THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE
ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

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

POLICE
FOUNDATION

The Police Foundation is a privately funded, independent, nonprofit organization established by the Ford Foundation in 1970 and dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing. The opinions and recommendations of this report are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Foundation or the Dallas Police Department.

This is one of two reports of the Dallas project. A second volume, a technical report, including the tables, measurement instruments, and methodology, is scheduled to be available from the Communications Department, Police Foundation, 1909 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

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FOREWORD

In 1971 the Dallas Police Department, in association with the Police Foundation, began a human resource development program intended to produce vast organizational change and personnel enhancement.

Reformation and acceptance of innovative ideas and programs are not easily attained in any type of organization: Such changes within our police department proved to be particularly difficult. Law enforcement, by nature, exists in a climate of caution; the volume and extent of the proposed changes were overwhelming to many members of the department.

At the time, department administrators believed that emphasis on human resource development was the key to operational improvement, attainment of goals, and professionalism for the department. Plans were made to upgrade minority recruitment practices, alter entrance requirements, improve personnel management systems and training programs, and decentralize major departmental functions.

Some of the proposed programs were unsuccessful. Others worked very well and continue to improve the operation of the Dallas Police Department. The concepts of decentralized neighborhood stations and generalist/specialist team policing never made it off the drawing board. Improving the status of

the patrol officer and achieving increased minority representation within the department have had limited success. But the educational level in the department has risen tremendously, the selection process and training of officers have improved significantly, personnel management information systems have been developed, and decentralization of duties and functions has been implemented.

Possibly the most important and far-reaching impact of "The Dallas Experience" is that personnel of the Dallas Police Department have gained valuable experience in managing innovative change within the context of the organization. That experience will benefit this department in future years.

Through publication of this report, we hope to share with others our experiences with massive change. Perhaps the awareness of the extent to which resistance to change can exert power and influence within an organization will enable others to take a less rocky road to implementing innovative programs. The experience has made the Dallas Police Department an organization more dedicated to change and improvement, and far more aware of the problems inherent in instituting innovative ideas.

Although the experience was very valuable, the anxiety it caused among the employees created an adverse effect on organizational efficiency and the orderly management of change.

In an attempt to determine how well employees accepted innovative change, as well as their attitudes about many of the issues pertinent to our efforts, surveys were conducted among our officers in 1973 and again in 1976. The latter survey indicated some positive attitudinal changes in such areas as job satisfaction and dedication. Our officers, especially those hired and promoted since 1973, indicated a desire to continue experimentation and innovation within the department. This attitude encourages us in believing that "The Dallas Experience" was worth the investment of personnel, time, and money.

I wish to extend my thanks to the staff of the Police Foundation and Southern Methodist University for their involvement with this experience in change. I would also like to express gratitude to the members of the Dallas Police Department, both past and present, for their sense of commitment and endurance.

D.A. Byrd
Chief of Police
Dallas, Texas

PREFACE

The Police Foundation's first major grant was to the Dallas Police Department for a drastic reform of the department—the sort of comprehensive reform implied by the Police Foundation's original charter. At that early point in the Foundation's life, its board and staff nucleus were struggling to define the Foundation's mission, beginning to explore how best to carry it out, and under extreme, if self-generated, pressure to "get started." Chief Frank Dyson, the architect of the proposal for reform, had at the same time taken over the police agency in a city still suffering the effects of the assassination of a president and the murder of his assassin. As this report makes clear, these several factors worked against the successful realization of all of the purposes of the grant. With the knowledge of hindsight, none of the principals involved in establishing the Dallas project would attempt now the comprehensive reform undertaken in the early 1970s.

And yet, because of the attempt at sweeping reform in Dallas seven years ago, the Foundation learned to focus its energies on more sharply defined and productive strategies for working with police agencies in the effort to increase knowledge and to improve police service to communities. The Dallas Police Department is substantially better able to plan, test, and direct change in manageable slices. Further, this

report of the Dallas experience can help other funding and planning agencies and city and police administrators avoid the pitfalls spelled out here and manage improvement more effectively. Finally, techniques for measurement and analysis of police change have been refined and further developed.

To make the key lessons from this experience easily available to their principal audiences, the Foundation is publishing its report of the Dallas project in two volumes.

Volume I, *The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform*, analyzes the history of the project, the practical problems that developed, the resistances and conflicts, and their impact on attaining the goals of the project. This volume will be of most interest and direct use to police and city administrators and to agencies that promote and fund police or other public service organizational change and improvement. In recording the errors from which lessons can be learned, the Foundation has not hesitated to include its own substantial contribution to the inventory of mistakes. Volume I is a history of the processes of change, and of the many pitfalls involved.

Volume II, *The Dallas Experience: Human Resources Development*, describes the formal empirical evaluation of the Dallas Police Department human resources development program, concentrating on the period from 1973 to 1976, and provides the results. The only substantial change measured was the marked increase in the level of education in the department. No significant changes in attitude or behavior at the street policing level were found. This volume will be of principal interest to sociologists, psychologists, and other reseachers and practitioners in the fields of survey measurement and analysis and human resource development.

The Dallas Experience yields several lessons. The first is that implementation, the stage between a vision of change and its accomplishment, is in itself a major object requiring considerable thought, planning, and action if there is to be any chance that the hoped-for change will occur. Volume I of this report gives detailed, concrete, practical meaning to this statement.

The second is that, as our later experiments in partnership with police agencies have confirmed, it takes great courage, not only to attempt significant change, but to be committed, for the benefit of others, to the publication of the results, come what may. Chief Dyson, Chief Byrd, and the Dallas Police Department have demonstrated both kinds of courage in fullest measure. It is through such strength that improvements in policing can come.

Finally, Chief Dyson's vision remains, in its own right, a great vision of policing. Continued pursuit of such a vision can only benefit policing.

Patrick V. Murphy
President
Police Foundation

NOTE ON EVALUATION

This report exemplifies and underlines the Police Foundation's commitment to evaluation research as a major instrument of improvement in policing. It traces and gives the results of the first such individual commitment the Foundation made. As the reader will see, this commitment had to be substantial, and it was made in the face of great uncertainty. That the commitment to evaluation would be expensive was apparent. An evaluation capacity would have to be established and maintained for five or six years. No upper bound of costs could be set at the beginning. There was no way to foresee what concrete actions were to be taken by the department, what specific stimuli would have to be measured, nor what impacts traced. Expensive baseline data would have to be collected before there could be any certainty whether any project action would be taken. Because this was the Foundation's first attempt at experimentation and evaluation, it was not even known whether the Foundation and the department could sustain essential partnership relations. These risks were accepted.

It is difficult, at best, to measure and to ascribe meaning to measurement in the field of human resource development. Day-to-day attitudes and behaviors are related obscurely, if at all, and the direction of causality is not clear. Subtle and complex effects must be pursued using relatively blunt instruments

to attempt to capture them. For example, police performance measures are in a relatively crude state of development, as are measures of performance in most aspects of public service.

In the event, these "natural" evaluation research risks and difficulties were compounded. Sometimes planned experiments within the overall change program were prepared for, then found to be confounded by some of the other actions being planned or launched. Consequently, these experiments had to be abandoned. The nature of expected changes shifted as concepts moved toward action. This meant costs without intended payoff, hiring and training one kind of evaluation personnel only to be forced to develop another kind as events unfolded, a harsh research environment made harsher by the turbulence of the Foundation-department relationship during some of the years of their association. At times the evaluation staff indeed occupied a lonely outpost. Nevertheless, the department and the Foundation did make this first attempt and sustained their commitment to learn from it through six years.

This report is a tribute to the tenacity and inventive adaptability of the evaluation staff and to the courage, patience, and understanding of many in the department and in the Foundation. Volume I is a case study that will help both those who practice and those who study organizational change. Volume II contains a wealth of data based on a life history model and advances the methods of measuring human resource development in a public-sector operational setting.

Joseph H. Lewis
Director of Evaluation
Police Foundation

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This evaluation was funded by the Police Foundation. We wish to express our appreciation to the Board of Directors and staff of the Foundation, the members of the Dallas Police Department, and all those other persons in participating organizations who made this evaluation possible.

Special appreciation is due Frank Dyson, former chief in Dallas, now chief of police in Austin, Texas, for his willingness to have us recount the history of the Dallas project and for his cooperation with our efforts. The command staff who worked with Chief Dyson included assistant chiefs William Fulghum, Thomas Hutson, Troy Moore, Donald Steele, Paul Townsend, and Robert Winters. Chief Steele was especially helpful during the transition period between administrations.

We wish to thank Chief Donald Byrd and his staff for their unfailing cooperation. Although there are many more officers than we could name who made important contributions, we wish specifically to thank Executive Assistant Chief J.F. (Fritz) Dahman, who was generous with his time and his insights, and who was always willing to facilitate our work.

Many others whose assistance and friendship we appreciated include Deputy Chiefs George Reed, Don Stafford, and Harold Warren; Captains Lowell Cannaday, Grant Lappin, Billy Prince, and Leo Savell; Sergeant Walt Smith; and Officer Charles Baker.

We thank our colleagues at Southern Methodist University, Robert Bogomolny and Bennett Miller.

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Mark Furstenberg, through his early and enthusiastic support of evaluation; Robert Kiley, with his caution and wisdom; and Richard Staufenberger, through his consistent support and his calm in time of crisis contributed enormously to the evaluation as program officers. We especially thank Charles Rogovin, former president of the Police Foundation, for his commitment to evaluations of this kind. Tony Pate provided consultation throughout the evaluation effort.

Special thanks go to the evaluation staff members: Judy Hill, Charles Bay, Florence Kanter, Ramona Wycoff, and Marilyn Zoroya, who, with their administrative and clerical skill, provided critical support.

Four members of the Dallas Police Department, in addition to their regular duties, worked part time as evaluation staff members: Captain Grant Lappin and Officers Norman Crawford, Russell Graves, and Christopher Smith. Their aid in collecting and interpreting data was valuable, and they brought spirit and good humor, as well as insight, to our sometimes tedious research tasks.

Tobie Hayes Sasser deserves special acknowledgment for her conscientious work, especially in the final stages of the project after the evaluation office was closed. Special thanks also go to Dr. Robert Peterson. He joined the evaluation staff near the end of the project, and contributed greatly to completing the effort.

Patrick V. Murphy, president of the Police Foundation, has consistently and patiently supported these evaluation efforts.

And finally, our thanks to Joseph H. Lewis, Director of Evaluation at the Police Foundation. He has been our mentor.

Mary Ann Wycoff
George L. Kelling

PROLOGUE

I have read the two volumes detailing the process of experimentation in Dallas, and have encouraged the Police Foundation to publish them. I hope that the experience they describe can offer valuable guidance to other police innovators. I am proud of what my colleagues and I tried to do and, admittedly, both eager and apprehensive about giving other managers the opportunity to learn from our successes and failures.

Beyond these statements, I find that the other comments I would like to make would only be redundant with those in what has been labeled, in this report, "The first thirteen pages"; that is, the original introduction to the Five Year Plan which my staff and I developed in 1970-1971.

For me that introduction is important and I am pleased that it was included in this document. It contains concepts which I thought were necessary to improve policing. And, without getting into details or justifications, it represents to me what I considered, and still consider, important improvements in the use of police resources for public service. I am proud of it.

I don't want to give the impression that all the ideas were original or that I developed the concepts alone. Other chiefs and managers, in both public and private sectors, had experimented with similar programs which, though not identical, were derived from common values and assumptions.

Likewise many bright and talented people in the Dallas Police Department and city government contributed their ideas, values, and work to the development of the concepts. But it was my good fortune to be in a position to bring those ideas together and attempt to implement them. So I want to encourage readers to read the introduction. It contains almost everything about the program and about my thinking on police reform that I wish to write about in this context.

The important thing is that all of us who are managers, and especially those of us who are police managers, have been able to learn from both the successes and the failures of others. If we don't we will all remain on the endless treadmill of repeating each others' mistakes, not understanding that some of these problems are inevitable and that our successes and failures are not unique; they do have common patterns, themes, histories.

One last comment: The authors seem to believe that, although the process of change was tumultuous and conflictual, and the project didn't obtain all the goals hoped for, the Dallas Police Department was strengthened and benefited. I sincerely hope so.

Frank Dyson
Chief of Police
Austin, Texas

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Improving the quality of police services to local communities was one of the major social goals to emerge in the 1960s. Out of concern for rising crime, increasing alienation between police and citizens, and police handling of the disturbances associated with the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, major efforts to reform the police were undertaken. Agencies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the Police Foundation (PF) developed to support such efforts.

In 1971, the Dallas Police Department (DPD) began an attempt to improve radically its organization, the quality of its workforce, and the delivery of services to the public. The Police Foundation funded part of these efforts.

The resulting complex program included upgrading the educational level of police officers, recruiting women and members of minority groups, validating police selection and promotion criteria, providing horizontal career development opportunities for patrol officers, decentralizing administrative and strategic decisionmaking to levels more closely in touch with community and neighborhood needs, and policing by teams of officers trained to serve as generalist patrol officers who would also be enabled to acquire specialist skills such as investigation, conflict management, and so on. Although programs were to be phased in over a period of time, the

changes were to be departmentwide and to be accomplished in five years.

The evaluation of this program began in 1971 and was completed in 1976.

This report is in two volumes. Volume I, *The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform* analyzes the history of the projects; the practical problems in the planning, initiation, and maintenance of the projects; the emergence of powerful resistances to the overall plan and the resulting conflicts; the resolution of the conflicts; and the impact of these conflicts on the attainment of the goals of the project. In sum, Volume I is a political and organizational history of the project.

The Introduction, the same in both volumes, presents Chief Frank Dyson's rationale for the overall goals and the specific programs of the DPD.

Volume II, *The Dallas Experience: Human Resource Development* describes the formal empirical evaluation and presents the findings. In addition to monitoring the history of the process of change (presented in Volume I), the evaluation design included panel surveys of DPD personnel in 1973 and 1976 to determine workforce and attitudinal changes over time, and the use of personal record information to determine behavioral changes. Although the original plan was to observe police officers as a primary method of noting behavioral changes over time, this idea later was abandoned as a result of program changes. Likewise, a planned community survey also was dropped.

The survey data were used to measure four goals. The goals, with indicators of each, and the findings, are as follows:

GOAL I. To recruit, retain, and promote officers different from those already in the department.

Indicators

A. Increased educational attainment
B. Increased minority representation (ethnic and sexual)
C. Increased numbers of personnel with cosmopolitan backgrounds
D. Increased discretion and toleration of ambiguity
E. Improved attitudes and values

GOAL II. To increase officer satisfaction.

Indicators

A. Decreased isolation and alienation of police officers
B. Increased job commitment
C. Increased job satisfaction

GOAL III. To increase importance of human relations and public service functions.

Indicators

Questionnaire items measuring attitudes toward these functions.

GOAL IV. To increase professionalism.

Indicators

A. Increased status of patrol force
B. Increased educational attainment
C. Increased importance of peer evaluation
D. Decreased isolation and alienation
E. Increased job commitment
F. Changed work orientations

Findings: Although the educational level of recruits and police officers rose considerably, and the absolute number of women increased significantly, few attitudinal changes took place over time.

The following departmental record information was collected to indicate performance and was monitored over time.

Sick time
Injury time
Suspension time
Automobile accidents
Chargeable automobile accidents
Incidents of injury to prisoners
Incidents of weapons fired
Number of commendations
Number of complaints
Number of complaints sustained
Supervisory ratings

Findings: Behavior, as indicated by such information, appears not to have changed during the three-year period.

The conclusion of each volume discusses the problems inherent in major efforts at organizational overhaul and what was learned in this particular attempt. Further, it identifies ways in which the DPD has changed, in spite of the lack of attitude and performance changes on the part of the individual officer.

CHRONOLOGY

This chronology is to assist readers in following the sequence of events from the inception of the program to the completion of the evaluation in September 1976.

The chronology is in three columns. The first column traces the dates of the Dallas Police Department's programs and the organizational events affecting the programs.

The second column traces the history of the events associated with the Police Foundation evaluation.

The third column traces the history of Police Foundation program events affecting the Dallas project.

CHRONOLOGY
DALLAS POLICE FOUNDATION PROJECT

	Department Program	*Foundation Evaluation*	*Foundation Program*
Jan 1971			
Feb 1971			
Mar 1971			
Apr 1971		Original Technical Assistance FAP-Evaluation $12,103	
May 1971	OPA started Intelligence liaison and minority recruiting—already operating		Planning grant $234,981
Jun 1971			Madison seminar
Jul 1971	Program extension	First evaluation contact	
Aug 1971			First program officer transferred Second program officer assigned to Dallas
Sep 1971	Media materials for minority recruitment		
Oct 1971			
Nov 1971	SMU funded	Evaluation design approved, $15,000	Grant, $1,182,428
Dec 1971			
Jan 1972		Continuation, $15,000	
Feb 1972			
Mar 1972		Design approved, $121,630; evaluation office opened	
Apr 1972			Board member visits Dallas
May 1972		Extension of design, $40,822. T1 HRD started	Police Foundation president resigns Second program officer resigns
Jun 1972	KOIDS established		Third program officer assigned to Dallas
Jul 1972	Intern program		
Aug 1972	Task forces started Task forces ended; media materials completed		
Sep 1972			Foundation board cities committee site visit to Dallas Acting Director's site visit to Dallas

CHRONOLOGY
DALLAS POLICE FOUNDATION PROJECT

Oct 1972			
Nov 1972		Survey approved, $20,000; observation abandoned	
Dec 1972	Tactical officers decentralized to SE; LEAA grant announced for Dallas		
Jan 1973			
Feb 1973			Acting Director's site visit to Dallas
Mar 1973		Extension, $90,495	Third program officer resigns
Apr 1973			
May 1973	Concurrent, predictive, and biodata validation project	Community survey cancelled	Second Foundation president appointed
Jun 1973	Intern program; physical fitness and prevention of assaults		Fourth program officer assigned to Dallas
Jul 1973		T1 HRD administration completed	
Aug 1973	SMU liaison terminated; OPA terminated, tactical, CID, intelligence liaison, attorney		
Sep 1973	decentralized SE, Dyson resigns		Grant extension
Oct 1973	Analysts decentralized Systemization of personnel records.		Grant, $685,000
Nov 1973	Firearms project; Field training officer project		
Dec 1973		Extension $33,638	
Jan 1974			
Feb 1974			
Mar 1974		Extension, $144,972	
Apr 1974	Dale Carnegie course for recruiters; Medical selection project		
May 1974	Automated Vita project		
Jun 1974	Disciplinary project begins		

CHRONOLOGY
DALLAS POLICE FOUNDATION PROJECT

Jul 1974		
Aug 1974	Task analysis of patrol officers	
Sep 1974		
Oct 1974	Intelligence liaison to district stations	
Nov 1974		
Dec 1974		
Jan 1975		
Feb 1975		
	Hiring process reduced to 30 days for minorities	Extension, $99,862
Mar 1975		
Apr 1975		
May 1975		
Jun 1975		
Jul 1975		
Aug 1975		Evaluation office closed
Sep 1975		
Oct 1975		
Nov 1975		
Dec 1975		
Jan 1976		
Feb 1976		
Mar 1976		Extension, $42,500
Apr 1976		T2 HRD administered
May 1976		
Jun 1976	One-on-one hiring ended	Final evaluation grant $61,240
Jul 1976		
Aug 1976		
Sep 1976	Program extension period ends	First draft of evaluation completed
Oct 1976		
Nov 1976		
Dec 1976		

THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE
ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

INTRODUCTION

This is the evaluation of an attempt to reform a police department through a program of human resource development (recruiting, selecting, socializing, promoting, and retaining people different from those already in the department) and numerous structural and strategic reforms. Chief Frank Dyson presented the intended scope of this program most eloquently in the following statement with which he began the 1971 proposal to the Police Foundation.

I. GOALS OF THE DEPARTMENT

> The heart of the Dallas Police Department proposal concerns redefining the role of police in Dallas and, by implication, in urban communities throughout the United States. The Department intends to focus its initial effort on reevaluation and redefinition of what police do and should do in the Dallas community. Substantial work already has been done in this field by Goldstein and the President's Commission on Crime in a Free Society.* A major portion of the planning period just completed by the Office of Program Management has revolved around the variety of roles that the police officer plays. It became very clear that a primary goal of the Department must be to identify the basic needs of the

*The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Report: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

Dallas community and to structure a police role in the community which conforms to these needs. In order to do this, certain fundamental perceptions of the police and their relationship to society will have to be cast aside, and a more open approach taken to the way police organizations react or should react will need to be developed. Dealing with the police role requires analysis and understanding of all the duties presently performed by the police, a genuine effort to establish an order of priority among them, and a realignment of the organization to reflect priorities and to facilitate rapid and effective response to the community's demands and needs for service.

During the planning period, certain objectives or goals seemed to emerge in connection with the examination and redefinition of the police role. Although the following list is not intended to be inclusive, since one of the major purposes of this program is to develop within the police organization the capacity to incorporate new values and goals as they are perceived and developed, certainly among the major goals of the program are the following:

A) A people-oriented police force sensitive and responsive to the needs of the many cultures embodied within the City of Dallas. For too long, the police and other governmental agencies have viewed the community as a monolith requiring impersonal and undifferentiated service. For too long there have been limits on understanding and undertakings concerning racial minorities, political groups, and different age groups within the society. Emphasis on people orientation requires realignment of the role of the police organization as it shifts from representing 'the state' or 'the government' or 'the institution' to representing and serving all people on a person-to-person basis.

B) The development of a more rational police-community relationship based upon mutual understanding. This requires a different kind of education and training for policemen, which concentrates on major community problems and relationships and provides policemen with the understanding and tools to work within the community as it really is.

C) For the Police Department to represent and serve all of the people in Dallas requires renewed and innovative effort in crime prevention and service delivery. This will entail de-emphasis of the traditionally rigid enforcement policies that have dominated training and thinking in the police community.

D) As the de-emphasis of the rigid enforcement role occurs, many of the militaristic organizational patterns which presently govern police activities will have to be abandoned.

E) As the militaristic organizational patterns are loosened, what emerges is a professional service of police officers armed with alternative solutions to problems in addition to the arrest power and trained to exercise discretion in the selection of alternative responses to problems they confront.

F) This orientation toward people requires policemen who thoroughly understand their accountability to the citizenry through the political process and who are prepared to operate in an organizational structure which is open to scrutiny and review.

In order to accomplish these goals, there must be a realistic examination of the needs of the people. Much of the early effort of this program will revolve around an examination of what happens when the people of the community call on their police. Once a picture of actual demands made on the Department is completed, evaluation of needed skills and roles can be undertaken so that police training can deal with the requirements of the people, maximize the skills available to meet these needs, and reinforce the bonds and obligations between the police and the people.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT

Our police organizational structure and our patterns of staffing do not meet the needs of employees and citizens. The structure itself is a traditional militaristic organizational scheme based on strong central authority and a vertical line of command. This method of organizing and staffing is a barrier to effective utilization of manpower and hampers the appropriate development of relationships between the police organization and the people it serves.

The present organizational structure and staffing came about in the same way that most police

hierarchies have evolved—growth and the application of traditional principles of management with major emphasis on providing a means of employee mobility and rewards. Responding to a corresponding growth in the city's population and crime rate, chiefs of police sought to deal with the growing complexities of policing by increasing manpower. The emphasis was on numbers with no serious effort to review new alternatives to better utilize existing personnel. As manpower increased in numbers at the operating level, so was there an increase in the numbers and levels of supervisors. Religious observance of the principle of 'span of control' necessitated one sergeant for each six to eight patrolmen; one lieutenant for each four to six sergeants; one captain for each two to three lieutenants, and so on until we reached our present configuration which has ten levels of sworn personnel, two levels of para-police, and one level of cadets.

As numbers increased at the base of the pyramid, levels and numbers increased above. As new functional needs were identified, we inevitably began by making judgments as to the importance of the new function to 'properly determine' the appropriate 'rank' for the person in charge. The governing principle seemed to be to award the highest rank and status the market would bear. Once the new rank was identified, it was necessary to staff 'downward' to supply the necessary number of employees to fill out the organizational chart. Rarely was serious attention paid to whether this organizational structure would fulfill the existing need.

We have failed to keep up with non-police agencies by offering incentives to attract better people and then to provide them with an organizational environment conducive to growth and realization of potential. We have further compounded the problem by closing police service to lateral entry. We have often not even been successful in promoting the best employees.

It is generally recognized among enlightened police administrators that promotional mechanisms in police service are, for the most part, unrelated to job performance. More reliance is placed upon indications that candidates for promotion have *not* 'created problems' within the system than on

demonstrations of leadership which discourages individual initiative and development, and we reward those who best conform to the mold by moving them into positions to shape others. Thus is suppression of individual development perpetuated.

We are now seeking to develop a new orientation within the Dallas Police Department toward policing. We hope to redesign our organizational structure, practices, and environment in ways that will shift the emphasis back to policing. We want broader community representation in our ranks and more college graduates—men with intellectual curiosity, analytical ability, a capacity to relate the events of the day to the social, political and historical context in which they occur. We want to place these men in an organizational environment that will encourage development of individual potential rather than suppress it, and we will expect more from them than we have in the past. We want to dismantle the pyramidal hierarchy which stifles communications and replace it with a structure and climate conducive to free and open exchange of ideas and information. We envision reducing the management levels from nine to three or four. Ultimately, the operative level should be one of professional competence providing leadership for para-police and looking to no more than two levels for management assistance.

III. OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

In reorienting the operations of the Dallas Police Department, we will emphasize what we call neighborhood police operations. A series of districts, or police centers with substantial autonomy will be established, based on such factors as density of population, major geographical features, community characteristics, and requirements for police service.

Each district police center will contain a number of neighborhood satellite stations which will be operations bases for neighborhood police teams. It is the neighborhood police team which will form the basic policing unit in Dallas. The teams will be composed of a new type of police officer described below and assigned according to an analysis of policing needs within the neighborhoods served. They would be managed by 'team leaders' who would coordinate activities and deploy manpower as needs indicated. The satellite stations would receive

support from neighborhood centers but would retain a substantial amount of autonomy from the center just as the center is largely autonomous within the Department as a whole.

IV. THE GENERALIST/SPECIALIST

We have selected the term 'generalist/specialist' to describe the kind of an officer that we envision doing the policing of the future. The generalist/specialist would be a professional in the sense of being *fully accountable* for his actions in meeting these needs. Additionally, he would have specialized skills in one or more areas which he could apply in a team effort with other officers to provide 'complete policing' to the areas served by such teams. As well as being competent to serve in a generalist police capacity, our officer of the future would be an expert, or leader, in one or more specialized policing or organizational areas, such as investigation, conflict management, youth counseling, crowd control, training, administration or management, and so on. The idea is to begin with a better man in terms of mental ability, personality and formal education, and develop him with professional training to become a generalist in most aspects of policing the community, and a specialist with certain highly developed skills to meet organizational and team policing requirements.

The generalist/specialist would be the authority in his field and would not require supervision and direction as we know it today. There would be only one 'level of policing' and this would be conducted under the general direction of neighborhood center managers who would serve primarily to coordinate neighborhood police teams in their policing activities. The center managers would work under the direction of the Chief of Police.

Our major tool in reaching our objective will be new training for new recruits and retraining for existing personnel. We have taken some steps in this direction already. We have begun to reassign and retrain certain of our investigators from a central location to district stations where they are serving in a broader role than before. They are now spending more time 'on the street' working offenses, in many cases from taking the initial complaint to final disposition.

We are in the planning stages of reassigning more of our specialists to district stations where they will be cast in more general police roles as we complete our transition to the generalist/specialist concept. They will become more and more involved in general, or basic, policing tasks as we move in this direction. A more rapid transition to this concept of policing must await the construction of adequate district and neighborhood policing facilities and better training programs.

An architectural staff within the city has just completed for the Department a proposed plan for locating and building the kinds of facilities we should have and will need in order to implement our team policing concept. The teams would operate out of 'neighborhood' police facilities arranged as 'satellites' to neighborhood centers which would provide administrative and technical support services. Funds for construction of the facilities in accordance with the architectural proposal will be requested in a forthcoming bond election.

The neighborhood teams would be complemented by para-police who would work under the direction of the teams in providing complete services to the neighborhoods on a continuing basis and would also assist team members with specific assignments as needed.

Para-police would perform a wide range of duties within the neighborhoods, such as general inspection, in order to identify potential problems and problem areas; follow-up on particular requests for service by citizens to insure that satisfactory service is provided, especially in referral cases; follow-up on minor complaints to insure satisfactory resolution; collection of information dealing with crime or potential crime problems; some assistance in follow-up investigation of lesser offenses; etc. Aside from the obvious benefits of gaining more community representation and involvement in policing, this approach would serve as a vehicle for channeling minority group members into police service who would otherwise be denied this opportunity because of lack of education and other employment requirements. This is not to say that we propose to develop a level of 'lower class' police within the service and then fill it with minority group members. On the contrary, this would simply serve as another

means of entry and would afford many persons opportunities which they would otherwise not have to begin their education and self-development. Additionally, it would provide us in police service for the first time with a means of obtaining continuing feedback from the citizens in terms of quality of services provided and services needed.

V. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

In order to develop the police role as described, human resources development will be a major task. Since we are operating an ongoing system and a majority of police have already attended the existing training programs, personnel development will require a variety of approaches to achieve the goals of the Department.

Training, education, and development should relate directly to the new role definition of the policeman. It is not simply a question of improving existing education and training, but rather a question of reorienting the whole educational thrust of the Dallas Police Department. Once it is determined that the major theme in the role of police is relationship with the people, that is to say the police as the community counselor and helper, then necessarily the majority of training in the Department would focus on this particular endeavor. It is anticipated that basic communication skills, techniques of counseling, techniques of listening, group dynamics, and understanding minorities and subcultures would become the basic curriculum around which police training would revolve. Traditional materials such as understanding criminal law, executing arrests, management of weapons, and the like obviously will be retained but in a community oriented perspective.

Recruiting will have to change drastically. The present Dallas Police Department profile does not represent a cross-section of the Dallas population. Nor does it necessarily represent those people who are best suited to be career police officers. Emphasis on our pilot program for minority recruiting should continue to help develop police from within the minority communities. Substantial effort should be given to recruiting people who prior to this time had not thought of the police as a career service. The Department suspects that it will become increasingly

clear that the new role requires new men, and although it recognizes that we have existing personnel and that maximization of their skills must be undertaken, recruiting must in fact fulfill a new dimension in the Department and must strive not to duplicate what is already here, but create clearly new lines of development.

Once the overall goals of the Department have been articulated and general organizational goals for police in Dallas delineated, it is necessary to attempt to describe how one changes the existing police department to achieve these objectives.

It is clear from our experience over the past several months that producing change within the Dallas Police Department is a formidable task. This is so for a variety of reasons.

1) Many of the existing men on the force represent the traditional view and method of policing.

2) Existing police structure has set up rewards for conformance, and innovation conjures a serious 'failure' threat.

3) All surrounding institutions that support the Department are not geared for change and may in fact inhibit it, e.g., the Civil Service system has limited and, in some cases, obstructed the successful hiring of the 'new' policeman.

4) Skills needed to produce the vast change desired are not present in the Department in sufficient abundance to effectuate the goals desired. Further, such skills are in limited supply nationally. Nevertheless, we are convinced that there are ways of overcoming the above deficiencies.

Our strategy for producing change calls for emphasis on several basic approaches. The primary approach calls for a complete revision of internal training procedures. *Curriculum* will have to be developed, *new methods* of teaching worked out and *new rewards* given to men who absorb the learning offered through the training program. Training will have to become a major continuous part of police operations which could even include a 'trainer' at every satellite police station.

Personnel policies concerning selection, promotion and lateral entry will have to be revised. This type of revision will have to include major changes in thinking and even legislative revision of existing civil service systems.

> Existing talent within the force will have to be augmented with a long-term alliance with Southern Methodist University so that the diversity of talent and skills available at a university can be used in a realistic and effective way to supplement existing Dallas police skills. Further, the local university effort will have to be coordinated so that it supplies consultants when available and augments consultants hired from other sources to avoid duplication. This relationship calls for formation of a true operating partnership between the Department and SMU to insure that the effort expended is relevant to the needs of the Department.

The authors believe this statement to have been visionary.

The programs were many, complex, and often overlapping, and at times the goals of some seemed in conflict with the goals of others. An evaluation, reported in Volume II, attempted to measure the impact of all these programs over time. It would have been impossible to distinguish among their impacts. Initially, the evaluation design was more ambitious: a community survey was designed to measure the effect of the programs in the community; observers were trained to assess changes in police officer performance. As some programs were scaled down, as the timetables of some were revised, and as others were discovered to confound costly evaluations, these aspects of the study had to be abandoned. The data used for the impact evaluation are derived from an extensive personnel survey conducted throughout the department in 1973 and again in 1976. The survey was based on a life-history model and included items on background, family structure, personal attitudes, work-oriented attitudes, and job history. Data collected from the department's personnel and internal affairs files, and the personal observations and impressions of the evaluation staff, were added to this information to provide the basis for the analyses reported in Volume II.

Volume I, *The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform*, analyzes the history of the projects; the practical problems in the planning, initiation, and maintenance of the projects; the emergence of powerful resistances to the overall plan and the resulting conflicts; the resolution of the conflicts; and the impact of these conflicts on the attainment of the goals of the project. It is a political and organizational history of the project.

CHAPTER 1
THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE

The Dallas project was an effort at radical organizational change. It was developed by the Dallas Police Department (DPD) in collaboration with the Police Foundation (PF) at a time when the foundation was self-consciously attempting to articulate for itself a strategy for reform in policing. Within the foundation there was a debate between those who believed in incremental change and those who believed in more radical change. Incrementalists believed that the foundation could have the greatest impact by starting, in several departments, a number of individual projects that might stimulate other changes in those departments and possibly spread to other agencies. The proponents of a more radical strategy believed that the problems in police agencies were too numerous and too urgent to wait for slow incremental remedies. They advocated broad-based change that would serve as a model for other change-oriented chiefs.

There were advantages to both approaches. Discrete projects are easier to manage because they do not involve the total organization, are not as likely to be resisted by interest groups, and are a means of exposing more agencies to experience with change, and they may be easier and cheaper to evaluate. If there are many of them, there is a reasonable probability that some will be implemented successfully.

The radicalness of an innovation has been defined as

> . . . the extent to which an implemented (adopted) innovation implies changes in the various sub-

> systems of the organization or in the behavior patterns of its members. A solution-radical innovation is always to some extent disruptive of the *status quo* and involves changes in the sub-systems of information, values, incentives, and power; and so on . . . the innovations considered influence a considerable number of members of the unit.[1]

The advantage of a successful radical approach is the extensive nature of the change and the speed with which a large amount of change can be induced. There is little doubt that it will be more difficult to manage, involve more conflict and resistance in the organization, and be more controversial than incremental efforts. A radical approach usually is expensive. For the foundation it meant the willingness to invest approximately 20 percent of its $30 million commitment from the Ford Foundation in one project. If the project succeeded and was well evaluated, it would be powerful evidence of the possibility of creating more effective police agencies in a relatively short period of time. If it failed, the material and psychological costs of the investment would be substantial. As the foundation struggled with its own goals and strategies, the Dallas project bore the burden of becoming a test case of radical organizational change. This case study traces the history of this effort.

The project started in 1971 when the chief began to develop his long-range goals. By 1973 the resistance to the program became so great that the chief and his key staff and advisors resigned. Although many of the programs were continued at a reduced level of activity, the evaluation of the program demonstrates that the goals were not achieved.

For some, the Dallas experience was more than adequate evidence that the radical approach to organizational change is unacceptable. Others argue that, because the problems of implementation in Dallas were so great, the concepts were not given a true test. In most cases, failure of specific elements of the program was the result of implementation failures; projects simply never got off the ground and, as a result, could not be

1. Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan, and Jonny Holbek, *Innovation and Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 24.

evaluated in terms of the contributions to the organizational goals.

The evaluation team has observed and recorded the implementation process in order to provide a context for other data being collected and to analyze the process itself. The team believed that the lessons from such a study could contribute as much to the process of change in other agencies as could the data about the success or failure of particular programs. The following section discusses models of the process of innovation and implementation which provide a conceptual framework for interpreting the Dallas change experience.

INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Although the literature on innovation is extensive, the literature on the problems of implementation is limited. There is perhaps even less recognition of the critical importance of the implementation process among program developers and managers. Having reviewed the literature on the politics of implementation, Williams (1975) concludes:

> Nothing comes across more strongly than the great naivete about implementation. We have got to learn that the implementation period for complex social problems is not a brief interlude between a bright idea and opening the door for service.[2]

In the 1960s there was a growing optimism that programs could be designed to produce social change, and there was considerable enthusiasm for the good idea, the right program. In many cases, little thought was given to the problems of program implementation. The Dallas experience serves as one proof among many that Good Causes cannot ensure their own victories. That this maxim has not been better understood can be attributed in part to a lack of systematic attention to the process of implementation. This, in turn, is a result of the cost and difficulty of monitoring such efforts and of the lack of conceptual frameworks for understanding the information.

Several scholars have treated the organizational innovation process in terms of stages, among which implementation is

2. Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment," *Policy Analysis*, Summer 1975, 531-66.

one. Wilson (1966) conceives of three stages: idea generation, adoption, and implementation. Hage and Aiken (1970), see the stages as evaluation, initiation, implementation, and routinization. Milo (1971) differentiates five parts of the process: conceptualization, tentative adoption, resource getting, implementation, and institutionalization. Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973) conceive two major stages of initiation and implementation and five substages. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) identify the variables affecting the outcome of a policy. These include interorganizational communication and enforcement activities; characteristics of implementing agencies; economic, social, and political conditions; and the disposition of implementors.

Other authors have provided additional concepts relevant to the Dallas experience. Knight (1967) sees innovation as being initiated under either slack or distress conditions. Both Williams (1975) and Dunbar (1976) cite vague goals and guidelines as a common cause of failures. Zaltman, *et al.* (1973) identify cost, risk and uncertainty, communicability, complexity, and gatekeepers as important determinants of success. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) making a point similar to the concept of "gatekeepers," speak of "clearances" required of decision-makers and make gloomy predictions when many clearances are required to activate a change. Dunbar (1976) argues that a policy is doomed unless it is communicated unambiguously. Downs (1967), also discussing communication, observes that messages are almost inevitably distorted—whether intentionally or unintentionally—when they are communicated within the organization or across organizational boundaries. Klein (1966) identifies strategies to deal with resistors to policy.

The following discussion uses these concepts and others to provide a conceptual framework for interpreting the events in Dallas as the department undertook a radical program of organizational change.

HISTORY

The histories of the Five-Year Plan and Project Pride are linked with the history of the Police Foundation, the political life of Dallas, the internal conditions of the DPD, and the interaction among the three.

The Police Foundation was established by the Ford Foundation in 1970 with an allocation of $30 million and a mandate to assist in the improvement of policing. A Board of Directors, consisting of 12 members, provides roughly equal representation for police administrators, political leaders, and academicians. By late summer of 1970, the first president and first staff members were hired and charged with developing the program objectives of the foundation. In addition to hiring support staff and establishing an office, the staff developed position papers for the first board meeting, held in September 1970. Several themes were discussed at that meeting. One of these—the development of police leadership—was heavily disputed during the next six monthly board meetings. Foundation staff members, committed to the idea that development of police leadership was a major key to improving policing, found themselves in conflict with powerful board members before styles of interaction, roles, and expectations could be established among staff, board members, and the foundation president. The balance normal in all organizations had yet to emerge. By February 1971 the debate had accelerated to the point that the staff was convinced that a new program approach was necessary.

Late in 1970, the staff had begun to examine various police departments as potential program sites. Some of these agencies were invited to submit proposals to demonstrate what they might do if awarded foundation monies. The staff tried to impress upon the departments that these were mock proposals, but one can only imagine the difficulty agencies would have understanding the concept, and the subsequent rise in expectations that took place in those departments. The Dallas Police Department had submitted one of these exercises. A foundation-supplied consultant and a local consulting firm assisted the department in the proposal development. The foundation staff considered the proposal to be one of the best it had received, and began to give serious consideration to Dallas as a program site. During February and March, several staff members traveled to Dallas to assess the environment for

change, both within the DPD and externally. Some staff interviewed within the department, while others met with the mayor, city manager, and civic leaders in the white and minority communities. Staff believed that the chief was among the most progressive in the nation, and the additional information they gathered convinced them that there was the potential in the Dallas Police Department for innovation and broad organizational change. Two staff members were assigned to work with the DPD to develop a proposal for the April 1971 board meeting, and they worked with a fervor that caused one of them to be hospitalized briefly for exhaustion. This also was a period of confusion for the DPD, because many DPD commanders did not understand that the foundation staff viewed the first proposal effort as merely an exercise—a dry run. There was considerable pride in the first effort, which had been commended by the foundation; that it was now being ignored and a new effort requested was difficult for some to understand. A sense of chaos and exasperation developed among several members of the DPD command staff. When the foundation staff considered requesting a second mock proposal for the April meeting, the chief refused. Whatever was to be presented in April would have to be an actual proposal.

The two foundation staff members worked frantically with department personnel to prepare the document. When they realized that much of the work on the first proposal had been done by the outside firm, they accepted for themselves the task of writing most of the second document. After a period of conflict and general tumult within the foundation staff, the two program officers retired for a weekend of day and night rewriting. Racing a deadline, the staff mailed the proposal to the board members and the Dallas chief simultaneously. A hasty telegram to the chief from the foundation president said, in essence: Here is your proposal; please let us know if you approve.

The reaction in Dallas was of near volcanic proportions. The chief, who himself had been somewhat dazed by the rush and confusion of the foundation attentions to Dallas, was now suspicious. The document had been rewritten and distributed without his approval, and he suspected an effort to lock him into a plan that was not wholly his. He responded with anger and threatened to reject the whole proposal in front of the board members. The two staff members tried to soothe him into accepting the idea that they simply had to get something before the board in order to get the chief enough resources to develop his own ideas further. After finally agreeing to attend the meeting, the chief, behaving in a way described as eloquent, drew his vision of the Dallas Police Department of the future and explained that the document before the board was only partially representative of his goals. Impressed, the board awarded Dallas a planning grant of $234,981 to be used to prepare the chief's program plans. The plans were to be ready for presentation at the November 1971 board meeting. Much of this money was to be used to develop an Office of Program Assistance (OPA) and to hire the civilian professionals the chief believed were necessary for developing and administering the programs.

An assistant chief, a close associate of the chief, was placed in charge of the OPA. He had been relatively uninvolved in the development of the proposal, and some of those personnel who had been involved were offended by the appointment.

From the beginning, then, there were tensions surrounding projects: the tension in the interactions between the department and the foundation created by the frantic rush to produce a proposal; and internal tension in the DPD created by the rush, the misunderstanding about the mock proposal, the lack of recognition for those DPD personnel who had worked on the proposal, and the suspicion on the part of some personnel that an outside organization was attempting to play too large a part in the life of the department. Within the Police Foundation there were tensions created by the rush, the lack of clearly developed role relationships, conflicts among some staff members, and the conflict between the board and the staff. These and additional tensions grew between April and November during the attempt to put the chief's plans into the form of a formal proposal.

Three police officers (a sergeant, a lieutenant, and a captain) were selected to work in OPA and OPA began to try to recruit civilian professionals. Conflict developed between the

OPA and the Police Foundation program officer about the role of the foundation in recruiting a professional staff. At times OPA wanted help and advice, and at other times actively resisted and resented it. The clash resulted in OPA challenging the Police Foundation to establish an office in Dallas and work with the department full time. This challenge was, in part, a response to the growing resentment of the "fly in/fly out" status of the Police Foundation representatives with whom the department had dealt. Department staff argued that Police Foundation staff, who worked with the department only occasionally, could not be adequately informed and that too much time was lost in trying to keep the foundation up to date. A permanent program officer in Dallas was simply out of the question for the foundation.

Part of the grant awarded in April was for the initiation of a program of minority recruiting. This task proved to be much more difficult than either the department or the foundation seemed to have anticipated. OPA was trying to manage this project at the same time it was attempting to locate space for an office, recruit a staff, and manage the writing of the Project Pride proposal for the November board meeting. Even at this early stage of the project, some observers thought that the small staff of OPA seemed overburdened by its responsibilities. Conflict developed between DPD personnel, OPA, city personnel, and foundation personnel over the sincerity and pace of the minority recruitment efforts.

By early summer of 1971, the conflict between the OPA chief and the foundation program officer had become serious. By midsummer, two foundation staff members and the foundation evaluator reported to the foundation that no progress had been made toward meeting the November deadline. The foundation president flew to Dallas to discuss the problem with the chief. The president suggested that the problem seemed to be the OPA chief; the DPD chief believed that it was too difficult for his people to deal with the foundation program officer. The result was assignment of a new program officer to the Dallas project.

The second program officer was no less committed to the role of change agent than the first, but the Police Foundation decided on a substantially different style. Rather than attempting to become involved within the department, the foundation now decided to maintain organizational boundaries, and deal with the department in a more institutional than personal way. The resulting formal relationship seems to have left fewer opportunities for interpersonal friction.

Tensions increased in the Office of Program Assistance as the summer passed without any progress on the proposal for the November meeting. Increasingly, OPA turned to external sources for assistance. One of these sources was the evaluation staff who had been assigned to Dallas and who were required to submit an evaluation proposal for the same November board meeting. Because it is almost impossible to design an evaluation without knowing details of the program, the evaluation staff was eager to be involved with OPA in order to learn the department's plans. As a result, they were pressed to contribute ideas and assist with the writing. Involved also was the law professor from Southern Methodist University (SMU) who was to head the foundation-funded Police Development Center.

Still, progress was very slow. It simply was not clear what the chief wanted to include in the funding document. Ideas were expressed in a general conceptual form, with little indication of how they were to be implemented. In fact, the second program officer reported that it was September 1971 before the chief clearly articulated to him his Five-Year Plan for the DPD. In retrospect it seems that the reason the plan had remained vague for many months, was not that the chief was uncertain about his goals, but that he feared revealing them to a department or city government that he believed were not adequately prepared to receive them. Although he had been in the DPD for nearly 20 years, he had been chief for less than a year. As an assistant to the previous chief, he had experienced the difficulty of implementing recommendations made by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 1968. Those ideas had been far less visionary than his own, and he knew that the department had too little experience with change to accept it easily. He was still making major changes in the structure and personnel of the command staff; there had not yet been time for the atmosphere to settle around these changes, and the

chief had not yet assessed fully the abilities or loyalties of his commanders. The head of OPA was one of the few people with whom he had felt comfortable sharing his ideas. In addition, there had been little opportunity to expose the ideas for debate, revision, and development, and to gain internal support for them. To present them in the funding document would be to present them to the department as a fait accompli.

In many respects, the chief was confronted with the same dilemmas that administrators face in all kinds of organizations, regarding the revelation of his long-range plans. He was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. The drive of the press to know, the need for an administrator to plan innovations freely without having to fear the development of resistances from groups with special interests, and the need to bring staff into plans are often in conflict, and there is no satisfactory solution.

Whatever the particular combination of reasons, reluctance to articulate proposals made the preparation of both the program and the evaluation proposals very difficult. Perhaps more important, there began to develop around the project an aura of secrecy which later contributed to the emergence of the resistances which the chief had feared.

After periods of mental anguish and late-night and weekend writing sessions, the proposal and evaluation design were ready for the November meeting. The department's document began with the 13-page statement of the chief's goals reproduced in the introduction to this report. Confronted with the need to touch all bases carefully before revealing the plan publicly, the chief had these pages removed from the copies of the proposal that remained in Dallas. Later, when selected department personnel, including the president of the Dallas Police Association, were permitted to read the document, they did not fail to notice that the first page number was 14. Rumors of the missing pages added to feelings of suspicion about the real intent of the plan.

The board approved the proposal at the November meeting, but voted to withhold a portion of the funds until some aspects of the program—primarily those concerning training—were more clearly defined. The amount approved for the first year of the program was $382,200. Because unspent funds remained from the planning grant, the second funding period did not begin until May 1972. The contractual arrangements to be made were somewhat complex. Since the department could not receive the grant directly from the foundation, monies would have to be awarded to the city and be administered through its general fund. The money to support the Center at Southern Methodist University had to be handled in the same manner. All program expenditures thus had to comply with city regulations which, for sums over $2,000, required a long process of accepting and evaluating bids. The foundation program officer discussed with the city manager means of expediting the paper work for the expenditure of grant monies; he even encouraged the city to establish a position for a finance officer whose sole responsibility would be the administration of grant funds. Although this proposal was not adopted, the program officer did believe that the city would cooperate in expediting program expenditures.

Almost from the beginning, the Office of Program Assistance, already experiencing frustration in trying to recruit a professional staff, began to experience conflict over city fiscal procedures. OPA believed the grant provided for an OPA staff of full-time civilian professionals who would be hired on the basis of one-year contracts, because the foundation grant depended on annual renewal. The employees were to be hired as independent contractors, which meant that they would receive none of the fringe benefits provided city employees. Salaries could be no better than competitive with those in industry, and contracts were subject to termination five days following a written notice. The recruitment effort was further complicated by the similar recruitment effort being made by the Center at SMU. (OPA's assumption that competition existed between SMU and the OPA for staff and the fact that the skills of the two staffs later overlapped added to the tensions that ultimately developed between the Center for Police Development and the department.)

Although the program grant was scheduled to begin in May 1972, negotiations between the city and the foundation created some delays. The PF board continued to have some

reservations about the training component of the program and was not yet ready to release this part of the budget. The city said it could not accept a grant for an indefinite amount and wanted a firmer commitment from the foundation. It was June before the issue was settled. The delay added to OPA's recruitment problem, and may have caused greater problems for the Center at SMU, which was attempting to recruit from basically an academic pool. (By June, most academics have established their plans for the next academic year and the Center head, like the OPA chief, had to devote more time and energy to recruitment than anticipated.)

The regulations about employee contracts and the issue of the contract between the city and the foundation were only the first of many binds the department experienced in trying to meet foundation expectations and comply with city regulations. Some expenditures the foundation would approve but the city would not, such as the amounts department personnel could spend for out-of-town trips (the city's limits for food and lodging or the higher ones of the foundation), the use of credit cards by OPA personnel, and other issues. Some of the problems OPA had with the city's finance office were, in part, the result of both the city's and the department's inexperience with such an arrangement. OPA thought that the city's business-as-usual paper flow was a hindrance to program development. OPA believed that, at best, the process was a waste of energies and hindered program implementation and that, at worst, city bureaucrats overemphasized the requirements because they did not support the department's program. Besides the fact that the staff of OPA had no experience with such procedures, they were overburdened by them. Eventually a staff member was hired who had a Masters degree in Public Administration with a concentration in financial affairs, whose sole responsibility was the financial transactions with the city and foundation. Although matters began to improve at this point, the finance officer found that he spent much of his time on mending the organizational fences. He worked, too, at helping the OPA staff understand the substance and purpose of the city regulations, which seemed unreasonably restrictive to those staff members who had come from either academia or industry.

The inexperience of the foundation also contributed to these problems. Dallas was the first city where the foundation had attempted this type of relationship, and there were lessons to be learned. One of these was that a police department is usually only one part of a city system, and cannot be dealt with as an independent unit. Failure to respect city regulations or to give proper credit to other city officials involved in the system contributed to the external resistances to the program and to OPA. In 1971-1972 the set of guidelines for grant recipients, which the foundation later prepared, was not available. OPA believed it had foundation encouragement to be flexible, but the city finance staff had no special instructions and could not have been expected to bend city procedures. OPA often could clear special expenditures or budget shifts with the PF program officer (depending on who it was) but formal notification was necessary for the city.

And it was the case that the foundation, by its very presence and style, set expectations, regardless of whether they were explicit or simply projected. When OPA had to expand its office space, it moved into the same office complex that housed the Police Foundation evaluation staff. The evaluation staff did not function in a style at all comparable to that of the city bureaucracy. The office operated in a highly flexible manner which, in comparison to the city's style, may have seemed flamboyant or at least enviable. The OPA office was always open during the city's working hours, but the hours of the evaluation staff were variable. The criterion was that quality work be done by the established deadlines. The working relationships across all levels tended to be far more collegial, personal, and informal than those in city offices.

Some aspects of this style must have looked attractive, especially to the civilian personnel in OPA who felt constrained by the bureaucracy to which they were unaccustomed. No matter how many or which extra hours they might choose to work, they were likely to be faulted if they were unavailable during city hours. The city decided that OPA staff could not finance working lunches from grant funds, and OPA personnel were always uncertain about whether they would be reimbursed if they offered to buy a meal for a foundation staff

member. And, perhaps more than anything else, the Dallas evaluator had an administrative flexibility that could only have made the OPA chief feel more constrained by comparison. The smallest effort on the part of OPA to adopt approaches similar to those of the evaluation staff (or perhaps simply to loosen their own procedures) seemed to cause the city to tighten the administrative rein. More important, any deviation from bureaucratic policy was apt to increase the resentment, both within and outside the department, toward OPA as a privileged unit.

In retrospect, it probably was not wise for the foundation to encourage OPA to function in any way different from standard city procedures. Although loosening the structure for the sake of flexibility and creativity might be a desirable goal in itself, to attempt it was to risk some critical program goals. The city bureaucracy was simply too important and too powerful for OPA to risk offending it. And, generally, OPA was too fragile an entity to risk attracting any special and potentially unfavorable attention to itself. Probably it would have been in the interest of OPA to have played an exemplary role of bureaucratic form, functioning with strictest adherence to city procedures, seeking expedition under only the most critical conditions. Instead, it was not hard to spot OPA as a maverick unit in the city structure.[3]

Whether city personnel were merely determined to adhere to the standard procedures or whether some kept special and burdensome vigilance over OPA is hard to determine. There were rumors from many sources that a highly placed city official with control over finances was an opponent of the chief. The reasons were unclear, but they apparently predated the new programs. There were also suggestions that other city departments were resentful of the large amounts of money which the DPD was able to secure from outside sources. Possibly the city manager, in order to protect his office from criticism and to control the external resistance to the DPD programs, felt it was necessary to make clear that OPA and DPD

3. Perhaps individuals or units can try to be bureaucratic mavericks after having mastered the courtesies and intricacies of bureaucracies, but certainly not before.

were receiving no special treatment, but that cannot be determined. Whatever the reasons, there appear to have been no extraordinary accommodations made, but city finance personnel resented the fact that they were requested, and OPA personnel resented the fact that they were denied. The department's Director of Fiscal Affairs (working in OPA) was caught in the middle of this conflict. Given his training and career path, and the tensions between his own supervisor and the OPA chief, his tendencies were toward strict adherence to traditional guidelines.

By the time the contract between the city and the foundation was settled in June 1972, the third Police Foundation program officer in less than a year was operating in Dallas. The second program officer left the foundation voluntarily to accept other employment. But it was also the case that he and his predecessor in Dallas had become convinced that the major impact program strategy being attempted in Dallas could not succeed; he attempted to persuade the foundation to abandon this approach for future projects. Other Washington PF staff members were just as strongly committed to the major impact approach and the board shared the intense conflict. The conflict became so exacerbated that the president of the foundation resigned and took a position at The John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government. An associate director (the first Dallas program officer) also resigned.

So just as Dallas was entering the first program grant period, the foundation was undergoing its own crisis and experiencing personnel changes with which the DPD also would have to cope. The search for a new foundation president lasted about six months. In the meantime, an associate director became the acting director. He quickly involved himself in the DPD-PF relationship as the temporary Dallas program officer. Shortly thereafter he appointed a new program officer to Dallas who attempted to develop a style as program officer somewhat similar to one that was working successfully in Kansas City. That model was to fund a special position *inside* the police department for a person acceptable to both the Police Foundation and the department. He made this attempt although that plan had been specifically rejected for Dallas as a result of early

experience and charges of foundation interference in Dallas. This program officer's style of almost completely ignoring organizational boundaries created still more confusion in the DPD about the role and purpose of the PF. The style of behavior on which both the program and evaluation staff had agreed earlier was one of a fairly formal and non-intrusive nature. The departure from this style, and the attempt to use one that would make the PF program officer a central and indispensable person for the department, caused tension. It created general suspicion and particular antagonism on the part of OPA, which found itself involved in too many projects and crises to respond adequately to an intrusive program officer. Further, this officer required activity and progress reports which OPA felt were premature and too time-consuming. (The overemphasis on this need and OPA's overreaction to it ultimately resulted in a progress report of approximately 500 pages which, indeed, was too time-consuming.) But to pursue this issue is to move ahead of the story.

In the months just before the first award of program grant money in June 1972, several events in the DPD affected the foundation-funded programs. In March of 1972, Chief Dyson appointed an almost entirely new command staff. This in itself was unsettling in the DPD inasmuch as the men he appointed to the rank of assistant chief were relatively young and were promoted over older officers who had expected the positions on the basis of tenure. The fact that they were bypassed created a pocket of resistance among some of the older commanders and the officers loyal to them. The new command staff had to become immersed immediately in programs in which some of them had had no planning role, and they had to learn to work as a group. The chief wanted to implement a process of participatory management through which he expected his assistant chiefs to make jointly many decisions traditionally reserved for the chief. The responsibility for formulating and implementing the new management style fell to the head of OPA, with whom the chief had shared the idea. The consequence of this effort was a succession of long meetings in which the command staff discussed department issues ranging in import from the most trivial to the most serious. Because the staff did not yet know

how to make group decisions nor how to select the appropriate agenda items for decisionmaking at this level, and because they could not always risk leaving decisions to managers beneath them whom they did not yet trust, the business of the department began to bog down. One of the chief's primary goals was to decentralize decisionmaking; the irony of participatory management in Dallas was that it caused decisionmaking to become more centralized than it had been before.

Presenting to the command staff all of the decisions to be made about the various programs was one way to make them familiar with the programs. The chief hoped that joint decisionmaking would cause them to feel involved in and committed to the projects more quickly. As with other department issues, the process did considerably slow decisionmaking about programs. The Center staff at SMU experienced the results of this problem as they attempted to develop proposals for their own work. Neither the DPD chief nor the OPA chief had been very clear about their expectations for the Center; now the new command staff was expected to decide what should be done. The Center staff would prepare formal proposals, wait for the command staff to meet, amend the proposals in response to whatever suggestions were made, and wait for the next command staff meeting. For several weeks the Center staff found all of their energies directed toward preparing and performing for the command staff. Participatory management allowed the projects to become the first arena in which the new assistant chiefs struggled for power among themselves. After their group was formed in March 1972, it was more than a year before the chief designated someone as his second-in-command. During those months there was strong, and often damaging, competition for the position. The head of OPA, friend and confidant of the chief, was a target for some of the other assistant chiefs; this meant that the programs for which he was responsible also became targets.

By June 1972 it was clear, from interviews with them, that the new assistant chiefs still did not have a clear and common understanding of the chief's long-range goals for the department. It also was apparent that some of them were uncomfortable in discussing these goals. They seemed to be uncertain

about some aspects of the plans and, at the same time, nervous that they might expose too much. The plans were still viewed as a secret in the department. In July and August 1972, the chief took his staff on two weekend retreats to areas outside Dallas to explain his ideas and engage them in planning implementation. The Dallas PF evaluator, the PF program officer, and the director of the Center for Police Development also attended these sessions. Although it seems clear that the chief needed extensive contact with his staff, his opponents later portrayed these meetings as secret and conspiratorial. At these sessions the chief suggested a pattern for his future involvement with his staff and with his projects. There was a time scheduled during the retreats for him to explain his goals to his staff and then leave the group to attempt to work out the details. And this is how it was to be. He was a charismatic, inspirational leader who did not then sit with his staff to ponder the details. Because he did not, he was not aware of their ideas or their doubts; this information would reach him in a secondhand process. Over time this meant that he was not in close touch with the operational and political problems of implementing the projects and that he could not judge accurately the positions of the men on whom he was most dependent. Almost from the beginning, he abdicated control over his Five-Year Plan. With time, his opponents would take advantage of this fact to subvert the projects and send him inaccurate information. In fairness to the chief, he was himself overextended and had to work for efficiency in his schedule; he was very much in demand for meetings and appearances locally, across the state, and nationally. Ironically, it can be argued that the very fact of having been identified as one of the outstanding police chiefs in the country may have added to his problems; it made it more difficult for him to pay close attention to the internal affairs of his own department. Opponents would argue that he sought the publicity and was using the department as a stepping-stone in a nationally oriented career; actually, it would have been difficult for this chief to avoid publicity. The attention of the media was a problem not only because it demanded his time but because it probably made him a target of jealousy. As he talked about his department and what he hoped to accomplish,

there was a growing retort in the department of "You and who else?" At various times he was mentioned as a candidate for director of the FBI, as the Director of Public Safety for Dallas (if such a position were to be created), and as a potential candidate for public office. It is possible that the jealousy spread beyond his opponents in the department to bureaucratic leaders who felt his growing community status would give him too much power in the system and to politicians in the community who would not relish his competition.

Publicity was a double-edged sword in another sense. During the honeymoon period of his administration, the chief enjoyed very good relations with the press. All the news from the department was good; the chief was popular with the officers and the press found him an attractive subject for stories. The chief instituted monthly press conferences to discuss crime rates and answer questions about the department. This early openness to the media was later to become a liability as problems developed in the department and as the chief increasingly felt the need to reduce the publicity about projects during their developmental stages. As he seemed to withhold information from the press, some reporters tended to press harder for details. At the same time, his opponents began to approach the press aggressively, providing reporters with the information—presented from the perspective of some news source—that the press felt it was not getting from the chief. Ultimately, this combination of the chief's increasing unavailability and the availability of his opponents swayed the reporters against the chief. Both the reporting press and the chief felt a sense of mutual betrayal; each may have thought the other had turned against the initially positive relationship. The chief had hoped that the merits of a good program and the sincerity of his good intentions would deserve and win the support of the department, the community, the politicians, and the media. When he realized that wasn't necessarily the case, he responded with withdrawal and sometimes with punitive responses, which only hardened opposition. An experienced administrator would have been more cynical during the honeymoon period (would not, for example, have allowed the media to develop the expectation that he would tell them everything),

and when he saw it ending, would have been unsurprised and would have moved into a more calculated stance. The chief did not. He could have remained a primary source of information for the press, inviting reporters in for special backgrounding sessions, but calculating the amount, type, and timing of the information he released. Although this approach would not have prevented his opponents from using the media, he would not have been placed on the defensive. This strategy might have avoided what became his adversary relationship with the press.

During this period the development of Police Academy programs was very slow, in spite of the planned significance of education and retraining in the Five-Year Plan. Three observations seem important. The first is that the funded projects were in fact, viewed as short-range. That the administration hoped finally to end the training function may have limited any commitment to investing energy and resources in projects soon to be eliminated. That the academy personnel suspected the chief's ultimate objective certainly may have influenced their willingness to cooperate with his efforts.

Second, in 1972 the academy had been directed for several years by one captain whom the administration seemed to see as an insurmountable obstacle to change. They grudgingly respected the academy as his territory and assumed that little progress could be made there until he retired. Transferring this captain appeared to be politically out of the question. This situation seemed to produce, at least in the head of OPA, the attitude that the academy hardly was worth the effort.

Finally, during the planning grant period, academy personnel had been asked to submit training proposals to be incorporated into the larger funding document. Apparently, in a flurry of activity, several ideas were developed and offered. Proud of their work, the academy staff reported disillusionment when it was not acknowledged and when, later, the academy received little attention from OPA. The first civilian hired by OPA was a curriculum development specialist who appeared to be committed to working with the academy. Yet this consultant reported that it was increasingly difficult to obtain meetings with the head of OPA in order to get responses to his proposals.

He reported having been told by the OPA chief to stay away from the academy in order to avoid seduction.

All of these factors served to limit the progress made with the training projects during the first year of funding.

Meanwhile the SMU Center for Police Development was also beginning its activities. The first Police Foundation program officer in Dallas had become actively involved in an effort to locate a suitable college or university and had concluded that the only suitable institution was the privately funded Southern Methodist University. The SMU administration had an expressed desire to work with public institutions, and the university included a credible law school. An SMU professor of law, known to the foundation, was interested in the possibility of establishing a police-academic relationship. The chief was reluctant to accept the foundation's recommendation; he thought the high tuition rates of the private institution would preclude eventually conducting training on that campus. Nevertheless, the foundation strongly urged that SMU be used as a source of research and consultant skills, the focus of which could be planning the long-range training program. The chief accepted with some reluctance.

As early as 1971 there was the beginning of a working relationship (during periods of grant writing) between the head of OPA and the law professor who was to head the Center. With planning monies, one staff member was hired for the Center in early 1972. It was June 1972 before all the contractual negotiations were completed between the city, the department, and SMU and the Center received funds for recruiting and developing a staff.

The Center director, who had anticipated involvement in training issues, found it difficult to get the department to respond to training-oriented proposals, perhaps due, at least in part, to the department's ambivalence about training. SMU represented a capacity which the department was not quite ready to use. OPA suggested some research topics in which the department would be interested and the Center began to develop proposals which OPA required to be reviewed and accepted by the entire command staff. This review proved to be a time-consuming and not always productive process. The

Center staff reported increased frustration with its efforts to get responses from the department. An apparently not atypical example is cited in the department's first progress report to the foundation; the reference is to a project concerning the delivery of police social services.

> The Department submitted a formal request on September 8, 1972. The CPD reviewed related research efforts in Dallas and a proposal was submitted October 11, and a budget was submitted on November 13. The proposal was resubmitted in December 1972 and OPA responded with their concerns in January 1973. Time lags between proposal submission and responses are generally the result of extensive review of several proposals submitted in December 1972.
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> Because of increased workload at CPD, the project was sub-contracted to the Institute of Urban and Environmental Affairs in February and a second proposal was submitted February 26, 1973. The proposal was reviewed by CPD and OPA on March 5, and revisions were suggested. A new proposal was resubmitted on March 8 (see Reference Document RD II, D, 28). OPA and Departmental approval is expected in April.[4]

Nine months elapsed between the first request and final approval of the proposal. The Center viewed this breakdown in communication as a barrier to productivity.

The first research reports the Center produced added to the strain of the relationship, when the OPA concluded it had not received what it had requested. It seems apparent that the first requests were vague in detail and that the Center failed to verify its understanding of the issues before proceeding. In addition, it appears that the department had unrealistic expectations about the usefulness of research for policy purposes. Research obviously is limited by available data, a fact which neither the department nor the Center had considered thoroughly. After these first efforts, later research statements were more precise. Although these other projects went more smoothly, this misunderstanding had strained the relationship in yet another way.

4. Dallas Police Department, *Progress Report*, March 1973.

In the summer of 1972 the Dallas Police Association grew less supportive of the Chief. The DPA, concerned that the new Five-Year Plan might mean the lowering of recruitment standards and the end of Civil Service protection, began a drive to include Dallas fire fighters and police officers in the state Civil Service system. A change from the city to state Civil Service had to be decided by city referendum, and it was decided to begin collecting the signatures necessary to place the issue on the April 1973 ballot. The chief strongly disagreed with the DPA's position; he believed control by state Civil Service would restrict his authority as an administrator. The issue festered for several months.

During the spring and summer of 1972 the new command staff was beginning to function. At the same time as they were organizing, the PF evaluation staff was getting established in Dallas and department members were trying to learn the identity and intent of the evaluation staff and to determine how to deal with them. The third PF program officer was beginning to operate in Dallas, and a style of interaction had to be developed with him. The staff of the Center for Police Development at SMU was being assembled and were beginning to move inside the department. The presence of all these new actors was its own source of confusion; simply keeping them identified by organization was at first an issue. In fact, role confusions that occurred during these early months lingered in the department. OPA seemed at times to be confused about the identity of the official Police Foundation representative in Dallas. Was it the program officer, or the more frequently available PF evaluator? If OPA got conflicting messages from them, who should be believed? Were the evaluation staff members independent agents, or were they carrying foundation messages that he should try to decipher in his conversations with them? Was the head of the Center for Police Development an independent agent, an agent of the department, or an agent of the foundation? If he had a special relationship with the foundation, should he also be examined for messages and motivations? (In an attempt to reduce this uncertainty, OPA eventually tried to control the contacts between the Center and the foundation, an act which, of course, did not

improve the relationship between the Center and the department.) The question of who spoke for the foundation was not an unreasonable one. Given three program officers within a year, their divergent styles, and the fact that the foundation president recently had resigned, the department was justifiably confused about the nature of the foundation. The foundation board was primarily an abstract entity and it was not at first clear what its relationship was to the Washington-based staff or to the Dallas-based evaluation staff.

An event during the spring of 1972 demonstrated the confusion (one that persisted) about the roles of key actors. At that time one of the central figures on the Police Foundation's board visited Dallas, only to be treated rather haughtily by a new command staff which resented examination by an Eastern outsider. The Dallas evaluator, understanding the critical nature of the encounter, worked to effect a rapprochement between the board member and the command staff, perhaps affecting the grant process. After that, the Dallas evaluator tended to be viewed as a special source of information about the foundation staff and Board. But what role was he meant to play? Could his information be trusted? Given the impermanence of program officers, the DPD had its closest contact with the foundation through the Dallas evaluation staff. This was a mixed blessing to the evaluators, because the department vacillated between friend and foe in its view of the foundation. Knowing that by now there was only a tenuous commitment to Dallas among board members, the department was inclined to be reciprocally tentative with the evaluators. It did not become an easy relationship for two years.

While the department was learning to deal with the various groups and individuals, they, in turn, were having to learn to deal with each other. After the award of funds in June 1972, the OPA staff began to include civilian professionals who had to learn to deal with each other, with the department, with the evaluation staff, and with the SMU staff. The period from March to September 1972 would have been an unsettled period if only because of the large number of new actors who were new both to their own roles and to each other. But all of this was occurring in the context of the department's plans for

organizational decentralization, the implementation of which was to begin in the fall of 1972. The dates were established at the command staff retreats during the late summer and the early fall. All the new actors, along with other department personnel, began to try to work together in task forces to plan the implementation, support, and evaluation of the project.

Before the work of the task forces could be published as a plan and distributed to the department, the first steps toward implementing decentralization already had been taken. During September, 14 officers were selected from the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for participation in the program. They were trained and, by early October, transferred to the Southeast Patrol District station. The Dallas press discussed these plans in articles which appeared in September and October with no indication that the information had come from the chief. It was another instance in which the administration seemed guarded about a program and the rank and file officers began to believe that the newspaper was a more reliable source of information than was their own chief. In November 1972 copies of the decentralization plan and more massive Five-Year Plan were distributed in the department, but this did not quiet the rumors which already were rampant. Supervisors, many of whom either did not understand the programs or did not support them, could have great influence over the way officers interpreted what they read. When officers had questions, they discovered that supervisors and more highly ranked commanders were at a loss for adequate responses. Even those who were loyal often could only speculate as to how some of the ideas would be implemented, and officers were quick to notice when responses of various commanders were incongruent. They became even more convinced that the fate of the department was not being revealed even to the commanders, let alone to the rank and file. In part because the documents were labeled as "plans" rather than concept papers, the chief found it difficult to explain to the officers that the ideas were long-range goals, many of which would require detailed planning by many persons in the department. They did not readily accept this; ideas presented without detail were considered "fuzzy" and the Five-Year Plan, once attacked as secretive, could now

be criticized as myopic, starry-eyed, unrealistic. Opponents had so skillfully politicized the situation that, for a growing minority, the issue was no longer the plan or its quality. A power struggle had developed. As had minority recruitment, the Five-Year Plan became a rallying point for those opposing the chief. Some officers did believe that the plan was too futuristic for Dallas, but in other cases persons whose vested interests were threatened by the plans encouraged opposition. They managed to take advantage of the uncertainty, misunderstanding, fear of change, and declining faith in management to rally opposition among the very officers who stood to benefit most from the program.

There seemed to be at least four main pockets of resistance within the department: (1) those people at any level or in any function who sincerely disagreed with the chief's model of policing; (2) those supervisors who feared their positions would be eliminated if the organizational structure were flattened; (3) those officers (primarily in specialized units) who feared decentralization would reduce the status and perquisites of their jobs; and (4) those people, some in high positions, who either felt vengeful because they had not been promoted by the chief or who had some hope of replacing him if he should fail. In addition to these specific concerns or interests, most Dallas officers shared a concern that the new policies would result in lowering standards for police recruits. Opponents with special interests were able to garner much indirect support for their own causes by emphasizing this possibility. At least one of these groups, supervisors who feared their positions would be eliminated, were in key positions in the department's chain of communication, and it was through them that the plans were being communicated to the rank and file.

When it became clear that the documents were prompting as many questions as they were answering, an OPA staff member began to work on a "communications plan" by which management would respond to questions from the field. Ironically, the plan was to use a system of passing questions up and answers back down the very chain that could not be relied upon. It seemed to indicate the persistence of the optimistic belief that, as soon as supervisors fully understood the plans,

they would support them enthusiastically. In any event, the communication plan was several weeks either on the drawing board or under debate in command staff meetings and in the meantime rumors multiplied and opposition organized.

During October 1972, Dallas police officers shot five black citizens, three of whom died. There followed the strongest protest that had ever been made by the Dallas black community. One of the protest marches was a funeral procession headed by the Rev. Ralph Abernathy for which the chief refused a parade permit. When the unauthorized procession confronted police barricades, and the decision was made to let it pass, many officers believed the department had "lost face" and "backed down" and that the chief had not given adequate support to officers taunted by the crowd. Although the chief was determined to hold conflict to a minimum (there were no serious injuries and property damage was minimal), many officers were angry at having been restrained. The city and the chief agreed to hearings on the shootings by the Greater Dallas Community Relations Commission. The chief asked officers to cooperate, but the DPA advised its members not to testify on the grounds that such hearings would establish the precedent for a civilian review board. The commission had no subpoena power and, in fact, received almost no cooperation from the department's rank and file. After two weeks of meetings the commission requested that the investigation be taken over by the city council, which does have subpoena power and the authority to receive sworn testimony. The council declined to take up the issue. Another shooting in November resulted in more protest marches. Tensions quieted when the acting city manager and the chief announced plans to increase minority hiring, to have officers involved in shootings transferred while the investigation took place, to have female suspects searched by female officers, and otherwise to attempt to improve police-community relations.

During late October, one of the assistant chiefs who had played a major role in the handling of the demonstrations suffered a collapse and was placed on departmental sick leave, an act which brought charges of favoritism from the DPA. This manager was one of the chief's recent appointments, a bright

man but one who was not widely popular among the detectives and investigators whom he commanded. Ultimately this officer was reduced to the rank of lieutenant. Within a few months a second member of the command staff suffered a breakdown and eventually resigned. Both cases are probably attributable, at least in part, to the enormous amount of stress these people were experiencing.

Late in October, primarily as a result of the issue that led to the demotion of the assistant chief, the mayor of Dallas formed a city council investigative committee to probe "rumors of police irregularities." The ensuing publicity increased the general sense that something was wrong in the department, although the investigation, which dragged on for six months, resulted in a report of no irregularities. A few disgruntled officers and some citizens with minor and routine complaints were the only witnesses to appear before the committee. Nevertheless, the very existence of the investigation added to the uneasiness in the department and gave momentum to the developing bureaucratic power struggle.

During November and December 1972 and January 1973, the department began to encounter delays in implementing decentralization; whether these were due to sabotage or to the inevitability of snags in the system is difficult to determine, but as schedules slipped, tensions mounted.

It was also during this period that strains increased between the department and the Center for Police Development at SMU. As discussed previously, the first products of the Center revealed that the two agencies had not developed clear understanding (despite or because of all the command staff meetings) of what was expected of the Center. These problems seemed to have been resolved when a situation in December exposed the department's unfamiliarity with the policy limitations of research.

Because Dallas police officers recently had been embroiled in shooting incidents involving minority citizens, the department requested that the Center study the circumstances of the incidents and the characteristics of the officers involved. When the report draft was presented in December, the DPD was upset to discover that the findings were as yet tentative and that

the data offered no clear guidelines as to how the chief should handle a situation which was creating political pressures for him. Both parties may have contributed to the misunderstanding: The department, inexperienced with research, expected too much from it; the Center, inexperienced in working with the police, may have been over-optimistic about what they could produce. The chief was disappointed and members of OPA, who felt responsible for the relationship with SMU, were quite angry. Subsequently OPA attempted to exert more administrative control over the Center (for example, requesting weekly reports of the use of each Center staff member's time), which hastened the deterioration of the relationship.

By the spring of 1973, the relationship between OPA and the Center had deteriorated seriously. The OPA seemed to suspect the Center of attempting to develop an independent power base and was annoyed any time the Center went around OPA and had independent contact with the foundation. The Center in turn claimed the OPA chief was unresponsive and was not available for meetings or to return phone calls. In May the OPA put a civilian staff member in charge of the liaison with SMU and the relationship improved temporarily. The role of this civilian psychologist highlighted another problem in the relationship. Both the Center and OPA had hired personnel with clinical, research, and computer skills, so the two units had overlapping abilities. Although there was ample work to occupy both groups, there developed a competitive rather than a cooperative relationship—especially when OPA placed civilians in a supervisory capacity over those at the Center.

Despite all these problems, there were external signs that the relationship was improving when, in August 1973, the OPA recommended to the chief that the relationship be terminated and the Center director was informed that continuation funding would not be requested. The relationship had lasted 18 months.

In retrospect this seems like a short time in which even to have begun a working partnership between two such disparate organizations; it was hardly time enough to have tested it and found it wanting. Under other conditions, the relationship might have had a better chance for survival. In the turmoil of

the change effort and the controversy over the Five-Year Plan, administrative tensions ran high and there was immediate demand for production. This pressure for products from a partnership that had not had adequate time to develop simply put too great a burden on it.

And yet there were products. Some were major research projects requiring the generation of substantial bodies of new data or the manual collection of large amounts of information from department records. Looking back, the productivity is especially impressive in light of the troubled quality of the relationship.

It was during this same period that OPA became increasingly concerned by the demands the Police Foundation was making on the DPD. In somewhat the same way that OPA attempted to tighten the control over the Center, the Police Foundation's third program officer began to make greater demands on the OPA. The relationship between the two organizations worsened with the threats of withholding or delaying the flow of foundation funds.

In December, a new city manager, previously an assistant city manager in Dallas, was named. There was some temporary concern about the impact this might have on the department's program effort.

This, then, was the context in which the DPD entered 1973. The major event of January was that the foundation evaluation staff began to administer the Human Resources Development questionnaire to the entire department. This questionnaire, to be administered at two separate times, was to be the major source of evaluation data. It included items (some considered sensitive) about officers' backgrounds and attitudes, and required about an hour and a half to complete. Generally the administration of the questionnaire was handled badly, which undoubtedly contributed to the already tense atmosphere in the department. The OPA approached the task nervously and did little to encourage positive reception in the department, although the department certainly cooperated fully in calling officers in from the street to complete the questionnaire during duty hours. The questionnaire was presented for review to the command staff by a relatively inexperienced evaluation staff

member, who had not been extensively involved in the development of the items, and who subsequently found himself hard pressed to explain the purpose of some of them. This left the command staff even less prepared to explain the questionnaire to other officers than they had been to explain the Five-Year Plan. What may have appeared in the field to have been conspiracy to withhold information was primarily the shadow of poor information, which had become less useful as it suffered the inevitable distortions in the chain of command.

The questionnaire was administered by university students hired and trained for this purpose but who had no particular knowledge of the questions and little familiarity with the police department. Later it was apparent that some of them had put pressure on officers to fill out a questionnaire intended to be voluntary. Despite whatever unrest may have been created, the response rates were high and the reliability of the response was strong.[5] The DPA voted to request the return of the questionnaires. The evaluator agreed that any officer requesting return of his own questionnaire could have it. There were no requests.

In January the OPA moved from its downtown headquarters into the building where the Police Foundation evaluation staff had its office. For several months OPA had been seeking new quarters and, through visits to the evaluation office, had become aware of the available space. There was no particular desire to be close to the evaluation offices, but program opponents later interpreted the move as proof of the foundation's controlling influence in Dallas. The new offices, modest by business standards but relatively pleasant by city standards, were criticized as plush and as being far removed from police facilities (although the City Credit Union was across the parking lot and the DPD Internal Affairs Division was only a few blocks away). Nevertheless, the move added to the mystery of OPA.

Beyond that, this move was significant in at least two other respects. The first was that it was *OPA* which moved out of police facilities, rather than any other unit. That fact alone suggests that OPA was not in the mainstream of the depart-

5. See the discussion of reliability in Chapter 2 of Volume II.

ment, but on the periphery. The second was that the geographical distance from the "innards" of the DPD further exacerbated the serious communication problems that already existed.

At the time of the move, the name of OPA was changed to the Management Services Bureau (MSB). This was more than a change in name, inasmuch as it also involved a restructuring which gave the head of OPA/MSB control over the Fiscal Affairs Division.

In mid-January the Dallas Metropolitan Criminal Justice Council was awarded a $20 million grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for which it had applied six months earlier. Planning for the department's share of the grant was done by the Planning and Research Division and other DPD personnel, but major responsibility for the work had been assumed by OPA. Some foundation program staff members and board members were concerned that the LEAA-funded projects would interfere with the human resources program funded by the foundation. The department emphasized that the programs were dissimilar and not at all competitive but, in fact, the planning and eventual supervision of so many projects severely taxed the resources of OPA/MSB. In addition, it soon became apparent that the presence of these programs made it impossible to maintain the control areas (geographical areas free of any new programs) in the city which had been established as part of the evaluation design. Consequently, a PF evaluation survey of Dallas citizens had to be canceled almost on the eve of its administration. It was only in the discussion of the control areas that MSB finally recognized the extent to which the many projects actually overlapped and confounded each other.

Also in January, the DPA and the Dallas fire fighters reversed their stand on attempting to join state Civil Service. After long negotiations with the new city manager, both groups agreed not to challenge the city Civil Service system.

On January 28, 1973, a brief item appeared in an editorial gossip column of a local newspaper suggesting that the decentralization project was running into trouble. On February 4, 1973, the press storm broke with a story on the front page of the

local news section titled "'Little Headquarters' Draws Fire: Senior Officers Suspicious of Federally Funded Police Foundation." The article included a picture of the building housing OPA/MSB's new offices and a reference to the Dallas evaluator in the same building as "another key but little known figure." The rival paper carried a long article the following day titled "Obscure Office Assuming Power." Two days later there was a long article on the evaluation questionnaire (attributing it to the Center at SMU), pinpointing sensitive items in the questionnaire and reporting officer opposition to it.[6] The same day another article reported a city council member as calling for an investigation of possible strings attached to outside funding for the department. For two weeks there were articles almost daily, generally negative in tone, reflecting charges made within the department about "secrecy" and "outside control." Also during these two weeks there were articles (primarily neutral in tone) about the DPD minority recruiting efforts. Coinciding with the series of articles, and reported in them, was an investigation of the Five-Year Plan by the DPA. A specific charge was that persons were being hired who were unqualified to be police officers. The sergeant in charge of the investigation who had been on a plainclothes assignment, was returned to uniformed, late night patrol duties in a move the department reported as unrelated to the investigation.

On February 18, the city manager responded to the charges with a detailed report to the city council in which he stressed the importance of the LEAA and foundation-funded programs for the department. He emphasized the decreasing crime rate in Dallas and what he saw as the increasing professionalism of Dallas police officers.

At this point the staff director, the acting executive head of the Police Foundation, visited Dallas and was greatly concerned by the apparent opposition in the department to the chief and the programs, by the sudden spate of negative press coverage and by what he believed to be the lack of progress in the

6. Almost all of the Patrol Division had been surveyed when this article appeared. Response rates in patrol were very high but dropped for the specialized units that received the questionnaire following the appearance of this story.

foundation-funded programs. He seriously considered withholding the quarterly foundation payment to give himself time to discuss the Dallas situation with other PF staff and board members. Almost immediately, the foundation's program officer for Dallas reported this possibility to OPA/MSB. In a quick series of events, the relationship between the PF and the DPD was again one of conflict. The program officer resigned, but the DPD was again acutely aware of the tenuous nature of its relationship with the foundation.

In February 1973, Dallas fire fighters and police officers approved a new pension fund that provided greater benefits to officers retiring after 20 and 25 years of service and allowed officers who resigned anytime before that to withdraw their contributions. It had been suspected that several officers had been postponing retirement in anticipation of the new program, but it was not possible to estimate how many people would leave the DPD following approval of the plan. Although the chief did not look forward to the loss of good, experienced officers, he may have anticipated the probability that some of his opponents, committed to traditional views of policing, would choose to retire. In addition, more retirements would mean more positions available for the better educated, more cosmopolitan officers the chief hoped to hire. When the first 20 officers had retired by April 1, the press called it a "police exodus." Opponents within the department began to cite the number of retirements as proof of dissatisfaction with the chief and his programs.

In late February, the chief made a presentation to the city council, after which he received unanimous endorsement for the concepts of his Five-Year Plan. In addition to the articles and editorials which reported or echoed the council's strong position, there appeared the following editorial:

THE COUNCIL AND POLICE

> The Dallas City Council appropriately gave its strong support to Police Chief Frank Dyson in his attempt to modernize the police department and to make it operate more efficiently.
>
> Chief Dyson has been under fire from senior members of the department in implementing a so-called 5-year plan for improving the department.
>
> Many policemen and citizens are suspicious of the use of outside funds, fearing that "strings" can destroy the independence of the law-enforcement agency. But Dyson has denied these charges: "They (the Police Foundation and federal agencies) will not tell us how to run our department . . . They only will decide whether we are using the funds as we said."
>
> Police officials have emphasized that the 5-year plan, which basically was developed by members of the department and consultants, is not set in concrete, but is merely a general outline setting goals and general organizational changes. An experiment in decentralization of the department is under way in the southeast district and modifications can be expected if parts of the plan don't work.
>
> The core of the furor, however, is the question of who runs the police department. Frank Dyson has been hired by the city manager with assent of the council to head the agency. The council gave prior approval to seeking a new course for the department and to using outside funds.
>
> If the 5-year plan proves unworkable, if morale is wrecked or if outside interference develops, it should be revised sharply or abandoned.[7]

The last paragraph is quite clear about the conditions under which the Five-Year Plan should continue to receive support. The chief had his vote of support but he had been put on notice.

If the council had settled the question of the Five-Year Plan to its satisfaction, there was still the question of the makeup of the city council to be resolved. City elections were set for April 2, and the issue that received the most attention was the police department and its Five-Year Plan. The report of the council probe into "reputed police irregularities," begun in October, had not yet been released. Although the decision was made to withhold it until after the election, there were ample rumors that the report would be favorable to the department. Nevertheless, three candidates running on an independent ticket vowed that, if elected, they would begin immediately a probe into the Five-Year Plan and the issue of DPD morale.

For several years, it had been impossible to be elected to a city office in Dallas without the endorsement of the Citizen's

7. *Dallas Morning News*, February 28, 1973.

Charter Association (CCA). Dallas has the reputation of being run like a large corporation and the CCA, representing the business community and the founding families of Dallas, selected the candidates who would maintain this style of management. Recognizing the need to include minorities in the process, the CCA recently had endorsed those who were most likely to support CCA positions. Although city council members were elected democratically, the influence of the CCA had guaranteed a relatively homogeneous group of decisionmakers. Critics claimed that it allowed the "Forty Families" to make the policy decisions which were then ratified by their handpicked council. If this charge had ever been true, it began to change in 1973 with such rapidity that by 1975-1976, the CCA was wondering publicly whether it should disband and reassemble under a different name. For the chief and his programs this meant that he had been selected, and his programs had been approved, by a city government of which the political makeup was now changing. Prominent citizens would no longer be able to guarantee support, regardless of the strength of their personal commitment. Fewer and fewer issues would pass with a unanimous council vote, and issues that once would have been handled discreetly would now find their way into an increasingly politicized council.

The same people who might applaud the growth of pluralism in the community might also admit that a chief attempting a massive change program in his organization is not likely to be helped by a simultaneous shift and struggle in the political environment around him. It was no help to have the same issues that had been treated suspiciously by the press in February resurrected by the council candidates in March.

Nor were the candidates the only ones to enter this arena. The following advertisement was purchased by one of the city's wealthy businessmen:

> PROVEN: Outside Control of
> Dallas Police Department!
>
> 1967: Presidential Commission recommends "lateral entry" into local police forces which suffer when policemen are "stupid, brutal."
> Commission headed by Nicholas deB. Katsenbach, member of eastern establishment Council on Foreign Relations. 70% of CFR'ers live in NY City, Boston, Washington, D.C. Katzenbach is former "Ford Foundation Fellow." CFR member and educator Kingman Brewster on Commission: sided with Black Panthers during a Yale student strike."
>
> 1971: Ford Foundation's Police Foundation funds Dallas Police's "Five Year Plan", with $1.4 million to date. CFR member McGeorge Bundy heads Foundation.
>
> "Five Year Plan": seeks "Lateral entry" for "infusion of people possessing needed skills" from outside of Police Department; alludes to inept top personnel hired "when physical factors rather than education preparation was (sic) stressed." (II-61); "anticipates" removing personnel selection from Department (III-21); projects "personnel training" may be met by questionably qualified." (III-22); says certain police functions can be put on "metropolitan basis" (II-9) . . . a pet socialist concept known at "Metro", funded for years by Ford Foundation.
>
> 1973: Special police office, staffed with Foundation personnel, controls outside funds, including Law Enforcement Assistance Adm., federal grants totaling millions. LEAA set up as result of Katzenbach Commission.
>
> TERMINATE OUTSIDE MONEY:
> TERMINATE OUTSIDE CONTROL!
>
> Paid for by Dallas County Support Your Local Police Committee,
> W.W. Caruth, III, 823-6444, Help us to help Dallas.[8]

Similar printed statements were distributed in the department.

Late in March there appeared in one of the Dallas papers a series of three front page articles by a reporter who had visited the Kansas City Police Department. In large type were these headlines:

"NOVEL KC POLICE PLAN PRAISED"

"KANSAS CITY'S POLICE MORALE AT HIGH POINT"

(headline on the continuation page read "KANSAS CITY AND DALLAS POLICE SITUATIONS")

"KC POLICE JOB BEING SPECIALIZED"

8. *Dallas Morning News*, March 28, 1973.

Explicit comparisons were made between two cities, two police departments, and two programs that were, in fact, quite different. The argument, only barely implicit, was that something must be very wrong in the DPD, because it appeared to be having far more difficulty in managing its change programs. Kansas City was involved in no changes of the magnitude and sensitivity of those being attempted in Dallas. The chief in Kansas City had 12 years of experience as chief of his department, had a strong political base at the local and state level, had no city council, no civil service, and no organized police association with which to contend. He was assisted by a powerful second-in-command who maintained order in the department and managed the annual dissolution, through transfers, of political cliques in the organization. Although the comparisons were unwarranted, they undoubtedly had their impact on the morale of Dallas officers, on the attitudes of the community, and on city leaders who seemed especially sensitive to issues of public image.

Also in March it was announced that a friend and colleague of the chief, a man who had left the DPD to become chief in another city, would return to the DPD in April to become executive assistant to the chief. The hope was that this man, reputedly swift to make decisions and very popular in the department, would be able to coordinate the command staff, shore up the program effort, and improve department morale.

At the academy, the training director retired in the spring of 1973 and a lieutenant, believed to support the chief's program, was appointed temporarily to head the academy. It was hoped that he would qualify as a captain after the next examination. (A lieutenant could hold this position only for an interim period.) With this change, project directors were appointed for each of the academy programs and some progress was apparent. In May 1973 the department was reorganized and the head of OPA/MSB was placed in charge of the Human Resources Development Bureau, a move which reduced his overall role in the department, but did give him direct line control over the academy. This move might have increased the direction OPA/MSB could offer the academy, but it did not seem to increase OPA/MSB's interest in the individual projects.

The primary concern of OPA/MSB was that the academy play its role in the validation of entrance criteria, meaning that the academy would be required to evaluate recruit performance much more thoroughly than it had in the past. This assignment was not popular among academy personnel. They argued that they would not have to assume the unpleasant responsibility of terminating recruits if the personnel division did its job properly. Because academy evaluation was an important step in the validation program, this resistance was a serious problem.

Opposition was developing on other fronts as well. During April an article appeared concerning the use of credit cards by what was still referred to as "a small but controversial planning unit"—OPA/MSB. Both the city and the foundation had approved the cards as a way of expediting special expenditures such as out-of-town trips, which might need to be arranged quickly, or for hosting visiting consultants or foundation personnel. The point was that this was the first government unit in the city to have such a privilege. That the cards had been in use since 1971 did not prevent the story from being newsworthy three years later.

There was some relief at the end of April when finally the city council reported that no irregularities in the DPD had been discovered during the investigation begun in October 1972. At one point the report criticized the Dallas press for "printing 'innuendo' and 'unconfirmed reports' of police wrongdoing."

In another move affecting OPA/MSB, the new executive assistant to the chief directed civilian staff of OPA/MSB to work directly with the units in which programs were being implemented and he placed them under the supervision of the police commanders of those units.

June was the first month in five when newspaper coverage of the DPD was essentially routine. In July, a $2.5 million program for dealing with juvenile delinquency was announced by the DPD. The Dallas crime rate was reported down once again. And then on July 24, a 12-year-old Mexican-American youth was shot to death by an officer who had held a gun to the boy's head in order to gain information about a burglary from a soft drink machine. The issue dominated the news for days. On July 29, a protest march on City Hall erupted unexpectedly in

violence. Five officers were injured, two police motorcycles were burned, 38 people were arrested and approximately $50,000 in damage was done to downtown store windows. In the aftermath, city officials, business leaders, and minority groups praised the chief and the department for their restraint in handling the crowds. The attitude inside the department was different. Charges were made that tactical officers had been prevented from assisting other officers under attack and that the chief had jeopardized his officers. Early in August the Dallas Police Association, in a long letter, accused the chief of not supporting officers in times of stress and generally criticized the handling of the Five-Year Plan. Angered by the letter, the chief met with the DPA. After discussing the disturbance, he told them that unless they were able to support the public charges they had made, he no longer would deal with them as a group.

And then in July the Dallas crime rate jumped dramatically by 12 percent.

The DPA voted to send the chief a list of documented charges, and through August and into September the public controversy between the chief and the DPA continued. In September the chief announced he would no longer deal with the association. At the chief's request, the executive assistant chief, reported to have a good relationship with the DPA, attended the next meeting to maintain communication.

During August the reported major crime rate in Dallas increased by 13.4 percent.

Late in September a $735,620 continuation of the Police Foundation grant was announced for Dallas.

In mid-October the executive assistant chief began a review of DPD hiring practices to determine whether unqualified officers were being hired. He was then given the authority to decide whether an applicant would be hired. (At that time a lieutenant under the command of the former head of OPA/MSB was in charge of the personnel division.)

On October 17, 1973, Chief Dyson resigned. One week later the former executive assistant was named as chief. At this time, the head of the Human Resources Development Bureau (formerly the head of OPA/MSB) also resigned, as did the two top civilians in that unit.

One of Chief Byrd's first acts was to conduct an audit of the DPD's expenditure of foundation grant money. This audit resulted in headline press coverage and praise from the DPA. No irregularities of expenditures or procedures were found.

The chief announced that the department would maintain a strong relationship with the press but that he would not conduct monthly press conferences. He would meet with the press when there was a need to do so and he would use no prepared text. He said they would have to listen more closely.

Within two weeks, 13 police recruits who had been hired during the previous administration were released on the grounds that they had never met the department's entrance requirements; nine of them were members of minority groups.

Captains were appointed to head the personnel division and the training academy, which recently had been directed by lieutenants. No appointments were made to the vacated positions in MSB and the Human Resources Bureau. Eventually, responsibility for supervising the functions of these two units would be given to the new chief's own executive assistant chief. Headlines proclaimed that the new chief would close the "lavish suite" of offices which had housed MSB and the Human Resources Development Bureau. (These units disappeared from the department organization chart.)

In September reported crime in Dallas rose 18.7 percent and in October 24.7 percent, but these figures no longer were rumored to be related to poor morale in the DPD.

The chief spent the next several weeks assessing the programs in which the department was involved and determining the changes to be made in the command staff. During this period, foundation programs were supervised by one of the assistant chiefs who was familiar with them. It was a period of considerable uncertainty among foundation program staff and evaluators and DPD personnel who had been working on projects. It was not clear whether the new chief would choose to continue the foundation-funded projects nor was it clear whether the foundation would maintain an interest in Dallas. It was March 1974 before the questions were settled, recommitments made, and progress begun on projects. (The attention given by the press to projects and outside funding during

this period was so greatly reduced that months later people both inside and outside the department expressed surprise on discovering that the DPD was continuing its foundation-funded projects.)

The new head of the academy was a captain who gave verbal support but no active leadership to the project. Interestingly, the academy projects seemed less affected by the department's administrative turnover than were the Pride projects in the personnel division. This perhaps was because OPA, being more interested in the personnel projects, had intervened in the staffing of the personnel division, an act which created turmoil in the unit. Additionally, OPA civilian professionals were in charge of the personnel projects, although there were nominal sworn project directors. As a result of the dissolution of OPA and the Human Resources Development Bureau, the personnel division was almost entirely devoid of program leadership during the months it took to restaff the division and make new personnel familiar with the projects.

At the academy, on the other hand, all the project directors were sworn personnel—most of them patrol officers—who grew accustomed to working on their own with little support or interference from the head of the academy or the head of OPA. They simply continued what they had been doing, little affected by the transitions. These projects, more than others, could be identified as the products of individual officers. These officers had gained considerable experience in designing and managing projects. The programs enjoyed those benefits, yet the negative consequence of their autonomy was that the separate projects were not integrated into a comprehensive program of training reform. Integration would have required a degree of leadership that did not characterize the academy during the funding period.[9]

9. As an historical footnote, in the spring of 1976, a new training director was named. He was transferred from his job as head of the personnel division where he had struggled with the lack of academy participation in the validation projects. With a strong interest in training, he is "discovering" work, such as an extensive curriculum program, done two and three years earlier but never implemented. Crisis intervention training, which somehow had "slipped" out of the curriculum under the previous director, has been reinstated.

By March 1974 the executive assistant chief had been given responsibility for supervising the projects and for handling contacts with the foundation. Although he had had no contact with the projects during the previous administration, he was a highly competent manager, committed to doing a good job. An able decisionmaker, he nevertheless was like the new chief in his expectation that the managers he supervised should also be capable decisionmakers. During the period when he was familiarizing himself with the projects, he expected the project directors to take care of the business of the projects. It was a style that persisted, the executive assistant playing primarily the role of a coordinator and final arbiter rather than that of a project engineer or manager. He, like the chief, was very popular with the rank and file, and his credibility increased that of the progams. He appointed a respected field sergeant to head the sensitive disciplinary project. Once this officer became persuaded of the program's merits and the acceptability of outside funding, his credibility, too, added to that of the project. It was made clear that sworn personnel, rather than civilians, were in charge of project administration.

The ease of the administrative transition of foundation-funded activities should not be overemphasized. In fact, people previously unfamiliar with the projects were put into new organizational roles at the same time they were given program responsibility. In the period of uncertainty about whether funding would continue, they had to learn their projects, work out relationships among themselves, and learn to deal with the foundation. Some new program personnel, having heard the rumors about outside control and foundation intervention, were at first suspicious of foundation evaluators and reluctant to discuss projects with them. The passage of time and the executive assistant chief's comfortable acceptance of the evaluation staff eased this problem. Also helpful was the style of the fourth Police Foundation program officer for Dallas, who had begun working with the department before the change of administrations. His was essentially a relaxed manner and his own calm reduced the chaos of the transition. DPD program personnel found him unthreatening (although not without viewpoints of his own and occasional advice to give) and generally easy to deal with.

In March 1974, the evaluation staff received permission to hire three DPD officers on a part-time basis to assist with data collection, an idea which, in OPA/MSB days, had met strong department resistance. There were about 50 inquiries about the job, and more than 30 applications (despite the fact that the salary was well below that which officers typically could earn in second jobs). Three very competent officers were hired. They were instrumental during the next two years in helping the evaluators understand the sources, problems, and limitations of the data being collected and in helping formulate reasonable interpretations of the data. They also were valuable as means of entrée into the department.

The relaxed atmosphere extended to data collection; by the spring of 1975, evaluators were working with the director of the internal affairs division to arrange for collecting what was generally considered to be sensitive data from their files. Characteristically, once the executive assistant had obtained the chief's approval, the evaluators worked directly with the unit involved.

The administrative comfort was due, in part, to the more relaxed atmosphere that characterized the department following the resignation of the preceding chief. There was the sense among many department members that "change" was behind them and that business would return to normal. Although change had not ended, many of the special projects seemed to have been given reduced priority and some were handled routinely rather than specially. This approach had both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage was that it reduced the department's level of tension about innovation. Another was that it allowed talented DPD personnel to develop and exhibit their abilities; the programs were largely theirs. The major disadvantage was that the programs seemed at times to need more definite coordination than they received; especially in cases where projects required cooperation across organization units, where the unit leaders might have differing interpretations of the goals or different amounts of organizational power and influence. If this lack of administrative intervention served to develop managerial skills in project directors at the expense of programs, it may, in the long run, have been wise.

There was another disadvantage of treating projects as routine business. They seemed not to have received high priority in decisions about the transfer of personnel. Each time someone new assumed responsibility for a project, that project slipped while the new person learned about it. In addition, the more casual attitude did allow room for administrators to fail. For several months a director of the training division was slow in implementing projects and processes important to the success of programs elsewhere in the department. After several months this problem was solved by the transfer of personnel.

Perhaps one of the best examples of the comfort of this administration came with the administration in April 1976 of the second HRD evaluation questionnaire. The department assumed responsibility for the entire process. Bureau and division heads reviewed a rough draft of the questionnaire and their comments were used in the revision of the instrument. The executive assistant chief explained the questionnaire to them and they arranged for its administration in their units. Questionnaires were distributed to the units by the property division and were returned to the training academy for shipment to the evaluation staff. Each unit kept lists of the officers who were absent at the time of administration so that they could be contacted later. Response rates were very high and responses were reliable. The only press coverage of the event was an editorial discussing the benefits of such research.

The external environment of this administration was different from that of the previous one in part because, by early 1974, the foundation was not the source of pressure on the DPD that it had been. Ironically, by that time it was assumed that the change effort in Dallas had ended and that programs probably would not survive the change of administrations. It was considered unwise to terminate funding entirely, but foundation attentions turned elsewhere. Whether as consequence or as coincidence, programs continued to be implemented in a period of relative organizational calm, in a business-as-usual manner.

CHAPTER 2
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will review the process of change that took place in Dallas, using an adaptation of Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975) path flow model shown in Figure 1, and attempt to specify what happens between the "bright idea" (policy) and "opening the door for service" (performance).

CHARACTERISTICS OF INITIATION

In 1972 and 1973 the Dallas Police Department was in a position of having extra funds available as a consequence of Police Foundation and LEAA funding. At the same time, it was in a "distressed" condition in the view of some department and community leaders who saw radical change as essential to the delivery of good service to the community. There were other community leaders and department members whose primary concern was to change the department's public image. The belief existed that the department's image, and consequently that of the city, had been damaged locally, nationally, and internationally by the highly publicized handling of the assassination of President Kennedy. For these people, the nature of the specific changes was less important than the desired consequence of a more prestigious image. But for either those who desired behavioral change or those who desired an image change, "distress" was a perceived condition.

FIGURE 1



The nature of the distress is important because it affects the organization's perception of the need for change. In Dallas, for example, officers who thought that the department was performing adequately were less convinced that radical change was necessary. Those persons concerned primarily with an improved image could not be expected to support changes that might be controversial and, yet again, attract unfavorable publicity to the department and to the city.

The locus of initiation is also relevant. It was primarily the chief and a few close associates who conceived the change program and began negotiations for its funding with the foundation. Because initiation occurred between the chief and the foundation, organization members may have perceived their influence as being less than that of external actors.

POLICY

Standards and Objectives

The lack of clearly defined program goals and plans created problems for both the implementors and the evaluators in Dallas. Implementors were left without clear guidelines for their own actions and at the same time were able neither to predict nor to develop strategies to deal with the responses of potential opponents.

The potential benefits to organization members were unclear. Vague statements of goals delayed the development of clearly defined opposition groups and precluded a stage of negotiation, leaving the administration with few bargaining options when the attack began. The vagueness itself led some officers to believe the administration was attempting to maintain secrecy and allowed others, who wanted to distort the program, to give it the worst possible interpretation.

Despite their lack of clarity generally, certain objectives posed real threats to some individuals and parts of the department. Personnel reform tends to be volatile in any organization because it affects the conditions of an individual's work. Whether out of prejudice or out of a fear of altered entrance standards, many individuals were concerned about the minority recruiting program. The recruitment of minorities and women would change the nature of the partner relationship for many officers.

The emphasis on recruiting persons from different social backgrounds with higher levels of education was an implicit threat to older officers' sense of self-worth. The advancement opportunities for these officers also would be threatened if the new types of officers were given preferential treatment or if they had qualities that would enhance their performance on promotional exams.

The relative status of the department units would be affected by the goal of enhancing the status of patrol. This could have been perceived as threatening by officers in units which traditionally were viewed as more prestigious than patrol.

The existence of some units and organizational levels was threatened. Special units such as criminal investigation were to be decentralized to district stations, where they would be subsumed under the same command structure as patrol and several other units. This move might have eliminated the special operating style and the status, as well as some command positions, of this unit.

The training academy was another seemingly threatened unit. Although the plans were not stated explicitly, it appears that the chief desired either to eliminate or to reduce greatly the functions of the academy.

The plan to flatten the department's organizational hierarchy seemed to pose a direct threat to lieutenants whose numbers were to be reduced, if not eliminated, and to officers below that rank who aspired to climbing the organizational ladders and already perceived the available promotions as too few in number. Many of these officers had reason to feel a vested interest in the existing structure, and were in a position to attempt to sabotage any efforts to change it.

Finally, there was the pervasive threat that comfortable structures and routines would change and the uncertainty about future organization patterns and processes affected all department members to some degree.

Characteristics

The preceding section summarized many of the potential social costs of the program: changed working conditions, struc-

tures, routines, status, rewards, authority patterns; the elimination of some department units; and the questioning of the qualities and performance of older officers.

The goals were costly, too, in terms of the efforts required of managers and implementors. The number of separate programs and the level of planning required put severe strains on the department's managerial capacity and undoubtedly drew energy and attention from the department's routine, but primary, business.

The program was also costly financially. Whatever changes were financed initially by outside sources eventually would have to be maintained by the city. The recruitment of women and minority group members was an expensive business. Providing financial incentives for horizontal career paths would be expensive, as would the construction of neighborhood stations.

Risk and Uncertainty. There was a great deal of risk associated with the Dallas program. There was no guarantee that the proposed changes would not *decrease* organizational effectiveness. Individual officers were very uncertain about the proposed nature of their work, their peers, and their rewards. The unspecified nature of neighborhood policing aroused considerable concern about its impact on work hours, days off, and vacation time. These concerns may seem unimportant in relation to the department's goals, but they contributed substantially to the resistance against the program.

Communicability. The Dallas plan was difficult to communicate. Because it was radical, complicated, and massive, and because officers had no previous experience with most of the proposed changes, some of the concepts were difficult for them to grasp. That many of the ideas were presented as goals whose operational nature was not defined was also confusing.

Complexity. The Dallas plan was complex both conceptually (which added to the difficulty of communicating it) and operationally. It affected several different units and levels of the organization, complicating the process of planning and administering the program.

The total package was complicated in terms of the number of distinct projects: including the LEAA-funded projects, there

were more than 20 being planned or made operational at one time. The planning and management of so many projects constituted a significant drain on both human and technical resources.

The program seemed intricate, too, because of the number of organizational roles and the diversity of the "outsiders" involved both directly and indirectly in the program. The funding arrangements established among the foundation, the city, the department, and SMU were complex and novel, at least in Dallas, and both factors contributed to the difficulty of administering the projects.

The external environment was complicated by the perceived nature of the Police Foundation, and by the involvement of the press, candidates for local political office, and ideological citizens groups.

Gatekeepers. For the Dallas project, there were gatekeepers (decisionmakers) within the Police Foundation and the city organization, and within several units and levels of the department. The interests and styles of the gatekeepers differed and the department frequently was caught between conflicting expectations. The city expected the department to adhere to routine bureaucratic guidelines and processes, while the foundation encouraged innovative processes. (For example, the foundation's providing credit cards for the OPA staff was interpreted by other city agencies as an unacceptable privilege.)

Given the number of gatekeepers and the differences that were to develop among them during implementation, the Pressman and Wildavsky calculations would have predicted a very low probability of success in Dallas.

INTRA- AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Communication about the program was hard to control in the DPD, especially once the rumors had begun and the reporting press had become an ally of dissident forces. Attempts to communicate through the chain of command were destined to failure because some supervisors, who were key links in the communication process felt particularly threatened by some

aspects of the plan. The desire to rely on the chain of command for both program implementation and the transmission of information about that implementation created a double bind for the chief. He stressed the importance of program success but was in the position of relying on program implementors to communicate problems with or failures of programs. It is not surprising that the chain of command did not provide reliable information about the process of program implementation.

Nor did the chain of command communicate clearly the substance of the program to the rank and file. Although the program was designed to benefit patrol officers, this was not generally understood in the field. Because the message to be delivered was a complex one, the chief not only needed a way to communicate directly and regularly with patrol officers, but equally important, needed a system to let him know how the message was perceived and what, if any, distortions were occurring. The fact that officers perceived incongruent responses from assistant and deputy chiefs emphasizes the need for the chief to have established some means of direct communication with his officers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

Many aspects of the Dallas situation are captured by this part of the model. A department unit (OPA) was created especially for the purpose of administering new programs, but it had no line authority and was not integrated into the organization. While this structural strategy for circumventing bureaucracy may have some advantages, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue that

> The cost of independence from ordinary bureaucratic constraints turns out to be the loss of contact with the very political forces necessary to preserve the thrust of the organization.[10]

OPA lost physical and political touch with the rest of the department, and this detachment limited the assistance it could provide the operational units of the organization. Many OPA employees were civilian consultants whose skills were critical to

10. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 129.

program design and implementation, but they were too far removed from the department's mainstream to understand its problems or to learn to work effectively with its members.

A crucial characteristic of the agency was the level of skill and experience of its leadership. The chief had been in office only a few months when he began negotiations with the foundation. He had not yet experienced situations which would test the skills and loyalties of department personnel and members of the city bureaucracy. The period of early support may have caused him to underestimate potential opposition.

The command staff was newly appointed; some did not take their positions until considerable work on the Five-Year Plan already had been done. There was no time to test the skills, ability to handle tension, or loyalty of the new assistant chiefs before they were plunged into the program. They had not begun to function as a team; the predictable struggles among them to establish their roles seriously affected the program.

These assistant chiefs had been promoted over some other department managers who were offended by the fact and who were in formal organization positions important to the success of the program. Although formally subordinate to the assistant chiefs, some of them had greater informal power, based in some cases on long and colorful careers and, for some, on political contacts in the community and state. Aware of their jealousy and power to sabotage, the assistant chiefs were reluctant to delegate responsibility to these officers and consequently centralized many decisions which ordinarily should have been made at lower levels of the organization.

Department leaders perceived the organization as being short on the human talents required for program planning and management. Whether this characteristic was real or only a perception resulting from the department's inability to define its talent base is a moot point. In fact, the department responded as though it lacked internal talent and needed to depend on civilian employees for both conceptual and technical development and the management of programs. In Dallas and other departments, the Police Foundation has encouraged the use of civilian employees as a way of exposing departments to talent, training, and bodies of knowledge that might not be

expected to develop in police agencies. In Dallas these civilians were pressed into service as program managers, and in this capacity they were resented by many officers who respected the formal chain of command.

The conceptual model treats the nature of the agency's political support as an organizational characteristic, and it is apparent that in Dallas this factor was critical. As the composition of the city council changed, so did the political power of the city's traditional leaders, and with it the nature of the pressures on the city manager and on the chief.

Another important characteristic of the department was the nature of its linkages with other influential agencies in the environment. Of special interest in Dallas was OPA's demand for special consideration from other elements in the city bureaucracy. Pressman and Wildavsky address this issue with particular reference to new bureaus such as OPA.

> Since the new bureau must deal with its department and possibly other bureaus, it will be under pressure to conform to their ways of doing business. The very act of repeatedly asking for exceptions may exhaust the élan of the new bureau and wear out the patience of other agencies with whom it must deal. Each exception has to be justified; each concession represents a favor that may have to be returned, a claim on future resources. Following routine procedure is just doing your job; acting outside its boundaries means doing a favor. Unless one believes the flow of favors can continuously move in a single direction they must be returned and not always in ways the new bureau would like.[11]

It appears that OPA did overextend its credit with other elements of the city bureaucracy. As other agencies complained about OPA requests and practices, the city manager found it necessary to tighten the controls on OPA.

The linkages with the Police Foundation were shaky. It became apparent to the department that the quarterly payments from the foundation could be withheld if the foundation were to become sufficiently displeased with the program. The foundation did not always communicate clearly its expectations to the department; the confusion of the

11. *Ibid.*, 129-30.

message was due in part to the identity struggle within the foundation and the frequent turnover of foundation program officers in Dallas. The department initially was confused about the identity and role of the foundation evaluation staff in Dallas as distinct from the program staff. As different messages came to OPA about the foundation from either the program officer, the evaluation staff, or the Center at SMU, there was occasional suspicion about the validity of the message and the motive for it. Although the department and the foundation were identified as "partners in progress," it was an uneasy alliance during the first two years.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Relevant social and political conditions in Dallas were well portrayed by Furstenberg and Kiley:

> It is impossible to understand either the city of Dallas or its Police Department in the 1970's without appreciating the consequences of two events which occurred in the 1960's.
>
> The first, of course, was the assassination of President Kennedy. There is no need to render a detailed accounting of the bizarre events which attended the President's murder, which focused intense national attention on Dallas for months and which, for many Americans, made Dallas irrevocably synonymous with violence, political fanaticism, and democracy's brand of regicide. What is important here is the reaction of Dallas' leadership and citizenry.
>
> The city drew within itself, seeking both reassurance from one another and explanations of what had happened. The result was, and still is today, a peculiar blend of extreme defensiveness and an antidotal rationalization that what happened in Dallas in November, 1963, could have happened anywhere in the U.S. The city did not seek scapegoats; indeed, the public rallied behind the Police Department and its Chief. Nor did it conduct an inquest of the heated social climate which suffused the President's visit to Dallas. No institutional reform was galvanized. What happened, entirely natural and human, was a massive effort to seek refuge in familiar, existing institutions, to renew faith and commitment in them, to reassert that Dallas had

been and would continue to be a great city, and to rehabilitate the city's *esprit* and *élan*.

At the same time that the shock of the assassination was being absorbed, another development was reaching a climactic stage. The generation which had created the Citizens' Council, propelled its civic works and harnessed the form and substance of the city government to its conception of public needs and service had all but passed from the scene. A new generation of leaders was not yet comfortably in place, and a sense of uncertainty and purposelessness began to take hold.

In its uneasiness, the Citizen's Council turned to Erik Jonsson as the one man who might bridge the change in leadership and who might provide the city the same sort of prodigious energy and vision which had brought his company, Texas Instruments, from a level of $20 million gross sales in 1950 to $200 million in 1960. Jonsson was elected Mayor in 1964, and the choice could hardly have been more inspired.

A few months into office, Erik Jonsson found himself harassed by one civic crisis after another; crises which he felt could have been avoided if the city had seen them in advance and had planned for them. This feeling of being "run over by the future" was in sharp contrast to the experience Jonsson had enjoyed at Texas Instruments where change was planned rather than coped with as it happened. The death of Kennedy cast an additional pall over a city experiencing difficulties of change. Jonsson came to the conclusion that Dallas had lost its way, and that its greatest need was not immediately available resources, but planning for the future.

Thus was conceived the "Goals for Dallas" program, designed to involve the citizenry, ultimately at the neighborhood level, in a process of seeking, as Jonsson put it, "the pinnacles of aspiration, the shared aims of Dallas citizenry." Costing some $150,000 per year (funded privately) and involving at its peak twenty professionals and 1100 volunteers, Jonsson put into motion three distinct processes—setting goals, fixing priorities, and planning implementation—over a period of three years. By 1967, over 75,000 people had been directly involved in the goal setting process. Politically, the process culminated in 3:1 voter acceptance of a $175 million bond issue, the raising of municipal and

> school taxes, the levying of a sales tax and the acceptance of federal assistance, hitherto an anathema in all but the most disguised forms, on a fairly broad scale.
>
> So, as the assassination and Goals for Dallas combined to make a fundamental difference in the course of Dallas' civic life, they also form an essential part of the background against which to view the operation of the Dallas Police Department during the 1960's.[12]

It was largely these circumstances which led some to believe that the department had a need to plan for long-term substantative changes and others to believe that the primary problem was one of a damaged image.

Another Dallas characteristic is its traditional wariness of outside influence, often suspected to be control. This attitude sustains a crusade for a group of very conservative citizens with resources which greatly magnify the power of their numbers. Paid advertisements in the press and leaflets distributed in the department effectively contributed to suspicion and resistance, both within and outside the department.

The community elite played an important role in the history of the DPD effort. Their attitude was initially supportive, but seemed to change in response to the inevitable turbulence that the change process created in the department and, as it was publicized, within the broader city bureaucracy and the community. This change may have been reflected in the editorial tones of the two local papers. Editors remained loyal to the chief and his programs longer than reporters did, but they, too, began to withdraw support as the controversy attracted public attention.

The racial tensions that developed in Dallas as a consequence of department actions also had an important, although indirect, impact on program outcomes. The situation drew managerial attention and energy away from program implementation, aroused feelings within the department directed against program efforts, and helped to make city politicians sensitive to the department as a political issue. It was another

12. Mark Furstenberg and Robert Kiley, "The Dallas Plan," unpublished, 1971, 5-7.

double bind. The conditions of police-community alienation which the programs were to alleviate created tensions which interfered with the development of the programs.

RESOURCES

Incentives were not readily apparent in the DPD program. An increased level of education was a goal Dallas did meet and it was supported by a system of educational incentive pay. In other cases officers perceived themselves as being asked to make changes for which they could not see the personal rewards. Because it was a complicated program, without doubt it was difficult to develop incentives that would motivate all the affected groups. In addition it appears that in Dallas organization members had no chance to state what they believed program costs would be and therefore no information for management to use in determining whether it had appropriate resources to balance these perceived costs.

The greatest resource problem for Dallas may have been the seemingly inadequate number of personnel who could plan and manage programs. Proven managers already were responsible for the daily functioning of the department and there was a widespread fear that department operations would suffer as a result of the attention to new programs. OPA was established as one way to solve this problem, but as the responsibility for a large number of programs pooled in one office, the staff and the chief of the unit quickly became overburdened. Because program management was centralized, the attention of the press and politicians and of internal opposition focused on OPA and the staff was additionally taxed by the time they had to spend defending their positions.

Financially, the DPD was resource rich, having funds from both LEAA and the Police Foundation. In fact, it can be argued the department had more money available than it was able to spend in the projected program period. The need to spend the money was another type of burden. Dallas serves as one example of the need to match financial and human resources in program planning.

Time was as important a resource in Dallas as money. In general, neither the department nor the foundation had

realistic expectations about the amount of time required for implementing the types of programs planned. As in the Oakland Project (Pressman and Wildavsky) there were pressures on Dallas to spend money hurriedly and to achieve a relatively rapid and dramatic success, and one consequence was that very little attention was paid to, or time allowed for, the planning of the implementation strategy.

PERCEPTION OF POLICY

The program, because of its vagueness and the inadequacy of departmental channels of communication, was not accurately perceived by organizational members. Often unintentionally, but sometimes deliberately, persons in the chain of command communicated inaccurate information or did not respond to queries by officers. In part because plans were vague, officers sometimes received conflicting interpretations from different sources, which contributed to a feeling that the program was utopian and not well-planned.

Special interest groups such as lieutenants and detectives had motives for distorting the fact that the program was meant to improve the status and working conditions of the field officer. It appeared that most officers were better versed in the potential costs of the program than in the predicted benefits.

Many department members believed that outsiders had played a major role in the development of the program, and this belief may have contributed to their suspicion of it.

REACTION TO POLICY

Although the program was praised by foundation personnel, city leaders, and some department personnel, there developed in the department a diverse group of skeptics and resistors whose number and ability to get attention grew throughout the implementation period.

Some questioned the program in good faith on operational grounds, believing that decentralization and team policing would increase greatly the cost of policing in Dallas and, at the same time, reduce the agency's effectiveness.

Others objected on the grounds that the admission of women and minority group members would result in the

lowering of department standards and effectiveness. Some were simply prejudiced.

Others were opposed because they feared their working conditions would change or, in some cases, that their positions would be eliminated.

There was no apparent strategy for dealing with resistance, and it seemed that all those who opposed the program, for whatever reasons, were treated as detractors of poor character—simply as bad people. As this served to harden the opposition, it became easier for opposition groups associated with the Dallas Police Association[13] to create an alliance of resistors. Without having to focus on the issues which concerned them most directly, the DPA leaders were able to rally support around the issues of lowered standards, secrecy, and inadequate support for officers from the chief. The DPA also knew how to use the press to its advantage.

The detectives, who held several leadership positions in the DPA, were in an especially good position with respect to the press. For years detectives had shared desk space with local reporters and frequently had supplied them with good stories. As they began to feel threatened by the program it was natural and easy for the detectives to share their concern with their friends of the press. At the same time department managers were withdrawing from the press, detectives were increasingly willing to share whatever information they had about the programs. The press probably was an important means of increasing support within the department for the DPA position. As rank and file officers read about lowering of standards, secrecy, and outside control in their local papers, it must have seemed to them that the DPA had a point, after all.

THE DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS

Department leaders and project implementors had little experience with planning and managing innovation. Theirs was largely a trial and error method under conditions of substantial

13. This was not the DPA's first experience with resisting a department change. When a 1968 IACP study recommended the elimination of detective status, a group of detectives was able to force the administration into a compromise position. The leaders of that effort had, by 1972, become the leaders in the DPA.

pressure. Members of the command staff were new to their positions and had not established themselves as a team. Some were insecure in their new jobs and felt threatened by other assistant chiefs and, in at least one case, by civilian consultants who, in certain areas, had as much expertise as the department leaders. There was some jealousy of "outsiders" who could be hired by the department and, within a few months, be earning salaries comparable to those of assistant chiefs.

In addition to these problems, there were some implementors who were in the ranks of the resistors. A few tried to carry out programs in which they did not believe while some others quietly attempted to sabotage programs for the same reasons.

PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

In Dallas, an effort was made to begin making programs operational before they were fully designed. It appears that both the department and the foundation failed to recognize the need for a period of detailed planning for implementation. The foundation had awarded the department a planning grant in 1971 but the DPD spent several months developing the conceptual details of the program and very little time planning for implementation. Once the initial program design statement was completed, both organizations seemed to respond to a need to spend money quickly and to see early program results. As Lewis (1976) has indicated, there is often considerable political value in program "starts." The initiation of a project can be announced with fanfare and publicity that the participating agencies may welcome. In Dallas, an immediate start was a signal to the foundation that, after an extended period of inactivity, the department was sincere in its desire to implement the program concepts. The consequence of the need to begin was a lack of time for management to assess organizational response to the programs and to plan implementation strategies. The pressures of program management and the heat of the conflict did not allow for the reasoned development of strategies which could extend beyond fighting brush fires and clubbing alligators.

The DPD program is one of a growing number of cases in which exemplary ideas such as those articulated in the introduction by Chief Dyson were never given a significant test, partly because failure was inherent in some of the ideas, but in some other cases because failure was a consequence of poor or nonexistent planning for implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

We have discussed the problems caused by splitting responsibility for implementation between a new organization unit (OPA) and an inexperienced command staff. Although OPA initiated policies, it did not have line authority over operational units. In effect, authority for implementation was highly fragmented and was, therefore, unaccountable and difficult to control.

The fact that civilian consultants had a great deal of informal authority over these line operations created serious tensions within the traditional organizational structure. While the skills of these people probably were essential to the program, the way in which they were used reduced their effectiveness.

REACTION TO IMPLEMENTATION

As indicated in the narrative, it is difficult to determine the extent to which decentralization problems resulted from internal resistance, because quiet sabotage and passive resistance are particularly hard to detect. The reaction to specific programs was more veiled than the reaction to particular implementors. There was clear resistance to OPA's role in implementation and to the civilian consultants who were placed in managerial roles.

There is little indication that opposition which developed outside the department was in response to specific projects or to the department roles of civilian employees. The concern among the politicians and, finally, newspaper editors was over department "morale" issues resulting from the change effort. For at least some of these people a quiet department atmosphere and its contribution to the community image ultimately was more important than the changes being attempted.

INTRAORGANIZATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

Enforcement was a problem in Dallas in part because of OPA's lack of line control over the program implementors. By the time the problem was apparent and program directors were requested to report regularly to the head of OPA, this directive simply added to the boundary conflicts between OPA and other department units. That the line supervisors of program directors could not always be counted as loyal added to the enforcement problem. The flaws in the communication system contributed to the inability to enforce programs; to know whether enforcement activities were needed, management would have required information that was controlled at times by program opponents. There were instances when the chief was told what the staff believed he wanted to hear, and he did not have (or use) a system for evaluating the accuracy of the information he received.

TIMING

The timing of the minority recruitment program as the first of several projects in the Five-Year Plan may have contributed to the general sense of opposition to any change. Minority recruitment is a divisive issue in any organization, and it certainly was in the Dallas Police Department.

Those who were concerned about it, whether racist or not, were right. Minority recruitment *did* challenge standards. (Whether those standards were appropriate is irrelevant in this particular discussion. The fact is that people *believed* in them.) The recruiting program *did* leave unhired a backlog of qualified white males at a time when increased staff was considered necessary. It did change the "kinds of people" officers would have as partners, and while it is arguable that over time society would benefit, that argument was unreassuring to those who suddenly had to adjust to different kinds of people with whom they traditionally had only very stylized contacts. It did threaten the promotion system. If there should be the rumored compensatory promotion, both minorities and women would have a distinct advantage.

The point is that the whole change effort in Dallas became entangled immediately in the minority recruitment issue,

which became the rallying point of almost all individuals and groups resisting the program, regardless of their specific motives or goals. We can only speculate about what the response would have been had this project been introduced after a series of less threatening, and perhaps even rewarding, projects had been implemented. For example, the major publicity about the new firing range, a popular project in the department, did not occur until early 1974. Although the chief did not view the range as an important element of his long-range goals, it was very much appreciated by the average officer and might have been used earlier as a tangible example of the benefits of change or of the advantages of working with the foundation.

In the same speculative way it can be questioned whether the strategy of finally giving OPA line authority might have been successful if initiated before the opposition to OPA had become extensive. Similarly, official communication about the program might have been effective had it occurred before the rumors became rampant.

CONCLUSIONS

The Dallas department encountered problems at every stage of the innovation process. Such a record is not uncharacteristic of change efforts and problems do not always result in program fatality, but in Dallas the combination of conditions was lethal. Some of the problems, such as the inexperience of the foundation staff and department personnel, perhaps were unavoidable, but it seems clear that others could have been avoided by a better understanding of the implementation process and by subsequent planning for implementation. Unfortunately, the Dallas department was relatively inexperienced with the management of change. The lesson about the importance of implementation planning had to be learned at great cost in terms of organizational goals and personal dreams and careers.

It can be argued that, in the case of a radical change program, a break will be required between the first and second period, a recess during which initial energies can subside and an aura of calm be established. In Dallas this break was created by the resignation of the chief who had designed and administered the period of turmoil. He had also envisaged the processes of institutionalization, but because he had become a target of organizational frustration it would have been very difficult for him to administer the period of implementation and institutionalization, even had politics permitted.

But there are lessons in the Dallas experience that go beyond those captured in the model of the implementation process. The model cannot acknowledge fully the magnitude and urgency of the Dallas effort nor the number of discrete projects constituting this effort. Both of these factors were important in determining the fate of the Dallas program.

It is conceivable that the department might have been better able to handle project planning and implementation had the Five-Year Plan not been so broad in scope and had it not included such a large number of projects. Any organization has a limited amount of talent, and demands on existing talent are especially stringent in a police agency which cannot choose to withdraw resources from daily operations for the sake of long-range planning; both tasks must be done simultaneously. Given this fact, any one aspect of the Dallas program—minority recruitment, changed entrance criteria, improved personnel management system, better training, or decentralization—in order to be implemented successfully, might have consumed all the combined talents and energies of both sworn and civilian personnel. And had these efforts been focused on one project at a time, it is arguable that the entire program might have been implemented gradually, piece by piece.

While there is little doubt that the Dallas department was swamped by the total number of LEAA- and foundation-funded projects, it also can be argued that the essential elements of the Five-Year Plan were interdependent and that the effectiveness of any one component depended on the simultaneous success of others. This was how the Dyson administration viewed the program. Decentralization, as it was conceived, required a new type of officer who would be trained differently and supervised differently from the traditional police organization. In order to retain this new type of individual, incentives in the form of improved salaries and career paths would be required. Recruiting, tracking, and effectively managing this new officer would

require vast improvement of personnel processing and information systems. Implementing only one of these elements would have left the project without the institutional support necessary to incorporate it into the department structure. This was understood, and the decision was made to try to progress on all fronts at the same time. That decision had consequences, but in the planning stages there was some fear that unless the effort was massive and multifaceted, the forces of tradition and inertia would overwhelm it.

This analysis has focused on many different problems contributing to the apparent failure, at least in the short run, of this strategy. But it is entirely possible that successful implementation of this strategy was beyond the grasp of any single administration which initiated it, regardless of the specific problems. The idea that all problems are manageable may be as naive as the idea that important change can occur without conflict. We suspect that a program of such massive and radical scope may, in fact, require two distinct phases of implementation and that each phase may require separate administration.

The first phase includes evaluation and initiation (Hage and Aiken); idea generation (Shepard); conceptualization, tentative adoption, and resource getting (Milo); conception, proposing, and adoption of change (Wilson). This is the period during which the problem is assessed, programs conceived and adopted, and the initial efforts made to implement them. This is the period, in a radical change program, when the traditional structures and value systems of the organization begin to be examined and altered. It is the time when the vested interests are most threatened. This is the period when all the costs, the pains of breaking apart the old and familiar, are experienced and few, if any, of the benefits and pleasures of the new order are yet available, or perhaps even visible. In the case of a radical program, it is inevitably a time of upheaval and turmoil, and new forms and ideas cannot be institutionalized until the old forms are dismantled. Under the best of conditions this is an unsettling, anxious time for organizational members. The stress may result in a desire for relief and the cause of calm will appear to many to be more important than the cause of change. It will be a rare administrator who can survive this period without becoming the target for the organization's

stresses and anguish. If this initial period becomes sufficiently tense, it may be undesirable and, in fact, impossible for the first administration to move the organization into the second phase, which includes the task of implementing and institutionalizing the changes.

If the first period is inevitably one of tension and anxiety, the second is one that requires a much quieter organizational atmosphere. Implementation and institutionalization require routine day-to-day decisions and processes almost inconceivable in the same atmosphere that characterizes the period of challenging the old institution.

With the break came the predicated period of settling and restored calm. Many organization members had the sense of being rescued from the change crisis by the succeeding administration. Perhaps more accurately, the department was moving from the first phase of a radical change effort to the second. At this point, all forward movement could have been terminated by a second administration that did not support the ideas of the first. Although it might have been extremely difficult to return the organization to its original posture, it would have been possible to halt the change program designed by the previous administration. The fact that many Dallas department members and observers assumed this would be the case contributed to a quick return to "normalcy" and to a sense of "honeymoon" for the second administration. Given this calm, and almost a sense of gratitude on the part of a weary organization, the second chief and his command staff could take advantage of an atmosphere conducive to implementing those elements of the Five-Year Plan which still seemed desirable. It is this quiet, if somewhat revised, process of implementation and institutionalization which currently continues in Dallas.[14] Perhaps, to use sociological jargon, we have observed a classic example of organizational development through change from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership. The charismatic leader came to be seen as a zealot. The organization rejected him, yet many of his aims and goals persisted through the routinization

14.We cannot determine at this time whether this process ever will be translated into changed behavior on the part of patrol officers. These changes may occur at a later point in the process, or they may never occur at all. Our present observations cannot provide a prediction.

of what he had initiated through charisma.

From the standpoint of the organization, the change process perhaps has occurred predictably and as well as it could have. But from the standpoint of some individuals, the transition from the first phase to the second was extremely painful and, in some cases, ruinous. If this process were generally understood and accepted, the change in administrations might be predicted, even prearranged, with the first administrator (and the rest of the political structure) fully aware of the consequences and prepared to deal with them. In this case, a reform chief would expect neither to endure in the organization nor to leave it with the affection of most of its members. He or she could expect to leave with rewards and appreciation from the city administration with whom the reform contract had been drawn and with the respect of professional colleagues who understood and valued the role of a reform chief.

But such an understanding remains more of a goal than a reality. In entering the Dallas experience there was no articulated understanding of the process of radical reform and surely not a full appreciation of the enormous difficulties of this role of a reform chief. Until there is a better, more widely shared understanding of this role, any reform-oriented chief must examine very closely his or her personal and professional goals. An effort to create change of major scope will almost inevitably result in grave personal costs for the administrators initiating the change. In a world where there is limited recognition of this fact and even more limited career mobility for police administrators, it will be a rare chief who will attempt massive and radical organizational change.

We appreciate those we know who have taken the risk.

CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION

Inevitably some of what we have written in this volume will be seen as critical of Chief Dyson, the DPD, the DPA, the Police Foundation, and the press and some of their actions. With candor we make the following three comments. Their purpose is not intended as a palliative to our earlier observations.

First, our respect for Chief Dyson is complete. He has identified most of the critical problems of policing, has conceived programs to deal with them, and has tried to implement those programs. We view Chief Dyson as one of the brightest, most capable police administrators in the country, by a wide margin.

Second, *The Book* has not yet been written on how to innovate in or change an organization. Most of the literature is simplistic, compared with the real world of conflict, resistances, vested interests, etc., with which administrators are confronted as they try to make their organizations responsive to a changing society.

Finally, *The School* has yet to be developed for chiefs. The turnover of chiefs in large cities is appalling. No system exists to train new chiefs or promising executives in the police field; there are almost no apprenticeships. Identifying a successor and preparing him or her for leadership is practically unheard of.

Each new chief must learn anew how to deal with the press. Each chief must learn anew how to deal with the intricacies of bureaucratic interaction. Each new chief must learn anew how

to deal with police associations and unions. And each chief must learn anew and alone how short the euphoric "honeymoon" of the new appointment can be. Finally, each developing police association will have to learn how to manage conflict, the rules of conflict, and the trade-offs involved in a war of all against all.

The goals of the Dallas program were meritorious, and the methods to achieve those public service goals were visionary. Chief Dyson's plans have lost little in the passage of time. But, as this evaluation reflects, there has been little change in three years in the measured attitudes and performance of Dallas police officers.

One could argue convincingly that it is still too early to expect most of the effects to have occurred. That may well be true. It may be true in part because some of the programs were implemented only very recently. It could also be true that future effects, if there are any, will be the result of both specific innovative programs and the fact that the DPD is a much wiser and more skillful organization now than it was in 1971.

For, although the empirical findings show no changes —and we have confidence in those findings (they confirm our impressions)—we have additional impressions that the DPD has changed substantially and now has skills and knowledge it did not have in 1971. Managers and supervisors at all levels have gained skills, experience, and wisdom since then. Officers, in general, are more accustomed to new ideas and practices. The department continues to attempt change. Decentralization, for example, is expanding.

As outside observers, we have watched sophistication develop at all levels and in many areas. The process of the last five years has taught so many people so many lessons that, in our judgment, the department now has the capacity to work toward many of the goals earlier posited for the DPD. (We don't mean to be overly optimistic; we are well aware that those skills also could be used to work toward goals considerably alien to those the PF originally funded.)

The program that the DPD attempted was extraordinarily difficult. It now seems unquestionable that an effort at personnel reform raises an extremely complex and volatile set of

issues. The more comprehensive such change is, the more politically sensitive it becomes in the internal dynamics of an organization. A person's work is simply very important to that individual: It leads to definition of self; it provides the wherewithal to accomplish other goals; it determines the amount of free time a person will have; it provides a major network of friends. In many respects, a person "is" what he or she does. Efforts to modify the work a person does, where he or she does it, with whom, and with what equipment, are of great personal importance to incumbents. It is known that people will resist individually and in groups: they will strike, destroy equipment, and literally fight when their work is somehow threatened, appears to be threatened, or even is improved in ways they cannot foresee or understand.

The Dallas proposal was a comprehensive effort at such change. The very nature of incumbents' jobs and the coworkers with whom they did them would change. The status of groups relative to each other would change. Ultimately some units would be eliminated. Most persons, at least theoretically, were meant to benefit through the increased status of patrol and increased opportunities for advancement, but the ways in which they were to benefit were unclear to many of them. "Flattening the organization" (reducing levels of management) meant that *something* had to happen to managers in the disappearing levels. Most of those managers were nowhere near retirement and they felt a vested interest in the current structure. The breakup of the Central Investigation Division was planned. The end of the academy was anticipated. These groups, too, represented significant vested interests.

The point is, the Dallas plan was an implicit and explicit challenge to many powerful and established groups. The plan would directly threaten the existence of subunits of an organization. It would threaten established routines of the organization both internally and in its relationship to other government units. The leadership of the DPD attempted to manage this change while still inexperienced and while attempting to manage the influx of millions of dollars from LEAA. Finally, the DPD attempted to do this while struggling to define a relationship with a funding agency, the Police Founda-

tion, which at that time was in its infancy and was communicating its expectations unclearly. Frequent turnover of foundation personnel during the first year added to the confusion of the relationship.

The question that we are sure to be asked by Police Foundation board members, staff of the DPD, former staff of the DPD, civilians who entered the DPD and now have dispersed, and staff of the Police Foundation who were affected is, "Was it worth it?"

The cost was great.

Many people went through great stress; some suffered physical and psychological reactions.

Careers in many organizations were affected, many quite negatively; several of those were damaged to the point that people were forced to leave policing (whether from the DPD, the Police Foundation, or SMU). Other people survived the conflict quite well; many went on to successful careers, some in policing, others in universities, others in consulting firms, others in a variety of endeavors.

The Police Foundation invested close to $2,500,000 in the program and evaluation.

The Dallas Police Department and the city government invested enormous personnel resources in the program effort and in the evaluations.

In some respects the answer to the question is discouraging. With the exception of increasing the educational level of personnel, few relevant changes in attitude and behavior were noted in the empirical evaluation.

On the other hand, the DPD is quite different now from what it was in 1971. Some of the changes we have noted are:

It deals easily with consulting agencies, universities, researchers, and other outside groups. There is little fear that it will be overwhelmed.

It has developed the skill of collecting and managing data. (We suggest that management use of these data is still in its infancy, but all police departments are confronted with that.)

It has developed an experienced pool of young administrators who have considerable experience in managing innovation and anticipating and managing resistances.

It has publicly committed itself, through minority recruitment, receipt of complaints, and decentralization, to increased civility in its relations with all citizens. We have no doubt that racist attitudes persist, but a public commitment has been made to, and organizational behavior is oriented toward, increased civility.

It continues to discover that many early concepts and plans drawn up by pre-OPA, OPA/MSB, and SMU staffs were well thought out, had potential for development, and were the products of reasonable people who were at best idealistic and bright, and at worst, politically naive.

It has implemented some of the plans, especially in the academy and the personnel division.

It knows that it can manage innovations, but in small doses and through the existing structure.

It continues to decentralize decisionmaking, and forces people to make decisions.

It has learned to deal with the press, regarding specific program issues, with skill.

It has changed personnel and leadership, but maintained goals. Chief Dyson's encouragement of Chief Byrd to return to Dallas and the relatively smooth transition from Chief Dyson's leadership to Chief Byrd's was important. In retrospect, given the level of conflict in the DPD, the transition was surprisingly quiet. It was disruptive for the careers of many people, but it was a relatively short and crisis-free administrative shift.

It has raised a leadership group that learned to work comfortably in a turbulent atmosphere and manage the administrative changes with skill.

It has continued to try to improve public service through decentralization of functions.

It has continued existing programs and developed additional ones aimed at improving recruitment, training, and maintenance of personnel.

In sum, the Dallas Police Department has changed during the past five years. Clearly, it has not changed as much as had been hoped. What we have learned is that change is a slow

process, complex and at times painful. Five years *is* a short time. Institutions, organization, and people change slowly.

In response to the question "Was it worth it?" we can only say that there are times when attempts to learn to change, to increase the effectiveness of an organization are simply very, very expensive in both human and financial terms.

There is no doubt that starts have been made in Dallas toward learning and changing. Perhaps many of the costs were inevitable, given the nature of the problem and the breadth of the solutions attempted. The lessons to be learned from this attempt have not been lost either on the actors or on the institutions involved. Those lessons perhaps can help others in policing across the country to attempt change more manageably and to manage change better. If they do, $2.5 million may have been a modest price.

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THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Volume II

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with the assistance of

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PoliceFoundation

The Police Foundation is a privately funded, independent, nonprofit organization established by the Ford Foundation in 1970 and dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing. The opinions and recommendations of this report are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Police Foundation or the Dallas Police Department.

This is one of two reports of the Dallas project. The first volume, a description of the history and process of organizational change, is also available from the Communications Department, Police Foundation, 1909 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

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FOREWORD

In 1971 the Dallas Police Department, in association with the Police Foundation, began a human resource development program intended to produce vast organizational change and personnel enhancement.

Reformation and acceptance of innovative ideas and programs are not easily attained in any type of organization: Such changes within our police department proved to be particularly difficult. Law enforcement, by nature, exists in a climate of caution; the volume and extent of the proposed changes were overwhelming to many members of the department.

At the time, department administrators believed that emphasis on human resource development was the key to operational improvement, attainment of goals, and professionalism for the department. Plans were made to upgrade minority recruitment practices, alter entrance requirements, improve personnel management systems and training programs, and decentralize major departmental functions.

Some of the proposed programs were unsuccessful. Others worked very well and continue to improve the operation of the Dallas Police Department. The concepts of decentralized neighborhood stations and generalist/specialist team policing never made it off the drawing board. Improving the status of the patrol officer and achieving increased minority representation within the department have had limited success. But the educational level in the department has risen tremendously, the selection process and training of officers have improved significantly, personnel management information systems have been developed, and decentralization of duties and functions has been implemented.

Possibly the most important and far-reaching impact of "The Dallas Experience" is that personnel of the Dallas Police Department have gained valuable experience in managing innovative change within the context of the organization. That experience will benefit this department in future years.

Through publication of this report, we hope to share with others our experiences with massive change. Perhaps the awareness of the extent to which resistance to change can exert power and influence within an organiza-

tion will enable others to take a less rocky road to implementing innovative programs. The experience has made the Dallas Police Department an organization more dedicated to change and improvement, and far more aware of the problems inherent in instituting innovative ideas.

Although the experience was very valuable, the anxiety it caused among the employees created an adverse effect on organizational efficiency and the orderly management of change.

In an attempt to determine how well employees accepted innovative change, as well as their attitudes about many of the issues pertinent to our efforts, surveys were conducted among our officers in 1973 and again in 1976. The latter survey indicated some positive attitudinal changes in such areas as job satisfaction and dedication. Our officers, especially those hired and promoted since 1973, indicated a desire to continue experimentation and innovation within the department. This attitude encourages us in believing that "The Dallas Experience" was worth the investment of personnel, time, and money.

I wish to extend my thanks to the staff of the Police Foundation and Southern Methodist University for their involvement with this experience in change. I would also like to express gratitude to the members of the Dallas Police Department, both past and present, for their sense of commitment and endurance.

D.A. Byrd
Chief of Police
Dallas, Texas

PREFACE

The Police Foundation's first major grant was to the Dallas Police Department for a drastic reform of the department--the sort of comprehensive reform implied by the Police Foundation's original charter. At that early point in the Foundation's life, its board and staff nucleus were struggling to define the Foundation's mission, beginning to explore how best to carry it out, and under extreme, if self-generated, pressure to "get started." Chief Frank Dyson, the architect of the proposal for reform, had at the same time taken over the police agency in a city still suffering the effects of the assassination of a president and the murder of his assassin. As this report makes clear, these several factors worked against the successful realization of all of the purposes of the grant. With the knowledge of hindsight, none of the principals involved in establishing the Dallas project would attempt now the comprehensive reform undertaken in the early 1970s.

And yet, because of the attempt at sweeping reform in Dallas seven years ago, the Foundation learned to focus its energies on more sharply defined and productive strategies for working with police agencies in the effort to increase knowledge and to improve police services to communities. The Dallas Police Department is substantially better able to plan, test, and direct change in manageable slices. Further, this report of the Dallas experience can help other funding and planning agencies and city and police administrators avoid the pitfalls spelled out here and manage improvement more effectively. Finally, techniques for measurement and analysis of police change have been refined and further developed.

To make the key lessons from this experience easily available to their principal audiences, the Foundation is publishing its report of the Dallas project in two volumes.

Volume I, The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform, analyzes the history of the project, the practical problems that developed, the resistances and conflicts, and their impact on attaining the goals of the project. This volume will be of most interest and direct use to police and city administrators and to agencies that promote and fund police or

other public service organizational change and improvement. In recording the errors from which lessons can be learned, the Foundation has not hesitated to include its own substantial contribution to the inventory of mistakes. Volume I is a history of the processes of change, and of the many pitfalls involved.

Volume II, The Dallas Experience: Human Resources Development, describes the formal empirical evaluation of the Dallas Police Department human resources development program, concentrating on the period from 1973 to 1976, and provides the results. The only substantial change measured was the marked increased in the level of education in the department. No significant changes in attitude or behavior at the street policing level were found. This volume will be of principal interest to sociologists, psychologists, and other researchers and practitioners in the fields of survey measurement and analysis and human resource development.

The Dallas Experience yields several lessons. The first is that implementation, the stage between a vision of change and its accomplishment, is in itself a major object requiring considerable thought, planning, and action if there is to be any chance that the hoped-for change will occur. Volume I of this report gives detailed, concrete, practical meaning to this statement.

The second is that, as our later experiments in partnership with police agencies have confirmed, it takes great courage, not only to attempt significant change, but to be committed, for the benefit of others, to the publication of the results, come what may. Chief Dyson, Chief Byrd, and the Dallas Police Department have demonstrated both kinds of courage in fullest measure. It is through such strength that improvements in policing can come.

Finally, Chief Dyson's vision remains, in its own right, a great vision of policing. Continued pursuit of such a vision can only benefit policing.

Patrick V. Murphy
President
Police Foundation

NOTE ON EVALUATION

This report exemplifies and underlines the Police Foundation's commitment to evaluation research as a major instrument of improvement in policing. It traces and gives the results of the first such individual commitment the Foundation made. As the reader will see, this commitment had to be substantial, and it was made in the face of great uncertainty. That the commitment to evaluation would be expensive was apparent. An evaluation capacity would have to be established and maintained for five or six years. No upper bound of costs could be set at the beginning. There was no way to foresee what concrete actions were to be taken by the department, what specific stimuli would have to be measured, nor what impacts traced. Expensive baseline data would have to be collected before there could be any certainty whether any project action would be taken. Because this was the Foundation's first attempt at experimentation and evaluation, it was not even known whether the Foundation and the department could sustain essential partnership relations. These risks were accepted.

It is difficult, at best, to measure and to ascribe meaning to measurement in the field of human resource development. Day-to-day attitudes and behaviors are related obscurely, if at all, and the direction of causality is not clear. Subtle and complex effects must be pursued using relatively blunt instruments to attempt to capture them. For example, police performance measures are in a relatively crude state of development, as are measures of performance in most aspects of public service.

In the event, these "natural" evaluation research risks and difficulties were compounded. Sometimes planned experiments within the overall change program were prepared for, then found to be confounded by some of the other actions being planned or launched. Consequently, these experiments had to be abandoned. The nature of expected changes shifted as concepts moved toward action. This meant costs without intended payoff, hiring and training one kind of evaluation personnel only to be forced to develop another kind as events unfolded, a harsh research environment made harsher by the turbulence of the Foundation-department relationship during some of the years of their association. At times the evaluation staff indeed occupied a lonely outpost. Nevertheless, the department and the Foundation did make this first attempt and sustained their commitment to learn from it through six years.

This report is a tribute to the tenacity and inventive adaptability of the evaluation staff and to the courage, patience, and understanding of many in the department and in the Foundation. Volume I is a case study that will help both those who practice and those who study organizational change. Volume II contains a wealth of data based on a life history model and advances the methods of measuring human resource development in a public-sector operational setting.

Joseph H. Lewis
Director of Evaluation
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This evaluation was funded by the Police Foundation. We wish to express our appreciation to the Board of Directors and staff of the Foundation, the members of the Dallas Police Department, and all those other persons in participating organizations who made this evaluation possible.

Special appreciation is due Frank Dyson, former chief in Dallas, now chief in Austin, Texas, for his willingness to have us recount the history of the Dallas project and for his cooperation with our efforts. The command staff who worked with Chief Dyson included assistant chiefs William Fulghum, Thomas Hutson, Troy Moore, Donald Steele, Paul Townsend, and Robert Winters. Chief Steele was especially helpful during the transition period between administrations.

We wish to thank Chief Donald Byrd and his staff for their unfailing cooperation. Although there are many more officers than we could name who made important contributions, we wish specifically to thank Executive Assistant Chief J.F. (Fritz) Dahman, who was generous with his time and his insights, and who was always willing to facilitate our work.

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for his commitment to evaluations of this kind. Tony Pate provided consultation throughout the evaluation effort.

Special thanks go to the evaluation staff members: Judy Hill, Charles Bay, Florence Kanter, Ramona Wycoff, and Marilyn Zoroya, who, with their administrative and clerical skill, provided critical support.

Four members of the Dallas Police Department, in addition to their regular duties, worked part time as evaluation staff members: Captain Grant Lappin and Officers Norman Crawford, Russell Graves, and Christopher Smith. Their aid in collecting and interpreting data was valuable, and they brought spirit and good humor, as well as insight, to our sometimes tedious research tasks.

Tobie Hayes Sasser deserves special acknowledgment for her conscientious work, especially in the final stages of the project after the evaluation office was closed. Special thanks also go to Dr. Robert Petersen. He joined the evaluation staff near the end of the project, and contributed greatly to completing the effort.

Patrick V. Murphy, president of the Police Foundation, has consistently and patiently supported these evaluation efforts.

And finally, our thanks to Joseph H. Lewis, Director of Evaluation at the Police Foundation. He has been our mentor.

George L. Kelling
Mary Ann Wycoff

PROLOGUE

I have read the two volumes detailing the process of experimentation in Dallas, and have encouraged the Police Foundation to publish them. I hope that the experience they describe can offer valuable guidance to other police innovators. I am proud of what my colleagues and I tried to do and, admittedly, both eager and apprehensive about giving other managers the opportunity to learn from our successes and failures.

Beyond these statements, I find that the other comments I would like to make would only be redundant with those in what has been labeled, in this report, "the first thirteen pages"; that is, the original introduction to the Five Year Plan which my staff and I developed in 1970-1971.

For me that introduction is important and I am pleased that it was included in this document. It contains concepts which I thought were necessary to improve policing. And, without getting into details or justifications, it represents to me what I considered, and still consider, important improvements in the use of police resources for public service. I am proud of it.

I don't want to give the impression that all the ideas were original or that I developed the concepts alone. Other chiefs and managers, in both public and private sectors, had experimented with similar programs which, though not identical, were derived from common values and assumptions. Likewise, many bright and talented people in the Dallas Police Department and city government contributed their ideas, values, and work to the development of the concepts. But it was my good fortune to be in a position to bring those ideas together and attempt to implement them. So I want to encourage readers to read the introduction. It contains almost everything about the program and about my thinking on police reform that I wish to write about in this context.

The important thing is that all of us who are managers, and especially those of use who are police managers, have been able to learn from both the successes and the failures of others. If we don't we will all remain on the endless treadmill of repeating each others' mistakes, not understanding that some of these problems are inevitable and that our successes and failures are not unique; they do have common patterns, themes, histories.

One last comment: The authors seem to believe that, although the process of change was tumultuous and conflictual, and the project didn't obtain all the goals hoped for, the Dallas Police Department was strengthened and benefited. I sincerely hope so.

Frank Dyson
Chief of Police
Austin, Texas

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Improving the quality of police services to local communities was one of the major social goals to emerge in the 1960s. Out of concern for rising crime, increasing alienation between police and citizens, and police handling of the disturbances associated with the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, major efforts to reform the police were undertaken. Agencies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the Police Foundation (PF) developed to support such efforts.

In 1971, the Dallas Police Department (DPD) began an attempt to improve radically its organization, the quality of its workforce, and the delivery of services to the public. The Police Foundation funded part of these efforts.

The resulting complex program included upgrading the educational level of police officers, recruiting women and members of minority groups, validating police selection and promotion criteria, providing horizontal career development opportunities for patrol officers, decentralizing administrative and strategic decisionmaking to levels more closely in touch with community and neighborhood needs, and policing by teams of officers trained to serve as generalist patrol officers who would also be enabled to acquire specialist skills such as investigation, conflict management, and so on. Although programs were to be phased in over a period of time, the changes were to be departmentwide and to be accomplished in five years.

The evaluation of this program began in 1971 and was completed in 1976.

This report is in two volumes. Volume I, The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform analyzes the history of the projects, the practical problems in the planning, initiation, and maintenance of the projects, the emergence of powerful resistances to the overall plan and the resulting conflicts, the resolution of the conflicts, and the impact of these conflicts on the attainment of the goals of the project. In sum, Volume I is a political and organizational history of the project.

The Introduction, the same in both volumes, presents Chief Frank Dyson's rationale for the overall goals and the specific programs of the DPD.

Volume II, The Dallas Experience: Human Resource Development describes the formal empirical evaluation and presents the findings. In addition to monitoring the history of the process of change (presented in Volume I), the evaluation design included panel surveys of DPD personnel in 1973 and 1976 to determine workforce and attitudinal changes over time, and the use of personal record information to determine behavioral changes. Although the original plan was to observe police officers as a primary method of noting behavioral changes over time, this idea later

was abandoned as a result of program changes. Likewise, a planned community survey also was dropped.

The survey data were used to measure four goals. The goals, with indicators of each, and the findings are as follows:

GOAL I. To recruit, retain, and promote officers different from those already in the department.

Indicators

A. Increased educational attainment

B. Increased minority representation (ethnic and sexual)

C. Increased numbers of personnel with cosmopolitan backgrounds

D. Improved attitudes and values

GOAL II. To increase officer satisfaction.

Indicators

A. Decreased isolation and alienation of police officers

B. Increased job commitment

C. Increased job satisfaction

GOAL III. To increase importance of human relations and public service functions.

Indicator

Questionnaire items measuring attitudes toward these functions

GOAL IV. To increase professionalism.

Indicators

A. Increased status of patrol force

B. Increased educational attainment

C. Increased importance of peer evaluation

D. Decreased isolation and alienation

E. Increased job commitment

F. Changed work orientations

Findings: Although the educational level of recruits and police officers rose considerably, and the absolute number of women increased significantly, few attitudinal changes took place over time.

The following information from department records was collected to indicate performance and was monitored over time.

Sick time

Injury time

Suspension time

Automobile accidents

Chargeable automobile accidents

Incidents of injury to prisoners

Incidents of weapons fired

Number of commendations

Number of complaints

Number of complaints sustained

Supervisory ratings

Findings: Behavior, as indicated by such information, appears not to have changed during the three-year period.

The conclusion of each volume discusses the problems inherent in major efforts at organizational overhaul and what was learned in this particular attempt. Further, it identifies ways in which the DPD has changed, in spite of the lack of attitude and performance changes.

CHRONOLOGY

This chronology is to assist readers in following the sequence of events from the inception of the program to the completion of the evaluation in September 1976.

The chronology is in three sections. The first section traces the dates of the Dallas Police Department's programs and the organizational events affecting the programs.

The second column traces the history of the events associated with the Police Foundation evaluation.

The final column traces the history of Police Foundation program events affecting the Dallas project.

CHRONOLOGY

DALLAS POLICE FOUNDATION PROJECT

	Department Program	Foundation Evaluation	Foundation Program
Jan 1971			
Feb 1971			
Mar 1971			
Apr 1971		Original Technical Assistance FAP-Evaluation $12,103	
May 1971	OPA started		Planning grant $234,981
Jun 1971	Intelligence liaison & minority recruiting--already operating		Madison seminar
Jul 1971	Program extension	First evaluation contact	
Aug 1971			First program officer transferred
Sep 1971	Media materials for minority recruitment		Second program officer assigned to Dallas
Oct 1971			
Nov 1971	SMU funded	Evaluation design approved, $15,000	Grant, $1,182,428
Dec 1971			
Jan 1972		Continuation, $15,000	
Feb 1972			
Mar 1972			
Apr 1972		Design approved, $121,630; evaluation office opened	Board member visits Dallas
May 1972		Extension of design, $40,822; T_1 HRD started	Police Foundation president resigns Second program officer resigns
Jun 1972	KOIDS established		Third program officer assigned to Dallas
Jul 1972	Intern program		
Aug 1972	Task forces started		
Sep 1972	Task forces ended; media materials completed		Foundation board cities committee site visit to Dallas
Oct 1972			Acting Director's site visit to Dallas
Nov 1972		Survey approved, $20,000; observation abandoned	
Dec 1972	Tactical officers decentralized to SE; LEAA grant announced for Dallas		

	Department Program	Foundation Evaluation	Foundation Program
Jan 1973			
Feb 1973			Acting Director's site visit to Dallas
Mar 1973		Extension, $90,495	Third program officer resigns
Apr 1973			
May 1973	Concurrent, predictive, & biodata validation project	Community survey cancelled	Second Foundation president appointed
Jun 1973			Fourth program officer assigned to Dallas
Jul 1973	Intern program; physical fitness and prevention of assaults	T_1 HRD administration completed	
Aug 1973	SRO liaison terminated; OPA terminated; tactical, CID, intelligence liaison, attorney		
Sep 1973	decentralized SE; Dyson resigns		Grant extension
Oct 1973	Analysts decentralized		Grant, $685,000
Nov 1973	Systemization of personnel records; Firearms project; Field officer training project		
Dec 1973		Extension $33,638	
Jan 1974			
Feb 1974			
Mar 1974		Extension, $144, 972	
Apr 1974	Dale Carnegie course for recruiters; Medical selection project		
May 1974	Automated Vita project		
Jun 1974	Disciplinary project begins		
Jul 1974			
Aug 1974	Task analysis of patrol officers		
Sep 1974			
Oct 1974	Intelligence liaison to district stations		
Nov 1974			
Dec 1974			

	Department Program	Foundation Evaluation	Foundation Program
Jan 1975			
Feb 1975			
Mar 1975	Hiring process reduced to 30 days for minorities	Extension, $99,862	
Apr 1975			
May 1975			
Jun 1975			
Jul 1975			
Aug 1975		Evaluation office closed	
Sep 1975			
Oct 1975			
Nov 1975			
Dec 1975			
Jan 1976			
Feb 1976			
Mar 1976		Extension, $42,500	
Apr 1976		T_2 HRD administered	
May 1976			
Jun 1976	One-on-one hiring ended	Final evaluation grant $61,240	
Jul 1976			
Aug 1976			
Sep 1976	Program extension period ends	First draft of evaluation completed	
Oct 1976			
Nov 1976			
Dec 1976			

THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE:

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

This is the evaluation of an attempt to reform a police department through a program of human resource development (recruiting, selecting, socializing, promoting, and retaining people different from those already in the department) and numerous structural and strategic reforms. Chief Frank Dyson presented the intended scope of this program most eloquently in the following statement with which he began the 1971 proposal to the Police Foundation.

I. GOALS OF THE DEPARTMENT

The heart of the Dallas Police Department proposal concerns redefining the role of police in Dallas and, by implication, in urban communities throughout the United States. The Department intends to focus its initial effort on reevaluation and redefinition of what police do and should do in the Dallas community. Substantial work already has been done in this field by Goldstein and the President's Commission on Crime in a Free Society.* A major portion of the planning period just completed by the Office of Program Management has revolved around the variety of roles that the police officer plays. It became very clear that a primary goal of the Department must be to identify the basic needs of the Dallas community and to structure a police role in the community which conforms to these needs. In order to do this, certain fundamental perceptions of the police and their relationship to society will have to be cast aside, and a more open approach taken to the way police organizations react or should react will need to be developed. Dealing with the police role requires analysis and understanding of all the duties presently performed by the police, a genuine effort to establish an order of priority among them, and a realignment of the organization to reflect priorities and to facilitate rapid and effective response to the community's demands and needs for service.

During the planning period, certain objectives or goals seemed to emerge in connection with the examination and redefinition of the police role. Although the following list is not intended to be inclusive, since one of the major purposes of this program is to develop within the police organization the capacity to incorporate new values and goals as they are perceived and developed, certainly among the major goals of the program are the following:

A) A people-oriented police force sensitive and responsive to the needs of the many cultures embodied within the City of Dallas. For too long, the police and other government agencies have viewed the community as a monolith requiring impersonal and undifferentiated service. For too

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*The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Report: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

long there have been limits on understanding and undertakings concerning racial minorities, political groups, and different age groups within the society. Emphasis on people orientation requires realignment of the role of the police organization as it shifts from representing 'the state' or 'the government' or 'the institution' to representing and serving all people on a person-to-person basis.

B) The development of a more rational police-community relationship based upon mutual understanding. This requires a different kind of education and training for policemen, which concentrates on major community problems and relationships and provides policemen with the understanding and tools to work within the community as it really is.

C) For the Police Department to represent and serve all of the people in Dallas requires renewed and innovative effort in crime prevention and service delivery. This will entail de-emphasis of the traditionally rigid enforcement policies that have dominated training and thinking in the police community.

D) As the de-emphasis of the rigid enforcement role occurs, many of the militaristic organizational patterns which presently govern police activities will have to be abandoned.

E) As the militaristic organizational patterns are loosened, what emerges is a professional service of police officers armed with alternative solutions to problems in addition to the arrest power and trained to exercise discretion in the selection of alternative responses to problems they confront.

F) This orientation toward people requires policemen who thoroughly understand their accountability to the citizenry through the political process and who are prepared to operate in an organizational structure which is open to scrutiny and review.

In order to accomplish these goals, there must be a realistic examination of the needs of the people. Much of the early effort of this program will revolve around an examination of what happens when the people of the community call on their police. Once a picture of actual demands made on the Department is completed, evaluation of needed skills and roles can be undertaken so that police training can deal with the requirements of the people, maximize the skills available to meet these needs, and reinforce the bonds and obligations between the police and the people.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT

Our police organizational structure and our patterns of staffing do not meet the needs of employees and citizens. The structure itself is a traditional militaristic organizational scheme based on strong central authority and a vertical line of command. This method of organizing and staffing is a barrier to effective utilization of manpower and

hampers the appropriate development of relationships between the police organization and the people it serves.

The present organizational structure and staffing came about in the same way that most police hierarchies have evolved--growth and the application of traditional principles of management with major emphasis on providing a means of employee mobility and rewards. Responding to a corresponding growth in the city's population and crime rate, chiefs of police sought to deal with the growing complexities of policing by increasing manpower. The emphasis was on numbers with no serious effort to review new alternatives to better utilize existing personnel. As manpower increased in numbers at the operating level, so was there an increase in the numbers and levels of supervisors. Religious observance of the principle of 'span of control' necessitated one sergeant for each six to eight patrolmen; one lieutenant for each four to six sergeants; one captain for each two to three lieutenants, and so on until we reached our present configuration which has ten levels of sworn personnel, two levels of para-police, and one level of cadets.

As numbers increased at the base of the pyramid, levels and numbers increased above. As new functional needs were identified, we inevitably began by making judgments as to the importance of the new function to 'properly determine' the appropriate 'rank' for the person in charge. The governing principle seemed to be to award the highest rank and status the market would bear. Once the new rank was identified, it was necessary to staff 'downward' to supply the necessary number of employees to fill out the organizational chart. Rarely was serious attention paid to whether this organizational structure would fulfill the existing need.

We have failed to keep up with non-police agencies by offering incentives to attract better people and then to provide them with an organizational environment conducive to growth and realization of potential. We have further compounded the problem by closing police service to lateral entry. We have often not even been successful in promoting the best employees.

It is generally recognized among enlightened police administrators that promotional mechanisms in police service are, for the most part, unrelated to job performance. More reliance is placed upon indications that candidates for promotion have <u>not</u> 'created problems' within the system than on demonstrations of leadership potential. We create an oppressive climate within police organizations which discourages individual initiative and development, and we reward those who best conform to the mold by moving them into positions to shape others. Thus is suppression of individual development perpetuated.

We are now seeking to develop a new orientation within the Dallas Police Department toward policing. We hope to redesign our organizational structure, practices, and environment in ways that will shift the emphasis back to policing. We want broader community representation in our ranks and more college graduates--men with intellectual curiosity, analytical ability, a capacity to relate the events of the day to the

social, political and historical context in which they occur. We want to place these men in an organizational environment that will encourage development of individual potential rather than suppress it, and we will expect more from them than we have in the past. We want to dismantle the pyramidal hierarchy which stifles communications and replace it with a structure and climate conducive to free and open exchange of ideas and information. We envision reducing the management levels from nine to three or four. Ultimately, the operative level should be one of professional competence providing leadership for para-police and looking to no more than two levels for management assistance.

III. OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

In reorienting the operations of the Dallas Police Department, we will emphasize what we call neighborhood police operations. A series of districts, or police centers with substantial autonomy will be established, based on such factors as density of population, major geographical features, community characteristics, and requirements for police service.

Each district police center will contain a number of neighborhood satellite stations which will be operations bases for neighborhood police teams. It is the neighborhood police team which will form the basic policing unit in Dallas. The teams will be composed of a new type of police officer described below and assigned according to an analysis of policing needs within the neighborhoods served. They would be managed by 'team leaders' who would coordinate activities and deploy manpower as needs indicated. The satellite stations would receive support from neighborhood centers but would retain a substantial amount of autonomy from the center just as the center is largely autonomous within the Department as a whole.

IV. THE GENERALIST/SPECIALIST

We have selected the term 'generalist/specialist' to describe the kind of officer that we envision doing the policing of the future. The generalist/specialist would be a professional in the sense of being capable of meeting the broad policing needs of the people and would be fully accountable for his actions in meeting these needs. Additionally, he would have specialized skills in one or more areas which he could apply in a team effort with other officers to provide 'complete policing' to the areas served by such teams. As well as being competent to serve in a generalist police capacity, our officer of the future would be an expert, or leader, in one or more specialized policing or organizational areas, such as investigation, conflict management, youth counseling, crowd control, training, administration or management, and so on. The idea is to begin with a better man in terms of mental ability, personality and formal education, and develop him with professional training to become a generalist in most aspects of policing the community, and a specialist with certain highly developed skills to meet organizational and team policing requirements.

The generalist/specialist would be the authority in his field and would not require supervision and direction as we know it today. There would be only one 'level of policing' and this would be conducted under the general direction of neighborhood center managers who would serve primarily to coordinate neighborhood police teams in their policing activities. The center managers would work under the direction of the Chief of Police.

Our major tool in reaching our objective will be new training for new recruits and retraining for existing personnel. We have taken some steps in this direction already. We have begun to reassign and retrain certain of our investigators from a central location to district stations where they are serving in a broader role than before. They are now spending more time 'on the street' working offenses, in many cases from taking the initial complaint to final disposition.

We are in the planning stages of reassigning more of our specialists to district stations where they will be cast in more general police roles as we complete our transition to the generalist/specialist concept. They will become more and more involved in general, or basic, policing tasks as we move in this direction. A more rapid transition to this concept of policing must await the construction of adequate district and neighborhood policing facilities and better training programs.

An architectural staff within the city has just completed for the Department a proposed plan for locating and building the kinds of facilities we should have and will need in order to implement our team policing concept. The teams would operate out of 'neighborhood' police facilities arranged as 'satellites' to neighborhood centers which would provide administrative and technical support services. Funds for construction of the facilities in accordance with the architectural proposal will be requested in a forthcoming bond election.

The neighborhood teams would be complemented by para-police who would be selected on the basis of need from the residents of the neighborhoods served. In this way, we would hope to gain a broader community representation in our police department and better tailor our policing to the neighborhoods of the city. We would require para-police, then, to work within the neighborhoods where they live and to begin or continue college education with the financial assistance of the city as prescribed in our university programs. The para-police would work under the direction of the teams in providing complete services to the neighborhoods on a continuing basis and would also assist team members with specific assignments as needed.

Para-police would perform a wide range of duties within the neighborhoods, such as general inspection, in order to identify potential problems and problem areas; follow-up on particular requests for service by citizens to insure that satisfactory service is provided, especially in referral cases; follow-up on minor complaints to insure satisfactory resolution; collection of information dealing with crime or potential crime problems; some assistance in follow-up investigation of lesser

offenses, etc. Aside from the obvious benefits of gaining more community representation and involvement in policing, this approach would serve as a vehicle for channeling minority group members into police service who would otherwise be denied this opportunity because of lack of education and other employment requirements. This is not to say that we propose to develop a level of 'lower class' police within the service and then fill it with minority group members. On the contrary, this would simply serve as another means of entry and would afford many persons opportunities which they would otherwise not have to begin their education and self-development. Additionally, it would provide us in police service for the first time with a means of obtaining continuing feedback from the citizens in terms of quality of services provided and service needs.

V. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

In order to develop the police role as described, human resources development will be a major task. Since we are operating an ongoing system and a majority of police have already attended the existing training programs, personnel development will require a variety of approaches to achieve the goals of the Department.

Training, education, and development should relate directly to the new role definition of the policeman. It is not simply a question of improving existing education and training, but rather a question of reorienting the whole educational thrust of the Dallas Police Department. Once it is determined that the major theme in the role of police is relationship with the people, that is to say the police as the community counselor and helper, then necessarily the majority of training in the Department would focus on this particular endeavor. It is anticipated that basic communications skills, techniques of counseling, techniques of listening, group dynamics, and understanding minorities and subcultures would become the basic curriculum around which police training would revolve. Traditional materials such as understanding criminal law, executing arrests, management of weapons, and the like obviously will be retained but in a community oriented perspective.

Recruiting will have to change drastically. The present Dallas Police Department profile does not represent a cross-section of the Dallas population. Nor does it necessarily represent those people who are best suited to be career police officers. Emphasis on our pilot program for minority recruiting should continue to help develop police from within the minority communities. Substantial effort should be given to recruiting people who prior to this time had not thought of the police as a career service. The Department suspects that it will become increasingly clear that the new role requires new men, and although it recognizes that we have existing personnel and that maximization of their skills must be undertaken, recruiting must in fact fulfill a new dimension in the Department and must strive not to duplicate what is already here, but create clearly new lines of development.

Once the overall goals of the Department have been articulated and general organizational goals for police in Dallas delineated, it is necessary to attempt to describe how one changes the existing police department to achieve these objectives.

It is clear from our experience over the past several months that producing change within the Dallas Police Department is a formidable task. This is so for a variety of reasons.

1) Many of the existing men on the force represent the traditional view and method of policing.

2) Existing police structure has set up rewards for conformance, and innovation conjures a serious 'failure' threat.

3) All surrounding institutions that support the Department are not geared for change and may in fact inhibit it, e.g., the Civil Service system has limited and, in some cases, obstructed the successful hiring of the 'new' policeman.

4) Skills needed to produce the vast change desired are not present in the Department in sufficient abundance to effectuate the goals desired. Further, such skills are in limited supply nationally. Nevertheless, we are convinced that there are ways of overcoming the above deficiencies.

Our strategy for producing change calls for emphasis on several basic approaches. The primary approach calls for a complete revision of internal training procedures. Curriculum will have to be developed, new methods of teaching worked out and new rewards given to men who absorb the learning offered through the training programs. Training will have to become a major continuous part of police operations which could even include a 'trainer' at every satellite police station.

Personnel policies concerning selection, promotion and lateral entry will have to be revised. This type of revision will have to include major changes in thinking and even legislative revision of existing civil service systems.

Existing talent within the force will have to be augmented with a long-term alliance with Southern Methodist University so that the diversity of talent and skills available at a university can be used in a realistic and effective way to supplement existing Dallas police skills. Further, the local university effort will have to be coordinated so that it supplies consultants when available and augments consultants hired from other sources to avoid duplication. This relationship calls for formation of a true operating partnership between the Department and SMU to insure that the effort expended is relevant to the needs of the Department.

The authors believe this statement to have been visionary.

The programs were many, complex, and often overlapping, and at times the goals of some seemed in conflict with the goals of others. An evaluation, reported in Volume II, attempted to measure the impact of all these programs over time. It would have been impossible to distinguish among their impacts. Initially, the evaluation design was more ambitious: a community survey was designed to measure the effect of the programs on the community; observers were trained to assess changes in police officer performance. As some programs were scaled down, as the timetables of some were revised, and as others were discovered to confound costly evaluattions, these aspects of the study had to be abandoned. The data used for the impact evaluation are derived from an extensive personnel survey conducted throughout the department in 1973 and again in 1976. The survey was based on a life-history model and included items on background, family structure, personal attitudes, work-oriented attitudes, and job history. Data collected from the department's personnel and internal affairs files, and the personal observations and impressions of the evaluation staff, were added to this information to provide the basis for the analyses reported in Volume II.

Volume I, The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform, analyzes the history of the projects; the practical problems in the planning, initiation, and maintenance of the projects; the emergence of powerful resistances to the overall plan and the resulting conflicts; the resolution of the conflicts; and the impact of these conflicts on the attainment of the goals of the project. It is a political and organizational history of the project.

CHAPTER 1

ISSUES IN POLICE REFORM

INTRODUCTION

The quality of urban police performance long has been a matter of concern, however fluctuating, to public officials and citizen groups. Uneasiness again reached a high in the 1960s, when the upsurge of crime and violence was keenly felt. Investigations of the criminal justice apparatus sponsored by government agencies, private organizations, and presidential commissions probed once again, as they had in the 1930s, the operational shortcomings of police departments. The goals were to determine their scope and understand their causes, and to discover the degree to which they contributed to the larger problems of urban crime and civil disorder. The findings and recommendations of these various investigations were controversial and received much publicity. Substantial numbers of police officers were reported to be prejudiced toward minority citizens, particularly blacks. Police arrest decisions were said to involve many injustices. Officers' handling of citizens, particularly of suspects, was "too frequently" accompanied by unnecessary force. A surprising number of police officers were discovered to be "on the take." Management often was found wanting. Although the links between these findings and larger social problems such as citizen unrest, crime, and violence, were not and still are not definitely established, many observers believe them to exist.

The conditions generally associated with deficiencies in policing are as varied as the deficiencies themselves. The failure of legislatures to enact clear statutes, the desire of police administrators for "good arrests," and the lack of supervision of field officers led some patrol officers to misuse discretion, resulting in systematic bias (racial and class) in the exercise of police powers. The corrosive nature of many police-citizen encounters apparently contributes to police dislike and disparagement of certain citizen groups. The physical risks involved in police patrol and officers' awareness of the ambivalent views the public holds about them lead them in turn toward suspicion and officiousness in dealings with citizens.

These conditions notwithstanding, many analysts of police operations in the United States have concluded that problems in police performance also are attributable to the low quality of police personnel. This assessment is not new. It was made in the nineteenth century when and wherever municipal police were introduced, and has been reported with remarkable consistency over the years. Particularly pronounced in the present-day assessment, however, is the assertion that more qualified police are needed not merely in order to eliminate the problems brought on by less than competent public servants, but also to mitigate the effect of the abrasive features (described above) that inhere in the police role. To achieve this difficult task, most analysts have called for policies of police professionalism and of personnel reform by means of changes in recruitment and promotion.

The call for police personnel reform did not originate in the 1960s, but the strength of the drive for personnel reform and the faith in it as asolution to the many problems of policing achieved unparalleled momentum in that decade. Many authors have mentioned it (Saunders, 1970; Bittner, 1970; Clark, 1970; Locke and Smith, 1970; Blumberg and Niederhoffer, 1970; Germann, 1971; Ahern, 1972; Kelling and Kliesmet, 1971; Ashburn, 1973; Richardson, 1974) and it was prominently featured in the recommendations of three presidential commission reports (the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, ch. 4; Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, ch. 2; National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969, ch. 3).

The personnel reform strategy seeks to change the police by bringing into the field people with backgrounds that would enable them to practice policing differently from those who are now dominant. Training of these officers would focus on the wise use of discretion and an appreciation for the complex and paradoxical role of the police in a democratic society. Career paths and promotion procedures would be structured to keep the best people in police work, and to provide capable supervisors and administrators to reduce the impact of the less incompetent. The staffing of police departments--not administrative technique, outside interests, or institutional structure--is seen as the key to change.

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS

One justification for personnel reform as a means to improved police service is that the complexity and importance of police functions require officers who are sophisticated. This position is articulated in the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and expanded in its Task Force Report on the Police. Among police functions are law enforcement, peacekeeping, and providing a variety of social services. Much police activity is critically important to the citizens directly involved; some areas of police work involve "emergencies," by definition episodes that take priority over routine events. Many of the problems the police deal with entail complex legal, social, and psychological issues. Police decisions often must be made quickly and in the face of hostility. Police are permitted to carry guns and at times to use force, even deadly force. Given the varied nature, importance, and difficulty of the police role, it is not surprising that many argue that only people of extraordinary ability can do police work adequately. Some see those who now dominate the field to be mediocre, and there is a demand to bring in new types of officers.

Another theoretical justification for personnel reform is that the vast amount of discretion inherent in the patrol function requires that all officers in the field be equipped to exercise this broad discretion thoughtfully and effectively. Studies of police as the crucial first agents in processing suspects through the criminal justice system (cf., Piliavin, 1974; Wilson, 1968; Reiss, 1971; Goldstein, 1960; Goldstein, 1963; Davis, 1969; Bittner, o970; Black, 1970) point to many circumstances in which police discretion is required. Because the criminal justice

system (police, courts, prisons, etc.) cannot possibly process all violators of the criminal law, it is essential for police to select those who will be processed.

Individual officers play a significant role in deciding when to invoke and enforce the law. The criminal law is often vague, and considerable latitude exists in interpreting particular statutes and determining which law, if any, applies to a particular situation. Further, most police officers do not work under direct supervision, but are alone in the field when they deal with citizens. This fact of police operation makes the implementation of uniform police policies difficult. The situations that an officer will encounter in a given tour of duty cannot be predicted precisely, so officers cannot be given specific advance instructions for handling these situations. Finally, police action must be responsive to an often unpredictable citizenry. The police rely on citizens to report crime and disorder, often look to the preference of complainants when alternative courses of police action are possible, and depend on citizens to serve as witnesses. 1/

A third justification for personnel reform is that if dynamic new groups are brought into policing they will stimulate change in many areas of police work. According to Egon Bittner

> College graduates will naturally tend to resist mechanical discipline and work assignments that are below the level of their qualifications; they will naturally demand opportunities for advanced training and explore new possibilities of practice in place of tired old routines; and they will demand recognition of their professional status over and above whatever recognition results from having employment ties with a police department. But this kind of militancy would, in effect, make the implementation of desired reforms a self-implementing process, simply because the ordinary career aspirations of college graduates are in line with them. Above all, college graduates will accept the idea of professional police schools with enthusiasm, and will provide the cadres of students and teachers. 2/

A related justification stems from the effectiveness of an entrenched, Old Guard police subculture in thwarting reform efforts of all kinds. Unless the subculture is "broken" by importing a substantial number of officers who reject the traditional police perspective or by educating those currently in the field in order to change their general views, no reform strategy can be effective.

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1. D. J. Black, "Production of Crime Rates," American Sociological Review 35, August 1970, 733-48.

2. Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Publication No. (HSM) 72-9103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 86-87.

Also, unlike many other occupations in our society, police service quality is affected in a relatively minor way by technology and equipment. In a volume of papers on police personnel administration, W. Donald Heisel and Patrick V. Murphy content, "A police department is as good as the quality and utilization of its human resources." 3/ In the same volume, Peter S. Ring and Frank Dyson say, "People, not machines, provide this country with public safety. Law enforcement agencies are labor intensive." 4/ Because machinery and technology play a marginal role, it follows that improvement in the quality of policing requires upgrading personnel.

Further, in a competitive economic marketplace, consumer response is instrumental in filtering out incompetents and advancing the careers of those who are effective. Police service, being in the public sector, is not delivered in such circumstances. Therefore, it is argued that more formal mechanisms such as recruitment, selection, training, and promotion must play larger roles in establishing and maintaing police standards. That most police officers enjoy tenure and other civil service protections further increases the need for effective personnel selection and retention practices.

A final justification arises from the feeling that police officers should be representative--racially, geographically, socioeconomically--of the people they serve. It is argued that such police-citizen similarity promotes greater mutual understanding and greater police sensitivity to the area served and its people's problems.

ELEMENTS OF PERSONNEL REFORM

Essentially, the various recommendations for police personnel reform share the assertion that improved police service requires

1. Recruiting different or better kinds of people.
2. Developing more professional attitudes.
3. Increasing police satisfaction with their roles as law enforcement experts and providers of service to the community.
4. Decentralizing the organization to support the other changes.

Some observers claim that realization of these often overlapping and intertwined ends would result in more dedicated and efficient police who would deal more effectively and tolerantly with citizens.

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3. W. Donald Heisel and Patrick V. Murphy, "Organization for Police Personnel Management," in O. Glenn Stahl and Richard A. Staufenberger, eds., Police Personnel Administration (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974).

4. Peter S. Ring and Frank Dyson, "Human Resource Planning," in ibid., 45.

The available evidence concerning the effectiveness of each of these three strategies for police personnel reform and the organizational change proposed to support them is examined in what follows.

RECRUITING AND SELECTING DIFFERENT OR BETTER KINDS OF PEOPLE

Recruitment

Recruiting quality personnel (however the individual department defines its personnel needs) is seen to serve two functions: it enlists field officers who are able to deal with the complexities of the patrol function and it provides police organizations with a pool from which capable supervisors and administrators can be drawn.

Education. It is argued that college educated recruits are more desirable than those who have not gone to college. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice said in its report on the police, "The quality of police service will not significantly improve until higher educational requirements are established for its personnel." 5/

Quoting early police reformer August Vollmer (1929), the report said:

> It is nonsense to state or to assume that the enforcement of the law is so simple that it can be done best by those unencumbered by a study of the liberal arts. The man who goes into our streets in hopes of regulating, directing and controlling human behavior must be armed with more than a gun. ...[His] intellectual armament, so long restricted to the minimum, must be no less than [his] physical prowess. 6/

In his study of the functions of modern police agencies, Egon Bittner said:

> In simplest terms: it must be made clear as unambiguously as possible that education does matter in police work. ...The main objective of the recommendation [that a B.A. be a prerequisite to police service] is to abolish permanently the idea that is all too prevalent in our society that if one does not want to take the trouble of becoming something worthwhile, he can always become a cop. 7/

The call for college-level recruitment is supported by several arguments. One advanced by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice is that the complexity and importance of the

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5. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report, The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 126 (hereafter cited as Task Force Report).

6. Ibid., 360.

7. Bittner, Functions of the Police in Modern Society, 83.

police function, as well as the discretion that inevitably rests with those at the patrol level, require a sophisticated patrol force. Educational prerequisites increase the likelihood that such people will be hired. Another argument points to the importance of citizen cooperation for effective policing. Because the public is inclined to respect occupations with high entry requirements, the argument goes, educated police are more likely to gain needed public support. Others contend that educated police will be receptive to change across a broad spectrum of issues, that they will be more sympathetic to the poor with whom they often deal, that education will undermine racial and cultural prejudices that have characterized police departments, that the intellectual sophistication of college graduates is needed if police are to deal adequately with the legal and social problems they confront regularly, that educated officers may be less inclined to use force than uneducated officers, and that only an educated police can accept the paradoxes that characterize police work in our society.

Another argument is that by not increasing educational prerequisites periodically police departments lower their recruiting standards. For example, Egon Bittner writes that

> By recruiting at the level of high school diplomas, police departments in effect lower their standards from year to year.
>
> ...As progressively larger percentages of high school graduates do continue their education, the remaining pool of eligibles will decline in average quality.

He argues further that the recruitment of educated officers is impaired by the failure of many police agencies to require college degrees:

> It makes a good deal of sense to suppose that, given the rather attractive remuneration--in comparison with teaching or social work--many a young man with a college degree does not choose to become a policeman <u>because</u> his diploma is not required. <u>8/</u>

Given the present glut of college graduates on the labor market, this factor may be significant.

It should be noted that arguments for requiring educational prerequisites for police appointments are extended to support proposals intended to encourage police officers to obtain college training in their off-duty hours. Enabling those officers without college education to go to college might, in addition to improving their perspective and performance, diminish resistance to college-educated recruits.

Despite the strong support from many quarters for increased educational standards in police recruitment, there are those who question the value of requiring higher levels of education.

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8. <u>Ibid</u>., 84.

> Some have argued that college-trained men are more likely to have the desired qualities [of good officers]. A plausible case can be made for this view. ...It is a measure of our ignorance in these matters that an equally plausible case to the contrary can be made. Recruiting college men will no doubt reduce substantially [at least for the time being] the chances of adding more blacks or other minority groups to the police forces, for they are under-represented in college classes. Second, college education may make a man civil...but it also gives him (or reinforces in him) his sense of duty. This has led some college-trained officers to be excessively aggressive and arrest-prone when a gentler hand might be better. Third, college men may not be able easily to identify with or understand problems of lower- and working-class persons with whom they must deal. In sum, the value of college training is still largely a matter of conjecture. 9/

This debate has entered a public arena. In a recent case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charged that the Arlington, Virginia, Police Department is practicing illegal racial discrimination by providing increment pay for college-educated officers. The argument is that blacks are less likely than whites to have attended college and that college education has not been shown to be related to the performance of the police officer's duties. Although in this case the charge has been overruled, unless research can demonstrate the validity of college education as a selection criterion, future court rulings may indeed make it illegal for police administrators to hire only, or even to favor, college-educated applicants.

Unfortunately, there are as yet no studies that provide the policy guidance that judges, government agencies, funding agencies, and police administrators seek. So far as can be determined, there is no systematic research on the impact of education on police performance which can be considered reliable and valid. The studies most frequently cited (Smith, Locke and Walker, 1967; 1968; 1970; Guller, 1972; Levy, 1967; Cohen and Chaiken, 1973) suffer methodological flaws that prevent conclusions regarding the causal relationship between education and police attitudes and performance. Nevertheless, these studies do suggest a positive correlation between officers' education, nonauthoritarian attitudes, career advancement, and lack of disciplinary action.

Minority recruitment. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended that

> It should be a high-priority objective of all departments in communities with a substantial minority population

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9. James Q. Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," in Robert F. Steadman, ed., The Police and the Community (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 51-90.

> to recruit minority-group officers, and to deploy and promote them fairly...If there is not a substantial percentage of Negro officers among policemen in a Negro neighborhood, many residents will reach the conclusion that the neighborhood is being policed, not for the purpose of maintaining law and order, but for the purpose of maintaining the ghetto's status-quo. 10/

Until the late 1960s, blacks were for the most part, excluded from serving in police agencies; the involvement of the police in the black community has not been even-handed. In many cities the police refused to respond to situations involving only black citizens. In dealing with incidents involving citizens of both races, the police tended to be abusive to blacks and overly lenient with whites. Given the history of relations between traditionally white police and the black community, recruitment of a substantial number of black officers may be the only way to convince black citizens that the police are finally prepared to work with them, not against them.

A second justification for minority recruitment is that effective policing requires the cooperation of the community, especially those segments that are disproportionately heavy consumers of police service. Reiss's 11/ research indicates that the police rely on the community to bring instances of crime and disorder to their attention, to help with prosecution, and for the confidence and sense of legitimacy that come with community approval. It is reasonable to assume that minority neighborhoods will be more likely to support the police if minority group members are significantly represented among the police.

It is also contended that minority police officers will be more sympathetic to the plight of ghetto residents. Therefore, a police department with minority representation will be able to provide more compassionate service than a police agency composed entirely of outsiders.

In 1974, Peter Rossi and his associates conducted an attitude survey of a few hundred ghetto policemen, both black and white, after the urban riots of the 1960s. Their results indicated that black officers were less likely to hold ghetto residents personally responsible for their poverty and life style, and more inclined to recognize broad social and political forces as contributing to the ghetto predicament. Black officers in Rossi's sample were more likely to have friends and relatives in the areas they patrolled, suggesting a greater stake in the community than white officers could have had.

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10. Task Force Report, 101-02.

11. A. J. Reiss, The Police and the Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

The call for increased minority recruitment is controversial. Few would question the need for improved relations between the police and minority groups, particularly the black community, yet some believe that recruiting minorities specially and giving them priority in the hiring process may not be the best way to achieve this end. Such objectors claim that giving any group priority to the extent that established standards are waived to recruit them may reduce standards of the occupation generally. (This view includes the assumption, which some would question, that established standards are job related.) They assert that, since minority communities are large consumers of police service and officers specially recruited will tend to be assigned to them, the negative impact will be particularly strong in these segments of the community. Thus, they state, there can be a conflict between the goals of having a representative agency and those of having a sophisticated, professional police. This conflict has been recognized by minority police applicants who have challenged educational requirements and seemingly objective hiring procedures on the ground that they are discriminatory.

Minority recruitment puts a good deal of pressure on police organizations; unless special training provisions are made for those given preference in the hiring process they may tend to do less well in the department generally. Unless there is political intervention, this relatively poor performance will cause them to be promoted at a disproportionately low rate (assuming that promotion procedures use criteria similar to those employed in hiring). Also, other members of police organizations will tend to resent those who are given preferential treatment, and a morale problem may develop. At the same time, unless preferences are given, the problems of recruiting (and retaining) minorities can be frustrating and very time consuming.

Such problems are not peculiar to the police, but are common to affirmative action in all fields. Many administrators believe that these difficulties are worth the advantages of bringing a mistreated and excluded group into the mainstream. But it should be noted that the problems raised by affirmative action may be more pronounced in professions such as policing for which representativeness is based on local rather than national populations. When representation is based on the national population, affirmative actions for blacks touch only 10 to 15 percent of the work force (the percentage of blacks nationally). In many police agencies in major cities, however, it will affect up to 50 percent of personnel because this is the percentage of blacks in many of these cities. It is in these urban centers that most police work is carried out.

There is little evidence supporting the hypotheses that officers who are representative of the community policed will be more effective and compassionate. The Rossi study cited previously suggests that black police officers are more sympathetic to the black community than white officers. But positive attitudes are not necessarily related to positive performance. Reiss's (1971) research indicates that black officers are slightly more inclined to use force unnecessarily against black citizens than are white officers. Reiss also found that black police were

less likely to use force against white citizens. 12/ Some observers (e.g., Riley) theorize that black officers are brutal to black citizens because black officers are particularly despised by the black community, on one hand, and must show their white police peers that their primary allegiance is to the police, on the other. 13/

Another argument against giving minorities preference to create a racially representative department is that the same standard may be applied to predominantly white communities. This would deny minorities opportunity in lucrative and comfortable suburban policing; it could promote racism in departments that are exclusively white or black; and it could create the potential for ugly racial conflict among police agencies in times of civil disorder. A proposal that would have established separate police departments along racial lines in Berkeley, California, was overwhelmingly defeated by both black and white voters in a referendum. 14/

Selection

Recruitment of police affects the pool of applicants from which new police officers are drawn; selection procedures determine which applicants ultimately become police officers. Selection procedures should reflect recruitment priorities if those priorities are to have maximum impact. Thus, if a department believes that college graduates will be superior police officers and college graduates are recruited, educational achievement should be given some weight in the selection process.

Some police reformers have agreed that good police officers possess certain psychological attributes. They have enlisted psychologists to devise and select tests to measure these attributes that can be conveniently given to applicants. Standardized personality tests such as the California Personality Inventory and the MMPI have been made part of the selection process in some cities (see Beahr, Furcon and Froemel, 1968; Knoohuizm and Bailey, 1973; Wisenberg and Murray, 1974), and work continues on this front (Lefkowitz, 1976).

Some reformers have advocated examination of work histories, academic records, criminal histories, and personal references to ensure that prospective officers are of good character. Others have urged that requirements which disqualify a large number of applicants but which do not bear a clear relationship to an applicant's ability to become a professional police officer be eliminated. This suggestion is directed especially at stringent physical requirements that traditionally have been prerequisites

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12. Ibid.

13. D. P. Riley, "Should Communities Control Their Police?" in Anthony Platt and Lynn Cooper, eds., Policing America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 190-97.

14. J. Skolnick, "Neighborhood Police," in J. Skolnick and George Gray, eds., Police in America (Boston: Educational Associates, 1975).

to police employment. Other proposals include personal interviews and role-playing exercises that simulate police encounters.

Many have recommended that a probationary period be conceived as part of the hiring process. 15/ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommends a one-year probationary period during which the performance of recruits would be carefully monitored. Department administrators would have broad discretion in dismissing recruits whose progress was not satisfactory. O. W. Wilson makes a similar suggestion. A probationary period would be a final check on the hiring process and would provide a needed opportunity to weed out recruits whose problems seem unsolvable. Because police officers in most cities enjoy civil service protection, they are not easily fired. A probationary period that is used effectively for screening is particularly important.

Unfortunately, even the best selection procedures are unreliable for predicting good police performance. The theoretical advantages of better selection procedures must be tempered by the realities of test technology. Whether this technology will improve significantly is an open question.

Many police selection practices reflect peculiarities of the labor market at the time they were advanced and should be reconsidered in terms of current situations. The argument has, therefore, been advanced that selection procedures and goals should adapt to changes in the labor market, police manpower needs, and available city funds. For example, the goal of hiring college graduates might have been unrealistic ten years ago when occupational opportunities for those with liberal arts backgrounds were plentiful, but it might be a quite reasonable goal in the current market. Advertising police opportunities to the public generally and streamlining application procedures would make sense at a time when the police are unable to fill vacancies, but would be absurd when departments are at full strength and are swamped with attractive applicants.

To summarize, literature on recruiting and selecting different types of people for police work suggests the potential of this reform strategy, and makes clear the need for more and better evidence of its impact. In response to both points: A primary goal of the HRD project was recruitment, selection, retention, and promotion of different types of people. The chief of the DPD believed that a police agency should be more representative of its community than the Dallas department had been. He also thought it desirable to recruit people who were more tolerant of cultural differences, capable of managing discretion, and oriented toward social service delivery as well as law enforcement. It followed that their supervisors should share these orientations. Correspondingly, a primary task of the evaluations conducted by the department and the Police Foundation was to ascertain the extent to which this goal was met, and to assess its impact on the community-relations issues thought to be related.

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15. Such a probationary program has in fact been implemented in the DPD.

INCREASING POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

Many theorists believe the call for more professional police to be synonymous with the call for general police personnel reform. According to Herman Goldstein, every improvement in policing from modernization of equipment to increased pay and better management techniques has been celebrated as a contribution to professionalization. 16/ Consequently there is confusion among police about what professionalism is.

Two perspectives on professionalization of the police, going back as far as the Wickersham Report (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931), are discernible. By far the oldest and most common perspective has been technical-managerial professionalization. Most calls for police professionalization have been "Weberian" 17/-- i.e., stressing management through technical and organizational efficiency, and through employing honest, dedicated public servants. This emphasis emerged in the reform-minded era of the 1920s and early 1930s, and was introduced into policing by such chiefs as O. W. Wilson in Chicago and W. H. Parker in Los Angeles. These reformers took seriously the public demand that police maintain order and control crime, and saw around them only feeble police organizations, political corruption, and low quality personnel. To carry out the police mission, as they saw it, required the application of up-to-date management principles to police organization, the application of modern technology to detecting crime and maintaining order, the complete separation of police from politics, and increased pay and educational standards in order to recruit a "better class" of police officer. This is essentially the model that characterized the successful transformation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a prestigious, professional investigative agency.

Wilson and Parker, however, were dedicated to a broader and less bureaucratic conception of professionalization. They believed in the development of an organized body of knowledge, techniques and procedures for police work, a code of ethics, professional police associations, uniform standards of admission, lateral entry, merit promotions, and recruitment by open competition. 18/ But given the deplorable condition of police agencies at the time, their immediate concerns were the development of efficient, quasi-military organizations, the recruitment of honest men, and little more.

Conditions began to change. Police budgets rose appreciably, and pay scales went up; standards increased and accountability mechanisms were introduced. Little attention, however, was given to the issues of

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16. Herman Goldstein, "Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance," 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1967, 1123-46.

17. J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

18. O. W. Wilson, Police Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); Parker on Police (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1956).

the exercise of police authority and the quality of noncriminal (i.e., social) community services. These issues assumed overriding importance only during the turmoil of the 1960s when the focus on police professionalization shifted dramatically to the question of civility. The police authority issue exploded in controversy over due process and justice at the hands of the police. It was fueled by a series of United States Supreme Court decisions in the Warren years restricting certain police practices. The call for legality in police performance was echoed by Skolnick (1968) when he wrote:

> The problem of police in a democratic society is not merely a matter of obtaining new cars or more sophisticated equipment, or communication systems, or of recruiting men who have to their credit more years of education. What is necessary is a significant alteration in the philosophy of police, so that police 'professionalization' rests upon the values of a democratic legal policy. 19/

The issue of police-community relations arose at the same time. The norm of civility implied that police must develop greater sensitivity and understanding of the racial, ethnic, and social composition of the neighborhoods they patrolled, and more humane and respectful dealings with citizens. Cumming, Cumming, and Edel confirmed in 1965 that fully 90 percent of police-citizen encounters are of a noncriminal nature, and police professionalization came to mean for many observers police acquisition of human relations and interpersonal communication skills.

Many features inherent in the police role make traditional aspects of professionalism difficult to apply to policing. 20/ In spite of conceptual problems in applying the full professional model to police, some of its elements--the desire for autonomy, peer review, cosmopolitan nature of personnel, job commitment, concern for service, and the like--may be applicable, and certainly remain as major goals of departments nationwide.

Accordingly, a second major goal of the Dallas HRD project was increased professionalism of police personnel. With respect to the technical-managerial aspect of this goal, increased professionalism was taken to mean greater commitment to the job, a stronger belief in service delivery, an increased capacity for handling autonomy and discretion, greater occupational status, and an increased belief in the importance of evaluation by one's peers. The human relations and communication skills aspect of professionalism led the project to emphasize changed perceptions of the functions of policing on the part of sworn personnel. The chief of

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19. J. Skolnick, The Police and the Urban Ghetto, Research Contributions of the American Bar Foundation, No. 3 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1968).

20. I. Piliavin, J. Ladinsky, G. Kelling, and M. Pate, "The Nature and Determinants of Job Satisfaction Among Police," Unpublished, 1976.

the DPD believed that there needed to be a greater organizational commitment to the services patrol officers delivered to the community and that patrol officers, in addition to viewing their work as more significant, should view human relations actions as a more substantial aspect of their responsibilities.

INCREASING JOB SATISFACTION

The final component of police personnel reform suggested by the literature is to create in police satisfaction with and pride in their jobs. Increasing job satisfaction is important for ensuring that the able people recruited to policing will stay in policing. In addition, greater job satisfaction may, according to some expressed views, produce better treatment of citizens. Finally, there has been the frequent suggestion of positive relationships between job satisfaction and physical and mental well-being, adaptation to work, work performance, and decreased job turnover.

There is a long tradition of behavioral science concern with the meaning of work and the dynamics of job satisfaction. It began in the 1930s in the "human relations in industry" school, and was a mainstay of concern to industrial psychologists throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Sociologists were interested during the formative years, and became interested again in the late 1960s when the "blue collar blues" were rediscovered in the popular literature. But throughout these years of concern, investigations of police officers' satisfaction with their work have been few, despite the as yet unproven assumption that police work generates discontent and stress.

The studies dealing with police officers' evaluation of their work treat the topic briefly and descriptively, with the exception of very recent work by Piliavin and others.21/ Comparative and theoretical analyses do not exist, but not because law enforcement authorities regard job satisfaction as irrelevant to police work. Niederhoffer (1969), in his account of the urban police officer, suggests that patrol officers lacking prestige envy the status of non-uniformed officers, soon become apathetic about their work, and come to look forward only to the day of their retirement.22/ Sterling (1972) claims that job satisfaction is "related to the worker's perception of the status and importance assigned to his work, the monetary return he gains from job performance and a host of other factors."23/ O. W. Wilson, writing as a police administrator, warns of the need to maintain police officers' satisfaction with their work or face the possibility of high worker turnover. Wilson's avenues toward satisfaction include good

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21. Ibid.

22. A. Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969).

23. J. W. Sterling, Changes in Role Concepts of Police Officers (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1972).

salaries, pensions, opportunity for leaves, and unionization.24/ Igleberger (1974), also a police administrator, states that public recognition is critical in police job satisfaction and that, lacking this recognition, police officers today have low morale.25/

Six published studies deal in some way with the level of job satisfaction among police and the conditions which lead to or flow from different levels of satisfaction.

One study in New York City, which examined recruit officers' perceptions of intrinsic satisfactions in police work, found that close to half of the recruits believed that the satisfactions of police work outweighed its headaches. Conversely, somewhat more than half believed that those who anticipated personal satisfaction from policing were "due for a rude awakening." In addition, it found that a large majority of police officers saw the primary rewards of law enforcement as salary or benefits.26/

Skolnick (1966) reported that 61 percent of a sample of Oakland officers liked police work very much, 31 percent liked it fairly well, and only 8 percent were indifferent or negative toward policing. Skolnick also reported that enjoyment of police work increased with education and with having close friends in the department; new officers liked police work more than veterans; upward aspirers were more positive about policing than non-aspirers; and officers who enjoyed police work were more likely to say policing had high prestige than were those who were indifferent to or disliked police work. These findings of decreased satisfaction with experience and the relationship between satisfaction and perceived prestige are consistent with findings of Niederhoffer (1969) and McNamara (1967). But in general the level of satisfaction among Skolnick's respondents is much greater than that predicted by Niederhoffer and that found in McNamara's sample.27/ A 1967 study reported findings on job satisfaction among a sample of 204 police officers in selected areas of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. The officers interviewed had many complaints. Most were unhappy about salaries and opportunities for promotion, although most were satisfied with their supervisors. Whites usually were more satisfied than blacks, and a substantial number (17 percent of whites and 31 percent of blacks) saw nothing good about police work.

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24. O. W. Wilson, Police Administration.

25. R. Igleberger, "Police/Yesterday and Today," Public Management 56, July 1974.

26. J. H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work: Recruits' Backgrounds and Training," in D. J. Bordua, ed., The Police: Six Sociological Essays (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967).

27. J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial; A. Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield; J. H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work."

There was considerable variation in dissatisfaction across cities but the factors influencing this variation were not identified. The small size of the sample would have made such an assessment hazardous in any event.28/

In 1972, Sterling published findings from a longitudinal study of police officers' changing definitions of their roles. On three separate occasions the author interviewed the same respondents in four cities--Cincinnati, Baltimore, Columbus, and Indianapolis. The interviews occurred first with new recruits, then at the end of training, and finally after 18 months of patrol experience. Two questions were asked: one concerned job satisfaction with policing as compared with other jobs, and the other asked whether respondents would become police officers if they could start their careers again. The respondents generally maintained high satisfaction with police work throughout the course of the study. After 18 months in the department, 95 percent were fairly well or very well satisfied with policing, and 96 percent said they would choose police work again if they had the opportunity. However, at the end of 18 months, there was a reduction in the proportion of "very well satisfied" of about 13 percent, after a peak at the end of training. There was also a reduction of 10 percent in those who would definitely choose policing again.29/ The overall high level of satisfaction parallels Skolnick's findings, but is at variance with those of Reiss and McNamara.

The most recent data on police job satisfaction were reported in 1974. About 40 non-randomly selected police officers working in ghetto areas in each of 13 major cities responded to queries concerned with eight aspects of police work. These officers expressed greatest satisfaction with their supervisors and co-workers and least satisfaction with job dangers and citizen respect. Blacks were about as satisfied as whites with police work, but this might not have been the case if the survey had included whites working in urban areas other than ghettos.30/

While Reiss's and McNamara's respondents are substantially less satisfied with their work than workers in general, the Sterling, Rossi, and Skolnick subjects are not less satisfied. Unfortunately, the usefulness of these findings is lessened by differing questions, sampling problems, and the absence of comparability. Studies did not examine how features of police officers' personal histories, work situations, and performance affect or are affected by officers' job evaluations. Systematic study of police job satisfaction has hardly begun: Its effects on police behavior remain a matter of speculation.

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28. A.J. Reiss, Jr., "Career Orientations, Job Satisfaction and Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems," Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, Section 2, Volume 2, Field Surveys III (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

29. J.W. Sterling, Changes in Role Concepts of Police Officers.

30. P. Rossi, R.A. Berk, and B.K. Eidson, The Roots of Urban Discontent: Public Policy, Municipal Institutions and the Ghetto (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).

Speculating that it would indeed produce positive outcomes, the DPD had as its third goal of the HRD project to increase the sense of job satisfaction on the part of sworn personnel. This goal is related to the first one in that the DPD chief believed that it is not efficient to recruit different and more professional types of people unless they are sufficiently satisfied with their occupation to remain committed to policing. "Satisfaction" was considered to be measured by attitudes toward the nature of the work, salaries, promotion opportunities, the quality of supervisors, and the way in which the department was administered.

The evaluation seeks to measure the extent of change in job satisfaction in the DPD and to determine the factors influencing police job satisfaction. Although evaluation staff also planned to analyze the relationship between job satisfaction and performance by examining behavior and attitude changes, they abandoned the idea because there were no measurable changes in either.

DECENTRALIZATION

The DPD's second major program to improve police services was to decentralize its organization and make it less bureaucratic. The plan, which was in some respects similar to team policing, was to reduce substantially the number of middle-range management positions, transferring most of the administrative decisionmaking to dstrict levels and decentralizing most of the service decisions to satellite substations. The satellite units were to be made up of teams of generalist/specialist police officers who would plan programs in response to local community needs. Those changes were to serve two basic purposes: to increase efficiency through eliminating supposedly unnecessary levels of bureaucracy, and to increase sensitivity to local (especially minority) community problems, needs, life styles, and resources.

This planned reorganization of the Dallas Police Department can be considered a change from a bureaucratic model to a human relations organization model. These models are idealized constructs; they help us to understand the central tendencies of the Dallas Police Department as it existed in 1971 and the proposed modifications described in the Five-Year Plan.

The characteristics of the bureaucratic organization were first described by Weber (1947) and subsequently further defined by authors like Blau (1956), Etzioni (1964), and Downs (1967). The essential characteristics of the bureaucratic organization are: a clear-cut division of labor; organization of offices based on the principle of hierarchical administrative control; operations governed by explicit rules and regulations; conduct of office based officially on rational, formal impersonality; employment and promotions based on technical merit; and emphasis on organizational rather than individual efficiency.31/

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31. P.M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), 28-31. See also A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967); Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Talcott Parsons, ed., A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, tr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 329-30.

The human relations school of organization developed in reaction to the bureaucratic school and was based on research such as the Hawthorne studies. It posited that the level of production is set by social norms, that noneconomic rewards and sanctions significantly affect production, and that workers respond, not as individuals, but as members of a group. It emphasized the importance of informal leadership.32/

Police departments traditionally have been described as bureaucratic organizations and their quasi-military structure supported this assertion. The effort to modernize and professionalize the police in the period from 1920 to 1950 strengthened the extent to which police departments were classically bureaucratic in form. The move during this period was away from district or ward control of police units and personnel to the centralization of bureaus such as patrol, detectives, and vice.

At least two developments have brought the wisdom of such centralization under scrutiny. The first was the increasing alienation of the police from citizens. There was a growing feeling in policing that centralization could not produce the desired results of increased efficiency and reduced corruption and that, instead, it removed the police too far from the communities they served.

Secondly, there emerged the idea that the police were developing occupationally and perhaps could be categorized as semi-professionals similar to teachers and social workers. This idea grew from the increasing awareness of the large amounts of discretion that a police officer uses and the relative unavailability of supervision for an officer in the field.

These two developments led to a goal of an organizational structure that would be responsive to local communities within a city and which would respond to the operational reality that police do use extensive discretion and are not constantly supervised in the performance of their duties. The human relations model of organization, with its emphasis on informal leadership, collegial control, and group norms, seemed an attractive alternative.

Many social scientists have discussed the issue of semi-professionals or professionals operating out of a bureaucracy. One paper on the subject discusses a concept of "street level bureaucratics" in which "street level bureaucrats are constrained but not directed in their work, and are thus relatively free to develop mechanisms to cope with their jobs."33/ These

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32. Etzioni, Modern Organizations, 34-36.

33. R. Weatherly and M. Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Social Education Reform in Massachusetts." Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1976. See also E.C. Hughes, Men and Their Work (New York: The Free Press, 1958); R.L. Simpson and I.H. Simpson, "Women and Bureaucracy in the Semi-Professions," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., The Semi-Professions and Their Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1969); N. Toren, "Semi-Professionalism and Social Work: A Theoretical Perspective," in Etzioni, ed., The Semi-Professions and Their Organization; H.L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" American Journal of Sociology 70, September 1960, 33-50.

mechanisms, often innovative in both a positive and a negative sense, are the performance accommodations which service workers make in adjusting to organizational limitations and restraints and the public demands.

In all of these discussions the issues raised deal with maintaining organizational accountability in situations where workers deliver services that cannot be made standard and in circumstances in which great discretion is used and supervision is unavailable.

The Dallas proposal recognized these organizational and service realities by suggesting that accountability cannot be maintained in police services through supervision alone, but must be managed through mechanisms such as internal socialization, peer control, and participative decision-making.

CONCLUSION

The DPD project was a major effort to change policing by changing attitudes and behavior of personnel. The attempt was to recruit and retain different kinds of people, to socialize them differently, to provide them with enriched training and job circumstances, to provide effective support systems for them, and to provide an organizational context within which they could work productively and with accountability.

CHAPTER 2

THE DALLAS PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION

The Dallas proposal was a complex package of personnel, structural, and strategic reforms. The emphasis was on recruiting officers with backgrounds different from those of officers already in the DPD. They were to be socialized differently. Supervisory patterns were to be altered in recognition of the professional status and internalized norms of the officers. Patrol or field services would be emphasized, and all police officers (detectives, juvenile, vice) would be patrol officers. All would have the option of adding specialties, e.g., investigations, juvenile, conflict management, and so forth. Any patrol officer could eventually earn the equivalent of a captain's salary, conditional upon attaining these specialties. The organization would be radically flattened (the number of ranks reduced) and decentralized. All services except a few specialized ones--e.g., homicide investigations--would be decentralized to a district level. Drastic alterations would be made in the training program. A special research and educational relationship would be developed with Southern Methodist University (SMU). Ultimately, university education would supplant most police academy training.

In sum, three clusters of programs were to exist: the Human Resource Development Program (HRD), the Generalist/Specialist Program, and the Decentralization Team Policing Program. These three programs were to change police street performance and effectiveness radically. Although the changes would be phased by district, the plan eventually would be implemented on a departmentwide basis. These were the basic elements of the Five-Year Plan as it related to organizational change and human resource development, but they were not the only programs the department was to attempt between 1970 and 1976. During this period, the DPD received a share of a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Impact Cities grant, Police Foundation monies, Traffic Safety funds, and individual LEAA bloc grants totaling approximately $15 million for the five years. (LEAA and Traffic Safety money was granted primarily for operational and technical projects.) In the spring of 1973, there were at least 20 separate projects funded in the department in addition to those having to do with organizational and personnel changes.

The following discussion is a general description of the Dallas programs. Persons interested in project details, guidelines for implementation, and more detailed program results should contact the Dallas Police Department.

OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS

ORGANIZATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION

Although the Police Foundation did not fund the decentralization program in Dallas directly, it was this project for which many of the foundation-funded efforts were to provide support. Decentralization had been one

of the ideas the chief discussed with the foundation early in 1971. As late as July and August 1972 he and his command staff were still working to develop the operational details of the program. Because it was viewed as a key element of the chief's plans, the foundation was to provide resources for its evaluation.

The DPD decided that decentralization would be conducted gradually, with only one function at a time being moved to a district station, and agreed that one district would be decentralized and would function long enough to permit evaluation before the reorganization was extended to the other four districts. The Southeast district, predominantly black in population and commanded by the only black administrator in the department, was selected as the test site.

The schedule for decentralization was as follows:

October 1, 1972	Transfer of 14 investigators
December 1, 1972	Transfer of tactical officers
March 1, 1973	Transfer of selected youth functions (10 investigators to handle arrested juveniles and handle juvenile-related complaints)
March 1, 1973	Transfer of additional investigators to handle follow-up investigations of deaths, rape, robbery, burglary, assaults, and all crime scene searches
March 1, 1973	Transfer of traffic personnel to handle selected traffic enforcement problems
July 1, 1973	Entire line force at Southeast to begin functioning in teams using the "generalist/specialist attitude "

Following two weeks of special training, 14 criminal investigation division (CID) officers were transferred to the Southeast district on Monday, October 2, 1972. In January of 1973, 25 tactical officers were transferred to Southeast.

An attorney and an operations analyst were working in Southeast by June 1973, and by October the intelligence liaison officer also was transferred there from the central intelligence division.

This was all of the decentralization plan accomplished by fall 1973.

On September 27, 1973, two weeks before the chief announced his resignation, the command staff decided to recentralize the 25 tactical officers who had been transferred to Southeast in January 1973.

Since that time, the transfer of youth functions has been delayed indefinitely. The transfers of traffic and community relations functions were never made, and the planned expansion of the jail function at Southeast never took place. Decentralization of investigators has occurred in all five district stations. During 1975-1976, tactical units worked out of the district stations while still reporting to a central commander. In the fall of 1976, these and additional tactical officers were to have been reclassified as investigators and transferred to the districts where they would have the responsibility for a broader range of follow-up investigations. They were to be assigned to the patrol division under the command of the district chief. In addition, investigators of crimes against property were to be transferred from the centralized CID to the districts where they would handle all property crimes except auto thefts and check forgeries. The investigation of crimes against persons is to remain centralized.

INTELLIGENCE LIAISON

Chief Dyson and others on his staff had been aware of the lack of communication between patrol officers in the field and the centralized detectives and investigators. They believed that the patrol people could be important sources of information for investigators and that decentralization would improve communication between patrol and investigation. At the same time, they recognized that this could hinder communication between investigators and the centralized intelligence division. To ensure the flow of information between field-based investigators and intelligence personnel, the department proposed the intelligence liaison project, which was approved and funded by the foundation. The program, which began in 1973, was a relatively simple one. Five patrol officers, one from each of the district stations, were selected to serve as liaison officers between the intelligence division and their patrol divisions. An extensive screening process was developed for the selection of these officers to ensure that they were hardworking, suitable for intelligence assignments, and accepted in their own divisions.

These officers put information collected in the field into bulletins and distributed them at the district stations. Patrol officers were given credit on the bulletin for having provided the information in the hope that this would encourage patrol participation and give the patrol officer an increased sense of involvement in the investigative process. After six months of operation, the unit had published thousands of these bulletins and there was a growing concern that sheer volume might result in patrol officers ignoring them.

By early 1972 the director of intelligence, who designed and managed the liaison program, had begun to explore the possibility of storing the information on a computer. He decided to do so, and obtained an additional PF grant to accomplish it. By June 1972, the Known Offender Identification System (KOIDS) was established. This is a computerized intelligence data system, recording information on target suspects, as supplied to the intelligence liaison section by patrol investigative units and other information sources such as informants or the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

With the introduction of the computer, it was decided to experiment with the use of an intelligence analyst at the district stations. The first analyst was trained for the Southeast district, where pilot decentralization was to occur. In October 1973, analysts were assigned to all the district stations.

In April 1975, foundation funding for the project ended. The project now consists of a detective, a research specialist, a computer operator, and a secretary. This unit has been relocated within the administrative section of the intelligence division. The early delays of decentralization changed the focus of the intended role of the liaison officer. The unit served as a liaison between patrol and intelligence, but was not needed in 1973 as a link between investigators and intelligence.

The Police Foundation evaluation staff continued, through the summer of 1976, to collect data on those parts of the liaison program that had become operational--the Liaison Officer program and the KOIDS system.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

MINORITY RECRUITING

Before developing the Five-Year Plan, the chief had decided the department should contain the same percentage of minority officers as there were minority citizens in the community; thus, by 1977 there would have to be 500 officers from minority groups, constituting 25 percent of sworn personnel. In May 1971, when the Minority Recruiting Program began, there were 48 minority officers in the department.

Several strategies for attracting and hiring minorities were proposed within several months. The first was a program directed at black colleges and implemented by the staff of the personnel division. The plan was to enroll police recruiters as full-time students in area colleges which had substantial numbers of black students.

As the Office of Program Assistance (OPA) staff became involved in planning for minority recruiting, they recognized that the department's educational requirements would be a factor in recruiting. By October 1972, recruits were required to have 45 college hours; consequently, minority recruiting would have to focus more effectively on college students. It also became clear that any sustained success with minorities would require the projection of a positive image of police service to the minority communities. When a survey conducted for the department indicated that this image did not exist, it was decided that recruiting strategies were to be complemented by media campaigns designed to make a police career more attractive to minorities.

Media development continued through 1972 and 1973. Black radio stations, newspapers, and a local television station with a large black audience used specially developed materials, and efforts were made to determine which applicants had responded to media messages. The Mexican-American community seemed particularly difficult to reach, perhaps because

in Dallas the Mexican-American communities are less well-defined geographically and less cohesive than the black communities. To overcome this problem the personnel division designed a mail-out recruiting brochure especially for Mexican-Americans and developed and used a mailing list.

The Center for Police Development, which had been established at Southern Methodist University and funded by the Police Foundation, helped identify prime areas for minority recruiting and developed a proposal for a coordinated media program. The staff created materials both for local use and for cities to which recruiters would travel for campus and motel-based recruiting, and developed material on the minority summer interns which was used by the Dallas media and by the students' hometown and college newspapers.

College Cluster Recruiting

When the program of enrolling police officers in colleges appeared to be too expensive, it was decided to send recruiting teams to colleges and universities with substantial minority enrollments in a five-state area. Efforts were made to visit these campuses during the second part of each semester.

Motel-based Recruiting

"Motel-based recruiting" was distinct, but not always separate, from college cluster recruiting. Local media announced the presence of a DPD recruiting team which would conduct interviews at a motel. The department tried this approach in several towns, but by 1974 decided that only in San Antonio did this approach result in enough applicants to make it worthwhile.

Recruiting Methods Improvements

In 1972, a three-day course presenting interviewing techniques and some self-awareness training was prepared for recruiters and background investigators.

In 1974, the entire personnel division enrolled in a Dale Carnegie Sales Training course where the emphasis was on public relations and on understanding the job in order to promote it better.

There were other ways in which traditional recruiting practices were reexamined. Recruiters were trained also to do background checks so that this information could be developed without a second trip to the applicant's area. In cities where recruiting campaigns were conducted, provisions were made for having physical exams done locally. This prescreening reduced the number of trips for both recruiters and applicants.

The DPD recognized that potential employees were being lost as a consequence of the many weeks required to complete the entrance tests, conduct background checks, and process the applications. By March 1975, the entire hiring process had been reduced to a period of 30 days for

minority applicants, but even this much delay presents a problem in trying to hire college-educated minorities for whom there is a high demand in almost all areas of government and business.

In addition to these efforts, in the spring of 1975 the department arranged with some major Dallas firms that they would notify the DPD of minorities meeting police standards who either applied to businesses having no openings or lost their low-seniority jobs during layoffs. Recruiters made efforts to contact these individuals.

Summer Interns

During the summer of 1972 the first internship program was implemented. The purpose of the program was to involve qualified minorities in department activities for one summer with the expectation that this experience would encourage them to seek a career in policing.

In planning the intern program, OPA undertook a review of all para-police programs to determine what role they could play in accomplishing the Five-Year Plan. These programs included the cadet, public service officer, intern, and conditional hire police officer programs and a proposed technical service officer program. OPA staff decided that the intern and cadet programs would serve as feeder routes to sworn positions for minorities; consequently, applicants for these programs would have to meet the same standards as police recruits.

The last year for Police Foundation funding of the intern program was 1973; when the city did not choose to pick up the project, it was incorporated with the cadet program.

Cadet Program

The cadet program was not originally intended as a vehicle for minority recruiting, but rather as a means of attracting to policing students (primarily white until 1973) who had not yet fulfilled the educational requirements. Students still in college who are interested in policing are paid for 20 hours of work a week in the department; these hours include instruction time at the academy as well as on-the-job training. Students who meet the age and educational requirements can choose to leave the cadet program and become sworn officers if they still meet all the entrance requirements, or they can choose to remain in the cadet program until they complete their college education. With the growing awareness of how difficult it was for the department to compete in the job market for minorities with 45 hours of college education, greater attention was given to the cadet program as a means of recruiting minorities.

Foundation funding for minority recruiting extended from October 1, 1973, to March 31, 1975. During that period, the department reports having hired about 90 minority officers.

Disciplinary Project/Psychological Services Unit

During 1973, persons working in the Office of Program Assistance began to perceive the need for an alternative to the traditional methods

of disciplining officers. They believed that the use of suspension time was, at best, punishment which resulted in the loss of expensive work hours to the department and that it gave no good evidence of correcting the problems prompting its use. They proposed a "behavioral cause" strategy, an effort to determine, through testing and counseling, the reason for the officer's inappropriate behavior. If the investigation suggested that counseling or transfer rather than (or in addition to) suspension could be useful, this option would be available to the chief as a disciplinary alternative. The evaluation of the project was to be based on a determination of whether the behavior of officers involved improved after psychological assessment and counseling.

Although the project was conceived early in 1973, little was done to develop it until early 1974.

In 1974, after the elimination of the Office of Program Assistance, a special unit within the personnel division was created to manage the disciplinary project as well as the entrance criteria validation project and the medical selection techniques project.

The psychological services unit continues to function, and has been fairly well integrated into the departmental structure. The unit has gathered data that will be used to evaluate changes in attitudes and behavior of the people who have participated in the counseling programs during the past two years.

Systematization of Department Records and the Automated Vitae

These projects developed out of some of the DPD planning done in 1973 for a personnel information system that would allow the department to match jobs and the individuals with the skills to perform them. The inability to accomplish much in this area was attributed initially to the recalcitrance of the personnel division; however appropriate this interpretation may have been, there also was the growing realization that personnel records were in such a state that the rapid retrieval of the data necessary for the personnel information system was impossible. Subsequently the department requested funds to make the records systematic. This project merely involved transferring personnel records from filing cabinets to an arrangement of open shelves purchased with grant money. The records of terminated sworn and civilian personnel were separated from those of active personnel, and grant money was used to purchase microfilm reader-printer for copying inactive files. Active files were color-coded alphabetically to speed jacket location and help prevent and locate misfiling. Because open shelving made the files more accessible, a security hinge was purchased for the file room.

Once the OPA staff began to examine personnel jackets, it was increasingly apparent that even the improved filing system would be inadequate for the department's needs. Some of the desired information was missing from the jackets. More critically, with even the best of data and the most efficient filing system, manual retrieval of the kinds of data desired for new management programs always would be prohibitively

slow and expensive. Plans were begun for automating the records, and this project was identified as automated vitae.

Two types of data were to be collected and stored: (1) information that routinely would be needed for the daily personnel actions to be taken by the personnel division and/or department management, and (2) information that might be required only on occasion for a special project or by another government agency. The first would be available at the terminals through an on-line system, and the latter would be kept in a tape storage system.

By September 1974, the project director had determined the nature of the system and had developed a questionnaire to be administered to gather the information division heads had identified as necessary.

VALIDATION OF ENTRANCE CRITERIA: CONCURRENT, PREDICTIVE, AND BIO-DATA VALIDATION

Although this project was a data collection project rather than an action program, it has been considered the most significant of the projects funded by the foundation in Dallas. It was one which would be of the greatest general usefulness, because it would evaluate the relationship between several entrance criteria and performance. The results would provide guidelines for other departments in their attempts to comply with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations.

The primary emphasis was on psychological criteria, and several test batteries were chosen to be compared and validated. These tests ultimately included:

Multiphasic Personality Inventory
California Psychological Inventory
Thematic Apperception Test
Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal
Firo - B
Strong Vocational Interest Blank
Interpersonal Checklist

For the purpose of determining predictive validity, the plan was to administer these tests to all entering recruits for a period of several months. After these recruits had been in the department for at least a year, data would be collected on their performance and compared with their scores on the psychological tests.

Concurrent validity would be established by giving the same tests to a group of department veterans and then comparing their scores with their performance data.

Because the goal was to determine the validity of already established psychological batteries, the project was not one that involved major test construction efforts. From a measurement standpoint, the most difficult part of the project was to determine indices of police performance,

inasmuch as there are no established scales or sets of such data which are generally considered acceptable.

The bio-data validation project was designed to validate background information used in selecting recruits. It finally was combined with the concurrent and predictive validation studies, and it was decided to administer extensive biographical data forms to recruits and veterans when the psychological batteries were given. Whatever performance measures were chosen to validate psychological criteria also would be used to validate background variables.1/ The administration of the personality batteries and biographical data forms to the veteran personnel began in the fall of 1974 and, for both recruits and veterans, testing was completed by June 1975.

MEDICAL SELECTION TECHNIQUES

By 1972, height and weight standards as entrance criteria for policing were being widely challenged as discriminatory. Aware that height and weight requirements had not been validated, the Dallas Police Department was interested in attempting to do so and, at the same time, to explore the relationship of performance to more sophisticated measures of physical fitness. The Center for Police Development at Southern Methodist University undertook a study of height and weight standards in 1973 and established a liaison with physical anthropologists at SMU who were interested in body measurements and performance.

The study began with a task force of sergeants and patrol officers who listed all physical activities in which a police officer might engage. This list was converted into a questionnaire with which 100 field personnel estimated the frequency of each activity. The four types of fitness most often required by police activity were determined to be: cardiovascular functioning; respiratory endurance; dynamic strength; and dynamic flexibility.

Measures for each of these dimensions were selected, and concurrent and predictive tests (similar in design to those for the psychological batteries) were constructed. In the case of the concurrent study, groups of high and low performers would be identified and their measures of physical fitness or agility taken to determine whether a statistical relationship existed between performance levels and physical measures. At the same time, norms on these dimensions would be established for the

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1. It had been assumed that the evaluation staff would use in its research whatever improved performance measures were developed for the validation project. The Checklist of Officer Performance (CLOP) was constructed and was used by department supervisors for one rating period. After that it was abandoned as the department's regular evaluation instrument in favor of a simplified scale. As a result, the evaluation had to rely on the traditional, more general, scoring of officer performance.

different racial and sexual groups making application. The goal was to determine the physical fitness level at which a person could enter and then, after physical training at the academy, reach the fitness level associated with high performance.

While the data were being gathered, temporary standards on these dimensions were set at the 25th percentile of the national adult population. Other studies suggested this level would predict good fitness development during academy training.

Ultimately, two predictive studies were designed, one longitudinal and one experimental. The longitudinal study consisted of physical fitness data collected at the time of a recruit's entry and of performance data collected approximately a year after the officer had been in the field.

The experimental predictive program involved 90 officers selected at random from a group of 300 volunteers. All were given extensive medical exams and the physical fitness tests. Forty-five of the officers were assigned to individually tailored programs intended to raise their physical fitness levels. The others were encouraged to maintain their normal habits. All were evaluated by their supervisors with the Checklist of Officer Performance at the beginning of the study, and were to be reevaluated at quarterly intervals for a year. In addition, data on sick time, injuries, preventable accidents, and complaints would be compared for both groups for periods before and after the experiment.

The data from all of these studies was to be used to determine the significance of physical fitness for performance and the fitness levels at which people could enter the academy and reach standards for good performance by the time of graduation.

There was another large-scale fitness program, not funded by the foundation, in which the Dallas Police Department was invited to participate. Run by the Aerobics Research Institute of Dallas with a grant from LEAA through the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the effectiveness of different fitness training programs was to be evaluated. For its participation, the Dallas Police Department would receive a copy of the data and some expensive training equipment. Again, the number of volunteers was impressive.

Other Personnel Projects

Other projects developed in the personnel division as offshoots of the funded programs. One of these was a task analysis of various department jobs which was designed to help determine physical and mental characteristics appropriate for different jobs.

Out of experiences with minority recruiting came the documentation and then streamlining of the procedures for processing applicants.

Consultants and sworn staff also spent considerable time developing models of career paths for sworn personnel and studying the assessment

center method of evaluation and promotion. These studies took place in 1974 and 1975, long after the demise of OPA/MSB which originally had promoted these ideas. Although these ideas have not yet been implemented, they have been explored seriously and there now exists some in-house expertise about them.

Training Division Programs

The training component of Project Pride attempted to address both long-range and short-range goals, none of which were well articulated in the initial proposal. Part of the foundation funding of Pride was conditional, based on a fuller specification of the training component. The department, working with the Center for Police Development at SMU designed a suitable list of short-range programs for academy improvement and it was understood that the department-university relationship would lead to the articulation and implementation of the long-range goals.

In fact, the chief's long-range goal was to remove the department from the training function altogether, on the grounds that it absorbed too many of the department's personnel resources. The chief believed an increase in the educational requirements for applicants would eliminate the department's need to offer what he considered essentially remedial behavioral science courses. In addition, he believed that a curriculum could be developed for a local college or colleges which would replace most of the training academy's curriculum; whether the chief expected to retain a departmental capacity for specialized and in-service training was not clear. The goal was not well articulated beyond the level of, "The department should get out of the training business." As discussed earlier, part of the problem resulted from the failure to distinguish between the department's educational and training needs. It was unclear whether external institutions were expected ultimately to fulfill one or both of these functions.

Although this was the chief's major goal with respect to the academy, it was recognized that it would be some time before the department could make this transition. The experimental decentralization program was to provide information as to the types of education and training needed to support team policing and generalist/specialist career model.

In addition, SMU was to conduct an extensive task analysis to provide detailed information about the duties for which a police officer should be prepared. Both of these efforts would require at least two years, plus the time required for curriculum development and negotiations with local campuses.

In the meantime, department administrators believed that the existing academy program should be upgraded to support the other aspects of the human resources development effort. It was an assortment of these "short-range" efforts that the foundation funded for the academy.

Summaries of the Projects

1. Behavioral Science Cluster

Initially, the focus of this project was on interpersonal skills; the goal was to increase the officer's self-control and understanding of citizens. Although the project was not well defined, the main interest seemed to be in improving the sociological and psychological aspects of the training curriculum. An examination of these areas produced the recognition that a total revision of the curriculum was needed. The new curriculum tried to avoid the unnecessary repitition of topics that had occurred under the old curriculum format, in which isolated subjects were taught by individual instructors whose materials were uncoordinated.

2. Learning Coordinators Advanced-on-the-Job-Training

This was a program in support of the new curriculum project. Training instructors attended two short courses prepared by Southern Methodist University in which the emphasis was on training techniques, assessment, and curriculum development.

3. Field Training Officer Development Project

Field Training Officers (FTOs) had long been recognized as highly instrumental in shaping the young rookies assigned them. "Tell me who the man's FTO was and I'll tell you what kind of officer he is," apparently was a common statement. Nevertheless, there were no standard selection procedures and no training for FTOs and there was no coordination between academy and field training. Rookies frequently were confronted with FTOs who advised them to forget everything they had learned at the academy. The FTO project was intended to develop a training program for FTOs that would emphasize the FTO's role as another instructor of the young officer. The training curriculum emphasized this role and provided instruction in training techniques. A curriculum was developed for FTOs to use with rookies so that there would be a standard field presentation; this resulted in the development and publication of instructional manuals for FTOs and for trainers of FTOs. In addition, FTOs were instructed in performance evaluation. It was recognized that new training programs offered the recruit in the academy could not have maximum impact if the rookie's FTO was unfamiliar with the training. Consequently, any new programs, such as crisis intervention training, also were presented to FTOs.

In addition, the project director worked to increase the status of the FTO. A uniform designation was created and approved, and a pay increase of $25 a month was proposed and approved.

Additionally, a proposal for selection of FTOs was made by the project director and approved by the administration.

4. Law and Police Discretion

This project was slow to develop and resulted in two different efforts. To assess instruction in the law, the department hired an attorney as a participant in a recruit class. His observations and recommendations resulted in an updated reading list and a slide presentation to be used in the classroom.

The major part of the project turned out to be the production of a film on the proper handling of a rape situation. It was the academy's first experience with the development of so sophisticated a training aid and it was generally considered to be effective and of professional quality. The film is used with all recruits. In addition, special instruction in rape crisis management was prepared for female recruits in the belief that the new female patrol officers might be especially effective in this area.

5. Minority Awareness and Human Relations

These were programs intended to improve the interpersonal skills of police officers.

The Minority Awareness project director worked with department personnel, a consultant, and members of the black community to outline training needs in this area. The result was additional time being given in the recruit curriculum to the sociology and psychology of minority communities. A handbook was to be developed for departmentwide use.

6. Crisis Intervention Training

The goal of this project was to devise a training program that would prepare officers to handle more effectively those calls involving conflict situations. The goal was to reduce the rate of callback to these situations and to increase the officers' safety. From a group of fifty volunteers, ten officers were selected, on the basis of their performance records, to participate in the development of a training program. After trips to other cities with similar programs, they participated with the project director and training consultants in a curriculum design for which they were the first students. The training program was very much an experimental one in which immediate feedback from the participants was used by the instructors (civilian professionals) to modify the curriculum and instructional techniques.

After five weeks of classroom work, the ten officers were assigned together to one watch at one district station. For a three-month period they tested their classroom information in field situations; data collected (statistical data, interviews with citizens, and the officers' perceptions) were used to modify the curriculum, which then was put into a format for both recruit and in-service training.

It is interesting that when the ten officers returned to their original assignments, they became doubtful about their ability to maintain their newly acquired behaviors in crisis situations. Supervisors and other officers, unexposed to the training, could not be expected to be supportive. Now that FTOs and several recruit and in-service classes have received the training, this is less a problem. The final product of this project was a detailed manual for crisis intervention situations.

7. Physical Fitness and Prevention of Assaults

Originally two projects, these were designed and coordinated by one police officer. The obvious purpose of the assault prevention project was

to reduce the injuries to officers. The physical fitness project was also to accomplish this end and was to result in fitness criteria to be applied to entering recruits and later to the rest of the department.

Assault reports for an 18-month period were studied to determine the types of training that should be developed. Academy instructors received training in physical defense skills which they were to teach to recruits. The project director worked with the supervisor of the firing range and the head of the crisis intervention project to develop safety training to be used in their instructional programs.

The project director studied physical fitness programs in other departments and worked with the department's medical selection project to identify the physical activities officers are required to perform. Data from five academy classes were analyzed to determine the fitness levels with which recruits could enter and still achieve the required levels of fitness after 16 weeks in the academy. Exercise equipment was purchased with part of the project funds and a small but well-equipped gym was established at the academy. Recruits also were instructed in nutrition and in routines for maintaining fitness.

Recruit training manuals and video aids were developed.

In February 1975, the project director participated with officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety and the San Antonio Police Department in a presentation of a 40-hour program of defensive tactics and physical fitness for training instructors in Texas and Oklahoma.

While there is little doubt that the recruits now receive greatly improved fitness training, it has been interesting to observe the spin-offs of the program. Most of the training staff joined recruits in the program and, within a few months, had themselves achieved the appearance of greater fitness. In addition, there seems to have been a growing awareness of fitness in the department: when a fitness project was funded by LEAA through the IACP, more officers than could be accepted volunteered to participate in the program of the Aerobics Research Institute.

8. Firearms Control and Safety

The financial heart of this program was the reconstruction and modernization of the firing range to provide for training in realistically simulated field situations. Improvements included turning targets, a pursuit target system, a Hogan's Alley target system, and a Shoot or No Shoot Pitco Reaction Trainer. A control tower and more firing lanes were added. In designing the improvements, the project director (the training range supervisor) studied firing ranges in other departments and in the process collected information for use in revising the training program.

9. Other Academy Developments

Although not discussed as aspects of particular projects, other capacities have been developed at the academy as a result of foundation

funding. Before specific projects were developed, the training consultant focused on instructional techniques emphasizing individual training and media aids. Equipment for video taping and cassette playback was purchased and academy personnel were trained in its technical use and instructional capacity. The academy has since produced some of its own filmed material and has a capacity to develop in-service training presentations that could be made available to district stations, perhaps for use during roll call. There exists a potential for a variety of sophisticated approaches to training needs.

In addition, the academy library was expanded as a result of funding.

THE CENTER FOR POLICE DEVELOPMENT

The chief's long-range plan to relocate the training function to Dallas colleges and universities seemed, in 1971, to coincide with the desire of the foundation program staff to nurture relationships between police departments and universities. At that time the goal of some of the foundation's program staff was to open police agencies to a wider range of knowledge, interest, and capacities and to improve their capability to make effective use of "outside" talent. In furtherance of this general thrust it seemed useful to make available to police departments the expertise that might be found in universities. In early discussions between the chief and the foundation, it was agreed that such a relationship would be part of any program in Dallas and the Center for Police Development was created at Southern Methodist University.

The relationship formally began in early 1972 and was terminated in August 1973. The following is a list of reports produced by the Center. Those marked with an asterisk indicate major research projects requiring the generation of substantial bodies of new data or the manual collection of large amounts of information from department records.

* The Development and Evaluation of a Behavioral Criterion of Radio Patrolman Job Performance.

  Report on the Jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace in Texas.

* Job Descriptions for 46 Selected Jobs Within the Dallas Police Department.

  Women in Policing: A Preliminary Opinion Survey.

* Task Description and Worker Trait Ratings for the Job of Radio Patrolman, Dallas Police Department.

* An Analysis of Physical and Educational Requirements.

  Development of a Social Service Referral System for the Dallas Police Department.

  Analysis of City of Dallas and State of Texas Civil Service Regulations.

Minority Target Identification and Ranking.

* Minority Recruitment Phase II - An Attitudinal Analysis of the Dallas Market for Blacks.

Officer Liability Under the Civil Rights Act.

Report on Marihuana Usage in the United States and Texas.

* Report on Two Police Practices: High Speed Chase and Field Interrogation.

* Report on Police Shootings (September 8, 1972).

Report on Police Shootings (August 14, 1973).

These then were the programs funded by the Police Foundation. The methods of measuring and analyzing whether there were changes in the DPD in consequence of these projects, the data, and the findings, are presented in the chapters which follow.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

A goal of the evaluation was to assess the impact of the Human Resources Development (HRD) Program--to determine whether different police attitudes and behaviors developed over the period under consideration. If any such changes occurred, it was the further goal of the evaluation to assess whether they were attributable to the HRD program or to intervening historical or personal factors. The primary means of evaluation were a survey of the personnel of the DPD at two points in time, and collection of performance data from the department's personnel records. Together, the survey and performance data provide for the determination of whether attitudes, job performance, and attainment changed during the years of program implementation. This chapter describes the development and use of comparison analyses employed in the HRD-DPD evaluation.

THE HRD QUESTIONNAIRE

OVERVIEW

The Human Resources Development Questionnaire was the heart of the $700,000 evaluation of the Human Resources Development program of the Dallas Police Department. The questionnaire was administered as a panel survey, in 1973 and 1976, to assess the impact on police attitudes and performance of programs implemented in the intervening period. (The program variables were described at length in the previous chapter. They included definitions, and new criteria for performance. These were, in effect, the stimuli introduced into the system. This chapter will not discuss them further, except in describing the means for their evaluation.) The questionnaire provided life history, demographic data, and attitude information about the responding officers.

DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

The first HRD questionnaire (HRD_1) was developed by the foundation evaluation staff with the assistance of the DPD. Many of the questions in HRD_1 and HRD_2 were written originally for the DPD evaluation. Others were drawn from scales derived from, tested upon, and previously administered to other populations. These scales had published histories of high reliability and validity, and were especially well suited to assess the variables of concern to the evaluation effort.1/ Specifically, the survey included

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1. Sclaes used in HRD_1 and HRD_2 were: Berkowitz and Wolkon, "Forced Choice F"; Rosenberg, "Faith in People"; Schuman and Harding, "Forced Choice F"; Wrightsman, "Philosophy of Human Nature"; Rokeach, "Dogmatism"; Meresko, et al., "Rigidity of Attitudes Regarding Personal Habits"; Dejong, "Religiosity"; Martin and Westie, "Intolerance of Ambiguity"; Renfisch, "Rigidity"; Glock and Stark, "Dimensions of Religious Commitment"; Wesley, "Rigidity"; Dunnette, et al., "Dimensions of Job Satisfaction and Job Dissatisfaction"; Hall, "Degree of Professionalization."

information on the following sets of variables:

Family socialization conditions. Variables here included race, religion, ethnicity, parents' education and occupation, whether officer's family of origin lived in a rural or urban setting and whether they moved often, whether father was an entrepreneur or a salaried worker, and number of siblings.

Early adult experiences. These were conditions of theoretical interest, intervening between early family influences and young adult outcomes. They included as primary factors: influence of significant others such as kin, teachers, counselors, etc.; aspirations, both educational and occupational; military experience and early labor force experiences, especially the first job. Also important were such variables as quality of education (measured by a later independent staff assessment of the reported school attended), training other than high school or college, and officers' perceptions of social barriers experienced because of their race or ethnicity.

Values and attitudes. These items covered religious, sexual, political, job-related, and authoritarian values and concerns.

Occupational outcomes. These items included: identification of officers upwardly mobile within the police department; identification of those leaving the department and their reasons; the officer's "track" in the department; and the officer's perceptions of his role and his own career.

HRD_1 was pretested on 50 Dallas officers and revised for administration to the entire membership of the department. Between January and April 1973, time one or T_1 for the survey, 1,344 of a total of 1,768 Dallas officers completed the questionnaire. Questionnaires in which at least 70 percent of the items were completed were selected for analysis. Excluding all unidentifiable (unsigned) questionnaires this yielded a total N at T_1 of 1,134 (64 percent of the entire DPD membership in 1973).2/

The initial questionnaire (HRD_1) was revised for administration to recruit classes. Items dealing specifically with on-the-job issues were

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2. The ability to measure the impact of the HRD program was completely dependent upon the willingness of police officers to respond truthfully to a long series of questions about sensitive issues, and upon their willingness to sign their questionnaires. Identification of questionnaire respondents was essential in order to compare individual T_1 and T_2 responses and to match subjects' survey responses with their personnel records. Concern that the need for signed responses would significantly lower the rate of participation in this completely voluntary survey proved unwarranted. A parallel concern, that accuracy and truthfulness of responses might be jeopardized by the need for signatures, also seems to have been unfounded. (See reliability section below.)

eliminated because they did not apply to recruits. This revised version was then administered to 12 recruit classes between January 1973 and December 1975 (N=314). One-third of the classes completed the questionnaire during the first week of training; another third at the midpoint (eight weeks); and the rest during the last week of training. (This three-part split will facilitate an analysis of the impact of the academy experience on attitudes, a separate analysis which is not part of this report.)

In early 1976, a draft of the second HRD questionnaire (HRD_2) was prepared by the foundation evaluation staff and reviewed by all department administrators. It was administered to the entire department in April 1976 T_2 for the survey. The response rate was 93 percent; 1,814 questionnaires were completed. Of these, 882 were identified as officers who had completed the 1973 HRD_1. An additional 202 were officers who had completed questionnaires as recruits in the academy. Finally, all personnel who had resigned during the previous five years were surveyed in order to determine whether new recruitment and training programs had "paid off" by increasing the tenure of the kinds of personnel that the department desired.

The administration of the second HRD essentially completed the period of the formal evaluation. Some data collected proceeded after April (through September 1976), including personnel, complaint, and turnover data, but most of the post-HRD_2 period was spent getting all data into computer-analyzable form. Further, the evaluation staff updated its awareness of program development so that the history of the projects is current to September 1, 1976.

RELIABILITY

Instrument reliability was assessed in terms of the questionnaire's ability to pick up no change in responses over time in conceptual areas where logically there should be no changes. If such responses do not change over time, confidence is greatly increased that respondents approached the survey seriously, and that little error entered into the responses. Further, if the instrument were to reflect changes in items where theoretically change was expected over time, confidence in the instrument's reliability would be even greater. In other words, the instrument's reliability would be evidenced by high correlations across time within stable-across-time items, and less strong correlations within items such as attitude questions, which can change across time.

The T_1 - T_2 responses to nine questions were compared in three conceptually distinct areas: logically stable, demographic characteristics; questions of fact which had to be recalled (i.e., relied on memory); and attitudes.

The questions regarding stable demographic characteristics were:

Age _____

Sex: Male _____
Female _____

What is your ethnic background:

_____1. White/Caucasian
_____2. Black/Negro
_____3. Chicano/Mexican-American
_____4. Other (Please specify:_____)

How many children, including yourself, were there in your family?

_____ children

Questions of recalled fact were:

How old were you when you joined the department?_____
How old were you when you became interested in police work?_____

Questions of attitudes included agree/disagree scaled response to:

_____The Bible is God's word and all it says is true.
_____Religious truth is higher than any other form of truth.
_____I know God really exists and I have no doubt about it.

All items were identical in format at T_1 and T_2.

The first four questions dealt with demographic variables. Age, an interval-level variable, was compared at T_1 and T_2 by comparing the mean difference for individuals at the two times (corrected for a three-year administration time difference) and by computing a measure of association. The mean difference in response to the age item was .1646 years. The Pearson product-moment correlation was .979.3/

Sex, a nominal variable, was compared by the percentage agreement in response between T_1 and T_2 and by Phi, an association measure. The percent of agreement for males in T_1-T_2 was 99.75 percent, for females 76.92 percent. (There were only 13 women; a small coding error, even in one case, could account for this difference.) The Phi coefficient was .76.

Ethnicity responses were compared by percent of agreement from T_1 to T_2. For whites, the agreement was 99.48 percent, for blacks, 100 percent, and for Spanish, 100 percent. The contingency coefficient, the measure of association, was .81.

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3. The measures of association used (Pearson product-moment correlation, Phi, contingency coefficient) were determined by the characteristics of the response categories for each item, e.g., nominal vs. ordinal, dichotomous vs. scaled.

Family size responses were compared at T_1 and T_2 by the mean difference in reported family size at T_1 and T_2, and the Pearson product-moment correlation. Scores were a -.015 change in reported number of siblings, and a correlation of .934.

The second area of questions concerned the officer's recollection of the time he or she joined the police department and the time he or she first thought of going into police work. The correlation between the T_1 and T_2 recollections about the decision to join the department were stronger than the correlations between the recollections of when the person first thought of going into police work, although both were high. For the latter (the time the person thought of going into police work), the mean response difference was .17 years and the Pearson product-moment was .741. For the time the person recounted joining the department, the mean difference was -.0139 years and the Pearson .98.

The third question area had to do with attitudes. Religiosity was selected, as it was felt that among attitudes people generally hold, attitudes regarding religion would have the least probability of showing substantial shifts over the three-year period.

The first question dealt with the person's perception of the Bible. The mean T_1-T_2 score difference over time was -.1708 and the Pearson .690.

The second question dealt with religious truth and the mean T_1-T_2 score difference was .2342 and the Pearson .564.

The final question asked about belief in God. The mean T_1-T_2 score difference was -.1063 and the Pearson .621.

In sum, three categories of questions were analyzed. As expected, questions of demographic fact had the highest degree of T_1-T_2 correlation, questions of recall of past decisions had the next highest degree of correlation, and questions of attitudes had the lowest degree of correlation. All three categories of questions had high levels of T_1-T_2 correlation, evidence that little error entered into recorded responses, i.e., that the HRD questionnaire is reliable and accurately reflects true change across time.

PRESENTATION OF DATA

Most of the data in this report are presented as percentages; some are stated in terms of group means. Comparisons are made: (1) among different groups at the same point in time; (2) between the same groups at two points in time; and (3) within and among groups at two different points in time.

Tests of statistical significance are not presented in this report. A test of statistical significance essentially asks whether an observed difference among elements in a sample is likely a result of sampling error ("chance"), or not. A sample is a set of observations systematically drawn from a larger conceptual population and taken to be representative of that population. All of the data presented in this report are

reported for either entire theoretically defined populations (e.g., all officers who left the DPD 1971-1976), or self-selected samples (e.g., officers who completed 70 percent or more of HRD1). When entire populations are described, a query into the possible extent of sampling error, i.e., the use of tests of statistical significance, is meaningless. When self-selected samples are described, the assumptions of probability statistics cannot be satisfied--self-selection is not a known sampling technique. Therefore, again, the use of tests of statistical significance is meaningless.4/

Data in this report are presented in simple descriptive form. In those instances where tabled data suggest complex patterns, further analyses, controlling for relevant variables, are conducted. Factor analyses performed at Time 1 were replicated for Time 2 so that comparisions of structures and values could be made.

It should be pointed out that neither the survey data nor the performance data discussed below represent a complete enumeration of all DPD personnel in either 1973 or 1976. Both the absolute values and percentages are close estimates of the realities being measured. This means, for example, that the DPD may actually have promoted slightly more captains, or hired slightly more women--in absolute numbers--since 1973 than are represented in the survey. But given the sample sizes, we are confident that the comparisons of group percentages present an accurate assessment of the DPD.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

OVERVIEW

The measurement of police performance has been an acute problem for administrators, researchers, and evaluators. Although the same problems have plagued effectiveness studies in social work, psychotherapy, and education, the lack of agreement about the nature of basic police functions has exacerbated the problem in this area. The evaluators were aware of these problems from the beginning of the evaluation.

The original plans were to have observers ride with patrol officers, observe their performance, and record detailed information. Finally, expert judges, both police and nonpolice, were to rate the quality of this reported performance. Evaluation staff knew that this methodology would still be one step removed from the outcome of an officer's behavior, i.e., whether citizens really benefited by what took place. Rather, it would be an evaluation of process rather than outcome. An outcome evaluation was simply too expensive and methodologically too difficult to attempt. Chapter 2 describes the reasons for abandoning the observer approach. In lieu of observational data, the performance measures were constructed from existing personnel and internal affairs records.

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4. Denton E. Morrison and Henkel E. Ramon, eds., The Significance Test Controversy (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970).

DEVELOPMENT

Extensive data were collected from DPD Personnel and Internal Affairs files for those officers who completed an HRD questionnaire either at T_1 or during academy training. For officers completing the questionnaire early in 1973, performance data were coded for three time periods:

1. Six months preceding HRD_1
2. Six months following HRD_1
3. Six months preceding HRD_2

For officers who completed their first questionnaire in the academy, data were collected only for the period six months before HRD_2.

Performance data consisted of the following indices, broken down into two general categories.

Personnel Data

Grade in academy
Ever resigned from department
Supervisor ratings
Number of occasions of sick leave, each period
Total number of sick days, each period
Number of occasions when sick leave was adjacent to other types of leave, each period
Number of occasions of injury time, each period
Total number of injury days, each period
Number of occasions when injury time was adjacent to other types of leave, each period
Number of occasions of suspension time, each period
Total number of occasions of suspension time, each period
Number of occasions when suspension time was adjacent to other types of leave, each period
Incidents of injury to prisoners
Automobile accidents
Chargeable automobile accidents
Number of times weapon fired
Field training officer rating

Internal Affairs Data

Complaints: number, type, circumstances, characteristics of complaints, resolution
Commendations: number and source

PRESENTATION OF DATA

As with the questionnaire data, except where means are more appropriate, the performance measures are presented in terms of percentages within and among the various police groups.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

Among the many objectives of the Five-Year Plan and Project Pride, it is possible to identify four major categories of goals central to the Human Resources Development Program. These four categories of primary goals are the following:

Goal I: The recruitment, retention, and promotion of different types of people. Department administrators believed that police officers should be more representative of the community than had been true in the Dallas Police Department. They considered it desirable to recruit people who were more tolerant of cultural differences, were capable of managing discretion, and were oriented toward service delivery, and it followed that the supervisors of these officers should share the same orientations.

Goal II: The increased sense of officer satisfaction. This goal clearly is essential to the first; it is not efficient to recruit different types of people unless they are sufficiently satisfied with their occupation to remain in the police department. "Satisfaction" was considered to be indicated by attitudes toward: the nature of the work, salaries, promotion opportunities, the quality of supervisors, and the way in which the department was administered.

Goal III: The increased professionalism of police personnel. Increased professionalism was taken to mean greater commitment to the job, a stronger belief in service delivery, an increased capacity for handling autonomy and discretion, greater occupational status, and an increased belief in the importance of evaluation by one's peers.

Goal IV: Changed perceptions on the part of sworn personnel of the functions of policing. Department administrators believed that there needed to be a greater organizational commitment to the services delivered to the community by patrol officers. They believed also that patrol officers, in addition to viewing their work as more significant, should view human relations actions as a more substantial aspect of their responsibilities.

Although briefly defined in this introduction, these primary goals are more clearly identified by the descriptions of indicators which follow. These goals do not encompass all the objectives of the Five-Year Plan and Project Pride; they are those for which it was possible to design an evaluation, using the two administrations of the HRD questionnaire and performance-related data collected from personnel jackets and the files of the internal affairs division.

EVALUATION OF GOAL I: THE RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND PROMOTION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF PEOPLE

There are five indicators of the attainment of Goal I:

A. Increased educational attainment.

B. Increased minority representation (ethnic and sexual).

C. Increased cosmopolitan nature of personnel.

D. Increased discretion and toleration of ambiguity.

E. Improved attitudes and values.

GOAL I-A. INCREASED EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT.

Project Rationale

The underlying assumption regarding increased educational attainment is that education can provide a broad background of information that can help police officers form attitudes conducive to effective policing in contemporary society. Further, education can enhance self-esteem and make officers more relaxed in their interpersonal contacts. It can provide the theoretical underpinning for skills, as well as the actual skills themselves. Education is central to the development of policing as a profession. Finally, additional education increases the prestige of policing in relation to that of the clients receiving police service and in relation to other occupations.

This section addresses six questions:

1. Have the distribution and level of education changed in the Dallas Police Department from 1973 to 1976?

2. Have officers who were already in the department in 1973 increased their education since 1973?

3. What was the educational level at the time of entry into the Dallas Police Department for persons entering since 1973, and how does that compare with the education of officers entering before 1973?

4. What are the 1976 education levels of persons promoted before 1973 and after 1973?

5. Is the DPD retaining those officers, relative to their cohort group, who have attained higher levels of education?

6. Do officers who have joined the department since July 1973 have different types of college degrees from those of officers who joined before July 1973?

Question 1. Have the distribution and level of education in the DPD changed from 1973 to 1976?

Rows 1 and 2 of Table 1 indicate that the education levels of officers substantially increased from 1973 to 1976.

Question 2. Has the education level of officers already in the DPD in 1973 changed by 1976?

Table 1

Percentage Distribution of Education Level as Measured at Dates Shown

Row	Group	Less than High School	High School Graduate	Technical School	Some College	College Graduate	Graduate School	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	3.8	15.4	2.5	63.5	10.8	4.0	(1050) 100.0	84
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	1.1	11.5	1.5	45.8	19.9	20.2	(1780) 100.0	34
3.	Same Officers, 1973[1]	2.8	14.4	2.8	64.9	10.8	4.3	(814) 100.0	68
4.	Same Officers, 1976	0.6	12.4	2.2	46.7	20.1	18.1	(872) 100.0	10
Officers Entering: (education at entry)									
5.	Pre-1973	3.5	44.1	4.8	39.8	5.9	1.9	(1446) 100.0	
6.	Post-1973	0.0	2.6	0.0	47.8	33.3	16.3	(312) 100.0	
Officers Promoted Pre-1973: (education in 1976)									
7.	Sergeants	1.1	15.9	1.1	42.9	17.6	21.4	(182) 100.0	4
8.	Lieutenants	2.5	2.5	0.0	45.0	15.0	35.0	(40) 100.0	1
9.	Captains	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	22.2	66.7	(9) 100.0	0

NOTE: In this report total percentages equal 100; cell percentages have been rounded.

Table 1, continued

Row	Group	Less than High School	High School Graduate	Technical School	Some College	College Graduate	Graduate School	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Promoted Post-1973: (education in 1976)									
10.	Sergeants	0.0	4.1	2.7	30.1	41.1	21.9	(73) 100.0	1
11.	Lieutenants	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.1	30.4	43.5	(23) 100.0	0
12.	Captains	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	28.6	57.1	(14) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Pre-1973: (education in 1973)									
13.	Remained	2.9	14.6	2.7	65.2	10.6	4.0	(893) 100.0	77
14.	Resigned by 1976[2]	5.9	11.8	0.0	55.9	20.6	5.9	(34) 100.0	1
15.	Resigned/Remained by 1976	0.0	13.3	0.0	60.0	26.7	0.0	(15) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Post-1973: (education at entry)									
16.	Remained	0.0	4.2	1.1	45.5	40.9	8.3	(264) 100.0	1
17.	Resigned by 1976	0.0	7.7	0.0	23.1	61.5	7.7	(13) 100.0	0
18.	Resigned/Remained by 1976	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	(3) 100.0	0

[1]These officers completed a questionnaire in 1973 and again in 1976.

[2]These are officers who resigned voluntarily. The category does not include persons who retired, died, were suspended, or were asked to resign.

Rows 3 and 4 reveal that the changes noted in Row 1 did not come about only as a result of differences in entrance requirements and recruitment efforts. The policies of the DPD also resulted in increased educational attainment by those officers who were already employees when these policies went into effect.

Interestingly, there is a drop in the category of "some college," but a large increase in those who have completed college, suggesting that persons with some college background may be those who most use the educational incentives and opportunities offered. Also, there is a large increase in those having some graduate education, again suggesting that those with college experience are likely to continue their education.

Question 3. What was the level of education at the time of entry of persons entering since 1973, and how does that compare with the education of officers entering before 1973?

Rows 5 and 6 of Table 1 indicate that officers joining the DPD since 1973 had an impressively higher level of education at entry than those who joined before that time.

The overall increase in educational level of the DPD was the result of both the recruitment of persons with higher education and the fact that officers already in the DPD in 1973 continued their education during the period 1973-1976.

Question 4. What are the 1976 education levels of persons promoted before and after 1973? (Rows 7-12, Table 1)

In 1976 persons who had been promoted to the rank of sergeant or lieutenant were more highly educated than persons in these ranks who had been promoted before 1973. Officers promoted since 1973 had education levels higher than those of the rest of the department while officers promoted before 1973 had education levels similar to those of the rest of the department.

Captains promoted before and after 1973 had similarly high levels of education and both groups were more highly educated in 1976 than the rest of the department.

Question 5. Is the DPD retaining those police officers who have attained higher levels of education? (Rows 13-18, Table 1)

Officers who left the department after 1973 were more highly educated (as measured in 1973) than those officers who remained in the department. Among those who left and did not return, 26 percent had at least an undergraduate college degree; only 13 percent of those who remained had one. But those officers who left and later returned were almost as highly educated as those who did not return.

Among officers who entered since 1973, 62 percent of those who resigned had college degrees as opposed to 41 percent of those who remained.

Table 2

Percentage Distribution of Academic Major
at time of Entry into DPD for Officers Entering
Since 1973 and Officers Entering Before 1973

Time of Entry	Academic Major				
	Liberal Arts	Technical	Police Science	(N) Total	Missing Data
Pre-1973	232 37.7	328 53.3	55 8.9	(615) 100.0	866
Post-1973	39.3	24.6	36.1	(285) 100.0	27
Total	38.2	44.2	17.6	(900) 100.0	893

Question 6. Do officers who have joined the department since July 1973 have types of college degrees different from those of officers who joined before July 1973? (Table 2)

There was a substantial change in the types of college degrees police officers had at the time of their appointment. Police science degrees (a specialty degree not broadly available before the early 1970s) seemed mainly to replace other technical kinds of degrees by 1973, but did not appear to draw students away from liberal arts programs.

CONCLUSION

The Dallas Police Department has been able to recruit officers of higher educational attainment. Further, officers already in the department in 1973, when new standards went into full effect, have significantly increased their educational levels. This is primarily the case for those officers who already had some college education or a college degree. Officers without college experience seem not to be affected educationally by the new programs. Officers promoted since 1973 are more likely to have completed their education or to have gone on to graduate work. Officers who left the department were more likely to have college educations than were those who remained. Those who left and later returned were almost as highly educated as those who did not return.

GOAL I-B. INCREASED REPRESENTATION OF RACIAL AND SEXUAL MINORITIES

Project Rationale

Ending racial and sexual discrimination in employment has been a high-priority social effort in the recent past. Court decisions, EEOC actions, and the efforts of community groups have focused on policing as an especially important area in which discrimination should end. It is believed that beyond the achievement of social justice, the benefits of

recruiting women and members of minority groups will include a decrease in community-police hostility, a decrease in overt discrimination on the part of white male officers, and the introduction of more enlightened points of view into police departments.

The questions asked include the following:

1. Has the number of minorities in the DPD changed between 1973 and 1976?

2. How many minorities were recruited between 1973 and 1976?

3. How many minorities were promoted at each rank before 1973 and how many since 1973?

4. What is the rate of voluntary resignations among minority officers?

Question 1. Has the number of minorities in the DPD changed between 1973 and 1976?

Table 3 indicates that there has been only a small increase in the percentage of minorities in the DPD (Rows 1 and 2). While the number of minorities has tripled in the three years, the impact has been relatively small on overall percentages.

Question 2. How many minorities were recruited between 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3-5, Table 3)

Between 23 percent and 30 percent of the recruits from 1973 through 1975 were minorities. But it should be noted that minority recruitment was strongest in 1973 and declined somewhat in 1974 and 1975.

Although the DPD was not able to achieve its one-on-one hiring goal, (hiring one minority group member for each white), the 25 percent minorities hired did approximate the minority percentage of the population of the city of Dallas. The problem is that at that rate, the goal of having minorities represented at the same level in the police department as they are a proportion of the population would not be achieved until complete turnover of staff occurred.

Historically, minority representation in other ranks has been lower than that in the patrol officer rank. Another goal of the Dallas Police Department was to increase the number of police officers in supervisory and command positions.

Question 3. How many minorities were promoted before 1973 and how many since 1973?

Rows 6-11 of Table 3 demonstrate that minority representation in supervisory ranks remains very slight. This is to be expected, inasmuch

Table 3

Percentage Distribution of Minority Representation

Row	Group	White	Black	Chicano and Other	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	95.2	2.2	2.6	(1051) 100.0	83
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	92.3	4.0	3.8	(1771) 100.0	43
Year Officers Recruited						
3.	1973	69.7	22.5	7.9	(89) 100.0	0
4.	1974	76.5	18.3	5.2	(115) 100.0	0
5.	1975	74.5	11.8	13.6	(110) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Pre-1973						
6.	Sergeants	98.6	0.7	0.7	(142) 100.0	11
7.	Lieutenants	100.0	0.0	0.0	(39) 100.0	2
8.	Captains	100.0	0.0	0.0	(8) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973						
9.	Sergeants	100.0	0.0	0.0	(70) 100.0	1
10.	Lieutenants	95.2	0.0	4.8	(21) 100.0	0
11.	Captains	100.0	0.0	0.0	(10) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Pre-1973						
12.	Remained	95.3 (94.9)*	2.1 (90.5)	2.6 (95.8)	(894) 100.0 (94.8)	76
13.	Resigned by 1976	97.1 (3.7)	2.9 (4.8)	0.0 (0.0)	(34) 100.0 (3.6)	1
14.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	86.7 (1.4)	6.7 (4.8)	6.7 (4.2)	(15) 100.0 (1.6)	1
	TOTAL	898 100.0	21 100.0	24 100.0	(943) 100.0	

Table 3, continued

Row	Group	White	Black	Chicano and Other	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Hired Post-1973						
15.	Remained	77.4 (95.3)	14.7 (97.5)	7.9 (80.8)	(265) 100.0 (94.3)	0
16.	Resigned by 1976	69.2 (4.2)	7.7 (2.5)	23.1 (11.5)	(13) 100.0 (4.6)	0
17.	Resigned/ Returned by 1976	33.3 (0.5)	0.0 (0.0)	66.7 (7.7)	(3) 100.0 (1.1)	0
	TOTAL	215 (100.0)	40 (100.0)	26 (100.0)	(281) (100.0)	

*Except where noted, figures within parentheses are column percentages; figures above them are row percentages.

as officers must serve a minimum of three years at the rank of patrol officer before being eligible to take a promotional exam. Minority officers recruited in 1973 would not have been eligible to take a promotional exam before the administration of HRD_2.

Question 4. What is the rate of voluntary resignations among minority officers? (Rows 12-17, Table 3)

Relative to their numbers in the department in 1973, minorities hired before 1973 were not disproportionately represented among those who resigned between 1973 and 1976.

Among officers hired since 1973, blacks resigned voluntarily in numbers proportionately smaller than was the case for other groups. At the same time, Chicano and other minorities resigned in numbers proportionately greater than resignation rates in other groups. Among all racial groups, 4.2 percent of the whites hired after 1973 resigned voluntarily; this was true of 2.5 percent of the blacks and 11.5 percent of the Chicanos and other minorities. Two persons in the latter category resigned but later returned to the department. The disproportionate number of resignations among Chicanos and other minorities may be related to the fact that this group was more likely to contain females than was the group of black officers. As Table 4 indicates, females tended to resign in disproportionately large numbers.

Regarding female representation in the DPD, the data address the same issues raised about racial minority representation.

Question 1. Has the number of women in the DPD changed between 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 4)

While the number of women recruited since 1973 has had little impact on the overall percentages of department composition by 1976, there nevertheless has been more than a fourfold increase in the number of women in the department since 1973. It would appear that an effort is being made to correct the historic imbalance.

Question 2. What has been the number of women recruited from 1973 to 1976? (Rows 3-5, Table 4)

Sexual representation has varied only slightly by recruit classes, ranging between 11.5 percent and 17 percent for the three years. The data indicate that recruitment of female officers declined in 1975 relative to 1973.

Question 3. How many women were promoted before 1973, and how many since 1973? (Rows 6-11, Table 4)

There was only one promotion of a woman before 1973 and, according to the questionnaire data, not one since.

Table 4

Percentage Distribution of Sex Group Representation

Row	Group	Male	Female	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	98.5	1.5	(1048) 100.0	86
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	96.0	4.0	(1775) 100.0	39
Year Officers Recruited					
3.	1973	83.0	17.1	(88) 100.0	1
4.	1974	88.5	11.5	(113) 100.0	2
5.	1975	87.3	12.7	(110) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Pre-1973					
6.	Sergeants	100.0	0.0	(138) 100.0	15
7.	Lieutenants	97.4	2.6	(38) 100.0	3
8.	Captains	100.0	0.0	(8) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973					
9.	Sergeants	100.0	0.0	(68) 100.0	3
10.	Lieutenants	100.0	0.0	(21) 100.0	0
11.	Captains	100.0	0.0	(10) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Pre-1973					
12.	Remained	98.3 (94.7)*	1.7 (100.0)	(892) 100.0 (94.8)	78
13.	Resigned by 1976	100.0 (3.7)	0.0 (0.0)	(34) (3.6)	1
14.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	100.0	0.0	(15) 100.0	1
	TOTAL	(1.6) 926 100.0	(0.0) 15 100.0	(1.6) (941) 100.0	

Table 4, continued

Row	Group	Male	Female	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Hired Post-1973					
15.	Remained	88.2 (94.7)	11.8 (91.2)	(262) 100.0	3
16.	Resigned by 1976	76.9 (4.1)	23.1 (8.8)	(13) 100.0 (4.7)	0
17.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	100.0	0.0	(3) 100.0	0
	TOTAL	244 (100.0)	34 (100.0)	(278) 100.0	

*Except where noted, figures within parentheses are column percentages; figures above them are row percentages.

Question 4. What is the rate of voluntary resignations among female officers? (Rows 12-17, Table 4)

Among those officers hired before 1973, the percentage of women resigning was smaller than the percentage of women in the department in 1973.

Among officers hired since 1973, women resigned in numbers disproportionate to total departmental resignations. Of those women hired since 1973, 8.8 percent resigned voluntarily; 4.1 percent of the men hired during the same period resigned voluntarily.

CONCLUSIONS

The DPD Human Resources Development program's goal of having minorities representing 25 percent of the manpower of the department by 1977 has not been reached. Although the goal may have been overly ambitious, the overall increase is disappointing. The number of minorities is increasing, but achievement of the goal of 25 percent representation appears to be years in the future. The same situation exists regarding women. Additionally, the department has more difficulty retaining female than male recruits. As discussed previously, officers recruited in 1973 would not yet have been eligible for promotion by early 1976.

GOAL I-C. INCREASED COSMOPOLITAN NATURE OF THE POLICE.

Project Rationale

Dallas is a modern urban center that has developed into one of the major cosmopolitan regions of the southwestern United States. Urban centers such as Dallas need to be policed by persons who are familiar with the lifestyles, norms, and values of persons living in these areas. The Dallas Police Department will be more representative of the Dallas populace if it increases the number of college educated persons, minorities, women, people from higher educated urban families and from a higher socioeconomic background. Indicators of cosmopolitanism are sex, race, education, father's education and occupation, and urban background.

Sex, race, and education have been presented in parts A and B above. Questions addressed below are:

1. Do the educational backgrounds of the fathers of new officers differ from those of the fathers of older officers?

2. Do officers promoted since 1973 have fathers with educational backgrounds different from officers promoted before 1973?

3. Do fathers of officers leaving the department since 1973 have educational backgrounds different from the fathers of other officers in their cohorts?

4. Do the fathers of newer officers have occupational backgrounds different from the fathers of older officers?

5. Do the fathers of officers promoted since 1973 have occupational backgrounds different from the fathers of officers promoted before 1973?

6. Do the fathers of people leaving the department since 1973 have occupational backgrounds different from the fathers of other officers in the same cohort?

7. Are the home communities of new officers larger than those of older officers?

8. Are the home communities of officers promoted since 1973 larger than those of officers promoted before 1973?

9. Do people leaving the department since 1973 come from communities of different size from those of other officers in their cohort group who remain in the department?

Question 1. Do the educational backgrounds of the fathers of new officers differ from those of the fathers of older officers? (Rows 2-8 Table 5)

As Table 5 indicates, the educational attainment level of fathers is substantially higher in 1973 and 1974. Eighteen percent of the officers recruited in 1973 had fathers who were college graduates as compared to 3.6 percent of the officers recruited in the three years before 1973. But by 1975, recruits had fathers with lower levels of education than did recruits in 1973 and 1974.

Question 2. Do officers promoted since 1973 have fathers with educational backgrounds different from those of officers promoted before 1973? (Rows 9-14, Table 5)

Sergeants promoted after 1973 tended to have more highly educated fathers than did sergeants promoted before 1973. This change corresponds to increasing education levels of DPD recruits.

Question 3. Do fathers of officers leaving the department since 1973 have educational backgrounds different from the fathers of the other officers in their cohorts who remained? (Rows 15-20, Table 5)

Among officers hired before 1973, those who resigned before 1976 were more likely to have college-educated fathers than those who remained.

There is little difference in fathers' educational backgrounds between officers resigning and remaining for those hired after 1973.

Question 4. Do the fathers of new recruits have occupational statuses different from the fathers of older officers? (Rows 2-8, Table 6)

More recently recruited officers do indeed have fathers with occupation levels which are higher than those of fathers of more experienced officers.

Table 5

Percentage Distribution of Father's Educational Level

Row	Group	Less than High School	High School Graduate	Technical School	Some College	College Graduate	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	44.4	38.9	3.7	8.2	4.9	(1009) 100.0	125
Officers' Experience								
2.	11+ years in 1973	59.9	27.8	1.4	6.9	4.0	(277) 100.0	56
3.	6-10 years in 1973	47.1	35.9	4.9	7.3	4.9	(206) 100.0	23
4.	3-5 years in 1973	35.5	46.1	2.6	8.3	7.5	(228) 100.0	21
5.	0-2 years in 1973	34.9	45.6	5.7	10.1	3.7	(298) 100.0	17
Year Officers Recruited								
6.	1973	28.2	33.3	7.7	12.8	18.0	(78) 100.0	11
7.	1974	30.0	30.8	2.8	14.0	22.4	(107) 100.0	8
8.	1975	34.3	34.3	2.9	15.2	13.3	(105) 100.0	5

Table 5, continued

Row	Group	Less than High School	High School Graduate	Technical School	Some College	College Graduate	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Promoted Pre-1973								
9.	Sergeants	57.1	27.8	3.0	7.5	4.5	(133) 100.0	20
10.	Lieutenants	63.2	21.1	0.0	13.2	2.6	(38) 100.0	3
11.	Captains	75.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	(4) 100.0	4
Officers Promoted Post-1973								
12.	Sergeants	38.5	41.0	2.6	10.3	7.7	(39) 100.0	5
13.	Lieutenants	66.7	25.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	(12) 100.0	1
14.	Captains	42.9	28.6	0.0	14.3	14.3	(7) 100.0	2

Table 5, continued

Row	Group	Less than High School	High School Graduate	Technical School	Some College	College Graduate	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Hired Pre-1973								
15.	Remained	56.2	26.6	2.9	9.5	4.8	(857) 100.0	113
16.	Resigned by 1976	36.4	30.3	0.0	18.2	15.2	(33) 100.0	2
17.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	46.7	26.7	0.0	20.0	6.7	(15) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Post-1973								
18.	Remained	29.4	33.9	4.4	13.7	18.5	(248) 100.0	17
19.	Resigned by 1976	38.5	23.1	7.7	15.4	15.4	(13) 100.0	0
20.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3	(3) 100.0	0

Table 6

Father's Mean Occupational Level*

Row	Group	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	38.8	23	934	196
Officers' Experience					
2.	11+ years in 1973	36.9	23	256	77
3.	6-10 years in 1973	34.2	22	193	36
4.	3-5 years in 1973	41.9	23	210	39
5.	0-2 years in 1973	41.3	23	275	40
Year Officers Recruited					
6.	1973	49.2	27	76	13
7.	1974	48.7	27	97	18
8.	1975	50.1	24	95	15
Officers Promoted Pre-1973					
9.	Sergeants	36.9	22	91	19
10.	Lieutenants	29.9	22	14	5
11.	Captains	37.3	43	3	3
Officers Promoted Post-1973					
12.	Sergeants	34.4	22	39	5
13.	Lieutenants	38.9	27	10	3
14.	Captains	43.9	29	9	0
Officers Hired Pre-1973					
15.	Remained	38.6	23	807	163
16.	Resigned by 1976	42.6	23	28	7
17.	Resigned/returned by 1976	48.3	17	12	4
Officers Hired Post-1973					
18.	Remained	49.3	26	228	37
19.	Resigned by 1976	58.7	28	11	2
20.	Resigned/returned by 1976	70.5	30	2	1

*The Occupational Scale used here is the Duncan Socio-Economic Index. (Blau and Duncan, 1967). Higher scores indicate higher occupational level.

Question 5. Do the fathers of officers promoted since 1973 have occupational statuses different from the fathers of officers promoted before 1973? (Rows 9-14, Table 6)

Father's occupation level was higher for lieutenants and captains promoted after 1973 but was lower for sergeants promoted after 1973. At both times, officers promoted to captain tend to have fathers with higher occupational levels than do persons promoted to sergeant and lieutenant.

Question 6. Do the fathers of officers who left the department since 1973 have occupational statuses different from the fathers of officers in the same cohort who remained? (Rows 15-20, Table 6)

Among officers hired both before and after 1973, those who resigned voluntarily had fathers with higher occupational statuses than those who remained. Those who resigned and returned had fathers whose occupational backgrounds were higher than did those of officers who resigned and did not return.

Question 7. Are the home communities of more recently recruited officers larger than those of more experienced officers? (Rows 2-8, Table 7)

The most marked trend is that of movement away from farm origins as years of experience in the department decrease. Although police work may have become less attractive to people of farm and rural origins, it is also likely that the data reflect the general shift of the United States population from rural to urban areas.

Question 8. Are the home communities of officers promoted since 1973 larger than those of officers promoted before 1973? (Rows 9-14, Table 7)

At all ranks, supervisors were less likely to come from farm and rural backgrounds in 1976 than in 1973. At both times, captains and lieutenants were more likely to come from the largest areas than were sergeants.

Question 9. Do people leaving the department since 1973 come from communities of different size from those of officers in their cohort group who remain in the department? (Rows 15-20, Table 7)

Among officers hired both before and after 1973, those who resign differ little from those who remain in terms of size of community of origin.

CONCLUSIONS

Generally, for the 1973 and 1974 recruit classes, the findings in this area are consistent with the hoped-for patterns. These findings are difficult to interpret because many of them could be the result of historical processes of urbanization, increasing education, and increasing

Table 7

Percentage Distribution of Community of Origin Size

Row	Group	Farm	Rural	2,500-10,000	10,000-50,000	50,000-100,000	100,000-500,000	Suburb	500,000 or More	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	21.0	13.8	11.9	13.3	6.5	11.1	4.8	17.6	(1049) 100.0	85
Officers' Experience											
2.	11+ years in 1973	31.0	16.5	10.7	7.4	3.2	14.8	2.6	13.9	(310) 100.0	23
3.	6-10 years in 1973	26.1	10.4	14.7	10.0	5.2	8.5	4.7	20.4	(211) 100.0	18
4.	3-5 years in 1973	16.0	15.2	12.9	15.2	6.9	9.1	5.2	19.5	(231) 100.0	18
5.	0-2 years in 1973	11.1	12.1	10.7	20.1	10.7	10.4	6.6	18.3	(289) 100.0	26
Year Officers Recruited											
6.	1973	12.5	6.8	14.8	14.8	13.6	14.8	1.1	21.6	(88) 100.0	1
7.	1974	6.3	6.3	9.8	18.8	9.8	14.3	8.0	26.8	(112) 100.0	3
8.	1975	10.9	10.0	15.5	17.3	10.9	9.1	10.9	15.5	(110) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Pre-1973											
9.	Sergeants	32.4	12.2	11.5	6.5	4.3	10.1	2.9	20.1	(139) 100.0	14
10.	Lieutenants	13.2	15.8	15.8	7.9	0.0	18.4	5.3	23.7	(38) 100.0	3
11.	Captains	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	37.5	(8) 100.0	0

Table 7, continued

Row	Group	Farm	Rural	2,500-10,000	10,000-50,000	50,000-100,000	100,000-500,000	Suburb	500,000 or More	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Promoted Post-1973											
12.	Sergeants	17.5	7.5	22.5	12.5	5.0	7.5	2.5	25.0	(40) 100.0	3
13.	Lieutenants	16.7	0.0	33.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.7	(12) 100.0	0
14.	Captains	0.0	0.0	28.6	14.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	42.9	(7) 100.0	0
Officers Hired Pre-1973											
15.	Remained	20.7	13.2	11.9	13.1	6.7	11.1	5.0	18.3	(893) 100.0	77
16.	Resigned by 1976	23.5	11.8	8.8	23.5	2.9	14.7	2.9	11.8	(34) 100.0	1
17.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	13.3	20.0	20.0	13.3	13.3	6.7	0.0	13.3	(15) 100.0	1
Officers Hired Post-1973											
18.	Remained	9.6	8.4	13.8	16.1	10.7	13.4	7.3	20.7	(261) 100.0	4
19.	Resigned by 1976	0.0	0.0	7.7	30.8	23.1	7.7	0.0	30.8	(13) 100.0	0
20.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	33.3	0.0	(3) 100.0	0

homogeneity of the population. Further, in critical areas of race and sex representation and level of father's education, there is some evidence that the pattern was beginning to reverse for the 1975 class.

GOAL I-D. DISCRETION AND THE TOLERATION OF AMBIGUITY

Project Rationale

These attitudes are considered important to develop in officers or are attitudes which should be present when officers are hired. Discretion refers to the officer's ability to make autonomous use of power and authority with respect to any given situation. Increased awareness of his or her discretionary powers coupled with training in wise use of this discretion should lead to more even-handed policing. Toleration of ambiguity refers to the officer's ability to see the complexities of situations and the unwillingness to see the world in terms of good or bad, either-or, black or white. The development of tolerance of ambiguity in police officers should give them more understanding of complex situations, greater ability to suspend their own personal moral judgments, and wiser use of discretion.

The questions chosen to assess the occurrence and degree of these two attitudes were factor analyzed using a principal components procedure. They formed four distinct factors, one measuring tolerance of ambiguity, three tapping aspects of discretion. These were a general attitude factor--tolerance of ambiguity--and three factors defining attitudes about discretion in work situations: work autonomy, opportunistic law enforcement, and tempered law enforcement. The specific attitude statements comprising the factor-based scores reported below are (see Attendixes C and D for item loadings):

I. Tolerance of Ambiguity (ambiguity factor)

1. You can classify almost all people as either honest or crooked.
2. There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the strong.
3. There are really basically two kinds of women: the pure and the bad.

II. Work Autonomy (discretion factor)

4. I am my own boss in almost every work-related situation.
5. I make my own decisions in regard to what is to be done in my work.

III. Opportunistic Law Enforcement.

6. Probably the best strategy for an officer is just to stay cool and avoid unnecessary contacts in your area.

7. In the long run, it's probably not a very good idea to be overly strict in enforcing the laws, since the more people you get in trouble, the more heat they put on you.

IV. Tempered Law Enforcement.

8. There are certain times and places where you have to bend the law a little instead of strictly enforcing it.

9. All laws ought to be enforced at all times, otherwise people lose respect for the law.

Scores reported for each factor consist of the means of sums of scores for those items reported above which identify each factor at both Time 1 (T_1) and Time 2 (T_2).

The following questions are answered in terms of the factor-based scores for tolerance of ambiguity and the three dimensions of discretion:

1. Does the department differ in 1976 from 1973?

2. Do respondents who completed the questionnaire in both years differ in 1976 from 1973?

3. Do officers who have entered the department since 1973 differ in 1976 from officers who entered earlier?

4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted earlier?

5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who have remained?

Question 1. Does the department differ in 1976 from 1973 in the way officers score on these factors? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 8)

With the exception of one factor, the responses from the entire department are substantially the same in both years. In 1976, officers socred slightly lower in their sense of work autonomy.

Question 2. Do respondents who completed the questionnaire in both years differ in 1976 from 1973 in the way they score on these factors? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 8)

On three factors, responses are almost identical in both years. In 1976, these officers indicated a slight decrease in their sense of work autonomy.

Question 3. In 1976 do officers who have entered the DPD since 1973 differ from officers who entered earlier in their scores on each factor? (Rows 5-14, Table 8)

Table 8
Discretion and Tolerance of Ambiguity
Factor-Based Scores

Row	Group	F_1: Tolerance of Ambiguity		F_2: Work Autonomy		F_3: Opportunistic Law Enforcement		F_4: Tempered Law Enforcement		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	4.6	0.92	2.4	0.89	4.9	0.95	3.0	0.77	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	4.6	0.96	2.7	0.87	4.8	0.91	[illegible]	0.73	1814
3.	Same Officers, '73	4.6	0.89	2.4	0.89	4.9	0.95	3.0	0.77	882
4.	Same Officers, '76	4.7	0.97	2.7	0.86	4.8	0.92	2.1	0.64	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]										
5.	13+ years	4.5	0.97	2.6	1.05	5.0	0.94	2.9	0.82	297
6.	10-12 years	4.7	0.96	2.3	0.89	5.1	0.99	3.1	0.77	58
7.	7-9 years	4.7	0.87	2.4	0.93	5.0	0.99	3.1	0.77	153
8.	4-6 years	4.6	0.87	2.2	0.83	4.9	0.96	3.0	0.76	209
9.	0-3 years	4.5	0.91	2.3	0.76	4.9	0.92	3.0	0.76	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]										
10.	13+ years	4.7	0.95	2.7	0.90	4.8	0.91	3.1	0.79	511
11.	10-12 years	4.8	0.93	2.8	0.91	4.9	0.99	3.2	0.70	208
12.	7-9 years	4.6	0.95	2.7	0.88	4.8	0.95	3.1	0.72	243
13.	4-6 years	4.5	0.97	2.6	0.78	4.8	0.87	3.2	0.67	432
14.	0-3 years	4.6	0.95	2.7	0.86	4.9	0.89	3.2	0.71	399

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 8, continued

Row	Group	F_1: Tolerance of Ambiguity		F_2: Work Autonomy		F_3: Opportunistic Law Enforcement		F_4: Tempered Law Enforcement		N [3]
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]										
15.	Sergeants	4.9	0.85	2.8	0.90	4.9	0.85	3.2	0.68	179
16.	Lieutenants	5.0	0.77	3.0	0.92	4.9	1.04	3.4	0.70	41
17.	Captains	5.5	0.59	2.5	0.95	5.0	1.02	3.6	0.47	8
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]										
18.	Sergeants	5.1	0.86	2.8	0.77	4.9	0.73	3.4	0.72	71
19.	Lieutenants	5.0	0.66	2.9	0.97	5.1	1.09	3.4	0.67	21
20.	Captains	5.4	0.46	2.3	0.62	5.3	0.65	3.7	0.52	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]										
21.	Remained	4.6	0.89	2.4	0.88	4.9	0.92	3.0	0.77	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	4.5	1.06	2.0	0.79	5.1	0.95	2.8	0.67	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	4.6	0.92	2.6	0.79	4.2	1.27	3.4	0.59	16

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

[3]All factor score calculations use replacement with means procedure on an item-by-item basis.

The responses of officers who have entered since 1973 (Row 14) are very similar to the 1976 responses of officers who entered earlier (Rows 10-13). New officers in 1976 (Row 14) indicated a weaker sense of work autonomy and a stronger belief in tempered law enforcement than did new officers in 1973 (Row 9). These differences are apparent for other experience groups in 1973 and 1976; they are unlikely to be the result of changes in recruitment since 1973.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 8)

Sergeants promoted before 1973 indicate a slightly greater tolerance of ambiguity and a slightly weaker belief in tempered law enforcement than do sergeants promoted since 1973. Lieutenants promoted before 1973 indicate a slightly stronger belief in opportunistic law enforcement than do those promoted since 1973. Captains promoted before 1973 indicate a weaker sense of work autonomy and a slightly stronger belief in opportunistic law enforcement than do captains promoted since 1973.

Question 5. Do officers leaving the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 8)

These items were asked only of officers who joined the department before 1973 and among them there are some differences. Those who resigned and did not return indicated a stronger sense of work autonomy, a weaker belief in opportunistic law enforcement, and a weaker belief in tempered law enforcement than did the other two groups. Those who resigned and chose (and were chosen) to return to the department had a weaker sense of work autonomy, a stronger belief in opportunistic law enforcement, and a stronger belief in tempered law enforcement than either those officers who did not resign or those who resigned and did not return.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, there has been little change in attitudes of discretion and the toleration of ambiguity. Nor do new officers differ from their more experienced colleagues. This must be understood within the context that, in both 1973 and 1976, officers exhibited high levels of agreement with items that advocated use of judgment and discretion in the exercise of work. Officers saw themselves as working independently, without supervision, and making many decisions both in 1973 and 1976. It could well be that a ceiling effect operated and there simply was relatively little room for movement in the desired direction. The critical question this raises, and one which will be partially dealt with in the performance section, is whether discretion was used in ways more congruent with the policies of the DPD in 1976 than in 1973.

GOAL I-E. IMPROVED ATTITUDES AND VALUES.

Project Rationale

Given the corrosive nature of many police-citizen contacts, policing needs people who are not only tolerant of ambiguity and able to make decisions, but who have other desirable attitudes or attitude sets as well. Police need to have and maintain high levels of faith in people. Given the negative feedback they often receive from citizens, they need to have high levels of self-esteem. Given their exposure to young people, they need to develop attitudes respectful of youth and tolerant of youth's period of rebellion.

These factors or sets of attitudes are composed of the following questionnaire items:

I. Faith in People

1. On the whole, people try to be fair.
2. The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.
3. Most people can be trusted.

II. Self-regard

1. I wish that I could have more respect for myself.
2. I'd like it if I could find someone to tell me how to solve my personal problems.

III. Belief in Freedom for Youth

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
2. What a youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

For each of these factors, the following questions will be answered in terms of mean factor-based scores:

1. Does the entire department differ in 1976 from 1973?

2. Do the same officers differ in 1976 from 1973?

3. Do officers who entered the department since 1973 differ from officers who entered before 1973?

4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted earlier?

5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from officers who have remained?

Question 1. Does the department differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 9)

Table 9

Attitudes and Values

Row	Group	F_1: Faith in People		F_2: Self-Regard		F_3: Freedom for Youth		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	3.4	1.02	4.3	1.05	1.4	0.60	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	3.4	0.83	4.4	1.03	2.7	1.02	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	3.5	1.00	4.3	1.05	2.0	0.89	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	3.3	0.83	4.4	0.98	2.8	1.03	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]								
5.	13+ years	3.1	1.03	4.1	1.12	1.3	0.59	297
6.	10-12 years	3.1	0.94	4.4	1.03	1.4	0.67	58
7.	7-9 years	3.5	0.96	4.3	1.00	1.4	0.63	153
8.	4-6 years	3.6	1.06	4.2	1.12	1.3	0.59	209
9.	0-3 years	3.6	0.97	4.4	0.95	1.4	0.58	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]								
10.	13+ years	3.1	0.82	4.3	1.12	2.7	1.05	511
11.	10-12 years	3.3	0.83	4.5	0.95	2.8	1.06	208
12.	7-9 years	3.4	0.85	4.3	1.00	2.7	1.10	243
13.	4-6 years	3.5	0.78	4.5	0.92	2.7	0.95	432
14.	0-3 years	3.5	0.84	4.5	1.05	2.8	0.99	399
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]								
15.	Sergeants	3.2	0.88	4.4	1.02	2.9	1.08	179
16.	Lieutenants	2.8	0.78	4.2	0.99	2.8	1.05	41
17.	Captains	2.8	0.69	4.0	1.06	3.1	1.55	8
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]								
18.	Sergeants	3.4	0.88	4.5	0.99	3.0	1.08	71
19.	Lieutenants	3.3	0.74	4.7	0.71	3.3	0.89	21
20.	Captains	3.2	0.70	4.3	0.82	3.5	1.17	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]								
21.	Remained	3.5	0.99	4.3	1.03	1.4	0.59	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	3.5	1.26	4.2	1.07	1.3	0.57	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	3.8	0.97	4.7	0.92	1.4	0.70	16

1 Attitudes measured in 1973.
2 Attitudes measured in 1976.
3 All factor score calculations use replacement with means procedure on an item-by-item basis.

With respect to faith in people and self-regard, responses were very similar in 1973 and 1976. A substantially stronger belief in freedom for youth was indicated in 1976 than 1973.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 9)

The same officers reported slightly stronger faith in people, slightly higher self-regard and substantially stronger belief in freedom for youth in 1976 than 1973.

Question 3. Do officers who entered the department since 1973 differ from officers who entered before 1973? (Rows 5-14, Table 9)

Compared with their more experienced colleagues (Rows 10-13), officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) indicate a slightly weaker sense of faith in people. The same pattern can be seen when comparing less experienced (Row 9) and more experienced (Rows 5-8) officers in 1973. These data, including the 1973-1976 comparisons of the same officers (Rows 3 and 4), suggest that with experience comes a stronger faith in people.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 9)

All three groups of officers promoted since 1973 indicate a stronger faith in people. Lieutenants and captains indicate a lower sense of self-regard, and a substantially weaker belief in freedom for youth than do officers promoted before 1973.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from officers who have remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 9)

Officers who resigned and did not return respond the same way as officers who did not resign. Officers who resigned and did return indicate slightly weaker faith in people and higher self-regard than officers in the other two groups.

CONCLUSION

There has been little change over time in the degree of faith in people or self-regard. There is an indication of a stronger belief in freedom for youth in 1976 than 1973. More recently appointed supervisors indicate greater faith in people but less belief in freedom for youth than do more experienced supervisors.

EVALUATION OF GOAL II: INCREASED OFFICER SATISFACTION

Three indicators of increased officer satisfaction are identified:

A. Decreased isolation and alienation of police officers.

B. Increased job commitment.

C. Increased job satisfaction.

GOAL II-A. DECREASED ISOLATION AND ALIENATION OF POLICE OFFICERS

Project Rationale

It has been hypothesized that police are relatively isolated from social contacts outside of the police world. Further, police are seen to be part of a relatively monolithic, closed culture and are characterized by feelings of alienation from the broader community they serve. Recruiting cosmopolitan persons with broad community interests will tend to decrease this alienation and isolation. Although a sense of isolation and alienation is not synonymous with a sense of dissatisfaction about work, it is related conceptually to an individual's general sense of satisfaction with his or her social situation.

To gauge a sense of social alienation, officers were asked the extent of their agreement with the following statements,

> "Police officers and their families are treated differently by their neighbors than are other people."

With respect to this statement, the following questions are asked:

1. Do responses of the entire DPD differ in 1976 from 1973?
2. Do responses of the same officers differ in 1976 from 1973?
3. Do the responses of officers hired since 1973 differ from those of officers hired before 1973?
4. Do the responses of officers promoted before 1973 differ from those of officers promoted since 1973?
5. Do the responses of officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those of officers who have remained?

Question 1. Do responses of the DPD differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 10)

Responses in both years are very similar; approximately two-thirds of the officers express some degree of agreement with the statement.

Question 2. Do the responses of the same officers differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 10)

The same officers respond very similarly at both points in time.

Question 3. Do responses of officers hired since 1973 differ from those of officers hired before 1973? (Rows 5-14, Table 10)

Responses at all levels of experience are similar; 60 to 70 percent of officers at every experience level agree to some extent with the statement. Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) respond in 1976 very similarly to the less experienced officers in 1973 (Row 9).

Table 10
Percentage Distribution of Treatment by Neighbors

Row	Group	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	12.6	18.0	36.0	15.8	9.9	7.7	(1126) 100.0	8
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	8.6	16.3	44.7	17.8	8.0	4.6	(1764) 100.0	50
3.	Same Officers, 1973	11.4	17.8	37.6	15.5	9.7	8.0	(876) 100.0	6
4.	Same Officers, 1976	8.7	15.9	45.8	16.7	8.9	4.0	(867) 100.0	15
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]									
5.	13+ years	12.5	16.9	37.3	10.5	10.5	12.2	(295) 100.0	2
6.	10-12 years	8.6	22.4	32.8	19.0	6.9	10.3	(58) 100.0	0
7.	7-9 years	18.9	16.3	28.1	17.7	11.8	7.2	(153) 100.0	0
8.	4-6 years	14.9	19.7	33.7	14.9	9.1	7.7	(208) 100.0	1
9.	0-3 years	9.7	17.8	39.1	19.3	9.7	4.5	(404) 100.0	5

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 10, continued

Row	Group	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]									
10.	13+ years	11.9	15.4	43.0	15.2	9.5	5.1	(495) 100.0	16
11.	10-12 years	9.9	17.3	41.6	21.3	6.4	3.5	(202) 100.0	6
12.	7-9 years	9.7	16.9	49.6	14.0	4.7	5.1	(236) 100.0	7
13.	4-6 years	7.1	16.0	46.1	18.6	8.7	3.5	(425) 100.0	7
14.	0-3 years	4.4	17.2	44.4	21.0	8.2	4.9	(390) 100.0	9
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]									
15.	Sergeants	13.3	17.1	38.7	17.7	7.2	6.1	(181) 100.0	5
16.	Lieutenants	7.7	20.5	33.3	25.6	12.8	0.0	(39) 100.0	2
17.	Captains	0.0	11.1	66.7	0.0	22.2	0.0	(9) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]									
18.	Sergeants	12.5	11.1	44.4	18.1	12.5	1.4	(72) 100.0	2
19.	Lieutenants	8.7	0.0	39.1	21.7	21.7	8.7	(23) 100.0	0
20.	Captains	13.3	13.3	40.0	20.0	13.3	0.0	(15) 100.0	0

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 10, continued

Row	Group	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]									
21.	Remained	11.6	17.9	37.7	15.8	9.2	7.8	(963) 100.0	7
22.	Resigned by 1976	17.1	20.0	31.4	17.1	11.4	2.9	(35) 100.0	0
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	13.3	20.0	20.0	26.7	20.0	0.0	(15) 100.0	1

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 11

Mean Frequency of Interaction*

Row	Group	Relatives		Neighbors		Police Officers Seen Daily		Police Officers Not Seen Daily		Other Friends		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	2.3	1.43	2.9	1.89	2.9	1.67	3.6	1.59	2.5	1.61	1074	60
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	2.1	1.44	3.1	1.91	3.2	1.72	3.7	1.57	2.4	1.64	1664	150
3.	Same Officers, 1973	2.2	1.36	2.9	1.87	2.8	1.60	3.6	1.57	2.5	1.63	852	30
4.	Same Officers, 1976	2.1	1.34	3.0	1.87	3.2	1.68	3.7	1.49	2.2	1.43	829	53
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]													
5.	13+ years	2.3	1.39	2.6	1.76	3.5	1.81	3.9	1.57	2.7	1.69	267	30
6.	10-12 years	2.0	1.22	2.9	1.85	2.9	1.71	3.6	1.64	2.8	1.63	55	3
7.	7-9 years	2.3	1.34	2.9	1.85	3.1	1.65	3.6	1.57	2.4	1.63	145	8
8.	4-6 years	2.4	1.54	3.0	1.91	2.4	1.43	3.5	1.52	2.6	1.67	203	6
9.	0-3 years	2.3	1.44	3.1	1.96	2.6	1.57	3.4	1.62	2.4	1.52	396	13
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]													
10.	13+ years	2.0	1.34	2.9	1.88	3.5	1.80	4.0	1.57	2.4	1.61	447	64
11.	10-12 years	2.0	1.35	3.0	1.88	3.4	1.67	3.9	1.53	2.5	1.60	187	21
12.	7-9 years	2.2	1.44	2.9	1.79	3.2	1.74	3.8	1.60	2.5	1.71	226	17
13.	4-6 years	2.2	1.44	3.1	1.90	3.0	1.62	3.6	1.52	2.4	1.58	405	27
14.	0-3 years	2.3	1.59	3.3	1.99	2.9	1.66	3.5	1.57	2.4	1.72	384	15

*1 = within past week; 6 = never

1 Attitudes measured in 1973.

2 Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 11, continued

Row	Group	Relatives		Neighbors		Police Officers Seen Daily		Police Officers Not Seen Daily		Other Friends		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]													
15.	Sergeants	1.8	1.27	3.2	1.90	3.5	1.67	3.8	1.47	2.5	1.63	158	28
16.	Lieutenants	2.1	1.41	3.0	1.85	3.2	1.72	4.1	1.40	2.2	1.74	36	5
17.	Captains	1.8	0.97	2.8	2.05	2.4	1.67	3.0	1.87	1.7	1.21	9	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]													
18.	Sergeants	2.0	1.37	3.1	1.88	3.5	1.70	3.7	1.63	2.6	1.60	69	5
19.	Lieutenants	1.7	1.03	3.7	1.82	3.3	1.63	3.8	1.35	1.5	0.65	23	0
20.	Captains	2.0	1.20	2.9	1.13	3.4	1.24	3.2	1.08	2.3	1.60	15	0
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]													
21.	Remained	2.3	1.4	2.9	1.9	2.8	1.6	3.6	1.6	2.6	1.6	921	49
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.9	1.8	3.3	1.8	2.8	1.9	3.5	1.7	2.3	1.7	34	1
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	2.8	1.7	3.9	1.9	3.1	1.9	3.7	1.9	2.0	1.7	16	0

*1 = within past week; 6 = never

1 Attitudes measured in 1973

2 Attitudes measured in 1976

1. the entire DPD in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers hired before and after 1973.
4. officers promoted before and after 1973.
5. officers who resigned after 1973 and who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire DPD differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 12)

Rows 1 and 2 indicate that there is a slight increase in membership in fraternal and veterans organizations between years 1973 and 1976. There are greater increases in membership in church-connected ogranizations, although interestingly there is a slight decrease in church membership itself. There also are increases in membership in parent-teacher and youth guidance groups.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 12)

The same patterns also appear in Rows 3 and 4. Organizational membership does increase in all areas, with the exception of church membership where there is a slight decline. Church-connected membership shows the same pattern of increase; membership in parent-teacher and youth guidance organizations also increases.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 5-14)

With the exception of church membership, officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) are less likely to belong to all other organizations than are more experienced officers (Rows 10-13.) The same was true in 1973 of officers with less experience (Row 9). In this respect officers hired since 1973 are not different from their more experienced colleagues. In general, organizational membership increases with experience (perhaps with age and family responsibilities) and the data indicate that officers become less isolated from other organizations the longer they remain in the department.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from those promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 12)

Rows 15-20 present 1976 organizational membership for those promoted before and after 1973. Generally, recently promoted officers have fewer organizational memberships than their more experienced counterparts; the newer captains have a greater number of church memberships. The sample is small, but the pattern is persistent.

Question 5. Do officers who resigned after 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 12)

Table 12
Percentage Responding "Yes" to Various Organizational Memberships

Row	Group	Fraternal Organizations	Church Connected	Veterans Organizations	Parent-Teacher Groups	Youth Guidance	Church	N	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	19.9	20.9	5.5	19.7	14.2	67.3	1054	80
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	25.0	28.5	7.4	23.4	20.9	66.4	1571	243
3.	Same Officers, 1973	18.5	21.1	4.4	19.5	14.7	67.0	842	40
4.	Same Officers, 1976	22.7	28.6	6.7	27.2	22.9	64.5	809	73
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]									
5.	13+ years	36.7	26.3	7.7	27.9	16.2	69.4	254	43
6.	10-12 years	34.5	31.0	6.9	36.2	25.9	70.7	54	4
7.	7-9 years	12.4	20.3	3.3	30.7	13.1	63.4	140	13
8.	4-6 years	11.5	15.3	5.3	13.9	12.9	60.3	203	6
9.	0-3 years	9.1	14.7	3.2	6.6	9.3	60.9	395	14
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]									
10.	13+ years	47.4	37.5	12.6	31.7	27.4	75.0	413	98
11.	10-12 years	25.1	33.5	6.9	37.1	28.2	65.2	174	34
12.	7-9 years	19.3	29.5	5.9	31.2	26.1	61.9	220	23
13.	4-6 years	13.2	18.7	5.5	15.5	14.9	60.4	379	53
14.	0-3 years	13.0	24.7	4.6	10.1	13.4	65.0	369	30

[1] 1973 data
[2] 1976 data

Table 12, continued

Row	Group	Fraternal Organizations	Church Connected	Veterans Organizations	Parent-Teacher Groups	Youth Guidance	Church	N	Missing Data
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]									
15.	Sergeants	43.6	32.1	12.2	32.7	28.9	69.1	156	30
16.	Lieutenants	54.1	54.3	18.7	50.0	44.1	78.9	32	9
17.	Captains	88.9	44.4	0.0	62.5	37.5	55.6	7	2
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]									
18.	Sergeants	33.8	31.4	1.4	29.0	20.0	53.5	70	4
19.	Lieutenants	26.1	34.8	0.0	27.3	26.1	78.3	23	0
20.	Captains	53.3	14.3	14.3	46.7	26.7	78.6	14	1
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]									
21.	Remained	17.5	19.6	4.6	19.0	13.5	63.6	908	62
22.	Resigned by 1976	11.4	14.3	5.7	8.6	11.4	62.9	32	3
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	6.3	6.3	0.0	25.0	0.0	62.5	15	1

[1]1973 data

[2]1976 data

Officers who resigned tended to have fewer organizational memberships than officers who remained, although all three groups were equally high in church membership. Officers who resigned and later returned had the highest membership in parent-teacher organizations of the three groups of officers and low membership in other organizations, perhaps suggesting that officers with children experience greater pressure to return to their jobs.

CONCLUSIONS

The evaluators examined three dimensions of the data relevant to the presumed problem of isolation and alienation among the police: attitudes, recent social contacts, and organizational membership. Generally, there was little change over time. The most interesting feature of these data was the suggestion that perhaps police are not so isolated and alienated as hypothesized. In fact, they appear to become less isolated as their years of experience increase. Additional, future analyses will compare patterns of friendship, social, and organizational membership in policing and other professions.

GOAL II-B. INCREASED JOB COMMITMENT

Project Rationale

Dallas wanted to develop a police department of the highest caliber. An important ingredient in accomplishing this goal was seen to be the development of a cadre of police officers who view policing as more than just a job. Officers with a greater sense of dedication and job commitment will improve service delivery. In addition, a sense of commitment to one's work is related conceptually to general satisfaction with one's role in life.

Job commitment is measured here by the attitudinal items which comprise a single factor, labeled dedication. (See Appendix C.) These are measures of attitudes, not of actual performance. Work performance will be presented and discussed in another section. The three questionnaire items are the following:

1. The dedication of people in the police department is impressive.
2. The high level of idealism of people in the police department is encouraging.
3. People in the police department have a real "calling" for their work.

Factor-based scores will be used for these comparisons:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers who joined after 1973 and officers who joined the department before 1973.

4. officers promoted before and after 1973.

5. officers who resigned after 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 13)

Responses are very similar in both years.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 13)

Again, responses are very similar with these officers showing a slightly stronger belief in dedication in 1973.

Question 3. Do officers who have joined the department since 1973 differ from those who joined earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 13)

Officers who have joined since 1973 (Row 14) are like the most experienced (Row 10) in indicating a slightly stronger belief in officer dedication than the other experience groups. This curvilinear pattern may be related to the fact that voluntary resignations are likely to occur between years 4 and 12 of the officers' career, when the sense of dedication may be lower. Although new officers in 1976 (Row 14) indicate a weaker belief in officer dedication than do new officers in 1973 (Row 9), a similar difference is seen for the same officers between 1973 and 1976 (Rows 3 and 4). This suggests that the effect is not due to changes in recruitment between 1973 and 1976.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from those promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 13)

Supervisors promoted before 1973 indicate a slightly stronger belief in officer dedication than supervisors promoted since 1973.

Question 5. Do officers who have resigned since 1973 differ from those who have remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 13)

Officers who resigned and did not return respond very similarly to officers who remained. Officers who resigned and later returned to the department indicate a weaker belief in officer dedication than do the other two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

In almost every case, the mean factor-based scores for dedication indicate that officers do believe that other DPD officers are committed to their work. The least and most experienced officers have the strongest belief in the dedication of fellow officers.

Table 13

Dedication/Job Commitment
Factor Based Scores*

Row	Group	Mean	Standard Deviation	N[3]
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	2.8	0.88	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	2.9	0.79	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	2.8	0.85	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	3.0	0.78	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]				
5	13+ years	2.8	0.94	297
6.	10-12 years	3.0	0.89	58
7.	7-9 years	2.9	0.94	153
8.	4-6 years	2.8	0.88	209
9.	0-3 years	2.7	0.81	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]				
10.	13+ years	2.8	0.78	511
11.	10-12 years	3.1	0.78	208
12.	7-9 years	3.0	0.81	243
13.	4-6 years	3.0	0.78	432
14.	0-3 years	2.9	0.81	348
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]				
15.	Sergeants	2.9	0.77	186
16.	Lieutenants	2.9	0.79	41
17.	Captains	2.7	1.00	9
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]				
18.	Sergeants	3.2	0.79	74
19.	Lieutenants	3.1	0.68	23
20.	Captains	2.8	0.72	15

*The lower the score, the stronger the belief in police officers' sense of dedication.

[1]1973 data

[2]1976 data

[3]All factor score calculations use replacement with means procedure on an item-by-item basis.

Table 13, continued

Row	Group	Mean*	Standard Deviation	N[3]
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]				
21.	Remained	2.8	0.84	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.9	1.13	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	3.2	0.79	16

* The lower the score, the stronger the belief in police officers' sense of dedication.

[1]1973 data

[2]1976 data

[3]All factor score calculations use replacement with means procedure on an item-by-item basis.

GOAL II-C. JOB SATISFACTION

Project Rationale

It is important that DPD officers be proud of their work and satisfied with working in the DPD. Officers who are satisfied with the various facets of their work are presumed to work more effectively with citizens and to remain employed in the department for a longer period of time, representing financial savings to the department, given the cost of recruiting and training officers.

Indicators of Job Satisfaction

The use of a summary measure of job satisfaction assumes that antecedents and consequences of satisfaction are the same over the various facets of the work situation. There is no evidence to support this assumption, and, in fact, the opposite appears more likely. Consequently, several indicators of satisfaction were developed for the 1973 HRD questionnaire. Responses for 62 items, ranging broadly over various aspects of police work, were factor analyzed using a principal components procedure. This resulted in the identification of nine factors, each pertaining to satisfaction with a specific aspect of police work. Items retained on these job facet satisfaction factors had commonalities of four or above; the nine factors explained 50 percent of the total variance. (See Appendix A for items comprising the factors and their loading.) The factors are as follows:

Satisfaction Factors

Satisfaction with immediate supervisor.
Satisfaction with police work roles.
Satisfaction with promotion opportunities.
Satisfaction with top management.
Satisfaction with departmental recognition of accomplishments.
Satisfaction with job security.
Satisfaction with pay.
Satisfaction with job autonomy.
Satisfaction with personal advancement.

Thirty-five of the items which defined these nine factors were included in the 1976 questionnaire. A factor analysis of these items produced eight factors which were the same as the first eight factors listed above. The ninth factor, "Satisfaction with personal advancement," was a single item factor at Time 1 and did not emerge at Time 2. For purposes of comparison, factor-based scores were constructed at Time 1 and Time 2. As reported in Goal I-D, these scores consist of the means of the sums of scores for those items which best identify each factor at both times. (See Appendix A for identification of the items for each factor.) Comparisons in terms of mean factor-based scores are made for each of the following groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.

2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.

3. officers hired since 1973 and officers hired before 1973.

4. officers promoted since 1973 and officers promoted earlier.

5. officers who have left the department since 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 14)

For the entire department, the average level of job satisfaction changed very little between 1973 and 1976. In 1976, officers were more satisfied with promotion opportunity, slightly more satisfied with top management and their own recognition, slightly less satisfied with their work roles and with their job autonomy. At both times, satisfaction was generally high with supervisors, work roles, job security, pay, and job autonomy. Satisfaction with promotion opportunities and top management generally was lower.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 14)

These officers indicate even less change over time. They were slightly less satisfied in 1976 with their work roles, promotion opportunities, and job autonomy, and slightly more satisfied with job security and top management in 1976.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from officers hired before 1973? (Rows 5-14, Table 14)

In 1976, officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) were slightly more satisfied with work roles and with promotion opportunities and job security than were more experienced officers. Responses were similar for new officers in 1973 (Row 9) and indicate that with respect to job satisfaction, officers hired since 1973 do not differ from those hired previously. Although the differences are slight, officers with 4-6 years experience in 1976 (Row 13) tend to be less satisfied with supervisors, work roles, promotion opportunities, top management, and recognition than are other groups of officers; they are more satisfied with pay than are the other groups.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 14)

Sergeants promoted since 1973 were slightly more satisfied in 1976 with promotion opportunities and with job security than sergeants promoted earlier. They were slightly less satisfied with work roles, recognition, and pay than sergeants promoted earlier.

Lieutenants promoted since 1973 were less satisfied in 1976 with supervisors than those promoted earlier. They were more satisfied with promotion opportunities and job security than lieutenants promoted earlier.

Table 14

Facets of Job Satisfaction
Mean Factor-Based Scores for Satisfaction with:

Row	Group	F_1: Supervisors*		F_2: Work Roles **		F_3: Promotion Opportunity **		F_4: Top Management **		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	4.6	1.18	1.5	0.75	4.0	1.06	4.1	1.08	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	4.6	1.04	1.8	0.79	4.1	1.03	3.7	0.93	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	4.6	1.16	1.5	0.69	4.0	1.05	4.1	1.07	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	4.6	1.05	1.8	0.77	4.1	1.07	3.7	0.95	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]										
5.	13+ years	4.7	1.13	1.6	0.78	4.1	1.17	4.0	1.12	297
6.	10-12 years	4.6	1.22	1.6	0.83	4.0	1.17	4.3	1.17	58
7.	7-9 years	4.4	1.28	1.6	0.79	4.3	1.00	4.3	1.08	153
8.	4-6 years	4.5	1.21	1.5	0.83	4.0	1.11	4.1	1.06	209
9.	0-3 years	4.6	1.16	1.4	0.63	3.8	0.90	4.0	1.04	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]										
10.	13+ years	4.7	0.98	1.8	0.82	4.1	1.01	3.5	0.93	511
11.	10-12 years	4.6	1.09	1.8	0.85	4.2	1.13	3.8	1.02	208
12.	7-9 years	4.5	1.11	1.9	0.80	4.1	1.06	3.7	0.98	243
13.	4-6 years	4.4	1.06	1.9	0.79	4.3	1.02	3.9	0.84	432
14.	0-3 years	4.7	1.01	1.6	0.66	3.7	0.90	3.7	0.89	399

*The higher the score, the greater the satisfaction.

**The lower the score, the greater the satisfaction.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 14, continued

Row	Group	F_1: Supervisors *		F_2: Work Roles**		F_3: Promotion Opportunity **		F_4: Top Management **		N[3]
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]										
15.	Sergeants	4.7	1.04	1.8	0.75	4.2	1.05	3.6	0.97	179
16.	Lieutenants	4.8	1.04	1.8	0.66	3.9	1.02	3.4	1.02	41
17.	Captains	4.9	0.92	2.2	1.68	3.4	1.03	3.2	1.32	8
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]										
18.	Sergeants	4.8	0.87	2.2	0.98	3.6	1.02	3.5	0.88	71
19.	Lieutenants	4.4	1.32	1.7	0.66	3.2	0.86	3.4	1.02	21
20.	Captains	5.1	0.76	1.6	0.55	3.3	1.25	3.0	1.21	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]										
21.	Remained	4.6	1.16	1.5	0.69	4.0	1.05	4.1	1.07	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	4.5	1.24	1.8	1.11	3.9	0.97	4.0	1.02	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	4.3	1.08	1.8	0.97	3.9	1.11	4.6	1.25	16

* The higher the score, the greater the satisfaction.
** The lower the score, the greater the satisfaction.

1 Attitudes measured in 1973.
2 Attitudes measured in 1976.
3 All factor score calculations use replacement with means procedure on an item-by-item basis.

Table 14, continued

Row	Group	F_5: Recognition for Accomplishment *		F_6: Job Security *		F_7: Pay *		F_8: Autonomy **		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	3.6	0.95	3.9	1.26	4.1	1.17	2.4	0.89	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	3.8	0.83	4.1	1.10	4.1	1.11	2.7	0.87	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	3.6	0.94	4.0	1.26	4.1	1.15	2.4	0.89	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	3.8	0.87	4.1	1.12	4.1	1.09	2.7	0.86	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]										
5.	13+ years	3.8	0.99	4.1	1.19	3.8	1.22	2.6	1.05	297
6.	10-12 years	4.0	0.96	4.1	1.21	3.9	1.04	2.3	0.98	58
7.	7-9 years	3.5	0.96	3.7	1.43	4.2	1.21	2.4	0.93	153
8.	4-6 years	3.5	0.91	3.7	1.30	4.2	1.11	2.2	0.83	209
9.	0-3 years	3.6	0.91	3.9	1.21	4.2	1.14	2.3	0.76	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]										
10.	13+ years	4.0	0.86	4.3	1.05	3.9	1.11	2.7	0.90	511
11.	10-12 years	3.8	0.85	4.0	1.18	4.2	1.09	2.8	0.91	208
12.	7-9 years	3.7	0.82	4.0	1.13	4.0	1.10	2.7	0.88	243
13.	4-6 years	3.6	0.83	4.0	1.06	4.4	1.08	2.6	0.78	432
14.	0-3 years	3.7	0.76	4.2	1.11	4.0	1.11	2.7	0.86	399
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]										
15.	Sergeants	4.0	0.86	4.3	0.98	4.0	1.11	2.9	0.90	179
16.	Lieutenants	4.0	0.75	4.4	1.04	3.7	1.14	3.0	0.90	41
17.	Captains	4.3	0.89	5.0	0.83	3.2	0.69	2.4	0.99	8

*The higher the score, the greater the satisfaction.

**The lower the score, the greater the satisfaction.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976

Table 14, continued

Row	Group	F_5: Recognition for Accomplishment *		F_6: Job Security *		F_7: Pay *		F_8: Autonomy **		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]										
18.	Sergeants	3.7	0.79	4.5	1.11	3.8	1.04	2.8	0.77	71
19.	Lieutenants	3.9	0.87	4.7	0.87	3.6	0.76	3.0	0.99	21
20.	Captains	4.4	0.66	4.5	1.40	3.7	1.21	2.5	0.59	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]										
21.	Remained	3.6	0.93	4.0	1.25	4.1	1.15	2.4	0.88	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	3.2	1.03	3.7	1.20	4.4	1.13	2.0	0.79	35
23.	Resigred/Returned by 1976	3.3	1.13	3.8	1.32	4.6	0.96	2.6	0.79	16

* The higher the score, the greater the satisfaction.

**The lower the score, the greater the satisfaction.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Captains promoted since 1973 were more satisfied with supervisors, work roles, promotion opportunities, top management, recognition, and job security than captains promoted earlier. They were slightly less satisfied with pay than those promoted earlier.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who have remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 14)

Officers who left were somewhat less satisfied with work roles, with recognition and job security than officers who remained. They were more satisfied with pay and job autonomy than officers who remained. Officers who resigned and later returned were less satisfied with supervisors and top management than were officers in the two comparison groups; they were more satisfied with pay than the other two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

There is little indication of job dissatisfaction among Dallas police officers. They registered generally high satisfaction with supervisors, work roles, job security, pay, and job autonomy. For the entire department, satisfaction with work roles and job autonomy decreased slightly between 1973 and 1976. At both times, satisfaction with promotion opportunities and top management was generally lower although satisfaction with top management had increased slightly by 1976. In 1976, it was observed that officers with four to six years experience registered slightly less satisfaction on several factors than did other groups of officers.

EVALUATION OF GOAL III: CHANGE OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE

Two indicators of changing officer perception of the police are identified. These include:

A. Increased status of patrol.

B. Increased importance of human relations.

GOAL III-A. INCREASED STATUS OF PATROL.

Project Rationale

Patrol historically has been the organizational location of rookies and officers never promoted. One goal of the DPD project was to enhance the perceived and real value of being a patrol officer. Patrol officers were to develop a professional self-identity which would make them want to remain in police field services rather than in police administration. Such a professional self-identity would allow officers to deal with the public from a position of assurance and high self-esteem. Presumably, officers would thus feel no compulsion to "prove" their authority in each citizen encounter. They would be even-handed and assured in their relations with citizens, and citizens in turn would respond more favorably toward them.

Attitudes toward patrol were measured in two ways. Table 15 presents responses to a question about the merits of patrol in relation to

other units. Table 16 presents factor-based scores for a factor called "Status of Patrol" which is composed of three questions about the desirability of patrol. Table 17 contains information about officers' willingness to spend their entire careers in the patrol division.

The question on which Table 15 is based is the following:

How would you compare patrol duty with other assignments in the department? Use the following code:

1 = Patrol is much better than other units
2 = Patrol is somewhat better than other units
3 = Patrol and other units are the same
4 = Other units are somewhat better than patrol
5 = Other units are much better than patrol

_____General image
_____Supervision
_____Pay and benefits
_____Promotion opportunities
_____Nature of contact with the public
_____Recognition by department
_____Recognition by citizens

Responses will be compared for the following groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers hired before and after 1973.
4. officers promoted before and after 1973.
5. officers who left the department after 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 15)

In 1973 officers saw patrol as being similar to other units in terms of promotion opportunities and recognition. The pay and benefits in patrol were considered slightly worse than in other units. Patrol was compared more favorably to other units in terms of image, supervision, and the nature of public contact. By 1976 the overall evaluation of patrol, relative to other units, had worsened.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 15)

The attitudes of the same officers over time are almost identical to those of the entire department.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from officers hired before 1973? (Rows 5-14, Table 15)

Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) rate patrol higher in terms of image, supervision, public contact, and recognition than do more

Table 15

Relative Merits of Patrol*

Row	Group	Image		Supervision		Pay and Benefits		Promotion Opportunities		Nature of Public Contact		Recognition		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	2.2	1.18	2.4	1.15	3.2	0.82	3.1	0.94	2.1	1.21	2.9	1.37	1104	30
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	2.7	1.21	2.9	1.18	3.3	0.88	3.1	0.94	2.4	1.31	3.1	1.27	1693	121
3.	Same Officers 1973	2.2	1.18	2.4	1.15	3.2	0.81	3.1	0.92	2.0	1.21	2.9	1.37	862	20
4.	Same Officers 1976	2.7	1.23	2.9	1.19	3.3	0.88	3.1	0.92	2.4	1.30	3.2	1.25	844	38
	Officers' Experience in 1973[1]														
5.	13+ years	2.3	1.16	2.4	1.17	3.1	0.77	3.0	0.94	2.3	1.23	2.8	1.30	281	16
6.	10-12 years	2.4	1.27	2.5	1.21	3.0	0.77	2.8	0.82	2.2	1.20	2.9	1.33	57	1
7.	7-9 years	2.2	1.14	2.5	1.20	3.4	0.87	3.3	0.97	2.1	1.25	3.1	1.42	149	4
8.	4-6 years	2.2	1.26	2.5	1.15	3.3	0.72	3.2	0.93	2.1	1.26	3.2	1.38	204	5
9.	0-3 years	2.1	1.14	2.3	1.10	3.2	0.88	3.0	0.93	1.9	1.12	2.8	1.39	405	4
	Officers' Experience in 1976[2]														
10.	13+ years	2.8	1.12	2.9	1.19	3.2	0.81	2.9	0.91	2.6	1.28	2.7	1.17	465	46
11.	10-12 years	2.8	1.21	2.9	1.20	3.3	0.87	3.1	0.88	2.6	1.32	3.2	1.23	188	20
12.	7-9 years	2.8	1.25	3.0	1.23	3.4	0.88	3.1	0.99	2.5	1.37	3.3	1.26	230	13
13.	4-6 years	2.9	1.29	3.1	1.15	3.5	0.89	3.2	0.90	2.3	1.32	3.3	1.26	415	17
14.	0-3 years	2.4	1.17	2.5	1.05	3.5	0.91	3.2	0.99	2.0	1.22	3.1	1.32	379	20

*The lower the score, the higher the rating of patrol in relation to other units.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 15, continued

Row	Group	Image		Supervision		Pay and Benefits		Promotion Opportunities		Nature of Public Contact		Recognition		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[1]															
15.	Sergeants	2.8	1.16	2.6	1.15	3.1	0.83	2.9	0.86	2.7	1.20	3.0	1.20	175	11
16.	Lieutenants	2.9	0.98	2.6	1.01	3.1	0.69	3.1	0.85	2.7	1.23	2.7	1.15	38	3
17.	Captains	2.9	1.36	2.9	1.05	2.9	0.78	2.4	0.73	2.8	1.72	3.3	1.32	9	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]															
18.	Sergeants	3.1	1.23	2.5	0.97	3.3	0.87	2.9	0.72	2.8	1.35	3.4	1.25	72	2
19.	Lieutenants	2.3	0.97	2.3	1.19	3.0	0.64	2.8	0.60	2.5	1.34	2.6	1.12	23	0
20.	Captains	3.1	0.88	2.5	0.92	3.2	0.77	3.0	0.76	2.7	1.23	3.3	1.03	15	0
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]															
21.	Remained	2.2	1.2	2.4	1.1	3.2	0.82	3.1	0.92	2.0	1.2	2.9	1.4	946	24
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.5	1.4	2.4	1.2	3.5	0.90	3.1	1.20	2.2	1.4	3.1	1.7	33	2
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	2.6	1.3	2.4	1.0	3.0	0.82	3.0	1.03	1.9	1.0	3.2	1.4	16	0

*The lower the score, the higher the rating of patrol in relation to other units.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 16

Status of Patrol
Factor Based Scores*

Row	Group	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	2.8	1.11	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	2.6	0.91	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	2.8	1.11	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	2.6	0.93	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]				
5.	13+ years	3.2	1.17	297
6.	10-12 years	3.2	1.22	58
7.	7-9 years	2.9	1.19	153
8.	4-6 years	2.7	1.11	209
9.	0-3 years	2.5	1.90	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]				
10.	13+ years	2.8	0.85	511
11.	10-12 years	2.7	0.95	208
12.	7-9 years	2.6	0.89	243
13.	4-6 years	2.5	0.92	432
14.	0-3 years	2.6	0.93	399
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]				
15.	Sergeants	3.0	0.90	186
16.	Lieutenants	2.9	0.59	41
17.	Captains	3.0	0.77	9
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]				
18.	Sergeants	3.1	0.92	74
19.	Lieutenants	2.8	0.67	23
20.	Captains	2.8	0.89	15

*The lower the score, the higher the status of patrol.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 16, continued

Row	Group	Mean*	Standard Deviation	N
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]				
21.	Remained	2.8	1.10	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.8	0.88	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	2.8	1.04	16

*The lower the score, the higher the status of patrol.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 17

Percentage Distribution of
Desirability of Career in Patrol

Row	Group	Like Very Much	Like Moderately	Like Slightly	Wouldn't Care	Dislike Slightly	Dislike Moderately	Dislike Very Much	(N) Total	Missing Data
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	25.0	21.1	8.3	8.4	15.4	6.2	15.5	(1127) 100.0	7
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	13.0	16.3	10.3	7.6	16.3	9.2	27.4	(1800) 100.0	14
3.	Same Officers, 1973	24.9	23.0	8.3	7.9	15.5	5.6	14.7	(870) 100.0	12
4.	Same Officers, 1976	15.5	18.4	11.7	8.9	15.1	8.2	22.3	(870) 100.0	12
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]										
5.	13+ years	27.1	13.6	5.4	10.9	15.9	7.5	19.7	295	2
6.	10-12 years	27.6	17.2	6.9	13.8	10.3	5.2	19.0	58	0
7.	7-9 years	27.0	15.8	11.2	16.5	13.2	5.9	10.5	152	1
8.	4-6 years	25.6	24.6	6.3	5.3	15.0	5.3	17.9	207	2
9.	0-3 years	22.4	27.5	10.6	4.4	16.7	6.1	12.3	407	2
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]										
10.	13+ years	15.2	12.0	7.9	9.9	15.8	7.9	31.4	(507) 100.0	4
11.	10-12 years	13.5	15.0	8.2	8.7	19.8	8.7	26.1	(207) 100.0	1
12.	7-9 years	15.1	23.1	11.8	7.6	14.3	5.9	22.3	(238) 100.0	5
13.	4-6 years	9.0	16.7	11.6	6.3	17.9	9.7	28.8	(431) 100.0	1
14.	0-3 years	12.8	18.1	12.6	5.5	14.3	12.6	24.1	(398) 100.0	1

[1] Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2] Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 17, continued

Row	Group	Like Very Much	Like Moderately	Like Slightly	Wouldn't Care	Dislike Slightly	Dislike Moderately	Dislike Very Much	(N) Total	Missing Data
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[1]										
15.	Sergeants	21.6	12.4	7.0	10.3	11.3	8.1	29.2	(185) 100.0	1
16.	Lieutenants	7.3	19.5	4.9	4.9	26.8	14.6	21.9	(41) 100.0	0
17.	Captains	33.3	22.2	0.0	22.2	11.1	0.0	11.1	(9) 100.0	0
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]										
18.	Sergeants	8.1	24.3	14.9	6.8	16.2	8.1	21.6	(74) 100.0	0
19.	Lieutenants	21.7	26.1	8.7	4.3	21.7	13.0	4.3	(23) 100.0	0
20.	Captains	26.7	13.3	13.3	0.0	20.0	6.7	20.0	(15) 100.0	0
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]										
21.	Remained	25.1	21.5	8.3	8.2	16.1	5.8	15.0	(965) 100.0	5
22.	Resigned by 1976	20.6	23.5	5.9	8.8	11.8	8.8	20.6	(34) 100.0	1
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	18.7	31.3	6.3	12.5	12.5	6.3	12.5	(16) 100.0	0

[1] Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2] Attitudes measured in 1976.

experienced officers (Rows 10-13). Newer officers rate patrol lower with respect to pay and benefits and promotion opportunities than do their more experienced colleagues. In general newer officers in 1976 (Row 14) rated patrol less highly than did their counterparts in 1973 (Row 9). These differences correspond to changes for the entire department (Rows 1 and 2) and for the same officers (Rows 3 and 4) over time, and do not suggest that officers hired since 1973 hold different attitudes toward patrol than did officers hired before them.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted before 1973? (Rows 15-20, Table 15)

Generally, officers promoted since 1973 rate patrol much like officers promoted earlier. Among officers promoted since 1973 (Rows 18-20), lieutenants have a more favorable attitude toward patrol than do sergeants or captains.

Question 5. Do officers who left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 15)

Officers who left the department viewed the image of patrol and its pay and benefits less favorably in 1973 than did officers who remained. Nevertheless, they saw patrol as better than or roughly equal to other units. Officers who resigned and returned evaluated the image of patrol less favorably than did officers who remained and evaluated pay and benefits more favorably than did officers who resigned but did not return.

The three questions which comprise the factor "Status of Patrol" (See Appendix E) are the following:

1. One disadvantage of being promoted is that you have to give up your job on the streets to become an administrator.
2. I wish there were some way that I could be promoted without having to leave my job working a beat.
3. There should be ways to improve your rank by doing a good job at working a beat instead of having to become an administrator.

Factor-based scores are presented in Table 16 for the following groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers who joined the department since 1973 and officers who joined earlier.
4. officers promoted since 1973 and those promoted before.
5. officers who left the department since 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 16)

The responses are very similar in both years, indicating at both times that officers accord patrol a slightly positive status.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 16)

The same officers accord patrol a slightly higher status in 1976.

Question 3. Do officers who joined the department since 1973 differ from those who joined earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 16)

Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) accord patrol about the same status as officers hired earlier (Rows 10-13.) The pattern differed in 1973 when newer officers (Row 9) rated patrol higher than did their more experienced colleagues (Rows 5-8). A comparison of the 1973 and 1976 data indicates that the differences are not the result of different kinds of officers being hired since 1973. Rather, from 1973 to 1976 more experienced officers came to believe more strongly that there should be means to career advancement while continuing to do patrol work.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from those promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 16)

More recently promoted officers view patrol with slightly more favor than do more recently appointed supervisors.

Question 5. Do officers who left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 16)

There is no difference among these groups.

Data in Table 17 are based on the question: "How would you feel about being assigned to patrol during all your years in the department?" Comparisons of responses are made for the following groups:

1. entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers who have joined the department since 1973 and officers who joined earlier.
4. officers promoted before and after 1973.
5. officers who left the department since 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1976 from 1973? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 17)

In 1976, officers are less positive about the prospect of spending their careers in patrol; in 1973, 54 percent indicated some degree of liking for such a career; in 1976, 40 percent liked the idea.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 17)

In 1973, 56 percent of these officers would have liked to spend their careers in patrol; by 1976, this was true for 46 percent of these same officers.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from officers hired earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 17)

Responses of officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) are similar to those of officers with seven to nine years of experience. Forty-five to 50 percent of these groups would like to spend their careers in patrol. Thirty-five to 38 percent of the other groups would like such a career.

Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) exhibit a lesser desire for a career in patrol than did new officers hired before 1973 (Row 9). But the whole department became less positive toward a career in patrol from 1973 to 1976; therefore, the differences between new officers in 1973 and 1976 are probably unrelated to changes in recruitment during that period.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted before 1973? (Rows 15-20, Table 17)

Sergeants and lieutenants promoted since 1973 (Rows 18 and 19) are somewhat more positive toward a career in patrol than their counterparts who were promoted before 1973 (Rows 15 and 16). Captains promoted at either time respond similarly.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 17)

Officers who resigned (Row 22) respond similarly to those who remained in the department (Row 21).

CONCLUSIONS

Generally, officers viewed patrol as a good unit in which to work in the DPD although this attitude has declined slightly in three years. However, responses also indicate that officers would not like to remain in patrol for the duration of their careers. Officers liked the prospect of such a career even less in 1976 than they did in 1973. A comment should be made here. The original goal of the DPD, and a step toward enhancing the status of patrol, was to make it possible ultimately for patrol officers to be able to achieve a pay level comparable to that of captain. And in fact, data from Table 16 indicate that officers became more supportive of this goal between 1973 and 1976. While that may have been

a commendable goal, it was in no way related to fiscal and political realities and was not realized. If progress had been made to achieve the financial goal, officers might have indicated greater willingness to remain in patrol. By contrast, failure to achieve the goal may have resulted in the growing disillusionment about a career in patrol which was reflected in Table 17.

GOAL III-B. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RELATIONS AND PUBLIC-SERVICE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE

Project Rationale

It is necessary to improve the quality of the relations between police and citizens, especially minority citizens. Further, the goal is to emphasize the full-service function of the police, rather than just the crime-related functions. The project was to change the perceptions and behavior of police regarding their function through recruiting different kinds of people, academy training, retraining, development of specialties, and decentralization.

A series of attitudinal items was used to measure this goal. This included questions about how much time officers felt they should spend in a variety of police activities, what officers thought should be indicators of good performance, and three items which clustered in a factor called service orientation. (See Appendix B.)

The first question reviewed was:

> How much of the total department time do you think should be spent on each of the following activities?
>
> Indicate how much time you think should be spent by using the following code:
>
> 1 = All of the departmental time
> 2 = Very much of the departmental time
> 3 = Much of the departmental time
> 4 = A moderate amount of the departmental time
> 5 = Little of the departmental time
> 6 = Very little of the departmental time
> 7 = None of the departmental time
>
> _____Patrolling in cars
> _____Patrolling on foot
> _____Controlling traffic
> _____Investigating crimes
> _____Telling the public about police work
> _____Assisting persons in emergencies
> _____Helping settle family conflicts
> _____Getting to know juveniles
> _____Questioning suspicious persons
> _____Searching suspicious persons
> _____Explaining rights to suspects
> _____Understanding problems of minority groups
> _____Explaining crime prevention techniques to citizens
> _____Informing people about available services

Table 18-A compares the attitudes of the entire department in 1973 with the attitudes of recruits who were in the training academy between mid-1973 and late 1975. In 1973, the entire department identified patrolling in cars, investigating crimes, assisting people in emergencies, and questioning suspicious persons as the activities in which police should be spending much of their time. The least important items were patrolling on foot, controlling traffic, telling the public about police work, and helping to settle conflicts. While recruits identified the same functions as being important, they also rated understanding the problems of minorities, getting to know juveniles, explaining rights to suspects, and explaining crime prevention techniques to citizens as deserving much of the department's time. The recruits emphasize service functions more than experienced officers in 1973.

Table 18-B compares the 1976 responses of officers hired after 1973 with the responses of all other officers in 1976. Both groups again identified patrolling in cars, investigating crimes, assisting people in emergencies, and questioning suspicious persons as functions which deserve much of the officer's time.

Strikingly, the officers hired since 1973 no longer emphasized the human relations aspects of police work as they had while they were recruits (Table 18-A). These data suggest that there is a powerful impact of actual field experience on officer attitudes. Regardless of whether officers had positive attitudes toward human relations activities when they were recruited or whether these attitudes were instilled by the training academy, they appear to have been eliminated during the early field experience.

Below are listed several factors which could be used as indicators of a "good" police officer. Please indicate how important you think each of these factors should be as an indicator. Use this code:

1 = Much more important than it now is
2 = Somewhat more important than it now is
3 = Same importance as it now has
4 = Somewhat less important than it now is
5 = Much less important than it now is

_____Infrequent valid citizen complaints
_____Frequent traffic arrests
_____Frequent misdemeanor arrests
_____Frequent felony arrests
_____Frequent car checks
_____Frequent pedestrian checks
_____Quick response to calls
_____Responsiveness to needs of the beat
_____Infrequent resist arrests
_____Infrequent disciplinary actions

Table 19 provides comparisons between:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the entire department in 1973 and the 1973-1975 recruits.
3. the 1973-1975 recruits and their later scores as experienced officers.

Table 18-A*

Mean Importance[1] of Functions
Comparison of Recruits and Entire DPD, 1973

Row	Functions	Entire DPD, 1973[2] N=1134		Recruits[3] 1973 - 1975 N=314	
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
1.	Patrolling in cars	1.4	0.66	1.3	0.53
2.	Patrolling on foot	3.7	1.23	3.2	1.13
3.	Controlling traffic	3.3	1.34	2.4	1.07
4.	Investigating crimes	1.6	0.82	1.4	0.62
5.	Telling the public about police work	3.2	1.19	2.3	1.00
6.	Assisting persons in emergencies	2.0	1.10	1.5	0.80
7.	Helping settle family conflicts	3.6	1.34	2.9	1.23
8.	Getting to know juveniles	2.5	1.03	2.0	0.89
9.	Questioning suspicious persons	2.1	0.94	2.2	0.97
10.	Searching suspicious persons	2.5	1.19	2.4	1.09
11.	Explaining rights to suspects	3.1	1.42	2.0	1.17
12.	Understanding problems of minorities	2.8	1.26	1.9	1.02
13.	Explaining crime prevention techniques to citizens	2.7	1.19	2.0	1.96
14.	Informing people about available services	3.1	1.23	2.3	1.01

*Because of scale differences for this item in the 1973 and 1976 questionnaires, Table 18-A and Table 18-B are not comparable. The comparisons within each table are based on the same scale.

[1] 1=very much; 6=very little

[2] 1973 data

[3] data collected from recruits from 1973 to 1975.

Table 18-B*

Mean Importance[1] of Functions
Comparison of Officers Hired Between
1973 and 1976 and All Other Officers in 1976

Row	Function	Officers Hired[2] Between 1973 and 1976 N=399		All Other[3] Officers in 1976 N=1394	
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
1.	Patrolling in cars	2.4	0.76	2.6	0.76
2.	Patrolling on foot	4.2	1.08	4.0	1.14
3.	Controlling traffic	4.0	1.09	4.0	1.20
4.	Investigating crime	2.5	0.87	2.4	0.82
5.	Telling the public about police work	4.0	1.08	4.2	1.12
6.	Assisting persons in emergencies	2.8	1.10	2.9	1.18
7.	Helping settle family conflicts	4.3	1.25	4.5	1.24
8.	Getting to know juveniles	3.5	0.93	3.5	1.01
9.	Questioning suspicious persons	2.8	0.97	2.9	0.93
10.	Searching suspicious persons	3.2	1.15	3.3	1.15
11.	Explaining rights to suspects	3.8	1.41	4.0	1.45
12.	Understanding problems of minorities	3.8	1.21	3.9	1.25
13.	Explaining crime prevention techniques to citizens	3.4	1.12	3.7	1.14
14.	Informing people about available services	3.8	1.11	4.2	1.17

*Because of scale differences for this item in the 1973 and 1976 questionnaires, Table 18-A and Table 18-B are not comparable. The comparisons within each table are based on the same scale.

[1] 1=very much; 6=very little

[2] 1976 data for officers who had been recruits in 1973, 1974, or 1975.

[3] 1976 data.

Table 19

Mean Importance* of Officer Evaluation Factors

Row	Evaluation Factors	Entire DPD, 1973[1] N=1134		Recruits[2] 1973 - 1975 N=314		Officers Hired[3] Between 1973 and 1976 N=399		All Other[4] Officers in 1976 N=1394	
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
1.	Infrequent valid citizen complaints	3.1	0.97	2.3	1.11	2.8	0.99	2.8	0.91
2.	Frequent traffic arrests	3.2	0.95	2.9	0.96	3.3	0.90	3.2	0.91
3.	Frequent misdemeanor arrests	3.0	0.87	2.6	0.92	3.0	0.75	3.1	0.77
4.	Frequent felony arrests	2.0	0.93	1.8	0.88	2.2	0.86	2.1	0.87
5.	Frequent car checks	2.7	0.96	2.8	1.03	3.0	0.88	2.9	0.89
6.	Frequent pedestrian checks	3.0	0.83	2.9	0.97	3.1	0.83	3.0	0.83
7.	Quick response to calls	2.2	0.87	1.5	0.70	2.3	0.83	2.2	0.82
8.	Responsiveness to needs of the beat	2.1	0.84	1.3	0.59	2.0	0.79	2.0	0.80
9.	Infrequent resist arrests	2.5	0.89	2.3	1.06	2.7	0.83	2.6	0.82
10.	Infrequent disciplinary actions	2.9	0.93	2.0	0.94	2.7	0.88	2.7	0.81

*1 = much more important; 6 = much less important

[1]1973 data

[2]data collected from recruits from 1973 to 1975.

[3]1976 data for officers who had been recruits in 1973, 1974, or 1975.

[4]1976 data

4. officers hired between 1973 and 1976 and all other officers in 1976.

1. The responses for the entire department in 1973 (N=1134) and all officers in 1976 (N=1394) are similar, with three exceptions: in 1976 officers considered "infrequent valid citizen complaints" (Row 1) and "infrequent disciplinary actions" (Row 10) as more important evaluation factors than they did in 1973, "frequent car checks" (Row 5) were considered less important in 1976 than in 1973.

2. Recruits between 1973 and 1975 rated many of the evaluation factors as more important than did the entire department in 1973. They were much more likely to emphasize the importance of "infrequent valid citizen complaints" (Row 1) and "infrequent disciplinary actions" (Row 10) than was the entire department as a whole in 1973.

3. For officers hired between 1973 and 1976, the importance of many of the evaluation factors had declined since the officers were in the academy. This is especially apparent for "infrequent valid citizen complaints," "frequent misdemeanor arrests," "quick response to calls," and "infrequent disciplinary actions."

4. The responses of officers hired between 1973 and 1976 and all other officers in 1976 are almost identical. Again, the data suggest that new officers quickly adopt the attitudes of their more experienced colleagues when they enter the field.

Table 20 presents factor-based scores for the factor service orientation (see Appendix B for items) for the following groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.

2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.

3. officers hired since 1973 and officers hired before 1973.

4. officers promoted since 1973 and those promoted earlier.

5. officers who have left the department since 1973 and those who have remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 20)

Responses are very similar in both years.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 20)

Again, responses are almost the same at both times.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 20)

Table 20

Service Orientation
Factor-Based Scores*

Row	Group	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	1.9	0.61	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	2.0	0.58	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	1.9	0.58	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	2.0	0.56	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]				
5.	13+ years	1.8	0.59	297
6.	10-12 years	1.9	0.57	58
7.	7-9 years	2.0	0.67	158
8.	4-6 years	1.9	0.64	209
9.	0-3 years	2.0	0.56	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]				
10.	13+ years	1.9	0.55	511
11.	10-12 years	1.9	0.62	208
12.	7-9 years	2.0	0.54	243
13.	4-6 years	2.1	0.57	432
14.	0-3 years	2.0	0.59	399
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]				
15.	Sergeants	1.9	0.55	179
16.	Lieutenants	1.9	0.62	41
17.	Captains	1.5	0.17	8
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]				
18.	Sergeants	2.0	0.61	71
19.	Lieutenants	2.0	0.55	21
20.	Captains	1.9	0.29	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]				
21.	Remained	1.9	0.57	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.0	0.55	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	2.2	0.70	16

*The lower the score, the more positive the orientation toward the factor.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

There is almost no difference among the experience groups in 1976. Officers with four to six years of experience indicate slightly less service orientation than do other groups. Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) respond exactly as new officers did in 1973 (Row 9).

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from those promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 20)

Sergeants and lieutenants appointed at either time respond similarly. More recently appointed captains indicate a slightly stronger service orientation than do more experienced captains.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 20)

Those who resigned and returned show slightly less service orientation than do officers in the other two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Statements about the public-service functions of the police draw high levels of agreement. In addition, it is interesting that officers seem increasingly to recognize that such public service functions should play an important part also in performance evaluations.

EVALUATION OF GOAL IV: INCREASED PROFESSIONALISM*

Six indicators of the attainment of increased professionalism are identified:

A. Increased status of patrol.

B. Increased educational attainment.

C. Increased importance of peer evaluation.

D. Decreased isolation and alienation.

E. Increased job commitment.

F. Changed work orientation.

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*The conceptual problem regarding the use of the term professionalism has been discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume. For the purposes of this evaluation we are referring to professionalism as it is discussed in the sociology of the occupations, particularly teaching and social work, rather than in the bureaucratic sense that has characterized the professionalism movement in policing.

GOAL IV-A. INCREASED STATUS OF PATROL

Project Rationale

As any occupation becomes professional, the actual practitioners of that occupation increase in social status. In the classical professions--medicine, academia, law, and the clergy--the members of the profession who actually perform the services hold high status. While the situation is somewhat different for professionals who work in bureaucracies (e.g., social workers and teachers), they do enjoy a relatively high status, and many practitioners maintain a goal of continued field practice. That has not been the case for patrol officers. Often patrol is of low status--that which you do if you haven't yet received a promotion or if you don't qualify for anything else. As policing professionalizes, more emphasis will be placed on patrol (field services) as a career. (The Dallas project envisaged patrol as a "horizontal career," with the patrol officers ultimately able to earn as much as captains.)

Findings. The findings regarding the increased status of patrol were presented in Goal III-A. Briefly, the findings were that while patrol is seen as a good place to work in the DPD, it is not a place where officers want to spend their entire careers. As the conclusion of that section pointed out, status and desire to remain at a practice level will probably continue to be associated with levels of pay. Until pay levels of patrol officers approach parity with other levels in police departments, it is unlikely that programs to enhance patrol will have much effect.

GOAL IV-B. INCREASED EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Project Rationale

All professions have long periods of socialization, at least to a baccalaureate level (e.g., teaching, nursing), often to a masters level (e.g., social work) or to a doctorate level (e.g., academia, medicine). Based on the concept that professions are learned occupations consisting of both knowledge and skills which can be communicated, college education is seen as necessary. As policing accumulates knowledge and skills, prolonged socialization will be necessary.

Findings. Educational requirements and educational achievement have substantially increased from 1973 to 1976 both for officers already in the DPD in 1973 and for those recruited since (See Goal I-A for the presentation of findings.)

GOAL IV-C. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF PEER EVALUATION

Project Rationale

Only as a result of long socialization are the knowledge and skills of a profession attained. The result is that only colleagues who have maintained their practice skills can evaluate the performance of a professional. Outsiders simply lack the esoteric knowledge to make judgments. Further, administrators who have left practice cannot be expected to have maintained their practice knowledge. As a result, professionals are accountable to internalized norms and peer evaluation.

Peer evaluation has been measured by two attitudinal items which formed one factor, "Peer Evaluation." (See Appendix B.) Agree-disagree responses were asked for the following statements:

1. Other officers are better able to decide who should be promoted than are supervisors.
2. Evaluation of my competence as a police officer should be by my fellow officers.

Using factor-based scores, comparisons will be made for the following groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers hired since 1973 and those hired earlier.
4. officers promoted before and after 1973.
5. officers who have left the department since 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 21)

The responses are essentially the same in both years, indicating that officers disagree slightly with peer evaluation.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 21)

The responses are very similar at both times.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 21)

Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) and officers with four to six years experience are slightly more likely to support peer evaluation than more experienced officers. Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) respond the same as new officers in 1973 (Row 9).

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from officers promoted before 1973?

Sergeants and lieutenants promoted at either time respond similarly. Captains promoted since 1973 indicate a weaker belief in peer evaluation than captains promoted earlier. Nevertheless, captains, lieutenants, and sergeants promoted since 1973 respond in the same way.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 21)

Table 21

Peer Evaluation
Factor-Based Scores*

Row	Group	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	3.7	1.11	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	3.6	0.98	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	3.7	1.09	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	3.6	1.03	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]				
5.	13+ years	4.0	1.13	297
6.	10-12 years	4.2	1.16	58
7.	7-9 years	3.6	1.15	153
8.	4-6 years	3.5	1.05	209
9.	0-3 years	3.5	1.03	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]				
10.	13+ years	3.8	0.99	511
11.	10-12 years	3.6	1.01	208
12.	7-9 years	3.7	1.01	243
13.	4-6 years	3.4	0.98	432
14.	0-3 years	3.5	0.91	348
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]				
15.	Sergeants	4.0	0.97	186
16.	Lieutenants	4.0	0.93	41
17.	Captains	3.7	0.97	9
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]				
18.	Sergeants	4.0	0.02	74
19.	Lieutenants	4.1	1.08	23
20.	Captains	4.0	0.78	15
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]				
21.	Remained	3.7	1.09	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	3.8	1.33	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	3.4	1.21	16

*The lower the score, the stronger the belief in Peer Evaluation

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Officers who left and did not return are very similar to those who remained. Officers who resigned and returned are more likely to support peer evaluation than officers in the two other groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Only slight differences were found between 1973 and 1976 for the factor, Peer Evaluation and at both times officers slightly disagreed with the concept. When the two items were analyzed separately, it was apparent that officers were more inclined to believe that peers should determine competence (65 percent agreed) than that peers should determine promotions (only 35 percent agreed.)

GOAL IV-D. DECREASED ISOLATION AND ALIENATION.

Project Rationale

As a result of their increasingly urban origins, cosmopolitan interests, and education with its socializing effects, police officers will become less socially isolated and alienated.

Findings. As discussed previously (location) changes were found in these dimensions over time. Part of this could be explained by the fact that officers measured at Time 1 seemed to have surprisingly low levels of isolation and alienation.

GOAL IV-E. INCREASED JOB COMMITMENT.

Project Rationale

Persons who are employed in occupations that are professions are considered to be in that profession because they "profess." That is, they have a commitment to service which is, according to the professional model, their primary motivation for being in that profession.

Findings. Levels of job commitment were uniformly high in 1973 and 1976 with no substantial changes. Some modest patterns emerged suggesting that the least and most experienced officers are most likely to believe that other officers are committed to their work.

GOAL IV-F. CHANGED WORK ORIENTATIONS.

Project Rationale

Professionalism is a major orientation toward work that might influence job-relevant attitudes, but it is only one of a number of important variables that have been examined by researchers. Drawing from the work of one group of researchers 1/ the evaluators reasoned that orientations toward police work would be described by three major concerns:

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1. John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Beckhofer, and Jennifer Platt, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behavior (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968).

(1) Officers' feelings about who should have the opportunity to evaluate the performance of police officers (citizens, fellow officers, community leaders, or others). This factor gets at a critical aspect of professionalism. (2) The relative importance to officers of attaining certain conditions in work, such as greater income, work autonomy, and prestige. These factors have to do with "the meaning of work," and are commonly measured in the literature. (3) The importance of standards in policing, including attitudes toward "professionalizing" the force and increasing educational requirements.

Items from the 1973 HRD survey measuring these concerns were factor analyzed; they yielded four orientations toward police work. (See Appendix B.) Together the four generated factors explain 48 percent of the variance. (Items that define each factor are underlined; minimum loading of .500 was demanded.)

Following the work of Wilensky (1964) 2/ and Goode (1969) we hypothesized that a professionalism factor would emerge, composed of certain attributes such as desire for increased education and professionalization, peer review, work autonomy, and public service. Other factors distinct from professionalism, having to do with the meaning of work, would also emerge. The results were somewhat different from predictions. A public-service factor emerged, but the education and professional standards items formed their own factor--concern with increased standards for police. The items dealing with respondents' sensitivity to community judgment of policing also fell on a separate factor. And concerns about income, promotion, and recognition fell on still another factor. The results suggest a more complex set of dimensions than initially conceived. Obviously, sensitivity to community judgment, service orientation, and concern with increased standards are values recognized as important for the human relations minded police officer. 3/ But they do not exist as a single "package" profile.

The items which loaded most highly on these four factors at Time 1 were included in the 1976 survey. When factor analyzed, they produced the same four factors, in the same order, and with very similar factor loadings as at Time 1 (see Appendix D). In addition, a fifth factor which can be identified as "concern with peer evaluation" emerged at Time 2. (The fifth factor at Time 1 had been uninterpretable.)

The four factors are as follows (see Appendix D for the items comprising them):

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2. H. L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" American Journal of Sociology 70, September 1964, 33-50.

3. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

F_1 = Sensitivity to community judgment

F_2 = Concern with work mobility

F_3 = Service orientation

F_4 = Concern with increased standards

Mean factor-based scores are compared for these groups:

1. the entire department in 1973 and 1976.
2. the same officers in 1973 and 1976.
3. officers hired since 1973 and those hired earlier.
4. officers promoted since 1973 and those promoted previously.
5. officers who have left the department since 1973 and those who remained.

Question 1. Does the entire department differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 22)

On each of the factors, the scores are slightly higher in 1976, suggesting a declining orientation toward these aspects of professionalism.

Question 2. Do the same officers differ in 1973 and 1976? (Rows 3 and 4, Table 22)

Here again, the scores increased slightly in 1976.

Question 3. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 5-14, Table 22)

The most experienced officers in 1976 (Row 10) indicate the most sensitivity to community judgment. There are no systematic differences for the second and third factors. Officers hired since 1973 (Row 14) indicate the greatest concern with increased standards. New officers in 1973 (Row 9) scored similarly on this factor; by 1976 these officers (Row 13) indicated less concern with increased standards. There is no evidence that officers hired since 1973 feel differently from officers hired before them.

Question 4. Do officers promoted since 1973 differ from those promoted earlier? (Rows 15-20, Table 22)

The differences are very slight with two exceptions: more experienced captains indicate a somewhat greater service orientation and more recently appointed supervisors at all levels indicate greater concern with increased standards.

Question 5. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 21-23, Table 22)

Table 22

Work Orientations
Factor-Based Scores*

Row	Group	F_1: Sensitivity to Community Judgment		F_2: Concern with Work Mobility		F_3: Service Orientation		F_4: Concern with Increased Standards		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
1.	Entire DPD, 1973	2.7	1.05	2.1	0.77	1.9	0.61	3.0	1.09	1134
2.	Entire DPD, 1976	3.0	1.11	2.2	0.76	2.0	0.58	3.3	1.00	1814
3.	Same Officers, 1973	2.7	1.03	2.1	0.75	1.9	0.58	3.0	1.07	882
4.	Same Officers, 1976	3.0	1.12	2.2	0.74	2.0	0.56	3.4	1.02	882
Officers' Experience in 1973[1]										
5.	13+ years	2.5	1.07	2.3	0.85	1.8	0.59	3.1	1.15	297
6.	10-12 years	2.6	0.73	2.1	0.75	1.9	0.57	2.9	1.13	58
7.	7-9 years	2.9	1.07	2.1	0.70	2.0	0.67	3.1	1.18	158
8.	4-6 years	2.7	1.07	2.1	0.75	1.9	0.64	2.9	1.03	209
9.	0-3 years	2.8	1.03	2.1	0.74	2.0	0.56	2.9	1.03	409
Officers' Experience in 1976[2]										
10.	13+ years	2.7	1.04	2.3	0.84	1.9	0.55	3.5	0.95	511
11.	10-12 years	3.0	1.19	2.2	0.75	1.9	0.62	3.4	1.04	208
12.	7-9 years	3.1	1.11	2.3	0.78	2.0	0.54	3.4	0.99	243
13.	4-6 years	3.1	1.10	2.1	0.70	2.1	0.57	3.3	1.00	432
14.	0-3 years	3.2	1.06	2.1	0.70	2.0	0.59	3.0	0.98	399

*The lower the score, the more positive the orientation toward the factor.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Table 22, continued

Row	Group	F_1: Sensitivity to Community Judgment		F_2: Concern with Work Mobility		F_3: Service Orientation		F_4: Concern with Increased Standards		N
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Officers Promoted Pre-1973[2]										
15.	Sergeants	2.9	1.02	2.1	0.72	1.9	0.55	3.5	0.94	179
16.	Lieutenants	2.5	0.75	2.2	0.67	1.9	0.62	3.3	0.96	41
17.	Captains	2.5	0.50	1.9	0.53	1.5	0.17	3.1	1.03	8
Officers Promoted Post-1973[2]										
18.	Sergeants	2.9	1.11	2.1	0.88	2.0	0.61	3.0	1.06	71
19.	Lieutenants	2.7	0.95	2.0	0.68	2.0	0.55	2.8	1.02	21
20.	Captains	2.8	0.70	2.1	0.39	1.9	0.29	2.7	1.06	11
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]										
21.	Remained	2.7	1.03	2.1	0.76	1.9	0.57	3.0	1.07	970
22.	Resigned by 1976	2.9	1.20	2.0	0.74	2.0	0.55	2.8	1.16	35
23.	Resigned/Returned by 1976	3.4	1.06	2.3	0.72	2.2	0.70	3.2	1.49	16

*The lower the score, the more positive the orientation toward the factor.

[1]Attitudes measured in 1973.

[2]Attitudes measured in 1976.

Officers who resigned and did not return are similar to those who never left. Officers who resigned and later returned are less sensitive to community judgment, less concerned with work mobility, less inclined toward service orientation, and less concerned with increased standards than are those officers who never resigned.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, work orientations appear to have become slightly less professional in the DPD during the three years studied. The exception is among officers hired since 1973; these people indicate greater concern for increased standards than do people hired before 1973. Among all supervisory ranks promoted since 1973, there is a greater concern for increased standards than among supervisors promoted before 1973.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The measurement of police performance has been an acute problem for administrators, researchers, and evaluators of the police. Although policing is not unique in this regard (the same problems have plagued effectiveness studies in court systems, social work, psychotherapy, and education) the lack of agreement as to what the basic functions of the police really are has exacerbated the problem in policing. The evaluators were aware of these problems from the beginning of the evaluation, and the original plans were to have observers ride with patrol officers, observe their performance, record the information, and finally expert judges (both police and non-police) were to make judgments on the quality of performance. (Even that would still be one step removed from the outcome of an officer's behavior, i.e., whether citizens really benefited by what took place. It would be an evaluation of process rather than outcome, for an outcome evaluation was simply too expensive and methodologically too difficult to attempt. Chapter 3 describes the reasons for abandoning the observer approach.)

Although the observations were cancelled, it was felt important that the evaluation get as close to officers' behaviors as possible. While few changes were noted in the attitudes of officers over time, the critical goal of the project was to change officer performance. (The question of the relationship between attitudes and performance will not be addressed in this report. That relationship remains murky, in part because of the methodological difficulties inherent in measuring attitudes in relation to specific behaviors, and in measuring the specific behaviors themselves.)

As a result, the indicators used to reflect officers' performance will be DPD record information of variables generally considered by police administrators to be measures of performance. The early plan of the evaluation had envisaged collection and use of these data, but the original purpose was to compare them with observations of actual performance.

Confidence in these data is warranted by the fact that the DPD has not substantially changed its record systems over the years; it is a well-kept record system and the data have been carefully collected and coded.

But all of the data have problems associated with them. These go beyond the problems of all recordkeeping in all social agencies--lack of standardization in data collection, verification of its accuracy, and so forth--to include the fact that most of these indicators are only theoretically rather than empirically linked to performance. Thus, the number of complaints an officer receives can be logically and theoretically assumed to indicate aggressive behavior toward citizens. It is equally logical that some officers simply are far more active, that is, that they have a much higher proportion of contacts with citizens, and as a result have a similarly greater number of complaints. Such competing interpretations could be offered for each of the indicators used.

With these cautions and caveats in mind, data for the following indicators are presented:

1. Sick time
2. Injury time
3. Suspension time
4. Automobile accidents
5. Chargeable automobile accidents
6. Incidents of injury to prisoners
7. Incidents of weapons fired
8. Number of commendations
9. Number of complaints
10. Number of complaints sustained
11. Supervisory ratings

The first five can be viewed as indicators of organizational efficiency or of the extent to which the department is able to use its human resources and equipment in an economically efficient manner. The last six are indicators of the quality of service being delivered to the public. Clearly, these are at best indirect measures of police performance, subject to all the problems discussed above. But the indicators listed above are those which a city agency and city administration would examine in assessing performance. We will analyze these indicators as the best available evidence of the performance of Dallas officers, asking of each:

1. Do the same officers differ in 1972 and 1975?4/
2. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier?
3. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained?

---

4. Performance data are used for the calendar year before the administration of each questionnaire.

Question 1. Do the same officers differ in 1972 and 1975? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 23)

The same officers had slightly more sick, injury, and suspension time in 1975. Table 24 indicates that 50 percent of these officers used more sick time in 1975, while only 5 percent had more injury time and 3 percent had more suspension time.

Question 2. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 3-6, Table 23)

Officers hired since 1973 (Rows 5 and 6) used slightly less sick and injury time during their first years in the department than did officers hired earlier. Suspension time was more nearly equal for the two groups.

Question 3. Do officers who have left the department since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 7-9, Table 23)

Officers who resigned, including those who returned, used more sick days than did officers who never left the department. There was almost no difference among the groups in terms of injury time.

Question 1. Do the same officers differ in 1972 and 1975? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 25)

The same officers experienced more automobile accidents as a group in 1975 than in 1972; 19 percent of the officers (Table 26) accounted for the increase. In terms of the other performance indicators, these officers behaved substantially the same at the two times.

Question 2. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired previously? (Rows 3-6, Table 25)

Officers hired in 1974 experienced during their first year of duty more automobile accidents, more chargeable accidents, and more injuries to prisoners than did first year officers hired in 1971. Second year officers hired in 1973 experienced fewer accidents, and fewer chargeable accidents, but more injuries to prisoners than did second year officers hired in 1971.

Question 3. Do officers who have resigned since 1973 differ from those who remained? (Rows 7-9, Table 25)

Officers who resigned and did not return had slightly more automobile accidents than did officers in the other two groups.

Question 1. Do the same officers differ in 1972 and 1975? (Rows 1 and 2, Table 27)

These officers received slightly fewer complaints and commendations in 1975. This finding is repeated in Table 28.

Question 2. Do officers hired since 1973 differ from those hired earlier? (Rows 3-6, Table 27)

More recently hired officers (Rows 5 and 6) experienced fewer complaints and commendations in their first years than did officers hired before 1973 (Rows 3 and 4). They experienced a slightly higher rate of sustained complaints than did officers hired before 1973. This may simply reflect the same change over time seen in Rows 1 and 2.

Question 3. Do officers who resigned differ from those who remained? (Rows 7-9, Table 27)

Officers who resigned and did not return had markedly lower supervisory ratings than did officers in the two other groups. This suggests that not all of these resignations may have been so voluntary as they appeared on paper. Officers who resigned and later returned had substantially more commendations and complaints than did officers in the other two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

We have examined DPD record-based personnel data to evaluate the effect of the HRD on the behavior of officers. Behavior, as indicated by such information, appears not to have changed during the three-year period. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the data was, as with the attitudinal data, the remarkable consistency of behavior over time. Changes, if any, were at the tenth of a percentage point. While it is true that some of the events (firing a weapon) are so rare that there may be a "bottoming effect" (it is so low to begin with that reducing it further is barely discernible), others, such as supervisory ratings, are in a range such that movement would be possible. If it is true that supervisors tend to rate on an extremely limited range, that would tend to reduce the value of supervisory ratings as an indicator of performance. But increasing the quality of supervision, ratings, and rewards was also a goal of the DPD.

In sum, behavior as indicated by available data appears not to have changed.

Table 23

Working Days Lost
(Mean Number of Days)
Patrol Officers Only

Row	Group	Sick Days		Injury Days		Suspension Days		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
1.	Same Officers, 1972	0.98	1.34	0.28	1.83	0.02	0.18	278	6
2.	Same Officers, 1975	1.29	1.50	0.40	4.70	0.05	0.34	276	8
Officers' Experience in 1972[1]									
3.	2 years	1.11	1.13	0.11	0.83	0.04	0.36	153	2
4.	1 year	1.11	1.34	0.10	0.55	0.01	0.04	67	1
Officers' Experience in 1975[2]									
5.	2 years	0.73	0.69	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.19	44	4
6.	1 year	0.84	1.30	0.06	0.30	0.01	0.10	67	3
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]									
7.	Remained	0.67	0.69	0.23	0.10	0.01	0.11	566	0
8.	Resigned by 1976	0.91	0.73	0.10	0.05	0.01	0.05	24	0
9.	Resigned/Returned	0.71	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	14	0

[1] 1972 data.

[2] 1975 data.

Table 24

Comparison of Lost Working Days, 1972 and 1975*

Row	Comparison	Type of Days		
		Sick	Injury	Suspension
1.	Same	12.0	89.1	96.0
2.	More	50.4	5.1	3.0
3.	Less	37.7	5.8	1.0

* Percentages refer to the similarity or difference among the same officers in the two survey years. N=882.

Table 25

Performance Incidents
(Mean Number of Incidents)
Patrol Officers Only

Row	Group	Automobile Accidents		Chargeable Automobile Accidents		Injury to Prisoner		Weapon Fired		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
1.	Same Officers, 1972	0.44	0.64	0.14	0.39	0.07	0.27	0.03	0.17	277	7
2.	Same Officers, 1975	0.38	1.02	0.13	0.36	0.06	0.25	0.00	0.00	278	6
Officers' Experience in 1972[1]											
3.	2 years	0.41	0.63	0.16	0.41	0.09	0.33	0.00	0.00	152	3
4.	1 year	0.46	1.32	0.18	0.39	0.02	0.12	0.00	0.00	66	2
Officers' Experience in 1975[2]											
5.	2 years	0.35	0.72	0.14	0.41	0.16	0.53	0.00	0.00	43	5
6.	1 year	0.62	0.86	0.27	0.45	0.09	0.42	0.00	0.00	66	4
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]											
7.	Remained	0.43	0.66	0.17	0.42	0.09	0.31	0.09	1.47	546	20
8.	Resigned by 1976	0.55	0.91	0.36	0.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	22	2
9.	Resigned/Returned	0.29	0.61	0.07	0.27	0.08	0.28	0.00	0.00	13	1

[1]1972 data.

[2]1975 data.

Table 26

Comparison of Performance Incidents, 1972 and 1975*

Row	Comparison	Type of Incident			
		Automobile Accidents	Chargeable Automobile Accidents	Injury to Prisoner	Weapon Fired
1.	Same	51.3	78.7	88.8	97.0
2.	More	19.1	10.1	5.1	0.0
3.	Less	29.6	11.2	6.1	3.0

* Percentages refer to the similarity and difference among the same officers in the two survey years. N=882.

Table 27

Evaluative Measures
(Mean Value of the Measure)
Patrol Officers Only

Row	Group	Number of Commendations		Number of Complaints		Number of Complaints Sustained		Supervisory Rating		N	Missing Data
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation		
1.	Same Officers, 1972	0.21	0.55	0.28	0.55	0.10	0.33	86.5	4.44	281	3
2.	Same Officers, 1975	0.11	0.43	0.09	0.32	0.06	0.27	86.1	6.61	281	3
Officers' Experience in 1972[1]											
3.	2 years	0.25	0.58	0.20	0.46	0.05	0.24	85.2	7.6	152	3
4.	1 year	0.16	0.54	0.31	0.58	0.13	0.39	84.4	4.1	62	6
Officers' Experience in 1975[2]											
5.	2 years	0.10	0.47	0.15	0.41	0.13	0.33	85.1	1.31	44	4
6.	1 year	0.06	0.29	0.16	0.47	0.10	0.43	85.6	1.87	66	4
Officers Hired Pre-1973[1]											
7.	Remained	0.18	0.51	0.22	0.48	0.09	0.30	86.9	5.10	530	36
8.	Resigned by 1976	0.10	0.30	0.14	0.48	0.10	0.44	80.2	19.09	20	4
9.	Resigned/Returned	0.57	0.94	0.36	0.63	0.21	0.58	84.9	4.65	14	0

[1] 1972 data.

[2] 1975 data.

Table 28

Comparison of Scores on Evaluative Measures, 1972 and 1975*

Row	Comparison	Number of Commendations	Number of Complaints	Number of Complaints Sustained	Supervisory Rating
1.	Same	84.7	73.7	87.5	6.8
2.	More	4.3	4.6	4.3	41.4
3.	Less	11.0	21.7	8.2	51.8

* Percentages refer to the similarity and difference among the same officers in the two survey years.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Inevitably some of what we have presented in this volume will be seen by implication as critical of the DPD. We strongly encourage readers of this volume to read the companion volume, which analyzes the process of change. With candor we make the following three comments. Their purpose is not intended as a palliative to our earlier observations.

First, our respect for Chief Dyson is complete. He has identified most of the critical problems of policing, has conceived programs to deal with them, and has tried to implement those programs. We view Chief Dyson as one of the brightest, most capable police administrators in the country, by a wide margin.

Second, The Book has not yet been written on how to innovate in or change an organization. Most of the literature is simplistic, compared with the real world of conflict, resistances, vested interests, etc., with which administrators are confronted as they try to make their organizations responsive to a changing society.

Finally, The School has yet to be developed for chiefs. The turnover of chiefs in large cities is appalling. No system exists to train new chiefs or promising executives in the police field; there are almost no apprenticeships. Identifying a successor and preparing him or her for leadership is practically unheard of.

Each new chief must learn anew how to deal with the press. Each new chief must learn anew how to deal with the intricacies of bureaucratic interaction. Each new chief must learn anew how to deal with police associations and unions. And each chief must learn anew and alone how short the euphoric "honeymoon" of the new appointment can be. Finally, each developing police association will have to learn how to manage conflict, the rules of conflict, and the trade-offs involved in a war of all against all.

The goals of the Dallas program were meritorious, and the methods to achieve those public service goals were visionary. Chief Dyson's plans have lost little in the passage of time. But, as this evaluation reflects, there has been little change in three years in the measured attitudes and performance of Dallas police officers.

One could argue convincingly that it is still too early to expect most of the effects to have occurred. That may well be true. It may be true in part because some of the programs were implemented only very recently. It could also be true that future effects, if there are any, will be the result of both specific innovative programs and the fact that the DPD is a much wiser and more skillful organization now than it was in 1971.

For, although the empirical findings show no changes--and we have confidence in those findings (they confirm our impressions)--we have

additional impressions that the DPD has changed substantially and now has skills and knowledge it did not have in 1971. Managers and supervisors at all levels have gained skills, experience, and wisdom since then. Officers, in general, are more accustomed to new ideas and practices. The department continues to attempt change. Decentralization, for example, is expanding.

As outside observers, we have watched sophistication develop at all levels and in many areas. The process of the last five years has taught so many people so many lessons that, in our judgment, the department now has the capacity to work toward many of the goals earlier posited for the DPD. (We don't mean to be overly optimistic; we are well aware that those skills also could be used to work toward goals considerably alien to those the PF originally funded.)

The program that the DPD attempted was extraordinarily difficult. It now seems unquestionable that an effort at personnel reform raises an extremely complex and volatile set of issues. The more comprehensive such change is, the more politically sensitive it becomes in the internal dynamics of an organization. A person's work is simply very important to that individual: It leads to definition of self; it provides the wherewithal to accomplish other goals; it determines the amount of free time a person will have; it provides a major network of friends. In many respects, a person "is" what he or she does. Efforts to modify the work a person does, where he or she does it, with whom, and with what equipment, are of great personal importance to incumbents. It is known that people will resist individually and in groups: they will strike, destroy equipment, and literally fight when their work is somehow threatened, appears to be threatened, or even is improved in ways they cannot foresee or understand.

The Dallas proposal was a conprehensive effort at such change. The very nature of incumbents' jobs and the coworkers with whom they did them would change. The status of groups relative to each other would change. Ultimately some units would be eliminated. Most persons, at least theoretically, were meant to benefit through the increased status of patrol and increased opportunities for advancement, but the ways in which they were to benefit were unclear to many of them. "Flattening the organization" (reducing levels of management) meant that <u>something</u> had to happen to managers in the disappearing levels. Most of those managers were nowhere near retirement and they felt a vested interest in the current structure. The breakup of the Central Investigation Division was planned. The end of the academy was anticipated. These groups, too, represented significant vested interests.

The point is, the Dallas plan was an implicit and explicit challenge to many powerful and established groups. The plan would directly threaten the existence of subunits of an organization. It would threaten established routines of the organization both internally and in its relationship to other government units. The leadership of the DPD attempted to manage this change while still inexperienced and while attempting to manage the influx of millions of dollars from LEAA. Finally, the DPD attempted to

do this while struggling to define a relationship with a funding agency, the Police Foundation, which at that time was in its infancy and was communicating its expectations unclearly. Frequent turnover of foundation personnel during the first year added to the confusion of the relationship.

The question that we are sure to be asked by Police Foundation board members, staff of the DPD, former staff of the DPD, civilians who entered the DPD and now have dispersed, and staff of the Police Foundation who were affected is, "Was it worth it?"

The cost was great.

Many people went through great stress; some suffered physical and psychological reactions.

Careers in many organizations were affected, many quite negatively; several of those were damaged to the point that people were forced to leave policing (whether from the DPD, the Police Foundation, or SMU). Other people survived the conflict quite well; many went on to successful careers, some in policing, others in universities, others in consulting firms, others in a variety of endeavors.

The Police Foundation invested close to $2,500,000 in the program and evaluation.

The Dallas Police Department and the city government invested enormous personnel resources in the program effort and in the evaluations.

In some respects the answer to the question is discouraging. With the exception of increasing the educational level of personnel, few relevant changes in attitude and behavior were noted in the empirical evaluation.

On the other hand, the DPD is quite different now from what it was in 1971. Some of the changes we have noted are:

It deals easily with consulting agencies, universities, researchers, and other outside groups. There is little fear that it will be overwhelmed.

It has developed the skill of collecting and managing data. (We suggest that management use of these data is still in its infancy, but all police departments are confronted with that.)

It has developed an experienced pool of young administrators who have considerable experience in managing innovation and anticipating and managing resistances.

It has publicly committed itself, through minority recruitment, receipt of complaints, and decentralization, to increased civility in its relations with all citizens. We

have no doubt that racist attitudes persist, but a public commitment has been made to, and organizational behavior is oriented toward, increased civility.

It continues to discover that many early concepts and plans drawn up by pre-OPA, OPA/MSB, and SMU staffs were well thought out, had potential for development, and were the products of reasonable people who were at best idealistic and bright, and at worst, politically naive.

It has implemented some of the plans, especially in the academy and the personnel division.

It knows that it can manage innovations, but in small doses and through the existing structure.

It continues to decentralize decisionmaking, and forces people to make decisions.

It has learned to deal with the press, regarding specific program issues, with skill.

It has changed personnel and leadership, but maintained goals. Chief Dyson's encouragement of Chief Byrd to return to Dallas and the relatively smooth transition from Chief Dyson's leadership to Chief Byrd's was important. In retrospect, given the level of conflict in the DPD, the transition was surprisingly quiet. It was disruptive for the careers of many people, but it was a relatively short and crisis-free administrative shift.

It has raised a leadership group that learned to work comfortably in a turbulent atmosphere and manage the administrative changes with skill.

It has continued to try to improve public service through decentralization of functions.

It has continued existing programs and developed additional ones aimed at improving recruitment, training, and maintenance of personnel.

In sum, the Dallas Police Department has changed during the past five years. Clearly, it has not changed as much as had been hoped. What we have learned is that change is a slow process, complex and at times painful. Five years <u>is</u> a short time. Institutions, organizations, and people change slowly.

In response to the question "Was it worth it?" we can only say that there are times when attempts to learn to change, to increase the effectiveness of an organization are simply very, very expensive in both human and financial terms.

There is no doubt that starts have been made in Dallas toward learning and changing. Perhaps many of the costs were inevitable, given the nature of the problem and the breadth of the solutions attempted. The lessons to be learned from this attempt have not been lost either on the actors or on the institutions involved. Those lessons perhaps can help others in policing across the country to attempt change more manageably and to manage change better. If they do, $2.5 million may have been a modest price.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Job Satisfaction Factors and Item Loadings, 1973 and 1976[1]

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_1: Satisfaction with supervisor		
Supervisor top notch*	-.836	-.818
Supervisor poor manager*	.762	.776
Supervisor doesn't listen	.743	.734
Mutual misunderstanding with supervisor	.741	.729
Supervisor not adequately trained*	.762	.717
Supervisor offers support	-.731	-.685
F_2: Satisfaction with work roles		
Enjoy the work*	.766	.800
Job is interesting*	.745	.786
Dislikes job*	-.752	-.732
Satisfaction from doing job well	.656	.721
No sense of achievement	-.608	-.702
Feeling of accomplishment	.694	.691
F_3: Satisfaction with promotion opportunity		
Based on wrong criteria*	-.706	.781
Dislikes promotion decision process*	-.630	.779
Highest qualified promoted*	.774	-.768
Best aren't promoted	.630	.746

1. Each item describes a characteristic of some facet of the job and each allows for a response varying from "strongly agree" (scored "1") to "strongly disagree" (scored "6"). The items presented are those which were used in both the 1973 and 1976 questionnaires. In 1973, 62 items were used to measure job satisfaction; in 1976, 35 of these same items were selected for use on the basis of the factor analysis at Time 1. At both times, the procedure was a principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores at T_1 and T_2.

	Factors and Items	Loadings	
		1973	1976
F_4:	Satisfaction with top management[2]		
	Policies communicated clearly*	.681	.738
	Management informs about changes*	.663	.736
	Keeps personnel in dark*	-.651	-.685
	Policies not clear cut	-.609	-.665
F_5:	Satisfaction with recognition for accomplishment[3]		
	Not enough recognition*	.704	.776
	Nobody notices good job*	.718	.723
	Not enough praise	.683	.709
	Not enough credit*	.772	-.708**
F_6:	Satisfaction with job security[4]		
	Easily lose job*	.753	.823
	Not secure about job*	.734	.723
	Position could only be lost by serious mistake*	-.594	-.683
F_7:	Satisfaction with pay[5]		
	Satisfied with salary*	.825	.880
	Salary is good*	.814	.873
	Not comparable to civilian pay*	-.660	-.647
F_8:	Satisfaction with job autonomy		
	Own boss in work situations*	.763	.751
	Make own decisions about work*	.757	.792

2. This was F_4 at Time 1 and F_5 at Time 2.
3. This was F_5 at Time 1 and F_4 at Time 2.
4. This was F_6 at Time 1 and F_7 at Time 2.
5. This was F_7 at Time 1 and F_6 at Time 2.

**Item reversed at Time 2.

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	1976
F_9: Satisfaction with personal advancement[6]		
Is getting ahead	.545	

6. This was a one-item factor at Time 1 which did not emerge at Time 2.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores at T_1 and T_2.

Variance and Eigenvalues of
Job Satisfaction Factors

		% Factor Variance	% Total Variance	Eigenvalue
F_1:	Satisfaction with supervisor			
	1973	20.6	12.0	13.9
	1976	19.2	11.8	7.9
F_2:	Satisfaction with work roles			
	1973	14.0	8.2	5.1
	1976	18.0	11.0	3.4
F_3:	Satisfaction with promotion opportunities			
	1973	11.2	6.5	4.2
	1976	13.9	8.5	2.5
F_4:	Satisfaction with top management			
	1973	9.7	5.7	2.4
	1976	10.8	6.6	1.6
F_5:	Satisfaction with recognition			
	1973	8.5	5.0	2.0
	1976	11.7	7.2	1.9
F_6:	Satisfaction with job security			
	1973	8.2	4.8	1.8
	1976	8.8	5.4	1.4
F_7:	Satisfaction with pay			
	1973	6.7	3.9	1.5
	1976	10.3	6.3	1.5
F_8:	Satisfaction with job autonomy			
	1973	5.3	3.1	1.3
	1976	8.8	5.4	1.2

APPENDIX B

Work Orientation Factors and Item Loadings, 1973 and 1976[1]

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_1: Sensitivity to community judgment		
Community leaders judge*	.824	.859
Judges judge*	.781	.820
Attorneys judge*	.780	.771
Citizens judge	.714	.738
F_2: Concern with work mobility		
Recognition by supervisors as goal*	.791	.604
Promotion as goal*	.781	.678
High income as goal*	.673	.691
Recognition by fellow officers as goal	.612	.509
F_3: Service orientation		
Service to community as goal*	.723	.714
Helping people important*	.680	.671
Responsiveness to needs of area*	.559	.536
F_4: Concern with increased standards		
Increase educational requirements*	.789	.789
Enhance professionalism*	.735	.787
F_5: Peer evaluation[2]		
Fellow officers judge		.787
Recognition by fellow officers		.611

1. The items presented are all those used in 1973 and again in 1976 to measure work orientations. At both times the procedure used was a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. See Appendix D-3 for source of items.

2. This factor emerged at Time 2 but not at Time 1.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores at T_1 and T_2.

Variance and Eigenvalues of
Work Orientation Factors

	% Factor Variance	% Total Variance	Eigenvalue
F_1: Sensitivity to community judgment			
1973	26.0	15.0	3.3
1976	31.8	18.1	3.3
F_2: Concern with work mobility			
1973	20.6	11.9	2.1
1976	21.3	12.1	2.1
F_3: Service orientation			
1973	16.7	9.7	1.4
1976	16.1	9.1	1.4
F_4: Concern with increased standards			
1973	13.4	7.7	1.4
1976	15.7	8.9	1.3

Source of Items for Work Orientation Factors

Items	Source
Community leaders judge Judges judge Attorneys judge Citizens judge Fellow officers judge	"How important do you think the judgment of each of these groups should be in evaluating the performance of police officers?" Scored "very important" (1) to "very unimportant" (6).
Promotion as goal High income as goal Recognition by fellow officers as goal Recognition by supervisors as goal Service to community as goal	"How important is it to you to achieve or attain each of the following things in your job as a police officer?" Scored "very important" (1) to "very unimportant" (6).
Increase educational requirements	"Educational requirements to become a police officer ought to be raised." Scored "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (6).
Enhance professionalism	"What the Police Department needs is a general increase in the level of professionalism." Scored "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (6).
Helping people important	"Helping people with their problems should be an important part of police work." Scored "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (6).
Responsiveness to needs of area	"Please indicate how important you think each of these factors should be as an indicator of a 'good' police officer." Scored "much more important than it now is" (1) to "much less important than it now is" (6).

APPENDIX C

Work Attitude Factors and Item Loadings, 1973 and 1976[1]

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_1: Dedication		
Dedication of officers impressive*	.781	.774
High level of idealism encouraging*	.701	.663
People in department have calling*	.645	.638
Officers believe in work	.569	.650
F_2: Status of patrol		
Give up streets for administration*	.729	.734
Want promotion without leaving beat*	.711	.790
Always work patrol division	.564	.349
Can leave streets if promoted	-.558	-.426
Improve rank working beat*	.503	.623
F_3: Work autonomy[2]		
Own boss in work situations*	.826	.786
Make own decisions about work*	.813	.858
F_4: Peer evaluation[3]		
Officers decide promotions better than supervisors*	.815	.746
Evaluation by fellow officers*	.779	.799

1. Each item reflects an attitude toward the work situation or toward the performance of the job. Each item allows for a response ranging from "strongly agree" (scored "1") to "strongly disagree" (scored "6"). The items presented are those which were used in both the 1973 and 1976 questionnaires. At both times, a principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation was used to determine the factors.

2. This was F_3 at Time 1 and F_4 at Time 2.

3. This was F_4 at Time 1 and F_5 at Time 2.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores at T_1 and T_2.

	Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_5:	Opportunistic law enforcement[4]		
	Best strategy is avoid unnecessary contacts*	.788	.771
	Don't be overly strict; avoid "heat"	.774	.788
F_6:	Tempered law enforcement		
	Bend the law sometimes*	.798	.763
	All laws enforced	-.764	-.759

4. This was F_5 at Time 1 and F_3 at Time 2.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores at T_1 and T_2.

APPENDIX D

General Attitude Factors and Item Loadings, 1973 and 1976[1]

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_1: Tolerance of ambiguity[2]		
People are honest or crooked*	.710	.822
People are weak or strong*	.699	.819
Women are pure or bad*	.663	.719
People are for or against truth	.613	.741
F_2: Faith in people[3]		
People try to be fair*	.732	.720
Typical person is concerned about others*	.658	.732
Most people can be trusted*	.626	.761
People look out for themselves	-.624	-.580
Most people are basically honest	-.600	.828
F_3: Religiosity		
Bible is God's word*	.831	.839
Know God really exists*	.776	.812
Religious truth is higher than others*	.733	.745
F_4: Self regard		
Need more respect for self*	.640	.735
Wish someone would help solve personal problems*	.562	.780
Don't have much to be proud of	.529	.422

1. Each item expresses an attitude and each allows for a response ranging from "strongly agree" (scored "1") to "strongly disagree" (scored "6"). The items presented are those which were used in both the 1973 and 1976 questionnaire. At both times, a principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation was used.

2. This was F_1 at Time 1 and F_2 at Time 2.

3. This was F_2 at Time 1 and F_1 at Time 2.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores.

Factors and Items	Loadings 1973	Loadings 1976
F_5: Freedom for youth[4]		
Obedience and respect for authority*	.661	.678
Young people should have strict discipline	.643	.778
Young people should get over rebellious ideas	.624	.125
F_6: Victim responsibility		
Assault victims invite attack*	.820	.855
Rape victims bring attack*	.805	.866

4. This was F_5 at Time 1 and F_6 at Time 2.

*Indicates items used to construct factor-based scores.

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