



National Institute of Justice

Research in Brief

Jeremy Travis, Director

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Issues and Findings

Discussed in the Brief: An NIJ-sponsored evaluation of the implementation of three demonstration programs for male juveniles that explored how the adult boot camp strategy could be modified to serve the unique needs of juveniles.

Key issues: The three demonstration programs in Cleveland, Denver, and Mobile (sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) were to serve as effective and practical alternatives to institutionalization. Soon after the demonstration sites were selected, evaluation efforts were initiated to determine how the sites were choosing and screening participants, hiring and training staff, and establishing programs.

Key findings: The evaluation team's observations and data indicated that planning and implementation met the demonstration program's goals:

- The sites formed active public-private partnerships, developed and refined coherent program rationales, and opened on schedule.
- First-year boot camp completion rates were high, ranging from 80 percent to 94 percent.
- Youths improved in educational performance, physical fitness, and behavior. Ratings of youths in respect for authority, self-discipline, teamwork, and personal appearance also improved significantly.

continued . . .

Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: An Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration Programs

Blair B. Bourque, Roberta C. Cronin, Daniel B. Felker, Frank R. Pearson, Mei Han, and Sarah M. Hill

Despite the rapid growth of boot camps for adult offenders throughout the 1980's in the United States' adult correctional system, the juvenile system did not immediately adopt boot camps because of questions about their appropriateness for young offenders. But as the population of juvenile offenders increased sharply and caused overcrowding at facilities, correctional officials began to take a hard look at boot camps as a way of preventing less serious juvenile offenders from embarking on a life of crime and institutionalization.

Could the adult model be adapted to the unique correctional needs of juveniles? To find out, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) funded demonstration programs at three sites to develop prototypical camps and aftercare programs for male juveniles. Applicants were selected in Cleveland, Ohio, Denver, Colorado, and Mobile, Alabama, through a competitive process.¹ OJJDP directed the grantees to identify adaptations of successful adult programming that would make the boot camp sanction suitable in a juvenile setting. Each site received an initial 18-

month grant for planning and implementation beginning in March/April 1992.

After OJJDP selected its demonstration sites, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored a 2-year evaluation that focused on boot camp implementation and the first-year experiences of participants from April 1992 to March 1993.²

This Research in Brief report discusses the evaluation's methodology, the programs' goals, the characteristics of participants, and each site's implementation activities, including participant screening, boot camp programming, and aftercare services. Ideas are then offered for other jurisdictions to consider when planning and implementing juvenile boot camps.

Study method

The basis of the study was an analysis of data collected about each site at five critical points:

Intake. Information was collected on each offender's demographic characteristics, delinquent history, instant (current) offense, disposition of current case, educational history, employment status, living arrange-

Issues and Findings

continued . . .

- Youths who graduated from the 3-month boot camp and remained in aftercare for at least 5 months reported positive changes in attitudes and behavior.

- Estimates of daily costs per youth indicated that the boot camps appeared to be more cost effective than State or local correctional facilities.

The evaluation found less success in these areas:

- Two programs were disrupted by high staff turnover and all struggled to find appropriate and effective disciplinary measures and a clear-cut termination policy.

- Staff found it difficult to achieve a healthy balance between programming emphasizing military discipline and programming focusing on remedial education and counseling.

- The aftercare phase was hampered by high levels of absenteeism and noncompletion. Nearly half of the youths who entered aftercare dropped out, were arrested for new offenses, or were terminated for not complying with the programs' aftercare rules.

More information is needed on why aftercare is hampered by high levels of absenteeism and noncompletion and what can be done to lower those rates. In addition, more information is needed on recidivism over the long term as well as on the costs of other alternatives to incarceration.

Target audience: Correctional officials, policymakers, juvenile judges, probation officers, and researchers.

ments, and criminality of family members and friends.

Beginning of boot camp. When possible, participants' performance was rated in a number of areas, including behavior, attitudes and values, literacy and education, and physical fitness.

End of boot camp. Staff at each site reported participants' dates of graduation or reasons for leaving the program prematurely; measured any change since the beginning of camp in behavior, attitudes and values, literacy and education, and physical fitness; and noted participants' requirements for special services.

Five months after graduation. Staff reported on how participants were faring in aftercare. Of particular concern was why graduates who were no longer participating in aftercare had dropped out, their residence and educational placement during aftercare, and disciplinary action in response to serious misconduct or lack of attendance. Active participants in aftercare were asked to rate their experiences and describe changes that had occurred in their attitudes and values, behavior, and expectations.

End of the demonstration's first year. Boot camp and aftercare staff reviewed the performance of first-year platoons, and gave descriptive evaluations of offenders who completed both the boot camp and the aftercare phase, as well as those who did not.

Data collection covered all youths admitted to the sites in the demonstration's first year. Although as much information as possible was collected on participants in the areas listed above, some sites were not able to measure progress in physical fitness and educational achievement.

Boot camp and aftercare staff designated at each site to help gather information also aided in resolving inconsistencies among data sources. To supplement their efforts, the evaluation team made an average of five visits to each site to observe the camps' operation and interview participants, administrators, staff, and other grantee representatives. The evaluation team also kept in frequent contact with key boot camp and aftercare staff by telephone.

Program goals

The agenda for the demonstration programs was ambitious. It mirrored that of adult boot camps in that adjudicated, nonviolent offenders were placed in an environment emphasizing discipline and work, but it also required that treatment and rehabilitation be the ultimate objectives of all boot camp and aftercare activities. More specifically, the programs were to:

- Serve as a cost-effective alternative to institutionalization.
- Promote discipline through physical conditioning and teamwork.
- Instill moral values and a work ethic.
- Promote literacy and increase academic achievement.
- Reduce drug and alcohol abuse.
- Encourage participants to become productive, law-abiding citizens.
- Ensure that offenders are held accountable for their actions.

Characteristics of participants

During the first year, the Cleveland site admitted 119 youths, the Denver program admitted 76, and the Mobile site

admitted 122. Nearly 80 percent of recruits in Cleveland and 64 percent of recruits in Mobile were African American, with the remainder in both programs primarily white. Denver’s first-year population was more diverse, with 35 percent African American, 35 percent white, 22 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent Native American and other. The programs chose to serve the

broadest range of juveniles stipulated by OJJDP—youths 13 to 18 years old.

In keeping with OJJDP guidelines, the programs targeted male delinquents likely to become further involved in the juvenile justice system and excluded youths with violent criminal histories. Most youths selected for the programs had committed a property,

drug, or other felony involving no injury and relatively small dollar loss. (See exhibit 1.) Youths in Cleveland had more instances of previous involvement with the juvenile justice system and had committed more serious offenses than had youths in Denver or Mobile. Many participants in Denver, however, had previously served short sentences in detention facilities, and a number of youths in Mobile had attended a 2-week mini-boot camp shortly before the demonstration program began.

Only Cleveland’s program was voluntary, and only Cleveland exclusively targeted youths who otherwise would have been confined in a State or county facility. Mobile targeted youths who had failed on probation, and Denver targeted juveniles awaiting placement in the State Department of Youth Services and those under probation supervision by the local juvenile court.

As was expected, records of a large percentage of participants in the demonstration reported multiple factors in their lives associated with delinquency: single-parent families, low income, poor school attendance, delinquent siblings or peers, gang involvement, drug or alcohol use, and a record of disciplinary problems at home or at school. (See exhibit 2.) Moreover, most youths entering the camps had a record of school failure; many were far behind grade level or had dropped out of school.

Implementing the boot camps

All of the sites implemented 90-day residential programs that put youths through an intensive daily regimen of military drills and discipline and physical conditioning. To greater or

Exhibit 1: Criminal Histories of Boot Camp Youths—Year 1

	Cleveland (n=119)	Denver (n=75)	Mobile (n=122)
	Percentage	Percentage	Percentage
Status in Juvenile Justice System Upon Arrest for Boot Camp Offense¹			
No current involvement	16.9	9.3	10.7
Pending charges	3.4	9.3	3.3
On probation or parole	73.7	61.4	73.8
Other ²	5.9	19.9	12.3
Prior Findings (excluding instant offense)³			
At least 3 felony findings	19.3	6.7	10.8
2 felony findings	21.8	13.3	10.0
1 felony finding	35.3	30.7	35.8
No felony but at least 1 misdemeanor	7.6	20.0	17.5
No felony or misdemeanor	16.0	29.3	25.8
Delinquency Record (including instant offense)			
At least 3 felony charges	46.2	21.3	26.2
2 felony charges	26.1	25.3	18.0
1 felony charge	24.4	29.3	34.4
No felony charge, but at least 1 misdemeanor	3.4	22.7	13.1
No felony or misdemeanor	—	1.3	8.2
Mean number of felony findings	2.8	1.5	1.8
Mean number of felony charges	3.0	1.9	2.4
Mean number of misdemeanor charges	1.4	1.4	2.1
Mean number of status charges	.8	⁴	1.4

¹ The number of cases with complete data in Cleveland for this category was 118.

² Includes informal adjustments, stayed commitments, escape, residential facility.

³ The number of cases with complete data in Mobile for prior findings was 120.

⁴ No data on status offenses were available in Denver.

lesser degrees, the sites also offered more traditional rehabilitative activities, including remedial education, life skills education and counseling, and substance abuse education. Other features shared by the programs included:

- A platoon structure in which 10 to 13 youths entered the program every 4 to 6 weeks and were expected to graduate together.
- Spartan facilities located on the grounds of an existing correctional facility.
- Onsite drill instructors, teachers, and case managers.
- Staff with military backgrounds.
- Intensive training for staff before the boot camps opened.
- Military-style uniforms for youths and drill instructors and use of military jargon, customs, and courtesies.
- An exhausting daily routine, starting at 5:30 or 6 a.m. and ending with lights out at 9 or 10 p.m.
- Summary punishment for minor breaches of rules and a progression of sanctions, culminating in removal from the program, for serious misconduct.
- A public graduation ceremony.

What distinguished the programs from one another were the correctional philosophies they adopted within that general structure. The Cleveland site stressed building healthy, prosocial norms in a safe, comfortable environment that was given order through military regimentation. It was the only site to make therapeutic counseling a central part of its programming. The Denver and Mobile programs, however, deliberately departed from the more traditional treatment-centered approach to juvenile justice and focused on a military model that taught socially acceptable behavior while emphasizing the consequences of deviance. Of the three sites, Denver devoted the most time to military drill, fitness, and hard labor, and spent the least time on education and life skills. Although the Mobile program was also militaristic, its participants were offered more educational programming.

Each site’s approach to staffing reflected their differing philosophical approaches. The program in Cleveland sought out a staff with both counseling and military backgrounds as a check against unhealthy bias toward unstructured treatment or overstructured military drill. Denver and Mobile, on the other hand, preferred all staff to have military experience, particularly drill instructors. Denver avoided instructors with counseling or therapy backgrounds for fear that they would have difficulty with the more militaristic aspects of their programs.

As shown in exhibit 3, high percentages of first-year youths completed the residential phase of boot camp, ranging from 94 percent in Cleveland to 82 percent in Mobile and 80 percent in Denver. The majority of youths not completing the programs were termi-

Exhibit 2: Characteristics of Boot Camp Families

	Cleveland (n=118)	Denver (n=76)	Mobile (n=120)
Percentage of Youths Residing With:			
Both parents	11.9	15.8	15.0
Parent and stepparent	13.5	14.5	15.0
Single parent	60.2	31.6	51.7
Other relatives	11.8	11.7	10.8
Other*	2.5	26.2	7.5
Percentage of Families Receiving Public Assistance	57.7 (n=104)	—	45.9 (n=109)
Percentage of Youths With One or More Delinquent Siblings	43.0 (n=114)	32.3 (n=68)	33.0 (n=109)
Percentage of Youths With a Parent or Guardian Who:			
Has been referred for child neglect or abuse	36.4 (n=110)	30.3 (n=66)	11.2 (n=107)
Is known to have a criminal record	47.7 (n=109)	28.6 (n=63)	17.3 (n=104)

*Includes foster home, group home, runaway.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate cases with complete data.

Exhibit 3: Completion Rates for Boot Camps: Year 1 Platoons

	Cleveland		Denver		Mobile	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Graduated boot camp	112	94.1	61	80.3	100	82.0
Terminated	7	5.9	15	19.7	22	18.0
Disruptive or noncompliant	3	2.5	6	7.9	7	5.7
Escape	4	3.4	3	3.9	12	9.8
Medical problems	0	0.0	5	6.6	3	2.5
Other	0	0.0	1	1.3	0	0.0
Total Youths	119	100.0	76	100.0	122	100.0

nated for noncompliance or attempting to escape. One-third of Denver’s drop-outs, however, left boot camp for medical reasons.

Overall, administrators and staff at each site reported that implementation of the camps proceeded smoothly. Interviews with a sample of youths from early platoons suggests that while youths initially found it difficult to adjust to the camps’ demanding regimen, many viewed the programs as a challenge and a positive influence on their

lives, and particularly enjoyed being in better physical condition and mastering military drills.

However, two sites, Cleveland and Mobile, were hampered by high staff turnover attributed to burnout and low salaries. For these programs, having to replace and train new instructors was a significant disruptive factor.

Staff also reported that the programs had some difficulty achieving a healthy balance between adhering to

the strict requirements of a military model and addressing the unique correctional needs of juveniles. Instructors and counselors with military backgrounds, for example, cited the frustration of trying to adjust to youths who were younger, more defiant, and less accustomed to structure than military recruits. On the other hand, staff without military experience were not familiar with military procedures and drills, and many favored rehabilitation over the military model.

All of the programs struggled to find disciplinary measures and a clear-cut termination policy that would not only have an impact on juveniles’ negative behavior and attitudes, but would also contribute to their genuine rehabilitation. To that end, Cleveland and Mobile used a setback sanction that recycled unresponsive youths through parts of the program before their graduation or termination.

Aftercare services

In recognition of the crucial role aftercare services play in the rehabilitation of delinquent youths, aftercare programming was an integral part of the programs. In designing that phase,

Exhibit 4: Completion Rates of Youths Entering Aftercare

	Cleveland (n=112)		Denver (n=61)		Mobile (n=100)	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Youths Graduated from Aftercare	50	44.6	16	26.2	49	49.5
Youths Still in Aftercare	6	5.4	2	3.3	23	23.2
Youths Terminated	56	50	43	70.5	28	28.3
Failure to comply	7	6.3	5	8.2	6	6.1
AWOL—no known offense	10	8.9	20	32.8	2	2.0
Arrested for criminal offense	37	33.0	18	29.5	20	20.2
Deceased	2	1.8	—	—	—	—

OJJDP stipulated that the sites utilize their community’s employment, education, and drug testing and treatment resources and orient the program to continue enforcement of the discipline and character instilled in youths during the boot camp phase.

The sites differed widely in the type of aftercare services they offered their graduates. In Cleveland and Denver, youths attended aftercare centers created for them by the programs, while in Mobile, graduates were “mainstreamed” to seven local Boys and Girls Clubs. Denver’s aftercare services focused on academic instruction and were offered in an atmosphere resembling a small private school. Youths were referred to other provid-

ers for nonacademic services such as drug counseling. Cleveland’s center, on the other hand, was the hub of daily counseling and support services in addition to operating an alternative school. Youths in Mobile were expected to participate in afterschool and evening activities at their neighborhood Boys and Girls Club. There was no centralized aftercare center.

Overall, of the three sites, Cleveland offered its graduates the most comprehensive aftercare program, reflecting that site’s greater commitment to rehabilitation and counseling. Cleveland also was the only site to employ a full-time vocational services counselor and a family services counselor.

Impact on behavior and costs

The demonstration programs met their most important objectives: they showed that the boot camp model can be adapted to the juvenile justice system, that it can be implemented in different areas of the country, and that it can serve a range of ages. What the demonstration did not conclusively show is that the programs were effective.

Boot camp phase. The demonstration did indicate that short-term success was possible in the residential phase. Data suggest that youths improved their educational performance, physical fitness, and behavior, and most participants graduated at each site. In Cleveland and Mobile, where staff

Exhibit 5: Youths' Ratings of Boot Camp Program at the 8-Month Mark

Compared to before boot camp . . .		Percentages of youths		
		Cleveland (n=19)	Denver (n=15)	Mobile (n=33)
How well do you think you can control your behavior and stay out of trouble?	More (Less)	57.9 (21.1)	66.7 (0)	69.7 (18.2)
How well do you get along with other people?	Better (Worse)	52.6 (5.3)	26.7 (13.3)	48.5 (6.1)
How do you feel about yourself?	Better (Worse)	63.2 (5.3)	66.7 (6.7)	60.6 (3.0)
How responsible are you in terms of what you say you will do and taking care of yourself?	More (Less)	68.4 (10.5)	93.3 (0)	60.6 (9.1)
How honest and truthful are you?	More (Less)	52.6 (5.3)	60.0 (6.7)	57.6 (0)
How well do you work with others?	Better (Worse)	63.2 (0)	40.0 (6.7)	51.5 (0)
How often do you use drugs or alcohol?	Less (More)	78.9 (5.3)	73.3 (0)	63.3 (15.2)
How often do you commit crimes?	Less (More)	94.7 (0)	100.0 (0)	84.4 (0)

tested educational achievement at entry and at graduation, youths gained an average of one grade level or more over the 90-day term. Drill instructor ratings of participants' respect for authority, self-discipline, team work, and physical appearance also improved substantially, particularly in Denver and Mobile. More important, youths surveyed shortly before they returned to the community and entered aftercare believed that they had significantly changed the direction of their lives.

Aftercare phase. What appeared to be a promising prognosis for youths' adjustment during the residential phase changed when they returned home. Without the 24-hour surveillance and regimentation of boot camp, youths soon reverted to old patterns of behavior.

All three programs reported high attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism, and new arrests. No site graduated more than 50 percent of its aftercare participants, and half of all terminations were caused by new arrests. In Denver, the first-year failure rate of youths in aftercare reached nearly 71 percent. (See exhibit 4.) Mobile terminated fewer youths in aftercare and had fewer rearrests than the other sites, most likely because they selected youths with less serious delinquent histories than did Denver and Cleveland.

One factor in this lackluster performance was the programs' inability to keep graduates involved in activities. None of the aftercare programs found effective incentives to attract regular attendance, and absenteeism was a significant problem at each site. In Mobile, case supervision in aftercare remained the responsibility of partici-

pants' probation officers and court-assigned case managers, making it difficult to identify youths not attending their assigned clubs and to take effective remedial action.

Moreover, the programs did not maintain the intensive discipline and regimentation of the boot camp phase, the withdrawal of which was associated with the breakdown in graduates' focus and motivation. Most military elements of the camps were abandoned, with the exception of a few military-style courtesies and titles and leadership training materials in Cleveland and Denver, and regular physical training in Denver. Youths who went on to aftercare and remained in the demonstration for at least 8 months reported that their attitudes and behavior had changed for the better in nearly every category surveyed. (See exhibit 5.) These findings were based on a small sample, however, and responses may have been biased toward socially acceptable answers.

Costs. Only rough estimates of the programs' daily costs, which ranged from \$75 per youth in Cleveland to \$66 in Mobile, were possible. They indicate, however, that the daily operating costs of boot camps were less than those of alternative State and local facilities. (See exhibit 6.) Ohio estimated the average daily cost of State institutionalization at \$99, and Denver's higher security and community residential facilities averaged \$138 and \$92, respectively, per day.

Considerations for future juvenile camps

The NIJ evaluation identified a number of areas in which the experience of the demonstration programs could benefit the planning and implementa-

tion of other boot camps for juveniles.

Developing an effective program rationale. Because this sanction's main objective is changing the behavior of young offenders, juvenile programs should develop a strong rationale for each of their program activities and clear expectations of what those activities are to accomplish.

To run smoothly, a program's staff and participants need to understand and support its design and purpose. In programs that have multiple agencies monitoring youths, the responsibilities need to be spelled out in detail, and youths must know who will hold them accountable for misconduct.

Balancing militaristic and rehabilitative elements. A military structure gives youths the discipline and structure they need to focus on changing their behavior and attitudes. Some youths are more accepting of treatment if it is delivered in a tightly controlled environment. However, without also addressing the educational, psychological, and emotional needs of youths within that structure, rehabilitation cannot be a realistic objective of any juvenile sanction. The effects of discipline, an important motivating tool when youths can be closely monitored, may quickly dissipate once offenders leave the boot camp environment.

Selecting appropriate youths. Juvenile programs should carefully define and select their target populations in light of program goals for rehabilitating offenders, reducing recidivism, and containing costs. Judging from the camps' graduation rates, it appears that the criteria successfully identified many youths who could tolerate the boot camp regimen. It was found, however, that youths with prior incarceration

tions were less likely to survive in aftercare.

The high attrition rates raise questions as to whether these programs struck the appropriated balance in selecting more and less serious offenders.

Two of the programs may have included too many serious offenders, while the third camp appeared to have included too many youths for whom less restrictive and cheaper probation sanctions would have been more appropriate.

Training staff. Continuous training is needed to prevent disruptions when staff leave the program in midterm. New programs must anticipate high turnover rates and build frequent training sessions into their workplans.

Exhibit 6: Annual Demonstration Program Costs

	Cleveland	Denver	Mobile
Boot Camp			
Personnel	\$567,112	\$457,840	\$551,425
Other expenses	258,954	160,608	217,500
Subtotal: Boot Camp	\$826,066	\$618,448	\$768,925
Aftercare			
Personnel	\$441,748	\$159,120	\$69,525
Other Expenses	359,104 ¹	63,221	21,000
Subtotal: Aftercare	\$800,852	\$222,341	\$90,525
Total: Boot Camp and Aftercare	\$1,626,918	\$840,789	\$859,450
Estimated Annual Cost of Maintaining a Single Program Bed/Slot			
Boot Camp ²	\$27,536	\$25,769	\$24,029
Aftercare ³	8,898	4,632 ⁴	943
Estimated Daily Cost for Participant			
Boot Camp	\$75	\$71	\$66
Aftercare	24	13 ⁵	3
Estimated Program Cost per Participant (Assuming Program Completion)			
Boot Camp ⁶	\$6,750	\$6,390	\$5,940
Aftercare ⁷	6,576	2,379 ⁸	822

¹ Includes \$138,800 for contract with an alternative school.

² Based on daily capacity of 30 beds in Cleveland, 24 beds in Denver, and 32 beds in Mobile.

³ Based on daily capacity of 90 youths in Cleveland, 48 youths in Denver, and 96 youths in Mobile.

⁴ Excludes cost of teachers.

⁵ Excludes cost of teachers.

⁶ Assumes standard program length of 90 days in boot camp at all sites.

⁷ Assumes standard length of stay in aftercare of 9 months (274 days) in Cleveland and Mobile, 6 months (183 days) in Denver.

⁸ Excludes cost of teachers.

Rethinking aftercare. The demonstration’s aftercare programs need to be rethought and possibly restructured. The transition from boot camp to aftercare should be less abrupt, building on the structure, discipline, and experiences of the residential stage.

It is also critically important at this stage to define more clearly expectations for behavior and guidelines for graduated sanctions. The question remains of how to effectively discipline youths in aftercare while retaining their support and attendance. Staff expressed widespread support for stiffer participation requirements and for more intensive supervision in the period immediately following release from the residential programs.

The evaluation team could not draw any conclusions about the programs’ long-term ability to change offenders’ behavior or to save money and space for the country’s overburdened juvenile justice system. Postprogram recidivism was not tracked and recidivism in aftercare was studied only to the extent that a rearrest prompted a juvenile’s termination from the program. Until more information is available on recidivism and the cost of alternatives to institutionalization, the impact of juvenile camps on correctional crowding and skyrocketing costs will be difficult to determine. It is doubtful, however, given the much shorter sentences juvenile offenders typically serve, that a juvenile program could match the potential savings of adult camps.

Notes

1. The applicants selected were the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, Ohio, in association with the North American Family Institute; the Colorado Division of Youth Services in Denver, Colorado, in association with New Pride, Inc.; and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile, Alabama, in association with the Strickland Youth Center of the Mobile County Juvenile Court and the University of South Alabama.
2. NIJ’s primary grantee during the first year of the evaluation was the Institute for Criminological Research (ICR) at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, with the American Institutes for Research (AIR), Washington, D.C., as the subcontractor. This relationship was reversed in the second year.

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Mei Han is an associate research scientist at AIR. The AIR report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah M. Hill, a student intern.

The full report of this project is available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000; tel: 800–851–3420 or e-mail askncjrs@aspensys.com. Ask for NCJ 157316.

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Austin, James Ph.D., Michael Jones, and Melissa Bolyard, *The Growing Use of Jail Boot Camps: The Current State of the Art*, NIJ Research in Brief, 1993, NCJ 134708.

Bourque, Blair B., Mei Han, and Sarah M. Hill, *An Inventory of Aftercare Provisions for Fifty-two Boot Camp Programs*, NIJ Research Report, 130 pages, 1995, NCJ 157665.

Bourque, Blair B., Mei Han, and Sarah M. Hill, *A National Survey of Aftercare Provisions for Boot Camp Graduates*, NIJ Research in Brief, 12 pages, 1995, NCJ 157664.

Clark, Cheri L., David W. Aziz, and Doris Layton MacKenzie, Ph.D., *Shock Incarceration in New York: Focus on Treatment*, NIJ Program Focus, 12 pages, 1994, NCJ 148410.

Cowles, Ernest L., Ph.D., Thomas C. Castellano, Ph.D., with the assistance of Laura A. Gransky, "Boot Camp" *Drug Treatment and Aftercare Intervention: An Evaluation Review*, NIJ Research Report, 184 pages, 1995, NCJ 153918. A summary is also available as a 16-page Research in Brief; ask for NCJ 155062.

Cronin, Roberta C., with the assistance of Mei Han, *Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders: Overview and Update*, NIJ Research Report, 68 pages, 1994, NCJ 149175.

MacKenzie, Doris Layton, Ph.D., and Eugene Hebert, eds., *Correctional Boot Camps: A Tough Intermediate Sanction*, NIJ Research Report, 19 chapters by different authors, 1995, NCJ 157639.

MacKenzie, Doris Layton, Ph.D., James W. Shaw, and Voncille B. Gowdy, NIJ Research in Brief, *An Evaluation of Shock Incarceration in Louisiana*, 1993, NCJ 140567.

MacKenzie, Doris Layton, Ph.D., and Claire Souryal, *Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration*, NIJ Research Report, 50 pages, 1994, NCJ 150062. A 2-page summary is available as an NIJ Update, *Researchers Evaluate Eight Shock Incarceration Programs*.

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