, not as I do" program. Drill instructors with gravy stains on their uniforms and a day-old growth of beard cannot effectively instruct inmates on grooming standards. Supervisors, counselors, and teachers who do not model the effectiveness of what Shock Incarceration is trying to teach undermine the actions of committed staff.

Because staff in the program so strongly influence results, they must be clear about the examples they set. The values of staff are reflected in their behavior, and the values they reinforce among inmates are influenced by the congruency of their words and actions. For example, the New York program's first General Order for inmates is to follow all orders given by all staff at all times. As such, it is incumbent on the staff to ensure that their orders are lawful, ethical, and moral. The *SMART* rule is emphasized in every aspect of the program: Orders must be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Timely. An officer who is out of shape and unable to do 10 pushups on a good day should not be ordering an inmate to "drop and give me 100."

To this end, staff are expected to model what is taught in the Shock Incarceration program. They are expected to "walk the walk" and to demonstrate congruently that the model works. The program also emphasizes an interdisciplinary approach to inmate instruction and supervision to maintain consistency among the security, treatment, and administrative staff. If inmates can play one discipline against another, the foundation of the program is undermined.

Acknowledging the importance of compliance to rules and consistent discipline from effective role models is important to the effectiveness of boot camp programs. Dale Parent, an observer of boot camps nationally, concluded:

The programs we observed varied in the consistency with which rules were enforced. Where rules were less consistently enforced, it appeared inmates were more prone to test the limits of enforcement. Confrontations



with staff seemed more numerous and overall tension levels seemed higher. Where rule enforcement was consistent, inmates seemed less prone to test their limits, confrontations were less evident, and tension levels seemed lower. . . . In terms of molding offender behavior, consistency and accountability in expulsion practices are important factors. The offender learns that his or her actions have clear, well defined consequences: that appropriate self control will be rewarded and inappropriate behavior punished (Parent, 1989:25–26).

It is important that New York graduates learn the program's behavioral model and remember it once they are back in their communities. Yolanda Johnson, one of the program's most successful graduates, tells this story to inmates in the program when she returns to present commencement addresses:

One night shortly after graduation I was at a party. A guy I used to know who I ran into immediately started digging in his pocket. When he passed me a crack pipe I said, "No thank you, I don't smoke no more." So he said, "Whoa! Baby! This used to be your shit!" He tried passing it to me again two or three times so finally I said to him, real loud, "What part don't you get? The no thank you or the I don't smoke no more?" And he backed right up and said, "Uh-oh baby," and left. I got *that* from my drill instructor.

Staff training. Because Shock Incarceration is not corrections as usual, it is important that staff understand the program, the theory behind it, and what is expected of inmates. One important way to ensure program integrity is through proper staff training. All staff who work in New York State Shock Incarceration facilities are required to attend a comprehensive, highly structured, rigorous 4-week training program that is similar to the regimen for offenders in the Shock Incarceration program. The goal of the training is to give all correctional employees, regardless of discipline, a thorough understanding of the program's concepts, goals, and structure.

All staff are required to attend this training. The training is based on the model first introduced in 1979 to train interdisciplinary teams to staff Network units. That training originally consisted of 2 weeks of intensive training in therapeutic community concepts as applied to a corrections facility. Shock Incarceration staff training was expanded to 4 weeks and also includes physical training, drill and ceremony, an introduction to ASAT, and decisionmaking skills as taught in Network.

The training is designed to help employees better understand the inmates they will work with as well as the interrelationships among security, programs, and administration. Staff training also gives employees an opportunity to increase their understanding of themselves and others. Group unity and teamwork are emphasized as staff are placed in platoons and work together throughout the training in an experiential approach to learning how to teach inmates.



The course content includes control theory, leadership skills, training in teaching inmates decisionmaking skills, the ASAT curriculum, drill and ceremony, physical training, and military bearing. The training emphasizes an interdisciplinary approach so that all staff are able to teach all aspects of the program. The training schedule is based on a modified version of a typical day for Shock Incarceration participants, beginning with physical training each morning and concluding with community meetings in the evening.

Each day's instruction includes drill and ceremony and is designed to cover some aspect of the 6-month treatment curriculum. As with the full inmate program, all staff training is taught using accelerated learning strategies. To work at a Shock Incarceration facility, staff agree to undergo this rigorous training and commit to the principles of the Shock Incarceration program. As a result of this training, the staff tend to be very committed to the program goals and are highly motivated.

As of October 1994, more than 1,800 New York State DOCS employees had been trained in Shock Incarceration methods. In addition to conducting staff training in New York, staff trainers also provided training for other States and localities.

Internalization

Nye's third type of social control, internalization, while the most complex, time consuming, and difficult to achieve, is the most desirable to accomplish due to its long-term effects. Internalization flows from a clear understanding of why we need to comply with limits. We internalize values learned from role models with whom we identify. Internalization is fundamental to our understanding of "who we are" and is concerned with our system of beliefs and values. Internalization of values is dependent upon our experience, which tells us that believing in these values has a payoff. Individuals, for example, often take a position of absolute certainty that what they believe is right when discussing political or religious values. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to change other people's beliefs and values. They must first see a benefit to themselves before they change values.

Inmates are taught in Shock Incarceration that the only people they can change are themselves. They are asked to examine their beliefs and attitudes to determine if the results they are getting in their lives are satisfying and fulfilling. Through this self-assessment, inmates begin to see the need to change their values and approaches to life.

Internalization requires willingness, and therein lies the difficulty. Very few people really want to change their beliefs; beliefs are essential to self-image and attitudes toward life. Internalization deals with the spiritual dimension of life, the most uncomfortable to confront. Internalization is what Hirschi refers to when he speaks of the four elements that constitute the social bond: attachment, belief, commitment, and involvement (Hirschi, 1969). Participating in the social bond implies making a



commitment to conventional beliefs and activities and understanding that decisions and behaviors have consequences.

The New York program seeks to have participants internalize a positive, prosocial system of values designed to raise self-esteem. The program emphasizes helping inmates acknowledge how their old values and choices led to their exclusion from society and restriction of freedom. In Shock Incarceration inmates experience positive values producing positive results—an important step toward realizing that a system of values is the key to changing behavior.

The limitations of internalization involve external influences that affect our daily choices. Shock Incarceration is designed to be a positive environment for human development in a caring community. Unfortunately, this environment does not always resemble postrelease reality for boot camp graduates. An overwhelming majority return to dysfunctional environments.

Even when Shock Incarceration graduates have strong family support, the neighborhoods to which they return are often steeped in the drug culture. Gangs and old friends offer the familiar environment that embraced and accepted them before they went to prison and that will support them again if they give up the “brainwashing” they learned in Shock Incarceration. Many graduates are undomiciled, with no community ties, and despite the program’s emphasis on academic education, may not have received a GED because they started from so far behind.

The New York program’s decisionmaking curriculum reinforces the principle “environment is stronger than will” and recognizes that social values greatly influence experiences and choices. Inmates find support in platoons of individuals working together to get through the program and in the bonds formed with each other and with their team of drill instructors, counselors, and teachers. Staff constantly emphasize that inmates need each other to get through the program and that it is easier to overcome challenge with support. Staff also remind inmates of programs like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Weight Watchers, churches, health clubs, and other community organizations that offer support for people with similar needs and interests; they encourage them to join support groups like these upon release.

In ASAT and in Network, inmates are urged to change “people, places, and things,” attend “90 meetings in 90 days,” and find a sponsor to mentor and support them in their continuing sobriety. Since the need to belong is a powerful driving force in human beings, staff encourage participants to seek support from postrelease groups that will continue to reinforce their positive growth.

For some graduates, this is too difficult; returning to the old neighborhood and the old gang triggers old behaviors and attitudes. The drive to get our needs met is so strong that people will actively seek out opportunities for belonging, power, freedom, and fun. A return to old patterns is to be expected of graduates if the old




Photo by Jan Phillips

New York's Network program, which promotes positive values and self-esteem, requires participants' active involvement.

neighborhood group is meeting their needs and aftercare resources are limited or nonexistent.

Nonetheless, many graduates withstand these pressures and overcome tremendous odds. The prison return rates for New York graduates indicate that 90 percent of released graduates do well in their first year of release. Over time, however, as followup support and resources diminish, their rates appear to become similar to those of inmates who spend more time incarcerated.

Autonomy

Nye's fourth type of social control, autonomy, represents the integration of the first three types and flows from those models. According to Nye, autonomy, or the ability to choose responsibly, involves "control over opportunities for conventional and deviant activities whereby compliance results from restricted choices or alternatives" (Nye, 1958).

Individuals who have gained internal control over thoughts, feelings, and behavior through study and practice have a wider range of choices about how they want to live their lives. Autonomy implies a recognition that our choices are determined by our standards of behavior and not by external circumstances. While circumstances do affect our choices, we can always control how we respond to those circumstances.

William Glasser, another proponent of control theory, wrote that "... to be worthwhile we must maintain a satisfactory standard of behavior" (Glasser, 1965:10). In the foreword to Glasser's book, O. Hobart Mower also emphasized standards of behavior, arguing that "...human beings get into emotional binds, not because their standards are too high, but because their performance has been, and is, too low." It flows from this premise that when we raise our standards of behavior, we raise our self-esteem. This approach to change is the core of the New York program and is emphasized in every aspect of the program. From 5:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., every experience of the day supports inmates' attempts to build life skills that lead to success.



The theme of the decisionmaking curriculum in Network is “Choose Your Life, Live Your Choice,” which is designed to teach inmates how to get their needs met in responsible ways, not by interfering with others. Glasser’s approach to control theory emphasizes the impact of internal controls and the way these controls stem from basic needs. Glasser’s theory states that the innate drive to meet one’s needs is so strong that if these needs are not met in positive and constructive ways, they will be met in negative and destructive ways (Glasser, 1965, 1986, and 1987).

A sense of self-worth and personal pride forms the foundation of a responsible lifestyle. The Network environment is structured to foster respect for self and others and focuses on supportive community living methods that were developed, tested, and refined by staff and participants over time and then codified into a set of community standards.

Network program objectives can be grouped into three areas: responsibility for self, responsibility to others, and responsibility for the quality of one’s life. To make responsible decisions, individuals must consider their needs, the effect those needs have on others, and the variables of situations they find themselves in.

As with all communities, there are rules and standards for behavior in the Network program to which members must adhere. If rule breaking is detected, the community will react:

The pressures of the group, accepting, yet confronting, interpreting, pointing out, suggesting modifications, understanding and facilitating problem solving will be a different reaction from the authoritarian suppression he has hitherto provoked, and he may come to see that for him also there can be the possibility of a shift of behavior roles in this different type of society. If he continues to act out, then the community imposed sanctions mount in parallel with his misdemeanors until it becomes clear that he must change his pattern if he wants to stay or if he wants to continue in his old ways (and he is welcome to do so)—he must leave (Whiteley, 1973:56).

Under the Network design, peer confrontation groups are used to deal with participants’ negative attitudes. The strength of peer groups is their lack of authority-based coercive feedback to inmates. Peer groups provide clear perspectives on the consequences of dysfunctional behavior while suggesting positive alternatives to that behavior. This approach works, however, only in the context of a caring community.

The Choices curriculum is taught in tandem with the 12 Steps to Recovery program espoused in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA). Throughout their 26 weeks in Shock Incarceration, participants study each step of Choices and the 12 Steps program; all aspects of their activities—community



meetings, group work, prerelease sessions, and academic classes—are tied into each week's curriculum theme.

The combined Choices and ASAT curriculum also involves inmates in experiential exercises, journaling (therapeutic writing exercises), and group discussions and activities that sharpen their skills, and planning for the future. The program's approach to learning is that the most long-lasting benefits result from practice.

"Muscle memory" learning techniques ensure that concepts taught to inmates are anchored in their experiences. Cadences, sung as inmates march or run, reinforce the message of the treatment sessions. Throughout their incarceration, inmates are reminded that AA and NA support is available nearly everywhere in the world and that they are taking the first step in a program of lifelong recovery and choices about freedom. Inmates are reminded daily that limits exist in everyone's life and that limits are not limitations. The Choices curriculum teaches that limits are facts of life, while limitations are feelings and attitudes that can be changed.

The Network community is an opportunity to live and practice the concepts taught in the Choices curriculum. Network promotes the positive involvement of its participants in an environment that focuses on their successful reintegration into society and encourages inmates to seek out other positive groups in their home communities to continue this reinforcement.

Substance Abuse Treatment

Within the therapeutic community model of Shock Incarceration, an emphasis is placed on substance abuse treatment because of documented drug or alcohol abuse by a majority of program participants. Since the start of the program, at least two-thirds of male participants and over 80 percent of female participants had been convicted of drug offenses prior to their incarceration. In remarks before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1989, the former New York State Commissioner of Corrections, Thomas Coughlin, underscored the priority given to substance abuse programs in the New York Shock Incarceration program:

For every 500 hours of physical training plus drill and ceremony that has led to the media calling it a "boot camp," Shock Incarceration in New York also includes 546 hours of the therapeutic approach to treating addiction, based on the Network and the ASAT programs. It also includes at least 260 mandatory hours of academic education and 650 hours of hard labor, where inmates work on facility projects, provide community service work, and work on projects in conjunction with the Department of Environmental Conservation (U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 25, 1989:1).



The New York program combines numerous treatment approaches that have been used successfully. The multitreatment approach employed at the program has been viewed as the best means of achieving positive changes in inmate behavior (Gendreau and Ross, 1979:485). Exhibit 2 indicates the relative amount of time spent on each aspect of the Shock Incarceration program.


In addition to voluntary participation, some of the components of successful correctional rehabilitation programs include formal rules, anticriminal modeling and reinforcement, problem solving, use of community resources, improved interpersonal relationships, relapse prevention and self-efficacy, and therapeutic integrity (MacKenzie, 1988:4). The New York program uses all of these components within the framework of a military structure to help participants learn to be productive citizens.

Aftercare

It must also be made clear that Shock Incarceration in New York is a unique two-part process involving both institutional treatment for inmates and intensive parole supervision and aftercare programs for graduates. With the most intensive supervision caseloads in the State, parole officers working with Shock Incarceration graduates use community service providers to facilitate job placement, relapse prevention, and educational achievement. During the first 6 months after inmates graduate, parole staff help them maintain the decisionmaking and conflict resolution counseling that began at Shock Incarceration facilities.

Exhibit 2. Proportion of Time Dedicated to Shock Program Components

New York State Department of Correctional Services Shock Incarceration Program





Many Shock Incarceration graduates have done so well after release that they have been hired by service provider agencies as employees. These graduates help newly released participants reintegrate into the community by facilitating Network counseling in community groups and providing life skills training, vocational training, services of the Alcohol Council and Fellowship Center in New York City, and a range of other services to their clients. A team of Shock Incarceration graduates also works with the New York City Probation Department to teach Network concepts to probationers. Periodically, successful graduates return to Shock Incarceration facilities to discuss their experiences with inmates and help prepare them for the second phase of the program.

While these types of aftercare services are critical to the success of graduates, there are limits to community-based resources. Funding dictates the number, type, and variety of resources available to ex-offenders and controls how long they may access aftercare services. Some services, such as AA and NA, are free, but many offenders need ongoing substance abuse treatment, family counseling, child care services, and a range of other services that require money.

Overall, New York's correctional officials believe that their Shock Incarceration program is a better method of incarceration than traditional prison. Inmates are constantly engaged and programmed in a shorter and more intense incarceration experience that builds self-esteem, detoxifies addicts, and teaches a modicum of responsibility. In sum, the New York program provides inmates with a prescription and the tools to succeed after graduation. Many community resources exist for ex-offenders to use after their Shock Incarceration instruction ends, but failure to follow the Shock Incarceration prescription, as in the medical arena, can lead to relapse and recommitment.

Program Results and Measures

There are a variety of ways to measure how well New York's program is achieving its goals and helping inmates restore the bonds that are described in social control theory. Any discussion of program results, however, must be tempered with the acknowledgment that there are limitations to what inmates can achieve in correctional treatment programs.

To ensure that Shock Incarceration in New York fulfilled its legislative mandate, two measurable goals were enunciated for the program: reduce the demand for bedspace and treat and release specially selected State prisoners earlier than their court-mandated minimum incarceration periods without compromising community safety.

To reduce the demand on prison bedspace, the program had to target offenders who would definitely be incarcerated. As a result, the New York program admits only those inmates sentenced to serve time in a State prison.



Photo by Jan Phillips

The Network curriculum seeks to foster respect for oneself and for others and to lead participants in taking responsibility for the quality of their lives.

In addition, the length of imprisonment for Shock Incarceration participants had to be substantially shorter than the prison term they would otherwise have served. Any long-term reduction in bedspace demand depends on inmates successfully completing the program and keeping their rates of return to DOCS custody consistent with the overall return rate for the department for similarly situated inmates.

The New York program's goals—saving bedspace and protecting the community—are clearly related, and the State of New York has sought to make them more achievable by:

- Limiting judicial involvement in deciding who goes into the Shock Incarceration program, thus ensuring that participants are drawn from a prison-bound population. (Some judges tend to use boot camp as an alternative to fines or probation, sending offenders to boot camp who would not have gone to prison anyway.)
- Creating the program as a backend (postsentencing) operation that is not an alternative to probation but rather a program for incarcerated felons.
- Creating a treatment-oriented program that emphasizes the development of skills designed to lead inmates to successful parole outcomes.
- Creating a strong, intensive parole supervision program for Shock Incarceration graduates that enlists the aid of community-based service providers.

With both the program's goals and underlying philosophy in mind, it is particularly important to determine if the New York program has had any systematic effect on participants by measuring outcomes in key program areas.



Academic Education

Improving the educational achievement of inmates during their imprisonment is one of the central concerns of the New York Shock Incarceration program. At all New York Shock Incarceration facilities, education is mandatory for inmates. Each week inmates must spend at least 12 hours in academic classes and 22 hours in treatment programs that also have an educational focus. The program's academic instruction is geared to enhance inmates' verbal, math, reading, and writing skills and to give inmates who are prepared the opportunity to take the general equivalency diploma (GED) exam.

For many inmates, the importance of obtaining a GED cannot be overstated. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and DOCS indicate that higher levels of education prior to incarceration or the completion of a GED while in prison is one factor related to lower recidivism rates (Beck and Shipley, 1989:5; and DOCS, Division of Program, Planning, Research and Evaluation, 1989).

Initial inmate placement in academic programs is based on the results of standardized achievement tests administered as part of the inmate reception and classification process. Achievement tests are subsequently administered to measure progress and to determine eligibility for placement in more advanced classes. DOCS uses the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE) exam as the standardized testing instrument in its Shock Incarceration program.

Even though attaining a GED while in Shock Incarceration is a desirable goal for all graduates, inmates have only 6 months to do so and education is but one of many required program components. Moreover, attaining a GED within 6 months is an unrealistic goal for inmates entering the program with low educational levels.

Achievement testing. An analysis of math and reading TABE scores for 1,202 New York Shock Incarceration inmates who graduated between April 1, 1993, and March 31, 1994, and who were given at least two achievement tests, shows that in 6 months or less, 84.7 percent had increased their math scores by at least one grade, 41.0 percent by at least two grades, and 15.8 percent by at least four grades.

Similarly, 62.8 percent of graduates increased their scores in reading aptitude by at least one grade, 27.0 percent by at least two grades, and 5.8 percent by at least four grades.

GED testing. Despite the short period of time that inmates spend at Shock Incarceration facilities, the proportion of graduates passing the GED in FY 1993–94 (68.4 percent) was notably higher than that of inmates at five State minimum security facilities (51.7 percent) and that of inmates at six State medium security facilities (59.3 percent) who were used as a comparison population. The passing rate for New York Shock Incarceration graduates has increased steadily since FY 1989–90, from 40.0 percent to 68.4 percent in FY 1993–94.



The New York Shock Incarceration program's emphasis on obtaining high-quality educational outcomes has thus shown positive results despite the short period of inmate incarceration and the relatively small amount of time spent in academic classes. Shock Incarceration facilities have also consistently tested inmates more often and more successfully than have comparison prison facilities.

Community Service Projects

One of the least publicized components of the New York Shock Incarceration program involves community service work performed by inmates. Community service work has often been used as an effective alternative to incarceration and has a successful track record.

The legislative mandate for the program stipulated that it had to involve inmate participants in an intensive regimen of physical labor. State correctional officials found an innovative way to fulfill this mandate by having inmates complete community service projects for towns, villages, and State parks near Shock Incarceration facilities.

Each year, supervised crews of Shock Incarceration inmates perform thousands of hours of community service as part of their daily routine; and as a result cash-strapped municipalities, religious organizations, and community groups receive manual labor needed to complete a variety of projects for which funding sources were not available. Based on information provided by Shock Incarceration facilities, it is estimated that in calendar year 1993 inmates performed approximately 1.2 million hours of community service. This is the equivalent of 1,000 inmates working 6 hours per day, 4 days per week for 50 weeks. In fact, since no money is available to fund these projects, they would not have been done at all.

Supervised crews of inmates perform community service. The work provides them positive experiences while fulfilling the State's requirement that they perform hard labor.





The opportunity for these inmates to perform much needed community services helps the program meet two important objectives: fulfill the hard physical labor component of the program and give inmates positive and altruistic community experiences. The positive behavior exhibited by inmates providing these community services is consistent with the ninth step of the Twelve Steps to Recovery program—to make “direct amends” for past destructive behavior wherever possible. Involving Shock Incarceration inmates in community affairs also helps build strong local support for Shock Incarceration programs and their accomplishments.

Bed Savings and the Cost Avoidance Model

When measuring the effectiveness of a Shock program using the standards of bed savings and recidivism, New York’s experience is consistent with the findings of a 1993 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report. The report concluded that shock programs reduced overall corrections costs and systemwide crowding and noted that of the jurisdictions studied New York was the best example of reported cost savings (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993:25).

What would it have cost DOCS if the Shock Incarceration program did not exist and all graduates since the start of the program had served out their sentences in non-Shock Incarceration facilities? The model constructed to answer this question measured the program’s effectiveness in two areas:

- Savings from reducing the need for care and custody of inmates.
- Savings from avoiding capital construction costs.

Because the New York model examined the fiscal impact of the program since its inception, dollar savings were considered to be cumulative. In New York, it is more costly on a per diem basis to run Shock Incarceration facilities than it is to run selected minimum and medium security prisons. It must be remembered, however, that per diem costs constitute only part of the New York program’s fiscal outlook, as money is saved through the early release of Shock Incarceration graduates.

Successful completion of shock incarceration is the only *systemic* way that New York State inmates can be released prior to their parole eligibility dates. As a result, graduates spend less time incarcerated.

If the New York program did not exist, each of the 10,927 Shock Incarceration inmates released through September 30, 1994, would have spent on average 546 days in prison, including time in reception, until their parole eligibility dates. The actual time Shock Incarceration releasees spent on average in DOCS custody, including time in reception, was 216 days. Thus each inmate released to parole supervision through Shock Incarceration represented a net savings of 330 days, or approximately 10.8 months.



An additional source of savings separate from the program's operating costs are bed savings, which allow the State to avoid capital construction costs as a result of not having to house Shock Incarceration graduates.

By examining the distribution of incarceration time owed by Shock Incarceration graduates, it is possible to determine at any given point how many of these inmates would still need to be housed if the New York program were not in existence. As of September 30, 1994, there were 2,173 inmates who would have required department housing if Shock Incarceration had not been available.

Based on the results of this model, DOCS has concluded that while the Shock Incarceration program is expensive to operate, it is capable of reducing the demand for bedspace and saving the State money. (See the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole's Annual Reports to the legislature for more information.)

Returns to Custody

The measure of community success typically used to evaluate the performance of correctional treatment programs is some form of recidivism. New York uses a conservative measure of returns to custody for new crimes and technical violations.

To provide some basis for comparison, data for Shock Incarceration graduates are compared with results for three groups of similar, legally eligible inmates who were either not exposed to shock incarceration or who were not able to complete the program. These inmates served longer prison sentences than Shock Incarceration graduates and were released to community supervision under less restrictive conditions. In contrast, during their first 6 months in the community, Shock Incarceration graduates are the most intensively supervised parolees in New York State and stay under active parole supervision longer than their non-Shock Incarceration counterparts.

Each year the return rates of Shock Incarceration graduates and those of inmates in comparison groups are examined. Offenders released between March 1988 and March 1993 were tracked until March 1994. All participants had been released a minimum of 12 months before data were collected. Success rates were determined by the number of offenders who had not been physically returned to DOCS custody within 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months of release. Shock Incarceration parolees have consistently had the highest success rate at each interval despite having spent between 8 and 12 fewer months in State prison.

Shock Incarceration parole supervision has also had a significant impact on employment and program enrollment rates of graduates relative to those of non-Shock Incarceration offenders who had traditional prison and parole experiences. It appears to be a factor helping Shock Incarceration graduates make the transition from institution to community.



Higher relative employment rates and greater levels of program participation among former Shock Incarceration inmates can be attributed in part to the more intensive services provided to them during their first 6 months on parole. Shock Incarceration graduates' relative success can also be attributed in part to the greater level of motivation and spirit exhibited by newly released Shock Incarceration offenders, who may be more inclined to follow up on employment and program referrals made by parole officers. These results support the likelihood that Shock Incarceration graduates will make a more successful transition to community living and become more productive citizens after release.

Conclusion

It is clear from this chapter that Shock Incarceration in New York is a complex correctional treatment program designed for younger nonviolent offenders, which employs a variety of change principles that have both theoretical and practical underpinnings. Boot camps serve a variety of purposes and are run very differently one from another. To simply say that all boot camps are the same is a gross simplification.

In New York, Shock Incarceration is a credible correctional treatment alternative that affords early release to youthful, nonviolent offenders, thereby allowing the State to save prison space for more violent and incorrigible offenders. But beyond this, the Shock Incarceration program in New York is a complex correctional treatment program that employs a wide variety of methods to change inmates' attitudes and behavior. The standards first set for the program in 1987 have been met. While not the cure-all many enthusiasts have portrayed them to be, shock incarceration programs like New York's can constitute an effective intervention.

Jurisdictions that run shock incarceration programs are encouraged to take the time to examine their programs' philosophies and to evaluate how they are being run. As this chapter has shown, there are a number of measures that can be used to examine success. Using them will lead to a better understanding of whom shock incarceration is designed for and for whom it appears to work.



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CHAPTER 4

The Development and Implementation of Illinois' Impact Incarceration Program

by Robert J. Jones and Steven P. Karr

Robert Jones and Steven Karr are research scientists for the Illinois Department of Corrections. Mr. Jones has primary responsibility for parole and work release classification, program evaluation of incarceration alternatives and correctional treatment programs, and recidivism and legislative bill analyses. Mr. Karr's primary areas of responsibility are the forecasting of juvenile and adult populations, impact analyses of juvenile policy, and evaluation of the State's Impact Incarceration Program.

Illinois' implementation of a voluntary boot camp program for nonviolent first offenders 17 to 29 years of age who had been sentenced to up to 5 years in prison involved the introduction of new State legislation, extensive planning with representatives of a broad spectrum of criminal justice, educational, and social service agencies, together with research and site visits to other States to understand the options available in instituting shock incarceration programs. The impetus for the Illinois program was prison crowding, but the program, as developed, included rehabilitative programming to improve basic education, reduce drug and alcohol abuse, and build offenders' self-esteem and life skills. A substantial aftercare component was built into the program incorporating both electronic detention and parole. Other features of the Illinois Impact Incarceration Program include the special selection and training of program staff and an evaluation component. Illinois' first boot camp, at Dixon Springs, opened in 1990, and the Greene County and DuQuoin boot camps opened in 1993 and 1994, respectively, in part to relieve a backlog of offenders slated to enter the program. In 1993 the Illinois Legislature increased the pool of eligible offenders to include those who had committed second offenses, were up to 35 years of age, and had been sentenced to prison terms of not more than 8 years.

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The Illinois prison population was well above rated capacity during the 1980's due primarily to the incarceration of large numbers of property and drug offenders. At the close of fiscal year 1983, the adult prison population was 13,735. By the end of fiscal year 1990, it had doubled to 27,295. In part as a response to this escalation, the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) decided to develop a shock incarceration (boot camp) program for nonviolent first-time offenders.

Termed Impact Incarceration Program (IIP), Illinois' was not the first shock incarceration program implemented by a State correctional authority, but it was one of the first boot camps to incorporate extensive residential program service elements and an intensive supervision aftercare component.

The IIP emphasizes the diversity of treatment elements for successful correctional rehabilitative programs both in the prison setting and in the community. The IIP uses a structured environment to address the problems that have led to the inmates' criminal activity. As shown in exhibit 1, the IIP has three components:

- A basic military physical training model stressing a highly structured and regimented routine.
- Substance abuse education, treatment, and counseling, together with basic education, life skills training, and aftercare preparation.
- A period of gradual reintroduction to the community through a series of increasingly less restrictive supervision levels.

The IIP is a 120-day program, with the first 2 weeks consisting of orientation to military bearing and physical activities and the final 2 weeks directed toward after-care preparation as the inmate gets ready for release to the community. The 90-day period between these two phases focuses on building self-esteem through program services, instruction, and treatment.

The IIP operates in three jurisdictions: Dixon Springs, opened in 1990; Greene County, opened in 1993; and DuQuoin, opened in 1994. The Dixon Springs correctional facility houses 220 male and 24 female inmates. Both Greene County and DuQuoin have a 200-bed capacity for male inmates only. Female inmates complete the same physical training and labor details as male inmates.

This chapter provides considerable detail about how the program was developed and implemented, together with a discussion of its day-to-day operation, for the benefit of jurisdictions considering implementing or modifying their own boot camp programs.

Exhibit 1. IIP Components

Physical Activities and Regimentation

- Instruction in Military Bearing and Conduct
- Drill
 - Military formations
- Physical Exercise Sessions
 - Calisthenics
 - Running
- Labor-Intensive Work Details
 - IIP grounds and facility cleanup
 - Community service projects
 - Highway cleanup and brush cutting

Program Services (Mandatory Participation)

- Substance Abuse Program
 - Education
 - Multilevel treatment
 - Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous
- Education
 - Academic skills development leading toward GED achievement
- Life Skills Program
 - Skills development required for gaining employment, managing money, and using public services
 - Positive parenting skills
- Aftercare Preparation
 - PreStart Phase I

Postrelease

- Electronic detention
- PreStart Phase II

Program Development

Two activities had to precede the implementation and much of the planning for the program. The first was to secure the legislation that would set the parameters for an effective boot camp program. The second was to identify and secure State and Federal funding.

Broad-Based Planning: A Key Ingredient for Success

Illinois' Boot Camp Planning Committee was able to draw on a large variety of resources in designing the IIP:

- *Legislative liaison*, to assist in writing and enacting appropriate legislation.
- *Representatives of legal services*, to identify and examine legal issues.
- *Policy and directives staff*, to establish policies and procedures, coordinating efforts with the legislative liaison and legal services staff.
- *Planning, evaluation, and data processing personnel*, to provide background information on strategies used by other correctional authorities, prepare grant proposals, and determine and enter the data needed to monitor the program's developmental progress.
- *Executive staff and wardens*, to provide experience in the administrative planning of opening correctional facilities and related programs and to present staff training needs and potential inmate issues.
- *Capital programs personnel*, to assist in the planning, development, and conversion of the boot camp facility.

Legislation

Development of a correctional boot camp program in Illinois required changes in State statutes, a process that began in February 1989 and culminated in the signing of Public Acts 86-1182 and 86-1183 in July 1990. The legislative process was extensive and called for compromise as staff from many branches of corrections and other government agencies expressed concerns for individual issues. During the first few months, staff from IDOC's Planning and Research Unit and Office of Intergovernmental Relations analyzed the data on prison crowding and informed the General Assembly of prospective impacts of a boot camp program on the prison population.

Two legislative bills and numerous amendments mandating a prison boot camp program were introduced in the Illinois General Assembly during the 1989 spring session. Discussion continued into the fall following further review by IDOC's Planning and Research Unit, Legal Services, and Intergovernmental Relations Office, as well as the Attorney General's Office.

After the law was passed, a Department Rule had to be filed with the Secretary of State before the first facility could begin operations. Administrative directives (internal departmental policies) and procedural forms were also prepared.

Planning

A great deal of groundwork needed to be laid, including development of a planning committee representing a broad spectrum of perspectives and experience that would learn as much as possible about Illinois' options in selecting sites, determining




- *Representatives of the juvenile division*, to provide recommendations for managing youthful offenders in an institutional setting and in the community.
- *Clinical services and treatment staff*, to coordinate the program services and instruction, develop testing and assessment instruments, and counsel inmates.
- *Health care staff*, to address medical, mental health, dietary, and environmental issues as well as substance abuse needs.
- *Personnel representatives*, to coordinate labor relations and central screening with respect to employee issues.
- *Training academy staff*, to prepare a specialized boot camp training manual and curriculum.
- *Inmate issues staff*, to develop policies regarding inmate privileges and grievance procedures.
- *Transfer coordinator*, to monitor classification of IIP-eligible inmates and authorize movements for intakes and IIP failures.
- *Parole staff*, to develop strategies for release preparation and coordinate the postrelease supervision system.
- *Staff of the public information office*, to inform the media and criminal justice professionals of program activities, merits, and concepts.

offender eligibility, and designing an effective program.

Department staff at all levels (executive, administrative, fiscal, research, and line staff) participated in the planning process, which began with a series of administrative planning sessions, research and site visits of other shock incarceration programs, and development of policy and procedural documents. A small planning committee was selected and met regularly to study the implementation of a shock incarceration program. Many other experienced staff served as consultants, providing advice to committee members, assisting with written documents, and making presentations at planning sessions.

Committee members studied research publications, State evaluation documents, and videos of boot camps in other jurisdictions to review methods of educating young, unsophisticated offenders to promote future lawful, responsible behavior, respect for authority, and self-esteem, and at the same time reduce prison bedspace and preserve public safety. They looked at how a shock incarceration program would affect their responsibilities, staff under their supervision, and all of IDOC. They discussed the degree to which discipline, physical activities, labor details, and military bearing would be balanced with program services, instruction, and aftercare supervision.

The committee defined a common purpose, drafted a mission statement, prepared specific objectives, and outlined a timetable for monitoring progress and documenting achievements (exhibit 2).





Obtaining Funds

General revenue funds allocated to the new program did not cover all elements. Looking for outside funding, IDOC applied for Federal money available from the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, Title VI of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Among other strategies to control drugs and improve the criminal justice system, Byrne funds support correctional alternatives for persons who pose no danger to the community, through formula grants and competitive discretionary grants to States.

IDOC received a \$250,000 discretionary grant, the largest award available, primarily for program services and program evaluation. Grant funds were used for salaries of educators, social workers, and an in-house parole agent to provide instruction in basic education, life skills, substance abuse, and aftercare preparation. Federal funds also supported a parole agent in the community, who worked with the in-house agent to develop individual supervision plans and coordinate community referrals. Funds were established for drug testing and electronic detention equipment to monitor IIP graduates. A research scientist was hired onsite to evaluate the program, collect and analyze data, and write progress reports. Remaining funds were used for travel within the State, site visits to boot camps in other States, and supplies for program services staff.

At the end of the first year of Dixon Springs' operation, IDOC was awarded another \$200,000 in Federal funding under the same discretionary grant program because of the progress made during the implementation and development of the program, especially in the program service components.

Further, substance abuse education and treatment at all IIP facilities has been funded through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, which distributes Federal drug appropriations, letting out contracts to private agencies for services.

Visits to Other Boot Camps

It was essential that IDOC staff visit and discuss shock incarceration programs with experienced administrators and line staff before and after implementing the program. The education and exchange of ideas would yield meaningful information from the successes and failures of other programs. Time and energy would be saved, and fewer problems would be confronted.

During the initial planning stages, several State administrators, legislators, and IIP staff visited an existing prison boot camp facility, the Special Alternative Incarceration Program in Michigan. During a 2-week period, they witnessed all phases of the program's operations, reviewed program documents, and interviewed experienced line staff.



A second site visit resulted from IDOC's participation in an evaluation of shock incarceration in eight States, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice. Planning and research staff joined correctional researchers from the seven other States in a visit to the Lakeview Shock Incarceration Program in New York during August 1990. The visit incorporated 3 days of discussion of shock incarceration evaluation strategies.

A third site visit took place in December 1991, after the Dixon Springs IIP had been operating for a full year. Six IDOC staff, now experienced in the implementation and operation of a boot camp program, observed functions at six Georgia DOC boot camp facilities. Georgia had recently completed a comprehensive evaluation of its boot camp program and was expanding the program to include various prison populations. IDOC was able to use the information gleaned in Georgia to review the implementation progress of the IIP. Innovative ideas regarding program components, philosophy, operations, and facility design were recorded and used.

Site Selection

One of IDOC's most important considerations was whether to house the boot camp in an existing facility or construct a new one. IDOC chose to convert an existing work camp facility for its first boot camp because the management system and fiscal structure of Illinois' work camps were considered to be similar to those of boot camps.

IDOC selected the site of the former Dixon Springs Work Camp located in southern Illinois. The site was isolated and would provide meaningful work opportunities in the Shawnee National Forest and the economically disadvantaged surrounding communities while reducing construction costs.

The capacity at the Dixon Springs Work Camp was 150 beds, requiring renovation to expand to the 200 beds planned for the boot camp. The conversion process included constructing an asphalted area for exercising and marching, developing additional parking space, grading the site, improving general site lighting, installing ceiling and floor tiles, and repairing fire alarms. The existing gymnasium was partially converted to programming use.

After the first 4 months of operation, 30 more beds were added. The expansion of the facility from its original 150-bed capacity to 230 beds required IDOC to upgrade the sewage treatment facilities and kitchen maintenance equipment and further renovate instructional classrooms.

Selecting Offenders for the Program

In formulating IIP legislation, the Illinois General Assembly provided for input from both judges and correctional officials in the selection process. The judge




recommends a statutorily eligible inmate for placement in the program, and IDOC staff further review the case to determine if the inmate would pose a safety, mental health, or security risk. This system allows a series of criminal justice professionals to review each case; combined efforts are used to select the lowest risk candidates. Exhibit 3 depicts the approval and subsequent IIP processes.

Allowing experienced corrections staff to help select participants had two advantages. First, it was likely that prison admissions would increase if the judge were allowed sole discretion. Other States' experiences indicated that judges would tend to sentence offenders to boot camp who would normally receive probation to "teach them a lesson." If the net were thus widened, offenders would be added to the traditional prison population. On the other hand, disallowing judicial discretion might hinder existing cooperation between the courts and the correctional system.

Having decided that the IIP was most appropriate for young, nonviolent, low-risk offenders sentenced to adult prison for the first time, IDOC developed more specific criteria for selecting candidates. Based on the experience of other programs and a profile of eligible candidates sentenced to prison each year, IDOC sought candidates who:

- *Were between 17 and 29 years old.* It was expected that the number of first-time offenders 30 years or older in good physical condition would be limited and would be likely to defy authority and challenge orders in front of their younger cohorts.
- *Received a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment or less.* The 4-month IIP program reduces the length of incarceration. Accepting offenders with longer sentences would shorten the incarceration time even further, but they would pose higher risks because of the greater seriousness of their offenses.
- *Could participate in strenuous physical activities or labor.* Inmates with physical problems would be most likely to quit the program or be forced to leave for medical reasons, adding an unnecessary cost to the program. A comprehensive physical examination would take place at reception and classification centers, and a doctor would have to approve and sign an IIP-specific medical screening form.
- *Would consent in writing to participate in the IIP.* The program was designed to be voluntary to allow inmates the personal decision to enter and withdraw. A voluntary program would also reduce the likelihood of attempts to escape. A consent-to-participate form was developed which each inmate would read and sign before placement in the program. Inmates who decided to leave the program would have to sign a notice of voluntary termination.

Exhibit 3. Flow Chart of IIP Process





Excluded were:

- Candidates who had previously served a felony sentence in an adult correctional facility.
- Offenders convicted of a Class X felony (serious crime), first or second degree murder, armed violence, aggravated kidnapping, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal abuse, criminal sexual abuse, forcible detention, or arson.
- Offenders with a mental disorder or disability that would prevent participation in the IIP. Inmates had to be able to understand and follow direct orders and not be intimidated to the point of assaulting staff and other inmates when under pressure. A separate, more detailed mental health examination would take place at IDOC's Reception and Classification Center, and the psychologist would approve and sign an IIP-specific mental health screening form.

IDOC would also consider whether the committed person had a history of escape or absconding or any outstanding detainees or warrants and whether participation in the Impact Incarceration Program would pose a safety or security risk.

Training Staff

IIP security staff were required to have 1 year of experience as correctional officers. All security staff had to participate in 240 hours of IDOC preservice correctional officer training, followed by another 40 hours of orientation at their worksite. Thereafter, 40 hours of inservice training were required at the worksite annually. IIP Dixon Springs staff were required, in addition, to complete 80 hours of specialized boot camp training before joining the boot camp staff.



Illinois' first boot camp, at Dixon Springs, opened in 1990 and can house 200 inmates.





The ensuing training program consisted of 12 modules covering military drill, inspections, and physical training; disciplinary procedures; and instruction skills, classroom management, and program delivery. There was a substantial emphasis on health issues, communicable diseases, and crisis intervention as well as on safety precautions, especially in the drill and physical training components. The lesson plans in the training manual offered guidelines on time allotment, target population, number of participants, and classroom space for particular components. The curriculum contained examinations, films, role playing, and interaction simulations. A considerable number of activities encouraged officers to understand and become acclimated to the use of nonverbal communication skills.

Moreover, staff had to maintain themselves in good physical condition. Staff medical examinations and psychological screening became mandatory, with procedures negotiated with employee unions.

Black, military-style uniforms were designed to distinguish boot camp personnel from the green-uniformed officers in conventional Illinois prisons. Staff uniforms had to be neatly cleaned and pressed to encourage orderliness and personal hygiene among the inmates. Blocked hats emphasized the military environment.

Information Dissemination

Two groups needed immediate information about the program: judges needed to understand the purpose of the shock incarceration program and their roles in it; sentenced offenders needed to know about the options before them so that qualified candidates would volunteer for the program.

Sentencing judges had to be made fully aware of the criteria, components, and philosophy of the shock incarceration program so that they could make knowledgeable decisions in recommending offenders for the program. To publicize the program before it began, IDOC made available a video about the proposed IIP and distributed it to judges and other interested parties. A second video was later prepared showing program activities after the IIP began operations.

Providing information to the courts is an ongoing effort. Since August 1990 correctional administrators have made a series of presentations to the judiciary to help it better understand the program. IDOC staff also work with the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC) to inform judges during AOIC training sessions. Copies of the IIP evaluation reports are mailed to judges periodically to keep them informed of program progress.

It was deemed important to inform inmates as well about the IIP, its advantages, requirements, and regimen. Thus, IDOC prepared a video that explained the IIP concept in clear, simple language for recommended offenders who had not yet volunteered for participation. Counselors at IDOC's Reception and Classification Center (R&C) were trained to provide consistent, reliable information to potential



candidates. Any forms that inmates would need to review while making their decision to enter the IIP were made available, and they were notified of all consequences, including the strenuous environment and shortened prison sentence, before signing participatory forms.

Backlog Problems

At first, all approved inmates were sent directly to the boot camp, but as publicity was generated by the opening of the boot camp, the number of judicial recommendations increased to the point that by January 1991 the IIP was consistently filled to capacity. It thus became necessary to have the male inmates awaiting entry held in a housing unit separate from the general population, at a nearby adult prison facility.

Over time, not only did the number of inmates waiting to enter the IIP increase, but the waiting period before entering the program increased as well. At one point the backlog reached 224 inmates who were waiting an average of 4 months to enter the program, increasing their prison stays and reducing cost savings.

This caused logistical and security problems, as institutional schedules had to be shuffled to keep the IIP inmates separate from the general population. For example, prospective IIP inmates had their recreational periods at night when the other inmates were sleeping or confined to their cells. Confrontations took place when general population inmates taunted and ridiculed inmates in the IIP holding unit.

Another consequence of the backlog was that a number of candidates, chafing at the delay, changed their minds about entering the program. As their release dates came closer, traditional prison and regular parole options seemed once more viable alternatives to the strenuous program and its intensive supervision. Worse, during the waiting period the candidates' lack of contact with inmates in the general population limited the type and number of activities they could undertake during the day. Some committed disciplinary infractions that eventually rendered them ineligible for the program. The backlog problem was eventually solved through the opening of a second facility.

Eligible boot camp inmates are still held in custody apart from the general prison population while they undergo the extensive screening process at R&C. Delays in reviewing court documents and warrants, together with medical problems that present obstacles to approval for entry into the IIP, cause candidate inmates to continue to be temporarily housed at the holding facility. In both of these circumstances, the inmate may be returned to R&C to be screened again.

Current Program Operation

As has been shown, development of Illinois' shock incarceration program took time, comprehensive planning, and the participation of many players. Since the



program was initiated, it has undergone further refinement, but the early efforts have benefited the program, which has gained favorable public acceptance, the thoughtful input of judges, and the enrollment of hundreds of sentenced offenders. Since program inception, 6,367 inmates have been admitted to the IIP (see exhibit 4). Of these, 4,079 have graduated, 1,119 have left voluntarily, and 528 have been removed involuntarily. On June 30, 1995, 641 inmates were participating in the program.

Orientation

Immediately upon arrival at the IIP, new program participants begin an orientation that prepares them for military regimentation and enables staff to assess them for appropriate programming. The recruits receive intensive instruction in military bearing, courtesy, drill and ceremony, and physical exercise. The purpose of the introductory phase is to provide a realistic overview of the IIP and of the expectations and potential benefits of the program.

Exhibit 4. Illinois Impact Incarceration Program

Participant-Flow Statistics <i>October 15, 1990, through June 30, 1995</i>						
	Start Date	Admissions	Graduates	Voluntary Failures	Involuntary Failures	30-Jun-95 Population
Dixon Springs	15-Oct-90	3,856	2,544	765	330	217
Male		181	99	35	23	24
Female						
Green County	15-Mar-93	1,658	1,060	265	132	201
DuQuoin	1-Aug-94	672	376	54	43	199
TOTAL		6,367	4,079	1,119	528	641

After the 2-hour intake process, inmates meet with a correctional officer to review the orientation manual, then with a parole agent to learn about electronic detention and the aftercare component. On the second day, new inmates start learning military bearing and drill, activities that will consume most of their time during the orientation period.

During this phase, inmates wear white jump suits to identify them as new recruits, or "ghosts." This is the most difficult period of the program for them. They also have an opportunity to talk to the experienced inmates to learn more about the



The first 2 weeks consist of orientation to military bearing and physical activities.

program and to have some of their fears allayed. Most adjust to the rigorous structure, but some decide to drop out during this period.

Staff are slightly more lenient toward the new inmates at this time. With the elimination of alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs, running and other strenuous exercises are at first difficult. Inmates are allowed to build their physical endurance. However, after 2 weeks, all inmates are expected to participate in full exercise.

Before leaving the orientation phase, all inmates receive a manual that contains the IIP mission statement, a list of formal procedures regarding care of personal items and inmate dress codes, and a narrative describing expectations and program activities. The manual also describes IDOC rules about disciplinary procedures and the inmate grievance process.

Inmates then enter the core program, where participation in regularly scheduled exercises and all program activities is mandatory. Activities are scheduled from 5:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m.

General Residential Rules

Inmates must adhere to all requirements and rules of conduct. Violation results in sanctions consistent with the program's disciplinary procedures. Positive behavior that supports individual and community growth is required, while negative behavior is targeted for change. Training alternatives, such as exercises of the day and a demerit system, are used in a progressive manner to instill correct behavior.

Military bearing is strictly enforced when inmates address program staff, gather for meal formation, and participate in drills. Specific rules of conduct for grooming



standards, dress codes, and foot locker maintenance are also enforced. Staff conduct personal and room inspections as well as inmate counts periodically throughout the day.

Personal items such as reading materials or electrical items are prohibited, and telephone, mail, and visiting privileges are limited. Inmates can receive commissary credits but only after purchases of necessary personal items have been deducted. Voluntary interfaith services are held for an hour each Sunday.

Medical emergencies or medical complaints are referred to an onsite health professional; sick call is conducted daily. Medically unfit inmates must stay on a medical bunk (without receiving participation credit for that day) while they are incapacitated.

While not participating in program services, inmates work on in-house details and public service crews cleaning grounds and roads. Inmates do work that is highly visible to the surrounding communities and builds good public relations for the program. The IIP also receives considerable media exposure, second only to the publicity generated by the military style of the boot camp. During the summer of 1993, the IIP received national recognition through the print and broadcast media for efforts to control Mississippi River flooding.

Substance Abuse Education and Treatment

The IIP provides a unique opportunity for treating substance abuse and breaking the cycle of drugs and crime. The IIP philosophy demands that the process begin at admission and continue through PreStart (parole) supervision. Inmates are counseled about the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse and the ramifications of selling drugs on the streets. Further, by instilling discipline, self-esteem, and positive work habits, the IIP teaches inmates that there are other, safer ways to make a living than resorting to drug dealing and substance abuse.

During orientation inmates are fully assessed and evaluated by licensed substance abuse professionals, and individual treatment plans are developed. The IIP is the only State correctional boot camp that offers multilevel drug treatment. Classified inmates fall into three categories:

- Level I inmates are designated as having no probable substance abuse and receive 2 weeks of drug education, during which they learn to identify and distinguish between different types of drugs and their effects. All inmates participate in drug education.
- Level II inmates are considered to be probable substance abusers. In addition to drug education, these inmates receive 4 weeks of drug treatment in which denial and family support issues are discussed in group therapy.



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- Level III inmates have been determined to have probable drug addictions and receive special group services. They review issues discussed in Level I and Level II and discuss substance abuse relapse, codependency, behavioral differences, and addicted families, along with the role that they play within their families. Therapy continues for a 10-week period after the 2 weeks of drug education. During the final 2 weeks of the IIP, Level II and Level III inmates meet with substance abuse counselors to arrange referrals for treatment upon release.

Basic Education

Program services in basic education are designed to enable IIP participants to receive their general equivalency diploma (GED). Inmates are assessed at orientation through the Test of Adult Basic Education; those scoring lower than a sixth grade level are required to attend a special class. Further testing to measure progress is conducted throughout participation in the IIP.

Inmates work at their own pace in the class. Not all are able to achieve the GED certificate level, but they are expected to work hard in the classroom. Teamwork is emphasized to ensure that individual educational achievement goals are met.

Inmates who already have a high school diploma or GED certificate help instructors in the educational development of other inmates. Outside the classroom, inmates are allowed to study during free periods that are incorporated into the daily schedule. Inmates are tutored by other IIP participants during study times. Through fiscal year 1995, 810 inmates had taken the GED examination, of which 704 had passed (87 percent).

Inmates who leave the IIP without a GED are assessed prior to release, and plans are made for them to continue their education and obtain a GED during the after-care phase.

Life Skills Development

IIP inmates participate in classroom sessions and group discussions in the basic life skills and positive value structures that will enable them to function in their community. The life skills curriculum focuses on four key areas: self-esteem, employment preparedness, financial planning, and health awareness.

IIP staff introduce inmates to the services available in the community and help them obtain important credentials, such as a social security card, birth certificate, driver's license, and library card. After release, parole staff help them make use of programs and services for gaining job referrals and developing job-searching techniques; these include Correctional Employment Services, the Illinois Job Service, the Job Training Partnership Act, and Title XX vendors. Inmates are also instructed in how to collaborate with State agencies, such as the Departments of Children and



Family Services, Public Aid, Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, and Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.

Aftercare Preparation

Preparation for aftercare begins when the inmates arrive at the boot camp; release plans are developed for their eventual placement on electronic detention. During the final 2 weeks of participation, inmates develop a release program with parole staff. An Individual Development Plan (IDP) is formed that comprehensively identifies postrelease needs and outlines a needs-resolution strategy with short- and long-range goals. The plan becomes part of the Mandatory Supervised Release (MSR) agreement signed by the releasee. Topics covered in the IDP include long-range personal goals and a maintenance program for health and physical fitness, social relationships, and positive use of free time; assessment of current and future problems, with appropriate resolutions; and orientation to MSR responsibilities.

IDOC employs a full range of resources to achieve beneficial programming in employment, education, and training. Referrals for use of these resources are initiated during this aftercare preparation phase of the IIP residential component. Although it is not a mandatory element of the program, IIP graduates are sometimes released to community correctional centers or contracted halfway house facilities when a suitable host site cannot be designated for electronic detention.

Inmates view a video on electronic detention that answers questions about what will be expected of them after release, and each inmate meets with the parole agent who coordinates aftercare activities and determines possible host sites for electronic detention.

Leaving the Program

The IIP is a voluntary program beginning at the time of the recommendation and sentencing by the judge, during the screening and approval process, and continuing throughout the 120 days of boot camp. At each of these stages, an inmate can withdraw from the program, with full understanding of the consequences of this withdrawal. Inmates who still request removal are placed on a “quitter’s bunk,” where they can discuss the issue with staff and other inmates. All means available are used to keep participants in the program; inmates who withdraw cannot reenter.

An inmate can be involuntarily terminated from the IIP for a major rule violation or noncompliance with program requirements as documented by disciplinary notices. This usually follows an accumulation of numerous infractions, careless following of program rules, or challenges to authority through intimidation and threats.

An inmate can also be discharged for medical or mental health reasons or for mistakes made in the eligibility review.



Extensions of time. Inmates may have their terms extended up to 60 days beyond the 120-day boot camp period for disciplinary reasons, medical problems, or other interruptions in their active program participation. For instance, inmates who consider leaving the program voluntarily are allowed time to weigh the decision. However, any time spent on this “quitter’s” status is not counted as active participation, and if they decide to stay in the program they must make up the lost time. In some cases boot camp inmates are allowed 3 days that do not need to be made up; these are for circumstances beyond their control (such as injuries sustained during program activities), after staff review the circumstances.

Graduation. Formal graduation ceremonies were included in the IIP’s original design to end the residential phase of the program with a positive, ceremonious recognition of participants’ accomplishments. IIP graduating inmates address their fellow inmates during morning formations, showing them that they have learned respect for authority and have acquired an ability to work with others. The graduates encourage inmates who are just beginning program activities or contemplating voluntary termination to stay with the program. IIP staff congratulate the graduates individually and give them their diplomas.

Aftercare Program

After release from the IIP, graduates begin a two-tiered aftercare program designed to gradually reintegrate them into the community. This consists of electronic detention followed by regular parole.¹

The relatively short stay at the boot camp marks just the beginning of efforts to address and resolve the underlying issues that have contributed to an inmate’s criminal behavior. Aftercare supervision is designed to closely monitor the releasee’s



When not participating in program services, inmates work on in-house details and public service crews.





activities and encourage law-abiding behavior. IIP graduates must participate in 35 hours per week of primary programming after release. Primary programming consists of education, employment, community service, substance abuse treatment, or group therapy. Graduates with a limited work history or who have no viable vocational skills are encouraged to enroll in a training program. Functionally illiterate releasees are required to enroll in a literacy program. Graduates are required to register with local job services and work with them until a job is found. Drug and alcohol counseling is mandatory for those with a substance abuse history.

Overall, the program gradually moves the releasee through a series of supervision levels. It is designed to reward positive adjustment and deter unwanted behavior. Releasees who demonstrate positive behavior are moved to the next, less restrictive phase. Minor violations or consistent lack of motivation to become fully active in worthwhile program activities delay the releasee's progress.

This final phase reinforces the program's accent on public safety. During the first 90 days after release, when the graduate is on electronic detention, random drug tests and physical spot checks are conducted and a curfew is strictly enforced. A schedule outlining the graduate's activities outside the home must be approved by parole staff, and face-to-face contacts are frequent. After successful community re-integration during electronic detention, as evidenced by stable employment, educational pursuit, or absence of substance abuse, graduates are placed in the regular parole supervision component (PreStart).

PreStart focuses on providing services that will reduce patterns of reoffending. Community service centers allow releasees in search of job, educational, and counseling opportunities to contact parole staff. Emphasis is directed toward providing reintegrative programming rather than strict enforcement of the MSR agreement.

Program Evaluation

Since the program was implemented, the IIP's developmental progress has been continuously monitored mainly due to two factors. First, an enacting clause in the IIP legislation mandates that IDOC submit an annual report documenting program activities and profiling inmates recommended for the program. Illinois is one of only two States (New York is the other) that publish annual reports describing their correctional boot camps. Second, participation in the National Institute of Justice's Multisite Study of Shock Incarceration provided guidelines and materials to evaluate the program. This is important because a main criticism in the development of correctional boot camps nationwide has been that methods in place for program evaluation are flawed and that there is insufficient evidence that boot camps are effective.

In response to those concerns, IDOC has made a commitment to analyze the program internally and to allow external reviewers to evaluate it as well. During the implementation phase, a process evaluation was conducted to determine whether



the IIP was operating according to design. This resulted in an increase in the number of scheduled hours for program services and a revision of disciplinary procedures. Further, an analysis of the backlog of IIP-eligible inmates, which started 4 months after the program was implemented, allowed IDOC to determine that the IIP should be expanded to a second site. The Greene County IIP started operations in March 1993.

As part of a series of recommendations, the Illinois Task Force on Crime and Corrections, using profile data provided by IDOC, called for expanding the statutory eligibility for the IIP. This recommendation culminated in a new law, enacted in August 1993, extending the maximum age of eligibility from 29 to 35, extending the maximum sentence from 5 to 8 years, and permitting second-time offenders to enter the program. The other eligibility criteria remained unchanged. Expansion of the eligibility criteria was primarily responsible for the opening of the DuQuoin IIP in August 1994.

IDOC has a quasi-experimental design in place to analyze recidivism and cost effectiveness. Comparison groups are made up of inmates who are statutorily eligible for the IIP but are either not recommended by judges or are denied participation by IDOC. During 3-year followup periods, recidivism analyses are conducted, with recidivism defined as a return to prison.

Exhibit 5. Impact Incarceration Program Recidivism Rates

	Graduates			Comparison Group		
	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
Number of Cases	1,388	795	199	5,610	3,200	886
New Crime	82 6%	134 17%	41 21%	610 11%	793 25%	299 34%
Technical	161 12%	140 18%	52 26%	70 1%	77 2%	29 3%
Total Violators	243 18%	274 35%	93 47%	680 12%	870 27%	328 37%

Source: Illinois Department of Corrections.

A study of IIP graduates revealed that 21 percent of releases returned to prison with a new offense within 3 years of release (see exhibit 5). This was found to be significantly lower than the comparison group's rate of 34 percent. Conversely, IIP graduates returned to prison with a technical violation (as opposed to a new crime) significantly more often than traditional releasees. In addition, fiscal analyses have revealed that the IIP has reduced incarceration costs by more than \$11,500,000.



since program inception. Primarily, this has been due to prison time reduction, which assists IDOC in conserving bedspace for higher risk inmates.

The recidivism results are consistent with the findings of the Multisite Study of Shock Incarceration. The study employed survival time procedures where the prevalence of recidivism and time spent on parole prior to a recidivism event are analyzed together. Illinois and Louisiana were the only States of eight studied that had significantly lower new offense rates for boot camp graduates and New York had lower rates of technical violations in comparison to similar prison releasees (see chapter 18 of this volume).

Another study sponsored by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority examined the new offense return-to-prison rates for IIP graduates, IIP failures, and traditional inmates. The study also included an examination of IIP graduates based on the level of assessed substance abuse treatment provided while at the boot camp. The study revealed that drug offenders among IIP graduates returned to prison less often than IIP failures and traditional releasees. Younger offenders in all three groups returned at a higher rate than their older counterparts. IIP graduates assessed for the most intensive substance abuse treatment had the highest return-to-prison rates. Original offense type, age, and committing county also proved to be indicators of recidivism.

Summary

The development and implementation of the IIP was an arduous process requiring much planning and deliberation. Although this chapter does not detail the specifics involved in putting the IIP into operation, key elements and considerations in beginning a correctional boot camp program have been noted.

A collaborative effort supported by a multitude of staff representing all phases of the legislative, administrative, and correctional process was instrumental in establishing a correctional boot camp program. IDOC instituted a series of planning sessions, pursued outside funding to support rehabilitative programs and staff, visited boot camps in other States, and prepared alternative procedural documents and training curriculums.

Most important, IIP administrators were flexible in their approach to making programmatic changes based on evaluation during the initial stages of development. This included revision of the disciplinary procedures, increase in the number of hours for instruction and other programming, expansion of the program to additional sites, and expansion of the eligibility criteria. The key aspects of program review focused on monitoring data over extended followup periods, developing profiles of all recommended IIP-eligible inmates, and participating in research studies.



The intent has been to build a boot camp program that can demonstrate proper methods of behaving in society—procedures that must be demonstrated in a relatively short time period and must be carried into the community and maintained in the future. It is anticipated that the IIP will continue to result in advantages for the reduction of prison crowding as well as for the young men and women who go through the program.

Note

1. A significant program modification occurred on November 1, 1992, when IDOC removed part of the IIP aftercare component. Under previous policy, IIP graduates spent at least 90 days on electronic detention plus at least 90 additional days on intensive supervision prior to being placed under regular parole (PreStart) supervision. The intensive supervision requirement was abolished mainly because of low recidivism rates for commission of new offenses by IIP graduates during the first year after release from the IIP. This was based on comparative analyses conducted with inmates released from traditional institutions who had similar demographic, criminal history, and sentence characteristics.

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CHAPTER 5

Programming in Georgia's Boot Camps

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Georgia's boot camps date back to 1983 when the State's Department of Corrections instituted Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI) to relieve the increasingly crowded conditions in prisons and jails. SAI provided short terms of imprisonment, followed by community supervision, as a condition for probation. Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program is an outgrowth of SAI and incorporates boot camps for both probationers and sentenced inmates, as well as special programs for certain State prisoners and detention centers for selected nonviolent offenders as a condition of probation. This chapter presents findings from a descriptive process evaluation. Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program provides a military-style regimen for all participants, inside and outside work detail, physical training, basic education, and programming in life skills and alcohol and substance abuse treatment.

Georgia Evaluates Its Boot Camp Operation

The description of Georgia's boot camp program presented in this chapter is drawn from the interim findings of an evaluation of Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program being conducted in 1992-1993 by the Evaluation and Statistics Section of the Georgia Department of Corrections with the assistance of the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Statistical Analysis Bureau. The evaluation had three goals:

1. To assess the implementation and goal achievements of the Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program.
2. To assess its potential for reducing the return-to-prison rates of its participants.
3. To assess the impact of the program on reducing prison crowding.

The evaluation was in two parts: process and outcome. As Blackmore (1991) has explained, process evaluations go beyond the scope of traditional audits, in asking questions concerning the appropriateness and the adequacy of the studied program and the cost effectiveness of its activities. Process evaluations may ask, "Are the program's objectives worthwhile? Does the program have the

Georgia was one of the first States in the Nation to use shock incarceration as a response to increased prison commitments and a chronic shortage of bedspace. During the late 1960's, several counties in Georgia had shut down their county work camps, producing overcrowded State facilities and large backlogs of sentenced inmates in local jails. Throughout the 1970's, Georgia jail and prison systems were beleaguered by repeated crowding crises that were relieved only by having the State Board of Pardons and Parole release more prisoners (Flowers et al., 1991). By the early 1980's, jail and prison crowding was universally recognized as the most serious problem facing Georgia's criminal justice system.

This chapter provides background on Georgia's experience in developing its boot camp program and describes the current system. Some early findings of a process evaluation (see box) and a description of programs in Georgia's boot camp facilities are presented. (Disciplinary aspects of the program are described in detail in chapter 12 of this volume.)

SAI: Forerunner of Today's Boot Camp Program

One of the initiatives to deal with correctional crowding was the development of the Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI) program. Mandated as a special condition to a sentence of probation, SAI required participants to serve 90 days in prison and then a period of postconfinement community supervision. The program offered judges a statewide sentencing alternative to lengthy prison terms.

scope and resources to reach the targeted population?"

During the process phase, evaluators record the program's formative stages of operation, identifying problems encountered during this phase, specifying the efforts made to resolve them, and documenting the development of future plans. A process evaluation provides a historical account of the program and of changes made in the program during the study. Program goals, activities, and resources are described through quantitative and qualitative measures.

This chapter reports on this first, process phase of the Georgia evaluation. Specific program data were collected, such as the number of participants entering and exiting the programs, reasons for departures, program components completed, and the number and type of disciplinary measures taken. Surveys were administered both to staff and participants to assess the social climate of the camps, sample opinions concerning the camps and their activities, and determine immediate effects of the program. Site visits were also conducted at three probation and two inmate boot camps. Recommendations from these site visits have already been incorporated into program operations.

SAI's prison phase was an intense, rigorously structured 90-day experience. Hard manual labor and strenuous physical conditioning exercises were the key components of this phase, and strict military-style discipline and regimen were its hallmark features. The followup community supervision, while less structured than prison, applied the general conditions of regular probation. Some selected offenders were required to follow SAI with assignment to a diversion center (a 4-month residential program) or Intensive Supervision Probation (Flowers et al., 1991).

The first SAI program was established in 1983 at Dodge Correctional Institution (C.I.) in Chester. Fifty beds at Dodge C.I. were used to house the SAI offenders, who were kept separate from the general inmate population. In November 1986, a second SAI program was started at Burruss Correctional/Training Center in Forsyth.

In January 1991, the Georgia Department of Corrections completed a major evaluation of SAI as it existed from 1983 to 1990 (Flowers et al., 1991). The study examined program operations and analyzed various return-to-prison rates of SAI graduates. It found that Superior Court judges sentenced 4,743 offenders to SAI between December 1983 and December 1990. During 1990 alone, judges sentenced 1,077 offenders to the program. SAI participants were 43 percent urban and 55 percent black; 15 percent were convicted of violent crimes, 26 percent of drug offenses, and 49 percent of property offenses.

The evaluators concluded that for the particular offenders studied, within the limits of the analytic approach employed,



recidivism of SAI participants was lower than recidivism of regular prisoners. Recidivism of SAI probationers was lower than that of offenders receiving intensive supervision probation, comparable to that of residents of diversion centers, and higher than that of offenders sentenced to regular probation.

Today's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program

Much has happened to affect the SAI program since that evaluation took place. During his campaign in 1990, then gubernatorial candidate Zell Miller pledged to expand and enhance the State's boot camp program. Once elected, Governor Miller said, he would discontinue the early release program his predecessor had initiated to ease statewide prison crowding. However, estimates suggested that within 3 to 6 months of this action, local jails would be crowded with four or five thousand additional inmates. It quickly became apparent that early releases could be discontinued only if another program was initiated to keep the backlog down and provide a publicly acceptable degree of punishment for offenders (Flowers et al., 1991).

The program thus developed, known as the Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program, was built on the foundation laid by SAI—that of hard work and military-style discipline—but new critical program elements such as compulsory drug education modules and postrelease followup in the community were added. The first goal of the new program was to relieve crowding in the State's 30 prisons by diverting about 12,000 lower risk offenders to boot camps each year. The second goal was to reduce recidivism among young offenders ages 17 to 30 by incorporating a rigorously structured program and intensive aftercare (Bowen, 1991).

The Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program plan that was developed now includes four types of facilities. Two—inmate boot camps and intensive treatment programs—house *sentenced prison inmates*. The other two—probation SAI/boot camps and probation detention centers—house persons who are sentenced to the boot camps as a condition of *probation*.

Inmate boot camps. Offenders in inmate boot camps have already been sentenced to prison; they are assigned to a boot camp by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles based on criteria established by the Georgia Department of Corrections and the Parole Board. If they successfully complete the 120-day program, they are released to strict parole supervision. If they "wash out" of the boot camp, they are transferred to a regular prison. In most cases the units are located next to large prisons that can provide basics such as food services, allowing GDC to keep operating costs down.

Selected offenders are processed through a central diagnostic facility for all inmate boot camps at Bostic C.I. in Milledgeville. At first only males between the ages of



17 and 30 convicted of a drug offense, with a sentence length of 1–10 years, could be assigned to an inmate boot camp. The pool of eligible offenders has now been expanded to include offenders convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), habitual traffic violators, and persons convicted of most other nonviolent crimes.

Georgia has six inmate boot camps, all located on the grounds of a State correctional institution. More than 6,500 men have entered an inmate boot camp, with approximately 87 percent completing the program.

Intensive treatment programs. These are for State prison inmates who have been assigned to the program as a disciplinary sanction. They are intensive, in-prison programs in which inmates work their way out of disciplinary isolation or administrative segregation and back into the general prison population. The programs have a military-based structure and call for compulsory participation in educational and counseling programs. (For more information on this program for prison inmates, see chapter 12 of this volume, which describes the program at the Valdosta Correctional Institution.)

SAI/probation boot camps. These target first-time drug offenders, DUI and habitual traffic violators, and other offenders identified and sentenced by judges as a condition of probation. These units combine the intensity of a boot camp regimen with compulsory drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs. The units may be adjacent to prisons or may be stand-alone units in the community. Georgia has three probation boot camps with a combined capacity of 437 offenders. Since their initiation, probation boot camps have graduated 92 percent of the 5,500 they have admitted. Although the normal stay at a probation boot camp is 90 days, the law now allows the probation boot camp superintendent to keep offenders an additional 30 days if they create disciplinary problems.

The evaluation found that probationers entering the boot camps were felons (only 2 percent were convicted of a misdemeanor), with 77 percent sentenced to less than 6 years. Most frequent convictions were for property offenses (45 percent), drug possession (25 percent), or violent offenses against persons (14 percent). Their average age was 19.8, and most were nonwhite males. Twenty-nine percent were sentenced as first offenders.

Probation detention centers. These form another option in Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program. Probation detention center participants are sentenced to the program by judges as a condition of probation. These centers aim their work-intensive, highly structured program at relatively low-risk offenders, including those convicted of alcohol- and drug-related crimes or property crimes, and those whose poor physical health would make them ineligible for the physically demanding boot camp programs. In addition to the compulsory community service now imposed on these offenders, a basic military-style daily regimen is in



place in these centers. The major program focus is on outside work details for the benefit of the community and on alcohol and drug education and treatment.

The average age of detainees sent to probation detention centers was 27.2 years. Detainees were primarily male, nonwhite (59 percent) and serving a 5-year straight probation sentence for a felony. Twelve percent were sentenced as first offenders, with 45 percent convicted for a substance abuse offense and 39 percent for a property crime.

In December 1993, 12 probation detention centers were in operation, including one for females. They had a total of 1,885 beds, usually 166 per unit. Since 1988, 23,280 probationers have been transferred to the detention centers, usually for 4–6-month periods. Almost all offenders complete the program successfully; the washout rate is only 4 percent.

Four-Phase Program

Whether in an inmate or probation boot camp facility, offenders move through a basic four-phase program plan that may differ slightly from facility to facility:

Phase 1, intake. This phase consists of diagnostic and orientation activities lasting for the first week of stay.

Phase 2, work/discipline. This phase consists primarily of drill and ceremony and work. The purpose is to instill responsibility in the offenders through emphasis on work, although offenders may begin their education and other programs during this time. This phase lasts 4 weeks.

Phase 3, programming. During this phase drill and ceremony are not emphasized as heavily. The offenders begin other programming classes, which may include leisure education, life skills, and Bible study. This phase lasts 4 weeks and is described in detail below.

Phase 4, prerelease. For the final phase of the boot camps, offenders are typically transferred to a prerelease counselor's caseload. At this time, they attend classes that emphasize the skills needed to search, apply, and interview for jobs. In addition, the prerelease counselor helps offenders plan for after their release, such as obtaining transportation home, finding a place to stay, and obtaining a job. During this phase offenders are allowed visits from friends and family members.



The Boot Camp Day

A typical day in a Georgia boot camp begins at 5:00 or 5:30 a.m. depending on the facility. The offenders march to breakfast at 6:30 after they have had time to dress, shave, make up their beds, police the barracks, and attend sick call if necessary. Offenders have 10 minutes to finish breakfast, after which they march back to their dormitories to prepare for work details.

Work details usually go out by 7:30 a.m. Sack lunches are prepared for those on outside detail; within the institution, lunch is held by noon. Outside details generally return to the institution between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Some institutions conduct physical training in the afternoon after details and before programs. Physical training is followed by dinner around 4:30 p.m. After this day of physical labor and calisthenics, at around 5:30 or 6:00, educational and other programming begins. Free time starts at 9:00 p.m. with lights out at 10:00.

Physical Training

Physical training guidelines specify nine different exercises, with a variable number of sets and repetitions based on the conditioning of the inmate (specified by medical clearance and length of time in the program).

Physical training takes place every day, including weekends, weather permitting. In most facilities, a correctional officer or recreation director conducts physical training by calling the count for the exercise and performing it along with the offenders.

Physical Labor

Work on various details is thought to instill the importance of making an earnest living in the world, getting offenders used to a consistent work schedule, and occupying them both mentally and physically during the day. All the camps maintain outside and inside work details.

Outside details typically involve construction or maintenance projects for local municipalities, counties, or the State. Many details provide the equivalent of thousands of dollars of free labor to these governments and enable the offenders to make partial amends directly to the citizenry of Georgia. These outside details have involved:

- Supporting State forestry projects, working with the Georgia State patrol, maintaining vehicles at Department of Transportation facilities, and working at the new youth facility in Eastman.
- Preparing construction sites and landscaping and maintaining public school buildings.
- Clearing drainage ditches and rights of way, building concrete curbs, and picking up trash in local cities.





Inside details typically involve maintenance or specialized labor for more skilled offenders such as brick masonry and vehicle repair, but they also include building maintenance, laundry, and general cleanup.

Program Components



Work on construction projects is thought to instill the importance of making an earnest living in the world.

Although work is heavily stressed as a part of the total program in Georgia's boot camps, a significant part of the offender's time is spent in treatment programming. Coupled with military discipline and hard physical labor, the goal of treatment programming and counseling is to assist the offender in building a respect for authority, a sense of self-worth and respect, and to provide the necessary tools to live a crime- and drug-free life once released. Following the "tearing down" provided by military drill and physical labor, programming attempts to provide the "building back up" stage in the offender's development. Chapter 12 in this volume describes this process.

Group sessions and classroom instruction are usually conducted every weekday evening, and for selected groups and activities on the weekends.

Orientation is conducted during the first week and includes instruction in the rules, regulations, and policies to be followed. A counselor usually conducts orientation.

Life skills are provided in a 12-class series typically offered during phases 3 and 4, designed to teach offenders the skills necessary to function successfully in society. Classes focus on values clarification, problem-solving skills, work-seeking and retention skills, family and parent training, communication skills, stress reduction, and consumer education. This class may be conducted by a staff person or a volunteer.

Twelve-step programs, such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA), promote a sober and drug-free lifestyle by providing a fellowship of persons who share their experience in order to recover from a common addiction. Such programs are available by referral and request throughout the 12-week boot camp experience. They are conducted by volunteers from local AA/NA chapters.

Substance abuse treatment is available to offenders who need it. Level I substance abuse programming involves 10 to 12 hours of substance abuse education; topics include alcohol, narcotics, barbiturates, opiates, stimulants, cocaine and crack, steroids, and “designer” drugs. This class is usually given during phase 1. Level II substance abuse programming includes a series of 16 to 24 interactive groups based on relapse prevention therapy. This program, known as Staying Sober Recovery Education Modules, has three primary components:

- Relapse education, which teaches individuals about the processes of recovery and relapse and helps individuals recognize and successfully manage relapse warning signs.
- Group therapy, which provides the individual an opportunity to personalize and integrate his understanding of recovery and relapse prevention.
- Relapse support groups, which give 12-step support for managing relapse and maintaining sobriety and a drug-free lifestyle. The program is offered during phases 3 and 4. These sessions are conducted by counseling staff.
- Prerelease, a series of groups typically held during phase 4, designed to focus the offenders on successful reintegration to their home communities. Group topics may include family issues, employment planning, treatment and support planning, postrelease plans, and goal setting. This class is generally conducted by the counselor responsible for prerelease.

Bible study is conducted by citizen volunteer religious groups who also offer life lessons and worship services for the offenders. On weekends, groups may also conduct inspirational singing.

Platoon meetings take place as inmates in each dormitory meet weekly as a group to discuss issues concerning living in the unit. An attempt is made to resolve problems using a positive group process and to promote discussion of opinions and ideas. This group is usually conducted by a staff counselor.

Leisure education occurs when offenders are taught sports fundamentals and are given the opportunity to participate in organized, structured games such as basketball, softball, and volleyball. This class is conducted by the recreation supervisor.



Library call gives offenders the opportunity to read books or magazines in the institutional library. In some facilities, inmates can check out reading materials to take to their dormitories.



All Georgia boot camps maintain outside work details that typically involve construction or maintenance for local government agencies.

Program Resources

Program resources vary from camp to camp with respect to space, staffing, and materials. Educational classes may occur in the institution's library or in day rooms and designated program rooms. In many cases, groups are conducted in the dormitory units for want of better program space.

At Treutlen Shock Unit in Soperton, one of the probation boot camps, an ambitious program schedule calls for use of both dormitory and program rooms. Programs are conducted during the evening hours in two 90-minute sessions, beginning at 6:00 p.m. Depending on his current phase and program plan, the offender may attend educational classes during one session and another class or program such as Alcoholics Anonymous during the other session. Offenders not involved in a program during a given period may go to recreation at the gym, or drill.

At Dodge Inmate Boot Camp in Chester, correctional officers conduct many of the classes and groups due to a lack of treatment staff. To signal this change of role, officers remove their circular campaign hats or caps and ease out of the formality of the military atmosphere that dominates life outside class. Each building officer typically conducts weekly groups in his dormitory. A new topic is assigned to each platoon each week. The officer calls members of the platoon out of their rooms and talks about that topic with them. Typical subjects are "The Importance of Goals" and "Your Duty to Your Family," treated in a lecture rather than discussion format. The officers generally indicated that they liked participating in these sessions but would benefit from more training.



Treatment staff provide individual counseling in addition to case management and scheduling of activities. These individual sessions are conducted at least once a month or more frequently as the need arises. Offenders may request to see their assigned counselor at any time through the use of a counselor request form. A review of institutional files revealed that in most cases the counselors made notations in the progress record section of the offenders' files every 2 weeks or so. The entries generally described the offenders' current activities and their progress in the program. Interviews with the offenders revealed that the counselors were available to the offenders on an as-needed basis (usually with no more than a day's response time to a request from an offender). The offenders also reported that the counselors made a point of seeing them approximately every other week.

Education

Three levels of adult education are provided in Georgia's boot camp program: basic literacy, adult basic education, and preparation and testing for the general equivalency diploma (GED). Limited resources among the camps create widely varying levels of programming.

At Treutlen, all educational services are provided by a local technical school. The program is funded by a Federal grant of approximately \$50,000 annually, which covers seven teachers' salaries, books, paper, and some equipment. Offenders are tested and placed in the appropriate level class during their orientation phase. Those who test up to the midpoint of the 5th grade go into basic literacy class, from the 5th to the 10th grade to adult basic education, at the 10th and above to preparation for the GED. Participation is mandatory and there is no waiting list. Classes average between 15 and 20 offenders.

Classes in all three levels are based on self-paced, individual modules, with each offender progressing to the next level upon completion of a module and successful testing on the material. The teachers work individually and with small groups of offenders during the sessions.

One counselor is certified to administer the GED test. At the time of the evaluation site visit, approximately 118 offenders had earned their GED certificates. Aggregate numbers were not available on the offenders' progress in the other educational programs. Individual results and achievement are made a part of the file that accompanies the offender back to his community and aftercare supervision.

At the time of the site visits, other boot camps did not have the resources of Treutlen for educational programming. One boot camp facility, located on the site of a State prison, shared a single instructor with the rest of the institution. Although the instructor staggered her weekly hours to accommodate an evening schedule of classes, there was a long waiting list to enter the classes. Another unit relied on two



volunteer teachers to come in during the evening hours to teach one basic education class each, 2 nights a week. Since that time, additional instructors have been hired at each of these units.

Community Supervision

Followup of offenders who have been in a probation detention center, an SAI/probation boot camp, or an inmate boot camp continues in the community. Where resources are available, offenders have a minimum of 3 months of highly structured supervision on probation or parole, followed by a period of regular supervision.

Conclusion

The adequate provision of resources is critical to any programming in corrections, but nowhere more so than in boot camps. As boot camp facilities around the Nation have discovered, a great deal can be accomplished in the relatively short stay of 90 to 120 days in a boot camp. Offenders have proved they can increase reading levels and even complete GED's.

Some have suggested that a boot camp that utilizes physical labor and military drill alone will not accomplish the goal of significantly changing the behavior of offenders if it does not include other program activities such as education, counseling, or drug treatment. MacKenzie and Parent (1990) list three hypotheses that support the combination of physical labor, military discipline, and treatment programming:

- The time spent in a boot camp program results in offenders freeing themselves from a downward cycle of drug usage and poor physical conditioning.
- Boot camp programs create an environment that shakes up the everyday life of offenders, creating stress. During this time, offenders may be more susceptible to outside influences, allowing programming to have a greater impact on them.
- In most cases, offenders in boot camp facilities receive more treatment (counseling or education) than they would in regular prison facilities.

It would be unreasonable to expect boot camp programs to reverse in 90 to 120 days an offender's lifetime of poor physical conditioning, failure in school, and negative experience with law enforcement and the entire criminal justice system. The criminal justice system has had little impact on these offenders through the more routine methods employed by probation and short-term incarceration in local jails.

However, as Hengesh (1991) points out, perhaps the role of the correctional boot camp is much like that of its model in the military, that is, providing a strong



foundation of discipline, responsibility, and self-esteem that can be built upon in followup training and treatment. Once the stripping away of the resentment of authority and the false pride of a criminal lifestyle is completed, counseling and educational programming, along with work and military discipline, can start developing self-esteem, self-discipline, and experience with success.

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CHAPTER 6

Bureau of Prisons: Expanding Intermediate Sanctions Through Intensive Confinement Centers

by Jody Klein-Saffran, Ph.D.

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The Federal Bureau of Prisons has two shock incarceration facilities, the Intensive Confinement Center (ICC) for men at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and the Intensive Confinement Center for women at Bryan, Texas. Both are adjacent or attached to Federal correctional institutions and contain a slightly older population (average age: 27) than State-administered boot camps. All participants are volunteers for the program, 90 percent of them committed directly by the court and the rest drawn from already incarcerated inmates. The Federal Government's ICC program shares many of the features of State programs but does not incorporate summary punishments or result in a reduction of participants' sentences. Through a daily regimen of physical training, work assignments, education, vocational training, and substance abuse treatment, the program seeks to improve offenders' decisionmaking, self-direction, and self-image and help them gain permanent employment. The 6-month incarceration period at the ICC facilities is followed by a community corrections period during which participants finish out their sentences, first at a halfway house and subsequently under home confinement. The overall objective of the ICC program is to change offenders' behavior so they will reduce their involvement in crime and become safely reintegrated into the community.

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The U.S. Bureau of Prisons' Intensive Confinement Center (ICC) program shares with State shock incarceration programs the same primary goal: to change offenders' behavior and ultimately reduce their involvement in criminal activity without compromising public safety.

Yet there are several important differences between the Federal and State programs. First, inmates tend to be older at the Federal level than at the State level. The average age for an ICC male participant is 27 in comparison to the average age for participants at the State level, which is between 19 and 20 (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994). Second, whereas most States reduce the sentences of boot camp participants, the Federal Government does not. Third, the Federal program does not use summary punishments by staff (as is done in some State boot camps) because it is inconsistent with Bureau of Prisons policy on inmate discipline, which follows due process procedures and carefully prescribes appropriate sanctions for acts of misconduct (Klein-Saffran, 1991).

A fourth difference between the Federal ICC and many State programs is that the ICC places a considerable emphasis on nonmilitary rehabilitative activities in contrast with many State programs that focus primarily on military-type activities. ICC participants spend roughly 3 to 4 hours each day in various types of programs such as life skills, health and nutrition, substance abuse counseling, and adult basic education and GED (general equivalency diploma) instruction. A fifth difference, unique to the Federal program, is the community corrections component. All inmates who graduate from the ICC spend the remainder of their sentences in a halfway house (community corrections center) followed by home confinement. Although this component shares the objective of State aftercare programs, it provides a far more controlled environment.

The Federal Intensive Confinement Center Programs

Consistent with the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Bureau of Prisons' Intensive Confinement Center at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, was established adjacent to the U.S. Penitentiary and began accepting male participants in that same year. ICC Lewisburg is designed to incarcerate 192 adult male Federal offenders. In July 1992, an ICC for women was established on the grounds of the Federal Correctional Institution in Bryan, Texas. ICC Bryan is designed to hold 120 adult female offenders in dormitory-style barracks.

As with all Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities, the ICC's mission is to maintain custody of inmates in an environment that is safe, secure, and humane. Both ICC Lewisburg and ICC Bryan were developed to direct offenders' behavior along prosocial lines without compromising public safety. Each ICC facility is purposely spartan and restrictive. In a highly structured environment, the ICC offers a specialized program consisting of a daily regimen of physical training, labor-intensive



Women at the Intensive Confinement Center in Bryan, Texas, do military drill in addition to 3 or 4 hours a day in educational, health, and rehabilitative programs.

work assignments 6 days per week, education and vocational training, substance abuse treatment, and life skills programs conducive to a successful reintegration into mainstream community life.

Each training cycle lasts 180 days. Program entrance is voluntary, and inmates who successfully complete the program are given the opportunity to serve the remainder of their sentence—a portion greater than otherwise would be possible—in a community-based program. This community component is designed to help offenders consolidate and sustain the gains they make during their incarceration.

Program Foundation and Philosophy

ICC program objectives are to help offenders develop responsible decisionmaking, self-direction, and a positive self-image, and obtain and keep a job. The intensive discipline, work, and program components of the regimen are designed to fulfill the decisionmaking, self-direction, and positive self-image objectives. Life skills classes and the postrelease community corrections component help participants attain the employment objective.

Bureau of Prisons management philosophy focuses not only on humane care but also on the promotion of positive interaction between staff and inmates. The use of summary and group punishment in some boot camp programs is considered inconsistent with this philosophy and with BOP's policy of providing prescribed, appropriate sanctions for acts of misconduct. In both the Bryan and Lewisburg facilities, BOP has attempted to blend the more positive elements of the boot camp approach to discipline with the traditional components of inmate management.

There are differences, however, in how the programs in the two facilities deal with inmates. For example, in establishing the program at ICC Bryan, BOP considered the particular concerns of female offenders with regard to interpersonal relationships, psychological issues, family ties, and similar matters. Perceiving that many



female inmates lack self-confidence, Bryan staff encourage them to take more control over their lives. A greater effort is made to offer programs that strengthen their self-esteem, help them deal with domestic violence, and promote their parenting skills. Although less emphasis is placed on military drill than at the male ICC, this aspect of boot camp training has proved surprisingly popular with the female participants.

While the two ICC programs differ in the respects mentioned, there are greater differences between the ICC and regular prisons, primarily with respect to mandatory classes to improve life skills, fitness, health, and nutrition, as well as substance abuse counseling sessions. In addition, the ICC inmates are taught to work together as a team, whereas in regular prison this is discouraged. In fact, the unspoken rule of “doing your own time” remains a strong component of the standard prison culture. At the ICC facilities, correctional officers are expected to establish close working relationships with inmates and gain more knowledge about their charges than would be the case in a typical prison facility.

Eligibility Criteria and the Screening Process

There are five basic eligibility criteria for initial court commitment designations to the ICC program. An individual must:

- Be serving a sentence of 12 to 30 months.
- Be serving a first incarceration sentence or have a minor history of prior incarcerations (e.g., for personal drug use or minor property offenses).
- Pose a minimum security risk.

Dormitory facilities at
ICC Bryan resemble
those of military boot
camps.





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- Lack medical restrictions.
 - Volunteer for participation in the program.

For ICC Lewisburg, males must be 35 years old or younger on program entry.¹

The original intent was for Bureau of Prisons regional office staff to identify candidates for the ICC program, with the concurrence of the sentencing judge. Optimally, all candidates for the ICC program were to be new court commitments meeting the eligibility criteria outlined above. When the ICC program started, however, only a few eligible court commitments were available. An administrative decision was therefore made to obtain volunteers for the program from persons incarcerated in minimum security facilities who met the eligibility criteria. Both ICC Lewisburg and Bryan now draw on offenders who are serving 12- to 60-month sentences at Federal institutions. However, direct court commitments currently account for over 90 percent of admissions to the ICC facilities.

The ICC population differs in some respects from the overall Bureau of Prisons population. This is illustrated in exhibit 1, which compares offender profiles for ICC inmates with those of the general male and female inmate populations. This program's purpose is to place offenders in a highly structured, no-frills environment for teaching self-control and discipline, thereby reducing the potential for future incarceration.

Initial designees may be rejected if they fail to meet the established criteria. The ICC Administrator has the option of terminating participants who fail to perform appropriately. Inmates who do not fully complete the program are reassigned to an appropriate facility and serve the imposed sentence without benefit of the special incentives derived from participating in the program.

Admissions, Orientation, and Daily Schedule

Once inmates arrive at an ICC facility, they are appointed to a team and participate in a 2-week admission and orientation (A&O) program. The A&O program familiarizes them with the mission, purpose, and scope of the facility and with the programs they will participate in. Each team consists of 40 to 55 participants who go through A&O and the ICC 6-month program together. During A&O, staff tell the inmates about the daily routine and the benefits of participating in the ICC program. Exhibit 2 presents a typical weekday schedule.

**Exhibit 1. Comparison Between All Male and Female Inmates
and ICC Participants for Selected Characteristics, May 1995**

	All Male Inmates (N=81,748)	ICC Males (N=174)	All Female Inmates (N=6,216)	ICC Females (N=117)
Average Age in Yrs.	37	27	37	31
Race (percent)				
White	60	64	58	61
African American/Other	39	36	42	39
Offense (percent)				
Drug	60	82	70	73
Property	5	1	6	2
Extortion/Fraud	6	12	10	16
Robbery	11	2	4	0
Violent	3	0	2	0
Firearms	10	1	4	0
Other	5	2	4	9
Inmate Security (percent)				
Minimum	28	84	66	99
Low	27	16	26	1
Medium	25			
High	13			
Unassigned	7			

Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. Not all offense categories are reported.

Percentages are based on the total number of inmates for whom information was available.

Community Corrections

After completing the 6-month intensive confinement period, inmates are transferred to a halfway house, or community corrections center (CCC). At the CCC, inmates progress through phases of increasing freedom based on demonstrated personal responsibility and commitment to law-abiding behavior. In most cases, the CCC phase ends with a period of home confinement supervised by CCC staff (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1992). In addition, inmates with a history of drug and alcohol abuse are required to participate in Transitional Services, a program that offers



inmates drug and alcohol treatment during the halfway house (CCC) period of their sentences.

Arrival at a CCC marks the beginning of phase I (the CCC component) of the postincarceration period. The inmate is initially placed in the Community Corrections Center. In this first phase, the inmate is expected to maintain regular employment in the community but remain at the center at all other times unless authorized to leave for religious or other special program purposes. All family visits and leisure activities occur at the center.

Exhibit 2. Typical Weekday at the ICC

5 a.m.	Wakeup call, physical training period, breakfast, inspection of living quarters.
8 a.m.	Work, education, or counseling assignments and military drill exercises, before and after lunch.
4:30 p.m.	Physical training, military style.
5:30 p.m.	Dinner, followed by educational classes or team activities for improving personal habits, team spirit, and military drill skills.
8:45 p.m.	End of workday.
10:00 p.m.	Lights out.

Source: Klein-Saffran, Chapman, and Jeffers, 1993.

Those who adjust satisfactorily may progress to the prerelease component (phase II). During this period, inmates have greater access to the community and may visit family and friends outside the center until the evening curfew. They also become eligible for weekend passes and furloughs. Successful completion of phase II allows inmates to be considered for home confinement, phase III, whereby they live at home for the remainder of the term, under certain restrictions and reporting requirements (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1992).

Generally, progression through the phases depends on an inmate's favorable adjustment. An inmate who fails to comply with CCC or home confinement program requirements may be placed in a more restrictive program phase or terminated from community corrections programs altogether and returned to a regular correctional institution for the remainder of the sentence.



Status of Program Participants

A total of 1,015 males graduated between Team 1's graduation in ICC Lewisburg in July 1991 through Team 22's graduation in December 1994. Approximately 9 percent (94) failed during their first 6 months in the halfway house, and approximately 6 percent (70) failed after 6 months. Exhibit 3 presents reasons for these failures. Reasons for the 10 arrests included driving with a suspended license or under the influence of alcohol, fighting, possession of drugs, spouse abuse, shoplifting, sexual assault, and trespassing.

A total of 457 females graduated between January 1993 and December 1994, of whom 30 (6 percent) failed within the first 6 months of the halfway house and 21 (4 percent) during the second 6 months. Two of the three arrests were for fraud. After 1 year or longer, six more females failed.

The Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and Evaluation is conducting a study to determine if ICC reduces recidivism among graduates. To this end, researchers are comparing recidivism rates among prison inmates in the first four graduating classes to rates for a control group of regular minimum-security inmates matched for their backgrounds and several variables. Recidivism was defined as a return to prison from a halfway house, rearrest while on parole, or parole revocation for violating parole conditions.

Summary of BOP's Rehabilitation Process

The ICC program is an intensive application of BOP's general approach to rehabilitating offenders in Federal correctional facilities. The Bureau of Prisons sees the offender rehabilitation process as involving three elements: the institutional experience, community involvement in the offender's life, and the offender's personal actions and personal choices.

The institutional experience. Prisons have the first-stage rehabilitative responsibility of providing inmates with access to appropriate programs. In the ICC, this consists of the intensive program opportunities previously described. Prison staff develop ways to promote self-motivation and encourage inmates to function as productive citizens. Innovative techniques are needed because traditional self-improvement and treatment programs have already failed to significantly help these offenders.

Community involvement. The community has a different but equally important responsibility in rehabilitating offenders. Generally, community support starts with the willingness of family and friends to maintain contact with imprisoned offenders, assuring them that they are still part of the community even though physically separated from it. Especially critical to this phase of the rehabilitation

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Exhibit 3.

**Reason for Failure of Male Inmates Who Failed
After Time in a Halfway House**

Offense	6 Months or Less		6 Months or More	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Drug	27	28.7	33	47.1
Unaccountable	21	22.3	8	11.4
Alcohol	16	17.0	7	10.0
Escape	13	13.8	9	12.9
Other	8	8.5	8	11.4
Arrests	6	6.4	4	5.7
Threats/Violence	3	3.2	1	1.4
Total	94	99.9	70	99.9

**Reason for Failure of Female Inmates Who Failed
After Time in a Halfway House**

Offense	6 Months or Less		6 Months or More	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Drug	8	26.7	8	38.1
Unaccountable	4	13.3	1	4.8
Alcohol	7	23.3	2	9.5
Escape	3	10.0	1	4.8
Other	5	16.6	5	23.8
Arrests	1	3.3	2	9.5
Threats/Violence	2	6.7	2	9.5
Total	30	99.9	21	100

Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.



process are programs and organizations that continue to provide support after the inmates are released from prison. They provide offenders services such as job placement, counseling, housing, and other programs vital to successful reintegration into the community.

Inmate responsibility. The third and most fundamental area of responsibility in the rehabilitation process rests with the inmates. For institutional programs to be effective and for community-based activity to be supportive, inmates must choose to better themselves and not commit crime upon release. The ICC program charges participants with the responsibility of taking advantage of all the resources offered to them as they plan for their release as law-abiding citizens.

Future Directions

The Bureau of Prisons' ICC program has received the enthusiastic support of politicians, correctional administrators, and line staff, who value the ICC as an option for offenders who would previously have served their sentence in a regular prison environment.

As shock incarceration programs become more refined over time, administrators will want to retain those features the research has shown to be effective and eliminate those proved ineffective. Moreover, if shock incarceration programs are to serve as a useful sanction along the continuum of intermediate punishments, it will be expedient for research to extend beyond the prison facility to include followup with community components.

Administrators believe services such as postrelease drug treatment and employment counseling will facilitate reintegration into the community. Organizational commitment to make these policies successful in practice will make it more likely that expectations will be met.

Shock incarceration programs, at whatever level of government, constitute more than just a response to prison crowding and political policy. They serve a special need for specific offender populations. The results of evaluations of these programs that take these special needs into account can then be used to expand program options and maximize positive outcomes.

Note

1. This criterion was changed for the male population in January 1994. Currently neither males nor females have to meet age requirements to be accepted into the ICC program.



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CHAPTER 7

A Survey of Jail-Operated Boot Camps and Guidelines for Their Implementation

by James Austin, Ph.D., Michael Jones, and Melissa Bolyard

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This chapter is designed to inform criminal justice practitioners and policymakers of current state-of-the-art jail-operated boot camps and to provide guidelines for their implementation. The results are based on a national survey of jail-operated boot camps and an evaluation of the Los Angeles County Regimented Inmate Diversion Program, both conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency through funding by the National Institute of Justice. Some of the suggested guidelines resulting from this research are to (1) establish realistic goals such as reduced jail crowding, inmate rehabilitation, and improved jail operations; (2) pretest the selection criteria so that program capacity can be achieved; (3) limit program length of stay to no more than 90 to 120 days so that time spent in jail is actually reduced by program participation; (4) establish a strong aftercare component so that the positive effects of the program's rehabilitative services can be maintained; and (5) conduct periodic evaluations of program operations and impact so that the effectiveness of jail boot camps can be determined.

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To date, most attention has been directed to boot camps as an intermediate sanction in State prison systems. Typically, these State prison-operated boot camps target offenders who would spend at least a year in prison had the boot camp sanction not been available to either the courts or the State prison system.

Most recently, there has been increased interest and activity in the use of boot camps for jail populations. Often neglected and misunderstood by the public, the Nation's jail system consists of approximately 3,500 adult detention systems that process 10.27 million cases each year.¹ On any given day nearly 490,000 pretrial or sentenced inmates are housed in jails.² In terms of numbers, the Nation's jails touch more adults than any other form of corrections.³

There are a number of other reasons why a jail-operated boot camp can be of strategic value to the criminal justice system. Although the overall average length of stay for defendants and offenders admitted to jail is relatively short (15–16 days) compared to State prisoners (approximately 2 years), jails are increasingly housing inmates who may spend many months in confinement; in most jurisdictions inmates can be sentenced to a year or more. In Pennsylvania, for instance, offenders can be sentenced to from 2 to 5 years. In most jurisdictions, inmates can also receive consecutive sentences of less than 1 year that can produce total sentences of several years without the benefit of good time.

Jails also hold significant numbers of State-sentenced inmates who spend many months there. For example, paroled prisoners who violate the terms of their parole are generally housed in local detention facilities until a decision is made by the State to revoke the prisoner's parole status. Such decisions may not be determined for several months.

Crowding in State facilities has also led to a wider use of jails to house long-term, State-sentenced prisoners (often for well over a year). Nearly 54,000 State and local prisoners from other authorities are now held in jail facilities.⁴

Because the inmate population found in jails is so diversified and differs from the State prison population, program goals and attributes associated with prison-operated boot camps may not apply or may be more difficult to achieve in a jail-operated boot camp. For example, a 180-day program in prison may result in early release for participants and subsequently reduce prison crowding, but due to a shorter average length of stay, a 180-day program will not produce the same effect in jails.

However, a boot camp may be particularly useful in jails for other reasons. For example, it may serve as an effective intermediate sanction for probation or parole violators in lieu of revocation and commitment to State prison. Significant numbers of adults placed on probation subsequently violate probation and are readmitted to

jail to await the court decisions on whether to return them to probation or commit them to prison. Offenders may spend substantial periods of time in custody during this process.

The data in this chapter are based on a 1992 survey funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD). The survey sought information on the number and characteristics of jail-operated boot camps across the Nation. In addition, data from an NIJ evaluation conducted by NCCD of the now defunct Los Angeles Sheriff's Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) boot camp program are included to shed light on practical issues in implementing jail boot camp programs.⁵

During spring 1992, NCCD mailed more than 2,200 letters to sheriffs, jail administrators, and State-operated probation departments throughout the United States to identify the number and characteristics of jail boot camps then in existence. The survey also asked whether jail administrators were interested in establishing boot camps or planning to do so in the near future. Approximately 200 (10 percent) of these surveys were returned, with 10 jurisdictions indicating that they were operating boot camps.⁶ In addition, 13 jurisdictions reported that they were planning to open boot camps in 1992 or 1993. An additional 130 jurisdictions responded that they had no immediate plans but were interested in opening ones in the near future. These survey results indicate that the popularity of jail-operated boot camps was growing.⁷ Since 1993, the Bureau of Justice Assistance has funded three county-based boot camps for young adult offenders as part of its Correctional Options demonstration program. And, as part of the 1994 Crime Bill, the U.S. Department of Justice funded another 12 county or regional boot camp programs in 1995.

A detailed followup telephone interview was conducted with each of the 10 identified boot camp programs to obtain more detailed information about how they operated. Following the interviews, NCCD researchers visited four boot camp programs to supplement information already collected and to learn more from program administrators and offenders about their boot camp experiences.

Organizational Characteristics

All of the surveyed boot camps were funded by State, city, or county governments (exhibit 1) and administered by local sheriff or county departments of corrections. Most of these programs were relatively new, having begun operations in 1991 or 1992. The earliest programs began in New Orleans (1986) and in Travis County, Texas (1988).

Although the programs tended to be located within large jail systems (all but 2 systems had 2,000 or more inmates), the size of the programs was quite small (ranging from 12 to 380 inmates), thus representing only a small proportion of the total jail

Exhibit 1. Jail Boot Camps: Organizational Attributes

Attributes	Travis, TX	New York City—Men	New York City—Women	Santa Clara, CA	Nassau, NY	New Orleans, LA	Harris, TX	Ontario, NY	Brazos, TX	Oakland, MI
Startup date	9/88	10/90	10/91	4/91	4/92	8/86	5/91	3/92	2/92	7/90
Bed capacity	76	300	100	44	38	126	384	18	12	60
ADP—County jail system	2,222	21,449	21,449	4,026	1,940	4,600	14,512	120	352	1,550
ADP—Boot camp	57	210	84	26	14	80	348	15	12	47
Percent of capacity	75%	70%	84%	59%	37%	63%	91%	83%	100%	78%
Annual admissions	266	1,059	210	124	N/A	177	814	108	36	119
Program length in days	90–120	60	70	63–70	90	250–300	90–120 ^a	5	120	56
Average length of stay	120	60	70	65	N/A	275	120	5	120	56
Number of staff	20	119	24.5	8.5	21	24	119	19	7	10
Administrative	5	3	4	.5	5	1	4	3	0	1
Custody	3	101	17	8	14	23	65	6	4	8
Program	12	15	3.5	0	2	0	50	10 ^b	3	1
Total annual budget	\$1.1 Million	\$367,119 ^c	\$858,174	\$507,000	\$600,000	\$879,175	\$3.5 Million	no separate budget	N/A	\$403,423
Staff-to-inmate ratio	1:3	1:2	1:4	1:3	1.5:1	1:4	1:3	1:2 ^b	1:2	1:5
Cost per inmate/day	\$53	\$5 ^c	\$28	\$53	\$117	\$30	\$28	N/A	N/A	\$24
Funding source(s)	county	city	city	county	Federal, State, and county	county	State and county	N/A	county and inmate commissary	county

^a Length of stay is extended beyond 120 days for inmates with disciplinary problems.

^b Part-time volunteer personnel not included in staff-to-inmate ratio.

^c Staff salary only; does not include maintenance costs.

population. The expected length of stay in these programs was considerably shorter than in prison boot camps. Five of the 10 programs had a maximum length of stay of less than 70 days, whereas prison boot camp stays ranged from 3 to 6 months.

Almost all of the programs operated at less than their design capacity, due in part to the selection criteria, lack of coordination among criminal justice agencies, and the fact that few jail inmates would be in custody longer than the expected duration of the boot camp program.

Considerable variation existed among the sites in their staffing and funding levels. Some programs—like New York City (men's program), and Harris County, Texas—had both a large program staff and a large custody staff. Consequently, their staff-to-inmate ratios were quite high.

Documenting the actual costs of these programs was quite difficult since many of the costs were appended to the jurisdiction's overall jail budget. Where such data existed, program budgets ranged from \$400,000 for the 60-bed program in Oakland, Michigan, to \$3.5 million for the 384-bed program in Harris County, Texas.

Program Goals



Like prison boot camps, jail boot camps list many goals they hope to accomplish, ranging from rehabilitation to punishment (exhibit 2). In the survey not all programs viewed reducing jail crowding as an important goal—perhaps recognizing that achieving such a goal would be difficult given the relatively short period that most inmates were in jail.

There is greater consensus that boot camps can reduce recidivism by rehabilitating offenders through a wide array of employment, educational, vocational, and drug treatment programs. These goals are directly linked to the perception that a large number of jail inmates are not yet committed to a criminal lifestyle and can either be deterred or rehabilitated through the boot camp program.

Some of the jails cited less dramatic but equally significant—and perhaps more pragmatic—program goals. In some cases, the jail hoped that the boot camp program would provide a safer environment for staff and inmates alike. Some programs also enhanced the sheriff's public image by having inmates participate in community work projects. Many administrators looked to custody staff assigned to the program to develop good interpersonal skills working with boot camp inmates because they were exposed to a more assertive but personal style of dealing with inmates on a daily basis.



Exhibit 2. Jail Boot Camp Goals



Selection Criteria

The criteria for selecting boot camp participants were quite varied across the 10 jurisdictions studied (exhibit 3). Like prison boot camps, most jail boot camp programs tended to identify youthful offenders, although many had age limitations exceeding 25 years. In particular, New York (men) and New Orleans had maximum age limitations of 39 and 45, respectively.

Although most programs typically selected first-time offenders convicted of non-violent or drug-related crimes, no consistent policy had been developed to automatically include such offenders at all sites. A number of programs accepted State parolees who had not been arrested for a new crime but had violated the terms of their parole supervision.

Four programs accepted both males and females, while two were exclusively set up for females (Santa Clara and New York City).⁸ It should be noted that the New York City women's program lacked a military training component. In general, coeducational programs had a low number of female participants, and some indicated they might discontinue female participation.

An offender was selected and admitted to a program by one of two basic processes: court sentencing or jail selection. At four sites the sentencing court had considerable power in determining who was admitted to the boot camp program. The court recommended that certain offenders be considered by the program staff. After the program staff screened the offenders to verify that they met the admission criteria, the staff made a recommendation to the court to sentence the offenders to the program. In one jurisdiction (Harris County, Texas), the judge could directly sentence inmates with or without the consent of program staff.

In five jurisdictions the jail had unilateral authority to admit an offender to the program independent of the court's recommendation. In this situation the jail conducted its own screening of potential candidates who were either in the jail or were brought to the attention of program staff by prosecutors or defense attorneys.

The process by which offenders are selected can greatly affect the program's ability to obtain recruits from the target population. In jurisdictions that rely on the court, intake may be less than anticipated if disagreements develop between prosecutors and defense attorneys on whether boot camp is an acceptable alternative sentence. Several jurisdictions indicated that disagreements between prosecutors and defense attorneys had reduced the projected program intake.

In situations in which the judge sentenced the inmate to a boot camp, the offender was returned to the court when leaving the program. The court had the authority to resentence inmates who failed the program to a longer period of incarceration.

Exhibit 3. Jail Boot Camps: Selection Criteria and Placement Procedures

Selection criteria	Travis, TX	New York City—Men	New York City—Women	Santa Clara, CA	Nassau, NY	New Orleans, LA	Harris, TX	Ontario, NY	Brazos, TX	Oakland, MI
Age	17–26	16–39	19 plus	18 plus	16–18	17–45	17–25	16–30	17–30	17 plus
Sex	Co-ed	Males	Females	Females	Males	Co-ed	Co-ed	Co-ed	Males	Males
1st-time offenders	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Nonviolent offenders	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Other	N/A classification	Low classification	Low abuse	Substance	N/A offender	Multiple	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Voluntary entry	For some	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	For some	Yes
Voluntary exit	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Placement procedure	Judge recommends with jail approval; judge then sentences; jail also selects parole violators.	Jail selects, no other approval necessary; technical parole violators admitted upon referral to boot camp.	Jail selects, no other approval necessary; technical parole violators admitted upon referral to boot camp.	Jail selects, no other approval necessary; technical parole violators admitted upon referral to boot camp.	Jail selects, no other approval necessary. ^a	Jail selects, no other approval necessary. ^a	Judge recommends with jail approval; judge then sentences.	Judge sentences, jail has no veto power.	Jail selects, no other approval necessary.	Judge recommends, jail approves.

^a Applicants screened by a board composed of correction staff, rehabilitation counselors, education counselor, clergy, and probation staff.

in prison or jail. Inmates who completed the program successfully were either discharged or began a period of supervised probation. Some programs allowed inmates to leave the program voluntarily while others did not.

All but one program (Harris, Texas) required that the offenders formally express their desire to participate. Typically this occurs during the screening process and prior to the judge's sentencing decision.

Program Services

Jail boot camp programming was found to be similar to that of prison boot camps (exhibit 4). The curriculum was generally separated into three phases of activity involving varying levels of military drill and physical training; structured work assignments; adult, vocational, and drug education; and various counseling and life skills programs.

Military drill, physical training, and work assignments were emphasized during participants' initial month. Most programs then allowed for a gradual shift from the physical training and work assignments to education, counseling, and community service activities as offenders progressed through the program. The number of privileges afforded inmates increased as they progressed through the program's various stages. For example, in several programs, no visits or television were allowed for the first 30 days. Thereafter, privileges were increased to reward the participant's performance.

Aftercare Supervision

Most of the programs included an aftercare component. Typically, after offenders successfully completed the boot camp program, additional time was spent under supervised probation or parole. In these situations, supervision was provided by the county or State probation agency.

In a few programs, a probation officer was assigned to the boot camp program to help prepare inmates for their release to the community. Several programs also allowed graduates to return to the program on a volunteer basis to attend group counseling or support groups.

Program Results

Little research or documentation was available to determine the success of jail boot camp programs in realizing their goals. The programs had not developed automated tracking systems that document admissions, services delivered, or program completion rates. Programs that manually tabulated completion rates showed that rates varied from 48 percent to 93 percent. Disciplinary violations were the most

Exhibit 4. Jail Boot Camps: Services, Aftercare, and Completion Rates

Services provided	Travis, TX	New York City—Men	New York City—Women	Santa Clara, CA	Nassau, NY	New Orleans, LA	Harris, TX	Ontario, NY	Brazos, TX	Oakland, MI
Phys. training & drill	3 hrs/wk	1 hr/day	1 hr/day	3.75 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	6 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	1 hr/day	4 hrs/day
Work	6 hrs/wk	3 hrs/day	0	1.5 hrs/day	4 hrs/day	5 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	° hrs/day	6 hrs/day	8 hrs/day
Vocational ed.	8 hrs/wk	3 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	2.5 hrs/day	0	3 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	2 hrs/day	Yes ^a	4 hrs/wk
Drug ed./couns.	4 hrs/wk	5 hrs/wk	2 hrs/day	1.5 hrs/day	4 hrs/day	1 hr/day	1 hr/day	4 hrs/day	1 hr/day	8 hrs/wk
Gen. education	5 hrs/wk	12 hrs/wk	2 hrs/day	1.5 hrs/day	4 hrs/day	4 hrs/day	4 hrs/day	0	1 hr/day	6 hrs/wk
Gen. counseling	Yes ^a	N/A	Yes ^a	1 hr/day	N/A	N/A	Yes ^a	2 hrs/wk	1 hr/day	2 hrs/wk
Other	Life skills, 4 hrs/wk	Community services	Community services, 5 hrs/wk	Personal hygiene, 1 hr/day	N/A	Community services, 1 hr/day	Life skills, 2 hrs/day	Health education, 2 hrs/wk	N/A	N/A
Special aftercare supervision	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Type of supervision	Depends on risk level	Limited aftercare supervision for parole violators and conditional releases	Limited aftercare supervision for parole violators and conditional releases	N/A	N/A	Moderate	Intensive: monitor devices, halfway housing	N/A	Intensive	Moderate
Supervision provided by	Probation	Parole and probation	Parole and probation	N/A	N/A	Jail and probation	Probation	N/A	Jail and probation	Jail and probation
Program completion rate	47.7%	69.9%	71.4%	79.0%	67.8% ^b	78.5% ^c	97.0%	92.6%	N/A	79.8%
Noncompletions	139	319	56	26	19	38	15	8	0	24
Medical/psychol.	21	13	6	3	5	N/A	0	0	0	4
Disciplinary	114	126	23	16	7	N/A	0	8	0	9
Voluntary withdrawal	0	169	22	0	7	0	0	0	0	11
Other	4	11 ^d	5 ^d	7 ^e	0	38 ^f	15 ^g	0	0	0

^a Hours not available.

^b Reflects those still successfully enrolled in program;
none have completed program to date.

^c Reflects those still successfully enrolled in program;
no 1992 completions to date.

^d Legal.

^e Sentence served prior to program completion.

^f Includes medical and disciplinary; breakdown not available.

^g Probation absconders.

frequent cause of noncompletion of the program, although a significant number of offenders failed because of medical problems that surfaced after their admission.

There was even less information on these programs' effect on recidivism rates. Only four sites reported a 12-month rearrest or probation violation rate. One site reported a disappointing recidivism rate of 90 percent. Another had a better rate of 26.9 percent, while two sites reported extraordinarily low recidivism rates of below 5 percent. With the exception of the now defunct Los Angeles boot camp program, none has undergone any formal, independent study or cost-effectiveness evaluation.

A Boot Camp That Didn't Work: The RID Experience

In September 1990, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department initiated the Regimented Inmate Diversion pilot program in cooperation with county probation authorities. This program was to function as a viable sentencing option for selected defendants who were likely to receive lengthy jail sentences (180 days or longer) or short prison terms, followed by formal probation or parole supervision.

Funded primarily by money and sale of assets seized from convicted drug dealers, the expressed major goals of the program were to reduce jail crowding, reduce costs through the avoidance of long-term incarceration, and reduce recidivism. An important secondary goal was to improve control of inmates by establishing and enforcing strict rules of conduct.

The program exposed young adult male offenders to a residential, military-style boot camp for 90 days, followed by a 90-day period of intensive supervision (ISP) in the community. In addition, RID required participation in formal education classes, drug treatment, and counseling sessions.

Program Utilization

The first RID platoon entered boot camp on September 26, 1990. Despite operating within the Nation's largest jail system, inmate participation was substantially below administrators' expectations and goals.

From its inception the boot camp facility had a 336-bed capacity, but during the first year the average daily population was only 128 inmates, 38 percent of program capacity. During the second, final year, the boot camp population averaged only 250 offenders, or 74 percent of program capacity.

All participants were to be supervised in the ISP component for 90 days following graduation from boot camp. At the end of the first year, 115 offenders were in the ISP program, only 34 percent of the 336 program capacity. The number of



offenders under ISP supervision never exceeded 200 offenders—about 60 percent of program capacity.

The chief problem was a lack of referrals from the courts. Offenders constituting the target population—young nonviolent offenders—typically do not serve much time in jail for their crimes. Neither prosecutors, defense attorneys, nor offenders had much incentive to participate in RID. For example, in Los Angeles County an inmate sentenced to 1 year in jail (a very lengthy jail sentence) typically served about 150 days of the sentence. When pretrial confinement days are credited against the net time to serve, a 1-year sentence can be further reduced to approximately 90 days.

Three specific steps were taken by program officials to increase participation, but these had negative long-term consequences for the program:

First, institutional probation staff were assigned the primary task of identifying and attracting referrals into RID. This meant that they were diverted from their original tasks of developing personalized community supervision plans for offenders, providing counseling, and ensuring program continuity as inmates moved into the community.

Second, the number of court jurisdictions targeted to refer cases to RID was dramatically expanded. This resulted in a weakening of offender supervision and services because ISP probation officers were required to spend increased nonproductive time traveling around the county. As ISP staff became more “thinly spread,” the team supervision concept was no longer practical and was subsequently abandoned.

Third, the requirement of court-ordered participation was eliminated. Large numbers of inmates ended program involvement without any aftercare supervision. The practice of administratively assigning inmates to the program also tended to remove critical criminal justice actors (i.e., judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys) from the vital referral process.

Despite greatly relaxed intake requirements, county officials withdrew funding for the program in February 1992 because of lack of referrals, high costs, and disappointing recidivism. The last platoon graduated from boot camp in April 1992, and the last offender exited the ISP component 90 days later.

RID Program Impacts

The following findings relate to the degree to which the program met its initial goals of reducing jail crowding, confinement costs, and recidivism. An important secondary goal was to improve inmate control.

Did the RID program reduce jail crowding? No. RID was designed to help alleviate crowding by reducing to 90 days the incarceration time of inmates who would otherwise spend substantial periods of confinement in pretrial and sentenced status. However, as already noted, program utilization was well below expectations.

Furthermore, when RID participants' total length of stay in county jails (157 days, including pretrial confinement and length of time in boot camp) is compared with the total time spent in jail by control group cases (88 days), RID participants spent 78 percent *more* time in the jail facility. The RID program actually *increased* the inmate's period of confinement.

However, it should also be noted that approximately 20 percent of the control group received prison terms of 36 months with an expected length of actual stay of 17 months. For this group alone, the RID program would have reduced the use of confinement but only to the benefit of the State prison system, not the Sheriff's Department.

Did the RID program reduce the cost of confinement? No. The program was to produce cost savings by reducing pretrial and posttrial periods of confinement and by reducing the likelihood of recidivism. Analyses suggest that since RID inmates were confined for longer periods than comparison cases, costs were substantially greater than those associated with non-RID inmates. Moreover, the per-participant daily cost of \$64.77 was far higher than that for a typical jail inmate (\$38.25 per day).

Did the RID program lead to reduced recidivism rates? No. Although program elements were all directed toward reducing recidivism, no evidence suggests that RID program participants had lower rearrest rates than nonparticipants.

- Overall, 250 of 528 RID participants (47 percent) were rearrested within 12 months of release from boot camp; the period between release and rearrest averaged 132 days. Of 183 comparison offenders, 81 (44 percent) were rearrested after an average 106-day period.
- No difference in rates of rearrest existed between offenders who successfully completed boot camp and those who did not.

Did the RID program improve inmate control? Yes. One of the most impressive observations while visiting the boot camp was that participants behaved very differently from other inmates. Given the high ratio of staff to inmates, there is little question that inmate control is enhanced in this military-type boot camp setting. Furthermore, it was not just the high ratio of staff to inmates but also the high level of staff intervention with inmates. Staff were encouraged to interact frequently with inmates as part of the military regimen. With regard to institutional misconduct, RID program participants had a far lower rate of misconduct than inmates in comparable housing (such as minimum-custody units). In addition, serious acts of



violence (e.g., sexual assault, assault with weapons, and homicide), possession of weapons, and drug use were nonexistent in the RID program during the period under investigation. These activities did occur in comparable regular jail units.

Suggested Guidelines for Operating a Jail Boot Camp

Although jail boot camps were in their infancy at the time of the study, a number of important lessons were learned about how such programs should be structured and operated.

Establish realistic goals. To be of practical value to a local jail system, a jail boot camp must establish goals that can be achieved. As indicated earlier, jail boot camps listed a wide array of program goals. The most frequently cited ones are discussed here, together with suggested means of achieving them:

- **Reduction of crowding.** Given the relatively short length of stay for most jail inmates, this objective will not be met unless the program carefully targets inmates who are spending at least 90 days or more in custody. These include probation and parole violators likely to be sentenced to prison or to spend considerable time in jail prior to transfer to State prison or release to probation or parole supervision. Diverting these offenders to a boot camp would help relieve prison intake. In these situations, the State prison system might have to subsidize the jail boot camp operations.
- **Rehabilitation.** Reversing the cumulative negative experiences of these youthful offenders within a 90-day period is, at best, a difficult objective to realize. A boot camp program can improve offenders' reading and work skills, help them find jobs, and help them deal with long-term drug abuse. Research findings indicate the Los Angeles RID program was successful in improving offenders' basic reading and math skills as well as helping place them in full- and part-time jobs. Such gains, however, do not easily translate into reduced crime rates.
- **Improved jail operations and public relations.** Although not a stated goal, perhaps the most beneficial aspect of boot camps is creating an efficient inmate work force and safe housing environment. Staff skills, too, improved as officers learned to deal with inmates in a direct but supportive manner. These, plus boot camp inmates' participation in community work projects, can improve the jail's community relations.

Pilot test selection criteria and minimize screening time. Once formal criteria are set for determining which offenders are sent to jail and how long they stay, program personnel need to pilot test their selection criteria and their screening process to verify that the program has enough offenders to approach capacity, and offenders' length of stay in jail decreases due to boot camp participation. This can be



done by drawing samples of potential candidates prior to starting the program to test the screening criteria, methods, and forms. In so doing, jurisdictions can identify problems noted here prior to starting the program.

The time required to identify and screen potential applicants must also be minimized so that it does not increase the participants' length of stay, as it did in Los Angeles.

Limit program length of stay to between 90 and 120 days. To reduce crowding and potentially produce cost savings, the designed program length of stay should not exceed the average jail or prison sentence for the target population. Unless there is compelling evidence that boot camp participants would spend, on average, 180 days or more in custody had they not been admitted to the boot camp, jail boot camps should limit their period of program participation to 120 days.

Establish a strong aftercare component. For the positive effects of the program's rehabilitative services to be maintained, supervision and services must be continued after offenders are released. In some situations this will require establishing a transitional halfway house, residential drug treatment, or intensive supervision for a minimum period of 3 to 6 months.

Evaluate program operations and effectiveness. Jurisdictions should conduct process evaluations that assess whether their program is:

- Accepting the type and number of offenders for which it was established.
- Delivering the types of services it should.
- Maintaining an acceptable program completion rate.
- Effectively working within the allotted budget.

Once these issues have been addressed, more rigorous impact evaluations should be launched to determine the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Jail Inmates 1991*. Washington D.C., June 1992.
2. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Jails and Jail Inmates 1993–94*, Washington, D.C., April 1995.
3. Assuming that nearly three-fourths of the total jail admissions represent individual adults who are booked only once a year, approximately 3 percent of the entire adult population is admitted to jail each year. By contrast, approximately a million adults are admitted to prison each year, according to an October 27, 1994, press release from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.



4. *Jails and Jail Inmates 1993–94.*
5. James, Austin, M. Jones, and M. Bolyard, *Assessing the Impact of a County Operated Boot Camp: Evaluation of the Los Angeles County Regimented Inmate Diversion Program*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, March 1993.
6. In the Bureau of Justice Statistics' *Jail Inmates 1992*, three jail boot camps are listed that NCCD was unable to identify during its survey. These three programs are operated by Tarrant County, Texas; Palm Beach County, Florida; and Ventura County, California.
7. As of January 1994, all 10 programs were still in operation. In addition, 1 of the 13 jurisdictions planning to open a boot camp in 1992 or 1993 began operation in late 1992 (Hidalgo County, Texas).
8. See chapter 8 of this volume for a description of the Santa Clara boot camp for women.

Editor's note. The material in this chapter was originally published in 1993 as a National Institute of Justice Research in Brief titled *The Growing Use of Jail Boot Camps: The Current State of the Art*. This chapter amplifies the original version with a more detailed discussion of the Los Angeles Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) boot camp program.

CHAPTER 8

Santa Clara County PRIDE Program: A Local Boot Camp

by Carole Sanchez Knapel

Carole Knapel is currently completing a Fellowship with the National Institute of Justice. In Santa Clara County, California, Ms. Knapel evaluated alternative sanctions programs, conducted inmate population projections, drew up inmate population management plans, and was responsible for studying new jail and court construction.

Santa Clara County, California, instituted a boot camp at its Correctional Center for Women in 1991. The program's chief goals are to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism through a program that incorporates general education, substance abuse education, health and fitness training, parenting skills training, psychosocial counseling, job skills training, and team-building exercises. The boot camp shares staff and other resources with the regular facility. This 11-week program admits volunteers from both pretrial and sentenced offenders (classified as medium- or minimum-security); selection is made by the program staff and administrators. The program enjoys local criminal justice and media support, and an informal review of statistics indicates graduates stay crime-free for as long as a year, a better record than inmates released from the standard jail program. The program has been increasing its emphasis on improving the education and self-esteem of the women, using physical training, drill, and ceremony as means to achieve these ends. The program benefits from an enthusiastic and committed staff, but issues that remain to be adequately addressed include training for staff and aftercare for released participants.



Until recently boot camps were thought to be appropriate chiefly for offenders sentenced to State prisons, where relatively long sentences, even for nonviolent first offenders, contribute to crowding. The boot camp alternative, which could significantly reduce the length of time served, offered a way to trim both inmate populations and correctional costs for States. At the same time, the intensive, regimented nature of the programs could instill the self-discipline that would help those who completed the program to lead productive, crime-free lives once they were released.

Local boot camps were considered to be ineffective because of the relatively short length of time that offenders spent in jail facilities. In recent years, these assumptions have been challenged, and local boot camp programs are beginning to appear. After outlining length-of-stay issues, this chapter discusses the goals and operations of one of these local boot camps, Project PRIDE, in Santa Clara County, California.

Length-of-Stay Issues

The inmates' length of stay in the facility *is* the first issue a local jurisdiction must address in developing a boot camp program. The average length of stay for inmates booked at local jails is 2 to 3 weeks. This figure may be misleading, however, because many inmates are booked but released within a relatively short time. Other inmates may remain far longer.

For example, Santa Clara County correctional facilities booked approximately 62,000 inmates with new charges in 1993. For those who remained in custody from the time of initial arrest until final adjudication, the average length of stay was 76 days. The average length of stay for sentenced felons in Santa Clara County was 106 days for male inmates and 99 days for female inmates. These numbers present a significantly different picture of the average length of stay in local jail facilities and suggest that boot camp programs may be appropriate for some inmates.

Traditionally, many jurisdictions have been reluctant to accept pretrial inmates into the boot camp program because of concern that pretrial inmates could be required to appear in court during the program and that their intermittent attendance could be disruptive to the program and of little benefit to the inmates involved. In recent years, however, more and more jurisdictions have begun to reevaluate this position. Many jurisdictions have determined that inmates held in pretrial custody remain in custody for long periods of time between scheduled court hearings. Having these inmates participate in classes during these periods could be beneficial for the overall management of the institution. Further, defense counsel have often encouraged inmates to participate in programs that address their needs. If a defendant is found guilty of charges but has participated in a program throughout the period of adjudication, the court may take this fact into consideration upon sentencing.



Although local jurisdictions may share with State prisons the goal of reducing crowding and the costs of incarceration, local programs may define this goal differently, as Santa Clara County did.

Santa Clara County Institutes a Jail Boot Camp

Santa Clara County's Project PRIDE,¹ a boot camp for women, was instituted in 1991 with the goal of reducing recidivism and rehabilitating offenders. Captain Kathleen Barrow of the Santa Clara County Department of Corrections had read reports and seen news coverage of boot camp programs that had been implemented in jurisdictions throughout the country. She noted that few of these programs had been created for female inmates. In her years of working at the county's facilities, she had observed that many of the women who spent time in county jail lacked self-discipline and self-esteem; on release from custody, many returned to criminal activity because they saw no other option. They went in and out of custody on a regular basis. Captain Barrow convinced the Department of Corrections that the discipline of a boot camp program that included educational and drug counseling components could help some women offenders. Further, she convinced officials that if given the opportunity to participate, many of these women could become better able to take charge of their own lives on release. The self-discipline and self-esteem they would gain from the program would enable them to change the factors that were driving them to crime.

When the program began, there was little information on the development and implementation of local boot camps. Thus, the department set out to develop its own plan, tailored to the county's philosophy, corrections operation, and needs.

Program Goals

Since Project PRIDE's goals are to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism, program staff are concerned with the personal development of each participant. The project seeks not only to increase the self-esteem and social awareness of participants but also to modify their behavior, help prepare them for jobs, and reduce their likelihood of recidivism.

All program activities are related to one or more of seven categories that staff and administration members believe are central to the program's goals:

- General education.
- Substance abuse education.
- Health and fitness training.
- Parenting skill training.
- Psychosocial counseling.
- Job skills training.
- Team-building exercises.



These are considered the building blocks of the program.

It is important to note that the county does not specifically mention the reduction of both jail crowding and the costs of incarceration as program goals. County officials and project staff members, however, point out that they do address these goals, but differently from State prison programs. County officials believe they can reach inmates *before* they go through the criminal justice system so many times that they end up in State prison. If they can produce a change in offenders' lives while they are in a county jail system, imprisonment can be avoided. Eventually this could affect the size of the State prison population.

Staff members believe that if they demonstrate the success of their program, they may have an even more direct effect on the State prison population. In California, inmates assigned to the State parole system can be rearrested and charged with parole violations. An inmate can be sentenced to a 3- to 6-month term in State prison for such a violation. Staff members believe that some of these parole violators may qualify for sentencing to county jail and assignment to the PRIDE Program. If the county is able to work jointly with the State Department of Corrections on this proposal, direct reduction of the State prison population could be achieved.

Program Description

The PRIDE boot camp is located at Santa Clara County's Correctional Center for Women. The Center's population averaged 425 inmates from July to December 1993. (The total population of the county's correctional system is approximately 4,300 inmates.) With a capacity for 44 inmates, the program has been running at 66 percent of capacity with an average daily population of 29. Two out of three women who signed up have successfully completed the program.

Project PRIDE is housed in a modular facility located within the Correctional Center but fenced off from other housing. Although the boot camp activities are conducted separately from the activities of the Center's general population, some of the resources provided for participants, such as drug education counseling and general education, are provided by the same staff who furnish services to the rest of the Center.

The daily regimen includes 4 hours of general and vocational education, 1-1/2 hours of drug education counseling, 1 hour of general counseling, 4 hours of physical training and drill, 1-1/2 hours of work time, and 1 hour for personal hygiene and health. Following an early rise and breakfast, inmates start the morning with general education and continue with physical training and formal inspection. After lunch, they participate in substance abuse education, self-esteem training, drill, and further substance abuse education. After dinner, they complete study assignments and maintain their living space and uniforms. No newspapers



or television are allowed, and outside visits are limited to 1 hour on Sunday afternoons.

Selection Criteria

Project PRIDE is an 11-week program. Because it operates in a local county jail, its participants include both pretrial and sentenced offenders. Due to limited resources, there is only one group per 11-week cycle, with enrollment allowed only in the first week. A 3-week hiatus between each cycle allows the staff time to recruit inmates for the next cycle, make necessary program adjustments, and complete other administrative tasks.

Participants are selected by the program staff and administrators. Inmates charged with crimes such as murder, manslaughter, and kidnapping are automatically disqualified. Although other serious charges, escape histories, and gang affiliations are closely examined, women with these charges or histories may be allowed to participate. In general, the women who participate are classified as either medium- or minimum-security offenders.

PRIDE staff members stress the importance of the voluntary nature of the program. One of the program's stated goals is behavior modification, but staff members believe that such modification can occur only when the inmate is ready to change. The inmate must be convinced she wants to change her behavior and is ready to participate in the program. This view is echoed by program participants, who say that reluctant participants—even under the current structure—detract from the program.

Participants are recruited by project staff members and by inmates who have completed the program but remain in custody because of the length of their sentence. Generally, participants must be screened by medical and mental health staff members, must agree to abide by program rules, and must be willing to participate in a rigid schedule of activities. Although graduates are convinced that the program should remain voluntary, they are anxious to help recruit new participants. They believe that once a prospective recruit sees what she can accomplish, she will voluntarily enter the program.

An inmate who wants to leave the program prior to its completion must submit a written request. Security and counseling staff interview her to address any problems she identifies as reasons for wanting to leave. PRIDE staff members believe this exercise is important in convincing the inmate that they are willing to help her do what is necessary to help herself.



Project Staff

Seven security officers are currently assigned to the boot camp to provide security and supervision around the clock. Two officers are designated as program coordinators to provide day-to-day program administration.

Staff members are selected for the program through a written application and interview process. Selections are based on the applicant's dedication to program principles and willingness to work with inmates and to assist them in every way possible to successfully complete the program.

An effort is made to select an ethnically diverse staff with some level of life experience in working with people individually or in groups. Staff members with this background are considered to be more familiar and more prepared to deal with inmate issues. Military training or experience is not a prerequisite.

In addition to the custody staff, the program uses the resources of the Milpitas Adult Education Program, Friends Outside, and other local community services and volunteers.

Program Support

The local criminal justice community and the media have provided strong support to the program. Judges, prosecutors, and other officials have participated in the graduation ceremonies, and the local press has provided extensive coverage of the ceremonies.

Although the program has not been formally evaluated, there is anecdotal evidence of its short-term benefits. In one case, a judge was convinced of an inmate's commitment to change her behavior because of her participation in the program. At the sentencing hearing, the judge noted the inmate's changed demeanor and presence and sentenced her to local jail rather than to a longer term in State prison.

Staff members have attempted to collect as much information as possible on the 203 women who have completed the program. They learned that 52 have been rearrested, but to date no analysis has been made on the average length of time before rearrest. One parole officer noted that clients who participated in the program appeared much more likely to meet the conditions of their parole and demonstrate an improved attitude than nonparticipants. The officer's informal review of statistics indicates that some participants were staying crime-free for as long as a year, whereas before participating in the program they were arrested every 3 to 4 months.

Despite these indications of short-term benefits, one issue raised in discussions with both project staff and inmates was the lack of aftercare once inmates were released. Many inmates reported that they were fearful of release because they had no place



to go but back to their old neighborhoods and friends. Participation in the program had taught them that to live crime-free lives they must break these old ties. Yet many did not have the resources to do this and feared they would return to old behavior patterns.

To deal with this issue, PRIDE staff have developed an informal network of out-of-custody programs that can be resources for some released inmates. Many of the most helpful programs are residential ones, which provide group support for getting off drugs, developing job skills, and finding employment. Sometimes the programs are outside Santa Clara County, helping the women put physical distance between their old and new lives. Program staff help graduating inmates find housing placements and link them with funding and other resources in the community. Out-of-custody placements are rare, however, and the majority of those who complete the program are released without any aftercare or followup.

Program Evolution

Because Project PRIDE was established when little information was available on local boot camp projects, program administrators and staff members depended significantly on the experiences of the Los Angeles County men's program and programs operated by the California Department of Corrections. Once Project PRIDE was implemented, several adjustments were made in the program's structure and activities.

One of the basic issues was the definition of program objectives. Program staff devoted significant effort to defining these objectives, and although there have been modifications in the program, staff stated that such changes were possible because of the clarity of the original program.

One change has been in the amount of time devoted to such activities as physical training, drill, and ceremony. As the program progressed, a greater emphasis was placed on learning and developing self-esteem. Staff members said that these issues are perhaps more critical for female inmates, who have lower self-esteem than male inmates. Physical training and the drill and ceremony are now used as tools to build self-esteem and address health and fitness needs.

Staff Training

Santa Clara officials reported that because of a lack of resources, training was not offered to the staff assigned to the program. Staff members completed a 1-day session with the Los Angeles County staff but had no other training.

Yet the issue of staff training can be vital to the startup of a new program and is particularly critical in areas of inmate discipline. Because of the regimented nature of



the boot camp program, policies and procedures for inmate discipline should be carefully drafted, according to project administrators. These should take account of the special considerations due pretrial inmates, who have not yet been convicted of a crime or sentenced.

PRIDE staff members also suggested that they be assigned to the program on a long-term basis, since they have formed a working team that functions well and could ensure the consistency of the program.

Many Issues Remain

Santa Clara County represents one of only a handful of jurisdictions that have attempted to operate boot camp programs at the local level. Such programs need to be evaluated to determine their effectiveness but have received little attention. It is difficult to demonstrate their cost effectiveness, given their generally limited duration and small inmate populations.²

Additionally, since local jail systems often operate separately from probation and parole programs, there may be little opportunity to develop aftercare programs for those released from custody. Local jurisdictions that are considering implementing such programs should look for opportunities to address the aftercare issue, including opportunities to work cooperatively with State systems. Since aftercare is recognized as an important component in many State boot camp programs, local jurisdictions may want to examine the potential for developing programs that incorporate both in-custody (corrections) and out-of-custody (probation) departments of local government.

Santa Clara's Project PRIDE, however, benefits from a staff dedicated to the goals of the program and enthusiastic about its potential benefits for inmates and the community. The support of the local criminal justice community, coupled with graduates' interest in recruiting new participants, indicates that this local boot camp program merits attention from jurisdictions faced with problems similar to those Santa Clara County confronted when it instituted Project PRIDE.

Notes

1. The acronym stands for **P**ractical **R**egimented **R**ehabilitation for **I**nmates **D**etermined **T**o **E**xcel.
2. See James Austin, Michael Jones, and Melissa Bolyard, *The Growing Use of Jail Boot Camps: The Current State of the Art*, Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, October 1993, as well as these authors' chapter 7 in this volume. See also D.L. MacKenzie and A. Piquero, "The Impact of Shock Incarceration Programs on Prison Crowding," *Crime and Delinquency*, 40, no. 2 (1994):222-249.

CHAPTER 9

The Development of Boot Camps in the Juvenile System: Implementation of Three Demonstration Programs

by Daniel B. Felker, Ph.D., and Blair B. Bourque

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The development and early implementation of three demonstration boot camps for juveniles offenders in Cleveland, Ohio; Denver, Colorado; and Mobile, Alabama, are described. The boot camps, which opened in April 1992, combined military regimentation and conditioning with rehabilitation and a range of aftercare and followup services. Participants, who were all male and ranged in age from 13 to 18, moved through three program phases: selection (including screening and intake), intensive training (a 3-month residential boot camp), and aftercare (a 6- to 9-month period of supervision in the community). Participants were all nonviolent, midlevel offenders, but the three boot camp populations varied in the seriousness of their criminal histories, with Cleveland having the most troubled adolescents and Mobile the least. Up to half of the youths came from families with criminal histories or histories of abuse and neglect. In all three camps physical fitness, basic education, and life skills training were part of each day's regimen. Drug prevention and health concepts were incorporated into various areas of boot camp instruction. The integration of military discipline and treatment, selection and training of staff, appropriate levels of punishment, and integration of boot camp and aftercare are among the issues that emerged as important in the future development of juvenile boot camps.

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In July 1990 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) announced its intention to demonstrate and test juvenile boot camps for nonviolent juvenile offenders. The juvenile program established through this initiative borrowed extensively from boot camps in adult correctional systems. Like adult boot camps, they were designed as an intermediate sanction—an intervention less severe than long-term institutionalization but more severe than immediate supervised release—and targeted nonviolent offenders at risk of continuing criminal behavior. The 90-day programs featured the use of military-like discipline and structure in a comprehensive residential setting and were followed by supervised aftercare in the community for up to 9 months. The programs were expected to reflect joint public and private sector programming.

In September 1991 OJJDP awarded boot camp grants to three groups:

- The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, Ohio, in association with the North American Family Institute.
- The Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile, Alabama, in association with the Strickland Youth Center of the Mobile County Court and the University of South Alabama.
- New Pride, Inc., in Denver, Colorado, in association with the Colorado Division of Youth Services.

The first 6 months were spent designing the intervention programs; the next year the boot camps were operated. The evaluation of the programs covered this 18-month period.

Boot Camp Designs

OJJDP stipulated the basic structure of each program as a contingency for funding. They were to consist of four phases: selection, intensive training, preparedness, and accountability. Within these general parameters, the three programs differed according to philosophy, needs, and constraints. These variations are summarized below.

Program context. The pressures that led the sites to seek Federal funding were similar to those being felt by juvenile justice systems nationwide: rapidly rising numbers of juvenile arrests, increased involvement of youths with drugs, over-crowded juvenile facilities, and the expense of institutionalizing youths. In addition, juvenile facilities in Ohio and Colorado were under public scrutiny for over-crowding and high rates of recidivism. Boot camps were viewed in those States as a possible means of alleviating crowding while also providing innovative services to at-risk youths.

Organizational structure. Because grant requirements stipulated public and private sector involvement, the organizational structure at each location was relatively complex.

In Cleveland the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court contracted with the Massachusetts-based North American Family Institute (NAFI) to run the residential and after-care phases of the boot camp. The juvenile court coordinated all program activities; conducted planning, research, and evaluation; and selected participants. NAFI was responsible for operating the program, training staff, and providing technical assistance. The court paid one manager out of grant funds to oversee the selection process and to serve as liaison between the court and NAFI.

In Denver the Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS) contracted with New Pride, Inc., a private, nonprofit corporation with a long history of providing community-based services for high-risk delinquents, to operate the program. DYS provided two client managers and a project coordinator to oversee operations, handle selection, and administer parole. New Pride operated both the residential and after-care phases of the boot camp program.

The Mobile boot camp was a partnership of the Strickland Youth Center of the Mobile County Court, the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Mobile (B&GC), and the University of South Alabama. B&GC was the prime contractor, but Mobile County's chief probation officer and the executive director of B&GC served as coproject directors. They jointly supervised the boot camp director who in turn managed the program's residential and aftercare phases. Strickland Youth Center provided intake processing, sentencing, and probation supervision through three probation officers assigned to boot camp youths.

Facilities. All three programs modified existing facilities for their residential camps. The Cleveland program, Camp Roulston, used two cottages at Cuyahoga County's Youth Development Center (YDC), situated 30 miles outside the city. The program admitted a new platoon of 10 youths each month. Camp Roulston shared classrooms, gymnasium, medical care, and food service with the YDC, but commingling was minimized and Roulston's cottages were separate from YDC facilities. Aftercare services were coordinated from a facility in downtown Cleveland.

The Denver program, Camp Foxfire, operated out of a building at the DYS Mount View Youth Services Center, where a regional detention center and the DYS Assessment Center were also based. Located on the outskirts of Denver, the facility consisted of a common day room, single sleeping rooms, a dining area, classroom space, staff offices, grounds for an obstacle course, and a fenced courtyard. Facilities were sufficient to handle intake of 12 youths every 6 weeks. Aftercare services were run by Wyatt Academy in downtown Denver.



The Mobile program, Environmental Youth Corps, shared the grounds of the Strickland Youth Center with Mobile County's juvenile court and detention center. Each month the program admitted a cohort of 13 youths, housed in a separate barracks-like building. Two nearby trailers were used for classrooms and administrative offices. There was an outdoor obstacle course adjacent to the trailers and an area for outdoor work and program activities 5 miles from the compound. Aftercare services were decentralized, operating from seven Boys and Girls Clubs in greater Mobile.

Staffing. Exhibit 1 summarizes staffing levels at the programs. The cognizant juvenile justice agency provided additional administrative and coordinating staff support at each site. Cleveland and Mobile had the largest staffs with 22 and 21 members respectively for the residential phase. In contrast, Denver had only 12 staff members. Drill instructors made up the majority of all three programs' staff. The bed-to-staff ratio was considerably lower in Cleveland than it was in the other two sites, but because both Denver and Mobile never operated at capacity, the participant-to-staff ratios there equaled the ratio in Cleveland.

Exhibit 1. Staffing at Three Residential Juvenile Boot Camps

Staff Position	Cleveland	Denver	Mobile
Commander/Director	1	1	1
Drill Instructors	16*	5	9
Night Security Guards	—	2	3
Client Managers	1	2	2-3
Educational/Life Skills Staff	3**	2	4
Administrative Personnel	1	—	1
Total Staff	22	12	20-21
Bed-to-Staff Ratio	1.2	2	2.4
Average Participant-to-Staff Ratio	1.1	1.3	1.2

* Supplemented occasionally by part-time staff.

** Educational program provided by subcontract with an alternative education center.



Operation of Juvenile Boot Camps

The boot camps had 6 months to flesh out policies and procedures and to prepare their facilities before they began accepting youths in April 1992. The programs combined military regimentation and conditioning with rehabilitation and a range of aftercare and followup services. Youths moved through three program phases:

- **Selection**, including screening and intake.
- **Intensive training**, a 3-month residential boot camp.
- **Aftercare**, a 6- to 9-month period of supervision in the community.

Screening criteria. In accordance with boot camps' status as "intermediate sanctions," OJJDP specified that the camps serve mid-level offenders, defined as non-violent youths whom the court considered eligible for confinement in a boot camp program. The programs met the nonviolent criterion by excluding offenders who had committed offenses on a proscribed list—murder, manslaughter, sex offenses, aggravated arson, and kidnapping. Denver and Mobile also excluded felony assaults. Mobile added robberies and burglaries to its proscribed list, preferring a less serious pool of offenders.

Only Cleveland selected youths who would otherwise have had a residential placement either at a State DYS facility or at a county correctional facility. Denver



The demands of boot camp dictated stringent medical and psychological screening to ensure the youths' physical fitness.





targeted youths committed to the State DYS and also youths placed on probation by the local juvenile court. Mobile defined its pool of eligible youths on a different basis, targeting those who had failed on probation and had a recommendation from a probation officer. All of the programs refused to accept escape risks or youths rated unacceptable for minimum security status.

The demands of boot camp dictated stringent medical and psychological screening. All three programs required participants to take medical examinations before assignment to ensure their physical fitness. Although the camps accepted youths with alcohol and drug abuse problems, they excluded those who required detoxification. Youths whose psychological assessment indicated serious mental disturbance or problems were also excluded.

Only male youths were eligible for the camps, and ages ranged from 13 to 17 in Mobile, 14 to 17 in Cleveland, and 14 to 18 in Denver. Although voluntary participation is typical of adult boot camp programs, it was required only for the Cleveland camp. Staff there perceived voluntary participation to have programmatic benefits as a motivational tool for youths. There was concern in both Denver and Mobile that the incentive to participate would not be as strong for juvenile offenders as it is for adults, who accept boot camp in lieu of longer prison terms, and that they would not have enough volunteers. Moreover, in Mobile, judges viewed voluntary participation as a limit on their judicial discretion.

Over the first year of operation the programs adjusted their selection criteria. Some sites found medical screening to be insufficient, failing in some cases to detect serious health problems. All of the sites initially admitted youths they could not control and tried to avoid this problem early in the program by eliminating participants with a history of fighting. Cleveland, however, relaxed the nonviolent criterion to include youths who had committed excluded offenses as long as those offenses were not the committing offenses for boot camp.

Because youths entered the boot camps in platoons of 10 to 13, the selection process had to occur early enough to identify sufficient numbers of youths by the transfer date to the boot camp program. In Cleveland, since youths are held in detention during the screening process, early selection placed a burden on the detention center. Although detention space became an issue only in Cleveland, all of the programs had to tinker with the selection timing, criteria, and process during their first 6 months of operation.

Screening results. As exhibit 2 shows, during the camps' first year of operation—April 1992 to March 1993—screening criteria yielded an all-male population predominantly composed of older, minority youths. Mobile drew a slightly younger recruit class with an average age of 15.6 (compared to 16.5 in Cleveland and Denver). The majority of boot camp enrollees in Cleveland and Mobile were African American, while in Denver they were more diverse: 35 percent were African

American, 35 percent white, 22 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent Native American and Asian.

The criminal records of youths in the boot camps, shown in exhibit 3, differed across sites. Of Mobile recruits, 73.8 percent were on probation or parole when arrested for the offense that led to their boot camp sentence—not surprising given that Mobile intentionally targeted youths who had broken the conditions of their probation. Similarly, 73.7 percent of Cleveland youths were on probation or parole before entering the program. Denver drew a lower proportion of its participants, 61.4 percent, from a parole/probation population.

**Exhibit 2. Percentage of Boot Camp Youths,
by Age and Race—Year 1**

	Cleveland n=119	Denver n=76	Mobile n=122
Age	13–14	4.2	23.0
	15–16	42.9	52.5
	17–19	52.9	24.6
	Mean	16.5	15.6
Race	African American	79.7	63.9
	White	18.6	36.1
	Hispanic	1.7	—
	Other	—	—
*(n=118)		(n=74)	

* Parentheses indicate number of cases with complete data.

The instant offense (offense prompting boot camp entry) was a violation of probation or court order for 37.7 percent of youths in Mobile, including 9 percent for violations of CHINS (children in need of supervision) court orders,¹ for 29.3 percent in Denver, and for 22.7 percent in Cleveland. Approximately half of the participants in both Denver and Mobile were brought in on felonies, which were primarily property offenses because selection criteria excluded most felony offenses against persons. Cleveland selected youths with more serious offenses: 72.4 percent came in on felony offenses; 16.8 percent came in on felony offenses against persons.

Exhibit 3. Criminal Histories of Boot Camp Youths—Year 1

	Cleveland (n=118)	Denver (n=75)	Mobile (n=122)
Status in Juvenile Justice System Upon Arrest for Boot Camp Offense			
No involvement	16.9	9.3	10.7
Pending charges	3.4	9.3	3.3
On probation or parole	73.7	61.4	73.8
Other*	5.9	19.9	12.3
Most Serious Instant Offense	(n=119)	(n=76)	(n=122)
Felony against person	16.8	4.0	4.1
Property felony	26.1	32.0	40.2
Drug felony	23.5	2.7	4.9
Other felony	5.9	12.0	—
Misdemeanor against person	0.8	—	3.3
Other misdemeanor	4.1	20.0	9.8
Violation of probation	22.7	29.3	37.7
Prior Findings (excluding instant offense)	(n=119)	(n=75)	(n=120)
At least three felony findings	19.3	6.7	10.8
Two felony findings	21.8	13.3	10.0
One felony finding	35.3	30.7	35.8
No felony but at least one misdemeanor	7.6	20.0	17.5
No felony or misdemeanor	16.0	29.3	25.8
Age of First Delinquent Referral	(n=119)	(n=75)	(n=122)
9 or less	2.5	—	2.5
10–11	5.0	—	7.4
12–13	21.9	18.6	29.5
14–15	45.4	45.3	48.4
16 or older	25.2	36.0	12.3
Mean age of 1st delinquency/status referral	13.9	****	13.3
Mean age of 1st delinquency referral	14.3	14.9	13.7
Most Serious Prior Sanction	(n=119)	(n=76)	(n=100)
Commitment	26.9	3.9	4.9
Probation plus detention/Camp Basic**	0.0	44.7	16.4
Intensive probation	21.8	***	1.6
Probation	35.3	25.0	61.5
None of the above	16.0	26.3	15.5

Parentheses indicate number of cases with complete data.

* Includes informal adjustments, stayed commitments, escape, residential facility.

** Camp Basic was a precursor to the boot camp in Mobile.

*** In Denver, no distinction could be made between intensive and regular probation. However, the intensive probation program was reported to be quite small.

**** No data on status offenses were available in Denver.

Of the three sites, Cleveland also selected youths with more extensive prior criminal histories. Over 41 percent of the participants in Cleveland had two or more prior felony findings, compared with 20 percent in the other sites.² Almost 27 and 21 percent of the youths in Cleveland and Mobile, respectively, had been committed prior to their boot camp offense. Although only 4 percent of participants in Denver had prior commitments to DYS, nearly half had previously been sentenced to probation plus detention or to a residential placement. Youths in Denver started their official criminal careers at an older age than did youths in Cleveland or Mobile.

Exhibit 4 shows youths' family characteristics. No more than 30 percent at any site lived with both parents or with a parent and stepparent. At the two sites for which public assistance data were available—Cleveland and Mobile—58 percent and 46 percent, respectively, of participants' families received some form of aid.

Exhibit 4. Characteristics of Boot Camp Families

	Cleveland	Denver	Mobile
Percentage of youths residing with			
Both parents	11.9	15.8	15.0
Single parent	60.2	31.6	51.7
Parent and stepparent	13.5	14.5	15.0
Other relatives	11.8	11.7	9.1
Other	2.5	26.2	9.2
	(n=118)	(n=76)	(n=120)
Percentage of youths with a parent or guardian who			
Has been referred for child neglect or abuse	36.4 (n=110)	30.3 (n=63)	11.2 (n=104)
Is known to have a criminal record	47.7 (n=109)	28.6 (n=66)	17.3 (n=107)
Percentage of youths with one or more delinquent siblings			
	43.0 (n=114)	32.3 (n=68)	33.0 (n=109)
Percentage of families receiving public assistance			
	57.7 (n=104)	—	45.9 (n=109)

Note: Valid cases are presented in parentheses for the variable if there are missing data.



What is extremely disturbing in these statistics is the percentage of youths whose families were engaged in the justice system through criminal records or child abuse and neglect charges. In Cleveland nearly half of the youths had a parent or guardian with a criminal record, and over 36 percent had a parent charged with abuse or neglect. These percentages were a little lower for family members and guardians in Denver: 28.6 percent had a criminal record and 30.3 percent had an abuse or neglect charge. Less than 30 percent of the youths in Mobile came from families with criminal or abuse records, but these lower rates may reflect differences in charging or recordkeeping.

By all indicators, Cleveland's program admitted the most troubled adolescents; they had more extensive criminal records and more severe offenses. Mobile fell at the other end of the spectrum, serving a slightly younger group of offenders who had not penetrated as far into the criminal justice system.

The boot camp: intensive training. The most visible program feature at each demonstration site was the boot camp itself, a 90-day, paramilitary residential phase. As in adult boot camps, this phase was designed to build self-discipline, responsibility, self-esteem, and teamwork by employing military structure, discipline, and physical fitness training. Because these programs operated within the juvenile justice system, their military dimensions were augmented by a number of therapeutic and educational services such as remedial education, group counseling sessions, and life skills training. The specific programming mix differed by site.

Military features employed by the boot camps are shown in exhibit 5. Only Mobile had barracks; Cleveland and Denver housed youths in dormitory units. Each program's level of military-like emphasis differed. Denver created the most military environment and Cleveland the least. Although all of the programs employed strict discipline, including the use of group punishment and rewards and summary punishment, Cleveland's disciplinary system was considerably less punitive, using summary punishment only after staff had tried less punitive measures. Denver and Mobile employed a "brig," or punishment cell, for serious offenses, but Cleveland did not. The degree of verbal confrontation and intimidation employed by drill instructors was less intense in Cleveland.

All three programs required youths to perform routine maintenance of their living areas. Recruits scrubbed, cleaned, and polished living quarters and policed outdoor areas. The programs considered work assignments that required little supervision, such as cleaning administrative offices, to be an earned privilege. In Mobile, labor was used not only as a reward but also as a form of punishment. Drill instructors made youths dig and fill in huge holes, a practice later discontinued.

Physical training was an important adjunct to the programs' military regimens. Youths participated in daily physical conditioning activities, beginning with exercises and runs early in the morning. Physical fitness tests administered to

Exhibit 5. Military Characteristics of Three Juvenile Boot Camps

	Cleveland	Denver	Mobile
Barracks-style housing	No	Yes ¹	Yes
Military titles	Yes	Yes	Yes
Military-style protocol	Yes	Yes	Yes
Drill instructors	Yes	Yes	Yes
Military-style uniforms for staff	Yes	Yes	Yes
Military-style uniforms for youths	Yes	No	Yes
Grouping in platoons	Yes	Yes	Yes
Military drills	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spartan regimen	Yes	Yes	Yes
Summary punishment	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group rewards and punishments	Yes	Yes	Yes
“Brig” or punishment cell	No	Yes	Yes
Public graduation ceremony	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regimented daily schedule	Yes	Yes	Yes
Verbal confrontation/intimidation	No	Yes	Yes
Room/personal inspection	Yes	Yes	Yes
Work details	Yes	Yes	Yes

¹For newest platoon only.

participants upon entry to the camps indicated wide variation in their physical condition, which raised concerns about the safety of an overly aggressive conditioning program. However, staff reports and fitness test scores did show considerable improvement in physical fitness for participants by the end of the programs.

Although the programs’ designs included challenge programming as an integral part of the boot camp experience, such efforts received short shrift during implementation. Denver never implemented a formal challenge program, although it did construct and use an obstacle course. Construction of a challenge course in Cleveland was delayed for months while staff attempted to locate funds and resolve location issues with the host facility. Mobile employed a challenge adventure course involving physical activities that demanded group decisionmaking and cooperation



Completing a high school education was made a higher priority than vocational education or job preparation.

to negotiate successfully and a mountainbiking course, but the activities were inconsistently scheduled.

Each program devoted several hours a day to educational activities. The Denver and Mobile programs hired instructors to provide educational services to participants. Mobile also used an individualized educational course, which culminated in passage of the GED (general equivalency diploma). In Denver academic instruction focused on teaching basic reading, writing, phonics, and math skills. Cleveland, after a few months of patching together a faculty using part-time teachers from its host institution, brought in instructors from an alternative school to run its program, which also focused on basic skills. In addition to remedial education, all of the programs offered life skills or social adjustment curriculums.

Completing a high school education was made a higher priority for youths at the boot camps than vocational education or job preparation. To some extent the entire boot camp experience was seen as a form of job preparation in that it attempted to improve youths' work ethic and manners and made them successfully follow a rigorous schedule. In addition, the programs included modules in life skills curriculums on finding jobs, filling out application forms, and preparing for interviews. The transition to work received considerably more attention during the aftercare phase.

The programs offered no separate drug and alcohol counseling sessions, but drug prevention and health concepts were incorporated into various areas of boot camp

instruction. Moreover, the life skills curriculums covered substance abuse problems. Cleveland attempted to develop a positive peer culture by holding Guided Group Interaction sessions each week that encouraged youths to air and resolve their problems. Drug and alcohol issues became more prominent during aftercare.

Each program also included a case management function. Case managers developed and regularly updated individualized plans for youths based on assessments conducted when they entered the programs. In Denver this function was performed by DYS client managers, in Mobile by one of the three probation officers assigned to the boot camp, and in Cleveland by a social worker.

Aftercare services. Following release from boot camp, youths entered a 6- to 9-month period of supervision in the community. Structure, supervision levels, and services during this phase varied across programs.

- Denver graduates attended a special school operated by New Pride for 6 months. The school was patterned after a private academy and enforced a tie and blazer dress code. Youths regained their regular probation and parole officers during this phase, with supervision continuing as long as sentences dictated. Some youths were also required to participate in drug and alcohol counseling and other programs.
- Cleveland graduates attended a day center for 6 months, where they were provided case management and supervision, counseling, recreation, and other services including transportation and meals. The program also created an alternative school at this center after finding it difficult to return boot camp graduates to regular school settings.
- Mobile graduates were given a choice of seven Boys and Girls Clubs in low-income neighborhoods throughout the area to report to after school. Attendance schedules were set by the program and their probation officers. The clubs offered graduates tutoring, recreation, drug and alcohol education, and other special programs. Mobile's aftercare program lasted 9 months, but attendance requirements declined progressively as the program neared conclusion.

Implementation Issues

Designing treatment intervention programs for juvenile offenders is a complicated process in any setting. Even more problematic is developing a program that combines treatment and rigorous discipline in a highly structured setting. The obstacles and successes these programs experienced while implementing their prototype juvenile camps offer valuable lessons to others. These issues are addressed below.



Degree of militarism. How much should a juvenile boot camp be modeled on the military? It is not a simple case of transplanting military recruit training procedures to juvenile corrections. Consideration must also be given to the age of participants and those aspects of military routine that address youth needs. All three programs established structured, military-like environments where staff wore distinctive military uniforms and military norms of behavior were expected (e.g., “Yes Sir,” “Sir, request permission to . . .”). However, the programs differed in intensity, and they all revised the level of military emphasis either upward or downward during early implementation.

Integration of military discipline and treatments. Boot camps are “carrot and stick” operations where education and counseling are embedded in a disciplined structure tolerating little individualistic behavior. The demonstration programs all established clear-cut military procedures for morning and evening routines and for maintaining an orderly flow of program activities during the day. However, military-oriented rules governing behavior of youths during classes, counseling, and recreation had to be worked out as the program was implemented. All programs revised their schedules to optimize the mix of time devoted to rigorous physical activities versus education and counseling sessions.

Staff backgrounds. Should boot camp staff have military backgrounds and learn to work with at-risk youths? Or is it better to have youth service professionals learn military routines? There is no simple, single answer. The ability to operate a program that adheres faithfully to military spirit and philosophy requires formal staff exposure to the military through training or experience. Some program staff members attended special training given by the U.S. Army or the Marine Corps. But by itself, military experience is not sufficient. Juvenile offenders differ from the average military recruit in important ways—they are younger, less prepared academically, and more emotionally and socially dysfunctional. If staff with military backgrounds are employed, they should be prepared to work with juvenile offenders. The programs generally found that the ability to relate to youths was more important for an effective staff than having military or correctional experience.


Appropriate levels of punishment and discipline. The three programs wrestled with determining appropriate punishments for program violations. The extremes were fairly clear: for minor incidents, extra pushups or drill time sufficed; for major flagrant violations, suspension from the program and referral to juvenile court for disposition could result. Intermediate levels of punishment and violations varied across sites—restraints in Cleveland and isolation cells and hard physical labor in Mobile and Denver. It proved difficult, however, to match violations to appropriate levels of punishment equitably or consistently. Violations of probation during after-care proved especially nettlesome. Program staff tended to be reluctant to file probation violations that might result in additional institutional time for youths who did not attend aftercare programs. These experiences demonstrate a need for better



articulation of program policies regarding levels of punishment, particularly on what constitutes grounds for filing a violation of probation during aftercare.

Integration of boot camp and aftercare. Each program consisted of a 3-month military-like residential phase followed by a community aftercare phase of up to 9 months. Program services for the residential phase were generally cohesive and consistent because participants were in one location and easily monitored. Aftercare service delivery was less consistent, largely because delivery points were scattered and involved different agencies and because youths often failed to report at scheduled times. One method employed by two sites to ease the transition from a structured environment to the community was creating a separate school for boot camp graduates to attend. But overall, aftercare treatment should be given more careful consideration during the planning process.

Meshing public and private sector staff. Because of grant requirements, the three programs were alliances of public and private sector agencies. As a result, program implementation was occasionally hampered due to “clashes” of different corporate cultures and lack of shared vision. For example, at times the camps’ military aspects contradicted traditional notions of juvenile treatment, and program procedures deviated from standard juvenile justice procedures. In addition, “hard money” staff having career civil service status had different work regulations and pay scales than “soft money” program staff who were hired specifically for boot camp and paid by grant funds. Cohesive program implementation involving a mix of public and private sector staff necessitates integrated staff actions.



The Denver and Mobile programs hired instructors to provide educational services to participants.



Prognosis for Juvenile Boot Camps

There are not yet any concrete results from OJJDP's experiment with boot camps in the juvenile justice system. In interviews many youths who graduated from the intensive training stage described the program as a positive experience, and some believed it altered the course of their lives. At a minimum, they were proud of having completed a tough military program. It is also known that boot camps can save the system money; how much depends on how expensive they are to run as well as the number of residential days they save.

But the promising steps youths took at the conclusion of the programs will be meaningful only after they return and participate over time in their communities. As the demonstration programs concluded their third year of operation, their challenge was to improve the transition to aftercare and continue the growth at-risk youths experienced in boot camp.

Notes

1. Mobile changed its policy midcourse so that youths who were brought in for violations of CHINS court orders were not eligible for boot camp.
2. Cross-jurisdictional differences in charging and sentencing practices make cross-site comparisons of criminal records difficult to interpret. One practice that can inflate criminal records is that of splitting various charges connected with one offense into several petitions. Neither Denver nor Cleveland split offenses, but Mobile did. Consequently, criminal records for Mobile may overestimate youth criminal histories compared with those of the other sites.

Observations in this chapter are derived from an evaluation conducted jointly by the American Institutes for Research and the Institute for Criminological Research at Rutgers University under the sponsorship of the National Institute of Justice. The full report and a Research in Brief are scheduled for winter 1995 publication. The demonstration programs were funded by OJJDP.

CHAPTER 10

First-Year Evaluation of the California Youth Authority Boot Camp

by Jean Bottcher and Teresa Isorena

Jean Botcher and Teresa Isorena are with the California Youth Authority's Research Division. They have been working on the LEAD evaluation since the program's inception in 1992 and expect to complete their final evaluation report at the end of 1996.

This chapter assesses the California Youth Authority (CYA) boot camp's first year of operation. The program, called LEAD, was established in 1992 with a legislative mandate to reduce recidivism and provide a cost-effective sentencing option. The camp serves CYA's nonviolent and least serious offenders and was designed with an experimental evaluation to be completed in 1996. This chapter documents the program's accomplishments, including the implementation of an officer training model that has helped develop confidence, teamwork, and discipline at the camp; a generally safer, healthier institutional environment, but with some emotional and abuse problems; and short-term reductions in length of confinement, although insufficient as yet to offset increased short-term program costs. The following issues relevant to policymakers are discussed: (1) the forces that work against cost-saving goals in a prison system, (2) the problems of designing a creative, dynamic program in a prison setting, and (3) the need for a solid treatment and training core with aftercare support. Also documented are inherent problems that will make LEAD difficult to sustain over the long term.

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The initiative for developing a California Youth Authority (CYA) boot camp came from Joe Sandoval, Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA), the State agency that oversees California's prison system. A former head of California's State police, Sandoval was appointed Secretary of the Correctional Agency by Governor Pete Wilson. The Wilson administration had good reasons for seeking out programs that would lower the State's incarceration costs, which increased dramatically during the 1980's. CYA's population of first commitments from juvenile court increased from 2,190 in 1980 to 2,433 in 1990, and wards' average length of incarceration increased from 14 months in 1982 to 25 months in 1992. CYA's estimated per capita incarceration costs had also risen rapidly, from \$19,953 in 1980 to \$30,783 in 1990.

In response to Sandoval's request, the CYA established a departmental committee in May 1991 to develop a boot camp program.¹ State Senator Robert Presley sponsored a bill mandating that CYA develop and evaluate a boot camp program. The bill was signed by Governor Wilson in February 1992.

The Presley Bill specified program and evaluation parameters, eligibility criteria, and policies regarding participating wards for the program, which was named LEAD, an acronym for the qualities the program was designed to promote: leadership, esteem, ability, and discipline.

The legislation set two major program goals for LEAD: (1) to provide the State a cost-effective sentencing option, and (2) to reduce recidivism. It also specified that the program be a "treatment continuum" beginning with a 4-month, highly structured institutional component with extensive treatment and military training and concluding with a 6-month intensive parole component with a wide range of services and a relapse-management strategy.

Judges were permitted to recommend but not select wards for LEAD, and CYA was expected to make every effort to retain participants. In exceptional situations wards could be retained in LEAD's institutional phase for an additional 30 days, but they were not to be penalized solely on the basis of not completing the program. The law also specifically stipulated that staff not use corporal punishment or "degrading, humiliating, or inhumane" training methods.

Preparations

Planning for LEAD began in earnest in summer 1992. Weekly planning sessions were held at the Preston School of Industry in Ione, California, the institution selected to house the program's "boot camp" phase. A collaboration was established during this period with the California National Guard, which was seeking peace-time service opportunities. Captain Robert Bradley of the Guard took an enthusiastic interest in LEAD, eventually providing the program training materials and staff



training. He also persuaded the CYA to base the program's instruction and drill procedures on the U.S. Army officer training model rather than a boot camp model in response to the potential problems of inmate abuse.

Military training for institutional staff began in midsummer 1992 at Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento, California, and in September the first platoon of 15 wards entered the program at Preston. The CYA's parole branch then conducted a series of planning sessions that culminated in a manual of guidelines and a 2-day training session for selected field parole agents who were to work with LEAD parolees. The CYA implemented the parole program when the first platoon of LEAD graduates was paroled in January 1993. The Superintendent of Preston and CYA parole officials encouraged research efforts and provided unusual access to the LEAD program, as did all other CYA staff at LEAD and other locations.

Evaluation Design and Methods

There are two legislatively mandated components to the program's evaluation design. This chapter presents findings from the first component, which was an implementation and process evaluation to determine whether the boot camp was set up as mandated and to describe how the program is functioning in practice. The second component is an experimental impact evaluation, which will measure the success of the program in achieving its goals.²

Wards were randomly selected and placed either in LEAD or in a control group, with the control wards sent to other CYA programs using standard procedures. The research team attended planning meetings at Preston and with parole staff during summer and fall 1992, and subsequently visited the operating boot camp on numerous occasions to observe the living unit, participate in staff meetings, attend graduation ceremonies, observe program activities, interview staff, and interview wards, dropouts, and control wards. Researchers also contacted parole offices to interview wards and talk to staff, and they visited both reception centers to discuss screening procedures with casework staff.

Selected wards and control wards were interviewed periodically toward the end of their incarceration periods. Researchers used an open-ended interview guide that included questions about what they liked and disliked about their programs and about feelings and attitudes that LEAD is attempting to cultivate. Wards also completed surveys at various times during their incarceration on their perceptions of the program and its impact on them, as well as a prison environment inventory designed by Kevin Wright (1985) but modified for a juvenile population.³

Evaluation surveys were administered to 122 LEAD participants and 72 control wards.⁴ An analysis of the characteristics of the LEAD and control wards used in the evaluation indicated that the two groups were quite comparable.



Immediately following LEAD's first year of operation, interviews were conducted with 9 parole and 21 institutional staff, including 13 of the 14 counselors originally with the program. Questions focused on descriptive program information and on subjective assessments.

Program Description Findings

The findings on LEAD's first year of operation address the screening and selection of wards, the institutional phase, and the intensive parole phase.


Screening and selecting LEAD wards. LEAD's legislative mandate included the following eligibility criteria: an age of at least 16 (subsequently amended to 14), a juvenile court commitment, no previous LEAD involvement, no commitments for serious violence, a history or risk of substance abuse (which has not been used to exclude wards from the program), medical clearance for strenuous physical activity, informed consent, and parole board approval. In addition, the CYA and the parole board established policies for other eligibility criteria that excluded wards with a primary need for the department's special mental health programs, wards who were illegal aliens, and wards who engaged in serious incidents of violence in the 6 months prior to entry that involved, or likely involved, substantial injury.

Referrals were considered from two sources: juvenile court first commitments and parole violators. Exhibit 1 shows that 59 percent of first commitment referrals were automatically rejected on the basis of the violent offense criterion and the much less restrictive age criterion in the first year of screening. Of the wards who survived screening, about 85 percent were approved by the parole board.⁵ For juvenile court first commitments, only 12 percent were accepted after both CYA screening and parole board review. For parole violators, only 5 percent of referrals were ruled eligible.

The screening and selection process was occasionally contentious during the first year. Staff at screening centers had difficulty identifying a sufficient number of eligible wards and were discouraged when wards were rejected by the parole board. Some program staff complained about "inappropriate" referrals of wards they believed should have been excluded due to their belligerence, lack of motivation, or need for more intensive psychological counseling.

During the first year 51 wards were referred to the program through judicial recommendations, 15 of whom did not meet the established age or offense criterion. Of the remaining wards, 19 were found eligible and 17 were not.

Exhibit 1. Screening and Random Selection Procedures
 (From July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1993)



The numbers on this exhibit are from fiscal year 1992–1993, which roughly approximates the first year of LEAD screening and random selection. Precise tabulations were not available for the boxes that do not display numbers.



Wards return to their living unit from school.

Overall during first-year screening, eligible wards were, on average, 17.5 years old and 40 percent Hispanic, 29 percent African American, 25 percent white, and 6 percent other. Of their commitment offenses, 69 percent were against property, 10 percent against persons, 7 percent drug-related, and 14 percent other.

Treatment and training in LEAD's institutional phase. LEAD's living unit or lodge, Hawthorne, occupies a central location at Preston, one of the oldest CYA institutions, located in the rolling foothills of the Gold Rush town of Ione, California. Three classrooms, a gym, and a common dining room are located a short march away. A path runs beside much of the institution's perimeter security fence and, were it not for the hills, wards using it would be able to see the lodge from almost any vantage point along its course. No other living unit at the institution could be more of a "fish bowl."

The boot camp lodge, like most Preston buildings, is made of brick and stone and was built in the 1950's. Its setting is attractive and nicely landscaped, but fixtures are old and furnishings spartan. The lodge is always kept clean and neat, and its two offices are usually busy. Observers found that wards were usually completing assigned paperwork, shining shoes, ironing clothes, or listening to or waiting for orders. Wards rarely watched television, which was available only for educational purposes.

LEAD's institutional program is run primarily by 12 "TAC" officers, who are classified as youth counselors and occupy the primary staff positions in all CYA living units. TAC stands for teach, advise, and counsel, key elements of the officer role as defined in the TAC Standard Operating Procedures. The procedures, which are in large part taken directly from Army manuals, stipulate that the most important element of the LEAD program environment is the TAC officer.



This LEAD focus on staff leadership is due primarily to the selection of a military officer training model as opposed to a basic boot camp model. It is the TAC officer's role to teach leadership and its attendant good qualities. The TAC officers' role in LEAD is an element of the program that explicitly and theoretically relates to reducing recidivism, which can happen in two mutually reinforcing ways. One way is through the "referent power" of the TAC's, the possibility that wards will identify with TAC's and emulate their good qualities. The other way is by internalizing the program's discipline as self-discipline. According to the operating procedures, this process is made possible when wards experience successes in training and when they identify with their officers. Toby and Pearson made similar observations in their study of juvenile boot camps.⁶

TAC officers report directly to a sergeant, who reports to a captain. LEAD also has a full-time institutional parole agent, a psychologist, three teachers, standard group supervisors who stand watch at night, two part-time liaison agents from the CYA parole branch, and an office assistant. The program administrator at Preston in charge of special units, who reports to the facility's superintendent, is responsible for the administration of LEAD.

The CYA budgeted and enhanced yearly cost of the LEAD program was \$532,500 in fiscal year 1992-93. Enhanced costs are those over and above the standard living unit costs of a 50- to 60-bed unit. A review of LEAD's budget indicated that staffing the additional positions mentioned above has been the program's biggest expense. LEAD's overall budget, including the institutional phase, was \$1,086,300. The other enhanced costs included additional parole agents, an additional parole board member, and research staffing.

LEAD's treatment and training program is organized in monthly phases, visually reinforced by color-coded T-shirts and caps. At monthly ceremonies, wards are



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"TAC" officers teach, advise, and counsel wards.




promoted in color and receive merit awards. The education program has a practical life skills focus (e.g., on health and employment issues the first month) and includes individualized services such as GED (general equivalency diploma) testing and special education screening and tutoring. TAC officers provide supervisory assistance in classrooms.

During the program's fourth and final month, wards perform community service activities, prepare for their parole board appearance, and complete their life plans (narrative accounts of their past, present, and expected future lives that include re-appraising values and developing plans to handle such issues as drug use, sexual relationships, finances, and work).

Daily activities begin with reveille at 6 a.m. and conclude with showers and cleanup at 10 or 11 p.m., depending on the platoon. Other activities include 2-hour evening substance abuse training sessions that use a 12-step model, daily physical training, drill and ceremony exercises, and lodge cleanup duties. Of particular note are tutoring arrangements with community volunteers and the program's voluntary 6- to 8-session bereavement therapy group, which was developed and conducted by Dr. Gary Mackelburg, the first LEAD psychologist, for wards who had experienced the loss of close family or friends.

During the first full year of program operation, 180 wards entered LEAD in monthly 15-member platoons, and 107 wards were paroled. Because of the program's graduated intake process, parolees represented 71 percent of the wards LEAD could have

paroled during the year. Forty-five wards were dropped from the program, of whom 42 came from the 10 platoons that could have been paroled. Based on these figures, the program's dropout rate was 28 percent for the first year. (One ward was demoted for 30 days at the end of the first year but was eventually paroled.)



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Physical training includes a monkey bar course.

Parole program. Guidelines for LEAD's parole program are based on a philosophy of providing the highest quality of services available to meet the needs of parolees. The underlying goal is to use every legitimate strategy in the book to help LEAD parolees avoid revocation and future criminal involvement.

The LEAD parole program involves both an institutional phase and a field parole phase. Two "liaison agents" from the parole program work part-time at the institutional site, acting as a crucial communications link among wards, institution personnel, and field parole staff. These agents are to ensure the promised "continuum of treatment" from institution to field parole; they also supervise LEAD parolees on intensive parole.

Specified service levels for intensive parole in urban or suburban locations are two contacts per week for the first 60 days and one per week for the next 4 months, two random drug tests per month, and other services as needed. Rural locations call for somewhat reduced numbers of contacts.

LEAD parole agents reported providing parolees the following interventions and services beyond routine contacts: substance abuse counseling (46 percent of LEAD parolees), employment referrals (42 percent), temporary detention combined with counseling or "restructuring" (36 percent), alternative placements (22 percent), a 60-day residential drug treatment program (13 percent), required community volunteer work (10 percent), electronic monitoring (4 percent), and a full-time day reporting program (2 percent).

Program Assessment Findings

The report's discussion of program assessment is framed by two questions: Are the program's legislatively mandated goals guiding its operation? How is the program working? Findings discussed below focus on the activities undertaken to fulfill the goals and on perceptions of the staff and wards interviewed. Final assessment of whether LEAD is achieving its mandated goals to reduce costs and recidivism must await completion of the impact evaluation.

Are the Program's Legislatively Mandated Goals Guiding Its Operation?

The LEAD program is a rich assortment of treatment and training activities that, compared to other CYA living units, are set in a relatively safe, positive, and disciplined environment. The program design is not notably theoretical. Implicitly, it is based on the following assumptions:

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- By employing diverse activities along with individualized treatment, the program will reach more wards.
 - Living in a structured environment will rub off as self-discipline.
 - A variety of constructive skills, positive attitudes, and knowledge will “produce” less criminal activity.

The TAC procedures previously discussed, which suggest how wards can internalize new values and behaviors through relationships with TAC officers, do, however, add a theoretical dimension to LEAD programming.

Reducing recidivism. LEAD’s first mandated goal was to reduce recidivism. The evaluation found that the program, as specified in the enabling legislation, had been implemented. It also addressed whether the program was designed and implemented with the explicit goal of reducing recidivism.

Virtually all staff expressed the goal of reducing recidivism by means of some specific treatment goals. Although institutional staff most commonly said that the goal of the program was to save money, they mentioned only treatment and training as methods to achieve that goal. There were some variations in focus among the boot camp staff, the parole staff, and the wards.

Among the boot camp staff, the most commonly mentioned methods of achieving LEAD goals were military training and structure (mentioned by 62 percent); educational training (43 percent); the 12-step drug abuse program (43 percent); motivational techniques and high staff expectations (38 percent); physical training (33 percent); good staff and role modeling (27 percent); and discipline and structure (27 percent).

Most parole staff cited reducing recidivism as a major goal and thought that it could be achieved through intensive supervision and more parole services. A third of the parole staff also said that forming closer relationships with parolees would help reduce recidivism.


Wards indicated in interviews that they generally liked the program and found it beneficial. Those who completed the institutional boot camp phase typically thought of it as an accomplishment in their lives. One ward pointed specifically to a “sense of accomplishment” and added that “most Youth Authority kids haven’t done anything difficult, anything to have pride about. It is instilled here. This is the best thing that’s happened to a lot of people.”

Analyses of selected items from the ward survey and prison environment inventory (see exhibit 2) indicate that, compared to control wards, LEAD wards thought staff were more supportive and offered a more challenging program. They also felt they had developed more self-discipline and lived in a safer environment.


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Exhibit 2. LEAD and Control Ward Responses to Questions Regarding Personal Growth and Safety


I learned a lot from the teachers in this program.




This program has helped me to be self-disciplined.



Wards have to associate with a gang to be safe.



A weaker ward is physically attacked.





Cost savings. LEAD's second mandated goal was cost savings. So far, data collected in this study have indicated that the program can "produce" differences in custody over the short term, but these differences are not yet sufficient to cover the additional costs of running an intensive program like LEAD.

Cost savings can be achieved in two ways: by reducing lengths of confinement and by lowering rates of recidivism. Some experimental study data on confinement are available on this issue, but they are based on very short-term analyses. Data from the first seven platoons and their controls showed that 81 percent of LEAD wards, compared to 50 percent of control wards, were paroled before the end of the first year. On average, the LEAD wards were in custody 8.8 months, compared to 10.7 months for the control wards. Time in custody was measured from a ward's admission to a reception center through September 30, 1993, and included any custody on parole for any reason including residential drug treatment.⁷

Cost savings were then estimated by multiplying the average difference in custody for the two groups (10.7 minus 8.8 = 1.9) by the number of wards in less custody ($1.9 \times 103 = 195.7$ months) to get months saved; and then multiplying that number by the average costs per month of custody ($195.7 \times \$2,303 = \$450,697$) to get estimated savings. The actual savings would probably not be as large as this figure indicates, however, because differences of this type would occur "at the margin," where estimated costs are typically lower than at the base. Furthermore, calculating *actual* cost savings would require including additional costs of the program for both its parole and institutional phases.

Over the course of the evaluation, many factors were identified that work against the goal of cost savings. One factor is a belief in the efficacy of institutional treatment for a very needy ward population. In staff interviews, for example, 8 of 21 institutional staff spontaneously mentioned LEAD's short length as a problem. Even parole staff commented on the program's short institutional program, with one agent remarking that LEAD "needs to be longer to sink in."

A second factor is that wards are often transferred out of the program when they are disruptive. Of the 180 wards in the first 12 platoons, at least 30 were dropped from the program for disruption, assaultiveness, or lack of interest and effort. Such transfers, sometimes called "bus therapy," are essential to the program's overall health and safety, but it is difficult to know where to draw the line.

A third factor might be termed the availability of special psychological treatment programs, to which five LEAD wards were transferred over the course of the first year. In contrast, not one ward from the control group was transferred to such programs, which suggests that LEAD's strong emphasis on treatment has unintentionally produced additional institutional treatment programming. Another factor is the parole board, which retains the power to deny parole following program completion. Despite a general understanding that the parole board would refer LEAD

graduates to parole, one graduate was denied parole based on the need for further psychological treatment, and another graduate was denied because of poor program performance.

Program efficacy was also hampered by parole revocations after offenders were released. Most of the revoked parolees were given one or more chances before revocation, but some simply exhausted the patience and ingenuity of parole agents. Wards themselves sometimes appeared to be willing partners in the extension of incarceration. They occasionally told interviewers that the program might be better if it were longer, and two demoted wards said the extra time was beneficial to them. One ward who resigned from LEAD was apparently partly motivated by his need for a place to stay longer.

Finally, at the department level, lengths of incarceration in the CYA were beginning to decline as LEAD was being implemented, and if these trends continue, they will dilute any cost savings projected for LEAD. Electronic monitoring, for example, is now used as a method of early release to parole. Nine control wards in the study gained early release to parole by submitting to electronic monitoring. In contrast, no LEAD or former LEAD wards were released early with electronic monitoring and only three LEAD wards were placed on electronic monitoring to prolong their parole. In short, maintaining savings in the LEAD program will be an uphill struggle. At the levels of institutional and parole programming, the cost savings goal often seems to conflict with treatment-oriented goals.

How Is the Program Working?

What are the prospects or promising characteristics of LEAD, and what problems or limitations emerged during its first year of operation?

Positive results. In response to an open-ended question about the positive characteristics of LEAD, most staff (76 percent) mentioned military structure. Wards also considered LEAD's military milieu and leadership training to be important features. One of the program's most successful training techniques is the rotation of platoon leadership among all the wards. Wards expressed a clear awareness of how this technique promotes responsibility, self-confidence, and teamwork.

Many staff mentioned enriched staffing patterns as a positive characteristic. On average, LEAD parolees had about two more parole agent contacts per month than did control wards and about one more drug test per month. Moreover, as exhibit 2 shows, wards more often thought that staff cared about them and wanted them to succeed.

More than half the staff considered the educational program to be a benefit, and wards spontaneously mentioned their classes in interviews, noting, for example, the



Seven wards demonstrate the LEAD Trust Fall, a physical activity designed to teach trust. A blindfolded ward is assisted to the top of five log steps. At the other side below the top step, three pairs of wards catch the ward as he falls.

practicality of learning about parenting and budgeting and the confidence gained by giving speeches in front of class.

Another area identified by staff and wards was the program's focus on physical training. An analysis of ward interview data found that wards liked physical training and drill and ceremony exercises more than anything else in the program.



Wards said that they had never felt better or been in better physical shape and that physical conditioning improved their performance in other program activities.

After making many observations and reviewing survey data (see exhibit 2) and interviews, researchers concluded that LEAD living units were safer and had much less gang activity than the living units of the general ward population. On every survey measure of violence or gang activity, for example, LEAD ward responses indicated less violence and gang-related hostility than control ward responses. There were no significant differences, however, between the two groups in responses to questions regarding the existence of racial problems or the extent to which wards liked or cared about each other.

Problems and limitations. A series of LEAD review meetings at Preston emphasized the need to develop more structured programming on parole. In particular, LEAD parole agents commented that paroled wards need more jobs, job training, assistance with schooling, and housing alternatives. Parolees described similar needs in interviews, saying that finding stable employment had been their most difficult problem. Parole agents placed over 20 percent of the LEAD parolees in alternative housing during the first year, and in some cases these placements appeared to have been critical to their short-term success.

Another issue is the need for an adequate number of candidates for LEAD. An analysis of the overall CYA pool of LEAD candidates (based on age and commitment offense) suggests that many potential participants were not properly tapped by LEAD's screening process. The CYA parole branch also studied the issue of screening parole violators and reported that about 40 percent of current parole violators represent an eligible but untapped pool of candidates.

A closely related issue is that of appropriate screening. A third of the institutional staff and over half of the parole agents felt that LEAD wards were too criminally sophisticated, immature, or unmotivated. Administrative steps have been taken to resolve the problems, but interviews with institutional and parole staff suggest that this issue has not been adequately addressed at the program level. The development of the program itself, however, has revealed that virtually all wards present difficult problems in terms of treatment or training, and staff will almost certainly have to develop more realistic expectations of ward accomplishment. However, this adjustment should be made without compromising the staff's ability to use high expectations as an important motivational tool.

The most common, and most controversial, criticism among institutional staff was the need for shift rotation to alleviate burnout. LEAD's original design built three yearly shift rotations into the program, but when the union representing staff counselors successfully challenged these rotations, no other comparable staffing arrangements were made. Although a few staff members supported the union's



position, nearly all agreed that the program was unusually exhausting and that variations in assignment could provide some relief.

Very few staff felt that emotional abuse of wards was a problem at LEAD. They acknowledged the confrontational nature of their military training techniques but tended not to find them excessive or abusive. However, ward responses to questions on emotional abuse presented a different picture. Both LEAD and control wards were likely to feel that some staff got carried away with their power over wards, although neither group typically reported being physically threatened by staff. (The LEAD group was, however, more likely to report physical threats than the control group.) About half of each group reported being embarrassed or humiliated in front of other wards; on the other hand, neither group felt that their program was too harsh or punishing (see exhibit 3). This information, as well as intimations of degrading techniques used by a few staff, suggest that some of LEAD's confrontational training methods should be toned down.

A number of staff criticisms directly or indirectly spoke to the need for administrative refinements at the level of institutional program delivery. About 24 percent of the staff directly mentioned administrative problems, and slightly higher proportions mentioned staff communication problems and conflicts regarding disciplinary procedures. Recent review meetings isolated a leadership-related problem as well—the program's need for a shared vision and shared goals. For example, some staff mentioned conflicts with management over LEAD's level of ward attrition. If everyone shared the cost savings goal, however, there would be more consensus on the need to contain ward attrition.

LEAD functions administratively in much the same way that other living units function, with two levels of staff supervision and standard procedures for most aspects of the program (e.g., grievance and disciplinary procedures). At LEAD, however, daily situations must be handled more creatively to motivate wards and keep them to the program's strict time commitments, and to ensure that wards are not lost to other programs. LEAD supervisors must creatively resolve issues that other programs do not have to deal with, such as being fair with wards in disciplinary situations while at the same time maintaining the program's momentum. Put differently, a certain inconsistency is required in LEAD to handle wards individually and constructively, according to each ward's needs and abilities.


Staff also expressed the need to have supervisors on hand more of the time. This need stems from another area that reflects the differences between LEAD and other CYA programs. LEAD thrives on relationships rather than on established procedures and requires an administrative structure somewhat different from that used by other programs.

This chapter's discussion of cost savings pointed to the many factors that work to lengthen incarceration time in CYA. Given the instability of ward motivations for a


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Exhibit 3. LEAD and Control Ward Responses to Questions Regarding Emotional Abuse


Some staff really get carried away with their power over wards.




Wards are physically threatened by the staff.



Staff have embarrassed or humiliated me in front of other wards.



This program is too harsh and punishing.





Two wards prepare resumes as part of their education and preparation for release.

program such as LEAD, this issue will likely be a perennial problem. However, the program's 28-percent attrition rate during the first year may not be unduly high as long as it is kept in check.

Because most TAC officers do not have prior military experience and because new staff are hired from time to time, periodic military training is essential. A degree of slackness in current military procedures and drill and ceremony exercises was noted by about 20 percent of staff interviewees. Moreover, ward interviewees typically requested even more disciplined military procedures. Although they were critical of demeaning or humiliating tactics, wards were almost uniformly in favor of tight structure and discipline.

Finally, about one-third of parole agents interviewed said that their case counts were too high for intensive supervision, and one-fifth of institutional staff complained about staffing shortages due to limited backup during staff absences and replacement. Staff supervision levels may need to be monitored more closely to ensure that enriched staffing patterns—a hallmark of this program—are continued.

Conclusions

Although LEAD had some notable accomplishments during its first year, the program will be difficult to sustain if some of its inherent problems and limitations are not resolved. This report concludes with five suggestions for program continuation and refinement:



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- Work toward some variation or modification of TAC officer assignments to address staff burnout, a serious problem that will sap the vitality of LEAD if left unattended.
 - Establish periodic program review processes and staff training, as well as CYA departmental administrative support for boot camp staff leaders. Coordinate program services among CYA branches. Experiment with program supervisory patterns and staff leadership strategies.
 - Continue work on a transitional program in the community that, if possible, includes employment. There is simply overwhelming evidence that wards released to the community lack the opportunities and overall skills required for long-term success.
 - Integrate the program's cost savings goal with its treatment goals. While requiring a great deal of creativity, meeting both these needs may be possible through greater reliance on the treatment continuum (from institution to parole), more extensive use of relapse management strategies, and possibly policy revisions that permit LEAD parolees to return to the program for brief periods of restructuring. To lower attrition, for example, referrals to parole could in some cases be made contingent on more rigorously defined treatment in the community. Linking parole to more treatment in this way might also provide more assistance to wards who need several chances to succeed in community supervision. Staff who know and care about such wards might be well poised to help them restructure their plans.
 - Cultivate and maintain positive features of the program. Prominent among these features are the program's safe and constructive environment, and the leadership rotation and TAC mentoring strategies provided in the military officer training model. While the military milieu has something to offer by way of disciplinary structure, it is the positive and nurturing relationships of the officer training model that stand to change wards in a positive and lasting way.

Notes

1. Later that year, the committee drafted a budget change proposal, which is the procedure for modifying activities funded by the State, but before it was approved, the CYA participated in discussions with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, State Senator Robert Presley's office, YACA, the State Assembly Ways and Means Committee (chaired by Assemblyman John Vasconcellos), and the State Youthful Offender Parole Board. At issue were parole board policies, particularly increased lengths of juvenile incarceration and the need for new options for youthful offenders. A compromise was eventually worked out.

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2. Program effects will be determined in the impact evaluation by measuring differences over a 30-month period on lengths of incarceration (the primary measure of cost savings) and on subsequent arrests (the primary measure of recidivism). Researchers expect LEAD wards to be incarcerated for shorter periods of time, on average, than control wards, and that this difference will not be offset by more arrests of LEAD parolees over equivalent time periods.
 3. Kevin Wright, "Developing the Prison Environment Inventory," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 22 (1985):257-277.
 4. Control wards were generally less accessible because they had been sent to CYA institutions and camps around the State. Staff at those institutions were not asked to administer surveys to ensure greater objectivity. Thus, it was not possible to administer as many surveys to control wards. There were no selection criteria for surveying control wards other than their geographical accessibility.
 5. Data on parole board approvals were taken from the program's northern California reception center in Sacramento because such information was not available from the southern reception center or for any parole violators.
 6. Jackson Toby, and Frank Pearson, "Boot Camp for Juvenile Offenders: Constructive Intervention," unpublished paper, 1992.
 7. It should be noted that the first 7 platoons each had 15 wards, for a total of 105 wards. The experimental study groups through the seventh platoon each had only 103 wards, however, due to screening errors that forced the exclusion of 2 wards from each study group (that is, experimentals and controls).

CHAPTER 11

The Development and Operation of Juvenile Boot Camps in Florida

by Elizabeth S. Cass, Ph.D., and Neil Kaltenecker

Elizabeth Cass is a researcher with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, where she is conducting an outcome evaluation of each of the juvenile boot camps operated by the State of Florida. Neil Kaltenecker is Program Manager of P.A.C.E. Center for Girls/ Leon, a nonprofit dropout prevention program in Tallahassee, Florida. He played a leading role in the development and implementation of juvenile boot camp programs while employed at the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

Florida operates more juvenile boot camps than any other State in the United States. An important aspect of these programs is the partnerships local and State governments have created to promote community involvement and the utilization of local resources. The six camps currently operating in Florida are run by county sheriff's departments with oversight by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. Boot camps target youths with a history of serious offenses. The program is designed to "shock" the youths into compliance by strict military-style discipline. This chapter provides an overview of the development and operation of these boot camps, with special emphasis on the State's first program in Manatee County. Drill instructors in the program receive more than 200 hours of training in boot camp procedures. Boot camps have an aftercare component that differs from county to county but generally includes a postrelease day program in the community for several months after graduation from the boot camp itself.

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
Although Florida has only recently employed boot camps as a method of dealing with juvenile delinquency, it currently operates more such camps than any other State. As of December 1994, juvenile boot camps were operating in six counties (see exhibit 1), and three additional camps are scheduled to open in 1995.

Juvenile boot camps in Florida were developed through partnerships between the State and local governments. Each of the six camps currently operating was created through the collaborative efforts of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and local county sheriff's departments. General guidelines for operating these programs are established by Florida statute and further defined in the State's administrative rule, but otherwise each locality is given the flexibility to develop a program that makes use of local resources and involves the community.

Statutory Origin

In 1989 the Florida statute pertaining to juvenile justice (F.S. Chapter 39) was revised, authorizing the creation of juvenile boot camps. The camps were to target "deep-end," more serious offenders, in contrast to adult boot camps, which are typically designed for first-time, nonviolent offenders. To be eligible for boot camp placement, the statute stipulated that juveniles be between the ages of 14 and 17 at

Exhibit 1. Geographical Distribution of Florida's Juvenile Boot Camps





the time of adjudication and have been committed to the custody of the State for either (1) a capital, life, first-degree, or second-degree felony or (2) a third-degree felony with two or more prior felony adjudications, of which one or more resulted in residential placement.

The statute intended the programs to be an “intensive educational and physical training and rehabilitative program for appropriate children,” which would require juveniles to “participate in educational, vocational, and substance abuse programs and to receive additional training in techniques of appropriate decisionmaking, as well as in life skills and job skills. Postrelease community supervision is mandated, and the camps’ residential and aftercare components must last at least 6 months.

An administrative rule was promulgated by the State to govern the operation of boot camps. It set minimum standards for policies and procedures and serves as the foundation for State oversight of boot camp programs. The State’s low per diem funding of boot camps has not covered all of their operational costs. Therefore, local communities have had to supplement that funding. With the involvement and financial backing of local communities, programs could be designed to best suit the juveniles in that area. To illustrate this process, this chapter focuses on the development of the State’s first boot camp in Manatee County, which has served as a model for the State’s other programs.

Development of the Manatee County Boot Camp

In September 1992, discussions between the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office led to the creation of the first boot camp for juveniles in Florida.¹ At that time, Manatee County Sheriff Charlie B. Wells was building a boot camp facility for the county’s adult jail population. With the support of the Manatee County Commission, he agreed to change the targeted population to juveniles to help ease burgeoning residential placement problems in Florida’s juvenile justice system. A program model for a new juvenile camp was developed by a group consisting of local and State HRS officials, Sheriff Wells, and his staff. The design made use of paramilitary structure and discipline but also emphasized education, personal accountability, and positive social values and behavior.

An operational contract was negotiated in which the State paid \$56 per youth per day to the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office—approximately half the State funding rate of other high-risk residential programs. The sheriff’s office supplemented the program’s budget by providing meals, medical services, and a computer laboratory. This type of collaborative partnership between State and local governments became the model for boot camps subsequently opened around the State.



Staffing. The program's drill instructors are members of the Manatee County Sheriff's Office who previously worked as correctional officers in the county jail. In addition to the 411 hours of training required to become a State-certified correctional officer, they received 200 more hours of training in boot camp procedures.

In 1994, the juvenile justice statute was modified to provide for the development of statewide boot camp staff training. The statute now requires all boot camp staff having direct contact with juveniles to complete a minimum of 200 hours of State-approved training, including training in counseling techniques, basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation and choke-relief, and the control of aggression. Furthermore, it requires that all training courses be taught by certified instructors of the division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement who have prior experience in a juvenile boot camp program. Counseling techniques must be taught by staff who have at least a bachelor's degree in social work, counseling, psychology, or a related field. The development of a statewide course will help address staffing problems faced by boot camps that need to replace instructors after initial staff training has already taken place.

Selection of youths. Florida's juvenile boot camp programs were originally designed to be high-risk residential programs. Unlike many boot camp programs for adults, placement is not voluntary. The process of placing youths in camps begins when a juvenile court judge commits a youth to DJJ custody. After a judge orders placement at one of four levels of restrictiveness (designated as nonresidential and low-, moderate-, and high-risk residential programs), DJJ assigns youths to specific programs. For youths who are ordered into a moderate- or high-risk residential program, one option is boot camp.

Florida's juvenile justice statute requires that all youths sent to boot camp be screened to ensure that programs admit only those juveniles who have "medical and psychological profiles conducive to successfully completing an intensive work, educational, and disciplinary program." Programs exclude youths with a history of psychiatric illness or suicidal tendencies, youths currently taking psychotropic medications, and those with abnormal electrocardiograms, asthma, or other physical problems that would make boot camp placement inappropriate. Although not dictated by statute, currently boot camps accept only males.

Manatee County Boot Camp has a capacity of 30 juveniles. Consistent with a military model, youths enter the program as platoons of approximately 15 members. While grouping inmates in platoons is an appropriate form of military organization, it produces certain complications for the State's juvenile justice placement system. New platoons typically enter camps every 2 months; some youths face a waiting period between disposition of their case and entry into the boot camp. Because supervision is necessary during this period, the State must provide temporary residential or nonresidential placement.



The Boot Camp Experience at Manatee

The first day of camp in the Manatee County program is designed to “shock” the juvenile offender into compliance. The day begins when hand and leg cuffs are placed on the youths and they are transported from the local detention center to the Manatee County Jail. Once offenders are inside the jail compound’s gates, their hand and leg cuffs are removed and they are driven to the boot camp grounds. The van is surrounded by drill instructors who bang on the outside of the van and demand that the boys exit the vehicle and line up.

The new arrivals are frisked and marched to a classroom where they receive military-style haircuts. The rules of military conduct are explained, including requirements that each recruit begin and end every sentence with “Sir” or “Ma’am” and excuse himself when passing others. Failure to perform this ritual is the most common reason for admonishment during the first day. The response of drill instructors to noncompliance is swift and loud, but abusive or derogatory speech is prohibited. Pushups are used to punish recalcitrant inmates.

Each recruit is assigned a room and a uniform. (The camp’s living quarters are made up of single rooms to increase staff control and to decrease recruit interaction.) Youths spend the remainder of the first day reviewing the recruit handbook. A drill instructor reads the handbook out loud while encouraging recruits to ask for clarification and questioning them to make sure they understand.

The first week of the program is designed to keep offenders off balance and confused. The expectation is that the shock of the new environment will cause the youths to question the behaviors and beliefs that led to their placement in the camp. They can then begin the process of changing their view of themselves and the world.

After a week of orientation, the Manatee County program’s demanding schedule begins, including training in military-style conduct and the basics of military drill. Youths begin each day at 5 a.m. and end it at 9:00 p.m. Exhibit 2 presents their weekday schedule.

Inmates spend the largest part of each weekday—6 hours—in school. Three and a quarter hours are devoted to physical activity that includes physical training, drill and ceremony, the obstacle course, and upkeep of the camp. One hour is devoted to group counseling sessions conducted by a private psychologist contracted by the camp. Youths also spend 1 hour each day in their rooms, where they are expected to read, write letters, or do homework. A silence rule is imposed with the exception of school, counseling, and, as necessary, during work details. No television sets, radios, or newspapers are available in the camp.

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Exhibit 2. Manatee County Boot Camp's Weekday Schedule

0500–0515	Wake up/inspection preparation/medications/roll call
0515–0530	Personal inspection
0530–0600	Breakfast/roll call
0600–0615	Return to barracks for laundry/roll call
0615–0645	Physical training/room inspections/roll call
0645–0715	Count/correct inspection deficiencies
0715–0815	Flag detail/drill and ceremony/roll call
0815–0930	Work squad/roll call
0930–1030	Obstacle course/roll call
1030–1130	Rational Emotive Therapy/roll call
1130–1200	Lunch/roll call
1200–1300	Personal time/sick call/review team/roll call
1300–1600	School/GED/substance abuse/roll call
1600–1630	Prep for dinner
1630–1700	Dinner/roll call
1700–1900	GED computer lab/roll call
1900–1930	Alternative training/roll call
1930–2030	Showers/barracks and uniform preparation/roll call
2030–2100	Laundry
2100	Lights out/roll call

The program's residential phase is designed to last 4 months. Inmates who in the commander's view have not progressed in that time can be held for a longer period. During this segment of the program, youths advance through a series of phases designated by colored hats. Progress is tracked through a daily contact record book in which drill instructors record the positive and negative behaviors of each recruit. If a recruit's progress is deemed satisfactory, he receives a new hat at the end of the month and is accorded the privileges associated with the next program phase. In the first phase youths are not permitted visits or phone calls except in an emergency. In the second they are allowed a 5-minute telephone call and a 1-hour visit with family members each week.

Youths who complete the program on time attend a transition ceremony on the boot camp grounds to mark their accomplishment. Family and friends are invited to attend, and each recruit receives a certificate indicating that he is a graduate of the



camp. The transition ceremony is viewed not as an ending but as the beginning of a new life outside the camp in which the lessons learned there will be put to use.

Programming Differences Among the Camps

Although the Manatee County pilot project was emulated by other Florida counties, each of the State's boot camps has modified the model to meet local conditions. The Leon County Sheriff's program, for example, has incorporated a second residential phase called the "Community Transitional Program" that gives juveniles more privileges and responsibilities. Youths are also permitted to participate in community service projects.

Pinellas County's program is called a "preparatory school" and is less regimented than the State's other boot camps, with time scheduled each day for recreational activities. The school is conducted without a strict military atmosphere and does not use some of the program's military protocol.

Postrelease Community Supervision

After graduating from boot camp, all youths are assigned to a day treatment program. Assignment is generally contingent on the location of youths' homes, and services are provided by a variety of private agencies. This section provides a general description of services that can in fact vary from program to program.

Youths attend day treatment for 6 to 9 months, depending on their needs. Typically, boot camp graduates are picked up from home early in the morning and transported to the aftercare facility for supervised activities throughout the day and evening. Youths are returned home by approximately 9 p.m. A curfew is enforced, with violations sometimes resulting in electronic monitoring.

During the day program's first few months, youths attend school at the aftercare facility. Nonschool hours are filled with group and individual counseling and recreational activities. As youths progress through the program, they earn unsupervised and unstructured time by demonstrating positive behaviors and eventually return to their local high schools or begin full-time jobs.

During the first 60 days following their release from boot camp, youths can be returned to custody for failing to abide by their aftercare programs' rules and regulations. This option, contingent on an administrative hearing, is intended to give aftercare providers a means to manage behavior once juveniles leave the highly structured boot camp environment. Returning youths to boot camp is viewed as a way to refresh instruction and demonstrates to other youths that noncompliance in aftercare carries consequences. However, because offenders enter boot camps as platoons and progress as a group (with some progressing in "hats" faster



than others), the return of graduates to camps has caused logistical problems. Some camps have elected to create separate platoons for these individuals; others have assimilated them into their newest platoons. Both approaches have proved less than ideal—the first produces a manpower drain and the second disrupts existing platoons.

Statistical Profile of Juvenile Inmates

Between March 29, 1993, when Florida's first camp opened in Manatee County, and August 31, 1994, 262 youths were placed in boot camp programs around the State.² Exhibit 3 presents basic information on the five programs operational as of that date.³ Youths ranged in age from 14 to 18 at entry, with a mean age of 16. Overall, 59 percent of youths were black, but programs varied tremendously in this regard, from a high of 81 percent to a low of 49 percent.

Exhibit 3. Program Profiles						
County in which program is located	Date opened	Number of entering recruits (platoons)	Mean age at entry	Percentage black	Percentage graduated	Average total days in boot camp
Manatee	03/29/93	110 (8)	15.9	54	95	145
Pinellas	11/29/93	72 (5)	16.3	49	94	126
Leon	01/12/94	43 (3)	16.1	81	93	149
Martin	04/19/94	31 (2)	15.9	74	87	145
Bay	06/30/94	6 (1)	15.9	50	100	123
Total		262	16.0	59	94	138

Of the 262 juveniles admitted to the five boot camps, 94 percent successfully completed their programs. Boot camps varied in the rate at which youths completed the program, from a low of 87 percent in Martin County to a high of 100 percent in Bay County.

Of the average of 17 recruits who did not graduate, nearly two-thirds left within the first 30 days. Inmates not completing their programs did not drop out in the traditional sense; the decision to leave a boot camp is not voluntarily made by recruits. The major reason for noncompletion was poor screening. Undetected medical problems were the most frequent cause for removal. A small number of youths were removed for assaulting drill instructors or attempting to escape.

Of the youths completing their programs, preliminary data indicate that 16 percent were returned to boot camps due to disciplinary problems in aftercare programs. The additional time they spent at boot camps varied widely, from 2 to 206 days, with an average of 66 days.⁴ Exhibit 4 indicates the distribution of time spent in boot camp. One issue of particular interest to DJJ officials is whether returning juveniles to boot camps ultimately improves their chances of successful reintegration into the community.




Exhibit 5 presents information on the most serious current offense for which each recruit was committed to DJJ.⁵ Twenty-five percent of recruits were convicted of a violent felony against a person. Pinellas County had the highest percentage of violent felons (31 percent), while Bay County admitted no youths who had committed violent felonies. This variation across programs reflects the disparate placement strategies applied throughout the State.

▲ ▲ ▲

Exhibit 5. Percentage of Juveniles Committed for a Violent Felony

County in which program is located	Percentage of recruits committed for a violent felony
Manatee	22
Pinellas	31
Leon	29
Martin	18
Bay	0
Average of Florida Programs	25

Inmates' histories of delinquent behavior were also examined. Exhibit 6 presents a tabulation of the average number of previous referrals to the juvenile justice system as well as the average number of adjudications in juvenile court. Recruits averaged 23 previous referrals to DJJ and 12 previous adjudications in juvenile court.⁶ It is clear that juveniles placed in Florida's boot camps had extensive histories of delinquency, and 73 percent previously had spent time in a commitment program. For the majority of youths, assignment to boot camp was not the first attempt by the juvenile justice system to change their behavior.

Exhibit 6. Delinquency Histories

County in which program is located	Average number of previous referrals	Average number of previous adjudications
Manatee	26	15
Pinellas	17	9
Leon	28	13
Martin	18	8
Bay	33	16
Average of Florida Programs	23	12

The Continuing Development of Florida's Boot Camps

During the 1993–94 session, State legislators made a number of important changes to Florida's juvenile justice statute that directly affected juvenile boot camps. The most important change concerned boot camp eligibility. After October 1, 1994, the



statute stipulated that eligible juveniles were those who had been committed to the department for “any offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony, other than a capital felony, a life felony, or a violent felony of the first degree.”

This modification simultaneously excluded some offenders who had previously been eligible for boot camp placement—the most violent felons—and broadened the pool of eligibility to all other felons.

A second statutory change authorized the creation of low- and moderate-risk residential boot camp programs. Moderate-risk programs now require juveniles to stay 4 months in boot camp and 4 months in aftercare, whereas low-risk programs require 2 months in boot camp and 2 months in aftercare. Finally, the new statute increased the minimum incarceration period for boot camps classified as high-risk residential programs to 4 months in boot camp and 4 months in aftercare.

The Florida Legislature also appropriated funds to implement a total of 12 programs across the State. Decisions as to which counties will operate camps are made at DJJ’s central office in Tallahassee, and priority is given to proposals that include significant local participation in funding and to those that provide facilities. Three boot camps are currently under development, including one contract in Volusia County held by the State Attorney’s office. A 40-bed facility for young women in Polk County is scheduled to open in 1995.

Future Evaluations

The statute authorizing the creation of juvenile boot camps in Florida directed DJJ to collect information on criminal activity, educational progress, and employment placement for all boot camp participants. Results in these areas are to be compared to results for youths placed in other types of juvenile programs operated by the State. DJJ’s Bureau of Research and Data is currently collecting data for this evaluation.

Notes

1. As of October 1, 1994, responsibility for juvenile justice programs was transferred from Health and Rehabilitative Services to the newly created Department of Juvenile Justice.
2. An additional 17 youths were placed in a Pensacola, Florida, boot camp operated by the Private Industry Council. The program closed within 2 months due to operational problems. These youths are not included in this analysis.



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3. Polk County Sheriff's Office opened a boot camp on September 30, 1994, and accepted a platoon of 20 recruits. It is the only program in Florida designed for platoons of 20.
 4. Some recruits were returned to boot camps on multiple occasions; these figures represent the total additional time recruits spent in those programs.
 5. Data were available on only 228 of the 262 cases.
 6. Data were available on only 189 of the 262 cases.

References

Florida Statutes, Chapter 39.057.

Juvenile Boot Camp Program Manual. Palmetto, Florida: Manatee County Sheriff's Office, 1993.

CHAPTER 12

Discipline in Georgia's Correctional Boot Camps

by Billie S. Erwin

Billie Erwin has been with the Georgia Department of Corrections for 21 years, with experience in community corrections field supervision, as Department of Corrections Chief of Evaluations and as Coordinator of Research and Development. She received The American Probation and Parole/Sam Houston State University Publications Award in 1987.

Georgia's boot camp system dates back to 1983 and currently incorporates both probation boot camps for men directly sentenced by the court and inmate boot camps for male offenders selected from among those sentenced to prison. Both types of boot camps have the same regimen of military-style basic training, hard work, programs addressing substance abuse and other offender problems, and followup through strict probation and parole supervision. Some require enrollment in classes to obtain a general equivalency diploma. Boot camp staff receive rigorous training, and selected officers participate in U.S. Army drill training courses at Ft. McClellan, Alabama. Verbal confrontation as a method of discipline is integral to the program, and all offenders must refer to themselves in the third person during any formal communication. Major disciplinary infractions result in revocation, but minor infractions are dealt with in several ways explicitly specified in the boot camp procedures manual followed throughout the boot camp system. This chapter also describes an extension of the boot camp model to a standard prison, the close security Valdosta Correctional Institution, which formed an Intensive Therapeutic Program within some dormitories. It began as an implementation of certain military-style protocols in regard to work programs, orderliness, and cleanliness of living quarters but has been extended to include an entire system of positive reinforcements.



Boot camp *is* discipline. Before discussing disciplinary procedures in correctional boot camps, one must recognize the assumptions underlying their concept and design. Boot camps are based on the rationale that many young offenders have never learned rudimentary discipline and respect for authority because of failure of parenting, inadequate socialization, or adolescent rebellion. A boot camp is a 90- to 120-day crash program in discipline.

The term “boot camp” itself conjures immediate, usually vivid images in the minds of most Americans, among them one of a platoon marching in cadence under the stern leadership of a drill sergeant. Another consists of rows of recruits or offenders (with freshly shaved heads) doing calisthenics, again under an exacting physical training instructor ever ready to deliver harsh criticism for any failure to perform with uniformity, vigor, and full extension.

Then there is the closeup of a hard-nosed, sabre-voiced drill instructor in a black campaign hat who addresses each group member from close range, shouting a barrage of directions, admonitions, and warnings along with a generally negative assessment of the individual and warnings about the changes in attitude and behavior required to survive in the platoon. These changes might relate to posture, appearance, even facial expression. This is popularly referred to as the “in your face” approach, indisputably effective in gaining the attention of the person receiving such treatment.

Another source of the prevalent perception of boot camps is the previous military experience of a large number of American men. Before the United States discontinued the draft, a significant proportion of able-bodied men from all segments of the population were likely to have had a military experience, often in the form of 3-year duty immediately after high school or college. Many remember this as the time when they learned to conform to tough discipline and associate the experience with their passage into manhood and responsible citizenship.

Although these images may be extremely popular and useful as an approach to punishment of law violators and may even be beneficial in garnering political support, they may miss the core content of the actual boot camp program, which evolved in response to a need for activities that contribute to changed behavior. This chapter describes the disciplinary component of the boot camp program as it has evolved in Georgia. It also contains a description of an innovative and successful application of the military boot camp model to a regular, more hardened population of close-security inmates sentenced to standard prison terms at the State’s Valdosta Correctional Institution. (See chapter 5 for a discussion of programs in Georgia’s boot camps.)



Historical Background

When the State of Georgia implemented its Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI) in 1983 for nonviolent young offenders, this program was designed primarily as a 90-day experience in drill and discipline in the military boot camp model. Through ongoing evaluation and assessment, program modifications have been made as necessary to increase effectiveness. The earliest evaluation in Georgia, conducted by Gerald T. Flowers, a Senior Operations Analyst with the Georgia Department of Corrections, pointed out the need for followup after the 90-day period of incarceration (Flowers, 1986). This was essential to ensure adequate supervision for offenders in the critical period after release. During that time, offenders needed assistance in dealing with issues such as conducting a job search, applying learned discipline to decisionmaking, and resisting temptations within the community. The agency implemented a policy of assigning offenders to intensive probation supervision for the first 6 months after release from boot camps.

Georgia Governor Zell Miller, who served in the United States Marine Corps as a young man, often refers to boot camp as a molding experience. He has strongly advocated boot camps as a sentencing tool for first-time drug offenders. Prior to his administration, the predominant offenders found in Georgia's boot camps were burglars. In reality many burglary offenses were known to be related to underlying substance abuse problems, but correctional officials did not address this in their programs. Georgia therefore developed programmatic standards for all boot camps that included mandatory formal educational and substance abuse training for all participants, as well as more intensive substance abuse counseling for selected offenders.



Governor Zell Miller signs into law new legislation establishing inmate boot camps in Georgia.





Programmatic Evolution and Expansion

The New Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program represents an expansion of SAI, both in terms of number of boot camps and number of participants. Georgia's boot camps now also incorporate more programming.

These boot camps can be divided into two groups: probation boot camps and inmate boot camps. The men in the probation boot camps are sentenced to the program directly by the court and are referred to as "detainees." The men in the inmate boot camps (referred to as "inmates") have received prison sentences but are given the opportunity by the corrections department to volunteer for the program. Selection is made during the diagnostic and classification process with the concurrence of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. Boot camp policies in Georgia are identical for both types of boot camps, and, except as indicated, this chapter refers to a regimen and programming applicable to both, with the term "offenders" used for both detainees and inmates.

The camps have four primary components:

- Military-style basic training.
- Hard work.
- Programs addressing substance abuse and other offender problems.
- Followup through strict probation and parole supervision.

A probation boot camp warden has described the progression through the program as beginning with "initial shock," moving to the "teaching phase," and following up with "positive reinforcement." The warden is not comfortable with identifying any reinforcement as a reward but believes that a desired work detail assignment may be an incentive for good behavior. Such assignments can involve kitchen duty or lawn mowing as opposed to digging and other hard labor.

The program has maintained its dominant image of military drill and discipline, and in no cases have officials relaxed the requirement for participants to perform regular work assignments. Originally, the evening hours were seen as a time for quiet reflection, thought to be therapeutic in eliciting behavior change. Modifications have given structure to these evening time slots by including both educational and basic substance abuse programming. There has also been an increase in elective recreation and religious activity time.

Access to television entertainment in the evenings has always been denied, although sometimes public television programs are allowed during certain time periods. Boot camp participants have access to library books and to Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous handbooks.



The boot camp concept has gained increasing popularity in Georgia. Use of boot camps was a major campaign issue supported by Governor Miller in his 1990 election campaign. With strong political support, two complete minimum security prisons were converted to probation boot camps, and one new probation boot camp and four new inmate boot camps were constructed.

A 1991 departmental evaluation tracking graduates from the SAI program over 36 months showed a 40.7-percent return-to-prison rate for graduates compared to a 53.4-percent return-to-prison rate for a comparison group of offenders. This second group met the eligibility criteria for boot camp but were sentenced to prison instead. On average, the comparison group served 118 days in prison, 28 days longer than the SAI group serving a standard 90 days (Flowers et al., 1991), showing significant cost savings.

Since Governor Miller's inauguration in January 1991, combined effects of new construction and allocation of dormitory units at several institutions produced a total of three probation boot camps. These camps have bedspace for 475 detainees, and inmate boot camp units have bedspace for 1,076 inmates, for a total of 1,551 boot camp spaces. Further expansion is projected through new construction to be completed in fiscal year 1996. Probationers are sentenced to the program directly by the court, and inmates are selected by departmental staff.

Eligibility criteria have been expanded to incorporate offenders 17 to 35 years old. There is no longer any firm requirement that the offender have no previous prison experience, although the intent is to target those who have not been hardened by such an experience.

Disciplinary Philosophies

The Georgia program was initially designed to shock young male probationers who had never experienced any incarceration in prison. (Georgia has not implemented any boot camp programs for females.) Many had tested the system, often through successive "last chances" on probation, and exhibited a continued lack of respect or even open defiance toward authority. The concept advocated a 90-day period of intensive verbal confrontation, drill, and rigorous work to instill respect for authority, physical conditioning, and work habits that would enable these young men to return to probation, gain and hold a job, and maintain self-discipline in the community.

Part of this approach was based on the belief that exposing these young offenders to the reality of prison life (without exposing them to any of the real abuses that may occur among a hardened prison population) would convince them never again to defy the law. This philosophy hinges primarily on habit training with little emphasis on specific skills development.



The routine and drill that established these disciplinary expectations have always constituted the core structure of Georgia's boot camps and were the means for showcasing boot camps to the media. All offenders must participate in drill and ceremony as well as develop and exhibit a level of skill in precision drill marching. Since most facilities create some sort of competitive process for grading platoons on precision drilling, this aspect can become a point of developing pride and improving self-image in addition to serving as a tool for discipline. Some boot camps, through competitive drill presentations, select a Gold Award Drill Unit to perform for visiting dignitaries.

Departmental staff, supported by criminal justice literature, acknowledge that defiance of the law can occur not simply as an absence of discipline but as the result when young offenders feel they are denied access to participation in the mainstream community and cannot achieve economic success and other goals through traditional and lawful means. Serious involvement in drug abuse, through both using and dealing, and a lack of basic life skills and employability are also major deficits in a large percentage of cases.

Programs now require that all boot camp participants complete a basic alcohol and drug education course. Some boot camps require participants without a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma (GED) to enroll in either GED or adult basic education throughout the boot camp period or until the GED is acquired.

Officer Training and Development of Procedures

Georgia's disciplinary program depends on staff training to ensure that both drill and disciplinary techniques are grounded in up-to-date military practice. It also depends on comprehensive handbooks that ensure understanding of rules and procedures by staff and inmates alike.

The Department's 4-week Basic Correctional Officer Training program, which is both rigorous and thorough, includes passing tests on departmental policies and procedures. Thus all officers have a firm knowledge of the official definition of disciplinary infractions and the appropriate response. In addition, boot camp officers complete drill instructor training developed by the departmental training division. Selected officers have participated in specialized boot camp training offered to correctional agencies by the U.S. Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia, and by the U.S. Army at Ft. McClellan, Alabama.¹ Because of the proximity of Ft. McClellan, its training opportunities and drill techniques are now used by all Georgia boot camps. Officers who graduate are entitled to wear the all-black uniform and black "campaign cover," or broad-brimmed hat, of the Senior Drill Instructor, a designation of distinction.



Participants, too, are taught the rules from the outset. As one warden observed, “Discipline begins at the gate.” During orientation, each boot camp participant receives a copy of a handbook that includes specific rules and procedures. Each facility prepares its own handbook, so there is some variation in specific institutional activities and rules. In all cases, however, the handbook describes the expectation of military decorum, protocol, and etiquette. The new boot camp participant signs an agreement indicating he understands the rules, and this agreement becomes the foundation of disciplinary policy.

Specific rules common to all Georgia’s boot camps include prohibition against fighting, sexual activity, weapons, drugs or alcohol, and escape. The handbook also describes the disciplinary process and grievance procedures, visitation, mail and telephone policies, and programmatic activities (both mandatory and voluntary). Special sections deal with policy allowing searches of person, property, and living areas at any time. Handbooks include a section on work and one on personal hygiene and cleanliness.

Verbal Confrontation and Communication

Verbal confrontation as a method of discipline is integral to the program. A verbal dressdown is a regular occurrence and may not be prompted by any specific violation. It is often applied in the assumption that offenders are arrogant and have previously shown a pattern of challenging authority. Correctional staff turn the “in your face” style of communication into an art form. Departmental policy forbids the use of profanity or physical contact by staff, but the terms often heard in admonishing boot camp participants may be highly derogatory. Staff often remark that “you must break them down so you can build them up.”

Boot camp participants are forbidden to speak until they make a formal request by first identifying themselves as “Inmate (surname), request permission to speak.” For the most part, the pattern of formal communication continues in the third person. There is considerable variation among institutions and supervisory staff regarding when and where to allow informal communication. General policy forbids talking at mealtime and on work detail without permission. In practice, however, some conversation does occur in work situations. At any point when this is considered to be detrimental or disruptive, correctional officers are expected to immediately impose the rule of silence. When any staff member directs a question to the offender, the expected response is “Yes, sir” or “No, sir.”



Dealing With Disciplinary Infractions

Staff report that physical conflicts are rare among boot camp participants. Activity is so closely supervised that there is little opportunity for uncontrolled behavior. Disciplinary infractions are categorized as “minor” or “major.” The most frequent minor infractions are verbal insubordination, failure to follow instructions, and failure to perform work assignments. Major disciplinary infractions include bringing an illegal drug into the facility from an outside work detail. This almost certainly results in a revocation.

When a minor infraction occurs, the officer is free to handle the situation by giving a verbal warning, issuing demerits, or preparing a written disciplinary report. Any written disciplinary report results in a formal hearing and a finding of guilt or innocence. Findings of guilt result in specific sanctions that must be approved by the warden.

An officer may deal with a minor infraction in several ways. He may issue a verbal warning and follow up with more precise instructions on how an assignment must be done, or issue three demerits on a participant’s work record for failure to follow instructions. Options vary with the style of the officer and with the circumstance. If the failure to perform the work assignment is seen as an intentional act of defiance, it is addressed with a written disciplinary report, which must cite a specific code section and violation. This requirement for a formal report ensures that disciplinary actions conform to departmental policies, become subject to audit, and meet high standards of professional judgment.

Disciplinary hearings are conducted under formal rules that allow an offender to have an advocate present, usually the person’s counselor. The offender may also request witnesses.

In the staffing design for probation boot camps, the correctional lieutenant is the highest ranking security officer, and he conducts the hearing. The shift supervisor on duty when an infraction occurs investigates the disciplinary report to ascertain all the facts prior to the hearing. The correctional lieutenant acts in the role of administrative judge, reviews the written disciplinary report, and hears testimony from the officer who wrote the report, from the offender, and from any other witnesses. A correctional captain performs the role of hearing officer in inmate boot camps. The offender has an opportunity to speak, and the hearing officer decides guilt or innocence as well as any sanctions to be imposed. This decision is reviewed by the warden or superintendent, who signs off on the finding and sanctions or makes changes. All disciplinary hearing reports are forwarded to the Department of Corrections Central Office.



Range of Sanctions

As noted, for minor disciplinary infractions the correctional officer may issue a verbal warning. When a minor infraction occurs, the officer also has the discretionary power to require pushups for the sake of immediacy of punishment. This is called “motivational physical therapy,” and no other situational punishments are allowed. As pointed out by Dale Parent, the use of summary punishments could erode the protections of disciplinary procedures established as national standards (Parent, 1989). For this reason, the Georgia Department of Corrections has established clearly defined limits for the use of any on-the-spot sanctions. If a formal disciplinary report and hearing occur, a specified range of options is defined in the boot camp handbook.

Sanctions for minor disciplinary infractions may take the form of delay of visitation or telephone privileges for specified time periods or extra duty assignments (in 10-hour increments). Other sanctions include loss of privileges for purchasing items at the boot camp store or extra duty in place of a recreation period. In general, Georgia boot camps observe a policy of progressive sanction, whereby successive infractions result in more severe sanctions.

Major disciplinary infractions may result in a 10- to 30-day “recycling,” or repetition of certain elements of the program; this results in a longer stay before graduation or release. Serious infractions may result in up to 10 days of isolation, which are not counted toward program completion.

In 1993 the Facilities Division extended the standard period for the inmate boot camp program from 90 days to 120 days to create time for programmatic additions without infringing on time allocated to standard drill, physical training, and work. For probation boot camps, the Community Corrections Division maintained the standard time period of 90 days, but provision was made for recycling up to 30 days. Probation detainees may be in boot camp for 120 days as a result of failure to meet disciplinary requirements, but if they exhibit no performance problems, they are released after 90 days. The potential for increased length of stay as a disciplinary sanction thus becomes a significant motivation for cooperation.

In inmate boot camps, an offender may be removed from the program when means of enforcing discipline are exhausted. The State Board of Pardons and Paroles has the authority to assign and release inmates. Recent statistics show that 5 percent of those originally assigned to the program voluntarily withdraw and 5 percent are removed through disciplinary action. In the case of inmates assigned to boot camp, a removal either for voluntary or disciplinary reasons results in reassignment to another institution. The security level assigned is influenced by the nature of the disciplinary problem.



In probation boot camps, detainees must be returned to the sentencing court for action; this usually results in revocation from probation and a new sentence for confinement. In some cases, however, the courts impose a different alternative sanction. Georgia's progression of intermediate sanctions place boot camp as the last alternative before incarceration, but judges are free to act in a different order. Sometimes reassignment occurs for medical rather than disciplinary reasons.

Preventive Discipline

Programs have formal and informal ways for giving offenders who are exhibiting adjustment problems special attention to enable them to succeed. Staff identify inmates who have serious family problems, exhibit volatility, or have accumulated 20 or more demerits (indicating potential escalation to more serious violations). One inmate boot camp has implemented a behavior adjustment group for those with marginal behavior. This group meets for four 1-hour sessions planned around issues of anger management and cognitive restructuring (a means of getting offenders to analyze how they responded to situations in their lives and to develop alternative responses). Individualized techniques include counseling and psychodrama scenarios that relate to "stuffing" (suppressing feelings), escalating, and directing behaviors. Various techniques for identifying and managing anger are presented.

Positive Reinforcement

Individual wardens differ philosophically about the appropriateness of rewards for positive behaviors during the boot camp stay. Some regard the completion of a GED certificate as an intrinsic reward realized for the offender but oppose tangible rewards within the program. Others dispense concrete rewards. In one facility, members of the platoon that wins the Gold Boot award for precision drilling earn the right to eat first for 1 week and receive soft drinks and candy.

Generally, some positive reinforcement is provided to balance the elements of work, drill, and discipline that dominate the military boot camp model. This positive reinforcement is achieved by several means.

In some boot camps a range meeting is held once a week at which positive achievements and behavior are recognized; the group may also have peer discussions of problems. Communication is less formal, and in some cases a counselor may follow up on issues raised or help individuals resolve problems.

In addition, each offender is scheduled for an individual counseling session at least once a month. This meeting begins after the offender knocks on the counselor's door and says "Inmate (or detainee) report." The counselor then responds by saying, "at ease," which signals the opportunity to converse during the counseling



session without formal permission to speak. However, counselors expect all responses to show self-respect and self-discipline.

Communication Issues

Staff members were asked about their experience and beliefs regarding the requirement that offenders identify themselves in the third person throughout the program while they are expected to reflect upon past behavior and feelings and to internalize behavioral and attitudinal change. This issue was originally raised by a staff psychologist who conducted regular adjustment groups in one inmate boot camp. Once a week for a 90-minute group session, he required each participant to use the first person for discussing and accepting responsibility for his own behaviors and feelings. Although this group was discontinued, the issue of the best means of promoting personal responsibility remains.

During site visits, researchers observed situations in which individual expression was exhibited in various ways:

- Often, skilled counselors created group situations in which a great deal of individual expression occurred while participants continued to observe the official protocol of formal communication.
- At some boot camps the development of the guidon, the banner displaying the platoon and company identification, is a group project under the direction of the correctional officer in charge of drill for the platoon. The group members are supplied basic art supplies to make the guidon, which expresses their pride and commitment. Some banners are quite artistic. Examples of guidons include one with the name "Mighty Aces," a bulldog pictured as mascot and a slogan, "United we stand, divided we fall." Administrators differ about the appropriateness of guidons like these, some considering them expressions of esprit de corps or power statements inappropriate to the offenders' status, and others viewing them more positively.
- Another form of group expression is the cadence chant, a creation of the platoon. These chants vary and often show how well the group is progressing. A counselor observed that when platoons near completion of the program, the word "freedom" is often heard as part of the cadence.
- During leisure education time, offenders have library access and can read or write as they like. On occasion, offenders have composed a written piece for use at a graduation ceremony.

As boot camp participants move toward completion of the program, they use more informal communication, whether as part of the boot camp planning or as the result of staff encouragement. This suggests that although formal communication remains



in the third person, there are opportunities for individual and group expression to develop.

Extending the Boot Camp Disciplinary Model to Standard Prison

The combination of strict military discipline, a code of ethics, and clear application of positive reinforcement is noteworthy and demonstrates the balancing of strict discipline with positive reinforcement. The success of this model in boot camps led Georgia to adopt it in a close-security (in Georgia, the next step down from maximum security) prison, the Valdosta Correctional Institution. The rest of this chapter describes the successful application of this model to an entirely different population to show the potential of this aspect of boot camps to offer a solution to some seemingly intractable problems in prisons housing more serious, violent offenders. While it is difficult to make long-term comparisons of the outcomes of this prison model (given the longer incarceration of prison inmates), it offers some interesting insights from the standpoint of theory and experience.

Valdosta inmates have committed serious felonies—some are among the most notorious offenders in the State and are serving multiple life sentences. All have been classified as in need of close security. In 1990 the prison implemented the boot camp style of discipline for inmates for whom previous methods of control would be periods of isolation or lockdown. The program at Valdosta is called the Intensive Therapeutic Program (ITP) and is a 30-day alternative to more traditional forms of control in the prison.

State Representative Bob Patten of Georgia reviews a platoon of inmates in the ITP program at Valdosta Correctional Institution.





The institution is led by a warden who clearly believes in positive reinforcement and uses the technique effectively. Valdosta has won awards as the outstanding institution in Georgia under this leadership and also won the 1993 award as the Outstanding Correctional Facility in the United States as part of *City and State* magazine's Excellence in Government/Correctional Award Program.

The ITP living unit was originally established to implement certain military-style protocols in regard to work programs, orderliness, and cleanliness of living quarters. As this approach proved to be effective, and inmates marched and developed cadences, the administration began to introduce more military protocols. The unit is managed by a drill instructor who has completed the U.S. Army course in military drill. The framed Code of Ethics, which hangs in every dormitory, demands discipline, self-pride, and uniformity.

Since the inception of the ITP program, 300 inmates have completed the program each year. By the end of 1993 disciplinary reports had decreased from an average of 330 a month to 100 a month and assaults by 75 percent. Staff from other units began to request the opportunity to use these protocols.

To provide positive reinforcement, the warden makes inspection tours twice a week, visiting each dormitory. The inmates present themselves and their quarters for inspection, observing military protocols. The protocols are often led by peers, and individual motivational statements are offered in some dormitories. These stress self-discipline and leadership support and are delivered in rote fashion while standing at attention. An observer gets the impression that the energy exerted would provide release equal to that provided by calisthenics.

The warden moves swiftly through the institution and takes careful note both of areas where improvement is needed and areas of excellence. He speaks to individual offenders about the need to tighten sheets or iron a shirt, but he also makes special note where the orderliness is exemplary. In advance of the inspection, his staff has prepared a listing by dormitory of individuals who have noteworthy accomplishments, such as receipt of a GED or a notation for improved performance. As he enters each dormitory he requests that these individuals be brought forward. He gives them his personal congratulation for the accomplishment. To an inmate who has completed a GED, he may affirm, "They can take that uniform away from you, but no one can take that education from you." An observer can see that the inmates value the individual recognition.

Positive reinforcement takes other forms as well. A golf cart follows the warden on his inspection tour across the grounds. The cart has been painted with balloons by the vocational education classes and is laden with refreshments. As the warden completes his inspection of each dormitory, staff members wait to distribute cokes and honey buns to all residents of a dormitory who pass inspection and something extra for those who lead in drill or who offer special motivational statements.



Conclusion

Universally accepted research in response conditioning, pioneered by B.F. Skinner, indicates that positive reinforcement is more effective than negative reinforcement in achieving behavioral change. Effective discipline seeks the necessary balance between disciplinary intervention to control destructive behavior and positive reinforcement of constructive behavior.

Within the span of a 90- to 120-day boot camp program that seeks to impart strict discipline for a group with serious deficits in this area, there may always be an apparent emphasis on calling attention to negatives. The positive reinforcements do occur, however, at lower decibels and with less attention from the press. It is important that they not be forgotten. Strong aftercare linkages to the community during the readjustment period offer opportunities to continue positive reinforcement of the self-discipline and personal responsibility instilled in the boot camp.

Note

1. Boot camps and other correctional agencies interested in this training should contact Retired Command Sergeant Major Josh Perry, Ft. McClellan Department of the Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, AL 36205 (telephone 205-848-4383). The training program at Quantico has been closed.

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CHAPTER 13

Substance Abuse Programming in Adult Correctional Boot Camps: A National Overview

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A survey of adult boot camps, preceded by a literature review, indicates a strong trend toward making drug education and treatment a part of shock incarceration programming. Questionnaires were sent in the fall of 1992 to the directors or commissioners of departments of corrections in all 50 States plus the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, followed up with telephone interviews with 31 administrators. A second survey targeted facility-level administrators and staff members responsible for the facilities' substance abuse treatment or education programs. All the boot camps surveyed said they offered at least substance abuse education, and more than 75 percent offered treatment as well. Various treatment methods were found to be in use, but they were rarely individualized to meet specific inmate needs. Methods of assessing inmates' need for treatment primarily consisted of screening interviews, case history information, and psychological testing rather than diagnostic processes that would allow a clinically based decision of need, treatment amenability, or potential effectiveness. New York, Georgia, and Oklahoma emphasized drug treatment but did not participate in the survey.



Many supporters of correctional boot camp programs and the officials who administer them contend that such programs have the potential to be a powerful mechanism for positive offender change. The strict regimen of the boot camp environment, coupled with a variety of treatment-oriented program components, can provide not only a greater level of internal discipline, self-esteem, and confidence to participants but also an array of skills that may promote successful reintegration into the community. These notions are quite consistent with the fact that correctional administrators commonly report rehabilitation of criminal offenders, not deterrence or retribution, as a primary goal of boot camps (MacKenzie, 1990; Elis, MacKenzie, and Souryal, 1992; MacKenzie, 1993; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993).

A rehabilitative program component often associated with the boot camp movement is substance abuse programming. Because many boot camps exclude violent offenders and some actively target drug offenders, institutions have reported that substance abusers constitute a greater proportion of the boot camp population than of the general inmate population (Florida Department of Corrections, 1990; New York State Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole, 1991). Arguably some boot camps have been designed with the intention of making positive impacts on drug-abusing offenders, and even those not designed this way often include substance abuse programming as an integral part of their programs.

Many available studies have reported information on the degree to which shock incarceration facilities target drug offenders or incorporate at least some form of substance abuse programming into the boot camp regimen. These studies tend to indicate that the targeting of drug offenders and the presence of substance abuse programming are common characteristics of boot camps. Unfortunately, little detailed descriptive or relevant evaluative information is presented within these studies. For instance, it is generally impossible to ascertain from the literature whether current drug treatment programming is clinically relevant and theoretically informed. This is a central question, since it is becoming increasingly apparent that correctional treatment programs are more likely to have desired outcomes if specific interventions are based on valid approaches appropriate to the target population (Andrews et al., 1990).

To fill this gap, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) awarded a research grant in the fall of 1991 to the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale to assess the quality of drug treatment and aftercare programs for offenders in adult boot camp prisons. This chapter reports some of the major findings from that study, preceded by a review of the literature.

Literature Review

Warnock and Hunzeker (1991) conducted a literature and statutory review of correctional boot camps at a time when 23 States operated them. They reported that New Mexico and Wisconsin specifically targeted certain drug offenders for participation in their boot camps and that in Tennessee certain drug offenders were statutorily excluded from participation. They also reported that statutes in at least 10 States specified that drug and alcohol education or treatment was to be provided in boot camps. In a related vein, Elis, MacKenzie, and Souryal's telephone survey of State and Federal correctional officials in March 1991 identified two boot camps specifically designed for drug offenders (Elis, MacKenzie, and Souryal, 1992).

An article published in *Corrections Compendium* in January 1991 included survey results from the 27 existing State boot camps. It was reported that 26 of the 27 facilities included or planned to include alcohol and drug treatment programs, 24 offered counseling, and 23 offered educational programming. The only State program that did not offer alcohol or drug treatment was Georgia, while Louisiana and South Carolina provided alcohol or drug education instead (Marlette, 1991).

The Evolution of Substance Abuse Programming in Boot Camps

The recently released U.S. General Accounting Office's review of correctional boot camps included some information on the value accorded substance abuse programming by boot camp administrators. GAO researchers asked them to rank the various objectives of boot camps on a scale of "very great importance" to "little or no importance." On this scale "drug treatment and education" was rated very highly by the respondents and was almost as highly valued as "meeting the need for alternatives to traditional incarceration" and "improving self-esteem." Of the 53 respondents, 32 rated drug treatment and education as a "very great" objective, 13 as a "great" objective, 7 as a "moderate" objective, and 1 rated it as having only "some" importance. No one accorded it a rating of "little or no importance" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993, pp. 19–20).

This report suggests that making positive impacts on the behavior of program participants, especially in terms of reducing substance-abusing behavior, is a primary goal of most correctional boot camps. Austin, Jones, and Bolyard's 1993 study of jail boot camps reveals goals similar to those that have been reported with regard to adult boot camps. All the jail programs reported rehabilitation as a goal. Drug education and drug treatment were also listed as important goals by all the responding agencies, and all agencies reported drug education or counseling as a program component. The amount of time residents spent in drug education or counseling ranged from 4 hours a day at Nassau and Ontario, New York, to 4 hours a week at Travis, Texas (Austin et al., 1993).



Literature on boot camp programming suggests that the program content of early boot camps was generally consistent across facilities and that changes have been made over time. Early programs tended to feature a strong military design in which offenders participated in physical training, drill and ceremony, and hard labor (Parent, 1989; MacKenzie, 1990; Coyle, 1990). As these programs emerged, basic rehabilitative elements such as substance abuse treatment and education (although commonly present) were overshadowed by a strong emphasis on structure and discipline. Because of the deemphasis on treatment and training, the early programs were criticized by some observers (Sechrest, 1989; Osler, 1991).

Correctional system officials responsible for boot camp programming in some States have acknowledged these concerns. For example, Florida officials conceded that for some inmates “these unmet needs [substance abuse treatment and education, basic education, and job training]...may have negated any rehabilitative success in other areas” (Florida Department of Corrections, 1990, p. 25). In a 1991 evaluation of Georgia’s Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI) program, the necessity of enhanced substance abuse programming was also highlighted:

At least 75 percent of the offenders who have gone through SAI have a problem with drugs and/or alcohol. They committed crimes while under the influence or to support their habits, or they were convicted of DUI or drug possession or sale. Strong substance abuse programs were needed, both in SAI and during the followup period of supervision and treatment. (Georgia Department of Corrections, 1991, p. xi).

It became clear that little evidence existed to support the idea that discipline and hard work by themselves would lead to lasting behavioral changes; enhanced substance abuse programming might be needed.

In addition to the lack of emphasis on standard rehabilitative elements within early boot camp programs, researchers expressed concern about lack of aftercare services, especially for the substance-abusing client, as programs grew more popular. For example, in a study examining the postrelease experiences of boot camp inmates from Louisiana, Shaw and MacKenzie noted that “the behavior of problem drinkers as a group was more varied than that of nonproblem drinkers, emphasizing the importance of and the need for programs such as this to provide adequate support and aftercare for problem drinkers and substance abusers” (Shaw and MacKenzie, 1991, p. 63).

Since the initial introduction of boot camp programs, changes in program structure appear to have taken place. Although early shock incarceration programs emphasized structure and discipline, newer programs appear to be incorporating more substance abuse treatment into daily inmate programming, and a stronger aftercare component as well (see also Gransky, Castellano, and Cowles, 1995).



Although they started with an emphasis on military drills, physical training, and work, an increasingly larger number of facilities appear to be giving at least equal emphasis to more traditional forms of treatment programming. Most boot camps today stress rehabilitation as a primary program goal, with substance abuse programming appearing to be highly valued by correctional officials in charge of operating these facilities. The overwhelming majority of boot camps include programming aimed at promoting the successful community reintegration of graduates. This is to be accomplished, at least in part, by promoting the ability of program participants to refrain from abuse of drugs or alcohol.

Beyond these broad trends and patterns, however, more needs to be known about the details of substance abuse programming associated with the boot camp experience.

The Impact of Boot Camps on the Lives of Substance Abusers

The only studies that have examined the impact of boot camps on the lives of substance abusers (and their potential differential impacts on substance abusers versus nonabusers) are evaluations of Louisiana's boot camp program.

Problem drinkers. One relevant examination involved an analysis of boot camp effects on the lives of problem drinkers (Shaw and MacKenzie, 1991). This study involved 112 shock incarceration inmates who entered the program between October 1987 and October 1988 and eventually graduated, and a comparison group of 98 prison inmates legally eligible but not recommended for placement in the program. The two groups were fairly similar in demographic characteristics (except for age), criminal histories, and measures of neuroticism, but the prison inmates showed more signs of social maladjustment, alienation, and manifest aggression. A total of 58 inmates from across the 2 groups (20 percent of the total) were identified as problem drinkers.

Researchers found that problem drinkers in the boot camp sample became more prosocial after 3 months, but the prison sample showed no change in antisocial attitudes. Problem drinkers in the shock incarceration sample also became less alienated than when they entered the program, while those in the prison sample became more alienated during incarceration.

For each of the first 6 months that a parolee was under community supervision, parole officers filled out a standardized evaluation form (the Prosocial Living Index), which attempted to measure each parolee's community adjustment. To have a much broader focus than just on recidivism, the Index contains such measures as employment status, school status, performance in treatment programs, as well as arrests and reconvictions. The community adjustment of boot camp parolees was found to be much more positive than the adjustment of inmate parolees, but there was no difference in the adjustments of problem and nonproblem drinkers. No link was



found between sample and drinker type, indicating that problem drinkers in the shock incarceration sample did not fare better while under community supervision than problem drinkers in the inmate sample. In general the performance of problem drinkers was more sporadic over the 6-month period than the performance of nonproblem drinkers. The evaluators underscored the desirability of implementing stronger aftercare components to address the specific needs of problem drinkers.

Other drug abusers. Another study of the Louisiana program examined its effect on drug-involved offenders (Shaw and MacKenzie, 1992). In this study the performance of offenders with a drug history, that is, prior drug arrests and convictions, was compared to that of offenders who were merely identified by corrections officials as in need of community counseling for substance abuse.

The adjustments of a group of 74 paroled boot camp offenders were compared to those of a group of 92 shock incarceration dropouts, 108 probationers, and 74 inmate parolees. Thirty-eight percent of all subjects were in the group with histories of prior drug arrests or convictions, and 28 percent were in the group that was considered to need substance abuse counseling. Although there was much overlap between these two groups, it is noteworthy that 52 percent of the offenders with drug histories were not required to attend community drug treatment. There was no difference across samples in the percentage of subjects with drug histories, but both boot camp graduates and the regular parolees were more likely than the probationers to be required to get drug treatment.

Evaluators examined program dropout rates to see whether drug offenders adjusted to the boot camp experience more negatively than nondrug offenders. No difference in dropout rates was found between those with and without drug histories. Self-reported drug history information also appeared unrelated to dropout rates. Thus, in-program adjustment patterns did not appear to be a function of prior drug abuse.

Four measures of failure were used to assess community performance, including positive drug screens, drug arrests, any arrest, and jailing or revocation. Sample subjects were followed for 1 year after release. A series of logistic regressions run on each measure of community adjustment revealed complex patterns in the community adjustment of the offenders. First (and consistent with the research discussed above), the prison parolee sample and the probation sample did not display failure patterns significantly different from those of the boot camp sample. Second, offenders with drug histories were less likely to fail while under community supervision than other drug offenders, especially when the effect of required treatment was statistically controlled in the analysis. That is, offenders arrested or convicted of a drug offense who were *not* also judged to need treatment were less likely to fail while under community supervision than those who *were* also judged in need of treatment. Moreover, they were less likely to fail than offenders without drug histories who were judged to need treatment. Thus participation in treatment may have actually resulted in higher failure rates.

A third finding may help explain this apparent anomaly. Although supervision level was controlled in the logistic regression models, it is possible that individuals in treatment had higher failure rates because of some aspect of supervision related to the requirement to attend treatment. In fact, higher failure rates in terms of jailing or revocation among those receiving community treatment were limited to those in treatment who were not making satisfactory progress (Shaw and MacKenzie, 1992, pp. 514–515).

In summary, the Louisiana boot camp experience itself did not seem to have any differential or positive impact on the community adjustments of either problem drinkers or drug-involved offenders. Although Louisiana's boot camp did provide some drug treatment programming such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA), it did not have a formal drug treatment component. Inferences about the efficacy of boot camp programming as a vehicle of change on the lives of substance abusers should await rigorous tests of programs with substance abuse treatment components that parallel those found in the community.

Methodology for the Survey of Boot Camp Drug Treatment Programs

The present research includes within its scope the identified universe of shock incarceration programs for adult offenders at the beginning of 1993. These include facilities operated by the Federal and State governments. Excluded from the study are juvenile programs and boot camps operated by local governments. Since the beginning of 1993, many additional boot camps have opened their doors. These newer programs may exhibit characteristics quite different from those typically found in older ones. Thus, findings from this survey may not be generalizable to all adult boot camp facilities.

In the fall of 1992, letters asking about the existence of boot camp facilities were sent to the directors or commissioners of the departments of corrections in all 50 States plus the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.¹ At the beginning of 1993, the survey indicated that there were 43 State boot camps operating in 29 States. In addition, two Federal programs were in operation.² Survey efforts also revealed 12 planned boot camps in 5 States (7 in Georgia, 2 in Iowa, and 1 each in Illinois, Kentucky, and Oregon) which were due to be operational within the next 2 years.

Survey data on substance abuse programming provided by the above facilities were collected in two distinct stages. During the first stage, telephone interviews were conducted with the person at the level of the correctional system most directly responsible for planning, implementation, or oversight of boot camp programming, such as the department of correction's central office. Interview questions sought to elicit information on the correctional aims, program goals, and program elements of the boot camp. As used in this research, correctional aims refer to broad constructs



that underlie correctional interventions (e.g., deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation). Program goals are more narrowly defined (e.g., reduced recidivism, reduced crowding) and can be subsumed by the larger correctional aim (e.g., rehabilitation includes reduced recidivism).

Of the 30 jurisdictions previously identified as operating a boot camp program, 2 States indicated that their boot camps served specialized functions and thus had different program operations (i.e., Oklahoma with 4 and Georgia with 2 distinct program types). The officials surveyed from these States were asked to report on aims, goals, and elements separately for each type of facility within their jurisdiction. This added to the number of interviews to be conducted, but three States declined to participate in the study. A total of 31 interviews were conducted, representing 26 States and the Federal system, a response rate of 91 percent.

The second stage of data collection began early in 1993. Two questionnaires aimed at collecting information from facility-level personnel were mailed to each facility. The first, directed to the facility administrator, sought the administrator's views as to the facility's correctional aims, program goals, and program elements, as well as a description of the target population and selection criteria, daily scheduling, costs, and staffing. This survey was designed to capture detailed information on the facility contexts in which substance abuse programming was provided. Sixty-nine percent of the administrative questionnaires were returned.

A second survey form was included in the packet with the first, with instructions for the facility administrator to forward the second questionnaire to the staff member responsible for the facility's substance abuse treatment or education program, if such a program existed. The second survey instrument asked about substance abuse assessment procedures, treatment modalities and interventions, hours of education and treatment provided, aftercare programs, and information regarding the staff providing substance abuse treatment or education.

As with the facility administrator's questionnaire, this survey solicited the substance abuse provider's perceptions of the program's correctional aims, goals, and elements. The purpose of the two-stage data collection on these issues was to measure congruence in the perceptions held by individuals responsible for programming at different levels in the correctional systems. Sixty-four percent of these questionnaires were returned.

Nonresponses for the administrative and substance abuse surveys were primarily due to response patterns from three States. New York State, which had five facilities at the time of this survey effort, refused to participate in the facility-based survey component. Officials from that State explained that all of their facilities have identical substance abuse programming and so there was no need to ask facility-level personnel to respond to the questionnaire. Only three of Georgia's six facilities responded to both surveys, and only one administrative questionnaire was returned from

among Oklahoma's four programs. Thus, these States represent 11 of the 14 administrative questionnaire nonresponses and 12 of the 15 substance abuse questionnaire nonresponses. Fortunately, these programs have been well documented (for example, see Clark and Aziz in this volume and Clark, Aziz, and MacKenzie, 1993) so that the nature of nonresponse bias can be estimated. These programs are discussed in the following analyses if they displayed substance abuse programming characteristics distinct from patterns gleaned from the survey data received.

Survey Findings

The survey findings presented below show the extent to which drug education and treatment have been made part of boot camp programming and the different forms they have taken. The survey also elicited information on how inmates were screened for treatment, how long the treatment lasted, and how boot camps staffed their education and treatment programs.

The Extent of Substance Abuse Programming

Exhibit 1 presents information provided by system-level officials, facility administrators, and substance abuse programming providers as to whether their boot camps incorporated particular program elements into overall programming. Only those facilities for which all three respondents returned the survey are included in this table. Interestingly, although all respondents in each category indicated that substance abuse education was a program component, a notable discrepancy emerges when attention turns to responses on whether alcohol treatment and drug treatment were provided.

All of the system-level officials indicated that alcohol and other drug treatments were being provided in their facilities, although this was true for only 75 percent of the facility-level respondents.³ There appears to be confusion among some respondents as to whether a drug treatment program existed at certain facilities. Prior surveys that indicated almost uniform drug treatment programming in boot camps may have overrepresented the reality of the situation because they tended to report responses generated by system-level officials. Responses from individuals closest to the delivery of such programming efforts indicate that a quarter of adult boot camps had no such programming.

Most respondents also indicated that physical training, physical labor, basic education, and prerelease programming were facility program components. Conversely, vocational education was not commonly found in boot camps, with only slightly more than 40 percent of the system-level respondents and 30 percent of the facility administrators indicating vocational education to be a facility program element. Drug treatment in most boot camps is one of a variety of components to balance military-oriented activity, exercise, and work with more traditional treatment-related activities such as education and prerelease programming.

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It is also noteworthy that despite the great emphasis placed on aftercare services as a necessary component to ease community reintegration of graduates, about a quarter of the respondents reported no postrelease service delivery.

Substance abuse programming appeared to be more available to the boot camp participant than to the general prison inmate. All of the responding boot camps had either a substance abuse treatment or a substance abuse education program. Most boot camps provide drug treatment (as distinct from drug education only), and

Exhibit 1. The Percentage of Facilities in Which Various Elements Exist as Reported by System-Level Officials, Site-Level Administrators, and Site-Level Substance Abuse Treatment Providers

	System-Level Officials (n=27)	Site-Level Administrators (n=28)	Site-Level Substance Abuse Treatment/Education Providers (n=28)
Elements	Percentage	Percentage	Percentage
Physical Training	100	96	96
Alcohol Treatment	100	75	75
Drug Treatment	100	75	75
Substance Abuse Education	100	100	100
Physical Labor	100	96	96
Drill/Ceremony	100	100	100
Basic Education	96	93	100
Vocational Education	46	32	43
Prerelease Programming	93	96	96
Postrelease Services Delivery	75	75	71

Percentages have been rounded to nearest whole percent.

In this table, percentages are presented only for jurisdictions with system-level respondents (27 of 31), administrative survey respondents (28 of 32), and substance abuse survey respondents (28 of 29).

virtually all offenders in such facilities participate in substance abuse treatment. In contrast, Lipton, Falkin, and Wexler (1992) indicate that the percentage of State correctional systems offering different types of substance abuse programming ranged from around 62 to 88 percent, with substance abuse education being the most popular. In a study 4 years earlier, Chaiken (1989) estimated that about 11.1 percent of the inmates in the 50 States were involved in drug treatment.

The Mix of Substance Abuse Education and Treatment

There is some disagreement in the literature on whether it is appropriate to consider drug education as a drug treatment modality. Many argue that substance abuse education or information programs do not constitute treatment (e.g., Lipton, Falkin, and Wexler, 1992) but that education or information programs may, at best, be considered to provide basic support for treatment.

To learn how substance abuse program providers in boot camp facilities viewed this issue, a number of survey questions sought to find out if drug education was considered a totally separate program from drug treatment or a component of treatment. The responses (summarized in exhibit 2) reveal three distinct program groupings for substance abuse education in boot camps. In the first group are those that provided only substance abuse education, defined in the survey questionnaire as "a separate, clearly identifiable substance abuse education program." Seven of the 29 responses (24 percent) indicated this approach. A second group of equal size (seven) maintained that substance abuse treatment was provided but that there was no education program as defined above. That is, substance abuse education was intertwined with the treatment component in such a manner that it was not considered a distinguishable program offering.

Finally, a third, larger group of 15 facilities (52 percent) indicated the presence of both an identifiable education program *and* a substance abuse treatment program. Beyond these fairly crude distinctions lies an interesting finding. When facilities with treatment programs were asked to identify the approaches that were used in their programs, all 22 identified education as one. Thus it would seem that education has played an important role in substance abuse programming in boot camp facilities whether it constituted the only program component or was integrated into a broader treatment approach.

Exhibit 2 also presents the perceptions of facility substance abuse programming providers as to the priority they attached to a variety of boot camp program components and the underlying goals of the boot camp. Responses are broken down by the type of drug treatment provided within the respondent's boot camp, as defined above.

**Exhibit 2. Comparison of Program Elements and Goals by Facilities
with Substance Abuse Education Only, Substance Abuse
Treatment Only, and Both Education and Treatment**

Program Elements	SA Education Only		SA Treatment Only		SA Education and Treatment	
	Mean	(n=7)	Mean	(n=7)	Mean	(n=15)
Physical Training	1.00	(7)	1.43	(7)	1.21	(14)
Alcohol Treatment	—	—	1.14	(7)	1.60	(15)
Drug Treatment	—	—	1.14	(7)	1.53	(15)
Substance Abuse Education	2.71	(6)	1.83	(6)	1.53	(15)
Physical Labor	1.67	(6)	2.86	(7)	1.67	(15)
Drill/Ceremony	1.43	(7)	1.57	(7)	1.47	(15)
Basic Education	2.71	(7)	1.57	(7)	2.33	(15)
Vocational Education	—	—	—	—	3.80	(10)
Prerelease Programs	3.14	(7)	1.43	(7)	1.64	(14)
Postrelease Programs	1.50	(3)	1.67	(6)	2.33	(12)
Program Goals						
Deterrence	2.83	(6)	3.00	(5)	2.27	(15)
Incapacitation	3.50	(7)	2.33	(6)	3.14	(14)
Retribution	3.50	(4)	3.50	(4)	3.46	(13)
Rehabilitation	2.00	(7)	1.50	(6)	1.33	(15)

Mean scores for the priority ratings attached to the program elements are based on a scale of 1 (highest priority) to 6 (lowest priority), and those for the program goals are based on a scale of 1 (primary goal) to 4 (least important goal). Mean scores are based only on responses that indicated a goal or program element was present at the particular boot camp, with the figures in parentheses indicating the number of boot camps with this goal or program element.

These data tend to indicate that the perceptions of providers of substance abuse programming varied considerably due to the framework under which substance abuse programming is provided in the boot camp environment. For instance, although rehabilitation had a higher priority than the other correctional aims across all types of facilities, those locations that had separate substance abuse education and treatment



programs gave rehabilitation a higher priority than those facilities providing only substance abuse education. Additionally, for programs in which substance abuse education is incorporated into substance abuse treatment (as opposed to being a distinct and separate program), alcohol and drug treatment elements were rated a higher priority than in programs in which drug education and drug treatment are separate and distinct portions of the inmate programming. Further, the presence of drug treatment programming appears strongly related to the incorporation of other rehabilitative programming found in association with boot camps. For example, a greater proportion of boot camps that have substance abuse treatment programming indicated the presence of postrelease programming (6 of 7 and 12 of 15, respectively) than those that had only substance abuse education (3 of 7). As these discussions illustrate, the presence of substance abuse treatment as a program element may be a defining characteristic of boot camps that most forcefully articulate and seek the goal of offender rehabilitation. However, programs that merge treatment and education programming may see the dilution of the former, at least in the eyes of substance abuse programming providers.

Education

For those 22 boot camps with a separate substance abuse education program, either provided in conjunction with treatment or alone, 20 (91 percent) mandated inmate participation in their educational programming. The total number of hours of instruction ranged from 6 to 358 hours, with the average at just over 61 hours. Facilities with both identified education programs and treatment programs provided an average of nearly 30 more hours of substance abuse education instruction than programs that had only an education program (70 versus 42), suggesting a more intensive program effort in facilities that had both substance abuse education and treatment.

Over half (54 percent) of the programs providing a separate education program used in-house staff to provide the educational programming. Eighteen percent had external educators, while about 9 percent contracted with an outside organization to provide education. The remainder used multiple providers or other sources. The ratio of inmates to education staff ranged from about 15 to 1 at the low end to around 200 to 1 at the high end. The most common inmate-staff ratios were about 30 to 1 reported by 18 percent of the facilities, and 50 to 1 reported by 14 percent of the facilities. Eight of the facilities (36 percent) required that their education staff be certified as substance abuse treatment providers in their respective States. Four facilities reported that half of their staff were certified; one facility indicated that 70 percent of its staff had certification; and four reported that their entire education staff were certified. The remaining 13 facilities did not indicate levels of staff certification.



Treatment

The literature identifies a variety of ways to incorporate substance abuse treatment in correctional settings. According to Brown (1992), five types of program models are available for drug abusers in correctional settings:

- Incarceration without specialized services.
- Incarceration with drug education or drug abuse counseling or both.
- Incarceration with residential units dedicated to drug abuse treatment.
- Incarceration with client-initiated or client-maintained services or both.
- Incarceration with specialized services that do not directly target users' drug abuse problems.

Using this taxonomy, the majority of boot camp substance abuse programs operating at the time of this study would fall into the second category, since all the programs featured either substance abuse education or treatment or both. A minimal number with well-integrated substance abuse program elements along the lines of a therapeutic community might even be placed in the third category, incarceration with residential units dedicated to drug abuse treatment.⁴ Further, substance abuse treatment provided in boot camp facilities best fits into what may be termed a short-term (less than 3 months) residential treatment program, although a few notable exceptions existed (such as Minnesota's and New York's programs) which had longer (180 days) and more extensive programming.

Models offered for similar correctional substance abuse treatment programs can be distilled into three primary components: an assessment phase including evaluation and development of a treatment plan, a treatment program, and an aftercare component (see Finn and Newlyn, 1993; Sherron, 1991; Wexler and Lipton, 1993). This review of boot camp substance abuse treatment programming examined the first two of these three components.

Assessment

Assessment of substance abuse problems of inmates was a fairly common practice in the shock incarceration programs surveyed. Of the 29 State and Federal programs responding to the substance abuse survey, 20 (69 percent) indicated that some type of substance abuse assessment was conducted while 9 (31 percent) stated that no assessment took place. All facilities doing such substance abuse assessment indicated they did so routinely for all inmates entering the facility.

Despite this common use of substance abuse assessment, there appeared to be a lack of clear links between substance abuse assessment and subsequent treatment programming. Of the 29 programs responding, 22 reported that they had substance

abuse treatment, but only 18 of this group conducted a substance abuse assessment. Further evidence of a lack of integration between assessment of substance abuse problems and subsequent treatment was reflected in the fact that of the 18 programs that conducted assessments, only half indicated using the assessment data to classify inmates for treatment programs.

The lack of articulation between substance abuse assessment processes and treatment decisions has been clearly driven by the large number of programs that require all boot camp inmates to participate in substance abuse treatment. In addition to the four facilities that place offenders in treatment without the substance abuse assessment mentioned above, six of the facilities indicated drug treatment was mandated by statute; in two the judge could mandate participation; in three others the facility mandated treatment after assessment; and two facilities had different mechanisms for mandating substance abuse treatment. One typical boot camp treatment provider indicated, "Any inmate that meets general criteria for shock incarceration receives substance abuse treatment."

A variety of tools, screening instruments, and classification systems were available to identify individuals with alcohol and substance abuse problems. Respondents were asked to identify the techniques they used to determine which inmates had substance abuse problems. As shown in exhibit 3, all except one of the responding agencies reported using face-to-face interviews.

Beyond a screening interview, two other methods were widely used to assess inmates' substance abuse difficulties. The first was examination of case history information (beyond the present offense) gleaned from sources such as presentence investigations, prior evaluations or treatment records, and self-reported information provided by the offender. Eighty-three percent of the programs reported using such information for assessment.

The second popular tool consisted of psychological and behavioral testing instruments, with 78 percent of those conducting assessments indicating the use of such tests. However, there did not appear to be a clear favorite among the instruments identified by respondents. The most commonly used instrument was the Michigan Alcoholism Screen Test (MAST), which was identified by nearly 40 percent of those using such tests. The Inventory of Drinking Situations was used by slightly more than a third (38 percent), and the Alcohol Use Inventory was employed by about one quarter (28 percent) of those using tests. Six other scales were identified by less than 20 percent of this group. It is noted that 56 percent of those indicating the use of such assessment instruments indicated they used tests other than the 14 that were listed on the survey instrument. In this regard several facilities indicated the use of substance abuse screening instruments apparently developed as part of their admission and diagnostic screening process.

The two other identified methods appeared to have limited use among boot camp programs. The use of urine and blood tests was reported by only one-third of the respondents, and case history reviews to determine if drugs were involved in the present offense were used by only 17 percent of the responding programs.

Exhibit 3. Types of Substance Abuse Assessment in Shock Incarceration Facilities Providing Substance Abuse Treatment

Type of Assessment	Percentage of SI Facilities ^a With Assessment n=18	Type of Assessment	Percentage of SI Facilities ^a With Assessment n=18
Psychological/ Behavioral Tests	78%	Face-to-Face Interviews	94%
Michigan Alcoholism Screen Test (MAST)	39%	Clinical Structured Interview for (DSM-III-R) ^b	39%
Inventory of Drinking Situations	38%	Other Structured Interview	33%
Alcohol Use Inventory	28%	Case History Beyond Offense	83%
MacAndrew Scale (MMPI subscale)	17%	Case History Confined to Drug Involvement in Offense Behavior	17%
Addiction Severity Index	17%	Biological Markers (e.g., blood/urine tests)	33%
Alcohol Dependence Data Schedule	11%	Use of Classification Systems^c	44%
Self-Administered Alcoholism Screening Test (SAAST)	11%	World Health Organization (ICD9)	6%
Substance Abuse Proclivity Index (SAPS)	6%	DSM-III-R	22%
Mortimer-Filkins	6%	Other	11%
Adolescent Drinking Inventory	5%		
Other	56%		

^aTwo facilities that conduct substance abuse assessment for aftercare purposes but do not provide treatment are not included in figures presented in this exhibit.

^bInterview protocol based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (Revised Third Edition) American Psychiatric Association.

^cFormal treatment classification systems used to classify inmates for treatment.

These data indicate that despite the rather extensive assessment efforts in place at many boot camps, the predominant means of placing boot camp offenders in substance abuse treatment has not been through a diagnostic process and clinically based decision of need, treatment amenability, or potential effectiveness. Rather, it has been done through legally mandated or nonclinical decision processes.

Treatment Modalities and Interventions

Respondents were asked to identify treatment modalities used in their programs from among six commonly associated with correctional substance abuse programs: substance abuse education; the Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous model; individual counseling; therapeutic communities; group counseling; and milieu therapy. (Findings from this study indicate that neither pharmacological approaches nor detoxification were in use in boot camp programs at the time of the survey.) “Modality” was used to mean the general treatment delivery approach employed by the program. Additionally, respondents were asked to select the interventions they used from among a list of 21 commonplace therapeutic interventions. Space was also provided for the respondents to list two interventions not included in the listing. Here “intervention” denotes the specific type or style of treatment offered. The frequencies of use for each of the modalities (excluding education) and the most frequent interventions used in conjunction with each of the modalities is presented in exhibit 4.

All but one of the reporting boot camps employed multiple modalities in their treatment programming. This means that some combination of substance abuse education, group counseling, AA 12-Step models, and milieu therapy was used to deliver substance abuse services. In fact, a combination of four modalities was the most prevalent grouping, seen in 36 percent of the programs. Twenty-seven percent used five of the listed modalities, and one reported using all six modalities.

This finding provides a central theme in the data reported by substance abuse treatment providers. Substance abuse treatment offered in boot camps has been eclectic. While eclecticism may be a positive attribute, it may also reflect a lack of clarity and specificity as to the theoretical orientation or treatment approach.

This eclecticism is evidenced by the number of interventions being employed in each facility—ranging from 1 to 14 with 5 and 7 the most common numbers. Further, the type of modality used seemed to have little effect on the number of interventions. The mean number of interventions ranged from 7.41 for therapeutic communities to 9.00 for milieu therapy. (Because there were only two therapeutic communities, interpretation of this finding is difficult.)



Exhibit 4. Most Frequently Used Treatment Interventions for Five Primary Treatment Modalities in Shock Incarceration Facilities^a


Modality (Approach)	Number of Facilities Using (%)	Treatment (Method)	Number of Facilities Using (%)
Group Counseling	19 (86)	AA 12-Step Reality Therapy Stress Management	18 (95) 16 (84) 15 (79)
Alcoholics Anonymous Model (AA/NA/CA—self-help)	17 (77)	AA 12-Step Reality Therapy Stress Management	17 (100) 16 (94) 13 (76)
Individual Counseling	14 (64)	AA 12-Step Reality Therapy Reentry Stress Management	13 (93) 12 (86) 11 (79) 11 (79)
Milieu Therapy	11 (50)	AA 12-Step Reality Therapy Reentry Stress Management	11 (100) 10 (91) 10 (91) 9 (82)
Therapeutic Community	2 (9)	AA 12-Step Positive Peer Culture	2 (100) 2 (100)

^aFor the 22 responding facilities indicating they provide substance abuse treatment.

"Modality" means the general treatment delivery approach employed by the program.

"Intervention" denotes the specific type or style of treatment offered.

As shown in exhibit 5, for each of the treatment modalities except the therapeutic community approach, three interventions (AA 12-Step, reality therapy, and stress management) were consistently ranked as the most frequently used interventions. The use of several modalities and the predominance of the same interventions across modalities (slight variations are noted for milieu therapy and individual counseling) seem to indicate a strong similarity, at least in orientation, among boot camp substance abuse treatment programs. This is not surprising given the relative newness and rapid expansion of boot camp facilities. The few more established programs frequently served as models for those that were newly established. Treatment components found in programs with developed substance abuse approaches, such as the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment model (ASAT) in New York, appear to be replicated again and again.



The similarities in treatment across programs is further illustrated in exhibit 5, which presents the percentage of facilities that employed each therapeutic intervention. Examination of the most and least often employed treatment interventions offered at boot camp facilities suggests that most programs have been taking a pragmatic, skill-building orientation to help offenders cope with the problems and stressors they would face on return to the community. Traditional psychotherapeutic approaches designed to deal with offenders' underlying psychological and emotional problems, particularly those associated with more serious substance abuse, have been used relatively infrequently.

Length of Treatment

Research over the years has consistently shown a relationship between time in treatment and treatment outcomes (e.g., Hubbard et al., 1989; Wexler et al., 1992). Two factors can affect the length of time an individual stays in a treatment program: whether or not someone completes the program and the actual length of the program.

As mentioned earlier, for the majority of boot camp facilities with substance abuse treatment programs, participation was set in motion through legal or administrative mechanisms rather than assessment procedures. Of the 22 reporting facilities with



treatment, in only 1 was treatment voluntary. In six programs, treatment was required for certain inmates, such as those with drug offense convictions or those for whom the judge mandated participation. In the remaining programs, all inmates were required to participate.

Once in the substance abuse program, an inmate had little opportunity to quit treatment without being removed from the facility. In only 5 of the 22 facilities providing treatment could an inmate be administratively removed from treatment but remain in the boot camp, and in only 3 of the facilities could the inmate voluntarily quit the substance abuse treatment program without leaving the boot camp.

These considerations, coupled with the reluctance or inability of respondents to indicate how much time a boot camp devotes to drug treatment, have made it difficult to estimate the average length of time a boot camp inmate spent in treatment and its intensity. Because of the eclectic nature of the treatments and the common lack of boundaries between what drug treatment is and what it is not, the most that can be said is that the length of drug treatment in boot camps paralleled the average length of boot camp programs (slightly over 5 months).

The statement of one boot camp psychologist as reported in Burns (1991) reflects much boot camp programming in this regard:

...(what I do)...probably does not come across as a very specific alcohol and drug component to the inmates. I don't separate it out. When I teach the 12 steps, I show them that the 12 steps are good for whatever their problem happens to be. And I view crime as an addictive behavior, just as drugs are addictive. So that these 12 steps, properly used, can get you over your addiction to crime" (Burns, 1991, p. 22).

In effect, a day in boot camp has been viewed by many boot camp treatment providers as a day in drug treatment.

Treatment Staff

As Lipton et al. noted in their review of correctional drug treatment, "staffing is one of the keys to successful programming whatever the modality" (1992, p. 23). There are two predominant issues when considering treatment staff: the quality and size of the staff relative to the client population and the type of treatment offered.

The survey responses revealed considerable diversity in the way treatment programs were staffed, but three models predominated. In the first, treatment programming is provided by full- or part-time agency staff, essentially an in-house program delivery. The second is a mixed model in which individuals are contracted to supplement agency staff in providing the program. The third model involves contracting all services through individuals or an outside treatment provider.

The in-house model was by far the most common single approach, with about two-thirds of the facilities relying solely on agency staff. Only two reporting facilities used contracted staff solely, and less than a third used the mixed model of both agency staff and contracted personnel. Exhibit 6 presents an overview of some of the characteristics of contracted and agency staffing. These findings indicate that full-time contracted staff were more likely to be certified and to have had formal training in substance abuse treatment than full-time correctional agency treatment staff.

Exhibit 6. Substance Abuse Treatment Staff at Facilities Providing Treatment (n=22)

Staff Type	Number of Facilities With (%)	Average Number of Staff	Range of Number of Inmates per Staff Member	Percentage of Staff With Formal Training	Percentage of Staff Certified
Full-Time Contracted	6 (27)	3.2	4–41:1	83	75
Full-Time Agency	20 (91)	2.7	10–90:1	70	40
Part-Time Contracted	7 (32)	3.7	10–33:1	71	33
Part-Time Agency	1 (4)	5.0	15:1	0	100

Boot camp programs also differed widely in the ratio of client offenders to substance abuse treatment providers. One program had a ratio of 4 clients for every treatment provider; at the other end of the spectrum, one had a ratio of 90 participants for every treatment staff member. The most common ratios were 10 to 1, 30 to 1, 45 to 1, and 50 to 1, each seen at two facilities. It seems difficult to imagine that a substance abuse counselor could have much individualized interaction with offenders at ratios nearing 100 or even 50 clients per staff member. However, inmate-staff ratios in boot camp treatment programs average in the range of 30 to 1 across types of modalities.

Summary and Conclusions

In general, adult boot camps provide substance abuse programming to a greater percentage of their clients than do correctional facilities. All of the surveyed programs offered at least substance abuse education, and over 75 percent offered substance abuse treatment. Interestingly, respondents who worked at actual boot camp sites were less likely than system-level officials to report that treatment was provided.



Substance abuse treatment programming was found to be a key element in establishing a rehabilitative correctional regime. Boot camps with drug treatment programming are not only more strongly oriented to rehabilitation as a primary goal but are also more likely to use the programming often thought necessary to promote the successful community reintegration of offenders (e.g., postrelease programming services).

Despite these positive findings, a number of issues have been identified in this chapter that suggest that all is not well with boot camp substance abuse programming. Most boot camps have provided drug treatment in a manner that makes it difficult to readily ascertain the number of treatment hours actually provided to boot camp participants (e.g., hours vary per week, treatment hours are not distinct from education hours). Research does confirm, however, that the relatively short duration of boot camp programs does not bode well for their ability to keep graduates substance free over the long term. Moreover, assessment of inmates' need for treatment appears to be an underdeveloped component of substance abuse programming, for it is infrequently used to classify inmates for treatment or to individualize their treatment plans.

Substance abuse treatment programs in adult boot camp facilities were also found to take several forms and to be part of a variety of simultaneously used modalities. While common in the field, multimethod approaches were not used in these boot camp settings to uncover and treat the wide variety of problems underlying drug use and dependence. For instance, individualized treatment has been rare, with individual counseling found to be a modality in only 14 of the 22 boot camps that provided substance abuse treatment. More commonly, all boot camp participants within a facility received the same treatment regardless of their individual needs or situations.

Researchers have identified the therapeutic community model as one of the most successful approaches to correctional substance abuse treatment (e.g., Lipton et al., 1992). Somewhat surprising, then, is the fact that only two of the facilities reporting, Massachusetts and Wisconsin, specified the use of a therapeutic community model. If New York's programs are included, the relative percentage of boot camps maintaining that a therapeutic community approach is used increases substantially. Nonetheless, it appears that a therapeutic community model of drug treatment has been underutilized in adult correctional boot camps. This is especially disturbing because such facilities appear ideally suited for the introduction of therapeutic communities.

Clearly there appear to be significant shortfalls in the manner by which substance abuse treatment is provided to adult boot camp participants. Although a number of promising programs exist, much can be done to improve the current programming in many States. Such efforts should be guided by the results of further experimentation and evaluation.

Notes

1. The responding correctional officials were given the opportunity to self-define whether correctional programming in their system included a “shock incarceration” facility. They were asked if their jurisdiction contained “any program that has an intensive training component, not necessarily based on a military model, that is an incarceration-based alternative to a traditional prison sentence.” Rather surprisingly, given the fact that the survey letter did not make reference to boot camps or shock incarceration and the program design of the facility was not constrained to a military model, respondents tended to identify the same facilities that had been identified in contemporaneous boot camp surveys (e.g., MacKenzie, 1993).
2. This count approximates the findings derived from a March 1992 census of boot camps that identified 41 boot camps in 26 States (MacKenzie, Shaw, and Gowdy, 1993). The 45 facilities identified in this survey are also comparable in number to the 46 reported by MacKenzie as existing during 1992 and 1993 (MacKenzie, 1993). Compared to the MacKenzie survey, the present research identified one more shock incarceration program in Georgia and two fewer facilities in Michigan. Both these surveys report far fewer boot camp facilities than either the more recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) or American Correctional Association (ACA, 1993) surveys. These lower counts are not due to a rapid increase in the opening of adult boot camp programs during 1993 but to the GAO’s identification of 19 boot camps in Georgia, while the ACA reported 11 boot camps in Georgia and 7 in Missouri. It is questionable whether these latter figures represent the actual number of boot camps in those States, even as they may be defined by correctional officials there. It appears that the present research effort has been successful in identifying the universe of broadly defined adult shock incarceration facilities in the United States at the beginning of 1993.
3. If responses from all of the New York facilities and those from Georgia and Oklahoma were included in this analysis, the percentage of boot camps with a drug treatment component would increase beyond the 75 percent reported above. Each State (but New York in particular) emphasizes drug treatment and has a fairly strong component. For further information on New York’s model, see MacKenzie (1993), Clark and Aziz in this volume, and Clark, Aziz, and MacKenzie (1993). This was not true of the original Georgia and Oklahoma programs, but in recent years such programming efforts have been introduced or enhanced in those States.
4. The percentage of boot camps that could be classified in such a manner would increase if New York’s boot camps were included in this analysis. New York’s drug treatment model is based on a therapeutic community approach.



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Editor's Note: A National Institute of Justice Research Report, Boot Camp Drug Treatment and Aftercare Intervention: An Evaluation Review (NCJ 153918) and a Research in Brief of the same name (NCJ 155062) summarizing the report are available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 800–851–3420.

CHAPTER 14

Boot Camps as an Alternative for Women

by Doris Layton MacKenzie, Ph.D., Lori A. Elis,
Sally S. Simpson, Ph.D., and Stacy B. Skroban

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Stacy Skroban is a graduate student with the department. Her primary research interests include applied statistical models and evaluation of delinquency prevention programs.

This chapter describes a study of women in adult correctional boot camps. The authors visited boot camp programs in seven States, interviewing staff and inmates, collecting questionnaire information from the women boot camp participants, and examining the facility design, structure, and operation. They found two different types of boot camps for women: one integrated women into boot camps designed for male inmates; other boot camps for females were completely separate from the male camps. After reviewing the evidence, the authors concluded that there were major problems for women in camps that combined men and women. Few women were in the camps, and those who were confronted serious problems. The environment and experiences of the women were not equal to those of the men in the same camps. Women in separate or semiseparate programs fared better. The pros and cons for the women in these camps were very similar to those for men, but some characteristics of the women made the boot camp experience much more difficult than for men. In particular, for women who had dependency problems or who had been victims of abuse, the boot camp provided a negative atmosphere. It was concluded that women should not be combined with men in boot camps designed for men. If boot camps are going to be developed for women, they should be designed to be compatible with the needs and characteristics of women offenders. Alternatives to boot camps should be considered that would offer women similar opportunities but in a more suitable environment.

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Boot camp programs generally target young, nonviolent, first-time offenders. Participants have been overwhelmingly male. However, in the interest of parity, many departments of corrections have opened boot camp programs to women offenders. Some boot camps offer intensive therapeutic programming or opportunities for early release that would not be available in traditional prisons or in other alternative programs. If women are denied access to boot camps, they will not have equal opportunities for therapy or early release.

Considering the public and political support for these programs, there is every reason to believe money will continue to be funneled into boot camps. If they do provide benefits for individual participants, these benefits should be available equally to men and women offenders. Legally, incarcerated women have a right to the same level of programming and benefits available to men (Rafter, 1990). However, prison boot camps were developed for men, with women often admitted as an after-thought.

Successful litigation by incarcerated females has increased the availability of upgraded programs for women in many prisons (Crawford, 1988). Correctional programs originally designed for men have become options for women. However, this trend is not without controversy. The integration of women into male-oriented correctional programs has been criticized by some scholars who argue that placing women in programs originally designed for males without a prior assessment of the needs of female offenders may be detrimental (Rafter, 1989; Morash and Rucker, 1990). Although the program may have possible benefits, its implementation may have unintended consequences for the women. "And, as the entire history of our prison system indicates, 'equal' treatment may actually create hardships for women if male needs and programs set the standard" (Rafter, 1990, p. 202).

Most of the research examining boot camps has focused on male inmates. In a multisite study of boot camp programs, MacKenzie and Souryal (1994) found that boot camps had a positive impact on the attitudes of offenders. Camps emphasizing treatment and aftercare may also lower recidivism rates of program graduates. Furthermore, some programs may be designed to reduce prison crowding by releasing offenders earlier than they would otherwise be released. Thus there is evidence that some boot camps offer benefits for offenders. The multisite study focused on male offenders because in most cases there were too few women in the boot camps to provide reasonable numbers for statistical analyses.


This chapter examines the adequacy of correctional boot camps for women. The researchers identified the State boot camp programs with women participants and selected half for a more indepth descriptive study (MacKenzie, Elis, Simpson, and Skroban, 1994). Before the study began, a focus group of feminist scholars, correctional experts, and criminologists identified an extensive list of issues important to consider in an evaluation of the appropriateness of boot camps for females. The study was designed to address the following questions:

- Do women offenders have an equal opportunity to enter and remain in the boot camps?
- Do the camps address the needs of women offenders?
- Are the boot camps potentially harmful for these offenders?
- What are the potential advantages of the camps for women?
- Are there alternative correctional programs that would be more appropriate?

Survey of Boot Camp Programs

In March 1992 the researchers surveyed all adult State correctional systems to determine the number and characteristics of the boot camp programs in existence. This study found 39 boot camp programs for adult felons in 25 States (the survey did not include boot camps in juvenile detention centers or in local jails). Thirteen of the 25 States had women in the boot camp programs, with women making up 6.1 percent of the boot camp population. Two additional States (Pennsylvania and Massachusetts) were planning to open boot camps, with women eligible to enter the program.

The number of beds for women in the boot camps varied from a low of 8 in Colorado, Kansas, and New Hampshire to a high of 150 in New York. Camps for women in the remaining States (Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas) were intermediate in size, their capacities ranging from 10 to 60. The capacity figure for the women in boot camps in these States was consistently smaller than that for male inmates (exhibit 1).





A major difference among the boot camps with respect to female participants was the fact that some programs integrated the females into the program with male inmates; others had completely separate female programs. Women participating in the integrated programs were housed either at the male boot camp or at a nearby female prison. In these programs the women participated with the men in almost all daily activities. Nine States with boot camp programs for women combined women and men in one program. The other four had completely separate programs in which males and females did not come into contact with one another.

Site Visits

Out of the 13 boot camps for women, 6 were selected for more indepth study. Since the research team pilot tested data collection instruments at one boot camp, the final selection of six sites was a 50-percent sample of boot camps in existence at the time of the survey. Four of these boot camps had integrated programs (men and women combined), and two were separate camps for women. At the time of the site visits, a total of 69 women were participating in the boot camps. The number of women in the camps was much smaller than the allowable capacity (a total of 143 beds). This was a particular problem with the integrated programs. The 4 integrated programs had designated a total of 64 beds for female offenders, yet there were only 9 women in the camps, or only 12.5 percent of the total capacity. In fact, two of the sites had no women at the time of the site visits.

The separate programs differed as to percentage of beds filled. At one site, 93 percent of the 55-bed capacity had been reached; at the other, 25 percent of the 20-bed capacity was filled. Thus, with the exception of one boot camp, the beds in boot camps for women were generally empty, particularly in the combined programs.

Because the numbers of women from the six sites were so small, an additional site was added to the study. This boot camp was not randomly selected. Its large number of women was expected to yield additional interviews and information about women's boot camp experience. Men and women spent some time together, but they were not integrated for all activities. Women were housed in separate buildings from the male inmates. They did not mix during work, and although they were with male inmates at meals, they were required to eat at separate tables. Males and females did participate together in educational classes, physical training, drill and ceremony, and drug counseling. Thus, for the purposes of this study, this program was classified as semiseparate.

At the seven boot camps, the researchers collected data through interviews with administrators and inmates. During a walk through the site, they also completed a checklist that examined the degree of integration in programs combining males and females, including the living situation, the decor, bathroom facilities, and cross-gender supervision. Female inmates were also asked to complete a questionnaire



asking for demographic data and information on their families, history of abuse, and prior drug and alcohol use.

Results

The majority of the women in the boot camps had children with whom they would be living after release. Most were the sole source of financial support for themselves and their children. They were serving time for nonviolent crimes (drugs, theft, or fraud), and a large percentage had prior contact with the criminal justice system. Many had substance abuse problems and histories of abusive relationships.

An analysis of the completed questionnaires, coupled with results of interviews with both inmates and staff, revealed a number of issues and problems about the boot camp experiences of women.

Do Women Offenders Have an Equal Opportunity To Enter and Remain in the Boot Camps?

The most conspicuous problem with the randomly selected sites was the small number of women in the boot camps. As noted earlier, some boot camp beds for women were not being used, and of the six sites receiving visits, two had no women in the program. The few women who did enter the boot camp program were apt to drop out. This is a particular problem when boot camps combine women and men in the same program.

There are some obvious problems that may account for the small number of women. First, the programs were designed for men. Women appeared to have more problems with the physical demands of the program. They frequently discussed health problems, and many of those in the process of dropping out cited a physical problem as the reason.

Another problem reported by the women, especially in the combined programs, was the emotionally stressful nature of the program. Almost all inmates have reported that boot camp programs are stressful (see, for instance, MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994). However, the women appeared to suffer additional stress because there were so few women in the program. That is, there were frequently only 1 or 2 women in a program with 30 or more men. In many cases, for their protection, the women were supervised more intensely in the program than the men. Interviews indicated that women's activities were often severely restricted to protect them from abuse and harassment (yet there were still many instances of problematic sexual activities in the boot camps).



Additional difficulties related by the women were due to their different standards of modesty, privacy, and aesthetics. Many of the boot camps' bathroom facilities permitted little privacy and employed cross-gender supervision. Furthermore, dormitories were barren; the women were not permitted to display personal items such as photographs. They missed these reminders of home and children.

If the women in these boot camps are compared to the men in another study of boot camps (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994), they are found to be similar in the type of crime they committed and the percentage who were employed (exhibit 2). However, the women were older than the men in the boot camps (23 to 29 years old compared to 19 to 24). Age restrictions for eligibility may be one reason why there were few women in the boot camps. Four of the sites had an upper age limit of 25 for participants in the programs and were filled only up to 33 percent of capacity. The two programs that had filled the majority of their beds either had no upper age limit or an upper age limit of 35. Thus, if women offenders are on the average older than men when they enter prison, they may be in effect excluded only because they do not meet age requirements. Other eligibility criteria may also limit the number of women who are admitted, particularly if the criteria were originally developed for male offenders (Chesney-Lind and Pollock-Byrne, 1993).

Although women may have been placed in the boot camps in the interest of equality, mixing women into a program designed for men did not create an equal situation. Programs did not take into consideration the average woman inmate's physical

Characteristic	Percentage of Positive Responses
Criminal History	
Convicted of drug crime, fraud, or theft	60–63
Was previously arrested	40–70
Was previously convicted	20–63
Economic Profile	
Employed	48–60
Sole support of family	50–60
Self-Reported Drug Use in Month Before Arrest	
Heroin	0–28
Crack	20–25
Cocaine	14–50
Alcohol	20–27

Exhibit 2. Profile of Female Offenders in Boot Camps in Four Sites

Characteristic	Percentage of Positive Responses
Criminal History	
Convicted of drug crime, fraud, or theft	60–63
Was previously arrested	40–70
Was previously convicted	20–63
Economic Profile	
Employed	48–60
Sole support of family	50–60
Self-Reported Drug Use in Month Before Arrest	
Heroin	0–28
Crack	20–25
Cocaine	14–50
Alcohol	20–27

stamina. The women had to cope with the additional stress of being in an environment where the majority of participants and staff were men.

Do the Camps Address the Needs of Women Offenders?

A review of the literature on women offenders suggests that their most important needs include vocational or employment training to help them support themselves and their children; substance abuse treatment; programming that considers their family obligations, such as parenting classes, life skills training, and help with the transition to the community; and counseling for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault (American Correctional Association, 1993; Rafter, 1990; Baunach, 1985). As expected, these problems were frequently mentioned by women in the boot camps.

Programs such as parenting training, general education, and drug treatment were available in many of the boot camps. If women are excluded from participation, they may not have an equal opportunity for such programming.

On the other hand, although many women had serious drug abuse histories (see exhibit 2), only half of the boot camps had drug treatment programs. Few offered therapeutic programs for the problems many of these women had, such as programs for surviving sexual assault or battering, making a successful transition to the community, or obtaining job skills.

Furthermore, there were no innovative visitation programs to encourage women's interaction with their children, and in the combined programs visitation was particularly limited. It appears that the programs failed to take into consideration the importance of children to women in boot camps. Since most of the women were mothers who expected to be reunited with their children upon release, the time in prison could be used to strengthen the mother-child bond and improve parenting skills. Furthermore, interaction with children may be a positive influence on female offenders.

Are the Boot Camps Potentially Harmful for Women Offenders?

Frequently in interviews inmates mentioned name calling and offensive comments by the drill instructors (DIs). They reported being told, "You are nothing but a convict" and "You're always gonna be a loser." Several reported being called "bitch." Perhaps the most offensive comments were those about the women's ability to be good parents or comments about their children. One woman who told a DI about having had a stillborn child believed the DI was out of place to say, "Good—you



didn't bring another slimeball into the world." Another reported that being told "your child is a coke baby" hurt her considerably. Women reported they were "dogged" and that the DI's attempted to "tear them down." The women made many comments about how after being torn down they were supposed to be built up, but there were few comments about how this was done. DI's in the combined programs were the source of the harshest verbal abuse.

Problems related to sexual activities were mentioned by both staff and inmates. For example, in one boot camp program a male DI required the women to exercise in their nightgowns upon arising in the morning while the male drill instructor walked through the dormitory. After they complained to a female DI, the male DI was no longer assigned to the women's dormitory.

One of the administrators in a separate program reported that at one time the program had been coeducational but that several pregnancies had occurred and one woman was murdered by a male inmate. This was one reason for the decision to separate the male and female boot camp programs.

Another reported a problem that occurred in a combined program when a male drill instructor had sexual relations with one of the female boot camp inmates. The administrator believed that despite suggestions that the woman had consented to the relations, consent could not freely be given because of the DI's power over the inmate. This boot camp had gone to great lengths to protect the female participants from male inmates, requiring a DI to be with the women at all times. Yet the DI, who could be male or female (depending upon who was on duty) had to stay in the bathroom while the women showered. The inmates were required to strip down to their underwear in front of the DI before moving into a shower stall (partially concealed from view).

Although some of the women mentioned that they had been pushed or shoved by correctional officers, none of those interviewed said they had been touched sexually. In the combined programs, several said that the men were pushed by the drill instructors more often than the women.

Another concern about the boot camps was their effect on women who had been battered or abused in the past. This comment from a woman who had just made the decision to leave the boot camp was typical: "I was physically and mentally abused and just being here reminds me of it." She went on to say:

I have bruises on my arms. They grab you and they push you around...They shouldn't be that harsh on you. They get in your face and make you feel like dirt. For someone like me that's been physically and mentally abused, that's all it reminds me of—being abused.



Another woman in a different program who had been in the program a week said, “You can’t talk to the DI’s like they are people because you are not just allowed to even look at them.” She couldn’t get used to this. “When you look at them they scream at you, ‘don’t look at me.’” She said this was frightening for people like her who had been abused in the past.

Another inmate remembered:

When I first got here, I had people screaming at me in my ears...I thought I was gonna just come apart, have a nervous breakdown...For the 2 months I was here, I cried because it triggered all that stuff from my childhood that I just started remembering when I came here.

On the other hand, some of the women who had been in the boot camps longer felt that they had learned useful lessons. One reported, “The program teaches you how to stand up for yourself and that you don’t have to take anybody’s crap. The DI’s are in your face all the time and you get to express your feelings. You can explain to them how you feel.”

What Are the Potential Advantages of the Camps for Women?

The two primary aspects of the boot camp prison that can be considered advantages are the chance for early release and increased opportunities for therapeutic programming. Most of the women said the greatest benefit was getting out of prison earlier. Mothers mentioned wanting to get home to their children, and others said that completing the program would mean they would not have a record of conviction. In one program, the women were upset because they had to wait a long time in prison or jail after signing papers to enter the boot camp, and this lengthened their total incarceration time. They had no choice between this program and other programs offering early release. It was either this program or no early release.

The program with the largest number of female offenders was one that separated the sexes. In contrast to those in the other boot camps, offenders in this camp were sentenced directly to the program. They mentioned the possibility of early release much less frequently, most likely because they could not be as sure what their sentences would have been otherwise. Some had been given a choice of the boot camp, a longer sentence to prison, or a delayed sentence.

Although the majority of the women in one site said they had originally entered the boot camp because they would serve less time in prison, most of them reported that the therapeutic programs and what they had learned while in the boot camp were the best parts of their experience. During interviews, they suggested ways in which the camps could be improved by adding specific types of programs. Most



comments about programming depended on whether a particular program addressed the inmate's own problems. If it did, she reported that the program was beneficial. If it did not (and this was the case most of the time), then the offender suggested what was missing from the program that should be included. Women who thought drug treatment was important reported it as a benefit and said they would recommend the program to others with drug problems.

Many of the women cited discipline as a benefit, and some cited it as a reason for entering the program. They said learning discipline would benefit them in the outside world and would help them achieve self-control. Another benefit reported by the inmates was that they were now in good physical condition, were exercising, and were getting in shape. Several mentioned losing weight.

Are There Alternative Correctional Programs That Would Be More Appropriate?

It became clear in the interviews that the boot camp programs failed to address several important needs of women. Many inmates said they regretted the lack of opportunity to see their children. They also knew they would need to support themselves and their children when they got out but said they received little help in boot camp to improve their occupational opportunities. In addition, women with substance abuse problems reported receiving little treatment, and victims of domestic abuse were not helped in how to deal with their husbands or boyfriends when they returned home.

For these and other reasons, it is questionable whether the benefits of the boot camps for women outweigh the costs. Certainly there are serious problems in combining women and men in one boot camp prison. There may be other, more appropriate alternatives for women offenders.

Summary and Conclusions

Many issues of concern for women in boot camps are similar to those for men. The military atmosphere carries with it some dangers (such as staff-on-inmate abuse, injury, and accidents), and there is little evidence that the military atmosphere alone will change offenders so that they will not be involved in crime in the future.

The authors believe that this research uncovered additional, serious problems for women offenders placed in boot camps with men. Few women entered and stayed in those programs, and their experiences were not the same as those of men. The stress was greater, their activities were restricted, and there were problems with sexual behavior. Thus these programs did not offer women an effectively equal opportunity for early release and appropriate programming.

In general, the separate and semiseparate programs seemed to have fewer problems than the combined programs. The separate programs were more likely to offer therapeutic programs suited to women's needs. Visitation policies were less restrictive, and the women had some opportunities to see their children while in boot camp. Surprisingly, some of them said they would *not* recommend the boot camps to males because men would have "attitude" problems that would make it difficult for them to complete the program.

However, the study identified serious issues with respect to both types of programs. Few of the boot camps addressed women's needs for vocational training, drug treatment, or transition to the community. Of even greater concern was their impact on women who had lived in abusive relationships. The confrontation and requirements for absolute obedience may be particularly bad for women who have been dependent on male criminal associates or for women who have been in abusive relationships (Pollock-Byrne, 1990; Rafter, 1990). When drill instructors confronted women who had been in such relationships, the women were sharply reminded of earlier abusive situations. Only a few said they had learned to stand up for themselves. The authors are concerned that many women, particularly those who dropped out of the program, left with added scars and diminished self-confidence. Together with the obvious potential for sexual, physical, or verbal abuse, this damage to already fragile egos seems to be one of the most dangerous aspects of the boot camp experience for women.

On the other hand, boot camps can offer women the advantage of earning their way out of prison earlier, and they have the capability of providing intense therapy for offenders that is seldom available in regular prison. If boot camp is the only way women offenders can obtain treatment and early release from prison, it should be possible to design women's boot camp programs that are more responsive to the needs discussed in this chapter. The authors believe that existing boot camps should be considered experimental. They should be carefully monitored and studied so that future programs can be designed that achieve the same correctional objectives without doing damage to the participants.

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CHAPTER 15

Planning and Designing Boot Camp Facilities

by Cindie A. Unger

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Boot camp facilities need to be designed in accordance with their goals and activities, which are different from the goals and activities of regular prisons. Whether renovating or adding to existing prison facilities or designing totally new facilities, correctional planners need to conduct five activities to ensure that designs enable the boot camp to fulfill its objectives to: (1) develop a preliminary program, (2) develop and consider facility options, (3) determine the costs of facility options, (4) identify strategies for reducing construction and operating costs, and (5) select the most feasible option. The recommendations made are drawn from Guidelines for Developing a Boot Camp Program, a manual prepared in 1993 by the Correctional Services Group, Inc., and jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Justice's National Institute of Corrections and Bureau of Justice Assistance. One chapter in the manual tells how to design boot camp facilities so that they promote the objectives of boot camp programs.

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The growth of boot camp programs has spawned numerous studies of boot camps, ranging from instructional manuals for implementation to comprehensive evaluations. Nearly all of these studies focus exclusively on the boot camp program—its objectives, its components (drill, physical exercise, education programming, substance abuse treatment), eligibility criteria, program length, and program effectiveness. Very little attention has been given to the physical facilities that house boot camp programs and how their design affects the ability of the programs to achieve their objectives.

Yet correctional administrators have long recognized that correctional programs and security practices are shaped by the structures in which they are housed. Since the earliest penitentiaries were constructed on American soil, an integral part of correctional facility design has been to plan the physical layout and structure of facilities to serve the prison's overall goals, programs, services, and activities.

This premise holds true for the planning of boot camp facilities, whether they are located in existing, expanded, or new correctional buildings. The Nation's earliest prisons were facilities that isolated prisoners because the prevailing correctional philosophies of the day emphasized silence, penitence, and solitude. Today's boot camps, on the other hand, simulate the barracks of military boot camps to bring nonviolent inmates together to instill discipline, promote teamwork, and ultimately generate a sense of responsibility for themselves and for others. Boot camps reflect a correctional philosophy that emphasizes rehabilitation through group interaction and activities.

Because of these special program goals and nonviolent offender populations, boot camp facilities are designed differently from traditional prisons and jails. They contain proportionally more space for physical exercise and substance abuse programming, use dormitory housing almost exclusively, and use outdoor areas for close-order drill and obstacle courses—training courses filled with barriers, such as ditches and walls, that must be negotiated.

To successfully plan and design an effective boot camp facility, a correctional agency should complete five activities: (1) develop a preliminary program, (2) develop and consider facility options, (3) determine the costs of facility options, (4) identify strategies for reducing construction and operating costs, and (5) select the most feasible option.¹

Develop a Preliminary Program

To select a feasible and effective option for a boot camp facility, the agency must first have a clear, if preliminary, idea of how the facility will function and the demands that will be placed on it. This requires the development of a preliminary program statement that identifies:

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- The boot camp mission.
 - Boot camp goals.
 - Boot camp programs and services.
 - The daily schedule.
 - Capacity projections.
 - The preliminary estimate of space needs.
 - The relationship among spaces.
 - Potential users.
 - Americans With Disabilities Act requirements.
 - Major activities to be carried out.

The mission of the boot camp guides the development of its goals, which in turn determine the types of programs and services that will be needed and that will determine the daily schedule that the boot camp participants will follow. Guided by this schedule, facility planners can identify the specific types of spaces the boot camp will need to provide. A sample daily boot camp schedule is provided in exhibit 1.²

The size of the facility, the number of participants it can accommodate at any one time, plus the daily schedule will dictate the number and size of the spaces planned for each activity or program.

The preliminary estimate of space needs involves several activities, preceded by a review of State and national facility standards. First, planners should develop a list of spaces needed to carry out the daily activities. For most boot camps, major functional spaces will include:

- Dormitory housing, including sleeping area, day room, showers, and toilets.
- Program space for academic classes, substance abuse programming, life skills training, anger management, and other skills enhancement training.
- Multipurpose space for group meetings, Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and religious services.
- Administrative offices and ancillary support space.
- Program and service office space.

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**Exhibit 1. Minnesota Correctional Facility—
Willow River/Moose Lake
Willow River Challenge Incarceration Program Daily Schedule**

Time	Event
5:30	Wake Up/Roll Call
5:35–5:45	Physical Training Preparation
5:45–6:35	Physical Training
6:35–7:00	Personal Cleanup
7:00–7:30	Breakfast Meal
7:30–7:45	Morning Flag Ritual
7:45–8:25	Barracks Maintenance/Offender Inspection
8:25–8:30	Program Readiness Preparation
8:30–9:55	Cognitive Skills Training/Barracks Inspection
10:00–11:55	Education Programming or Work Assignment
11:55–12:00	Roll Call
12:00–12:30	Lunch Meal
12:35–3:15	Work Assignment
3:15–3:30	Physical Training Preparation
3:30–4:30	Physical Training
4:30–4:55	Personal Cleanup
4:55–5:00	Roll Call
5:00–5:30	Evening Meal
5:30–6:00/6:15	Evening Flag Ritual/KP/Administration Building Cleanup/Program Readiness Preparation
6:00–7:00	Lecture or Acupuncture Treatment
7:00–8:00	Chemical Dependency Programming
8:00–9:00	Squad Meeting
9:00–9:25	Individual Offender Programming and Journal/Correspondence and Study Time
9:25–9:30	Personal Cleanup
9:30	Roll Call
9:35	Lights Out



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- Gymnasium for indoor physical exercise and drill.
 - Outdoor physical training area for running track, calisthenics, and drill.
 - Library.
 - Kitchen.
 - Dining room.
 - Warehouse, including food stores.
 - Laundry.
 - Visiting area.
 - Offender property storage area.
 - Clothing, facility supplies storage area.
 - Intake area.
 - Space for staff services, including lockers, showers, training room, and assembly room.

Besides the schedule, planners will have to take into account the capacity of the facility. Then the estimated net square footage for each type of space listed must be determined. This is the amount of space required for a particular function, exclusive of interior walls or circulation space around the functional area. Each space must be large enough to accommodate the number of people who will use the space (both offenders and staff) and the nature of the activities that will take place there.

To make functional spaces work in relation to one another, designers add a grossing factor, which adds space for interior walls and partitions, internal corridors, and circulation among functional components (such as administrative and program areas). To illustrate grossing, a factor of 35 to 40 percent is typically added to the net square footage (NSF) estimated for dormitory housing. Thus, a 50-foot by 70-foot dormitory would have 3,500 square feet, yet the gross square footage (GSF) would be at least 4,725 square feet ($3,500 \text{ NSF} \times 0.35 \text{ growing factor}$). In addition, the preliminary estimate of space needs also involves computing the facility's overall efficiency factor. Typically, the efficiency factor is about 1.25 times the gross square footage. In this way, the overall size of the facility can be determined. A sample housing space list with estimated square footages is provided in exhibit 2.

After determining their space needs, boot camp planners should study the relationship among the spaces, determining which spaces need to be next to or near one another (in the language of architects, spacial relationships are called adjacencies)

Exhibit 2. Example Space List
Premier Shock Incarceration Center

Summary of Area Requirements: Inmate Housing Area

Space	No. of Spaces	NSF per Space	Total NSF
Secured Vestibule	1	100	100
Officer Station	1	90	90
Staff Toilet	1	30	30
Dormitory Area	64	50	3,200
Day Room	64	35	2,240
Dining Area	64	15	960
Television Viewing Area		Included in Day Room	
Showers	8	36	288
Toilets	8	12	96
Sinks	8	5	40
Urinals	8	5	40
Outdoor Recreation Courtyard	1	1,000	1,000
Indoor Weight Station	1	180	180
Interview Room	1	100	100
J.C./Trash storage	1	100	100
General Storage	1	150	150
Beverage Counter	1	20	20
Food Service Staging	1	100	100
Telephone Alcove	1	20	20
Laundry Room	1	100	100
Clothing Storage/Issue	1	100	100
Electronic Equip. Room	1	80	80
Medical Screening Room	1	120	120
Total (One Dormitory)			9,154
Total (Four Dormitories)			36,616



and projecting the flow of people, information, and things throughout the facility. They must also visualize the volume, frequency, and importance of this flow. Potential users include staff, offenders, visitors, volunteers, and vendors. Designers should consider the number of these people, the period and length of time they will spend there, and any special requirements they may have.

The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 significantly strengthened the law on accessibility to public buildings. Areas or objects whose accessibility must be evaluated include exterior step handrails or possible ramp; doors, which should be wide and easily opened; elevators or ramps to accompany interior stairs; floors, which should be level and nonslip; restrooms, which should have wide doors and grab bars; counters, which should be of suitable height; corridors, which should be brightly lit and fitted with grab bars; and waiting rooms with comfortable seating.

The design must also be based on an understanding of the major activities to be undertaken for each user or facility area throughout the building and the typical sequence of activities, including what people are involved, what they do, and where they do it. A master operational schedule, completed by the users of the facility, is invaluable to designers at this point (exhibit 3).

The Illinois Impact Incarceration Program (IIP) at Dixon Springs furnishes an example of what happens when the facility design does not take into account an important aspect of the program. The program's inmate code of silence dictates that inmates may not communicate with one another and that they may not speak to staff unless they first obtain permission or are addressed by staff. The facility, a former forestry camp, has 3 housing units—1 for women, 1 large unit for 80 of the newest participants, and another large unit comprising 10 smaller dormitories, each housing 14 inmates.

Staff are aware that participants routinely violate the code of silence when they are in the small dormitories. To enforce the code, IIP would have to place an officer in each of the 10 small dormitories to visually monitor inmates' talking behavior. Because this level of staffing is cost prohibitive, the inmates are "on their honor" to adhere to the code of silence. A better facility design would have consisted of 3 large dormitories housing between 60 and 75 inmates each, with a correctional officer assigned to each dormitory. Alternatively, a housing unit design could have been adopted similar to that of the Georgia's Women's Detention Center (see exhibit 4), where 166 inmates are housed in 4 dormitories designed around a common control center. The officers who staff the control center have unobstructed views into each of the dormitories.

Another important issue to consider at the planning stage is the impact created by the facility design (the materials chosen to construct the facility, its layout, and the number and types of spaces included in the facility), as well as the furnishings, on the attitudes of staff, inmates, and the public. These features communicate a

Exhibit 3. Master Operational Schedule



message. The public, particularly, wants to see correctional boot camps that mirror their ideas about military boot camps—campus-style facilities built of wood or simple concrete block with sealed concrete floors; few or no window treatments; recreational opportunities limited to drill, calisthenics, running, and the obstacle course; minimal interior decoration; and inexpensive furnishings, preferably metal. The message most correctional agencies wish to communicate to inmates and staff is somewhat different. Spartan facilities with simple furnishings focus the attention and energies of both staff and inmates on the basics of the boot camp program—growth and development of the program participants through discipline, training, and education. Utilitarian designs, furniture chosen for its durability rather than its beauty, give the message that the program is unadorned, no-nonsense, rigid, rigorous, and character-building.

Develop and Consider Facility Options

Unlike most secure jails and prisons, boot camps can be housed in existing buildings or expansions of existing structures. Boot camp programs have operated out of forestry camps, medium security prisons, a school house, military barracks, and a maximum security jail. The potential for using an existing building is important to consider, particularly when funds are limited or there is a need to implement the program as quickly as possible, but there are many considerations to be addressed. Basically, correctional officials have three principal options for housing boot camps:

- Renovate an existing facility.
- Construct a new boot camp on the grounds of an existing facility.
- Construct a new stand-alone facility.


Renovating an existing facility. While this option may appear attractive, based primarily on speed and cost, a number of conditions must be met. The failure of the facility to meet any one of these conditions can nullify any benefits derived from use of an existing structure.

First, the building must comply with standards and legal requirements for boot camps. It must be large enough to house the projected offender population, including those waiting to enter the program, and to accommodate the program's goals and objectives as well as being adaptable to program needs. It must be possible to maintain separation between boot camp inmates and regular inmates.

The building must be sound, fire-safe, and secure, and provide the minimum level of comfort required as well as meet sanitation requirements. It must comply with all building codes, have appropriate space for programs and services, and promote staff efficiency.

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Exhibit 4. Boot Camp Design Used in Georgia



If the proposed building does not meet all of the foregoing criteria, it must be renovated to bring it into compliance. The cost of the required renovation is an important consideration in choosing renovation over new construction. While these considerations are also important in evaluating the construction of a new facility, the agency will dictate, up front in the planning process, the standards, codes, and regulations that the facility design and construction will have to meet. Retrofitting a facility to meet applicable codes, standards, and regulations is often more expensive than designing and executing these requirements in new construction.

Addition to existing facility. Adding the boot camp facility to an existing facility is an option favored by some. In a study of Georgia's boot camp program, Special Alternative Incarceration, judges who were interviewed said that the boot camps should be housed within a regular prison setting. They believed the suggestive jeering and taunting of the older, hardened, adult inmates would instill fear in the boot camp offenders and thus deter them from future criminal activity and possible return to prison.³

Another rationale for placing the boot camp within a larger facility is to enable the program to receive wider staff scrutiny and thus guard against abuse of offenders.



A final reason is that staff can be easily rotated into and out of the program when they cannot adjust to the boot camp environment or are at risk of burnout.

Most agencies that operate boot camp programs have followed a similar development path. That is, most boot camp programs have been initiated not by corrections agencies but by legislatures, county commissioners, governors, or city councils. Existing staff have formed planning teams to develop the program, recommend policies and procedures, and estimate the staff, facilities, and other resources required. Because the implementation schedule may have been set by agencies outside corrections, the timeframe for developing and implementing the program was frequently very short—a few months to a year. It became expedient for most boot camp programs to use existing facilities, renovating them for use as correctional boot camps.

For example, the Illinois and New York correctional agencies converted work camps for adult offenders. The About Face Program in New Orleans Parish operates out of a former school building. While such actions may meet agencies' requirements for expedient, less costly program startup, boot camp staff report inadequate facilities, especially lack of program space.⁴

Other factors need to be considered before attempting to expand an existing structure: disruption of operations, temporary relocation of offenders, and permanence of the facility. Exhibit 5 presents a facility options checklist to help structure agency decisionmaking concerning the efficacy of renovating an existing facility for use as a boot camp.

Constructing a stand-alone facility. Most corrections agencies have not chosen the option of constructing a stand-alone facility, most likely because this option costs the most and takes the longest time to execute.



The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Intensive Confinement Center for women in Bryan, Texas, was established on the grounds of the Federal Correctional Institution. It holds 120 offenders in dormitory-style barracks.

▲ ▲ ▲ _____

Exhibit 5. Existing Facility Options Checklist

Complete this form for each reasonable facility option.

Option: _____

Focal Concern	Positive Attributes of this Option	Negative Attributes of this Option
Building Soundness and Adaptability	_____	_____
Fire and Life Safety	_____	_____
Security and Safety	_____	_____
Separation	_____	_____
Scale	_____	_____
Comfort and Humane Conditions	_____	_____
Appropriate and Adequate Spaces for Programs, Services	_____	_____
Sanitation	_____	_____
Efficiency	_____	_____
Other Concerns (Indicate): _____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
Ramifications of the Change	_____	_____
Summary	_____	_____

Source: Jay Farbstein: *Correctional Facility Planning and Design*. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1986.

Construction Process for Building a Stand-Alone Facility

The process involves five primary steps:

- **Site selection**—Determining the best location for the camp within the jurisdiction, obtaining the necessary zoning and building permits, performing the necessary site evaluations, and holding public hearings.
- **Predesign**—Preparing the architectural and operational plan, including identifying the planning standards that will govern the design of the facility (e.g., State and local building codes, American Correctional Association Standards, State standards); determining the program goals; describing how the facility will operate; specifying the types and number of spaces that will be required; and identifying the number and types of staff necessary to operate the facility.
- **Design**—Preparing the conceptual design, schematic design, design development drawings, and contract drawings;

The construction of a stand-alone boot camp [see box] can take from 12 to 26 months, depending on the size of the facility, how difficult it is to site the facility, how long it takes to secure the necessary zoning and building permits, and the level of attention given to planning the facility. The schedule for constructing a stand-alone boot camp facility is shown in exhibit 6.

Determine Facility Option Costs

After choosing the facility option that best makes sense for a jurisdiction, planners should develop a preliminary estimate of the cost of the renovation, expansion, or new construction. This is done by determining current construction costs on a square-foot basis, computing the total gross square footage for the option selected, estimating current total construction costs, and adjusting for inflation.

Equally important is to make a preliminary estimate of what the facility will cost to operate, on an annual and life-cycle basis, including not only existing but potential operational expenses. Calculating operational expenses is critical because they are annual costs, while renovation or construction expenses are a one-time cost. To estimate operational costs, planners should:

- Calculate annual costs, including fringe benefits.
- Determine the cost of offender services on an annual basis, not excluding permanent agency employees, but including contractual services.
- Compute the annual cost of facility maintenance, including the costs of labor, materials, and contractual services.



- calling for bids; and awarding contracts.
- **Construction**—Constructing the facility, including site preparation, paving, extension of utilities (if necessary), construction of the physical plant, and shakedown of the facility. In this context shakedown is a facility inspection specifically to ensure the security of the facility. The construction of the boot camp facility is comparable to the construction of any other type of residential facility except for the installation of detention, security, and communications equipment.
 - **Activation**—Hiring and training staff; ordering and installing unsecured furniture, fixtures, equipment, and supplies; developing policies and procedures; writing post orders; developing program documents; and admitting inmates according to the agency's occupancy schedule.

- Determine all other operational costs, such as costs for inmate clothing, food, uniforms, travel, utilities, supplies, and equipment.
- Calculate the operating cost per bed by adding the total personnel costs, offender services costs, facility maintenance costs, and all other operations costs, and divide by the number of inmates who will be assigned to the program. This calculation will provide the annual operating cost per bed for the boot camp program.

The final activity in calculating estimated costs is to determine what the facility will cost to operate over its expected life. An escalation index, or inflation factor, is applied to the estimated annual operating expenses over a 20- to 30-year period to derive the life-cycle cost of the boot camp.

Identify Strategies for Reducing Construction and Operating Costs

Sometimes, after calculating construction, operational, and life-cycle costs, planners find the costs exceed the agency's budget. In this situation, planners can employ one or more of the following strategies to reduce construction and operational costs:

- Reduce dependency on expensive construction, hardware, and equipment.
- Minimize the use of expensive mechanical and electrical systems.
- Use readily available building materials.
- Select a site that is easy to build on.

Exhibit 6. Schedule for Constructing a Stand-Alone Facility

Step	Timeframe (in Months)
Site Selection	0–6
Predesign Program	1–2
Facility Design	2–4
Construction	8–12
Facility Activation	1–2
Total	12–26

- Employ a “fast-track” or phased construction process to reduce time to completion.
- Use boot camp offenders to construct the obstacle course, running track, and other physical training facilities.
- Locate the boot camp within a larger general population facility so that it can take advantage of some of the staff resources of the larger facility, such as food service, laundry, warehouse, and medical services.
- House offenders awaiting admission to the boot camp in an existing facility, rather than building a larger boot camp facility to accommodate them.

To save money on construction, Georgia built some of its newer boot camp barracks on existing State prison grounds, availing itself of existing offender service systems. With the use of offender labor, Georgia was able to build these new barracks at a cost of about \$2,000 per bed. Stand-alone boot camps that required their own food service systems, medical sections, counseling centers, and staff offices were costing Georgia about \$8,900 per bed.⁵

To reduce operational costs, agencies have used a variety of strategies, including limiting the size of the building to reduce staff, utility, and maintenance costs and increasing the size of the housing unit while keeping the same number of security staff supervising the unit, thus achieving staffing efficiencies. Designs can be created that focus on maximizing staff efficiency or energy efficiency, and mechanical systems can be selected that cost little to maintain.

The Georgia Department of Corrections designed a boot camp facility for its Probation Detention Center that allows one staff member, supported by one rover (a correctional officer whose job is to move continuously through specified areas of the facility, supervising inmates and assisting correctional staff assigned to stationary posts), to supervise 166 offenders. The housing design (see exhibit 4), four



Exhibit 7. Option Rating Form		
	First Cost (\$)	Operating Cost (\$/yr)
OPTION 1:	\$	\$
OPTION 2:	\$	\$
OPTION 3:	\$	\$
OPTION 4:	\$	\$
Etc.		
Note: Consider options for various time-projection periods.		

dormitories arranged around a central control center, results in an efficient staff-to-inmate ratio of 1 to 83. After 1 year of operation, the only recommendation staff could offer for improving the design of the housing units was to increase the number of isolation cells from three to four.⁶

Select the Most Feasible Option

Each option—designing a new stand-alone boot camp, renovating an existing facility, or constructing a boot camp on the grounds of an existing facility—should be evaluated, with adequate consideration given to construction and operating costs, as well as to the advantages and disadvantages of each. An Option Rating Form, to facilitate this analysis, is provided in exhibit 7.



To sum up, with careful planning and attention to the goals of the boot camp program, a renovated facility is an acceptable alternative to a new facility, particularly if the jurisdiction wishes to start up a boot camp program quickly and cost is a factor. On the other hand, however well a renovation of an existing facility is planned, it can often be difficult to eradicate the prior function of the facility without considerable reconstruction. If an extensive renovation is required to meet the agency's needs for a boot camp program, it may make more sense to plan, design, and construct a new facility.

Notes

1. This chapter is drawn from Cindie A. Unger, "Guidelines for Developing a Boot Camp Program," unpublished report, Kansas City, Missouri: Correctional Services Group, Inc., August 1993. The preparation of this manual was jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Justice's National Institute of Corrections and Bureau of Justice Assistance. The manual tells how to design boot camp facilities so that they promote the objectives of boot camp programs.
2. In exhibit 1, "Program Readiness Preparation" is the expression the Minnesota Department of Corrections gives to the brief period of free time before inmates begin a busy day of program participation. During this period they may use the rest room, gather materials they may need for class, tidy their beds or barracks, and the like.
3. G.T. Flowers et al., *Special Alternative Incarceration Evaluation*, Atlanta: Georgia Department of Corrections, 1991:3.
4. Unger, "Guidelines for Developing a Boot Camp Program." See also chapter 13 of this volume.
5. A. Bowen, "Making Boot Camps Bigger and Better in Georgia," *Corrections Today*, (October 1991):100.
6. Cindie A. Unger, *Women's Detention Center Case Study*, Georgia Department of Corrections, Community Corrections Division, 1992:10.

CHAPTER 16

Boot Camps and Prison Crowding

by Dale G. Parent

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Prison boot camps reduce crowding only under a limited set of difficult-to-achieve conditions. Population simulations suggest that to reduce prison crowding boot camps must recruit offenders who otherwise would be imprisoned, offer big reductions in prison terms for completing a boot camp, minimize washout and return-to-prison rates, and operate on a large scale. Few boot camps meet these conditions. Many limit eligibility to nonviolent first offenders, select offenders who otherwise would receive probation, and intensively supervise graduates, thus increasing return-to-prison rates for technical violations. In most jurisdictions, boot camps appear more likely to increase correctional populations and costs rather than reduce them. These findings have important implications for how those programs should be designed and operated. If boot camps are intended to reduce prison populations, they should have a large capacity; they should select participants from among offenders already committed for relatively long prison terms; and they should implement policies to minimize in-program and postrelease failures.



In jurisdictions that run boot camps, most correctional officials report that their boot camps are intended to reduce prison populations, prison crowding, and correctional costs.¹ This chapter explores conditions that must be met to achieve these goals and assesses the extent to which boot camps are likely to achieve them. First, boot camps' impacts on population levels and crowding are examined, and then cost issues are discussed. The chapter concludes by describing key implications and design features of boot camps that will increase the chances of affecting prison population levels.

States' prison populations are determined by factors that are mostly outside the control of officials who run prisons, including sentencing laws passed by legislatures, enforcement priorities set by police, charging and bargaining practices instituted by prosecutors, sentencing patterns followed by judges, supervision and revocation patterns of probation agencies, and release and revocation practices of parole boards. Prison officials cannot exercise discretion legally vested in these other officials.

In the short term, correctional officials have one discretionary decision that can be used to affect prison population levels. Within limits set by law, they can shorten the duration of confinement for selected offenders who have been committed to their custody. To some extent they can adjust durations of confinement by granting or withholding various credits for aspects of program participation and behavior. Correctional officials can release some prisoners early on furloughs or work release, but other forms of release, such as parole, must be approved by other agencies. For some inmates, release before serving a minimum period of confinement is prohibited by law. Thus, if boot camps are to reduce prison populations or crowding, inmates admitted to boot camps must serve substantially shorter prison terms than they would have served otherwise.


In the long term, correctional officials might be able to reduce prison admissions if boot camp graduates returned to prison at lower rates than comparable parolees, because the graduates either had fewer new convictions or lower revocation rates for rule violations.

Impact on Prison Bedspace

In 1991, a simulation model was developed to identify conditions that must be met for prison boot camps to reduce the number of prison beds needed. The model can be used when planning a boot camp to understand how it should be designed to reduce populations. It can also be used once a boot camp is in operation to see whether the program is having the expected impact on prison bedspace.² Researchers used the model to assess the population impact of Louisiana's boot camp³ and to assess the population impacts of boot camps in jurisdictions participating in a multisite evaluation.⁴

In the analysis of the model reported, boot camps' impacts on prison population levels were assessed in relative terms. For example, as shown in exhibit 1, as the probability of imprisonment varies, so does the number of prison beds lost or, conversely, saved. The objectives of the simulation were to find out how different boot camp design options affected the need for prison space and to determine how many prison beds a State would need to provide after implementing a boot camp that had particular design options, compared to the number it would have had to provide if its past population trends continued. For this objective, other factors influencing prison populations were assumed to be constant, which would allow the identification of the independent effect of a particular configuration of boot camp policies on prison population levels. The objective of the simulation was not to predict the total number of prisoners a jurisdiction would have in the future. Such a model would be much more complex and require development of a substantial data base on overall sentencing practices and offender characteristics.

Exhibit 1. Estimates of the Impact of Boot Camps on the Need or Loss of Prison Beds When the Probability That Entrants Would Have Been Imprisoned Changes



Source: Doris Layton Mackenzie and Claire Souryal, *Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration*, National Institute of Justice Evaluation Report, November 1994.

These analyses suggest that the following conditions must be met if boot camps are to reduce the need for prison beds:

- The probability of imprisonment for those admitted to boot camps must be very high (see exhibit 1).
- Boot camp graduates must get a substantial and real reduction in their term of imprisonment.
- In-camp failure rates must be low.
- Boot camps must operate on a large scale.



High probability of imprisonment. This condition refers to the odds that offenders admitted to the boot camp would have been imprisoned if the boot camp did not exist. Given typical in-program and postrelease failure rates, the model indicates that 80 percent of those admitted to a boot camp would have to receive a prison term just to begin reducing required prison beds. Larger reductions require even higher probabilities of imprisonment.

In many States, boot camps are restricted to nonviolent first offenders. This restriction was lifted from earlier shock probation laws, under which young, inexperienced offenders (who presumably were most impressionable and most likely to be deterred) were sent to a regular prison for 90 days and then returned to community supervision. Evaluations failed to show any deterrent effect in shock probation.⁵ Variants of these deterrence-based eligibility criteria appear in most boot camp programs.

If boot camp participants are selected at time of sentencing, deterrence-based eligibility criteria make it difficult to achieve a high probability of imprisonment; no State imprisons 80 percent of its nonviolent, first-time felons.

Reduction in term of imprisonment. If boot camp graduates serve 6 months rather than 24 months, each boot camp graduate will save the system 18 person-months of confinement. A small reduction—6 months versus 8 months—will not reduce bedspace needs appreciably. As shown in exhibit 2, duration of imprisonment varied substantially among different State programs in the multisite study.

Exhibit 2. Average Duration of Imprisonment in Five Shock Incarceration Programs

	Average Duration of Imprisonment (In Months)				
	FL	GA	LA	NY	SC
Shock Incarceration Graduates	3.3	3.0	4.0	6.0	3.0
Shock Incarceration Dropouts	0 ¹	0 ¹	13.7	18.1	0 ¹
Shock Incarceration Washouts	9.5	2.6	14.5	20.4	12.0
Shock-Eligible Prisoners	8.5	9.6	20.5	17.9	12.4
Shock Graduates Revoked	13.4	13.4	10.7	20.6	13.2

¹ No voluntary dropouts were permitted.

Source: Doris Layton Mackenzie and Claire Souryal, *Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration*, National Institute of Justice Evaluation Report, November 1994.

Particularly important is the comparison between the time that shock incarceration graduates spent in prison and the time they would have spent (e.g., the time the shock-eligibles spend in prison).

Deterrence-based eligibility criteria also make it difficult to achieve substantial reductions in durations of confinement. In most States, the few nonviolent first offenders who are imprisoned are likely to be released after having served very short prison terms.

Minimization of in-program failure rates. In typical programs, 30 to 40 percent of those admitted fail to complete the program and serve regular prison terms, quickly eroding savings in prison bedspace.

If these first three conditions are not met, the simulation shows that boot camps will *increase* prison populations. Boot camps can cause substantial increases (relative to their capacity) depending on how they are configured. If their participants have a low probability of imprisonment—for example, if only 10 percent of them would have been in prison if the boot camp did not exist—a typical 200-bed boot camp will increase the prison population by more than 500 inmates, due mainly to the 30 to 40 percent who will fail during the program and who will serve prison terms as a consequence. If the boot camp lasts just 90 days, then four times a year it can cycle in a new group of participants, of whom 30 to 40 percent will become regular prison inmates. In this example, 90 percent of these in-program failures would not have been in prison at all if the boot camp did not exist.

Operation on a large scale. If jurisdictions achieve the three conditions described above, they still must operate large-scale boot camps if they want to reduce prison bedspace requirements. The exact size of boot camps needed to achieve a desired reduction varies with the probability of imprisonment, the amount of reduction in time served for completing the boot camp, and the failure rates. But the effect of a small (e.g., 50-bed) boot camp in a moderate-sized prison system will not be discernible. If jurisdictions cannot run boot camps that conform to the three conditions described above, running small boot camps at least will minimize the increase in prison bedspace that will result.

Long-Term Impact on Prison Populations

In the long-term, boot camps might reduce prison populations if graduates return to prison at lower rates than comparable offenders who did not participate in boot camps before their release from prison.

At present, the evidence of boot camps' impact on return-to-prison rates is inconclusive. Most studies show that boot camp graduates do not return to prison at significantly different rates than members of comparison groups.⁶ To date, however,



none of the studies has randomly assigned inmates to experimental and control groups, so outcomes may have been affected by inmate self-selection. (For example, some eligible inmates volunteer for boot camps and others do not; some enter and complete boot camps while others drop out after a few weeks.) Also, none of the studies has tested the impact of different models of aftercare on outcomes. Boot camp graduates frequently are intensively supervised, even though they usually are not the high-risk or high-need offenders for whom intensive supervision was originally intended. Intensive surveillance may detect more rule violations that lead to revocation, thus itself inflating return-to-prison rates.⁷

Limits on Population Reduction

When design features and practices in existing boot camps are compared with the findings of the simulation model, it appears that most adult boot camps are now designed and operated so that they are more likely to increase rather than reduce prison populations. In many jurisdictions, enabling legislation restricts participation to nonviolent first offenders and allows judges to select participants at the time of sentencing, practices almost certain to yield a pool of offenders who probably would not have been imprisoned if the boot camp were not available. Many existing boot camps also have moderately high in-program and postrelease failure rates.

Even if boot camps have been carefully designed to reduce prison bedspace requirements, the broad factors that drive prison population can easily overwhelm any population reductions achieved by boot camps. When the New York State Department of Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) designed boot camps in 1987, officials made all the appropriate choices to reduce populations. NYSDOCS, not judges, identified candidates for boot camps from among regular incoming prison inmates, so their probability of imprisonment was 100 percent. The legislature approved boot camps for offenders convicted of moderately serious crimes, who had somewhat longer prior records. Hence, most New York inmates who complete a boot camp shave 18 to 24 months from their prison terms. Finally, officials ran a large boot camp operation—providing 1,750 beds in 5 separate boot camps.

NYSDOCS staff credibly estimate that by 1992 their boot camps caused the prison population to be 1,540 less than it would have been otherwise. Yet, between 1988 and 1992, New York's prison population grew from approximately 41,000 to nearly 58,000—an increase more than 11 times greater than the relative reduction from boot camps.⁸ At best, New York's boot camps slightly lessened the extent of prison population increase.

If officials seriously expect to reduce or eliminate prison crowding, then boot camps should be only one small piece of a much larger and more fundamental strategy to structure discretionary sentencing choices and to provide an appropriate range of sanctioning options. If prison populations are at or near equilibrium, prop-

erly designed boot camps by themselves may be able to effect a slight reduction. However, if the prison population is rising, boot camps are not likely to stop or reverse that trend.

Impact on Correctional Costs

Boot camps that have sparse programming during the institutional phase cost about the same to operate as regular prisons on a per-inmate, per-day basis because the staffing levels and facility costs are very similar. Boot camps with richer programming (e.g., intensive drug treatment, individual counseling, extensive education, or other programs) cost more to operate.⁹ Thus, to reduce total operating costs, boot camps must substantially shorten participants' duration of confinement.¹⁰

Measuring operating cost savings is difficult. Officials often incorrectly estimate operating cost savings by multiplying the estimated reduction in total person-days of confinement by the average daily cost of running regular prisons. They calculate average daily costs by dividing the total cost of running a prison for a year by the number of person-days of confinement it provides in the year.

This approach leads to substantial overestimation of savings. In the short term, population reductions are likely to save only the costs related to reductions in goods and services “consumed” by offenders, such as food, clothing, and health care. In most prisons, these short-term costs amount to only a few dollars a day.

Staffing patterns (and costs) do not change when a facility’s population varies by a few inmates. To save long-term costs, populations must be reduced enough that a cellblock or even an entire prison can be closed, or that construction of a new facility can be averted. Averted costs are especially difficult to demonstrate because it is not known whether a legislature would have authorized additional prison construction if the boot camp had not been operating.

Finally, many practitioners now advocate an expanded aftercare program for boot camp graduates that provides a longer period of supervision, greater continuity in treatment, and more rigorous provision of support services. It is difficult to evaluate the cost of such an aftercare program, but it will cost more than the type of aftercare now offered to most boot camp graduates.

Implications

For officials considering establishing boot camps to reduce prison populations or costs, these findings have sobering implications. They suggest that officials should first consider whether they should rely on boot camps for this purpose or invest their energy and resources in broader and more promising strategies. For those who decide to proceed with boot camp development, this section describes the author’s



assessment of how boot camps should be designed and operated. It is based on a review of the research, talking with correctional officials, and visiting programs.

If officials want boot camps to reduce prison populations, crowding, or correctional costs in the short term, then they should select boot camp participants from among offenders already committed for imprisonment. This is the most effective way to recruit offenders who have a very high probability of imprisonment. This method, of course, is not foolproof. Judges might alter their sentencing practices and imprison selected offenders so that they may be selected for boot camps. Correctional officials might counter this potential by operating “low profile” boot camps, in which they actively seek to avoid publicizing their programs, and by forcefully communicating with judges that the Department of Corrections, not judges, control placement decisions for those committed to prisons.

Thus, if population impact is the goal, boot camps should be used as a form of early release. Agencies that operate confinement facilities should run boot camps and select participants. If judges select boot camp participants at time of sentencing, experience strongly suggests that a large percentage of those admitted to boot camps probably would have been given probation, making their expected rate of imprisonment very low. If this is the case, judicial selection of boot camp participants may be incompatible with the goal of reducing costs and prison populations.¹¹

In addition, boot camps should target offenders who otherwise would serve moderately long periods of confinement, not those who will be released in a few months anyway. This is the most effective way to get bigger reductions in time served for offenders who complete the boot camp. Because almost all boot camps’ length varies between 3 and 6 months, there is little room to increase the reductions by shortening the boot camp’s duration.

This implies that boot camps should be run only by correctional agencies that confine offenders for substantial periods of time, for example, 2 or more years. Agencies that confine offenders for short terms—like county jails and juvenile training schools—will find it especially difficult to reduce populations with boot camps because they probably will not be able to reduce confinement terms enough to reduce total person-days of confinement significantly. They will also find it harder to get eligible offenders to volunteer if they can offer only a very small reduction in time served.

Another policy implication is that policymakers should avoid deterrence-based eligibility criteria that limit boot camps to first-time, nonviolent offenders. Early boot camps inherited deterrence-based criteria from prior programs like Scared Straight!, and shock probation. Deterrence-based eligibility criteria limit both the probability of imprisonment and the amount of potential discount. Instead, boot camps should target offenders with prior convictions and with moderately serious offenses (e.g., situational assaults), as well as probation or parole violators.



In order to minimize in-program failure rates, boot camps should not permit participants to withdraw during the first few weeks of the program. The first few weeks in a boot camp are most difficult, physically and mentally, for inmates, leading to high rates of voluntary withdrawal. A policy of prohibiting withdrawals during the first 3 weeks would allow inmates to adjust to the regimen before considering withdrawing.

In addition, boot camps should develop strong behavioral management systems aimed at reducing dropouts due to violations of program rules. They could do this by providing a range of in-program rewards and sanctions (the latter not involving removal from the program). Boot camps should continuously monitor and assess participants' progress toward behavioral or performance objectives, so that they can provide immediate, positive reinforcement to participants who behave appropriately or who excel, and immediate correction to participants who do not attain minimum specified levels. This will let officials intervene before small problems escalate into serious issues that might warrant removal from the program. Of course, officials need the option to remove from the boot camp and return to regular prison those who persistently misbehave.

Finally, officials must be willing or able to operate boot camps with a large capacity. Otherwise, their relative impact on prison populations (even under the best conditions) is likely to be negligible.

Long-Term Impact on Prison Readmissions

If officials intend to reduce prison populations by reducing return-to-prison rates for boot camp graduates, then officials should be certain that the means by which they expect boot camps to reduce return-to-prison rates are clearly stated, plausible, and capable of being implemented as expected.

Boot camps may affect return-to-prison rates by two means or by both operating together (see chapters 17 and 18). First, the disciplinary regimen may improve offenders' self-esteem or attitudes toward authority, leading them to change their behavior once they are released. Second, treatment programs such as counseling and drug treatment may be effective in the structured setting of boot camps in dealing with inmate deficiencies that form obstacles to improved behavior.

Disciplinary regimen. If the disciplinary regimen is expected to alter offenders' future behavior, the agency should describe the link between the regimen and the expected future behavioral changes. For example, an agency may expect that if staff provide good role models for inmates, then offenders' attitudes and behavior may become more prosocial, and upon release, their new crime and violation rates will decline. Careful selection and thorough training may be essential if staff are to play these roles effectively.



Treatment. If treatment is expected to lower the return-to-prison rates, the boot camp should have a plausible method of identifying treatment needs and delivering treatment services. At a minimum, this should include the capacity to assess offenders' needs and to develop treatment plans that address each offender's needs, setting measurable objectives and performance schedules. The correctional treatment services specified in those plans should be delivered to offenders during their stay in the boot camp. The agency should provide the resources (staff, materials, space) and allot sufficient time during the daily schedule of activities to deliver the services. It should monitor offenders' progress toward implementing their treatment plans while in the boot camp and modify plans as required.

Because all treatment needs probably cannot be met during a short boot camp program, the agency operating the boot camp should provide for or ensure continuity of treatment during aftercare. If different agencies operate the boot camp and aftercare, both should be involved in planning the total program, and appropriate interagency agreements and protocols should be implemented to make sure that treatment is delivered during aftercare as intended. Those who deliver aftercare should be included in the development of treatment plans and in the preparation for offenders' transitions from institution to community. Finally, the agency operating aftercare should monitor progress on the treatment plan during aftercare and modify it as required.

Program officials and aftercare providers should work as advocates to promote offenders' access to programs and services offered by other agencies and to monitor offenders' utilization of those services. They also need to recognize and remove barriers to access and utilization of services.

Aftercare should provide surveillance only to the degree that it is justified on a case-by-case basis by a valid risk-assessment instrument. If aftercare consists mostly of intensive surveillance, revocation rates are likely to be high (due mainly to minor or "technical" violations of supervision rules, not new crimes), thus undercutting population reduction objectives.

Boot camps that conform to the conditions described in this chapter may reduce somewhat the need for prison bedspace. However, as New York's experience demonstrates, even the best-done boot camps cannot stop prison population growth if imprisonment rates or prison terms are growing rapidly. However, boot camps could be one small part of a broad set of policy initiatives to help structure the use and duration of confinement sentences.



Notes

1. Doris L. MacKenzie and Claire Souryal, "Boot Camp Survey: Rehabilitation, Recidivism, Population Reduction Outrank Punishment as Main Goals," *Corrections Today* (October 1992):92.
2. The simulation model runs under Lotus 1-2-3, version 2.1, and is available free from Dale G. Parent, Associate, Abt Associates Inc., 55 Wheeler Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.
3. Doris L. MacKenzie and Dale G. Parent, "Shock Incarceration and Prison Crowding in Louisiana," *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 19, no. 3 (1991):225–237.
4. D.L. MacKenzie and A. Piquero, "The Impact of Shock Incarceration Programs on Prison Crowding," *Crime and Delinquency*, 40, no. 2 (1994): 222–249.
5. In 1979, Dr. James Finckenauer, an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, conducted an experimental analysis that randomly assigned eligible participants to Scared Straight! (a program to deter juveniles from further delinquent behavior by showing them the rigor and brutality of adult prison) and control groups (no Scared Straight!). At a 6-month followup point, those exposed to Scared Straight! performed worse—41.3 percent engaged in new delinquent behavior, compared to only 11.9 percent of the controls. See J. Finckenauer, *Scared Straight! and the Panacea Phenomenon*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982.
6. Doris Layton MacKenzie and Claire Souryal. *Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration: Executive Summary*. Final report to the National Institute of Justice, 1994.
7. See MacKenzie and Parent (1991), and J. Petersilia and S. Turner, *Evaluating Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole: Results of a Nationwide Experiment*, Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, May 1993.
8. *Facility Capacity and Inmate Populations, 12/31/85 to 12/31/94*, Program Planning, Research, and Evaluation Unit, New York State Department of Corrections Services, Albany, 1995.
9. See Dale G. Parent, *Shock Incarceration: An Overview of Existing Programs*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1989.

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10. This assumes that boot camp graduates are not more likely to fail when released to the community (and to trigger the social and criminal justice costs associated with such failures) than are offenders who do not graduate from them. In fact, data from States with “backend” selection procedures generally show that boot camp completers fail at rates equal to or lower than non-completers or nonparticipants. In States with frontend selection, the situation is less clear. Failure rates for boot camp graduates appear to be somewhat higher, but “comparison” groups may not, in fact, be comparable. In addition, there is strong evidence that many boot camp graduates fail not because they are a more risky population, but because they are more intensively supervised, and, hence, there is a greater chance that minor rule violations will be detected and punished.
 11. Parent, 1989.

CHAPTER 17

Shock Incarceration and Positive Adjustment During Community Supervision: A Multisite Evaluation

by Robert Brame and Doris Layton MacKenzie, Ph.D.

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In recent years, shock incarceration, or “boot camp” programs, have become the object of widespread attention. One of the often cited advantages of shock incarceration programs is that they provide offenders with a heightened sense of personal responsibility, confidence, and self-discipline and an increased ability to make a successful return to the community. This paper examines data collected in five States on the extent to which offenders emerging from boot camp programs adjusted to the day-to-day requirements of living in the community. The results indicate that boot camp programs have had limited impact on positive adjustment. Supervision intensity in the community, however, played a key role in the explanation of community adjustment. More intensively supervised offenders in community supervision status tended to adjust more positively than offenders who were less intensively supervised.

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In recent years, corrections officials and policymakers have been exploring alternatives to traditional forms of punishment (see, for example, Morris and Tonry, 1990). These efforts have become more prominent in the wake of increasing concern that traditional correctional strategies have failed to meet both public demands and offender needs. Shock incarceration, or “boot camp” programs, have attracted much attention because of their unorthodox approach to customary correctional methods. Initial reports both from offenders who have participated in these programs and from the officials who administer them indicate that the net effect of boot camps is positive (MacKenzie and Shaw, 1993). Consequently, shock incarceration programs are seen by many as an important component of a correctional system that relies on an array of sanctioning alternatives.

Most accounts of dramatic success have been based on anecdotal evidence. These accounts have supported public expectations of what convicted offenders should experience in prison. The boot camp offender is involved in structured activities for large portions of the time spent in confinement. These structured activities include military-style drills, work, physical exercise, drug and other treatment, education, and counseling (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1991). Not surprisingly, the positive changes in offender behavior attributed to the boot camp atmosphere have left many wondering why such programs were not implemented long ago.

Proponents have contended that the boot camp emphasis on hard work, personal responsibility, and, in some cases, treatment of substance abuse and psychological problems helps prepare offenders for better adjustment in the community. This adjustment includes finding and maintaining employment; having residential and financial stability; attending drug treatment and counseling; accessing educational and vocational training opportunities; and avoiding troublesome behavior such as rearrest and failing to meet conditions of community supervision. Data from a multistate study were used to examine whether shock incarceration had a positive effect on offenders’ adjustment to their communities.

Previous Research

Although past research has focused little on whether shock incarceration programs have a positive effect on offenders’ adjustment to their communities, it indicates that the supervision intensity, rather than shock incarceration itself, is of greater significance. MacKenzie et al. (1992) found that the apparent positive effect of shock incarceration on offenders’ community adjustment in Louisiana was due to the intensity of supervision while in community supervision status. While boot camp offenders did perform better than other groups in the community, they were also supervised more intensively. The implicit message in such a finding is that offenders who are coerced to engage in certain activities (such as education, employment, or treatment) as a condition of their community supervision status tend to meet those requirements more completely than offenders who are not supervised

as intensively. The evidence in Louisiana suggests that this effect holds regardless of whether offenders are released from boot camp, paroled from prison, or placed on probation.

Researchers have also begun to explore the impact of other intermediate sanctions on offender adjustment in the community. Several major findings have emerged from these efforts. First, recidivism patterns for offenders in intermediate sanction programs have been generally neither better nor worse than for those in more traditional programs (MacKenzie, 1991; Petersilia and Turner, 1993; Gowdy, 1993; MacKenzie et al., 1992; Souryal and MacKenzie, 1995; Latessa and Vito, 1988; Vito and Allen, 1981; Vito et al., 1985).

Second, several studies reveal that revocations for technical violations of probation or parole were more likely when offenders were more intensively supervised (MacKenzie and Shaw, 1993; Petersilia and Turner, 1993). The close monitoring of activities was the often cited reason for this disparity. Intensively supervised offenders could have higher technical violation rates than their less intensively supervised counterparts because they are observed more closely and have more requirements to meet. The studies by Petersilia and Turner (1993), which incorporate random assignment of offenders to intensive community supervision programs and traditional comparison programs in several States, provide persuasive support for this possibility.

Third, the literature supports the possibility that intensive supervision has positive implications for adjustment in the community. Consistent with the findings of MacKenzie et al. (1992), offenders in intensive supervision programs—either through behavior modification or through “legal coercion” (Anglin and Hser, 1990)—tended to pursue employment and treatment programs more aggressively than offenders in other programs (Latessa and Vito, 1988; Petersilia and Turner, 1993). To the extent that intermediate sanction programs are effective at nudging offenders into positive activities in the community, they may represent a valuable mechanism for reducing future problematic behavior.

Methodology

The data for this study were collected as part of a National Institute of Justice multisite research program on shock incarceration (MacKenzie, 1990). The selection of participant States was guided by the desire to include boot camps with different program characteristics and participant criteria. Five States took part in the study: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and South Carolina.¹ Data in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina were collected between 1989 and 1991. Data for New York were collected between 1988 and 1990 and for Louisiana between 1987 and 1988.



Demographic information, current offense characteristics, and prior criminal history variables were available from offenders' official records. The positive adjustment index used in Florida, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina developed by Latessa and Vito (1988) was also used for compiling information on supervision intensity and positive adjustment during community supervision. The index, completed by each probation or parole agent, provides a summary description of offender activities during community supervision. Among other items, the index includes descriptions of activities related to employment, treatment, education, counseling program participation, residential stability, and financial security. The index can range in value from 0.00 to 1.00 (where 1.00 represents the highest level of positive adjustment). A positive adjustment instrument with similar although not identical items was used in Louisiana (MacKenzie et al., 1992). The Louisiana index yields a score that is interpretable in exactly the same way as the scores in other States.

In Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, supervision intensity was operationally defined as the number of monthly contacts (both face-to-face and telephone) between officer and offender. In Louisiana, supervision intensity was measured by using three indexes that tapped the level of knowledge of offender activities, requirements for satisfactory progress, and the level of surveillance. Supervision intensity data were not available in New York.

A sample of male boot camp program graduates was selected for study in each State. Each State also selected at least two offender samples from other correctional programs to which the shock program graduates could be compared. Samples examined varied by State. The most common comparison subjects included prison parolees, probationers, and boot camp dropouts.² All samples included offenders who met the eligibility requirements for the shock incarceration program in the respective States.³ It is important to note, however, that offenders were not assigned to their respective samples in random fashion. Indeed, several important differences were identified between samples in each State that could reasonably be expected to influence positive adjustment. Conclusions, therefore, are based upon multivariate models that control for the effects of these observed differences.

Subjects were followed during community supervision for a maximum of 12 months. Many offenders did not complete the full 12-month followup period, however. The most common reasons for failure to complete the followup period included some form of recidivism (e.g., technical violation, new crime, rearrest), a legal release, or some unknown reason about which data are missing. Although data were collected over time, the positive adjustment scores studied were averaged over the entire 1-year followup period for each subject. An offender who was followed for 6 months, for example, would have a positive adjustment score that was the mean score for his 6-month followup period. Exhibit 1 presents sample sizes and descriptive statistics for each of the five States.

Shock Graduates	112	38.8	79	30.2	77	27.7	94	32.9		
Shock Program Dropouts	68	23.5			16	5.8	97	33.9		
Prison Parolees	109	37.7	98	37.4	74	26.6	95	33.2	64	19.6
Probationers									69	21.2
S.C. Split Probationers									24	7.4
S.C. DPPPS Shock Graduates									85	26.1
S.C. DOC Shock Graduates									84	25.8

Nonwhite (%)	56.8	61.5	63.3	82.9	60.7
Age at Beginning of Community Supervision (mean)	19.4	21.8	25.1	22.0	21.1
Age at First Arrest (mean)			20.8	18.0	18.9
Violent Offense (%)	33.2	15.3	9.2		12.9
Drug Offense (%)	14.2	27.1	29.9	53.5	25.2
Property/"Other" Offense (%)	53.6	57.6	61.0		61.9
N.Y. Property Offense (%)				22.7	
N.Y. "Other" Offense (%)				23.8	

CHAPTER 18

Multisite Study of Correctional Boot Camps

by Doris Layton MacKenzie, Ph.D., and Claire Souryal

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The proliferation of boot camp programs nationwide appears to have been largely unguided by comprehensive and methodologically rigorous evaluations. This chapter provides a brief overview of boot camp evaluation literature, beginning with a review of early boot camp research and concluding with selected findings of a recently completed NIJ-sponsored evaluation of eight State-level programs. The findings concern attitudinal change during incarceration, adjustment during community supervision, and offender recidivism. The study found that the in-prison phase of boot camps had a positive impact on the attitudes of boot camp participants, in contrast to a sample of regular prison inmates, whose attitudes deteriorated during their incarceration. However, boot camp graduates did not adjust more positively to community supervision following boot camp than did comparison samples of boot camp failures, prison releasees, and probationers. Recidivism findings suggest that common components of boot camps, such as military-style discipline, physical training, and hard labor, did not reduce recidivism. The authors conclude that future evaluations should focus on the efficacy of specific boot camp program components, such as academic training, and on the relative effectiveness of different types of community supervision provided to boot camp releasees.

Since the inception of the first military-style correctional boot camp (or shock incarceration) programs in 1983 in Georgia and Oklahoma, boot camp programs have become a common intermediate sanction in States and counties across the country. In one decade, 36 State correctional systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have implemented more than 47 boot camp programs for adult offenders. Boot camp programs have also been developed for juvenile offenders in six States and for use in local jails. The passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which allocated \$25 million for the development of boot camp programs, virtually ensures their continued growth and development.

What accounts for the tremendous popularity of boot camp programs? Why have correctional agencies so readily embraced them as viable intermediate sanctions? Certainly, it is not due to the favorable results of empirical research. Until recently, comprehensive and methodologically rigorous evaluations of boot camp programs have been noticeably lacking.

Rather, the rapid growth of boot camp programs across the Nation is attributable to other factors, including the politics of crime control (i.e., politicians clamoring to appear "tough" on crime), the compelling images of boot camps produced in the mass media and especially on television, the appeal of military-style discipline as a correctional tool with young offenders, the punitive nature of the program in comparison to other intermediate sanctions, and the promise of meeting a wide range of goals for both the system and individuals (MacKenzie and Parent, 1992). Evaluation research appears to have played a very small role, if any, in the proliferation of boot camp programs nationwide. Indeed, until recently, comprehensive evaluations of boot camp programs were rarely conducted.

This chapter begins with a review of early boot camp research and concludes with an overview of principal findings about boot camps' effects on individuals—one aspect of a recently completed NIJ-sponsored evaluation of eight State-level programs.

Early Boot Camp Evaluations

This Nation's first correctional boot camp programs were developed in Georgia and Oklahoma in 1983. Other States swiftly followed suit and by the end of the decade, 14 had developed their own programs. The development of the earlier programs seems to have been largely unguided by evaluation research. In November 1987, for example, then-Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas requested a study of State boot camp programs from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The resulting report, released in September 1988, concluded that "available data are not sufficient to determine if boot camps reduce prison overcrowding, costs, or recidivism" (GAO, 1988).



Until recently, boot camp evaluations were limited in scope and methodology and typically conducted by the State correctional agencies that run them. The results of these in-house studies were not widely disseminated, nor were they very thorough. Examinations of recidivism, for example, often simply assessed the return-to-prison rates of boot camp graduates without selecting adequate comparison samples or controlling for the amount of time graduates spent on the street after release.

Moreover, some of the earlier evaluations compared the return-to-prison rates of boot camp graduates with those of the total population of prison releasees in a State. Data used for this comparison unfairly favored boot camp graduates because boot camp programs specifically targeted nonviolent offenders who did not have extensive criminal histories. Clearly, the selection of adequate comparison samples is essential to conducting thorough and unbiased evaluations.

Another major problem with many of the early evaluations was that researchers failed to control for the time offenders spent in the community following their release from boot camp. At a meeting of the American Correctional Association, a boot camp program official bragged about low recidivism rates for a program that had been operating for little more than 6 months. The program had released only one group of graduates, none of whom had been supervised in the community for more than 3 months. The recidivism rates for such a program would appear to be low, of course, if compared to those of prison releasees who had been supervised in the community for a year or more. In general, the longer ex-offenders are in the community, the greater the percentage who fail.

The great diversity among boot camp programs is also problematic from a research perspective. While some programs devote 3 or more hours per day to therapeutic activities such as drug treatment, academic education, or life skills training, others limit the schedule of daily activities to marching, military ceremony, and hard labor. Therefore, the results of any single evaluation have been difficult to generalize from one jurisdiction to another.

The NIJ Multisite Evaluation

In 1990, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded an evaluation of boot camp program efficacy in eight States. This multisite study's overarching research question was whether boot camp programs successfully met their stated goals.

As previously noted, prior NIJ-funded research examining the effectiveness of boot camp programs had focused on a single jurisdiction, a major limitation given the large differences among programs nationwide (see MacKenzie et al., 1993). The 1990 evaluation was designed to address this deficiency by selecting multiple sites



for participation, which would significantly enhance the ability to generalize results.

The eight States that participated in the study were Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Sites in those States were selected because they incorporated the core elements of boot camp programs and because they varied on several dimensions hypothesized to influence the achievement of program goals.

Core elements of boot camp programs were defined as follows:

- Strict rules, discipline, and a military boot-camp-like atmosphere.
- Mandatory participation in military drills and physical training.
- Separation of program participants from other prison inmates.

Differences among programs were examined in these areas:

- Decisionmaking authority.
- Program location.
- Program components.
- Supervision intensity upon release.

The evaluation was also designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of each program (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994). Rather than focusing on one measure of program success, such as recidivism reduction, the evaluation consisted of five major components: a process evaluation or qualitative description of the eight programs based on interviews with staff and inmates, official program materials, and observation; a study of inmate attitudinal change during incarceration; a study of offender recidivism; a study of positive adjustment during community supervision; and a study of prison bedspace savings.

At the individual level, the first stage of the evaluation examined offenders' experiences during the in-prison phase of the programs. Its objective was to ascertain whether the boot camp experience engendered positive or negative changes in attitudes over the course of the programs. Next, after offenders had either completed the program and been released to the community or failed the program, their community performance was assessed in terms of both positive adjustment to community supervision and recidivism. Positive adjustment to community supervision included a variety of measures such as employment/educational status; recidivism was measured by arrests, revocations for new crimes, and revocations for technical violations.

This chapter presents a brief overview of these findings. The multisite evaluation's results and methodology have been presented in detail elsewhere. (See Brame and MacKenzie, this volume; MacKenzie, 1994a; MacKenzie, 1994b; MacKenzie and

Souryal, 1994; MacKenzie and Piquero, 1994; MacKenzie and Brame, 1995.) Also note that system-level analysis results have not been presented (see chapter 16 in this volume and MacKenzie and Piquero, 1994, for a discussion of the impact of boot camp programs on prison bedspace savings).

The remainder of this chapter will focus on examination of the programs at the individual level.

Overview of Evaluation Results

Three sections of the evaluation assessed the impact of boot camp programs at the individual level. In each study the performance of boot camp participants (either during incarceration or during community supervision) was compared to the performance of demographically similar offenders who were legally eligible for boot camp programs in their States but had served time in a conventional prison. Samples of probationers were also examined in the recidivism and community adjustment studies. It should be emphasized here that comparison samples were selected to be as similar as possible to boot camp participants in each State.

Attitudinal change during incarceration. Boot camp participants and comparison samples or prison inmates were asked to complete a self-report questionnaire two times during their terms of incarceration. The questionnaire was first administered at the beginning of offenders' incarceration periods and again approximately 90 days later (180 days later in New York). The questionnaire focused on two types of attitudes—antisocial attitudes and attitudes toward the program (or prison). An anti-social attitudes scale was used to gauge opinions of police and authority, levels of maturity, and degree of social deviance (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1993b). The scale has been found to be related to recidivism and short-term change. The scale for program attitudes measured the degree to which offenders expected their period of incarceration to motivate them to change in a positive manner, such as growing more mature or learning self-discipline.

Findings for this section were remarkably consistent across sites despite differences in program content, such as in rehabilitative programming. Inmates in both samples developed fewer antisocial attitudes during incarceration. On program attitudes, however, results differed over time. Boot camp participants' attitudes became more positive as their programs progressed, while prison inmates' attitudes became less positive or stayed the same. Thus, contrary to the expectations of some critics, the boot camp experience did not result in the development of more negative program or antisocial attitudes.

In short, regardless of variations in structure and programming, the boot camp programs appeared to have a positive impact on inmate attitudes. Compared to samples of offenders incarcerated in conventional prisons, boot camp inmates believed that



their boot camp experience had changed them in a positive way. Prison inmates, on the other hand, did not view prison as a positive experience. The fact that the program attitude changes were so consistent across sites led us to conclude that these attitude changes were likely a result of the boot camp atmosphere and not a product of additional treatment or therapy available in some camps. Thus, one potential benefit of the programs is that participants think of boot camps as a positive experience, a change in attitude which could help produce behavioral changes after graduates are released to the community.

Positive adjustment to community supervision. Performance during community supervision was assessed in five States using a positive community adjustment scale. Positive adjustment was measured in terms of success in pursuing employment, education, residential and financial stability, and treatment opportunities. During 1 year of supervision, probation or parole officers were asked to complete a 10-item index at 3-month intervals. Community adjustment was considered to be a stronger measure of success after release than simple arrest or revocation rates because boot camp programs are believed to increase the capability of offenders to adjust successfully to the day-to-day requirements of community living. (See chapter 17 of this volume for a fuller description of this portion of the evaluation.)

The results of this section of the study were also quite consistent across sites. With the exception of one jurisdiction, which did not stand out from the other programs in rehabilitative programming, boot camp graduates did *not* adjust more positively to community supervision than comparison samples of boot camp failures, prison releasees, and probationers. Positive community adjustment was related to demographic and offense-related characteristics, criminal history, and supervision intensity, but not to whether offenders had completed their programs. Similar to the study's examination of attitude change, then, results were fairly consistent across sites despite programmatic differences. This section's results, however, provided rather convincing evidence that the in-prison phase of boot camp programs had little, if any, effect on positive community adjustment.

Offender recidivism. Recidivism levels for boot camp graduates and comparison samples were examined using the following outcome measures: arrests, probation revocations for new crimes, and revocations for technical violations. The followup period was either 1 or 2 years of community supervision. It should be noted that because revocations for new crimes could not be distinguished from revocations for technical violations in two States, a general revocation measure was constructed.

The results of the study were not quite as consistent across sites due to variations in the measures of recidivism available, the length of the followup period, and differences in supervision intensity. In some States, for example, boot camp graduates underwent intensive supervision while comparison samples did not. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the results indicated that the in-prison phase of the boot camp programs had a negligible impact on recidivism. By and large, boot camp graduates

appeared to perform at the same level as probationers and prison releasees who had served longer terms in prison.

In five States—Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas—there were no differences in recidivism that could be attributed to the in-prison phase of the program. But in three States—Illinois, Louisiana, and New York—evidence emerged indicating that boot camp graduates may have had lower recidivism rates on particular recidivism measures. Graduates in Illinois and Louisiana, for example, were less likely to have their supervision status revoked as a result of a new crime revocation than were comparison samples. Similarly, graduates of New York's program were less likely to be returned to prison as a result of a technical violation, although they did not differ from the comparison sample on any other measure of recidivism. Graduates in Illinois, however, were more likely to have their supervision status revoked as a result of a technical violation.

What do the Illinois, Louisiana, and New York programs have in common that might explain the similarity in results? These programs stand out as the only boot camps in the study that have developed an intensive supervision phase for boot camp graduates. It is therefore very likely that differences in recidivism rates in these States were due to the type of community supervision provided to graduates, not in-prison programming. In other words, the effect of the in-prison phase on participants was likely confounded with the level of supervision intensity after their release.

These programs also devoted a considerable amount of time per day (3 hours or more) to rehabilitative activities, had high dropout rates, required voluntary participation, and selected participants from a pool of prison-bound offenders. (Note, however, that the characteristics listed above are not exclusive to these programs.)

Although this study was not able to untangle the particular effects of each program component on recidivism, results clearly show that the core elements of boot camp programs—military-style discipline, hard labor, and physical training—by themselves did not reduce offender recidivism. At this time it is unclear which component or components are critical to reducing recidivism, but it is likely that some mixture of rehabilitation and intensive followup supervision plays an important role.

Summary of Results

Paradoxically, the results for each individual-level component of the evaluation were remarkably similar across sites despite differences among the State programs. While the results of the attitudinal change survey revealed that the in-prison phase had a clear and consistent impact on the attitudes of boot camp participants across sites, this change did not appear to affect offenders' performance during commu-



nity supervision. In fact, there is very little evidence that the in-prison phase had much of an impact on community supervision performance. The results of the positive adjustment to the community supervision phase of the study would seem to be a case in point. With the exception of Florida, boot camp graduates did not adjust more positively to the community supervision than did comparison samples of boot camp failures, prison releasees, and probationers. Although results from the recidivism study were not as consistent as results from the other two studies, they strongly suggest that in-prison components common to each program, such as military-style discipline, physical training, and hard labor, did not reduce recidivism.

Conclusion

Unquestionably, more research is needed to indicate what can be accomplished with boot camp programs. Many times people ask, "Is this a correctional fad?" Yes, today boot camps are a fad, and they will fade away as fads inevitably do unless we explore indepth which aspects of this sanction are worth keeping and which are not. As jurisdictions around the country consider implementing their own programs, the many issues raised in this study need to be explored. For example, as there does appear to be some positive attitudinal change associated with boot camp participation, it is important to explore whether this atmosphere facilitates other positive changes associated with participants' success in the community after release. Do boot camp inmates learn more in academic classes than they would in a traditional prison during the same time period?

Research to answer these important questions could easily be accomplished using a pretest/posttest design. Academic achievement could be measured first upon entry to the boot camp and again 90 days later. Performance in boot camps could be compared with the performance of similar prison inmates over the same time period. Studies could also be conducted examining such factors as moral development and life skills.

Moreover, more information is needed about the adjustment and activities of boot camp graduates in the community. There is evidence that intensive supervision helps boot camp graduates when they return to the community; it is important to know exactly what elements of this supervision are helpful. Does such supervision have to be preceded by incarceration in a boot camp or would other prisoners do just as well if they were provided with the same type of supervision and services?

These are the kinds of questions we need to answer to improve our correctional system over the long term and move beyond following the latest correctional fad. What is clear from the multisite study is that boot camp programs are not one-dimensional—a boot camp is not a boot camp is not a boot camp. We must identify the elements of boot camps that work and reject those that do not. This

type of exhaustive evaluation will not be possible, however, until enough time, money, and effort are devoted to independent and objective study of the programs.

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CHAPTER 19

The Future of Boot Camps

by David W. Hayeslip, Ph.D.

David Hayeslip currently manages the Program Design and Development Division of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), U.S. Department of Justice. He was formerly a Program Manager with the National Institute of Justice, where he oversaw NIJ evaluation initiatives in intermediate sanctions, community policing, drug enforcement, and training assessments.

Boot camps have become an ever more available alternative to traditional incarceration in the past 5 or 6 years, partly as a result of media attention and popularity with criminal justice officials, politicians, and the public. There is growing evidence that they offer cost savings over longer term imprisonment despite high per diem costs. The long-term effects of the boot camp experience on offender behavior are not yet known, although short-term effects have been positive for some programs. Research is needed to measure these long-term effects, but such assessments, comparing participant outcomes to those of control groups, are difficult to undertake, given the limited availability of boot camps in some jurisdictions. During this growth period, boot camps have evolved from strictly military-style, discipline-oriented models to ones that offer more treatment, especially in relation to drug abuse. Although boot camp programs are expected to remain popular for now, it is not known if growth can be sustained. Among the factors affecting such growth are political and popular interest, success in achieving program goals, and legal issues associated with the selection of program participants.

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Shock incarceration programs or "boot camps" emerged as an alternative intermediate sanction at the State level a little over a decade ago when Georgia opened the first one in December 1983. Early growth in the use of this alternative was slow; by January 1987 only four boot camp programs existed (Parent, 1989). However, boot camps began to multiply later the same year. By 1993 there were at least 46 operating in 30 States, and 3 more States were seriously considering implementation. In 1993, Doris MacKenzie reported a total program capacity for State and Federal boot camps of 7,518 (MacKenzie, 1993, p. 22). The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated 8,880 in June of 1992 (GAO, 1993, p. 15), and the American Institutes for Research more recently put the figure at about 10,000 (Cronin, 1994, p. 11). It is not clear what accounts for the differences in capacity estimates, but varying definitions of "boot camps" could be part of the reason. Nonetheless, with the current average length of stay approximately 107 days in a boot camp program, the minimum number of prisoners who could complete boot camp programs is in excess of 23,000 per year (MacKenzie, 1993).

Yet this total is small in comparison to the total daily adult incarcerated population, which exceeded 1 million in prison and 490,400 in jails in 1994 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994, 1995). That boot camps make up only a small proportion of correctional populations is further compounded by the fact that many camps have had difficulty keeping their facilities filled because of restrictive selection criteria and high dropout rates.

Growth of the total incarcerated population seems likely to continue in the foreseeable future (GAO, 1993). Given this growth and severe prison crowding in many jurisdictions, correctional administrators will continue to face the necessity of building new prisons or developing alternatives to traditional incarceration, including boot camps. Indeed, over 80 percent of boot camp administrators surveyed by the GAO ranked as "very great" the importance of boot camps in supplying such alternatives (GAO, 1993). In light of this, many might argue that recent trends in boot camp implementation will continue unabated. All 50 States will have boot camp programs by the year 2000 if there is no change in the current trend.

One could also argue, however, that while this rapid growth may continue in the short term, it will slow down significantly and perhaps level off over the long term. Factors that have supported recent rapid expansion of boot camps will be balanced by other factors working against continued rapid growth. Political and popular interest in boot camps, success in achieving program goals, management or administrative issues, the composition of boot camp populations, and emerging legal considerations are all factors that will affect growth.

Available evidence also suggests that boot camps of the future are likely to be programmatically different from ones of the past in terms of both military discipline and treatment.



Evidence Supporting Continuing Growth

One of the major driving forces contributing to the proliferation of boot camps has been the significant level of political interest in establishing them, ranging from the local politician to the highest levels of Federal Government. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, for instance, allocated \$24.5 million in competitive funds for boot camp construction and operation.

The political popularity of boot camps rests in part on the strong appeal created by the media. As Dale Parent has noted:

In many states a political constituency for Shock Incarceration (boot camps) has developed, spawned, in part, by extensive favorable media coverage. Shock incarceration makes “good copy,” conveying powerful visual images well suited to the electronic media (Parent, 1989, p. 1).

Or as Adam Nossiter recently suggested, the appeal of boot camps is their “filmability” in that the typical media message portrays them as “programs that do not coddle prisoners” (Nossiter, 1993, p. 38). It seems likely that as positive portrayals of boot camps continue in the media, the political appeal of such programs will remain quite high.

Boot camps are not only appealing to politicians and their constituencies. The concept is also attractive to offenders, judges, and corrections officials (GAO, 1993). Popularity among offenders is no doubt tied to the shortness of time offenders serve in boot camps compared to the time they would spend in prison for the same sentence. It has also been suggested that for some offenders the physical regimen and military orientation are also attractive, particularly for those hoping (often unrealistically) to serve in the Armed Forces one day.

As an alternative sanction (one the public views as relatively severe), boot camps are also attractive to the judiciary. In some jurisdictions sentencing judges can order boot camp commitments directly.

Correctional agency appeal is confirmed by the fact that of 26 States that already had boot camps (as surveyed by the GAO), 14 were planning or considering expansion (GAO, 1993). Boot camps’ potential for reducing crowding and creating cost savings is important for corrections officials. Evidence also suggests that boot camps are much easier for administrators to manage and (at least as important) constitute relatively safe correctional settings (Cronin, 1994; Parent, 1989).

Boot camps are thought to fulfill a variety of important goals for both offenders and correctional agencies. According to a recent survey, the most important goal of correctional boot camps is rehabilitation (MacKenzie, 1993), and there appears to be considerable agreement concerning this goal among system-level officials, facility



administrators, and drug treatment and education supervisors (Gransky et al., 1993). In some programs evidence has suggested that in the short term, at least, participants are demonstrating physical improvements and increased educational achievement (Cronin, 1994, pp. 57–58).

Studies also reveal that participating in boot camp programs results in positive attitude changes (MacKenzie, 1993; Shaw and MacKenzie, 1992; MacKenzie and Shaw, 1990). Boot camp participants appear to adjust better in the community, at least initially, than other offenders (MacKenzie et al., 1992). Theoretically, if these demonstrated short-term results can be translated into long-term rehabilitation effects and significant reductions in recidivism, support for boot camp programs is more likely to continue. However, there is little evidence of long-term rehabilitation effects.

Other fundamental goals of boot camps are cost savings and the reduction of prison crowding (MacKenzie and Piquero, 1994; MacKenzie, 1993; MacKenzie and Parent, 1991; Parent, 1989). The current boot camp approach normally places offenders in boot camps for shorter periods of time than if they had been sent to prison. The assumption is that by holding these offenders for shorter periods, even at slightly higher per diem rates, the resulting bedspace will mean reduced crowding and lower prison confinement costs. MacKenzie (1993) did find bedspace reductions and lower overall confinement costs compared to normal imprisonment in Louisiana, despite slightly higher daily costs and the expense of intensive supervision following completion of boot camp. The GAO suggests that this is not an isolated finding; many States have reported significant cost savings, primarily due to reduced sentence lengths (GAO, 1993). MacKenzie and Piquero (1994) confirmed this observation for several specific States but also found that cost savings were not guaranteed. Other factors influencing the bedspace needs of prison systems must also be carefully assessed and managed by correctional officials to achieve lower costs. Thus support for continued growth in boot camps appears to be based primarily on political and constituent interest, media support, and the potential for changing long-term behavior.

Evidence Working Against Continuing Growth

Despite the articulated goals of correctional boot camps, growing criticism and recent evidence have raised questions about the extent to which these programs are achieving long-term behavioral changes. In addition, there is increasing concern about potential legal issues associated with boot camp programs, which up to this point have been largely ignored. Concerns are also being raised about practical difficulties in managing such programs. All these factors appear to be working against continued rapid growth, at least over the long term.



The empirical evidence to date concerning sustained postrelease behavioral change is relatively limited. What evidence is available would suggest that long-term goals of boot camps are not being met. For example, boot camp participation appears unrelated to performance during the first year following release (Shaw and MacKenzie, 1992), and boot camps have not appeared to contribute to reducing long-term recidivism rates to any significant degree (MacKenzie, 1991; MacKenzie et al., 1992; GAO, 1993). In one of the earliest evaluations of boot camps in Louisiana, MacKenzie found "no differences in the recidivism of offenders who served time in a traditional prison, who served time in a shorter shock prison program in lieu of prison, or who were given a sentence of probation, with no prison time" (MacKenzie and Parent, 1991, p. 231).

A much more extensive boot camp evaluation confirmed these findings across various types of programs in different jurisdictions (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994). It is not clear why there has been no evidence of differences in recidivism between boot camp participants and others, but some have speculated that short-term confinement in boot camps may not allow time for building participants back up after they are broken down (Osler, 1991) or for providing for adequate preparation for return to the community (Gowdy, 1993). These findings have also raised the concern that for boot camps to be effective they must provide adequate aftercare supervision and treatment. The importance of aftercare in goal achievement is only now beginning to receive research interest as is the complexity of multiple influences on the future behavior of boot camp participants.

As noted earlier, to fulfill the goal of reducing prison crowding, the selection pool of boot camp eligibles must be drawn from an otherwise prison-bound population. However, some boot camp participants are selected from a population that would normally receive probation instead of imprisonment (Parent, 1989; Nossiter, 1993). This "net-widening" effect (MacKenzie and Parent, 1991) can result in increasing numbers of beds rather than the opposite and add to correctional costs rather than decreasing them. This phenomenon is potentially most problematic where placement authority rests with the judiciary, which occurs in at least eight States (Cronin, 1994).

An additional requirement for prison crowding reduction is that there be a sufficient number of offender participants compared to systemwide populations (GAO, 1993). However, as was pointed out earlier, the relatively small size of boot camps means they cannot have a real effect on crowding given normal prison and jail populations (Parent, 1989). Compounding this problem is the fact that because of selective participation criteria, most boot camps can draw only from a limited pool of offenders. Many programs have also found they must screen large numbers of potential participants to end up with a sufficient group. Medical, legal, and psychological screening requirements also necessarily limit the number of participants. For example, Cronin (1994) reported that in South Carolina only 723 offenders out of



8,542 identified candidates were finally admitted to boot camp during the first 16 months of operation.

Thus, many programs have difficulty keeping their programs filled. In addition, large proportions of those who enter boot camps drop out for medical, personal, or disciplinary reasons. In Louisiana, for example, 43 percent of those selected dropped out (MacKenzie and Parent, 1991; MacKenzie et al., 1993). Those who drop out typically end up serving longer terms of imprisonment. In Louisiana this period averaged 7 months longer (MacKenzie et al., 1993).

A limited selection pool, potential net widening, dropout levels, and difficulties keeping programs filled all work together to make some boot camps more expensive than current correctional options. In at least one local jail boot camp program, higher costs associated with longer boot camp stays ultimately contributed to the program's closing (Austin and Bolyard, 1993). A key to cost savings and participant recruitment has been to offer sentence reductions or accelerated parole eligibility to offenders as an incentive. But to minimize risk associated with such reductions, many programs have been developed with strict screening criteria as to type of crime, criminal history, and physical and mental impairments (GAO, 1993). Legal issues surrounding this restrictiveness have not yet been adequately addressed. It is possible that legal challenges on the basis of equitable punishment and non-discriminatory access to programs and services may have a negative effect on the future development of boot camps.

Of additional concern in the future may be the "voluntary" waiver of legal rights by offenders who take part in boot camp programs. Participants typically reside in spartan environments, with activities allowed the regular incarcerated offender severely restricted. Visitation and recreation are examples of activities that may be "voluntarily" waived by boot camp participants. Many jurisdictions assume that because participants volunteer to enter the program, the boot camp is shielded from liability. However, as Parent (1989) points out, it could be argued that the decision to enter a boot camp program is really not as voluntary as it seems when an offender is offered the choice of a few months in boot camp versus several years in prison.

Although a positive argument for boot camps is their supposed safety and easier management (in terms of offender behavior), recent observations have suggested a number of unanticipated negative features in managing correctional boot camps. Participants are subjected to varying degrees of physical training, psychological intimidation, and summary punishment. In some boot camp programs, particularly those implemented early in the growth period, initial verbal confrontation has been common. Critics assert that such behavior by correctional staff is demeaning and abusive, and for this reason was long ago abandoned in the military (Parent, 1989; Morash and Rucker, 1990). Hengesh states that many critics consider boot camps "throwbacks to outdated correctional methods" (Hengesh, 1991, p. 106).



Summary punishments, such as doing pushups or being intimidated by drill sergeants (GAO, 1993; Frank, 1991) are still commonplace, with approximately 86 percent of surveyed States operating boot camps reporting the use of such techniques (Cronin, 1994). While these activities may be considered essential components of boot camp programs, a fine line exists between summary punishment and abuse (MacKenzie et al., 1989). In 1992 five deputies in Harris County, Texas, were indicted on charges of beating and choking inmates (Nossiter, 1993). In her evaluation of the boot camp program in Louisiana, MacKenzie found that "overzealous, control-oriented officers" had to be removed from the program (MacKenzie et al., 1989, p. 35).

"Working in a boot camp is as demanding as serving time in one," according to Acorn (1991, p. 114). Drill instructors are typically expected to engage in the same physical regimen as inmates, including running, pushups, and other activities. In addition, stress and officer burnout seem more likely in boot camp programs that emphasize verbal confrontation (Parent, 1989) and heavy workloads (MacKenzie et al., 1989). Such stress and burnout contribute to high staff turnover rates. Accordingly, officer selection, training, and oversight are becoming major concerns of boot camp administrators.

Thus a number of factors may work against continued sharp growth in boot camp programs. It may be possible, for whatever reason, that boot camps cannot achieve some of the goals on which they are theoretically based. New and unanticipated legal issues may make boot camps less attractive, and management issues, particularly as they relate to staff oversight and retention, may continue to be problematic. The combination of these negative factors (should they continue) could offset some of the positive factors that have so far supported the expansion of boot camp programs across the country.

Conclusions

It seems likely, in the short term at least, that the numbers of boot camp programs will grow and new jurisdictions will adopt such programs, primarily because of their popularity among the media, criminal justice officials, politicians, and the public. Experience has clearly shown that when correctional programs have such appeal they are likely to expand and be sustained regardless of their effects. As researcher Charles Logan has pointed out, "Fads such as Scared Straight, even when shown as not beneficial, have had surprising resilience" (Parent, 1989, p. 47). There is also recent growing evidence that boot camps, as alternatives to incarceration, can constitute an effective cost-saving approach to dealing with offenders, but they must be carefully developed and managed.



Whether this growth can be sustained over the long term is a matter of speculation; current evidence seems to suggest that sustained growth may be unlikely. However, it should be cautioned that boot camps are not a static phenomenon. They have continually developed and changed nationwide over the past decade (MacKenzie, 1993; Gransky et al., 1993). Indeed, some authors have suggested that there has been a significant change in the focus of many boot camps recently in that they have moved away from a strictly military, discipline-oriented model to one that is more treatment oriented, particularly with respect to drug abuse (Gransky et al., 1993). How these programs evolve and further incorporate aftercare and community supervision is likely to have an impact on their future.

Of critical importance at this juncture is the recognition that research concerning goal achievement, management issues, and effectiveness has been relatively meager and methodologically limited. For example, few States have performed their own formal evaluations (GAO, 1993), and only recently have any large-scale evaluation efforts been targeted at multiple boot camp sites (MacKenzie and Souryal, 1994).

Further understanding of the nature of boot camps and how to guide their implementation requires ongoing program-specific process evaluations. As was recently pointed out, "Jurisdictions need to be encouraged to conduct, at a minimum, process evaluations that would assess whether the program is accepting the type of offenders it wants, delivering the types of services it should, maintaining an acceptable completion rate, and effectively working within the allotted budget" (Austin, Jones, and Bolyard, 1993, p. 8).

Such evaluations are needed to understand the problems associated with implementing and maintaining boot camp programs. Further, process evaluations can uncover promising approaches and practices to guide future development. This research is required to help policymakers set the future course of boot camps.

Answering the question of whether or not boot camps "work" is difficult. Scholars to date have been able to offer only insights into possible effects of boot camps rather than measurements of their impact. The reason for this is that scientifically measuring the impact of boot camps requires the use of rigorous experimental designs in which participants and control groups are randomly selected and compared. Given the limited availability of boot camp participants in many jurisdictions, implementation of this type of research design has been difficult (Institute for Criminological Research, 1992). However, if researchers are truly to learn the outcomes of boot camps, this experimentation is required. Through such experimental evaluations, the speculation about short-term behavioral and attitudinal change can be examined along with longer term recidivism and deterrent effects, if they exist. Future research also needs to examine programmatic efforts beyond the boot camps themselves. For instance, many observers have noted the importance of aftercare as part of the boot camp program continuum, yet evaluators have paid scant attention to its implementation and effects.



In summary, whether boot camps will continue to grow or be abandoned as another correctional fad will be contingent on research on both their implementation and effects. Further, the kinds of boot camps developed in the future are likely to be quite different not only from the original ones that used the “get in your face” approach but also from today’s, which combine drug treatment and military discipline. The research needed as these changes occur will guide policymakers at the local, State, and Federal levels in charting the future direction of boot camps.

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