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**Jail Removal in the States:
Where Do We Stand?**



Jail Removal in the States

Where Do We Stand?

Section 223(a)(14) of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, as amended, stipulates that no youth shall be detained or confined in any adult jail or lockup. The jail removal provision of the Act represents an attempt to reduce the trauma associated with preadjudicatory detention, since studies and experience have shown that youths are more likely to suffer physical and emotional abuse when they are held in adult secure settings than when they are placed in secure juvenile facilities. In order to assist states as they work to attain the objectives of the Act, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has provided formula grant money which can be used for removal planning and program development.

State officials have worked very hard in recent years to accomplish jail removal. Some, for example, have been able to design and implement innovative removal programs which have reduced juvenile jailings significantly. Others have relied on legislation which specifically prohibits juvenile jailings. But regardless of the strategy, programs continue to be developed and removal continues to progress.

The following pages summarize briefly the status of these removal efforts. Jailing data are reviewed in an attempt to determine the nation's overall rate of success, and some of the more innovative programs that have helped reduce jailings are highlighted. This information should give one a sense of the improvements which have been made around the country as well as the importance that creative planning has in solving juvenile jailing problems.

THE DATA

Despite the importance which jailing data play in understanding the removal problem, it is indeed quite ironic that so little of such data actually exists. Because of the sporadic nature of data collection efforts and differing definitions and collection periods between surveys, it is difficult to assess the actual national progress made in jail removal since the implementation of the JJDP Act. Although each participating state is required to collect jailing data in order to measure compliance with the Act, varying survey periods and techniques do not necessarily make the data comparable.

Yet a source of information does exist which, when carefully scrutinized, provides a gauge to measure the number of juveniles placed in adult jails around the nation. This source is the Bureau of Justice Statistics' periodic one-day census of United States jail inmates. Because the

census includes persons of juvenile status, one can make an educated guess as to how many juveniles are being held in jails, based on the BJS count of juveniles in county jails for the two most recent censuses conducted on February 15, 1978, and June 30, 1983. Although this database still has limitations (i.e., it cannot be extrapolated to represent a year, the definition of "juvenile" varies between states, and the census is a self-reporting survey), it does provide clues about the aggregate trend in juvenile jailings.*

Table One compares the data gathered from the 1978 and 1983 jail census. It appears that the actual number of juveniles jailed, according to the BJS one-day count, has increased slightly — by about eight percent, from 1,611 to 1,736. Yet such a strict interpretation of the data may be somewhat misleading. Together New York and Florida account for 36 percent of the 1983 jailings, and they show a 400 percent increase over their 1978 total. When their jailing figures are removed from the totals, there is actually a 26 percent decrease for the remaining states.

The reason for the drastic rise in juvenile jailings in New York and Florida is difficult to ascertain, but is probably tied to the number of juveniles tried in adult court in those states. The 1983 BJS *Jail Census* defines a juvenile as a person subject to juvenile court jurisdiction based on age and offense limitations of state law. Qualifying youths were thus still considered juveniles in the census even though state codes in New York and Florida allow the processing of certain persons under the age of majority in adult court. It is likely that the jailing increase was due to a larger number of youths being tried in adult court in these states. As legal adults, technically they could be held in an adult jail without violating the removal requirements of the JJDP Act.

It is clear from Table One that the number of jailings fluctuated across the country, with no region recording fewer jailings than another. Figure One standardizes the 1983 jailing rate according to juvenile population and shows that there were no regional biases. Interestingly enough, the states traditionally considered "rural" registered both high and low jailing rates (e.g., Idaho versus Nevada). Conversely, states with high urban populations are also represented at both ends of the scale. This seems to suggest that the rural areas, usually regarded as having the greatest jailing problems, have been able in some instances to reduce juvenile jailings significantly.

The BJS data also indicate that 28 of the 46 reporting states (61 percent) reduced their number of juvenile

*It should also be pointed out that the BJS data are not used by the states to indicate their progress toward compliance with the JJDP Act. In fact, the BJS study counts *all* juveniles detained in adult jails, while monitoring data include only those juveniles who would represent violations of the Act (e.g., those held longer than six hours in a jail or lockup). Furthermore, the BJS *Jail Census* does not include lockups in its survey.

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Table One

A ONE DAY COUNT OF JUVENILES IN ADULT JAILS

Region and State	1978	1983	Rank 1983	Percent Change 1978-1983	Jailings Per 100,000 Youths		Rank Per 100,000 Youths	
					1978	1983	1978	1983
Northeast	99	319		222				
Maine	6	18	24	300	2.5	7.4	24	12
Massachusetts	0	0	43	*	0	0	43	43
New Hampshire	8	6	37	-25	4.1	3.1	19	22
New Jersey	0	15	27	*	0	1.0	43	38
New York	84	277	2	230	2.4	7.8	27	10
Pennsylvania	1	3	40	200	0.1	0.1	42	42
North Central	515	338		-34				
Illinois	23	30	14	30	1.0	1.3	37	36
Indiana	152	133	3	-13	12.7	11.1	7	6
Iowa	10	11	32	10	1.7	1.8	33	28
Kansas	64	23	19	-64	13.7	4.9	5	18
Michigan	21	10	34	-52	1.0	0.5	37	40
Minnesota	13	13	29	0	1.5	1.5	34	31
Missouri	20	22	21	10	2.0	2.2	30	27
Nebraska	38	27	17	-29	11.7	8.3	9	8
North Dakota	1	7	36	600	0.7	5.1	39	17
Ohio	88	29	16	-67	3.8	1.3	21	36
South Dakota	23	6	37	-74	15.6	4.1	3	19
Wisconsin	62	27	17	-57	6.1	2.7	15	24
South	669	840		26				
Alabama	22	12	30	-46	2.5	1.4	24	33
Arkansas	57	62	6	9	11.5	12.5	10	5
District of Columbia	0	23	19	*	0	21.1	43	2
Florida	42	355	1	745	1.9	19.8	31	3
Georgia	9	1	42	-89	0.7	0.1	39	41
Kentucky	60	59	7	-2	7.5	7.4	13	12
Louisiana	15	6	37	-60	1.5	0.6	34	39
Maryland	0	36	11	*	0	4.1	43	19
Mississippi	68	16	25	-77	11.3	2.7	11	24
North Carolina	32	22	21	-35	2.5	1.7	24	30
Oklahoma	28	51	8	82	4.5	8.2	18	9
South Carolina	34	16	25	-53	4.8	2.3	17	26
Tennessee	61	30	14	-51	6.3	3.1	14	22
Texas	64	48	9	-25	2.1	1.5	29	31
Virginia	155	103	4	-34	13.9	9.2	4	7
West Virginia	22	0	43	-100	5.3	0	16	43
West	328	239		-27				
Alaska	1	3	40	200	1.1	3.3	36	21
Arizona	17	34	12	100	3.3	6.6	22	15
California	113	64	5	-58	2.4	1.4	27	33
Colorado	23	8	35	-65	3.9	1.4	20	33
Idaho	41	38	10	-7	19.2	17.8	2	4
Montana	20	11	32	-45	11.9	6.6	8	15
Nevada	16	12	31	-25	10.0	7.5	12	11
New Mexico	39	22	21	-44	12.8	7.3	6	14
Oregon	17	0	43	-100	3.2	0	23	43
Utah	1	0	43	-100	0.3	0	41	43
Washington	16	15	27	-6	1.9	1.8	31	28
Wyoming	24	32	13	33	23.9	31.8	1	1
United States	1611	1736		8	3.4	3.7		

*Not defineable.

"Jailings per 100,000" . . . is the number of jailed youths per 100,000 5 to 17 year olds.

Data were unavailable for Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont

Source: BJS Jail Census

Jail Removal in the States

jailings, and 16 (or 35 percent) reported an increase. These figures are somewhat misleading, however, because certain states reported very few jailings. For example, Pennsylvania had an increase in jailings between jail censuses. However, the change was nearly inconsequential given the size of the juvenile population — one jailing in 1978 versus three in 1983. If we were to include all those states with a difference of two cases or less in our definition of "no significant change in juvenile jailings," then the number of states reporting increases is reduced to 11 of the 46.

The net reduction in jailings is summarized in Figure Two. From the map it is clear that jailing rate decreases are not concentrated in any single area of the country; rather they are found throughout. This is probably due to the fact that a large number of states have made jail removal a priority. Many state planning agencies have formed task forces, collected data, or devised action plans for removing youths from adult jails. Their efforts could well be reflected in the data.


But the BJS data also suggest that in many states efforts to reduce juvenile jailings have been stalled or are nonexistent. Although the reasons for the jailings cannot be determined from the BJS information, the placement of

juveniles in adult settings remains a major source of concern.

Still, based on what the census data show, it appears that juvenile jailings around the country are declining. A majority of states reported lower jailing figures for the 1983 census than they did in 1978. This trend continued as the December 1985 JJDP Act substantial compliance deadline approached, and participating states increased their jail removal planning activities in order to meet the deadline. Recently passed removal legislation in several states should also help reduce juvenile jailings even further. But although we can look forward to even greater progress, much remains to be accomplished before total success can be claimed.

STATE AND NATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Major reductions in juvenile jailings do not happen overnight. A state wishing to eliminate its jailing problems must generate a strong commitment to a removal



philosophy first, which means that statewide public education campaigns must often accompany its attempts to implement creative programs and services. What follows is a brief description of some of the most successful and innovative jail removal programs around the country.

The National Jail Removal Initiative

The National Jail Removal Initiative (JRI) was a planning and evaluation project designed to help rural jurisdictions remove youths from adult jails and lockups. In 1981 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provided 23 sites in 13 states with a total of \$5.3 million to assist them in developing alternative placement settings. The sites shared several characteristics unique to rural jurisdictions which had prevented removal plan development, including low population densities, limited use of secure and nonsecure alternatives, depressed local economic conditions, low tax bases, and lengthy transportation distances. Each site was awarded approximately


\$200,000 to overcome these obstacles and implement removal plans.

The JRI was a two-phased project. Phase I, the plan development stage, involved organizing a task force, defining problems, and conducting both a resource inventory and a needs assessment. During Phase II removal plans were implemented, monitored, and then evaluated extensively. Data on nearly 50,000 juveniles were gathered during the project.

Before the Initiative the participating sites had little access to either secure or nonsecure juvenile detention, they had no intake screening units, and they did not use specific and objective detention criteria. Once appropriate alternative services were established, however, many jurisdictions were able to reduce juvenile jailings significantly. Across all 23 sites, the number of jailings decreased by 55 percent (see Table Two); after adjusting for a decreased number of intakes, there still was a 45 percent decrease in jailings during Phase II. This decrease was doubly impressive considering that the sites did not simply substitute secure detention for jail to solve their jailing problems. The number of youths placed in secure juvenile detention remained virtually the same, and the net increase in secure detention placements — i.e., in the portion of youths entering the system that were placed in

JUVENILE JAILINGS 1978 vs. 1983

Figure Two



SOURCE: 1983 Jail Census

Jail Removal in the States

secure detention — rose from seven percent preceding the Initiative to eight percent afterwards.

Perhaps the most encouraging outcome of the JRI, however, was the fact that the overall decrease in secure placements (both jail and secure juvenile detention) was accompanied by an increase in nonsecure placements and outright release. Apparently intake workers felt that with appropriate alternatives available, many of those youths previously jailed could be better served in a less restrictive environment. It was also clear that before the Initiative many youths were held in secure custody simply because local officials felt they had to do something — and there were no other options available.

By the end of the Initiative's reporting period, eight of the sites had achieved 100 percent removal. Of the remaining 15, all but one had some degree of success, with juvenile jailings decreasing by 23 to 98 percent over pre-Initiative figures.

There are many reasons for the varying degree of success achieved by the participants. The sites that accomplished total removal, however, shared a few common characteristics, one or more of which were missing from the programs of less successful jurisdictions. For example, the sites achieving total removal established fully functional intake screening units where trained personnel used specific and objective detention criteria to determine appropriate placements. Whenever intake workers made all placement decisions, the site was able to reduce the number of inappropriate placements and control admissions to jail and/or alternative services. The intake criteria they developed also reduced the degree of subjectivity used in making detention decisions, while still allowing enough discretion for intake workers to choose the least restrictive setting. As a result, these sites usually made fewer secure placements, while at the same time increasing the number of nonsecure placements and releases.

Yet some sites with 24-hour intake centers were still unable to control placements because they lacked full cooperation from law enforcement. The intake unit was designed to relieve law enforcement agencies from the responsibility of making detention decisions. Many times, however, local law enforcement would contact intake *after* they had put a youth in jail. Consequently, even though a site's intake unit was fully functional and local police were aware of its role in the initial screening process, for one reason or another juveniles were still being jailed. As a result, many projects were less than completely successful despite the fact that local officials had carefully planned and implemented a number of alternative programs and services. It became clear right from the start that total control over the initial placement decision was the single most important contributing factor to a jail removal program's success.

Availability of secure juvenile detention, whether on-site or through purchase-of-care agreements, was

another integral component of a successful removal plan. The Phase I needs assessment usually indicated that a certain portion of each jurisdiction's intake population would be eligible for secure detention. Unfortunately, the sites that had no access to a secure juvenile detention center or other acceptable alternative were forced to place serious offenders in the local jail or lockup.

But even for those sites with access to secure detention, removal plans were incomplete without a core of alternatives. Most participating jurisdictions had very few placement options to choose from before the Initiative. Consequently, during Phase I local officials carefully planned and negotiated a number of regional service agreements which substantially expanded each site's limited resources. The project's success in this area is summarized in Table Three, which shows, for example, that before the Initiative only five sites had access to nonsecure alternatives. By the end of the JRI, however, nonsecure options were available in 20 of the 23 participating sites.

These features formed the basis of all well-planned removal efforts and were common to all successful sites. Other aspects of successful programs included (1) a set of written policies and procedures to guide decision-making throughout the juvenile justice network; (2) close monitoring of the plan and placement decisions by local planners; and (3) active community support in the form of ample local funding and the participation of leading community members and police and court officials in program planning. Sites who neglected any of these features were generally less effective than desired in meeting their goals.

It became clear right from the start that total control over the initial placement decision was the single most important contributing factor to a jail removal program's success.

Programs for removing juveniles from adult jails are often resisted by local citizens and public officials who are concerned for the safety of the community. Their fears are based on the idea that juveniles previously locked behind bars will be turned loose to continue delinquent behavior before adjudicatory and dispositional action is taken. Yet results from the JRI indicate that these fears are not well grounded. For example, the predispositional rearrest rate, used during the JRI as a measure of the increased threat that release poses to the community, actually decreased from 3.9 percent to 2.1 percent of all intakes. The threat to the court process as measured by the rate of failure-to-appear for hearings was also negligible. In fact, despite the increase in nonsecure placements and releases, the failure-to-appear rate remained virtually the same — 2.6 percent prior to the JRI versus 3.0 during it.

Many officials involved in the Initiative were also concerned that the number of inappropriate placements

The National Jail Removal Initiative
CHANGES IN JAILING RATES

Table Two

Placement Setting	Preceding Initiative*		During Initiative**		Percentage Change	Adjusted Change***
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
Adult Jail	8,955	32.5	4,029	18.0	-55.0	-44.6
Secure Juvenile Detention	1,815	6.6	1,825	8.1	+0.5	+19.5
Total Secure Placements	10,770	39.1	5,854	26.1	-45.6	-32.9
Nonsecure Detention	707	2.6	2,407	10.7	+240.4	+318.6
Release	16,040	58.3	14,118	63.1	-11.9	+8.2
Totals	27,517		22,379		-18.7	

*January 1, 1980-December 31, 1980.

**July 1, 1982-June 30, 1983 — the last four reporting quarters of the JRI.

***Presents percentage increase or decrease after adjusting for the decrease in intakes.

The National Jail Removal Initiative
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE NETWORK

Table Three

Type of Service	Number of Sites with Option	
	Pre Initiative	Initiative
24 Hour Intake Screening and Criteria	1	23
Crisis Intervention	1	23
Secure Juvenile Detention:		
Facility	7	10
Intensive Supervision in Shelter	0	5
Attendee Program in Shelter	0	1
Attendee Program in Jail	0	1
Shelter Home	9	20
Emergency Foster Care	7	9
Home Detention	0	3
Multi-Service Center (intake, court, shelter, crisis hold)	0	8
Alcohol/Drug Program:		
Counseling	2	5
Detox	1	4
Transportation	8	23
Counselor Supervision	0	21

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would increase as youths were transferred from jail to the newly created alternatives. This practice, dubbed "net widening" by researchers and planners, did in fact occur in several Initiative jurisdictions, but not to the extent originally feared. Overall, the number of inappropriate detentions dropped during the JRI, except for nonsecure settings. But the rise of inappropriate placements was probably less due to unwise placement practices as much as to the fact that nonsecure placement options were twice as available as they were before. Before the JRI, placement officials often did not have the opportunity to use nonsecure detention. Whether the placement was appropriate was beside the point. Apparently once the alternatives were established, it was deemed better to hold a youth occasionally in temporary nonsecure detention pending further arrangements than to place that same person in an adult setting. Therefore, while net widening did technically exist, the burden on the system which often accompanies the practice did not materialize.

The Initiative concluded in 1984, but many sites sought funding to continue providing alternative pretrial services and programs. Fortunately many were successful, and as a result a large number of sites were able to offer alternatives to adult jail beyond the JRI's termination.

The JRI also became a catalyst for longer-term removal efforts in many states. The lessons learned during the Initiative, both by participants and OJJDP, were useful in planning similar or expanded programs. Perhaps the most useful and significant of these was that the idea of secure detention need not be the only alternative to adult jails. Most of the juveniles being placed in adult facilities do not require intensive security and can better served in less restrictive settings.

Pennsylvania

In the mid-1970's the State of Pennsylvania had a serious jailing problem: as many as 3,600 juveniles were being jailed in a single year. After State justice planners began active removal planning, however, the State quickly became a leader in complying with the Act. By the mid-1980's the number of annual jailings had been reduced to none.

A key to the State's success was early passage of jail removal legislation. In 1977 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law which prohibited the holding of juveniles in an adult jail or lockup. The law was a valuable tool for those who wanted to convince local officials that the State was sincere about removal.

After law was passed, however, local planners, sheriffs, and justice officials were not left to struggle with the removal issues by themselves. Instead, State personnel worked closely with local officials to develop regional removal plans that took maximum advantage of the State's limited resources. For example, the plan called for

the development of a network of community-based alternatives such as emergency foster care, rather than relying on adult jail for temporary placement. In areas that lacked their own juvenile detention facilities, the plan called for a transportation system so that local officials could arrange to send their more serious offenders to an appropriate secure juvenile facility nearby.

To provide an incentive for counties to increase their reliance on alternatives to secure detention, State reimbursement for pretrial detention is placed on nonsecure settings. For example, 50 percent of a county's cost for detaining a youth in secure detention is reimbursed, while 90 percent of shelter care is reimbursed. Although home detention is not reimbursed, its daily cost is only one-quarter that of the reimbursed secure detention rate. Obviously it is cheaper for counties to rely on the least restrictive alternatives.

The study showed that jail removal did not cause serious overcrowding problems for detention facility administrators, and that after implementation, attitudes toward the new program changed dramatically from resentment to acceptance, and even outright enthusiasm. Also, the study indicated that economic factors (specifically, the way the program was funded) were a key to the jailing reduction.

An unanticipated result of the plan was the effect on juvenile secure detention placements. Not only did jailings decrease to none, but secure juvenile detention was also down by about 30 percent. Even though secure juvenile detention was a major component of the plan (three new facilities were built and four were renovated), discretion by placement officials and the incentives provided by the funding mechanism combined to reduce substantially all use of secure detention. In fact, two of the juvenile facilities have been closed because of reduced demand.

A study was conducted by Virginia Commonwealth University to examine what effect the jail removal program in Pennsylvania had on the entire State's juvenile justice system. One question raised in the study was whether existing facilities became overcrowded as a result of the new policy prohibiting jailings. Officials were also concerned whether or not local officials would resent the transportation network and general regionalization of services. The study showed that jail removal did not cause serious overcrowding problems for detention facility administrators, and that after implementation, attitudes toward the new program changed dramatically from resentment to acceptance, and even outright enthusiasm. Also, the study indicated that economic factors (specifically, the way the program was funded) were a key to the jailing reduction.

Michigan

Michigan had a serious problem with pretrial placement in the State's Upper Peninsula region. A lack of secure detention services and lengthy transportation distances meant that hundreds of youths were being jailed each year. However, only about one-half of those jailed were held longer than 24 hours. In fact, careful scrutiny of the 1981 detention data revealed that only about 23 percent of those being jailed required any sort of secure detention, with most needing only short-term supervision. Based on these findings, the State decided to implement a series of regional alternative services to provide low cost predispositional custodial care.

The major components of the system were the nonsecure holdover network, a home detention program, and transportation services to a regional detention center downstate. The nonsecure holdover network was developed because of the short length-of-stay for many Upper Peninsula cases. The holdovers provide a short-term custody option (up to 16 hours) for youths requiring placement pending their preliminary hearing. Counties wanting to set up a holdover need only designate a room in an existing public building where youth attendants could provide the necessary supervision. Once the holdover location is approved, the county will be reimbursed for the cost of the holdover attendant's wages.

If the court decides after the preliminary hearing that only a limited amount of supervision is needed to insure the youth's appearance at the dispositional hearing, then a youth may be returned home to be supervised by "quasi volunteers" under a home detention contract. Under this alternative program, the volunteer home detention worker makes daily contact with the youth, his or her parents, school officials, etc., to make sure that the terms of the contract are being fulfilled. Supervisors are paid ten dollars for each day they are directly providing such services.

Individuals accused of certain violent personal felonies, on the other hand, might require placement in secure detention. But rather than make a long-term jail placement, the Michigan plan provides for transportation of such youths to an existing regional detention facility in the Lower Peninsula's Genesee County. Eligible youths are transported to the Mackinaw Bridge which links the Upper and Lower Peninsula. A van from the Genesee facility meets the youth at the bridge and returns him or her to the detention center — approximately 180 miles to the south. The same system is used to return youths to the Upper Peninsula.

Counties are charged \$137 per day for use of the Genesee detention center. Because the State reimburses only 50 percent of this daily rate, this service is reserved for the more serious offenders who cannot be served by alternative programs. The fact that other services are fully

reimbursed by the State has encouraged Upper Peninsula counties to expand the use of less restrictive alternatives — a practice which also produces significant cost savings.

This regional alternatives program has been quite successful to date. Statistics compiled by the Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice indicated that prior to plan implementation about 24 juveniles were jailed in the Upper Peninsula each month. Twelve months after the alternatives were initiated, the monthly rate had averaged about six, and it has remained at this level as programs were expanded into Northern Lower Michigan.

The Michigan solution has proven to be cost effective as well. Figures tabulated in 1982 showed that only 15 percent of \$66,000 allocated to the program was actually spent. In other words, only \$10,000 was required to reduce juvenile jailings by 83 percent. Last year the State spent about \$50,000 on direct service care (holdover network, home detention program, and training for holdover attendants and home detention workers) in the Upper Peninsula. This averages about \$345 per child, or a daily rate of \$35.88, to run the entire jail alternatives program in the Upper Peninsula.

Tennessee

When the JJDP Act was amended in 1980 to require the removal of juveniles from adult jails, the State of Tennessee had serious predispositional detention problems. Its adult jails were used extensively for detaining delinquents and status offenders, and occasionally status offenders were even being placed in secure juvenile detention. Because of these problems, legislation was passed to make it illegal to hold juveniles in county jails or lockups after January 1, 1985. Detention criteria were also formulated to insure that all detention decisions were made according to specific and objective guidelines. However, no money was attached to the legislation. A study committee was appointed instead to determine the steps necessary for accomplishing the goals established by the legislation.

A needs assessment concluded in 1984 showed that several components should be added to the State's juvenile justice network in order to effect the changes required to accomplish jail removal. For example, it was clear that the state needed to expand its nonsecure crisis intervention services. Before the legislation was passed, many counties lacked the ability to provide intake or crisis intervention services simply because a significant number of county juvenile courts lacked adequate staff. Obviously, jail removal would be difficult to accomplish without a sufficient number of juvenile officers available in each county to assist in making detention decisions. State justice program planners also realized that they needed to increase the total number of available bedspaces in secure

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facilities. Often juveniles eligible for secure detention were placed in jail because adequate bedspace was not available or transportation to an appropriate setting could not be arranged immediately.

The needs assessment also indicated that a large portion of those juveniles held were detained for only a very short period. About 80 percent were released from jail within 72 hours and more than 60 percent were released within 24 hours. This information was instrumental in the decision to expand secure detention by creating short-term secure holdovers. The holdovers are designed to provide nonsecure or secure detention on a round-the-clock basis. Space for the four-room settings is found in existing buildings and the holdovers are staffed by on-call personnel who have been trained by the State to provide the necessary supervision. They are used only as needed.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the study, the Tennessee legislature allocated \$600,000 for capital development of secure detention centers and temporary holdovers. Because holdovers represent a new type of placement setting, standards were also developed for their design, program, and staff requirements.

Although data have not yet been collected to measure the total impact of the Tennessee plan, State justice officials expect to be able to claim significant reductions in juvenile jailings for the next JJDP Act reporting period. In the final analysis, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Tennessee experience was the State's ability to react quickly to the legislation and develop a comprehensive removal plan in a limited amount of time.

Virginia

In 1980, Virginia had one of the highest juvenile jailing rates in the country. Although several juvenile detention centers had been built in the State, they were not being used for detaining serious juvenile offenders because local officials feared that they wouldn't provide adequate security. Consequently, such offenders were being placed in jail. There was also a certain amount of resistance to the idea of sending juveniles to the state's Department of Corrections; judges preferred to keep youths needing secure detention under local control, and thus adult jails were often used to circumvent DOC placements. Because of these practices, delinquent and nondelinquent youths (including runaways) were being jailed.

State justice program officials concentrated their efforts on working with judges and citizen groups (e.g., the Parent-Teachers Association) to heighten awareness of the jailing problem and develop solutions. The Virginia Crime Commission and the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services conducted major surveys which

indicated that many jailed youths could be better served in alternative settings.

The data collected from the surveys and the recommendations for action were passed on to the legislature. As a result, in 1985 provisions for jail removal which represented the cooperative efforts of State officials, judges, intake workers, sheriffs, and citizens became State law. Included in the package was a stipulation that no juvenile shall be placed in an adult jail or lockup, and specific and objective criteria were designed to give intake workers some guidance in their placement decisions. As a compromise measure, State judges were also given the authority to use detention facilities for sentencing purposes. This provision would insure that the court could retain local control over dispositional decisions without using adult jails.

These efforts have meant that the State has achieved significant success in jail removal. However, State officials are still searching for ways to use existing alternative resources efficiently, and they hope that with regionalization, a key plan component, further reductions in jailings will soon occur.

Colorado

Data collected for calendar year 1981 revealed that approximately 6,000 juveniles were placed in Colorado's county jails. Because of obstacles such as the rural nature of many Colorado counties, a lack of appropriate alternatives to jail (especially secure juvenile detention), and lengthy or mountainous transportation routes, many youths were being detained in adult facilities. Yet even with these problems, Colorado had achieved a 66 percent reduction in jailings by 1984.

The method used to achieve this reduction was based on the theory that it is more economical for rural jurisdictions to operate on a regional rather than on a local basis. This idea — i.e., the idea of regional detention services — plus the Colorado Sheriffs Association's active participation in the program, were keys to the jail removal program's success.

Distance to existing juvenile detention centers presented a significant problem for planners. The five centers were located roughly on a line stretching north and south across the Eastern Slope of the Rocky Mountains. To get to these centers, Eastern counties had to travel up to 300 miles one way, while Western counties were forced to cross hazardous mountain passes, which significantly increased travel time, especially in the winter. Recognizing the need for appropriate predispositional detention and the usefulness of a regional network, the Colorado Sheriffs' Association came forward with a solution. The

CSA plan offered to set up a transportation network which would use off-duty police officers to transport juveniles to and from existing detention centers. Counties would be reimbursed at a rate of 20 cents per mile for the transportation, plus the cost of the transporting officer's time, through the Colorado Sheriffs' Juvenile Jail program.

Besides the transportation network, each county also developed a set of intake screening criteria in order to ground detention decision-making in an objective process. Trained intake screeners who represent the local juvenile court consult these criteria at each referral. Through strict observance of the criteria, access to intake, the transportation scheme, and a commitment to choose the least restrictive placement setting, Colorado officials have been able to reduce jailings significantly.

In 1984 Colorado completed a study to determine the steps necessary to achieve complete removal and its associated costs. It appears that to remove the final 2,000 youths still being jailed annually, local courts are going to have to (1) hold more firmly to the principle of choosing the least restrictive placement setting, and (2) develop a network of holdovers for rural or mountainous counties. At least one new juvenile detention center may be constructed in Western Colorado as well.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Colorado initiative is the active role that the Sheriffs' Association has taken in jail removal activities. The CSA has been involved throughout the removal planning process in devising planning strategies, developing standards, and working on revisions of the State Code. Their activities are an excellent example of how one sector of the juvenile justice network can effect improvements in predispositional detention services throughout an entire state's system.

Additional State Activity

As the December 1985 deadline of the JJDP Act approached, many states stepped up their efforts to meet the Act's substantial compliance requirement. Missouri, for example, recently passed legislation prohibiting the placement of juveniles in adult settings and is now stressing purchase-of-care agreements for counties that lack secure detention facilities. Studies have indicated that many secure beds are available in existing facilities, beds that could be put to use if the necessary agreements were contracted.

Arkansas has reduced jailings by approximately 35 percent, but still needed to remove an additional 40 percent by December in order to meet the substantial reduction requirements of the Act. Their strategy had been to focus an intensive education campaign on the State's juvenile judges, intake personnel, and probation officers. The campaign was designed to persuade these

professionals to support removal efforts. Arkansas officials have also stressed using the least restrictive alternative and purchase-of-care/transportation arrangements when feasible.

Iowa has responded to the JJDP Act's removal requirement by sponsoring a major survey of the juvenile justice system this past summer. Officials are conducting a needs assessment to measure the effects of placement criteria and determine the number and location of secure bedspaces. Also, state planning officials are carrying out an opinion survey of juvenile system personnel on the topic of jail removal. The State Ad Hoc Juvenile Committee hopes to take their recommendations, which will be based on the results of the survey, to the legislature this winter to secure funding for developing alternatives.

Overall, 18 states have passed legislation prohibiting the detention of juveniles in jails and lockups. At least five additional states are working on the passage of similar legislation, and other states are expected to follow their lead and develop state laws requiring jail removal soon. These examples are clear indicators that jail removal remains a serious concern and that much planning and legislative action has been undertaken in response to Sections 223(a)(12)(13)(14) and (15) of the Act. But state planning agencies have not been alone in their efforts to improve predispositional detention services. Many national organizations directly involved in the juvenile justice network such as the National Association of Counties, the American Bar Association, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the National League of Cities, and the American Correctional Association, have endorsed jail removal as well.

Yet despite these clear indications of progress, the placement of children in adult jails remains a serious moral and legal problem in this country, one that has not been solved. Additional planning, education, and legislation will be required to push the number of youths jailed each year toward zero.

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