READINGS
ON
PRODUCTIVITY
IN
POLICING

Edited by
JOAN L. WOLFLE
and
JOHN F. HEAPHY

PoliceFoundation

FOREWORD

Practitioners and scholars in public administration are well aware of the critical dilemma created by the combination of the rapid increase in the volume of crime, the increasing demand for public services, and the limitation of the tax dollar. The tension generated by these two forces is only exaggerated by the nation's current general economic conditions. In such a context, discussion of productivity improvement is not simply appropriate, it is imperative. Maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency with which public services are delivered must be one of the most important responses of public administrators to the urban crisis.

In no area of government service is productivity improvement more important than in policing. Nor are there any areas of public service in which the improvement of productivity is more difficult. The diversity of the functions which make up policing, the service nature of most of these functions, and the difficulty in isolating the police responsibility from that of the criminal justice system as a whole make the measurement of improvement in police efficiency and effectiveness difficult at best.

In the past, police departments have periodically attempted to increase arrest rates, improve the enforcement of certain laws, and shorten the time spent on paperwork in the belief that such efforts were signs of increased effectiveness. These efforts, although worthwhile, almost invariably focused on immediate and obvious problems whose elimination was sought by means that were limited in scope and duration.

What was missing from these past attempts to improve police productivity was the understanding that better policing cannot be achieved until productivity concepts are applied continuously and regularly to every aspect of a police department's work. If at one time productivity measurement and productivity improvement were terms confined to private industry, that is simply no longer the case. Explorations have already begun into the accuracy and usefulness of traditional measurements of police

productivity, into the development of new measurements for police activities not previously considered measurable, and into the customary ways of providing police service.

This book of readings is provided by the Police Foundation for the purpose of facilitating discussion on the many important issues which surround the problem of improving police productivity. It is intended to encourage a more focused dialogue among both practitioners and scholars in public administration.

The Police Foundation gratefully acknowledges the fine contributions of each of the authors and hopes that readers will find their efforts both interesting and useful.

Ivan Allen, Jr.
Chairman
Board of Directors
Police Foundation

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Each of the chapters of this book is an original article, specifically prepared at the request of the Police Foundation for inclusion in this book of readings. Accordingly, our primary acknowledgement must go to the individual authors, each of whom was most cooperative in assisting the Police Foundation to further its objective of police improvement through the publication of this book.

We wish also to express our appreciation to Philip Sawicki, editorial consultant to the Foundation, and Sharon J. Winkler, Foundation Public Information Officer, for their valuable assistance.

Due to time constraints, the contribution of Edward J. Kiernan, President, International Conference of Police Associations, is not included in this volume. However, it is available separately from the Police Foundation.

CONTENTS

PRODUCTIVITY:
A NATIONAL CONCERN

George H. Kuper

Two sidewalk superintendents are watching an earth-mover at a construction site. The first says: "That machine has replaced 1,000 men with shovels." The second responds "Yes, or 10,000 men on their hands and knees with teaspoons."

Their data may not be very accurate, and their terminology is not technical, but these two economists without portfolio are talking about our subject in this book — productivity. They are considering how to organize and use men, machinery, money, technology, or any other resources to produce something we want. And the second commentator could have gone on to say that the 9,999 men no longer required to wield teaspoons under miserable working conditions can now be employed by society to teach our children, grow and distribute our food, build our houses, etc., etc. — to produce all those things our society pursues under the rubric "quality of life."

The other essays in this book discuss how managers of police services can best organize and use their resources to protect the public safety, that is, how to discharge their basic managerial responsibility to be productive in the use of public resources. In this opening paper, we want to lay the foundation for the more specific discussions that follow by treating several general questions about the concept of productivity:

- What is productivity?
- Why should we be concerned about productivity?
- Why is public sector productivity important?
- How do we achieve productivity improvement in general?
- How do we improve productivity in the public sector in particular?

Our essay is not only more general, it is broader in scope than the others in this volume. Our perspective is national rather than local; we see public sector productivity, including police productivity, in the context of the nation's productivity. And, of course, we want to convince you that productivity is not only important enough to you to warrant your reading the rest of the papers in this book, but also to persuade you of its value in your managerial responsibilities.

WHAT IS PRODUCTIVITY?

Productivity means many things — good and bad — to many people. We all know it has something to do with getting work done. We speak of actions or people as being productive or counter-productive. But since this is a book on productivity, we should not rely on these casual impressions.

What do we mean when we speak of *productivity?* Put very simply, any activity that uses resources of one kind to produce a result of another kind can be said to be productive. *Productivity* refers to the relationship between the resources used and the results produced. However, it will usually be evident from our discussion that we are not concerned only with *productivity* in and of itself, but with *improving productivity,* that is, with getting more and better results from the resources consumed, or using fewer resources to maintain a basic level of output.

Resources include manpower, capital, technology, machinery, land, energy, etc., anything that can be combined by the application of managerial intelligence into an end-product of some kind. Results of such efforts can be either goods or services.

Both resources and results can usually be described or summarized in monetary terms, as long as we remember that money is just a convenient means for expressing values and making comparisons. Thus, productivity improvement in manufacturing is the increase in output per man-hour expressed in constant dollar terms. But productivity could also be measured in terms of other scarce resources used in the production process, e.g., output per unit of energy.

What is the relationship of the concept of productivity to the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency? These terms often prove treacherous in public discussions, with debaters blithely sliding from one to the other and exploiting their favorable connotations without ever defining or distinguishing them. Here, because of the bearing the distinction has on the meaning of productivity, we want to distinguish the two terms with precision.

2

Effectiveness generally refers to achieving certain defined results or outcomes without regard to the cost of achieving them, whether these costs be calculated in terms of money and manpower or in some other way. A well aimed sledgehammer will in fact kill flies, and can therefore be *effective* in that mission, although most people would use the analogy to describe a gross misallocation of resources. Or, if you are in fact ever confronted with an objective to be achieved *at all costs* or where *cost is no object,* then the standard by which your performance is being measured is an *effectiveness* standard.

Efficiency, on the other hand, refers to achieving any given result with the minimum expenditure of effort required to achieve that result. Efficiency is an extremely useful concept when the results obtained are within the range of desirable or acceptable results, but not otherwise. There is no virtue in having gone from New York to Indianapolis at the lowest possible cost if you were supposed to have gotten to Chicago.

Productivity is a combination of the effectiveness and efficiency concepts. Productivity asks both whether a desired result was achieved (the effectiveness question) and what resources were consumed to achieve it (the efficiency question). It is especially important to emphasize this combination of concepts when we talk about productivity improvement in services, where the output indicators are less likely to include a quality factor than thay are in manufacturing. Two examples will help clarify the problem.

Suppose that two shirt manufacturers make and sell shirts of identical quality. They have the same kind of cloth, same style, same number of buttons, etc. The manufacturer who makes shirts for lower unit cost — in capital investment, labor, textiles, etc. — is the more productive of the two. Both are effective in that they actually produce shirts, but he is the more efficient, and therefore more productive, because he consumes fewer resources in reaching the objective.

Or suppose that two garbage collection crews operate over routes comparable in distance and number of collection points. Tons of garbage collected will be a significant indicator of their efficiency. But to know whether the crews are being effective, we would also have to ask how much garbage is left uncollected. The purpose of the service is not to fill a land-fill with garbage, but to maintain clean neighborhoods. So the full productivity picture should also include some qualitative indicators.

We make these obvious points because we are about to move into far more complicated issues where these commonplace understandings tend to be forgotten. But before we leave these

preliminary issues, we want to make one further point that bears directly on managerial responsibilities.*

Two common ways of dealing with management problems — reducing service or increasing expenditures — are often ways of decreasing, not increasing, productivity. Reducing service is reducing effectiveness. Increasing expenditures can signal decreasing efficiency. The manager who says that he needs more resources to be more productive may not really understand what productivity is. When he makes such an argument, he had also better be able to describe the incremental output *over and above* that which would have been expected from the additional expenditures. Only then can he claim to be more productive.

WHY THE CONCERN ABOUT PRODUCTIVITY?

To return to our sidewalk superintendents, their brief conversation makes two important points about productivity. The first is that productivity improvement usually entails different ways of doing things with concomitant costs of change. In the example, productivity improvement included a large increase in capital per worker along with manpower dislocations, sometimes a consequence where a labor-intensive operation becomes capital-intensive or technologically dependent. The second point is that productivity gains in the long run lead to substantial benefits for all of us. The economic benefits from improved productivity fall into four general categories.

● The real hourly compensation of American workers (the amount of goods and services that the pay check will buy) increases at the same rate as productivity — and no faster. As every citizen is recognizing more clearly every day, wage increases without productivity improvement create only a delusion of economic growth, a delusion we call inflation. Only true productivity growth enables real income to grow, maintaining a stable, non-inflationary economy.

● Productivity gains in this century have allowed Americans more time for education and leisure than in any other society in history.

● Increases in productivity result in higher quality, lower cost goods and services for the consumer.

● Finally, productivity gains generate additional economic capacity enabling us to achieve things we have not been able to do before such as a cleaner environment, more education, earlier

---

*This discussion is more directly applied to the problems of the police manager in *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services*, National Commission on Productivity, 1973.

4

retirement, improved health or government services, or any combination of these.

The economic history of our country, with fairly steady productivity growth, can easily lull us into the notion that productivity growth just happens as part of the normal course of events such as death and taxes. Some of us believe that competition in the economy is the natural force compelling managers to be ever more productive. In the 14-year period between 1960 and 1974, output per man-hour in manufacturing increased an average of 3.3 percent a year. That is not a bad record until compared with the output-per-man-hour rates of some of our major trading partners:

Japan	10.4	Germany	5.8
Italy	6.4	Canada	4.3
France	6.0	United Kingdom	3.9

But more recent figures of our independent progress make us realize that productivity growth is neither automatic nor inevitable. In 1969 and 1970, our output per man-hour in the non-farm sectors of our economy increased by less than one percent per year — the worst performance in years. By 1974, in partial response to the business cycle, productivity was actually declining.

To be sure, the average citizen is aware that many factors are contributing to our current economic problems: inflation; recession; weakened competitive position in foreign markets; underemployment and unemployment. But public recognition of productivity as an issue is particularly important, because productivity is the one critical economic factor on which every worker and every manager in the economy can have some impact.

Selling the idea of productivity improvement is easier in hard times than in good. In good times, the prevailing optimism makes all problems seem soluble. When resources seem unlimited, any problem that cannot be solved by greater efficiency can seemingly be solved by application of more resources.

But our national attitudes have shifted sharply within the last year. The waste-makers are in retreat, and the string-savers have come to the fore. But despite the shifts in national sentiment, the productivity issue has always been the same. Productivity should always be one of our primary concerns, because changes in productivity make the difference in our economic welfare in the long run.

5

WHY IS PUBLIC SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY IMPORTANT?

The public sector is a part of, not apart from, the national economy. In fact, the public sector is one of the fastest growing components of our economy.

Government purchases of goods and services now absorb about 22 percent of our gross national product, compared with 13 percent in 1950 and 10 percent in 1930. In addition, one out of every six American workers is a government employee, and projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that during the next decade one out of every four new jobs will be· a government job. The projections call for a 30 percent increase in state and local government employment between now and 1985!

The impact of such growth cannot be ignored. Resources absorbed by the public sector cannot be used for production by the private sector. Therefore, as the public sector absorbs an ever increasing portion of the nation's available resources, its productivity performance becomes increasingly important to the nation's well-being.

While we can see what the public sector is consuming, it is harder to recognize and measure what it is producing. The benefits of public services are often diffuse, somewhat abstract, and difficult to quantify. How do we measure the benefits of an efficiently run court system to a citizen who never has occasion to use it? The secondary benefits of public services are even harder to deal with. What effect does smooth-flowing rather than congested commuter traffic have on the quantity and quality of daily output of the people who work in a city? Does the availability of public tennis courts or twice-weekly refuse collection really influence a potential employer to locate in an area?

Whatever the public administrator may think of these more speculative issues, he should recognize that productivity improvement is one way he has to deal with three basic pressures he constantly faces: increasing demands for more, different, and better services; demands for increased compensation to the labor force in terms of dollars, time off, or other fringe benefits; and a growing citizen resistance to any kind of increase in taxes, the basic source of the public administrator's resources.

Only improved productivity can enable him to avoid trading off these demands against each other. Without productivity improvement, he must pay for wage increases either by decreasing service or increasing taxes. Or he must pay for increased services by denying pay demands, and/or increasing taxes, and/or hoping that some other level of government will bail him out.

It is plain that because of government's size, responsibility,

and projected growth, denying legitimate demands or trading them off against each other is no longer enough. Public administrators must learn how to get more out of the resources available to them, that is, to improve government productivity.

HOW DO WE IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY?

If productivity is so important and so valuable, how is it achieved? First of all, we must state that achieving productivity growth is a long-term, tedious, and unglamorous task. Second, productivity growth varies from sector to sector over both the short and the long term. Between 1948 and 1973, the average improvement in output per manhour ranged from 5.8 percent a year in the farm sector to 1.4 percent a year in services.

The sources of productivity growth are so interrelated that any categorization of them is somewhat arbitrary, and their significance will vary greatly from industry to industry. But for our purposes we can say there are five major sources of productivity growth:

● *Application of knowledge.* E.g., the introduction of technology, such as automatic data processing.

● *More capital per worker.* The capital employed per man-hour in the United States went up over 60 percent between 1950 and 1970.

● *Higher quality of labor.* The percentage of the labor force who had completed high school went up from 32 percent in 1940 to 69 percent in 1972.

● *Improved allocation of labor.* The workers required by the agricultural sector decreased from 17 percent of total civilian labor force in 1940 to 4 percent in 1974.

● *Economies of scale.* Average farm size increased 136 percent from 1940 to 1972.

Our examples are broadly stated, drawn as they are from the whole economy. But these principles apply to most industries or organizations.

Within an organization, the common element of all these factors is that they are within the purview of management responsibility. It is up to managers in each sector to identify opportunities and to seek out the resources needed for productivity growth.

HOW DO WE IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY?

Productivity in public services follows the same general pattern as productivity anywhere else in the economy. The problems may appear more difficult because, as noted earlier, the benefits are more diffuse, or because government is predom-

7

inantly involved in the delivery of services rather than the production of goods, and the standards for the quality of services are more vaguely defined.

Furthermore, no competitive market provides continuing pressure for improvement. But there are taxpayers, and voters. And they can tell the difference between good service and bad: between clean streets and dirty streets; between smooth-flowing and congested traffic; between prompt and slow police response. So the taxpayers can and do provide both some of the pressure and some of the problem identification that competition provides in the private sector of the economy.

Acknowledging the pressures for and learning the five general sources of productivity growth still do not achieve productivity growth. What must the public manager do next? If he is content to follow traditional patterns, he will respond to constituent demands too loud or to persistent for him to ignore, or he will buy new products or methods sold by persuasive salesmen. But there are at least four management requirements for assuring that productivity improves on a regular basis.

● *Commitment.* Public administrators — elected and appointed — must be ready and willing to work for productivity. Productivity improvement will not get far without real and visible political and organizational support from the top administrators.

Productivity improvement may require expenditures of dollars (to be recaptured by real productivity gains), expenditures of time, and a certain amount of risk-taking. These three commitments are not easy to make, especially when we recognize that the payoffs from productivity improvements usually appear in the long term.

The public administrator must be willing to defend his productivity initiatives with the realization that not all of them will produce the desired results. However, the return on this kind of investment can be in the form of large dollar savings or markedly improved service delivery.

● *Analytical capability.* Not all productivity opportunities are visible to the manager. So it is necessary to have someone who can ask the right questions, determine whether or not there is an opportunity for productivity gain, and tell the manager what to do next.

Analytical capability must be present if the commitments of money, time, and risk-taking are to pay off. This capability may be found or developed within government. Obviously, the people on the spot are the ones most familiar with the problems to be solved. Many times, however, the problems are so complex or so wrapped in traditional ways of doing things that it is necessary to

8

go to other departments or outside the government to find individuals with the needed analytical capability.

Good analysis will not be hit or miss. It will follow recognized systematic procedures that assure the analyst that he is taking into account all relevant factors. It will define objectives, carefully review costs and outputs, weigh alternatives, establish criteria, etc. Sometimes good analysis will require the technical expertise of a statistician or industrial engineer. It will always entail the systematic application of common sense.

● *Know-how.* This may be the easiest requirement to fulfill, for in many instances the know-how to solve productivity problems already exists and in some cases is already documented. This volume on police productivity is one example of a compilation of materials that most police departments should be able to adapt to their own use. Of course, we should never forget that the people actually performing a task are a primary source of know-how on possible improvements.

National associations, professional groups, and government agencies are continually gathering information on *best practices* in government services. If these *best practices* were adopted nationwide (with appropriate modifications for differences in local conditions), the resulting improvement would be significant.

● *Development of new ideas.* Hundreds of minor adjustments in government operations can lead to small productivity gains. These are not to be scoffed at or ignored; any gain is worth having. But the major breakthroughs in productivity come from new ideas, different — often radically different — ways of thinking about old problems.

The development of new ideas is not an easy process; there is no way to teach a person to have an idea that neither you nor he has ever had before. But the quest is worthwhile. Inventing new equipment (for example, a side-loading garbage truck for one-man crews), or finding a new way to do old things (for example, disposing of a city's garbage by burning it to power electrical generators, or rerouting garbage collection crews to reflect shifts in population), can mean turning hopeless problems into political and economic successes.

If productivity improvement is to be more than a matter of chance or response to crises, public administrators must organize their productivity improvement efforts. Top administrators should fix responsibility for productivity improvement in a key official, line up the analytical talent necessary to support his efforts, decide on where the productivity team is to operate within the organization, and make productivity improvement a continuing priority. It is also imperative that top management

coordinate its productivity improvement efforts at every step of the way with employees and their representative organizations. That does not mean management telling labor what is to be done next, but sitting down with labor and mutually deciding on how to take advantage of improvement opportunities while respecting the concerns of both parties.*

Instead of relying on larger budgets garnered by emotional pleas before elected councils, the police manager is going to have to become more reliant on his productivity improvement efforts to meet the service demands he faces. In the context of broad national concerns, there are too many opportunities for the application of our scarce public resources for us not to start holding police managers accountable for efficient and effective use of those resources.

---

*For more detailed discussion of how to organize a productivity program, see *So, Mr. Mayor, You Want to Improve Productivity*, National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality, 1974.

POLICE PRODUCTIVITY: THE VIEW FROM CITY HALL

Edward K. Hamilton

If any accurate generalization can be derived from the jumble of conflicting data on urban administration it is that every mayor and city manager has a deep and abiding interest in the productivity of the local police. If a citizen must select a single indicator of the effectiveness, responsiveness, and general character of the incumbent administration, the conventional wisdom is that in most cases it will be police performance. Whether or not the chief executive has the legal or traditional authority to affect policy administration, he knows that his store of political capital — whether he conceives of it as a personal asset or as the support necessary to exert effective leadership — is greatly influenced by the public's perception of police productivity.

Yet the same factors which make it important make it hard to define, impossible to measure with precision, dangerous to measure with spurious precision, especially sensitive to the ebb and flow of social tides, and exquisitely difficult to translate into the basis for effective cooperation between City Hall and Police Headquarters. The essence of the problem lies in a genuine dilemma. On the one hand, the urban police are large, militarily-structured, routinized, labor intensive (and therefore fearfully expensive) systems of precisely the variety to which many of the productivity-improving techniques developed during the past half-century have been addressed. On the other hand, the functions which most clearly define the profession, both in reality and in the public mind, defy quantitative expression and measurement. This problem is compounded by the fact that the value at stake is public safety, where tolerances for misjudgments are most limited and the case for an insurance margin most compelling.

Edward K. Hamilton, former deputy mayor of New York City, is president of Griffenhagen-Kroeger, a management consulting firm.

For most of American history the interests of the politician and those of the career guardian of public safety were jointly served by a professional police culture which discouraged systematic collection and analysis of operational data. Since it was (and remains) clear that no index could be developed which measures or expresses the productivity of judgmental endeavor, it was both plausible and convenient to assume that rigorous management techniques had nothing relevant to offer, that no useful purpose was served by training officers in analytic skills or by organizing civilian analytic staffs, and that quasi-objective information about deployment, utilization, or other aspects of police operations would only cause political problems by confusing and misleading the public. Reinforced by decades of application, these principles have produced departments which, although highly skilled in many ways, remainly largely innocent of quantitative information about the ways they invest their resources or the relation of that pattern to the distribution of workload. The long-standing reticence of politicians on such "professional" matters has resulted, in many cities, in a hyper-sensitivity to inquiries or suggestions which has been reflected in charges of "political interference" levelled in the same terms and at the decibel level usually reserved for attempts to rig the captain's promotion list.

The thesis advanced here is that basic changes in the politics and economics of many American cities have made a significant and probably durable change in the value that both City Hall and progressive police leadership attach to collection, analysis, and public reporting of systematic evidence that the resources and authority provided to the police are used productively. It is not suggested that this has occurred everywhere, or in any two cities in precisely the same degree. The urban landscape is much too diverse and complicated to permit such simple generalizations. Neither is it possible to cite definitive social research which "proves" the thesis or its supporting propositions; most of the empirical work required remains to be done. Thus, the argument is advanced as the impressionistic result of a broad range of experience with political and police leaders in many urban contexts, and in the knowledge that no pattern of generalizations can do justice to the nuances so critical to the particular pattern of politics and police administration in any single place.

A bit of forewarning is also useful with respect to the subtle definitional problems involved in discussion of police productivity. As noted, above, the police are charter members of the group of public sector service employees — which also includes teachers, nurses, executives, and many others — for whom performance is so much a function of the exercise of balanced

12

judgment that there is no practicable way of developing a quantitative expression or set of expressions which accurately measure the absolute or relative productivity of individuals. Moreover, even if it were possible to assess the police officer's productivity in the performance of his assigned duties, the relation of that performance to the final outputs associated with policing (e.g., reduction of the rate of index crimes) is sufficiently obscure that it remains largely impossible to establish a reliable link between what might be termed "input productivity" (optimal deployment of resources with respect to a stated list of police activities) and the productivity which President Nixon apparently had in mind when he issued his inane — and potentially quite dangerous — summonses to the chief of the Washington police to engage in Oval Office reviews of the previous month's crime reports as an index of police performance. Finally, policing is so integral to the political and emotional climate of a city that it is singularly subject to large and sudden changes in the priorities which condition judgments of productivity. In the wake of some sensational event, for example, the mayor, the police, and the public may be unanimous that the capacity to respond quickly and in force has taken on a priority which amply justifies holding in ready idleness a substantial number of officers, despite a careful decision in the previous week that pressures on the city budget demand that such idle reserves be minimized. Sensible assessment of police productivity, therefore, requires highly sensitive attention to a volatile array of purposes and values being served.

With these formidable caveats, the discussion below seeks to explore the factors, largely political in character, which have changed the perspectives of many mayors and city managers during the past 10 years. It then speculates on prospects for the coming decade, in which it is likely that the preoccupation with police productivity will either stimulate introduction of important new management tools, or that is will collapse in a wave of public and professional disillusion. It hardly needs saying that much in the quality of urban life in America is dependent on the direction of that evolution.

MAKING IT AS AN ADMINISTRATOR

All protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the most important single determinant of City Hall's attitude toward police productivity is the pattern of priorities, sensitivities, and professional incentives established by local politics. Much posturing and wasted motion results from our chronic tendency to deny or disguise this fact. Even more serious consequences flow

from our instinct to suppress its effects by largely ineffectual attempts to wall off police administration from the influence of officials elected to manage city affairs and from their appointees. In fact, of course, all available evidence suggests that nothing would make the citizen less happy than effective insulation of police policy and operations from the popular values and demands expressed most frequently, and probably most faithfully, through the ballot box and the inter-election flow of communication between the public and its representatives.

This is not to suggest that mayors and/or police administrators should make every decision according to the last election or the latest opinion poll. Nor do changes in public perceptions and electoral behavior usually create the huge fluctuations in the priority attached to police productivity which they stimulate in many less prominent services. (Only a major scandal or a dramatic incident focuses attention on the productivity of the architectural drafting section of a public works department, for example, whereas the intensity of interest in police productivity — however it is currently defined — is relatively constant by comparison.) Also, every mayor, like every other citizen, has a personal agenda of priorities in law enforcement which he will tend to emphasize in conjunction with those which his political antennae tell him are most central to the voters. He will also seek to change the perceptions and priorities of his constitutents to a pattern which he regards as more realistic and directed to what he believes to be the more important values at stake.

In the end, however, the mayor's approach to police productivity will be heavily conditioned by the attitude of the electorate, as he finds it or as he is able to shape it. It is useful to know, therefore, whether that attitude has undergone any demonstrable systematic change in the past decade, so that it is now reinforcing a different pattern of City Hall concerns and actions. Several factors suggest that major changes of this kind have occurred.

Most importantly, there is much evidence of a substantial increase in what an economist might call the perceived marginal value to a politician of a documented record as an able administrator of public services at the local level. In more earthy terms, the savvy politician is beginning to recognize that there is political gold to be mined from the demonstrated capacity to deliver more local service for the taxpayer's dollar. Rhetoric to the contrary, this is a relatively novel concept in American politics. Although reams of copy have been produced in each local election pledging superior administrative performance, our cities abound with structures, procedures, and documents clearly

14

designed to avoid any possibility that the precise nature of that performance might be defined and some reasonably objective data developed to suggest after the fact whether it had actually been delivered.

One must hasten to say that this two-faced approach to the issue of administrative performance was not the result of some dark conspiracy among villains bent upon hoodwinking the people. It was, and to a large degree remains, a perfectly rational response to the attitudes toward local administration which have prevailed in most of our cities for most of our history. Americans have traditionally adopted a half-suspicious, half-patronizing attitude toward public (as distinguished from private, profit-oriented) administration, believing that their interests were best served if it were minimized. The corollary was that whatever irreducible minimum remained could be performed by people whose talents were not sufficient to be essential to the private sector and whose basic attributes were honesty, good will, and an abiding interest in job security. Although these propositions were held to be self-evident for all levels of government, their full force was reserved for the traditional functions of cities. After all, the litany ran, what sane person would suggest that the really first-rate people in the economy should be attracted to such obviously simple tasks as collecting garbage, answering fire alarms, filling potholes, or deciding which cop walked which beat? Beyond the narrow technical esoterica which are generated in any field, it was widely supposed that no legitimate contro-versy with respect to purposes or priorities (i.e., no legitimate *political* controversy) should be generated in these subject areas. The principal object of charters and statutes, therefore, was to shield these mundane services from the abuses thought certain to attend direct involvement of political executives in their administration. The most important goal was a negative one — to erect the most efficient possible barriers to corruption, whether personal or political in nature.

By the 1960s the cumulated effects of this were manifest in nearly every city in the land. City pay scales were far below the wages and salaries of people in comparable jobs in the private sector (except where the political force of the private counter-part had been brought to bear, as in the case of some skilled tradesmen). Job security guarantees and pension rights, on the other hand were at least competitive. *Non-partisan* elections were more the rule than the exception at the local level. The principle of stewardship was frequently in evidence, usually expressed in government by unpaid or nominally paid councils which effectively co-opted their successors. The city manager system had been adopted by many small and medium-sized cities

(the largest is Dallas), and the similar pattern of weak mayor-strong chief administrative officer had been adopted in places as diverse as Atlanta and San Francisco (where the chief administrative officer is appointed for life). Many cities had established long terms of office for key agency heads, including police chiefs, which were independent of the terms of the mayor or members of the local council. Lateral entry into an established city work force, especially the police or fire departments, was nearly impossible, and inter-city transfer of personnel was nearly unknown, except for very senior positions. The social caste assigned to urban administrators was generally quite low, and public impressions and expectations of the efficiency of local government could hardly have been lower, in part because of widespread understanding that most of the usual links between job performance and reward had been destroyed or seriously weakened in the public service.

Most of these developments are well-known. However, there is less recognition of the fact that they have usually occurred with the active support of the elected politicians who were affected. On its face this would seem a paradox, because the net effect has been substantially to decrease the administrative authority which they might otherwise have enjoyed. If a major object of professional politicians is to acquire power, why have they so often and so cheerfully cooperated in their own enfeeblement?

No single answer suffices to explain this phenomenon. It is doubtless accounted for in part by the traditional popular disapproval of overt, naked attempts to acquire or protect personal or institutional power. In the case of cities, it is also to some degree a function of the fact that most such decisions are largely made by state legislators and others who often have their own reasons for limiting the discretion of local elected officials. Nevertheless, experience suggests that much of it reflects a much simpler and more fundamental implication of the traditional public attitude: the deep conviction that no advantages accrue to the career politician through the exercise of local administrative authority, whereas such authority does bring with it very substantial risks.

The logic supporting this proposition seems clear enough. If the service functions of cities were generally considered easy to perform, no credit would be given for effective performance. Americans found it hard to conceive of the award of a Nobel prize for achievement in street sweeping, park maintenance, or police patrol. Similarly, politicians doubted that leadership in such achievement could lead to a seat in the Congress, the Governor's mansion, the Senate, or the White House. On the other hand, the political professional was well aware that

notoriously poor performance of these services, or involvement in a scandal or fiasco of some sort would, whether fairly or unfairly, subject those perceived as responsible to serious criticism and political damage which could cripple or even end a political career. Thus, local administration was — and to a large degree still is — regarded as a "no-win" position — one in which there are no pluses to offset some highly dangerous potential minuses. This negative view was reinforced by the fact that only a small minority of our elected officials enter politics with proven administrative skills or a natural inclination to acquire them. More often than not, the officeholder has been a lawyer or a member of another service profession in which the capacity to direct a large organization is neither important nor tested. Very often, therefore, the politician felt particularly insecure about his ability to exert strong managerial leadership even if he decided that his interests and those of the people he represented required that he do so.

The most obvious and frequently chosen way to avoid these dangers was to rise in the political system through the legislative rather than the administrative route. It was perceived as safer to run for the state legislature or for Congress than for mayor, county executive, or full-time supervisor with direct administrative authority. City councils were regarded as somewhere in the middle: dangerous, but tolerable as long as most ills could be blamed on the mayor, the city manager, or some other politically visible official. Legislative positions also offered more familiar substantive fare for lawyers and, because of the strange quirks in our system, presented better economic opportunities because they did not prohibit the simultaneous pursuit of private practice to which the fact of legislative office could not be harmful. Given these advantages, it is not surprising that a high proportion of the nation's career politicians — and an even higher proportion of those who successfully negotiated the path to our most senior national offices — chose this route of ascent. Nor is it strange that major city administrative offices, particularly that of mayor of a large city, became known as political graveyards.

However, not everyone could or wanted to follow the preferred path. If one's natural political base were within the city, it was often difficult to acquire the stature and public recognition necessary to seek national office in any way other than the holding of city-wide office. Moreover, many of our larger cities are political universes of sufficient size and complexity to be attractive as frameworks for a lifetime of active elected service. (The current mayors of New York and Chicago, for example, are both career politicians who have never aspired to any office outside their cities and do not feel deprived in the

least.) Also, there were large numbers of political professionals who knew more about urban problems than about other matters, cared most deeply about them, and felt that they could be of most meaningful service in dealing with them.

Yet getting elected and staying elected in an urban context meant that ways would have to be devised to deal with the "no-win" problem and the public attitudes which underlay it. The evidence suggests that in many cases the school solution was to acquiesce in, or in some cases even to lead, efforts to separate political officeholders from administrative power and responsibility. Put in the most cynical terms, there is much in the twentieth century experience of urban America that indicates that political officials have found it in their interests to maximize their ceremonial and representational stature, along with their ability to command the news media as critics or city advocates, while minimizing their visible administrative authority. It is important to note that this shunning of administrative power did not extend to acquiescence in any diminution of patronage powers, although the wave of civil service installations which swept the country in the first three decades of the century were impossible for most mayors to openly oppose. This wave reduced patronage opportunities to a small fraction of the city labor force, a trend which was further reinforced in many cities by the evolution of strong public employee unions. It should also be emphasized that the premium was on decreasing *visible* administrative authority, not necessarily actual authority. As a result some ancillary, unofficial control mechanisms (e.g., political parties) became much more important as de facto linkages between the real and the ostensible powers. However, in many cases — as almost invariably where the city manager system was adopted — real losses in authority went along with apparent losses.

In many instances, however, the answer seems not to have been to divest oneself of authority but to share it with sufficient number of others that, as one politician put it, "in case of trouble, they can't get us all with one burst." This is only one of the factors which explains the plethora of boards, commissions, committees, and other forms of shared responsibility which infest our urban governments, but it is impossible to believe that the current crazy quilt pattern could have evolved if this motivation had been absent. Similarly, something of this intent is reflected in the complexity of the deliberative processes engaged in by urban governments, and in the impenetrability of the documents which they produce. (To how many citizens, for example, is the local city budget even vaguely comprehensible — and how much time and effort has been invested to make it so?) The final result in most cities is that even the most dedicated

18

citizen is severely challenged to follow the progress of an issue through a local government and is even more hard put to fix responsibility for any decision, operation, or policy upon any single elected official. It is no accident that this reflects almost perfectly the lessons of American politics through the early 1960s.

The middle and late 1960s produced great changes in public perceptions. Perhaps the most fundamental was the upward revaluation of the public sector signified by the enactment of nearly 200 new federal programs addressed to domestic problems in the years 1965-1968. We had discovered during the macroeconomic bliss of the early part of the decade that overall prosperity in the private sector did not cure our poverty of public goods. High personal income did not ensure decent schools, effective urban transit, or adequate police protection. Cities, which served as the hubs of the metropolitan areas which contained the vast majority of our citizens, staggered under the dual load of skyrocketing demand for traditional urban services and public insistence that local government mount (even if federal and state governments financed) new and effective programs in such unknown areas as drug addiction, job training, and neighborhood preservation. Massive and prolonged demographic shifts in the older inner cities simultaneously intensified these problems and weakened the local resource base from which they could be addressed. Yet most cities were also caught up in the revolution in public sector salaries which was begun in 1963 when the federal government adopted the principle that compensation in the public sector should be set according to that in comparable positions in the private sector. In the larger cities, particularly in the Northeast, the rise of strong public employee unions was at least as important an influence in this direction as the change in federal policy, but the effect was the same. The changes at both levels, however, were a reflection of the same general upgrading of the importance of functions performed by governments as against those traditionally in the private sector.

This revaluation also brought with it basic changes in urban politics which are still unfolding and only incompletely recognized. The clearest change would seem to have been in public perceptions of the importance and the order of difficulty of urban government. Contrary to the general impressions that "anybody can pick up the garbage," the public became painfully aware of the problem of disposing of solid waste while conserving the environment. From a general sense of security that the ultimate answer to unprecedented rises in crime rates was an increase in the numbers and armaments of the police, people evolved to a much more complicated view of the maintenance of

order and the workings of the broader criminal justice system. In field after field it became recognized that urban governments were dealing with problems of almost unmanageable complexity, and that they were doing so with pitifully inadequate resources, even after the unprecedented infusions of federal dollars.

Yet it was the reflection of these changes in personal and corporate finance which produced the most marked effects upon urban government. Under the pressure of expanded work loads in the traditional services and the new demands for non-traditional activities, for both of which unit costs were doubling every five years, state and local expenditures increased by an average of 221 percent per capita during the period 1960-1970. State and local tax rates rose by an average of 212 percent per capita during the same period. Fees, transit fares, and user charges for government services also rose dramatically. Taken as a whole, the cost of state and local government was by far the fastest rising single element in the taxpayer's budget. In short, at long last the return on the tax dollar invested in local government began to evolve into an issue of sufficient force that it could not be satisfactorily raised by a shotgun charge of "waste at City Hall," and could not be satisfactorily defended against by vague generalizations or by receding into professional gobbledegook which explained nothing but implied that the complexities of the profession were simply too deep for the layman to understand.

Translated into the perceptions of our average career politician, these changes had very substantial consequences. First, in seeking office he generally found a greater public receptivity to programmatic analysis and argument. There was new interest in and appreciation for specific proposals for increasing the effectiveness of urban services, and there was more advantage to be realized from systematic demonstrations that the incumbent had failed to do so. Second, having achieved office, he found that the effectiveness of arrangements designed to insulate him from responsibility for problem-filled programs had substantially declined. An aroused taxpayer is not much mollified by the officeholder's plea that he is without authority to intervene in an important service area. (How many New Yorkers know or care that the mayor has no administrative authority chartered by the state? It is not the governor's name which fills the air when there is a subway breakdown.) Increasingly, urban citizens demanded action from their elected representatives, and they tended increasingly to hold the officeholder responsible whether or not he had the corresponding authority.

Third, the officeholder discovered that, in an era when media exposure was the most important single key to political advancement, the occupant of administrative office had a clear

advantage over the average legislator *if* he could produce evidence of real and positive change in the areas for which he was responsible. Since crime had been the overriding local preoccupation of urban voters, progress in criminal justice was particularly advantageous. In general, however, the day-to-day process of administration produced many more dramatizable experiences of the sort that make good television than did the legislative process, in which television coverage generally reduces to interviews of dubious average impact. Fourth, the elected official discovered that the null hypothesis that characterized most popular views of the delivery of urban services (viz. "Philadelphia or Los Angeles or New York — is ungovernable") reversed the political poles. Since the task was generally viewed as hopeless, failure was expected and did not represent the crippling blow that it would have been in earlier eras. If successes were achieved, on the other hand, the administrator must be a miracle worker. Thus, traditional risks were substantially reduced and potential advantages greatly increased.

Fifth, the officeholder realized that he had two natural advantages in engaging in the programmatic debate. His data and analytic resources were far greater than those of any potential challenger, and he had a substantially greater probability of attracting media attention when and where he wished. Together, these factors comprised a formidable case for aggressive use of systematic evidence of effective administration as an important weapon in his political arsenal. The depth of analytic homework which accompanied a major program proposal or a review of current performance could condition the press and public to expect serious programmatic reviews and proposals to be presented with a degree of detail and analytic precision which only he was in a position to supply. Challengers could be made to appear shallow and ill-informed by comparison. The ability of interest groups and special lobbies to distort policy could be minimized. In general, the capacity of the officeholder to determine the course of events — including his own political fortunes — could be greatly enhanced. The price was simple, if stark. The administrator must have sufficient confidence in his capacity to bring about improvement to permit the collection and dissemination of systematic data; he must be willing to permit it to announce his failures and mistakes as well as his triumphs; and he must accept the fact that in most instances, the media would treat the mistakes as bigger news than the successes.

In summary, the evolution of urban politics in the past decade seems to have opened new and promising ways to *make it* in the political profession through documented ability to improve delivery of local services. Just as important, that evolution has

21

closed off some of the more usual methods of avoiding such responsibility while enjoying the benefits of office. There are few clear-cut success models as yet, although the senatorial election of the Mayor of Salt Lake City and the strong losing effort by the Mayor of Indianapolis — a campaign based entirely upon his record as mayor — are suggestive of what we may expect. There are large numbers of related phenomena, primarily concerted efforts by "weak" mayors to acquire strong-mayor powers and/or metropolitan standing, which also seem likely to multiply. However, occupants of City Hall who are involved in these trends face a special history and a special set of constraints when the politician deals with the police. An understanding of this requires a brief excursion into that history.

TOUCHING THE UNTOUCHABLES

The relation between City Hall and Police Headquarters has had a special quality in virtually every American city. There have been as many specific configurations as there are cities, but a few basic factors seem relatively constant. Also, there are signs of fairly widespread and similar evolutions in the relationship which have significant implications for cooperation in matters of police productivity.

The delicacy with which this relationship has usually been approached — and much of the hypocrisy which has grown up around it — is a direct reflection of the perception of the police as purveyors of the most vital of the traditional urban services and the politician as the self-serving administrative imbecile who, left to his own devices, would either turn the force into a swamp of corruption and patronage or reduce it to a disorganized mass of keystone cops scurrying to respond to his latest politically-inspired whim. Like all stereotypes, these are not without historical foundation. The rapaciousness of many of our best known city bosses — and not a few of the police leaders who served under them — deserves its legendary status. Probably even more soundly based is the stereotypical mayor who, responding to the incentives discussed in the previous section, confined his contribution to police business to shrill calls for action when the public was aroused. It is not difficult to distinguish the origins of the general sense that the public interest requires that the police be protected from the politicians.

There was a deeper reason for this attitude, however. The police fit within the charmed circle of activities crucial to personal and national security. Most civilizations, and most certainly our own, have accorded special status to profes-

22

sionalism in such pursuits. The gravity of the authority granted the police to affect citizens' lives and the potential for tragedy and injustice in the event of error or abuse have until quite recently invested police admininstration with some of the same mystical character long accorded to the military. This case has been argued elsewhere* and cannot be developed in full here, but the essence of the point is that during most of this century, simply categorizing an activity as necessary to *security* or its domestic cognate, *safety,* largely forestalled serious debate about the value received for the tax dollar invested. This reflected the belief that security matters are of a different order of urgency than other governmental activities, that such matters require judgments which can be made only by career professionals, and that constraints on government resources should not be permitted to exert a major influence on those judgments. In both the military and the police, decorum has demanded preservation of the fiction that any role in management by elected authorities is illegitimate, that these forces operate above the political process, and that their inner workings are at the same time so efficient and so technologically arcane that there is neither need nor external capacity to examine them.

As a practical matter, of course, public expectations have long been at variance from the principle of a totally independent police force. Virtually every mayor, whether strong or weak, will testify that his constituents *expect* action from him in police crises regardless of whether he has any formal power to intervene. They are impatient with any evidence of disagreement between City Hall and Police Headquarters even if the incumbent chief or commissioner is an appointee of a previous administration with a diametrically opposed theory of law enforcement. (This is the principal reason that in New York and other cities the formal term of the police commissioner has become meaningless and public opinion overwhelmingly supports the right of a new mayor to appoint a commissioner satisfactory to him.) The public is at least as disapproving of any suggestion that a mayor is uninvolved in times of police-related crises (which, regrettably, includes most times in the present turbulent era in large cities) as when there is evidence of a City Hall role (the pejorative term is *influence*) in the determination of police policy or administrative procedure. The mayor, therefore, has walked a thin and shifting line between the actual necessity of

---

*For a fuller treatment of this argument, see E. K. Hamilton, "Productivity Bargaining and the Police," in *Guidelines and Papers from the National Symposium on Police Labor Relations;* Police Foundation; Washington, D.C. 1974.

involvement in police administration and the traditional proprieties with respect to police independence.

However, the assertion here is that the fading of much of the security mystique, beginning with the military and extending to police, has combined with the evolution of incentives to administrative interests and competence among mayors to encourage the appearance of a new and healthier public attitude toward this dilemma. Nothing in current experience suggests that the people are more forgiving of attempts by City Hall to use the police to feather its own political nest, either through patronage or favoritism to special interests. State laws render the former largely impossible and the glare of publicity in which most large departments now operate is an effective check upon serious excesses of the latter variety. But there is much to indicate a weakening in the knee-jerk reflex to regard any City Hall opinion about or involvement in police administration as illegitimate meddling. In part this reflects the financial concerns outlined in the previous section; police usually involve the largest single appropriation of local funds and are, therefore, in the forefront of the taxpayer's concern. Yet, the reaction seems even more closely related to the general consensus that the entire system of criminal justice, of which the police are the most visible component, is massively inefficient and on the verge of collapse. In essence the public seems to be telling the politician that he might as well have a shot at helping to reform the police because decades of protecting them from him have not seemed to be the answer.

The result is not a mandate for City Hall to engage in wholesale kibitzing. Rather, it is to remove some of the standard exemption from managerial scrutiny which many large urban departments have enjoyed for so long. It is a signal to both parties that they are held jointly accountable for the effective use of police resources and the social priorities which underlie police policy. It indicates a low and declining public tolerance for small-time politics on the one hand and haughty retreat into professional mysticism on the other. Rightly understood, it constitutes a new and promising basis for joint action.

HANGING TOGETHER — AND THE ALTERNATIVE

Mutuality of interests has also been increased by growing public attention to administrative, as opposed to crisis-oriented, controversies involving the police. Put another way, police leaders find themselves more and more often pressed to defend against the same sorts of criticisms which mayors, city managers, and other urban administrators have been dealing with for years.

In many cases they find that their traditional training and that of their subordinates equip them poorly for this arena.

This mismatch is a direct result of decades of earnest effort to seal off the internal politics of police departments from the general process by which urban polities set priorities and made decisions. It is not much of an oversimplification to say that for many years most urban police chiefs operated on the principle that the worst disaster that could befall them would be to give the public or any of its elected or appointed representatives any basis for action or even for comment upon the allocation of police resources, the determination of police policy, or the setting of standards for police behavior. Related to this, and just as strongly held, was the belief that close identification with the mayor or the public accountability processes in which the mayor was constantly involved was unprofessional and, in the long run, vocational suicide. No savvy police professional believed that this approach eliminated internal politics; police departments, like the military, the foreign service, and every other corps-type personnel system ever developed, evidenced the most bitter, time-consuming, and minutiae-sensitive political struggles imaginable. But great pains were taken — and human costs incurred of a magnitude not yet fully known — to assure that every possible deliberative process was held within the opaque walls of the department and that every decision was presented as though no question had ever arisen. The corollary for the police leadership was that the appearances or other evidence of contact with politically selected officials were to be strictly rationed and carried on in the most formal manner possible. Unless the mayor were a boss with a reasonable expectation of decades in office — and corresponding leverage upon even the most independent of the urban administrative community — excessive identification with him was seen as the kiss of death.

Indeed, police departments have generally been among the most thorough-going examples of what C. P. Snow has called *closed politics*. That is, they have been strict hierarchies on the military model, empowered to co-opt their entrants with no practicable method of lateral entry at a supervisory level, and investing rank in the officer rather than in the job he is performing. Neither the training required of recruits nor that provided by experience on the job equipped even the average senior officer to employ rigorous approaches to the management of manpower, facilities, and equipment, and chronic inbreeding kept the internal pressure for reform to a minimum. As long as the system sucessfully resisted application of the standards increasingly used to judge the performance of other agencies, it

was reasonably well insulated from change and the political needs of the leaders and the led were identical.

When the combination of financial pressure and public disillusion caused the mystique to slip, however, visible fissures began to appear in the police monolith as new similarities developed between the interests of chiefs and mayors. Many chiefs found that, when faced with penetrating and inescapable questions about resource allocation, minority hiring policies, inventory control, cost/benefit trade-offs, computerized dispatch systems, and the like, the traditional police structure was unlikely to produce the analytic skills required to assemble and interpret the data necessary for an acceptable response. Moreover, they often found that the attitudes and modes of communication encouraged by the police ethos were, like those of the military, severely inadequate to the task of dealing with an increasingly dubious and restive public. As the power of the uniform to reassure the fearful and awe the inquisitive began to recede, acute problems in dealing with the press and the public were thrown into sharp relief. These weaknesses were further dramatized as the public relations of most large departments were strained by serious threats of labor problems — strike threats, job actions, sick-outs, by-the-book slowdowns, etc. — of precisely the type that had previously been cited as the kinds of things the police would never do, which in turn was an important argument for their special status among city employees.

Police chiefs often found that most acceptable solutions to these problems led through the mayor's office. City Hall usually held the keys to the budget, which determined the extent to which the department could fill the new need for analytic personnel and analytic training for regular officers, as well as add the people and facilities needed for more extensive and sensitive community relations. With the inception of federal assistance in these and other areas, City Hall normally appointed or influenced the allocative mechanisms which controlled federal funds to a far greater degree than the police. The lateral entry of civilian analysts and the civilianization of many existing jobs often required the intercession of the mayor before the local council or other representative body. Often, indeed, the mayor provided the initial analytic help necessary for the police leadership to make a sensible judgment about such questions as whether to initiate work on a computerized dispatch system. Perhaps most important, the increasingly beleaguered police chief often acquired a new taste for articulate partners in his jousts with press, interest and community groups, political authorities, and the federal and state governments. He found himself forced to operate in new territory and under new ground rules not required of his

predecessors. New battles produced new alliances.

The result has been visible movement in many cities toward an understanding between city leaders and police leaders of the need for a major effort to define, monitor, and improve police productivity. In the circumstances described, it should be no surprise that this view has been very largely introduced from the top down (a phenomenon by no means confined to police among government agencies). All other factors aside, this is natural in a hierarchical structure, and it has certain advantages in the form of greater assurance of prompt, uniform, and systematic implementation. In some important cases, however, it has been an irritant to already strained relations between police leadership and the rank and file, especially where union roles and politics are involved. In a few instances the productivity issue has raised the specter of deadlock between leaders and led, a prospect which is reasonable cause for grave concern. Aversion of this danger will be largely a function of the capacity of the police leadership, working with the technical assistance and the political support of City Hall, to evolve systems for monitoring and improving police productivity which are sensible, economic to carry out, and comprehensible to the reasonably well-informed public.

EFFING THE INEFFABLE

For many decades, even in the ever-boiling cauldron of police administration, both politician and professional could be confident that the public's incapacity to ask searching questions about operational matters was exceeded only by its incapacity to absorb and digest the answers. For every inquiry he received of a systemic nature, the average police chief answered hundreds about the more sensational of his current investigations. Although interest in the Los Angeles "Slasher," the Boston "Strangler," and the San Francisco "Zebra Killer" has not noticeably declined, the very intensity of interest in crime, and its apparent imperviousness to the simpler approaches to reducing it, have greatly increased the critical faculty of the public in general and its information media in particular. From dry, inside-page filler, systemic data ranging from geographic concentration to temporal deployment patterns to average response time have become formidable contenders for page one whenever such data can be procured. Anyone who doubts that such information is absorbed should inquire into the reaction in New York in 1972 when a published analysis of comparative police expenditures in each of the city's 62 planning districts yielded the unsurprising conclusion that the per capita rate was much higher in the ghetto than in affluent neighborhoods. The

27

surprising *political* force of the movement for program budgets in cities, and thereafter for budget breakdowns by geographic area, are direct reflections of the public's new thirst for comprehensible systemic data.

Moreover, many major newspapers have shown that if the police will not provide such data, reader interest is sufficient to support an independent effort to develop it. These efforts are greatly assisted by the more stringent laws against the withholding from the public of government documents, which are being enacted by more and more state legislatures. When faced with the charge from city authorities that their analysis is faulty or amateurish, the newspapers have a perfect reply: "We would be more than happy to print your version if you are in a mood to supply it." Needless to say, this attitude in the press is a powerful stimulus to individual legislators, council members, and challengers for office, for whom responding to a perceived need is a professional necessity. The result has been a flood of data, quasi-data, and non-data on how and where police resources are invested, as well as a hail of charges of inefficiencies ranging from "cooping" (sleeping in patrol cars) to anti-rational deployment. Increasingly, local political campaigns feature proposals which respond to public outcry in blithe ignorance of the resource trade-offs implied. The intellectual poverty of most of these suggestions is expressed in the fact that the great majority call for stationary, permanent posting of high-priced manpower at specific and bounded geographic points — schools, transit stations, welfare centers, and the like.

The handling of such proposals dramatizes both the new mutuality of interests and the challenge involved in translating the political debate into a true controversy about real options. Such assertions generally occur in the wake of a newsworthy event or series of events — school violence, welfare thefts, transit vandalism or muggings — which have drawn substantial public attention and with which both the occupant of City Hall and the police leadership must be publicly and privately concerned. The suggested remedy is simple, straightforward, easy to understand, and easy for the press to report. Despite the weakening of public confidence in police presence as an antidote to crime, it retains some plausibility. And it is likely to be viewed favorably by the police union (if any) and by all levels of command who do not lose, or who do not believe that they should lose, officers in the process. Effective rebuttal requires arguments which are peculiarly difficult for a police chief to advance alone and which he cannot possibly carry out without the support of city-wide political leaders. It requires frank talk about priorities, about opportunity costs, about the ease with which the offender can

28

shift his locale without changing his prey, and about the responsibility of other individuals and institutions, many of them public agencies, to make better provisions for security. None of these are easy points to make to aroused citizens, but a truly effective argument must go beyond even these topics. Someone must deal frankly with the absence of any clear link between numbers of police officers and the incidence of crime. Someone must point out that police protection, important as it is, is only one of the vital services supported by the local budget, and that fire protection, sanitation, public works, health care, and the rest have legitimate claims on resources which must also be met. Someone must relate the police budget to the tax rate in such a way that the voter can have some notion of the effect on his pocketbook of the new deployment principle proposed. And, as mentioned above, someone must help the chief get the analytic resources to develop careful and well-documented responses to such proposals.

Yet simplistic *solutions* of this kind also draw strength from the traditional consensus that such quantities as the number of men and the number of patrol cars are the only numerical data which can form the basis for argument about police productivity. This sense is very deeply imbedded in most departments and has a number of important origins in fact and experience. The first, and the most clearly valid, is the one with which this article began, and which cannot be overstressed. It is that there remains no practical or theoretical means of deriving a quantitative indicator or series of indicators which expresses the individual or unit productivity of police officers. Many police leaders are very concerned that the zeal to measure the return on resources invested in police may cause this fact to be obscured, and that police priorities will be distorted by a mindless attempt to maximize some sterile number (e.g., the arrest rate) regardless of operational consequences. Others worry that the introduction of quantitative data will encourage the already widespread tendency to relate police performance to some cosmic measure of final output (e.g., a reduced crime rate) which is affected by so many other social phenomena that the most creative and professional police work may produce no measurable improvement whatever. Unfortunately, recent experience has given substance to both of these concerns, much to the detriment of attempts to advance the state of the productivity-monitoring art.

Beyond these worries is the prevailing impression that it is demeaning and threatening to officers to have police work the subject of quantitative analysis. Professionals of all varieties find it insulting to be told that any aspect of their activities can be represented by numbers. They dislike the implied comparison

with workers on a production line, and they are proud of the subtleties and opportunities for individuality which characterize the more taxing portions of their jobs. They are generally fearful, and often with good reason, that these nuances will disappear in the evaluation of any operation of which some part is monitored using quantitative data. Some are also legitimately fearful that such analyses will discover real shortcomings in their performance and/or an irrational pattern of investments which over-emphasizes some type of activity or geographic area in which they prefer to work. By no means every officer wants to see ways developed to civilianize clerical jobs, to reduce the time that officers spend in court, to cut down on the number of shifts spent guarding the prison ward of a hospital, or to smooth the incidence of vacations over the year so as to reduce overtime costs.

Of course, City Hall has its own limitations with respect to rigorous police management. Political executives generally have no more training or known aptitude for collecting or using such data than police executives. Moreover, they are under heavy pressure constantly to redefine productivity in terms of response to the latest object of public outrage, and many can be at least as impervious to systemic counterarguments as any citizen. It is also often inconvenient for them to know that the decision to make a show of force in response to this week's headlines entails reversal of the priorities developed in response to last week's. And seasoned mayors and city managers share the skepticism of the police professionals that any information system or productivity monitoring mechanism will be as useful in keeping track of the real world as the opinions and hunches of experienced individuals, a proposition which is invariably correct.

Thus, there is much concern in both City Hall and Police Headquarters about the feasibility and desirability of rigorous systems to monitor and improve productivity. However, in those cities where safeguards have been erected to suppress the instinct to quantify the unquantifiable, extensive progress has been made. Space does not permit an extended discussion here, but most advances have fit into one of the following four categories.

1. *Simple Return on Investment.* Although the output of the best known aspects of policing defies quantification, there are numerous support activities which lend themselves to classic input/output analysis. Examples include vehicle maintenance, motor fuel utilization, facility location, and some parts of civilianization. The analytic tools used here have been more or less directly adapted from those used in the private sector.

2. *Patterns of Assignment.* Much has been accomplished in

several departments through systematic examination of the relation between the profile of the work load and that of the work force. This does not address the productivity of each individual; it simply seeks to assure that manpower and equipment are likely to be concentrated in the places and at the times when they will be needed. (So irrational are current patterns of assignment that the work done in this area suggests the probability of great productivity improvements before even approaching the problem of maximizing individual or unit output.) This category also includes the introduction of new technology which speeds the dispatching process and provides a larger flow of information to those dispatched, and extensive work on overhead processes — particularly personnel — with condition effectiveness.

3. *Partial Indicators and "Look-See" Systems.* If It is genuinely agreed that no single operational datum is a true index of police productivity, it is useful to collect and systematically examine a number of partial indicators. In this context, for example, the arrest rate is in interesting number, and the rate of quality arrests (those for felonies) even more so. The objective of this examination is *not* to render a summary verdict on the productivity of a unit or an individual, but to spotlight major deviations in expected rates and thereby help to allocate the attention of top management in reviewing current performance. For example, a halving or doubling of the arrest rate in a given precinct may be perfectly consistent with changing circumstances; however, if accompanied by other unusual changes in partial indicators, it may be worth an inquiry by departmental management to see.

4. *Cost/Benefit Trade-Offs.* Systematic analysis has also been useful in approximating the major costs and benefits involved in various patterns of resource allocation. It has focussed attention upon such issues as how many men to take out of uniform, whether the interface between patrolman and detective provides for an efficient transfer of responsibilities and what is involved in changing the span of control of first-line supervisors. In most cases the benefit side of these analyses remains largely comprised of the admittedly subjective judgments of experienced personnel. Nevertheless, the systematic framework has helped to get the professionals to focus upon such questions and to render the most precise judgments which the subject matter permits.

Enough such work has not been completed and reflected in

31

day-to-day operations that its usefulness seems well established. Nevertheless, substantial doubt remains whether this usefulness will produce lasting change in the real and perceived skill requirements of the model police professionals. In many cities this will be heavily influenced by the attitude of police unions, about which a special word is appropriate.

MORE THAN *MORE*

The movement toward productivity consciousness raises special issues and problems for the unions, and it is still too early to tell what the characteristic response will be. About all that can be said with confidence in early 1975 is that a number of unions have discovered that the peculiar sensitivity to public opinion which must characterize effective public employee bargaining demands a somewhat different response than Gompers' famous reply to an inquiry about the basic demands of his organization. For many citizens believe that the police already have *more*, and the growing trend toward productivity bargaining (bargaining in which management demands union's cooperation in steps to improve productivity in return for wage adjustments) tends to center attention upon information which reinforces that view. By its nature productivity bargaining encourages the widest possible dissemination of data on salaries, fringe benefits, average number of tours actually worked, pensions, early retirement rights, special subsidies (e.g., free bus fares), uniform allowances, vacation entitlements, transfer protections, and other prerequisites which may not be available in most private employment. In most cases this information comes to light at precisely the moment that the union is in its most bellicose negotiating posture, threatening sick-outs, job actions, and strikes. The problem is compounded by the absence of any effective incentive during the process of development of the union's demands to reject any wild notion which any faction wants included. As a result the union's proposals are usually cluttered with expensive bric-a-brac (e.g., the construction of one or more public hospitals for the sole use of police officers and their dependents) which neither side expects to see in the final contract, but which management can cite as evidence of union unreason. The net effect in recent years has often been to make the union's image so unfavorable that it has become not only acceptable but politically advantageous for elected officials to resist it with great flourish, and the nation's first major spate of police strikes to result.

However, if public relations tend the union leader in the direction of receptivity to talks of productivity, the internal

politics of most unions press in the opposite direction. It seems fair to observe that these internal politics are now at least as difficult and uncertain as those of cities. The day of the union boss who could deliver his membership on any set of terms he selected seems well past. Generational differences, ethnic divisions, and struggles over tactics have made the professional life expectancy of a big-city police union leader a matter of constant doubt. The fading of the police mystique has combined with the growing perception of physical risk to produce an accent upon "militancy" and a certainty that regardless of how "militant" the incumbent may be, there is someone somewhere in the membership who aspires to his job and will adopt an even stronger stand. Although difficult to define, "militancy" invariably connotes a strong stand against management, particularly when the subject at issue is work rules, so that proposed changes in those rules to enhance productivity are natural lightening rods for insurgent movements.

Thus, the raising of the productivity issue is a very delicate moment for a union leader. He knows that his ultimate standing among his constituents is predominantly determined by their perception of the terms he is ultimately able to negotiate as against what they believe was feasible. He also knows that what is actually feasible, since the holders of the purse strings are politically selected, depends heavily upon the public image which he and his union present. And he has growing reason to believe that that image is in turn greatly affected by his stance on productivity matters, despite the fact that the very word may be a battle cry for his more militant adversaries within the union. Small wonder that he generally considers the entire subject a headache that he could cheerfully live without.

However, the savvy union leader discerns that his worst mistake would be to declare against productivity in principle. Taxpayers are in no mood to tolerate that, and there is no shred of rationale to support such a stand other than simple contrariness — a position which a challenger can afford to adopt but the person responsible for actual negotiation cannot. On the other hand, he believes that his internal position will rarely permit him to greet the suggestion with open arms. Thus, he generally adopts a cautious, wait-and-see posture; he declares himself generally favorable to the principle of productivity improvement, but suggests the gravest doubts that the ninnies on the management side can evolve changes which make operational sense. He then plays his negotiating hand on a case-by-case basis, agreeing to changes where he believes he is buying something worthwhile, where public understanding and support of the proposed change are greatest, and where he has a reasonable hope of delivering his

membership.

This attitude offers reasonable hope of union evolution into a grudgingly cooperative stance with respect to greater productivity, and it should not be dismissed as blind opposition. However, it leaves the union leader with the general fear and hatred of the word "productivity" and may set him up for an internal challenge partially based on his identification with that term. The best hope of a better solution lies in a fourth position adopted by a few farsighted public employee union heads, not usually including police. This aims at making productivity as much a union issue as a management issue. It is reflected in union *productivity demands* designed to increase career development opportunities, expand city-financed training in analytic and other skills, institute job enrichment programs, protect promotional opportunities, and generally advance the opportunity of the union member to be a rising member of a more productive work force. This position, if adopted by major police unions, offers great promise of an eventual working consensus with City Hall on the principle of productivity and, thereby, on a framework for two-way negotiation of specifics.

GETTING ON WITH IT

The composite view from City Hall is that police productivity was never so important, both from the standpoint of the welfare of the city and from that of the Hall's most senior occupant. No mayor can afford to be without the richest possible flow of data on the rationality and, where possible, the effectiveness received in return for the municipal investment in police. Neither can the police chief nor perhaps even the union leader. If each of these principals can take advantage of the benefits of rigorous analytic and managerial techniques — while keeping both his own and his constituents' eye on the limitations of those techniques as well — the change bodes well for the public interest.

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Patrick V. Murphy

In 1974 the National Commission on Productivity commissioned the Harris Survey to determine public opinion about the productivity of various groups of workers in American society. One of those groups was public employees. To those of us who are, or have been, employed by federal, state, or local government, the results of that poll were unwelcome news. Harris found that most people believe public employees are much less productive than most other workers.

It is obvious that this unfavorable opinion cannot simply be shrugged off by those in public service. Public employees are a significant portion of the total work force, and the cost of public services has risen astronomically in the last decade. Given the economic conditions of 1975, that rise in costs is unlikely to continue. Inflation and recession in combination have jolted ordinary citizens. Resistance to higher state and local taxes has probably never been greater, but that resistance may be only the tip of the iceberg if economic conditions continue to worsen. This citizen concern is being reflected in the actions and concerns of the public's elected officials, who have begun to take a much closer look at governmental budgets. Now and in the future, mayors and other municipal officials will be seeking more actively to understand how they can best use resources. The attempt will be made to identify more precisely than ever before what government agencies are trying to accomplish and what the true results of their activities are. Efficient use of financial resources and public agreement that those resources are being used efficiently are rapidly becoming the price of survival for administrators and managers.

Patrick V. Murphy, former police commissioner in New York City, is president of the Police Foundation.

Police departments will not be exempt from these budgetary pressures or from the requirement for a much higher degree of public accountability. In the recent past, mainly because of public concern about crime and public disorder, many police departments have been successful in getting more public funds when they asked for them. Sometimes, mayors during election campaigns have promised more police officers and resources or have told police administrators to hire more officers. The future seems likely to be different. The money simply won't be there. As merely one among dozens of local agencies competing for limited municipal resources — and as one of the largest and most expensive of those agencies — the local police department will have to make a much more strenuous effort to justify its proposed budget to mayors, city councils, and city managers. In short, the local police department will have to become more accountable for what it does.

Up until now, police administrators have not been held to close account for the use of resources. While there have been instances where they have been held responsible, fairly or unfairly, for police corruption, increased crime, or for inept handling of mass public disorders, for the most part police chiefs have not been held accountable for the productivity and improvement of their departments by any well-developed standards. There are many understandable reasons why this has been so.

First among these reasons is the difficulty of defining with precision the responsibilities of the police. Why do we have police in the first place? In answer we might say that police have the responsibilities of keeping the peace and maintaining public order, of preventing crime, and of detecting and arresting those who violate the enormous number of laws pertaining to criminal activities, the operation of motor vehicles, and public health and safety ordinances. Furthermore, we could list the many services that police perform, such as dealing with traffic or personal accidents, helping the sick and the lost, giving out information and referring citizens to appropriate agencies for their problems, and intervening in the daily crises that affect individuals, families, schools, and neighborhoods.

But having said all this, we still would not have gotten far in explaining the extraordinary complexity of police work and its problems. The police deal daily with human nature in all its enormous variety, and especially with what are called the deviant aspects of that nature. This is enormously challenging work, and it is very difficult to measure in terms of success or failure.

Another reason why the police have seldom been held accountable is the fragmented and isolated character of our

locally based police organizations. There are more than 25,000 police jurisdictions in the United States, enormously varied in terms of organization, policies, practices, priorities, and goals. This is the inevitable result when there are few objective and agreed-upon standards to which police departments can be held to account. But because there is very little exchange of experience and ideas among departments, standards of appropriate performance are slow to emerge.

This insular attitude of police departments toward each other is paralleled by a tradition of aloofness toward the public in general. In the belief that police work is so complex that it cannot really be explained to the public, the police have taken a detached and distant view of those they serve. In short, to a considerable degree they have resisted being called to account, enjoying the mystique that surrounds police work. To protect that mystique, the police have been prone to keep to themselves and to keep their information to themselves as well. It must be admitted, of course, that this attitude arises largely out of the content and stresses of police work. Generally, the police come into contact with people at their worst, in situations where citizens are hostile or uncooperative. Inevitably, this daily experience tends to develop in police officers a degree of cynicism toward people in general.

Yet another reason why the police have not been held to account for much of what they do has been the emotionally overpowering attitudes of fear and frustration that so many citizens continue to feel about crime and violent behavior. Because citizens feel so strongly about these matters, their feelings have great political implications for state and local elected officials, who suspect that their political survival depends upon their showing the proper attitude of concern about crime. As a result, other police matters are shoved aside as the public and its elected representatives focus on crime statistics. And most police chiefs, because they too are concerned about crime rates, respond to these community pressures by emphasizing law enforcement rather than crime prevention.

The result is that despite the enormous scope of police work, its effectiveness is most often measured in the narrow terms of the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) published by the FBI. Even though the FBI itself warns against using UCR figures to make operational decisions, police administrators and other city officials frequently make judgments about resources and priorities by comparing their own jurisdiction's reported crime rates with those of similar jurisdictions.

Yet it is a misuse of UCR figures to draw from them implications about the productivity of a police department, for

the simple reason that it has become apparent that UCR data do not accurately portray either the nature or the extent of the crime problem in any given municipality. The national victimization survey conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's National Crime Panel has revealed that a large percentage of crime is never reported to police by citizens. The survey has also revealed that under-reporting of crime varies considerably among cities, making it even more inappropriate to draw conclusions about police productivity by making comparisons of reported crime rates among cities. While not without its own limitations, the panel's victimization survey has provided more of the information necessary to construct an accurate picture of crime.

The fact that mayors, city councils, city managers and others responsible for overseeing police departments and their budgets focus on reported crime rates is unfortunately indicative of the poor understanding most civilian officials have about police work. What frequently seems to be most important to them, even more important perhaps than crime statistics, is the ability of a chief to project a favorable public image. Provided the chief does so, the tendency of his elected superiors is to give the chief a free reign to supervise the department. When they exert pressure it is indirectly, in ways that will be advantageous politically to themselves. Public officials, for instance, have been known to take a deep interest in who is being promoted, and to what, in police departments. This reveals, unfortunately, the common lack of professional status of the police.

No such deep interest is shown by officials about the much more important aspects of policing, however, because most officials do not know what questions to ask. In the past, when crime rates have risen and officials have asked the chief what the solution is, it has been enough for the chief to say, for instance, that he needs 50 more officers. No one has known what data to ask for that would show how the hiring of the new officers would actually result in crime reduction.

Since the police budget must be approved by the local governing body, it is clearly the duty of elected officials to make a serious effort to determine if the money spent on policing is being used wisely and efficiently. The only way this can be done is for elected officials to make the effort to understand how the department operates. How many officers are assigned to traffic control? How does the department decide how many to assign to traffic control? How does the department set priorities in enforcing the huge number of laws for which it is legally responsible? How are the resources used in criminal apprehension balanced against the resources used for crime prevention? What

standards does the chief use to hold commanding officers accountable for the performance of their units? What recent steps has the department taken to minimize the possibilities of corruption? These are simply a few of the many questions that public officials could ask that would begin to give them a greater insight into the complexities of police work.

In many cases the right questions would also reveal the feeble progress of many departments toward modern management methods and professional upgrading of the work done throughout the department. The police world has been a closed world. It has relied too much on sworn police officers to perform functions which they are not qualified to perform. Throughout most police departments sworn officers will be found at work as managers, legal advisors, planners, analysts, researchers, personnel directors, training directors, public information directors, and budget specialists. Throughout most police departments sworn officers will also be found performing clerical, secretarial, and maintenance work, answering switchboards and typing and filing and even sweeping the floor. Yet very few of the police officers in this wide spectrum of tasks have been trained in any professional sense to perform the work they are doing; they have been trained to be police officers, and this training has not given them the high level of expertise necessary to address very complex issues.

One of the chief ways by which police efficiency could be improved would be to re-define the police officer's job. This re-definition would screen out both the work that must be done by persons with highly developed and specialized skills in management, planning, and so forth, and the work at lower levels that should be done by para-professionals and sub-professionals. Certainly there will be cases where police officers will find that their interests are in gaining some of the highly developed and specialized skills necessary in managing a department, and they should be encouraged to gain those skills. But most police officers become police officers because they want to be police officers, not management analysts or typists.

The re-definition of the police officer's job would also mean placing a new emphasis on police work which is effective in preventing crime, maintaining order, and fulfilling a more positive police role. Crime prevention is far superior to the best possible police reaction after a preventable crime has occurred, yet the definition of the police job — and the rewards — still lean heavily in the direction of arrests and other enforcement activities.

Frank discussions between public officials and police managers also could have effects that would be extremely helpful to

the police. A vast amount of police work is devoted to the so-called victimless crimes of gambling, prostitution, and the like. Where sizable segments of the population participate or condone such activities, it is clear that total enforcement of the laws pertaining to them decreases the amount of time police should be spending on more important endeavors. Here the responsibilities of the police become intertwined with broader questions which are not the responsibility of the police to answer. It is public officials, in the final analysis, who must do so. When they do not, inevitable confusion arises among the police as to the extent and degree of enforcement of these particular laws.

Discussions between public officials and police might also help to pinpoint the public's own responsibility in every stage of the criminal justice process, from reporting a crime to the police to serving as witnesses in courts. For various reasons the public takes its own responsibilities too lightly. The unfortunate result is that the work of the police and other criminal justice agencies is frequently undermined.

Any discussion of police accountability cannot ignore the fact that police departments are just one part of the larger criminal justice system that includes prosecutors, the courts, and penal and correctional institutions. This means that the true degree of police accountability for handling crime will only be discovered when the other parts of the system have also been held accountable. Most citizens tend to focus their attention upon the police, who are highly visible, and ignore the rest of the criminal justice process, whose workings they would just as soon forget.

Holding the entire criminal justice system properly and reasonably accountable is difficult, however. Many observers, both inside and outside criminal justice agencies, believe that the criminal justice process in this country is so uncoordinated that it does not deserve to be called a system. A recent study by New York's State Commission of Investigation found that the so-called system of criminal justice in New York City was "a jumble of ill-coordinated and inefficient agencies, each pushing its own budget and interests with no regard for any over-all plan to cope with increasing crime." That description, from the *New York Times,* could no doubt be applied to most other city and state criminal justice systems.

One of the factors that impedes coordination among the various agencies is a high degree of interagency rivalry. All too often relations among agencies are characterized by refusals to exchange information and personal antipathy to those who work in other agencies, instead of cooperation and professional teamwork. Police administrators, for instance, are repeatedly thwarted when they try to find out the disposition of arrests

40

made by their officers. The efforts of these administrators to measure effectiveness and to develop new enforcement policies are thus frustrated.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that many police departments make too many arrests. Consider, for instance, all the arrests made for public intoxication. While persons under the influence of alcohol must certainly be taken care of in some way, it makes little sense to arrest them and thus propel them into the criminal justice process. Alcoholism must be recognized as a medical illness and treated accordingly.

Many of the arrests police make are of poor quality. This is the natural result when too much stress is laid upon number of arrests and not on quality. In far too many instances, police arrests fail to pass the court's determination of probable cause at arraignment. The fact that so many arrests are of poor quality is an indication of the lack of balance in our criminal justice systems. The number of police has risen, often dramatically, but there has not been a concomitant increase in the numbers of prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and correctional institutions which are more than mere prisons. Holding the police alone to account is a far cry from understanding and working to improve the entire process of criminal justice.

The news and entertainment media also have their effects on police accountability. The effects are mixed, sometimes very good and sometimes not at all good. On the one hand, the media have shown great initiative and skill in exposing police corruption. The newspapers in New York and Indianapolis and Chicago, for instance, can be rightfully proud of the work they have done in this area. But they are not the only ones. Many other newspapers and television stations employ reporters who are devoted to getting a true picture of how criminal justice agencies work by studying police statistics and court records, by reading commission reports and Justice Department documents, by talking to police officers, prosecutors, judges, wardens, and prisoners.

Yet the media also show, as they have always shown, a great interest in the dramatic and sensational and, if you will, lurid aspects of police work. Crime can command a great amount of space or time, but policy is frequently ignored. The truth about police work is frequently dismissed in favor of imaginary protrayals of the police and criminals in comic strips, in the movies, and in television drama. In providing these to its consumers the news media are no doubt fulfilling a certain demand that is perhaps typical of human nature. Stories of murder and police-criminal combat will perhaps always interest

the public more than serious analysis of less dramatic police work.

The police, however, can lend their weight to more serious analysis by understanding that reporters seeking information are people doing their job, and that when they ask questions it is not necessarily because they are antagonistic to the police. New York's State Commission of Investigation noted what it called ". . . an enormous information gap in which most meaningful data are lacking and the self-serving statistics kept by individual (criminal justice) agencies tend to be inaccurate, incomplete, and often misleading." That information gap is not limited to New York. One way it can be closed is for police departments to do a better job in evaluating the information they provide to the media. Like other public agencies, police departments have preferred to release information that is complimentary and positive about the work being done. This is hardly unnatural. It would take much more self-confidence, on the part of the police or other public agencies, to reveal information suggesting internal problems, failures, and difficulties. Personally, I find it difficult to ask that the police expose themselves to a degree that is not requested of other public agencies. At the same time, however, when the police are asked, by elected officials or the media, about various internal problems it behooves the police to be as candid as possible. Furthermore, much more information could be made public if the police made a start at collecting and analyzing much more data about their various activities. A good place to begin would be to take a new look at the information customarily provided to the media. Is it available? Is it understandable? Does it answer the question reporters have? Does it clarify, rather than confuse, the police role? If the answers to these questions were always yes, the police would be considered more accountable than they are now.

What this paper has been suggesting up to this point is that for various reasons the police have not been held accountable to any large degree for what they do, but that from now on public officials, reflecting public opinion, will become much more closely concerned with police expenditures, police efficiency, and police effectiveness. What is going to happen is that police departments, as well as other public agencies, will be required to institute new and more exact methods for determining what is done and how it can be done better without increasing costs. The pressures are mounting for public agencies to adopt the twin concepts of productivity measurement and productivity improvement which have been used for many years in private industry.

These concepts developed from private industry's interest in profits, which are only earned when a company can sell its

products for more than the cost of materials and labor involved in making the product. These concepts, aimed at improving efficiency and productivity, have the effect of determining accountability with great precision, at least in manufacturing industries. Most industrial managers keep day-to-day watch on productivity. Few police departments, on the other hand, could at this moment tell their city councils in any detail what they are doing, much less offer the data by which council members could make their own evaluation.

Developing such measurements will not, of course, be easy. Finding ways to measure the whole gamut of police activities will be much more difficult than determining, say, the number of television sets manufactured by a company. Human interaction, which is what police work is all about, presents new problems when it comes to definition and measurement.

Furthermore, as the police begin to devise new measurements to add to, or take the place of, the traditional ones such as reported rates of crime, they will be faced with the problem of changing the public conceptions of crime prevention and criminal apprehension as the definition of the police job and crime statistics as the measure of police worth.

But there will be advantages too. When ways to measure police work in all its variety are found, front-line officers will be found to respond more positively to the work at hand. They will not feel that they are wasting their time except when they are impressing their superiors by boosting their arrest total. From experiments in neighborhood team policing we have already seen how the enthusiasm of police officers can be rekindled by making them responsible for a much broader range of activities. Many police departments, for instance, have officers who excel in defusing potentially violent situations, such as domestic disputes and street disturbances. Yet this talent cannot be measured by such traditional gauges as the number of summonses handed out or arrests made.

What also should be developed are new measurements of overall departmental effectiveness. Perhaps the department protected the public's constitutional rights better this year than last year, but there is no adequate way to determine if this is true. Perhaps the department prevented and deterred more crime this year than last, but here again we have no really reliable ways to determine this.

What we measure, and how we measure it, is only half of the productivity question. The other half is how we improve with the resources we have. Productivity improvement is a continuing process. It is a way of managing an organization by relating measurements of efficiency and effectiveness to the achievement

of clearly stated organizational objectives. Productivity improvement can involve any number of specific projects, but the critical underlying factor is an across-the-board concern with defining objectives and the development of measurements that indicate what progress we are making toward those objectives. The entire department should be involved in the effort. From police chief to patrol commander to records bureau head, every manager in the department must be thinking in terms of the productivity of his or her own unit.

The productivity improvement process begins when police managers begin asking better questions than they have in the past. We have too long been content to operate on the basis of history and tradition. We have been reluctant to raise the basic questions of what we are doing and why. Both our concern with public opinion and our professional integrity demand that this situation change. Much of the theoretical information that we need to help us is readily available. We need only to consider it seriously.

Police managers would do well to ask themselves why one police department's civilian employees total 47 percent while those in another department in a city of similar size comprise only eight percent. There must be some important differences in the way these departments are administered. What are the differences in cost-effectiveness, and what do those differences mean to any other police department?

Or they might ask themselves why half of the departments serving populations between 300,000 and one million were still distributing manpower equally over all three shifts in 1973, even though police administration text books have said for at least twenty years that personnel should be distributed according to number of crimes and calls for service. Why does one major city employ less than two officers per 1,000 residents while another of roughly comparable size employs six? Why is the rate of stolen property recovered by the police, excluding motor vehicles, nine percent in one city and 38 percent in another? Why is it that in 1973, among major cities of comparable size and with very similar rates of reported burglary, arrest rates for burglary varied from 28.6 per 100 officers to 136.5 per 100 officers?

Certainly, given the state of our data-gathering and reporting practices, it could be argued that some of the above comparisons are inappropriate, due to reporting differences, geographical configurations, and so forth. While there is a great deal in that argument, the differences are so striking that we cannot simply write them off. I do not cite these comparisons for the purpose of suggesting performance standards or making value judgments.

44

I cite them merely to illustrate the variability in how different agencies carry out their mission.

Let us look for a moment at the form productivity improvement efforts might take. Since personnel constitute up to 90 percent of the resources of an urban department, many questions can be asked about productive use of personnel. How, for instance, do we actually deploy patrol personnel? Is deployment based on analysis of crime and service-call data or on tradition and unchallenged assumptions? How much flexibility do we give field commanders, who are most directly accountable for police services in their areas and who know the most about local conditions? In 1971 New York City precinct commanders were encouraged to assign uniformed personnel to plainclothes activities aimed at robbery and other street crimes. Using various decoy and "blend-and-observe" tactics, these units were successful in making high-quality arrests. Thus, it can be asked if it is worthwhile to shift officers from uniformed patrol to duties out of uniform which produce more high quality arrests. A recent experiment conducted by the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department with Police Foundation support concluded that the presence or absence of random preventive patrol by uniformed officers had little or no effect on rates of crime and citizen satisfaction. Since random patrol typically occupies a significant amount of on-duty time in a police department, what better use might be made of this time to increase productivity? What is the optimal balance in allocating personnel to patrol, detective, juvenile, traffic and other police functions?

We might do well to consider the formation of enforcement policy as another area for potential improvement. To what extent do we gather the appropriate data and analyze crime as a means of establishing enforcement priorities? Do we coordinate our efforts with the prosecutor, so that we are, in fact, bringing to court those cases with the highest priority, or are we loading the system with arrests for offenses that are very low on the prosecutor's priority list? An internal staff study done in 1973 involving one police department revealed that only 15.3 percent of those arrested on narcotic misdemeanor charges were incarcerated, most of them for less than 30 days. It was estimated that each offender had cost the department approximately $2,500. A similar analysis of prostitution showed that 240 persons were incarcerated during 1972 for an average of 30 days at an approximate cost of $3,200 each. Figures like that offer dramatic proof of the need for a more rational establishment of enforcement policies and close coordination with other criminal justice agencies.

These are only two of the many areas of police operations

that can be looked at critically with an eye toward significant productivity improvement. It is neither possible nor desirable to present a shopping list of productivity improvement efforts, however, since there are no simple answers to productivity problems. Rather, there are simple questions that demand hard analysis, followed by bold, imaginative management.

Accountability is a political concept. Under our system of government the public, acting through its elected representatives, has delegated powers and responsibilities to various public agencies. Having delegated these powers and responsibilities, and having provided these agencies with large amounts of public funds to carry out their duties, the public has the right to know what its agencies are doing and to hold them accountable. The lack of uniformly accepted standards and comprehensive understanding of all aspects of police work have prevented the public, and often the police themselves, from seeing clearly the professional nature of the tasks performed by the police.

Thus, as the police develop the kinds of specific information that will permit the public to assess what their departments are doing for them, as they work in partnership with other municipal agencies, and as they maximize the use of their resources, they will be taking important steps in the direction of increased accountability, productivity, and professionalism.

THE POLICE, THE UNION, AND THE PRODUCTIVITY IMPERATIVE

John A. Grimes

INTRODUCTION — *WHAT'S HAPPENING TO MY POLICE FORCE?*

The *Blue Flu* sweeps the Detroit police force. Half of Baltimore's patrol officers walk off the beat in an acrimonious dispute over wages. New York City's "finest" strike; so do police in Milwaukee. Ticket slowdowns, picketing, mass sick calls, mass resignations, and other *job actions* by police officers break out in several major cities.

What was unthinkable just a few years ago is now a common occurrence — law enforcement officers across the country are engaging in a variety of work stoppages and slowdowns, often in defiance of the law, to win improved wages, hours, and working conditions.

The vehicle for what has been aptly termed the *revolution in blue,* is, in the main, the heretofore docile local police officer's association which — despite the appearance of *fraternal* or *benevolent* in its title — now has taken on all the characteristics of a trade union. Other police groups have indeed joined traditional trade unions.

But whether they are affiliated or independent these police organizations are aggressive; they are militant; and they are fast learning the uses of power.

The transformation has caused more than one police chief to fear that he is in imminent danger of losing control of his police force. These fears were dramatically expressed by then-Police Commissioner John Nichols of Detroit in a 1972 article in *The*

John A. Grimes, formerly a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, *is a consultant to Sam Zagoria, executive director of the Labor-Management Relations Service.*

Police Chief, published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police:

> Let me sound the "certain trumpet" of dangers of "It can't happen to me-ism." Police unionism is on the move — power struggles are forming, and I would fully expect the rise of police unions almost across the country to closely follow the ascendancy of other labor unions, which resulted in damage; harassment of nonparticipating employees; enforcement squads; sporadic work slowdowns; control of organizations in a well-indoctrinated, vociferous few; a diversion of loyalty from organizational goals to union goals; and ultimately, as expressed in a public seminar by two of our most outspoken union leaders who said, "Chiefs, Superintendents, and Commissioners are temporal. They'll change. The union is the only permanency in the department. It is us with whom you will deal, we will make the policy."
>
> So for those of you who feel that unionism has no designs on management prerogatives, no desire for power, no intentions to covertly or overtly control the organization, forget it. Just as other labor organizations are encroaching on the management level, so shall police unions. . .

Scary words. And though Commissioner Nichols tempered these words in some later utterances, his comments raise many of the issues the movement to police unionism is stirring. Is the emergence of police unions crippling management's control? Once a police union is formed, are the next steps strikes, slowdowns, or other work stoppages? Where will the loyalty of the police officer lie? In short, who's going to run the department?

At the same time city administrators and their police departments are under another extreme set of pressures.

Even before the present explosion of inflation, municipalities regardless of size were finding the tax funds available to them shrinking. Concurrently, citizens were demanding more and more services from their local governments.

With the soaring crime rate, nowhere has this demand been more sharply focused than on the police department; the cry is heard as loudly from the ghetto as from the silk stocking districts. At the same time the citizenry is firmly resisting increases in taxes to supply the funds necessary to broaden police services.

With this budgetary squeeze police officials are hard-pressed to maintain the existing level of services, much less increase

them. New York City's Mayor Abraham Beame recently set off a storm by announcing the layoff of as many as 400 police officers to help reduce the city's huge deficit. In Cleveland more than 1,000 city employees from all departments — more than ten percent of the work force — are being laid off. Other cities are facing similar pressures.

To meet this challenge city management has had to turn to intense consideration of how it can stretch available funds to yield more services or, as is more often the case, extract the same level of services from fewer tax dollars.

These needs have forced closer attention to public sector productivity and how to improve it. Simply stated, the problem of public sector productivity is how to make the present resources of money and people yield more in services and to maintain or increase the quality of that output.

Productivity improvement in industry is quite well understood. Its application to municipal services, and in particular to policing, is just beginning to be explored. The dialogue and debate in considerable degree are still concerned with how to define public sector productivity, let alone achieving the more difficult tasks of how to measure and improve it. Is an increase in arrests a valid productivity measurement? How do you measure the crime that may not take place because of the efficiency of an individual police officer on a beat, or of a particular police patrol tactic?

Productivity is concerned with quality as well as quantity. What is a quality arrest? What is quality police patrolling?

The new emphasis on productivity is instigating some totally new thinking on the part of city administrators and police officials as to how the police function should be carried out. Some old concepts of policing are being challenged in the search for greater productivity. Police officials are finding out that productivity does not mean merely "do what you have been doing, but do it more efficiently." Applying productivity to the police function is demanding not only new concepts, but also greatly more imaginative use of the resources at hand.

Inevitably this must involve the entire police department. A basic necessity in the application of any productivity program is to have the complete understanding of those to be affected as a preliminary to having their cooperation. It has been demonstrated in more than one situation that without employee cooperation the most imaginative, innovative and, on paper, potentially successful productivity program can founder and fail. Productivity improvement is a management function, but labor will greatly determine whether, and to what extent, the improvement programs will succeed.

49

Attaining the cooperation of the rank and file patrol officer today in implementing productivity improvement programs means enlisting the police union, or whatever organization speaks for police employees. The day when the chief's orders traveled unquestioned and unchallenged from top to bottom is fast vanishing.

The union is a party at interest because productivity improvement programs often mean changes which affect wages, hours, or working conditions, or all three. Touch any of these and you are on turf that the union considers its own, and the territorial imperative applies. The union can be a positive asset or a devastating liability.

Further, it is not merely whether the police union is involved in the productivity process but how it is involved that can have an important bearing on whether a productivity program succeeds or fails.

For these reasons it is important that those officials who will be engaged in productivity efforts at any level in city administrations or police departments understand the nature of the employee organizations involving their law enforcement officers — what brought them about, what and who they are, what their aims and goals are, how they view their role in relation to police management, how they view productivity. Enhancing that understanding is what this presentation is all about.

THE HISTORY OF POLICE EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS — YOU'VE COME A LONG WAY BABY!

Any recounting of the history of police employee unionism properly starts with the Boston police strike of 1919. While it made Calvin Coolidge a President, that strike also stopped the move to police unionism in its tracks for decades.

Police employee organizations existed in large cities before 1919 though most of the groups were *fraternal* or *benevolent* and supplied only death benefits and welfare insurance. The American Federation of Labor had been petitioned to issue police union charters and had refused. But the impact of rising inflation on the fixed wages in the public sector in the wake of World War I induced the Federation to reverse itself. By late 1919 some 37 locals had been chartered, among them one in Boston.

The conditions which led to the strike are worth a look. Professor William J. Bopp, assistant professor of law enforcement at Florida Technological University, provided a description in an article in the magazine, *Police:*

The working conditions of Boston's policemen had been allowed to deteriorate over the years until by 1919 their

situation was shameful. Patrolmen worked between 73 and 98 hours a week, depending on their assignment, for which they received $21.09 per week. Men on the afternoon shift were forced, after performing eight hours of duty, to stand by, on reserve, in the back rooms of station houses where they slept on vermin-infested bunks. When on duty, patrolmen were often ordered by superiors to pick up suspicious looking bundles from different locations in the city and deliver them to police command officers ... Although competitive promotional examinations were periodically administered, police administrators consistently ignored the results and promoted political cronies, ignoring obviously qualified personnel. Other aspects of the patrolmen's situation testified to the plummeting social and economic status of officers. Forced to take extreme action in their own behalf because of the intransigence of city officials, frustrated rank-and-file officers moved to unionize by affiliating with the American Federation of Labor ... thus, precipitating a crisis.

What followed was swift and cataclysmic. The police union asked the city for recognition and bargaining rights. The city refused, instead bringing 19 leaders of the union movement to trial and finding them guilty of failing to disband the union. Buoyed by a seemingly sympathetic statement from Governor Coolidge and his refusal to become involved in the crisis the policemen struck, and the city was left almost defenseless. Looting, arson, and thefts began to spread. Mayor Andrew Peters called out the state guard housed in Boston, some 4,800 World War I veterans. Saber-swinging cavalry broke up a Scollay Square crowd; troops using machine guns fired on a South Boston mob. Seven persons were killed, hundreds injured. Order was restored, the strike broken, and the strikers fired.

It was only then that Coolidge moved into the situation, seeking to capture some credit by calling for the restoration of public order. When AFL President Samuel Gompers appealed to him for leniency for the strikers, Coolidge declared that "there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime."

The statement made Coolidge a national hero and caused the AFL to revoke all its police union charters. Other police groups which had been considering unions quickly dropped their plans. Even the bland Fraternal Order of Police, just then beginning to appear on the scene, was regarded as suspicious.

Trade union officials today contend that the Boston strike not only froze police unionization but also chilled the organization of public employees generally for some years. An exception was

51

the International Association of Fire Fighters, now affiliated with the AFL-CIO, which in spite of a record of some 30 work stoppages in 1918 and 1919, continued organizing during this period. The union now represents almost all of the nation's urban fireman.

The Boston strike convinced a generation of police that unions were not for them. This attitude was reinforced during the Depression. With secure jobs and good benefits, police had no need for a union. During the same era, police were often called on to break up picket lines and put down violence brought on by union activities. There was no love lost between cops and trade unionists, who regarded police as strike-breakers.

"Had it not been for the Boston police strike," says one official of a union affiliated with the AFL-CIO who has kept a close eye on police unionization, "police unions and management would be far more advanced and mature in their relationship." What the delay has meant, as he sees it, is that "both police unions and management are trying to acquire a great amount of experience (in their collective bargaining relationships) in a very short time."

Another factor, this official adds, is that states and local jurisdictions have only recently enacted laws or ordinances permitting collective bargaining between municipalities and their police organizations. "The fact that these organizations have been shut off from the traditional mechanism of collective bargaining has helped breed a lot of discontent," he says.

Even when the organization and recognition of public employees began to accelerate in the 1960's — most rapidly in the wake of President John F. Kennedy's executive order permitting bargaining in the federal sector — there was considerable reluctance to extend the same status to police officers. Police were shunned by trade unions active among public employees because in many cases police unionization was forbidden.

This is not to say that the organizing of law enforcement officers was entirely ignored after the Boston strike. As early as 1937 the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (then affiliated with the AFL) organized a local of police officers in Portsmouth, Virginia, and continued to add police units until they numbered 49 by the end of World War II. The Fraternal Order of Police continued to spread and grow during the 1940's and the 1950's, and what is now the International Conference of Police Associations made its appearance in 1953. (These and other police organizations are discussed in detail later in this paper.)

More importantly, police officers in many cities during this period were either forming their own local associations or moving

to vest more authority in existing organizations as their spokesmen on an increasing range of matters.

Thus by the 1960's, police were highly organized. There are now police employee organizations in one form or another in some 90 percent of all cities over 50,000. Indeed, next to the fire fighters the police are the most thoroughly organized of all public employees, and the police organizations have become the channel for the recent explosion of dissatisfaction and discontent.

As well as being highly organized, police have been a highly active group politically. Although they have lagged behind other public employees in winning the right to organize and bargain, law inforcement groups through highly effective lobbying have been convincing state and local governments to grant them these rights at an accelerating pace. Some 36 states have laws that cover labor-management relations affecting public employees, and 27 states now permit collective bargaining by police; 31 states forbid strikes by police.

With the political pressure of police organizations at the state and local level increasing, however, the numbers, places, and types of collective bargaining laws on the books are not important, for the simple reason that the situation is volatile. Police unions do not shun *illegal* activities if they feel the provocation is great enough. William J. Usery, director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, has warned that present no-strike laws are no guarantee against strikes. Speaking at the National Symposium on Police Labor Relations sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Police Foundation, and the Labor-Management Relations Service last June, Usery had this to say:

> . . . I do think it important to note that jail terms and fines have historically failed as strike deterrents. For example, teachers have been jailed and teachers' unions fined in recent years, yet we are seeing more teachers' strikes than in any period in history. There is no reason to believe that sanctions will be any more effective against police strikes than against strikes by teachers or any other group of workers.

What caused the *police revolution* as some historians have termed it, was increasing police disatisfaction combined with two new ingredients — a desire to do something about the dissatisfaction, and a mechanism for making things happen.

Numerous factors have produced this dissatisfaction. Important among these, of course, is the level of police pay. Charles M. Unkovic, chairman of the Department of Sociology of Florida

Technological University, points out in the foreword to *The Police Rebellion* by Professor Bopp that "policemen in this country ... are confronted with the nasty reality that while protecting the public their pay is 33 percent less than is needed to sustain a family of four in moderate circumstances in a large city."

Furthermore, the police have been subject to increased "law and order" demands while the courts and activist civilian groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union — so police believe — have made enforcement of the laws more difficult.

But perhaps the most important factor in the boiling-over of police dissatisfaction has been the increase in public hostility. The rise of civil disobedience in the mass demonstrations of black, student, civil rights, anti-war, and other militants has brought to police harassment, assault, mass vilification, and sometimes mayhem and death.

Bopp argues that four incidents in the 1960's triggered the aggressiveness of police organizations: the Berkeley free-speech riots, the fight over the Civilian Review Board in New York City, the violence at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and the Cleveland massacre. In the latter, three Cleveland policemen were slain in ambush by black nationalists, after which then-Mayor Carl Stokes subsequently ordered the withdrawal of white police from the riot scene.

"Berkeley crystallized police opinion; New York showed them that they had political muscle; Chicago drove them together, and Cleveland created a new militancy," Bopp writes.

Whether one agrees completely with this tidy assessment, the evidence is that increasingly during the 1960's the police began to feel isolated, frustrated, threatened, and not understood or supported (except by George Wallace and others on the political right). Such a feeling of apartness generates its own fear and anxieties.

What also cannot be underestimated is the feeling among many police officers in urban areas that they have been deserted by the city administration they had in the past looked to and drawn protection from. Among the police the feeling began to grow that a police officer was under intense, critical, and often disapproving scrutiny no matter what move he made. And the criticism often came from precisely those persons from whom the officer expected defense. The overwhelming cry from police departments in the 1960's was that "they won't let us do our job." This attitude remains.

Spread out before police in city after city during the 1960's were many examples of other public employees groups that — despite no-strike provisions and resistance from city authorities

to the point of riot — were organizing, gaining official recognition, striking and winning pay and benefit increases in cases where municipal officials first insisted the money was not available but then managed to *find* it.

The pressure on police employee organizations to do something also was fueled by an influx of younger officers into the ranks. These younger officers were better educated. They had no memories of the Boston police strike of the Great Depression, and they were not prepared to accept a lifetime working in the rigid paramilitary climate that characterized almost all large urban police departments. They thought they deserved something better for their more and more thankless jobs.

Defeat of the Civilian Review Board in 1966 by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association in New York City provided the lesson that an organization of policemen, by policemen, and for policemen could veto actions unacceptable to it.

The lesson was well learned. In many different ways police employee organizations have managed to veto city administration-proposed measures with which they disagree. In their book, *Police Unionism,* Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille provide an example involving the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association and Mayor Kevin White's order that the police wear name-tags.

At a 1969 disturbance at Harvard University, the Boston Police removed their badges, claiming that the stick pins could be used to stab them. Mayor White proposed sewing on name tags and the commissioner agreed. The union objected, claiming that this would lead to harassment of their families. The commissioner ordered the tags sewed on and arranged for union tailors to come to headquarters and sew them on. The police threw up a picket line and the union tailors refused to cross. The police-union attorney filed a grievance and the department agreed to hold off until the grievance was resolved. The union lost the grievance and took it to arbitration. Simultaneously, the union attorney introduced a local option permissive bill in the legislature which would, if adopted by a city, ban the wearing of name tags if identifying numbers were worn. The union got the bill through, but the governor sent the bill back for redrafting. Finally, the governor signed it and the union got the bill passed in the city council. The arbitrator finally came down with his award supporting the city, but by this time the issue was moot and the men do not wear name tags.

Police employee organizations are still in the growth and development stage. They have become an integral part of public

sector labor relations. But how they will respond to the responsibilities they are acquiring along with their gains is still to be determined.

THE ORGANIZATIONS

Of the 450,000 policemen in 40,000 separate jurisdictions throughout the country some three-fourths are members of and are represented by some employee organization, whether through affiliation with a traditional trade union, national or regional "police only" groupings, or solely through their own local organization. How many are in each organization is not entirely relevant — today's local police union affiliated with the AFL-CIO American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees may be tomorrow's affiliate of the independent International Brotherhood of Police Officers or simply the local police officer's association.

Not so long ago there was a tendency in police management to consider "police unions" to be only those unions affiliated with national trade unions. But by now the lesson should have been learned that it is not how the police organization is affiliated but how it acts that is the true determinant of whether it is a union. This point will be discussed in more detail shortly.

The Fraternal Order of Police

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is the oldest of the national police organizations. Lodge #1 was organized in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1915. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has aptly termed its national structure as "the epitome of decentralization." Its long-time president, John J. Harrington, is a retired Philadelphia police sergeant who works out of his home in the Philadelphia area. The FOP's recording secretary, Earl Bannister, can be reached by calling the Flint, Michigan, Police Department, where Bannister works in the detective bureau. What there is of the national headquarters follows the recording secretary.

The FOP claims the affiliation of 1,020 lodges around the country, with a membership of more than 150,000. Its constitution says the lodges "shall not strike or by concerted action cause a cessation of the performance of police duties or induce other members or other lodges to do likewise. The penalty . . . shall be immediate expulsion." Nor shall the lodges have any affiliation "directly or indirectly with any labor union, congress, federation or committee of like nature." In a considerable shift, however, the FOP not long ago endorsed collective bargaining by its lodges.

56

Leaders of the FOP encourage federal, state, and local lobbying by its lodges. The organization is active and aggressive in this regard in some states, such as Pennsylvania, but the local lodges are completely free to chart their own course. Some of them are acting as if they were already unions. In a study entitled *Conflict and Collusion: Police Collective Bargaining* for the Operations Research Center of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Margaret Levi cites FOP Lodge #8 in Atlanta as such a case:

> Police employees faced not only the antagonism of elected officials to their 1968 organizing efforts but also the adamant opposition of [former Police Chief] Herbert Jenkins. The chief rejected any form of labor organization on the force. Nonetheless, the police rank-and-file persisted in their right to belong to and form a lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police ... They engaged in lobbying, a work slowdown, and court action before achieving their aim. In the process they gained 'gripe rights' and a pay increase ... The FOP failed to win on union prerequisites or the dues checkoff, a written grievance procedure and collective bargaining, and remains a pressure group ... But the transformation to a union has begun.

As a low-key organization the FOP is vulnerable to inroads from more aggressive groups seeking police membership. Lt. Bannister concedes that the FOP has lost some lodges. His own department in Flint voted recently to drop its FOP tie and be represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in which case Bannister would join the Teamsters but still retain his position as FOP recording secretary. (The Teamsters' movement into the police ranks will be treated more fully below). Bannister contends that the defections "go both ways."

However, the FOP is finding that its membership now demands far more than fraternalism. Bannister reports that 90 percent of the requests for help the national office received from its lodges involve labor-management affairs. As a result, the FOP, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Labor, is planning a series of regional conferences for its membership on collective bargaining. One was held January 11-12 in Atlantic City; others will follow at so far unspecified dates.

"The FOP is at the crossroads," Bannister argues. "If it is going to be a labor organization, and that's the definite trend, then it's got to be a labor organization and get into it with both feet." The fraternal order for a long time "has been a sleepy organization, and we have been naive" in the area of collective bargaining, he adds. "We think this [a movement toward

becoming a labor organization] is the direction our people want."

Whether the FOP will become an out-and-out labor organization, and when, is not yet clear. More may become apparent at the organization's 1975 convention. But it does seem clear that the FOP is on the way to becoming more activist.

The American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), affiliated with the AFL-CIO, is one of the nation's most militant and rapidly growing unions. Its membership totals more than 600,000. Among these are some 10,000 (the union says it may go as high as 15,000) police officers, the bulk of these in Maryland, Connecticut, and the Great Lakes area, notably Michigan. In Maryland and Connecticut these police unions are grouped under administrative units called Police Councils; elsewhere, they look to councils which also include a wide range of other public employees.

The national union defends the ultimate rights of its locals to strike but really does not like them to except in extreme cases. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf says he would rather see an orderly set of procedures up to and including arbitration, for resolving impasses with management. Up until 1970 the union prohibited its police locals from striking and revoked the charter of an Illinois local which did strike. However, when the Baltimore police local struck in 1974 the national headquarters provided strong support to the strikers — both during the strike and after the Baltimore police commissioner fired the strikers and decertified the local. As of this writing the local still is decertified but seeking recognition again. Most of the fired strikers have been reinstated, except for some 90 probationary officers. Many of these, however, have found jobs in suburban police agencies.

Officials of some police units have been applying pressure to set up a law enforcement division in the AFSCME national headquarters, but no movement towards one is yet discernible. The organization of police officers is not among the union's high priorities, nor is it likely to become so. If the union does seek a police unit these days, it is because it sees that as an opening wedge to the organization of other public employees in a certain jurisdiction. However, if a police unit really wants to be organized, AFSCME won't turn it down, union officials say.

There is a certain amount of discomfort within AFSCME about its police locals, and vice versa. There is the risk of a sharp

conflict of interest. AFSCME in some strike situations has found itself in tense confrontation with the police. What if the local police also were members of the union? AFSCME officials would rather not be faced with that sort of situation.

Meanwhile, police in the union don't like being lumped in with other public employees; they consider their problems to be special and apart. As one AFSCME police union official put it, "we do not like to be called 'oinks' and 'pigs' by other officials of the union."

The National Union of Police Officers

The National Union of Police Officers (NUPO), or what's left of it, started out to become THE national police union. It was formed in 1969 by John Cassese, who had recently been president of New York City's Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. Cassesse sought a charter from the AFL-CIO but was turned down for two reasons: the union didn't have enough of a national showing, and AFSCME President Wurf objected, contending that Cassese had some of its members. Also, Wurf thought that if police could be organized separately and chartered by the AFL-CIO, other groups within his union — social workers, for example — could also contend that their "special problems" justified a separate union.

After being denied an AFL-CIO charter, NUPO affiliated with the AFL-CIO Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which also organizes public employees.

NUPO has never "taken off," SEIU officials concede. Indeed, from nearly 10,000, its membership is now down to some 3,000. Not only that, but NUPO is "under reorganization" within the SEIU and is being "brought more closely into the national structure." Translated, that means that John Cassese is no longer in control.

The SEIU says it is doing no more than providing a "temporary home" for the police officers until they can get an AFL-CIO charter. The union did engage in some of NUPO's organizing efforts but wants no further part of that. Not only is SEIU not planning any more police organizing efforts, it is saying "no" to police groups seeking representation. "We just can't service them," one official says.

SEIU officials say it is clear that police officers need a national organization but contend that it ought to be one of their own creation. It is apparent from the "officials" guarded remarks that they think police officers as a group pose too many problems.

59

The International Brotherhood of Police Officers

The International Brotherhood of Police Officials (IBPO) is relatively new. It was formed in Cranston, Rhode Island, in 1964 and for the next few years consisted of some 16 Rhode Island locals. In 1969 it affiliated with the National Association of Government Employees, an independent organization. At the time of its affiliation it had about 1,000 members.

In recent years, however, IBPO has been highly active. It now claims 280 locals throughout the country with a membership of more than 30,000. Much of its membership still is in New England, but the union is branching out. It recently won the right to represent Washington, D.C., patrol officers, sergeants, and detectives, beating out NUPO. The Beaumont, Texas, Police Department also voted recently to affiliate with IBPO, and the union defeated a local organization in Santa Barbara, California, in a representation election.

IBPO officials also say they have taken police members away from both AFSCME and NUPO in some other recent representation-right elections. Union officials say that "police across the country are looking for a professional organization that has a police identity — and we give it to them."

IBPO is aggressive. It drums the slogan that "IBPO means action." It does not sanction strikes, but in its disagreements with municipal administrators it doesn't hesitate to turn out off-duty police officers on the picket line and encourages IBPO members from neighboring jurisdictions to join in. It has found this a successful pressure tactic in some cases.

The union's aim is to win full collective bargaining status for its locals; it has a staff of advisers ready to service its constituents in collective bargaining and other labor relations matters.

The International Conference of Police Associations

The International Conference of Police Associations (ICPA) is the largest of the national "police only" organizations and clearly has its eye on becoming an out-and-out labor union, as well as the one representing the majority of the police in the United States. The current president is Edward J. Keirnan, who was vice president of the New York PBA when Cassese was president and succeeded him in that post.

The relatively new ICPA dates from 1953. It grew out of a gathering in Washington the year before of local associations from major cities to lobby Congress against the extension of Social Security coverage to policemen and firemen. The thought behind the founding meeting in Detroit was that a national structure was needed to establish and promote better communication among local associations.

60

For the first few years ICPA was lobbying organization of, in the words of Kiernan, "very limited success." But in 1971, at ICPA's Las Vegas convention, it was decided to set up a dues structure for a more active national organization with a full-time president, and Kiernan was elected.

"Before that," Kiernan says, "everyone was talking about how we should be professionals, and professionals shouldn't be involved in labor relations. The concept also had been built up that, because we were policemen, the municipalities and the states would take care of us with the right salaries and benefits. We subsequently found out that that wasn't so."

School teachers, sanitation workers, and other public employees were surpassing the police in salaries and benefits, Kiernan says, "so it became evident that we needed some union-type association."

ICPA is an association of associations; it does not sign up individual police members. More than 160 associations now are members — including those in almost all of the nation's larger cities — which in turn claim membership of more than 170,000.

The Conference "does not encourage strikes." Its objective is to "collect, study, standardize, summarize and to disseminate factual data and to strive for the establishment and maintenance of equitable wages, hours, retirement and working conditions for ... all police officers." Another objective is "to advise and assist law enforcement officers in the formation of effective police associations."

Kiernan says the Conference is "now involved in labor relations seminars around the country, training our people how to negotiate contracts, educating their lawyers on how to handle negotiations. We are establishing a legal program; we have attorneys who are constantly interchanging briefs and memos on different legal decisions."

"We are," he adds, "closer and closer to what a real international union is."

One of the Conference's "big functions now is organizing," Kiernan explains. "We don't organize individual policemen into the Conference. For example, we set up the Memphis Police· Association. We set them up with a set of by-laws and constitution. We set up their election of officers. Then we go in and assist them when they have contract negotiations."

Kiernan says that "I think if I went to the AFL-CIO right now I could get a police charter, because we've got the membership." But he then tempers this by adding that he believes a national police union is "some time" down the road, and that the leaders of AFL-CIO unions "still remember cops as strikebreakers not too far back. They've never been given anything to prove to them

61

that it couldn't happen again. So they're not anxious to jump in there." Some AFL-CIO officials are convinced that many of the larger local associations of ICPA would strongly oppose affiliation with the Federation now and for the forseeable future.

The Teamsters

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been free-booting in the police field for about a decade. A list of its holdings shows more than a hundred individual units, most of them quite small and not confined to sworn officers. Police units organized by the Teamsters are lumped in with other categories of members in most cases. For example, all of the police personnel represented by the Teamsters in Michigan are signed into Local 214 headquartered in Detroit, which also represents the union's state employee members.

Teamster officials say there is no national union policy on organizing police. "If they want to join, let 'em join," is the way one headquarters official puts it. The result is that whether the Teamsters are active in any particular area of the country seems to be up to the union's General Organizer in that area. For example, following a successful contest to represent the Fairfax County, Virginia, police the Teamsters now are seeking to organize the Richmond, Virginia, department.

The Teamsters have often been described as "spoilers." In the Fairfax campaign, for example, AFSCME organizers contend it was they who laid the groundwork, only to have the Teamsters come in at the last minute and take the unit away with "exaggerated promises."

The police themselves in some cases seem to regard the Teamsters, from their reputation elsewhere, as the kind of "hardnosed" union they need to represent them.

Appearance of the Teamsters on the scene seems to frighten many police administrators. This perhaps dates back to former Teamsters' President James Hoffa's noises about a "national police union" in the 1950's after the Teamsters were expelled from the AFL-CIO on charges of corruption. The resulting furor made Hoffa back off the idea, if indeed he ever was serious about it.

It's unlikely that the Teamsters will ever be much beyond a local force among police unions. Officials of other unions who are acquainted with the economics of servicing small units believe that sooner or later the Teamsters will either become disenchanted with their police members and retreat from the field, or they will economize on service outlays, in which case the police members will become disenchanted with the Teamsters.

62

The Other Unions

Some other traditional trade unions also have some police members. The Laborers Union in 1973 conducted a strike of members of the Idaho Falls, Idaho, and Klamath Falls, Oregon, police departments to win new contracts. The Mason County, Washington, sheriff's deputies are represented by the International Wood Workers Union. Patrol officers in West Branch, Michigan, recently selected the United Steelworkers of America as their bargaining representative.

But none of these unions is serious about widespread police organizing. What usually happens in these cases is that the police have been represented by another union and have gotten mad at it, or they want to be organized and turn to the dominant union in the area to accomplish it.

THE *REAL* POLICE UNIONS

Any survey of the police field turns up overwhelming evidence that the dominant form of unionism is, and will continue to be, the local police employees' association. Even if a police unit is affiliated with a traditional trade union or national "police only" organizations such as the FOP or ICPA, what happens locally will influences how the unit acts. This was well put by Hervey Juris in a speech at a 1970 conference of major-city police administrators:

> I believe that the only significant unit of analysis is the local police employee organization interacting with the municipal employer. I do not believe at this time that affiliation with ICPA, FOP, or IBP affects the relationship ... Regardless of what the local organization may call itself, it is important to remember that it functions as a union ... If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, and looks like a duck — that's good enough for me.

Juris and Feuille also point out in *Police Unionism* that "the most salient characteristic of national organizations is that they have little control over the activities and affairs of their affiliated [police] locals."

The experience in many of the nation's major cities — New York, Detroit, Atlanta, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, to name a few — is that the spreading wave of police militancy stemming from the rank and file can quickly turn a fraternal or benevolent organization into an aggressive and accomplished union.

Where existing organizations don't lend themselves to this, police have not hesitated to form new organizations. Boston

63

patrolmen in 1965 formed the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association despite the existence of our other organizations, and by 1967 defeated them in an election for representational rights. Since then the BPPA has been one of the country's most aggressive police unions.

The widespread experience now before police officers is that they have within themselves the resources to form an organization, that this organization can gain recognition despite the opposition of the city government or the police chief, and that it can exercise real power and achieve dramatic improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions — all without the help of *outsiders.*

IS A NATIONAL POLICE UNION COMING?

Because the dominant aspect of police unionism is its local character, and because police have found this an eminently satisfactory vehicle for solution of their problems, a national police union akin to, say, the United Auto Workers or the Steelworkers is not in sight. This is conceded by trade union officials who would very much like to see police in a national union. These officials, citing their experiences with police, characterize them as elitist and clannish; the concept of trade-union solidarity is alien to them. Indeed, some traditional AFL-CIO unions have found that it is not only being affiliated with other types of members which causes resentment among police but also that police dues dollars aren't spent exclusively on them and their problems. The main reason police groups in Seattle, Omaha, and Hartford discarded AFSCME was they felt there was a lack of return on their investment.

Further, as mentioned above, many police organizations have found, as Juris and Feuille put it, that "the essential functions will be performed solely by local leaders interacting with local officials in a local political and collective bargaining arena in which the union exercised a great deal of power."

That pattern is so firmly set and, on the whole, proving so successful that it is not likely that police will easily give it up. It is questionable whether a true national police union would emerge quickly even if a federal law was enacted permitting collective bargaining rights for all public employees, including police.

WHAT POLICE UNIONS WANT

Quite simply, the basis for the appearance of any union on the scene — and police are no exception — is to fulfill a need. The

64

movement toward police unionism is unique in that in most cases it has come from within. It has resulted from rank-and-file grievances against the department, stemming either from wages or working conditions and most often both.

The aim of the union, also quite simply, is to force police management to recognize those grievances and resolve them. Enough experience in labor-management affairs has been provided in the private sector to show that the most satisfactory method to arrive at the mutual settlement of these grievances is through the process of collective bargaining. So recognition and bargaining are the chief initial demands of a police union.

Recognition of the union is a process and has a meaning which has been brought over from the private sector. It means that management agrees that the union has the support of the majority of the employees and that it agrees to meet and deal with the union's designated representatives.

This can be a crucial step. The whole tone of a relationship between union and management can be established in that process. If police management or a city administration decide that they can ignore the fact that the rank-and-file of the police department has voted overwhelmingly for representation by a union, it's a safe bet they are asking for trouble. Studies have shown that a most frequent cause of strikes, the *blue flu,* picketing, and the like is the refusal to recognize.

Quite often, the request for recognition will also be coupled with a specific demand on which the union wants management to ·bargain immediately. Again, refusal by management to bargain is a frequent cause of *job actions.*

The union will want a contract specifically committing both union and management to the items agreed upon. If management takes the position that the signing of a contract with a union is not permitted either by law or ordinance, it may have to come up with a "memorandum of understanding" or other substitute that will permit the signing of a binding agreement.

Management should constantly keep in mind that the union is a political institution formed to achieve specific results. If the presently elected leaders do not achieve those results they will be replaced by others, who may in the process be authorized to adopt more extreme tactics.

Police unionism is in its infancy in many cases, and its leaders are inexperienced. Thus, police union leaders will often adopt aggressive tactics and rhetoric that are out of all proportion to the real case they are presenting and to the real contract provisions for which they are willing to settle. Patience, forebearance, avoidance of overreaction, and a willingness to

arrive at an agreement that a police union leader can take back to the membership with the confidence that something real has been accomplished will help establish a firm relationship. The union leader who has gotten himself out on a limb but whom management has helped back with a face-saving solution owes something to that management.

Experience tends to cool the climate. Where collective bargaining has been established there are repeated cases of police unions and management bargaining without incident well beyond the contract expiration date in search of an agreement. Protracted negotiations, however, can lead to problems, particularly if one side or the other is stalling or refusing to bargain in good faith.

Once the union has gained recognition, it is almost certain that the prime priority for bargaining will be wages and benefit items, the traditional "bread and butter" issues. But early in the negotiations, too, will come union security demands. This is the union's way of solidifying itself as an institution. It seeks such things as the dues checkoff, time off for union officials to conduct union business, the union shop or the agency shop, where permitted, and other mechanisms so that the union spends as little time as possible maintaining itself.

Also high on the list of priorities of the union is likely to be the establishment of a grievance procedure. This also is a mechanism taken from the private sector. It is often a highly formalized procedure, sometimes embodying as many as five steps, up to and including final and binding arbitration. It has been said many times, and proven true, that grievance procedure is the heart of the contract. It is the method of resolving those day-to-day differences within the contract without both the union leaders and management constantly being embroiled in the settlement of violations of the contract, violations of rules and regulations, or violations of a police officer's rights.

Juris and Feuille found that most police grievance systems — even where there is a union — are still of "the chief's door is open" type. The result of this system is that the chief winds up with most of the grievances on his desk.

A lesson taught by grievances in the private sector is that the most successful grievance-handling system disposes of them quickly and at the lowest possible level. A number of cities — Boston, Buffalo, Cranston (Rhode Island), Dayton, Detroit, Hartford, New Haven, Omaha, Providence, and Rochester — have multi-step grievance procedures with final and binding arbitration as the final step.

Beyond that, a survey of current police unions' contract negotiations demonstrates that the unions will be seeking pretty

66

much the same list of items as their counterparts in the private sector: seniority in promotions, job assignments, and layoffs; improved sick leave; longer vacations; reduction in hours; and rearrangement of shifts. Additional items include uniform and cleaning allowances, gun allowances, and safety items.

Potentially, unions view anything that touches wages, hours, or working conditions as a legitimate area of interest for the employee organization and thus bargainable.

More experienced unions have found that they really don't want to invade the management rights area so deeply that they, in effect, start making many of the decisions. Lessons also drawn from the private sector demonstrate that the decision-making power also entails the responsibility for mistakes. The unions would rather let management make the mistakes and use the grievance procedure against them.

The decision to engage in collective bargaining does not automatically mean that mutually beneficial agreements will be peacefully reached. It is not so perfect a mechanism that impasses will not result. But rather than those impasses resulting in strikes or other job actions, the trend more and more is to turn to neutral "third-party" mechanisms such as mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration, or some combination of those elements.

In several states some or all of these procedures have been written into law. The New York state legislature, for example, amended the Taylor Law covering public employees to require arbitration of police and firefighter contract impasses.

Compulsory arbitration of disputes, however, is not universally admired. There are mixed views among both labor and management, along with a considerable amount of emotion. Public administrators in Michigan, for example, fought the extension of that state's Police and Fire Fighters Compulsory Arbitration Act, which had been initially supported by police and fire fighter groups. They contended that it had proved no bar to police officer and fire fighter strikes, as intended.

Public administrators hold their anti-compulsory arbitration view for several reasons. Compulsory arbitration can and often does make a useless formality out of collective bargaining, as one side or the other — usually, in their view, the unions — merely goes through the motions because it thinks it can get a better deal from the arbitrator. Public administrators also contend that arbitrators too often do not understand the problems of municipalities. Furthermore, they are seen as tending to be pro-labor. Finally, the arbitration process can be expensive.

Former Detroit Commissioner Nichols noted in an article in a 1972 issue of *The Police Chief* that following passage of the

arbitration law in Michigan in 1969 "the Detroit Police Officers Association has invoked it every year to their ultimate benefit."

MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE

Police unionism now is obviously entrenched.

Authorities who have surveyed the field agree that it is a safe bet that any sizeable municipality that does not have a well-functioning union, or at least an employee organization that is well on its way to becoming one, will soon have one.

These authorities also agree that the most dangerous response by management is to try to interfere with this process or get rid of a union. It tends to make the union that much stronger and that much more determined to "get even."

In his 1970 speech to an audience of police managers Juris bluntly declared that "police unionism is a management problem . . . The men organized because they had grievances against the department . . . The best way to cope with the union is to cope with those grievances."

FMCS Director Usery, in the labor-management symposium speech mentioned earlier, also voiced some suggestions for the proper response by management:

Police unions can be tough negotiators, and procedures to negotiate with police unions must be thought out and established in advance if they are to work.

. . . Police labor relations are becoming more like industrial labor relations. It follows then that effective techniques that are used to keep industrial labor peace can be used to keep police labor peace, insure smooth agency operations and quarantee continuous public protection. . .

First — and here's where history is looking over our shoulder — police unions must be recognized and accorded their legitimate rights. Opposing police unions, ignoring police unions, or worse yet, insulting police unions in the hope that somehow they'll just go away is asking for trouble. Such tactics put the police union and the police agency straight-away on an adversary relationship. The hatred, suspicion, and mistrust that darkened earlier private labor and management relations can take hold and make it difficult for either side to compromise. . .

If the union is inexperienced at the bargaining table, quite often management is even more inexperienced. Not only is the union in cases better prepared but management too often seems to confine its role to reacting. Authorities on the subject stress that bargaining

68

is a two-way street. Management, if it is being asked to give up something, should be prepared to ask for something in return. Juris and Feuille concluded that: "There must be strong management across the bargaining table from the union demanding quid pro quo, seeking innovative solutions to mutual problems and opposing demands which would impose intolerable burdens. We found no evidence of this kind of two-party bargaining on any broad scale. Rather, we found only selected cases where this degree of sophistication had been reached."

Bargaining at its present stage of development, indeed, seems to intimidate police management and city administrators. The suddenness with which unions have come to power, and the extent of that power, appears in many cases to induce a "what can we do?" attitude.

That attitude is accentuated by what a number of authorities have termed "the legislative end run." It is a considerable problem. Stephen May, former mayor of Rochester, New York, talked about it in his presentation to the labor-management symposium:

> One of the problem areas in establishing clear and definitive labor-management procedures in the police field is the multilateral nature of public sector bargaining . . . The development of workable bargaining relationships has unquestionably been inhibited by the vulnerability of municipal management to the array of tactics police can utilize. These include political pressures, appeals for citizen support, referenda and lobbying, as well as collective bargaining to achieve their objectives.
>
> It has become established practice for police unions to try to use their political skills and influence to obtain from legislative bodies additional benefits which their representatives are unable to gain at the bargaining table . . . The integrity of the labor-relations process depends on all issues being aired simultaneously and exclusively in one area. Then the various trade-offs can be worked out . . . Every effort must be made to discourage tactics which seek elsewhere benefits which should be negotiated openly as part of the regular collective bargaining process.

There is no question that, with the advent of unionism, fundamental and far-reaching changes have taken place in the nation's police departments. A most important development is that management is learning that unions can be lived with. Former Commissioner Nichols, in another presentation to the symposium, conceded that "in a general sense, many of the strides by unionism have possibly been good for management quite by accident. For example, I think we all have been forced

to become better managers, and to develop a better organizational climate for leadership . . . If there is a central problem for management, it lies not in the mere existence of a union force, but in the need for management, at all levels, to know and understand the rules of the game — the contract."

The "let's deal with present reality" theme was echoed by former mayor May:

> Make no mistake about it, police unions are here to stay and bilateral involvement in decision-making, at least with regard to wages, hours, and working conditions, is a present and future reality. It should now be clear to police unionists and municipal administrators that there is an urgent need for education and development of policies which are responsible to the new unionized environment in which each side must function.
>
> Optimal labor-management relationships are most likely to develop where both parties are strong, understand their own interests, have information and data to support those interests and have the capability to present a strong advocacy position. . .

For the future, and here again there are many authorities in agreement, police management and union leaders should look for ways to cooperate outside the collective bargaining relationship, seeking to make that relationship less troublesome and less *accident-prone.*

A mechanism to accomplish this, again borrowed from the private sector, is the informal labor-management communication committee (it can be called many things, but that is perhaps the best description of its function). Such committees provide a means for labor and management leaders to get together informally to discuss mutual problems and explore possible solutions. There are few ground rules, the chief ones being that the meetings are not collective bargaining sessions, and no one is *bound* by what he may say in the meetings. For both management and the union it is a way to *float* new ideas, develop new concepts, and smooth the way for facilitating departmental change. The recent contract between New York state troopers (represented by AFSCME) and the state establishes such a committee to promote communication between the parties, resolve problems, explore safety or technical developments, and "discuss other matters of mutual interest."

PRODUCTIVITY AND POLICE SERVICES

The application of productivity concepts to police services is

relatively unexplored, but appears to hold great promise. More than that, the soaring crime rate and the shrinking tax dollar are increasing the pressures to make it work.

Much is being written about productivity in police services; the Police Foundation, The Urban Institute, the National Commission on Productivity, the International City Management Association, the International Chiefs of Police, and the Labor-Management Relations Service have all devoted considerable time and attention to the subject.

But there is much confusion and uncertainty. If one thing is agreed on, it is that much more must be learned. What is productivity? How do you measure it? Are the valid measures being applied?

The difficulties in measuring productivity are noted in a voluminous study entitled *The Challenge of Productivity Diversity* prepared by The Urban Institute and the International City Management Association for the National Commission on Productivity. It states that "measuring police productivity is a complex task involving many conceptual difficulties . . . A major (perhaps unsolvable) problem is to measure the effect of police activity on the deterrence of crime."

The study adds that it would be "overly pessimistic" to say that all police productivity is not measurable because of the "weakness in the basic data on crime statistics and on police outputs." But it concedes that the formulation of valid measurements still has a long way to go. The Police Foundation is just beginning to work out what it believes are some reliable job performance standards. What is productivity improvement and what is innovation (they are not necessarily the same) is in many cases still not clear.

The results of what is being tried are yet to flow back in such a form that a broad reliable body of case histories can be extracted. "This whole area is moving very slowly," confides an official at the National Commission on Productivity. "It's like a mass of silly putty when you reach for it, constantly changing its shape."

Concern about productivity is coming at a time when new things are being learned about policing which are causing considerable surprise and sometimes calling into question long-held beliefs, traditions, and concepts. The Kansas City Patrol Experiment, for example, has raised new questions about the patrol concept. As the productivity experience develops it is entirely possible that more such questions will arise.

Enough experience has been obtained through the introduction of productivity improvements to show that in many cases the resistance to such programs comes from management as well as unions, particularly at mid-management levels.

71

The NCOP, in a pamphlet entitled *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services,* the report of the Advisory Group on Productivity on Law Enforcement, said the group "agreed that the resistance to new ideas — even those that have been tried and tested — is a principal cause of low productivity in police departments." And it devotes a section of the pamphlet to "Barriers to Productivity Improvement" in which it is plain that its comments are primarily directed to police management.

The introduction of productivity improvement is a management function and responsibility. It follows that if management does not have a clear concept of what it wants to do and a thorough understanding of how it wants to do it the rank-and-file employee is not likely either to greet the program with enthusiasm or carry it out successfully.

PRODUCTIVITY AND POLICE UNIONISM

If a productivity program is to work it must have the support and the understanding of the rank and file.

For police management this means consulting and working with the union. Advance consultation is essential to discover where the problems are and how they can be resolved.

There are no formal guidelines for this process. Robert Fogelson, associate professor of Urban Studies and History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is completing a study on the response of police employee organizations to proposed innovations, says the response of these organizations "is not uniformly anything." What is readily accepted by one police union may be adamantly opposed by another.

But, he points out, "if you want to bring about a change in the direction of productivity, you have to understand that the unions are going to have a vital say in whether you can do it or not, and if you operate on the assumption that this is not the case, you're looking for trouble." He adds that "the line between managerial prerogatives and work rules in police departments is blurred almost beyond distinction. Unions have a big stake in these things, and they're well prepared to indicate what that stake is."

What it's all about for the police manager is succinctly put in another NCOP publication entitled *So, Mr. Mayor, You Want to Improve Productivity.* It declares that:

. . . productivity improvement must affect and involve the employee. Therefore, it is inevitable that the issue of productivity will thread its way into your relationship with labor and eventually into the collective bargaining process.

Because of the weight given to precedents in labor relations, the initial practices with respect to what is bargainable, how the bargaining is conducted, and how disputes will be settled can have long-standing consequences . . .

"Admittedly," the pamphlet adds, "productivity poses difficult labor relations problems." But it points out that "whether or not proposed changes need to be negotiated, always discuss them with employee representatives before you implement them."

Unions can, and have been, obstructionist when it comes to productivity programs. In one large city an ambitious and far-reaching productivity plan was sabotaged by the police union, and the chief quit as a result. The problem was that the union felt it had not been adequately consulted. In New York City the union successfully opposed the initial attempts by former Mayor John Lindsay to introduce a Fourth Platoon designed to put more patrolmen on the street during high crime periods.

Police unions do not, however, automatically oppose productivity. Before it was decertified the Baltimore police union represented by AFSCME offered a lengthy list of productivity items on which it had fully cooperated with the police commissioner, including civilianization, minority recruitment, and a host of others. "We didn't turn him down on a single productivity item," declares a union official.

Many union leaders undertand that they are an essential part of any productivity improvement program. ICPA President Kiernan says that "once police management gets rid of the idea that we are anti-productivity, they are going to be very surprised when they propose some of the issues as to how readily acceptable they are to the guys in the union." Union leaders regard the patrolman as a potentially valuable and creative resource if given the framework and the incentive.

The NCOP agrees. In its pamphlet, *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services,* it remarks that "too often the individual talents of sworn officers are overlooked or suffocated by rigid organizational procedures."

Unions do have some strong negative biases, however. "What we on the union side fear most when the subject of productivity comes up," Kiernan says, "is the lack of concern on the part of management for the safety of our members." For that reason, he adds, "we won't talk about one-man patrol cars."

Kiernan argues that "one of the biggest drawbacks to increased productivity is the lack of responsible collective bargaining in many areas of the country." He concedes that "this may seem . . . to be self-serving on the part of the union, but it has a great deal of value in arriving at productivity measures reached by the give and take of negotiations." Others have

73

pointed out that once productivity measures are in the contract they commit the union to see that they are carried out in good faith.

Management should understand, however, that the quid pro quo process also applies to the introduction of productivity whether or not it is part of the collective bargaining process. The employee should understand that improvements in productivity can lead to improvement in his own situation.

New York City some time ago instituted productivity bargaining, which establishes that the city will not sign a labor contract without clear productivity advances built into it. Other cities are also adopting this technique, or are expected to. New York, however, has gone a step further and has established, in a recent contract, a joint labor-management committee which reviews present work practices and procedures and recommends more efficient ways to get the task done.

The New York City committee can meet on the request of either party "to discuss ways and means of implementing experimental or pilot programs brought before the committee by the Police Commissioner." After the pilot stage the committee reviews the results and then can recommend that the collective bargaining agreement be reopened for the negotiation of "prompt implementation of the program."

Sam Zagoria, director of the Labor-Management Relations Service, pointed out other approaches to productivity questions in a recent presentation to the annual conference of the International City Management Association. "In local government where there are traditional practices or contractual provisions which hinder productivity improvement, these have been negotiated out or at least watered down by trading dollars for managerial flexibility," he says. This has been bluntly referred to as *buying out work rules* where they impede a program for the introduction of productivity programs, but the experience is that it works.

Zagoria also mentioned another plan involving "productivity improvement of a kind which can be measured in actual dollar benefits and a formula has been developed at the bargaining table for a division of such gains."

A final note: Throughout this presentation there have been references to resistance to departmental changes within management. This was not done in an attempt to bias the presentation against management. I hope that this presentation has been as objective as possible, given the realities encountered in researching this project.

But one is struck by the large body of evidence uncovered by researchers that management has proved to be a problem.

74

Management is prepared to encounter obstructionism from unions. It is not quite prepared to handle obstructionism within its own ranks.

PRODUCTIVITY: WHAT'S HAPPENING

As has been mentioned, much in the way of programs which hold promise of increasing productivity is being tried. One of the first steps in improving productivity is to utilize more fully the resources of the police department. A basic resource is the patrol officer.

This section will discuss some programs being tried in departments across the country which attempt to reach down into the department and tap the resources of the individual patrol officer.

The Kansas City Police Department has been referred to as "one huge resource laboratory" because of its multilevel involvement in experimental police projects aimed at improving the quality of police services. The department, under former Chief Clarence Kelley, now director of the FBI, put into effect a participatory management program designed to tap the total resources of the department. It was that program which gave rise to the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.

What is important to this presentation is the method by which this came about; it is an excellent example of how police management can use the human resources of police departments to facilitate productivity improvements.

Chief Kelley's view was that a good many of the reasons for the lack of knowledge about what police do and how much of it is effective was that past police administrators had not tapped the wealth of knowledge held by the patrol officer. The department set up four task forces in its patrol divisions, each force given authority to identify the critical problems in its division and to present the chief with a program to attack these problems. As stated by the publication *Kansas City Patrol Projects, 1973,* compiled by the department, "the introduction of change in law enforcement agencies has often failed because it does not have the support of lower ranks."

Task force membership was composed primarily of patrol personnel. Each member had an equal voice. "To make sure that the chief heard what the patrolman in the street thought his problems were and what he proposed to do about them, task force proposals were forwarded to him without change or veto," *Patrol Projects* stated.

The results have been "most heartening." From the task forces five programs with multiple components have emerged.

The officers involved have displayed an enthusiasm for change and a willingness to work with the administration to carry out new strategies; a number of patrol officers have shown the ability to both design and administer programs.

Extending participatory management to the lowest levels of the department, the department notes, "significantly redistributed decision-making power. The task force process, therefore, became a test of commanding officers" as to how they could adjust, become more involved, and encourage the process.

The entire exercise took time and effort and the participation of the chief. The department comments that "as the democratic environment proved unsettling to some tradition-oriented commanders, Chief Kelley had continually to reaffirm his desire that field officers be truly involved in planning."

A variation of this approach has been tried in Dayton. Called the Dayton Police Department's Citizen/Police Policymaking Project, it uses citizen-police task forces which involve lower-ranking police officers and members of civilian groups which most frequently come into contact with police. Some of the topics covered by the task forces include policy regarding police handling of traffic cases, domestic disputes, and mentally disturbed citizens, high-speed chases, field interrogation, and curfew. The policies go to the police chief and his staff for approval; the chief may ask that the policy be revised, but he cannot ignore it.

Initial reluctance of police officers and the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge, which represents the Dayton police force, has been overcome, and the project is now endorsed without reservation.

The Kalamazoo, Michigan, Police Department also has reached down into its ranks with a program to find out how to make the department more productive. The problem was lack of communication between department administrators and non-supervisory personnel. Four three-day retreats were conducted for 80 line officers, who were encouraged to (and did) let their hair down about the department. Morale was a chief subject covered. The officers' skepticism about the program was abated somewhat when, after the program, participants met with the chief to discuss the ideas developed. These discussions resulted in immediate implementation of some policy changes.

An unexpected problem in Kalamazoo was the negative attitude of several command officers toward the new project. They felt the chief had bypassed the chain of command and that the complaints of the line officers would be directed at them. The program was then broadened to include similar sessions with command officers.

Neighborhood team-policing programs, which have been tried

in a wide range of cities, are another example of innovations which reach down into the department to tap the creativity and talents of the individual officer. A Police Foundation report on seven case studies of team policing summed up by saying that the results were mixed. The report assigned part of the blame for those which failed thusly: "Mid-management of the departments, seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans."

Neighborhood team-policing programs involve the assembling of teams of patrol officers with a command structure into quasi-autonomous units. As far as possible the teams are given total responsibility for handling police problems in their assigned neighborhoods. A central element is the maximization of communication among team members and between them and the community. For police officers that means getting out of cars and onto the street to find out who is in the community, what their problems are, and how the police, using the resources of the neighborhood and the entire range of their training, can help.

The programs have been controversial and are still in the development stage in many cases. Space does not permit a fuller analysis, but the conclusion is warranted that the programs have yielded many positive results. Cities where neighborhood team policing has been tried in one form or another include Holyoke (Massachusetts), Albany (New York), St. Petersburg, Cincinnati, Detroit, Venice and Oxnard (California), New York, Richmond (Virginia), Los Angeles, Dayton, and Syracuse.

The Police Foundation is supporting a project called *Community Profile* in San Diego, designed to test the effect on police services of giving patrol officers the opportunity to learn more about the special conditions of their beats. The officers involved are expected to learn what sources of aid they can tap in helping citizens, to determine what patrol problems they are likely to encounter, and to devise patrol techniques to address particular conditions on their beats. They learn about the beat from the community, and how it looks from the community view instead of the outsider's and police officer's view. Initial indications are that the police are happier with their jobs and that citizen satisfaction has risen.

The Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau initiated a Strike Force, a coordinated team approach to reduce the incidence of burglary and "stranger-to-stranger" street crime, and initial success has resulted in its expansion to include all major identifiable problems. Strike Force teams are created whenever it is determined that a serious criminal situation threatens the well-being of a neighborhood. The Strike Force consists of two to 12 officers and remains in existence anywhere from two weeks to seven

months. The teams are flexible in composition and include officers with a variety of skills drawn from different precincts. The team is allocated overtime hours and all necessary equipment needed. Feedback from members of the teams indicates a high level of enthusiasm. Officers have the opportunity to become deeply involved in crucial community problems and are exposed to and are able to integrate new disciplines into their jobs. Tangible benefits to the community after six months of operation included a 9.4 percent decrease in residential burglaries, a 4.3 percent drop in street robbery, a 25 percent decline in street assaults, and a 13.5 percent decrease in purse-snatchings.

These are projects that, while sometimes not showing an immediate productivity result as compared to, say, a change that drastically reduces the amount of time spent writing reports, have the potential for improved productivity. In addition they reveal success or failure in attempts to use the most basic resource of policing, the patrol officer, more efficiently.

The Portland Strike Force is similar to the special patrol units initiated in many cities which focus on street crime. These units often operate in plainclothes and seek out crime instead of relying on random patrol. The units have proved highly effective and highly popular both among police officers and the community. Examples of this kind of unit are Kansas City's Tactical Unit, New York City's Anti-Crime Squad, and Denver's SCAT (Special Crime Attack Team).

NCOP, in its pamphlet *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services,* remarks that these units are a "recognition that the added or marginal value of putting a few more regular patrolmen on the force may not be as great as using that manpower in a different and more productive fashion."

An increasing use of the special unit has been in the field of family crisis intervention. Studies have shown that a high percentage of domestic disputes are connected with later crimes of violence. A number of cities have instituted units which receive special training in the problems of alcoholism, the handling of teenagers, and domestic conflicts. These units move in to defuse potentially violent situations; if the officers cannot resolve the problem they see to it that those involved are referred to the proper city agency rather than arrested. Hartford, Connecticut, has recently adopted such a program.

Louisville has given its entire police force intensive training on how to help resolve domestic disputes without violence or arrests. Since the inception of the plan no officer has been injured in more than 1,200 incidents.

An innovation which has attracted a high degree of interest, as

well as considerable skepticism and criticism, among law enforcement officials is the Orange, California, incentive plan which ties pay increases for patrol officers to a specified decrease in certain crime rates.

The plan was suggested by the Orange city manager during an extended period of productivity bargaining with the City Police Association. The Association felt it should get some reward for the low crime rate in Orange as compared to adjoining jurisdictions. The pay increase was keyed to a reduction in the rates of rape, burglary, robbery, and auto theft; these were considered to be repressible through crime prevention efforts. Pay was to be increased for a reduction above a certain percentage. The number of crimes for the four classes was down by nearly 19 percent as of February 1974, the end of the first year of the two-year agreement, and police officers got a two percent pay increase starting in March of 1974. Current indications are that pay will go up another three percent in March, 1975, when the agreement expires, as a result of further decreases in crime rates. There is no penalty if other crime rates go up, and crime rates in nonincentive program classifications have risen in Orange, as elsewhere.

A preliminary evaluation of the incentive plan by The Urban Institute stated that it "appears to have been successful in achieving its immediate goal of reducing the total number of reported rapes, robberies, burglaries and auto thefts." But the Institute's evaluation contains several qualifications. For one, it notes that the Orange police department had introduced a number of crime prevention programs at the same time the incentive program began.

"It is not clear," the evaluation says, "whether the apparent success in reducing burglaries achieved was due to the incentive plan," the crime prevention programs, or a mixture of the two. It also notes that "since the police themselves play an important part in providing the crime data, certain other questions need to be raised. Police have some leeway in classifying crimes; for instance, some burglaries can be classed as larcenies or criminal trespassing," which are outside the incentive program. "Police also have a role in determining whether a crime is unfounded, and to some extent they can influence the reporting of crime in the first place," the evaluation states, although it concedes that evidence of manipulation of the figures was "scanty."

Further, the Institute's report notes that "as now designed, the plan has a potential for serious abuse and possibly detrimental impacts. In focusing on only a few crimes, police officers may be encouraged to artificially reduce the number of crimes of interest by under-reporting or reclassifying criminal incidents

into categories not covered by the incentive agreement." It adds that "the plan may need to include financial penalty if the crime rate subsequently increases. Otherwise, salaries could continue to rise over the long run even if . . . the crime rates returned to high levels." A more practical approach, the report suggests, might be to make such an agreement a one-a-year bonus.

As for the impact on productivity, the report says the results have been "uncertain: some indicators rose and some fell." It adds, however, that "greater cooperation and improved morale have been reported by nearly all persons involved in the program."

Civilianization has been used by many police agencies in a variety of forms to better utilize police manpower. Simply, it is the use of non-sworn personnel in many "inside" and administrative jobs, freeing officers for patrol activity. For example, Oakland, California, sworn personnel were once used to compile checklists in the Criminal Investigation Division. Fully a third of the officers assigned to CID have now been replaced by civilians and put on street assignment.

New York City is well along on a civilianization program which will replace 2,000 sworn officers in clerical and other positions with non-sworn personnel over a two-year period. The savings are estimated to run some $20 million a year since the civilians cost less than new officers.

One New York City precinct has a full-time non-sworn precinct manager. His duties consist of identifying positions that can be filled by civilians, combining job tasks and duty descriptions, and developing performance standards and procedures. At one time this precinct had 50 officers performing such tasks as switchboard operations, compilation of statistics, payroll maintenance, and the like. As a result of the civilianization program 23 non-sworn personnel and 18 officers took over the work, with 32 officers being freed for street duty.

The Scottsdale, Arizona, Police Department has combined recruitment with its civilianization efforts in a police assistant program. The plan was started in 1971 as a move to introduce 18 to 20-year-olds to police work, at the same time relieving sworn officers from non-law enforcement work. The police assistants must meet the same requirements as police officers. They receive a shortened version of the same training program, wear blue blazers and gray slacks, drive marked patrol cars, and respond to calls where a crime is not in progress. These calls include burglary, runaways, theft, certain types of traffic accidents, and robbery. During the first year of operation, with four assistants, the program saved the department $26,000.

St. Petersburg has a "public safety officer" program which

80

combines police and fire duties. The officer's first responsibility is responding to a fire when his ladder company is called, but the majority of time is spent performing police and fire inspections and backing up police on service calls. Public safety agents are recruited from both police and fire departments, receive both police and fire training, and are paid a higher salary than either a fireman or police officer with comparable service. They also have more discretion in the use of their time.

In a dramatic departure from tradition some jurisdictions have adopted programs which combine both police and fire departments. Durham, North Carolina, with some 100,000 people spread over 40 square miles, is the largest of several cities attempting a transition to a system of public safety officers. As reported recently in the *New York Times*, Durham officials say the system, though still not perfect after three years of operation, has increased security and cut costs by making better use of manpower and equipment. Others experimenting with this system are Clifton and Plainfield, New Jersey.

These public safety officers are trained to fight both crime and fires. They patrol the city in squad cars and man the fire trucks on a rotating basis. The city has been able to double the number of patrol cars on the street as a result.

Much of the saving comes from more efficient fire work. Formerly, fire trucks were sent to nearly every fire; now, specially-equipped patrol cars handle small fires which account for most fire alarms. Police and firemen initially resisted the program but pay raises of from 10 percent to 30 percent have helped eliminate objections.

However, the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, has strenuously fought combined services, claiming that the savings are *illusory*. The union points out that Peoria, Illinois, dropped the combined police and fire setup after some years as *unsatisfactory*.

Other cities have adopted public service officer or community service officer programs in which paraprofessionals perform such tasks as assisting the sick, handling community agency referrals, and administrative tasks. Miami has established such a program in hopes it will free regular police for more patrol duty, improve community relations, and serve as a means of recruitment.

Many smaller cities have adopted more informal dress for police as a symbol of professionalism. In many cases police agencies report it helps improve morale and is accepted by the community.

Simi Valley, California, adopted blazers and slacks as a "uniform" for its 30-officer police force in 1970 as part of a low-profile approach to law enforcement. It also eliminated

traditional police titles. The department is the Community Safety Agency, composed of community safety officers, special officers, and supervisory personnel headed by a safety administrator. The agency reports to the city's Human Resources Director. Since the departure of the city manager who introduced the changes, however, the department has reverted toward a more traditional para-military structure.

A number of cities have tried a rearrangement of hours in seeking greater efficiency. More than 75 police departments have introduced a four-day, 40-hour week. The ten-hour day provides three ten-hour shifts which create daily overlaps that allow higher concentrations of manpower during periods of maximum need.

The results have been mixed. Smaller and medium-sized cities appear to be most successful in utilizing this innovation. Washington, D.C., dropped it after a year's test. Atlanta has curtailed the use of the four-day week, and Honolulu discontinued its experiment with it in the Pearl City police district. Huntington Beach, California, however, has used the "4-40" plan since a successful trial in 1970.

Combining jobs is another way in which a number of police departments have managed to increase efficiency by reducing personnel. To cite just one example, New York City combined the jobs of arrest-processing officer and cell attendant, freeing five patrol officers for street duty.

Some cities have found that they could release officers for street duty by transferring certain services, such as issuing licenses and performing inspections, to other city agencies. For example, Miami Beach reassigned parking meter duties from the police department to the city finance department. This freed 40 patrol officers for street duty.

The centralizing of booking procedures is another method many cities have found to yield dramatic results in reducing "wasted" police man-hours. In New York City a central office in each borough (Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, etc.) manned by special police personnel has taken over the booking process, thus allowing the arresting officer to return to patrol duties more quickly. The department claims a saving of more than 200 police man-years per year. Oakland found that after centralization the time needed to process an arrestee could be cut to less than an hour.

Another method to increase patrol time is the early screening of arrests by legal counsel. Arrests that show a low probability of passing the arraignment stage can be dropped and officers need not waste time in court waiting for a case to come up that has little chance of survival. Washington, D.C.'s, operation screens out about 350 cases a month, with an average time-saving for the

patrol officer of two to three hours a case.

Several cities have discovered that issuing a summons for a misdemeanor instead of sending an officer to make an arrest saves time. New Haven has found that there is no significant difference between the court appearances of people issued a summons and those arrested and posting bond.

St. Petersburg saves time by taking some crime reports over the phone rather than dispatching an officer to the scene. Followup surveys indicate that nearly all those receiving this service were satisfied.

Other cities have found better ways to use equipment to save time. Miami Beach discovered that a considerable amount of time was being lost when a police car radio broke down, since the car had to be taken out of service while the radio was being repaired. Replaceable radios were installed, and when one breaks down another can quickly be substituted.

No chore brings as many complaints from police officers as filling out forms. Examination of police paperwork by some departments has yielded great time savings. Miami Beach, for example, discovered that much of the information its police department was collecting on accident forms was used solely by insurance companies. The forms were shortened, and the insurance companies now must do their own work.

Cranston, Rhode Island, discovered that about 15 man-hours per 24-hour day were devoted to writing of reports by hand, and that many reports were illegible. It eliminated this by installing a system in which the officer dictates his report to a recorder. A civilian then transcribes the tape. The department reports that the system reduced writing time an average of 12.72 minutes per report or, in all, about 11.5 of the previous 15 man-hours spent on that task.

Some cities have targeted auto theft for special attention. In Cleveland members of the criminal justice community and business and citizen groups have successfully combined in a broad attack on the problem through the Cleveland Auto Theft Prevention Program. CATPP claims a 20 percent reduction in auto theft in its more than three years of operation. It had been jointly funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and local insurance companies. The program included an extensive public information campaign with the theme *Lock It or Lose It.* Lockage rate of autos in response to the campaign went from six percent to 75 percent.

Many police agencies have found that the pace of change is so rapid that training has become a problem. The Beaumont, Texas, Police Department determined that the police radio could be used as a training aid. A training course was designed after a thorough

analysis of the department to pinpoint training needs. This training material was then broadcast over a special frequency at the rate of one three-minute module per hour over 24 hours. Each module was repeated several times over a 12-month period, with 48 hours of material covered over a year. The city Civil Service Commission has incorporated questions based on the modules in promotional exams.

One of the most rapidly growing innovations in police departments in major cities has been the introduction and increased use of computers. One authoritative study predicts that by 1977 nearly three-fourths of the nation's police departments will be using computers for a variety of tasks. (See *Computers And the Police Revisited: A Second Look at the Experience of Police Departments in Implementing New Information Technology,* by Kent Colton, Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.)

Briefly, computers have been applied to police and patrol inquiry, thus permitting an officer to make rapid inquiries about the identification of people or property; automated records of traffic accidents, citations, and parking violations; police administration; crime statistical files; files relating to jail arrests and intelligence records; analysis of police services and provision for the allocation and distribution of patrol units (in some cities, computers help predict workloads and alter police patrol force deployment to meet changing crime patterns on an hourly and seasonal basis); criminal investigation, providing information on crime patterns, modus operandi, fingerprint matching, and the like; and dispatching of cars, patrol units, or even individual officers.

In Oakland, for example, a patrol officer can type the license number of a vehicle on a computer terminal in his patrol car and learn within seconds whether it is stolen. In St. Louis an experiment is under way in the city's largest police district to monitor each patrol car by using new locational and computer technology. Precise vehicle location will be displayed on a screen in the dispatch center, permitting decisions as to which car should respond to a certain call.

New York City's SPRINT (Special Police Radio Inquiry Network) is perhaps the most sophisticated computerized dispatching and car-monitoring system in existence. As well as automatically registering calls with the appropriate dispatcher the device indicates which units are available for dispatch. In addition, SPRINT compiles and prints information, such as number of calls serviced, length of time for service, and other response-time information.

Because of the complexities of police department computerization and the questions which must be answered before such a major and expensive innovation is made, police managers would do well to read and analyze Colton's study as an important first step.

IN CONCLUSION

The argument is no longer whether methods of productivity improvement are to be applied to police services, but how. Productivity has become an imperative.

Edward K. Hamilton, former deputy mayor of New York City, in a presentation to the IACP symposium pointed out:

> . . .the factors underlying the current pre-occupation with productivity . . . will continue along present lines for some time. Thus I think the political demand and the base for productivity improvements will . . . be with us for the forseeable future.
>
> How well we, as a society, make use of this consensus will largely depend on two factors. On the management side, the stakes ride on the degree to which we invest in the analytic capacity necessary to monitor and improve the efficiency of our police service . . . On the union side, the critical need is to evolve affirmative positions on productivity that are acceptable to a volatile and often disgruntled membership. The secret to this strategy probably lies in 'counterprograms' that emphasize job enrichment, training rights, enlarged promotional opportunities and greater flexibility to move between titles.
>
> Success on both sides will require leadership of a very high order.

Any productivity improvement program will need a productivity measurement component, both to help guide where productivity improvement is needed as well as to evaluate how successful the improvements have been.

While productivity measurement thus has many uses, it should be recognized that it is not an end in itself. By itself, productivity measurement will not tell a government what is wrong or what should be done to improve the situation. It exists to help guide government in its productivity improvement efforts.

WHAT IS MEANT BY PRODUCTIVITY IN POLICE CRIME CONTROL?

Defining the output or product of police crime control is a major problem. As noted in the introduction, for most public sector services (and certainly for police activities), what is meant by output or product can take many different forms. At least five police functions can be identified.

1. There is general agreement that one output of crime control activity should be reduced crime. Thus, preventing or deterring crime is a principal police function. However, it is also clear—and has been said many times before—that police activity is only one of many factors (including demographic and economic conditions) affecting the amount of crime in a community. In addition, the courts, the prosecutor's office, corrections agencies, various social service programs, and other government activities also have important roles in crime reduction. Nevertheless, the police seem to share this important responsibility. By raising the probability of apprehension and by arresting criminals who are subsequently removed (at least temporarily) from the opportunity for subsequent crime, the police presumably contribute to reduced crime.[2]

2. A related police function is helping to maintain a feeling of security in the community.

3. A third major function of the police is to apprehend the persons responsible for crimes.

4. In addition, the police have non-crime-related functions, such as traffic law enforcement and emergency response to

---

[2]Since there is little formal "proof" as to this and related assumptions, and since skeptics can point to such evidence as the recent Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, which suggests that routine patrol car preventive patrol may not make much of a contribution to crime prevention (see Reference 25), I will avoid expressing complete certainty about the ability of the police to help in this role. Nevertheless, it is certainly a product that the public hopes will, at least partially, come from police activity, and therefore it should be a subject for measurement.

non-crime citizen problems. (Handling of family quarrels is considered here to be a crime-related activity—as a means to prevent future crimes, as well as, in some cases, apprehension of offenders, maintenance of security, and the reduction of severity of the incident.)

5. In the process of undertaking these functions, performance qualities become important. It is generally agreed that police services should be provided rapidly and in a fair, courteous, and honest manner while avoiding undue harrassment and false accusation of innocent persons. These latter characteristics should apply to the treatment of victims, witnesses, bystanders, and offenders.

Productivity measurement in the private sector generally involves the use of a physically identifiable item as the unit of output to be related to the amount of man-hours or dollars of input.[3] The closest analogy in police services is probably the number of calls responded to by police related to the number of police man-hours. However, few have seriously suggested such a measure as being a major indicator of police productivity. This is because (a) there are many different types of calls, varying from calls about major crimes in progress to calls for assistance in getting into a locked car; (b) mere response to a call says little about what the police were actually able to accomplish by their response; and (c) responding to calls is only one part of police activity. Nevertheless, for some specific police activities, some of the more traditional types of productivity measures have been used such as the number of cases of a certain type handled per investigative man-hour, or the number of fingerprints processed per man-hour (if a jurisdiction has enough such work to make this meaningful). These primarily address the efficiency with which a certain activity is performed.

An important issue in public sector service productivity measurement is whether the term *productivity* should be used to encompass effectiveness (the extent to which the service is accomplishing its purposes) as well as efficiency (the extent to which it is undertaking its activities at minimum cost in resources). For the police crime control function, there seems to be general implicit agreement that governments cannot talk productivity without discussing the effectiveness of the service. But effectiveness, as will be discussed later, is almost never presented in the form of a ratio of output to input, as is the classical productivity measure. The position is taken here that this is primarily a definitional problem, not one of substance. In talking about productivity measurement, effectiveness and ef-

---

[3]But even in the private sector quality issues are handled, if at all, with great difficulty.

ficiency need to be considered jointly. The specific meaning of this and how it might be done will be illustrated in the following sections.

This paper will not examine the measurement of traffic control productivity (which involves not only the police but also such other government activities as traffic engineering, signs and signals, and even street maintenance and construction). Nevertheless, since traffic control and crime control activity may be undertaken by the same police officer, this does cause problems for police crime control productivity measurement. This is discussed later under Input Measurement Problems.

WHOSE PRODUCTIVITY SHOULD BE MEASURED?

This is a basic question which must be considered in police productivity measurement. The following levels of concern can be distinguished:

1. The productivity of the individual police officer (or individual police employee, civilian or sworn).

2. The productivity of police units, such as shifts, police districts, neighborhood policing teams, or precincts.

3. The productivity of particular kinds of units, such as motorized police, foot patrols, investigative units, special tactical strike forces, canine corps, etc.

4. The productivity of the police department as a whole.

5. The productivity of the crime control system, including both police activities and private activities to reduce crime.

6. The productivity of the total community criminal justice system, including the police, the courts, the prosecutor's office, corrections and social service agencies, and private sector crime prevention activities (such as use of locks, watch dogs, etc.).

In one way or another, a community is concerned with the productivity of each of these. However, each interest group in a community—citizens, city council, mayor or city or county manager, police chief, police division heads, police employees and their associations—will have different priorities. The choice of viewpoint(s) desired by a local government will affect the set of productivity measurements that is needed. Some of the different perspectives are as follows:

- Measurements of the proportion of police time spent on "non-productive" activities are likely to be of considerably

90

more interest and use to police department managers and employees than to citizens, who are likely to be considerably more concerned about crime rates in their neighborhoods.

- City or county officials are likely to be most interested in the productivity of the crime control system, or the total criminal justice system (although in the latter case their interest will be tempered by their lack of responsibility for the courts, prosecution, and where controlled by a different level of government, the correctional systems).

- For higher local government management levels and the council and public it probably is most important to be concerned with, on one hand, the combined effectiveness of the police operations, and secondarily, of groups or teams of police.

- For internal management purposes (i.e., internal to the police agency), periodic examination of the productivity of individual employees may be appropriate—in the same way that annual performance appraisals are provided *but* with more output-oriented measurements.

A special note of caution seems appropriate for attempts to measure the productivity of individual police employees. The measurement of individual police officer performance is discussed later. Many if not most of the important products of police services such as deterrence of crimes and successful apprehensions of offenders are generally due to the combined activities of a number of persons in the police department. For example, for a successful apprehension there may be field work by the policemen at the scene of the incident, subsequent investigation by a police investigator, often supported by numerous crime lab operations such as fingerprinting and weapon analysis techniques, and perhaps crime analysis, communications, and data processing units.

ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

The principal technical issue in productivity measurement is what specifically should be measured. This section addresses that issue and how the data might be collected.

A set of functions of police crime control was identified in a previous section. These functions suggest the major purposes, goals, or objectives of police crime control and are the basis for the measurements discussed below.

Productivity measurements can be obtained on a regular basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, annually) in order to identify problem areas and monitor progress in productivity. Measurements can

also be taken at special points in time in order to evaluate specific productivity improvement projects.[4]

Some recent suggestions about specific productivity measures are listed in Exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibit 1 is taken from the National Commission on Productivity's 1973 report of its Advisory Group on Productivity and Law Enforcement. Exhibit 2 is taken from a 1972 National Commission on Productivity publication (prepared by The Urban Institute) which was one of the first to examine the productivity measurement problem in crime control. Four characteristics of the two exhibits are particularly important:

1. Each of the exhibits lists a number of measures. None of the authors believed that a single measure, or even a few measures, would adequately reveal productivity.

2. Each of the exhibits contains measures of the effectiveness or quality of police services and not merely the workload accomplished.

3. In each of the two exhibits are measures that are *not* in the form of the classic productivity measurement, i.e., an output divided by an input.

4. A number of the proposed measurements in each exhibit require special data collection procedures which currently are not in general use by local governments.

Most of the principal measures in these exhibits will be discussed in the following sections.

---

[4]Procedures for evaluating productivity improvement projects so as to identify the contribution of the project as distinguished from other factors is a subject of itself and is not further discussed here. Reference 25, on the Kansas City preventive patrol experiment, and Reference 52, on the District of Columbia policewoman experiment, describe examples of the more sophisticated and powerful (and most expensive) evaluation approach, that of conducting "controlled" experiments.

EXHIBIT 1

POLICE PATROL MEASUREMENTS*

National Commission on Productivity Advisory
Group on Productivity in Law Enforcement, 1973

INCREASING PATROL TIME

1. Measure to help determine the ability of management
to make manpower available for patrol:

Patrol Officers Assigned to Street Patrol Work
Total Patrol Officers

This measure does not indicate whether the patrol
officers thus assigned are accomplishing anything
useful. It is an indication of the department's success
in making sworn officers available for more directly
patrol-related activity. [Author's note: This measure
also implies that patrol officers not on street patrol are
not being used as productively as those on street
patrol.]

2. Measure to indicate the extent to which patrol time
out in the field is being committed to patrol activities:

Man-Hours of Patrol Time Spent on
Activities Contributing to Patrol Objectives
Total Patrol Man-Hours

Time can be "lost" by performing non-patrol tasks
during duty hours. Examples are filling out unneces-
sary forms, servicing vehicles, running errands, and
spending unnecessarily long hours waiting for court
appearances. As noted for the previous measure, this
measure does not indicate whether the time made
available is put to good use. It does measure success in
making more time available, which can be turned to
good use.

---

*These measures and the accompanying notes are taken from
Reference 29, *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police
Services*, Report of the Advisory Group on Productivity in Law
Enforcement, National Commission on Productivity, Washington,
D.C., 1973. Some minor liberties have been taken in assembling the
measures identified in that report and putting them into the
arrangement used here.

MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF PATROL:
DETERRENCE

In the absence of a direct measure of deterrence, three
types of substitutes were used:

3. Existing reported crime indices, used with discretion.

4. Victimization surveys.

5. Quantitative measurement of activities which profes-
sional judgment suggests contribute to deterrence.

MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF PATROL:
PATROL RESPONSE TIME

6. $$\frac{\text{Number of Calls of a Given Type Responded to in Under ``X'' Minutes}}{\text{Total Calls of That Type}}$$

"X" minutes is used in the numerator to indicate that
different response times are appropriate for different
types of calls. The value of "X" would depend on
whether the call was an emergency or non-emergency
call, or whether the call was about a crime in progress,
suspicious activity, or previously committed crime.
Additional breakouts by type of crime may also prove
helpful. A call about a bank robbery, for example, may
require a more rapid response than a larceny in
progress. In each case the department must determine
for itself what is a desirable response time ("X") for a
particular kind of call, based upon the considerations
noted above.

7. $$\frac{\text{Number of Calls Responded to in Under ``X'' Minutes}}{\text{Resources Devoted to the Response Function}}$$

To the extent that measures 6 and 7 reveal inefficient
resource use, it would help, in diagnosing the problem,
to divide response time into three segments: Dispatch-
ing delay, queue delay, and travel delay.

The note under measure 6 also applies here.

8. Measure of response effectiveness in leading to arrests:

$$\frac{\text{Arrests Surviving the First Judicial Screening Resulting From a Response to a Crime Call}}{\text{Crime-Related Calls for Service}}$$

Again, this measure should be applied to appropriate categories of arrest (felony, etc.) and be calculated separately for each major type of call.

MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF PATROL:
APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

9. Measure for apprehension productivity:

$$\frac{\text{Arrests Resulting From Patrol Surviving the First Judicial Screening}}{\text{Total Patrol Man-Years}}$$

10. An example of more detailed measures of apprehension productivity measure for each major arrest category:

$$\frac{\text{Felony Arrests Resulting from Patrol Surviving the First Judicial Screening}}{\text{Total Patrol Man-Years}}$$

This measure can be modified for consideration of different kinds of arrests, including felonies, misdemeanors that involve a particular victim, consensual crime misdemeanors as determined by local jurisdictions, and other violations.

11. Measures of the ultimate disposition of arrests, which provide an additional check on the quality of apprehensions and post-arrest activities:

$$\frac{\text{Convictions}}{\text{All Arrests Made by Patrol Force}}$$

12.
$$\frac{\text{Convictions}}{\text{Arrests Resulting From Patrol That Survive the First Judicial Screening}}$$

Measures 11 and 12 also may be calculated separately for each arrest category to provide more detailed information.

PROVISION OF NON-CRIME SERVICES

13.
$$\frac{\text{Number of Non-Crime Calls for Service Satisfactorily Responded To}}{\text{Man-Hours Devoted to Non-Crime Service Calls}}$$

Here the number of calls includes both emergency and non-emergency situations. (Information on quality of

the response would be provided by a follow-up survey of callers.)

14. Calculating the measure separately for major categories of non-crime service calls. This would be useful. For example:

Medical Emergency Calls
That Emergency Room Personnel
Evaluate as Having Received Appropriate First Aid
Total Medical Emergencies

MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES*

15.   Number of Charges During the Year
(perhaps only those clearly supportable)
Total Number of Department Personnel

Several types of complaint and disciplinary actions can be lodged against officers; for example, for illegal search, illegal detention, illegal confiscation of property, and other acts of criminal and unethical conduct against the public, or for violation of departmental policies and regulations, ranging from insubordination to sleeping on duty.

16.   Number of Man-Days Lost During the Year Due to
Illness, Disciplinary Action, and Injury
Total Number of Man-Days Served During the Year

17.   Total Turnover During the Year
Total Number of Department Personnel

---

*Additional measures for recruitment, selection and assignment, and training were also included in the report but are not included here.

EXHIBIT 2

PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENTS
FOR THE POLICE CRIME CONTROL FUNCTION* **

(The Urban Institute, 1972)

A. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE

1. Population served per police employee and per dollar***

2. Crime rates and changes in crime rates for reported crimes (relative to dollars or employees per capita)

3. Clearance rates of reported crimes (relative to dollars or employees per capita)

4. Arrests per police department employee and per dollar***

5. Clearances per police department employee and per dollar***

B. REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL DATA-GATHERING

1. Crime rates including estimates of unreported crimes based on victimization studies

2. Clearance rates including estimates of unreported crimes based on victimization studies

3. Percent of felony arrests that "survive" preliminary hearings in courts of limited jurisdiction

---

*This exhibit is from Reference 30, *The Challenge of Productivity Diversity: Improving Local Government Productivity Measurement and Evaluation, Part III, Measuring Police-Crime Control Productivity*, prepared by The Urban Institute for the National Commission on Productivity, National Technical Information Service, PB223117, June, 1972. This reference suggests that the best approach to police crime control productivity measurement is to consider the *set* of measures along with the associated input data (i.e., man-hour and dollar cost data).

**These measures (except for A-1, B-7, and B-8) should be disaggregated by type of crime.

***Data on resource inputs should, to the extent possible, exclude resources expended on non-crime functions, such as traffic control.

EXHIBIT 2 (continued)

4. Percent of arrests that lead to convictions

5. Average response times for calls for service

6. Percent of crimes solved in less than "x" days

7. Percent of population indicating a lack of feeling of security

8. Percent of population expressing dissatisfaction with police services

PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING MEASURES AND WAYS TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS WITH NEWER MEASUREMENTS

Crime Prevention-Deterence Measures

Communities hope crime prevention and deterrence are a major impact (if not *the* major impact) of police crime control activities. Even though the deterrent effect of visible police patrol is yet to be determined, other kinds of police work seem quite likely to deter at least some crime. If the police are more successful at the apprehension of criminals the likelihood of punishment presumably is increased and thus certain potential criminal acts are deterred. Arrests leading to the incarceration of criminals who would otherwise be free to commit new crimes also seems likely to reduce crime. Thus the police can be said to have a role in crime prevention and deterrence.

But the problem in productivity measurement, as has often been stated, is that it is extremely difficult to determine how many crimes police activity has prevented. Even very large scale, in-depth, ad hoc studies (not feasible for regular productivity measurement) are likely to find this extremely difficult.[5] Thus, what is done as a practical matter is to measure the number of crimes *that have not been deterred.*[6] By looking at changes in crime rates over time and making comparisons with similar communities a local government can obtain some idea, albeit a crude one, about the extent of crime prevention.

The traditional approach has been to count crimes reported to

---

[5]For some particularly interesting studies of tests of this relationship, see References 4, 25, 36, and 44.

[6]See Reference 53 for an exposition of this point.

the police. The FBI, in its Uniform Crime Reports, has attempted to achieve some commonality of definitions on crimes and procedures. A number of objections, however, have frequently been raised about these data.[7] These objections will not be repeated here in detail, but the major problem is that a significant percentage of crimes is not reported to the police. Recent victimization surveys conducted nationally by the federal government and by local governments indicate that only about 25 to 75 percent of all crime is reported, with reporting varying by type of crime.[8]

To alleviate this problem the use of surveys in which a scientific sample of citizens is asked about their victimization has been gaining support. Victimization *rates,* the total number of estimated crimes divided by the population, are then computed.[9] Victimization surveys rely on memories, and willingness to respond, of those sampled. Such surveys are therefore subject to errors other than the possible errors arising from sampling. Some studies of these problems have been made by the federal government,[10] indicating that such errors do exist and the likely direction and nature of the errors. Nevertheless, this author agrees with the many researchers who believe that the estimates obtained are a substantial improvement over reported crime rates.

The recent experience of St. Petersburg, Florida illustrates the usefulness of victimization information. Reported crimes had shown a sharp rise over a two-year period. In the second year the police had initiated a special effort to have citizens report crimes. The victimization estimates obtained from citizen surveys at the end of each of the two years indicated that *total* victimization including both reported and unreported crimes had risen less sharply than reported crimes. Thus, a considerably different

---

[7]For example, see References 20, 30, 43, and 48.

[8]For example, see References 13, 31, 32, and 35.

[9]Victimization rates can also be interpreted as the probability that an individual (or business establishment, if computed on a per business establishment basis) was victimized during the period. Most typically, the total estimated number of crimes is divided by the appropriate population. Perhaps a more appropriate measure of the probability of a specific person or household being victimized would be to use, as the numerator of the ratio, the number victimized one or more times.

[10]See References 5, 16, 32, 35, and 45. The National Academy of Science currently has underway a new study to evaluate the National Crime Panel which will provide national victimization data by interviewing 60,000 families and 15,000 businesses each year. In addition, 10,000 families and 2,000 businesses in each of 13 cities will be surveyed each year over a three-year period.

picture emerged than that obtainable from only the reported crime statistics.

The data from a victimization survey can be used *directly* to give an estimate of total victimization (since respondents are asked to list both reported and unreported crimes). Alternatively, governments can multiply the ratio, obtained from the survey, of unreported crimes to reported crimes, by the official count of reported crimes; this will provide an estimate of the number of unreported crimes which, when added to the official count of reported crimes, will provide an estimate of total victimization.[11]

The victimization surveys undertaken by the federal government so far have involved a lengthy questionnaire and large samples. These give fairly precise victimization estimates but can be quite costly and therefore may not be practical on a regular basis for other than the largest cities and counties. However, some recent surveys undertaken by local governments have used shorter forms of the questionnaire, with smaller sample sizes (600-1,000 households) and using somewhat less sophisticated sampling techniques than those used by the Bureau of the Census. (Among areas recently undertaking such efforts are St. Petersburg, Florida; Nashville, Tennessee; Palo Alto, California; Randolph Township, New Jersey; and Arlington County, Virginia. The surveys in the first four covered other municipal services as well as police.)[12]

The question is whether such surveys can be undertaken at a reasonable cost while retaining sufficient precision so that local governments, even smaller ones, will be able to undertake *annual* surveys in order to obtain adequate and regular comparative data. While worthwhile surveys costing less than $10,000 seem possible, some technical questions remain. Municipalities using such surveys will have to settle for less precision and less detailed questioning. The one-to-two percentage point confidence limits, possible through the larger surveys and the longer interviews, would cost many thousands of dollars more per year.[13]

---

[11]However, considerable care is needed in this procedure. The survey-derived data must be applied in a compatible way to the reported crime data. For example, if the unreported crimes estimated apply solely to household crimes, they should be applied to the reported number of household crimes, not to the number of crimes against commercial establishments.

[12]See Reference 13. Reference 46 contains the questionnaire used by St. Petersburg. Note that none of these surveyed commercial establishments.

[13]To illustrate the difference between larger and smaller surveys, it can be pointed out that a random sample of 500 households, costing under $10,000 would provide statistical confidence intervals of about plus or minus 4 percentage points at the 90-95 percent confidence level.

Fortunately, such considerable precision and detail may not be necessary, but the use of smaller surveys will mean that municipalities will have to accept the fact that small differences in victimization from one year to the next will have considerably more likelihood of being due to sampling error rather than real changes in total crime rates. Other cost savings may be achieved by using telephone (rather than in-person) interviews[14] and by using the survey to obtain information on other governmental services. (The latter would reduce the costs to the police agency.)

My tentative judgment is that these small and regular victimization surveys are probably justified. They provide information that, although not completely precise or detailed, will still be considerably better than reported crime rates. They seem likely to refine the skepticism about crime rates that citizens might otherwise have — especially if productivity measurement became regularly reported to the public.

Without victimization surveys, crime reports remain the only source of crime count information — probably better than nothing, but by no means ideal.

Another question is how to combine the number of incidents for each category of crime. The FBI categorizes each crime as to whether it is a Part I or Part II crime and whether it is an *Index* crime.[15] The Index is commonly used to represent the most serious crimes. The Index adds together each of a number of categories from murder to larceny. Thus, in effect, the Index counts one murder and one larceny equally. The Index is, therefore, affected to a considerable extent by changes in the more common types of Index crimes, such as larceny and burglary.[16] Critics have proposed various weighting schemes, such as the Sellin-Wolfgang weights[17] or some modification of them. Interestingly, however, one recent comparison of what the Index would look like if the Sellin-Wolfgang weight were used rather than the FBI's equal-weight approach reported that for the

---

[14]Telephone surveys also have the advantage of permitting many callbacks to persons not at home and under some conditions permit more convenient access to certain households. Recent random dialing approaches have made the telephone survey professionally acceptable but still have the sometimes major problem that households without telephones cannot be reached by this means.

[15]Such distinctions as violent vs. property crimes, Index crimes, Part I vs. Part II crimes, stranger to stranger crimes, street crimes, *victimless* crimes, each have some use though these categories are often ambiguous.

[16]Burglary and larceny comprise about 70 percent of all reported Index crimes. If auto theft is added, these three categories comprise over 85 percent. See Reference 17.

[17]See Reference 43.

1960-72 time period, the two were highly correlated for *national* totals and therefore the Sellin-Wolfgang weights provided little additional information.[18]

But this does not seem to be an important issue for productivity measurement by individual local governments. No one suggests dropping the data on the individual crime categories; a municipality will always have available the figures for the individual components of the Index as well as on the Index itself.

In sum then, the *ideal* measure of crime prevention productivity, "the number of crimes prevented per man-year," is not feasible given the current state of the measurement art. Rather it is necessary to track the actual amount of non-prevention, "the number of crimes committed," and its per capita form, "the number committed per capita," (or "per business establishment"), preferably by obtaining a more accurate figure that includes an estimate of the number of unreported crimes. Note that the classical productivity measure form, "number of crimes per man-year," does not make sense as the productivity measure. For example, a 10 percent *improvement* in both numerator and denominator would leave the ratio the same as before the improvements! Even more troublesome is that it is not clear whether larger ratios would represent better or worse conditions since a larger value for the ratio, number of crimes per man-year, might represent increased crime, or it might represent increased efficiency or merely a reduction in the number of police employees.

Apprehension-of-Offenders Measures

After a crime is committed the police have the job of apprehending the perpetrator(s). Currently, the measures of output on apprehension customarily used are the number of arrests and clearance rates. Important problems exist, however, with the current definitions and data collection procedures used for each measure.

1. *Arrests.* The number of arrests per police man-year at first glance may seem to be a very attractive measure of police productivity, and it has been used as a basis for evaluating the productivity of individual patrol officers.

The mere fact that an arrest was made, however, does not mean that the person committing the crime was successfully brought to justice, nor that the person arrested was actually the guilty party. Even if the person arrested was guilty, many things

---

[18]See Reference 7.

can happen after an arrest which can lead to the offenders being let off without being punished (or otherwise treated in an appropriate manner, such as by probation, release to a rehabilitation program, etc.). Furthermore, some arrests are likely to be made of persons who are innocent or which are otherwise inappropriate.[19] There are many reasons for inappropriate or poor-quality arrests, some of which can be attributed to police action such as poor judgment, insufficient diligence collecting evidence, mishandling of evidence, misunderstanding of the law, and the like. Failures in the criminal justice system can also occur in the prosecution system or the courts. Some situations, such as witnesses refusing to testify, will leave unresolved the question as to where the responsibility lies. In any case, arrests which do not lead to some type of constructive action or which involve innocent persons, regardless of the reason, are inappropriate and, in a literal sense, unproductive. In examining the productivity of the police department and its employees, we would ideally like to isolate those situations in which inappropriate or ineffective arrests were due to actions within the purview of the police. As a practical matter, however, this can at best be approximated.

Furthermore, the measure "arrests per police man-year" is liable to produce perverse effects if emphasis is placed by a municipality on increasing the number of arrests per man-year. If the police believe they are being evaluated on the number of arrests per policeman, they may be encouraged to make excessive, unreasonable, or at least marginal arrests.

As a step towards evaluating the quality and effectiveness of arrests, and at the same time to reduce the likelihood of encouraging undesirable arrests, Exhibits 1 and 2 each suggest the use of the measure "number or percent of arrests that pass the first judicial screening."[20] This becomes a productivity measure in the classical form when related to the number of man-years

---

[19] A dropped arrest does not necessarily mean that the person arrested was innocent. Also, some arrests of innocent persons or of persons who, though guilty by the letter of the law, should better not have been arrested (such as in certain family argument incidents), get by the initial judicial screening and perhaps even lead to a conviction. The arrest of innocent people is a different problem from insufficient evidence. Ideally, we would like to know as an indication of poor productivity the number of innocent people arrested. However, no feasible procedure for estimating the number of such situations seem to be available. Research on the subject of how many innocent people are arrested and convicted might be appropriate, but the measure does not at this time seem feasible for regular performance productivity measurement.

[20] This might be a preliminary hearing or a state prosecuting attorney's investigation. For misdemeanors, where these hearings are waived, final disposition of the case would need to be the basis for the measure.

involved. Recent tests of this measure suggest that in data collection procedures the *reasons* for the dropping of all charges should be identified to the extent possible, particularly for the purpose of distinguishing reasons which are likely to be at least partly controllable by the police from those which are not controllable.[21] Also, procedures on how to count reduced charges and multiple charges on an arrest need to be specified.

The number, or percent, of arrests per man-year that lead ultimately to a conviction (at least on one charge) is another option proposed in the exhibits. However, because of the additional involvement of the court and prosecution systems, and the time span from arrest to ultimate disposition, thus making the data less timely for productivity measurement purposes, this measure may be less useful to the police. It may be a better indicator of the productivity of the criminal justice system considered as a whole, however.

Unfortunately, measures reflecting arrest dispositions have current drawbacks. First, the data are not currently generally available to police agencies. Very few police departments currently receive regular, systematic data on the disposition of arrests at the various points in the adjudication process. Collection of these data has been undertaken in such jurisdictions as the District of Columbia, Kansas City and New York City. Other preliminary tests of procedures to obtain and use court disposition data have been tried in St. Petersburg and Nashville.[22] Such data collection requires the cooperation of the courts or what is perhaps more easily obtained, the cooperation of the prosecutor's office. Whatever the difficulties in obtaining such data, however, they may well be worth the effort, not only for productivity measurement purposes, but also by providing the police with timely operational data to keep them better informed on the disposition of persons who have been arrested.

A second problem is that the reasons for arrests not surviving the first judicial screening (or not leading to a conviction) can be quite diverse, and many of them may be unrelated to police actions. Some police departments may therefore be reluctant to use such a measure, fearing that they will be blamed unfairly for arrests that are dropped. Nevertheless, the information certainly seems appropriate, and if not used unfairly to criticize the police can be a constructive measuring yardstick.

Another difficulty with arrest disposition measures relates to

---

[21] See, for example, References 11 and 40 and the work of Washington, D.C., and New York City.

[22] A description of these tests and data collection procedures based on them can be found in Reference 40.

the special handling of juvenile offenders.[2][3] Most juveniles are processed through the Juvenile Court, where they do not go through the same adjudication process as adults and where information about them is held more tightly.

This confidentiality of information on specific cases and different adjudication process are hurdles to be overcome in obtaining appropriate data. However, it seems likely that useful data collection procedures on the disposition of arrests could be worked out with Juvenile Courts that would maintain the confidentiality of individual cases.

Local governments may differ somewhat in their definitions as to what constitutes an arrest for data-gathering purposes. As with procedures for collecting any data, careful attention is needed to develop clear and comprehensive definitions for data categories and to assure that data collection procedures are properly followed. It also may be useful to distinguish the number of arrests made at the scene from those resulting from subsequent investigation. This would provide information relevant to the productivity of quick-response units, as compared to investigative units.

2. *Clearance Rates.* A number of concerns have been expressed at various times about such problems as variations in what constitutes a clearance and the variability that can occur when a police department emphasizes or does not emphasize exceptional clearances, such as making special efforts to get offenders to admit to other crimes. Two other important problems exist.

First, as with arrest rates, the counts of clearances used in most jurisdictions include incidents for which an arrest was made, regardless of whether the arrests survive the initial judicial screening or do not lead to an ultimate "conviction." Thus, if a crime leads to an arrest which is subsequently thrown out of court there is no current provision to "unclear" the crime for clearance rate reporting purposes or to at least count such occurrences.

Second, a clearance (as defined by the FBI) is recorded by the arrest of any one of several criminals committing a crime even if the others are never apprehended. There is currently no measure which indicates the success of the police in identifying and apprehending *each* of the offenders involved in a single crime carried out by more than one person. A proposal made in the 1972 Urban Institute report was to measure the percentage of total known offenders who were subsequently arrested. Thus, if

---

[23]Thus far, the experiences with the quality-of-arrest measure that this author is aware of have been limited to arrests of adults.

in an armed robbery it was known that there were three offenders, and only one eventually was apprehended, the apprehension rate for the incident would be 33.3 percent. Currently, however, the incident would be computed as fully cleared for statistical purposes. Two variations of this measure, both useful, seem appropriate. One would emphasize the total *solution* rate: the "total number of man-crimes for which someone was successfully brought to justice, including *other* crimes cleared by arrests" divided by "the total estimated number of man-crimes." The second variation would focus on the risk to the criminal (the probability of being caught in one particular incident). Here, the denominator would be the same, but the numerator would be "the number of persons arrested and successfully brought to justice," without counting other crimes that the police simultaneously are able to clear. For example, if there are two crime incidents, one involving one criminal and the second involving four, and if one of the four persons in arrested and convicted, and in the process the police also link that person to the first crime, then the *solution rate* measure would be 2/5 = .40 but the *criminal risk* rate would be 1/5 = .20. (As a practical matter, for many crimes, such as burglaries, it is not possible to know how many offenders actually participated. The reported number would probably need to be conservatively weighted, that is, one offender would be assumed for incidents in which no contrary information is available.)

In sum, then, police departments and their communities currently do not have full information on the number of successful apprehensions relative to the total number of those who should be apprehended.[24] Ways to provide better information are to measure both the "number of arrests that survive the initial judicial screening per man-year," and the "percent of estimated man-crimes committed leading to an apprehension that survives the initial judicial screening." These both seem to be appropriate and feasible to measure in determining apprehension productivity.

Citizen Feedback Measures: Including Measures of Feeling of Security; Rapid, Courteous, and Fair Response; and Satisfaction with Response to Non-Crime Calls

Exhibits 1 and 2 both recommend measures that require feedback from citizens as to their perceptions of the quality of services they are receiving, such as their feeling of security and

---

[24] Another problem arises in comparing performance with other jurisdictions. Police departments may differ in their definitions of clearance.

their satisfaction with crime and non-crime call response from the police. Such information is seldom, if ever, collected regularly by local governments today. Fortunately, such questions can be included at little additional cost in the same survey used to collect victimization data. Or, alternatively, these data might be collected by systematic surveys of persons who have previously called for assistance.[25] These measures are useful for detecting problem areas and improvement or worsening of conditions over time.

Certain measures based on citizen perception data can be related to man-hours expended to provide the classic form of productivity measurement. For example, measure 13 of Exhibit 1 is "number of non-crime calls for service satisfactorily responded to per man-hour," where the identification of satisfaction is obtained from a survey of persons who have called for assistance. Other possibilities would be to compute the "estimated number of persons responding that they felt reasonably safe being alone in their neighborhood at night per police man-year or per dollar." This use of citizen perception feedback is uncommon and may seem strange to many. It is analogous to the industrial practice in which only outputs that pass quality control inspection are counted when measuring output and relating it to total cost. Thus, at the very least, these measures might be more informative as far as productivity is concerned than use of the measures "number of calls responded to per police-year" or "population served per police-year or per dollar," which indicate nothing about the adequacy of the service provided.

Note that here, as with victimization survey information, the values used for the output unit have to be estimated from the results of the sample survey and thus are subject to possible sampling error as well as a variety of other problems in the sampling process (such as problems in listing all of the population from which the sample of persons to be interviewed is to be drawn, questionnaire-wording problems, possible interviewer errors, and respondent memory limitations).

Police honesty and corruption are other important concerns to a community. Whether they should be included in examining a police department's productivity is not clear. The NCOP Advisory Committee report[26] contains a measure on the number of *charges* against the police department, such as complaints or disciplinary actions lodged against police officers (Measure 15 in

---

[25] Reference 40 discusses this procedure at greater length.

[26] Reference 29.

Exhibit 1). If separated into charges related to supportable incidents of police dishonesty and corruption, as distinguished from other complaints, such as harassment — the measure would be relevant here. However, this is not a very satisfying measure because of the hidden nature of most incidents of corruption.

Police-community relations is a similar local issue. The quality of police relations with the community might be measured roughly through citizen surveys. A productivity measurement might be the "number of persons who express a positive attitude toward the police per police man-year," based on results of questions in the citizen survey. Such a measure, however, has the problem of possibly encouraging police to expend undue effort on *propaganda.*

Workload-Oriented Measures

Neither the NCOP Advisory Group on Productivity in Law Enforcement (Exhibit 1) nor the earlier Urban Institute report (Exhibit 2) calls for the use, for productivity measurement purposes, of the traditional measures "number of calls per man-year" or, for investigative officers, "caseloads per officer." Such measurements presumably have been used to identify the efficiency of groups of employees or individual employees. These particular measures, however, do not take into account case difficulty or workload accomplished. The latter problem can be reduced by using cases actually *closed* or completed per man-year, but cases vary widely and the quality of their handling is difficult to assess.

With the sudden recent rediscovery by local governments of the industrial engineer, there is likely to be considerable effort in many local governments on applying work measurements and work standards (such as by use of time studies) to government activities. Some of this interest is bound to flow into the police area as work measurement specialists attempt to develop standards for everything countable. Such measures as "caseloads per investigator" or its more classic form for work standards, "number of man-hours per case" for specific categories of cases, will probably once again be scrutinized. Such measures are most appropriate where the product is relatively standardized, the procedures for obtaining that product are standardized, and quality standards are clear. Major problems in the police area will continue to be the great diversity of incidents and cases, thus requiring a wide variation in the amount of effort necessary to resolve cases and the consequent difficulty in adequately specifying characteristics for case handling.

Certain routine police activities, however, such as those involving clerical or certain data processing tasks, may well be

108

amenable to work standards which can help a department to improve the scheduling of such activities. Work measurement approaches might also help identify improved procedures that police could use for a variety of their activities. However, it does not seem likely that traditional work standards will be useful on a widespread basis in police departments.

Productivity measurement in such terms as "percent of police time spent on productive activities" is likely to be a measure of major concern to internal police management concerned with maximum efficient use of manpower. But difficulties abound in defining what are, and what are not, productive activities. The measure just named also raises a problem, in that it is not clear what the relation is between improvements in this measure and more effective crime control, i.e., crime reduction or apprehensions. Nevertheless, this measure can be useful to internal police management in evaluating certain types of productivity improvement efforts.

PROBLEMS WITH MEASURING THE APPROPRIATE INPUTS[27]

Thus far I have concentrated on problems and possibilities in measuring the output, or the impacts, of police control activities. There are also problems in calculating the amount of input — the number of man-years or dollars associated with the output. Even if output over input ratios are not always appropriate, it is always appropriate to compare resources applied against the various measures of police effectiveness.

In general it is desirable to relate outputs to both manpower and total dollars. The more traditional form of productivity measurement has been to use manpower alone as the input unit and thus determine labor productivity. However, local governments are interested in the productivity of all the resources at their disposal and thus will probably want to relate outputs to total dollars as well.

Some typical input measurement problems are listed below.

1. A major question is what to do about police resources applied to non-crime services, particularly traffic control, especially in the common situation where the same police officers carry out both crime and non-crime functions.

2. A similar problem exists for providing data on specific crime control activities, such as specific police units. Even more

---

[27]Some further discussion of problems with input measurement is contained in Reference 28, page 15ff, and Reference 50, page 13ff.

difficult to obtain is information on the resources applied to specific types of crimes, such as burglaries or robberies, where the same police employees may routinely switch from one crime to the other.

3. Overhead, support costs, and costs of equipment are also problems. Supervision, employee fringe benefits, vehicle maintenance, and equipment and vehicle purchases need to be considered when measuring output against total costs. For example, considering the use of mechanization, output per unit of manpower will rise, but when all costs are considered (including the increased equipment costs), the output per total dollar will show less of an improvement and perhaps even a worsening. Costs for facilities and equipment that are expected to last more than one year should probably be amortized in a fashion that avoids distorting the calculations for individual years. One approach is to develop an equivalent rental cost (already done in some localities, where police departments are charged for vehicles on a rental basis even though the vehicles are actually owned by the government).

Most local governments lack the cost-accounting systems necessary to provide man-hour or cost information for specific police activities. This author is reluctant to suggest extensive cost-accounting procedures, which could involve very detailed timekeeping by members of the police department. This could quickly become more costly and annoying than it is worth. However, some improvements in cost-accounting, combined with some cost *estimation* for special needs, seem generally appropriate.

In making comparisons from one year to the next on productivity measurements using dollars, adjustments for price increases should be made to provide "constant dollar" productivity comparisons.[28] However, governments are also concerned with current dollars (i.e., dollars unadjusted for price-level changes), and it seem appropriate to relate output to current dollars as well. Use of both constant and current dollar measures will permit governments to identify to what extent productivity changes are due to price increases.

---

[28] A local government can readily adjust its own prices from year to year, based on its salary and wage increases for various positions. The problem becomes considerably more difficult in making comparisons with other jurisdictions.

MEASUREMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES: SHOULD IT BE DONE AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS?

As mentioned earlier, most major police products will represent the joint efforts of many employees. Therefore, most productivity measurement should aim at the joint product and not at the contribution of each individual employee. Nevertheless, for *internal* police management purposes periodic examination of the productivity of individuals, if undertaken properly, may be appropriate. If undertaken, great care will be needed both to avoid antagonizing the work force and to avoid a measurement system that encourages employees to pervert the basic purposes of the agency.

Of particular interest are likely to be measurements for each individual of the following:

Apprehension

1a. Arrests, especially the number that pass the preliminary judicial screening, or
1b. The number that pass or are not rejected *for a police-related reason.*
2a. Percent of arrests that pass the preliminary judicial screening, or
2b. Percent of arrests that pass or are not rejected for a police-related reason.

Patrol Time

3. Percent of patrol time spent on activities contributing to patrol objectives (see Measure 2 in Exhibit 1).

The latter measure (3) is an indicator of efficiency; the former are indicators of effectiveness — at least of apprehension effectiveness.

There are many problems in such evaluations. The evaluations should be kept within the police department and used to guide efforts to improve the work force, preferably through encouraging improved performance by lower-rated individuals, such as through added training or assistance with particular individual difficulties that may be inhibiting performance.

Comparisons should, of course, be made primarily with other individuals working in similar units and under similar conditions. It is important to look carefully for the reasons for low performance. There may be good reasons for it. The employee may have been on sick leave during much of the period, may have been assigned to an area with a very low incidence of crime during the period (incident rates will vary by both location and

shift), may have worked an area where the mix of crime was such that arrests were comparatively few (assault, for example, being more likely to lead to arrest than larceny), or may have been involved in circumstances which resulted in others receiving credit for arrests in which the individual participated, etc. Demographic and economic factors, discussed in the next section, are also likely to be useful for interpreting performance individuals.

Our extensive examination of individual patrol officer performance in regard to arrests during 1971 was conducted by a police inspector in a large city police department. The study presented data on total number of felony arrests, total number of misdemeanor arrests, and total number of summonses issued for each patrol officer for each precinct and for each type of unit (e.g., motor units, scooter units, special anti-crime units, etc.)[29] Neighborhood conditions, such as crime rates and population density, were considered by persons familiar on a first-hand basis with them. Individual police officers who had low productivity were questioned as to the reasons. (Some of those reasons were fear of working on the street, lack of anyone taking them to task, couldn't work beyond formal duty hours because working on other jobs or taking care of children while wife was working a full-time job, etc.) No attempt was made in this study to determine whether the arrests were justified or not, including the disposition of arrests.

Quality-of-arrests determinations seem indispensable, however, when arrests are used as a productivity measure for individual police in order to avoid encouraging officers to make undesirable arrests.[30] The measure "number surviving the initial judicial screening" seems of considerable help here. However, a problem remains in determining whether proper judgment was exercised in those instances where the officer has discretion in making an arrest, e.g., in family arguments, fights between acquaintances, etc.[31] *Quality* here seems extremely difficult to measure quantitatively, since seldom will there be an independent, trained observer on the scene to make such ratings. For this aspect of arrest quality the judgment of the officer's supervisor seems the best, if not the only, option at this time. A possible scoring system (proposed in the recent LEAA Prescriptive Package on

---

[29] The report presents data with the names of individuals and appropriately is available only on a restricted basis.

[30] In addition to References 29 and 30, see, for example, Reference 12.

[31] Discussion of the discretion that police officers have in making arrests is contained in References 6, 8, 34, and 38.

Neighborhood Team Policing)[32] for rating the relative arrest productivity of different officers is shown in Exhibit 3.[33] This scoring system attempts to consider several dimensions of arrest importance and quality: general type of crime, disposition, and use of force (such as whether it was appropriate or led to unnecessary injury).

EXHIBIT 3
SAMPLE ARREST PRODUCTIVITY INDEX*

ACTIVITY	POINT SCORE	COMMENT
Parking violation	1	Do not count if dismissed.
Moving violation	2	Do not count if dismissed.
Misdeameanor arrest (no prosecution)	4	
Felony arrest (no prosecution)	8	
Misdemeanor arrest resulting in a prosecution (no conviction)	8	
Felony arrest (no conviction)	16	
Misdemeanor arrest (conviction)	12	
Felony arrest (conviction)	24	
Arrest without probable cause	−4 to −24	Minus score depends on seriousness of officer's error and frequency of previous error (do not count any positive points for the arrest).
Arrest involving the necessary use of physical force	+4	In addition to other points earned for the arrest. Do not count if the arrest was without probable cause.
Arrest of a dangerous individual without the use of force	+8	In addition to other point scores for the arrest.

*Source: Neighborhood Team Policing, by Peter B. Bloch and David Specht. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, December 1973.

---

[32] Reference 6, pp. 96-99.

[33] Much care and consideration is needed in developing such a scoring system. For instance, the example shown in Exhibit 3 may place too much importance on parking and traffic incidents, and encourage police to emphasize strict enforcement of parking and traffic violations, which probably can be achieved easily as compared to felony arrests.

EXHIBIT 3 (continued)

Arrest involving an arror in judgment causing injury or death to offender	−4 to −24	Minus score depends on seriousness of officer's effor and frequency of previous errors.
Arrest involving injury or death of bystander	−24 to −72	Minus score depends on seriousness of officer's error and frequency of previous errors.
Arrest of an individual for several previous offenses	−	Total points for all offenses up to a maximum score of 36, including points for prosecution or conviction. Also count points related to the use of force or avoidance of force in connection with the arrest.

Police investigative activities are likely to be particularly amenable to measurement of arrest production. I repeat here, however, that measurement of the productivity of individual employees (as with traditional performance appraisals) should be internal to the police agency, and there should be no public dissemination of names of individuals or information permitting such identification. When and if a police agency develops procedures for examining the productivity of individual police personnel, it should incorporate a procedure for careful interpretation of the reasons for apparent low productivity.

In undertaking such performance evaluation, participation by employees in developing the procedures seems necessary to alleviate the natural hostility and negative actions likely to occur if such procedures are installed unilaterally or without sufficient consideration of the interests of employees.

INTERPRETING PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT DATA

There are numerous approaches and techniques to data analysis. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these at length. [34] However, three aspects of analysis will be briefly addressed: (1) what a government might use for comparison to determine how "well" it is doing; (2) what other factors should be considered in assessing productivity; and (3) establishing targets for next year's productivity performance.

---

[34] For some examples of related analytical approaches, see Reference 19 and Chapter 4 of Reference 30.

Appropriate Comparisons[35]

(a) *Performance can be compared among time periods.* Such information will not become available until a measure has been used for more than one time period. If comparisons are made for periods less than a year, seasonal factors will need to be considered.

(b) *Comparisons among police districts, precincts, or population groups within a jurisdiction may be used.* Governments could use districts that perform well as targets for poorer performance districts. But since differences in performance may reflect inherent differences among the districts (or population groups) rather than differences in the effectiveness of the city service, comparisons of different population groups or service districts should take such factors into account. This is discussed further in the next subsection.

(c) *In some cases the performance of other governments will be available for comparison.* Such comparisons, of course, are valid only if the same measurements are used. For example, some data are available nationally on reported crime rates, clearance rates, and arrests (and recently some data have become available on victimization surveys). As more local governments undertake these measurements more information will become available for comparison. But comparisons will have to be made carefully because of the many differences between jurisdictions. Only in a few cases are national data currently available on a government-by-government basis, such as on reported crimes (and number of police employees). On other measures comparisons will have to be made with aggregate figures or by obtaining data directly from other jurisdictions, if available.

(d) *Comparisons might be made with estimates of how much change in productivity was anticipated by an advance analysis.* This may be an excellent approach, but it requires in-depth analysis, such as a projection of the likely costs and effectiveness of the jurisdiction's program. Actual performance could subsequently be compared with those that had been projected. Such studies, however, are likely to be feasible only in very selective circumstances.

The above comparisons can be used individually or in combination.

External Explanatory Factors Which Should Be Considered

Many factors other than police crime control efforts will

---

[35]This section is adapted from Reference 46, pp. 15-16.

affect such productivity measurements as crime and clearance rates. Such factors can change over time, can differ in various parts of a community, and can differ among communities. These factors may therefore account for some of the apparent differences in performance over time, among parts of a jurisdiction, or among jurisdictions. Thus, wherever possible, it is desirable to make allowances for such factors in interpreting whether performance is relatively good or bad.

(a) *Crime Prevention-Deterrence Measurements.* A variety of socio-economic-demographic characteristics of the population have been studied in attempts to identify factors that have strong correlation with crime rates. [36] These studies have primarily compared different cities in the United States to determine likely explanatory factors. Researchers have frequently assumed that factors such as size [37] and location (e.g., suburban vs. central city), number unemployed, number with low incomes, and sex and age mix (e.g., males between the ages of, say, 15 and 25), seem likely to be correlated with crime rates. If this is so, the performance of police agencies should be considered in the context of these factors. Crime rates in locations where existing factors were such that high crime rates should be expected, should be considered in that light, and vice versa. This is also likely to apply to different geographical areas within a single jurisdiction.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to synthesize the numerous research studies and statistical analyses in which possible correlations have been examined. My impression after examining some of these is that the results to date have been far from conclusive. Those correlations which have been discovered appear to explain only a small part of the variations in performance. [38] The results are not nearly sufficiently definitive to provide an individual government with what would be most useful, that is, norms, or a procedure for deriving them, for each jurisdiction based on its own particular characteristics.

Thus at this time the only useful suggestion I can make is for a government to continue to emphasize comparisons with other parts of the jurisdictions or other jurisdictions of roughly the

---

[36] For example, see References 4, 10, 15, 22, 23, 24, 30, 37, 39, 41, 42, and 47.

[37] For example, city size may affect salary levels and other costs and result in economies, or dis-economies of scale.

[38] Most such studies have had to depend on less than the most desirable data, such as having to use reported crime data rather than crime rate data derived from victimization surveys. Many studies have also been handicapped by old data on at least some of the variables considered.

116

same population and type and to monitor factors such as unemployment rates, disparity in income levels, racial changes, and to make judgment allowances when making these comparisons. This is unsatisfying and not very helpful, but it seems to be the only recourse until, and if, more useful findings become available that permit more definitive adjustments.

(b) *Apprehension Measurements.* Little statistical analysis, to my knowledge, has been done as to non-police factors that might help explain differences in arrest or clearances among jurisdictions or among sub-regions within a jurisdiction. One attempt is described in Reference 30. It indicates that the number of clearances per police employee was related to the number of index crimes per police employee.

Exhibit 4 illustrates graphically the finding. The rationale was that "the more cases a police officer has to solve, the more he should be expected to solve up to the point that he becomes saturated with work. This would be especially likely if it is true that a large portion of all crimes that get solved essentially solve themselves, or are easily solved by routine police work." [39]

The 1972 report suggested that individual jurisdictions compare their own current "number of clearances per employee" figures against a norm derived from an equation such as that shown in Exhibit 5. This equation was developed from the data shown in Exhibit 4. For example, a city with 150,000 population and 24 Index crimes per police employee could use 4.4 Index clearances per police employee as its own norm against which to compare its own performance. [40] That effort, however, was merely a preliminary analysis. If subsequent analysis indicates that this relationship generally holds, such an adjustment would seem worthy of consideration by individual communities. Of course, it only considers one of many factors (number of reported index crimes per police employee) as an explanatory variable.

That same report also suggested a procedure for obtaining a norm for suggested clearance rates based on national clearance rate data. Clearance rates on each particular Part I crime can, of course, be compared against the national averages reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. [41] However, if a jurisdiction wants

---

[39] See Reference 30, p. 57. The study included all employees of the department and not, for example, only investigative units.

[40] $(.161 \times 24) + .504 = 4.368$.

[41] Differences among local governments in data collection and reporting, as noted earlier, put these comparisons in some question, but as with crime rates, these national data are probably better than nothing.

EXHIBIT 4

INDEX CRIME CLEARANCES PER POLICE EMPLOYEE VS. REPORTED INDEX CRIMES
PER POLICE EMPLOYEE
(Cities of 100,000 — 250,000 population)
(1970)

Sources

No. of police employees and
index crimes: "Crime in the
United States, Uniform Crime
Reports-1970."
Index clearances: FBI, Uniform
Crime Reporting Section, data
sheets.

SOURCE: Reference 30, p. 50.

Y-axis: Index clearance per police employee (0 to 12)
X-axis: Reported index crimes per police employee (8 to 42)

EXHIBIT 5

RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
CLEARANCES PER POLICE EMPLOYEE VS. INDEX
CRIMES PER EMPLOYEE

For each case a straight line was fitted to the data using the least squares criterion. The equation for the line was $y = mx + b$, where:
  y = index clearances per police employee (at end of year)
  x = reported index offenses per police employee (at end of year)
  m, b = contents divided from the basic data on the cities

	City Population			
	1970			1965
	All Cities Over 100,000	100-250,000	Greater Than 250,000	Greater Than 250,000
m	.174	.161	.185	.179
b	.443	.504	.549	.889
r	.585	.493	.724	.655
r^2	.342	.242	.525	.432
No. of Cities Used in Sample	136	84	52	49
Statistical Significance	.01 level	.01 level	.01 level	.01 level

SOURCE: Reference 30, p. 60.

to examine its performance in aggregate over all Part I crimes, an easy calculation can be used. Clearance rates differ significantly among crime categories in the United States, ranging from clearance rates on the order of 10 to 20 percent for larceny to 50 to 80 percent for person-to-person crimes such as rape and murder.[42] From year to year, or from jurisdiction to

---

[42]See Reference 17.

jurisdiction, the mix of crimes can vary considerably. By multiplying the base-year national clearance rates (perhaps for jurisdictions in a given population range) by the specific number of reported crimes of each category in the jurisdiction for the year of interest, and then adding these, an aggregate norm is obtained for the number of clearances. This would then be compared to the actual total number of clearances for the jurisdication for the year of interest. Comparisons of the two numbers would indicate to what extent the clearances for the current year were better or worse than would be expected, based on the national averages.

Similarly, a local government could also compare its current aggregative Part I crime clearance rate against its *own* performance in some prior year. It would use the same procedure as noted above, except that the clearance rates of the *jurisdiction's base year* would be multiplied by the jurisdiction's current year's number of crimes of each category to give the aggregate norm. Note that these procedures are only necessary when looking at aggregative clearances, not clearances for individual types of crimes.

These two examples illustrate the approaches that individual governments might undertake to develop norms or standards for their own current performance. They are refinements over the more straight forward comparisons discussed in the section on *Appropriate Comparisons.*

Establishing Targets for Next Year's Productivity

The preceding section discussed comparisons that might be used to determine whether recent productivity has been relatively good or bad. Here, another approach will be discussed, that of establishing targets for productivity measures for the next time period (say the next year) against which the next year's actual productivity can be compared. A major purpose of target-setting is to encourage high-level performance. Recent use by many local governments of Management By Objectives (MBO) is one expression of the interest in this approach.

However, setting targets on certain productivity measures, such as those involving crime rates (which can be affected by many external factors), can be hazardous. Governments wanting to establish productivity targets should not do so casually. Targets should be set only after careful consideration of past experiences, what is feasible in light of the resources available, and specific police programs. It is highly desirable that targets be set with the participation of those who will be held responsible for meeting them. Targets that are too easy to meet will be of little use; targets that are unrealistic are likely to be frustrating to

120

all concerned. With little experience thus far in the United States on setting productivity targets of the type presented here, caution will be appropriate during the early stage of the use of these productivity measurements.

It is recommended that targets not be set on an "arrests per police-year" measure, if at the same time there is no "arrest that survived the initial judicial screening" measure. As discussed earlier, without the latter, the likelihood of perverse behavior detrimental to the community becomes too high.

Target setting on productivity for *individual* police employees is likely to be a very controversial issue, and should probably not be undertaken without intensive participation by the individual employees.

Miscellaneous Productivity Analysis Approaches

A number of attempts have been made to analyze public sector productivity statistically.[43] These attempts have for the most part been aimed at identifying determinants of changes in unit costs or aggregative patterns of changing productivity. They have generally been oriented towards inter-city issues. Thus far these approaches do not seem to have yielded procedures or data significantly useful to individual local governments for measuring their own productivity.

CAN PRODUCTIVITY DATA BE DEPENDED ON?

As the use of productivity measurement data for evaluating police performance becomes more common, particularly in helping to determine future wages and benefits, special precautions will become necessary to reduce the possibility of either unintentional error or intentional manipulations of data. Recently, when evaluators undertook an early examination of the new crime reduction performance incentive system in the City of Orange, California, they encountered extensive concern among many knowledgeable professionals, who believed that inevitably the police would be sorely tempted to manipulate crime report data in their favor (such as by non-reporting and alterations of crime categories in certain situations). In any case, public credibility is important for all concerned, public employees and city management alike.

---

[43]For an excellent summary of the work to date in this direction, see Reference 51. Of particular interest to local governments is its presentation of rough approximations to identify changes in unit costs that can be attributed to (a) workload changes, (b) cost-factor increases, and (c) quality-productivity.

Two approaches seem appropriate to prevent intentional or unintentional error. These should be used by police departments both to reinforce the credibility of the data they are providing and to avoid the scorn of the inevitable skeptics of the world. These two approaches are: (1) wherever possible, to provide for collection of data by an independent, disinterested source; and (2) to provide for external auditing of data.

1. Collection of data by independent, objective means is becoming more possible in local government. A major theme in crime reporting currently is the use of the victimization survey. Since such a survey inevitably will be conducted and directed by persons outside the police department, it would be an appropriate check on reported crime data (even if the police department sponsors and funds the survey as long as reputable survey professionals are used). Other data obtainable through a survey of citizens, such as feelings of security and citizen satisfaction with police handling of incidents, would also have the advantage of being objectively gathered.

2. Periodic auditing is familiar to local governments but usually is limited to financial matters. However, as productivity measurement becomes more important, it will also be necessary to undertake periodic audits of procedures and practices. Some states already call for auditing of crime reports. The drawback here is that this can be expensive. To reduce the expense, such auditing could involve sampling techniques and not cover all procedures (and all incidents) each year. Instead, periodic, unscheduled audits, perhaps even performed by the staff of some central city staff office, might be undertaken. It is particulary important to check for misclassification or miscounting of crimes, arrests and clearances and sloppy recordkeeping or changes in classification practices. For example, one eastern police department found that a clerk was counting as cleared those cases that were routinely closed after a few years, even though no arrest had been made. (This made comparisons of past and present figures meaningless.)

SOME SUMMARY THOUGHTS

Measuring police crime control productivity is now a very unsatisfying activity. Nevertheless, substantial improvements over current general practices seem possible for local governments. The major improvements seem to be as follows:

1. Though the "number of crimes deterred" is not currently measurable, improvement in measuring the number of crimes seems possible through victimization surveys. The key issue appears to be whether smaller, less detailed, surveys than those undertaken by the federal government are sufficient so that individual cities and counties could, on at least an annual basis, undertake such surveys. Initial experiences are encouraging but not yet by any means conclusive.

2. For measuring apprehension productivity, at least two improvements seem desirable. First, indicators of the quality of arrests seem highly desirable, perhaps in part based on arrest survival at the initial judicial screening. Secondly, all *man-crimes* should be accounted for in determining a really comprehensive and proper *clearance* rate (that is, a crime should not be counted as completely solved until all criminals involved in the crime have been apprehended and with a *satisfactory* disposition). Reasons for *non-satisfactory* disposition should be regularly examined by police for a variety of management purposes.

3. Other measures of police performance, involving citizen feedback, can be obtained from the same citizen survey used to obtain data on the number of unreported crimes. These include indications of citizen feelings of security, and citizen perception of the rapidity, courteousness, and fairness of police in response to both crime and non-crime calls.

4. Work measurement and work standards appear to be trends for local governments. Though likely to have limited applicability to most major police activities, they are likely to have some influence in helping to identify preferred procedures (on relatively routine activities). In certain activities, such as clerical activities, work standards may be appropriate.

5. Measures of the productivity of *individual* police employees are likely to increase in use but should be used very cautiously probably only as an internal management tool for constructive improvements. Indicators of the productivity of individual police employees, especially individual police officers, raise the same problems as measures of total police productivity. Arrest counts seem appropriate, but should be screened as to their quality, e.g., the number and percent that pass the initial judicial screening. Supervisors should carefully consider the circumstances surrounding arrest counts. They should

123

consider such factors as the opportunity to make arrests each individual had and the various circumstances involved.

6. No commonly accepted standards or norms exist for interpreting how *good* current levels of productivity are. However, the following are likely to be useful: comparisons of current performance with past performance, comparisons of performance of (similar) police districts or similar units, comparisons with similar jurisdictions that collect similar performance data and, when available, comparisons with the performance projections made in in-depth analyses. Consideration, of course, should be given to external and non-controllable circumstances, such as varying demographic and economic characteristics. Unfortunately, there are few tools other than subjective judgment currently available to guide governments in adjusting to such special circumstances.

7. Measurements should be subject to periodic auditing, both to ensure the quality of the information obtained and to reinforce public credibility.

There appears to be little question that local governments can improve their productivity measurement practices. Many of the procedures noted above can readily be scaled down to be useful to even the smallest jurisdictions. However, if the government, for whatever reasons, cannot or is not interested in using productivity measurement information for making decisions regarding improvements in either the costs or outputs of police services, or has not developed the data for some future analytical purpose, the undertaking of the procedures would be a costly waste.

REFERENCES

1. Ahern, James F. "Crime and the Police," Chapter 6 from *Police in Trouble.* New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc. 1972.
2. Albright, Ellen et al. *Criminal Justice Research: Evaluation in Criminal Justice Programs, Guidelines and Examples.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. June 1973.
3. Anderson, Ralph E. *Police Standards and Goals.* International Association of Chiefs of Police. Gaithersburg, Md. Undated.
4. Beaton, W. Patrick. "The Determinants of Police Protection Expenditures." *National Tax Journal.* Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (June 1974).
5. Biderman, Albert D. "Surveys of Population Samples for Estimating Crime Incidence." *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science.* Vol. 374 (November 1967).
6. Bloch, Peter B. and David Specht. *Neighborhood Team*

Policing. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Washington, D.C. December 1973.

7. Blumstein, Alfred. *Seriousness Weights in an Index of Crime.* Carnegie-Mellon University Urban Systems Institute. Pittsburgh. January 1974.

8. Bozza, Charles M. "Motivations Guiding Policemen in the Arrest Process." *Journal of Police Science and Administration.* Vol. 1 (1973).

9. Chaiken, Jan M. et al. *The Impact of Police Activity on Crime: Robberies on the New York City Subway System.* New York: New York City RAND Institute. January 1974. (R-1424)

10. Chilton, Roland J. "Continuity in Delinquency Area Research Comparison of Studies for Baltimore, Detroit, and Indianapolis." *American Sociological Review.* Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1964).

11. City of Kansas City, Missouri. *Annual Report of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department.* 1970.

12. City of New York, New York. *City of New York Police Department Evaluation Guide.* Undated (about 1974).

13. City of St. Petersburg, Florida. *Multi-Service Citizen Survey for the City of St. Petersburg.* Office of Management and Budget, St. Petersburg, Florida. January 1974.

14. City of Sunnyvale, California. *Performance Auditing Project: Public Safety Function.* September 1974.

15. Council on Municipal Performance. "City Crime." *Municipal Performance Report.* May-June 1973, with June 1974 Supplement. Also discussed in "City Crime: Report of Council on Municipal Performance." *Criminal Law Bulletin.* Vol. 9, No. 7 (1973).

16. Dodge, Richard W. and Anthony G. Turner. "Methodological Foundations for Establishing a National Survey of Victimization." Speech presented at the 1971 American Statistical Association meeting, August 23-26, 1971.

17. Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Crime in the United States: Uniform Reports, 1973.* Published annually.

18. ＿＿＿ *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook: How to Prepare Uniform Crime Reports.* Washington, D.C. January 1974.

19. Greenwood, Peter W. *An Analysis of the Apprehension Activities of the New York City Police Department.* New York: New York City RAND Institute. September 1970. (R-529)

20. Hindlang, Michael J. "The Uniform Crime Reports Revisited." *Journal of Criminal Justice.* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1974).

21. Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants. *Output*

Measurement Discussion Papers, Vol. 3, "Police and Protection." London. December 1972.

22. Jones, E. Terrence. "Evaluating Everyday Policies: Police Activity and Crime Incidence." *Urban Affairs Quarterly.* Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1973).

23. _____. "The Impact of Crime Rate Changes on Police Protection Expenditures in American Cities." *Criminology.* Vol. II, No. 4 (February 1974).

24. Kakalik, James S. and Sorrel Wildhorn. *Aids to Decision-making in Police Patrol.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporatior February 1971 (R-593)

25. Kelling, George L. et al. *The Kansas City Prevention Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report.* The Police Foundation. Washington, D.C. October 1974.

26. Lind, Robert C. and John P. Lipsky. "The Measurement of Police Output: Conceptual Issues and Alternative Approaches." *Law and Contemporary Problems: Police Practices.* Duke University. Vo. XXXVI (Autumn 1971).

27. Morgan, J. M., Jr. and R. Scott Fosler. "Police Productivity." *Police Chief.* Vol. XLI, No. 7 (July 1974).

28. National Commission on Productivity. *Improving Productivity and Productivity Measurement in Local Governments.* Washington, D.C. June 1971.

29. _____. *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services.* Washington, D.C. 1973.

30. The Urban Institute. *The Challenge of Productivity Diversity: Improving Local Government Productivity Measurement and Evaluation, Part III: Measuring Police-Crime Control Productivity.* National Commission on Productivity. National Technical Information Service, PB223117 (June 1972).

31. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. *Crime in Eight American Cities.* Washington, D.C. July 1974.

32. _____. *Crimes and Victims: A Report on the Dayton-San Jose Pilot Survey of Victimization.* Washington, D.C. June 1974.

33. Ostrom, Elinor, "On the Meaning and Measurement of Output and Efficiency in the Provision of Urban Police Services." *Journal of Criminal Justice.* Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1973).

34. Parnas, Raymond. "Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family Violence." *Law and Contemporary Problems: Police Practices.* Duke University. Vol. XXXVI (Autumn 1971).

35. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1967.

36. Press, S. James. *Some Effects of an Increase in Police Manpower in the 20th Precinct of New York City.* New York

City Rand Institute. October 1971. (R-704)

37. Quinney, Richard. "Structural Characteristics, Population Areas, and Crime Rates in the United States." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science.* Vol. 52, No. 1 (September 1966).

38. Rubenstein, Jonathan. *City Police.* New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 1973.

39. Scarr, Harry A. et al. *Criminal Justice Research: Patterns of Burglary.* 2nd ed. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1973.

40. Schaenman, Philip S. "Measuring Police Effectiveness in Crime Control." Draft final report to National Science Foundation. The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. August 8, 1974.

41. Schmid, Calvin F. "Urban Crime Areas: Parts I and II." *American Sociological Review.* Vol 25. Nos. 4 and 5 (August and October 1960, respectively).

42. Schuessler, Karl and Gerald Slatin. "Sources of Variation in U.S. City Crime, 1950 and 1969." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency.* Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1964).

43. Sellin, Johan Thorsten and Marvin E. Wolfgang. *The Measurement of Delinquency.* New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1964.

44. Shoup, Donald C. and Stephen L. Mehay. *Program Budgeting for Urban Police Services.* Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California-Los Angeles. Los Angeles, California. 1971.

45. Turner, Anthony G. *The San Jose Methods Test of Known Crime Victims.* Statistics Division Technical Series Report No. 1, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. July 1971.

46. Urban Institute and International City Management Association project team *Measuring the Effectiveness of Basic Municipal Services: Initial Report.* Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association. February 1974.

47. Walzer, Norman. "Economies of Scale and Municipal Police Services: The Illinois Experience." *Review of Economics and Statistics.* Vol. 54, No. 4 (November 1972).

48. Ziesel, Hans. "The Future of Law Enforcement Statistics: A Summary View." Chapter 12 from *Federal Statistics: Report of the President's Commission.* Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1971.

49. Schaenman, Philip S. "Police Productivity Measurement: Initial Approaches and Practical Problems." *Proceedings of the Criminal Justice Symposium Focusing on Police Produc-*

tivity, Lehigh University. July 19, 1974. To be published.

50. Hatry, Harry P. "On Measuring Local Government Efficiency (A Preliminary Examination)." Draft final report to National Science Foundation. The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. August 8, 1974.

51. Ross, John P. and Jesse Burkhead. *Productivity in the Local Government Sector.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books (D.C. Health & Co.). 1974.

52. Bloch, Peter B. and Deborah Anderson. *Policewomen on Patrol Final Report.* The Police Foundation. Washington, D.C. May 1974.

53. Bloch, Peter B. *Equality of Distribution of Police Services – A Case Study of Washington, D.C.* Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, February 1974.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING
A PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM

James P. Morgan

Although the terms *productivity measurement* and *productivity improvement* may seem new to police work, many police departments have been practicing them for years. Consider, for instance, the use of differential manning by some departments. By varying manpower according to need at different times of the day, these departments have shown an awareness of the need to get the maximum return from available resources. While differential manning is seldom referred to as *productivity improvement,* that is in fact what it is.

For the most part, however, productivity improvement in police work has been limited to a small range of problems. The current economic crunch means that all departments are going to have to adopt productivity improvement as an overall, continuous goal. Productivity programs offer the police manager the opportunity to assure maximum utilization of tax dollars. What is needed, therefore, is an organized analytical approach to productivity, with the commitment, as well as endorsement, of the chief.

Productivity improvement is only half of the productivity process. The other half, and what must come first, is productivity measurement. For too long the fame and fortune — by that I mean the tenure and budget — of police chiefs have been tied to the performance indicator known as the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Most city officials have continued to judge the quality of police service provided their citizens by comparing their own city's UCR figures with those in other cities. The police have helped perpetuate the use of this unreliable evaluative tool by not developing more realistic measurements of police work. By

---

James P. Morgan, former public safety director of St. Petersburg, Florida, is chairman of the NCOP's Advisory Group on Productivity and associate professor at Virginia Commonwealth University.

adopting productivity measurements that deal with all aspects of police work, police administrators have the opportunity to free themselves of the UCR albatross.

The purpose of this paper is to outline a method that can be used by police administrators to install a program of productivity measurement and improvement. But first it is necessary to clear up some common misconceptions about productivity.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

The first misconception is that police departments do not need productivity improvement programs because improvements will occur automatically through the existing management process. This is not the case. Let us look at two examples.

For years police executives and police officers themselves have complained about the amount of time wasted by officers waiting in courtrooms for their cases to be called. Instead of acquiescing in this situation the New York City Police Department decided to do something about it. First, the department studied the situation and found that approximately 45 percent of the officers scheduled to appear in court were not actually needed. Second, the department worked out a system with the prosecutors and courts which eliminated some 28,000 police appearances in one year. Translated into dollars, the new system saved the department close to $4 million in one year. This change did not just happen. It was caused by people who realized that time and money were being wasted.

The other example does not involve the police, but I think it will be helpful nonetheless. For years commuters using certain bridges and tunnels paid for the privilege each time they crossed. It didn't take much "research" to determine that there would be little, if any, loss in revenue if the toll were doubled and collected only at one crossing. This innovation was nothing more than a variation of the round-trip ticket long used by railroads, airlines, and bus companies. But it didn't just happen. Someone had to ask if there were a better way to do things.

Another misconception is that productivity measurement and improvement are limited to manufacturing industries, where output is easily measured. It is of course easier to measure output of cars or refrigerators than it is to measure services. But in police work there is already some measurement of services, for instance, the measurement of police response time to calls for service. Other government agencies have also started learning how to measure services, beginning with easy ones like the number of tons of trash collected in a day by a sanitation worker. Going beyond response time or number of arrests or tons of trash is

130

harder, but there are service outputs in policing that can be measured in order to gauge positive or negative change.

The National Commission of Productivity discovered, for instance, that the Detroit Police Department now uses a closed-circuit television system monitored by police trainees for stationhouse security. It cost $1.1 million to install and staff the system. Before that, Detroit was using 130 officers to protect stationhouses at a cost of $2.6 million. The new system has not only saved $1.5 million but also has meant better surveillance, since television cameras don't feel the cold the way human beings do.

A third misconception, and possibly the most significant one, is that organized labor will automatically oppose productivity programs. We all know that advances in technology and productivity have caused manpower dislocations. Since unions are protective of their members, they will naturally ask questions about any changes that affect the rank and file. But as I see it, police union opposition to productivity measurement and improvement does not exist to any great degree, and it will not arise if police managers are careful when they introduce and implement these concepts. Later in this paper I will suggest how to handle any union anxieties that may arise.

A fourth misconception that should be put to rest is the belief that smaller police agencies do not lend themselves to productivity improvements. It is true that smaller departments will not be able to achieve the substantial savings cited in the New York and Detroit examples. But the value of a productivity program is relative. The St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department put approximately five percent more sworn officers on the street in 1972 after establishing programs that eliminated one-third of all paperwork and allowed officers to dictate the rest over the phone into special equipment. Another department, with less than 50 officers, reduced sick leave resulting from traffic accidents by 15 percent in one year. The department did this by introducing a defensive driving course for its officers; that made more workdays available, a good first step in increasing productivity.

The last misconception is that it is useless to start a productivity program if experienced professional productivity analysts are not available or cannot be hired due to lack of funds. Outside analysts with experience and training can certainly bring valuable qualities to a department and may well pay for themselves over a period of time. But even if a department cannot hire outside analysts, alternatives do exist.

PLANNING A PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM

Decisions involving the scope, structure, resources, and con-

131

tent of a productivity program should be made early but remain flexible. What must always be kept in mind is that better service is the primary objective and that earlier decisions may need to be modified as a program moves forward.

One of the earliest decisions to be made in planning a program is where to place administrative responsibility. A similar decision had to be made in the 1960's, when community relations programs were introduced into police organizations. The decision about administrative responsibility for productivity programs should be the same as it was for community relations programs. That is, administrative responsibility for productivity should be kept as close to the top of the department as possible during the early stages of a program.

In most departments, particularly larger departments, this will mean installing a productivity manager with direct access to and a close working relationship with the chief. The productivity manager will probably be someone already employed by the department and handling administrative responsibilities, such as an administrative assistant to the chief. (In St. Petersburg, with which I happen to be especially familiar, the department's chief of planning and development also served as the productivity manager.) In smaller departments the chief might possibly serve as the productivity manager.

The chief who appoints someone else as productivity manager cannot afford to take a casual attitude toward the program, however. Productivity programs, like community relations programs, suggest that they are being instituted because regular methods are not working. This may or may not be the case, but the chief must understand productivity concepts and be able to explain the department's program to the news media, the public, and most importantly, city officials. This ability may become particularly crucial if the program is slow in showing positive results.

Later in the program, possibly after two or three years, administrative responsibility for productivity can be delegated downward through the ranks. Ultimately, certain aspects of such programs can even become the responsibility of officers on the street.

After fixing administrative responsibility within the department, the next step is to line up the resources necessary to operate a productivity program. The productivity unit's chief need will be for personnel with the ability to conduct in-depth studies of police operations through the use of techniques commonly employed by industrial engineers, professional planners, systems analysts, and accountants. The size and composition of the productivity staff will vary, of course, from

132

department to department. Conceivably, in a very small department the chief might be personally responsible for everything from planning through implementation and monitoring. But most departments will probably have the capacity of creating a productivity staff with at least one trained productivity analyst.

Because productivity analysis techniques include such things as time-and-motion study and flow-charting, it may be thought that I am suggesting a return to the "scientific measurement" once championed by Frederick Taylor, who emphasized that the individual had to adapt to the organization and not the organization to the individual. But I am not suggesting that. The concepts of productivity measurement and improvement in public services take into account the fact that the productivity goals of an individual worker and those of an organization are not necessarily the same. The measurement and improvement techniques are not an end in themselves but rather a part of the dynamics of change.

The position, or positions, of productivity analyst should be filled by persons with the academic training and professional experience necessary to analyze productivity. It makes very good sense to consider hiring such persons from the private sector. In private industry, where increased productivity can mean increased profits, there are many analysts who have learned the special probing skills necessary for productivity programs.

An outside analyst's lack of knowledge about police management and procedures might even be an asset. Consider what the reaction of such an analyst might be when confronted with the widely debated question of whether to use one- or two-officer patrol cars. In all probability the analyst would be told that the use of two-officer car is based on the hazards that can be expected to confront this type of police unit in a particular area during certain times of the day. The analyst might well ask how the hazard data have been collected and if they are still current. The analyst might ask as well if there were any firm data to prove that the second officer had in fact increased the safety of the unit. Or the analyst might ask an even tougher question: is it possible that the second officer has caused the patrol unit to become more aggressive, thus increasing the potential hazards to two-officer patrol cars?

While analysts from the private sector are desirable, their absence should not be the only reason for failing to introduce productivity programs. After all, if the availability of experienced criminal justice planners had been the sole criterion for implementing the funding of the Safe Streets Act, most departments would still be waiting for their first LEAA grant.

In many cases police departments already have personnel who

are performing productivity analysis even though they are not called productivity analysts. Employees engaged in determining the locations of frequent traffic accidents in order to improve traffic enforcement or in evaluating crime data to determine the possible location of future stake-outs are obviously doing analytical work. One department that I know of has a "meter maid" who spends two hours each day in a very basic analytical task. She marks reported crimes on a location map in the read-off room for the information of the patrol division. The point is that police agencies already have employees, sworn or otherwise, who have the potential ability to handle more varied and broader tasks in productivity measurement and improvement.

There are also other places where a police department might find productivity analysts. Other agencies within the local government may have analysts who could be borrowed, at least temporarily, on a part-time or full-time basis. A call or visit to a local college or university might turn up a faculty member or even a graduate student who could devote a significant amount of time to analysis.

In addition to one or more analysts, a productivity program will need one or more project coordinators. These coordinators might be a regular part of the productivity unit, or they might work part-time in the unit while devoting the rest of their time to their customary duties. Then too, the productivity manager might even act as the project coordinator for a particularly important project. I might just mention here that about nine different projects were underway at the peak of the productivity improvement effort in St. Petersburg, and all of them utilized in-house personnel who continued to handle their normal assignments.

The creation of a productivity unit within a police department may require certain other adjustments in personnel and equipment. One department, for instance, might want to move its unit into adjoining offices with a supporting staff including secretaries and computer operators. Another department might need only an office for the project manager and contract out its computer work.

My references to managers, analysts, coordinators, and supporting staff may have suggested that the costs involved in introducing a productivity program are prohibitive. This is not so, however. The creation of such a program will depend upon the normal availability of resources, combined with a department's need or desire to improve productivity. Of course, as the National Commission on Productivity has pointed out, the creation of a productivity unit which costs more than the anticipated savings is the very opposite of productivity improve-

134

ment. One rule of thumb suggested by the Commission is that a department employ one analyst for each 200 employees. Departments with less than 200 employees should consider part-time analysts. In order to keep costs down it is also important to fix the responsibility for each improvement project with a specific analyst as well as the productivity unit in general.

Choosing Targets

At the same time that a productivity management unit is being set up, the top command in the department should be considering potential areas for productivity measurement and improvement. Several areas where productivity analysis seems likely to be particularly useful are discussed below.

• *Operations that involve large numbers of employees who perform routine and repetitive tasks.* These include such operations as parking regulation enforcement, traffic direction at school crossings, house checks, and report typing. For operations like these, consideration should be given to hiring civilians to take the place of uniformed personnel. The chief factors to be taken into account are net cost and efficiency. If a $6,000-a-year civilian replaces a uniformed desk officer who earns $20,000 a year there would be no savings if the substitution is not really one for one; that is, if it actually takes two civilians earning a combined $12,000 a year to replace the one uniformed officer. If, however, these two civilians can increase output by more than 25 percent over that of the officer there is an overall net increase in productivity, assuming the quality of work is the same.

• *Functions that consume large numbers of manhours.* The most obvious of these, of course, is patrol. But patrol, in all probability, will not be scrutinized to see if the number of manhours devoted to it can be reduced since the visibility of the patrol force often draws more public attention than the quality of its performance. When it was reported that only 1,000 of New York City's 31,000 police officers were on street patrol at any one time, that statistic was widely quoted; the quality of police patrol performance, on the other hand, is rarely discussed.

Thus, a department may first want to determine what proportion of its sworn officers are assigned to street patrol and how much of their patrol time is actually spent on the street. Is an abnormally high percentage of patrol time spent in court? Is the time spent at traditional roll-calls productive in any way? Would it save patrol time if police cars filled up at the nearest private gas station instead of the city's pumps?

Within the routine patrol function there are also certain tasks that require an abnormally high expenditure of manhours. Two of these are accident investigations and arrests for public

drunkeness. What would happen if patrol officers no longer automatically investigated every non-injury accident or arrested every drunk they came across? It could be that a reduction of 50 percent in the time patrol officers spend on these two duties could supply the extra manpower many departments need for more critical purposes.

In addition to looking at the quantitative aspects of patrol, departments should consider the quality of their patrol work. The recent study of routine patrol in Kansas City, Missouri, has challenged longstanding assumptions, and other departments might do well to consider the effectiveness of their own routine patrol. They might ask themselves whether additional uniformed officers made available through other productivity improvements should be assigned to routine preventive patrol or to directed patrol, investigations, or security checks.

● *Functions that normally result in backlogs of work.* A typical case here is the filling out of reports. By investigating the purpose of each type of traditionally required report, a chief may find, for example, that employees are doing work for insurance companies which should be required to hire their own clerks. Some reports may simply be satisfying the curiosity of certain staff members who want to know everything that is going on regardless of their responsibility for it. Other reports may pile up needlessly because no one ever made a decision to discontinue those no longer needed.

In many instances the caseload of investigators or detectives can be considered backlogs. When these employees are assigned new cases, will they begin by going out and asking the victim and the witnesses to a crime the same questions that have already been put to them by a patrol officer? Wouldn't it make more sense to have the uniformed officer who makes the initial investigation follow through on a case? The "two-platoon" system has been accepted as standard operating procedure in many departments, but it is ripe for examination under any productivity program. So too is the practice of keeping cases open when further investigation would in effect lead to a dead-end. For example, if the prosecutor declines to prosecute certain types of cases, how much effort should detectives expend on such cases?

● *Areas where unit costs are high.* Sometimes such costs can be justified; but if they cannot be, consideration should obviously be given to their reduction or elimination. There is little logic, for instance, in providing every officer with a fully equipped pursuit vehicle, regardless of assignment. A fully staffed and equipped photography lab may be a prestige asset to a police department, and a police administrator may contend that police photographs

136

have to be handled confidentially, but isn't it perhaps possible that an outside laboratory could both meet the confidentiality requirements and do the job more cheaply?

Spending $2,000 to send an officer to a training program offered by a prestige institution when approximately the same program is offered locally for $200 is a high price to pay for a fancy lapel pin. What is even worse is that the $2000-officer often becomes the sole custodian of the knowledge acquired at the training program. A formal system for diffusing the knowledge acquired at a training program can greatly increase the output produced from the time and money invested.

Telling the Staff

As a police department begins to create a productivity unit and select targets for productivity measurement and improvement, it should also make certain to notify its employees of its general intentions and to ask for their support and assistance. The larger a department is, the more difficult it will be to involve all employees in the planning process. Nonetheless, the employees of a department are a highly valuable resource, and some method should be devised for channeling upward the many suggestions for productivity improvement that they are likely to make. In Kansas City, for instance, task forces composed largely of precinct-level officers were created to propose possible improvements; other cities have used similar mechanisms. Employee participation at all levels should be encouraged from the planning phase onward.

It is especially important that officials of the police union or police officers' organization be consulted and asked for their support. This should not be done simply to prevent union opposition. It should be done because the union can often provide valuable insight into problems, and the resolution of those problems, within a police department. The city administration should also be given the courtesy of early notification and a request for support through the customary channels.

IMPLEMENTING A PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM

Once a police chief has established a productivity management unit, provided it with staff, identified possible targets for productivity improvement, and involved employees, union officials, and the city administration, he should be ready to implement the productivity program. The implementation phase has two principal parts. The first is the setting of productivity objectives and the determination of strategies to meet these objectives. The second is to determine what data need to be

collected to show whether or not the strategies are leading to improved productivity. This, of course, is productivity measurement.

Setting Objectives

Several general rules exist for determining specific productivity objectives. The first is that the objectives should be realistic. This means that the objectives should be attainable with available or projected resources. Police departments must be concerned with the probabilities of success in attaining objectives for the simple reason that early failures can seriously hinder continuation of a productivity program.

Another rule is that the objectives should be quantifiable for measurement purposes. An objective which is so vague that progress toward it cannot be measured is clearly of little use. This does not mean, however, that police departments should set only productivity objectives, such as an increase in arrest rates, that can be measured in traditional terms. Some objectives will require the development by departments themselves of new means of measurement.

A third rule is that a specific period of time should be allotted for achieving each objective. While a productivity program should be continuous, productivity objectives should not be. Otherwise, obviously, those responsible for achieving any particular objective will have little incentive to do so.

Fourth, the setting of objectives should take into consideration the fact that once the time period for achieving them has ended it must be possible to evaluate the strategies used and the progress made in achieving the objectives.

Who sets the objectives? This is actually a two-part process. The first is a memorandum from the chief to all division heads outlining the overall productivity goals of the department (determined after consideration of potential targets for productivity improvement) and asking each division head for divisional objectives, indicators that can be measured, a timetable, and an action plan.

The second step in the process is a memorandum from each division head answering the chief's memorandum. Although division heads should exercise a degree of influence over the setting of objectives, the police officers who must carry out the objectives should play a major role in their development.

Exhibit A shows some of the objectives developed by the first team policing unit created in St. Petersburg in 1972. It is interesting to note that these, and other objectives represented input from all 23 members of the original team.

138

EXHIBIT A

KRA's	INDICATORS	SHORT-TERM OBJECT
Police/Community Relations Program	Number of Police/ Community Relations Programs	To develop or maintain six (6) Police/Community Relations Programs no later than 1/30/73 at a cost not to exceed the present budgetary limitation.
Manpower Availability	Number of Team members available for service at any given time	To make certain that one-half on-duty personnel is available at all times, no later than 4/10/73 at a cost not exceeding budgetary limitations.
	Amount of response time on all calls for service	To maintain a two- or three-minute response time during 1973 to all calls for service in the Team.

ACTION PROGRAMS

Police/Community Relations Programs

A Police/Community Relations Program — "Operation 'Cool-it' " — was operational in the Team during the school vacation time in 1972. It will be continued next summer. It involves children from 2 years to approximately 12 years who enjoy playing in sprinklers that are connected to fire hydrants.

A Police/Community Relations Program — "Neighborhood Assistant Organization" — will become operational in January 1973. It will involve all interested and able citizens in the Team area. They will be given 15 hours of training by Team members (Team concept, radio procedures, Team procedures), and will ride with Team members and play an active part in their programs.

A monthly Team area businessmen meeting will be held to acquaint businessmen with the operations of the Team. Helpful suggestions will be exchanged with the aim of developing a solid working relationship. To start 11/1/72.

A monthly community meeting will commence in January 1973. This will help to educate and inform all members of the community in the Team operations. Again, information will be exchanged which will strengthen the relationship.

A softball league has been established to attract boys from ages 14 through 17. Six teams composed of 115 boys played during the summer months of 1972. Team members and businessmen played an active part in the program co-sponsoring the league which is called the "Public Safety

Junior Softball League." To be continued and expanded during 1973.

A $750 two-year scholarship to St. Petersburg Junior College has been formed. This will be awarded to a youth from the Adam Team. The subject of "need" will be incorporated into the qualification requirements. The monies are provided by the Police Athletic League.

Manpower Availability

There will be no traditional "stand up roll call" practiced in the Team. The members will be required to check themselves on duty and check into service.

There will be no traditional "stand up read-off" practiced in the Team. The members will be required to acquaint themselves with past and future police activities. Both this and the above plan should prevent the long periods of time spent in these two functions which delays the members' appearance on the street.

Team members will remain in service in the Team area until called in by the relief unit. This will prevent the lack of manpower in service at shift change.

Each Team member will have his own portable radio. This will allow him to exit his vehicle and familiarize himself with the community members and problems while still remaining in contact with communications for calls for service.

The Team has averaged 2.61 minutes response time to all calls for service. The above programs will help to maintain this rate. (KRA means Key Result Areas and represents areas of specific accountability. Indicators are measurable aspects which reflect specific outputs. Short Term Objectives set the target date for implementation of specific programs. Action Plans spell out how the desired results will be accomplished.)

Data Collection

Before productivity can be improved, data must be collected to show current baseline productivity levels. In some cases police departments will find that they cannot measure current productivity because the information needed is not being collected. If that is the case, methods must be developed to gather such data. For instance, an attempt to match manpower with calls for service means that calls will have to be classified as to type, time of day, and day of week. If this information is not available, immediate corrective action should be taken.

The determination of current productivity levels will also

140

show where improvements need to be made, provided that a department has already set its general goals. In other words, if current productivity in an area is below the department goal there, obviously that area of service is a place to focus upon improvement. The determination of current productivity is also necessary to establish a plane against which change can be measured on a continuous basis during the improvement process.

Productivity measurements, however, should not be used to compare one police department with another. Instead, they should be considered only as in-house management tools for the benefit of each individual department. The reason for this is that political, demographic, and geographic differences will affect even jurisdictions of similar size in different ways.

The reduction of police response time to calls from 12 to six minutes in one jurisdiction, for instance, may not be as significant as a reduction from four to three minutes in another jurisdiction if the one-minute reduction results in a marked increase in arrests and convictions. A comparison of improvements in response times may also be faulty for another reason. One department may be able to cut its response time in half with a relatively small expenditure of funds, while another department may have to make a very large expenditure to do likewise, thus cutting into funds that might be used elsewhere to achieve more substantial productivity gains.

One more thing should be said about the collection of productivity data. Traditional manpower utilization studies are concerned primarily with the output, as compared to the resources, of an individual worker or a production unit. While this is valuable, functional analysis in police work must go beyond such typical measurements and look at relationships between parts of a system.

Suppose, for instance, that the installation of burglar alarms in all the major commercial establishments of a city results in a dramatic increase in arrests and convictions. The possibility still exists that the installation of the alarms was not as productive as it appears on the surface. What must also be determined is how much time police spent in answering false alarms set off by faulty alarms, careless employees, or both. It may be discovered that while arrest and conviction rates rose, the increase was achieved at the cost of increased nonproductive police time. Furthermore, the time and effort wasted by police in answering false alarms may have resulted in an increase in response time to other kinds of emergency calls. Thus, evaluation of a program means that the total resources committed to its achievement must be considered.

What follows in Exhibit B is an analysis of a productivity program which arms a police administrator with facts rather than

141

opinions based on tradition.

EXHIBIT B

Objective:

More officers on the street available for "real" (dangerous) police work.

Function to be Analyzed:

Calls for police service.

Question:

Are there non-dangerous calls that could be handled by non-sworn personnel at a substantial savings in sworn personnel time?

Analysis:

a. Identify non-dangerous calls by examining the type of calls that, in the past, have resulted in hazardous conditions for officers. These should have been recorded; if not, look at every assault on an officer in the recent past and then determine what type of call instigated his appearance at the scene. Consider what type of call *could be* considered potentially dangerous (input here from employees and employee organizations by means of an open-ended survey and, if necessary, actual discussions on the subject).

b. Determine the number of each type of non-dangerous call received over a specific time (usually month or year — averages determined by adequate sample will suffice).

c. The time of day these calls will be most frequent.

d. The amount of time officers now spend on this type of call. This information should be available for all calls; if not, institute necessary procedures at communication center.)

Conclusion:

a. There are x number of non-dangerous calls that normally do not require the utilization of sworn officers. They include lost/found property; contact messages; animal complaints;

142

dangerous obstructions; pranks, etc.

b. There are x calls for lost/found property; x calls for contact messages; etc.

c. These types of calls occur during these times of the day: (utilize groupings such as four-hour intervals). During the 0800 to 1200, 20 percent of all calls for service period fall into this category; from 1200 to 1600, the figure is 22 percent; and from 1600 to 2000, these calls require the most attention —25 percent.

d. The time presently expended on these types of calls averages x hours per month of sworn officer time, which represents x percent of all time spent answering calls.

Recommendations:

1. Non-dangerous calls should be handled by non-sworn officers between 0800 and 1600 hours. The period 1600 to 2000 is not included, even though such calls are at their peak during these hours, because assaults on officers begin to occur during these hours.

2. Special additional training should be given to non-sworn personnel (cadets, trainees, meter maids, etc.) to enable them to handle these calls in addition to their present duties. (This presupposes that they have "down time" that could be used more effectively. The benefits that accrue to the individual from this job enrichment procedure should not be overlooked.)

3. Special additional training should be given to communications center personnel to assure that they do not unnecessarily place non-sworn personnel in a potentially hazardous position in connection with normally

non-dangerous calls. (E.g., animal complaint — normally barking dog type—involving mad dog which has bitten several citizens and will probably have to be shot.)

4. Mount an educational program to inform citizens that they will be receiving services from specially-trained non-sworn personnel in non-dangerous situations so that sworn officers will be more available to handle dangerous situations.

MONITORING A PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM

Monitoring each project in a productivity program is necessary to insure that fluctuating resources are maximized to meet changing needs. Therefore, a project coordinator should be assigned to each project to keep abreast of its progress and problems. These coordinators will normally be sworn or non-sworn personnel who report directly to the productivity manager. As mentioned earlier, coordinators can either be assigned full-time to coordinating several projects at one time, or they can continue to handle their customary duties while coordinating one or two projects during part of their workday.

The project coordinator will have two principal tasks. The first will be to prepare status reports on each project handled for the information of the productivity manager. These reports should indicate where planned tasks have not been accomplished and include recommendations for accomplishing them in the future. Either the productivity manager, or the chief, may have to use some *clout* to make certain that the tasks are carried out. As well as working with the productivity manager, the project coordinator should work with those who are directly responsible for carrying out the project, by activities such as making sure that data from the project are accurate and directing those involved in the project to problems they may have overlooked.

The data gathered about each project should, in either complete or summary fashion, be distributed to the police chief and to other interested parties at all levels. The mere circulation of such information will act as an incentive to those responsible for the project. It must be remembered, of course, that the purpose of each project is not just to generate statistics but to get the job done better, and therefore care must be taken to

144

determine not only the quantity of improved output but also its quality.

In the case of a particulary innovative project a department may decide to carry it out for only a very short period of time with very tight controls before expanding it into a full-fledged project subject to the customary monitoring. After a trial period such as this, the chief will probably be in a better position to explain or defend such a program if it is decided to introduce it in expanded fashion.

Exhibit C, which follows, is a synopsis of an extended study of a project conducted in St. Petersburg to conserve police patrol car time for important calls. The problems noted in the synopsis were resolved in part because of the organizational position held by the chief of planning and development. After some minor adjustments, offense report officers (mostly injured officers on light duty) were able to handle certain calls for service effectively in approximately 30 percent of the time that would normally have been spent in dispatching regular patrol cars. Note that quality control was built into this experiment by obtaining the opinions of police officers and members of the public, a good monitoring device for most innovations.

EXHIBIT C
OFFENSE REPORT OFFICER PROJECT

SYNOPSIS

The Department of Public Safety has recently completed a 30-day examination of the Offense Report Officer Project. This project involved the assignment of a Uniformed police officer to the Communication Center as a telephone offense report officer who would receive certain calls for service and attempt to handle them over the telephone. It was felt that this type of officer could accomplish three things:

First, the officer could handle certain type of calls in a shorter response period than a uniformed officer.

Second, offense reports completed by telephone would tend to reduce radio transmission time.

Third, the removal of non-priority offenses from regular patrol officers, would tend to increase their patrol time and patrol effectiveness on the other more serious offenses.

During the evaluation period, the Offense Report Officer (ORO) handled 112 offenses. When the quantity of each type offense was multiplied against average patrol time expenditures for similar type of offenses it was shown that the use of the

---

Offense Report Officer conserved approximately 81 hours of patrol time.

Due to the newness of this program, certain organizational and procedural problems developed which hindered achieving total effectiveness; however, based on the benefits that were derived, it has been estimated that such an officer could satisfactorily handle approximately 400 offenses every 22 working days with an approximately patrol cruiser time saving of 454 hours. This would be the equivalent to adding 2.5 officers to the street.

Part of the evaluation consisted of a public attitude survey in which random offense reports were taken from the offenses handled by the offense report officer. Name and telephone numbers of the complainant were obtained and they were contacted and asked to express their opinion of their police call for service being handled over the telephone. Without exception, all persons contacted were complimentary of the program. Public comments varied from: "the officer was very polite" to "no comments about the system."

Another random survey was also conducted on Uniform Patrol Officers. The majority of those surveyed indicated interest in continuing and expanding of the offense report officer project.

It has been shown that the concept of certain type complaints being handled over the telephone is feasible. It has also been found, that there are certain organizational and procedural problems that must be resolved before this can be implemented on a total basis in St. Petersburg. We are, therefore, in a total analysis phase of the program to make modifications to insure that this concept achieves maximum effectiveness for the citizens of St. Petersburg.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

The introduction of a productivity improvement program will be challenged by obstacles that differ little from those that accompany the introduction of any innovation in a police department. The maximum involvement of employees throughout the various phases of a productivity program will greatly improve the chances of overcoming these obstacles. Conversely, any program which promotes innovation at the expense of cohesion and employee moral will probably be counterproductive. The most obvious obstacles to a productivity program include the following:

• *The political reality that programs must appear successful soon after their adoption.* For this reason an incremental

146

approach is highly desirable. Short-range, achievable objectives will buy the time and support necessary to achieve long-range productivity improvements. Such incremental approaches are more acceptable to employees, city officials, and the general public.

● *The absence of technical and analytical in-house employees.* The lateral entry of trained specialists, or if time permits the development of potentially capable employees from within a department, can fill the personnel vacuum present in too many police departments. One or the other is necessary, since an attempt to introduce a productivity improvement program without the right kind of technical assistance is unlikely to succeed. Outside funding agencies should be contacted for financial support.

● *The customary idea that police effectiveness is shown by crime rates.* Victimization studies, correctional reports, and sociological essays provide the information needed to neutralize the customary impact of crime rates. Information like this, showing that there are more relevant ways to measure police effectiveness, must be explained and disseminated to the community. One way to do this is through personal appearances by the chief or other police officials. Attempts should be made to interest the news media in these appearances.

● *The tendency to support traditional rather than innovative programs.* To overcome this, care should be taken to maintain the level of traditional services during introduction of productivity projects. In this way attention will be directed to the new projects instead of focusing on traditional activities that have been discarded. If, nonetheless, it is necessary to reduce the level of some traditional service, the average citizen is unlikely to complain if convinced the reduction is necessary to improve more important services.

● *The belief that productivity programs threaten job security.* If not overcome, this belief can prove to be a formidable obstacle to productivity improvement. Police employees must be assured that productivity programs are not intended to reduce the size of the work force and that if this need does arise it will be accomplished through normal attrition (retirement, resignation, and so forth.) Jobs elsewhere in the department can and should be found for employees with manual or clerical skills who are displaced by productivity improvement programs.

THE HUMAN ASPECT OF PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS

Getting more work done, or getting it done better, with the same amount of resources are not the only objectives of productivity programs. An equally important objective is to

147

improve the morale and professionalism of each officer and the department as a whole. The police manager who can lead a department to the accomplishment of its goals while at the same time helping each employee achieve his or her own personal objectives will have fulfilled the definition of the manager's position. The manager will have meshed individual and organization goals, much to the delight of "Argyris's Army." Productivity can play a part in this meshing process, since it does not necessarily mean working harder or faster, at least not in the police field. It means working better.

This can be shown by an examination of three general goals for patrol as recommended in the National Commission on Productivity's *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services.* The accomplishment of these goals should prove rewarding both to the police manager and to the officer on the street:

1. Making a greater proportion of existing police officers available for active (street) patrol. Those who enter police work do so for various reasons, but one of the chief ones is certainly the excitement and challenge of the job. Excitement and challenge are found on the street, not behind a desk. Thus, the more sworn officers who can be assigned to street duty, the better the chances for both better service to the community and fulfillment of the needs of individual employees.

2. Increasing the "real patrol time" of those who are assigned to active patrol work. The professions of law and medicine do not require their practitioners to handle the less demanding and routine functions involved. So it should be in police work. By reducing the time spent waiting in courtrooms, writing reports, or responding to insignificant calls, police departments will permit their patrol officers to devote more time to real police work. By assigning patrol officers to quality cases (both law enforcement and service type) the majority of the time, departments will motivate their officers to improve their skills and increase the satisfaction felt in handling cases competently. Increasing real patrol time should increase the quantity and quality of police services while diminishing police boredom and apathy.

3. Utilizing patrol time to best advantage. The personal satisfaction that comes from solving problems and completing a task will be increased if each officer is better trained for his or her job, is placed where crime is most likely to occur, and has the necessary technical equipment to work successfully. If a large percentage of a department's employees achieve personal success the goals of the entire organization will also be accomplished.

The goals of a police department, in other words, can be

achieved by productivity programs without sacrificing human dignity. Someday, perhaps, police departments will employ officers equally proficient and efficient at handling prevention, diversion, referrals, arrests, and probation and parole duties. This one highly paid and well qualified professional, who might be called a criminal justice agent, could take the place of several members of the criminal justice community. Many of the duties I have just listed were once handled, in most cases unofficially, by an individual called a *beat cop*. Perhaps a look backward would be helpful in increasing future police productivity.