


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# social science research institute

Evaluation in an Imported  
Gang Violence Deterrence Program:

Final Report

(NIJ #81-IJ-CX-0072)

Malcolm W. Klein

Cheryl L. Maxson

Margaret A. Gordon

Social Science Research Institute  
University of Southern California

1984

This volume includes:

Executive Summary

Final Report

Addendum to the Final Report

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## Abstract

Police investigative data describing gang and comparable non-gang violent incidents in two large police jurisdictions in Los Angeles are reported. Approximately 800 homicide as well as over 500 violent, non-homicide incidents occurring between 1978 and 1982 were analyzed to respond to three research goals: descriptions of gang violence, determination of significant discriminators between gang and non-gang incidents, and estimation of the impact of police investigative procedures on the official designation of cases as gang or non-gang.

The data revealed very substantial differences between the character of gang and non-gang violent cases, primarily with respect to descriptors of the participants but also with respect to the settings in which the incidents occurred. Gang incidents involved more participants, lower levels of prior suspect-victim relationships, lower ages, more male-only cases, and more minority involvements. They more often occurred in public locations, involved cars, guns and other weapons, involved more unknown suspects and fears of retaliation, and more often yielded additional charges and additional victim injuries.

A series of discriminant analyses yielded surprisingly high levels of success in classification of cases as gang or non-gang, with younger age, minority status, and number of participants as

the best discriminators. Special gang indicators such as argot, turf designations, and special dress and behavioral cues also emerged as excellent discriminators. Evidence for the impact of police investigation and reporting practices on these gang/non-gang differences was weak, although more so in one jurisdiction than the other. Finally, most of these findings pertain to both homicide and non-homicide events, but more fully to the homicides.

Future research needs include the validation of these findings in other large urban settings and the testing of their utility in smaller cities facing gang problems. The data reported here suggest the utility of a "gang indicators index" and special gang identification training for police investigators in cities not having sophisticated gang intelligence units.

## Goals and Design

In the context of a dramatic increase in gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County (peaking at 351 victims in 1980) and a major gang intervention effort by various public agencies, this research was undertaken to gather basic data which could be pertinent to the evaluation of major gang intervention efforts. The research was not an evaluation effort per se, but an investigation of issues of descriptive and analytic concern to criminologists and criminal justice officials.

The research design involved the parallel collection of data from the investigation files of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Data collection, analysis, and reporting were undertaken separately for the two agencies because of differences in departmental structures and practices, reflected in differences in research decisions about sampling and coding of investigation files. The principal analyses were carried out on homicide files for cases designated as gang-related by special police gang units and on comparable files for cases not designated as gang-related. An additional sample of non-homicide violent cases, both gang and non-gang, were studied for methodological comparison purposes; the analysis of these cases is reported in an addendum to the main report. Table 1 summarizes the sampling data including the data sources, time periods, and numbers of cases.

Table 1

## Sampling Description

	# of Stations in Sample Pool	Restricted Sample <sup>1</sup>	Sample Period	# of Cases Sampled per Year <sup>2</sup>	Sample Total <sup>3</sup>
<u>Homicide</u>					
LASD					
Gang	19	No	1/78-6/82	Total Population	312
Non-Gang	19	Yes	1/78-6/82	50	200
LAPD					
Gang	3	No	1/79-12/81	Total Population	152
Non-Gang	3	Yes	1/79-12/81	50	148
<u>Non-Homicide</u>					
LASD					
Gang	2	Yes	1/78-12/81	40	280
Non-Gang	2	Yes	1/78-12/81	40	243

<sup>1</sup> Only cases with at least one name-identified suspect aged 10-30 included in sample pool. Non-gang homicide sample stratified by proportion of gang cases per station to total sample pool.

<sup>2</sup> 1982 sample size half that of other years.

<sup>3</sup> Deviations from anticipated sample size due to missing files, excluded cases, etc.

The cooperation of the two police agencies was excellent, resulting in access to confidential investigation files without any restrictions. The files themselves were extremely comprehensive, and the data collection and coding tasks very complex and time consuming. Nonetheless, coder reliability was surprisingly high and the problem of missing data surprisingly low. Thus despite the complexity and inherent ambiguity of difficult felony investigations, the goals of the research have been minimally affected by problems with the raw data.

Three major goals provided the focus of the research. The first was to provide an informed description of principal characteristics of gang homicides, in part by comparison with non-gang homicides. The second was to establish the variables which best discriminate between gang and non-gang homicides. The third was to assess the degree to which police definitions, investigations, and reporting practices might impinge upon the distinctions between gang and non-gang incidents.

#### Characteristics of Gang and Non-Gang Homicides

Measures of variables extracted from the LASD and LAPD were separated into three categories, those describing homicide settings, homicide participants and, to be discussed later, investigative practices. In both the LASD and LAPD data sets, most setting and participant measures yielded differences between gang and non-gang cases, with participant variables providing the



greater differences. Among LASD setting variables, gang and non-gang cases differed significantly on 16 of 21 (see Table 2 in the full report). Gang homicides more often occurred in public settings, involved autos, involved guns and other weapons except knives, had more additional victim injuries and associated offenses related to homicide and assault, had more unknown suspects, and more often involved fear of retaliation. Most of these differences were significant beyond the .01 level, although measures of association were uniformly fairly low.

LASD participant characteristics, by comparison, more effectively differentiated between gang and non-gang homicides. Twelve variables were studied, and all twelve yielded statistical significance (eleven at the .01 level). Levels of association ranged from a low of .151 (victim gender) to a high of .762 (suspect gang affiliation). Gang incidents involved more participants, lower likelihood of prior victim/suspect relations, more acknowledged gang affiliations, lower mean ages of participants, more gender homogeneity (male) of suspects and of victims, and more Hispanic suspects and victims (see Table 3 in the full report).

In sum, the LASD data revealed consistent differences between gang and non-gang homicide incidents, more for participant characteristics than for setting descriptors. Gang incidents are more complex, generally, being less of the one-on-one nature often found in domestic and felony murders and more of the public and mobile confrontational sort often depicted in media accounts of gang killings.

In the LAPD data, the same basic patterns emerged, but less strongly. Only seven of the 21 setting characteristics yielded significant differences, while 10 of the 12 participant variables did so. The data do not by themselves reveal whether these lower levels of differentiation result from fewer "actual" gang/non-gang homicide differences or from differences in departmental styles of definition and investigation. Other analyses of investigative processes suggest, however, that stylistic differences may have contributed to this contrast between LASD and LAPD results.

#### Discriminating Between Gang and Non-Gang Homicides

Knowing that a number of setting and participant descriptors individually differentiate between the two sets of homicides does not tell us, in a multivariate sense, which are the "best" discriminators, nor whether there are fairly unique variables that "mark" a homicide as gang-related. To approach these issues, we employed two analytic procedures. The first was discriminant analysis, in both the LASD and LAPD data sets, and the second was a descriptive assessment of the special "gang indicators" often used by investigators, items such as gang tatoos, dress styles, argot, and place names.

Discriminant analysis was applied to most of the same variables already discussed, although in some instances changes were made to accommodate to missing data, measurement requirements, variable redundancies and conceptual interests. Investigative variables were included, but will be discussed in a later section of this summary.

Within the LASD data, the analysis yielded a discriminant function of surprising strength. The canonical correlation of .70 yielded an Eta squared of .49. Classification of cases as gang was 85% successful, and of non-gang was 80% successful. The variables comprising the function are listed in Table 2 below (total structure coefficients represent the independent correlation of each variable with the discriminant function); note that participant variables are paramount, and particularly those referring to participants on the suspect side rather than on the victim side.

Table 2  
Total Structure Coefficients: LASD

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Mean age of suspects	-.652
Hispanic suspects	.592
No. of participants, suspect side	.557
Street location	.538
No. of witness interviews	.447
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.419
No. of suspects charged with homicide	.385
No. of participants, victim side	.372
Proportion of male suspects	.349
Associated violent offenses	.315
Mean age of victims	-.308
Gun present	.302
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	-.270

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -1.03959; gang, 0.91982]

The LAPD data yielded somewhat similar results although once again the differentiation is less strong. In Table 3 one can see that age, ethnicity, and numbers of participants are the best

discriminators. That is, in both data sets, participant rather than setting variables are most important. In both data sets,

Table 3  
Total Structure Coefficients: LAPD

Variable	Coefficients
Mean age of suspects	.767
Mean age of victims	.507
Number of suspects charged with homicide	-.505
Number of participants, suspect side	-.415
No prior contact, victim and suspect	-.408
Total number of interviews	-.408
Number of witness interviews	-.357
Proportion of male suspects	-.348
Gun present	-.318
Number of participants, victim side	-.311
Auto present	-.243
Black suspects	.134

[Group Centroids: non-gang, 0.82487; gang, -0.86612]

younger ages, minority ethnicity and larger numbers of suspects are likely to signify a gang event. In the LAPD cases, the canonical correlation of .65 yields a lower Eta squared of .42.

Classification success is also a bit lower, at 85% for gang but 75% for non-gang.

The principal import of the discriminant analysis is that a stable set of variables describing homicides can be used to define a function which differentiates between gang and non-gang cases. Given the complex, ambiguous nature of these cases, with files that take hours to code, the classification success achiev-

ed is surprisingly high and holds promise for the development of diagnostic instruments appropriate to field investigation and early designation of cases, a matter of significance to gang investigators.

The "gang indicators" analysis compared gang and non-gang cases on a series of items thought to be particularly characteristic of gang incidents. The issue here was the frequency with which any of the indicators appeared in each gang and non-gang investigation file. The data were of two major types, each with subdivisions:

1. Categorical indicators included five groupings: gang motive, gang location, gang physical/behavioral, gang participant identification, and incident identification as gang;

2. Cultural indicators were of two kinds, one labeled argot and the other labeled manifest, covering 24 specific items such as tatoos, hand signals, special terms like "veterano," "gang-banging," and so on.

The analysis revealed enormous differences, as expected, between the occurrence of gang indicators in the gang and non-gang files. Categorical indicators appeared in 15% (LASD) and 20% (LAPD) of the non-gang files, but in 88% and 91% of the gang files. Cultural indicators yielded figures of 19% and 16% for non-gang files and 66% and 73% for gang files. The fact that non-gang files contained gang indicators as often as they did

reveals the potential for mislabeling cases, as does the absence of indicators in a number of gang files. Our data, overall, reveal major gang/non-gang differences on many matters, but also make it clear that the designation of cases as gang or non-gang is far from automatic. An index which combines the best discriminators from the descriptive analysis along with the discriminant analysis and the gang indicators analysis could prove a most useful tool both for future research and for police field investigation purposes.

#### Investigative Impact on Gang Designations

Because all of the data employed in this study come directly from police investigation files, caution dictates that an attempt be made to assess the degree to which gang/non-gang distinctions reflect not only offender variables but also police practices. Take the obvious example of official definitions. In Chicago and Philadelphia, homicides are labeled as gang-related only if both suspects and victims include alleged gang members. Both the LASD and LAPD use much more comprehensive definitions. Our estimate is that the application of the narrow Chicago/Philadelphia definition to the Los Angeles data would reduce the reported Los Angeles gang homicide "rate" by about fifty percent.

But we were concerned about more subtle intrusions of police practice into rate determination, most particularly because our

data collection bracketed the peak years of gang homicide rates (rising from county-wide totals of 200 in 1978 to 351 in 1980 and back down into the 200s in subsequent years). Such dramatic changes automatically raise questions about the determinants of such rates.

Because the data describing gang/non-gang differences are derived from the police agencies, we were faced with a complex "chicken-and-egg" paradox; there was no single or definitive way to disentangle investigative practice from the designation of cases as gang or non-gang. Instead, we undertook a number of relevant analyses with the understanding that a consistent trend might reveal evidence of investigative impact on designations (and therefore on reported rates). These several analyses, taken together, suggest that some such impact did take place but that at the most it was minor and inconsistent. We judge that most of the gang/non-gang differences revealed in our data are the direct reflections of differences in offender and setting characteristics, with investigative variables accounting for a relatively small portion of the variance. This conclusion is based on such findings as the following:

1. In our descriptive analyses, investigative variables were studied as differentiators between gang and non-gang cases in exactly the same manner as were setting and participant characteristics. These yielded the fewest number of significant varia-

bles and lower measures of association than did setting or participant variables. This was true both for the LASD and LAPD cohorts.

2. An analysis was undertaken of these same three sets of variables over time, seeking changes in the four-and-one-half years of LASD data collection and the three years of LAPD collection. This revealed no consistent pattern differentiating investigative from setting or participant variables. An inordinate contribution of the former to the increases and decreases in gang homicide rates as opposed to non-gang rates would have suggested special investigative contributions; there was no evidence of this sort.

3. In the discriminant analysis, a special procedure was used (a comparison of two models of variable entries) to determine whether investigation variables substantially increased the Eta squared as a measure of variance explained. In neither LASD nor LAPD analyses was this contribution of any meaningful level; setting and participant characteristics were by far the principal components of the discriminant function. Analysis by year, however, suggested a higher level of investigative contribution to the gang/non-gang differences (a decline in these differences) in 1980 within the LAPD data. 1980 was the peak year for gang homicides in the city. The effect was not major, but it was quite noticeable against the background of low investigative impact in all other analyses.



4. Gang cases were divided into those manifesting involvement of special police gang units and those evidencing no such involvement. In the LASD cases, the comparison yielded the conclusion that the result of gang unit involvement was better investigation but not the recording of participant and setting characteristics which might affect labeling of cases as gang or non-gang. In the LAPD cases, the 1980 difference found in the discriminant analysis also appeared with respect to gang unit involvement; the data suggest that unit involvement was not associated with the character of gang cases in 1980, a performance that might have resulted from an exaggeration of the proportion of gang homicides among all homicides in that one peak year as compared to the other years.

5. Finally, all of the analyses carried out on the gang and non-gang homicide cases were repeated on yearly samples of gang and non-gang non-homicide, violent cases taken from LASD files for the 1978-1981 period. These data and analyses were designed as a "control" for the homicide data and analyses. Major gang/non-gang differences occurring in homicide but not in non-homicide cases could be taken as evidence of special investigative impact on the homicide rates. However, the bulk of the non-homicide analyses failed to give any substantial support to a hypothesis of special, differentiating investigative effects. This material, included as an addendum to the main body of the

Final Report, also contains descriptive data on gang/nongang differences for non-homicide violence which readers may find of interest.

### Implications

The data and the analyses included in the full report suggest several items of conceptual and practical significance.

First, it has been demonstrated that there are clear and major differences between both the quantitative and qualitative character of gang and non-gang violent incidents. Such data should contribute to criminologists' understanding of these phenomena.

Second, we now have two instances of very large urban enforcement agencies for which we can report that rates of violent gang incidents reported appear to be relatively free of any obvious manipulation over a period of heightened gang activity. Evaluation of gang programs should not shy away from the use of such rates as criteria. In addition, our analysis has provided several models for assessing investigative impact on those rates so that rate manipulations, advertent or inadvertent, might be detected and assessed.

Third, there is a demonstration here that urban jurisdictions with major gang activity can profit from the development of sophisticated gang intelligence units in their enforcement agen-

cies. Such units do yield more comprehensive investigations with increased levels of suspect arrests.

Fourth, for jurisdictions which face increasing gang problems but have not developed sophisticated gang intelligence units, we are encouraged to believe that gang incident identification can be substantially increased. For the early on-site investigators, for detectives assigned to gang incident investigations, and for prosecutors concerned with bringing violent gang perpetrators to court, earlier and more convincing differentiation between gang and non-gang cases should be a useful capacity. It is toward this concern that our continuing research will next turn, with attention to a "gang indicators index" and possibilities for training police investigators in early gang identification.

Finally, there is a need for future research to validate our findings in other large urban settings. Also, research should be undertaken to assess the applicability of these findings to smaller jurisdictions with gang problems, especially those not having sophisticated gang intelligence units.

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## Introduction

This report addresses a nationwide concern about violent crimes by presenting findings from a three year research project on street gang homicides. Our primary objectives are to describe the nature of gang-related homicides and how they differ from non-gang homicides as well as other violent incidents, both gang and non-gang. In addition, we address the role of law enforcement activities and the increasingly specialized gang investigation units relative to (a) distinguishing between gang and non-gang incidents and (b) outcomes of the investigation process. This focus on the character of officially designated gang homicides and on potential changes in the nature of official definitions relative to incident characteristics provides basic research data informative to intervention program evaluations.

The report is divided into four major sections, each with a number of subtopics. The four major sections are (1) Restatement of Aims and Alterations, (2) Statement of Research Objectives, (3) Aspects of the Research Process, and (4) Data Analyses.

### I. Restatement of Aims and Alterations

#### A. Aims

The situational context that provided the impetus for this project consisted of (1) a period of dramatic increases in gang homicides in Los Angeles County,<sup>1</sup> (2) the development of major law enforcement programs to combat gang violence in Los Angeles, and (3) the initiation of a very large, deterrence oriented

---

<sup>1</sup>From 1973 to 1980, Sheriff's officials reported a rise from 12 to 83 gang-related homicides. The Los Angeles Police Department recorded a rise from 39 to 192.

street-work program in Los Angeles, modeled after the Crisis Intervention Network (CIN) in Philadelphia. It was, in fact, this latter development which led to our research proposal and was a principal focus of our rationales for data collection.

The overall spirit of the effort was not to evaluate gang violence reduction programs, but to undertake and demonstrate analyses which could yield data of value to gang program evaluations. The unusual situations of gangs and gang control measures in Los Angeles County provided one context for this research; past research provided another.

1. Gang control measures: Between the mid-1950s and about 1970, gang intervention programs throughout the country were variations on the transformation model. Emerging from the Chicago Area Projects (Kobrin, 1959) and the operations of the New York City Youth Board (NYCYB, 1960), most major urban centers in the 1960s were committed to this model. The basic element was the assignment of "detached workers" to established, traditional gangs to transform their structure and value systems into more acceptable forms. There were often other components stressing community connections--schools, jobs, tutoring, recreation, parent clubs--and the detached worker was charged with liaison efforts and attaching his gang members to these alternative opportunities. Theoretical reliance tended to be placed on the tenets of Differential Association Theory (Sutherland, 1955) and Opportunity Structure Theory (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Three major evaluations were carried out on detached worker projects, in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles (see Klein, 1971, for an overview of all these; also, Klein, 1969; Miller, 1962; Carney et al., 1969). The findings were remarkably uniform; projects which successfully engaged gang members' interests, and successfully brought to bear a host of alternative opportunities, nevertheless failed to have an ameliorative effect on deviant gang behavior. In fact, the evidence suggests that, however inadvertently, the projects had the effect of perpetuating or even increasing gang cohesiveness and increasing the level of gang delinquency.

The gap between 1970 and 1980 has produced very little new research on gang behavior (exceptions include Miller (1975), Moore (1978), and a useful summary by Schubert and Richardson (1976)), and no useful evaluations have appeared. However, a major reorientation in gang programming from the transformation model to a deterrence model has emerged. Reasons for this are not hard to find. The level of gang violence has escalated, along with the availability of firearms (Miller, 1975). While Los Angeles has been the most severely affected city, reports from other cities and from cities previously free from serious gang violence, generally, are in agreement on this escalation.

In addition to the increased gang activity is the increased national concern with rising violence, generally, and the "neo-conservative" mood of many leaders in the criminal justice and political arenas. If community leaders have come to

understand that gangs cannot readily be eliminated, they have not settled for the increased violence that gangs are now producing. Calls for "crackdowns" and punitive responses are common.

The epitome of the deterrence model is the Crisis Intervention Network (CIN) in Philadelphia, and now its translation to the Los Angeles setting. Prior local examples include the California Youth Authority's Gang Violence Reduction Project (Torres, 1978a, 1978b, 1980) and the Sey Yes (sic) Project (1980) funded by OJJDP. The basic elements of the deterrence model are the provision of heightened street visibility/surveillance by project staff, area rather than specific gang focus, violence rather than general delinquency as a focus, and intergang mediation efforts. Other elements may also be involved--parent and community councils, special liaisons with probation and police officials--but the essence of the matter is the reactivation of visible, community controls and the rapid response to violent and crisis events. The Philadelphia and Los Angeles operations are further characterized by a central communications center and radio-equipped cars.

To those familiar with gang intervention, there can be no mistaking the differences in the two models. The transformation model was social group work in the streets, with orientations toward gang members that were empathic and sympathetic, and accepting of gang misbehavior as far less a problem than the alienating response of community residents and officials. By contrast, the deterrence model eschews an interest in minor gang

predations and concentrates on the major ones, especially homicide. The worker is, in essence, a part of a dramatically energized community control mechanism, a "fire fighter" with a more balanced eye on the consequences as well as the causes of gang violence. Success is measured first in violence reduction, not in group or individual change.

Simply put, the first focus of our evaluation was to be on gathering data that have implications for the outcome of this deterrence model.

Because impact assessment and management information systems were in other hands for the street work program (County Youth Gang Services--CYGS), the USC team was free to follow its own intentions, summarized as follows in the original proposal:

...Our intent through this proposal is to provide what we are calling a "criminologically-informed evaluation," designed to illuminate factors associated with levels of program success achieved, but not typically taken into account in evaluation opportunities. Included here will be descriptions of gang structure and cohesiveness, violent incident characteristics, and police recording changes. Such an evaluative approach ... emphasizes the gathering of basic research data on the substantive targets of the program and uses these basic data to inform the program directorate of both static and dynamic statuses of these targets (e.g., gangs; police recording practices). Decisions in the program can then be based not only on perceived program progress, but also on the status of factors affecting program targets and target measuring systems.

Put succinctly, the rationale above was the unifying theme for the project.

Much is known about the reasons for the deleterious effects of the transformation model (Klein, 1971). We believed that an



inadvertent falling back to the transformation model could easily take place in the absence of the feedback to the Los Angeles program of the types of data we proposed to collect on gang structure, cohesiveness, and violence patterns. If we were successful in this feedback operation, then a comparison of the effectiveness of the two models (i.e., transformation in the 1960s; deterrence in the 1980s) would be available for public and professional review.

Our second focus, obviously related directly to the first, was to be on the degree to which the purportedly highly successful CIN version of the deterrence model can be related to changes in homicide patterns attributed to gangs in Los Angeles. However much the model was retained in "pure" form, the ultimate question was whether or not an anticipated reduction (or a feared increase) in gang-related homicides could be attributed to the intervention model. Success for the model could only be claimed when alternative explanations of an obvious sort can be eliminated. Thus, the data we were to collect and report back to the program directorate would, by design, be directly pertinent to whether changes occurred in homicide-involved gangs, in the recording of homicides, and/or in patterns of gang and non-gang homicides.

2. Past research: Although instances of competent research on street gangs go back to 1927 (Thrasher, 1963), the heyday of gang research was in the 1950s and 1960s (Miller, 1966; 1967; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965;

Spergel, 1964; 1966; Suttles, 1968; Klein, 1971). What is currently known about street gangs is based on the findings from that period. There are indications that our knowledge is out-dated (Miller, 1975; Torres, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; Moore, 1978), but none of this results from research of the quality to be found in the earlier period. Miller's conclusions are drawn from a superficial national survey of public officials and news reports. Torres' evaluation of a violence reduction project is narrow and seriously flawed methodologically. Moore's analysis is insightful but highly dependent upon "Pintos," a group of gang oriented, ex-addict "veteranos" whose objectivity as informants must be seriously questioned.

Nonetheless, there is some uniformity to reports of changes in gang structure and activity. Principal among these are the following:

- a. Gangs now consist of a far higher proportion of adults, and are more connected to adult criminal activity;
- b. Gang violence and killings have increased significantly in numbers, aided in part by far greater access to firearms;
- c. Gangs have become more cohesive;
- d. Gang offenses, especially violent activity, have become less internecine and more often directed toward non-gang, adult victims in non-gang areas (a recent compilation by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department reveals a ratio of 62 adult to 24 juvenile victims, with ages ranging from 13 to 86).

Another major aim of the current research was to investigate these and related trends to assess their validity as gang-related trends.

Three major data collection efforts were related to the issues addressed above: (least important) data collection from police gang homicide investigations in Philadelphia; (next in importance) data on gang structure and cohesiveness from the CYGS program; and (most important) data collection from police homicide files of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and Los Angeles Police Department. Altogether, such data were to provide inter-city (Philadelphia/Los Angeles) comparisons, across-time comparisons (L.A. gang structure, 1960s/1980s), and analyses of police reporting and recording practices in Los Angeles.

B. Alterations

Changes in research plans have been necessitated with respect to all three data collection activities. We will deal with each in some detail.

1. Philadelphia: Contrary to expectation, access to Philadelphia police files could not be obtained. We were alerted, too late, to a state legislative act that prohibits access to criminal records for any but primary criminal justice agencies. Clearly, this law precluded homicide investigation data collection of the sort we envisioned. An extended interview with the city's Criminal Justice Coordinator revealed that California's approach to successful legislative amendments to resolve the same problem had not received backing in Pennsylvania. Several legislative attempts had failed to get out of committee and further attempts, it was felt, would generate

significant controversy between the various groups that framed the original legislation.

Further, it seemed unlikely that corrective legislation would include the level of access to individual files that we needed, although that might have been left to the discretion of the Philadelphia Police Commissioner. The new Commissioner, we were told by police officials and others, was not giving file access of any kind to any non-police officials, including other justice agencies and previously favored research organizations. Our anticipated Philadelphia research component was abandoned and the planned resources shifted to other purposes.

In the same visit to Philadelphia in which we learned of the data access problem, we also conducted additional interviews with city police officials, research colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, and officials of the Crisis Intervention Network.<sup>2</sup> These interviews over a two day period provided new information on the role of the CIN in the marked decrease in Philadelphia gang-related homicides in the mid-seventies, the decrease which led Los Angeles officials to import the CIN model into the CYGS operation. While CIN was initiated in 1974, it was only operational in the last quarter of that year and involved only a pilot operation in one area of the city. It took the program another nine months (i.e., mid-1975) to gear up to full complement. Nonetheless, 1974 was the year in which the trend in increasing homicides dramatically reversed itself. CIN officials were unable to report any data, or any combinations of program

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<sup>2</sup>Given the access problem, the failure of promised cooperation from the Director of CIN became a moot point. Through his staff, arrangements had been made for data sharing, hiring of his staff for our data collection, and a letter of support to go to NIJ. Despite repeated inquiries, the letter never materialized. Our scheduled interview with the Director was cancelled upon our arrival at CIN headquarters. Other staff members did, however, meet with us and did respond to our inquiries about the CIN experience.

growth or targetting along with homicide declines, that could be used to substantiate claims of direct CIN impact on the continued decline after mid-1975.

In the area of policing, the city's Gang Control Unit was quite large--60 men plus 20 more "liaison officers" working with detectives (the Gang Control Unit did not work homicides). This unit was using heavy surveillance tactics (e.g., truancy sweeps, closed school campuses, selective enforcement in high gang activity areas, admittedly illegal stops and searches, overcharging of large numbers as accomplices, etc.). However, so far as we could ascertain, there was no particular police crackdown over the period (mid-seventies) in which Philadelphia officials reported the dramatic decline in gang-related homicides.

Nor could we find evidence that the rapid decline might be attributed to changes in police recording practices or definitions. Attribution of gang homicide was determined by the detective unit, rather than by the staff of the Juvenile Aid Division or its Gang Control Unit. Definitions of what constituted gang-related events were quite narrow by Los Angeles standards, involving only "gang-on-gang" incidents motivated by turf protection or retaliation. This is a definition which leaves little room for discretion of any but the most open and detectable sort. Several anecdotes confirmed that this definition remained constant until recently.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>One anecdote, provided by police officials, made it clear that the reported peak 1974 gang homicide total was inflated by three cases, or about six per cent only.

Thus, nothing we learned--and we did a good deal of cross-checking between our interview respondents--could be used to attribute the homicide decline either to CIN or to altered police operations. On the other hand, it was generally agreed that various neighborhood groups, tied into a strong community network, began springing up during the period in question. Sister Falaca Fatah's House of Umoja and a persistent, militant anti-gang group of grandmothers, Concerned Mothers, are the most noted of many block and neighborhood level groups funded by welfare grants. They are reported to have exerted strong community controls of a sort fairly easily activated in a city like Philadelphia (and unlike Los Angeles) which has developed a strong corner, block and neighborhood focus. If the gang homicide decline can be attributed to anything other than normal cycles or self-generated deterrence, then these neighborhood-level developments may be more likely candidates than either CIN or the particular actions of the Philadelphia police.

2. CYGS: The invitation to become involved in this research came from the Director of CYGS, whose full support was immediate and quickly implemented. Unfortunately, the program became a very political issue, and decisions within the program became politicized. After research collaboration efforts had been crystallized, and Cheryl Maxson hired by CYGS to implement Management Information System forms of use to both the program and the research, the Director (and his co-Director) were forced

out. The new Director showed little of the enthusiasm for research or interest in accountability of his predecessor. The presence of a Field Coordinator who did have some residual interest kept the relationship alive, but not thriving, for almost two years. When the second Director was in turn forced out and replaced, then the relationship was all but severed with a total turnover (yet again) in program administrative staff. As a consequence of this and other factors noted below, the opportunity to gather data on gang structure and cohesiveness and to compare these with 1960s data was precluded.

The processes of planning, initiating, implementing, and exercising supervisory control of a management information system is difficult in many "normal" situations. It is potentially more difficult in a large street gang program for several reasons. The line work is done "on the street," away from centralized control mechanisms. It is carried out by street-wise workers who are usually inexperienced at and unsympathetic to paper work of any kind. Some, in addition, may not have the requisite language and writing skills. The physical gap between worker and supervisor is often considerable. Workers are often extremely wary of revealing anything about their gang "clients." Finally, the relationship between recording practices and program goals is not easily, if at all, spelled out.

The fact that some prior gang projects had successfully overcome major obstacles to reliable and valid reporting does not, ipso facto, mean that CYGS would do so. In fact, the prior

projects about which most has been learned for operational purposes were those in which there was a heavy research component (various programs in New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles come to mind). This is because the research component required reliable data and helped organize the data collection process, and because the concern for what research might offer management signalled a form of management that was alert to articulating the operations with program goals.

When the new Directors of CYGS came aboard, the dramatic decrease in commitment to the research process meant, in our view, a serious decrement in the utility of the management information system that was being developed. For the research team, this in turn meant that data on which we had counted was to be seriously compromised or not collected. The following will serve as examples.

a. Number of gang contacts logged by the workers was found to be a function of reporting practices. A particularly telling case in point is contained in a report to the CYGS directorate for November, 1981:

This analysis is limited to the last two weeks of the month when the most complete information was available. As of 12/2/81, Team 1's summary of the week ending 11/27 and Teams 5-8 for the week before were not submitted. Team 4 was there but untabulated due to my error, with the exception of gang contacts. For the two week period, 12 team reports show a striking increase in number of gang contacts—a total of 2,395. Clearly, this increase has to do with reporting practices and is not a real increase. However, these contacts are not necessarily direct, interpersonal contacts. I recommend a tightening up of definitions here as these numbers are so inflated, I not only question their validity (obvious estimates), but also



their utility. For example, one report that was not included in the above figures referred to one to two thousand contacts during the course of a school follow-up.

b. Rates of reporting gang incidents by workers was often low (as judged by centrally logged incidents and comparisons between workers). More critical to any research interest, however, was the high variability in reporting both contacts and incidents between workers or teams as well variability over time. For instance, for December, 1981:

1. proportion of weekly paperwork submitted to that date ranged from .21 to .75 for one team over four weeks, from .23 to .73 for another. Over four weeks, the team averages ranged from .44 to .75, with an average of about .60. This means an average data loss of 40 per cent.

2. reported field contacts (non-gang) per week ranged from 84 to 949 for one team, and summated totals over all teams ranged from 1153 in one week to 3329 in another.

3. In one week, reported gang contacts ranged from 68 for one team to 836 for another.

Since we already know that something like 40 per cent of the data were lost in any case, these figures are in fact an underestimate of the variability that features worker reporting. We do not suggest that there should not be variability, but a review of these and other reports from the program made it clear that, as gauges of program activity, the worker reports simply could not be relied upon for research purposes. They were, however, dutifully recorded for program accountability purposes.

c. Gang incident reports turned in by the workers were expected to be a major source of data on present-day gang activity. Again, the nature of the reports prevented this. The principal problems lay with incomplete reporting, inaccurate reporting, and faults in the reporting forms.

As to the first, incomplete reporting, our sample month of November, 1981, showed 39 incidents centrally logged, but only 18 with incident reports filled out. Only 12 of the 18 proved to be actual incidents.

With respect to inaccurate reporting, an analysis was done on the August, 1982, incident reports. These reports provide for short-hand, often pre-coded designations of level of worker involvement, site, offense, number of participants, gang designations, race, gender, weapons use, presence of police, arrests, and time. Over all these items for 25 reported incidents (others were logged but not reported), an average of 17 per cent of the items were missing or inappropriately coded. Validation on the September, 1982, reports yielded very similar results.

Finally, there are more irremediable faults traceable to the forms, as they were eventually used by the workers. For instance, the time noted on the reports variably seemed to refer to the time of the incident, time of worker arrival, time of logging, or time of report writing. Five of the 25 reports indicated that the worker was on the scene. In all other cases, the data are gathered after the fact with all the problems

related to recalled events. And most crucial to our interests, data on gang affiliation, race, and gender applied only to the individuals specifically named on the report by the worker. Typically, this constituted one or two people, although the number of participants noted went as high as 500 and averaged about ten individuals (excluding the cases of 100 and 500 participants). To base any sort of statement of gang membership characteristics on such data would be fallacious.

d. We became aware, rather early, that the data being collected on the program were of little research value. Therefore, we initiated conversations with CYGS officials about gathering gang structure data directly from the workers. Although not originally met with enthusiasm by the officials, in time they became more interested in what such data might do for them, and indeed suggested additional information they would like us to gather not only from the workers but from schools, community agencies, and police as well. They asked that we assess such areas as major activity foci of each gang (drugs, street crime, violence), gang signals and colors, history of development and rivalries, leadership and processes of promotion, and enumeration of all community resources (hospitals, churches, schools, community agencies and groups) in each gang area.

This belated interest in program-relevant data emerged in mid-1982, a year after the program started and almost that long after the first change in the directorate. Not only did these items far exceed our research focus, they were well beyond any

resources remaining to us. Nonetheless, the conversations continued about what information might be sought from the workers themselves.

The principal problem with these negotiations centered around the reluctance of the CYGS officials to direct, or even ask, workers to reveal the names of gang members known to them. This reluctance, not unusual among workers, is less often encountered in management. Indeed, every major gang project in the past has relied on worker data about gang members and has gathered it. A memo outlining the advantages to the program of learning directly about its targetted gangs and gang members was provided to CYGS management. But in CYGS, relations between management and line staff were poor, with private confrontations, public accusations, and civil suits becoming common. Management asked that we attempt first to gather the required data by means of questionnaires, devised by us but presented to the line staff by CYGS officials. We complied with this request with grave misgivings and with the understanding that interviews between us and the workers represented a back-up alternative.

In a word, the results of the questionnaire were a disaster. They had been filled out by team leaders but not by the individual workers, and incorrectly beyond the point of redemption. For instance, although each gang was to be described on a separate form, the team leaders used one form for all gangs in their purview. There was absolutely no way to disentangle the

descriptions. Further, they failed consistently to provide individual identifications.

It was immediately clear that only individual interviews could provide data of any merit. Unfortunately, it was at this point that the second director of CYGS and his staff were replaced by a totally new management team. Our interest in pursuing the gang structure data was totally rejected under these new circumstances.

While we have described this data access problem as one of collaboration, it is important to note as well that this collaboration problem is in part a function of the newer approach to gang problems represented by CIN in Philadelphia and CYGS in Los Angeles. The old "value transformation" model of the '50s and '60s was based on individual rapport between worker and gang member. Thus, for example, everything was done to prevent worker turnover, since this rapport was seen as an interpersonal bond not easily reestablished by a new worker. But in the late 1970s and early '80s, direct service to gangs has been replaced, under the "deterrence" model, by more concern for surveillance, crisis response and violence control. Workers are more replaceable, and are given broad neighborhood assignments and radio-directed calls to crises as opposed to self-directed searches for relationships. This allows for only sporadic contact with gangs and gang members. Thus, gang workers are no longer the unique source of individual information they used to be; they have lost their coin of the realm, if not their retentive attitude about the little change left to them.

For researchers, this results in a radical reduction in direct access to observation and interview of gang members in situ and greater dependence on secondary sources whose ultimate knowledge of gang members and gang structure is likely to be minimal. Thus, the very kind of empirical knowledge about gangs has changed as a function of societal attitudes toward the treatment of crime. In our research, the program structure has precluded the gathering of valid data on gang structure. For intervention goals, one must wonder about the effectiveness of a program structure which cannot take advantage of what can be known about the structure of the targetted gangs.

3. LASD/LAPD: Funds and energies originally allocated to the Philadelphia and CYGS areas were, to the extent possible, shifted to the data collection efforts in the Sheriff's and Police Departments in Los Angeles. The major advantage gained here was the opportunity to collect data on all, rather than a sample, of LASD gang homicides for the years involved, and to gather a sample of comparable non-homicide gang and non-gang violent incidents. These latter data were collected for comparison to the gang/non-gang differences found among homicide cases, an opportunity mentioned with faint hopes in the original proposal.

The only other alteration of significance is our decision not to aggregate data or findings across LASD and LAPD, but to treat the two data collection efforts as two rather separate studies. This decision was based on some major differences in the approaches taken by the two departments, and also on some

research procedures that called for differential approaches between them with respect to sampling, data extraction, and coding.

In sum, then, factors which could not be anticipated earlier nor overcome later dictated our concentration of resources and interests on the analysis of the Los Angeles enforcement agencies' investigations of gang violence. The materials to follow in this report will deal only with issues raised with respect to these contemporary Los Angeles data, what they tell us about gang-related homicides and what they tell us about the role of police investigations in the reporting of gang homicide rates.

## II. Statement of Research Objectives

Given the above alterations, it became necessary to refocus our efforts. The objective of providing basic research data that is informative to program evaluations remains, albeit as a by-product of the information we have gathered on the nature of gang designated homicides as well as the official process whereby they are labelled "gang" and responded to by official agents of social control. Since the research period spans several years, we are positioned to address the following questions:

1. What are the characteristics of gang designated homicide incidents (i.e., the "how, what, when, and where" addressed by the "setting" variables) and the individuals involved in them (i.e., the "participant" variables respond to the "who")?
2. Do these characteristics change during the research period which encompassed a dramatic increase in reported gang homicides?

3. How does the nature of gang homicides compare to non-gang homicides and to other violent incidents? Are the changes in gang homicide characteristics, if any, also discernible in non-gang homicides and other violent incidents (i.e., to what extent are changes unique to gang homicides rather than reflective of more general changes in all homicides or violent incidents)?
4. Are any changes in official gang definition practices apparent? What role do police activities play in distinguishing gang from non-gang homicides relative to the characteristics of the incidents and their participants? What effect, if any, has the growth of gang units had in the definition and investigation of gang homicides? In other words, to what extent are changes in gang homicides a function of (as well as contributor to) changes in law enforcement gang control activities?

These questions represent our research objectives; each is addressed in the analysis section with data extracted from police investigation files. This data collection was a long and quite arduous process; the methodological issues raised by the intricacies of the investigation files as well as the complex issues posed by the research questions were many. In order to document our methodology, as well as to benefit future researchers in this area, we detail several aspects of the research process in the following section.

### III. Aspects of the Research Process

#### A. Definitional Criteria

At issue here is the various ways in which "gang related" is defined, nominally, by different departments, by different units within departments, and at different times ("gang related" as an empirical issue will be dealt with in our data analyses). A number of points are addressed here.



One concern in the definitional area relates most directly to the effects of policy and policy changes. In many cities with gang problems, the official police definition of a gang incident requires a "gang on gang" component; that is, a gang incident must involve gang members on both victim and suspect sides. Often, this fairly narrow but relatively "clean" definition also includes indications of territoriality (gang "turf", an Eastern term primarily) and/or retaliation. This has been the working definition in such cities as Philadelphia and Chicago for many years, and was commonly employed by the LASD until 1974.

The choice of operating definition is of course important both for official statistics purposes and for research purposes. A narrow, gang on gang definition yields far lower statistics on gang crime than does a more inclusive definition. Choice of definition may reflect the search for a reliable index, but it may also be used to express effective control (narrow definitions, lower statistics) and the need for funds to increase control (broader definition, higher statistics). This choice is usually up to the enforcement agencies, not to the officials to whom they report.

For our purposes in assessing levels of gang homicide and variables related to these levels, police definitions are a critical issue. To compare "gang-related" homicides to non-gang homicides, we must have relatively clear guidelines as to what the police use to make this distinction. This is particularly true when, as in our case, we are also interested in investigative issues related to the two contexts of homicide.

The LASD situation proved to be a bit unique in that the working definition of gang-related events, as reflected in the official statistics, evolved principally from the concern and activities of one individual. This Sheriff's sergeant started collecting gang homicide statistics in 1974 in the most active gang area, East Los Angeles. He expanded the definition well beyond gang on gang to include almost all incidents where any participant is a gang member. In such incidents, he looks for what the deputy described as an "identifiable gang trait." Two examples were offered to us:

a. A gang member gets involved in an isolated incident with his non-gang neighbor. The gang member is killed. This would not be labeled as gang-related. However, if the neighbor was the victim, then the designation would be questionable and the sergeant would look closely at the circumstance (e.g., "if he was backed up by his homies").

b. A gang member shoots a clerk in the process of robbing a store. This definitely would be labeled as gang-related because "if he were not a gang member, he probably wouldn't be carrying a weapon."

This is not a matter of whether there is a correct or incorrect definitional stance. These definitions serve the purposes of the definers; they are goal-directed rather than arbitrary. But clearly the broader the definition becomes, the more ambiguous it becomes as well and it is important for a research team to be able to understand the bases of the

designations. We tested this by having three members of the research team designate 59 cases as either gang or non-gang, independent of the LASD official designations. Spread over the four years between 1978 and 1981, 33 of these had been labeled as gang and 26 as non-gang by LASD. Between the three coders, there were only eight discrepancies (out of  $3 \times 59 = 177$  possibilities), all of which were LASD-labeled gang cases. Most of the eight were cases in which there was name calling involved, but it was not obvious that both sides were gang members or necessarily engaged in a territorial dispute. In light of the LASD broad definitions, the eight disagreements were resolved in favor of the gang designation. Beyond this, there were only 3 cases in which the coders agreed on a designation different from that of the LASD. Thus we were satisfied that even the relatively more ambiguous definition employed by the LASD process yields a reliable designation of cases as gang or not gang-related.

One other point should be made here. The influence of this sergeant is pervasive. He remains a gang expert in the department, his views on gang activity prevail over most stations and are still the basis for official statistics, and he lectures on gang matters at the Academy.

The situation in LAPD differs somewhat. The official statistics come from the gang intelligence unit which receives copies of all homicide investigation reports and determines therefrom which will be listed as gang-related. This

determination is based upon Special Order No. 21 (8/22/80) which reads as follows:

Gang-related Crime - a) When homicide, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, rape, kidnapping, shooting at inhabited dwellings, battery on a police officer or arson is reported and the suspect or victim is on file as an active gang or associate gang member. b) When the investigation reveals that the incident involves a gang member, although neither the victim nor the suspect is known to be an active or associate gang member, i.e., "A" shoots "B" and yells the name of a gang during the commission of the crime.

A supplemental description in Central Bureau in October of the same year provides even broader guidelines:

Gang-relatedness may be established when:

- a) Suspects yell a gang name during the crime or when leaving the scene
- b) Suspects yell "where are you from?" before the crime
- c) Witnesses say the suspects were gang members
- d) Victims are gang members.

Note: Gang affiliations may be determined by the victim's appearance, dress, vehicle, or known gang association.

Thus, in effect, the LASD and LAPD approaches are very similar; official statistics for each agency are based upon very broad definitions of gang-relatedness, definitions which could yield a considerable amount of discretion in their application between cases, between investigators, between stations, and over time. Whether or not such discretion has led to systematic differences is of course an empirical question, and one to which we shall return. Meanwhile, the reader should note that the preceding comments refer to the designations reflected in the official department statistics only; we will comment below on differences between statistics supplied by different units within the same department.

Before that, however, it may be instructive to consider known instances of discretion at work. For instance we were told of, and received confirmation of, the instance of a city within Los Angeles County in which the Chief felt that his gang homicide statistics were embarrassingly high for a given year -- over twenty. Accordingly, he instructed that the official report would reflect only half of these, and it was the halved figure which became a part of the official total for the County that year.

Another example consists of definitional tautologies. Examples include the following:

- a. Reviewing a station log with members of the research team, the head of an investigative unit noted a number of cases of shooting into an inhabited building (P.C. 246) that were not listed as gang incidents. Taking out his pen, he recorded them all as gang-related, saying, "There are no P.C.246s that aren't gang!"
- b. Another senior investigator in a high gang activity area, responsible for designating incidents at the station as gang or non-gang related, reported that once domestic and business-related assaults are discounted, "probably 90%" of all assaults are gang-related.
- c. After a gang-sensitive watch commander was newly assigned to a station, gang-related burglaries reportedly jumped in the statistics from almost none to over 100 within a year. This came about because the new man defined as gang-related any

burglary in which only firearms were stolen and the incident occurred in known gang territory. Thus, a new watch commander, experienced in gang matters, had a rather dramatic effect on the statistics for gang-related burglaries. We can add to this the admission of a gang unit investigator that in non-homicide cases potentially involving gangs targetted by that unit, he would worry about proper jurisdiction of investigation afterwards -- "I'll make it gang if I have to."

These anecdotes suggest that discretion may be less of a problem in homicide cases than in others, and understandably that seems to be the case. In the Sheriff's Department, where we did collect a sample of non-homicide violent offenses, our informants confirmed this. For non-homicide cases, we were told, gang designations vary more from station to station, being more dependent upon the extent to which detectives at the station are attuned to indications of gang involvement.

Robberies are particularly susceptible to this variation. Whether a robbery is gang-related or not is "purely subjective" in the words of one informant. At the station in one major gang area, the incident is labeled gang if a gang member is involved; in other stations the label is applied only if there are several gang members involved or if there is certain knowledge that the several suspects are gang members.

By way of contrast, cases of assault are likely to be subject to less variation because station personnel are generally more attuned to the nature of gang assaults. We cited earlier

the view of one informant that (at least in his experience) with the exclusion of domestic and business-related assaults, 90 per cent of what is left is gang related.

These anecdotes and personal experiences make it clear that one of the factors to be considered in gang statistics is the sophistication in gang matters attained by individual investigators, by investigative and intelligence units, and by command-level personnel. During the 1960s in Los Angeles, gang sophistication in the LAPD and LASD was quite low. Few personnel were assigned to gang responsibilities, and their views of gang activity and structure contained as much myth as fact. The contrast with the present situation is striking. Genuine expertise exists in both organizations. If there is a problem in sophistication now, it is not so much a matter of the level thereof, but of discrepancies between units, each of which provides statistics purporting to describe the nature and particularly the extent of the gang problem. We turn, therefore, to a brief look at several units within the LASD and LAPD.

1. LASD: As noted above, the official LASD gang homicide statistics are based on a broad definition of gang-relatedness, reflecting the early and continuing influence of a particular departmental expert. This individual is a member of the gang unit called Operation Safe Streets (OSS) which maintains a central (downtown) headquarters as well as having members located in the stations of high gang activity. OSS has a gang "log" which consists of brief descriptions of each gang-related violent

offense. The statistics are taken directly from this log. However, even this within-unit process is not totally consistent. Although the differences are slight, OSS yearly statistics tend to be higher than a count from the log. For instance, for armed robbery in 1979, 1980, and 1981, the comparative figures are 219 to 228, 258 to 266, and 186 to 188 with the latter figure being the yearly statistical total and the former the log total. The yearly reported totals are less than three per cent higher than log totals, a difference of little significance, and primarily attributable to a few failures to transfer cases from the station team logs to the special gang logs.

But OSS is not the only unit to maintain relevant statistics. When we first collected LASD gang homicide cases for 1978, using centralized homicide files, we obtained a total of 49 cases, yet the OSS figure for that year was 61 gang homicides. The discrepancy between the homicide unit<sup>10</sup> and OSS occurred every year thereafter as well. Factors contributing to the discrepancies probably include the counting of "assists" (aid given to investigators in other departments), handling of open cases which are not cleared, solved, or rejected until the following year(s), and definitional differences. The homicide unit uses a narrower definition of gang-relatedness which emphasizes the gang-on-gang criterion, along with clear motivational indications of territoriality, retaliation, or initiation rites. Even so, we have alternative indications that the homicide unit during these years obtained gang homicide

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<sup>4</sup>A special team was earlier called VOTT (Violent Offender Investigation Team) and later called MAGOT (Mexican American Gang Offender Team). OSS logs homicides, but does not investigate them.



statistics in excess of those reported by OSS and used in the official department reports. Since it was these latter, OSS, data that are given to the public and to county officials, and upon which official actions such as the funding of CYGS are based, our sampling decision was easy. We used the source, OSS, related most directly to public policy. But for other researchers concerned more with non-political validity, the message is clear: beware of reliance on any one defining unit, without clear, demonstrable data on alternate units and alternative definitions and counting practices. Official statistics may be only official statistics.

2. LAPD: In the LAPD as well, there are multiple units with their own statistical procedures. Here we have the operational units (CRASH), the central robbery/homicide statistical unit, and the gang intelligence detail. The gang detail is the source of the official reports and, as above, the criterion for our research. CRASH statistics are not used department-wide, and as described later are neither exclusively gang nor inclusive of all gang cases.

Despite the existence, quoted earlier, of a department-wide, official definition of gang-relatedness, the robbery/homicide and gang detail units do not come up with the same totals, again primarily as a result of their definitional approaches. Robbery/homicide uses the narrower criterion of gang-on-gang, along with motives of territoriality and retaliation. The gang detail seeks gang membership of either suspect or victim, as well

as accepting motives, clothing, location, name yelling, and so on. As one member of the robbery/homicide unit said of the gang detail, somewhat derisively, they'll call it gang "anytime the shooter is identified as gang," i.e., with or without gang motives or gang targets, and thus possibly including domestic and other non-intergang incidents. A CRASH officer also cited the case of a homicide in the central jail committed by an incarcerated gang member. This was counted by the gang detail, but not by CRASH.

What is perhaps most interesting in all of this is that the specific gang details in both departments employ the more inclusive definition, one likely to yield higher statistical counts. The existence of intelligence units is likely to increase the statistics for the crimes for which they are concerned. The investigative units yield lower totals. We are reminded that the Philadelphia statistics for the period of question in the mid to late 1970s were kept by the investigative unit, using a narrow, gang-on-gang definition. Similarly, Chicago statistics and earlier Los Angeles data also relied on the narrower definitions. Cross-time and cross-departmental comparisons in such matters (cf Miller) must be undertaken with considerable caution.

A final point on definitional criteria relates to the research delimitation, i.e., the types of groups the one can call "gang." For example, we have excluded from gang incidents all those involving only motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, car clubs, and occasional drug-related loose affiliations. Otherwise,

ambiguous groups were handled as gangs if the police investigators so defined them. Fortunately, such exclusions accounted for very few instances, perhaps two dozen in all.

#### B. Sampling Design and Procedures

This section will describe characteristics of the two jurisdictions which necessitated somewhat different sampling procedures. The particulars will be presented separately for the Sheriff's Department (LASD) homicide sample, the Police Department (LAPD) homicide sample, and the non-homicide, violent offense sample.

1. LASD homicide: The LASD has a centralized homicide unit that investigates all homicides occurring in county areas.<sup>5</sup> These files are retained in one downtown location. This feature made it practical to collect information from all homicide incidents that were designated as gang-related by the LASD gang unit, Operation Safe Streets (OSS). Thus, with a few exceptions to be noted later, all gang-related homicides that occurred in LA County areas between 1978 and mid-1982 were included in the LASD homicide population.

A complete listing of all homicides occurring in the LASD jurisdiction is maintained by the homicide division. This log was used for sampling. The large number of non-gang homicides occurring during the time period studied required a rather complex sampling procedure. Fifty non-gang homicides from each year 1978-1981 and 25 from the first half of 1982 comprise the

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<sup>5</sup>Within this unit, the Gang Homicide Unit has been in operation since April of 1980.

non-gang comparison sample.<sup>6</sup> In order to exclude non-gang homicides with inadequate information or too little basis for comparison to gang homicides, only cases with at least one name-identified suspect within the age range of 10 to 30 years (ascertained by a log maintained by the homicide unit or a check of files) were included in the sampling pool. Because the frequency of gang homicide varies by geographical region, sampling of non-gang homicides was stratified by station according to the percent of gang homicides (with identified suspects aged 10-30) that each of the 19 LASD stations contributed to the county-wide total for each year. With this sampling restriction for suspects, it was not always possible to obtain the full number of non-gang homicides. The required additional numbers were supplied by non-gang homicides from other stations according to their proportions of gang homicides.

The intent of this stratified sampling design was to represent accurately any gang/non-gang differences between stations with different levels of gang homicide. The implication of the deviation from the design is that stations with lower gang homicide frequencies are slightly overrepresented (relative to the highest gang stations) with more non-gang cases. While this is regrettable from a methodological standpoint, such difficulties are a reflection of a much higher proportion of violent crime attributed to gangs in areas of very high gang activity. It has never been our intention to study differences between stations but rather to focus on gang/non-gang homicide differences over time and to compare these differences in

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<sup>6</sup>Multiple deaths within the same incident were treated as one case for sampling purposes.

homicides to other violent offenses.

Information from all gang homicides will be utilized to provide a comprehensive picture of gang homicides. For gang to non-gang comparisons, the gang sample will be limited to cases with at least one name-identified suspect within the specified age range.

2. LAPD homicide: The LAPD central robbery/homicide division handles the investigation of "high profile" and multiple homicides that cross jurisdictional boundaries between stations. In contrast with LASD, most LAPD homicides are assigned to either station detectives or area-specific CRASH investigators. CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) is the LAPD unit which handles many gang incidents, but not these exclusively. Prior to October, 1980, CRASH did not conduct homicide investigations. Since a city-wide sample of these homicides would have required at least 18 data collection sites, three stations were selected on the basis of an analysis of patterns of gang homicides over several years. Figures from Hollenbeck Division indicated a slight but steady increase from 1978-1980 with a falling off in 1981. Newton Division showed a sharp increase through 1980 and maintenance in 1981. 77th St. Division showed a pattern similar to Hollenbeck, but with a more accentuated yearly increase to 1980 and a sharp decrease in 1981. All three stations are high gang homicide areas; between 1978 and 1981, these stations accounted for over 40% of all LAPD gang homicides.

Station homicide logs provided a complete listing of all homicides and were used to establish the sampling pool. All gang-related homicides (designated by the LAPD gang intelligence unit) that occurred in the three stations between 1979 and 1981 were included in the study.<sup>7</sup> Fifty non-gang homicides per year were sampled using a procedure similar to that used in LASD. For each year, the proportion of the 50 non-gang cases to be sampled from each station was determined by the percent of gang homicides contributed by that station out of the total for all three stations. As with LASD, imposing the restriction of identified suspects aged 10-30 resulted in insufficient numbers of non-gang homicides in one station, Hollenbeck. The missing Hollenbeck cases were redistributed among Newton and 77th. As with LASD, this deviation produces slight overrepresentation of stations with lower gang homicide rates.

3. Non-homicide: The non-homicide sample is limited to LASD. Whereas all LASD homicide investigations are conducted by a central unit, the investigation of other violent crimes occurs in each of 19 LASD stations. Since a county-wide sample of non-homicides would have required travel to each station for a handful of cases from each year (the time required to construct the sampling pool for each station is extensive), we decided to sample 80 (40 gang/40 non-gang) cases per year (1978-1981) in several high gang stations. Selection of stations was constrained by the need to have OSS gang designations of incidents. Although each station reports gang-related statistics by type of offense, only three stations maintained lists of

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<sup>7</sup>Resources did not permit collection of 1978 or 1982 homicide cases in LAPD.

incidents with gang designations, one of which did not have complete information for 1978. The remaining 16 stations kept informal tallies for statistical purposes. In these stations, it was impossible to reconstruct which incidents were counted and reported as gang-related.

Therefore, data collection of non-homicides was limited to two LASD stations, East Los Angeles and Pico Rivera. East L.A. has the highest incidence of gang homicides among all stations and Pico Rivera offers a limited opportunity to pick up any systematic biases that may be peculiar to East L.A. Although the frequency of gang homicide in East L.A. is about three times higher than in Pico Rivera (the third highest station), equal numbers of cases were collected from the two stations.

Initially our plan was to select one or more violent offenses to use as a comparison to homicide. However, restricting both gang and non-gang samples (named suspect, 10-30) to maximize incident participant information substantially reduced the number of cases in the sampling pool. The earlier years in Pico Rivera did not have enough gang cases of armed robbery or shooting into an inhabited dwelling. Limiting the sample to felonious assaults was problematic as many of these incidents involve injury on both sides, making it difficult to identify one side as the victim or suspect side, a procedure that is critical to our analysis. We decided to draw a random sample of several violent offenses. These included armed robbery,

TABLE 1  
SAMPLING DESCRIPTION

	# of Stations in Sample Pool	Restricted Sample <sup>1</sup>	Sample Period	# of Cases Sampled per Year <sup>2</sup>	Sample Total <sup>3</sup>
<u>Homicide</u>					
LASD					
Gang	19	No	1/78-6/82	Total Population	312
Non-Gang	19	Yes	1/78-6/82	50	200
LAPD					
Gang	3	No	1/79-12/81	Total Population	152
Non-Gang	3	Yes	1/79-12/81	50	148
<u>Non-Homicide</u>					
LASD					
Gang	2	Yes	1/78-12/81	40	280
Non-Gang	2	Yes	1/78-12/81	40	243

<sup>1</sup>Only cases with at least one name-identified suspect aged 10-30 included in sample pool. Non-gang homicide sample stratified by proportion of gang cases per station to total sample pool.

<sup>2</sup>1982 sample size half that of other years.

<sup>3</sup>Deviations from anticipated sample size due to missing files, excluded cases, etc.



attempted murder, house shooting, assault with a deadly weapon, other felonious assaults (excluding assault on a peace officer), rape and related sexual assaults, and felony child endangerment.

Station logs listing all reported crimes were used to construct the sample pool. All violent incidents of the above type were listed. When suspect information was not entered on the station log, investigation files were checked to ascertain whether the case fell within the sampling criteria. Among non-homicide cases, we anticipated a higher attrition rate due to missing cases; eighty (40 gang/40 non-gang) cases were selected randomly for each year as a minimum of 30 cases in each category was deemed sufficient for analytical purposes. Table 1 summarizes the numbers of cases, in various categories, resulting from the various sampling decisions.

### C. Sources of Information

Jurisdictional variations described in Section B preclude combining cases from the LASD and LAPD. This section documents other differences, having to do with information sources encountered in the data collection. These differences suggest caution in interpreting results, not only across jurisdictions but also within the two departments across years, and between homicide and other violent incidents.

1. LASD homicide: Three sources of information on LASD homicide investigations were utilized in data collection: "murder books," "murder memos," and investigator files.

Generally, murder books were the most complete source of information for our data collection purposes. They contained investigative reports, evidence analyses, autopsy reports, and interview transcripts. We were informed that murder books were compiled on all homicides. When questioned regarding the substantial number of cases where books were not found, our informant replied, "things happen." He referred to clerical deficiencies and lack of supervisory follow-up, and observed that investigators had been known to take their favorite cases with them upon retiring from the department. As these books are utilized by prosecuting attorneys, we believe they are more likely to be compiled on cases with apprehended suspects.

Murder memos are homicide department summaries of incidents and case action. These are in manila folders that sometimes include all information contained in murder books with the exception of autopsy and evidence reports. In many instances, however, murder memos consisted of only a few pages. We were able to locate these folders on most cases.

Information was collected from both murder books and murder memos whenever available. If substantial investigatory material was obviously missing in cases with murder memos only, attempts were made to locate the original investigation file. These files were stored separately in an extremely unorganized manner; despite considerable investigative efforts of our own, we were able to unearth less than 10% of these files. Some reports as well as crime photos, investigator notepads, and original evidence were located in these files.

In LASD, all homicides are investigated by the centralized unit and investigation materials are retained in one downtown building. There is no indication that the sources of information available varied across years with the possible exception of informal reports of improved clerical support. Most important for our analyses, there is no evidence that there was variation between gang and non-gang information sources.

2. LAPD homicide: We found homicide investigation files to be similar in content and organization in the three LAPD stations. Investigation materials were located in binders which generally include the initial and progress reports, chronological logs of investigators' actions, witness statements, arrest reports, photographs of the crime scene, and extensive investigator notes. Older cases were stored in a separate location on the station premises and were somewhat more likely to be missing. Cases assigned to CRASH were located separately in CRASH bureau offices; these had a format similar to cases located at stations.

The basic content of the investigation files appeared consistent throughout the three year period. However, the LAPD files were very different from the LASD murder books. The former contained difficult-to-decipher investigator notes, often on loose scraps of paper. Information without contextual referent to the case investigation and handwritten witness statements also presented collection problems. The more formal progress reports were both less frequent and detailed than those found in the LASD murder books. On the other hand, the LASD investigator files

were less informative (although rarely used) than LAPD investigator files. In short, differences in sampling (i.e., LASD is a county-wide sample while LAPD is limited to three stations) as well as record keeping procedures and information sources make direct comparison between LASD and LAPD homicide investigations problematic.

3. Non-homicide: Information on non-homicide violent incidents was collected from LASD station investigation files. These files were less extensive than homicide information sources. Not surprisingly, less care was taken in maintaining non-homicide files (i.e., more frequently lost or missing reports within files). The level of information obtained for non-homicide investigations was far more limited than for homicides.

The location of the non-homicide case files varied from year to year in both stations. Due to lack of space, files were retained in the station for only a few years. The 1978 files were coded in the County Archives; our only access to 1979 and some 1980 files was on microfilm retained in the County Hall of Records. Other 1980 and all 1981 cases were located at the stations.

Questions of comparability arise in collecting cases from various locations. The most complete information can be found in the station files; storage at the archives and on microfilm required xeroxing and transferring the contents of station files. Although we were assured on numerous occasions that the entire contents of the station files were retained in the county

records, it became clear that they were not. In addition, there are opportunities for reports to be misfiled or lost in any transfer. The 1980 cases afforded the opportunity to assess this problem as files from several months were both at the station and on microfilm. The contents of the station files of 12 East L.A. cases were compared to the microfilmed contents. In most cases, the initial complaint report and subsequent investigation reports were available at both locations, but teletypes of checks for previous arrests and other incidental reports were not copied onto microfilm. The research variables most affected are the number of pages of investigation and the arrest history of participants. While comparison of these variables over the several years would be a bit inappropriate, comparisons between gang and non-gang cases within the same year are still possible.

#### D. Range of Materials

A police investigation of a homicide may yield only a few pages of material, most commonly when there is no identified suspect, no witnesses, and the victim fits no category eliciting special attention. A homicide investigation may also yield, exclusive of physical evidence, filed materials equal to the height of the investigator.<sup>8</sup> For those not familiar with the details of homicide investigations, we provide below some illustrative materials. We found that data extraction on a single case could take up to a full day (excluding such anomalies as the freeway murder instance) and took 4.8 hours on the average until we streamlined our procedures.

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<sup>8</sup>Such a case, one of the famous "freeway murders" in Los Angeles, fell by chance into our original non-gang sample.

1. Multiple incidents: One common form of multiple incident is the "shooting spree" in which the assailant(s) fires shots sequentially at different victims, often while the assailant's car is careening through a rival territory. If time is clearly compressed, this can be coded as one incident with multiple victims. But time is the critical factor, along with intervening events. A five minute spree is qualitatively different from one lasting over an hour or two, especially if there are intervening events (stopping for gas, going home, picking up new companions or weapons, being the victim of retaliation, etc.). For our purposes, a rule was developed to designate as separate incidents those in which intervening time and events could reasonably have necessitated separate decisions to start up the action again. Five shots while driving down a few blocks was coded as one incident. If a stop was required to obtain a new weapon, we opted for two incidents, regardless of whether the police investigation made such distinctions or not. Needless to say, coder agreement on such cases was often difficult, and sometimes decided by "majority rule."

Case #01088:<sup>9</sup> At a large amusement park, there were three incidents of assault with a deadly weapon, one resulting in death. All were seemingly unrelated cases, but all or most participants were gang members. The police covered all exits, making numerous arrests based upon witness descriptions. One of those arrested was the eventual murder suspect, although this was not known at the time because the victim was still alive. In

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<sup>9</sup>These are research identification numbers, not police file numbers.

addition to yielding several assaults and a homicide charge, there were charges of accessory and resisting arrest. Our coding problems were simplified in this instance because we were then sampling for homicide cases. Had we been sampling for assault, the coding problems would have been most difficult in a police investigation of a series of incidents with over 50 arrests!

Case #04183: One assailant committed three separate robberies at the same drive-in theater. He was pursued and caught by two civilians following the third robbery. For coding purposes, we collapsed the case into one "spree," including all victims as coded participants but excluding the two civilian heroes. This is the case which yielded our favorite police charge (not to be found in the California Penal Code); while reaching into a car window to grab a woman's purse, the robber also inadvertently pulled out both the purse and the woman's baby. He was charged with "grand theft, person."

Case #50025: In considering this case, the reader is alerted to a common complication, that in a multiple incident the suspect in one offense may be the victim of another. Victim #1 is alone on the street when a car with four occupants pulls up. After an exchange of gang signals, Victim #1 is shot by Suspect #1. Victim #1 tells Victim #2 and Suspect/Victim #1 in their house. They go back outside and see damage to the car of Victim #2. Then the raiding car returns; Victim #2 yells at the occupants who then fire at all three and drive off. Suspect/Victim #1 gets his father's gun, jumps in a car and

pursues the first car. In an exchange of gunfire, he kills one of the occupants, Suspect/Victim #2. The other three occupants, are labelled as suspects, and one of them, Suspect #1, is charged with ADW and homicide. Suspect/Victim #1 is also charged as a homicide suspect, but this is rejected by the D.A. as self-defense.

Case #60075: Six male gang members in a car stop, rob, and stab Victim #1 who is making a call in a phone booth. The victim's brother and a friend witness the stabbing, jump into a truck and chase the fleeing car. Two of the six suspects, preferring to escape on foot, jump out of the car when it stops briefly, but the driver suddenly accelerates, killing one of the two (Victim/Suspect #1). The second, Victim/Suspect #2, is hit by the truck. Victim/Suspect #2 and the four remaining car occupants are charged with homicide and robbery. (The homicide is a "felony murder," a homicide resulting from commission of another felony, in this case the robbery of Victim #1.) Note the complications when the homicide victim is the accidental result of the actions of his own fellow suspects. Felony murders required very careful scrutiny before final coding decisions were made.

Cases #50025 and #60075 illustrate a category of multiple incident cases that proved an immense challenge to our coding procedures. These "suspect/victim" cases involved injuries (in a few cases, death) on more than one "side," homicides resulting from self defense (e.g., store owners' response to robbery attempt), or the unintended death of assailant companions



mentioned above. Police designations of individuals ("suspect," "victim," "suspect/victim," or "victim/suspect") appeared inconsistent and somewhat arbitrary in terms of who initiated the event, extent of injury, and apprehension and charging of participants. In non-suspect/victim cases, we were able to distinguish victim participants from suspect participants by their police designations (all labeled victims could be loosely placed in opposition to labeled suspects), but this becomes quite inappropriate in cases where there are designated victims, suspects, and/or some combination of the two on the same side.

We decided to forego our customary reliance on the official designation of role in order to place designated individuals on one of two sides (in our terms, the "dead person's side" or if homicides on both, the non-initiating side, were treated as the "victim's" side). In some instances, (i.e., more than two sides involved or sides not distinguishable), even this coding scheme was not useable (coding instructions on these matters can be found in Appendix B).

While it became necessary to delete suspect/victim cases from analyses involving police designation variables (and regrettably, from the discriminant analyses presented in Sections IVC and IVD), it seemed important to include them in our collection as they exemplify the complexities that police confront in responding to the gang fray. These cases constitute approximately 10 per cent of our homicide cases. They proved to be among the most interesting cases, although, in retrospect,

they were probably not worth the considerable amount of additional collection, coding, and analysis resources required to incorporate them.

Finally, under this heading, we present a complex multiple incident which was excluded from our data because the sampled offense, an ADW, occurred outside Los Angeles County. The case also involved kidnapping and attempted murder, the former being the charge that led to Los Angeles involvement in the investigation and inclusion in the log from which our sample was drawn.

The Eastern station received a call from a deputy sheriff in Pine County regarding an ADW that had occurred in Pine County.<sup>10</sup> They had arrested eight people, but upon investigation had learned that 3 of them were not involved and in fact were victims of kidnapping and attempted murder that had occurred in Los Angeles County. From the information provided by the Pine Deputy and later investigation by Eastern Station, this is what happened:

Three victims and five suspects were at Victim #3's trailer at horse stables in the Eastern area. A sixth suspect arrived, demanding to know where Victim #3's sister was. Victim #3 told the suspect (designated Suspect #1) that she was in Pine. Suspect #1 then forced the 3 victims at gunpoint plus the other 5 suspects into his car and he drove them to his house in the Western jurisdiction. He decided there that he would take Victim #3 and go to Pine to find her sister. He handcuffed Victims #1

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<sup>10</sup>The Los Angeles and northern county jurisdictions are not identified here. "Pine County" is in rural northern California. "Eastern" and "Western" stations are within Los Angeles County.

and #2 to each other around the toilet and left one suspect (designated as Suspect #4) with a knife to guard them, saying that if Suspect #4 did not hear from him by the next day she should kill Victims #1 and #2 because it would mean that Victim #3 had lied. Suspect #1, Victim #3 and 3 other suspects then left for Pine. One suspect (designated as Suspect #6) went his own way at this point. Upon arriving in Pine, they went to the location where Victim #3's sister was staying (an aunt's house). No one was home so they broke into the house. As they were leaving, they were confronted by a neighbor demanding to know what they were doing. Suspect #1 fired 3 shots at him. Then the suspects and Victim #3 got back in the car and returned to the Western area, arriving the morning of the next day. In the meantime, Suspect #4 had stabbed both Victims #1 and #2. Victim #1 had a puncture wound in her chest, while Victim #2 was not seriously hurt. Sometime after arriving back in the Western area, Suspect #1 decided to return to Pine. This time, he took all 3 victims, Suspect #4 and 2 of the 3 remaining suspects. It is unclear what became of the other suspect. When they got into Pine County, they were arrested for ADW for the incident involving the neighbor that occurred during the previous trip. Upon investigation, Pine Sheriffs learned the whole story and notified Los Angeles.

Suspect #1, plus 2 of the 3 other suspects with him on the second trip, were held in custody in Pine. Suspect #4 turned herself in to the Eastern station, and Suspect #6 was arrested by

Eastern. Suspect #5 was never apprehended. Arrest warrants were issued on all 6 suspects. Suspects #4 and #6 were charged with kidnapping and attempted murder. Felony holds were teletyped to Pine County Sheriff's Department against the suspects held in custody there.

2. Additional complexities: It is significant that even in the last days of coding, we came upon new issues requiring new conceptual rather than merely mechanical decisions. One example is that of cases occurring in or being investigated in multiple jurisdictions. The Pine County case just cited was one of these. The problem arose more often in the Sheriff's Department which not only contracts its services to many cities, but also helps out in some investigations outside its jurisdiction. Such cases were usually excluded from our samples.

A second problem involved investigator transfers from the station of original jurisdiction to a non-sampled station. A third involved highly publicized cases which yielded unusually intensive investigations likely to mask the effects in which we were interested. Similarly, officer-involved cases were a problem (officer as victim, officer as suspect) because of the special investigative effort likely to result. In instances such as these three, we usually excluded the case for fear that the special circumstances would either mask or distort the variables of concern in our research.

Another group of problems arose around charges. Often, no arrest charge was specified in the investigative file, although

the station log indicated a specific charge. Sometimes only D.A. charges were indicated. In some instances, charges were altered during the investigation (ADW becomes homicide when the victim dies; robbery becomes accessory after charge bargaining). The problem in these latter cases is that of sampling for one offense, only to find the charge later altered to an offense for which we were not sampling (or a case selected for our violent offense sample emerges as appropriate to our homicide sample). Whenever possible, coding decisions were designed to match the investigative effort to the sampled offense.

3. Investigation file contents: The kinds of material to be found in an investigative file, especially in the case of homicide, became a major challenge in the early days of coding. In order to clarify what was to be included in our coding as well as to train our coders uniformly, a summary list of over 70 types of material was compiled early in the data extraction process. Others appeared as data extraction continued, but those listed below will provide some flavor of what one may expect to find.

Complaint report-teletype or handwritten  
 Supplemental Reports: e.g., Additional information; Photos;  
 Evidence held; Search warrants; Investigation; Complaint  
 filed; Trial, hearing date; Witness info.; Juvenile taken  
 into custody-300; Suspect in custody; Medical status;  
 Criminalistics lab receipt  
 Other laboratory reports  
 Firearms identification section  
 Search warrant  
 CLETS teletype  
 Personal property custodian  
 Return to search warrant  
 Coroner's autopsy report  
 Arrest review

Coroner's inventory of personal effects  
Coroner's protocol report  
"Wants" check-teletype  
Booking slip  
Consent to search form  
Teletype-transport suspect  
Felony complaint  
Processing form giving court dates  
Intoxilyzer check test  
Other Police Department (child abuse report)  
Release of suspect  
Charge evaluation worksheet  
Interview testimony transcripts  
California Bureau of Identification-record check  
Arrest warrant  
Wanted for murder-Inf.  
Correspondence to FAA - Extradition Agent carrying Service  
revolver  
Subpoena - Criminal - Preliminary Hearing  
Traffic collision report - CHP  
Murder memo - (synopsis of case, LASD homicide)  
Waiver of extradition and hearing  
Teletype - Nationwide broadcast  
AFS (automatic firearms system) - Inf. (evidence)  
Report of toxicological analysis (part of autopsy)  
Scientific Services Bureau Report (testing to determine  
murder weapon)  
Investigation of robbery report (from LAPD)  
LA consolidated booking form (from LAPD)  
Mug show-up folder  
Line-up sheet  
Witness cards  
Area 3 broadcast  
Complaint felony (Arraignment)  
Crime report  
Arrest narrative crime report  
Diagram of crime scene  
Order to court  
DMV check  
CII field search check  
Juvenile detained petition request  
Juvenile petition request witness list  
Letters in name of victim and informant  
Letter from Mexico PD (requesting suspect)  
Warrant of arrest from Mexico  
Dealer's record of sale of revolver  
Employee form re: suspect  
Release of charges  
Claremont PD/Activity log

Researchers entering the world of police investigation

reports for the first time must be prepared to deal with a mystifying array of materials. A large sample of files must be reviewed before final data collection and coding forms can be devised.

#### E. Jurisdictional Differences

The format of this report includes entirely separate analysis sections for the LASD and LAPD. This separation, amounting really to two independent research studies, has been necessitated principally by the following differences between the two enforcement agencies.

1. Variations in definition of "gang-related": As noted in the preceding section, the official statistics on gang homicides from both departments are based on similar but somewhat ambiguous definitions. It was our impression, and only that during our sampling procedures, that there was somewhat more uniformity in the application of the LASD definition because of the central role played by the Sergeant who took over the labeling responsibility in 1974.

2. A priori designations of gang incidents: To make comparisons between gang and non-gang events, some independent designation of each is needed to avoid tautological reasoning. For homicides, we were fortunate that both departments had a gang intelligence unit which made a priori gang designations.

However, the situation differed for the non-homicide sample drawn from LASD. As noted earlier in the sampling section, only three stations maintained lists of such incidents with gang

designations. Comparisons of homicide with non-homicide investigations, pertaining only to LASD, must be constrained by this restriction in a priori designations.

3. Handling of files: A number of differences emerged between LASD and LAPD files, enough in fact to force some coding format changes when we moved from one department to another. Many of the differences were minor, but the few noted here as examples will give some "flavor" of them.

a. On labeling of suspects, LASD specifically labels these in Supplementary Reports and provides more details during the course of the investigation. The suspect "net" is comparatively wider than in LAPD which more often uses the label "suspect" only when they have identified "the" assailant(s). LAPD files are more likely to include terms such as "possible suspect" or to include mention of "suspect-like" contacts. For a research enterprise emphasizing the descriptive information on suspects, these differences between the two departments are obviously of direct importance.

b. There were differences in the investigators' reporting of contacts. The LAPD notes in the files indicated more contacts than was the case in LASD. This could reflect differences in contact rates or in accepted recording procedures (LAPD notes were more informal), or both. For research seeking number of participants and numbers of interviewed witnesses, as well as counting of pages of investigation (both of which were true of our procedures), such differences will reduce comparability between departments.



c. LASD files typically contained a number of Supplementary Reports, formal statements of new information in relatively raw form. LAPD, on the other hand, more often used summary forms of reports. These were a coder's delight in that they simplified the data extraction process, but at the same time they omitted quite a bit of the day-to-day investigative detail which showed up in the LASD files. From the research viewpoint, the LASD reports therefore presented more "raw" data, presumably less selectively available to the data extraction process.

d. On the assumption that the level of gang intelligence and its uniformity are a function of the experience and size of the unit, the LASD/LAPD differences could well be important. Both departments have had intelligence units for decades, but these were until recently quite small and quite removed from close contact with gang matters. In LASD, Operation Safe Streets expanded from a detail of four deputies and a supervisor in 1979 to over forty in 1982. This growth clearly brackets the period of our research interest, and the period of greatest increase in reported gang homicides and the subsequent decline. The station-assigned members of OSS are active case investigators of non-homicide gang offenses, and willing contributors in homicide cases as well. They select the most active gangs as targets, and thus have deliberately unequal levels of information about various gangs, or even given gangs at different periods of time. But it is important to keep in mind that OSS is not merely an intelligence unit--it has become an active investigative group as well.

The LAPD unit is far smaller--about 15 officers--and more restricted to the gang intelligence function. They keep statistics on most gang felonies, with the exceptions of rape, arson, kidnapping, and battery of a police officer. It is CRASH that does the bulk of the gang investigations (along with many non-gang investigations as well). The gang unit assists on a number of these, but obviously does not have the personnel for major involvement.

On the other hand, this LAPD unit takes great pride in the completeness of its gang (and gang member) files. The effort going into these files was so substantial that it led to an ACLU suit against the city which forced the development of a number of rigid safeguards regarding access to the intelligence files and periodic expunging of information on inactive gang members.

The difference in effectiveness, knowledge level, and other aspects of the units in these two departments could easily be the subject of a separate research project. For us, the differences loomed large enough to reinforce our inclination to undertake the departmental analyses separately.

e. Finally, the reader is reminded that the two departments are organized differently for investigative purposes. LASD has MAGOT (formerly VOIT) as a special gang homicide investigative unit, and this is centrally located and administered. LAPD has CRASH, decentralized through the several geographical Bureaus, initiated in each Bureau in different years (1973-1981), and not concerned only with gang events (nor always the investigating

unit even in gang events). It should be noted that centralization or decentralization of investigations also means centralization or decentralization of files.

The implication for different levels of reporting and recording differences seems clear. In both departments gang felonies may be investigated by regular detectives, rather than by gang specialists. Differences in departmental structures and procedures will affect these cases as well, to say nothing of the non-gang comparison cases included in our research. For these and the other reasons listed above, research sampling decisions were designed to accommodate to cross-jurisdictional differences. These decisions affected station selection, numbers of cases, and types of incidents as noted earlier in the section on sampling. These, in turn, require separate departmental analyses.

#### F. Access

Throughout the period of the project, access to LASD files was facilitated by various members of the department, and no significant obstacles were encountered. At the outset, the same promised to be true in the LAPD, and in the end we did indeed receive splendid cooperation. However, in the case of LAPD the process was complicated by two factors. First, we encountered case investigators who were somewhat protective of their case files--especially open files. This issue was tentatively resolved by discussion with command level officials, but inadvertently led to a far more serious problem involving the State Evidence Code. Because of its importance to future

research using investigative information in California and probably in numerous other states as well, we detail here both the problem and the resolution agreed upon by us, the LAPD, and the City Counsel.

The issue arose when we arranged for an LAPD official to speak with our coders about the importance of maintaining absolute confidentiality of investigative file materials. This officer noted what no one else in either department had, that Section #1040 of the California Evidence Code prohibits provision of access to any investigative material on a voluntary basis. The provision is very broad, covering not only justice system materials but also personnel files, such as promotional dossiers of faculty members in the state educational system. In our case, the fear was that our access to the files would stand as a precedent, giving equal access to others (such as defense attorneys in particular).

The LAPD official reported the issue immediately, and the department sought the opinion of the City Counsel. His opinion, in turn, was clear: we could not be allowed access to the investigation materials. There followed a series of discussions involving the City Counsel, LAPD, and us along with our colleague from the USC Law Center, formerly a member of the State Court of Appeals. The resolution, suggested first by our colleague, was to circumvent the voluntary aspect of the law by writing a non-remunerative contract between the Police Commission and USC requiring access to the files in order to carry out the research and provide LAPD with a final report of the results.

Such a report would have been provided in any case, so the contract approach required only LAPD's willingness to participate and the Commission's agreement to the entire proposal. Both were forthcoming, the contract was written (largely on the basis of the content of the research team's formal letter of request to the Commission), and all stations involved were notified that the collaboration would proceed. Although these arrangements caused a delay of many months, they did save the LAPD portion of the project and we are obviously pleased with the outcome and the collaborative attitudes involved on all sides. The contract is appended to this report, since we see it as a potential model for other, similar situations (see Appendix A).

#### G. Complexities of Investigative Files

An earlier section of the report details the sorts of materials to be found in the typical, extensive homicide investigation file. Beyond this, our research process has involved decisions about a host of coding complexities.

All of these are, of course, represented in the coding manual appended to this report (see Appendix B). However, two problems are presented here in order to illustrate the kinds of complications that arise in this sort of research where the seeming arbitrariness of practices in operating agencies may not suit the needs of research. Sometimes, instead, alternative forms of arbitrariness must be settled upon for research aims, with the ever-present danger that the latter decisions may inappropriately represent or distort the basis for the former, operating decisions.

1. Arrests and charges: Some years ago in connection with a review of police handling of juveniles in 49 police departments in Los Angeles County, an analysis was undertaken of the meaning of arrest in juvenile matters.<sup>11</sup> Technically, the term "detention" replaces arrest in the Welfare and Institutions Code which refers to juveniles, but the WIC is terribly ambiguous on the meaning of detention. Interviews with Chiefs in 47 of the 49 departments and with juvenile officers or their counterparts in all 49 departments added little clarity. There was no uniformity of opinion as to when a juvenile arrest had or had not occurred.

Yet each department sent to the state's Bureau of Criminal Statistics (and in most instances to the FBI) both monthly and yearly statistics on the number of juvenile arrests and the disposition of them. Someone in each department was counting something in order to yield these figures. In each department we located this individual--usually a clerk or an officer--to determine what definition of arrest was used for these reports. In over 80 per cent of the cases, the answer was the same: if the suspect was physically in the station (brought or cited), he was tallied as an arrest. Field detentions, or citations to probation which bypassed a trip to the station, were not counted. Thus, there was an unrecognized but reasonably uniform operational definition which was reflected in official department statistics.

At the outset of the current research, we planned to use this same definition and to code the charges recorded for each

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<sup>11</sup>See Klein, M. W., S. L. Rosensweig, and R. Bates, "The Ambiguous Juvenile Arrest" in Criminology (1975) 13:78-89.

such "arrest." But, of course, we ran into numerous complications, some of which we noted earlier with respect to the explicit statement of charges and arrests actually being located in the investigative files. An extended conversation with a police command official who holds responsibility for such matters and who teaches courses in criminal law, police science, procedures, and so on, yielded the following description, from field notes which--as the reader will see--provides its own ambiguities.

His operational definition of arrest is "taken into custody." This is often accomplished in the field. They will transport to station for booking. On occasion, they will arrest and release prior to booking but they don't arrest without the intention to book. Apparently the Watch Commander oks it, and if he doesn't the suspect is released according to Penal Code Section 849(lb). When such a release occurs, theoretically the arrest should not appear on suspect's record. He used the term unarrested (this may be pre- or post-booking). Felony arrests for adults are easier to do than misdemeanors because of probable cause. Misdemeanor has to be observed by officer. So in field, officer will go for felony arrest wherever possible and detective/investigator will pare it down if he thinks it's necessary. Juveniles are different in that they can detain on misdemeanor if there is probable cause. Same terminology applies in so far as arrest, for us, means detained in field or station. I asked specifically if this means arrest to them. He said, "Well, they can't leave," therefore it's arrest. Contrary to our previous information, he said they always go to D.A. with a charge. He agreed that you couldn't necessarily tell that charge from the file, nor would D.A. particularly care. He (D.A.) makes his own decision (after police personnel "educate the uninitiated"). Charging in this matter often takes place in absence of arrest; i.e., suspect does not have to be in custody. D.A. may issue arrest warrant or may opt not to pursue case.

This description, while it clarifies some matters of intended procedure, is not definitive about operating procedures as we learned from our own journeys through the files. In order best to represent actual operations without masking them (in this case, we are concerned with comparing response to and recording of gang vs. non-gang cases), we coded cautiously. For both LASD and LAPD, arrests were counted if there was a specific statement in the file that an "arrest" occurred, and/or if booking was indicated. References to suspects "detained" were not counted as arrests in the absence of evidence of police charging or booking. Although charging is clearly related to arrest, we looked for separate indicators (see point f, below).

In LAPD, we coded additional information regarding contact with designated suspects (i.e., "detained" or "taken into custody," brought to station, etc.) in the absence of a statement of arrest or booking. The decision-making on arrests is no easy or automatic matter, although most research reports using arrests as a dependent measure would not alert one to the problem. As an example, consider the data in categories developed for our LAPD files:

- A category for "clearly not arrested" accounted for 18 per cent of all designated suspects.

- "Clearly arrested" accounted for 46 per cent. This leaves an additional 36 per cent to fall into other categories of a less definitive nature. For instance,



- 2 per cent were "detained" or "taken into custody" and brought to the station

- 6 per cent were brought to the station without any statement of "detained" or "taken into custody"

- 6 per cent were "other" contacts, usually field contacts

- 3 per cent were cases with arrest warrants issued, but without contact noted

- 19% were cases with non-identified suspects, many of whom, of course, would have been placed in one of the above categories if they could have been identified.

Considerations such as these led to a series of data collection and coding decisions designed to reflect police practice and intention. Major decisions included the following:

a. Arrests for incident-associated charges were included (most often, ADW or robbery). Arrests on the scene for drugs or weapon possession were counted only if they clearly involved participating suspects; uninvolved persons on the scene arrested for being under the influence (also a victim companion), etc., were not counted. Also, persons arrested during the investigation process were not counted if charges did not relate to our incident (e.g., suspect's mother arrested for possession of dangerous drugs and stolen property when officers go to pick him up). Arrest of suspects away from the scene were counted, but additional charges of drugs, etc., were not coded. The key is whether charges were related to our incident.

b. Arrests for charges stemming from our incident such as harboring a felon, withholding information, intimidating witnesses, resisting arrest (a suspect's mother), juvenile carrying a loaded firearm (uninvolved juveniles removing a hidden murder weapon), and accessory were not counted as arrests unless the individuals were specifically charged with murder or accessory to murder. For example, a person arrested and charged with murder for providing a weapon was counted even though he was not a participant.

c. Arrests of murder suspects for unrelated incidents were not counted unless there was evidence of in custody charging for our sampled incident.

d. As noted earlier, multiple incidents with the same suspects sometimes presented difficulty in determining with which murder the suspect was charged (where multiple counts were not indicated). These were decided on an individual basis according to file information. Limiting the "incident" to the homicide situation also had implications for arrest coding. For example:

(1) Extension of a gang raid (homicide victim was accidentally killed by his own gang) to a car chase resulted in ADW. Officers responded to the ADW call and arrested the participants, charging them with ADW (they were unaware of the homicide). Since there was no evidence of homicide charging later, these arrests were not counted.

(2) After a drive-by murder, the suspects drove off and shot at another car, running it off the road. These

"victims" (never designated as such) were detained (arrested) as suspects in the murder. Their arrests were counted.

e. Children "arrested and charged" for being dependent/neglected were not counted.

f. Charging in the absence of an arrest counted as charging but not as arrest (warrants issued; D.A. filing with no indication of suspect in custody). Juvenile petition request reflects charging, but if there is no evidence of an arrest, then this is not counted as an arrest.

2. Relationship of suspect to victim: We were particularly concerned with this issue for two reasons. First, the suspect/victim relationship seemed likely, according to prior research, to reflect differences between gang and non-gang group incidents. Second, we wished to be in a position to assess the truth of the commonly heard allegation that gang killings have increasingly involved total strangers as victims.

Coding the relationship between victim and offender required three total revisions of coding categories. While previous research has tended to dichotomize the relationship as stranger/not stranger, we selected to explore, empirically, the complex nature of victim/offender relationships for the gang/non-gang comparison. One issue was to establish how much contact or prior personal knowledge constituted a "relationship." The group nature of many of the incidents raised another issue. Gang interactions increase the relationship ambiguities because

of gang affiliation as a homicide motive: this often seemed to preclude a "stranger" relationship even in the absence of prior personal contact. Thus the gang dimension of relationship was coded separately from the prior contact dimension.

Categories for the non-gang dimension included various levels and types of contact. Minimal familiarity (visual or identity recognition only; minimal prior contact as with a previous incident or contact immediately preceding incident) was distinguished from clear personal relationships. In LAPD, the relationship was narrowed to the homicide victim (rather than companions) and the perpetrator(s) to the extent possible. Indirect association (connection by virtue of a participating companion or non-participant) was reflected as a separate category. In LASD, any relationship that could be established between any two opposing participants was sufficient for coding a clear relationship or minimal familiarity. Mistaken identity or innocent bystander situations (relationship exists between offender and intended target, but none involving actual victim) were another category. In cases of ambiguity, the purity of the "stranger" category (no indication of prior contact or connection) was maintained.

The gang dimension of relationship was captured by coding categories reflecting affiliation awareness based on behavioral or descriptive information pertaining to the incident and on gang motives. Guidelines were established for the type of incident behaviors that communicated affiliation (e.g., yelling gang names; territorial or affiliation challenges; physical description as gang or "cholo" type). Witness reports of behavior or physical evidence could also suggest participant awareness of affiliation.

Conflicting reports and varying levels of information provided by investigators increased coding difficulty. The emergent nature of the final coding scheme remains a source of concern. In general, we are very confident that the LAPD relationship coding is valid, and are a bit less confident about the LASD data. The latter were collected first and, although problems were documented carefully, the progression from general to more specific categories is problematic.

3. Coder reliability: Given the foregoing descriptions and earlier comments about the research process, it is reasonable to question how reliably the investigative file data could be collected. This was a major concern of the research staff, especially those whose direct contact with the data collection revealed the ambiguities and redundancies to be found in the files. Limited resources prohibited a truly thorough reliability check on all aspects of data collection and coding--double collection would have been prohibitive, given the length of time

any one file can exhaust.

Nonetheless, three checks on reliability were undertaken to assess the degree to which the very extensive training and intensive supervision of data collection and coding were yielding satisfactory results. One of these involved data collection from LAPD station files. A second involved data collection from LASD archive files which posed more difficult problems than centralized homicide files. The third involved in-house coding of LASD files collected early in the project when errors were most likely and coder variability could most be expected. The results, somewhat to the surprise of the coding supervisors, were most encouraging.

a. LAPD data collection: Of 23 items selected to be "worst case" items for double coding, there was perfect coder agreement, over 20 sampled cases, on 5 of the 23. Among the remaining items, the lowest level (on two items) was 70 per cent agreement. Over all 23 items, agreement averaged 85 per cent, a most satisfactory outcome given the selection of worst-case items and our overall trepidations about data extraction from such complex files.

b. Archive data collection: Eleven cases were double-collected, yielding in aggregate 11 basic records containing 40 items (440 items) plus 49 participant sheets each containing 10 items (490 items) for a total of 930 double-collected items. Among these there were only 71 coder disagreements, or a 92 per cent agreement rate, actually an

underestimate because case agreements were used for some items when the more appropriate denominator would have been number of instances (e.g., # of participants). Our concerns about the archive collection were allayed.

c. In-house coding: Forty-eight early LASD homicide cases, stratified by coders, were double-coded. The comparison coding sheet showed 85 item disagreements. Of these, 55 were judged to be merely careless (random) errors of the sort that most of their population of errors would be corrected by logical checks in data cleaning. These errors were distributed across coders in very close approximation of the coder contributions to the total coding task, e.g., the coder doing 30 per cent of the cases contributed 25 per cent of the errors, while the coder doing 28 per cent of the cases contributed 30 per cent of the errors. Each case contained a minimum of 65 coded variables. Of these, 45 were coded without disagreement; i.e., on a variable basis alone, we have 69 per cent coder reliability. Discrepancies occurred in 31 per cent of the variables. Eight of the variables showed only one discrepancy over the 48 cases.

Only two sets of variables showed more than a 10 per cent discrepancy rate. One of these, comprised of dates of incident, assignment to detective unit, assignment to homicide unit, and assignment to or mention of gang unit, involves 22 discrepancies out of a possible total of (4x48) 192, for an actual rate of 11.5 per cent.

The other set of variables is charges lodged against participants. Three types were coded (initial police, ultimate police, and D.A.) and up to four charges were codeable in each of these categories. Thus, there are (3x4x48) 576 potentials for discrepancies, and only 22 actual discrepancies, for a rate of 4 per cent, if one assumes only one participant charged per case. Since there are approximately five participants per case, this discrepancy rate reduces to less than one per cent. Even if there were only one charge per case (the other three potentials being uniformly coded 00), the rate would remain under 4 per cent.

Overall, then, coding reliability is exceptionally high. Only one variable, dates of incident or assignment, exceeded 5 per cent and logical checks in cleaning decreased this problem substantially. We can move on to the data analysis section of this report with considerable confidence in the reliability of the coding process.

#### IV. Data Analyses

Within each department separately, the basic approaches to analysis will be the same, except that the LASD data include a large sample of non-homicide violent offenses. A separate comparison in LASD will be made between gang and non-gang homicides on the one hand and gang and non-gang other violent offenses on the other.



A. Bivariate Analyses: The L. A. Sheriff's Data

From the Sheriff's Department (LASD) we have extracted data from the investigation files covering the period from January, 1978 through June, 1982. Included here are data on 312 gang homicides (so designated by OSS)--the total number for this 4 1/2 year period--and a comparable group of 200 non-gang homicides. In addition, we have samples of gang and non-gang, non-homicide violent incidents which will be reported upon in a later addendum to this report. Descriptively, we will report findings related to these questions:

- What are the characteristics of gang-related homicides, overall?

- How do these compare with non-gang homicides (restricted to both gang and non-gang cases with known suspects, aged 10-30)?

- Are there discernible patterns over the 1978-1982 time period? This is a matter of some importance, because we know that the number of gang-related homicides throughout the county peaked in 1980 and because this 4 1/2 year period was one of considerable expansion in gang intelligence, control, and prosecution efforts within the County.

- How well, on the basis of the LASD data, can one discriminate between gang and non-gang cases and thus, by implication, initiate development of a "gang indicator index" for violent offense incidents?

- Finally, to be covered in a second report, how do gang vs. non-gang homicide comparisons differ from gang vs. non-gang other

violent comparisons? Such differences between differences may yield inferences about gang homicide definitions, reporting practices, and investigative procedures by testing the extent to which these are unique to homicide cases.

1. Characteristics of Gang-Related Homicides: Aggregating the data over the 4 1/2 year period obscures changes over time, but these will be described shortly. These changes are not so great that this aggregated description will be misleading.

We divided the homicide incident descriptors, a bit arbitrarily, into three categories. These correspond roughly to characteristics of the setting, characteristics of the participants, and characteristics of the homicide investigation undertaken by the Sheriff's personnel. The data reported here refer to all 312 gang homicides recorded within the Sheriff's jurisdiction.

a. Setting: Typically, LASD gang homicides involve the use of cars, take place at night, in the streets or other open areas rather than in residences, involve firearms (often more than one), sometimes result in injuries to persons other than the homicide victim, often include offenses other than homicide--most typically, charges of assault with a deadly weapon (ADW)--usually involve unknown suspects in addition to the ones charged with the homicide, and in a significant number of cases these incidents include the fear of retaliation or of intimidation of witnesses. There are no surprises in this description, at least to those reasonably familiar with modern gang killings--this is street

crime as typically pictured. The specifics of the distributions, nonetheless, are worth reviewing.

1) Fully 50 per cent of gang-related homicides occur in the streets and another fourth (26 per cent) in open, public areas such as parking lots and parks. Only 23 per cent occur in residences, a pattern quite unlike that of homicides generally.

2) Given the above, it is not surprising that automobile involvement is quite high. Forty-one per cent of the incidents had some form of auto involvement, with an additional 26 per cent involving shooting out of a moving car. Gang killings are clearly facilitated by the mobility provided by cars. Common examples are "cruising" in rival gang territories and on public thoroughfares (e.g., Whittier or Hollywood Boulevards) where gang names are shouted from one car to another, followed by shots. These "driveby" shootings are recorded as almost exclusively gang-related--55 out of 57 cases in our overall LASD data.

3) We broke the 24-hour day into three periods corresponding to our personal observations of gang activity patterns. These were early daytime (prior to the end of school at 3:00 p.m.), afternoon and evening (up to 10 p.m.) when there is a lot of random intra-gang contact being made, and nighttime (from 10 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) when parties, other social events, and cruising are most common. Sixty per cent of the gang homicides took place in the night period; 29 per cent in the afternoon and evening, and 10 per cent during the earlier part of the day.

4) Many incidents involve more than one weapon, and some more than one type of weapon. We recorded whether or not certain kinds of weapons were present in each incident. Guns were reported in 82 per cent of the cases, knives in 25 per cent, and other weapons in 26 per cent. These latter included various clubs, pipes, chains, bottles and so on, but excluded the use of fists and feet.

5) A number of the homicide incidents resulted in the recording in the files of offenses in addition to homicide. Forty-one per cent yielded one additional offense and 23 per cent (for a total of 64 per cent) more than one. Most common of the additional offenses were ADW (in 36 per cent of the incidents), other homicide--conspiracy, attempt, accessory--(in 29 per cent), and robbery (in 12 per cent). Thus the homicides which led to our cases were very often not isolated incidents, but the result of a violent interchange between the parties involved. Indeed, other victims sustained injuries in 29 per cent of these incidents, an average of 1.59 other victims in such instances.

Reading the investigation files made it clear in many instances that who finally becomes the homicide victim may often be more a matter of chance than of planning; the initiator of a gang homicide incident may well become the deceased, or may in fact never become known to the police. Unknown suspects constituted almost a third of the suspects designated by the police (e.g., "male Hispanic, early twenties, pendleton shirt over blue pants").

6) Finally, it is worth noting that in 28 per cent of all gang homicide incidents, intimidation, actual or attempted retaliation, or fear of retaliation is mentioned in the investigation file. This may be against the suspects or witnesses; in either case, it is an oft-recorded feature of gang killings, very much as reported in the media, to an extent far greater than expected in homicides generally.

b. Participants: Gang homicide incidents are typically not one-on-one affairs. As recorded in the homicide investigation files, these incidents involve a mean of 4.53 participants on the assailant's side of the affair, and 3.86 on the victim's side. There was one case with 24 participants on the suspect's side, another with 86 on the victim's side. Such figures make it clear that "participant" as we coded it does not equal "suspect" or "victim," yet the mean numbers of suspects and victims so designated by the sheriff's personnel, among the participants, was 3.08 and 1.98 respectively. From the enforcement viewpoint, then, a gang homicide tends to involve not just an assailant and a victim in the midst of other onlookers, but a situation with multiple active participants. As suggested above, the eventual victim may often be determined as much by chance as by original intent.

There was no indication of prior contact between gang victims and their assailants in fully 53 per cent of the cases. In only 13 per cent was there a clear, prior relationship, while in 20 per cent there was some other, minimal prior relationship.

As a separate category, seven per cent of the victims were listed as innocent bystanders or cases of mistaken identity.<sup>12</sup> Those readers familiar with data on homicides will recognize that this description of suspect/victim relationships is exceptional in its depiction of the minimal relationship among these participants.

Part of the explanation for these patterns may lie in the gang affiliations of victims and suspects in these gang cases, as indicated in the police investigations. These affiliations are not as high as one might expect. For instance, including those involved in the homicides and the other associated offenses, 53 per cent of the cases had one or more designated victims with a clear gang affiliation, and 61 per cent had one or more designated suspects with a clear gang affiliation. "Possible" affiliation adds only 5 per cent to each group of cases. When the comparison is limited to homicide victims and homicide suspects, the figures become 47 per cent and 76 per cent (of known suspects, or 63 per cent of all suspects). This leaves quite a few gang cases without clearly gang-affiliated victims or even gang-affiliated suspects.

Thus one reason for the low suspect/victim prior relationships, noted above, may have to do with the nature of gang homicides being not restricted to intergang hostilities (or, alternatively, to the local police definition of gang-related homicides; it will be recalled that the Los Angeles definition, unlike Chicago and Philadelphia definitions, does not require gang-on-gang incidents). Another part of the explanation is that

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<sup>12</sup>In the remaining cases, there was insufficient information in the file to permit coding of relationship.

even in gang-on-gang homicides, many members of rival gangs are unknown to each other, in many instances even by reputation.

Age, gender, and ethnic status also tell a story.<sup>13</sup> The average age of gang homicide suspects per case is 19.45, a fact which seems to confirm reports of older gang-member involvement in violence than was the case two decades ago. "Juvenile gangs" are now, perhaps, more properly labeled "street gangs." The victims of these homicides are older yet, averaging 23.19 years. This age discrepancy of over three and a half years further confirms the suggestion that gang killings are no longer intergang events primarily; intergang homicides should yield less discrepant average ages.

By contrast, there is greater homogeneity with respect to gender and ethnicity. Within these LASD cases, 93 per cent involve male homicide victims only, and 94 per cent involve male suspects only. Ethnically, 82 per cent of the homicide victims and 74 per cent of the homicide-charged suspects were Hispanic, while 13 and 24 per cent respectively were Black. This is, of

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<sup>13</sup>Demographic characteristics of the participants also tell a story. In the next paragraphs, we will report age, gender and ethnic status for gang homicide victims and suspects charged with homicide rather than all designated victims and suspects. Within each case, age is averaged for these individuals and gender is represented by the proportion of cases with all male homicide victims and charged suspects. Ethnicity is more appropriately presented on an individual rather than a case basis, so Ns will vary accordingly (323 homicide victims and 459 homicide suspects). The following comparisons between victim and suspect characteristics refer to each group separately; they do not involve within-case comparisons of suspect and victim characteristics. These within-case comparison variables were, however, considered for the discriminant analysis, to be reported later.

course, partially a reflection of the Sheriff's jurisdiction. More interesting is the homogeneity within each group. Almost without exception, all victims are of the same race and all charged suspects are of the same race (99 and 97 per cent respectively). The predominance of Hispanic victims and suspects suggests that victim/suspect homogeneity is quite high; Hispanics kill Hispanics and Blacks kill Blacks.

In sum, then, these gang homicides involve multiple participants of relatively homogeneous character who are not, nonetheless, well known to each other across sides. There are many gang-related killings that are not of the gang-on-gang character often depicted in the media. To an extent far greater than is true of typical non-gang homicides, gang killings included strangers similarly located in the social structures of the society.

c. Investigation characteristics: The characteristics of the homicide settings and participants described above are taken from investigation files. Quite clearly, aspects of the investigative process may affect the detection and recording of those characteristics. Thus, throughout this analysis, selected aspects of the files which may reflect more directly on the investigative process will be reported. Although more pertinent to comparative questions (e.g., changes over time, gang vs. non-gang characteristics), we report here a few descriptive items to provide the comparative base and a sense for the kinds of variables which can be extracted for this purpose.



Most central, perhaps, is the number of pages in the investigative file, a reflection both of case complexity and of investigative thoroughness (the reader may wish to refer again to pages 50-52 which list many of the items to be found in a file). The average LASD investigation required 52.5 pages, with a range of one to 216 pages across the 312 cases.

A substantial number of pages are accounted for by interviews. The average case included 2.75 interviews with designated participants, 8.45 with informants of various kinds, and 3.30 with witnesses for a total of 14.5 interviews per case. The range for total interviews was from none to 58. Clearly, the amount of investigative work on gang homicides varies greatly; one should avoid thinking in terms of "typical" cases.

Obviously, not all homicide cases are cleared; some never lead to the charging of a suspect for homicide. In the case of LASD gang homicide cases, only 61 per cent ended with at least one suspect charged for homicide, this despite the generally acknowledged fact that homicide cases have one of the highest clearance rates. Also of interest, because of the group nature of gang homicides (a mean of 4.53 participants recorded on the side of suspects), is that in the 189 cases with homicide charged suspects, there was a mean of 2.56 suspects so charged, a rather high mean for homicides and especially given the relatively high proportion of cases (31%) with unknown suspects recorded in the files and the mean number of unknown suspects per case overall (.86).

More confusing than charged suspects is the issue of recorded arrests (see pages 58 to 63). In only 64 per cent of the cases were arrests recorded (obviously one cannot arrest an unidentified suspect, of which there were many in these gang homicides). However, among such cases there were, on the average, 2.89 arrests, a figure very close to the average number of suspects charged with homicide. The slightly higher number of arrests reflects, among other things, arrests for offenses other than homicide.

The reader may have noted the references here to several different categories of assailants. We have participants on the suspect side, we have suspects, we have charged suspects, and we have arrested suspects. They are not the same, but the distinctions became necessary to reflect information in the files which varied widely over many cases. Participant is a term we will use often. It is inclusive, a research term rather than a police term, and refers to persons on the scene, whether or not they were designated by the police as suspects or victims.

No single term "correctly" captures, by itself, the essence of the counterpart to the victim. The victim is much easier for us. On the average, there were 1.98 designated victims per case (victims not only of homicide but of associated offenses in the incident as well). Perhaps the best counterpart terminology on the assailants' side, then, is designated suspect, a term codeable with regularity from the Sheriff's files. The average number of designated suspects was 3.08. This is less than the

number of participants on the suspect side but more than the number of either charged or arrested suspects.

This term "designated suspect" (our term) is of interest because it really does represent the deliberate, explicit designation by the Sheriff's personnel--"suspect Juan Morales was interviewed on May 17 of this year"--and provides a base for judging investigative decisions about charging and arresting. When we turn later to the analysis of the LAPD data, we will find a different terminological approach is required to reflect a different set of recording practices in that department.

Finally, because it too reflects on gang homicide complexity and investigative processes, we have noted the listing of witness addresses in the files. Follow-up interviews of on-the-scene witnesses as well as interviews with witnesses not on the scene are difficult if witness addresses are not recorded. Sixteen per cent of the gang homicide cases had missing witness addresses. In those cases, the missing addresses account for a half (.49) of all the witnesses in the cases. This is a considerable deficit, albeit in only 16 per cent of the cases overall. A few of these instances, we learned, resulted from deliberate withholding of witness information for the protection of the witness.

We do not conclude from these data anything about investigative thoroughness. These descriptive data apply to complex homicide incidents as suggested by the earlier data on settings and participants. But they will provide the base for comparisons over time and comparisons with non-gang homicides in

the pages to follow. Some clarification of investigative processes may thereby be obtained.

2. Gang versus non-gang homicides: For purposes of this comparative analysis, we employ a sub-group of the total gang sample to be referred to as the "restricted gang" sample. It will be recalled, for the sake of comparability, that the non-gang sample was drawn from cases with at least one name-identified suspect between the ages of 10 and 30, inclusive (see page 33). Thus for the gang/non-gang comparison we must similarly limit the analysis to gang cases with at least one name-identified suspect between the ages of 10 and 30. This reduces the gang population for the 4 1/2 year period from 312 cases to a sample of 226.

This loss of 86 cases represents a potential bias, but upon investigation it appears that the loss in numbers is more of a problem than is bias. The gang/non-gang comparison was made twice, once with the full gang population and once with the restricted gang sample. Among a total of 93 variables, there was a difference in conclusion (significant vs. non-significant statistical difference) with respect to only seven variables.<sup>14</sup> An additional seven variables exhibited minor differences (e.g., significance levels altered from  $p < .01$  to  $p < .05$ ). The rationale for limiting the analysis to the restricted gang sample remains valid. What these data mean is that, with relatively little concern, the gang/non-gang comparisons to be presented here can reasonably be generalized to the full gang population.

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<sup>14</sup>As might be expected, most of these were related to the omission of unknown suspects; e.g., proportions of cases with arrests, number of cases with suspects charged with homicide, and proportion of unknown suspects over designated suspects.

For these gang/non-gang comparisons, we will again present data separately for three categories: characteristics of the setting, characteristics of the participants, and characteristics of the investigative process. In this material, more detailed tabular data will be presented.

a. Setting: A large proportion of the descriptors of homicide settings differ significantly between the restricted gang and non-gang samples. Table 2 reports the data.

As Table 2 makes clear, most of the variables describing the setting of gang and non-gang homicides yield significant differences both statistically and substantively. The where and the how of homicide is a function of the gang/non-gang distinctions. The exceptions are time of day, presence of knives, mean number of other victim injuries when there are such injuries, and mean number of unknown suspects in cases where there are such suspects.

Gang killings are far more likely to take place in public settings. They are somewhat more likely to have auto involvement, but this is principally a function of the distinctive "drive-by" shootings. They are more likely to involve guns, and more weapons overall in the incident.

Gang incidents involve more additional offenses, especially additional charges related to homicide and ADW, and more of these incidents involve other injuries. There are more cases with unknown suspects, and more cases involving intimidation or fear of retaliation.

Table 2  
Setting Characteristics for Restricted Gang and  
Non-Gang Samples (LASD)

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (n=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>	Characteristics	Restricted Gang (n=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Location</b>			.392**	<b>Type of Associated Offense</b>	(N=164)	(N=105)	
Street	48% (109)	14% (27)		Per Case with Offense			
Other Public	27% (61)	34% (67)		Other Homicide (e.g.			
Residence	24% (55)	53% (106)		Attempt,			
Missing	— (1)	— (0)		Conspiracy)	45% (73)	22% (23)	.230**
<b>Auto</b>			.264**	Robbery	20% (32)	34% (36)	-.166**
None	34% (76)	42% (85)		ADW	57% (94)	39% (41)	.178**
Car Involved	43% (98)	52% (104)		Other	23% (38)	50% (53)	-.282**
Shooting Out of Car	21% (48)	4% (7)		<b>Other Victim Injuries</b>			
Missing	2% (4)	2% (4)		Cases with Injuries	30% (67)	10% (20)	.243**
<b>Cases with Drive-by Shootings</b>	(N=48)	(N=7)		Mean Number Injured Per Injury Case	(N=67) 1.69	(N=20) 1.35	n.s.
	69% (33)	29% (2)	.278*	<b>Unknown Suspects</b>			
<b>Time of Day</b>			n.s.	Cases with Unknowns	19% (43)	7% (14)	.169**
Daytime	11% (24)	12% (25)		Mean Number Per Designated Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.11	.03	.202**
Afternoon/Evening	32% (73)	33% (66)		Mean Number Per Case with Unknowns	(N=43) 2.74	(N=14) 1.71	n.s.
Nighttime	56% (127)	51% (102)		Mean Number Per Des. Suspect Per Case with Unknowns <sup>c</sup>	.54	.54	n.s.
Missing	1% (2)	4% (7)		<b>Fear of Retaliation</b>			
<b>Weapons</b>				Present	33% (75)	10% (19)	.290**
Guns Present	80% (180)	60% (120)	.218**	Missing	— (1)	— (0)	
Missing	— (0)	— (1)					
Knives Present	31% (70)	36% (73)	n.s.				
Missing	— (1)	1% (2)					
Other Weapons Present	31% (70)	22% (45)	.128*				
Missing	— (0)	2% (3)					
Mean Total Number of Weapons	2.23	1.68	.160**				
<b>Associated Offenses</b>							
None	27% (62)	48% (95)					
One	43% (98)	28% (57)	.212**				
More Than One	29% (66)	24% (48)					
Mean Number	1.12	.90	.108*				

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (226 and 200). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 205 for gang and 178 for non-gang cases.

In sum, most of the setting variables do differentiate between gang and non-gang homicides. Gang homicides appear to be considerably more visible and more violent. Yet the differences are not so striking as one might have suspected. The street vs. residence location represents a major difference, but killings in other public settings shows little gang/non-gang difference. Location, with a Cramer's V of .392, is the most outstanding difference among these setting variables, but a coefficient of .392 is not particularly high. Expected differences in such matters as auto involvement, weapon use, and fear of retaliation emerge, but they have considerably lower coefficients.

Auto use, often associated with the "modern, mobile street gang," attains statistical significance in Table 2 primarily by virtue of cases of shooting out of a car, yet drive-by shootings, presumably the quintessence of gang killings, occurs in only 33 of 226 cases. Similarly, fear of retaliation is noted in a third of the gang cases--one might have expected a higher figure--but also in 10 per cent of the non-gang cases. The difference in presence of various weapons, also, is less striking than might have been expected.

Finally, the fact that less-heralded variables such as presence and type of associated offenses, injuries to other victims, and number of unknown suspects also emerged in this analysis (admittedly with low coefficients of association) helps to fill out a picture of the gang homicide setting. As compared to the non/gang setting, it is less dramatically different than

is often depicted to be the case, but more broadly different than is generally recognized. This suggests a generally qualitative as well as quantitative difference.

b. Participants: The second pattern of possible differences concerns the characteristics of the homicide suspects and victims.<sup>15</sup> Table 3 reports the data.

As with the setting variables, the participant variables clearly distinguish gang from non-gang cases.<sup>16</sup> In a number of instances, the differences are quite striking. Gang homicides involve two and a half times as many participants, on both the suspect and victim side. They are twice as likely never to have had known prior contacts, less than one third as likely to have had a clear prior relationship. Suspects charged with homicide are almost five years younger and homicide victims almost six years younger in gang incidents, despite the age restrictions (10 to 30). Gang suspects and victims in this jurisdiction are far more likely to be Hispanic, and almost never White, in contrast to the more even ethnic breakdown in non-gang cases.

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<sup>15</sup>Participants and relationship refer to individuals on the scene. All other characteristics refer to suspects and victims of the sampled homicide, not of the associated offenses.

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<sup>16</sup>Readers may have noticed a singular absence of an important participant characteristic, prior record. The LASD files were found to be an unreliable source for collecting priors. Missing values approach 50 per cent for suspects, 75 per cent for victims among both gang and non-gang cases. It was unclear whether the lack of information was attributable to the failure to record instances in which a check was done with negative results (evident in roughly 10% of non-gang designees and less than half that number for gang designees) or to the absence of a prior record check.



Table 3  
Participant Characteristics for  
Restricted Gang and Non-Gang Samples (IASD)

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	<i>p</i> <sup>b</sup>	Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	<i>p</i> <sup>b</sup>
<b>Participants</b>				<b>Mean Age</b>			
Total	8.96	3.59	.344**	Homicide Suspects	(N=188) 19.36	(N=166) 24.11	-.220**
Missing	3	6		Homicide Victims	(N=224) 23.41	(N=200) 29.20	-.215**
On Suspect Side	4.07	1.79	.386**	<b>Gender</b>			
Missing	7	7		Homicide Suspects,	(N=188)	(N=166)	
On Victim Side	4.70	1.79	.262**	All Male	94% (177) (N=226)	84% (139) (N=200)	.168*
Missing	6	7		Homicide Victims,			
<b>Relationship</b>				<b>Ethnicity, Homicide</b>			
No Prior Contact	50% (114)	23% (46)	.494**	Suspects <sup>c</sup>	(N=458)	(N=238)	.505**
Minimal Familiarity	26% (59)	8% (16)		Black	24% (111)	42% (99)	
Clear Prior Contact	18% (40)	64% (129)		Hispanic	74% (340)	30% (72)	
Mistaken Identity/ Innocent Bystander	5% (11)	2% (4)		White	1% (4)	27% (65)	
Missing	1% (2)	2% (5)		Other	1% (3)	1% (2)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Homicide Suspects</b>				<b>Ethnicity, Homicide</b>			
No Mention	(N=188) 13% (30)	(N=166) 92% (152)	.762**	Victims <sup>c</sup>	(N=236)	(N=209)	.498**
At Least				Black	12% (28)	32% (67)	
One Clearly Gang	76% (143)	5% (8)		Hispanic	83% (195)	39% (81)	
At Least One				White	3% (6)	29% (60)	
Possibly Gang	8% (15)	4% (6)		Other	3% (7)	— (1)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Homicide Victims</b>							
No Mention	45% (102)	94% (188)	.524**				
At Least							
One Clearly Gang	47% (106)	4% (9)					
At Least							
One Possibly Gang	7% (16)	2% (3)					
Missing	1% (2)	— (0)					

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (226 and 200). Where Ns differ, e.g., by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. Reported by individual, rather than by case.

The contrast between setting and participant variables is easily illustrated by reference to the measures of association. The highest coefficient in Table 2 was .392. Table 3 contains five larger coefficients; it seems clear that the participant variables are important. The ethnicity difference is not surprising; Los Angeles has long been known for its Hispanic gangs. The absence of White suspects and victims in contrast to non-gang cases confirms for this area the well-known, if occasionally lamented, absence of White ethnic gang activity (as contrasted, say, with Chicago in its gang heyday, or Boston with its earlier clashes between Italian, Irish, and even Jewish gangs).

The relationship difference may be surprising to some readers, because in decades past gangs were generally portrayed as preying primarily upon each other. The assumption was presumably that warring gang members knew each other at least by reputation, and often by sight and name as well. The assumption may have been weak--it certainly seems to be today. Further, the assumption of gang forays limited to the hangouts of other known gang members seems untenable. Territories of activity may remain predictable, but eventual victims may not.

One other point in Table 3 is of particular interest. That there are major differences in gang affiliation is of course no surprise; it is practically definitional. Rather, one might question why the difference is not even larger. Why are there 9 per cent of the non-gang cases with indications of gang

affiliation for suspects, and 7 per cent in the case of victims? Why do 16 per cent of the gang cases have no mention of gang affiliated suspects, and as many as 45 per cent in the case of victims? These are potential (but only potential) false positives and false negatives, cases in which the sheriffs may have mislabeled the cases as gang or non-gang.

c. Investigation characteristics: Do gang homicides receive different investigative effort than non-gang homicides? The question is complex, because the nature of the cases, as we have seen, is considerably different and could understandably require investigative differences. However, this effect could also be confounded by the development of special gang squads within enforcement agencies, and by special community gang control programs which might in turn have specific impact upon gang investigations. To prepare for material on this question, we report in Table 4 on the gang/non-gang comparisons for six selected investigative variables.

Once again, we are dealing with a preponderance of significantly different patterns, although there are two reversals of directions when denominator controls are employed. Gang cases involve more effort, as measured by length of file and numbers of interviews, but the evidence suggests perhaps less success in charging, designating suspects and victims, and in getting the addresses of witnesses. Since gang cases involve more effort, the implication would be that the lower success rates are due to the greater complexity of gang cases, a feature

Table 4  
Investigation Characteristics for Restricted  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples (IASD)

Characteristic	Restricted Gang (N=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>	Characteristic	Restricted Gang (N=226) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=200) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Pages of Investigation Means	63.5	55.8	.095*	Arrests			
Interviews				Cases with Arrests	88% (198)	86% (173)	n.s.
Total Per Case With Designated Participants	16.14	11.90	.230**	Missing	0% (2) (n=180)	2% (4) (n=156)	
With Witnesses	3.57	1.82	.344**	Number of Arrests in Cases with Arrests <sup>c</sup>	2.83	1.52	.347**
With Informants	3.70	1.57	.316**	Number of Arrests Per Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.87	.98	n.s.
Proportion with All Designated Part. Minus Unknown Suspects <sup>c</sup>	8.87	8.51	n.s.	Designated Participants <sup>c</sup>	(N=205)	(n=178)	
Charged Suspects (Homicide) Cases with Homicide Charges	83% (188)	83% (166)	n.s.	Des. Suspects	3.64	1.83	.382**
Mean Suspects Charged Per Charged Case	(n=188) 2.56	(n=166) 1.49	.311**	Des. Suspect Per Susp. Side Participant	1.11	1.12	n.s.
Suspects Charged Per Suspect Side Participant	.81	.95	-.150**	Designated Victims	2.15	1.37	.272**
				Des. Vict. Per Victim's Side Participant	.71	.90	-.312**
				Witness Addresses			
				Cases with Witness Address Missing	19% (42)	5% (10)	.207**
				Mean Witness Addresses (N=42)	(N=42)	(N=10)	
				Missing Per Case with Address Missing	2.20	2.36	n.s.

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (226 and 200). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 205 for gang and 178 for non-gang cases.

implicit in the data reported in Tables 2 and 3 about settings and participants.

Note, however, that the measures of association yield rather low coefficients in Table 4. No variable stands out as highly differentiating between gang and non-gang cases. This generally present but weak effect is directly relevant to our question about the impact of police investigations on the designation of homicides as gang or non-gang related. To judge from the data presented thus far, the impact is minor.

### 3. Patterns over time

It was noted earlier that changes over time were generally not of such a magnitude as to invalidate the descriptions based on data aggregated over the 4 1/2 years of the LASD data collection period. Having just presented these aggregated data, it is appropriate now to discuss the time-related patterns.

For this purpose, we looked at the data for thirty-one discrete variables or inclusive categories of variables (e.g., arrest patterns, all interviews) for the total gang homicide population (n=312). Three patterns emerged from this data review: variables exhibiting no discernible pattern of change, variables exhibiting linear changes over time, and variables exhibiting curvilinear patterns. Good examples of each are the following:

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u> (1/2)
a. No Pattern-Clear Relationship	12%	11%	16%	14%	17%
b. Linear-Night Incidents	73%	62%	57%	53%	45%
c. Curvilinear-Cases with ADW Charges	29%	33%	45%	36%	34%

The patterns must be looked at rather tentatively, because the number of cases per year is dramatically reduced from the total numbers on which the prior data tables were based. For 1978 through the first half of 1982, the numbers of cases are, respectively, 59, 84, 82, 58, and 29. The problem of missing data further decreases the numbers for some years and some variables. Nonetheless, we will look at the three patterns in two ways, first grouped by our prior categories of setting, participant, and investigative characteristics (as in Table 5) and then listed irrespective of the prior categories.

There are, in Table 5, fourteen instances of no pattern, seven with linear changes, and ten with curvilinear patterns (peaking or dipping around 1980). Ethnicity shows disparate patterns for Hispanics and Blacks. The three categories of setting, participant, and investigation characteristics are not related systematically or differently to the change patterns. On the face of it, the few linear increases and decreases do not seem to constitute a meaningful group. Nor do the curvilinear changes, until one recalls that gang homicides in Los Angeles County peaked in the 1979-80 period. The peak was almost a two-year peak in the Sheriff's Department, a 1980 peak in the LAPD.

We need to look at this more closely. The variables that peaked were car present, ADW, other victim injuries, numbers of participants (total, suspect, victim), arrests, and designated suspects and victims. Unknown suspects dipped at the same time. Now here we may discern a combined pattern of increased gang

Table 5  
Case Characteristics by Patterns Over Time for LASD  
(all gang)

<u>Setting</u>	<u>No Pattern</u>	<u>Linear*</u>	<u>Curvilinear</u>
Location on Street	X		
Car Present			X
Nighttime		X(-)	
Gun Present	X		
Knife Present	X		
Other Weapons Present	X		
Number of Weapons		X(-)	
Mean No. Associated Offenses	X		
ADW as Associated Offense			X
Other Victim Injuries			X
Unknown Suspects			
Per Designated Suspect			X
Fear of Retaliation		X(+)	
<u>Participants</u>			
Total			X
Suspect Side			X
Victim Side			X
No Prior Contact	X		
Clear Relationship	X		
Gang Affiliation			
-Suspects	X		
-Victims	X		
Mean Age-Suspects	X		
-Victims		X(+)	
Gender	X		
Ethnicity-Suspects		X(-) Hispanic	
-Victims	X	X(+) Black	
<u>Investigation</u>			
Number of Pages		X(+)	
Interviews		X(+)	
Charged Suspects	X		
Arrests			X
Designated Suspects			X
Designated Victims			X
Designated Suspects and Victims as Proportion of Participants	X		

\* (-) means decrease, (+) means increase over time.

homicides and increased enforcement response. It is helpful to look as well at both the County and the State level data. These data, taken from the Sheriff's Department and the State's Bureau of Criminal Statistics, reveal that both willful homicide and assaults peaked in 1980 (robbery in 1981) and have fallen off significantly in each following year. This general trend in violence suggests that the gang peaks reported in Los Angeles are more likely a function of gang behavior than of investigative processes, although we certainly cannot rule out the latter.

We can go one step further. In looking at the peaking variables, we noticed in particular the rise in ADW charges, an increase from 29% to 45% of the cases from 1978 to 1980, followed by decreases to 36% and 34%. We know from descriptions of many homicide cases in the files that the difference between ADW and homicide may often be a matter of inches rather than a matter of intent. Perhaps the homicide peak--or at least the peaking of variables attending these homicides--is an indirect function of the assault peak. Perhaps a geographically broad increase and decrease in general assaultive behavior can account for a major portion of the other peaks we have noted. For gang homicides in particular, this seems sensible; we have already noted in the setting and participant characteristics a very unusual homicide description of many participants, more weapons, more injuries, and so on. This description fits far better with violent, assaultive milieus than it does with "normal" murders.



Accordingly, we looked to see specifically whether our cases with charges of assault, as compared to those without such charges, were also higher<sup>17</sup> on the other peaking variables noted in Table 5. Of the 9 other variables appearing under the curvilinear heading in Table 5, eight of them were significantly higher in assault cases. Tentatively, then, we are suggesting that the variables showing the curvilinear patterns are principally a function of an assault pattern which characterizes County and State data as a whole.

By way of confirming this link of associated assault charges to the other variables, we looked at the comparison non-gang data. In these data, the assault peak took place not in 1980 but in 1981. Significantly, seven of the nine variables showing the curvilinear pattern in Table 5 show the same pattern for non-gang cases, but show them concordantly in 1981. Exceptions are the arrest variable, which showed a linear increase, and the unknown suspects variable which had too few cases in the non-gang homicides to reveal a pattern. But to find so many confirmations, delayed by a year as was the non-gang assault peak, certainly provides greater confidence for our tentative suggestion. And for those seeking an explanation for the gang homicide peak in 1979/1980, it seems reasonable to ask that they rephrase their question to focus on more general assaultive behavior rather than homicide as a specific outcome. The homicide increase could be, in part or whole, an unfortunate by-product of a general assaultive increase.

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<sup>17</sup>Changing the sign for the unknown suspect dip in 1980 to maintain terminological consistency.

What, then, about the variables noted in Table 5 as showing linear changes? We noted a decrease in nighttime killings, a decrease in total number of weapons, and a decrease in the proportion of Hispanic suspects. We noted an increase in fear of retaliation, in victim age, in the proportion of Black suspects, in pages of investigation and in interviews. Our reasoning here was that the proportional increase in Black homicide suspects might reflect a slow ethnic shift in the Sheriff's jurisdiction. If so, if Black gangs are increasing proportionately, then perhaps this increase could account for the other linear changes noted in Table 5.

Therefore, we compared cases with predominately Black versus Hispanic suspects, among our gang cases, on the six non-ethnic variables with linear changes in the table. Number of interviews and fear of retaliation did not show a concordant change, but the others did, all of them reaching the .05 level of significance or less. Blacks are less likely to be involved in nighttime homicides and their cases involve fewer weapons. They have older victims than Hispanic cases, and yield higher numbers of pages of investigation. We conclude, very tentatively, that the linear changes over time are probably a function of ethnic changes among the Sheriff's gang homicide cases. In the non-gang data, the trends are in the same direction, but are not strong enough to suggest confirmation.

We can summarize this section on patterns over time so far with several brief statements about gang homicides:

1. There is more stability than major change over the 4 1/2 year period of investigation.
2. There are some variables which increase into 1979-80 and then decrease. Evidence suggests that this is a function of assaultive activities, and mirrors broader state and county patterns.
3. There are a few variables which change in a linear fashion. These may be a function of ethnic changes in gang composition in the Sheriff's jurisdiction.

This brings us to the question of whether these gang patterns, over time, relate to non-gang patterns in any way different from those already covered in this report. Using the restricted gang sample for this purpose, we compared gang to non-gang homicide cases on the same variables covered above.

Of 30 compared variables, eight showed the same patterns and four showed one very similar. Another nine showed the same peaking patterns already discussed, but with the one-year delay in the non-gang cases. Thus 21 of 30 variables manifest quite similar patterns across the 4 1/2 years for gang and non-gang homicides. Nine variables exhibit notably different patterns over time. With the exception of arrests, these all are setting and participant characteristics. Investigative patterns over time do not seem to differentiate gang from non-gang cases.

The nine differences in patterns are as follows:

1. Arrests: Curvilinear in gang, linear increase in non-gang.
2. Guns Present: No pattern in gang, curvilinear in non-gang.
3. Number of Weapons Present: Linear decrease in gang, linear increase in non-gang.
4. Unknown Suspects: Curvilinear in gang, too few cases for pattern in non-gang (trend is curvilinear).
5. No Prior Contact: No pattern in gang, curvilinear in non-gang.
6. Age of Suspects: No pattern in gang, linear increase in non-gang.
7. Age of Victims: Linear increase in gang, curvilinear in non-gang.
8. Ethnicity of Suspects: Proportionate linear increase of Blacks in gang, no pattern in non-gang.
9. Gang Affiliation of Suspects: No pattern in gang, too few cases for pattern in non-gang.

It is hard to discern a pattern among these differences. If there is one, it would be that there are more continuing or delayed increases (curvilinear) in non-gang homicides, suggesting that a few variables were more likely to peak in gang cases. This is generally in line with the earlier demonstrations of the 1980 gang versus 1981 non-gang assaultive peaks, but this is at best a weak pattern in an overall picture of relative similarity of time patterns among gang and non-gang cases.

Another way of seeking comparative differences over time yet remains, and this involves comparing the yearly gang/non-gang differences as these differences vary over time. For instance, the difference between total number of weapons recorded for gang and non-gang cases decreases steadily, from +1.01 in 1978 to +.95, then to +.39, then to +.11, and then to +.05. Each year, gang propensity toward greater numbers of weapons than non-gang decreases to just about the point of equality with non-gang cases.

This steady decrease is readily apparent in the data. However, few other clear patterns emerged from this analysis as applied to 31 variables. This weapons change was primarily a function of increasing numbers of weapons being recorded in non-gang cases. In particular, presence of guns in non-gang cases had much to do with this pattern.

Another of the patterns revealed in this form of the analysis is a difference in assaults as associated offenses. Non-gang cases with assaults increased slightly during the 4 1/2 years but gang cases, as in the earlier analysis, peaked noticeably in 1980.

A third pattern involves a curvilinear dip in the differences in killings of strangers. But just as in the weapons pattern, it is not a major change in gang relationships that produces this change. Rather, the gap in stranger killings is closed by an increase within the non-gang cases. However, since the number of cases per year is small, it would not be wise to make much of this finding.

Beyond these few most discernible patterns of gang/non-gang shifts in differences, the comment about stability over time holds true. The predominant pattern is one of relatively little change. However, an additional global pattern emerges when one reviews the entire five year display over 31 variables. There are twelve variables in which the figures for a given year of the five stand out as markedly different. For example, consider the following illustrations, each figure being gang minus non-gang:

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
Cases with Victim					
Injuries	+22	+23	+27	+1	+21
Per cent Black Suspects	-21	-16	-32	+2	-14
Car Present	+ 7	+19	+10	-7	+11

The twelve variables are:

- Location at residence
- Auto present
- Number of associated offenses
- Number of cases with victim injuries
- Mean number of injuries in cases with injuries
- Total number of participants
- Number of participants on the suspect side
- Proportion of cases with all Black suspects
- Proportion of cases with all Hispanic suspects
- Proportion of cases with all Black victims
- Proportion of cases with all Hispanic victims
- Total number of interviews

For all twelve such variables, it is 1981 which contains the anomalous figure. Obviously it is risky to take what might be a random anomaly and make a case out of it; yet we are tempted to do so because 1981 is a special year. Following the county-wide gang homicide peak of 1980 (351 recorded gang-related homicides), public hearings were held by the Board of Supervisors; the Youth Gang Services project was initiated; the Sheriff's OSS staff was

increased; the District Attorney's Operation Hardcore (anti-gang vertical prosecutions) was increased; LAPD's CRASH operation began to take on homicide investigations.

In other words, 1981 saw a significant expansion of gang control efforts. By and large these were not aimed at prevention, but at surveillance, deterrence, and increased intelligence. The variables in our analysis which exhibit the 1981 anomalies do not easily fall into a single category that would correspond to changes in enforcement practice, but it is an hypothesis worth considering. Analyses to be reported later will be directed toward shedding light on this 1981 anomaly. What reinforces our intention is the fact that, as with the above illustrations, each of the twelve 1981 patterns shows the gang/non-gang differences at their minimum, the sort of thing that might happen if a gang crackdown were to take place. Crackdowns tend to be more indiscriminant than selective targetting, and more indiscriminant action would serve to mask gang/non-gang differences by practice, or by designation of cases, or both. The twelve variables in the above list refer primarily to the settings and numbers of participants, the very sorts of things that increased patrolling might be expected to affect.

B. Bivariate Analysis: L. A. Police Department Data

From the LAPD, the data cover the period from January 1979 through December 1981. Included here are 152 gang homicide cases, so designated by the Gang Intelligence Section, and 148

comparison non-gang homicide cases with known suspects aged 10 to 30. The three year time period will yield a slightly less rigorous over-time analysis than was possible with the Sheriff's data, and the smaller numbers (data collection limited to three stations) can be expected to reduce the number of significant differences in the gang/non-gang comparisons. Basically, however, the descriptive analyses will follow the same pattern used in the earlier LASD section of the report.

1. Characteristics of gang-related Homicides: We present first the aggregated data for the entire three year period for all gang homicides in the three stations, since changes over time were for the most part less striking than stabilities over time.

a. Setting: LAPD gang homicides tend to involve the use of cars, take place at night, principally occur in the streets, involve firearms, often yield injuries to persons other than the homicide victim, often involve other associated offenses--most typically these are related murder charges such as accessory, conspiracy to commit murder, etc.--often involve unknown suspects, and in a substantial number of cases there is fear of retaliation or intimidation of witnesses.

This description, for the most part, parallels that given for LASD cases, and of course this is not surprising. We caution the reader throughout this section, however, not to engage in significant comparisons between specific items in the LAPD and LASD data for the reasons stated earlier in this report; we have separated the two analyses quite deliberately. With that



warning, we can review the separate components of the setting category.

1) Forty-nine per cent of the homicides occur in the streets, with the rest rather evenly divided between other public areas (24 per cent) and residences (28 per cent).

2) Automobile involvement is high. Cars were noted in 46 per cent of the cases, with an additional 21 per cent in which shooting was done out of the car. Of these latter, most (24 out of 27) were "drive-by" shootings, a pattern almost exclusively recorded as a gang event (only one non-gang drive-by shooting).

3) Night-time incidents comprise 47 per cent of all cases. The late afternoon and evening homicides comprise an additional 39 per cent, leaving only 12 per cent for the school-day period (one case was unknown; late discovery of a body can preclude establishing a time of day for the killing).

4) The average case involved the recording of 1.58 weapons. Guns were noted in the vast majority of cases (83 per cent), as compared with far lower numbers for knives (21 per cent) and other weapons (11 per cent).

5) Homicide files often recorded offenses other than the sampled homicide. Forty-eight per cent of the cases included other offenses (34 per cent with one and 14 per cent with more than one additional offense). Most common among these are other homicide charges such as accessory, conspiracy, and attempted murder (in 25 per cent of the cases), followed by robbery (17 per cent) and ADW (13 per cent). Victims other than the sampled

homicide victim suffered injuries in 21 per cent of the cases, for an average of 1.56 other victims in such instances. The complexity of these gang homicides is further confirmed by the finding that 28 per cent of the cases included unknown suspects, and these unknown suspects constituted 18 per cent of designated homicide suspects.

6) Finally, we note that indications of intimidation or fear of retaliation comprise 32 per cent of the total, a proportion of notable size and the source of considerable consternation to police and prosecutors seeking witness and participant help in resolving these cases.

b. Participants: Gang homicides handled by the LAPD typically involve more than a single suspect and a single victim. There were, on the average, 3.81 participants on the suspect's side and 2.79 on the victim's side. Maximums were provided by a case with 45 on the suspect's side and a case with 20 on the victim's side. The reader may recall our earlier comment that LAPD and LASD have different approaches to designating participants as their suspects and victims. The LAPD investigators designated 3.76 and 1.44 suspects and victims per case. The definitional procedures yield a ratio of about three designated victims to every four victim participants, but slightly more than one designated suspect (1.14) for each listed suspect participant.

LAPD gang homicide suspects and victims were strangers in almost half (46 per cent) of the cases. In only 19 per cent was

there a clear prior relationship between the principal opponents. Gang membership is an ambiguous, unstable status; rival gangs can have many members who have never met each other, so that many gang-on-gang incidents result from affiliations, not prior contacts. Seventy-eight per cent of the cases had at least one charged suspect and 39 per cent at least one homicide victim who were recorded in the files as having known gang affiliations, another five and nine per cent respectively having a possible affiliation. Looking at this from the other side, we find that 17 per cent of the cases had charged suspects with no gang affiliation, along with 49 per cent having homicide victims with no gang affiliation (at least, as known to the police investigators). In sum, the data provide many reasons to account for the surprisingly high incidence of stranger relationships in gang killings. These are not synonymous, as some newspaper reports would have us think, with random killings of innocent bystanders in non-gang areas of the metropolis. The "little old lady from Pasadena" has greater worries than gang assaults.

Age, gender, and ethnic status repeat much of the expected pattern. Average age of homicide suspects is 19.44 as compared to 23.79 for their victims. In 95 per cent of the cases, all suspects are males (limited to cases with charged homicide suspects) and in 93 per cent of the cases homicide victims are male. The ethnic mix among homicide victims and suspects, however, is far greater. Forty-five per cent of suspects and 51 per cent of victims are Hispanics, while 55 per cent of suspects

and 45% of victims are Black. Within the City of Los Angeles, Whites and others account for 4 per cent or less of the designated participants in gang killings. Minorities kill minorities, but unlike the case in LASD episodes, the marginal totals among Blacks and Hispanics do not necessarily yield the conclusion of suspect/victim homogeneity in ethnicity; the existence of multiple participants on each side makes coding of ethnic homogeneity into quite an art form.<sup>18</sup>

c. Investigation characteristics: Again, recognizing that homicide file data are to some unknown extent a function of investigative practices, we present here a few indices of these practices. We leave for later some analyses which bear more directly on their impact. If the length of an investigative file is reflective of case complexity, then pity the LAPD investigator and others required to resolve the LAPD gang killing. The average gang homicide file contains 94.8 pages of material, with a range across these 152 cases of from 24 to 248 pages.

A substantial portion of this work is occasioned by interviews. The average LAPD case includes 2.43 interviews with designated participants, 15.72 with informants, and 3.18 with witnesses for a total of 21.33 per case. This is one of the areas to which we alluded earlier in which LASD and LAPD files differed markedly; LAPD files were more inclusive, and LASD files more organized and structured. Coding procedures were modified accordingly. It is not at all obvious, from these data alone, whether or not such differences reflect differences in the homicide incidents, per se.

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<sup>18</sup>How would one code three Hispanic Suspects against four Hispanics and one Black, or one Black against three Blacks and a Hispanic?

Turning to more detailed indices in the files , we find in the LAPD sample of cases that 77 per cent report a suspect charged with homicide, with a mean of 2.19 charged suspects within the 77 per cent cohort of cases. Both figures differ from those in the LASD cases, one higher and one lower, but again represent the kinds of data from which comparative implications should be drawn with the greatest of care. The LASD data came from a total population of gang homicides, while the LAPD data derive from a sample of stations in the most gang infested areas of the City. Differences must be anticipated.

With respect to arrest indices, the reader is reminded again of the inherent ambiguities discussed in pages 58 to 63. In the LAPD cases, 76 per cent had recorded arrests, with 2.27 arrests in the average such case. This latter is very close to that for average number of charged suspects, the slight difference probably being attributable to arrests for associated offenses.

As we noted in the description of the LASD cases, we draw no conclusions from the above data about investigative thoroughness. The data will however provide the basis for some of the comparisons to follow between time periods and between gang and non-gang cases.

2. Gang versus non-gang homicides: As was the case for the LASD analysis, this comparative analysis is based upon a "restricted gang" sample of cases involving name-identified suspects between the ages of 10 and 30. Over the three year period involved, this reduces the gang sample from 152 to 135

cases, to be compared with a sample of 148 non-gang cases having the same restrictions. This loss of only 17 cases makes virtually no difference in the comparisons except with respect to cases with unknown suspects (.993 for all-gang, .762 for restricted gang) and derivative indices. This in turn affects arrest indices (an increase from 76 per cent to 85 per cent), and charges (a slight increase among restricted gang cases). Setting and participant characteristics are unaffected, and generalizations to the larger, all-gang sample present no problem at all.

a. Setting: The majority of the descriptors of homicide settings differ significantly between the restricted gang and non-gang samples. Table 6 reports the data.

As Table 6 makes clear, a number of factors differentiate between gang and non-gang cases in the LAPD cases. However, it is notable that the distinctions are not as uniform nor as large as we observed in the LASD data on settings. In fact, the highest coefficients in the table are .303 for drive-by shootings, of which there were only 24 in gang cases, and .304 for fear of retaliation which appeared in only 45 gang cases. The Ns in the LAPD samples are not so small as to preclude finding differences at a higher level, so further comment may best be withheld until more of the LAPD data are presented.

b. Participants: Following the pattern of description we have followed previously, we present comparative participant characteristics in Table 7.

Table 6  
Setting Characteristics for Restricted  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples (LAPD)

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Location			n.s.
Street	49% (66)	34% (50)	
Other Public	22% (30)	26% (39)	
Residence	29% (39)	39% (58)	
Missing	— (0)	1% (1)	
Auto			.294**
None	36% (49)	51% (75)	
Car Involved	44% (59)	46% (67)	
Shooting Out of car	20% (27)	3% (4)	
Missing	— (0)	1% (2)	
Cases with Drive-by Shootings	(N=27) 89% (24)	(N=4) 50% (2)	.303**
Time of Day			n.s.
Daytime	14% (19)	12% (18)	
Afternoon/Evening	41% (55)	39% (57)	
Nighttime	44% (60)	47% (70)	
Missing	1% (1)	2% (3)	
Weapons			.175**
Guns Present	82% (111)	67% (99)	
Missing	1% (1)	1% (2)	
Knives Present	23% (31)	36% (53)	n.s.
Missing	3% (4)	2% (3)	
Other Weapons Present	12% (16)	15% (22)	n.s.
Missing	3% (4)	2% (3)	
Total Number of Weapons	1.63	1.57	n.s.

Legend

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (135 and 148). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 130 for gang and 135 for non-gang cases.

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Associated Offenses			
None	52% (70)	62% (92)	
One	33% (45)	29% (43)	n.s.
More Than One	15% (20)	9% (13)	
Mean Number	.71	.48	.136*
Type of Associated Offense	(N=65)	(N=56)	
Per Case with Offense			
Other Homicide (e.g. Attempt, Conspiracy)	51% (33)	41% (23)	n.s.
Robbery	38% (25)	29% (16)	n.s.
ADW	28% (18)	25% (14)	n.s.
Other	23% (15)	23% (13)	n.s.
Other Victim Injuries			
Cases with Injuries	21% (28)	14% (20)	n.s.
Mean Number Injured Per Injury Case	1.54	1.15	n.s.
Unknown Suspects			
Cases with Unknowns	23% (31)	10% (15)	.174**
Mean Number Per Designated Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.11	.04	.208**
Mean Number Per case with Unknowns	(N=31) 3.19	(N=15) 2.08	n.s.
Mean Number Per Designated Suspect Per Case with Unknowns <sup>c</sup>	.46	.39	n.s.
Fear of Retaliation			
Present	33% (45)	13% (99)	.304**
Missing	—	—	

Table 7  
Participant Characteristics for Restricted  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples (LAPD)

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Participants</b>			
Total	6.96	3.77	.281**
Missing	8	6	
On Suspect Side	3.82	1.92	.254**
Missing	9	8	
On Victim Side	2.83	1.83	.225**
Missing	9	8	
<b>Relationship</b>			
No Prior Contact	47% (63)	25% (37)	.465**
Minimal or Indirect <sup>19</sup> Relationship	30% (40)	7% (11)	
Clear Prior Contact	19% (26)	61% (91)	
Mistaken Identity/ Innocent Bystander	2% (3)	4% (6)	
Missing	2% (3)	2% (3)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Homicide Suspects<sup>c</sup></b>			
	(N=116)	(N=126)	.746**
No Mention	16% (19)	90% (114)	
At Least			
One Clearly Gang	78% (91)	8% (10)	
At Least One Possibly Gang	5% (6)	2% (2)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Homicide Victims<sup>c</sup></b>			
			.524**
No Mention	50% (68)	96% (142)	
At Least			
One Clearly Gang	39% (53)	2% (3)	
At Least			
One Possibly Gang	9% (12)	1% (2)	
Missing	1% (2)	1% (1)	

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (135 and 148). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables and interval data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. Reported by individual, rather than by case.

<sup>19</sup>"Indirect" relationship was a new coding category developed for LAPD cases; victim and suspect interacted only as a result of a mutual third party contact, e.g. brother or girl friend of victim.

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Mean Age</b>			
Homicide Suspects	(N=116) 19.44	(N=126) 23.86	-.483**
Homicide Victims	(N=133) 23.79	(N=146) 30.65	-.301**
<b>Gender</b>			
Homicide Suspects	(N=116)	(N=126)	
All Male	95% (110)	83% (105)	.123*
Homicide Victims	(N=135)	(N=148)	
All Male	93% (126)	88% (130)	n.s.
<b>Ethnicity, Homicide Suspects<sup>c</sup></b>			
	(N=251)	(N=165)	.140*
Black	55% (138)	65% (107)	
Hispanic	45% (112)	34% (56)	
White	0	1% (2)	
Other	0	0	
Missing	0 (1)	0	
<b>Ethnicity, Homicide Victims<sup>c</sup></b>			
	(N=136)	(N=148)	n.s.
Black	43% (58)	56% (83)	
Hispanic	53% (72)	39% (58)	
White	4% (5)	4% (6)	
Other	1% (1)	1% (1)	
Missing	0	0	



To a greater extent than was the case with the setting variables, the LAPD participant characteristics do differentiate between gang and non-gang cases. Victim gender and ethnicity are the only exceptions. In contrast to the LASD comparisons, these are again less strong; the two exceptions are joined by a general pattern of lower coefficients of association. However, the difference from the LASD data is nowhere near as striking as it was with respect to setting characteristics.

c. Investigation Characteristics: The existence within LAPD of the Gang Intelligence Section as well as the CRASH investigators makes the concern with investigative indices particularly complex, in part because CRASH investigated both gang and non-gang cases, but did not get homicide cases until late in 1980, or after the gang homicide rate began to decline. Table 8 reports the comparative data.

Here again, there are a number of gang/non-gang differences; over half of the indices attain statistical significance. But, as before, the differences are substantially fewer and with lower coefficients of association than was true in the LASD data. Since the overall pattern is similar--same reversals, same reduction of significance with denominator controls--we are perhaps not dealing so much with differences in the homicide cases as with differences in investigative approaches. At least, this is a tenable hypothesis to which we will return later.

3. Patterns over time: In the LAPD, the analysis is on fewer cases than in LASD, and over a more constricted time period.

**Table 8**  
**Investigation Characteristics for Restricted**  
**Gang and Non-Gang Samples (LAPD)**

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Pages of Investigation Means	95.47	76.23	.209**
<b>Interviews</b>			
Total Per Case	20.70	16.43	.172**
With Designated Participants	2.65	1.77	.245**
With Witnesses	3.24	2.16	.222**
With Informants	14.80	12.51	n.s.
Prop. With All Des. Participants Minus Unknown Suspects	.57	.52	n.s.
<b>Charged Suspects (Homicide)</b>			
Cases with Homicide Charges	86% (116)	85% (126)	n.s.
Mean Suspects (N=116)		(N=126)	
Charged Per Charged Case	2.20	1.45	.324**
Suspects Charged Per Suspect Side Participant	.78	.88	-.142
<b>Arrests</b>			
Cases with Arrests	85% (115)	80% (110)	n.s.
Number of Arrests in Cases with Arrests	2.28	1.43	.375**
Number of Arrests Per Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.79	.87	n.s.

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (135 and 148). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 130 for gang and 135 for non-gang cases.

Characteristics	Restricted Gang (N=135) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=148) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Designated Participants<sup>c</sup></b>	(N=130)	(N=135)	
Designated Suspects	3.85	2.47	.165**
Designated Suspects Per Suspect Side Participant	1.16	1.36	n.s.
Designated Victims	1.43	1.21	1.49*
Des. Victim Per Victim Side Participant	.73	.85	-1.94**
<b>Witness Address</b>			
Cases with Witness Address Missing	9% (12)	4% (6)	n.s.
Mean Witness (N=12)		(N=6)	
Addresses Missing Per Case with Address Missing	1.33	1.33	n.s.

These two factors should make significant changes over time more difficult to discern, especially reliable curvilinear changes. In reviewing changes in the full gang sample from 1979 to 1980 to 1981, only eight of 31 variables or categories of variables manifest changes, and few of these are of much magnitude (see Table 5 for the list of variables). Three of the eight are investigative characteristics; pages of investigations, number of homicide charges, and number of arrests all show linear increases. Presence of a car, nighttime incidents, number of weapons, and victim age also show linear increases.

Finally, as was true in the Sheriff's data, we find a significant shift in ethnicity. Proportion Black suspects increases from .50 to .50 to .61 over the three year period, as proportion Hispanic suspects decreases necessarily from .47 to .50 to .39, there being a negligible number of other ethnic suspects. Victim ethnicity, as was true in the LASD data, showed no patterned change. Clearly, then, a significant shift in ethnic gang homicide took place during this period. Our data cannot be used to explain the shift.

One final point on this time pattern; the variables in the LASD that were found to accompany the proportionate increase in Black suspects do not show the same pattern here. Victim age and pages of investigation again increase linearly, but nighttime incidents and number of weapons increase here whereas they decreased in the LASD cases. There is no generalizable pattern among cases that relates to ethnicity, as far as this limited analysis can determine.

When the gang patterns are compared to non-gang patterns in the same fashion, we find 26 of 31 variables manifesting no pattern over the three years. The investigative measures showing increases in gang cases do not do so in non-gang cases, alerting us to remain open to possible relationships attributable to gang investigation practices. The ethnic changes show a slight reversal of the gang pattern--Black suspects down and Hispanics up--suggesting that the ethnic change is a gang issue, not a jurisdictional demographic one, confirming the suggestion implicit in the Sheriff's data.

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it was the  
reverse

But overall, one must conclude that the dominant pattern over the limited, three year period is one of no pattern for both gang and non-gang data. Among other things, this means that the relatively smaller number of differences between gang and non-gang data aggregated over time (Tables 6, 7, and 8) cannot be attributed to variability between the three time periods; the time element here introduces little "noise" into the overall descriptive comparison.

As we did in the analysis of the LASD data, we also looked at time patterns by comparing the gang/non-gang differences within each year and then looked for trends in these differences over the three years for 32 variables. This was the analysis which, in the LASD data, revealed the 1981 anomalous pattern. No such pattern is revealed in the LAPD data.

While once again the predominant result is the revelation of a preponderance of no change, a few trends do appear. We report these here.

a. Street location, car involvement, nighttime incidents, and number of weapons showed increased differences between gang and non-gang cases over the three years. It is increases among the gang cases that causes the change.

b. The ethnic disparity between gang and non-gang cases decreases primarily because gang cases increasingly approach the non-gang predominance of Black participants.

c. An increasing difference in number of pages of investigation is accounted for primarily by large increases in the length of gang investigation files.

d. Increases in the disparities in mean numbers of arrests and mean numbers of suspects charged with homicide are accounted for primarily by increases among gang cases.

In sum, what few changes are noted here seem to reflect two concomitant changes. One is an increase in the "ganginess" of the gang homicide settings; the other is an increase in investigative effort in gang cases.

### C. Discriminant Analysis: L. A. Sheriff's Data

1. Introduction<sup>20</sup>: A unifying theme underlying all of our

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<sup>20</sup>There is a vast literature on Discriminant Analysis procedures. For the present report, we have relied principally on Klecka (1980) and Pedhazur (1982). The procedure assumes equal covariance matrices across the groups, a condition not met here. However, logistic regression does not make this assumption (Press and Wilson, 1978), so we have applied this technique to our data as well. The resultant model of gang/non-gang differences was quite fully substantiated. Similarly, the comparison of results of a quadratic classification analysis (Huberty, 1984) with results of our classification rates yields substantially no difference. Both of these alternative techniques indicate that the unequal covariance matrices across the groups is not a significant problem for our analysis.

analytic pursuits has been to assess the differentiation between designated gang cases and non-gang cases during a period of changing gang activity and changing gang control measures. To accomplish this in a multivariate context, we have chosen to use discriminant analysis; this procedure serves our purposes for several reasons. First, our "dependent" variable is categorical--gang designated versus non-gang. Second, it is not necessary, using discriminant analysis, to distinguish between variables that are predictors of group membership (i.e., gang or non-gang) and variables that are a function of membership. This technique allows us to determine the relative effect of variables in differentiating the groups, regardless of their temporal relationship to the grouping variable. While it would not be hard to argue that characteristics of the setting and the participants are logically prior to case designation, the same argument cannot be made so easily for the investigation variables. Particularly during this period of increasing specialization in gang investigation, it is possible that these variables might be determinants of, as well as determined by, the designation. Finally, discriminant analysis as a statistical tool is most in line with the conceptual issues we are addressing. Given two or more mutually exclusive groups, this technique produces a linear combination of discriminating variables (a discriminant function) that best separates the groups from each other. That is, it will combine the variables in such a way as to produce the greatest differentiation between

the two groups and will tell us the relative effect of each of the variables in producing this discrimination. Given the nature of our research, we decided that this approach was most appropriate for our analysis.

In using discriminant analysis, we have several aims in mind. First, we want to determine which of our variables best differentiate designated gang cases from non-gang cases in the absence of any a priori suggestions. In a more specific vein, this part of the analysis is an amplification of the foregoing bivariate analyses. The bivariate analyses provided information about changes in gang-designated cases over the years, with the non-gang designated cases serving as a comparison. Discriminant analysis allows us to do the same thing in a multivariate context. That is, we can assess how different the two groups are from each other, the nature of the differences, and the extent to which those differences change in degree or quality over the years. Finally, the most specific aim in using this technique is to resolve a "chicken-and-egg" problem. We are aware of the fact that changes over time--both among gang cases alone and in comparison to non-gang cases--could be a function of changes in designation practices that have resulted from increased law enforcement investigative specialization. Discriminant analysis could indicate to what extent characteristics of the setting and the participants have to do with the differentiation between gang and non-gang designated cases versus the role played by investigation characteristics, and whether or not and how that comparison changes over time.

These two forms of analysis reflect a common purpose--the differentiation of gang designated cases from non-gang designated cases. But there are important conceptual differences between them as well, and each of these purposes has different methodological implications involving the discriminant analysis technique. They vary along a continuum that describes the degree to which we are willing to select variables and willing to control the interplay among them. The first purpose above, taken strictly, implies no variable selection--just let all the variables sort themselves out. The second purpose implies selecting variables on the basis of the bivariate analyses, and letting those sort themselves out, and looking for changes over time. The third purpose implies not only selecting variables, but controlling the way in which they are used in the analysis in an attempt to distinguish the effects of different types of variables. This involves imposing more structure on the analysis, but not to the point of introducing unwarranted, a priori hypotheses about gang/non-gang differences. Attempting to address the chicken-and-egg question is the most ambitious of the three purposes; its advantage is that in planning an analysis with that purpose in mind, the other purposes are subsumed.

The chicken-and-egg question addresses the relationship between changes in the nature of the gang world (perhaps reflected in an increase in gang-designated homicides) and changes in law enforcement's response to the gang world. There is a need to separate these two types of changes as much as is



possible.

The first question is, how has the nature of gang-designated homicides changed over the years for which we have data? This is answered with the analyses of the total gang data over time. The second question is whether or not those changes are unique to gang-designated cases or whether they are more general changes in the nature of homicide cases. This was addressed by the "restricted gang vs. non-gang" bivariate analyses on the data in Tables 2 through 4 and 6 through 8.

However, since we are dealing with gang designated cases, both changes over time and changes in comparison to non-gang cases could be a function of changes in designation practices, not a reflection of changes in the "true" gang world. Law enforcement specialization with regard to gangs increased over these years, so that changes in investigation could be linked to changes in designation practices. For this reason, we want to treat the group of variables that describe investigation separately from those that describe the incident or the participants. To do this we enter variables into the discriminant analysis procedure in discrete blocks such as setting and participant variables, participant homogeneity

variables,<sup>21</sup> and investigation variables. This procedure has two advantages. First it provides control over certain confounding variables and "main effects" variables; for instance, the number of designated participants is logically a partial function of the number of participants, which suggests that to examine the discriminating power of the former, we need first to control for the confounding effects of the latter. Second, it allows us to talk about the effects of these blocks net of the other blocks. This will be described in more detail later.

However, entering variables into the analysis as blocks requires an a priori ordering of block entry. This again raises the chicken-and-egg question. We want to know if the changes observed are "true" changes in the nature of gang cases or whether they are changes in designation practices. The question cannot be fully answered, as it is essentially a processual

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<sup>21</sup>In an early analysis which, though flawed methodologically, offered some interesting hypotheses, Bernard Cohen (1967) compared offenses recorded by police against gangs and non-gang groups. A consistent trend showed more homogeneity between victims and suspects in gang cases. To follow up on Cohen's results, we have included selected examples of his variables in our analysis. These participant homogeneity variables refer specifically to differences between victim and suspect characteristics (e.g., mean age difference) within each case. When entered into the discriminant function, they are preceded by the variables describing the characteristics on each side (e.g., mean age of victims only). By entering the variable for each side separately prior to the homogeneity version, we insure that homogeneity variables per case contribute the group effect to the function net of the per side effect.

question and would involve dynamic relationships between changes in the case characteristics and changes in designation. But, a partial answer can be sought by focusing on the role played by investigation variables in discriminating between gang and non-gang cases and how that role changes over time, net of changes in setting and participant characteristics.<sup>22</sup>

One implication of this for the analysis is that incident and participant characteristics might best be entered first, followed by participant homogeneity variables. (There are additional stages of entry here, but these are set up to handle the issue of controlling for confounding and "main effects" variables.) Investigation variables are the last block to be entered. This means that the other blocks of variables have the best chance to discriminate between gang and non-gang, but there are justifications for doing this: (1) the other variables are intrinsic to the incident and, by making an assumption of only minimal rationality on the part of law enforcement, one can see that logically these will shape and to some extent constrain the subsequent investigation, and (2) if a case is to be made for the possibility of a chicken-and-egg situation, then it is best to make the investigation variables prove themselves. If they don't

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<sup>22</sup>The discriminant analyses use the same definition of most variables as have our prior analyses. In the present case, we have included all suspects and victims, including those related to the associated charges in the incidents and characteristics of uncharged, or indeed "unknown" suspects. A few other variables were changed to dummy coding. Appendix C contains a list of variable definitions used in the discriminant analyses.

show any effect, one can't say that such a situation does not exist; but if they do show an effect, then there is a much stronger case for arguing about the changing role of investigation in determining designations and what that implies for the chicken-and-egg question. While one still can't absolutely know "which came first," one can assess the role played by investigation in discriminating gang cases from non-gang cases and how that changes over a period of time during which investigation of gang cases became more specialized.

All the above involves entering the investigative variables block last. We will refer to this as Model 1. There is something to be said, nonetheless, for precisely the opposite, entering them first in order to maximize the chances for their appearance in the discriminant function. We will refer to this as Model 2. Comparison between the results of the two models might prove illuminating. Since we are exploring these issues for the first time, we decided to do the analysis both ways, and both will be reported below.

The multi-stage procedure for the discriminant analysis is described below. Readers less interested in the technical aspects of the analysis may wish to skip over this single-spaced section.

Model 1  
Stage 1:

We enter variables for the number of victim participants and the number of suspect participants (VICPART and SUSPART) as a first block. These are major variables which, a priori,

were thought to be required as controls because of high intercorrelations with a number of other variables. These will remain in the discriminant function throughout the analysis. In this stage we also enter the setting variables and the participant variables as a single block using a stepwise procedure; any variables that do not meet the criteria (see Appendix C) for entering the discriminant function are left out of the next step.

#### Stage 2:

We enter VICPART and SUSPART and the setting and participant variables selected in Stage 1 as a first block--these will stay in the function regardless of how variables perform; the second block of variables are the participant homogeneity variables--these are entered by a stepwise procedure.

#### Stage 2B:

For those homogeneity variables that entered the function in Stage 2 we want to make sure for purposes of interpretation that the corresponding main effects variables are also included; if any of these were not selected in Stage 1, they are now included; they become part of the first block which is again entered first and which remains in the function. The homogeneity variables are then entered again in a stepwise procedure, but now they are controlled for their main effects; if any of these variables are selected in this procedure, they remain in the function at Stage 3, along with their main effects. If not, the main effects variables are eliminated from Stage 3 and only the homogeneity variables that were selected in Stage 2 remain in the function.

#### Stage 3:

All of the variables selected so far are entered as a block--they go in first and they stay in; the investigation variables make up the second block and they are entered in a stepwise procedure. The results of this stage provided us with the final function.

#### Model 2

As noted earlier, the block entry is repeated, but this time with the investigation variables as a block entered first in a stepwise procedure (again controlling first for VICPART and SUSPART). At the second stage, the setting and participant variables are entered in a stepwise procedure, following VICPART and SUSPART and the investigation variables selected in Stage 1. At the third stage, all of the variables selected up to this point are entered first as a block and then the participant homogeneity variables are entered in a stepwise procedure. In the case of homogeneity

variables whose main effects variables were not included in the second stage, Stage 2B (above) is repeated. If the homogeneity variables are selected with the main effects controlled, then the whole set of variables is included in the final function; if not, then only the homogeneity variables are included.

2. All years combined: The results of each discriminant analysis will be reported in the same fashion. Two sets of data will be offered, the first displaying the standardized discriminant function coefficients and the second the total structure coefficients. In addition, we will present several statistics for each analysis: the group centroids, Wilks' Lambda, the canonical correlation, eta squared, increments to eta squared, and classification success. For the first data display, LASD with all years combined, a brief narrative will indicate the meaning to be attached to the several materials presented.

(a) Model 1, Investigation variables entered last: Table 9 reveals that 13 variables, of those meeting our minimal criteria (see Appendix C), entered into the function. The first nine of these, and 11 of the 13, are setting and participant characteristics; investigation variables play a very minor part in distinguishing gang from non-gang cases. Since these coefficients are not affected by order of entry, they reflect the relative importance of the variables in distinguishing between gang and non-gang cases. Thus two participant variables--mean age and ethnic status of suspects--are clearly the most important variables, followed by two setting variables, street location and presence of a gun.

Table 9  
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients:  
LASD, Model 1, All Years Combined

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Mean age of suspects	-.472
Hispanic suspects	.405
Street location	.328
Gun present	.282
Mean age of victims	-.250
No. of participants, suspect side	.237
Proportion of male suspects	.179
Associated violent offenses	.155
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.149
No. of witness interviews	.148
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	.138
No. of suspects charged with homicide	.136
No. of participants, victim side	.064

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -1.03959; gang, 0.91982]

However, these standardized coefficients are partial coefficients, and variables that are highly correlated (i.e., showing the same discriminating information) share their contribution to the discriminant function score. Therefore, the coefficients for those variables will be smaller than if only one were used in the function. The importance of a variable to the function might be masked by its correlations with other discriminating variables.

Table 10 reports the total structure coefficients which have a somewhat different interpretation. These are bivariate correlations between each variable and the function; the higher the coefficient, the more that variable is related to the discriminant function or the more it "carries" the same discriminating information. These coefficients are analogous to factor loadings in factor analysis.

Table 10  
 Total Structure Coefficients:  
 LASD, Model 1, All Years Combined

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Mean age of suspects	-.652
Hispanic suspects	.592
No. of participants, suspect side	.557
Street location	.538
No. of witness interviews	.447
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.419
No. of suspects charged with homicide	.385
No. of participants, victim side	.372
Proportion of male suspects	.349
Associated violent offenses	.315
Mean age of victims	-.308
Gun present	.302
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	-.270

The three variables with the highest coefficients all pertain to characteristics of the suspects. In the full list, there are two other variables descriptive of suspects (one of them investigative) and two which describe the suspect-victim relationship (no prior contact, mean age difference between suspects and victims). We can best "label" the discriminant function as a suspect function; the most important set of factors distinguishing gang and non-gang homicides is determined by the suspects, rather than the victims, or the setting, or investigative processes.

The question of how effective this suspect-dominated function is as a discriminator is answered by the following statistics:



Group Centroids	Non-gang, -1.03959; Gang, 0.91982
Wilks' Lambda	.51
Canonical Correlation	.70
Eta Squared	.49
Stage 3 Increment to $\eta^2$	.007 (F=2.73, p<.07)

Classification Success:

Non-gang	80%
Gang	85%
Overall	82.6%

The Group Centroids report the mean of each group on the function and the direction (which is arbitrary). In this case, the gang centroid of .91982 is positive. Most of the structure coefficients are also positive, meaning that they relate positively to the gang designations. In each table presented, the reader may judge the relationship of the variable to the group by noting the sign of the variable and the signs of the centroids. For example, Table 10 shows us that, along this function, gang cases were characterized by younger suspects (as designated by law enforcement), predominantly of hispanic ethnicity, that they tend to have involved a larger number of participants on the assailant side, and were more likely to have occurred in the street.

Wilks' Lambda is an inverse multivariate measure of group differences over a number of variables (the lower the Lambda, the better). It tests the discrimination between gang and non-gang cases prior to deriving the discriminant function. In this

instance, and all those to follow, the Lambda is of moderate size and reaches high levels of statistical significance, suggesting the feasibility of seeking discriminant functions.

The Canonical Correlation is a measure of association which summarizes the degree of relatedness between the groups and the discriminant function. In this case, a correlation of .70, we have an acceptably high level of association. The square of this coefficient is Eta Squared which signifies the proportion of variance in the function accounted for by the two groups (gang and non-gang homicide cases). An  $\text{Eta}^2$  of .49 is surprisingly high, given the complexity and ambiguity of the file materials, the data collection and coding processes, and the exploratory nature of the research in which clear, a priori, decisions on most relevant variables were not based on solid prior research or theory in this area.

The stage 3 Increment to  $\text{Eta}^2$  reports the additional proportion of variance in the function accounted for by the groups with the addition of the investigation block of variables, over and above that accounted for in Stage 2 when the function was comprised of setting, participant, and participant homogeneity variables. In this case, the increment of .007, which falls just short of statistical significance, provides a quantitative measure of just how little the investigative variables contribute to the discriminant function. The distinction between gang-related and non-gang homicides is almost unaffected by elements of the investigation procedures; it is, in fact, principally characterized by elements of the incidents and,

within those, by suspect-related variables.

While the single discriminant function is a descriptive tool that tells us about the variables discriminating between the two groups, the classification analysis is a predictive tool, based on the same information, that provides the best guess as to which group a case belongs. The classification proportions reported above (80, 85, and 82.6% represent, in our view, a very satisfactory level of success compared with the approximate 50 per cent we might have had by chance alone. The function is a good tool for differentiating gang from non-gang cases.

Since classification rates can be distorted by derivation from the same cases used to derive the function, a cross-validation procedure was used by randomly dividing the LASD gang and non-gang cases in half. Using the discriminant function derived from the first half, we obtained an overall classification success of 81.1 per cent. The classification rate in the other half not used to derive the function was 82.2 per cent. Thus, we are confident in reporting these classification rates as being quite reliable.

(b) Model 2: Investigation variables entered first: When investigation variables are entered first, the resulting standardized discriminant function coefficients and total structure coefficients are almost identical to those just reported (generally differing only at the third point beyond the decimal). The ordering of the variables, Wilks' Lambda, the Canonical Correlation, and Eta Squared are all virtually identical as well.

The Increment to  $\text{Eta}^2$ , however, is very different (.274 as compared with .007) and statistically significant well beyond the .01 level. In other words, with only investigative variables entered ( $\text{Eta}^2=.22$  in Stage 1), a great deal of variance in the function was left unexplained by the two groups until the function took on other variables in Stage 3. This verifies in a comparative way the greater discriminating power of the setting and participant variables.

This is the only difference of any substance between the two models, however. The discriminant functions end up in stage 3 as virtually the same, and the classification functions similarly yield the same success rates; the figures under Model 2 are 80%, 85%, and 82.9% overall. For the analyses to follow, we have employed both models. We will report only the results of Model 1 in the interests of brevity, pointing out differences in results between the two models when and if they reach levels of substantive interest.

3. Three time periods: Discriminant analysis can be readily affected by small numbers of cases, small numbers making it more difficult for a variable to enter into the function. We have tried to combat this in two ways. First, we eliminated from the analyses any variables for which there were many missing values (usually because the information was often unavailable in the police files). This applies equally to all these analyses:

Additionally, in the LASD instance we combined some years to increase the numbers. In the report to follow, 1978 is employed

separately, as we felt it could serve as a "base" year. The years 1979 and 1980 were combined, since they represented the peak years of gang homicides, and 1981 and 1982 (a half year of data collection) were also combined as the post-peak period. Thus we ran three sets of discriminant analyses. The procedure is identical to that just described, but the reader should keep in mind that each new analysis may result in the inclusion or exclusion of different variables in the resulting functions; each application of the procedure is a new discriminant analysis. Since both sets of coefficients refer to the same variables, it will be more convenient hereafter to produce just one table, with variables ordered according to the standardized coefficients.

Table 11  
Discriminant Analysis Results,  
LASD, Model 1, for 1978

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Hispanic suspects	.424	.621
Difference in proportion of males, victims and suspects	-.421	-.395
Mean age of suspects	-.417	-.535
Gun present	.398	.383
Associated violent offenses	.330	.359
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.297	.664
Proportion of male victims	-.293	.228
Number of participants, victim side	.263	.566
Mean age of victims	-.243	-.321
No. of suspects charged with homicide	.178	.387
Number of participants, suspect side	.138	.550
Proportion of male suspects	-.005	.187

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -1.02840; gang, 1.37120]

Wilks' Lambda	= .41
Canonical Correlation	= .77
Eta Squared	= .59
Increment to $\eta^2$	= .006 (F=1.11, p<.30)
Classification Success:	
Non-gang	= 87.5%
Gang	= 86.1%
Overall	= 86.9%

Table 11 reports the results for the 1978 data. The Model 2 results were almost identical except, as before, for the Increment to  $\eta^2$ . Model 2 yielded a slightly better non-gang

classification rate (89.6%) and a somewhat lower gang classification rate (77.8%), but with small Ns these differences have little meaning. Model 1 misclassified 11 of 84 cases; Model 2 misclassified 13.

We can see in Table 11 that only one investigative variable, number of charged suspects, enters the function, and it is not of relatively major importance. Participant variables predominate as discriminators, followed by setting variables. Fully 59 per cent of the variance in the 1978 function is accounted for by the two groups, and classification success is quite high. This can now be compared with the results for 1979-1980, the period of most intensified gang homicide activity, shown in Table 12.

Table 12  
Discriminant Analysis Results  
LASD, Model 1, for 1979-80

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Hispanic suspects	.519	.549
Mean age of suspects	-.463	-.608
Number of participants, suspect side	.344	.585
Mean age of victims	-.337	-.391
Gun present	.337	.248
Street location	.328	.516
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	.233	-.318
Number of witness interviews	.176	.432
Associated violent offenses	.149	.393
Proportion of male suspects	.130	.488
Proportion of victims with priors missing	.123	.223
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.087	.421
Number of participants, victim side	.028	.272

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -1.30391; gang, 0.92041]

Wilks' Lambda	= .45
Canonical Correlation	= .74
Eta Squared	= .55
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .009 (F=1.86, p<.16)
Classification Success:	
Non-Gang	= 85.7%
Gang	= 88.2%
Overall	= 87.2%

Once again, Model 2 results closely resembled those for Model 1 except for the Increment to Eta<sup>2</sup> which, again, showed a major improvement over Stage 1 with the addition of the setting

and participant variables. With Model 2,  $\text{Eta}^2$  remains at .55 and overall classification success is 87.7 per cent.

There are some changes between the 1978 and 1979-80 variables which enter the discriminant function. However, it remains true in the later period that participant variables strongly predominate, and only two investigative variables appear. It is the suspect variables which have the highest structure coefficients, while the greatest single shift is the decrease in importance of the relationship variable (no prior contact). The fact that the investigative variables do not attain more importance in 1979-80, the period of the homicide peak clearly suggests that the peak should not be attributed to changes in the way cases are investigated, but reflect a "real" increase in gang homicides. Turning to Table 13 which displays the 1981-82 results, we see that there are some more striking changes.

Table 13  
Discriminant Analysis Results  
LASD, Model 1, for 1981-82

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Mean age of suspects	-.601	-.829
Street location	.394	.559
Number of participants, victim side	.371	.331
Proportion of male suspects	.275	.354
Number of suspects charged with homicide	.240	.302
Hispanic suspects	.185	.338
No prior contact, victims and suspects	.126	.199
Number of participants, suspect side	.037	.211

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -0.87356; gang, 0.84538]

Wilks' Lambda = .57  
 Canonical Correlation = .65  
 Eta Squared = .43  
 Increment to Eta<sup>2</sup> = .011 (F=2.16, p<.14)  
 Classification Success:  
   Non-gang = 80.0%  
   Gang = 87.0%  
   Overall = 83.7%

The number of variables entering the function is lower. While this might be attributable to smaller Ns, the number of cases in 1981-82 exceeds that for 1978 when twelve variables emerged. Eta<sup>2</sup>, or the proportion of variance explained, has also decreased notably from .59 and .55 in the prior years to .43 in 1981-82. Classification success for non-gang cases has dropped somewhat, although the success for gang cases has remained constant. Given the small numbers involved (12 cases mislabeled



as non-gang, 8 as gang), little importance can be attached to this change.

Within the variables listed, we note several changes. The proportion of all Hispanic suspects assumes far less importance in 1981-82, while suspect age emerges as a predominant discriminator, followed by street location. Participant and setting variables remain the most important. The Model 2 analysis performs exactly as it has before, so we are left with the overall suggestion that the discriminability between cases designated as gang and non-gang has decreased in 1981-82. This confirms a pattern noted in the earlier bivariate analyses, that there were far fewer gang/non-gang differences in 1981 and 1982.

What does one make of such a finding? First, it may be an anomaly having little significance; we are, after all dealing with short time periods and a variable phenomenon (number of homicides). Second, gang/non-gang differences may have been exaggerated as the peak homicide rate was approached in 1980, so that the 1981-82 lower discriminability represents a return to "normal." Third, Sheriff's personnel may have been designating more gang cases in 1981-82 as non-gang (a) inadvertently or (b) deliberately in order to reduce the gang homicide rate which did in fact decrease during this period. The failure of the investigative variables to manifest any difference over time in our analyses renders this third explanation less likely. Later in this report we will review other data to reflect on this issue

a bit further.<sup>23</sup>

In sum, the LASD discriminant analysis reveals a strong overall capacity for the participant variables to discriminate between gang and non-gang cases, and this is particularly true of variables describing designated suspects and other participants on the suspect side. Setting variables are of secondary importance, while investigative variables demonstrate the lowest association with the functions. The tertiary importance of these latter is confirmed by the use of alternative models for entering variables first.

Over time, discriminability shows a slight decreasing trend, with ethnicity in particular becoming lower in importance and suspect age becoming more important. The former was noted earlier in the bivariate analysis. The latter, judging from our data (not reported earlier) seems to be a function of non-gang suspects becoming older over time (23.9 in 1978 and 27.3 in 1982) rather than a function of gang suspects becoming younger. This is the sort of change which may reflect demographic changes over a five year period (as, indeed, may the decrease in Hispanic proportions among suspects).

D. Discriminant Analysis: L. A. Police Department Data

1. All years combined: The report of the LAPD data will follow the pattern just used for the LASD data. The only difference is that the time period is 1979, 1980, and 1981, so the three

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<sup>23</sup>See Section E on Gang Unit Involvement.

subanalyses will be for yearly data sets. The results for the combined years are presented in Table 14.

Table 14  
Discriminant Analysis Results,  
LAPD, Model 1, All Years Combined

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Mean age of suspects	.672	.767
Mean age of victims	.329	.507
Black suspects	.247	.134
Total number of interviews	-.246	-.408
Number of suspects charged with homicide	-.221	-.505
Proportion of male suspects	-.194	-.348
Gun present	-.181	-.318
Number of witness interviews	-.178	-.357
Number of participants, victim side	.159	-.311
No prior contact, victim and suspect	-.147	-.408
Number of participants, suspect side	-.138	-.415
Auto present	-.083	-.243

[Group Centroids: non-gang, 0.82487; gang, -0.86612]

Wilks' Lambda = .58  
 Canonical Correlation = .65  
 Eta Squared = .42  
 Increment to Eta<sup>2</sup> = .037 (F=5.00, p<.002)  
 Classification Success:  
   Non-gang = 74.5%  
   Gang = 84.6%  
   Overall = 79.2%

A total of twelve variables enter the function, most of them the same as found in the LASD analyses. Suspect variables in particular, and participant variables in general predominate, with age the outstanding contributor. The investigative variable, number of suspects charged with homicide, has quite a high structure coefficient. In combination with number of witness interviews and total number of interviews, it may be that investigative processes played a greater role in the gang/non-gang designations in the LAPD data than we saw in the case of LASD.

Total variance accounted for, at 42 per cent, is lower than in LASD, and classification success is also lower, although only slightly. With three investigation variables in the function, we observe for the first time a significant Increment to  $\text{Eta}^2$ ; the addition of investigation variables at Stage 3 did make a difference, though a very small one of under four per cent.

Model 2 yielded similar results, although auto presence, a setting characteristic, was replaced by a fourth investigation variable, number of designated victims. With four investigative variables out of twelve, one might expect the Stage 1  $\text{Eta}^2$  for Model 2 to be rather large, since investigative variables alone are entered in Stage 1. However, the  $\text{Eta}^2$  is only .20, slightly less than was found in LASD. It remains the case, then, that the investigation variables are of relatively less importance as discriminators between gang and non-gang homicide cases. Model 2 classification success is almost identical to that for Model 1, so once again we find that order of entry of the variable blocks makes little difference in the outcome of the analyses. We can now move to the yearly breakdowns of data, starting with the 1979 data in Table 15.

Table 15  
Discriminant Analysis Results,  
LAPD, Model 1, for 1979

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Mean age of suspects	.680	.542
Number of participants, victim side	.614	-.200
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	.431	.462
Number of witness interviews	-.400	-.474
No prior contact, victims and suspects	-.314	-.463
Number of designated victims	.305	-.267
Number of participants, suspect side	-.295	-.353
Difference in proportion of males, victims and suspects	.279	.348
Gun present	-.270	-.258
Black suspects	.238	.316
Number of suspects charged with homicide	-.223	-.174
Mean age of victims	.080	.537

[Group Centroids: non-gang, 0.82080; gang, -1.36800]

Wilks' Lambda = .46  
 Canonical Correlation = .73  
 Eta Squared = .54  
 Increment to Eta<sup>2</sup> = .058 (F=2.48, p<.07)

Classification Success:  
 Non-gang = 80.9%  
 Gang = 88.9%  
 Overall = 83.8%

2. Three time periods: In the 1979 function, participant characteristics predominate, with mean age of suspects and of victims having the highest structure coefficients. There are three investigation variables, one of which has the third highest coefficient (-.474). For the first time, both of the participant homogeneity variables emerge, mean age difference and mean ethnicity difference between victims and suspects. Eta<sup>2</sup> and the classification success rates are quite high.

Model 2 in this case shows a few departures from Model 1, although not of a substantive nature. The Model 2 function includes 13 rather than 12 variables. It includes two investigation and two setting variables rather than three and one. Its classification rates are slightly higher. The ordering of some of the standardized coefficients is slightly different. But none of these differences is major, and none affect interpretations of the data in any way.

Table 16 reports the data for 1980, the peak year for LAPD gang homicides--192 cases were reported, up 67 per cent from 1979. Such an enormous increase would be expected to affect the discriminant analysis. Larger numbers of gang cases could alone produce more variables in the function. More homicides might be the outcome of exaggerated gang structures, which would lead one to expect higher discriminability.

On the other hand, if some portion of the unusual increase is due to mislabeling of non-gang cases as gang cases, then less discrimination should result; the two groups should account for a lower proportion of the variance in the function, and the classification success rate for gang cases in particular should be lower.

Table 16  
Discriminant Analysis Results,  
LAPD, Model 1, for 1980

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Mean age of victims	-.735	-.510
Total number of interviews	.402	.607
Mean age of suspects	-.378	-.705
Mean age difference, victims and suspects	.365	-.179
Number of participants, suspect side	.272	.567
Auto present	.265	.402
Black suspects	-.241	-.129
Number of participants, victim side	-.239	.276
Number of suspects charged with homicide	.214	.525
Gun present	.141	.339

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -0.88348; gang, 0.76569]

Wilks' Lambda	= .59
Canonical Correlation	= .64
Eta Squared	= .41
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .042 (F=2.62, p<.08)
Classification Success:	
Non-gang	= 75.6%
Gang	= 80.9%
Overall	= 78.3%

The data reported for Table 16 are more supportive of the latter interpretation. Compared with 1979, the Eta<sup>2</sup> has dropped from .54 to .41; gang classification success has dropped from 89 per cent to 81 per cent. The two investigation variables have unusually high structure coefficients, suggesting that the lower discriminability between the gang and non-gang cases is associated with investigative processes.

This does not mean that gang homicide rates did not increase in 1980; rather, it suggests that in such a horrendous period of

gang killings, LAPD investigators may have begun to see gang connections where they did not before, to exaggerate the pervasiveness of the problem. This interpretation best fits the results of the gang unit involvement analysis as well (see Section E, following).

The Model 2 analysis reinforces this pattern, with another variable dropped from the function and one investigative variable, total number of interviews, achieving the highest standardized coefficient. The first stage  $\text{Eta}^2$  in Model 2, when investigative variables are entered first, reaches .27, the highest in any of the analyses undertaken for LAPD. In all the analyses offered to this point in the report, this is the first which so clearly suggests an investigative effect.

Table 17  
Discriminant Analysis Results,  
LAPD, Model 1, for 1981

Variable	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients	Total Structure Coefficients
Mean age of suspects	-.810	-.830
Total number of interviews	.269	.349
Proportion of male suspects	.253	.252
Number of participants, victim side	.237	.426
Number of designated suspects	.237	.564
Mean age of victims	-.208	-.434
Auto present	.125	.344
Number of participants, suspect side	.026	.450

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -1.00949; gang, 0.883311]

Wilks' Lambda = .52  
 Canonical Correlation = .69  
 Eta Squared = .48  
 Increment to  $\text{Eta}^2$  = .031 (F=2.44, p<.10)  
 Classification Success:  
   Non-gang = 81.0%  
   Gang = 83.3%  
   Overall = 82.2%



Finally, in Table 17, we see the data for 1981. Model 2 results are almost identical to those for Model 1, leaving the prior year of 1980 as the more exceptional one. The 1981 results produce a function with only eight variables, and 48 per cent of the variance in the function explained. Classification success rates are better than in 1980, but lower than those for 1979. Again, suspect variables appear to be the most important discriminators (as with LASD, suspect age has a very high coefficient in this last period), while ethnicity drops out of the function.

Summary: The LAPD patterns seem to be several. First, over the three years there is a decline (unrelated to  $N_s$ ) in the number of variables entering the discriminant function. Second, there is somewhat greater involvement of investigative variables than was seen in LASD. Third, the differences between the three years emphasizes the relatively poorer discriminability in 1980, the year of enormous increase in gang-related killings. Overall, the combined years function yields many of the same variables as were found in the LASD analysis, and a similar preponderance of participant variables, especially those pertaining to designated suspects.

While the discriminability is somewhat lower in LAPD, we are encouraged by several points of similarity in the two major analyses: (1) the variables are roughly comparable, (2) investigation variables play a relatively minor part in the gang/non-gang discrimination, and (3) both analyses seem

measurably sensitive to large changes in gang homicide rates. Thus the chances for external validity seem promising. The dissimilarities are less striking but should be kept in mind; LAPD discrimination between gang and non-gang cases is lower, and in the peak year, in particular, this may be a reflection of increased contributions of investigative variables. In the next section, this difference will emerge in yet another analysis.

#### E. Gang Unit Involvement

There are three principal procedures by which we have approached the question of the impact of police practices on identifying gang cases. The first was contained in the bivariate descriptive analyses in Sections IVA and IVB. These allowed the reader to see the differences between gang and non-gang files with respect to the category of investigative variables. The second was the discriminant analyses reported in Sections IVC and IVD, in which we found that the block of investigative variables were far less involved in gang/non-gang distinctions than the setting and participant descriptors.

We come now to a third approach to the same issue, one made possible by the existence of specialized gang units in the justice agencies in Los Angeles. While these include a specialized group in the District Attorney's Office (Operation Hardcore), another in the L.A. County Probation Department, and the Youth Gang Services Project initiated in 1981, the bulk of the gang unit involvement in homicide investigations was lodged

within LASD and LAPD.<sup>24</sup> Therefore we compared the files which did with those which did not contain mention of the gang units, leaving out instances of non-LASD and non-LAPD gang units, as well as cases in which the mention merely amounted to a notification or a "copy sent" entry. In other words, we looked more closely at cases in which a gang unit seemed to be involved, to some extent, in the investigative process.

1. The L. A. Sheriff's data: Of 312 gang homicide files, a minority, 129 or 41 per cent, specifically manifest gang unit involvement. The unit was usually OSS (the central gang intelligence group), a station gang unit, or the homicide gang investigation unit (MAGOT). In a number of instances, more than one gang unit was involved. With the growth of OSS in particular, there was more involvement, generally, as time went on, as shown in Table 18:

Table 18  
Gang Unit Involvement, LASD, Over Time

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982(1/2)</u>
Unit	16 (27%)	23 (27%)	44 (54%)	36 (62%)	10 (34%)
No Unit	<u>43</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	59	84	82	58	29

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<sup>24</sup>In 312 LASD gang case files, involvement of Operation Hardcore appeared 19 times, the Probation Unit and YGS never. In 152 LAPD case files, the corresponding figures were 20, 3, and 0.

In 1979, gang homicides in the Sheriff's jurisdiction increased rapidly. It was not until mid-1980 that the gang homicide unit (MAGOT) was established, and early 1981 that OSS expanded significantly. Thus the increase in unit involvement in 1980 and 1981 makes sense, but note also that these expansions cannot be used to "explain" the increase in homicides labeled gang-related; the case increase preceded the unit expansion.

What differences appear in investigation files in conjunction with gang unit involvement? First, we can report that the preponderance of cases with information missing on some of our variables (e.g., auto involvement, time of day, suspect-victim relationship, and gang affiliation) are cases without unit involvement. Unit involvement seems to lead to more complete information gathering (it seems less likely that gang units become involved in easier gang cases).

Second, gang unit involvement makes a significant difference in a total of 18 (or 35%) of 51 separate variables investigated with years combined. This is not an inconsequential difference. Equally interesting is the type of variables affected; eleven of the eighteen are among our investigative variables, while five are setting and two are participant characteristics. When year by year differences are investigated, the small numbers reduce the proportion of significant differences per year, but the relative proportion of investigation variable differences increases to 58 per cent. Included among these investigative variables are workload items such as numbers of interviews and number of pages

in the file, as well as "pay off" items such as number of arrests and number of homicide charges. It would be a reasonable conclusion that LASD gang unit involvement--the use of specialized officers--does precisely what it should, increase investigative thoroughness and increase clearance rates. The absence of differences in setting and participant variables suggests that this is probably not due to involvement of units in easier cases.

One final point can be made with these data; differences in investigative acuity over time (corresponding, for example, to gang unit expansion) cannot be demonstrated with our data. For instance the number of variables showing significant differences by gang unit involvement per year does not increase linearly (the progression from 1978 to 1982 is from 3 to 15 to 9 to 13 to 6) but may merely to be an artifact of the number of cases (see Table 18). This is in spite of a trend toward an increase over the five years in the proportion of investigative variables contributing to the differences attributable to gang unit involvement (from 0% to 53%, 56%, 69%, and 83% over the five years). There is, in other words, no evidence here to support a hypothesis that gang unit involvement changes the character of gang-designated homicides, only the care with which they are pursued.

There is, still, one final means at our disposal to look at the effects of gang unit involvement. In the original data collection process, coders were required to record the date on which various investigative events took place, including the appearance of a gang unit in the investigation. We hoped that the date of

gang unit entry might allow an assessment of gang unit involvement, and whether early involvement altered the characterization of a case.

Since this question reduces our data further to a comparison of early vs. later involvement among unit-involved cases only, we are dealing in this analysis with very small Ns. Early involvement is defined here as being on the date of the homicide or the next day only. In the LASD cases, this divides the numbers conveniently into 47 per cent early and 53 per cent later involvement.

Is early involvement of gang units involved with differences in types of cases? Not very much; in 80 variables with sufficient Ns to provide a test, early versus late entry yields only nine significant differences. Further, early unit involvement is not associated with more "gang-like" cases, as judged by the differences seen in our earlier bivariate analyses. Rather, the difference between early and late gang unit entry seems more associated with victim variables. This is interesting because prior analyses have produced more differences associated with suspect variables. Early unit entry is associated with younger homicide victims, victims with designated gang affiliations, and more participants on the victim's side. The only suspect variable emerging here is the number of unknown suspects.

This picture is consistent with a process of homicide investigation in which gang unit involvement is sought by homicide investigators primarily when help is needed. After all, it

is victim information which is more reliably available in homicides than suspect information, so it is more likely that the victim variables are the ones to be associated with the "calling in" of gang units. Additionally, if suspect information is readily available, there is less need for help from the gang unit. Thus it is cases with ambiguous or unknown suspects which may most benefit from the special knowledge available in gang units.

The importance of such a scenario for us, however, is not in documenting one aspect of the investigative process. Rather, it is that this process serves as an alternate hypothesis for early unit involvement to one that would be based on early entry as a determinant of designating cases as gang-related or not gang-related. Since early entry of LASD gang units is not associated either more or less with gang-like characteristics but does seem to fit this alternative hypothesis of investigative process, we have another "confirmation of the negative," i.e., we find little evidence that LASD designations of gang and non-gang homicides reflect police practice, but rather that they reflect "real" differences between gang and non-gang events.

Does early involvement of gang units relate to gang/non-gang differences over time? This second question about the timing of unit involvement is of a different sort. Here we return to a question raised earlier about differences over time. Consider the data in Table 19.

Table 19  
 Number of Variables with Significant Differences  
 Between Gang and Non-Gang Files

Year	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
No. of Variables	57	58	55	28	31

These data come from our bivariate analyses. They were confirmed in the discriminant analysis on the LASD data which showed a decrease in discriminability between gang and non-gang designated cases in 1981 and 1982. Why is there such a noticeable drop in 1981-82?

It is not because of changes in the frequency of gang unit involvement; proportionately more cases had gang unit involvement in 1981-82 (46 of 87 cases) than in the prior three years (83 of 225 cases). More gang unit involvement should have yielded greater, not lower, discriminability. Our thought was that greater involvement might have led to more early involvement and that this in turn might have resulted in "overlabeling" cases as gang-related.

In 1978-80, there were ten variables relating to the early-late entry dichotomy. In 1981-82, there were 26 such variables, suggesting indeed that it is time of gang unit entry that was at work here. But as we have just seen, the early-late differences did not relate to variables consistently distinguishing gang from non-gang cases, but rather perhaps to the process by which gang units get called into a case.

In considering the failure of the level and timing of gang



unit involvement to account for the 1981-82 decrease in discriminability between gang and non-gang cases, we are brought back to the chicken and egg question raised earlier. It may be recalled that a major interest in this project was in determining whether gang investigations--the definitional, investigative, and recording processes--were involved in the dramatic changes in recorded gang homicides. If such processes could be ruled out as a major factor, then the official reports could reflect, accurately, nothing more than the changes in gang behavior, not police behavior. The chicken and egg problem is captured in the difficulties of disentangling the events from the recording of them, and the increase in them from the increased police capacity to identify them. Which came first, the chicken (gang homicide increases) or the egg (police investigation responses such as might result from expanded gang units)?

On the basis of the foregoing analyses of the LASD data, we are inclined toward the chicken. In the case of the 1981-82 drop in discriminability between gang and non-gang homicide descriptions, we are inclined toward the hypothesis that this later level of discriminability--which is still quite high--is the more "normal" level. As gang homicides approached their exaggerated peak in 1979 and 1980, discriminability may have been unusually high in response to a caricature of the gang homicide. In our five year data set, it is the period of increase that represents the anomaly, not the normalizing years of 1981-82.

All of the foregoing leaves us with the not unreasonable

conclusions that LASD gang unit expansion and case entry are principally reactive, and that the results of gang unit involvement are better investigations rather than altered designations of cases. If such conclusions are tenable, then the corollary is that the participant and setting variables found here to differentiate between gang and non-gang designated homicides are not only reliable discriminators, but valid ones as well.

2. The L. A. Police data: Of 152 gang homicide cases handled in our sample of LAPD stations in 1979, 1980, and 1981, a total of 78 or 51 per cent had gang unit involvement. Most commonly, the unit was CRASH which, as the reader may recall, was not limited to gang cases. While CRASH units were initiated slowly into all LAPD Bureaus between 1973 and 1981, the sampled stations had CRASH units prior to the years of data collection. The other unit showing up in the files with most consistency was the downtown intelligence unit which, like OSS in the Sheriff's Department, was responsible for the final determination of a case as a gang case. With only a Lieutenant and fourteen officers, this unit was limited principally to the record-keeping intelligence function and less oriented to field operations than OSS. Changes in gang unit involvement over the three years are noted in Table 20.

Table 20  
Gang Unit Involvement, LAPD, Over Time

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
Unit	14 (41%)	27 (47%)	37 (61%)
No Unit	<u>20</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	34	57	61

Unlike the LASD case, the increase in gang unit involvement is similar to the increase in gang/non-gang differences in variables, which went from 25 to 27 to 38 over the three years. Thus we have for LAPD a preliminary indication of direct gang unit association with gang/non-gang differences recorded in the case files. In the majority of cases, as we noted, it was the investigative group, CRASH, that was involved, but CRASH did not receive homicide assignments until late 1981. The nature of the involvement in our cases is somewhat ambiguous, as a result, but as a patrol and "roll-out" group, CRASH may have had impact on homicide investigations via early entry into the cases. Our data indicate gang unit involvement on the day of the incident in 62 per cent of the 78 unit-involved cases.<sup>25</sup>

Unlike the LASD comparison, we find no difference between unit-involved and non-involved cases in information missing in the files, primarily because of the overall low level of missing data. Another difference from the LASD is in the distribution of

<sup>25</sup>-----  
Early vs. late entry of gang units produced only 2 significant differences over all years. There were so few cases of early and late gang unit entry per year that comparisons were not possible for the LAPD data, and the timing variable cannot be related to this discussion.

differences between unit-involved and non-involved cases across our three categories of variables. LASD differences were on 18 out of 51 variables, with the majority of these in the investigative category. The LAPD differences are in 14 of the 51 variables and are evenly spread across setting, participant, and investigative variables. The proportion of investigative differences does not increase with increased unit involvement as it did in the LASD files. Though the numbers are small, this may represent a second indication of more direct relationship between LAPD gang unit involvement and gang/non-gang differences of the setting and participant variety.

In the LASD data, we noted that changes over the five years in the number of variables significantly affected by unit involvement was not related to the increase in unit involvement, but seemed at best to be an artifact of the number of cases per year. Obviously this did not support any hypothesis, for LASD, of direct impact of gang units on changes in gang designation of homicide cases.

In the LAPD data, we find a different picture. The number of variables showing significant differences between unit-involved and not-involved cases was 23 in 1979, 5 in 1980, and back up to 24 in 1981. Something very striking seems to have taken place in 1980, the year of the great (67%) increase in numbers of gang-designated homicides. Gang unit involvement made essentially no difference in the character of the cases placed in the gang homicide category. It's as if specialization in gang

affairs and gang intelligence added nothing in 1980 to the delineation of gang homicides.

Did gang events become suddenly less gang-like in 1980 (e.g., fewer participants, injuries, drive-by shootings, etc.)? This could have produced the lower discriminability, but it would not explain the reduced effectiveness of the gang units. Did gang designations get applied to a broader number of cases, incorporating a larger portion of what would otherwise have been called non-gang cases? This would explain both the lower discriminability and the reduced effectiveness of the gang units. Thus we are inclined toward this second hypothesis--we are inclined, this time, toward the egg. The enormous increase in the number of reported gang homicides in 1980 may have been produced, in part, by changes in definition or designation practices.

This is not to say that an increase in gang homicides did not occur in 1980 in the LAPD jurisdiction. The LASD peak of 92 cases in 1979 was only slightly lower in 1980 at 83 cases, and other cities in the County peaked in 1980 with 76 gang homicides, seven more than in the prior year. Statewide and county homicide rates generally peaked in 1980 as we indicated earlier. Thus it is not the fact of the LAPD peak that is at issue, but the extent of it. We are suggesting, albeit tentatively and only by indirect data suggestions, that some form of definitional or designation change may have led to an increased proportion of homicide cases being labeled as gang related. Why such a process might have taken place in 1980 is certainly not discernible from our

data. Any increase attributable to such a process is in any case small in relation to the total numbers of gang homicides, so one should not try to make too much of our hypothesis. It is enough, for now, to indicate that we have another indication that investigation processes (rather broadly conceived in this instance to include designation) can be significantly involved in the reporting of gang homicide rates.

#### F. Gang Indicators - Analysis

In all the foregoing analyses, the descriptors of gang homicides and the comparisons of gang to non-gang homicides were comprised of "normal " criminological variables. These were variables about the incident setting, the participants, and the investigative process which might be applied across a wide range of criminal incidents. There was nothing intrinsically gang-like about them with the one exception, brought out in the analysis, of "drive-by" shootings.

In a sense, then, it is highly significant that so many variables did indeed differentiate between gang and non-gang incidents. But we have not yet dealt with some of the variables that knowledgeable gang investigators feel give the gang incident its very special flavor. These are the sorts of presumably gang-specific indicators that produce early recognition of a gang event, that allow an experienced gang watcher to accumulate an intuitive "feel" for the gang event. They are, in fact, so well entrenched in the presumed culture of or mythology about modern street gangs that to "investigate" their ability for gang/non-

gang differentiation seemed to us almost tautological. It is for this reason that they have not been included in the foregoing analyses.

However, because they convey some of the unique flavor of gang incidents, it seems appropriate here to present descriptive data on these specific gang indicators. They fall into two general classes. We shall refer to the first as categorical gang indicators because they can be organized into five conceptual categories having to do with gang characteristics or recognition. The second we shall refer to as cultural gang indicators, each of which is a specific item of gang argot, adornment, clothing, or behavior which generally signifies or suggests gang membership. There are 24 such cultural indicators in our data which in turn fall into two larger categories labeled argot and manifest indicators.

Because both categorical and cultural gang indicators are obtained from the same investigation files, it cannot be claimed that they are mutually exclusive. For example, a witness designation of a suspect as a gang member (categorical indicator) could well have been based on hearing the shouting of a gang term or seeing a gang hand signal (cultural). To the extent possible, coding decisions were specifically designed to minimize such overlapping, but it is safer not to undertake analytic procedures with these data which press the point (e.g., claiming that one indicator category appears twice as often as another). We will limit the description, accordingly, to notations of the numbers

of times or percentage of cases in which the indicators were noted by the coders.

1. Categorical-gang-indicators: There are five of these categories, each of which subsumes several items derivable from investigation files. In each case, the data reported here are the numbers of cases in which at least one item within the category appears in the file. Thus, any one homicide case can contribute to the numbers for all five categories, but only once in each.

a. Gang-motive: A case was recorded as involving a gang motive if the file revealed

- a specific statement of gang retaliation, or
- an indication of previous conflict between the same gangs, or
- an identification of territorial or neighborhood gang affiliation.

In the 312 gang files in the LASD cohort, exactly half (156) contained at least one gang motive indicator. Gang motive was found in only 6 non-gang files.

In the 152 LAPD files, gang motive indicators appeared at least once in 62 files (41%). In non-gang files, there were only two instances of gang motives.

b. Location: A case was recorded as involving a gang location indicator if the file revealed

- mention of the incident as being in a known gang area, or
- mention of prior gang activity in the area, or
- mention of gang graffiti in the area, or



- linking participants or non-participants with the area.

In the LASD files, 99 of the cases (32%) contained a location indicator. There were only 2 such non-gang cases. In the LAPD cohort, location indicators occurred in 62 (41%) of gang cases, and in only five non-gang cases.

c. Physical/Behavioral: A case was recorded under this heading if the file contained a description of clear physical or behavioral evidence of gang membership by

- the suspects (participating or behavioral), or
- the victim or victim's companions, or
- non-participants involved in the investigation.

In the Sheriff's cases, 174 (56%) contained indications of this category, as opposed to 22 instances (11%) in non-gang cases. In the LAPD cases, the corresponding figures are 83 (55%) and 14 (9%).

d. Participant Identification: A case entered this category if someone, e.g., witness, victim, gang investigator, clearly identified one or more persons as gang members. This occurred if such an identified person was

- a suspect (participating or designated), or
- the victim or a companion, or
- a non-participant involved in the investigation.

In the Sheriff's cases, 257 files, or fully 82 per cent, contained such personal identification. Fourteen non-gang cases, or seven per cent, also contained participant gang identifications. In the LAPD, the numbers are 129 (85%) and 20 (14%).

e. Incident identification: It also happens that an individual involved in a case may characterize an incident as gang-related, without reference to particular participants, e.g., "This was clearly a case of Clover getting back at Dogtown for last week's drive-by shooting." Cases fell into this category if they contained

- a specific statement of gang involvement from law enforcement, or
- a specific statement of gang involvement from a citizen, or
- a specific statement of expected or actual reprisal for a gang attack.

There were 121 cases of incident identification in the LASD gang files, or 39 per cent of the total. In non-gang files, only three cases contained such gang characterizations. In the LAPD files, 70 (46%) gang cases and six non-gang cases entered the category.

2. Cultural gang indicators: Two categories of specific cultural indicators, argot and manifest, capture a series of 24 items which are said to be particularly indicative of the gang culture. We should note here that, as is implied by the term cultural, some of these may refer to the Los Angeles region only, or more generally to Black, or Hispanic, or Mexican-American groups. Variations and alternatives can be expected in other settings, making the cultural gang indicators less generalizable in their specific content than the categorical gang indicators.

There is no reason to believe, however, that analogous cultural indicators would not emerge from studies in other settings.

The 24 specific items are listed below according to their placement within the argot or manifest categories.

<u>Argot</u>	<u>Manifest</u>
Cholo	Hairnet
Homies (Homeboy, Homegirl)	Beanie cap
Low rider	Pendleton
Cruising	Bandana/headband/handkerchief
Veterano	Teardrop tattoo
Flying colors	Tattoos of gang name or initials
Hoorahing	Gang name on clothes or personal property
Gang-banging	Hand signals
Pachucho	
Back-up	
Partner	
Blood	
Vato	
Cuz	
Turf	
Weapon terms (poppin caps, deuce-deuce, set gun, shank, shit, etc.,)	

For any given investigation file, any cultural indicator among these 24 was coded only once. For instance, if a witness used the term cholo three times, or three witnesses used the term once each, or two suspects were noted as having a gang tattoo, the coder would make one entry for cholo, and one for gang tattoo. We were merely interested in the occurrence of the item. But note that one witness statement could contain several of the 24 items, and each would be coded as present in the file.

In the data reported here, as was the case for categorical indicators, we count the number of cases in which at least one argot item is found and the number of cases in which at least one

manifest item is found.<sup>26</sup> In the Sheriff's gang cases, 135 (43%) contained one or more argot items, as compared to 21 non-gang cases (10.5%). Manifest items were found in 169 gang files (54%) and 23 non-gang files (11.5%).

The corresponding figures for the LAPD were 94 instances of the argot (62%) and 65 instances of the manifest category (43%) in gang files. In non-gang files, the numbers were 15 (10%) for argot and 12 (8%) for manifest.

3. Combined-gang-indicators: Having offered the frequency of occurrence for categorical and cultural indicators separately, and for the five subcategories in the first and two subcategories in the second, we can also seek the analogous figures across categories.

How many cases contain at least one of the five types of categorical indicators? How many contain at least one of the two cultural categories? Finally, how many contain one or more items of either the categorical or the cultural indicator type?

Table 21 reports the results of this combined inquiry.

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<sup>26</sup>There were, in fact, no cases with very many items mentioned. In the LASD cohort, a maximum of seven argot and five manifest items were found in a single gang file.

Table 21  
Occurrence of File Entries of Several Categories  
of Gang Indicators

Type of Case	Any of Five Categorical Types	Either of Two Cultural Types	Either Categorical or Cultural
LASD: All gang	273 (88%)	207 (66%)	280 (90%)
Non-gang	30 (15%)	38 (19%)	41 (20%)
LAPD: All gang	138 (91%)	111 (73%)	141 (93%)
Non-gang	30 (20%)	23 (16%)	35 (24%)

The combined sets of indicators, as would be now be expected, differentiate very effectively between gang and non-gang cases and allow one to label a gang case successfully at least 90 per cent of the time (assuming that case designation as gang does not lead to insertion of indicators). Interestingly, the categorical indicators do almost as well by themselves, and considerably better than the cultural indicators as a separate set both in LASD and LAPD.

4. Summary: There is some intrinsic interest that inheres in these data. More than any others we have to report, they capture something about the distinctive flavor of a gang incident. This is above and beyond the demonstration that gang homicides are more complex, more violent, and more visible than otherwise comparable non-gang homicides. Issues of motive, territory, argot and the like more quickly capture the imagination of the public, of justice officials, and of the media.

For readers of this report, several points should be made about this descriptive gang indicator analysis. First, because of the expected preponderance of indicators in the gang files, we have not bothered to offer the restricted gang/non-gang compari-

sons, as we did earlier. The point here was to catalogue the presence of the indicators, not to see ~~if~~ they differentiated between gang and non-gang cases. That differentiation was a foregone conclusion, so the non-gang figures are reported here merely to provide a baseline for judging the figures for the full gang cohorts.

Second, these findings refer to all years combined. Reviewing the data as broken out for the separate five years of the LASD cohort and separate three years of the LAPD cohort revealed no consistent change patterns. There is some between-year variance in percentage of cases with categorical indicators and cultural indicators, but no consistent increase or decrease in their appearance over time.

Third, and implied in the above, is the overwhelming consistency with which the various categories of indicator frequencies greatly exceed the non-gang baseline. There are, of course, several ways of looking at this fact. One is merely to comment on how clear this difference is. A second is to wonder why gang indicators do appear in about one fifth of the non-gang files. Is it that non-gang cases have been incorrectly designated by law enforcement? Or is it that gang and non-gang are not exclusive categories, but modal points on a continuum? Either and both explanations are logical and possible. Our data cannot provide a definitive answer; a definitive answer, in fact, does not seem likely or useful. The ability to characterize our cases as successfully as we have, given the complexities and ambiguities of

the incidents and the reporting/recording/investigative procedures, seems to us to be quite striking.

Fourth, as the data per category show, there is nothing inevitable about finding a gang indicator of any particular type in a gang homicide file. Inexperienced investigators (and researchers new to such files, certainly) should not expect that categorical and cultural indicators will leap out at them, permitting easy identification of a case as gang or non-gang. It is the indicators ~~in conjunction with~~ the setting and participant variables which will maximize the true positives and true negatives of identification. And one must add to this, on the basis of our earlier analyses, that such identification must be sensitive to the role of the sorts of investigation variables we have included in preceding pages. The investigation variables have emerged as ~~relatively minor but not negligible~~ contributors to gang/non-gang differentiation.

Finally, there is the contrast in the indicators analysis between the LASD and LAPD data. Actually, it is the absence of contrast that may be of some significance. Judging by these indicators, the two enforcement agencies reveal about the same proportion of gang case files, and non-gang case files, with gang indicator entries. The indicators are very similar in the two agencies in their ability to identify gang homicide cases. Yet we know from the discriminant analyses reported earlier that the Sheriff's Department cases yielded somewhat more successful discriminant functions as judged by proportion of variance

accounted for and by classification success rates. Further, we know that the LAPD peak year of 1980 showed the lowest discriminability and that investigation variables emerged more prominently in the LAPD functions.

These differences are not great, and they certainly do not permit one to say definitively that one department is a more successful designator of gang-related homicides than the other. But the differences do suggest that, within the overall stability of the comparative findings, there is room for inter-departmental variation and this variation may relate directly to investigative factors that affect definition, detection, and recording of gang cases. The sorts of criminological variables which emerged from our bivariate and discriminant analyses do relate to interdepartmental variation and variation between more and less active gang violence years. The sorts of variables employed in the gang indicators analysis, alone or in conjunction with these others, augur well for the processes of police identification of gang events.

#### V. Summary and Implications

Our analysis has been highly exploratory. In the absence of much prior research on differences between gang and non-gang crime, and with a veritable dearth of research on gang homicides, we have attempted to build a descriptive data base about gang homicides. The search for patterns was led as well by an explicit evaluation concern; since gang control programs tend to be judged by changes in gang crime rates, we wished to gather data



pertinent to the construction of such rates, in this case gang homicide rates. Therefore, certain aspects of police investigations of gang homicides also became a part of our research. And since the data for our descriptive interests were taken from the very police investigations being studied, we have had to deal as well with the "chicken and egg" problem when describing changes over time. The comments to follow reflect both on the descriptive and the evaluative issues. And while the chicken and egg problem cannot be resolved fully, identification of the investigative impact will also be addressed.

A. Differences: Overall

There can be little doubt, given the data presented here, that gang homicides differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from non-gang homicides. Most distinctly, they differ with respect to the participants. Gang homicide victims and suspects are mostly minority members, younger than other victims and suspects, with more participants on both sides of the affair. Participants are far less likely to have had prior personal contact with each other. For these reasons alone, investigative specialization may be justified in police departments of cities having large gang populations.

Secondarily, gang homicide settings differ from those of other settings. They are more likely to take place in public areas, to involve autos, more weapons, more associated offenses, and more injuries to other victims. Further, gang incidents are --expectably--characterized by a number of distinctive features which symbolize the "culture" of the street gang. Thus recogni-

tion of gang offenses is not ordinarily difficult for the experienced investigator, and changes in gang homicide rates can be documented, for evaluation purposes, by factors other than mere official designations of gang-related cases.

#### B. Confirmations and Surprises

Overall, findings such as those just described are not unexpected. Several items of particular interest may nonetheless be highlighted. For instance, some readers may be surprised by the relatively common instances of gang homicides involving participants on each side with no prior personal contact, but also by the relative absence of "innocent bystander" victims. Greater auto involvement fits the general picture of modern mobile street gangs, as do the preponderance of intra-ethnic relationships between opposing sides and the preponderance of minority group and male involvement. Finally, while gang suspects and victims are, as expected, considerably younger than their non-gang counterparts, they are older than might be expected of "youth gang" members. In the absence of good historical data, it is nevertheless our impression that gang homicide participants described here are older than their counterparts of two or three decades ago.

#### C. Stability Over Time

Our two sets of homicide cohorts were gathered over a 4 1/2 and a 3 year period. While we found and reported a few pattern changes over time, the predominant pattern was one of stability in the characteristics of the reported incidents and partici-

pants. This is particularly interesting because of the very major changes in both homicide rates and control measures which were encompassed by these periods. Again, for evaluation purposes, this short-term stability augers well for the assessment of rate changes attributable to intensive intervention efforts.

#### D. Assault and Homicide

Early in our exploration of homicide files, we became aware of how "accidental" many gang homicides, in particular, seem to be. The precipitating incident is often unplanned, chaotic, with multiple participants. Who becomes the final victim, or suspect, might often be difficult to predict at the outset of the incident. The difference between an assault and a homicide, we learned, may often be an inch.

Thus our findings in the LASD in particular are to us worth greater research attention, that the core of the incidents may better be characterized as assaultive than homicidal; i.e., the death may be the accidental outcome of a complex assaultive event. For program initiators and evaluators both, attention might better be directed to the control and assessment of assault incidents -- homicide rates may be reflections of more common and controllable assault rates.

#### E. Investigation-Variables

We initiated this research with the anticipation that reported gang homicide rates might reflect, to some extent, the nature of the investigative processes employed by enforcement agencies. Obviously, definitions make this true, but we were concerned with normal investigative processes. In our analyses, we found occa-

sional evidence for the investigative effect on these rates, but for the most part the effect was relatively negligible. The participant and setting characteristics of homicides, as well as the rates, showed little direct impact of investigative processes, while these processes did seem to yield somewhat more thorough and effective investigations when involving specialized gang units.

F. Interdepartmental Differences

The LASD and LAPD cohorts were studied separately for a number of reasons specified earlier. We warned against comparing the two sets of data on specific elements of the analysis. Still, some of the comparative patterns of results are worthy of consideration.

The bivariate analyses suggested that greater gang/non-gang differences in participants and settings characterized the LASD data. Since we believe that jurisdictional boundaries in Los Angeles are more arbitrary than gang ecology, such differences suggest either that the LASD field investigators more successfully distinguish between gang and non-gang homicides, or that gang designations are more differentiating in the LASD cases.

The discriminant analyses reveal a validating pattern; discriminability between gang and non-gang homicides is slightly higher in the LASD cohorts. Further, the gang unit involvement comparisons reveal a different pattern during the peak homicide years, in that greater differentiation occurs in the LASD data while the LAPD data suggest a peak year masking of gang/non-gang differences.

These differences are minor, not major. Both agencies successfully distinguish gang homicides from others. But such differences as do exist suggest greater differentiation by the Sheriff's Department. What might lead to this is of course highly speculative, but future research might consider in particular the nature of gang specialization. The LASD approach entailed greater involvement during these years in the investigative process; most LAPD CRASH teams were not given gang homicide cases until late in 1981. Thus one might recommend, however tentatively, a greater operational melding of the intelligence and investigative elements of gang control.

G. Methodological Qualifications

While the foregoing summary and implication statements seem to flow legitimately from the data, a project of this sort can lend itself to an infinite regression of further analyses and refinements. This is particularly true because of potential interactions between components of the research design -- methodological issues -- and certain of the statistical analyses employed. Clearly, one would want to minimize the chances of drawing substantive conclusions that flowed more from methodological anomalies than from legitimate data analyses.

There were, in particular, four methodological issues against which we felt compelled to test the stability of our results: a) station effects, b) data collector effects, c) effects of case status (active or inactive), and d) effects of case file location. While other challenges might also exist, these

four are inherent in the research methods employed in this study and therefore require examination in order to verify that our results were not seriously confounded by our methods.

We ask four questions about each of the methodological challenges: (1) Are there statistically significant additive effects or interaction effects stemming from these methodological issues? (This is an issue of complete or proper model specification.) (2) Are there variables whose entry into the discriminant function was blocked by the effect of any of these methodological problems?<sup>27</sup> (3) Were there variables in the bivariate analyses which would have discriminated between gang and non-gang cases had it not been for the effects of any of these methodological problems? (4) Do the most important variables in each discriminant function remain in the function regardless of the impact of any of these methodological problems?

The four methodological challenges derive from the following problems:

1. Station Effects: Among the many LASD and three LAPD stations, there may have been inter-station differences which, acting independently or in interaction with other variables, might have affected the results of the analyses. Each station, after all, represents a unique combination of demographic context, social organization, gang problem, and investigative practices.

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<sup>27</sup> Applied, for simplicity, to combined years analyses only.

2. Data-Collector-Effects: Because of the timing of personnel hiring and allocation of time to collecting data, collectors were not assigned at random to gang and non-gang cases. Thus findings pertaining to the discrimination of gang cases from non-gang cases might be reflections, in part, of collector differences.

3. Case-Status: While the majority of cases were "inactive", or closed, some -- especially in the last year of the test period -- were still active or open cases, cases not yet fully resolved. This active/inactive distinction might be expected to relate to some of the variables measured (for example, number of arrests or pages of investigation) and therefore to affect the results of the analyses.

4. File-Location: In LASD, for homicide cases, there was the distinction between cases in which our information came from "murder books" (generally more comprehensive) and "murder memos" (generally less comprehensive). For non-homicide cases, some files were in archives, others on microfilm, and others -- the bulk -- were located at the stations. These distinctions, in turn, might have related to the gang/non-gang distinctions and thus might have affected the results.

These four challenges were investigated, with respect to the four questions noted above, within the LASD homicide cases, the LAPD homicide cases, and the LASD non-homicide cases as covered in the Addendum to this report. To answer the first question regarding additive and interaction effects, regression analysis

was used. For each of the three samples the four most powerful discriminating variables (based on their standardized discriminant function coefficients) were used as independent variables; the methodological variables (station, data collector, case status and file location, coded as a single dummy variable or a set of dummy variables) were then tested to see if they significantly increased the explained variance in gang/non-gang designation. Next, interactions between the methodological variables and the discriminating variables were tested for a significant contribution to explained variance. To answer questions 2 and 3 regarding the potential masking effects of these methodological problems, MANOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Variance) was used. Finally, to address the fourth question, Discriminant Analysis was employed in much the same way as before, except that the methodological variables were used as control variables. The results are as follows:

1. LASD Homicide: Using regression analysis, neither additive nor interaction effects of station with the discriminating variables increased significantly the explained variance in gang/non-gang designation. There were, however, some effects on individual variables that are worthy of note. In the full model (all additive terms plus all interaction terms), the unstandardized regression coefficients for predominantly Hispanic suspects, street location, and the presence of a gun are no longer significantly different from zero (at the  $p < .05$  level). Additionally, the interaction between the presence of a gun and several of the



station dummy variables was statistically significant. These results might indicate that the relationships between suspect ethnicity, location, and gun presence and gang/non-gang designation are partly a function of station effects.

The MANOVA analyses indicated there was also a significant effect of station on the number of other victim injuries, suggesting that this variable might have entered the discriminant function with station effects controlled. Station effects on the bivariate variables were almost non-existent, with only weak effects on presence of autos and knives, suggesting that there was not a significant masking effect occurring in the bivariate tables.

Data collector effects were investigated for gang and non-gang cases separately because the timing of collector assignments led most to be given only gang or only non-gang cases. There were no substantial collector effects on gang cases. In non-gang cases, the only effects were on mean age of suspects, a variable in the discriminant function, and on proportion of male victims, a variable failing to enter into the function. While any effect is undesirable, an examination of the differences in the means of these variables across collectors indicates that the effects were limited and minor, suggesting that they had little impact on the discrimination between gang and non-gang cases. Data collector, as a variable, contributed to approximately ten percent of the variance in each of these variables.

Turning to case status (active/inactive), there was neither a significant additive nor a significant interaction effect on the explained variance of the gang/non-gang designation. Of those variables making up the discriminant function, only the presence of a gun was affected by adding the additive and interaction terms for case status to the regression model. Case status had no notable effects on the variables failing to enter the discriminant function nor on those failing to demonstrate a bivariate relationship with gang/non-gang designation.

The effect of file location (in this instance, "murder books" vs. "murder memos") was similar to that of case status. While this variable had neither significant additive nor interaction effects on the explained variance of the gang/non-gang designation, presence of a gun again had no significant effect on designation in the full model. The effect of file location on number of pages of investigation was to be expected (see p. 39); further analysis indicated that this methodological problem did not mask the relationship between pages of investigation and gang designation.

In sum, then, the methodological effects on the stability of the LASD homicide findings are minimal and scattered with the exception of the presence of a gun in the incident. This variable was strongly affected by three of the four methodological variables, raising questions as to its stability as a discriminator between gang and non-gang incidents. Therefore, as a further check, we recalculated the LASD discriminant analyses, for all years combined only, controlling separately for each of the meth-

odological variables (with the exception of data collector). There was no effective alteration in the contribution of the gun presence variable; it remains one of the stronger discriminators. As suggested by the MANOVA analysis, controlling for station effects, the number of other victim injuries does enter the function. However, its contribution to discriminating gang from non-gang cases is minimal and we are satisfied that the overall stability of the LASD homicide findings is high.

2. LAPD-Homicide: Dummy variables representing station contribute a significant additive increment to the explained variance of gang/non-gang designation beyond that explained by the most powerful discriminating variables. In other words, station adds information toward explaining the designation of incidents beyond that provided by those other variables. Since only three stations were included in the LAPD sample (compared to fifteen for LASD), the differences among them are much more apparent. Moreover, in this full additive model, the unstandardized regression coefficient for the predominance of Black suspects is no longer significantly different from zero. What appeared to be a discriminating effect of suspect ethnicity might in fact be a station effect. This may be the unavoidable result of the selection of the three stations with the highest gang homicide rates: one of these was predominantly Black, one predominantly Hispanic, and one mixed. Any variation due to race is irrevocably tied to station, and the two effects cannot be disentangled very effectively because only one of the three (the

one with mixed ethnicity) presents marginals within which variations can be found.

In addition, the interactions between station and the discriminating variables also add significantly to the explained variance of gang/non-gang designation, implying that at least some of the discriminating effects vary from station to station. This is most noticeable with regard to the total number of interviews. There were, however, no notable LAPD station effects on variables in the bivariate analysis or on variables not entering the discriminant function.

In LAPD, most data collectors collected roughly equal numbers of gang and non-gang cases, permitting us to check for differential collector bias between gang and non-gang cases. Although variables representing collectors do not significantly add to the explained variance of case designation, the terms for the interactions between those variables and the discriminating variables do. Additionally, the effects of mean age of the victims and the predominance of Black suspects are no longer significantly different from zero, while the effects of the interactions for mean age of the suspects and the total number of interviews are. Given the large number of variables (29) in the equation, however, statistical significance should be viewed cautiously as an indicator of important substantive effects, particularly since no clear pattern of an interaction effect emerges from the analyses. MANOVA analyses indicate that only the means for the total number of interviews vary significantly across collectors and this involves one collector almost exclu-

sively. As a variable, data collector did not have substantial, consistent or strong effects on the most discriminating variables in the function. There were no notable effects of data collector on the variables failing to enter the discriminant function nor on those failing to show a bivariate relationship with case designation.

There was no significant additive effect of case status on gang/non-gang designation, but the interactions between status and the discriminating variables do add significantly to the explained variance of case designation. Moreover, interactions between status and the predominance of Black suspects and between status and the total number of interviews are significant. This indicates that the relationship between gang/non-gang designation and both of those variables is different in active cases than in inactive cases. Further analysis reveals that, in fact, the relationships are in opposite directions. Thus, if the discriminant function has been misspecified at all it is in the direction of underestimating the discriminating power of the two variables, which are already relatively strong discriminators. It should be kept in mind, however, that the effect of the predominantly Black suspects variable is seriously confounded by station differences in ethnicity. Case status has no notable effects on other variables not in the function or not achieving significance in the bivariate analysis.

File location (in this instance, station vs. CRASH units) was not distributed evenly enough to permit any analysis.

In sum, the methodological challenges require little rethinking of the LAPD findings with the exceptions of the predominance of Black suspects and total number of interviews. Both of these were particularly affected by station differences. Rerunning the discriminant analyses with the station variable included verified this impact. The standardized discriminant function coefficient for the predominantly Black suspects variable dropped from .247 to .155; the numbers for total number of interviews were .246 to .216. (Because for this purpose we are interested only in the magnitudes of the coefficients, the signs have been ignored). At the same time, one of the station dummy variables proves to be a strong discriminator, having the second highest coefficient (.401 compared to .625 for the mean age of suspect, the strongest discriminator). Thus the station/race interaction is seen to be quite strong; within the LAPD data, we cannot be certain that race of suspects is an effective discriminator between gang and non-gang homicide incidents. A broader sampling of stations might have permitted this, but for now the race connection must remain conjectural. The effect on the total number of interviews is much less marked and does not substantially alter our original findings. By the same token, the data force one to be sensitive to jurisdictional differences, a caution not out of line with reasonable thinking about police responses to gang violence.

3. LASD Non-Homicide Violence: The analysis of these data is found in the Addendum to this report. The methodological challenges yielded no substantial effects for stations or data

collectors. A preliminary analysis (pp. 41-42) indicated that the research variables most affected by file location (archives, microfilm, or station) were the number of pages of investigation and the arrest histories of participants. File location was directly tied to the date of that incident, however, and thus its impact is most relevant to the overtime analyses in this report. Therefore, it was not an issue addressed by this supplemental analysis. Case status did not apply to non-homicide cases -- virtually all cases were inactive (closed).

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Analysis of Non-Homicide Violent Incidents

An Addendum to the Final Report on  
Evaluation in an Imported Gang Violence Deterrence Program

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Addendum: Analysis of  
Non-Homicide Violent Incidents

Introduction

This addendum to the report on gang homicides is based on data collected from two stations of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department only. Comparisons with the prior homicide data must be made with caution not only because of this restriction to two stations, but also for other reasons: these two stations are in very high gang activity areas; the data represent four rather than four and a half years of incidents; these are the only stations for which prior designation of non-homicide violent offenses as gang or non-gang were available for the years included here; the samples were collected equally from the two stations rather than in proportion to their gang activity levels; logs used for drawing the samples sometimes fail to distinguish between individual offense types such as assault, or rape, or robbery, using instead combinations such as robbery/assault which reduce comparability to the prior, "cleaner" homicide charge used in the earlier log-sampling process. Finally, as noted in the final report (pp. 41-42), the location of non-homicide investigation files varied by year. Station files, files in central archives, and microfilm versions varied in the amounts of incident

information retained. Number of investigation pages and participant arrest records were particularly affected, yielding questionably comparable indices over time.

As noted in the earlier analysis (see pp 35-38), we drew a sample of 280 violent gang incidents and a comparable sample of 243 non-gang violent incidents. These were both restricted, as in the homicide cases, to incidents with at least one name-identified suspect aged 10 to 30. Offenses included in the non-homicide sampling were armed robbery, attempted murder, house shooting, assault with a deadly weapon, other felonious assaults (excluding those on a police officer), rape and related sexual assaults, and felony child endangerment. Analyses of these data, based on data extraction and coding procedures used in the homicide cases, will be reported in roughly the same format as those found in the main report on homicides. The purposes of these analyses, however, differ somewhat as noted below.

#### I. Goals of the Analysis

We will report the analyses as they pertain to two major goals -- one methodological and one descriptive. By far the most important of these, the rationale for collecting non-homicide data, was the methodological goal. This pertains to the "chicken and egg" problem discussed in the report, the problem of separating changes in gang homicide rates over time from possible

confounding police practices in defining, reporting, and recording of incidents.

For clarification, let us use an imaginary example. Suppose that gang homicide rates in a city rise steadily for a few years, and then fall after the initiation of a gang intervention program. Let us suppose, further, that no careful evaluation of that program's impact was contemplated or funded. Clearly, our imaginary example has some reality built into it.

In such situations, it almost invariably happens that public officials claim success for the program based on the reversal in homicide rates concurrent with program initiation. Clearly, such claims may be justifiable, but equally clearly they may not because intervention programs tend to be implemented during upswings in undesirable rates, and often at or near the peak of those rates. Time series analyses have been designed to deal with such situations, but as yet have not been applied to the gang homicide situation.

But even time series analyses would be invalidated if the rates reflected not only behavior changes among gangs, but also definitional or recording practices among the police who are the sources of the reported rates. In our work, we wished to look at the second source of homicide rate changes. We have shown already, in the main report, that the evidence for major intrusion of investigative factors into the homicide designations as gang

or non-gang was rather slight. But the case could be strengthened by a comparable analysis of non-homicide cases.

The reasoning for this is simple. If police definition and recording practices were deliberately or inadvertently affecting rates over time in connection with the coordinated attack launched by the various agencies in Los Angeles County, this would be most manifest in homicide rates. It was the enormous rise in gang homicides per se that aroused the action by public officials. Any shift in operating definitions and recording practices -- either to augment or to diminish the rates -- would affect homicide rates, but presumably would not equally affect the rates for the more common events such as assault and robbery. The word equally is stressed, since the sheriff's gang unit was concerned with general violence, not just with homicide. If gang/non-gang differences in our data showed marked changes over time in homicide but not in non-homicide cases, we would have to suspect alterations in practice related to the public crackdown in gang homicides. If such changes (or no change) were about the same for homicide and non-homicide cases, then no such suspicion need be entertained. In this sense, then, the non-homicide cases serve for us as a methodological control on the homicide cases. By comparing gang/non-gang differences between the two types of cases, homicide and non-homicide, we get a reading on alterations in practices presumably related to altering the homicide rates.

The second goal in reporting the non-homicide data is purely descriptive. Most gang offenses, of course, are not homicides, and here we have an opportunity to describe gang/non-gang differences with respect to a broader assortment of violent offenses. The scientific literature is almost devoid of reliable characterizations of the nature of gang violence as contrasted with "normal" violence.

In the pages to follow, we will first present the bivariate data, as we did with the homicide cases. As a result, we will discuss our second or descriptive goal prior to our first, methodological goal.

## II. The Bivariate Analyses

Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3 display the non-homicide data in the same format as was used for the bivariate displays of the homicide data. Characteristics of the incident setting are shown in Table A-1, characteristics of the participants are shown in Table A-2, and investigative characteristics are shown in Table A-3.

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Insert Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3 about here  
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As was the case with the homicide data, most of the characteristics yield statistically significant differences between



Table A-1  
Setting Characteristics for Non-Homicide  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples

Characteristics	Gang (n=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Location</b>			.229**
Street	43% (121)	23% (57)	
Other Public	35% (99)	39% (95)	
Residence	21% (59)	36% (88)	
Missing	— (1)	1% (3)	
<b>Auto</b>			.202**
None	40% (111)	56% (137)	
Car Involved	52% (147)	42% (102)	
Shooting Out of Car	7% (20)	1% (3)	
Missing	1% (2)	— (1)	
<b>Cases with Drive-by Shootings</b>	(N=20) 85% (17)	(N=3) 25% (2)	n.s.
<b>Time of Day</b>			.173**
Daytime	11% (30)	21% (52)	
Afternoon/Evening	34% (95)	32% (77)	
Nighttime	55% (154)	45% (109)	
Missing	— (1)	2% (5)	
<b>Weapons</b>			
Guns Present	31% (88)	17% (42)	.163**
Knives Present	27% (76)	21% (51)	n.s.
Other Weapons Present	41% (114)	40% (98)	n.s.
Mean Total Number of Weapons	1.33	0.93	.168**

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (280 and 243). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 277 for gang and 235 for non-gang cases.

d. Includes sampled offense, which may or may not involve injury.

e. Unlike the station logging of homicide incidents, non-homicide incidents often appeared on the logs (and therefore in our sampling procedures) as multiple offenses, e.g. "robbery/assault" or "assault, possession of firearm, conspiracy." Since we sample incidents, number of associated offenses was coded as the number of offenses minus one. The inability to determine which should be the sampled offense among several is the reason for omitting "type of associated offense" in the table.

Characteristics	Gang (n=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Associated Offenses<sup>e</sup></b>			
None	55% (154)	74% (180)	
One	29% (82)	18% (43)	.199**
More Than One	16% (44)	8% (20)	
Mean Number	1.71	1.37	.173**
<b>Type of Associated Offense<sup>e</sup> Per Case with Offense</b>			
Other Homicide (e.g. Attempt, Conspiracy)			
Robbery		Not applicable to this analysis	
ADW			
Other			
<b>Other Victim Injuries</b>			
Cases with Injuries <sup>d</sup>	61% (170)	69% (168)	-.09*
Mean Number Injured Per Injury Case	(N=170) 1.41	(N=168) 1.19	.122*
<b>Unknown Suspects</b>			
Cases with Unknowns	28% (79)	10% (25)	.224**
Mean Number Per Designated Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.14	.05	.202**
Mean Number Per Case with Unknowns	(N=78) 2.20	(N=25) 1.84	n.s.
Mean Number Per Des. Suspect Per Case with Unknowns <sup>c</sup>	.52	.52	n.s.
<b>Fear of Retaliation Present</b>	12% (34)	9% (21)	n.s.

Table A-2  
Participant Characteristics for Non-Homicide  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples

Characteristics	Gang (N=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Participants</b>			
Total	5.25	3.28	.330**
Missing	6	3	
On Suspect Side	3.32	1.74	.333**
Missing	8	7	
On Victim Side	1.87	1.56	.142**
Missing	10	7	
<b>Relationship<sup>d</sup></b>			
No Prior Contact	53% (148)	35% (84)	.307**
Minimal Familiarity	15% (43)	6% (14)	
Clear Prior Contact	28% (79)	56% (136)	
Mistaken Identity/ Innocent Bystander	1% (2)	— (0)	
Missing	— (0)	1% (2)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Suspects</b>			
	(N=241)	(N=155)	.587**
No Mention	24% (58)	84% (130)	
At Least			
One Clearly Gang	65% (156)	12% (18)	
At Least One			
Possibly Gang	11% (27)	5% (7)	
<b>Gang Affiliation, Victims</b>			
			.225**
No Mention	88% (245)	98% (239)	
At Least			
One Clearly Gang	8% (22)	1% (2)	
At Least			
One Possibly Gang	4% (12)	— (0)	
Missing	— (1)	1% (2)	

**Legend**

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (280 and 243). Where Ns differ, e.g., by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. Reported by individual, rather than by case.

d. In each sample, 3% were coded "ambiguous."

Characteristics	Gang (N=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
<b>Mean Age</b>			
Suspects	(N=241) 19.45	(N=154) 22.88	-.369**
Victims	(N=278) 24.51	(N=238) 26.84	-.101**
<b>Gender</b>			
Suspects, All Male	(N=241) 91% (219)	(N=155) 88% (137)	n.s.
Victims, All Male	66% (186)	54% (130)	.132**
<b>Ethnicity, Suspects<sup>c</sup></b>			
	(N=507)	(N=207)	.238**
Black	— (1)	3% (7)	
Hispanic	98% (495)	86% (179)	
White	2% (9)	10% (21)	
Other	—	—	
<b>Ethnicity, Victims<sup>c</sup></b>			
	(N=435)	(N=287)	.156**
Black	1% (4)	2% (6)	
Hispanic	87% (380)	77% (220)	
White	9% (38)	18% (53)	
Other	2% (8)	2% (6)	

Table A-3  
Investigation Characteristics for Non-Homicide  
Gang and Non-Gang Samples

Characteristic	Gang (N=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Pages of Investigation Means	10.18	6.54	.301**
Interviews			
Total Per Case	4.69	3.18	.257**
With Designated Participants	3.01	2.00	.291**
With Witnesses	.73	.62	n.s.
With Informants	.94	.55	.128**
Proportion with All Designated Part. Minus Unknown Suspects <sup>c</sup>	.81	.78	n.s.
Charged Suspects			
Cases with Charges	86% (241)	64% (155)	.259**
Mean Suspects Charged Per Charged Case	(N=241) 2.11	(N=155) 1.34	.257**
Suspects Charged Per Suspect Side Participant	.749	.869	-.160**

Legend

a. Most variables refer to the number of cases (280 and 243). Where Ns differ, e.g. by reason of sub-sampling or use of participants rather than cases, the different Ns are indicated.

b. Significance levels were determined as appropriate by chi squares or t-tests. Levels of association in the last column were determined as appropriate by Phi, Cramer's V, or Pearson's r, respectively, for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables, and interval level data. A single asterisk (\*) denotes the .05 level of significance; a double asterisk (\*\*) denotes the .01 level.

c. See the earlier discussion of suspect/victim cases. These are deleted in the table from all variables involving police designation of suspects or victims (non-suspect victims). The resulting Ns here are 277 for gang and 235 for non-gang cases.

Characteristic	Gang (N=280) <sup>a</sup>	Non-Gang (N=243) <sup>a</sup>	p <sup>b</sup>
Arrests			
Cases with Arrests Missing	88% (243) 1% (4)	67% (160) 1% (3)	.258**
Number of Arrests in Cases with Arrests <sup>c</sup>	1.94	.90	.331**
Number of Arrests Per Suspect <sup>c</sup>	.68	.59	.100*
Designated Participants <sup>c</sup>			
Des. Suspects	2.80	1.58	.330**
Des. Suspect Per Susp. Side Participant	.94	.95	n.s.
Des. Vict. Per Victim's Side Participant	1.61	1.21	.207**
Des. Vict. Per Victim's Side Participant	.89	.88	n.s.
Witness Addresses			
Cases with Witness Address Missing	4% (12)	6% (14)	n.s.
Mean Witness Addresses Missing Per Case with Address Missing	(N=12) 2.17	(N=14) 1.71	n.s.

gang and non-gang cases. The directions of the differences are the same, and the predominance of those pertaining to participant characteristics remains true. But while the patterns are similar, the coefficients of association are quite often lower. By ratios of 10 to 5 (setting), 11 to 1 (participant), and 9 to 7 (investigation), the corresponding associations are higher in the homicide cases. Thus homicide differences between gang and non-gang cases are similar in pattern but more pronounced in character. The fact that investigative variables were least different is suggestive of a differential impact of these as compared to setting and participant variable.

While comparisons of individual items across homicide and non-homicide cases must be treated cautiously, several of these form a pattern that is interesting. Guns were noted as present in 31 percent of non-homicide gang cases but in 80 percent of homicide gang cases. A similarly enormous difference, 17 percent and 60 percent, describes non-gang cases. Other particularly large differences are found for presence of associated offenses, other victim injuries, and number of participants. We see these particular differences as expanding our earlier suggestion about gang homicides as being more complex incidents than non-gang homicides. Now we would suggest that various sorts of gang incidents are more complex events than their non-gang counterparts. Gang homicide prevention or reduction programs may miss their

mark by concentrating on homicides only and might better concentrate on factors relating to more broadly conceived gang violence.

At the same time, we should note that gang affiliation of victims is not noted in 45 percent of homicide cases but in 88 percent of non-homicide cases. This suggests that the gang homicides are more likely by-products specifically of inter-gang incidents, perhaps because these are in turn more likely to involve larger numbers of willing participants on both sides, and participants more likely to be armed. Gang homicides, that is, may not be just random by-products, but by-products of non-random confrontations. However, our earlier caution about reduced levels of information in some non-homicide files should be recalled, since these levels could also account for a portion of this observed difference.

### III. Trends Over Time

If homicide and non-homicide incidents were handled with equal attention to their intrinsic elements, we should find similar patterns of gang/non-gang differences for the two offense categories. As noted above, that is what we found. If homicide and non-homicide incidents were handled without differential concern for the public response to gang killings, then we should find similar patterns of gang homicide and non-homicide characteristics over time. We turn to this issue now, using several of

the approaches employed in the main body of the report.

Table A-4 repeats the content of Table 5 from the main report, where each x indicates the pattern exhibited over five years by 31 variables describing the gang incidents only. Table A-4 adds to this the patterns exhibited over four years by the nonhomicide violent gang incidents, each of these indicated by a V.

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Insert Table A-4 about here  
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As is immediately clear, the homicide and non-homicide patterns are not the same. Curvilinear patterns appeared for 10 homicide characteristics, but for no non-homicide characteristics.<sup>1</sup> There were seven homicide and eight non-homicide linear patterns, but only two of them are the same. There were fourteen characteristics with no pattern in homicide data, but twenty-two in the non-homicide data.

Stated otherwise, whereas some form of pattern appeared for the majority of homicide characteristics, the existence of no pattern is found for over two-thirds of the non-homicide charac-

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<sup>1</sup> The reduction from five to four years might account for some, but certainly not all, of this difference. Lower levels of information in the non-homicide files may have contributed to the higher evidence of non-patterned variables as well.

Table A-4  
Case Characteristics by Patterns Over Time for LASD  
Homicide (X) and Non-Homicide (V) Offenses (Gang Only)

<u>Setting</u>	<u>No Pattern</u>	<u>Linear*</u>	<u>Curvilinear</u>
Location on Street	X V		
Car Present	V		X
Nighttime	V	X(-)	
Gun Present	X V		
Knife Present	X V		
Other Weapons Present	X V		
Number of Weapons		X(-) V(-)	
Mean No. Associated Offenses	X V		
ADW as Associated Offense		Not applicable to this analysis	
Other Victim Injuries	V		X
Unknown Suspects			X
Per Designated Suspect	V		X
Fear of Retaliation	V	X(+)	
<u>Participants</u>			
Total		V(-)	X
Suspect Side		V(-)	X
Victim Side		V(-)	X
No Prior Contact	X V		
Clear Relationship	X V		
Gang Affiliation			
-Suspects	X	V(-)	
-Victims	X V		
Mean Age-Suspects	X	V(+)	
-Victims	V	X(+)	
Gender	X V		
Ethnicity-Suspects	V	X(-) Hispanic	
-Victims	X V	X(+) Black	
<u>Investigation</u>			
Number of Pages		X(+) V(+)	
Interviews	V	X(+)	
Charged Suspects	X V		
Arrests	V		X
Designated Suspects	V		X
Designated Victims		V(-)	X
Designated Suspects and Victims as Proportion of Participants	X V		

\* (-) means decrease, (+) means increase over time.

teristics. Of the changes to be seen in Table A-4, the most disturbing is the total absence of curvilinear patterns among non-homicide cases, since this suggests the homicide peak of 1979-80 might in part reflect investigative and reporting practices as well as gang behavior changes. After all, assaults also peaked in 1980, as did robberies in 1981, but these do not seem to be reflected in the data summarized in Table A-4. Since the differences in the table are notable but not overwhelming, however, we take them to be more suggestive than definitive.

Implied in the data of Table A-4, however, is a non-independent form of confirmation. It will be recalled that homicide cases with associated assault offenses yielded a 1980 peaking of those assault-involved incidents. These assault-related incidents also had gang characteristic peaks in 1980 for car present, injuries, unknown suspects per designated suspect, total participants, total suspects, total victims, arrests, designated suspects, and designated victims. The absence of these peaks in violent incidents which don't lead to homicide is puzzling, and does not support our earlier tentative suggestion that gang homicides are often an accidental by-product of violent confrontations. It may be that violent incidents leading to homicide are qualitatively different from those that do not. If so, associated variables and precursors may be identifiable to the end of reducing such incidents.



Among our non-homicide cases, how different are the gang and non-gang patterns over time? Twenty-two characteristics show no pattern in gang cases, while twenty-one show no pattern in non-gang cases. Both groups, then, reveal relative stability over time. These twenty-two and twenty-one characteristics contain 15 common items, so that this stability is roughly shared. Most of the linear gang patterns disappear when viewing the non-gang cases, and non-gang cases show six curvilinear patterns where gang cases showed none, three of these involving presence of weapons. As in the gang/non-gang homicide comparisons, there is little in these similarities and differences that seems conceptually meaningful. The presence of curvilinear patterns over time in non-gang but not in gang cases is, if anything, opposite to the situation with homicide cases, so perhaps this constitutes an additional suggestion that investigators handled gang homicides differently from gang non-homicide incidents. If so, the evidence is again suggestive but far from definitive.

Finally, we can compare these data with the homicide data with respect to the 1981 pattern noted earlier, namely that a number of the variables showed a "markedly different" pattern in 1981. We suggested that, because the pattern involved decreased gang/non-gang differences, there was a suggestion of a "crack-down" in that year. The particular variables involved suggested such a pattern.

The non-homicide data do not reveal a similar pattern, al-

though the 1981 differences are indeed smallest for fully one half the variables. This pattern is too weak to corroborate a police "crackdown" hypothesis, yet consistent enough to be considered somewhat similar to the homicide pattern. The conclusion can only be equivocal.

What have we learned thus far from this homicide/non-homicide comparison? There is more of a suggestion in these data than was obtained from the homicide data alone that police procedures might have influenced the reported homicide rates. But given the sampling differences, a suggestion hardly makes a strong case; the comparison does not allow one to depart with any confidence from our earlier conclusion about the LASD homicide data, that the gang/non-gang differences are far more reflective of participants' behavior than of police practices.

Another way of looking at this question is perhaps more directly focused on the issue, and that is the effect of gang unit involvement. The homicide data suggested that involvement of the LASD gang units led to more thorough investigations with better output rates. If homicide crackdowns were being used to affect homicide rates specifically, then a comparison of the effects of gang unit involvement in non-homicide incidents might prove illuminating.

#### IV. Gang Unit Involvement

Generally speaking, one would expect the data on gang unit

involvement in non-homicide cases to resemble those for the homicide cases, if gang investigation units were not involved in altering the homicide rates disproportionately, however inadvertently. The one exception to this expectation would be that there might be fewer cases, proportionately, of gang unit involvement in non-homicide cases overall, simply because these are the less serious cases, those calling for a lower level of investigative expertise.

On the other hand, major departures from the homicide pattern, especially those exhibiting fewer differences associated with unit involvement in non-homicide cases, could be taken as indications of investigative impact on the labeling of homicides as gang-related. This and the contrary hypothesis were investigated by comparing the LASD gang unit involvement findings in the main body of this report with the data for the non-homicide cases.<sup>2</sup>

We can describe the comparisons quite briefly, without reference to tabular material, because -- as anticipated -- there were significantly fewer instances of gang unit involvement in the

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2 The analysis of gang unit involvement in non-homicide cases is limited to gang-designated cases, as it was in the homicide cases. Gang unit involvement in non-gang cases comprised only 5% of the total, or 13 cases. It should be noted that the homicide analysis included all gang cases (i.e. sampling restrictions not applied), whereas the non-homicide gang sample includes only those cases with at least one identified suspect between 10 and 30 years of age.

non-homicide cases. Whereas across all years the homicide cases included 41 percent with an indication of gang unit involvement, the corresponding figure for the non-homicide cases was 28 percent, or 78 out of 280 gang-designated cases. This reduction makes our comparisons less likely to reveal major pattern departures.

-----The homicide data revealed an increase in the gang unit involvement over time, an increase expectable with the continuing increase in the size of the gang investigation program in the Sheriff's Department. The same pattern is found in the non-homicide data, progressing from 7 to 16 to 33 to 54 percent over the four years in question. There is nothing here to suggest a differential pattern between homicide and non-homicide cases.

-----In the homicide cases, gang unit involvement was associated with significant differences on 18 of 51 measured variables, most of these being investigative rather than setting or participant variables. In the non-homicide cases, the figure is 8 out of 51 variables, a change worth noting but not definitive and perhaps limited by the smaller number of cases. Again, the variables involved were principally the investigative variables. This comparison, yielding similar patterns, provides no evidence of any intrusion of investigative procedures into the classification of homicides as gang or non-gang cases.

-----In the gang homicide cases, the relative contribution of investigative variables attributable to unit involvement increas-

ed over time. The number of such investigative contributions was too low among non-homicide cases to provide a reliable comparison, but the largest number occurred in the 1979 cases, as was true in the homicide data.

-----Early versus late entry of gang units into the investigative process of gang homicide cases made little difference, and was not associated with case difficulty. In the non-homicide cases, there were only two variables related to entry time, so no comparison is possible.

In sum, the gang unit involvement data yield little evidence of investigative impact in the designation of cases as gang or non-gang. Low numbers of instances (fewer gang unit involvements) may be responsible for this in part, but in addition these patterns which do emerge are far from clear in their implications for the effects of police practices in homicide designations. Some might say that this very fact is significant, since unit-involved cases are the ones most prone to investigator influence.

#### V. Gang Indicators Analysis

In the main body of this report, the gang indicators data were limited to descriptive rather than analytic purposes because of their potentially tautological nature. They documented the rather "unique flavor" of the gang homicide incidents. Thus the methodological control function of the non-homicide gang indica-

tors data must similarly be limited.

Because non-homicide incidents involve fewer participants and less extensive investigations, we should expect a lower proportion of cases with gang indicators noted in the files. Such lower numbers could not be taken as pertinent to investigative impact in gang designation of the homicide cases. However, radical departures in the ratios of indicators in the gang and non-gang might more readily reflect such impact. The relevant data are reported in Table A-5 for the homicide and non-homicide cases.

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Insert Table A-5 about here  
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Included in Table A-5 are the proportions of cases for which at least one indicator of each type was found in the investigative files. The numbers and percentages are reported for each of the five "Categorical" types (Motive, Location, Physical/Behavior, Participant Identification, and Incident Identification); for each of the two "Cultural" types (Argot and Manifest); and for any Categorical type, any Cultural type, and any case with either a Categorical or Cultural type.

As can be seen, the data confirm the expectation of lower percentages in each category. More importantly, the ratios of the gang to non-gang percentages are quite strikingly similar in most instances. This provides no support for the investigative

Table A-5: Gang Indicators for Homicide and Non-Homicide Cases

Indicator	Homicide			Non-Homicide		
	(312) Gang	(200) Non-gang	percentage ratio	(280) Gang	(243) Non-gang	percentage ratio
Motive:	156 (50%)	6 (3%)	16.7 to 1	36 (13%)	1 (0.5%)	26 to 1
Location:	99 (32%)	2 (1%)	32 to 1	26 (9%)	0 ---	
Phys/Beh:	174 (56%)	22 (11%)	5.1 to 1	123 (44%)	16 (7%)	6.3 to 1
Part. Ident:	257 (82%)	14 (7%)	11.7 to 1	159 (57%)	15 (6%)	9.5 to 1
Incid. Ident:	121 (39%)	3 (1.5%)	26 to 1	36 (13%)	4 (2%)	6.5 to 1
Argot:	135 (43%)	21 (10.5%)	4.1 to 1	43 (15%)	2 (1%)	7.5 to 1
Manifest:	169 (54%)	23 (11.5%)	4.7 to 1	119 (43%)	22 (9%)	4.8 to 1
Any Categorical:	273 (88%)	30 (15%)	5.9 to 1	201 (72%)	29 (12%)	6 to 1
Either Cultural:	207 (66%)	38 (19%)	3.5 to 1	138 (49%)	23 (9%)	5.4 to 1
Either Categorical or cultural:	280 (90%)	41 (20.5%)	4.4 to 1	211 (75%)	36 (15%)	5 to 1

impact hypothesis. Indeed, overall the non-homicide cases provide slightly better discrimination,

#### VI. Discriminant Analysis

The non-homicide data to date have described the gang/non-gang comparisons and tested the possibility that homicide cases were treated differently, yielding exaggerated gang homicide rates. It remains, now, to report the discriminant analysis of the non-homicide data, much as we did for the homicide data.

Tables A-6 through A-9 report the results of the non-homicide discriminant analyses in the same form as we reported the homicide data in the main body of the report. The most general conclusions to be drawn about the comparison between the two sets of data include the following:

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Insert Tables A-6 through A-9 about here  
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1. The non-homicide  $\eta^2$ s are substantial, but lower.
2. The non-homicide classifications success rates are substantial, and slightly lower.
3. The non-homicide Model 2 results (not shown here) parallel those for the homicide Model 2 analysis; i.e., the variables entering the function are not substantially altered by entering the investigative block first (though some variables are added), and investigative variables remain a lesser block of



Table A-6  
Discriminant Analysis Results  
Non-homicide, Model 1, All Years Combined

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficient	Total Structure Coefficient
Mean age of suspects	-.518	-.678
Number of participants, suspect side	.266	.567
Robbery as case offense	.217	.329
Hispanic suspects	.217	.325
Pages of investigation	.175	.523
No prior contact, victim and suspect	.167	.327
Number of suspects charged with violent offense	.163	.583
Number of case offenses	.150	.365
Proportion male suspects	.149	.252
Auto present	.144	.304
Hispanic victims	.144	.219
Street location	.134	.328
Mean age of victims	-.098	-.177
Number of participants, victim side	.089	.241
Gun present	.089	.258
Difference in proportion of males, victims and suspects	-.061	-.218

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -0.78077; gang, .65360]

Wilks' Lambda	= .66
Canonical Correlation	= .58
Eta Squared	= .34
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .015 (F = 5.31, p < .005)
Classification Success:	
Non-gang	= 74.2%
Gang	= 78.9%
Overall	= 76.7%

\* Includes both sampled and associated offenses.

Table A-7  
 Discriminant Analysis Results  
 Non-homicide, Model 1, for 1978

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficient	Total Structure Coefficient
Mean age of suspects	-.744	-.765
No prior contact, victim and suspect	.394	.249
Number of participants, victim side	.334	.364
Difference in proportion males, victims and suspects	-.327	-.194
Night occurrence (10pm-6am)	-.279	.016
Number of participants, suspect side	.246	.507
Mean age of victims	-.244	-.220
Proportion male suspects	.226	.273
Gun present	.222	.318
Number of suspects charged with violent offense	.198	.447
Hispanic victims	.187	.260

[Group Centroids: nongang, -1.08918; gang, .94864]

Wilk's Lambda	= .49
Canonical Correlation	= .72
Eta Squared	= .51
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .008 (F = 1.70, p < .195)
Classification Success:	
Non-gang	= 83.3%
Gang	= 83.9%
Overall	= 83.6%

Table A-8  
 Discriminant Analysis Results  
 Non-homicide, Model 1, for 1979-80

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficient	Total Structure Coefficient
Mean age of suspects	-.460	-.587
Robbery as case offense	.429	.463
Hispanic victims	.295	.253
Car present	.272	.336
Number of participants, suspect side	.257	.579
Difference in proportion males, victims and suspects	-.241	-.347
Pages of investigation	.196	.514
Hispanic suspects	.194	.329
Night occurrence (10pm - 6am)	.156	.249
Number of participants, victim side	.142	.239
Number of case offenses	.126	.375
Proportion male suspects	.106	.201
No prior contact, victim and suspect	.080	.352

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -.82655; gang, .67851]

Wilk's Lambda	= .64	
Canonical Correlation	= .60	
Eta Squared	= .36	
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .006	(F = 2.16, p<.143)
Classification Success:		
Non-gang	= 73.5%	
Gang	= 77.2%	
Overall	= 75.5%	

\* Includes both sampled and associated offenses.

Table A-9  
 Discriminant Analysis Results  
 Non-homicide, Model 1, for 1981

	Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficient	Total Structure Coefficient
Hispanic suspects	.458	.406
Numbers of participants, suspect side	.388	.426
Mean age of suspects	-.354	-.534
Number suspects charged w/violent offense	.347	.594
Number of participants, victim side	-.345	-.027
Street location	.334	.311
Difference in proportion males, victims suspects	.327	.072
Mean age of victims	-.313	-.169
Robbery as case offense	.284	.253
Proportion suspects with missing priors	-.277	-.292
Hispanic victims	-.229	.023
Car present	.228	.258
Numbers of case offenses*	.218	.368
Proportion male suspects	.213	.228

[Group Centroids: non-gang, -.94098; gang, .78876]

Wilk's Lambda	= .57
Canonical Correlation	= .66
Eta Squared	= .43
Increment to Eta <sup>2</sup>	= .051 (F = 4.92, p<.009)
Classification Success;	
Non-gang	= 75.9%
Gang	= 82.4%
Overall	= 79.4%

contributors than setting and participant variables.

4. Changes over the three time periods are not substantial; the period of lower discriminability between gang and non-gang cases is 1979-80, but the difference seems negligible.

5. The relative size of the investigative coefficients is somewhat higher in the non-homicide case, with pages of investigation and number of charged suspects being more prominent. This is opposite to the effect one would anticipate on the basis of the investigative impact hypothesis. If police manipulation of case designations of homicides had been under way, we would have expected more investigative impact in the homicide analysis than in the non-homicide analysis.

Taken together, these five statements seem to confirm the absence of evidence for the investigative impact hypothesis. Homicide and non-homicide data, when subjected to discriminant analysis, have not revealed differential patterns of a sort to suggest that LASD case investigations of homicide were affected by the intent to misapply gang or non-gang labels.

One cautionary note for future research is in order, on the basis of these non-homicide data. Comparing these with the homicide data (see Table 10 in the main report), we find the ordering of variables, according to their coefficients, and the content of the variables as well to be quite different. This can cause problems for the proposed development of a gang indicator index which would be equally applicable to both homicide and

non-homicide violent incidents. Whether this problem is minor or not will be determined as part of our continuing research.

APPENDIX A

The Contract: City of Los Angeles and University  
of Southern California

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF  
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE  
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SOCIAL  
SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

This Agreement is made and entered in this 25<sup>th</sup> day of January, 1983 the City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, acting by and through the Board of Police Commissioners (hereinafter "Department") and the University of Southern California and the Social Science Research Institute, a subdivision thereof, (hereinafter "Institute").

WHEREAS, the Institute is conducting research into gang-related acts of violence pursuant to a research grant to the University of Southern California from the National Institute of Justice, an agency of the United States Government; and

WHEREAS, the Department is desirous of assisting in the research being conducted by the Institute to the end that these acts of violence may be reduced; and

WHEREAS, the Los Angeles Police Department is desirous of obtaining the final report of the research conducted by the Institute to aid in the further development of its approach to the problem of gang-violence.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants, conditions and representation herein contained, the parties hereby covenant, and agree as follows:



## ACCESS TO RECORDS

1. The Department agrees to permit authorized employees of the Institute access to Department investigative files relating to juvenile gang and comparable non-gang homicides and other violent offenses which occurred during the years 1978 through 1982.

2. Said access shall only be given upon the Institute obtaining and maintaining an order authorizing such access from the appropriate Superior and/or Municipal Court and presenting said orders to the Board of Police Commissioners.

## RECORD OF INFORMATION

3. The Department agrees that employees of the Institute, under the direct supervision of Institute employees, may extract data from each sampled investigation file and enter said data on a data collection form in coded format. The data which may be collected shall be limited to the following categories:

(a) Information relating to the offense situations:

Date, site, number of participants including suspects and victims, presence of weapons, involvement of autos, extent of victim injury, specified indications of gang-relatedness, etc.

(b) Information relating to persons involved in the

incident: The names of the suspects and victims their ages, prior record indications, gender, ethnic status, address, and gang affiliation if any, etc.

(c) Information relating to the investigative process:

Sources of data, number of witnesses interviewed, conclusions concerning gang relatedness, number and type of charges listed, etc.

SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

4. The Institute agrees to the following procedures relating to security and confidentiality:

a. All employees of the Institute who will have access to the information made available by the Department will be thoroughly instructed in the contents of this agreement.

b. The institute shall ensure that its employees conform to the standards of security and confidentiality contained in this Agreement.

c. That Institute will ensure that in addition to normal precautions and admonitions to data coders, the Institute will handle data in line with both University and federal requirements for data control. Coders will be notified, at time of hiring, that any failure to maintain total confidentiality will result in immediate dismissal. All data will be coded for computer analysis. Data collection forms will be maintained in a locked file within a locked room at the Social Science Research Institute at USC and only employees of the Institute shall have access to these forms. Names of assailants, required temporarily for supervision/confirmation purposes, will be

transformed into five-digit identification codes for computer analysis, and thereafter destroyed. No access to identifying data will be released to others except as otherwise provided herein. Under the federal legislation authorizing NIJ research grants, the data is not subject to subpoena.

#### SERVICE TO BE PERFORMED BY THE INSTITUTE

5. The Institute agrees to deliver to the Department a copy of the final report which the Institute produces as a result of the study. Said report may be used by the City and any of its subdivisions for any purpose consistent with the purpose of this agreement.

#### TERMS OF AGREEMENT

6. The effective date of this Agreement shall be the date executed by the parties hereto and shall remain in effect until December 31, 1983 unless terminated by either party.

7. This Agreement may be terminated by either party by rendering a written notice of termination no later than 24-hours prior to the effective date of termination.

8. This Agreement may be amended by setting forth in writing the contemplated change and executing said change in a like manner as the original agreement.

9. Should either party elect to terminate their agreement for any cause, the Institute shall continue to maintain the security and confidentiality of all information obtained from Department files in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Agreement.

COMPLAINCE WITH LAW

10. The Institute will comply will all applicable Federal, State and Municipal laws, rules and ordinances.

11. The Institute or its officers; employees or agents will not disclose the identity of any person identified in any Department investigative file to any other Institute employee except as necessary for its performance herunder. In no event shall the Institute reveal or otherwise disclose any information obtained from the Department's files which contain the identities of any persons named in said files, except as provided herein.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

12. The performance of all functions by the Institute hereunder shall be in the capacity of an independent contractor and not as an officer, agent or employee of the City of Los Angeles or the Department. In this connection, the Institute shall indenmify and hold the City of Los Angeles and the Department harmless from all liability for damage or injury, actual or alleged, to any persons or property arising out of the acts or ommissions of the Institute during its performance hereunder.

Prohibition Against Assignment or Delegation

13. The CONTRACTOR may not, unless it has first obtained the written permission of the CITY;

(a) Assign or otherwise alienate any of its rights hereunder; or

(b) Delegate, subcontract, or otherwise transfer any of its duties hereunder.


The parties hereto have executed this agreement.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a  
municipal corporation

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

IRA REINER, CITY ATTORNEY


By:

  
BYRON R. BOECKMAN  
Deputy City Attorney


Date January 25, 1983


Effective date of contract:

January 28, 1983

  
President, Board of Police  
Commissioners

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN  
CALIFORNIA

  
MALCOLM W. KLEIN  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH  
INSTITUTE

  
CORNELIUS J. PINGS  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR  
ACADEMIC AFFAIRS

APPENDIX B:

Coding Manuals and Instructions

1. Data Collection Form and Instructions

POLICE DATA COLLECTION  
FORM

OUR CASE ID # \_\_\_\_\_

--	--	--	--	--

DATA COLLECTION SITE \_\_\_\_\_

--	--

OFFICIAL CASE ID # \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Tracking information: Record identifying information (ID# if different from official case ID#, agency completing, and date of report) for initial/complaint reports, and assignment to Homicide or other detective unit.

TYPE OF REPORT  
specify type

ID#, if different  
from above

AGENCY COMPLETING  
or INVOLVED

DATE OF  
REPORT or  
1st mention


DATE OF COLLECTION

--	--	--	--	--	--

YR

DAY

DATA COLLECTOR #

--	--

TYPE OF OFFENSE BY  
POPULATION LISTING

--

OTHER OFFICIAL CHARGES

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



GANG STATUS DESIGNATION

DATE INCIDENT OCCURRED

YR		MO		DAY	

TIME OF DAY  
INCIDENT OCCURRED

--	--	--	--

INCIDENT LOCATION:

street address: \_\_\_\_\_

city: \_\_\_\_\_

name: \_\_\_\_\_

CENSUS TRACT					

INCIDENT SETTING

If other, specify: \_\_\_\_\_

AUTOMOBILE INVOLVEMENT

If "1", code circumstances:

If other, specify: \_\_\_\_\_

NUMBER OF DESIGNATED  
VICTIMS

--	--

TOTAL NUMBER OF  
PARTICIPANTS ON SUSPECT  
SIDE

--	--

TOTAL NUMBER OF  
PARTICIPANTS

--	--

NUMBER OF DESCRIBED &  
DESIGNATED SUSPECTS

--	--

INDICATION OF RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN OFFENDERS & VICTIMS  
OR OPPOSING PARTICIPANTS

WEAPONS

PRESENCE

NUMBER

FIREARMS

--	--

KNIVES

--	--

OTHER  
specify:

--	--

---



---



---

SPECIALIZED GANG UNITS  
INVOLVED IN INCIDENT AND  
FOLLOW-UP

UNIT	TYPE	DATE OF REFERRAL OR 1st MENTION INVESTIGATIVE INVOLVEMENT	LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT								
_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%;"> </td> <td style="width: 25%;"> </td> <td style="width: 25%;"> </td> <td style="width: 25%;"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">YR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">MO</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">DAY</td> </tr> </table>					YR	MO	DAY		<input type="checkbox"/>
YR	MO	DAY									
_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">YR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">MO</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">DAY</td> </tr> </table>					YR	MO	DAY		<input type="checkbox"/>
YR	MO	DAY									
_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">YR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">MO</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">DAY</td> </tr> </table>					YR	MO	DAY		<input type="checkbox"/>
YR	MO	DAY									
_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">YR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">MO</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">DAY</td> </tr> </table>					YR	MO	DAY		<input type="checkbox"/>
YR	MO	DAY									

NUMBER OF ARRESTS MADE

YGS INVOLVEMENT

INTERVIEWS/CONTACTS - JUVENILES

INTERVIEWS/CONTACTS - ADULTS

INTERVIEWS/CONTACTS - AGE  
UNSPECIFIED

INTERVIEWS/CONTACTS - WITNESSES

INTERVIEWS/CONTACTS - INFORMANTS

WITNESSES' ADDRESSES

ANY WITNESS' ADDRESS WITHHELD?

OTHER INDICATION OF FEAR OF RETALIATION?  Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES OF INVESTIGATION

CASE ID# \_\_\_\_\_

Gang Indications Included in Any Report (include reporting agency and date of first mention): Describe nature of reference, or quote, and include source of statement.

Specific statement of gang involvement or speculated gang involvement:

Indication of Drive-by:

Specific statement refuting gang involvement:

Reference to gang names or affiliation, include specific names:

Reference to gang argot:

Reference to costume, dress, colors, insignia, tatoos, etc.:

Reference to physical setting, graffitti, gang territory, or neighborhood:

Reference to gang retaliation motive:

Reference to other gang motive:

Other gang indications, not listed above. Includes gang name calling or exchange, "where are you from?", etc:

CASE ID# \_\_\_\_\_

PARTICIPANT ID#

NUMBER OF INITIAL POLICE CHARGES

COUNTS

SPECIFY \_\_\_\_\_

POLICE DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT'S ROLE

AGE

DATE OF BIRTH

YR MO DAY

ANY CHANGES IN ABOVE CHARGES (SPECIFY DATE, CONTEXT, AND SOURCE):

GENDER

ETHNICITY

NAME, NICKNAME, AND RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CENSUS TRACT

NUMBER OF PRIOR ARRESTS

ARR.?

GANG AFFILIATION

SPECIFY \_\_\_\_\_

INJURIES SUSTAINED

IF VICTIM, OF WHAT OFFENSE(S): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

POLICE DATA COLLECTION MANUAL

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Always write clearly. Check any unclear situations or problems with data collector supervisor and carefully document problems along with any decisions made with supervisor in field. Missing data codes are always 9, 99, or 999 depending on number of columns. Not applicable codes are 8, 98, or 998.

ITEM

INSTRUCTIONS

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 1 | Tracking Form  | For Official Case ID#, record any police identification numbers that identify our case. In LASD, this will be a 15-digit DR#. In LAPD, an 8-digit number is used. Beware that this number can change during the case investigation. Note other numbers that facilitate location of the case (e.g., LAPD consecutive incident number for homicides). For TRACKING INFORMATION, record identifying information -- ID#, agency completing, and date of report (or date of first mention, if earlier) -- for (1) initial complaint, incident, or crime report, and (2) assignment to Homicide or any other detective investigative unit. Refers only to our incident. |
| 2 | Date of Collection   | List collection date by year, month, and day.   |
| 3 | Data Collector Number  | To be assigned to each data collector.  |
| 4 | Type of Offense by Population Listing (Supervisor Will Assign) | Code police designation of type of crime<br>1 = Homicide, PC 187<br>2 = Non-homicide, violent offense   |
| 5 | Other Official Charges   | List offense and PC number of other official charges used to describe the crime. This includes only charges at the police level and may be drawn from warrants for our incident, booking forms, and narratives. Includes  |

charges against an individual, but is not limited to charged suspects. Enter "none" if no other charges.

- 6 Gang Status Designation Prior to Data Collection (Supervisor Will Assign)  
 0 = Non-Gang  
 1 = Gang, designated by our official source
- 7 Date Incident Occurred  
 List incident date by year, month, and day. If exact date is unknown, use date reported and indicate as such on coding form. Do not use date of death as incident date, unless they are the same.
- 8 Time of Day Incident Occurred  
 List military time if available. If range is given compute average. If time of report or discovery is given, but you can deduce the incident time from reports, etc., use that figure.
- 9 Incident Location  
 List street address and city where incident occurred. List name of building or place if given (e.g., park, development). List cross streets if no street address is given. Do not fill in census tract boxes.
- 10 Incident Setting  
 Code setting of victim at time of receiving injury, or if not known, code location of body.
- 1 = Street  
 2 = Residence (includes yard & driveway), as well as sidewalk or curb if the house is meaningful to the situation), apartment.  
 3 = School  
 4 = Park  
 5 = Commercial property (also motel if not permanent residence)  
 6 = Parking lot  
 7 = Other, specify and record on "other" list  
 8 = Open setting
- 11 Automobile Involvement  
 Was auto mentioned in incident description?  
 0 = No  
 1 = Shooting stems from within car (includes motorcycles) whether mobile or stationary. "Drive-bys" are to be noted on form.

- 2 = Vehicle mentioned as part of setting, means of arrival or escape, an element of precipitating situation, or is related to incident in some manner.
- 3 = Vehicle is mentioned but connection to incident is unclear or unspecified, usually due to lack of information. Specify circumstances on form.

FOR LAPD ONLY

12 Circumstances of Shooting Out of Car

If auto involvement = 1, determine circumstances of shooting such as whether victim was mobile (in a moving vehicle or momentarily stopped vehicle), or stationary (not in vehicle); and what type of exchange (any verbalization or behavioral signals that could be seen as challenge) took place between participants.

- 0 = Clearly not a drive-by (i.e., suspect's car is stationary and not just stopped momentarily).
- 1 = Stationary victim, no exchange
- 2 = Mobile victim, no exchange
- 3 = Stationary victim, exchange between both parties
- 4 = Mobile victim, exchange between both parties
- 5 = Stationary victim, one way exchange
- 6 = Mobile victim, one way exchange
- 7 = Other, specify
- 8 = Auto involvement not equal 1
- 9 = Not enough information to code circumstances

In coding Participant Variables, it is necessary to establish sides and degree of involvement in incident. Factors of temporal sequence and physical proximity are considered in this process. Beware of cases where designation between suspects and victims is not clear. Refer to supervisor as these will often be coded "97" (see Suspect/Victim Coding instructions, p. 18).

13 Number of Victims

Count the number of "ever" officially designated (by police) victims. Exclude victims not present, even if

so designated. Victims on two sides should be pointed out to supervisor.

14 Number of Participants on Suspect Side

Count the number of participants (includes designated suspects and those clearly allied with suspects) on suspect side. Use all reports for best estimate. If range is given, take average, or if necessary, lowest.

15 Total Number of Participants

Includes designated suspects and victims, plus any other participants on either side involved in incident. Use all reports for best estimate.

16 Number of Designated and Described Suspects

Count the number of "ever" officially (police) designated (by term suspect or subject if juvenile) suspects with at least two bits of identifying information. Derived from crime reports, supplemental reports, warrants, or narratives. Designation may originate from an official listing, being charged with our incident offenses, reference in narrative as "suspect" in the context of our incident. This precludes individual brought in for questioning, but not designated.

References to "several," a number range (e.g., 1-? or "?? Unknown Suspects" are coded "00" and noted on form.

17 Weapon Presence

Code the mention of each weapon present at incident. Other category excludes body parts, but in case of non-weapon cause of death, note on form but do not count.

0 = No

1 = Yes

2 = Ambiguous (e.g., conflicting testimony, note reason on form)

18 Weapon Number

Count the number of each type of weapon mentioned in reports as present or used in incident. For counting "other" weapons: (1) count number of each type if known; (2) where number is unknown, count one for each weapon



type; (3) if number of some weapons is known and others not, count those known and add one for each unknown type. Specify accompanying number of each type in parenthesis.

"99" may be used for number only if information on presence is indirect (e.g., victim's wounds).

If presence = 0, number = 98.

### Indication of Relationship Between Offenders and Victims

Any relationship that can be established between any "2" opposing participants is sufficient for coding even if all others are unknown to one another. Break down relationship information into two separate variables reflecting gang and non-gang dimensions, based on all available information. In the absence of information, code in category most consistent with prior codes. Assume designated suspect to be participating suspects unless information is present to the contrary. In LASD, third party relationships are reflected as victim/offender relationship; in LAPD see separate codes. Lack of information in LASD as to degree of personal familiarity is coded as clear relationship.

#### 19 GANG DIMENSION

- 1 = S/Gang vs. V/Gang: Gang related motive and/or gang behavior during incident (pertains to mistaken identity victims, designated suspects and identified culprits).
- 2 = S/Gang vs. V/Gang: No evidence of affiliation awareness, gang motive, or gang behavior during incident.
- 3 = S/Non-Gang vs. V/Gang: Affiliation awareness stems from behavioral or descriptive information pertaining to incident.

- 4 = Gang vs. Non-gang: Only one side is gang and that is known to other side from some implied prior exposure, and no evidence of gang behavior.
- 5 = S/Gang vs. V/Non-gang: Gang behavior during incident is only indication of suspects' affiliation to victim; mistaken identity and innocent bystanders. Excludes cases wherein the suspect affiliation is unknown to victim and irrelevant to incident.
- 6 = Indirect affiliation awareness (LAPD only): A third party participant or non-participant expresses affiliation awareness not based on incident behavior.
- 7 = Ambiguous: Relevance or awareness of ganginess is not clear enough for above codes.
- 8 = No gang implications to case: (e.g. "gang related" is only reference).

## 20 NON-GANG DIMENSION

- 0 = No indication of any prior contact.
- 1 = Personal connection: Clear relationship exists by virtue of time duration or degree of contact; contact beyond minimal familiarity.
- 2 = Minimal Familiarity: Visual or identity recognition only; minimal prior contact (e.g. previous incident); or only immediately precedes incident.
- 3 = Indirect Association (LAPD only): Connection exists by virtue of third party participant or non-participant.

- 4 = Mistaken identity/innocent bystander: Relationship exists between suspect and intended target but none known involving victim.
- 5 = Ambiguous: Information not explicit enough for above codes; too suggestive to dismiss. Specify.
- 9 = Missing information due to incomplete file.

21 Specialized Gang Unit Involved in Incident and/or Investigation

List all specialized gang units involved in case. Include names of units from arrest to prosecution, such as OSS, CRASH, station gang detail, VOIT, gang homicide, Probation Specialized Gang Unit, or Operation Hardcore. Also include the names of individual gang experts involved if not part of unit. Include units that get sent report copies. List dates of referral or date of first indication of investigative involvement. If number exceeds four, continue listing.

All 4 sets of boxes should be filled in. If no gang units are listed all boxes should be filled in with zeroes. If less than 4 are listed, the ones listed should be coded and the remaining boxes filled in with zeroes.

Duplicate codes are required when there are separate listings for:

- a. OSS teams at different stations
- b. OSS at a station and OSS Headquarters
- c. Station gang details at different stations
- d. Ambiguous gang details at different stations
- e. Separate CRASH units

If more than 4 units are listed "informed" decisions will be made as to which will not be coded.

## 22 LASD Gang Unit Codes

- 00 None listed
- 01 OSS; includes YSB/OSS and any combination of OSS station with YSB or OSS
- 02 CRASH
- 03 Probation Specialized Gang Unit
- 04 Operation Hardcore
- 05 LASD Homicide Gang Unit (MAGOT)
- 06 LASD station gang details; includes gang details at non-OSS stations, gang details at OSS stations prior to the start of OSS at that station, and "G" patrol units (e.g., 20G-4)
- 07 LAPD station gang details
- 08 Independent cities' station gang details
- 09 YSB; only when used alone
- 10 VOIT
- 11 LASD gang detail, ambiguous as to whether it refers to an OSS unit or a station gang detail; includes reference to a gang detail at a station during a time when there is both an OSS team and a station gang detail at that station
- 12 LAPD gang detail, ambiguous as to whether it refers to a CRASH unit or a station gang detail
- 13 Specialized unit, ambiguous as to whether it is targeted at gangs or not
- 14 Gang details outside of LA County
- 15 Other LASD gang detail (Specify)
- 16 Headquarter Gang prior to Dec., 1978

## 23 LAPD Gang Unit Codes

- 0 = None listed
- 1 = Crash bureau wide - includes any references to Crash, or "bureau" gangs for all central bureau stations, and for south & west bureau stations ( S. & W. entries dated post Jan. 1981)
- 2 = Crash station based - includes the 3 Valley based units (i.e., N. Hollywood, Van Nuys, Foothill), 77th, S. W. Venice & possibly others (all pre Jan. 1981)
- 3 = VOIT
- 4 = DSD Gangs (also ISD & DHD Gangs)
- 5 = Gang detail/unit unspecified

- 6 = Hardcore
- 7 = LASD or LASO gang references - includes station units, OSS, Gang Homicide unit, etc. Specify on list.
- 8 = Probation gang units - specify on list
- 9 = Miscellaneous other - (e.g., S.E.). Specify on list.

FOR LAPD ONLY

- 24 Level of Gang Unit Involvement
- 1 = Copies sent, "Special Request Distribution," or "unit notified" only.
  - 2 = Unit contacted for specific information, use of mug books, files, etc., but no other investigative involvement.
  - 3 = Active investigative involvement or case assigned to unit.
  - 4 = Other, specify.
  - 9 = Unit mentioned but no information regarding extent of involvement.
- 25 Number of Arrests Made
- Count number of arrests made for our incident, but beware of including arrests for related cases stemming from our incident. In-custody charging for our incident is counted as an arrest. Arrests are indicated by a specific statement as such or booking information.
- 26 YGS Involvement (Up until 1981 will be "0")
- 0 = YGS not reported to be at scene of incident, and not interviewed.
  - 1 = YGS not reported to be at scene of incident, but interviewed by arresting/investigating officers.
  - 2 = YGS reported to be at scene of incident, interviewed by arresting/investigating officers.
  - 3 = YGS reported to be at scene of incident, not interviewed by arresting/investigating officers.

In coding Interviews/Contacts, be aware that police officers often use the term "witness" for what we would call informants. Witnesses are (1) involved in incident regardless of extent of what was seen, (2) watching from nearby, or (3) in rare cases may be involved throughout incident except at moment of homicide and are able to give extensive information regarding the event. Informants are (1) those not on scene, or (2) those

in general area of incident but removed from the immediate situation and who may have heard something or seen something prior or subsequent. If you have difficulty categorizing, consult supervisor.

Arbitrary codes:

- 2 = People, persons, or others
- 3 = various or some
- 4 = several, numerous, or many

Testing alone doesn't count, nor do attempts to locate someone. Look for investigative contacts.

Contacts between law enforcement personnel or with the justice system or governmental agencies (e.g., probation, FBI, etc.) are usually not counted as they tend to be procedural. Exception would be when officials have un-official involvement in incident (e.g., witness to crime) or knowledge of participants through personal or professional relationship (e.g., Housing Authority Officers, military personnel, etc.). Private security officers do not count as law enforcement.

FOR LAPD: Investigator logs and notes are used in counting contacts where there is an indication of derived information. Be careful not to duplicate counts. Where a name, phone number, and perhaps, address is provided, but no information, comments, etc., do not count as contacts. (Count the number of such entries and note on interview pages.) Logs showing just derived information, address, and/or date with no name can be counted unless some other named contact has same address or same date.

- 27 Interviews/Contacts - Juveniles Code the number of juveniles (whether victims, suspects, witnesses, informants or others) where information is deliberately sought or volunteered. This excludes physical contacts where no information is sought or volunteered (e.g. transporting to station, gaining permissions, etc.) but includes phone contacts if information is sought or volunteered.
- 28 Interviews/Contacts - Adults Same as above, for adults
- 29 Interviews/Contacts - Age Unspecified Same as above, for individuals with unspecified age
- 30 Interviews/Contacts - Witnesses Code the number of witnesses interviewed where information is deliberately sought or volunteered. Specifically excludes victims or suspects unless they are designated as witnesses at the time of the interview.

- 31 Interviews/Contacts - Informants Code the number of informants interviewed where information is deliberately sought or volunteered. Specifically excludes victims or suspects unless they are designated as informants at time of interview.
- 32 Witnesses' Addresses Code the number of witnesses interviewed for whom addresses were reported. If no witnesses were interviewed, code "00".
- 33 Any Witnesses' Address Withheld Code any indication that any witness' address was withheld through fear of gang retaliation. If no witnesses interviewed, code "0"  
0 = No  
1 = Yes
- 34 Other Indication of Fear of Retaliation Code any indication of a fear of retaliation other than withholding witness address. Specify nature of indication on data collection form.
- One dimension captured here are statements that participants or informants are (a) hesitant to give information regarding our incident and/or concerned about retaliation for providing information (e.g., witness intimidation) or (b) recipients of such intimidation attempts. A second dimension is retaliation resulting from our incident, most commonly against suspect participants.
- For multiple code situations, use gang over non-gang; intimidation over retaliation; and attempts over fear expressed.
- 0 = Neither fear expressed or attempts made  
1 = Fear of intimidation, gang specified  
2 = Fear of intimidation, not gang specified  
3 = Intimidation threat or attempt, gang specified  
4 = Intimidation threat or attempt, not gang specified

- 5 = Fear of retaliation, gang specified
- 6 = Fear of retaliation, not gang specified
- 7 = Retaliatory threat or attempt, gang specified
- 8 = Retaliatory threat or attempt, not gang specified
- 9 = Missing or not codeable above, specify

Ambiguous as to whether gang should be coded as not gang specified.

35 Total Number of Pages of Investigation

Counted differently for LASD and LAPD. In both jurisdictions, exclude obvious duplications. Round up. Count back of sheets. Count typewritten versions instead of handwritten versions.

LASD: Count everything in the file that pertains to case investigation (i.e., forms and reports that represent information seeking or giving). Exclude justice system forms that pertain only to body processing (i.e., booking slips, juvenile petition requests, warrants, receipts, permissions, and photos of crime scene or victims). Refer to attached list of file contents.

Also, in LASD, included are reports from other incidents if their connection to sampled incident is firmly established (i.e., it was the precipitating event for our instant, or the result of it, as in resisting arrest and accessory; murder weapon is retrieved or stolen; additional information on suspect pertinent to investigation of incident is obtained).

LAPD: Include all contents of file except (1) photos, and (2) arrest reports of suspects if unrelated offense even if leading to in-custody charging (exception here is when arrest incident stemmed from suspected involvement in our incident as when



description fits either suspect or vehicle implicated in our incident -- these would be counted). Exclude reports for other incidents (even if related) unless they are investigating the murder as well. Reports regarding situations stemming from our incident are included. Loose field investigation cards are counted 2 equals 1 investigative page. Six loose mug shots count as 1 page.

36 Gang indications Included in Any Report

For each of the items, if it is included (mentioned, or referred to) in any of the reports in the case file, indicate the report in which reference first appeared (including agency source) and the date on which it first appeared in that report. (This might be the same as the date on which the report was written, but if possible indicate the date on which it was first included in the investigation). Specify the source of the statement or reference (e.g., whether by witness or officer observation) and the nature of the statement or reference.

#### PARTICIPANT CODING

Use a separate participant coding sheet for each victim and described suspect. A described suspect has at least 2 pieces of identifying information as requested below. Both victims and suspects must be designated as such by police.

37 Participant ID#

Consecutively number participants irrespective of role in incident

38 Police Designation of Participant's role

Stems from police designation and pertains to our incident. Suspect role is determined from charges (or lack thereof) and not from whether an arrest occurs. Note on form if the charging takes place without an arrest. Also note that charges at the D.A. level have no bearing on this variable.

01= Suspect, "ever" charged for sampled offense.  
 02= Suspect, charged for related offense  
 03= Suspect, never charged  
 04= Victim of sampled offense  
 05= Victim of related offense  
 33= Suspect arrested, charges unknown  
 34= "Possible" suspect only. Not charged  
 99=Missing

- 39 Age Code age. Should be consistent with date of birth and relative to the time of the incident. Under 1 year old is coded "00". If range is given, take average.
- 40 Date of Birth Code date of birth by year, month, and day. If different dates are given, use one most consistently used or that matches the age.
- 41 Gender  
 1 = Male  
 2 = Female
- 42 Ethnicity  
 1 = Black  
 2 = Hispanic  
 3 = Asian  
 4 = White  
 5 = Other, specify
- 43 Name, Nickname, and Residential Address (Note aliases) List street and city of residence closest to date of incident. Do not fill in census tract boxes.
- 44 Prior Arrests Arrest information can be derived from any official record check and from narratives as well. Include parole violations or revocations as arrests but exclude all vehicle code references. Note that record checks often include receipt to institution which is not counted as arrest. Also beware of difference between warrant issuance and arrests for warrants (on rap sheet). "0" can be used only when a check has come back negative or a specific statement of no arrests has been made.

- 0 = No arrests
- 1 = 1 arrest
- 2 = 2 or more arrests

## 45 Gang Affiliation

Refers to involvement or association, not solely membership. "Unknown" suspects are coded "3" if affiliation clear or possible and "0" if no indication.

- 0 = No evidence of affiliation. No evidence of participation in the episode. Friend, relative, roommate etc. of gang member with no other indication. Unsubstantiated labels (e.g. gang related) or statements (e.g. fight possibly over gang affiliation).
- 1 = Specific gang affiliation stated. Participation in name calling behavior. Participation in hand signaling or bandanna waving. Gang response to "where are you from." Gang tattoos. Gang associate. Gang name on clothes or personal property carried.
- 2 = Gang affiliation without specification or conflict regarding which gang. Reference to incident as between "rival gangs."
- 3 = "Associates" with gang members. Described as Cholo, gang type, possible or suspected member. Participant in "where you from" asking. Ex-member with no statement of present affiliation. Denial of affiliation contradicted by evidence. "M" tattoo. Contradictory information in general. D & D suspects or possible suspects whose participation in clear gang behavior is unconfirmed (unless there is a reason to assume "0").

- Participation in episode with gang member (with reference to suspect side only).  
 Presence in a gang car.  
 "Nowhere" response.  
 Unknown suspect in gang episode or unknown co-suspect of known gang member.  
 Suspects when incident is defined as gang retaliation for previous incident (specified).
- 4 = Victim side when incident defined as gang retaliation for another incident.  
 Physical or behavioral evidence: use of "cuzz", "blood", "homeboy", wearing bandannas, teardrop tattoos, referrent of terms "vato", "pachuco", "my homeboy", "cuzz", or "blood".  
 Companion to a "3" in incident.
- 46 Injuries Sustained (For Victims or Suspect/Victims Only)
- 0 = None  
 1 = Required medical attention but no hospitalization  
 2 = Hospital treatment, no hospitalization  
 3 = Hospital treatment, unclear whether hospitalized  
 4 = Hospitalization  
 5 = Death  
 6 = Death by suicide  
 7 = Injury, but no medical attention received or extent received unknown  
 8 = Not applicable (for suspects)
- 47 If victim, of what offense(s) List the offense by which victimized. Does not necessarily have to be charged against any individual or even specified in case.
- 48 Initial Police Charges Include initial charges relative to our incident only, at the police level. Can be derived from arrest listings, narrative, booking slips, warrants (in the absence of an arrest), other forms (e.g. juvenile petition requests). List number and specify all charges by PC number and description. Code number of counts but do not fill in offense boxes.

Clearly note changes in police charging and any D.A. charges filed. For all charges, specify date, context (arrest, booking, warrant, etc.) and source (JPR report, etc.). List other dispositional information as available.

49 LASD: Arrested?  
(For Designated & Described  
Suspects only)

- 0 = Clearly not arrested (use if role=3)
- 1 = Clearly arrested
- 2 = Possibly arrested, though no clear statement of such
- 7 = Not applicable for unknown suspects
- 8 = Not applicable for victims
- 9 = Arrest information not available

50 LAPD: Arrested or Contact?

- 0 = No contact
- 1 = Statement of arrest or indication of booking
- 2 = "Detained" or "taken into custody" and brought to station
- 3 = Brought to station but no statement of "detained" or "taken into custody"
- 4 = "Detained" or "taken into custody", but not brought to station
- 5 = Other contact
- 6 = Warrant issued, no contact
- 7 = Not applicable for unknown suspects
- 8 = Not applicable for victims
- 9 = Arrest/contact information not available.

## SUSPECT/VICTIM CODING

Previously, we decided to code number of victims, number of Participants on suspect's side and described and detained suspects as "97" and include count of total participants. Participants sheets were completed on all victims, suspects, and suspect/victims with later given a role of "6". We found that we were losing too much information due to our inability to reconstruct who's on which side. Comparing demographic characteristics of opposing participants was precluded by above method. The designation of a V/S or severe injury on both sides makes labeling of one side as "victim" or alternatively "suspect" difficult. Since culpability has never been a factor for us (except to extent that police designation is related to culpability), we're keying sides by dead person. If sides can not be determined to this extent (on dead person's side or not), case is coded in old way at "97" for number of victims, participants or suspect's side, and described and detained suspects. All other suspect/victim cases are coded (by supervisors). The following coding scheme is to be used in cases which have any one participant designated as S/V by police or in situations where there is a designated "suspect" "victim's" (defined here as dead person's) side (or vice versa) or where there are homicides on both sides. Once a case is established to be a "S/V" situation, police designation per se becomes immaterial. Our concern is to establish the number of participants on particular sides, and to compare participant demographics accordingly.

Coding:

Number of designated victims	=	# of participants on Dead Person's side (including Dead Person). In cases when homicide victim on both sides or if side breakdown not possible, use "97".
Total number of Participants on suspect side	=	"97"
Total number of Participants	=	Total # of Participants
Number of described and designated suspects	=	"97"
Number of arrests	=	Arrests from incident

Participant roles-add the following codes to be used for all designated participants whether "V", "S", or "S/V". Injuries and charges applicable for everyone.

6 = Person dead, not on initiating side.  
7 = Person dead, on initiating side.

- 8 = Designated participant, aligned with dead person.
- 9 = Designated participant, aligned with other (not dead person's) side. If homicide victims on both sides, refers to initiating side.
- 10= Person not alignable (non-side situation).
- 11= Non-participating designee.
- 99= Missing

For S/V cases, codes 1-5 will not be used.

2. In-House Coding Form and Instructions



Coder Initial \_\_\_\_\_

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

CASE ID

6	7
---	---

STATION

8	9	10	11	12	13
---	---	----	----	----	----

CR DATE

14	15	16	17	18	19
----	----	----	----	----	----

ASSIGN DATE-DET

20	21	22	23	24	25
----	----	----	----	----	----

ASSIGN DATE-HOM/NG

26	27	28	29	30	31
----	----	----	----	----	----

ASSIGN DATE-HOM/GG

32	33	34	35	36	37
----	----	----	----	----	----

ASSIGN DATE-GANG UNIT

38	39	40	41	42	43
----	----	----	----	----	----

COLL. DATE

44	45
----	----

COLL. ID

46	47
----	----

#1

48	49
----	----

#2

50	51
----	----

#3

SAMPLED OFFENSE

52
----

#CHG

53	54
----	----

#1

55	56
----	----

#2

57	58
----	----

#3

59	60
----	----

#4

OTHER OFFICIAL CHARGES

61
----

SUSP?

62
----

GSD

63	64	65	66	67	68
----	----	----	----	----	----

DATE INCIDENT

69	70	71	72
----	----	----	----

TIME INCIDENT

73
----

SET.

74	75	76	77	78
----	----	----	----	----

CASE ID

79	80
0	1

CARD #

1 [ ] AUTO	2 [ ] D-B	3 4 [ ] [ ] # VIC	5 6 [ ] [ ] #S PART	7 8 [ ] [ ] TOT. PART.	9 10 [ ] [ ] D & D S.	11 [ ] REL	12 [ ] PRES	13 14 [ ] [ ] #	15 [ ] PRES	16 17 [ ] [ ] #	18 [ ] PRES	19 20 [ ] [ ] #
							FIREARMS		KNIVES		OTHER WEAPONS	

21 22 [ ] [ ] TYPE	23 24 25 26 27 28 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] DATE	29 30 [ ] [ ] TYPE	31 32 33 34 35 36 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] DATE	37 38 [ ] [ ] TYPE	39 40 41 42 43 44 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] DATE
--------------------------	--	--------------------------	--	--------------------------	--

45 46 [ ] [ ] TYPE	47 48 49 50 51 52 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] DATE	74 75 76 77 78 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] CASE ID	79 80 [ 0 ] [ 2 ] CARD #
--------------------------	--	--	--------------------------------

1 2 [ ] [ ] # ARRESTS	3 [ ] YGS	4 5 [ ] [ ] JUV	6 7 [ ] [ ] ADULT	8 9 [ ] [ ] UNSP.	10 11 [ ] [ ] WIT	12 13 [ ] [ ] INF.	14 15 [ ] [ ] WIT.ADD.	16 [ ] W/HLD	17 [ ] FEAR	18 19 20 [ ] [ ] [ ] PAGES	21 [ ] CASE STATUS
-----------------------------	-----------------	-----------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------	--------------------------	------------------------------	--------------------	-------------------	----------------------------------	--------------------------

74 75 76 77 78 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] CASE ID	79 80 [ 0 ] [ 3 ] CARD #
--	--------------------------------

CODER INITIAL \_\_\_\_\_

1 2  
[ ] [ ]  
ROLE

3 4  
[ ] [ ]  
AGE

5 6 7 8 9 10  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
DOB

11  
[ ]  
SEX

12  
[ ]  
RACE

13  
[ ]  
PRIORS

14  
[ ]  
AFFIL.

15 16 17  
[ ] [ ] [ ]  
GANG

18  
[ ]  
INJURY

INITIAL  
POLICE  
CHARGES:

19  
[ ]  
#

20 21  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

22 23  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

24 25  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

26 27  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

28 29  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

30 31  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

32 33  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

34 35  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

ULTIMATE  
POLICE  
CHARGES:

36  
[ ]  
#

37 38  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

39 40  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

41 42  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

43 44  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

45 46  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

47 48  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

49 50  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

51 52  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

D. A.  
CHARGES:

53  
[ ]  
#

54 55  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

56 57  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

58 59  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

60 61  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

62 63  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

64 65  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

66 67  
[ ] [ ]  
TYPE

68 69  
0 [ ]  
COUNT

70  
[ ]  
VIC. OFF.

71  
[ ]  
UNK?

72  
[ ]  
ARR?

74 75 76 77 78  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
CASE ID

79 80  
[ ] [ ]  
CARD #

## In House Coding Instructions

General: As always, ASK QUESTIONS. This is our last opportunity to pick up problems with the forms, so please beware of any problems or inconsistencies that you can pick up. Dates are coded year, month, day. Initial all forms that you complete. Use of "9s" reserved for missing information. Instructions for use of "0s" are by particular variables.

### Card 01

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
1-5	CASE ID	
6-7	STATION ID	Refer to Station Codes list.
8-13	CR DATE	Earliest date of complaint report. Use "9s" if missing.
14-19	ASSIGN DATE-DET	Earliest date of assignment to or mention of a detective bureau other than homicide. Use "9s" if missing.
20-25	ASSIGN DATE-HOM/NG	Earliest date of assignment to or mention of the homicide unit ( <u>not</u> gang homicide unit). If the case is not a homicide case (i.e. case ID begins with some number besides 01 ---), code "8s". If homicide case, use "0s" if no mention and use "9s" if date only is missing.
26-31	ASSIGN DATE-HOM/GG	Earliest date of assignment to or mention of a the gang homicide unit (a.k.a. Gang Offense Team, Homicide Gang Offense Team, or M.A.G.O.T.). If the case is not a homicide case, code "8s". If homicide case, use "0s" if no mention, and "9s" if date only is missing.
32-37	ASSIGN DATE-GANG UNIT	Earliest date of assignment to or mention of a specialized gang unit. Exclude VOIT. Exclude copies sent references. Double check listings on page 3. If no mention code "0s", and if date only is missing use "9s"
38-43	COLL. DATE	Date of Collection
44-45	COLL. ID	Data collector identification number. If more than one, use the one in the box.
46-51	SAMPLED OFFENSE #1 - #3	If Type of Offense by Population Listing = 1, code "01" in #1 boxes, and use "0s" for #2 and #3. If Type of Offense by Population Listing = 2, refer to Offense Coding Instructions and include only <u>violent</u> sampled offenses. Use "0s" for unused boxes.
52	# OTHER OFFICIAL CHARGES	Count the number of charges listed. Exclude offenses coded as sampled offense. Use "0s" for unused boxes.

Card 01 continued

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
53-60	OTHER OFFICIAL CHARGES: #1 - #4	Refer to Offense Coding Instructions.
61	SUSP?	If any one charge listed as Other Official Charge is "suspicion of .....", code "1". If not, code "0".
62	GSD	Gang Status Designation. Only homicide cases can have a "2", these should be brought to the attention of a supervisor.
63-68	DATE INCIDENT	Date of incident.
69-72	TIME INCIDENT	Time of incident.
73	SET.	Incident setting.
74-78	CASE ID	
79-80	CARD 01	

Card 02

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	
1	AUTO	Auto involvement.
2	D-B	Drive-by. If box is checked, code "1". If not, code "0".
3-4	#VIC	Number of designated victims.
5-6	#S PART	Total number of participants on suspect side.
7-8	TOT. PART.	Total number of participants.
9-10	D & D S.	Number of described and designated suspects.
11	REL.	Indication of relationship between offenders and victims or opposing participants.
12	FIREARMS PRES	Presence of firearms
13-14	# FIREARMS	Number of firearms
15	KNIVES PRES	Presence of knives.

● Card 02 continued

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
16-17	# KNIVES	Number of knives
● 18	OTHER WEAPONS PRES	Presence of other weapons
19-20	# OTHER WEAPONS	Count the number of types of other weapons. In earlier cases, beware the number in box is <u>not necessarily accurate.</u> Body parts excluded.
21-52	TYPE & DATE GANG UNIT #1-#4	Type and date of first mention of involvement of specialized gang unit. Includes copies sent to. Type is pre-coded. Code first unit mentioned as #1 and others chronologically through #4. Use "0s" for unused boxes.
53-73	BLANK	
74-78	CASE ID	
● 79-80	CARD 02	

● Card 03

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
1-2	# ARRESTS	Number of Arrests.
3	YGS	YGS involvement.
4-5	INTERVIEWS: JUV	Number of juveniles interviewed.
6-7	INTERVIEWS: ADULT	Number of adults interviewed.
8-9	INTERVIEWS: UNSP.	Number of interviews with individuals of unspecified age.
10-11	INTERVIEWS: WIT.	Number of witnesses interviewed.
12-13	INTERVIEWS: INF..	Number of informants interviewed.
14-15	WIT. ADD.	Number of addresses for interviewed witnesses.
16	W/HLD	Any witnesses' address withheld?
17	FEAR	Indication of fear of retaliation.
● 18-20	PAGES	Number of pages of investigation

Card 03 continued

COLUMN      VARIABLE

INSTRUCTIONS

21            CASE STATUS

On upper right hand corner, there should be a note as to whether case is active or inactive. Use the following codes:

- 1 = active
- 2 = inactive
- 9 = information missing

22-73        BLANK

74-78        CASE ID

79-80        CARD 03

Participant Sheet  
Card 04 - ??

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
1-2	ROLE	Police designation of participant's role.
3-4	AGE	Age.
5-10	DOB	Date of birth.
11	SEX	Gender.
12	RACE	Ethnicity.
13	PRIORS	Prior arrests.
14	AFFIL.	Gang affiliation.
15-17	GANG	Locate the code for gang named on Gang ID list. If more than one gang is specified, ask supervisor. If AFFIL = "0", GANG = "8". If AFFIL = "9", GANG = "9".
18	INJURY	Injuries sustained by victims or suspect/victims. If suspect injuries listed, consult supervisor.
19	# - INITIAL POLICE CHARGES	Count total number of charges determined to be initial police charges. For victims, code "8s" in boxes 19-35. For uncharged suspects, code "0s".
20-35	TYPE & COUNTS: INITIAL POLICE CHARGES	Refer to Offense & Charge Coding Instructions for type codes. If nothing, "00" or "01" is coded in collection form box, code counts "1". If "02" or more is coded on form, code counts "2". Use "0s" for unused charge and count boxes.
36	# - ULTIMATE POLICE CHARGES	Count the total number of charges determined to be ultimate police charges. If no change in charging occurs on police level, code boxes 36-52 "0". For victims, code "8s" in boxes 36-52.
37-52	TYPE & COUNTS: ULTIMATE POLICE CHARGES	If any changes in charges occur at police level, refer to Offense & Charge Coding Instructions for type codes. Regarding counts, if there is no indication of counts, or one count is indicated, charge box is coded "1". If there is indication of two or more counts of a charge, that count box is coded "2". Use "0s" for unused charge and count boxes.
53	# - D.A. CHARGES	Count the total number of charges determined to be D.A. charges. If no D.A. charges given, code boxes 53-69 "0". If dispositional information is available, consult supervisor. If victim, code "8s" in boxes 53-69.



Participant Sheet  
Card 04 - ??  
Continued

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
54-69	TYPE & COUNTS: D.A. CHARGES	Refer to Offense & Charge Coding Instructions for type codes. If there is no indication of counts, or one count is indicated, charge box is coded "1". If two or more counts is indicated for a charge, that count box is coded "2". Use "0s" for unused charge and count boxes.
70	VIC. OFF.	If victim, of what offense: 1 = Victim of sampled offense 2 = Victim of non-sampled violent offense 3 = Victim of non-sampled non-violent offense 9 = Victim of unspecified offense If suspect, code "8".
71	UNK?	Code "1" if unknown or not fully named participant. Otherwise, code "0".
72	ARR?	Use all information on coding form to determine whether participant was arrested. Compare number of arrests with participant roles. 0 = Clearly not arrested 1 = Clearly arrested 2 = Case information indicates probable arrest 7 = Not applicable for unknown suspects 8 = Not applicable for victims 9 = Information about arrest not available.
74-79	CASE ID	
79-80	CARD #	Number card numbers consecutively starting with 04. Order is irrelevant to suspect or victim status.

## OFFENSE AND CHARGES CODING INSTRUCTIONS

1. Offense codes are given on the following page. Code each offense separately. If more than one offense falls in the same category, repeat that offense code.
2. In regards to sampled offense, if more than 3 offenses appear, select the 3 to code from the following priority list. In order of highest priority of inclusion:
  1. Officer involved offenses
  2. Homicide
  3. Other death related offenses
  4.
    - Attempted murder
    - Administering poison
  5. Conspiracy to murder
  6. Rape
  7. Assault with a deadly weapon  
Mayhem
  8.
    - Assault with intent to commit felony
    - Other felonious assault
    - Child endangering
    - Sodomy
  9. Robbery
  10. Shooting into an inhabited dwelling
  11. Other violent offenses - our code "15"
  12. Drugs - our codes "40-42"
  13. Burglary
  14. Other non-violent offenses - our code "61"
  15. Weapons possession - our codes "30-31"
  16. Vehicle Code violations
3. Probable cause and attempts are coded as offense, except in the case of homicide, code "03" for attempted murder.
4. If any one offense is "suspicion of....", code the offense and put a "1" in the SUSP? box, column 61.
5. Accessory is coded as "61" - other non-violent offense.
6. For coding participant charges, divide charges by initial police, ultimate police, and D.A. charges. If no indication of time of charging, assume initial police charges. The addition of charges may not be clearly marked on coding form, so when you come across these changes in charging, ask supervisor until you get the hang of things. If more than 4 charges (at the same level) appear, select the 4 to code from the priority list above.

## OFFENSE CODING

### VIOLENT OFFENSES (excluding officer involved offenses)

- 01 Homicide - PC 187
- 02 Other death related offenses (e.g. manslaughter) - PC 192
- 03 Attempted murder - PC 217, 664/187
- 04 Conspiracy to murder - PC 182/187
- 05 Mayhem - PC 203
- 06 Robbery - PC 211 (includes strongarm)
- 07 Assault with deadly weapon - PC 245
- 08 Assault with intent to commit felony - PC 220-221
- 09 Administering poison - PC 216
- 10 Other felonious assault (e.g. with caustic chemicals) - PC 244
- 11 Shooting into inhabited dwelling - PC 246
- 12 Rape - PC 261
- 13 Child endangering, wife beating, childbeating - PC 273
- 14 Sodomy - PC 286
- 15 Other violent offenses not included above (e.g., simple assault/battery - PC 240-243; kidnapping - PC 207-210; other sexual assault such as PC 288, PC 289)

### OFFICER INVOLVED OFFENSES

- 20. ADW on peace officer - PC 245(b); resisting - PC 148; evading arrest - VC40303(i); assault/battery on peace officer - PC 240-243; giving false information to police officer - VC 31 and others

### WEAPONS POSSESSION

- 30 Firearm specified- PC 12025, PC 12031
- 31 Other weapon or unspecified (i.e., possession of blackjack, etc. - PC 12020; explosives - PC 12033; exhibiting deadly weapon - PC 417)

### DRUGS (excluding alcohol)

- 40 Use oriented or possession not for sale
- 41 Sale oriented
- 42 Other drug offense

### VEHICLE CODE

- 50 All vehicle code violations (except VC 40303(i) and VC 31)

### OTHER NON-VIOLENT OFFENSES

- 60 Burglary - PC 459
- 61 All other non-violent offenses including arson - PC 447, Municipal codes, WIC unspecified, parole violations, Business and Professions Code, etc.

## OFFENSE CODING

### VIOLENT OFFENSES (excluding officer involved offenses)

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- 02 Other death related offenses (e.g. manslaughter) - PC 192
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### OTHER NON-VIOLENT OFFENSES

- 60 Burglary - PC 459
- 61 All other non-violent offenses including arson - PC 447, Municipal codes, WIC unspecified, parole violations, Business and Professions Code, etc.

3. Gang Indicators Coding Form and Instructions

INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT

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CASE ID NUMBER

DESIGNATION OF INCIDENT AS GANG RELATED

SPECIFIC STATEMENT-LAW ENFORCEMENT


SPECIFIC STATEMENT-CITIZEN


INDIRECT DESIGNATION-LAW ENFORCEMENT


DESIGNATION OF INCIDENT AS NOT GANG RELATED

SPECIFIC STATEMENT-REFUTING


SPECIFIC STATEMENT-UNDETERMINED OR AMBIGUOUS


GANG RETALIATION AS MOTIVE

SPECIFIC STATEMENT-GANG RETALIATION


PREVIOUS CONFLICT-SAME GANGS


INTRA-GANG RETALIATION


GANG RETALIATION REFUTED


OTHER GANG RETALIATION


OTHER GANG MOTIVES

(COL. 66-73 BLANK)

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CASE ID #

0	3
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CARD #

TERRITORY/NEIGHBORHOOD/GANG AFFILIATION


PRESENCE OF GRAFFITTI/WRITING GRAFFITTI


PERSONAL CONFLICT INVOLVING GANG MEMBERS


OTHER GANG RELATED MOTIVES


GANG AFFILIATION-SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION

VICTIM OR VICTIM'S COMPANIONS

YR		MO		DAY

PARTICIPATING SUSPECTS OR DESIGNATED AND DESCRIBED SUSPECTS

YR		MO		DAY

NON-PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION

YR		MO		DAY

GANG AFFILIATION-BEHAVIORAL OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

VICTIM OR VICTIM'S COMPANIONS

YR		MO		DAY

PARTICIPATING SUSPECTS OR DESIGNATED AND DESCRIBED SUSPECTS

YR		MO		DAY

NON-PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION

YR		MO		DAY

REFUTATION OR DENIAL OF GANG AFFILIATION

STATEMENT BY OTHER THAN PARTICIPANT

YR		MO		DAY

STATEMENT BY PARTICIPANT

YR		MO		DAY

REFERENCE TO PHYSICAL SETTING, ETC. (COL. 73 BLANK)

CASE ID #				CARD #
				0 4

INCIDENT OCCURRED IN KNOWN GANG AREA

YR		MO		DAY

PREVIOUS GANG ACTIVITY IN AREA OF INCIDENT

YR		MO		DAY

PARTICIPANTS OR NON-PARTICIPANTS LINKED TO GANG AREAS

YR		MO		DAY

GANG WRITING IN AREA OF INCIDENT OR AREA LINKED TO INVESTIGATION

YR		MO		DAY

OTHER REFERENCE TO PHYSICAL SETTING, ETC.

YR		MO		DAY

OTHER INDICATIONS

INCIDENT IS A DRIVE-BY SHOOTING

YR		MO		DAY	

INVOLVEMENT OF GANG UNITS

YR		MO		DAY	

FEAR OF GANG RETALIATION

YR		MO		DAY	

ACTUAL INCIDENT OR THREAT OF GANG RETALIATION

YR		MO		DAY	

REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR TESTIFY-GANG LOYALTY

YR		MO		DAY	

INFORMATION PERTAINING TO GANGS IN GENERAL

YR		MO		DAY	

OTHER INDICATION

YR		MO		DAY	

(COL. 73 BLANK)

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CASE ID #

0	5
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CARD #



Other Incidents

--	--	--	--	--	--

Info/Part/Gang

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TERMINOLOGY OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Cholos

Back up

Homeboys/homegirls/  
homies

Partner

Low rider

Blood

Cruising

Tatoos of gang names  
or initials

Veteranos

Teardrop tatoos

Flying colors

Gang names written on  
clothes or personal  
property

Hoorahing

bandana/headband/  
hankerchief

Hand signals

Pendletons

Gang-banging

Beanie cap

Pachuco

Hairnet

Vatos

Other, specify \_\_\_\_\_

Cuz

Territory

Weapons

(COL. 22-73 BLANK)

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CASE ID #

0	6
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CARD #

## INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: For each of the following indications of gang involvement that appears anywhere in the case file, list the earliest date of appearance in the file by year, month and day. Date of appearance is the earliest date on which the statement was made or the evidence became known to the investigators. If that is not available use the date of the earliest report in which the statement or the evidence appears. Check with supervisor for replacing missing dates. For all items that do not appear in the case file enter zeroes in the boxes.

### I. INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT BASED ON STATEMENTS DESCRIBING OR CHARACTERIZING THE INCIDENT

#### A. Designation of the incident as gang related or possibly gang related :

INSTRUCTIONS: Only statements specifically labelling, describing or characterizing the incident should be included.

1. Specific statement by Law Enforcement or other Government Agency (e.g., the incident is called "gang related" or described as a "gang disturbance").
2. Specific statement by citizen (e.g., the incident is called "gang related" or described as a "gang fight" or "gang disturbance").

NOTE: "Indirect designation -"law enforcement" indication has been deleted.

#### B. Designation of the incident as not gang related or designation of gang involvement as undetermined or ambiguous:

INSTRUCTIONS: Only statements specifically describing or characterizing the incident should be included.

1. Specific statement by Law Enforcement or other Government Agency refuting gang involvement (i.e., incident described as not involving gangs or gang motives).

NOTE: "Specific statement - undetermined or ambiguous" indication has been deleted.

## II. INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT BASED ON MOTIVES

### A. Gang Retaliation:

INSTRUCTIONS: Include statements specifically identifying gang retaliation as the motive or reason for this incident. Also include other pieces of information specifically indicating that this incident was motivated by a previous incident or conflict involving gangs.

1. Specific Statement identifying gang retaliation as the motive or possible motive for the incident. Includes identification of the incident as "in response to" a previous incident (e.g., "the occupants of (the suspect vehicle) were retaliating members of Marianna gang", "they were headed to Bassett area for a retaliatory strike", or "the killing balanced an earlier Eastside victim who was stabbed in 1975"). Excludes intra-gang situations.
2. If not above, other references to previous conflict between gangs, identifying the previous conflict as the motive or possible motive for this incident. (e.g., reference to "ongoing conflict", "a witness stated that she heard one of the victims state to another 'Those are the guys we had trouble with from Artesia earlier'"). Excludes intra-gang situations.

NOTE: In general, the use of the words "rival", "rivalry", "opposing", or "opposition" does not constitute a motive. This may imply gang affiliation for both sides. If these terms are embedded in a context that clearly suggests that there have been particular incidents of previous conflict, then previous conflict or retaliation may be coded. General information regarding gang conflict histories are coded as previous conflict if other terms (besides rival, etc.) are used (e.g., "enemies", "at war", "bad terms").

NOTE: "X gang and Y gang are rival gangs" is coded other, other.

3. Reference to intra-gang retaliation as the motive or possible motive for the incident (excludes accidental situations).
4. Statements or information refuting gang retaliation as the motive or possible motive for the incident (e.g., Q: "You don't have any-any reason to retaliate against him, is that correct?" A: "I don't even know him."). Specify.
5. Other evidence or information suggesting gang retaliation as the motive or possible motive for the incident. Specify.

B. Other Gang Motives:

INSTRUCTIONS: Include statements or other evidence indicating or suggesting other motives for the incidents that are gang related or that involve gang members.

1. Reference to a gang's territory or neighborhood or to gang affiliation as the motive or possible motive for the incident (e.g., participants being in the "wrong" neighborhood, as part of the incident participants yell "get out of (gang area)", as part of the incident participants ask "where are you from?" or "Are you from (gang area)?"). This category includes cases of mistaken identity if motive was territorial or based on affiliation (e.g. "V., who lives in Largo area, may have been mistaken for a gang member.).
2. Indication that the presence of gang graffitti was the motive or possible motive for the incident or that the act of writing graffiti on the part of the participants was the motive or possible motive.
3. Indication of personal conflict between gang members that is not gang related (i.e., conflict over girlfriend) as the motive or possible motive for the incident. (This category is not very common).
4. Evidence or information suggesting other gang related motives. Specify.

III. INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT BASED ON GANG AFFILIATION OR POSSIBLE GANG AFFILIATION OF PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION

- A. Specific identification of participants or non-participants involved in the investigation as having gang affiliations or possible gang affiliations (includes clear self-identifications):

INSTRUCTIONS: Include specific statements (by law enforcement or other government agency, participants, witnesses or informants) identifying participants or non-participants involved in the investigation as having gang affiliations or possible gang affiliations (e.g., "Investigators referred to 'Kitchen Crips' as a possible affiliation of the suspect", "Witness said 'Lote' gang did the shooting", "Victim stated he felt he was shot by a member of his own gang by accident"). Also include information on gang affiliations obtained from law enforcement or other official records. Include gang names yelled during the incident & gang response to "Where are you from?" (if a gang name is mentioned).

1. Identification of victim or victim's companions.
2. Identification of suspects participating in the incident or of designated and described suspects.
3. Identification of non-participants involved in the investigation (this includes witnesses, informants, friends or families of the participants).

- B. Reference to behavioral or physical evidence suggesting gang affiliations for participants or non-participants involved in the investigation:

INSTRUCTIONS: Include information obtained from a description of the incident (e.g., asking "Where are you from?" as well as "Nowhere" response, identification of suspects' vehicle or victims' vehicle as belonging to members of a named gang), physical evidence (e.g., gang tatoos (excluding tear drop tatoos), gang names on personal property, hand signals, "cholo" description), or other evidence of gang affiliation (specify on form). Do not include costume indicators unless costume is described as linking individual to gang. Use of the terms homeboy, homegirl, or homies are behavioral evidence for the person using the term but does not apply to the person referred to in the statement.

1. Identification of victim or victim's companions.
2. Identification of suspects participating in the incident or of designated and described suspects.
3. Identification of non-participants involved in the investigation (this includes: witnesses, informants, friends, or families of the participants).

- C. Specific refutation or denial of gang affiliation of participants:

INSTRUCTIONS: Include specific statements (by law enforcement, participants, witnesses, or informants) refuting or denying the gang affiliation of participants. Also includes references to participants as former gang members. Excludes the refutation or denial of gang affiliation of non-participants involved in the investigation (i.e., witnesses, informants, friends or families of the participants).

1. Specific statement refuting the gang affiliation of any participant by any one other than that participant.
2. Statement by participant denying gang affiliation (includes statements by the participant that he "no longer" is involved or that he only "associates" or "hangs out" with gang members).

IV. INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT BASED ON REFERENCE TO PHYSICAL SETTING, LOCATION, TERRITORY OR NEIGHBORHOOD

INSTRUCTIONS: Include statements and other information or evidence concerning the area in which the incident occurred that indicate or suggest gang involvement. Also include statements and other information or evidence concerning areas to which participants and non-participants involved in the investigation are linked that indicate or suggest gang involvement. Excludes statements and other information or evidence indicating area, territory or neighborhood as the motive or possible motive for the incident.

- A. Information or evidence indicating or suggesting that the incident took place in a known gang area (i.e., "the shooting took place in Bassett area"). (Subsumes "linked to gang area" as part of incident").
- B. Reference to previous or on-going gang activity in the area of the incident (i.e., "It should be noted that there have been numerous incidents of gang activity in recent weeks at the location.").
- C. Information or evidence linking participants or non-participants involved in the investigation to gang areas or neighborhoods (e.g., reference to a person's residence; reference to "gang hangouts"; "Victims live in Jardin area and attend Vial H.S. with VNE members."). This indicator refers to any gang area; not only for suspect(s) and victim(s) gang areas. Excludes links based on identification of incident location as a gang area and links based on responses to "Where are you from?" or gang names yelled during incident. It is uncommon to code "known gang area" or "previous gang activity" and this category ~~from~~ the same or similar statements.
- D. Reference to gang writing on walls, sidewalks, etc. (i.e., "the whole area was spray painted with numerous nicknames and graffiti consistent with members of the Lil Watts gang.") Includes reference to the location of the incident and references to other areas linked to the investigation. Excludes references to writing graffiti as motive or possible motive for incident. Also excludes references to gang writing on personal property.
- E. Other information or evidence concerning physical setting, location, territory or neighborhood indicating or suggesting gang involvement, that is not included above. Specify.

V. OTHER INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT OR POSSIBLE GANG INVOLVEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Include statements or other information or evidence referring to the items below and indicating or suggesting gang involvement or possible gang involvement. Note that items B,C and D should be consistent with information on Page 3 of the coding form. Exclude any statements, information or evidence included elsewhere as indications of gang involvement or possible gang involvement.

- A. Indication that the incident is a "drive-by" shooting. Check gang indicators page and the auto involvement box. If there is an indication that a drive-by did take place on the gang indicators page but it is not relected in the auto involvement box, bring this to a supervisor's attention.
- B. Mention of Gang Units in the incident investigation. (Should be filled in if Gang Units are listed on Page 3 and vice versa.)
- C. Indication or evidence of fear of gang retaliation stemming from this incident. (Should be filled in if Other Indication of Fear of Retaliation (Page 3) is code 1 and vice versa.) Included is the fear of further gang retaliation beyond the incident (e.g., witnesses refusing to give information due to possible gang reprisal or persons on the suspect's fearing revenge by gang members on the victim's side) Also included are statements of concern by police or other officials regarding possible further retaliation due to our incident (this applies to concern for anyone; e.g., suspects, witnesses, informants).
- D. Reference to an actual incident of gang retaliation or to a specific threat of gang retaliation stemming from this incident. Included is an actual gang reprisal against witnesses or against those on the suspect's side.
- E. Indication or evidence of the refusal of any individual to provide information to investigators or to testify in court because of their affiliation or association with a gang (i.e., gang loyalty). Excludes refusal due to fear of gang retaliation.
- F. Presence of information on the case file that pertains to gangs in general (e.g., reference to terms associated with gang culture). Code reference to particular gangs under Section I.
- G. Any other indication of gang involvement or possible gang involvement, not elsewhere included. Specify. Examples: gang names yelled during incident which cannot be sorted or aligned to victim or suspect, and statements where gang-relatedness is ambiguous. Specify.
- H. Other gang-related incidents - excluded <sup>from</sup> other incident coding because 1) stated conflict (previous or subsequent) did not relate to our incident or 2) did not involve 2 gangs or affiliation of one side ambiguous. Statements of previous conflict as incident motive where affiliation of participants is unclear may be coded here. Specify.
- I. Specific Information about particular gangs (not necessarily involved in our incident). Examples are statements about 'subgroups territorial boundaries, characteristic criminal activity, and lack of rivalry with other gangs. Excludes elaboration of terminology/ physical evidence such as explanation of graffitti. Specify.

VI. INDICATIONS OF GANG INVOLVEMENT BASED ON TERMINOLOGY OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

INSTRUCTIONS: Include any reference to or use of the terms listed on the coding form. Also include any reference to the items of costume, dress, colors, insignia, tatoos, etc. listed on the coding form. For each of the listed items that appears anywhere in the case file, code 1 in the box next to the item. For all items that do not appear in the case file, code 0 in the box next to the item. Below are some examples of terms included within various categories:

- 1) Cuz - includes Cous and other Crips argot.
- 2) Territory or turf includes barrio or varrio, but excludes their use as part of gang name; e.g., "Varrío Norwalk" or "Barrio TRese;" although includes their use as a replacement for the word "gang", e.g. "hang around with a barrio named Townsman."
- 3) Blood - includes Pirus argot; e.g., "Rue boys" but not "brothers".
- 4) Beanie- includes "watchcap."
- 5) Weapons - includes "Roscoe", "jackin'," and "set gun".
- 6) Bandana - includes "flags" and "rags".



APPENDIX C

Notes on Variable Selection for  
Discriminant Analysis

## Notes on Variable Selection for Discriminant Analysis

Our first and most basic criterion for selection was the bivariate relationship between the variable and gang designation. Any variable with a significant ( $p < .05$ ) relationship with gang designation, with all years combined or in any year or time period, was tentatively selected. Variables were eliminated if one was a linear combination of others. This choice was usually made on the basis of the strength of the relationships with gang designation, consideration of N's and conceptual considerations. Having compiled a tentative list in this way, we moved on to check intercorrelations and partial intercorrelations, controlling for VICPART and SUSPART.<sup>1</sup>

We also reassessed decisions that, although similar, were made at different points in time and, hence, possibly inconsistently, and applied the above considerations in a systematic way. In general, where choices had to be made we tried to rely, first, on the strength of the relationship. However, in some cases methodological or conceptual concerns overrode that; but, where that was true, decisions were made consistently for LAPD and LASD.

Described in more detail below are decisions that were made involving variables that had been tentatively selected for use in the analysis, both for LAPD and LASD. For some of these decisions the issue of inconsistency was not relevant because the basis for the decision was clearly defined for us. These as well as others in which inconsistency is an issue are detailed below for the purpose of documentation.

Problems common to LAPD and LASD:

- 1) Participant homogeneity: these weren't really a problem, but, with the exception of mean age difference and difference in proportion male, none demonstrated significant bivariate relationships with gang designation and so were not considered for the analysis.
- 2) Ethnicity: high correlations between victims' ethnicity and suspects' ethnicity and between variables for Black participants

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1. See explanation of mnemonics at the conclusion of this Appendix.

and Hispanic participants forced us to choose just one variable - victim or suspect side, Black or Hispanic; we chose the variable for Hispanic suspects for LASD and the variable for Black suspects for LAPD because these were the variables that showed the strongest relationships in the respective data sets.

3) Charges: we had a choice between using N1 (the number of suspects charged with homicide), N2 (the number of suspects charged with something other homicide), both of those, or NCHG (the total number of suspects charged); since NCHG is  $N1+N2$ , the sum can't be used with the two components. N2 showed no significant differences - there wasn't a lot of non-homicide charging. Therefore, NCHG is mostly a function of N1 but has noise contributed by N2. For these reasons we chose to use only N1.

4) Setting: STREET and RESID have consistently very high correlations; we have always had a conceptual preference for STREET, and RESID has higher correlations with other variables (e.g., CLEARREL) - we chose STREET.

5) Relationship: CLEARREL AND STRANGER also have consistently very high correlations; CLEARREL has a stronger relationship with gang designation, but we are afraid that that might partly be a function of coding procedures - the rule for coding was that a relationship was coded as "clear" unless there was information to suggest that it was only "minimal," and the odds are that gang cases in general had more information on the data collection form from which to make that distinction (e.g., gang indicators information) and, thus, were less likely to have been coded as "clear." For this reason, we chose to use STRANGER in both LAPD and LASD.

6) Associated Offenses: we have a choice among NOOTHCG (no. of associated offenses), VIOLENT and NONVIOL; NONVIOL has low Ns and is generally not significantly related to gang designation; NOOTHCG and VIOLENT are consistently highly correlated so we had to choose one. Because NOOTHCG is methodologically linked to the charge variables (#3 above) we picked VIOLENT; also we preferred it conceptually.

7) NUMARST (number arrested) vs. N1 (3, above) vs. DSGSUS (designated suspects): in both LAPD and LASD, NUMARST and N1 have high correlations with each other; in LASD, DSGSUS is added into that. We decided against DSGSUS because it didn't seem to be as meaningful a measure of police investigation as arrests or charges; between NUMARST and N1, we chose N1 because it has a

stronger and more consistent relationship with gang designation and a weaker relationship with SUSPART.

8) DSGVIC vs. VIOLENT (LAPD) and DSGVIC vs. VICINJ (LASD): In LASD we decided against DSGVIC solely on a conceptual basis; particularly since it is so highly correlated with these two variables, it's hard to make an argument for it as a good measure of investigation - it seems basically to reflect that the police do a good job of writing down the names of the people who got hurt. In LAPD, DSGVIC was retained, since their correlation was lower.

9) PROPMPRS (the proportion of suspects missing information on prior offenses - there is a comparable variable (PROPMPRV) for victims): this failed to show any significant relationship with gang designation and so was excluded from both lists.

LAPD problems:

1) PRPROPS (proportion of suspects with priors): although this showed a significant relationship with gang designation, it was excluded because it was contributing too much to the loss of cases in the discriminant analysis.

2) PAGEINV vs. TOTINT: we had to choose because of high correlations, and decided in favor of TOTINT; PAGEINV did not show as strong a relationship with gang designation and is also something of a noisy investigation measure.

LASD problems:

1) PAGEINV vs. N1: see 2 above.

## LAPD Variables for Discriminant Analysis

- \* VICPART - Number of participants on victim side
- \* SUSPART - Number of participants on suspect side
- \* STREET - Dummy variable for incident occurring in the street
- \* RESID - Dummy variable for incident occurring in a residence
- \* CLEARREL- Dummy variable for clear relationship between victims and suspects
- \* STRANGER- Dummy variable for no relationship between victims and suspects
- \* AUTO - Dummy variable for presence of auto in incident
- \* NOOTHCG - Number of associated offenses
- \* VIOLENT - Dummy variable for violent associated offense
- \* GUNPRES - Dummy variable for presence of gun in incident
- \* INTWIT - Number of witness interviews
- \* TOTINT - Total number of interviews
- \* NUMARST - Number arrested
- \* DSGVIC - Number of designated victims
- \* DSGSUS - Number of designated suspects
- \* MNAGVA - Mean age of victims
- \* MNAGSA - Mean age of suspects
- \* MNAGDIF2- Mean age difference
- \* HOMSUSP - Number of suspects charged with homicide
- \* PAGEINV - Number of pages of investigation
- \* ALLBLKS - Dummy variable for predominantly black suspects
- \* MLPROPS - Proportion of suspects who are male
- \* MLPROPV - Proportion of victims who are male
- \* MLDIFF2 - Difference in proportion male
- \* PRPROPS - Proportion of suspects with priors
- \* PROPMPRS- Proportion of suspects with missing information on prior offenses

\* Variables actually included in discriminant analysis runs; see attached documentation for reasons why other variables were excluded

## LASD Variables for Discriminant Analysis

- \* VICPART - Number of participants on victim side
- \* SUSPART - Number of participants on suspect side
- \* STREET - Dummy variable for incident occurring in the street
- RESID - Dummy variable for incident occurring in a residence
- CLEARREL - Dummy variable for clear relationship between victims and suspects
- \* STRANGER - Dummy variable for no relationship between victims and suspects
- NOOTHCG - Number of associated offenses
- \* VIOLENT - Dummy variable for violent associated offense
- NONVIOL - Dummy variable for non-violent associated offense
- \* GUNPRES - Dummy variable for presence of gun in incident
- \* TWPNUM - Total number of weapons present in incident
- \* INTWIT - Number of witness interviews
- \* INTPART - No. of desig. parts. interviewed/No. of desig. parts - unk. suspects
- NUMARST - Number arrested
- \* VICINJ - Number of non-homicide victims with injuries
- DSGVIC - Number of designated victims
- DSGSUS - Number of designated suspects
- \* MNAGVA - Mean age of victims
- \* MNAGSA - Mean age of suspects
- \* MNAGDIF4 - Mean age difference
- \* N1 - Number of suspects charged with homicide
- PAGEINV - Number of pages of investigation
- \* ALLHSPS - Dummy variable for predominantly Hispanic suspects
- \* MLPROPS - Proportion of suspects who are male
- \* MLPROPV - Proportion of victims who are male
- \* MLDIFF4 - Difference in proportion male
- PROPMPRS - Prop. of suspects missing information on prior offenses
- \* PROPMPRV - Prop. of victims missing information on prior offenses

\* Variables actually included in discriminant analysis runs; see attached documentation for reasons why other variables were excluded