DOWNTOWN SAFETY, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

JULY 1985

A Joint Report
by
The Citizens Crime Commission of New York City
and
Regional Plan Association

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ABSTRACT

The Downtown Safety Project involved a national solution search to develop strategies that would combat the crime problems identified in three outlying commercial centers in New York City.

The findings of the site visits fell into three categories--design and development strategies, police and private security programs and downtown leadership and organization.

In order to increase pedestrian flow and minimize the fear of crime, urban design and development should emphasize such features as dense and compact development, increased housing and mixed use development and stimulate downtown special events and activities.

Police and private security play major roles in safeguarding downtowns. The findings indicate that quality of life enforcement using permanently assigned beat officers is a common and effective police strategy in New York City and elsewhere. While private security forces are widely used, there appears to be a lack of consensus on their effectiveness and appropriate deployment.

Organization and cooperation of downtown businessmen is an important element of downtown crime reduction programs. This partnership should not be limited to business interests but extend to the community and public entities. In this way, mobilization of all area resources can be focused against crime and disorder.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Citizens Crime Commission and Regional Plan Association
have jointly undertaken the Downtown Safety, Security and
Economic Development Program to address the problem of crime as
a barrier to the economic health of three outlying commercial
centers of New York City: Jamaica Center in Queens, Fordham
Road in the Bronx and Downtown Brooklyn.

While recognizing that a whole range of improvements--from
better transportation to more attractive stores--are necessary
for these downtowns to become economically vibrant, this
program was initiated with the belief that these areas must be
secure so that potential downtown users are not afraid to take
advantage of them. In the past, shopping and office activity
have both been impeded by safety and security problems.
Greater use will attract both retailers and office locators.
For example, many corporations feel that by locating in these
downtowns, they will be less able to compete for vital
personnel who do not want to work in what is perceived to be a
high-crime environment. This is especially important in light
of New York City's effort to attract "back offices"
(administrative, computer and clerical sections of
corporations) to these areas rather than lose such jobs to
suburban areas or to other states.

An increase in the number of back-office jobs could provide a
major source of employment for low-income minority groups in
these areas. By improving these downtown areas and attracting
corporations, jobs would not only be saved, but new ones
created that would provide employment for people in the
surrounding neighborhoods.

The goal of this program is to assess the security needs in three outlying downtowns (Phase I) and search locally and nationwide for possible solutions that can be implemented in these areas (Phase II). This information will then be utilized to design effective anti-crime programs that can be implemented by a coalition of business, residents and government. The ultimate goal of the project is to make the three downtowns safer and thus more commercially viable and to pass the accumulated experience along to downtowns in the tri-state area and the nation.

The Phase I study involved a telephone survey of 610 trade area residents, interviews with local businessmen and officials and detailed analysis of police crime data in the precincts for the three downtowns.

During the course of Phase II, information on downtown programs was gathered from many cities across the country, and field visits were conducted in Newark, N.J.; Hartford, Conn.; Cleveland, Ohio; Atlanta, Ga.; Charlotte, N.C.; Oakland, Ca.; Philadelphia, Pa; Paterson, N.J.; and Washington, D.C. Phone interviews were also conducted with officials and businessmen in Tulsa, Okla.; Miami, Fla.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; New Orleans, La.; Danbury, Conn.; Seattle, Wash.; San Francisco, Ca.; Los Angeles, Ca.; Portland, Ore.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Orlando, Fla.; and Minneapolis, Minn.

The Healthy Downtown

An economically vibrant downtown concentrates in a geographically compact area a wide spectrum of business, social and leisure activities. When a large number of people can walk quickly and safely from one activity to another, a downtown assumes its two unique characteristics: the capability for visitors to engage in multi-purpose visits, known as the multiplier effect, and a high level of interpersonal communication.

Fear Of Crime

The fear of crime disrupts a downtown's economy primarily by
altering the way people behave when they get there. Although
the project findings indicate that the fear of crime may not
significantly deter people from coming downtown, this fear can
alter the behavior of pedestrians once they reach the area:

- --it depresses the multiplier effect by reducing the level
  of pedestrian activity and the distances people are
  willing to walk on the streets.

- --it encourages insulated activity, in which self-contained
  complexes and indoor walkways are preferred to outside
  sidewalks.

- --it decreases the level of face-to-face communication
  between downtown users.

- --it promotes the desertion of the downtown area after five
  o'clock.

- --it increases auto use and demand for close-by parking.
  When demand for this parking exceeds existing capacity,
  people will park in peripheral downtown areas, thereby
  dispersing pedestrian activity and increasing
  vulnerability to crime.

Feelings Of Safety In The Three Outlying Downtowns

The survey results showed that respondents feel safer in areas
that are generally attractive and likely to have a high density
of "their kind of people" on the streets. This suggests that

the overall revitalization of a downtown area can bring
substantial changes in general feelings of safety.

Specific signs of physical disorder, such as broken windows and
vacant buildings, have little impact on respondents' visitation
rates, general feelings of safety or expectations about the
occurrence of specific crimes. This may be unique to New York
City, where such signs are commonplace for an inured citizenry.
Specific signs of behavioral disorder, on the other hand, such
as drug use and sale, public drinking and loitering do appear
to have a substantial impact on the expectations of the
occurence of specific crimes.

Overcoming Fear Of Crime

The prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image
is the network of downtown businessmen and workers and their
friends and relatives. If negative messages about downtown
safety are being sent into the community, no public relations
campaign will be able to improve the downtown's high-crime
reputation.

Office development is the key strategy to start the
revitalization of a downtown. To attract this development
employers must ensure that their workers will be safe on the
street during the day and on the way home after work. While
there may be few late-working or night employees, their safety
may be critical in locational decisions.

The key to making downtown users feel safe is increasing the
density of orderly, law abiding people on the street during the
day and peak traveling hours. A high level of lawful street
activity helps inhibit anti-social behavior and increases the
multiplier effect and economic vibrancy of the business
community.

In the absence of this self-policing critical mass of respectable people, increased private and security efforts are needed to ensure safety. Thus, daytime security is generally easier to maintain than round-the-clock protection or safety in downtowns with little office worker activity; in these cases, greater numbers of police and security personnel are needed to substitute for the daytime pedestrian flow.

Design And Development Solutions

1) Dense and Compact Development will increase the concentration of orderly pedestrian activity, create a more attractive core area, and thereby minimize fear of crime.

Specialized activity enclaves (isolated areas dominated by government, retail, office or cultural facilities) and linear development along one side of the street help impede compact development.

Downtown limited-access structures (self-contained buildings) and off-street networks (hotels, office and apartment buildings, garages and other structures linked together by over-street walkways and building connections) impede outside pedestrian activity, yet may be the only way to attract new businessess to downtowns with high-crime images. Indeed, some off-street networks, if they are multi-functional, can stimulate a multiplier effect and accelerate a downtown's revitalization process. A goal for both types of facilities should be to open them up to the street as the downtown safety image improves.

2) Housing and Mixed-Use Development improve downtown security by, again, increasing pedestrian traffic, making the area more attractive and well-maintained, and by supporting evening restaurant, cultural and retail activity that would not be economically viable on lunchtime office traffic alone.

3) <u>Promoting Evening Activity</u> by encouraging after-office
hours retailing, restaurant and cultural/entertainment activity
is an important strategy for downtowns well along in their
revitalization process, but unrealistic in more decayed urban
centers. Daytime safety must be achieved before nighttime
security can be effective.

4) <u>Major Downtown Events</u> are held in many cities to attract
suburban residents or encourage office workers to stay after
five o'clock or use the streets during lunchtime. Despite the
enthusiasm among many development officials for this strategy,
more active tactics for improving feelings of safety among
daily employees and businessmen--who then pass on their
perceptions to their networks of friends, relatives and
neighbors--appear to have the greatest impact on changing the
general public's image of a downtown.

5) <u>Safe Parking Facilities</u> are important to reduce employee
and visitor fears of traveling downtown. Attached parking
areas and garages are preferable in many areas, but the
potential space available for such parking is limited.
Well-lit open lots are generally safer than garages, but
designing garages with open stairwells, glass elevators and few
hiding places can substantially improve safety conditions.
Although television surveillance can be effective, uniformed
patrols on foot and by vehicle are the best ways to monitor
garages and lots.

<u>Police And Private Security Solutions</u>

1) <u>Public Policing</u> plays a major role in safeguarding
downtowns. The Phase II research indicates that there was a
consensus in New York City and around the country on effective

police strategies. The key ones are:

--Special downtown patrols, particularly by permanently
   assigned foot officers. Foot patrols appear to make
   office workers feel safer during the day, particularly in
   downtowns without large number of employees; foot
   patrol presence is felt less in areas with a high
   concentration of office workers and during the evening
   when the area is sparsely populated.

--Strong emphasis on enforcement of quality-of-life crime
   and control of special populations such as the homeless
   and teenagers.

--Close liaison between the police and the community from
   the beat officer level to that of ranking commander.

In respect to these criteria, the New York City Police programs
appear soundly conceived and are now in the process of
institutionalization. Among possible recommendations that
could be made for the three outlying New York City downtowns
are:

--The downtown community should support the police to
   ensure that the judicial system recognizes the need to
   deal effectively with quality-of-life arrests made by the
   police department.

--Safe public transportation supports dense and compact
   development and a high concentration of pedestrian street
   traffic, and is especially critical to the revitalization
   of the three outlying downtowns, which are major transit
   centers. Subway crime in particular, is an important
   topic that warrants further study, since the subways are
   the main transit service in the three downtowns.

--Because there is a tendency for citizens to overestimate
the extent of the crime problem in their neighborhoods,
it might be useful to consider some vehicle, such as a
newsletter, for police or other public officials to
communicate crime and safety information to community
leaders.

2) In contrast to the police findings, there appears to be no
general consensus around the country about the effectiveness of
private security forces on the streets. Nevertheless, patroled
safety corridors for office employees, and escort, van and
convoy programs to take workers to remote parking and public
transit areas during commuting hours can be effective in
reducing crime, despite their high costs.

Downtown Organization and Leadership

Cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors have
resulted in campaigns to address crime and other revitalization
problems in downtown areas. The most successful--and
comprehensive--programs have managed to galvanize leaders in
the municipal, business and residential communities.

1) Downtown Councils and Associations draw membership
primarily from the business community, and are usually
associated with the city's chamber of commerce. These groups
have become increasingly involved in promoting downtown safety
through seminars, agenda-setting for city-run security
programs, and even fund-raising for added foot patrol strength
in downtown areas.

2) By establishing geographically-defined special assessment
districts and levying special tax assessments for additional
police and security services, many cities have raised

considerable money to launch and maintain anti-crime programs. This type of cooperative venture may be an effective way to concentrate and mobilize downtown resources.

3) Cooperation between private security contingents in efforts such as employee escort services is a potentially cost-effective strategy for increased downtown safety. Cooperative programs linking public police and private security strength is another area with promise.

4) Good working relationships between the public and private sectors--from the level of beat officers and merchants to that of top political and business leaders--can have a positive impact on the success of all the programs outlined in this report.

5) Interaction with the residential community is another area where cooperation pays off for the business community. By providing residents in and around the downtown area with a stake in the viability of the business district--through employment, good relations and safe shopping facilities--stores as well as restaurants, theatres and others can increase the pedestrian flow necessary to build both day and evening activity. Joint security programs between residents and businesses have been developed in some areas in Queens and Brooklyn.

6) Many organizations are attempting to improve their downtown's safety and public image by devising ways to cope with special populations, such as street people and teenagers. Truancy control programs, as well as other educational and employment projects directed toward teenagers, are particularly effective and popular in some communities.

I INTRODUCTION

The Citizens Crime Commission and Regional Plan Association have jointly undertaken the Downtown Safety, Security and Economic Development Program to address the problem of crime as a barrier to the economic health of three outlying commercial centers of New York City: Jamaica Center in Queens, Fordham Road in the Bronx and Downtown Brooklyn.

While recognizing that a whole range of improvements-- from better transportation to more attractive stores--are necessary for these downtowns to become economically vibrant, this program was initiated with the belief that these areas must be secure so that potential downtown users are not afraid to take advantage of them.

Greater use will attract both retailers and office locators. In the past, both shopping and office activity have been impeded by safety and security problems. Many corporations, for example, feel that by locating in these downtowns, they will be less able to compete for vital.personnel who do not want to work in what is perceived to be a high-crime environment. This is especially important in light of New York City's effort to attract "back offices" (administrative, computer and clerical sections of corporations) to these areas rather than lose such jobs to suburban areas or to other states.

An increase in the number of back-office jobs could provide a major source of employment for low-income minority groups in these regions. By improving these downtown areas and attracting corporations, jobs would not only be saved, but new ones created that would provide employment for people in the surrounding neighborhoods.

Program Goal

The goal of this program is to assess the security needs in
Jamaica Center, Fordham Road and Downtown Brooklyn, and search
locally and nationwide for possible solutions that can be
implemented in these areas. This information will then be
utilized to design effective anti-crime programs that can be
implemented by a coalition of business, residents and
government. The ultimate goal of the project is to make the
three downtowns safer and thus more commercially viable.

The entire program consists of four phases:

-- Phase I was a needs assessment study to examine the
specific crime problems in the three downtowns. This
study was completed in September 1984 and the major
findings are included in this report.

-- The second phase focused on a nationwide search for
solutions to the problems targeted in Phase I. This
report presents these findings.

-- The third phase will present the results from the first
two phases to people in New York City, the New York
Urban Region, and elsewhere.

-- The fourth phase will include technical assistance to
help downtowns develop their own safety and security
programs.

It is anticipated that this program will produce training
materials that can be used to help set up programs to increase
downtown security throughout the country. The information will
be disseminated locally through the networks of Regional Plan
Association and the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City,

and nationally through the Downtown Idea Exchange and other
economic development professional organization, including the
National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions. The
findings from this project will also be made available to local
business associations, development corporations and other groups
involved in downtown revitalization efforts.

Phase I Study Results

The Phase I study involved telephone surveys of 610 trade area
residents, numerous interviews with local businessmen and
officials and detailed analysis of police crime data in the
precincts for the three downtowns. The findings confirmed that
crime is a serious problem in the outer-borough downtowns, in
terms of both actual crime rates and citizen perceptions.
Although some of the Phase I survey findings proved
inconclusive, it is reasonable to assert that fear of crime
among trade area residents and downtown workers impedes economic
development by altering the behavior of users once they arrive
and depressing the "multiplier effect," which is the willingness
of people to take advantage of more than one downtown
activity--such as banking, shopping or working--during their
visits.

While one of the newer criminological theories contends that
fear of crime is stimulated by physical signs of disorder, such
as graffiti and broken windows, the Phase I findings indicated
that these specific signs were not as important as others for
trade area respondents. Feelings of safety appeared to be more
affected by behavioral factors, such as public drinking, drug
dealing and disorderly youths. Ultimately, the major
determinants of feeling safe downtown during the day were
whether or not respondents felt comfortable with the kind of
people they expected to find there and the overall
attractiveness of the area.

The Phase II Study

Because of these findings, special attention was given in the Phase II solutions search to programs targeted to behavioral types of disorder--known as "quality of life" offenses--,such as drug use and sale, public drinking, disorderly conduct, loitering and street gangs. In respect to youths, it should be noted that in the Phase I study males under 25 years old were determined to be the predominant criminal group in the three downtowns.

Other areas concentrated on in Phase II were:

1. Design considerations for new construction and redevelopment policies relevant to crime-control.

2. Police and security strategies to control crime and increase feelings of safety.

3. Downtown leadership and organization.

During the course of Phase II, information on downtown programs was gathered from many cities across the country, and field visits were conducted in Newark, N.J.; Hartford, Conn.; Cleveland, Ohio; Atlanta, Ga.; Charlotte, N.C.: Oakland, Ca.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Paterson, N.J.; and Washington, D.C. Phone interviews were conducted with officials and businessmen in Tulsa, Okla.; Miami, Fla.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; New Orleans, La.; Danbury, Conn.; Seattle, Wash.; San Francisco, Ca.; Los Angeles, Ca.; Portland, Ore.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Orlando, Fla.; and Minneapolis, Minn.

The results of the nationwide search for solutions to the crime problems isolated in the three outlying downtowns are detailed in Section IV of this report.

Sections II and III set the stage by describing the elements of a healthy operating downtown economy and the impact of crime on such an economy.

II ELEMENTS OF A HEALTHY DOWNTOWN ECONOMY

A city downtown concentrates in one fairly dense and compact geographic area a wide spectrum of business, social and leisure activities. A downtown is typically a major merchandising center with retail outlets ranging from small merchants to large department stores. Because it is usually a major transportation center with rail, bus and highway access, and is located in the heart of a densely populated residential area, the downtown is in a unique position to tap large retail markets.

In addition, downtowns are frequently the location for municipal, state and federal government offices, as well as court facilities. Government activity can be a major source of employment opportunities; it also serves to draw area residents into the downtown community.

Successful downtowns can also be substantial centers of private-sector office employment when the following elements are in place: 1) a large office labor pool, 2) proximity to business support services, and 3) the opportunity for direct contact and interaction with other businesses.

Other activity facilities often associated with a successful
downtown are museums, theaters, hospitals, educational
institutions, major churches, medical and dental offices,
restaurants, residential housing, bus and rail stations,
convention centers, hotels, and indoor and outdoor sports
facilities. Table 1, showing the results of a survey of
visitors to downtown Cleveland in 1981, illustrates the
relative drawing power of some of these activities.

Table 1
Three Main Reasons For Visitors Coming to
Downtown Cleveland in 1981[*]

	Percent		
Activity	1st Reason	2nd Reason	3rd Reason
Shopping	24.1	20.5	7.1
Medical	4.9	4.4	2.8
School	3.2	1.2	1.5
Recreation	20.6	16.9	9.7
Personal Business	20.2	20.3	8.9
Work	22.9	4.7	3.4
Other	3.8	2.4	6.4
Not available	0.3	29.6	60.2
TOTAL	100	100	100

[*]Source: The Greater Cleveland Growth Association

Basic Components of a Vibrant Downtown

The first is the ability to draw shoppers from its potential
trade area and attract workers from its labor pool. In part,
this entails providing the right jobs, retail mix and
amenities, such as restaurants, theaters, and parks. But
workers and shoppers must also have the means to travel safely
to and from downtown--by car, bus, rail or foot--within
acceptable travel times and at acceptable costs.

Successful downtowns typically have heavy pedestrian traffic.
In Manhattan, for example, there are flows as high as 12,000
pedestrians per hour on the west side of Fifth Avenue near 47th
Street, while portions of Lexington, Madison and Third Avenues
can reach sidewalk flows of about 6,000 per hour.[1]

High pedestrian flow not only generates the traffic needed for
merchants, restaurants and theaters to thrive, but also plays a
role in discouraging street crime and increasing feelings of
safety among pedestrians. As Wilson and Kelling have stated:

> "A busy, bustling shopping center and a well-tended
> suburb may need almost no visible police presence (to
> maintain order). In both cases, the ratio of respectable
> to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make
> informal social control effective."

[1]Smaller downtowns exhibited lower though still impressive
levels of pedestrian traffic: up to 5,000 per hour in Chicago
and Toronto; 3,000 in San Francisco; and 1,500 (comparable to
some Manhattan crosstown streets) in Seattle (Pushkarev &
Zupan, Urban Space for Pedestrians, 1975).

The results of the trade area telephone survey conducted during Phase I of this project support the contention that a high ratio of lawful, orderly pedestrians (Wilson and Kelling's "respectable" people) can engender feelings of personal safety. A significant correlation was found between how safe respondents felt their downtown was during the day (compared to other commercial centers) and the perceived likelihood they felt of finding people they were comfortable with shopping there. This result is very consistent with prior research showing that fear of crime is strongly influenced by how well we can predict the behavior of people we meet. Such predictability is greater when we interact with lawful, orderly or "our kind" of people.

A high concentration of pedestrian activity is fundamental to the operation of the other two components of a healthy downtown. The second important characteristic is the downtown's viability as a concentrated, self-contained business community where people can easily engage in face-to-face communication. For office occupants downtown rents buy not only leasable space but easy access to a range of needed skills, supplies, market information and investment sources. Because of the compactness of the successful downtown, much of this access can be achieved through direct personal contact.[2]

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[2]In Manhattan, for example, the nine-square-mile Central Business District has reached a density level of land use, business transactions and personal interaction far beyond any other business district in the nation, with some two million employees housed in 600 million square feet of floor space in the area from the Battery to Central Park South. In its densest area, more than 500,000 jobs are compressed in one square mile, where on an average weekday there are 100,000 opportunities for face-to-face contact between workers within a ten-minute walking radius. The fact that commercial land values in the area have reached $1,400 per square foot reflects the economic benefits associated with this degree of concentration (Armstrong and Milder, 1985).

The third and final element of an economically viable downtown is known as the "multiplier effect"--the tendency of visitors who come downtown for one particular activity to engage in a number of others during the course of their stay. A shopper, for example, will also decide to dine and see a show while downtown, or an office worker may lunch and shop at the noon hour. This phenomenon is particularly important for downtown retailing, as illustrated in Table 2, which shows that 52% of the shoppers surveyed in downtown Denver in 1972 had come downtown initially to engage in other activities.

Table 2
PRIMARY REASONS SHOPPERS IN DOWNTOWN DENVER GIVE FOR BEING DOWNTOWN (1972)*

Activity	Percent
Work	31.3
Shop	48.0
Business, financial, and legal matters	7.5
Medical/dental visits	3.3
Meet friends or business associates	0.9
Attend meetings/conventions	0.4
Vacation visit	0.1
Recreation, amusement, eating	3.0
Visit government office	0.1
Seek employment	0.8
Education/cultural affairs	0.7
Other	3.9

*A. Smith, "The Future of Downtown Retailing," Urban Land 1972, pp. 3-10.

The impact of office workers on the downtown retail economy can be very substantial. It was recently estimated, for example, that federal office workers who will soon be moving to Jamaica Center will each spend about $1,700 per year in retail stores during their lunch hours. During the Phase II site visits, downtown officials across the nation invariably reported that middle-income shoppers, now usually residing in the suburbs, had for the most part left for the outlying shopping malls, and that the existing vitality of their middle-income retailing was attributable primarily to daytime purchases by downtown office workers. A 1984 survey of downtown workers in Cleveland shows that about 93% had shopped there during normal weekday working hours in the past year.[3]

Another example of the importance of office workers to downtown retailing is the widespread complaint encountered during the site visits of "five o'clock flight", the term given to the daily exodus of employees rushing home directly after work. This flight, caused in part by fear of crime, results in the desertion of downtown streets and forces retail stores, restaurants and cultural facilities to close at night.

Office development by itself can help improve the physical appearance of an area as well as provide employment opportunities for suitably trained nearby residents, but it is largely because of its ability to stimulate a multiplier effect that office development has become generally recognized as an

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[3] Greater Cleveland Growth Association. Retail Market Research Survey of Downtown Cleveland's Workforce. Cleveland, 1984. In addition, a 1983 Regional Plan Association study found that on an average day about 25% of office employees in Manhattan make daytime trips to eat lunch or shop, compared to 20% of those working in regional sub-centers and 14% of those in campus-style office complexes.

important downtown revitalization strategy. And the multiplier effect can stimulate far more than the retailing industry: in Cleveland, the 1984 worker survey cited above showed that 22% of the respondents would be willing to live downtown if suitable housing could be provided, while 45% attended an Indians baseball game and 32% attended live theater at Playhouse Square.

If a downtown has a multiplier effect, facilitates business concentration and interpersonal communication, and can get workers and shoppers to and from the area in a safe and efficient manner, then it has an environment in which private investment will flow. It is an old and accepted axiom that retailers follow the customers, so if shoppers are going downtown, retailers will want to follow. In turn, if retailers want to locate in a downtown, then developers will have prospective tenants for existing or new retail space. Offices will also want to locate downtown and developers will again have a strong demand for existing or new office space. And the strength of the demand for commercial space as well as the overall level of economic activity will make long-term lenders willing to invest in future downtown projects.

While the three outlying downtowns in this project do not precisely fit the classic definition of a metropolitan downtown, they are the principal--or one of the principal-- commercial centers of their respective boroughs. Indeed, Brooklyn constitutes the fourth largest city in the United States, and its downtown is comparable in size to that of some major cities studied during this program.

III THE EFFECTS OF CRIME ON A DOWNTOWN ECONOMY

The widespread decline of urban downtowns in this country
following World War II was not _initiated_ by crime. Instead it
was the result of numerous factors, including the increased use
of the automobile, the shift of middle-class residents and
shoppers to the suburbs, the aging of downtown buildings and
infrastructures and the development of competitive suburban
shopping malls and campus-style office complexes.

These same forces resulted in a loss of commercial businesses
to outlying areas, an increase in vacant and abandoned
buildings, a shift towards businesses positioned for low-income
and transient populations, and nearby residential populations
increasingly comprised largely of lower-income and minority
groups. Disinvestment rather than investment in buildings and
property became the rule in many central business districts.

During the 60's and 70's, the deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill and the development of methadone clinics and
halfway houses for released offenders further altered the
character of many downtown populations.

As the composition of downtown user populations changed there
was a commensurate rise in crime rates against people and
property.[4] Fear of crime increased among the remaining
workers, businessmen and residents. The high-crime image
associated with downtowns was perpetuated by the network of
downtown workers and businessmen who passed on their
perceptions to fellow workers, relatives and friends residing
outside of the core area. The fear of crime was further

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[4]An intensive discussion of the foregoing is found in
Policing a City's Central District: The Oakland Story (Reiss,
1984 forthcoming)

stimulated by the burgeoning of low-level "quality of life" offenses, such as illegal drug sales, teenage loitering, littering and harrassment.[5]

Thus began a cycle of fear and flight to the suburbs that accelerated the economic decline of many central business districts. This cycle must be broken before substantial progress can be made toward the economic revitalization of America's urban centers.

[5]The Citizens Crime Commission of New York City reported in 1983 that: "Thousands of crimes involving low-level drug abuse, turnstile jumping and general street disorder are committed every day in New York City. Considered individually, these offenses seem insignificant, but taken as a whole they constitute a tidal wave of disorder that affects virtually every New Yorker every day. These 'minor' crimes, as well as more serious offenses, help determine the quality of life in an urban environment." (Crime and Criminal Justice in New York City, 1983 p.17)

A) FEAR OF CRIME

The Phase I telephone survey illustrates the extent of fear of crime among trade area residents.[6] The results showed that 58% of the respondents felt a visitor to their local downtowns would be likely to be attacked, beaten or raped, and 75% felt a visitor would be likely to have his money, wallet or purse stolen (Table 3).

TABLE 3

RESPONDENTS FEELING A VISITOR
TO THEIR DOWNTOWN WOULD BE LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER
SPECIFIC CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR*

	Percent			
	Downtown Brooklyn	Fordham Road	Jamaica Center	All
Have their car stolen or broken into	53.4	55.8	65.6	58.2
Be attacked, beaten or raped	37.8	38.8	51.1	40.3
Have their money, wallets or purses stolen	72.3	76.7	77.8	75.5

*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report

The fear of crime robs a downtown of those features that make it uniquely advantageous as a business location. Evidence gathered during the initial phase of this project suggests that fear of crime impedes downtown business activity by inhibiting people from taking certain pedestrian trips, keeping them out of certain areas or pedestrian routes and inducing them to make shorter and more single-purpose trips. Ultimately, the perception of crime among the two primary user populations--the daily office workers and employees, and the intermittent group of shoppers and visitors--depresses the multiplier effect and strangles the downtown economy.

[6] The Phase I findings discussed in this report are based on research in three outer-borough downtowns in the New York urban region and may not be as applicable to other parts of the country.

1--Daily Population

As noted earlier, "five o'clock flight" is a widely reported phenomenon among downtown workers. Executives and development officials in the three outer-borough downtowns, as well as in Atlanta, Charlotte, Hartford, Newark, Cleveland and Oakland, all report workers rushing to leave the downtown area immediately after work.

Little shopping is done after dark. Stores close, streets become deserted, and employees working late often walk together in groups or are escorted to their destinations.

This desertion of downtowns and the avoidance behavior of those who remain reflects the dangerous image of downtowns at night. The Phase I trade area telephone survey showed that 66% of the respondents felt their downtown was less safe for nightime shopping than other commercial centers. (Table 4).

TABLE 4

GENERAL FEELINGS OF COMPARATIVE SAFETY SHOPPING DURING
THE EVENING IN THE THREE DOWNTOWNS*

How safe trade residents feel in the evening in their downtown compared to other shopping centers:	Downtown Brooklyn	Fordham Road	Jamaica Center	Total Sample
-- safer	2.9	1.5	0.5	1.6
-- about as safe	10.7	12.3	8.1	10.4
-- less safe	62.6	64.7	70.2	65.8
-- don't know or no answer	23.8	21.6	21.2	22.2
	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report

During the day, in downtowns or those parts of downtowns that have few law-abiding, orderly pedestrians, office workers may choose to lunch at their desks or in the company's cafeteria rather than venture out on to the streets. A recent survey of office workers in Jamaica Center, for example, showed that 60% left their buildings at lunchtime no more than once a week.[7]

The same survey illustrates the pervasiveness of fear of crime among downtown workers. The local park in Jamaica Center has a reputation for crime, drug use, and public drinking. The survey showed that more than 54% of office workers avoided going through the park during the day, even though it would be more convenient to do so. Yet an analysis of actual crime statistics showed that the park and its peripheral streets have fewer street robberies than main portions of the retail strip where a higher proportion of orderly people are found. This avoidance behavior is probably stimulated by the drinking and other incivilities that people observe in the park.

Merchants interviewed in Phase I in the three downtowns also perceive a high threat of crime; as many as 89% felt that pickpocketing and purse snatching were serious problems in their areas, while up to 72% saw street robbery and mugging of shoppers as serious concerns.

The prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image is the network of daily businessmen and workers and their friends and relatives. If negative messages about downtown safety are being sent into the community, the downtown's economy is likely to suffer from it's high-crime reputation.

2--Intermittent Population

Downtowns can still get a substantial number of visitors during the day. The Phase I trade area telephone survey found that

[7]Vernon Boggs, King Park and Manner Users Study (Cooperative Research Unit, CUNY Graduate School, 1984), p. 23.

about 37% of the respondents visited their downtowns at least once a month and another 37% visited at least once in a while.[8] These visitors are not necessarily poor: the survey found that wealthier trade area residents are about as likely to visit their downtowns as poorer residents.[9]

While it is difficult to ascertain specifically why these people came downtown, the Phase I report concluded they did not come primarily to shop.

Much of the evidence suggests that other unique activities are responsible for drawing them downtown. Jamaica Center, for example, has 50,000 people entering its subway stations each day, with 3,000 coming daily to the motor vehicle office and countless others coming to courts, hospitals, York College, the public library and other facilities.

3--Fear of Crime and Downtown Visitation Rates

The Phase I trade area survey revealed that nearly 63% of the residents visit their downtown less than once a month. In addition, a substantial percentage of people felt visitors were likely to be victimized by crime while downtown (Table 3), and would encounter specific signs of disorder, such as graffiti, public drinking, drug sale, loitering and harrassment. Thus,

[8]A recent survey in Charlotte showed that 18% of the respondents visit the downtown area (known as the "uptown" among residents) daily while 44% visit it at least occasionally. (Central Charlotte Assn., Greater Cleveland Growth Assn.) In Cleveland, a 1982 trade area survey conducted by the Greater Cleveland Growth Association found that 37.8% of the respondents had been downtown within the past month and 60.6% had visited within the last year.

[9]The 1982 Cleveland survey showed no relationship between income and downtown visitation rates: more than 60% of those visiting at least once a month had household incomes of over $15,000, and 37.7% had incomes above $25,000.

while it would seem reasonable to infer that there is a general
fear of crime in the three outer-borough downtowns, and that
this fear may affect visitation rates among the 63% of
respondents who rarely come downtown, the Phase I analysis
summarized in Table 5 found no substantial correlation between
respondents' fear of specific crimes and downtown visitation
rates and feelings of comparative safety during the day.

4--Physical and Behavioral Signs of Disorder

During the survey, respondents were asked about their reactions
to physical signs of disorder, such as broken windows and
graffiti, and behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug
dealing, loitering and prostitution. As noted, little
correlation was found between specific physical and behavioral
signs of disorder and feelings of comparative safety during the
day (Table 5). However, the two most strongly associated
variables in respect to general feelings of safety were the
likelihood of finding their type of people shopping there and
the attractiveness of the downtown area.

The overall attractiveness variable may be interpreted as a
measure of general physical disorder, and the variable of the
likelihood of finding their type of people shopping downtown
can be interpreted as a measure of behavioral disorder. These
correlations suggest that general perceptions of public order,
while not significantly affecting visitation rates, may have a
substantial impact on depressing the multiplier effect.

TABLE 5   Strength of Association Between General Attitudes Toward Downtowns, Physical Signs of Disorder, Behavioral Signs of Disorder, Specific Crimes and A) How Often Downtowns are Visited and B) How Safe Survey Respondents Feel Downtown is During the Day Compared to other Shopping Areas.*

	A) How Often They Visit Downtown	B) Feeling Safe During the Day
1. General Attitudes Towards Downtown		
-- Likelihood of finding merchandise they want	.17	.15
-- How attractive they feel their downtown is	.24	.38
-- Ease of visiting downtown	.26	.18
-- Likelihood of finding their type of people shopping downtown	.24	.36
2. Physical Signs of Disorder		
-- Clean Streets	.12	.26
-- Abandoned Stores and Buildings	-.09	-.22
-- Well-lit streets	-.00+	-.07
-- Broken windows	-.12	-.13
-- Graffiti	-.09	-.21
3. Behavioral Signs of Disorder		
-- Groups hanging out**	-.11	-.13
-- Beggars and Bag People	.04+	-.12
-- Drinking in Public Places	-.11	-.20
-- Gangs on the Street**	-.12	-.26
-- Drugs being used/sold	-.18	-.23
-- Prostitutes on Street	-.15	-.17

+ not significant below 0.05

Table 5 continued

	A) How Often They Visit Downtown	B) Feeling Safe During the Day
4. Specific Crimes		
-- Cars stolen/broken into	-.15	-.25
-- Attacks, beatings rapes	-.20	-.28
-- Street robberies	-.10	-.28
5. General Feeling of Safety		
-- Day	.30	----
-- Evening	.23	.37
6. Other		
-- Race	.27	.26
-- Income	.12	.14
-- Sex	.13	.14

*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report. Pearson correlation coefficients measure the strength of association between two variables and range in value from plus one to minus one, with plus one being the highest positive correlation. A correlation of plus or minus .3 or more is considered to be of analytical import.

**"Groups hanging out" differs from "Gangs on the street" in that the former are informal groupings while the latter are organized such as street or motorcycle gangs.

In specific terms, individual physical signs of disorder do not contribute as strongly as might be expected to the fear of crime. Wilson and Kelling have maintained that signs of physical disorder, such as broken windows, graffiti, dirty streets and abandoned buildings, in addition to disorderly people, signal that public authority can no longer maintain order in the area and increase the perception of crime.[10] Research in Cleveland, for example, found that dirty streets make people feel unsafe.[11] Yet the findings from the Phase I trade area survey summarized in Table 6 indicate that of all physical signs of disorder only graffiti displayed even a modest correlation with fear of specific crimes.[12]

Stronger correlations were found between expectations of specific violent crimes and behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug use and sale, public drinking, street gangs and loitering teenagers.[13]

[10]James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety", Atlantic Monthly, (3/82, pp. 28-38).

[11]Greater Cleveland Growth Association

[12]Though the Phase I data does not confirm the physical signs of disorder theory, this may be due to the pervasiveness of such signs in the New York City area. New York City residents may, in fact, have become inured to graffiti and abandoned buildings, confronting these signs so frequently that they have become a part of their daily experience.

[13]These findings are corroborated by the results of the Crime, Fear and Control In Neighborhood Commercial Centers study completed in 1983 by the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center. This study found that "...where residents perceived problems representing potential threats to their well-being--in particular, people harassing other, drunks, noisy or unruly teenagers, strangers and "outsiders", purse-snatching and street crimes--a significantly greater proportion of the respondents engaged in more avoidance behavior...Alternatively, avoidance was not highly related to physical conditions in the centers, such as litter, trash, upkeep, appearance of businesses, and evidence of vandalism. These...are apparently not dangerous by themselves, and do not lead to residents' avoidance or use of precautions while in the center to as great an extent."

TABLE 6   Strength of Association Between Physical and Behavioral Signs
           Of Disorder and A) Expectations About Specific Crimes and B)
           Feelings of Safety Downtown Compared to other Shopping
           Centers[*]

| | A) Specific Crimes | | | B) Feeling Safe Downtown | |
Signs of Disorder	Auto	Assaults	Street Robberies	Day	Evening
A. Physical					
Street Cleanliness	-.13	-.13	-.16	.26	.15
Abandoned Stores and Buildings	.26	.23	.20	-.22	-.20
Street Lighting	-.20	-.19	-.23	.07	.09
Broken Windows	.26	.26	.18	-.13	-.19
Graffiti	.26	.30	.25	-.21	-.17
B. Behavioral					
Groups Hanging Out	.26	.23	.31	-.13	-.19
Beggars & Bag People	.21	.25	.29	-.12	-.12
Public Drinking	.33	.32	.35	-.20	-.27
Gangs on Streets	.22	.35	.26	-.26	-.25
Drug Use & Sale	.42	.46	.41	-.23	-.21
Prostitution	.22	.29	.24	-.17	-.23

[*] Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report. Pearson correlation coefficients
measure the strength of association between two variables and range in
value from plus one to minus one, with plus one being the highest
positive correlation. A correlation of plus or minus .3 or above is
considered to be of analytical import.

The foregoing suggests that programs aimed at dealing with behavioral
signs of disorder (quality-of-life offenses) would do more to decrease
fear in the New York City area than would programs aimed at improving
specific signs of physical neglect; however, a general improvement in
downtown appearance might well increase general feelings of safety.

5--Responses to Fear of Crime

Although the daily and visiting user populations have different purposes
for coming downtown, they share several key responses to the fear of
crime once they arrive:

a. Limited Street Activity

Fear of crime keeps many downtown users off the streets. Generally,
these visitors won't travel far on foot to reach secondary destinations
such as shops and restaurants. And they will avoid downtown areas that
lack a suitable density of orderly pedestrians or have visible signs of
disorder.

In addition, fear of crime encourages use of self-contained or
off-street activity areas. Shoppers, for example, can pull into the
downtown Brooklyn A&S garage, use the over-street bridge into the main
store, conduct their shopping, and reverse the trip without having to go
out on the street--in fact, many people do precisely that. In
Charlotte, a visitor can park in a garage and walk the equivalent of
seven city blocks through a series of over-street bridges and building
connections to reach nearly all the major office buildings, the two main
department stores, the two major hotels, and 80 shops and restaurants.

b. Fewer Multi-Purpose Visits

Fear of crime tends to make downtown visits more single-purposed: "Quick
in and quick out" becomes the rule. This substantically impedes the
ability of businessmen-- especially retailers--to benefit from
pedestrian traffic.

c. Limited use of public transit and increased demand for auto
   parking

Fear of crime is reputed to affect the commuting habits of workers and
visitation habits of others who travel to reach downtown. Public

transit is usually an important asset of downtowns, as it is capable
of bringing large numbers of people into the heart of the area while
using a minimum of valuable land. Yet the perception is that the
fear of crime on public transit reduces potential ridership or
restricts it to rush hours. Consequently, those who can afford to
will be likely to travel downtown by car; those who can't may be
inclined not to shop or work there at all. The relationship between
concern for crime and use of transit, subways in particular,
warrants further study.

The reluctance to use public transit exacerbates an already
difficult situation by generating more auto users than necessary.
The automobile is the primary means for workers and visitors to get
downtown in many cities. In Cleveland, for example, 70% of downtown
visitors come by car.[14] The fear of crime increases the demand in
most downtowns for close-in parking; companies located downtown
often have long waiting lists of employees waiting to get access to
these facilities. One company contacted during this study claims
that employees typically have to wait more than two years.[15]

In addition, heavy auto use causes its own security problems. Large
areas of closely-situated parking can provide long stretches of
lightly used sidewalks. Affordable parking for the lowest paid--and
often female--clerical help is often located in more remote downtown
areas. Personal security in parking structures is a prime concern
for many employees; car theft and auto larceny also contribute to
fear of crime.

[14]Greater Cleveland Growth Assn. Retail Market Research
Survey of Cleveland Standard Consolidated Statistical Area.
Cleveland, 1982.

[15] The demand for close-by parking means that prime land must
be used. This inevitably results in higher building costs,
making it more difficult for downtown development sites to
compete financially with those in the suburbs. In addition,
the demand for close-by parking facilities by office workers
can conflict with the needs of the downtown retail community.
In Hartford, for example, workers occupy 16,000 of the 18,000
available parking places by 10 AM, thus leaving comparatively
few places for shoppers and other visitors.

For potential workers and shoppers alike, concern about safety
in getting to and from downtown (whether by car, bus, or rail),
high parking costs, and fears about walking safely on downtown
streets can all become factors in keeping them from taking jobs
or shopping in the area.

B) CRIME AND OFFICE DEVELOPMENT

Office development is a key strategy to begin the
revitalization of a downtown. Most companies are genuinely
concerned about security in the areas surrounding potential
office sites, as well as the safety of employees, especially
women, during their commutation to and from work.[16] In a
1983 survey of 47 large corporations headquartered in Manhattan
(see Table 7), Regional Plan Association found that safety and
security ranked third in importance among 19 criteria used in
making decisions regarding back office locations. Companies
are worried about employees looking for new jobs in safer
areas; obviously, this could be very costly.

The price of providing employee security can also be costly.
Table 7 shows that operating costs (criteria I and II) are
considered more important in office location decisions than
safety and security. If the cost of making downtown employees
feel safe and secure is too high, then firms will locate their
offices elsewhere.

[16] In the outer-borough downtowns, those higher up on the
corporate ladder are more likely to travel to work by car, but
the clerical worker is likely to come by public
transportation. Employees using public transit are most
vulnerable to crime from the time they leave their office
buildings to the time they get to their bus or subway stations,
and while waiting for their buses or subway trains to come.
Auto users, on the other hand, face greatest exposure from the
time they leave their office buildings to the time they reach
their garages, and from the time they enter their garages to
the time they are in their cars. Enhanced security is
therefore most often needed during these periods of time.

Table 7   How 19 Back Office Location Criteria Ranked In Importance
            Among 47 Firms That Have Moved Back Offices Out Of Manhattan*

Criteria	Rank
Cost per square foot	1
Cost of electricity-	4+
40,000 square feet plus floors	14
Secure & proximate parking	11
Mass transit access	4+
Proximity to headquarters	12
Proximity to restaurants & shops	16
Safety & security in surrounding area	3
Access to fiber optics cable to communicate with headquarters	10
Access to satelite communications systems	15
Direct micro-wave link to headquarters	17
Proximity to attractive neighborhoods where workers can live	13
Quality of labor pool with 30 minutes of site	6
Physical attractiveness of area surrounding site	8

+ Same ranking

Table 7 continued

Criteria	Rank
Income of residents in surrounding area	18
Reliability of electric power	2
Residential locations of back office work force	9
Regulations on business	7
Waterfront access	19

*Source: Regional Plan Association

Some employees need to work past the normal quitting time and
the evening rush hour traffic. A recent survey of government
office workers in Queens shows that about 20% work past 5:00 PM
on an average workday. Research indicates that most employees
working late are gone by 7:00 or 7:30 PM and only a very few
remain past 9:00 PM. Extra security is therefore frequently
needed between 6-9 PM for these evening office workers, many of
whom use public transit.

Other corporate operations, especially those that are
computerized, now run on a round-the-clock basis, and a
pressing concern of these employers is with those workers
(again, very often women) who work on the evening and
early-morning shifts. Since the evening shift is likely to be
arriving during the normal evening rush hour, and the late
shift will leave during the morning rush hour, the main period
of concern for employee security is between 11:00 PM and 1:00
AM, when the evening and late shifts are likely to change.
Most of these workers are likely to come by car, primarily
because traffic will be lighter and parking easier to find, but
also because of worries about safety.

Relocating firms also want their office employees to be able to
walk safely in the downtown during the day. Being able to shop
and eat out at lunchtime is frequently considered an important
worker amenity needed to keep employees happy with the
company. So providing adequate daytime security may be yet
another cost center for prospective office developers.

C) CRIME AND RETAIL DEVELOPMENT

The fear of crime impedes the ability of retailers to tap both
existing and potential customer traffic. An ideal downtown
retail area attracts a mix of customers in all income

categories, but downtowns in decline usually attract primarily lower-income and ethnic shoppers.[17] In these downtowns, office workers have little inclination to go out to shop or lunch during the day. More successful downtowns, on the other hand, such as Hartford, Cleveland, Atlanta and Charlotte, maintain a healthier retail mix by drawing sufficient concentrations of office workers onto the streets during the day.

In nearly all the downtowns visited during Phase II of this project, retailers felt they had a large potential market of middle-income shoppers (usually residing in a geographic ring beyond the closer-in, more modest residential areas) who they were unable to attract because of the city's high crime image--an image which downtown development officials generally felt was unwarranted.

As the profile of the downtown shopper becomes increasingly low-income and ethnic, the retail and merchandise mixes follow suit.[18]

Crime, by helping deter potential middle-income customers from shopping downtown, contributes to the pressure felt by retailers aiming at this market segment.

[17] Analysis of Phase I survey results and research on retailing in Jamaica Center indicates that higher-income citizens may visit downtown, but they will be far less likely to shop. Initially, this may result from limited pedestrian activity due to the fear of crime; in its later stages, this trend is worsened because the overall retail mix has weakened.

[18] A good example is Jamaica Center, which just 30 years ago was a strong middle-income-oriented commercial area. But times changed, and although the average household income in its trade area was about $20,000 in 1979, 80% of its shoppers in a survey two years later had incomes below $17,000. Not surprisingly, middle-income stores such as Macy's, Gertz, B&B Long, Ethan Allen, and Wallachs have moved from the area in recent years.

Compounding this problem is the higher operating costs suffered
by downtown retailers as a result of crime. The results from
the Phase I retail survey (Table 8) demonstrate the extent to
which retailers are concerned with crime in their downtowns:
approximately 70%, for example, felt that mugging is a serious
problem in their trade areas.

Table 8

Responses To Retail Survey: Percent of
Retailers Considering Specific Crimes To Be
Serious Problems*

	Downtown Brooklyn	Fordham Road	Jamaica Center
	% Serious	% Serious	% Serious
Shoplifting	96.9	93.6	97.5
Pick Pocketing/Purse Snatching	89.0	87.3	87.5
Crime in Downtown Subway Stations	76.6	70.2	62.5
Shoppers Being Mugged/Held Up	71.9	63.8	70.0
Autos Being Broken Into Or Vandalized	59.3	72.3	70.0
Vandalism	56.2	59.6	42.5
Stores Being Burglarized At Night	56.3	68.1	75.0
Stores Being Held Up	54.7	61.7	50.0
Employee Theft	43.8	40.5	47.5
Average	67.2	68.6	66.9
Total Number of Respondents	64	47	40

*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report

While security costs are a common problem wherever retailers locate, reports from the outer-borough downtowns and other cities visited during Phase II generally indicate these costs are more severe in downtown areas. Retailers may also fear for their personal safety during operating hours, while making late-night bank deposits or while going home after work. All of these are incentives for retailers to relocate.

For downtowns to achieve retail revitalization they must first attract office development of sufficient size and concentration to produce the purchasing power needed to stimulate an upgrade in the retail mix.[19] Yet before such an upgrade can be felt in the downtown retail community, it is essential that targeted customers not be afraid to shop. Some of these potential customers will already be downtown, so the problem becomes one of making them feel safer as they move about the area.

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[19] Usually this is initiated by pulling in office employee noontime expenditures. Pushkarev and Zupan, for example, found that one Manhattan department store did "almost 50% of its business during two and a half hours at lunchtime and only 6% during its late open hours (p.38). Strategically placed, these new retail stores should increasingly draw trade from current middle-income shoppers, who eventually begin to come downtown just to shop. Further retail upgrading would occur as current workers and shoppers stay later after 5:00 PM and through word-of-mouth by other shoppers induced to come by the downtowns new facilities and safer image of the downtown.

IV) NATIONWIDE SOLUTIONS TO DOWNTOWN CRIME PROBLEMS

In examining solutions to downtown crime problems, it is
necessary first to specify the type of central business
district and economic development goals set by community and
business leadership. These factors will determine the nature
and extent of the security problems to be confronted. If, for
example, the primary emphasis is on retaining and attracting
new office development, then daytime safety and making
late-working employees secure as they go home is of paramount
importance, since the area will be otherwise largely deserted
at night. But if a downtown already has a substantial office
population and is attempting to promote more nightime activity,
then general evening security becomes a major concern.

Throughout the Phase II site visits, businessmen, development
officials and police were unanimous in affirming that a key to
making downtown pedestrians feel safe during the day and
evening is increasing the flow of orderly, law-abiding people
on downtown streets. A higher density of such pedestrian
traffic helps inhibit anti-social behavior and results in more
street activity, thereby increasing the downtown multiplier
effect and economic vibrancy of the business community.

Although the precise "critical mass" needed to decrease fear of
victimization is not known, evidence collected during this
project indicates that pedestrians definitely feel safer in
areas where they are likely to find similar types of people on
the streets. In the absence of a critical mass of respectable
people and the resulting level of self-policing it affords,
increased private and public security efforts are needed to
ensure safety. Thus, daytime security is generally easier to
maintain than 24-hour protection, because greater numbers of
police are needed after office hours to substitute for the
daytime pedestrian flow.

In this section, three categories of strategies for enhancing downtown safety are identified:

A) Downtown Design and Development

B) Police and Private Security

C) Civic and Business Organization

A) DOWNTOWN DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

No downtown can be completely rebuilt as if it were one gigantic piece of vacant land, but when opportunities to construct new or rehabilitated office, retail, entertainment, cultural, residential and transportation facilities arise, consideration should be paid to methods for, as one city official puts it, "people-izing" the area.

The following design and development stategies are aimed at increasing pedestrian flow and minimizing fear of crime among downtown users.

1--Dense and Compact Development

The success of downtown business is, of course, greatly affected by proximity to potential customers.[20]

[20] An analysis of walking habits of Manhattan office workers shows that the average distance for pedestrian trips is about 1,100 feet, or roughly twice the length as in other downtowns. The average distance traveled to eat lunch is about 810 feet, while daytime shopping trips have a median length of 1,250 feet (Pushkarev and Zupan, Urban Space for Pedestrians). According to sources in the retail industry, stores must be located within four city blocks, or about 800-900 feet of a concentration of at least 4,000 office workers to benefit from lunchtime shopping.

Dense and compact development will foster pedestrian activity, office worker retail sales and lessen the period of exposure on the streets. Moreover, by leading to the emergence of an attractive core development area, it can also lower the fear of crime; the trade area telephone survey found that there was a meaningful correlation (Table 5) between how generally attractive respondents considered their downtown to be and how safe they felt it was to shop there compared with other shopping centers.

a. Obstacles to Dense and Compact Development

Although commercial centers are often relatively dense and compact, the overall downtown area can be rather large from security and pedestrian perspectives. There are several important ways that downtowns impede dense and compact development and concentration of pedestrian activity:

--Linear Development

In many downtowns, including those in the outer-boroughs, it is not unusual to see development concentrated along linear corridors that may be a mile or more in length. In some cities, this tends to occur on one side of the street. The failure to develop both sides of the street diminishes the ability of development on that block to generate pedestrian activity.

Developing both sides of the street may also help dislodge facilities (such as bars and "head" shops) that generate the wrong kind of pedestrian traffic. Judging from the cities studied during Phase II, one-sided linear development on major streets also seems to siphon off pedestrian traffic by encouraging the use of over-street walkways and other building connections.

--Specialized Activity Enclaves

Many downtowns have areas dominated by government, retail, private office or entertainment/cultural facilities, all separated from each other by considerable walking distance. This situation is intentional in cities where planners have tried to "clean up" individual portions of downtowns, with the hope that this would stimulate further development in the remaining areas. This strategy has been most successful in cities with safe and reliable public and para-transit systems to help link these downtown enclaves.[21] If they can't be linked, however, such areas--particularly single buildings or developments--tend to assume a fortress-type image with users viewing them as outposts surrounded by hostile territory.

[21] In Denver, for example, there is a free shuttle bus with 70-second headways that services the 16th Street Mall, and its use is considerably higher than had initially been projected. Cleveland has a loop bus for the downtown area. In Newark, Prudential runs a van shuttle every 20 minutes between its headquarters complex, the Gateway Center and the two major railroad stations. While the Prudential shuttle is deemed safe by over 92% of its users, it is costly. And in many downtowns, people are afraid to use downtown buses and subways.

--Limited-Access Structures and Off-Street Pedestrian Networks

A limited-access structure is typically a single-tenant office building with an attached garage, few entrances, a security force that strictly controls floor-to-floor access, blank walls on street level, and a work force that commutes by car, eats lunch at their desks or in the company cafeteria, and resorts to five o'clock flight.

Another type of limited-access structure is a retail mall entirely surrounded by a parking structure or fenced-in parking lot. Foot traffic from the street is restricted by the limited number of entrances, and these malls usually have a large security force and television surveillance. The chief objection to these structures is that, by keeping people from using normal sidewalk routes, they diminish a downtown's street life and keep visitors from engaging in more than one activity. Says one retailer: "They rob from the street".[22]

Off-street networks link together hotels, office buildings, apartment buildings, garages and convention centers by means of self-contained over-street walkways and understreet tunnels. Some examples are the Overstreet Mall in Charlotte, Peachtree Center in Atlanta and Gateway Center in Newark. In Montreal, Dallas and Houston substantial portions of the pedestrian

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[22]The Vermont/Slausson Shopping Mall in Los Angeles is an interesting example of a limited-access structure, though it was built in a neighborhood business district. Crime in this low-income area, especially that committed by teenage groups, was making local residents afraid to shop in the area, and retailers were leaving. The creation of a limited-access shopping center was a key condition for the city to interest a developer and recruit his two major tenants. The completion of the mall and the security it provides has stimulated a wave of shopping activity from local residents, while the on-street merchants are, at best, doing about as well as they had done before.

networks are underground. In this type of development there are usually numerous restaurants and boutiques, most of which can be entered only from within the network. These (usually privately-owned) complexes have the advantage of strong private security contingents which help monitor the flow of orderly people throughout the network. Reports from Charlotte, Atlanta and Newark all indicate that middle-income users feel very safe in these areas.[23]

While a limited-access structure that has a single function helps depress the downtown multiplier effect, this is not necessarily the case with off-street networks. These are generally multi-functional and can link numerous activities together in a rather compact area, stimulate middle-income pedestrian activity and foster the multiplier effect. Although a considerable portion of the downtown pedestrian traffic will be contained inside, there is a concentration of traffic nonetheless. As one developer puts it: "the Overstreet Mall is Main Street in Charlotte." Indeed, Charlotte's mall (Map 1) has substantially improved the area, triggering demand for middle-income housing and upgrading on-street stores on Tryon Street.

Although the construction of limited-access structures and off-street networks may seem at odds with the classic definition of a downtown, there is reason to believe that under certain circumstances

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[23]By siphoning off middle-income shoppers, off-street networks may increase the percentage of lower-income pedestrians on the outside sidewalks. This leads to a functional separation of downtown users by income. But this phenomenon is neither complete nor a matter of public or corporate policy. And in most urban areas, such a separation usually occurs in retail and residential areas.

downtown development may be unable to proceed without them.
Providing space in these facilities may in fact be the only way
to induce businesses to locate in a troubled urban area; care
should be taken, however, to build them with the capability to
open up access to the street as the downtown progresses toward
revitalization.

2--Housing and Mixed-Use Development

Development officials interviewed during the Phase II site
visits generally felt that office development, while essential
in the early stages of a downtown's revitalization, can take
the process just so far and that more residential development
for middle- and upper-middle-income families is the key to
taking it the rest of the way. Such residential development is
seen as directly improving a downtown's security situation by
increasing the number of orderly people on the street and
improving the appearance and maintenance of downtown
buildings. Indirectly, residential development can also help
support restaurants and shops that would not be economically
viable on lunchtime office traffic alone.

The feasibility of the downtown residential development
strategy rests on the ability to provide affordable housing in
attractive and safe downtown locations. The demand for housing
is there, as the Cleveland survey mentioned on page 11
attests. Jamaica Center and Fordham Road already have
substantial residential populations, although both lack sizable
numbers of middle-income residents, and downtown Brooklyn has
middle-income residents living on its western edge and in
surrounding neighborhoods. But all of the outer borough
downtowns also have "crimeogenic" residential areas in or
around their downtowns.

Providing affordable middle-income housing is now a problem
practically everywhere in the country, but some is being built
in the three downtowns and special programs such as that of the
NY Partnership are being developed to deliver more. And
residential development is the surest strategy for most
downtowns to generate restaurant and boutique-type retail
development needed to attract people downtown for cultural,
entertainment and other evening events.

3--Promoting Evening Activity

It is widely accepted among downtown retailers and development
officials across the country that complete economic
rejuvenation cannot be achieved without significant numbers of
people going to restaurants, shows, movies, concerts and retail
stores after the workday is through. This activity makes the
downtown more attractive to potential users, its businesses
more profitable, and its users safer since it increases the
flow of orderly, law-abiding pedestrians. A crucial problem in
making a downtown "alive after five" is fear of crime.

It must be reemphasized that in terms of economic development
goals, the issue of evening crime shrinks in importance if
making the downtown alive after five is of less concern. For
downtowns in the early stages of the revitilization process, it
can be argued that increasing after-five o'clock activity is an
impractical goal--daytime security must be achieved before
evening safety can be attempted (the safety of late-working
employees and residents will always be a concern but there need
not be too much emphasis on protecting other potential evening
visitors).

For downtowns with a significant amount of office development, increasing after-five o'clock activity may be a more reasonable goal. Yet even here the Phase II interviews with downtown officials and businessmen--including those in the outer boroughs--revealed certain unrealistic expectations that might generate needless security concerns. For example, many of those interviewed believe that because suburban malls stay open until 9:00 PM downtown department stores and retail shops can attract a similar business.[24] But suburban malls can stay open primarily because they draw shoppers from middle-income areas; in many downtowns, potential middle-income shoppers live beyond a ring of lower-income neighborhoods and it is often easier for them to shop at a mall.[25]

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[24] Many businessmen also think that retailing in Manhattan flourishes during these evening hours and is further proof of the potential for their downtowns. In Manhattan, though, most department stores only stay open until 9:00 PM on Monday and Thursday evenings, and as noted earlier, get only a very small percentage of their customer traffic during the evening hours. On other evenings, the retail strips on Fifth Avenue, 34th Street and 57th Street, for example, are closed tight by 7:00 PM or 7:30 PM. It is true that some boutiques do stay open, but these are usually located in strips in Manhattan's residential areas, such as Columbus Avenue and East 86th Street.

[25] To draw these people downtown a unique shopping opportunity must be offered. In Manhattan, off-price retailing on Orchard Street and discount lighting stores on the Bowery offer such opportunities and succeed in drawing numerous middle-income shoppers to highly urbanized areas with strong high-crime images. But the Bowery does this during the weekdays and Orchard Street mostly on Sundays, not during the evenings.

A new type of downtown retail complex is the "festival center," epitomized by the Faneuil Hall project in Boston, Harborside in Baltimore and South Street Seaport in Manhattan. These have proven themselves to be capable of drawing middle-income users. (footnote continued on next page)

(footnote 25 continued)

However, data compiled on some sample festival centers by the
Downtown Research and Development Center show that retailing
may only account for 32%-60% of the center's space (See Table
9), while restaurants, fast food operation and food markets can
account for 42% to 62% of the area. Festival centers, as the
name imples, have a strong recreational draw and are quite
different in nature to traditional department store or chain
store retailing.

Table 9. Space Utilizations in Three Sample Downtown Festival
Centers

| | Festival Centers Downtown | | | |
	A	B	C	Average
Total Retail Space (S.F.)	95,000	140,000	220,000	151,700
Average Unit Size (S.F.)	1,120	900	1,250	1,090
Sales/Customer ($)	5.95	4.00	6.87	5.61
Retail Stores (%)	60	32	46	46
Restaurants/Cafes/Pubs (%)	31	41	52	41
Fast Food (%)	6	14	5	8
Food Markets (%)	3	7	5	5

Source: 1985 Alexander Research & Communications, Inc.

Moreover, as Table 10 shows, these centers draw primarily
on normal trade area residents with tourists the next largest
group. This suggests that the facilities are most feasible in
downtowns that have a substantial number of middle-income
residents nearby and a significant tourist and convention
business.

Table 10. Analysis of the Components of Traffic Flow at One
Downtown Festival Center

Source of customers/visitors	Share of total (%)
People working onsite	8.2
People living onsite	2.7
Hotel occupants onsite	1.1
Convention Center visitors	6.5
Tourists	19.6
Basic Trade Area Residents	62.1

Source: Downtown Research & Development Center, 1985.

Yet it is possible to generate sizable middle-income activity during the evening: many downtowns are trying to attract new users by rehabilitating or constructing cultural and entertainment facilities, such as Playhouse Square in Cleveland, Spiral Square in Charlotte, and BAM in Downtown Brooklyn. These facilities can provide services that suburban areas might find hard to compete with, especially legitimate theatre and concerts[26]. The Playhouse Square Theatres, for example, attracted about 110,000 theatergoers to downtown Cleveland in 1983.[27]

However, the problems associated with strategies to increase nightime activity are substantial. Entertainment and cultural events may not generate enough traffic to stimulate the opening of new restaurants and small retail stores.[28] Without them, visitors may come away feeling that the downtown at night is still dead and deserted. Moreover, while the costs of providing police and private security to cover evening

[26]An important note here: care must be taken to hold family-oriented entertainment events. Rock concerts, for example, can attract boisterous, drunk or drugged teenagers and may do more to reinforce a downtown's negative image than improve it, as some cities have learned to their dismay.

[27]The manager of a large retail complex in downtown Hartford commented that his real anchors, especially in the evening, were his quality restaurants; the other stores, basically boutiques, fed off the traffic brought in by these tenants. It seems likely, however, that these restaurants were primarily magnets for those coming downtown for other reasons, such as attending events at the nearby Coliseum.

[28] Sporting events may generate higher numbers of people and on a more frequent basis. Riverfront Stadium in Cincinatti, for example, has had a very positive effect on the downtown hotel and restaurant business.

activities may be significant, there is no substantial
multiplier effect to be gained from these visitors.

It is important to note that residential, cultural,
entertainment, dining and boutique retail facilities will have
a greater propensity to reinforce each other if they are
located close enough to each other to stimulate pedestrian
activity. This suggests that the development of evening
activities that link residential development with cultural,
entertainment, dining and boutique retail facilities is a much
more viable strategy than simply concentrating on attracting
outsiders downtown.

4--Downtown Events

Many cities, including Cincinnati, Hartford, Cleveland and
Denver periodically promote major downtown events to attract
suburban residents (such as Oktoberfest Cincinnati), or bring
out downtown office workers (such as outdoor lunchtime and
evening concerts). The objectives are to draw enough orderly
people to establish a positive downtown image among everyday
workers and suburban residents who otherwise would stay away.
In Cincinnati, these events can attract as many as 250,000
people, according to local police. In Cleveland, a downtown
All Nations Festival drew about 125,000 participants in 1983.

Despite the enthusiasm of downtown development officials, the
overall effectiveness of this strategy as a public-relations
tool is debatable. In decayed downtowns, premature use of
major events simply confirms the negative impressions of
infrequent visitors. In slightly healthier downtowns, people
may decide it is safe to go downtown only for events with large

concentrations of people. Furthermore, noontime events in some public spaces may dilute, but not relocate the disorderly proportion of users, who move back into the area once the events are finished.

As noted earlier, the prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image is the network of daily employees and businessmen, and their friends and relatives. Thus, more active tactics for improving feelings of safety among daily users appear to have the greatest impact on changing the general public's image of a downtown.[29] If negative messages about safety are being sent into the community, no public relations campaign will ever be able to improve the downtown's high-crime reputation.

5--Parking Facilities

All of the cities reviewed during Phase II had a high level of auto use among downtown visitors. A car affords a greater sense of mobility and convenience and in some cases gives added protection against crime.

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[29]The Downtown Councils in Cleveland and Cincinnati are taking important steps in this direction. The council in Cincinnati, for example, has a popular auxiliary group called the UpDowntowners, whose 400-person membership consists primarily of young, single professionals. The social life is one inducement to join, but companies encourage their employees to belong to the organization; by actively working to better the downtown and its image, the members improve their status in the group and the community at large.

Although auto use in the three outer-borough study areas is not currently as high as in other downtowns, this is expected to change in the near future. Three projects now being planned or constructed in the outlying downtowns (the Mack building, Fordham Plaza and Atlantic Terminal), for instance, call for between 400 and 1,000 spaces of on-site parking.

By bringing large numbers of people in and out of the downtown area conveniently, safe public transportation can encourage dense and compact development and a high concentration of pedestrian activity. Heavy auto use, on the other hand, can make these goals more difficult to achieve, due to the limited amount of parking space in a downtown core area.

Inadequate parking facilities causes auto users to park farther away in peripheral parts of the downtown. This dispersion lessens the density of pedestrian traffic and makes it more difficult for policing because the area involved may be too large to patrol adequately. This situation may discourage evening activity in the downtown area because of the fear of crime.

The demand by office workers for nearby parking can conflict with the parking needs of the retail community. This competition can result in office development in peripheral areas--often in the form of limited-access structures--and further disperse pedestrian traffic.

Drivers want to park as close to their destination as possible: a 1982 Hartford survey found that the maximum distance people were willing to park from their destination was three blocks.[30]

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[30] Source: Rideshare Corporation, 1982

Thus, it is not surprising to find that in most downtowns recent development projects have attached or underground parking facilities. Some examples are the Gateway Center in Newark, the Embarcadero in San Francisco, Peachtree Center in Atlanta, and the Convention Center in Constitution Plaza in Hartford. In some downtowns, retail complexes are almost fully enclosed by parking facilities; in others, over-street bridges link department stores to their garages. Underground parking is often expensive to build and seldom accomodates all of a building's auto users.

According to interviews conducted during Phase II, attached parking is widely regarded as the best method for promoting a sense of safety among late-working office employees. In Charlotte, N.C., for instance, one corporation has a seven-story attached garage that is well-lit and patrolled, with designated parking areas for late-night and overtime workers.

Well-lit, attended open lots are generally considered more secure than garages. Within garages, good visibility and an absence of blind spots are considered important for security; pillars and enclosed stairwells and elevators should be avoided. Some consultants feel that TV surveillance combined with an audio system can improve safety. While corporate security personnel agree that such equipment can be valuable, some argue that they are at best cost-effective eyes and ears. After hours, there seems to be agreement that there is no substitute for security presence, either on foot or a scooter-type vehicle.

Appendix A provides more detail on security and transportation facilities.

B. <u>POLICE AND PRIVATE SECURITY</u>

<u>1--Public Policing</u>

A crucial and highly visible component of downtown security is
police presence. In recent years, the New York City Police
Department has initiated major programs for:

* increasing total police patrol, particularly foot officers,
  in local neighborhoods. One example is the community
  patrol officer project begun in the Sunset Park district of
  Broooklyn in 1984 as part of the Total Patrol Concept
  (TOPAC). This project employs foot officers on regular
  beats who not only enforce laws but become an active part
  of the community by interacting with residents and working
  on other neighborhood problems, such as inadequate street
  lighting. These foot patrols are designed to be
  "proactive", in the sense that officers are trained to deal
  with low-level street offenses instead of simply reacting
  to citizen complaints.

* increasing the level of law enforcement against
  quality-of-life crime, such as drug use and sale,
  prostitution, and loitering. The NYPD believes that such
  activity will also help reduce the incidence of serious
  crimes. An example of this enforcement is the Operation
  Pressure Point program being conducted in various New York
  City neighborhoods. It began in 1984 when a police task
  force saturated the Lower East Side drug market area of the
  city. This resulted in nearly 3,000 arrests and a
  considerable reduction in the local crime rate. Robbery,

for example, fell by 50 percent, according to police department statistics.

The Phase II research found that downtowns in other locales have similar programs emphasizing foot patrol and enforcement of quality-of-life regulations. Such patrols are now being used in Atlanta, Charlotte, Hartford and Oakland and will soon be deployed in Cleveland. A variant of the program (currently being used in Denver) involves motorcycle officers parking their vehicles and engaging in foot patrol for substantial parts of their shifts. Refer to Appendix B for more background on the history and theory of police patrol in urban America.

a. Foot Patrol

National interest in foot patrols originated from the findings of two systematic evaluations of neighborhood programs in Flint Michigan and Newark, N.J.. These studies showed that while foot patrols did not actually lower crime rates, they did have a number of other favorable results:

> *local residents believed that crime rates had been reduced, felt more secure and had a more favorable opinion of police performance.

> *local merchants felt more secure and were almost invariably strong supporters of the patrols.

> *They greatly reduced the perceptual disparity between blacks and whites regarding the quality of police performance.

Kelling and Wilson argue that foot patrols work because they "elevate the level of public order" and address two of the

primary fears of pedestrians in urban public spaces: the
fear of being suddenly and violently attacked by a stranger,
and the fear of being bothered by panhandlers, drunks,
addicts, rowdy teenagers, loiterers, the mentally disturbed
and other disorderly people. The foot patrolman keeps an
eye on these types of individuals and makes sure they obey
public standards.

The Flint evaluation also emphasized other roles that foot
patrolman can play: they can be service brokers linking the
community and local service agencies, and also dispute
mediators informally resolving neighborhood conflicts. Both
roles are strongly emphasized in the NYPD programs.

One of the keys to the success of foot patrol programs is
the permanency of the patrol and of the patrolmen's
presence. This permits patrol officers to become familiar
with residents, local merchants and minor offenders.

The objectives of downtown foot patrol programs vary in
specificity and scope in different cities. In Hartford, the
primary purpose is helping downtown retail growth by making
shoppers from the suburbs and local merchants more secure
during the day, as well as encouraging visitors to attend
downtown events during the evening. The patrolman is
expected to be a visible "downtown mayor," giving
information and generally helping downtown users. Although
he is not charged with a particularly strong quality-of-life
enforcement role (perhaps because problems with drunks, drug
users and loiterers are not particularly acute in the area),
the foot officer has been used successfully to discourage
teens from congregating in front of entrances to major
retail stores.

In Charlotte, Atlanta and Cleveland, the primary goal is for
foot patrollers to be visible among local merchants and make
all downtown users feel more secure. But police and
businessmen in all three cities report that by the very nature
of their job, foot patrol officers deal with drunks, derelicts,·
verbal harassment, and other low-level disorder problems.

The foot patrol in Oakland is one component of a carefully
designed downtown security program jointly undertaken by local
developers and police to deal with those crime problems that
most impinge on the area's economic development potential. The
program utilizes five types of police patrol, each deployed to
deal with specific downtown crime problems: foot, mounted,
scooter, motorcycle and car. Each is deployed to deal with
specific downtown crime problems. The Oakland Project
emphasizes aggressive enforcement against quality-of-life
crime, including liaison with prosecutors and courts to insure
that violations are taken seriously by the other segments of
the criminal justice system. The police also maintain contact
with community groups to deal with special populations such as
the homeless and youth.[31]

An interesting feature of the Oakland Project is that the
business community provides some $300,000 annually for the
services of five patrolmen, four horses and three scooters (See
discussion in Section C).

[31] Such "street people" not only appear menacing but there is
evidence to suggest that when they cluster together in an area
crime rates may increase. Police officials in Charlotte, for
example, claim that over 70% of the street robberies, muggings
and assaults in the downtown area are committed by or against
street people.

Street crime in downtown Charlotte has decreased since the start of their patrols in 1982.[32] Surveys for two years in a row showed that over 70% of the area merchants felt that foot patrols were the best way to deal with crime.[33] In Hartford and Oakland, interviews with local retailers revealed that foot patrols made them feel more secure, have helped to increase lunchtime traffic and kept some retailers from moving to seemingly safer areas. As one Oakland merchant put it:

> "I can honestly say that if we didn't have the foot patrol and increased police presence downtown, I wouldn't be in business in Oakland. And I don't make these statements lightly".

An analysis of the Oakland Project by Reiss found an impressive number of "soft" crime (quality-of-life) arrests, indicating that the downtown foot officers were indeed carrying out their mission. Crime statistics show that since the implementation of the foot, mounted and scooter patrols, certain offenses, including strongarm robberies, purse snatches and property crimes, have dropped significantly.[34]

[32]In this and other references to crime reduction, we rely on the statements of those cited; we have no independent varification of such claims. As in all crime-reduction programs, questions must be asked about possible displacement of crime to other areas, times, targets, etc. (See T. Reppetto, "Crime Control and the Displacment Phenomenon," Crime and Delinquency, April 1976.) One must also note the general trend of crime in the larger area. It is possible, for example, that crime reductions may well be a result of general trends rather than a specific local program. In addition, experimental projects often display the "Hawthorne Effect," wherein the very fact of a program's being new and unique causes participants to operate at higher levels of efficiency.

[33]Central Charlotte Assn.

[34]See footnote 32.

Oakland police also claim that since the inception of the program prostitutes have moved elsewhere, there are cleaner streets, fewer broken windows, panhandlers, and some "SRO" hotels have closed down. The reactions of local businessmen acknowledged these changes: "There are fewer weirdos on the street with foot patrol," or "I don't hear about muggings anymore," are typical responses.

Reports in Oakland indicate that foot patrols substantially increased office employee pedestrian activity. Businessmen report office workers being more secure and going out at lunchtime. One bank manager claimed that use of the bank's cafeteria has dropped significantly since the inception of the program, a good sign that workers are going out more frequently. The retailing community also reports more shopping by lunchtime office employees.

Downtowns in Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleveland, Denver and Hartford all have larger concentrations of office workers than Oakland; interviews with businessmen, police and development officials in these cities indicate that even before the institution of foot patrols, workers felt safe going out at lunchtime to eat and shop. In light of this project's findings it is reasonable to assume they felt safe because of the density of office employee pedestrian traffic. The fact the the number of office workers in Oakland is well below the 60,000 to 120,000 employees found in other downtowns suggests that foot patrols can be effective in making office workers feel safer during the day in those downtowns that lack the density of pedestrian traffic needed to generate feelings of street safety.

Yet evidence regarding the impact of foot patrols on the perceptions of other types of shoppers and visitors is less conclusive. In downtowns with a high concentration of office workers where the foot patrol role does not heavily emphasize

proactive control of quality-of-life crime, infrequent visitors--particularly those coming for the first time--may or may not encounter a foot patrolman; for them, the number of orderly pedestrians may be more effective in making them feel safer on the streets.

In downtowns with fewer office workers and highly proactive foot patrol, however, visitors may see fewer signs of disorders and notice more police on the streets. Foot patrolmen in these areas seem more likely to increase feelings of safety.

b. Mounted Patrol

To increase the visibility of downtown police officers and the sense among pedestrians that they can be observed by the police, cities are increasingly using mounted horse patrols: Atlanta, Cleveland, Oakland, and New York City all use this tactic. As one New York City Police Commander put it: "It is the equivalent of a ten-foot cop."

During site visits in Oakland, Atlanta and Cleveland businessmen and merchants expressed positive reactions to horse patrol, maintaining that in addition to increasing feelings of safety it helps improve relations between the police and downtown users.

c. Night Safety

In respect to downtown economic development strategies, it appears that police patrol is less effective in improving perceptions of safety at night.

All of the foot patrols in the cities surveyed during Phase II are operative in the evenings, but they do not appear to have much influence on reducing five o'clock flight. Nor is there evidence that those venturing downtown after dark feel any

TABLE 11

Ability of Foot Patrols to Diminish
Fears of Crime Among Downtown Users

	Type of Downtown/ Time of Day			
Type of Downtown User	Hi Office/ Day	Hi Office/ Evening	Lo Office/ Day	Lo Office/ Evening
Office Workers	Marginal	Marginal	Significant	Marginal
Merchants	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
Residents	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
Frequent Visitors/ Regular Shoppers	Marginal	Marginal	Significant	Marginal
Infrequent Visitors/ Irregular Shoppers	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal

contrast, foot patrol has only a marginal impact on nightime and infrequent visitors, as well as late-working employees going to remote parking.

d. New York City Police Programs

There are a number of specific programs to enhance safety in the three outlying downtowns of New York City. The NYPD uses foot posts, scooter patrol, special enforcement against peddlers, anti-crime teams and, in the Bronx and Queens, mounted patrols. Downtown Brooklyn is patroled by a team of 21 officers, and there is special attention given to truants and teen loiterers. Similar programs are in effect in Jamaica Center and Fordham Road.

Based on the Phase II site visits, it would appear that the NYPD programs are soundly conceived, and are now in the process of institutionalization. It is clear that the city emphasizes many--if not all--of the same police programs found elsewhere in the country:

1) Special downtown patrols, particularly those using permanently assigned foot officers.
2) Strong efforts to deal with quality-of-life crime and special population groups, including teenagers and the homeless.
3) Close liaison with the community, from the beat officer level to that of senior commander.

There are three problem areas, however, that need to be considered in discussing police policy for the three outer-borough downtowns:

1) Judicial Treatment of Quality of Life Offenses

Many arrests in New York City's Operation Pressure Point as

well as other quality-of-life arrests have been summarily
handled by the New York City criminal courts.[36]

Community groups--in conjunction with the police--must make
local prosecutors and courts aware of the necessity of
supporting police efforts to control quality-of-life offenses.

2) Public Misconceptions of Crime Statistics

The Phase I study noted that both trade-area residents and
merchants overestimated the crime rates in the three outlying
downtowns.

In Newark, police issue a newsletter presenting crime
statistics and discussing local crime problems. A similar
newsletter might be considered for use in the three downtowns.

3) Public Transportation Security

An important element in downtown safety is getting people in
and out on public transportation. The Newark police department
has undertaken a special program called BUS'T Crime, in which
officers board city buses to enforce quality of life-type
regulations. The New Jersey Transit Authority claims the
program has resulted in a 40% reduction in bus crime.[37]

Although the New York City Police Department has employed BUS'T
Crime tactics in some of their precincts, the basic

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[36]The Citizens Crime Commission noted in 1984 that: "The courts
are primarily geared to handle only the most serious cases. For
example, in 1983 there were 28,000 felony cases filed in State
Supreme Court and an average of 165 judges to dispose of them.
In the lower criminal court, 240,600 cases were filed but only 76
judges were assigned to hear them. Some criminal court judges
routinely dispose of 200 cases at one sitting. Frequently,
individuals are either dismissed or pay a small fine. This is
turnstile justice at its worse. Thus, all but the most egregious
offenses are simply swept out the door in a court system that
lacks the resources to handle them." (Crime and Criminal Justice
in New York City, 1983 p.18)

[37] See footnote 32, page 52.

transportation system of the city is the subway, which is policed by a separate Transit Authority Police department. Subway crime problems frequently make headlines in NYC and it is generally conceded that people are afraid while using the system. Yet there is no direct evidence regarding the impact of crime on ridership. At present, two major studies of subway safety are in progress. This is an important topic that warrants further study, since the subways are the main transit service to the three downtowns.

During Phase II, the subway systems in Atlanta, Philadelphia and Washington were examined. In each, there was the familiar emphasis on control of quality-of-life crime and proactive enforcement. In addition, great emphasis was placed on improving the physical conditions by upgrading trains, station renovations, better lighting, and open areas.

The New York City subways provide another example of the notion that security is provided by a high density of orderly people. Suburban railroads report far less crime than in the subways.[38] Their passengers are generally persons who have purchased tickets which are collected by conductors. In the subways, it is simple for gangs of youths to jump turnstiles and roam through the system during non-rush hours.

In Brooklyn, the Pfizer Chemical Company installed a TV surveillance system in the Flushing Avenue subway station, which adjoins its 17-acre plant. The station also faces the Marcy Avenue Housing Projects, a rather dangerous area. Crime statistics supplied by the Transit Authority Police indicates

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[38] In 1984, for example, there were 97 robberies reported on Metro-North trains, compared with 5,999 in the New York City subways; Metro-North also recorded 49 assaults during the year, while the subway claimed 901. Sources: NYPD; Transit Police; Metro-North Police Department.

that there has been no decrease in the number of crimes at the
station since the introduction of the system, but plant
officials claim that workers feel more secure when they use the
station, and a number of local residents have voiced similar
feelings.

In January, the Mayor announced that he would assign police
officers to each train and high-crime platforms during the
hours between 8 PM and 6 AM. Refer to Appendix C for more
information on security and public transportation.

2--Privately-Financed Police Patrols

Businessmen are becoming increasingly aware that security on
downtown streets beyond the boundaries of their properties is
essential to their economic viability, and thus many are
willing to defray some or all police foot patrol costs. Reiss'
Oakland study noted that considerable money had been spent in
the past on improving private security in downtown office
buildings but that this had little impact on the surrounding
streets. As a result, Oakland businesses began in 1981 to
provide more than $300,000 a year for public policing.

A number of techniques are being used to finance added police
strength. In Oakland, voluntary contributions from local
developers and major office tenants are used to support the
downtown security program. The Downtown Council in Hartford
used $250,000 of its funds to contract with the city for extra

foot patrol officers. Foot patrol costs in Charlotte and Cleveland are being covered by the city governments, although in Cleveland the general assumption among downtown leaders is that if the program is a success, the business community will assume its costs, perhaps through a new downtown special assessment district.

Funds raised by special assessment districts in Denver and New Orleans are used to support extra police presence in their downtown areas; the intent is to assure long-term financing for foot patrol programs. Refer to section C for more detail on special assessment districts.

Yet there are problems associated with the funding of police programs by the downtown business community. Voluntary support from the Oakland business community for the downtown police enhancement program has not grown substantially since the effort began, and the bulk of the funds have been supplied by two large developers. It should also be noted that there was reluctance to support the concept when it was presented at a recent meeting of the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions, whose membership includes groups with operating heads representing both the law enforcement and business communities. In addition, there may be charges from minorities and neighborhood residents that the city has adopted a "rent-a-cop" policy in which greater police protection will go to those who can afford to pay for it. This problem might be ameliorated through good relations between businessmen and local residents, who generally recognize the importance to them and to the whole community of their downtown revitalization.

3--Private Security

As mentioned earlier, downtown businesses are concerned about safety on the streets abutting their properties and on

heavily-used pedestrian walkways within them. Among private
security directors interviewed during Phase II, there was
overwhelming agreement that normal private security personnel
cannot adequately patrol adjacent streets and sidewalks because
they lack sufficient authority, training and motivation.

Businesses in Charlotte, Cleveland, Atlanta, Hartford and
Newark are allowed to hire off-duty city police officers as
security personnel, and many are actively doing so. In
Peachtree Center in Atlanta, for example, off-duty city
policemen patrol on foot the streets surrounding the nine
square blocks of the Center that include several hotels and
office buildings, a sizeable retail area, a Trade Mart, and
several garages. While many of these are connected by
over-street walkways, there is much street-level pedestrian
activity. These off-duty officers provide about 140 man-hours
of foot patrol each week in the Peachtree Center area. Georgia
Power also uses off-duty Atlanta officers for the same purpose.

Almost every major corporation in Newark, including Prudential,
Western Union, and AT&T, has an off-duty policeman patrolling
the sidewalks on the perimeter of its building.

In Cleveland and Charlotte, off-duty policemen are used to
patrol enclosed pedestrian walkways. Their use in Cleveland,
in conjunction with improved safety design, was instrumental in
controlling crime and increasing business activity in the
Terminal Tower Complex.

In Charlotte, off-duty officers patrol portions of the
privately-owned Overstreet Mall network in conjunction with
private security personnel.

Most private security is still provided by non-police sources. The quality of security organizations varies widely. One development employed an "elite" private security team outfitted in orange jumpsuits patrolling on motorbikes. In other developments, the security personnel were less impressive. In similar fashion, the level of cooperation between public and private agencies varies greatly. In the judgment of those interviewed during the Phase II study, security officers should at the very least present a non-threatening appearance in keeping with their responsibilities. While an assessment of security practices in general is beyond the scope of this report, it is an area for each development district to study carefully. Among questions that should be addressed are:

1) What is the appropriate mix of public police and private security?

2) What authority should be invested in private officers? Should they be armed and given power of arrest? What standards of training, discipline and appearance should be maintained?

3) Are extensive private security efforts fully effective if public street safety is not well maintained?

4) If street safety is deemed inadequate, should private interests contribute funds to public policing as in Oakland, New Orleans and Denver?

5) Should off-duty regular police be employed as private security guards?

While there seems to be a general nationwide consensus in respect to effective downtown public policing strategies, the Phase II findings suggests that appropriate private security measures will vary in different cities.

4--Security Escorts, Convoys and Vans

Escort programs are the most frequent response to the problem
of getting workers to their parked cars during the evening.
These services are most likely to be initiated by large
corporate employers or large developments, such as Atlanta's
Peachtree Center or Newark's Gateway Center, all of which have
their own security personnel.

Escorts can vary in operation from an informal arrangement
where late-working employees ask the downstairs security guard
to watch as they cross the street to the parking lot to more
formally planned and operated programs.[39]

While the problem of security within parking facilities can
never be totally ameliorated, much can be done to mitigate it.
According to operators and designers of parking facilities,
valet parking is one of the best ways to insure security, but
it is expensive. A computerized identification system is used

[39]American Airlines has instituted a formal escort program
for its employees in Hartford, some of whom park in an area
that is a five minute walk away on the other side of an
interstate highway and near a housing project. The program was
instituted after a number of incidents involving evening
workers going to their cars resulted in increased employee
apprehension. A security officer, linked to the office by
walkie-talkie, walks groups of three to five workers to their
cars; one of the workers normally gives the officer a ride back
to the base. The program operates from 5:30 PM to 1:30 AM, and
on an average evening 40 to 50 employees are escorted. There
have been no incidents since the escort program was instituted.

The Travelers Insurance Company, also in downtown Hartford, has
a program in the evening where in response to telephone calls,
security personnel drive employees to their parked space in a
marked car with a flashing light. The escort then waits until
the driver has entered the street before returning to base. In
a typical month, about 130 escort rides are given, many of them
carrying more than one person.

in a number of recently constructed garages in Houston, but this system is also expensive and not suited for facilities open to the general public.

Private firms are also using a variety of escort and "convoy" programs for employees going to subway and commuter rail stations. Firms in Downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica, have security officers, after the evening shift, walk a convoy of workers to the subway station.

A number of other firms in Newark·operate van shuttles to take employees to the railroad stations. In addition to being expensive, one firm's experience showed that employee use of the shuttle drops off unless service is frequent enough, since they could walk to the station in less time than that needed to wait for the van.

Since shuttle service can be expensive, an attempt was made in Newark to develop a single shuttle for a number of firms. The attempt stalled, in part because of insurance problems, but also because employees had become so used to their existing shuttles that they resisted the new one. Perhaps the idea of an overall shuttle could work in downtowns where firms have not already developed their own program.

According to a number of corporate office managers common sense can do much to make workers feel more secure even if they do not have access to attached parking. One widespread practice is to arrange the work schedule so that people arrive early and leave work before dark. Other tactics include having late-working employees move their cars to an attached garage, having supervisors drive late-working clerical help to their cars, and firms sending employees home by cab when they work past an appointed hour.

C) DOWNTOWN LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Downtowns are by nature fragmented in a way that makes cooperation and unified problem-solving difficult undertakings. Although they may be distinct geographic areas, Central Business Districts are rarely autonomous jurisdictions. This means that the provision of municipal services--including those of the police department-- may entail a number of often uncoordinated administrative entities. Downtowns may, for example, be divided between two or more police precincts as is the case in Fordham Road and Downtown Brooklyn.

The fragmentation in the public sector is often mirrored in the private sector. Getting sizable groups of retailers, property owners, community organizations, and corporate and civic executives to work together on a voluntary basis is typically a daunting task, made even more difficult by the lack of an authoritative downtown decision-making structure. Encouraging cooperation between private sector groups is often a cost-effective means for increasing safety and reducing operating and security costs. (One example is the joining of separate private security contingents to operate Newark's safety corridor; see page 71).

Because it limits the amount and scope of resources that can be mobilized, fragmentation reduces a downtown's ability to mount comprehensive programs to solve its revitalization problems. The downtowns will be unable to significantly ameliorate their security situations unless they can first surmount the barriers produced by fragmentation.

The following strategies address these barriers by emphasizing
leadership and cooperation among members of municipal, business
and community sectors:

1--Downtown Councils and Associations

One response to fragmentation is the downtown council or
association. Such an organization typically draws its
membership from downtown businessmen and is usually associated
with the city's Chamber of Commerce. Most important, it is the
business organization having the designated mission of dealing
with the downtown area. Activities can range from lobbying
city agencies for cleaner streets and more parking to
well-planned financial efforts to manage the downtown area,
though they make lack any formal authority for such a task.
Some of these organizations, such as the Downtown Councils in
Cleveland and Hartford and the Central Charlotte Association,
have been already referred to earlier in this report.

The stronger and most successful of these organizations use as
a model the unified management structure characteristic of many
of their competitors in suburban shopping malls; it results in
better up-keep of the area, better sanitation, better tenant
control and mix, better retail promotion and better security.
Downtown Councils often try to replicate this type of
management as much as possible, given that downtowns do not
have unitary property ownership. They raise their funds from
voluntary dues and contributions and their programs use these
funds or the voluntary coordination of their members' services.

Typical programs include supplementary street cleaning services
(in Hartford and Cleveland), downtown sales promotions, or
special events to bring new people downtown. Increasingly,
these councils have been entering the area of downtown
security, initiating programs of varied complexity, cost and
goals.

Some projects focus on security audits and safety seminars.
The Downtown Council in Cleveland, for example, has been
running a seminar program for downtown employees since 1977,
and the Central City Association in Los Angeles recently
instituted a Downtown Watch Program, a main component of which
involves seminars to teach crime-prevention techniques to
downtown employees.

Bringing downtown people together to discuss common security
problems can help create a consensus on the type of security
programs needed in a downtown as a whole or in particular
areas. In Cleveland, this has been essential to the
effectiveness of campaigns to increase security in the Terminal
Tower area and to get the city to implement a downtown foot
patrol program. A special downtown business committee of this
sort in Newark led to the creation of a safety corridor
involving a good deal of cooperation between numerous public
and private security agencies.

The Downtown Council in Hartford has used its funds to pay for
extra downtown foot patrols; a smaller group of businesses in
Oakland worked together to pay for the police augmentation
program in their downtown.

2--Special Assessment Districts

An increasingly popular strategy for improving downtown
management and increasing police strength is the creation of
special downtown districts. These are geographically-defined
areas which usually encompass a large portion of the downtown,
and certainly its commercial core, in which special tax

assessments are levied to pay for augmented or additional
services in the downtown area. Cities of all sizes are using
such districts, including New Orleans, Tulsa, Charlotte,
Denver, Raleigh and 11 other municipalities in North
Carolina--some with populations as small as 7,800.

The Special Assessment Districts and business improvement
districts found in parts of New York City -- including the
outer-borough downtowns -- are similar in nature, though
elsewhere it is unusual to find two or more special districts
in one downtown, as is the case in Downtown Brooklyn and
Jamaica Center, or for them to cover such a comparatively small
area.

In Denver, Tulsa and New Orleans, revenues derived from these
districts are used in part to pay for additional police
officers. In Denver, the district's managing body contracts
with the city to provide 10 extra officers and a sergeant for
its "Mall Patrol". In New Orleans, part of the revenues is
used to provide 13 additional officers and a sergeant.

The amount of money that a district can raise is a function of
its size, wealth and the rate of the extra assessment. Some
districts use an assessment formula based on "frontage," but
most use some variant of assessed value of the property. In
North Carolina's 13 districts, assessed value was used as the
basis for the assessment, and the rates in 1979 ranged from
$0.025 to $0.45 per $100 of assessed value. The smallest
district raised only $12,000 in 1979. In contrast, New Orleans
expects to raise $3.2 million in 1985.

These districts are not easy to create. Sensitive issues
include determining which properties should be taxed and the
fairness of the load assumed by larger property owners, and the
concern that normal service levels might be lowered if
additional city services are contracted for. Because many

downtown businessmen ⌐ e reluctant to pay twice for municipal
services, a number of districts have refused to contract with
their cities for augmented security. But other district
officials claim these problems can be overcome through
effective monitoring of added services and contact with
appropriate administrative officials.

Funds raised by special assessment districts have been used for
other security-related capital projects, including parking
lots, and, in Tulsa and Denver, downtown shuttle service.

A prominent concern of downtown businessmen in the outer
boroughs and elsewhere in the country is the consistency of
police service. They want to ensure that they will get the
type of policing they need and that if a problem flares up in
another area, the level of police service will not be altered.
Using contracts with the city to buy additional police patrols
--as one police chief confirmed--is a good way to achieve this
end. By paying for extra police protection, downtown
businessmen also defuse the issue of whether they are getting
an unfair share of a scarce community resource. Yet there are
some drawbacks to such efforts, as noted earlier in the section
on Privately-Financed Police Patrols.

3--Cooperation Betweeen Private Security Forces and Public
Police

Almost every downtown business of any size has its own security
force, usually confined to patrolling the periphery of their
own property. Greater cooperation between private security
contingents might help make downtown safety efforts all the
more effective. For example, many security forces provide
similar services, such as escorting workers to subway stations
at night, and it might prove cost-effective to develop a common
program.

Increased cooperation between private and public police personnel is another strategy that can result in better downtown safety and reduced private-sector security costs.

One of the most successful programs involving cooperation between private security forces and city and transit police is the Safety Corridor developed by the Business and Employee Safety Committee of the Newark Chamber of Commerce. The corridor runs about 1 1/4 miles along the primary routes used by people going to the two railroad stations in the downtown. During the evening rush hours, about 50 security people stand on static posts outside their buildings; the contingent includes on-duty officers from the city and Transit Police Departments, off-duty cops hired by private firms, private security personnel and officers from Rutgers University. The objective is to make downtown employees feel more secure in the area through the visible presence of this security force. While data on crime levels is not currently available, security directors and employees are very enthusiastic about the program.

In Dayton, Cleveland and soon in Hartford, CB radios and walkie-talkies are used to link downtown merchants and security forces with local police. But the results of some of these programs have been disappointing. Merchants and security people often lose interest in listening to their "scanners", and concern about possible lawsuits for false arrests makes private security officers hesitant to attempt to have suspects arrested on the basis of radio description. Many police departments also resist the concept of private security people becoming involved in such arrests. This suggests that the tactic of coordinating downtown private security efforts with police is difficult at best, and may have limited potential.

4--Public-Private Sector Partnership

In the urban development field, it has become almost axiomatic
that revitalization demands the forging of a partnership
between the public and private sectors. This is equally true
in the area of downtown security.

Both the Oakland and Hartford security programs show the
benefit of on-going communication between police and
businessmen. On the daily level, the foot officer and the
merchant became well-acquainted with each other. While the
benefits to merchants have been cited elsewhere, this
collaboration has also helped the police departments target
strategies and patrol tactics for their downtown program.

On a more general level, the ability of business leaders and
city political leaders to communicate and develop a concensus
can dramatically affect downtown security programs. In some
cities, animosity between the business community and City halls
has severely hampered the progress of downtown security
efforts. In others, such as Charlotte, the working
relationship that exists between business and political leaders
have allowed the city to deal effectively with a number of
difficult issues, of which downtown safety is one.

5--Business-Community Partnership

Some businessmen and development officials also feel there is a
need to forge good relations with residents in and around their
downtown.

In some downtowns, animosity can develop between some
businessmen, especially retailers and local residents. Often
of differing ethnic and income groups, some residents may view

merchants as outsiders and exploiters, and thus legitimate
targets for shoplifters and other criminals. In other
instances, local residents may themselves be intimidated and
refrain from exercising the informal constraints necessary for
social control in the neighborhood.

A growing number of businesses, however, have begun to
respond. Zayre's, a major retail chain, for example, has found
it very profitable to operate in the kind of ethnic, relatively
poor urban areas that other retail chains normally avoid. As
part of a careful planning effort to determine how best to
penetrate such markets, improving security became a major
objective. The program they developed combines diligent
implementation of internal security techniques with a
community-relations program. A spokesperson claims that their
shoplifting rates are significantly lower than existed before
the program.

There is nothing new in the security used by Zayre--the real
key to their success lies in their attitude to the local
community. The management insists on providing a clean,
attractive store; graffiti is quickly removed and vandalism
repaired. The merchandise is carefully selected to meet local
tastes, and they are scrupulous in maintaining fair pricing and
returns policies. Employees are hired from the local area, and
the store managers know how to relate to their customers. They
also participate in and support local community fairs and
festivals.

The objective is to make local residents see Zayre's stores as
a part of their community, one that provides good merchandise
at a fair price and takes pride in itself and the
neighborhood. Joint security programs between residents and
businesses have been developed in some areas in Brooklyn,
Queens, Chicago and Portland.

The Edgewater Community Council, a neighborhood group located in northeast Chicago, has actively developed "block watchers" programs to assist police in fighting quality-of-life crime. The Council believes that the residential and commercial communities are inter-dependent, each needing the other to be healthy. And both are contributing to the program.

The Pratt Area Community Council in Brooklyn has a citizens patrol with about 100 volunteers, of which an estimated 15-20% are drawn from the neighborhood's business community. Local retailers and banks also make donations to buy equipment for the patrol.

In East New York, the business workers and residents located in an "in-place" industrial park pay fees to the local development corporation, which manages a uniformed security patrol during the evenings. Using vans, the patrol not only deters burglaries but also escorts residents from the subway station to their homes.

Similar partnerships between downtown business organizations and local residential organizations benefit from their grass-roots origin and are worthy of pursuit in many downtown areas.

6--Special Populations

As noted in Section III, fear of crime among trade area respondents in the three outer-borough downtowns was substantially affected by behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug abuse and sale, loitering and public drinking. Downtown organizations have frequently undertaken programs to confront those groups whose behavior can signal public disorder to downtown visitors. Of particular interest to this study are

efforts aimed at dealing with two special population groups:
street people and teenagers. The following are brief reviews
of some current programs; Appendix D provides more detail on
these and other projects across the country.

a. Street People

A major problem facing downtowns across the country is the
growing number of homeless, drug-addicted, mentally disabled
and unemployed citizens. While it is beyond the scope of this
study to address fully the issue of these "street people", many
cities--including New York--have attempted to meet some of the
basic needs of this population. For instance, New Orleans
supports the city's alcoholic detoxification center with
$30,000 per year from the funds raised by the downtown special
assessment district. The HOW Foundation, sponsored by the city
of Tulsa, Oklahoma in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce
and others, receives contracts for work projects for
alcoholics, drug abusers and unemployed. The participants in
this voluntary program are provided with housing, food,
clothing, medical care and stipends; local officials claim it
has reduced the number of street people by 70 percent.

In New York, a similar project sponsored by the Manhattan
Bowery Group and Project Renewal gives street people downtown
cleaning jobs. This program, however, differs from the HOW
program in several key respects: first, it is publicly funded
and run on a non-profit basis; second, it does not have a
service contract with a downtown business organization.

b. Teenagers

Many cities have recognized the need to control the number
of loitering teenagers on the street by reducing truancy,

providing employment and offering entertainment and leisure
opportunities.

Project Pride in Newark, N.J., was orginally intended to
reduce juvenile vandalism and mischief. Initiated by New
Jersey Bell, the project brought together other organizations
suffering from vandalism, including the Board of Education and
the Bus Company. The program attempts to instill in young
people a sense of pride and responsibility for their
neighborhoods through educational and recreational activities,
and anti-vandalism groups to patrol housing sites and report
vandalism to security personnel.

Two other programs in Newark seem particularly promising. The
Self Esteem Enhancement Program (SEE) links the Police
Department with the Board of Education to give youths an
opportunity for growth and learning by keeping the schools
open after hours for sports activities, counseling, and
classes in photography, crafts and design. Many of the
classes are taught by Newark police officers.

In the second project, the Neighborhood Clean Up Program,
first-time minor juvenile offenders perform community work,
such as cleaning streets and removing graffiti.

Truancy is one of the prime contributors to loitering and
rowdiness among teenagers--behavior that often affects
shoppers, businessmen, office workers and other downtown
users. In addressing this problem a multi-pronged effort is
needed, such as in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the Police
Department and the Citizens Committee on Youth worked with the
downtown business community for:

    --stricter enforcement of existing ordinances to discourage
      loud music and loitering.

--reduction, through bus passes, of the time students are
  permitted to stay downtown

--the holding of graffiti art contests

The New York City Police Department has established special
truancy units to deal with this problem in many areas,
including the three study areas. However, the future
cooperation of other municipal departments and agencies is
required to enhance this program.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A basic premise of this report is that crime and the fear of crime are impeding the economic development of the three outlying downtown study areas. Both physical signs of urban decay, of which graffiti is a prime example, and behavioral signs of disorder, which include quality of life offenses such as public drinking and loitering, appear to be related to limited use of downtown activities. The program findings, however, suggest that behavioral elements were stronger than physical signs in stimulating the fears of workers and visitors.

Site visits and analysis of progress made in other cities supports the Phase I finding that the key element in a healthy downtown is the presence of a high density of law-abiding, orderly citizens on the streets. This critical mass of pedestrian flow results in greater feelings of safety and a substantial measure of self-policing. Where this concentration does not occur naturally, increased police and security presence is the most effective substitute.

The Phase II study examined possible solutions to the crime problems faced by the three outlying downtowns; the findings fell into three categories--design and development strategies; police and private security programs; and downtown leadership and organization.

A) DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

The following are potentially effective methods for increasing pedestrian flow and minimizing fear of crime among downtown users.

(79)

1--Dense and Compact Development

Dense and compact development fosters pedestrian activity, office worker retail sales and lessens the period of exposure on the street. In general, it can assist in controlling the physical signs of disorder and improve the overall appearance of the area.

Specialized activity enclaves are areas dominated by government, retail, office or entertainment facilities, all separated from each other by considerable walking distance. These areas can be successful if linked by reliable public transit systems, but if not such areas tend to assume a fortress-like image with users viewing them as outposts surrounded by hostile territory.

Limited-access structures such as single tenant office buildings or malls deter visitors from walking on streets and participating in more than one activity while downtown. Off-street networks are self-contained multi-functional complexes that occasionally can generate enough internal pedestrian activity for a healthy multiplier effect.

2--Housing and Mixed-Use Development

Although commercial activity is essential in the early stages of downtown revitalization, it is necessary for middle- and upper-middle income residential development to grow as well. This improves the downtown security situation by increasing the number of orderly people and improving the appearance and maintenance of the area.

3--Promoting Evening Activity

In order to minimize "five o'clock flight", it is necessary to encourage the growth of after-work activities, such as

restaurants, movies, concerts and evening retailing. However, this may be an unrealistic goal for some downtown areas; it appears to be most effective in downtowns that have achieved a high level of daytime security.

4--<u>Downtown Events</u>

Many of the cities studied hold major downtown events to attract suburban residents or encourage downtown workers to remain in the evening. The long-term objective is to draw crowds of orderly people and foster a positive image. Despite the enthusiam of some officials, the overall effectiveness of the strategy is debatable. In decayed downtowns, premature use of major events simply confirms negative impressions.

B)   <u>POLICE AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS</u>

Police and private security play a major role in safeguarding
downtowns:

<u>1--Public Policing</u>

The Phase II research revealed a consensus in New York City and
around the country on effective police strategies.   The key
ones are:

 a) Special downtown patrols, particularly those using
    permanently assigned foot officers.

 b) Strong enforcement of quality-of-life laws, and control
    of special populations, including teenagers and the .
    homeless.

 c) Close liaison with the community, from the beat officer
    level to that of ranking commander.

In respect to these criteria, the New York City Police
Department programs appear soundly conceived. The fact that
the city plans to add several thousand additional officers over
the next few years lends considerable hope that such programs
will in fact be greatly expanded. Indeed, the police
department is committed to providing the necessary resources to
help facilitate economic development in the commercial areas of
the city.

Among possible recommendations that could be made for the three
outer-borough downtowns are:

  --The downtown community should support the police to ensure
    that the judicial system recognizes the need to deal
    effectively with arrests for quality-of-life crimes.

--Because there is a tendency for citizens to overestimate the extent of the crime problem in their neighborhoods, it might be useful to consider some vehicle, such as a newsletter, for police or other public officials to communicate crime and safety information to community leaders.

--Safe public transportation supports dense and compact development and a high concentration of pedestrian street traffic, and is especially critical to the revitalization of the three outlying downtowns, which are major transit centers. Subway crime in particular, is an important topic that warrants further study, since the subways are the main transit service in the three downtowns. At present, several major studies of subway crime-fighting tactics have been undertaken by the transit authority and the city government. These should be monitored closely.

As relates specifically to economic development, foot patrol has been shown to reassure merchants and residents and may, in areas of low pedestrian density, increase feelings of street safety among downtown users. However, patrols appear less effective in diminishing fear of crime during the evening hours when there are relatively few orderly people on the streets.

2--Private Security

In contrast to the findings on police, there appears to be a lack of consensus around the country about the effectiveness of private security forces. This suggests that each community should address a number of questions regarding the appropriate mix between public police and private security, the authority of the security officers, and the possible use of regular police officers as security guards. In a number of cities, private security efforts do not address public protection on the street and therefore fail to promote economic development. Some

communities have sought to remedy this by providing private funds for augmented police services. However, there are considerable problems with this practice and its use varies according to local considerations.

3--Security Escorts, Convoys and Vans

Private firms are using a variety of escort, convoy and shuttle services for employees going to subway and commuter rail stations after work. Escort programs appear to be the most frequent response to the problem of getting workers to their parked cars in the evening.

C) DOWNTOWN LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors have resulted in some impressive campaigns to address crime and other revitalization problems in downtown areas. The most successful--and comprehensive--programs have managed to galvanize leaders in the municipal, business and residential communities. Some prime examples of these partnerships follow:

1--Downtown Councils and Associations

These organizations draw membership primarily from the business community, and are usually associated with a city's chamber of commerce. Increasingly these groups have become involved in promoting downtown safety through seminars, agenda-setting for city-run security programs, and even fund-raising for added foot patrol strength in downtown areas.

2--Special Assessment Districts

By establishing geographically-defined downtown districts and levying special tax assessments for additional police and security services, many cities have raised considerable money to launch and maintain anti-crime programs. This type of cooperative venture appears to be one of the most effective ways to concentrate and mobilize downtown resources.

3--Cooperation Between Private Security Forces and Public Police

Cooperation between private security contingents in efforts such as employee escort services is a potentially cost-effective strategy for increased downtown safety. Cooperative programs linking police and private security strength also seem to have promise.

4--Public-Private Sector Partnership

Good working relationships between the business community and police and city officials--from the level of beat officer and merchant to that of top political and business leaders--can have a tremendous impact on the success of all the programs outlined in this report. The Oakland and Hartford security programs, in particular, demonstrate the value of ongoing communication between police, city officials and businessmen.

5--Business-Community Partnership

Interaction with the residential community is another area where cooperation can pay off for the business community. By providing residents in and around the downtown area with a stake in the viability of the business district--through employment, good relations and safe shopping facilities--

merchants, restaurants, theatres and others can increase the
pedestrian flow necessary to build both day and evening
activity. Joint security programs between residents and
businesses have been developed in some areas in Queens,
Brooklyn and Chicago.

6--Special Population Programs

Many organizations are attempting to improve their
downtown's safety amd public image by devising ways to cope
with special populations, such as street people, and
teenagers. Truancy control programs, as well as other
educational and employment projects directed toward teenagers
seem particularly effective and popular in some communities.

VI. APPENDICES

A) Transportation and Downtown Security

B) Police Patrol Strategies

C) Subway Safety

D) Special Populations

E) PHASE II Site Visits/Interviews

TRANSPORTATION AND DOWNTOWN SECURITY

Because of its ability to bring large numbers of travelers in
and out of the core activity area, safe public transportation
can reinforce a downtown's ability to concentrate facilities
and pedestrian activity. This means that pedestrian trips can
be shorter and pass through an area where there is likely to be
more people and which will be of a size amenable to foot and
mounted police patrols. High auto use, on the other hand, has
a much greater potential to conflict with the desire to
concentrate downtown facilities and activities.

Downtown users, like their counterparts in campus office sites
and shoppers in suburban malls, want to park their cars as
close to their destinations as possible. A 1982 survey of
trade area shoppers in Hartford found that most came by car and
that although most were willing to park a maximum of three
blocks away, they preferred to park in a facility at their
destination (Source: Rideshare Corp. 1982). Thus, it is not
surprising to find in downtown after downtown that recent
development projects have attached or underground parking
facilities. In some downtowns, such as Stamford and White
Plains, retail complexes are sometimes almost encased by

parking facilities. In others, over-street bridges span across streets from department stores to their garages; Macy's in White Plains, Pogue's in Cincinnati and Davisons in Atlanta are two examples of this type of structure.

The automobile is the primary means for most people to go to and from the downtown in most cities, and although this is not now the case in the outer-boroughs, their new projects indicate they will have more automobile users in the near future. In Cleveland about 66% of the downtown user population reports traveling there by car; in Charlotte, the personnel department of one large corporation estimates that over 80% of their downtown workers get there by car.

In the core downtown area the demand for parking can quickly become a factor serving to disperse facilities and pedestrian activities. Underground parking is often expensive to build and seldom accomodates all of a building's auto users. Surface garages and lots must compete with other users in the core downtown area. In some downtowns there may not be available sites on which "next door" parking can be easily provided for either new or older buildings. In other instances surface garages and lots in the core area may mean that key buildings must be spaced further apart and create "dead space" for pedestrians on the sidewalks abutting the garages.

This, in turn, can cause developers to locate new buildings in those parts of the downtown where they can construct appropriate parking. These sites may be beyond the periphery of the core area, creating a tendency for the development of limited-access structures or rival activity nodes.

Moreover, there may be competition between different downtown users for available parking places. In Hartford, for example, retail growth is being impeded by the fact that by 10 AM 16,000 of the available 18,000 parking places are occupied by downtown workers. In Jamaica Center, 1,500 of the 3,000 federal office workers soon to locate there might be expected to travel by car, thus creating new competition for spaces in the vicinity. Unless the core area can provide sufficient spaces for all auto users, there will be a tendency for a significant number of downtown users to park in peripheral parts of the downtown. Cost factors will induce less wealthy shoppers and office workers to use these more distant parking places since parking fees usually vary inversely with distance from the core downtown area. The consequent dispersion of shoppers and especially office workers after working hours creates a low-density pedestrian situation conducive to crime and fear. The dispersing of these auto users also makes it more difficult for police patrols to be an effective remedy, because the area involved may be rather large and the number of officers

required disproportionately large to the number of people to be
protected.

Subway and rail stations tend to make downtown users converge
as they go home. Located in the core downtown area and perhaps
in peripheral activity enclaves as well, these transportation
facilities tend to increase pedestrian traffic in what may
already be a fairly concentrated area and therefore may be more
amenable to police patrol.

Because of the downtown parking situation, Hartford is
developing a system whereby workers are shuttled in vans to and
from four large parking lots on the periphery of the downtown.
If the parking facilities themselves are safe, this could
provide a potential solution to the problem of getting
employees who do not have attached spaces safely to their
cars. American Airlines explored the possibility of
establishing their own peripheral parking lot, or sharing one
that would provide the 300 spaces they require at lower rates
than those to be found downtown. But the cost of the shuttle
service, when combined with parking and the fact that many
employees wanted to continue using closer parking facilities
and would still need an escort service, made the overall costs
too high. This approach, however, may be more viable in other

situations, and we believe it deserves consideration because of
its ability to deal with both downtown land use and security
problems.

In the private sector, among corporate executives and security
directors, parking facility operators and designers, as well as
among police officials interviewed during Phase II, attached
parking was considered by far to be the best way of reducing
the fears of people as they walk to and from their downtown
parking lot or garage.

This is viewed to be especially true for late-working or
evening-shift employees. For evening-shift workers such
parking often can be very easy to obtain since their firm uses
such facilities for their day workers and the number of evening
workers is often considerably less than that during the day. A
fairly typical example is a corporation in Charlotte with
17,000 employees, about 20% of whom work the second and third
shifts. Attached to their two connected office buildings is a
seven-story garage which is exceedingly well-lit and patrolled;
late-working employees are told to park in specially designated
spaces clustered close together near the entrance to the
building. Workers are reported to feel very secure, even late
working secretaries.

While the problem of security within parking facilities can
never be totally ameliorated, much can be done to mitigate it.
Valet parking is one of the best ways to insure the security of
persons, according to operators and designers of parking
facilities, but it is expensive. To keep people "who don't
belong there" out, a computerized "anti-passback" and
identification system is being used in a number of recently
constructed garages in Houston, such as the Texas Bank of
Commerce garage. This system, too, however, is very expensive
and not suited for facilities open to the general public.

Well-lit, attended open lots are generally considered less
fearful than garages. Within garages, good visibility and an
absence of blind spots are considered important for security.
Pillars and enclosed stairwells and elevators should also be
avoided. Some consultants feel that TV surveillance combined
with an audio system can help make people feel more secure and
deter criminals. While corporate security personnel agree that
such equipment can be valuable, some argue that they are best
treated simply as cost-effective additional "eyes and ears".
After hours, there seems to be agreement that there is no
substitute for having a security person on hand, either
"walking the decks" or patrolling on a scooter, as is done in
Hartford. Nevertheless, care should be taken to assure that
these security people are readily identifiable as such, or they
may end up scaring the very people they are meant to reassure.

POLICE PATROL STRATEGIES

Until the second World War, American municipal police
departments deployed as much as 70% of their personnel on
uniformed (primarily foot) patrol. The primary task of these
beat officers was to maintain public order against drunks,
vagrants, disorderly youths and other low-level offenders.[1]
The volume of major crime was far less than at present and it
was primarily dealt with by the relatively few officers (10%)
assigned to specialized units such as detective bureaus. Beat
officers were well known by local businessmen and residents,
and police districts or precincts were comparatively small and
part of the neighborhood's social fabric.

After World War II, as crime increased, there were efforts to
make the uniformed patrol force more effective against major
crimes. One trend was to put officers into cars so they could
cover a wider area and respond more quickly to crime scenes.
This was sometimes accompanied by policies stressing
"aggressive preventive patrol," i.e. field interrogations or
the stopping and frisking of criminal suspects.

Another trend was to reduce the number of neighborhood police
stations, because they wasted manpower on administrative duties

In a crime attack model the uniformed patrol force is
motorized and strong emphasis is placed on rapid response to
radio calls, particularly ones involving crimes in progress.

Recent research has questioned the wisdom of these policies.
Some studies have shown that patrolling police officers
rarely encounter crimes in progress. For example, it has
been calculated that a Los Angeles police officer on motor
patrol will encounter a robbery in progress an average of
once every 14 years.[4] Another study found that 87% of
arrests result not from police observation but from
citizen-initiated calls or apprehension of offenders by
security guards and private citizens.[5] Similiarly, it has
been found that most crime victims do not call the police
immediately after the event. Reasons for delay may include
unavailability of a phone, need to obtain first aid, desire
to seek counsel of family and friends, etc. [6]

An alternative to the crime attack model is the "community
service" model.[7] The rationale for this is that a sense of
territorial identity and greater understanding between police
and citizens will reduce the amount of crime while enabling
the police to provide other services more effectively. In
essence it is a return to the old style of police work. This
model is often carried out through a neighborhood police

that team policing had reduced crime, increased citizen satisfaction with the police, or improved the job satisfaction of police officers.[8] Given the various problems connected with team policing, many departments that had instituted it chose to cut back or abolish their teams.

In some instances, resource limitations have dictated the mode of policing. Between 1975 and 1980, due to a financial crisis, the New York City Police Department was reduced from 31,700 officers to 22,600. As a result, the department lacked the resources for extensive beat patrol and stressed instead crime attack policies such as anti-robbery and career criminal programs. As the department begins to regain its strength (present plans call for 30,600 officers by 1987) it has revived foot patrol programs, known today as the Total Patrol Concept (TOPAC).

Community service versus crime attack is not an either/or proposition. In a police department with extensive beat patrol, it would still be necessary to focus on major offenders such as career criminals, those people who commit robberies and burglaries on a regular basis. As noted, the division between a uniformed patrol force that emphasizes order maintenance and a detective force that operates against professional criminals was a hallmark of traditional American municipal policing.

enforce the law vigorously against quality of life crime, it is difficult for the rest of the criminal justice system to accomodate their efforts. In an era where the rate of major crime is five or six times higher than a generation ago, many prosecutors and judges are reluctant to pay adequate attention to disorderly conduct or loitering arrests when they are spending half their time arraigning murders, rapists and robbers. Also, court decisions have narrowed the scope of laws against loitering, vagrancy and other low-level offenses and lessened the authority of police to deal with them. The deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill has led to the release onto the streets of thousands of people who in a past era might have been in an institution. This often contributes to the ongoing urban problem of the homeless population.

A generation ago, the streets of America's cities-- particularly in the central business districts--were fairly orderly, at least in the daytime. Today they present a casbah-like appearance, with large numbers of vendors and disorderly people. The trend in dealing with these problems seems to be a return to basics, including beat patrol, vigorous order maintenance, and a realization that the criminal justice system must impose meaningful sanctions against all levels of offenders.

SUBWAY SAFETY

Subway systems are trying a number of methods to improve
passenger safety. Since the spring of 1984, the New York City
Transit Police have been experimenting with a program in which
they eject passengers who smoke, drink alcoholic beverages,
blast radios, put their feet on seats or commit other minor
offenses in the subway. Ejection, it is hoped, will be a more
effective tactic than the previous practice of issuing
summonses, most of which were not responded to by their
recipients.

Atlanta is also stressing the maintenance of order as the prime
security strategy in its new subway system. The system is
physically attractive, and graffiti is quickly removed. The
subway police make it their policy to make a prompt and tough
response to any infraction, no matter how small. "We are
hard-nosed about crime," claimed one official, "and the
community knows it."

This proactive attitude is shared by the Metro Security
personnel in Washington, D.C. Several years ago, the transit
police in Washington invited to their headquarters 16 judges
who were resisting the clogging of their courts with minor
offenses. After seeing slides of graffiti in New York

that could be combined more efficiently in a centralized
system, and because they were centers of parochial, even
corrupt interests. In 1961, for example, O.W. Wilson, the
greatest police reformer of the post World War II era, reduced
the number of police stations in Chicago from 38 to 21 and
virtually eliminated foot patrol.[2] One unintended result of
these efforts was that police officers became anonymous
impersonal figures to local residents.

This type of policing has been referred to as the "crime
attack" model.[3] It assumes that the police force rather than
the public at large has the primary responsibility for crime
prevention and control, and that this is best achieved by
aggressive patrol and the arrest of offenders, whether in the
act of committing a crime or through follow-up investigation.
The goal is to fight crime through 1) maximum effectiveness in
apprehending actual criminals and 2) the resulting deterrance
of potential offenders. The method involves the deployment of
police personnel when and where major crimes are most likely to
occur. For example, a special anti-robbery unit may be
assigned to set up decoys in high-crime areas during the
evening hours. While such units are often successful in
apprehending muggers, they do not provide visible police
presence, nor do they alter the milieu of street disorder in
which mugging flourishes.

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motorized and strong emphasis is placed on rapid response to
radio calls, particularly ones involving crimes in progress.

Recent research has questioned the wisdom of these policies.
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rarely encounter crimes in progress. For example, it has
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and citizens will reduce the amount of crime while enabling
the police to provide other services more effectively. In
essence it is a return to the old style of police work. This
model is often carried out through a neighborhood police

team. The basic elements of a neighborhood team are:

1) patrol officers are assigned permanently to a specific
neighborhood rather than shifted periodically from one area
to another. Efforts are made to dispatch all calls in a
particular area to the neighborhood team even though its
members might not be as readily available as police units
outside the neighborhood. The reasoning is that speed of
response is less important than familiarity with the
neighborhood.

2) emphasis on close ties between the police team and the
neighborhood through a systematic effort by team members to
get to know the people of the neighborhood.

3) administrative decentralization, whereby major decisions
on such issues as personnel deployment and operational
tactics are made by the team rather than police headquarters.

Many aspects of team policing negate hierarchical centralized
control by senior officers. Because of the emphasis on
geographically dispersed personnel, the community service
model generally requires a level of resources far greater
than the crime attack model. A national assessment of team
policing published in 1977 indicated there was no firm proof

that team policing had reduced crime, increased citizen satisfaction with the police, or improved the job satisfaction of police officers.[8] Given the various problems connected with team policing, many departments that had instituted it chose to cut back or abolish their teams.

In some instances, resource limitations have dictated the mode of policing. Between 1975 and 1980, due to a financial crisis, the New York City Police Department was reduced from 31,700 officers to 22,600. As a result, the department lacked the resources for extensive beat patrol and stressed instead crime attack policies such as anti-robbery and career criminal programs. As the department begins to regain its strength (present plans call for 30,600 officers by 1987) it has revived foot patrol programs, known today as the Total Patrol Concept (TOPAC).

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SPECIAL POPULATIONS

Downtown organizations often undertake programs that can reduce
fear of crime levels by ameliorating the impacts of special
populations whose behavior can often signal public disorder.

1) Street People

Downtowns have long been magnets for homeless and disoriented
people, and their Skid Rows are usually well-known locally.
Now it appears that shelters too are likely to be located in
depressed downtowns, giving the areas a disproportionate share
of an already heavy burden.

To deal with this problem in New Orleans, $30,000 per year from
funds raised by the downtown special assessment district is
used to support the city's detoxification center in order to
improve its services to Skid Row alcoholics; the district is
also trying to develop a longer term solution to the problem.

The main "disorder" problem in Tulsa, Oklahoma's downtown mall
and special assessment district is street people, most of whom
are alcoholics and drug users.

The program is a detoxification and rehabilitation program run by the HOW Foundation in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce and Downtown Tulsa Unlimited, which helped bring the HOW Foundation to Tulsa. Local officials claim that it has been successful in reducing the number of street people in the downtown by 70%.

Two panel trucks, referred to as "booze cruisers", pick up winos and derelicts on the streets. The vehicles are staffed by graduates of the program, who can relate to the derelicts; the program operates in coordination with the Tulsa Police, who generally turns over to HOW anyone they pick up who seems suited to the project and has not actually broken the law. They are happy to do this, as each time a person joins HOW instead of going into police custody the police department saves $25.00. Participation in the program, however, is voluntary.

The program even helps pay for itself. Last year the HOW program had earned income of $452,000 from its cleaning projects and operating expenses of $428,000. The program has a contract with Downtown Tulsa Unlimited for a variety of clean-up services in the downtown area. No federal, state or county money is involved; everyone in the assessment district pays into the program in return for the clean-up work. Every evening, for example, HOW participants sweep the sidewalks.

A secondary benefit is increased security and public order. The sweepers are in uniform, use pick-up trucks equipped with flashing lights, and give the public a perception of increased security in the downtown in the evening. They are on the streets from 8:00 PM to 2:00 AM, and, ironically, they help remove derelicts as well: whenever a problem with winos or street people surfaces, the cleaners are instructed to aggressively clean up "right under" the offenders, to get them moving and off the sidewalks.

The program has been in effect for three years. In a typical year, they deal with nearly 1,000 people. Only 10% graduate --that is, complete the recommended six-month period--, but annual follow-ups (by letter or phone) indicate that 75-80% of program participants are still sober and holding jobs after a year or longer--a high recovery rate for this population.

2) Teenagers

The Phase I Report suggested that: "Programs are needed to get teenagers off the street by reducing truancy, providing employment and offering entertainment and leisure opportunities other than hanging out downtown." (p.40) One such program is Project Pride in Newark, New Jersey, which was originally intended to reduce juvenile vandalism and mischief. Started

like photography, crafts and design. Many of the classes are taught by Newark police officers. In addition, weekly discos are held in target area schools.

The Neighborhood Cleanup Program links the Newark Police Department, the court system and the city's community development agency. A Juvenile Conference Committee, staffed by thirteen community members, hears cases involving juveniles accused of first or minor offenses. After hearing each case and determining the needs of ech youth, the Committee offers selected youths the option of performing community service activities. Focused upon physical signs of disorder, community work service duties include clearing debris-strewn lots, removing graffiti from buildings and similar activities.

One of the prime reasons that youths litter, loiter and congregate in ways threatening to other daytime downtown users is that they are often truants. The Police Department in Oakland in conjunction with the Oakland Public Unified School District created a truancy reduction program called Operation Stay-In-School, that is reportedly very successful in controlling youth behavior downtown and very popular with the local community. According to public officials the truancy program has been the biggest reason--next to foot patrol--for the reduction of quality-of-life crime in the downtown area.

When a youth is observed in the area during school hours he is escorted by an Oakland police officer or school system official to an Operation Stay-In-School Reception Center. There the youth is counseled and the parents contacted before he is returned to school.

Cincinnati dealt in an innovative and multi-faceted way with a potentially serious problem involving teenagers on the outdoor, privately-owned over-street skywalk system. The skywalks had become the "in" place for teenagers to hang out on their way home after school. Brought there by buses, the students' bus passes allowed them to stay downtown while making connections to other lines. Although about 98% of the students behaved in an acceptable manner, the other 2% were causing problems such as harassment, graffiti and--after one fireworks event--gang violence.

The Police Department and the Citizens Committee on Youth worked closely with the downtown business community and other city agencies to put together a multi-pronged effort to deal with the youth problem. While the police used stricter enforcement of existing ordinances, a very simple tactic was also employed to reduce the amount of time high school students could stay downtown--the use of bus passes was altered so that students could not stay downtown for more than 30 minutes.

The Youth Services Bureau, a unit of the Citizens Committee on Youth, also developed a program in which former local sports stars (who can deal with the kids) approach them in a friendly manner, but still get across the point that they can't hang out and have to keep moving.

In Cleveland a similar problem with teenagers loitering downtown was successfully ameliorated by staggering bus schedules so that fewer students would be in the area at the same time.

APPENDIX E

<u>ON SITE VISITS AND INTERVIEWS:</u>

<u>Oakland, California</u>

Bill Bodrug
Vice President
Bramale
January 10, 1985

Charles and Bud DeLauer
Owners of bookstore
January 11, 1985

Erich Gehring
Manager
Wells Fargo Bank
January 11, 1985

Jerry Grenley
Head of Oakland Merchant Ass.
January 11, 1985

Tony Hare
Oakland Police Department
January 10, 1985

David Ralph
Project Director
Office of Economic Development
   and Employment
January 10, 1985

Hank Rauch
Security Director
Oakland Center Development Co.
January 10, 1985

Captain Peter Sarna
Commander
Downtown Unit-Oakland P.D.
January 11, 1985

George Williams
Director
Office of Economic
   Development and Employment
January 10, 1985

Clyde Woolridge
Owner
Camera Corner
January 10, 1985

<u>Atlanta, Georgia</u>

Barry Marler
Director of Security
Peachtree Center
December 10, 1984

Gene Slade
Atlanta Crime Commission
100 Edgewood Avenue
December 10, 1984

Dan E. Sweat, Jr.
Central Atlanta Progress, Inc.
2 Peachtree Street, NW
December 10, 1984

<u>Charlotte, N.C.</u>

Doug Cunningham
Personnel Department
NCNB
One NCNB Plaza
December 11, 1984

Charles Duncan
President
Jack Woods, Ltd.
300 S. Tryon
December 11, 1984

Charlotte, N.C. (con't.)

Major Jones
Charlotte Police Department
Law Enforcement Center
December 12, 1984

Randy Jones
Transportation Department
City of Charlotte
City Hall Annex
December 12, 1984

Krisann Keisler
Manager
Central Charlotte Association
129 W. Trade Street
December 11, 1984

Commander Sam Killman
Charlotte Police Department
December 12, 1984

Fred Kline
Partner
Trammell Crow Company
Charlotte Plaza
December 11, 1984

Carol Loveless
Asst. City Manager
City Hall
December 11th & 12th, 1984

H.R. McCroskey
Operations Manager
Belk Brosders, Co.
115 East Trade Street
December 11, 1984

James L. Patterson
Property Manager
Trammell Crow Company
Charlotte Plaza
December 11, 1984

Cleveland, Ohio

Bruce Campbell
President
Higbee's
December 18, 1984

Barbara Hajes
Downtown Council
Greater Cleveland Growth Ass.
December 17th & 18th, 1984

Captain Michael Janero
Cleveland Police Dept.
3rd District
December 18, 1984

Captain Jerome Joyce
Cleveland Police Dept.
Special Operations Unit
December 17, 1984

Sergeant W. Manocchio
Cleveland Police Dept.
3rd District
December 18, 1984

Marty McCann
Director of Security
LTV Corporation
December 18, 1984

Bob Zion
Downtown Council
Greater Cleveland Growth Ass.
December 17, 1984

Hartford, CT

Lois Barr
Downtown Council
December 5th & 6th, 1984

Roy Bangham
Hartford Police Dept.
50 Jennings Road
November 30, 1984

Rudy Brooks
Hartford Institute of Criminal
  and Social Justice
November 20, 1984

Fred Burton
Director of Security
Travelers Insurance Co.
1 Tower Square
December 6, 1984

Tony Caruso
Executive Director
Downtown Council
250 Constitution Plaza
203-728-3089
December 5, 1984

John Chapin
Owner
Shenanigans Restaurant
Bushnell Towers
Gold Street
December 5, 1984

John Coleman
Rideshare Corporation
December 5, 1984

Don DeWard
Director of Employment
Travelers Insurance
1 Tower Square
December 6, 1984

George Garrity
Manager of Civic Center Mall
December 5, 1984

Lt. Jim Luby
Hartford Police Department
50 Jennings Road
December 5, 1984

Phil Pizzanello
Owner
The Paper Chase
55 Pratt Street
December 5, 1984

Bernie Sullivan
Chief
Hartford Police Department
50 Jennings Road
December 5, 1984

Neil Sullivan
Manager, Security-Safety
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.
140 Garden Street
November 20, 1984

Bob Wiles
Hartford Institute of Criminal
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November 20, 1984

Dan Ward
Hartford Police Department
50 Jennings Road
November 30, 1984

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   and Social Justice
November 20, 1984

Dan Ward
Hartford Police Department
50 Jennings Road
November 30, 1984

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Ben Blair
Program Manager
Passenger Facilities Department
Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority
130 South 9th Street
December 12, 1984

Harry Zucker
Director - Communications and
    Engineering Services
Room 630 - City Hall
December 12, 1984

Thomas P. Smith
Chief,
SEPTA Police
200 West Wyoming Avenue
December 12, 1984

Newark, N.J.

Lou Dell'Ermo
Safety Security Director
Gateway Center
November 28, 1984

Norman Green
Manager of Security
Prudential Ins. Co. of America
November 28, 1984

E. Carroll Gerathy
Project Director
Third Gateway Urban Renewal
    Association
Gateway One
Newark, N.J.   07102

Hubert Williams
Police Director
Newark, N.J.
November 1, 1984

Bronx, New York

Captain Andrew Dillon
Commander
46th Precinct
January 30, 1985

Geraldine McGowen
52nd Precinct
January 30, 1985

Captain Dan Sheeler
Commander
52nd Precinct
January 30, 1985

Jerome Williams
46th Precinct
January 30, 1985

Kevin Malley
46th Precinct
January 30, 1985

John O'Boyle
52nd Precinct
January 30, 1985

Inspector Charles Sibon
Zone Commander
January 30, 1985

Brooklyn, N.Y.

Captain Robert Frankel
Commanding Officer
84th Precinct
January 24, 1985

Sergeant Joseph Iannuzzi
84th Precinct
January 24, 1985

Inspector Kenneth Strange
84th Precinct
January 24, 1985

Richard Recny
Executive Director
Local Development Corporation
  of East New York
Brooklyn, N.Y.
November 26, 1984

Joseph Glettfelder
Police Officer
84th Precinct
January 24, 1985

John Russo
Police Officer
84th Precinct
January 24, 1985

Tom Riley
Director of Security
Pfizer Corporation
630 Flushing Avenue
Brooklyn, New York
November 17, 1984

Queens, New York

Deputy Inspector Curran
103rd Precinct
January 4, 1985

Hank Forberg
103rd Crime Prevention Unit
January 4, 1985

Assistant Chief Inspector
  William Fitzpatrick
103rd Precinct
January 4, 1985

Deputy Inspector Bill Iverson
103rd Precinct
January 4, 1985

Washington, D.C.

Angus Boyd MacLean
Chief
Washington Metro Transit Police
Police
600 Fifth Avenue
December 11, 1984

Burton Morrow
Inspector
Washington Metro Transit

600 Fifth Avenue
December 11, 1984

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS IN RPA OFFICE

David Nutter
Manager
16th Street Mall
Denver Partnership
Denver, Colorado

Bob Reynolds
New Jersey Bell
Newark, N.J.

Georgia

Bob Brennan
Director of Public Information
MARTA
Atlanta, Georgia

Roy Woods
Director of Operations
Peachtree Center
Atlanta, Georgia

Illinois

Jim Gonska
Back of the Yards
   Neighborhood Council
Chicago, Illinois

Paul Lavarkis
Center for Urban Affairs
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

Louisiana

Fredrick Grant
Downtown Development District
301 Camp Street
New Orleans, LA

Massachusetts

Ned Shaw
Zayre Corporation
1 Mercer Road
Farmingham, Mass. 01701

New Jersey

Yolanda Collinson
Secretary
Little City Hall
   Neighborhood Corporation
Newark, N.Y.

Joseph Harm
Director for Economic Dev.
Newark Chamber of Commerce
Newark, N.J.

Jake Hayward
Motivated Guard Services
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