REDUCING THE "SIGNS OF CRIME:"
THE NEWARK EXPERIENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

by

Antony M. Pate, Wesley G. Skogan,
Mary Ann Wycoff and Lawrence W. Sherman

With the Assistance of Sampson Annan

Final Draft Report
to the
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The Honorable James K. Stewart,
Director

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ACQUISITIONS
This report summarizes the results of a field test conducted by the Newark Police Department and evaluated by the Police Foundation under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. The test, successfully carried out from the fall of 1983 through the summer of 1984, evaluated the theory that by attempting to reduce the social and physical "signs of crime," municipal police, working with other city agencies, can reduce the fear of crime.

**Findings in Brief**

The evaluation found that the effort to reduce the "signs of crime," although implemented as planned, had few statistically significant effects, either at the area level or among the same individuals over time. None of the desired effects were achieved. Both types of analysis indicated that residents of the program area took significantly more steps to protect their homes from crime than did those in the comparison area. Significant reductions in at least two types of recorded crime, however, were detected in the program area.

The key to these generally disappointing results may be due to the fact that relatively few program area residents were aware of the program activity. Those persons who recall being exposed to the various components of the program generally demonstrated one or more positive effects.
The "Signs of Crime": The Problem and a Possible Solution

Recent research has repeatedly shown that the fear of crime is more often related to the perceived level of social and physical disorder in a person's neighborhood than to that person's actual experiences as a victim of crime. Social disorder--such as teenagers hanging out on the streets, drug use, and public drinking--as well as physical disorder--abandoned buildings, vacant lots, and littered streets--serve as indicators of impending danger, even if no actual crime has been observed. Other research has shown that there is a dynamic quality to this relationship: neighborhood deterioration is followed by rising crime which is followed by further deterioration. As the deterioration continues, the composition of the neighborhood changes, leading to the development of a subculture tolerant of law violation.

The evidence that deterioration and disorder--the signs of crime--constitute an engine of neighborhood destabilization and decline is compelling. What is not clear, however, is what can be done to dismantle that engine. Given that the sources of the problem are broad and complex, it is unreasonable to think that any solutions which are not equally broad and complex could have much chance of being effective. A number of long-range proposals, from improved zoning, planning and building code enforcement to the provision of social and educational services, have been made to address this cycle of disorder, deterioration, fear and crime. In the short term, however, most suggestions have focused on the police in terms of their roles of enforcing the law and maintaining order. Both Wilson and Kelling (1982), and Kobrin and Schuerman (1982), for example,
have suggested that the intensification of law enforcement and order maintenance, especially by foot patrol, in areas with noticeable, but not unredeemable, levels of disorder and deterioration could contribute to reclaiming those areas for their law-abiding residents.

The Newark Program

In late 1982, the National Institute of Justice issued a request for competitive proposals to test strategies for reducing the fear of crime. The Police Foundation won the competition and was asked to plan and conduct such studies on an accelerated timetable. Two cities were selected in which to conduct the tests--Newark, New Jersey, an old, dense city with a declining population and a deteriorating revenue base, and Houston, Texas, a new city with low population density, rapid population growth and an expanding economy. In each city a Fear Reduction Task Force was created to consider possible strategies, select those that were most appropriate for the local conditions and plan and implement those strategies over a one-year period.*

Early in its deliberations, the task force recognized the relevance of the research concerning the relationship between the "signs of crime," fear, crime and neighborhood decay to the circumstances in Newark. During the spring and summer of 1983, the group developed two separate but coordinated efforts to reduce social disorder and physical deterioration. The first effort, consisting of the random institution of intensified enforcement and order maintenance operations in the program area, was implemented by the

*For a discussion of other fear reduction strategies that were tested as part of the Fear Reduction Project, see Pate et al., 1985.
Directed Patrol Task Force. The second effort was a clean-up program aimed at physical deterioration.

Directed Patrol Task Force. A group of 24 patrol officers was selected by the precinct commanders as those best qualified to conduct the enforcement and order maintenance operations. The group received three days of training on the legal, tactical and community relations aspects of such operations. From April through August 1983, several demonstration operations were carried out in areas of the city not involved in the test to refine the techniques required for conducting such activities without disrupting community relations.

In order to provide this group of officers with time away from their regular assignments, a pool of 157 non-patrol officers was established. Each one of these officers was expected to spend one eight-hour tour of duty per month in a patrol car as a replacement for one of the specialized enforcement officers.

This unit engaged exclusively in the following operations:

- Foot patrol to enforce laws and maintain order on sidewalks and street corners,
- Radar checks, to enforce speeding laws on the streets,
- Bus checks, to enforce ordinances and maintain order aboard public buses,
- Enforcement of the state disorderly conduct laws, to reduce the amount of loitering and disruptive behavior on corners and sidewalks, and
- Road checks, to identify drivers without proper licenses or under the influence of alcohol, to detect stolen automobiles and to apprehend wanted offenders.
These operations were conducted at least three times per week, from Monday through Friday, based on a random assignment schedule to minimize their predictability. Although primary emphasis was given to the program area studied here (and another program area, which also tested this approach in the context of a broader effort), the Directed Patrol Task Force was also assigned periodically to other areas of the city where levels of disorder required it. However, these operations were not conducted in the comparison area.

Altogether, the task force spent slightly over 2,500 hours in this program area, during which time they conducted 188 different operations on 82 different days. Over 70 percent of these hours were spent on foot patrol, about 15 percent were spent conducting radar checks, 7.5 percent were spent on bus checks, four percent on the enforcement of disorderly behavior laws and three percent on conducting road checks. Brief descriptions of the activities involved in each component are presented below.

- Foot Patrol. On a typical evening, eight pairs of two officers would walk throughout the program area for one to four hours. During that time, the officers would engage in a wide variety of activities, ranging from casual conversations with area residents and merchants to dispersing unruly crowds to ticketing illegally parked cars to responding to calls for assistance. The sergeant in charge continuously drove through the area, observing the officers on foot, stopping to discuss developments with them and providing instructions.
Radar Checks. These operations were conducted by two officers, sitting in a marked police vehicle equipped with a radar device, alongside a major thoroughfare. When a vehicle was found to be exceeding the legal speed limit, the police vehicle, with lights flashing, would quickly pursue the violator and require it to pull to the side of the road. The officers would then approach the vehicle, request the driver's license and vehicle registration, and, if no acceptable excuse for the excessive speed was provided, issue a ticket to the violator. In addition to issuing summonses to violators of speed laws, the officers checked the credentials of the drivers and determined if the driver had been driving while under the influence of alcohol, or whether the car has been reported stolen.

Bus Checks. As a result of repeated complaints from citizens, the Directed Patrol Task Force began a program designed to reduce disorderly behavior on public buses. On a typical operation, two officers would signal a bus driver to pull to the side of the road. One officer would enter the bus by the rear exit, the other through the front door. The officer at the front would deliver a variant of this message:

Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen, this is a Newark Police Department bus inspection. We are here to remind you that there are certain city ordinances which apply when you ride public transportation in our city. There is no smoking, no drinking, no gambling and no loud music allowed. Anyone doing any of those things should cease immediately. Otherwise, we will ask you to get off the bus.

[After dealing with any problem cases.] These bus inspections are being conducted by the Newark Police Department for your safety and comfort. Thank you for your cooperation.
After the message was delivered and offenders were evicted, the officers answered questions from the passengers and requested the bus driver to sign a form indicating the time and place the inspection occurred. These forms were submitted to the supervisor of the Directed Patrol Task Force to document the unit's activities.

Disorderly Conduct Enforcement. The disorderly conduct enforcement component was designed to reduce street disorder by the rigorous enforcement of the state disorderly conduct laws. Operations of this component were carried out in three stages. First, any group of four or more persons which "congregated to create a public hazard" (in the words of the State statute) were notified by officers in a marked police car that they were in violation of the law and required to disperse. Second, a few minutes after this notice was given, officers in a police van appeared and, assisted by as many other officers as necessary, took to the local precinct station all persons who failed to heed the request to disperse. Finally, those persons detained were processed, screened for existing warrants and charged. It was expected that continual enforcement of this law would eventually lead to a reduction in the number of disorderly groups lingering in public places.

Road Checks. Road checks were established to identify drivers without licences or under the influence of alcohol, to determine if any of the automobiles stopped had been stolen and to ascertain if there were any outstanding arrest warrants for any of the persons stopped. In accordance with legal precedents, it was decided that, as
a general rule, every fifth vehicle would be stopped. If traffic was sparse, the sampling interval was reduced; if the flow was heavy, the interval was increased.

The motorist would first become aware of such an operation by the presence of a sign indicating "Newark Police Road Check in Effect" and a police vehicle with flashing lights on its roof. Reflective cones would designate the paths through which traffic was to flow. At night, flares would also be used to illuminate the traffic lanes. To insure compliance to the selection procedure, an officer recorded the license number of every vehicle passing through the checkpoint, designating which ones were to be stopped and, in certain instances, notified the inspecting officers of suspicious behavior by the occupants of particular cars. At this point, selected drivers were requested to pull off the road; all others were allowed to proceed.

The selected motorists would then encounter another sign saying, "Have driver's license, registration and insurance card ready." Two officers would approach each selected car and request the required identification papers. If all was in order, the driver was allowed to drive on. In most instances, the delay required three to five minutes. In cases in which licenses had expired, registration or insurance certificates appeared not to be in order, or drivers acted suspiciously or appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, further inquiries were made. If record checks and further discussions with the driver could resolve all questions, the vehicle was allowed to pass through the checkpoint, requiring a total delay of perhaps ten minutes. In
those cases where violations were found, summonses were issued or arrests were made.

Clean-Up. The second effort, directed at the reduction of physical disorder and deterioration, had two components: an intensification of city services and a revision of the juvenile judicial sentencing process to allow for youths to perform community service work by cleaning up the program area. The operations of these components are summarized below.

- **Intensification of City Services.** The city government committed itself to intensifying its demolition of previously abandoned and condemned buildings; cleaning up lots designated to have high priority by the police department; and intensifying efforts to repair streets, improve lighting and maintain garbage collection in the area. The personnel necessary for this effort were to be from either existing city agencies or private contractors hired by the city to accomplish the requisite tasks.

- **Juvenile Judicial Sentencing.** The second component of the clean-up program was the creation of a legal mechanism to assign juveniles arrested for minor acts of delinquency or other minor offenses to appear before a Juvenile Conference Committee (JCC), where they were given the option of performing community service activities or appearing before a juvenile court judge for case adjudication. The committee was comprised of 15 representatives of the business community, the clergy, educational institutions and area residents.
Members were selected by the police and probation departments and approved by the presiding judge of the Domestic Relations Court.

At a typical meeting of the Juvenile Conference Committee, the accused youths, aged 13 to 18, were given an opportunity to respond to the charges against them--ranging from possession of marijuana to receiving stolen property to simple assault to shoplifting to burglary. In the company of at least one of their parents, each youth was given a chance to explain the circumstances of his/her arrest. If the youth accepted culpability and was willing, he/she was considered for inclusion in the community work service program. Depending on the seriousness of the offense, the JCC would assign the youth to serve a designated number of hours in such service.

On the first day of such service, the youths were given a physical examination by the police department surgeon to insure that each was able to participate in program activities without serious risk. All those who passed this exam were then given instructions by the program supervisor concerning the rules of their participation, physical fitness training and the necessity to work as a disciplined team. After this instruction, the youths were transported to the work site, where they were trained in the use of the necessary equipment, organized into work teams and supervised closely during the remainder of the eight-hour work day. During the half-hour lunch period, the youths were driven to a local fast food franchise where they were provided with a meal paid for by the local franchise.
The supervisor of these work teams evaluated the attitudes and performance of each youth and supplied these evaluations to the JCC for their review. Each youth was expected to appear for work on as many days as were required to complete the work sentence supplied to him/her. If a youth did not successfully complete that sentence, he/she would be referred again to the JCC, which would either administer an alternative sentence or refer the youth back to the court for trial.

A total of 16 of the 20 locations designated as requiring attention actually received it. Of these 16, the city cleaned up eight, youths removed trash and debris from five and adult residents cleaned up three. There were no buildings which were designated as requiring demolition.

**Evaluation Design and Methodology**

The fundamental evaluation design was based upon the comparison of attitudinal measures collected before and ten months after the introduction of the program. These measures were obtained by conducting interviews with random samples of residents and representatives of non-residential establishments in both a program area and in a comparison area in which no new fear reduction activities were undertaken. In addition, monthly recorded crime data were collected for both areas 44 months prior to, and 13 months during, the implementation of the program.
Five areas, closely matched in terms of their size, demographic characteristics, land use, level of disorder and other characteristics, were selected to be included in the overall Newark Fear Reduction Program. One of those areas was selected, by a random procedure, to be the program area exposed to the effort to reduce the signs of crime. The same selection procedure assigned another neighborhood to be a comparison area, in which no new police programs would be introduced.

Demographic data from the 1980 Census concerning these two areas are presented below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Demographic Data for Signs of Crime Program and Control Areas</th>
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<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program (South 1)</td>
<td>4519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison (South 4)</td>
<td>4300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1980 Census

The resident surveys produced area response rates of ranging from 76 to 83 percent. Attempts to conduct interviews with a set of respondents both before and after the program began (a "panel") produced panel response rates of approximately 61 and 64 percent in the program and comparison areas respectively. Interviews were also conducted with owners and managers of
non-residential establishments. The response rates for these interviews were consistently higher than 86 percent.

Survey questionnaires were designed to measure each of the following:

- Recalled Program Exposure
- Perceived Area Social and Physical Disorder Problems
- Fear of Personal Victimization in Area
- Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area
- Perceived Area Crime Problems
- Victimization
- Evaluation of Police Services and Aggressiveness
- Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime
- Household Crime Prevention Efforts
- Satisfaction with Area

Analysis and Results

This evaluation examined the effects of the Newark program to reduce the "signs of crime" in several ways:

1. Recalled program awareness and contact in both the program and comparison areas were examined to determine the extent to which respondents recalled different program components. In addition, differences in awareness across population subgroups were investigated.

2. To provide indicators of the possible program impact on residential respondents, two different types of analysis were conducted:
   a. An analysis of pooled cross-sectional data, to supply evidence of program impact at the broad area level, and
   b. An analysis of panel data, collected from the subset of the same persons interviewed both before and 10 months after the program was implemented, to provide an indication of the program's impact on particular individuals.
3. Among members of the panel sample in the program area, comparisons by outcome measures were made between those persons who recalled being exposed to the program and those who did not.

4. Tests were made for possible differential program effects on particular subgroups among members of the panel sample.

5. Recorded crime data were subjected to interrupted time series analysis to determine if trends or levels were affected by program implementation.

The results of each of these analyses are presented below.

Recalled Program Awareness and Contact

Among program area residents, the component with the highest level of awareness was the bus check tactic, which 42 percent of those interviewed recalled. Twenty-nine percent said they were aware of the disorderly conduct enforcement operations; 24 percent recalled seeing foot patrol; 20 percent knew about road checks. Awareness of these components among representatives of non-residential establishments was consistently higher than among residents, probably due to the fact that much of the program activity was situated in active commercial areas. Very few persons said that they themselves had been stopped by the police in the area, either while walking or driving. Only about ten percent said they were aware of any local clean-up efforts.

Survey Indicators of Program Impact

Two different types of analysis were conducted to measure possible program impact on residents:
Data from the area-wide samples for both areas, for both waves of the survey, were merged and subjected to a pooled cross-sectional regression analysis in which statistical controls for survey wave, area of residence, the interaction between survey wave and area of residence, and 18 respondent characteristics were applied.

A similar analysis was conducted on the data obtained from the subset of persons who were interviewed both before and ten months after the program started (the panel). In this analysis, in addition to using those variables included in the pooled analysis, Wave 1 score for each individual was used as an additional control of unmeasured differences among respondents.

The results are summarized in Table 2. The first and third columns report the sign and size of the regression coefficients associated with living in the program area after the other variables in the model have been taken into account in the pooled and panel analyses respectively. The second and fourth columns report the level of statistical significance of the coefficients.

The results indicate that the program had consistently significant results in both types of analysis only with respect to the installation of household crime prevention measures. In both the cross-sectional and the panel analyses, respondents living in the program area took significantly more steps to protect their homes from crime than did those in the comparison area. Both effects were quite large, although that found in the cross-sectional analysis was somewhat greater.

Four other effects were significant only among the cross-sectional analyses. Specifically, residents of the program area:

- Indicated higher levels of perceived area personal crime problems;
- Demonstrated lower levels of satisfaction with the area;
- Perceived lower levels of police aggressiveness, and
- Indicated higher levels of victimization by personal crime.
Table 2
Program Effects for Cross-Sectional and Panel Analyses of Resident Surveys: Regression Coefficients and Levels of Significance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome Measures</th>
<th>Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis</th>
<th>Panel Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relative Effect</td>
<td>Level of Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Area Social Disorder Problems</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Area Physical Deterioration Problems</td>
<td>+.06</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Personal Victimization in Area</td>
<td>+.03</td>
<td>(.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems</td>
<td>+.15</td>
<td>(.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry About Property Crime Victimization in Area</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Area Property Crime Problems</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Police Service</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Police Aggressiveness</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>(.02)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Area</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>(.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Behaviors to Avoid Personal Crime</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Crime Prevention Efforts</td>
<td>+.52</td>
<td>(.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization by Any Crime</td>
<td>+.08</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization by Property Crime</td>
<td>+.04</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization by Personal Crime</td>
<td>+.08</td>
<td>(.04)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance level less than or equal to .05.
The analyses of the panel data revealed only one significant effect other than that pertaining to household crime prevention efforts: Residents of the program area perceived more physical deterioration problems than did those living in the comparison area.

Representatives of non-residential establishments in the program area, relative to those in the comparison area, were more likely, at a statistically significant level, to have indicated:

- Less improvement in perceived area physical deterioration,
- Less increase in worry about property crime in the area,
- More increase in concern about crime expressed by employees and patrons, and
- More improvement in the perceived business environment.

In general, then, the program appeared to produce none of the desired effects. The only positive result was that the program, at least among the cross-sectional sample respondents, reduced perceived levels of police aggressiveness. It is also important to note that the program was associated with increased efforts to prevent household crime.

Recalled Program Exposure Effects

- The program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard of foot patrol in the area expressed a fear of personal victimization that was lower, to a statistically significant degree than that expressed by other program area residents.

- Program area panel respondents who recalled having seen or heard about bus checks expressed evaluations of police service in the area which were higher, to a statistically significant degree, than the evaluations given by those who did not recall such program exposure.

- Program area panel respondents who saw or heard of police operations to remove groups of loiterers from the streets were significantly more likely to have improved their evaluation of police services in the area. In addition, they indicated a significant reduction in the level of police aggressiveness they perceived in the area.

- The only statistically significant relationship between exposure to road checks was that it was associated with a significant increase
in the social disorder problems perceived by those who saw or heard of such operations.

Those who recalled local clean-up activities were more likely to express satisfaction with the neighborhood. Recalled exposure to the clean-up program was also associated with respondents' engaging in more defensive behaviors to avoid crime.

Analysis of Subgroup-Specific Effects

The relative changes in level of perceived area physical deterioration problems, worry about property crime victimization in the area and perceived area personal crime problems noted among previous victims in the program area, relative to non-victims, were less positive than the relative changes among comparison area residents. Thus, the program was less likely to have positive program effects on previous victims than on those who had not been victimized before.

The results with respect to residents of single family homes were somewhat more complicated. Specifically, respondents living in single family homes in the program area indicated a decrease in worry about property crime, while residents in other types of housing reported an increased level of worry. On the other hand, although program area respondents in single family homes indicated a more improved evaluation of police service than did those program area respondents in other dwelling types, the relative improvement was not as great as that found among residents of single family homes in the comparison area. Furthermore, respondents in single family homes in the program area indicated that they thought that police aggressiveness had decreased; program area respondents in other types of dwellings--and respondents in all types of housing units in the comparison area--perceived an increase in aggressiveness. Finally,
single family home residents in the program area indicated an increase in efforts to prevent household crime; in the comparison area, however, such results indicated a decrease in such efforts.

Recorded Crime Analysis

Results from interrupted time series analyses of recorded crime data from the program area show that significant reductions occurred in the level of (1) total Part 1 crimes, (2) personal crimes, and (3) burglary. No significant changes were found in the comparison area.

Discussion

The Newark effort to reduce the fear of crime by reducing the "Signs of Crime," although successfully implemented as planned for ten months, generally was unsuccessful in achieving the outcomes hypothesized by Kobrin/Schuerman and Wilson/Kelling. There could be at least four possible explanations for the failure to find the expected results:

1. The measurement of program effects might have been inadequate.
2. The program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately.
3. The strength or length of implementation of the program could have been too limited to allow for effects to have been achieved.
4. The theory itself could be wrong.

It is necessary to consider each of these possible explanations in order to put these findings in perspective.

Measurement of program effects could have affected the results in several ways: the size of the samples selected could have been too small to
show significant effects, the sampling procedures could have provided biased results, or the measurement and analysis procedures could have been invalid. In all cases, these potential problems appear incapable of explaining the failure to support the theory. With regard to sample size, the samples selected, although constrained by a finite budget, were chosen in order to be more than adequate to be representative of the populations under study and to allow for proper analytical techniques to be applied. Furthermore, although this study, as any other, would have benefited from larger sample sizes, the trends demonstrated by these data were not consistent enough to have supported the theory which prompted it, no matter how large the samples might have been. The sampling procedures were based on accepted sampling principles and were carried out with considerable, documented, success. Sophisticated measurement and analysis techniques were utilized in order to maximize the reliability and validity of the results.

The second possible explanation, that the program might not have operationalized the theory appropriately, also does not appear persuasive, since both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the Wilson/Kelling prescriptions place heavy emphasis on the importance of foot patrol, the primary component of the Newark program. In addition, the Wilson/Kelling specifically argued for the maintenance of standards on public transportation, the goal of the bus check component. All other components were similarly designed to maintain order.

Another aspect of the operationalization of the theory--the nature of the area in which it was tested--may have affected the effectiveness of the strategies applied. In the first place, both the Kobrin/Schuerman and the
Wilson/Kelling formulations emphasize that reclamation efforts are extremely difficult, if not impossible, in areas which have deteriorated beyond a "tipping point." Unfortunately, because neither formulation presents a clear definition of such a "point," it is impossible to determine how the program area compares to it. Second, Baumer (1983) has suggested that police activity may be able to reduce fear only in areas with high levels of perceived risk. Based on this interpretation, the fear reduction efforts may not have succeeded because the experimental area residents were not fearful enough to begin with. Again, because no clear definition of the level of fear necessary to permit effective reduction has been proposed, we can only speculate as to the relevance of this admonition.

The third possible explanation for the failure to find the expected results was the brevity or weakness of program implementation. This appears to be more plausible. It is not unlikely that, had the program been continued for a full year, as had originally been planned, instead of only for ten months, as was required to meet the evaluation schedule, a greater level of awareness could have been achieved. However, the fact that, even after ten months, awareness was quite low suggests that additional time would have made little difference—and points to the relatively weak "dosage level" of this program as an experimental treatment.

An insight into the relative strength of the program is provided by comparing this program, over 70 percent of which consisted of foot patrol, to the previous foot patrol study conducted in Newark five years earlier. In that earlier study, in which foot patrol was more widely perceived,
significant reductions in the fear of crime were achieved. A key question, then, is why foot patrol succeeded in that case but not in this one.*

The most persuasive answer to that question is that the extent and nature of the foot patrol implemented in the earlier study were radically different from that effected here. In the earlier study, two officers patrolled six nights a week from the hours of 4 p.m. to midnight, resulting in an average of 392.5 officer hours in each program area per month. In this study, five to eight pairs of officers walked, at irregular hours, on a few nights per month, resulting in an average of 176 officer hours expended per month.

The two studies also differed in terms of the nature of the foot patrol strategies. In the first study, such patrol was conducted only along commercial strips in predictable and intensive fashion. In this study, foot patrol, although it was implemented primarily in commercial areas, also occurred on residential streets. Such patrols, however, occurred at unpredictable intervals, based on the principle that potential criminals and troublemakers should not know in advance when police would be present. While such an approach could, under certain circumstances, be appropriate to deter or apprehend criminals, a different, more consistent, pattern of activity may be more effective in producing general reassurance of citizens.

*Other studies (Trojanowicz, et al., 1982; Spickenheuer, 1983) have suggested that foot patrol may have positive effects. Unfortunately, however, these efforts were either combined with other program activities, were evaluated in problematic fashion, or both, thus making the inferences from those studies questionable.
Finally, it is clearly premature to pronounce judgment on the validity of the theory underlying the Newark effort to reduce the "signs of crime." The results concerning bus checks, enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, road checks and physical clean-up activities were based on relatively meagre program efforts and showed no consistent results. It is quite plausible that each of these types of programs, if more strenuously implemented, could have different effects. Much more extensive research would be necessary, however, to discover those differences.

The results concerning foot patrol, based on these findings and those generated in the earlier Newark study, suggest that such activity, to be effective, should be implemented on an intensive, continuous and predictable basis, rather than sporadically and at random, and in places, and at times, where it is most likely to be seen by the general public. This is supported by the fact that those persons who recall having seen foot patrol officers in their area expressed a lower level of fear of victimization as a result. Similarly, those who were personally exposed to most other program components also experienced some positive effect. Unfortunately, it appears that too few people were exposed to the program for these effects to have become widespread.

More generally, then, these results suggest that fear reduction techniques, as opposed to "crime attack" techniques which focus on deterring or apprehending criminals, should focus on the broader community, providing frequent, enduring assurances that positive steps are being taken to maintain order.

*Complete details of the program and its evaluation are available in Pate and Skogan, 1985.*
This study was conducted under Grant No. 83-IJ-CX-0003 from the National Institute of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Newark Police Department or the Police Foundation.

References


NEWARK FEAR REDUCTION TASK FORCE

Newark Police Department
Hubert Williams, Director
Charles Zizza, Chief
Captain Joseph Santiago, Coordinator
Maria Cardiellos, Asst. Coordinator
Deputy Chiefs:
  John Cross
  Arnold Evans
  George Hemmer
  Thomas O'Reilly
Captains:
  Peter J. Basalo
  George Dickscheid
  Charles Knox
  Michael O'Connor
  Joseph Rox
Lieutenants:
  John Kossup
  John Dough
  Harold Gibson
  Frank Peake
  Vincent Peszynski
  Robert Rankin
  Kenneth Wilson
  Jack Yablonski
Sergeants:
  David Dziebela
  Ernest Newby
  John Reid
  Andrew Turner
Detectives:
  Joseph Bongo
  Allan Howard
Crime Analyst:
  Megan Ambrosio

Board of Education
Carl Sharif, President
Columbus A. Salley, Executive Supt.
Gladys Hillman Jones, Deputy Supt.
Dr. Anthony D'Agostino, Asst. Exec. Supt.
Elizabeth Ruffalo, Curriculum Dir.
Jill Goodman, Admin. Supervisor
Dr. Lorenzo Grant, Admin. Supervisor
Ruth Hazelwood, Admin. Supervisor
Dr. James Barrett, Principal

New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts
Robert D. Lipscher, Admin. Director
John Mason, Staff Attorney

Essex County Courts
Hon. Nicholas Scalera, Assignment Judge
Hon. Paul T. Murphy, Presiding Judge

Essex County Probation Department
Nicholas Fiore, Chief Probation Officer
Jude Del Preore, Coordinator JCC

Newark Municipal Courts
Hon. Better J. Lester, Presiding Judge

Graduate School of Criminal Justice
Rutgers University
Professors:
  Frieda Adler
  Anne Campbell
  John J. Gibbs
  Gerhard Mueller
  David Twain

City of Newark, New Jersey
Honorable Kenneth A. Gibson, Mayor
Barbara Sachs, Aide to the Mayor
DIRECTED PATROL TASK FORCE

Lieutenants:
John Dough
Harold Gibson
Robert Rankin

Sergeants:
William Clark
David Dzibela
Ernest Newby

Police Officers:
Manual Costa
Wayne Dooley
Rocco Malanga
Michael Petrillo
Mark Riccardi
Robert Russo
John Cantalupo
Willie Floyd
Brian Gavin
Edward Hopkins
Michael Kraynanski
Joseph Marzano
Patrick Corcoran

Kevin George
Billy Murray
Barry Sierra
Charles Upshaw
Leonard Cunningham
Martin Goldman
Thomas Hill
Joseph Mauriello
Herman McDonald
Domingo Rivera
Evelyn Catalano
Bonita Johnson
Marsha Jones