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# International Terrorism



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

NCJRS

MAR 18 1987

ACQUISITIONS

*Following are texts of an address by President Reagan, statements and an address by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, and a statement by Ambassador Parker W. Borg, Deputy, Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.*

## **PRESIDENT REAGAN APRIL 14, 1986**

*Address to the nation,  
the White House,  
Washington, D.C.*

My fellow Americans, at 7:00 this evening eastern time, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Muammar Qadhafi's subversive activities. The attacks were concentrated and carefully targeted to minimize casualties among the Libyan people, with whom we have no quarrel.

From initial reports, our forces have succeeded in their mission. Several weeks ago in New Orleans, I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recently, I made it clear we would respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible for such attacks.

On April 5 in West Berlin, a terrorist bomb exploded in a nightclub frequented by American servicemen. Sgt. Kenneth Ford and a young Turkish

woman were killed, and 230 others were wounded, among them some 50 American military personnel.

This monstrous brutality is but the latest act in Colonel Qadhafi's reign of terror. The evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of LaBelle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime. On March 25, more than a week before the attack, orders were sent from Tripoli to the Libyan People's Bureau in East Berlin to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties. Libya's agents then planted the bomb. On April 4, the People's Bureau alerted Tripoli that the attack would be carried out the following morning. The next day, they reported back to Tripoli on the great success of their mission.

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***When our citizens are abused  
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world on the direct orders of  
a hostile regime, we will  
respond . . . . Self-defense is not  
only our right, it is our duty.***

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Our evidence is direct; it is precise; it is irrefutable. We have solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi has planned against the U.S. installations and diplomats and even American tourists.

Thanks to close cooperation with our friends, some of these have been pre-

vented. With the help of French authorities, we recently aborted one such attack—a planned massacre, using grenades and small arms, of civilians waiting in line for visas at an American Embassy.

Colonel Qadhafi is not only an enemy of the United States. His record of subversion and aggression against the neighboring states in Africa is well documented and well known. He has ordered the murder of fellow Libyans in countless countries. He has sanctioned acts of terror in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as the Western Hemisphere.

Today, we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again. It gives me no pleasure to say that, and I wish it were otherwise.

Before Qadhafi seized power in 1969, the people of Libya had been friends of the United States. And I'm sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world. The Libyan people are decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.

To our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission, I would only say you have the permanent gratitude of the American people. Europeans who remember history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety in the appeasement of evil. It must be the core of Western policy that there be no sanctuary for terror, and to sustain such a policy, free men and free nations must unite and work together.

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Sometimes it is said that by imposing sanctions against Colonel Qadhafi or by striking at his terrorist installations, we only magnify the man's importance—that the proper way to deal with him is to ignore him. I do not agree. Long before I came into this office, Colonel Qadhafi had engaged in acts of international terror—acts that put him outside the company of civilized men. For years, however, he suffered no economic or political or military sanction, and the atrocities mounted in number, as did the innocent dead and wounded. And for us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in nightclubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight—a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

We believe that this preemptive action against terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior. I have no illusion that tonight's action will ring down the curtain on Qadhafi's reign of terror. But this mission, violent though it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women. We will persevere.

This afternoon, we consulted with the leaders of Congress regarding what we were about to do and why. Tonight, I salute the skill and professionalism of the men and women of our armed forces who carried out this mission. It's an honor to be your Commander in Chief.

We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force—and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted wrong.

I warned that there should be no place on earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant it. I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone, if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have.

## AMBASSADOR OAKLEY FEBRUARY 28, 1986

*Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C.*

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today with my colleagues from the Treasury Department and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] to discuss the threat of terrorism.

Our presence here together illustrates the partnership within the U.S. Government, the Congress, and the American people in this combined effort to counter the modern day scourge of terrorism. Obviously, there has to be a certain amount of "specialization" in this effort, and the FBI is the primary agency on dealing with the terrorist threats at home, and the State Department is the lead agency in coordinating the U.S. Government's antiterrorism effort overseas. Treasury has an important role in both. We work together, especially where the threat abroad has a potential for trouble here at home.

Mr. Webster [FBI Director] is covering the domestic situation, and I will sketch out the growing problem of overseas international terrorism which in 1985 all too frequently caught the television screens and, thus, the eyes and ears of Americans. This was partly because terrorists singled out Americans for death in three of the most dramatic attacks—the prolonged TWA 847 hijacking in June, the *Achille Lauro* hijacking in October, and the November hijacking of the Egyptian airliner in Malta. Five Americans were among the 19 killed in the December massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports by the Abu Nidal group, supported by Libya. We also experienced the continuing anguish of the American hostages in Lebanon and their courageous families in this country.

A preliminary review of statistics shows that in 1985 there were more than 800 incidents of international terrorism. There were 2,223 casualties, of which 23 of the killed and 139 of the injured were Americans. Over the past 2 years, international terrorism incidents have risen sharply (60%) from the yearly average of about 500 incidents for the 1978-83 period.

### The Terrorist Threat Abroad

There are a number of diverse reasons and causes behind this disturbing trend. Middle East-related terrorism is a major cause for the increase, with the number

of incidents rising from 109 in 1983 to 378 in 1985. Within that category, there are a variety of factors and actors. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is only one component, and it includes terrorism conducted by radical Palestinian groups and their state supporters trying to disrupt the peace process, plus one Palestinian group against another. There is also the terrorism inspired by Khomeini's brand of politico-religious fanaticism and the Iran-Iraq war as well as Qadhafi's assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents.



Some terrorist acts were attempts by terrorists to obtain the release of their colleagues or relatives arrested for previous actions. The one consistent demand of the captors of the American hostages in Lebanon is the release of the 17 Iranian-inspired terrorists convicted in Kuwait for the bloody terrorist attacks there in December 1984, which killed and wounded almost 100 people. Other terrorists, such as Abu Abbas whose group hijacked the *Achille Lauro*, were trying to make an anti-U.S., anti-Israel political point as well as obtain the release of captured colleagues.

The most deadly of the Middle East terrorist attacks came from the Abu Nidal group, which shifted the locus of its operations from Iraq to Syria in 1983. In early 1985, Abu Nidal focused his attacks against Jordanian and mainstream Palestinian officials. Then, about the middle of the year, after Syria and Jordan began high-level discussions, Libya became his main backer, and his targets shifted. The hijacking of the Egyptian airliner to Malta, in which women passengers—American and Israeli—were singled out for killing for the first time, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks were the major operations of the Abu Nidal organization after it began to receive strong Libyan support.

West European groups also were active. The Red Army Faction attacked American and NATO-related installations in Germany, causing several American deaths, and their counterparts in France and Belgium also carried out attacks in these countries. In Italy, just this month, the Red Brigades revived after the Italians had dealt major setbacks to the group. In Spain, Basque separatists continued their campaign. An American businessman was killed last year when a car bomb blew up in Madrid, wounding over a dozen Spanish Civil Guards.

# Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Attacks, 1981-85<sup>1</sup>

Number of casualties



<sup>1</sup> 1985 figures are preliminary and may be subject to review and revision.

In Latin America, terrorist incidents grew from 81 in 1984 to 132 in 1985, many of them by groups with Cuban and Nicaraguan support. Eighty-six of these incidents involved the United States, including the killing of four marines and two businessmen in San Salvador. Narcoterrorism was an increasingly important problem.

The list is by no means complete, but I cite these incidents to illustrate the variety of types of terrorists. There is a common point, however. The terrorists, regardless of what they or their backers may claim, are not some kind of romantic freedom fighters whose attacks should be excused away on the ground that they are fighting for a political "just cause." What they are conducting are criminal acts. In many cases they are deliberately trying to kill and wound as many innocent persons as possible, including those without any direct connection to their grievance.

## International Terrorist Threat to the U.S.?

We're often asked: "Will overseas terrorism move here?" It is difficult to give a categorical answer because there are so many varieties of overseas terrorists, but all concerned agencies of the U.S. Government take the threat very seriously—particularly State, Justice, and Treasury.

Most recently, Libya's Qadhafi gained additional headlines by more threats to bring terrorism to the United States. While we consider this to be an exaggeration, it is not to be ignored. There has been a clear pattern of assassination by Libyan agents abroad of their own countrymen whom Qadhafi did not like. The new Abu Nidal connection gives Libya a greater capability. Last year the FBI successfully foiled a plot by a group of Libyans in this country, and a member of Libya's mission to the United Nations was expelled because of his involvement in terrorist activities.

Sikh terrorists, who were inactive until just 2 years ago, suddenly emerged in the United States and Canada as well as in India. The FBI thwarted potential Sikh operations here. The planting of bombs last year on two civilian airliner flights from Canada, however, hit close to home. The Air India tragedy was the single most devastating event in 1985. The crash last June, which all evidence attributes to a bomb planted by Sikh terrorists, took 329 lives. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,

and India are making a special effort to identify and preempt possible Sikh terrorism.

There are other groups which have, in the past, used American soil to air their grievances by action against representatives of other countries, such as Armenian terrorists who had been attacking Turkish diplomats and the Jewish Defense League, which has attacked Soviet diplomats. However, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that there were no incidents actually carried out in this country last year involving connections with groups or governments abroad.

I also wish to make a point about the differences between actual and potential threat from groups of citizens or permanent residents in this country with strong family, ethnic, or religious ties abroad. While there have been a small number of incidents involving individuals from these groups, a combination of good law enforcement and pressure to cease and desist from the groups themselves has tended to prevent the continuation or repetition of terrorist activity. These groups are composed overwhelmingly of peace-loving, patriotic citizens. It would be a mistake and grossly unfair for the American public, Congress, or the media to label or imply ethnic communities in this country are potential hotbeds of terrorism.

There are a number of reasons why terrorists from abroad are not more active here. One, of course, is the excellent work of the FBI, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms Bureau of Treasury, and other law enforcement agencies. A second is the good work by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and other agencies in developing intelligence abroad on possible threats to this country. Another factor is that the intellectual, political, and psychological atmosphere which seems to nurture some of the European ideological terrorists is not popular here. Yet another is the good work by INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], Customs, and the State Department in keeping out potential terrorists.

One result of this good work is that it is easier for terrorists who want to strike at Americans to do so overseas. There are millions of us working and traveling abroad at any given time. The buildings we work in, the cafes we eat in, and the airports we use are much more accessible to terrorists who want to strike symbolically at Uncle Sam or

strike indiscriminately at American civilians. The security in some of the countries has not been what it should have been. It is difficult to gauge whether the situation at home would change if stronger antiterrorism actions were taken by the U.S. Government overseas. We already have taken a number of economic and political measures against Qadhafi, for example, and the United States and Israel have long been his targets. The United States is also target number one for a number of other groups in the Middle East and Latin America.

While one cannot rule out that stronger actions against Qadhafi or other terrorists might increase further their desire to do something against the United States at home, there are the basic obstacles mentioned above which even the most irrational terrorist needs to consider. A desire for revenge does not necessarily change the equation of the relative difficulties of terrorists getting to and operating in the United States or our abilities to prevent them.

In any event, this Administration has decided upon a still more vigorous campaign of counterterrorism and will not be deterred by the risk of retaliation in this country. This is the main conclusion of the report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, which President Reagan has approved. It recommends measures to strengthen our antiterrorist capabilities abroad and at home and a continuation of the policy of no concessions, no backing down where terrorism is concerned.

Of course, nothing is certain in this business, and the terrorists have the advantage of surprise and shifting tactics. Thus, in considering our responses to a given situation, we try to take all factors into account. But we cannot let ourselves be immobilized into inaction for fear our actions might prompt more terrorist attacks. To the contrary, the cost of doing nothing is usually higher than the costs of doing something.

Many European governments have long demurred at joining in action against Libya or terrorist groups, rejecting even seemingly simple controls upon those entering or living in their countries, because they were concerned about losing Arab world business. Belatedly, they have now come to realize that they are not being spared and that terrorism is costing them dearly in falling tourism revenues, increased security costs, and apprehensive potential investors, as well as some loss of confidence by their own public.

## International Cooperation

Dealing with terrorism overseas is complicated by such economic factors and by differing political and foreign policy viewpoints even in the case of attacks where the primary targets are American. It should be kept in mind—and it is often overlooked by the media and public—that the primary legal and political responsibility for countering terrorism is the government of the country in which the terrorists may attack.

Our power is limited and constrained both legally and politically. For instance, we can post military guards inside the grounds of our embassies or other installations to help protect them, but we are dependent upon the host government for the outer defense, just as it is the host government's responsibility to protect travelers at the airports, businesses, and other facilities within its jurisdiction.

We can mobilize our military forces to strike terrorists, but our ability to use them in friendly or neutral foreign territory is dependent upon the concurrence of the host government. Application of our legal power to pursue terrorists abroad is also heavily influenced by host government attitudes. In this connection, tightly worded extradition treaties without political loopholes subject to exploitation by terrorists are very important. The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty pending before the Senate for ratification is an example.

We can, and do, work with many of the other countries to help improve their defense against terrorism. But, in the end, the decisions—or sometimes the lack of decisions—on how to deal with the situation are up to the other sovereign governments. And it is obviously in our interest to see them take as strong and effective action as possible, dealing with the threat abroad rather than having it spread to the United States. In countering terrorism, our efforts to obtain international cooperation and provide international assistance are all important.

## Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program

An important part of our cooperation with other nations is the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program for civilian law enforcement agencies of friendly foreign governments. The program is administered by the Department of State, and over 1,800 officials from 32 countries have participated during the nearly 2 years of its operation.

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and professional police associations supply most of the instruction for the program, which provides a very valuable structure for developing a better working relationship with other countries facing the same threat. The Departments of Justice and Treasury and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] have provided support for the program. A first phase, the Executive Seminar, enables the United States and the participating country to exchange ideas and insights. The second and third phases are used to identify specific needs and to provide actual training in the United States of officials of the recipient country.

In authorizing the ATA Program, the Congress established a requirement that participating countries be screened on the basis of their adherence to acceptable standards of human and civil rights, and the Congress has the right to pass on prospective participants. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs reviews and approves each and every country before Congress is notified by the State Department of the intention of that country's participation in the ATA Program. Both the Department of State and the Congress seek to screen out those countries which have questionable human rights records. We also have the option, where U.S. interests are compelling, to limit the extent of training to those foreign agencies or specific areas of operation which are directly and immediately relevant to the safety and protection of U.S. citizens.

We make recognition and protection of human rights a dominant and pervasive theme in all instruction, and we select training agencies—such as metropolitan police forces—which, by word and example, demonstrate to the foreign participants that ethical standards, professionalism, and effective counterterrorism must and can go hand in hand.

#### **Actions Taken Over the Past 2 Years**

The pace of our cooperative international programs and other activities is quickening.

- We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world and begun discussing common counterterrorism efforts with countries where we have not had such close ties.
- We have dedicated more resources and given a still higher priority to col-

lecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad.

- We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; we have begun to cooperate more closely with the private sector in sharing information on threats abroad and how to counter them; the Inman panel [Advisory Panel on Overseas Security] provided an important outside review of what needed to be done to enhance security and an additional boost for obtaining the necessary resources.

- As noted by President Reagan, improved intelligence collection, better security, and closer international cooperation helped us deter or preempt more than 100 international terrorist actions during the past year. This is in addition to the 23 potential domestic incidents reported by Mr. Webster.

- We have begun a new, more assertive phase in combating the state supporters of terrorism, exemplified by the President's decision to sever all economic as well as political contacts with Libya, to persuade other governments to join us, and to retain the option of more forceful unilateral action should this cooperative campaign fail to stop Qadhafi.

- We have worked hard and successfully in international organizations such as the UN General Assembly and Security Council to establish that terrorism is a threat to all nations and should be considered as a crime. In the specialized agencies, aviation and maritime specialists are drafting new security standards.

- We have made effective use of recent legislative tools, such as the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984, and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe it is useful to have more legal tools for the antiterrorism effort. We support, for example, S. 1429, which recently passed the Senate, making it a federal crime to kill or conduct other terrorist acts against Americans overseas. We also, of course, strongly back passage of the U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Extradition Treaty.

- President Reagan has approved the work of the task force directed by Vice President Bush which reviewed all aspects of our counterterrorist policies and practices and recommended a number of improvements.

#### **Coordination**

To ensure maximum coordination for the U.S. response to terrorism, lead agencies have been designated by the White House. These responsibilities, recently

reaffirmed by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, give the State Department the lead agency responsibility for all incidents which take place outside U.S. territory. Within the State Department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the responsibility for providing protection to U.S. facilities and personnel overseas and the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism for the general measures of cooperation with foreign governments to combat terrorism.

The Interagency Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Ambassador at Large, provides the forum for the major departments and agencies involved in combating terrorism to meet regularly and share ideas, develop plans, and make recommendations on policy and programs. Permanent members include representatives from the National Security Council; the Vice President's office; the Justice Department (which has the interagency lead role for domestic terrorism); the FBI; the Departments of Defense (both the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the office of the Secretary), Treasury, and Energy; the Central Intelligence Agency; the FAA; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The IG/T provides a single point where the various departments and agencies can address questions and make proposals.

There are a number of specific working groups established under the auspices of the IG/T. They include one on rewards, one on improving technology such as equipment for detecting explosives, and another on coordinating antiterrorist training by all agencies of the executive branch, civilian and military.

When a crisis occurs, task forces are set up in the principal agencies to look after their specific concerns—at the State Department to consider diplomatic issues, family liaison, and overall coordination; at the FAA to consider the technical aspects of a hijacking and maintain liaison with U.S. carriers; at Defense to consider the possibility of using U.S. troops in the area; etc. During a crisis where the use of American force might be considered, a special high-level coordinating group convenes almost immediately at the White House, where key decisions are made. Thus, with the other agencies, we at State have both a good informal working relationship and a formal structure from which flows many of the working relationships....



## Conclusion

We predict that, on the international side, the terrorism threat is likely to continue to grow and be with us for at least another decade. There are too many causes, too many diverse actors, and too many political, religious, social, and nationalistic sore spots in the world which generate individuals ready to become terrorists. Too many groups think they can make a political impact favorable to their particular cause—magnified mightily by the media around the world—and there are governments which refuse to forgo the temptation of using terrorism as a cheap form of warfare. We should not be discouraged or panicked about it but, rather, keep our cool and determination. This will be a long process; there are no magic solutions or remedies. As the terrorists increase their activities, however, we are increasing ours and, indeed, trying harder to get ahead of them on our own and with other governments.

We can take comfort in the large number of terrorist incidents preempted abroad, at the low level of terrorism in this country. But the big increase in the number and viciousness of international terrorism incidents, the even sharper increase in the casualties deliberately caused by the terrorists, and the fact that the United States remains the top target show clearly that the struggle is becoming more intense and we cannot afford to be complacent.

The Reagan Administration is determined to keep at it, adding to and improving the tools we have. Strong congressional support has been and will continue to be extremely important in this effort.

## AMBASSADOR OAKLEY FEBRUARY 19, 1986

*Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C.*

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on our topic of mutual concern: international terrorism.

It seems that almost every day some new terrorist horror jumps at us from the screens of our televisions, the front pages of our newspapers, and the covers of our magazines.

- In Paris earlier this month, bombs were placed in popular shops and tourist centers, even in the Eiffel Tower.

*Excerpt from "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism," February 1986*

## U.S. POLICY AND RESPONSE TO TERRORISTS

Since no country is immune to terrorism, it is imperative that governments have the appropriate policies, intelligence and flexible response options to deal effectively with terrorist acts. Trained personnel and programs must be in place before, during and after each crisis, both to respond to the problem and to answer inevitable criticism in the event of failure. Long-term policies to achieve these objectives are costly, complicated and difficult, yet essential as a defense against the importation of terrorism from overseas.

### Current Policy

The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place. Several National Security Decision Directives as well as statements by the President and senior officials confirm this policy:

- The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or

unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.

- The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.

- States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests.

- The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.

- The United States will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles, and encourage other governments to take similar stands.

U.S. policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people.

Middle East terrorists claimed responsibility for the bombs and the casualties. In Rome and Vienna on December 27, Abu Nidal's group of terrorists massacred 19 innocent people waiting at El Al and TWA ticket lines—including 5 Americans—and over 80 people were injured. Four terrorists are dead; three are being questioned.

- A month earlier, the Abu Nidal group, again supported by Libya, hijacked an Egyptian airliner and began shooting passengers one by one, starting with all the Israeli and American citizens. By the end of the incident, 60 people, including an American, had died, and 20 more were wounded; one terrorist survived and is being tried by Maltese officials.

- In October, terrorists acting under orders from Abu Abbas hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murdered an elderly crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer. The four perpetrators

were captured by the United States and await trial in Italy. Abu Abbas is at large, with a \$250,000 reward out for his arrest and punishment.

- Last June, there was the dramatic hijacking of TWA 847 in Athens and the tragic killing of American sailor Robert Stethem when the aircraft was on the ground in Beirut. Also in Lebanon, there is the prolonged agony of the Americans held captive there. A representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Mr. Terry Waite, has been shuttling to Beirut, meeting with the captors, but they remain hostages of the Iranian-influenced Hizballah organization. . . .

### Libyan Support for Terrorism

It was the pattern of rapidly growing Middle East terrorism, with greatly increased casualties, more frequent target-

ing of U.S. citizens and interests, and stronger state support, which caused the Reagan Administration to draw the line for Qadhafi and Libya's direct involvement in terrorism. Libya is not the only state in the Middle East supporting and using terrorism: Syria and Iran remain very much involved. But over the past 6 months, Libya has become by far the most active, especially against American and European travelers. If it cannot be stopped, others can be expected to follow its lead.

Qadhafi's general support for terrorism is not new. He long has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. He has given support to a variety of groups around the world, from the IRA [Irish Republican Army] in northern Ireland to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. A more detailed description of Libya's activities is in State Department Special Report No. 138, January 1986.

In summary, the most significant Palestinian groups Libya has backed are Abu Nidal; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the PFLP; and Fatah dissidents. Abu Nidal's beneficiaries in Europe include—in addition to the IRA—the FP-25, in Portugal and anti-Turkish Armenian terrorist groups. Asian groups, aside from those in the Philippines, include Pakistan's Al-Zulfikar group, the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia, and Muslim insurgents in Thailand. In Central and South America, Qadhafi has provided training and funding to a variety of groups, including Colombia's M-19, Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left and Manuel Rodrigues Patriotic Front, and insurgent groups in Guatemala and El Salvador. More Libyans arrived just last week in Nicaragua, via Cuba, to assist the regime there and other terrorist/revolutionary groups such as those just mentioned.

Closer to home, Qadhafi has tried to undermine the governments in neighboring Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan and has invaded Chad. In Egypt, Abu Nidal operatives were caught last year trying to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. Indeed, Qadhafi's own terrorist activities have been more wishful thinking and big talk, or largely aimed at Libyan dissidents, until he joined forces with Abu Nidal toward the middle of last year. Until that time, the group in recent years had been the beneficiary of almost exclusive Syrian support. The

pattern of attack during that period focused upon mainline PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and Jordanian officials and Jordanian Air Lines offices.

There is still a connection with Syria, but for the major activities since mid-1985—Rome, Vienna, and Malta—the primary and more significant support has been Libyan. Some of the terrorists involved in the Rome and Vienna attacks may have been "trained" in the Bekka Valley of Lebanon controlled by Syria. But it doesn't take much training to fire submachine guns and throw hand grenades against civilian passengers in a crowded airliner terminal. Even in this, Abu Nidal shows his cynicism and cruelty. His group recruits young men, some of them still teenagers, for suicide attacks. They are the cannon fodder, while Abu Nidal and his lieutenants remain safely in the shadows.

During the last half of 1985, we know of Libyan money in the millions of dollars going to Abu Nidal, of Libya providing and buying arms for Abu Nidal, of Abu Nidal and his top lieutenants living in Libya, of his killers being trained there, and of travel documents and other facilitative assistance being provided by Libya for their travel to commit terrorist attacks abroad. Some of this evidence, such as the use of confiscated Tunisian passports by terrorists in the December 27 attack, is in the public domain. Some of it is highly classified intelligence, and to reveal it would help the terrorists beat our defenses. But there is no question about the Libyan-Abu Nidal connection or what Qadhafi hoped to accomplish. By this new terrorist resource, the fanatical Libyan leader believed his limitless ambitions and wild dreams could become true—that the West as well as the Arab world would be so intimidated that they would accept him as a major power on the regional and world scene.

#### U.S. Actions Against Libya

That is the basic reason for the strong reaction by the Reagan Administration to the massacres at Rome and Vienna. Against the background of the unmistakable imprint of Colonel Qadhafi and the Abu Nidal organization on a dozen attacks around the rim of the Mediterranean in the last half of 1985, and the previous unwillingness of most of those governments to join in collective measures to stop the threat, the airport attacks were seen as a clear call for action and leadership by the United States.

After careful deliberation, the President decided to take unilateral action against Libyan support for terrorism. He moved to terminate the remaining U.S.-Libyan commercial and financial relations and called upon other countries to join us in sending Qadhafi and other governments the signal. The decision required still further economic sacrifices for the United States, which has already given up a multibillion-dollar annual business with Libya to make clear our stand against terrorism, but if we had not taken the lead, no one else would have done so. Moreover, the moral issue was such that any administration in this country would be bound to act.

There are a number of reasons why other governments in Europe and elsewhere have been reluctant to act, both in earlier years when we previously tried to exert pressure on Qadhafi to end his support for terrorism and in the immediate wake of the Rome and Vienna airport attacks. These reasons include: concern for the safety of their citizens in Libya or elsewhere if they were to join the United States in strong action; skepticism over the effectiveness of economic sanctions; and other foreign policy interests.

In the Middle East, the initial reaction of the Islamic countries to President Reagan's decision to oppose Libyan terrorism shows just how dangerous the situation has become. A number of moderate governments, among them those who have been directly threatened by Libyan subversion and terrorism, consented to a resolution by the Organization of the Islamic Conference supporting that country and opposing the United States. This was more than an expression of solidarity toward a fellow Islamic country which the media had depicted as about to be attacked militarily by the United States, although such a sentiment has strong popular appeal. It also reflected the concern of a number of governments at the potential political power exercised upon parts of their population by Qadhafi's brand of militant political ultranationalism—particularly at a time when moderate Arab regimes are also worried by the potent religious-military-political power of Iran and agitation of the Palestinian people, present in substantial numbers in many Middle East countries. . . .

Our overall policy is to seek to obtain long-term cooperation of the world community against the use of terrorism for political ends, no matter how worthy one may consider those ends. We have also concluded that while increased



security—an essentially defensive action—is important and must be energetically pursued, there is also a need for more offensive, active measures if the spread of terrorism is to be stopped.

### European Efforts Against Terrorism

Although it is, of course, too soon to tell what the ultimate effect will be on Libya, there is no question in my mind but that the other governments in Europe and elsewhere share a growing recognition of the extreme gravity of the threat and the need to take action. Although some of them were reluctant to announce what they had done, there was a positive response, in public or private, by almost all the governments which Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I visited last month. Following the visit, the EC [European Communities] foreign ministers discussed terrorism at length and issued a positive statement. They announced a decision not to export arms or other military equipment to countries which support terrorism, a pledge not to undercut steps other states have taken to deal with terrorism, and the formation of a permanent working group to make future recommendations.

Some individual governments have gone further. For example, Italy has imposed a visa requirement for all visitors from North Africa, in view of the growing number of terrorist incidents involving falsified North African travel documents. Italy also has stopped all arms supply—including deliveries on existing contracts—despite the financial losses. Italy also is reviewing its overall relationship with Libya and has intensified still further the very good work being done by its police and magistrates to fight domestic terrorism. Canada had already reduced the level of diplomatic ties with Libya, as had the United Kingdom. Canada also further agreed to stop shipping sophisticated oilfield equipment to Libya, despite the loss of sales, and to discourage any Canadian business activity there. All governments with which we spoke said they would consider additional measures, and we intend to continue our consultations with them on how best to confront the common threat posed by Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

Those who say that this type of non-military action will not work against Libya should suspend their judgment until our efforts have had time to be tested, for it is a long-term effort rather than a one-shot affair. The private signals reaching the Libyan leadership from Europe and elsewhere are mostly

negative, even if Qadhafi had an initial upsurge in public support. Despite their rhetoric, the other Arab governments do not appear willing to bail out Libya's badly faltering economy, nor have they taken any substantive economic or political actions against the United States. The Soviet Union has been stridently supportive in its rhetoric and has continued its very dangerous policy of supplying weaponry to a regime known for its erratic, reckless behavior. (We all recall the strong evidence that Soviet-supplied mines were used by Libyan ships in the Red Sea in 1984. Soviet-supplied aircraft additionally were used in bombings in Sudan in 1984 and this week in Chad.) Yet there are also signs of unease and caution by the Soviets, and they appear no more eager to bail out Libya economically than the Arab governments. (It is our guess that, if spot oil prices stay under \$20 per barrel, by the end of this year Libya's annual revenues will be in the range of \$6-7 billion, whereas 5 years ago they exceeded \$20 billion dollars, and 2 years ago they were over \$10 billion.)

... There are signs that these efforts by the United States and the Europeans are getting to Qadhafi. This is indicated by his frantic efforts to reach out to both the international media and several European and Middle East governments to try to persuade people that he isn't really such a bad guy at the same time that he strikes militaristic poses and threatens the U.S. Sixth Fleet. I don't think anyone is really being fooled—unless they want to be.

Should Qadhafi not heed the voices of reality and again unleash his agents to commit terrorist acts, or should other governments not understand the broader message warning against state support of terrorism, President Reagan has made it clear to all that he is prepared to continue exercising the responsible leadership role of the United States. Consideration of the careful use of force in such circumstances has not been ruled out, in accordance with our right of self-defense.

### The Need for Congressional Support

The antiterrorism effort is a long and complicated one, to be pursued by a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures. However, there are no magic weapons—most terrorism

takes place abroad where our power is fettered; the enemy is determined and clever and ready to die. Qadhafi is only a part of the problem, and we are not losing sight of that. As Secretary Shultz and others have noted, terrorism is a form of a low-intensity warfare. Nevertheless, we have achieved the national consensus called for 2 years ago by Secretary Shultz; we have completed a thorough review of security, chaired by Adm. Bobby Inman, and are implementing the recommendations; the Vice President's task force on more active counterterrorist measures has finished its work and implementation is beginning; and other governments seem to be awakening. I would like to assure you that, with your support and continued help, we will continue to be in this effort for the duration.

We welcome the support and interest of this committee and its members, for the effort to counter terrorism can only succeed if it is a partnership. Previous legislation passed by this committee is being used vigorously, such as the rewards legislation. We support new legislation which is being considered to extend and strengthen the protection afforded U.S. citizens abroad from terrorist acts. We would like to work with you on other measures—including passage of the revised U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty, which will send a strong signal to other governments in the important area of extraditing terrorists rather than allowing them to escape proper punishment.

### AMBASSADOR BORG FEBRUARY 19, 1986

*Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.*

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to review with you today our progress in improving security for international air travelers and to give you an overview of recent actions undertaken to combat terrorism. . . .

### U.S. Cooperative Efforts To Combat Terrorism

**Bilateral Efforts.** Our bilateral efforts to combat terrorism are becoming more complex, with better exchanges of intelligence, more frequent high-level com-

munications, cooperative efforts in counterterrorism technology, and better judicial and military cooperation. More countries are establishing centralized counterterrorism offices able to coordinate the various parts of their bureaucracy, both on a routine operational basis and during a terrorist incident. Our bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism is already good and steadily improving.

Counterterrorism cooperation is on the agenda for every high-level visit to the United States; other countries can have no doubt as to the commitment of the United States to combat terrorism by every means. Ambassador Oakley has led numerous interagency delegations to many nations for specific discussions of counterterrorism cooperation.

We have found the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to be a very effective policy tool for stimulating general interest in other countries in general cooperation and in stimulating support for specific U.S. policy concerns. It has helped us strengthen our policy dialogue with such states as Turkey, Greece, Egypt, the gulf states, Israel, and Colombia. To date, 32 countries have participated in some aspect of the ATA Program, with a total of over 1,800 participants. The Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security have cooperated closely in the administration of this program. There is no doubt that there is a higher level of awareness in many countries of the dangers of international terrorism and a greater willingness to take effective actions against it because of the ATA Program. . . .

**Efforts in International Organizations.** The United States has had success in international organizations in obtaining more effective agreements and stronger resolutions against international terrorism. The UN Security Council has issued several statements condemning international terrorism and unanimously approved a U.S. resolution in December against hostage-taking. Also in December, the UN General Assembly adopted a strong resolution which unequivocally condemned as criminal "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed . . ." The resolution specifically called on all states to take appropriate measures as recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and as set forth in relevant international conventions to prevent terrorist attacks.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) acted upon a U.S. resolu-

tion, introduced at the IMO's 14th assembly in November 1985, to instruct the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to develop measures for the prevention of terrorist attacks against passengers and crews on board ships. A detailed U.S. proposal was favorably received by the MSC at its meeting which ended February 5, and we expect adoption of a final text at the next MSC meeting in September. . . . Although the mandates of ICAO and IMO are significantly different, we are grateful to ICAO for making available to IMO its years of experience with security measures so that IMO could accomplish in a matter of months in the maritime area what took years to accomplish in international civil aviation affairs.

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*. . . the time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps.*

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Secretary Shultz  
June 24, 1984

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As a separate matter, we have for some time been engaged in an effort to encourage more states to become parties to the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal conventions, which relate to aircraft safety, hijacking, and sabotage. This effort has been going on for several years and has achieved such a degree of success that these conventions are now among the most widely accepted internationally. The Tokyo convention has 121 parties; the Hague, 126; and Montreal, 127.

These activities by the United States in international organizations represent a good deal of recent success. U.S. policy in multilateral organizations for combating terrorism is directed toward:

- Increasing public understanding and awareness of the nature of terrorism;
- Encouraging the development of internationally accepted standards of behavior and responsibility for individual states in preventing, deterring, and punishing terrorism; and
- Encouraging effective international cooperation to combat terrorism, including adherence to existing international counterterrorism conventions.

The above cited actions make clear that progress is possible and that the system recently has been responding favorably and with a sense of urgency to our calls, and those of others, for action.

**Multilateral Efforts.** In contrast to these impressive developments in our bilateral relationships and with international organizations, multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism among like-minded nations has gone more slowly, but there has been some progress. For example, European states, partly as a result of our pressing them to do more to stop Qadhafi's support for terrorism, have organized a high-level EC committee to coordinate actions on the problem. We welcome this effort by European states to address collectively the problem of international terrorism, and we are seeking ways to cooperate, institutionally or informally, with this group.

The Council of Europe's committee on combating terrorism has proposed in recent days to expand the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism to additional states. We welcome the initiative and look forward to contacts with the Council of Europe to explore how we might move forward with a broader convention.

Cooperation in the Summit Seven<sup>1</sup> context has been, frankly, less rewarding during the past year. We have sought as a first step with this group, which represents some of our closest allies, to revitalize the Bonn declaration<sup>2</sup> of 1978 and obtain agreement to cooperate in specific other areas outlined in previous summit statements at Venice, Ottawa, and London, but the political climate has not permitted the sort of multilateral cooperation which we believe is essential. . . .

## Conclusion

These examples illustrate that some progress has been achieved but also illustrate the broader problems in obtaining joint international actions against terrorism along the lines foreseen in Title V of the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act. We are keeping our objectives firmly in mind and pressing them at every opportunity where acceptance by other countries provides a reasonable prospect for success. . . .

<sup>1</sup>Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

<sup>2</sup>The 1978 Bonn declaration on civil aviation security.

**AMBASSADOR OAKLEY  
FEBRUARY 13, 1986**

*Excerpts from an address before the Conference on Terrorism, Tourism and Traveler Security, Washington, D.C.*

... Every day, it seems we are confronted with a new terrorist incident. But let's take a longer view tonight and look at terrorist trends and how the U.S. Government is combating terrorism.

**Trends and Developments**

In looking at trends and developments, we note:

**First**, terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the international political landscape for the rest of this century.

- There were around 500 international terrorist incidents per year in late 1970s and early 1980s, 600 incidents in 1984, and 812 for 1985—a 60% increase in the last 2 years.

- Continued political unrest, disputes between nations, and socioeconomic problems create conditions of frustration and hatred which can easily be transferred into terrorism.

- Mass global communications assure instantaneous publicity for terrorist acts.

- Frustrated splinter groups increasingly recognize they can make their mark more easily through acts of violence than through normal political opposition.

- Travel has become much easier between different countries, and border controls have been reduced, particularly in Europe.

- A worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes weapons available more easily to terrorist groups.

- Weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare potentially too costly, particularly against stronger adversaries, causing some governments to see terrorism as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies.

**Second**, we tend to think of terrorism as an American problem, but it is an international problem. Of a total of some 800 international terrorists incidents in 1985, none occurred in the United States, where our security and intelligence agencies have full authority and maximum capability to act.

In 1985, there were 177 incidents which involved American individuals or facilities overseas, compared with 131 for all of 1984. For both years this was slightly less than one-fifth of total incidents and less than 10% of total casualties. Twenty-three Americans were killed and 139 injured by terrorists abroad in 1985 (compared to 20,000 killed in traffic accidents in this country). In recent events, the TWA and Egypt Air hijackings, the *Achille Lauro*, and, to some extent, at the Rome airport attack, Americans were singled out as targets.

Why does it appear that the United States is being singled out?

- Because of our position as the world's number one power and the perception abroad that our policies and actions somehow are responsible for situations, policies, and actions in other countries. This makes it popular for terrorists to attack U.S. targets and for the media to play up attacks on the United States more than others. And, naturally, the U.S. media focused on attacks affecting Americans—the "hometown angle" spread over into the national networks.

- Because the United States is so present abroad: military, diplomats, foreign assistance personnel, businessmen, and tourists. There are more than a million Americans overseas for one reason or another.

- Because Americans are on the move more than other nationalities; Americans make up the majority of cruise ship passengers and a substantial plurality of airline passengers.

In terms of combating terrorism, this means that the U.S. Government and American citizens overseas are very dependent upon the protection and cooperation of other governments.

**Third**, terrorist attacks are increasingly violent. Trends over recent years have shown a steady increase in the number of dead and wounded—an even more rapid increase than in the number of incidents.

**Fourth**, state sponsorship has become an increasingly dominant factor in global terrorism. There has been an unmistakable rise in the past few years, with Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua as the most active, determined, systematic supporters of terrorist groups. Direct government assistance in arms and explosives, communications, travel documents, money, and training combined with fanatic individuals or

groups exploited by governments for political ends make state-supported terrorist groups more deadly. They have the means and desire to shift tactics toward bombing and armed attacks which make maximum political impact. The state support enables them to operate without worrying about financing or arms.

**Fifth**, the Middle East has become the primary source of international terrorism (378 incidents in 1985), in past years accounting for about 35% of the incidents. In 1985 this rose to 45%. Middle East terrorist activities are taking place not only in the region but also in Europe.

There are two main categories of Middle Eastern terrorists:

- Fanatical Palestinians, most of whom have split off from—and often act in direct opposition to—the mainline PLO led by Arafat. They often have the direct support of Libya, Syria, or Iran; and



- Shia zealots from various Arab countries, especially Lebanon, who are inspired and trained, often armed and financed, and, to varying degrees, guided by Iran.

The targets of Middle East terrorism fall principally into four groups: Israel; Western governments and citizens, particularly the United States; moderate Arab governments and officials, including the mainline PLO as well as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; and critics of radical regimes, particularly Libyans.

Other regions where terrorism is at a high level are Western Europe (208 incidents), where there are a number of indigenous groups motivated by ideological or ethnic/separatist beliefs, and Latin America (132 incidents), where the roots from which terrorists spring are a combination of ideology, politics, economic and social grievances, and—recently—narcoterrorism. Indigenous European terrorism decreased somewhat last year, thanks to outraged public opinion and better police work in countries such as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. In Latin America, the trend is up, and so are attacks against the United States.


As you in the industry know better than we in government, the upsurge of Middle East terrorism is having a negative effect on tourism, and especially upon tourism emanating from the United States. Three major incidents

# International Terrorist Attacks, 1985 <sup>1</sup>


 Attacks on U.S. citizens and property  
 Other Attacks

Number of Attacks <sup>2</sup> 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500


## Type of Target



## Type of Event



## By Region



<sup>1</sup> Based on preliminary 1985 figures, which may be subject to review and revision.

<sup>2</sup> Number may be higher than total number of attacks because of capability of recording multiple victims and/or installations attacked.

seem to have had the greatest impact, due to a combination of the acts themselves and the wide publicity they were given:

- The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens;
- The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*; and
- The massacres at Vienna and Rome airports.

Although we have no precise figures, the best guess of the State Department is that the European and Middle Eastern countries of the Mediterranean rim lost upwards of \$1 billion in anticipated revenue from tourism last year, and it will probably be worse this year. This is a blow to the tourist industry but an even greater blow to countries counting heavily upon revenue for their economies: Italy, Greece, Egypt, Tunisia, and others. Even Amsterdam is affected.

### Dealing with Terrorism

What has been and is being done to deal with international terrorism? There are several real problems in dealing with terrorist incidents which occur outside the United States.

First, let us recall that the U.S. Government has only limited ability to influence the situation when it occurs abroad, particularly since some governments tend to shy away from cooperation with us. Some erroneously believe that because the U.S. Government is a principal target of terrorists, working with us could bring more trouble; or they have nationalistic reasons for keeping a distance.

Second, most European states have closer economic links than we do with the Middle East and, particularly, with the oil-rich states that are prime sponsors of terrorism—notably Libya and Iran.

Third, some governments believe that they can have a sort of gentleman's understanding with Middle East terrorists and those states who support them: in exchange for a pro-Arab foreign policy and virtually free entry and passage for persons from Middle East countries (even suspected terrorists), no terrorist activities will take place on their territory. (Unfortunately for the governments in question, terrorists are not gentlemen.) They also tend to believe that it will "not happen here" and, therefore, avoid the troublesome, expensive actions necessary to deter terrorist attack.

Recognizing the problems—and they're not easy ones—let's look at some of the actions we have been taking that have an effect on tourism.

### Actions Affecting Tourism

Improved civil aviation security has been one of the highest priorities. It is an area where we can see some results. We had actually anticipated the danger of an increase in aircraft hijacking and airport attacks stemming from Mid-East terrorism. Over a year ago, the State Department and the FAA began a major effort with friendly governments and with the airline industry and the ICAO to draw attention to the threat and to propose measures to deal with it. . . .

Unfortunately, there was not enough concern by most other governments until after the TWA 847 hijacking in June 1985, and the State Department issued a travel advisory for Athens airport. At that time, behind the leadership of Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole and her Canadian colleague, the ICAO Council expeditiously adopted a number of additional minimum security measures; Greece implemented rapidly the improvements for Athens airport which had been in limbo since agreed upon with a U.S. team in February; and several other governments took rapid advantage of offers by the State Department and FAA for technical assistance and training in civil aviation security.

Today, the FAA is sending officials to airports around the world in order to measure their safety. If there are problems and they are not corrected, a travel advisory will be issued—as it was for Athens airport. Better intelligence has also enabled the FAA and other U.S. Government agencies to issue more frequent, timely threat alerts for airlines and airport authorities abroad. Hijackings declined sharply in the second half of 1985. However, these tighter security measures did not apply to public access areas, where both international and U.S. airports are vulnerable. Most airports were designed to facilitate, not inhibit, public access. Since the attacks at Rome and Vienna, additional armed guards are in place at most major airports in Europe, and vigilance is up.

Maritime security is a new subject. We did not anticipate passenger hijackings because there had not been any in more than 20 years—and never previously in the Middle East. Some lines established their own security measures, but these added to the cost of the tours and were not regarded universally as necessary. The tragic *Achille Lauro* incident jolted the U.S. and other governments into a much more active policy of safety standards for ships and ports, focusing upon a reinforced role for IMO and national actions. A special inter-agency working group has been set up within the U.S. Government with the Coast Guard, the Departments of Transportation and State, and other agencies to deal with this problem more effectively. New international safety standards which the United States proposed are being considered by the International Maritime Organization, which met in January and should approve them later this year—a breakthrough for international ship travel.

We recently have held informal meetings between representatives of the U.S. travel industry and the Departments of State and Commerce to develop a more effective common approach to the terrorism problem. We need to work more closely on exchanging our assessment of the terrorism situation with you for information on the impact of terrorism on tourism. Using the clout of the loss of tourism dollars, we have an added weapon to use with other governments.

### Improving U.S. Ability To Act Against Terrorism

The Administration has been hard at work unilaterally to improve its ability to act against international terrorism. The antiterrorism legislation passed by Congress in late 1984 has put into practice, with arrest warrants and extradition requests issued and rewards posted for the hijackers and killers of TWA Flight 847 and the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship. The Department of Justice and the FBI have, thus, become more directly involved in investigating and preparing to prosecute terrorist crimes against Americans abroad. This also has the effect of emphasizing that terrorists are not some kind of romantic "freedom fighters" but are vicious criminals. Additional legislation along these lines is pending, as is a new U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty which would treat terrorists as criminals.

There has been a significant increase in intelligence resources being applied to the terrorist problem, and further improvements have been made in our ability to respond militarily to a terrorist attack should this situation arise. The successful interception of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers is the most spectacular manifestation of both these improvements, combining excellent intelligence with timely military action in a precise, restrained way. Less publicized is the fact that over 100 terrorist attacks planned against the United States abroad were preempted in 1985 due to better intelligence or better security.

We have beefed up substantially the protection accorded U.S. Government officials stationed abroad, both military and civilian, and improved cooperation with private American business overseas, including the creation of an Overseas Advisory Security Council composed of State Department and private business representatives.

The Diplomatic Security Bureau and the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the State Department have also increased their programs for providing information to travelers and prospective travelers, as well as businessmen. When a call comes in on whether or not it is safe to travel to a particular country, they can provide the latest evaluation based upon the view of our diplomatic posts abroad and the intelligence community here in Washington. As a general rule, the State Department and its posts abroad do not discourage foreign travel because there are terrorist incidents. If there are problems in a particular country which warrant attention but not, in our judgement, cancellation of the trip, we point this out. If the problems are very serious—as in Lebanon or Libya or, for a time last year, at Athens airport—we will issue a public travel advisory.

### The Need for International Cooperation

The measures which the United States can take unilaterally to combat terrorism are limited by a variety of factors. We cannot, for example, arbitrarily land assault troops at the airport of a friendly country to storm a hijacked plane without working out arrangements with the host country. Nor can we really track suggested terrorists ourselves

in the slums of Beirut, the deserts of Libya, or the jungles of Central America. The problem is an international one, and effective responses require international cooperation.

As Secretary Shultz said in a June 24, 1984, speech, terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations, and "...the time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps."

Obtaining agreement on specific international steps is a difficult and long process—going back to even before the 1984 speech. Indeed, the efforts go back to the terrorist outbreaks in the 1970s. It has not been easy, for the reasons I mentioned earlier and because there is a strong sentiment of independence, if not resentment, amongst these governments vis-a-vis leadership from the United States.

Progress is being made, however. Italy recently has been the most cooperative European country, perhaps because of the jolt of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, perhaps because its remarkable success in reducing domestic terrorism convinced its government of the need to act sooner rather than later. The United Kingdom and West Germany also deserve special recognition for the vigorous efforts they have been making to combat terrorism in their countries and to promote greater multilateral cooperation against the common threat.

Other governments have been less vigorous and less cooperative, adhering to a practice of accommodation and outdated policies of liberal refuge and asylum for those who claim political motivation for what are really heinous criminal acts. The U.S. Government disagrees strongly with such an approach and has made its views known.

On balance, discreet but effective bilateral cooperation between the United States and most of its allies has improved substantially over the past year, just as we have been able to focus greater world attention on the issue by pushing hard for resolutions condemning terrorism in the United Nations. The General Assembly and Security Council have both approved resolutions in recent months. Effective multilateral action on specific problems or countries, however, is still not in sight.

Unfortunately, these measures, unilateral and international, have not been enough. . . . There has simply not been enough action by other governments to act against terrorists before they can strike or to arrest and punish them once a crime has been committed. . . .

There is the beginning of an awakening in Europe. Although still somewhat embarrassed politically by U.S. leadership, there was a positive response behind the scenes by most of the nine governments which Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I visited last month. Cessation of arms supply to Libya, including existing contracts; an end to government credits for exports; tighter controls on Libyan entry and movement; and a promise not to substitute for departing American companies and technicians—these have been agreed to by almost all governments. Some have gone further—notably Italy, which has imposed a visa requirement for all visitors from North Africa and is reviewing its overall relationship with Libya. Collectively, the EC has decided to establish a high-level committee to study the terrorist problem and make recommendations. We hope this will be a forum for vigorous action.

One of the motivating factors behind this sudden activity in Western Europe has probably been the loss of tourist revenues, particularly from the United States. Europeans who in the past have been reluctant to take vigorous antiterrorist actions because of commercial interest are beginning to understand there is another side of the financial ledger. Terrorism is costing them hundreds of millions of dollars in lost tourism, increased security costs, and apprehensive investors. Another is the pressure of public opinion, which in most European countries is demanding firmer action by governments and is angry at what seems to be an inadequate response. In both these areas, groups such as those represented here tonight can use your potential pressure to good effect, making clear through your own channels which governments you believe are taking seriously their responsibilities to fight terrorism and protect all persons in their countries. Combined with the efforts of the U.S. Government, this can have an important positive impact.



## Chronology of Major American-related Terrorist Incidents, 1985

### December 27

**Rome, Italy; Vienna, Austria:** Terrorists simultaneously attacked passengers at airports in Rome and Vienna with grenades and automatic weapons fire. Five Americans were among those killed in attacks on El Al and TWA passengers in Rome. Two El Al passengers were killed in Vienna. Airport guards killed three terrorists and captured another in Rome. In Vienna, one terrorist was killed and two were captured. The Abu Nidal group claimed credit for the attacks.

### November 24

**Frankfurt, West Germany:** A car bomb exploded at a U.S. military post exchange (PX) injuring 36, including 18 U.S. military personnel and 15 U.S. civilians. The bomb was contained in a silver BMW. No group claimed credit.

### November 23

**Malta:** An Egyptair flight carrying 96 people, including three Americans, was hijacked en route from Athens to Cairo and diverted to Malta by three Arabic-speaking gunmen. When demands for refueling were not met, two Israeli women and three Americans were shot in the head with a small caliber weapon. One Israeli and one American died. An Egyptian commando unit stormed the plane using explosives to enter a cargo hold. A fire and gun-battle ensued. In all, 59 passengers were killed. Three groups claimed responsibility: Egypt's Revolution, the Egyptian Liberation Organization, and the Arab Revolutionary Brigades (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group).

### November 6

**San Juan, Puerto Rico:** Two unidentified assailants on a motorcycle shot and wounded Maj. Michael Snyder, a U.S. Army recruiting officer, as he was riding a moped to his office in San Juan. A passerby was also wounded. The Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution claimed credit.

### October 28

**Santiago, Chile:** Four people were wounded as bombs exploded at the offices of two U.S. companies and a Chilean-Arab exporting firm. The first bomb exploded at the headquarters of

International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), wounding two Chilean security guards. Shortly afterward, an explosion damaged the offices of the United Trading Company, a Chilean-Kuwaiti fruit exporter, and severely injured two employees. The third bomb went off at the offices of Freeport Chilean Exploration, a New Orleans-based mining company and subsidiary of Freeport McMoran, Inc. of New York. Damage was extensive.

### October 23

**Concepcion, Chile:** A bomb exploded at the U.S.-Chilean Binational Center, causing extensive damage and one injury. The explosive detonated outside the center's front door where it seriously wounded a young girl who happened to be passing by. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility for the attack through an anonymous telephone call to a radio station.

### October 7

**Port Said, Egypt:** Four gunmen seized the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* off Port Said, Egypt, and took some 400 people on board hostage. Among the hostages, representing many different nationalities, were 12 Americans. The hijackers demanded the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israel. The hijackers killed Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly American confined to a wheelchair, and threw his body overboard. The ship returned to Egypt where the hijackers surrendered to PLO and Egyptian officials. Egypt released the hijackers. The U.S. Navy intercepted the hijackers' plane and forced it down in Italy where they were taken into custody.

### September 16

**Rome, Italy:** Two Soviet-made F1 grenades were thrown into the Cafe de Paris, a popular tourist spot located 100 yards from the U.S. Embassy. One grenade exploded and injured 40 people, among them several Britons and Americans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group) claimed credit. Police arrested a Lebanese-born Palestinian.

### September 9

**Madrid, Spain:** A car bomb exploded in central Madrid during a morning rush hour and wounded 16 civil guards in a van and two passersby. One of the wounded, U.S. businessman Eugene Ken Brown of Johnson and Johnson, died 2 days later. Brown was hit in the chest and neck by shrapnel while jogging in the area. ETA, a Basque separatist group, claimed responsibility in telephone calls.

### September 3

**Cali, Colombia:** A large bomb exploded in the library of the U.S.-Colombian Binational Center (BNC) and three bombs were placed in front of the Coca-Cola bottling plant. Hours earlier, the U.S. Embassy had passed on to the American community advance warning that terrorist activity would be directed at U.S. interests in Colombia that evening. Two injuries and considerable damage were reported from the BNC explosion. Both the M-19 and the Ricardo Franco Front claimed responsibility for the bombings.

### August 8

**Frankfurt, West Germany:** A car bomb exploded in a parking lot at the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Force Base, killing one U.S. airman and the wife of another. The 20 injured included 18 U.S. citizens. The bomb vehicle was a metallic green Volkswagen with forged U.S. Armed Forces license plates. The Red Army Faction (RAF) and Action Directe jointly claimed credit for the attack under the name of the "Commando George Jackson," an American member of the Black Panthers who was killed attempting to escape from a California prison in 1971.

### August 7

**Wiesbaden, West Germany:** A U.S. serviceman, Edward Pimental, was shot, killed, and robbed of his military I.D. card after leaving a nightclub in the company of a man and a woman just before midnight. Police speculated that the stolen I.D. card might have been used by the Red Army Faction to gain entry to the U.S. Air Force base at Rhein-Main, where a car bomb exploded the day after the murder. On August 13, a copy of an RAF communique and the I.D. card were sent to a news agency.

**July 22**

**Copenhagen, Denmark:** Two bomb blasts wrecked the offices of Northwest Orient and damaged a Jewish synagogue and old people's home. At least 14 people were injured, but no deaths were reported. One bomb was thrown through the window of the airline office; it injured 10 people inside and one passerby. The other bomb exploded between the synagogue and the old people's home, injuring three or four people. An anonymous caller in Beirut claimed credit for the Islamic Jihad, saying the bombings were in retaliation for an Israeli raid on the southern Lebanon town of Kabrikha the day before.

**July 19**

**Santiago, Chile:** A powerful car bomb exploded in front of the U.S. consulate. A Chilean passerby was killed, and four other Chileans were injured. Two of the wounded were police guards posted at the consulate. Damage to the consulate consisted of broken windows. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed credit.

**July 14**

**Karachi, Pakistan:** A bomb exploded near the main entrance to the Pan Am office. A man was seen placing a bag on the stairs of the office, but a passerby moved the bag away before it exploded. The blast injured the passerby and two others. No group claimed credit. On August 17, 1985, a Pakistani male who was described as strongly anti-American was arrested. He is believed to have acted alone.

**July 1**

**Andori, Colombia:** Attackers, believed to be with the leftist National Liberation Army, shot and severely wounded Douglas Brannen, a former Florida State senator, near Brannen's gold mine north of Bogota.

**Madrid, Spain:** Terrorists attacked a building shared by TWA and British Airways. A man ran into the British Airways ticket office below the TWA office and threw a box onto the counter. The box exploded and gutted the office. The TWA office was also damaged. One Spanish woman was killed, and at least 28 people were wounded, among them two American tourists. "The Organization of the Oppressed" and the Revolu-

tionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group) claimed credit.

**June 23**

Air India Flight 182, flying from Toronto and Montreal to India, crashed at sea off southwest Ireland, probably as a result of a bomb blast. All 329 passengers, including four Americans, were killed. A caller to the *New York Times* claimed credit on behalf of a Sikh group. The crash appeared to be related to another incident the same day at Tokyo's Narita Airport where a bag being transferred from a Canadian airline to an Air India flight exploded and killed two airport workers.

**June 19**

**San Salvador, El Salvador:** Gunmen shot and killed 13 people, including four marine security guards and two U.S. businessmen, at an outdoor cafe. The slain marines were identified as Cpl. Patrick Kwiatkowski, Sgt. Bobby Dickson, Cpl. Gregory Webber, and Sgt. Thomas Handwork. George Viney and Robert Alvidrez, two businessmen from Wang Laboratories, were also killed. Witnesses said a pickup truck stopped at the curb, and 6-10 men dressed in military-type uniforms and armed with automatic weapons jumped out and fired at cafe patrons. The gunmen seemed to single out the marines, who were in civilian dress. The Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers claimed credit.

**June 13**

**Beirut, Lebanon:** TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Beirut was hijacked with 153 passengers on board. Two Lebanese hijackers took the plane from Beirut to Algiers, back to Beirut, to Algiers again, and finally back to Beirut. They demanded the release of 700 Lebanese Shiites held in Israel. During the second stop in Beirut, the hijackers killed passenger Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, and a number of Americans were taken off the plane when about 12 Lebanese Amal members boarded. Passengers were released until 39 American men remained. All but the three crew members were taken from the plane on June 17 and held by Amal and Hizballah for 13 days until Syria obtained their release. *Beirut Radio* has identified the two original hijackers and has announced that they will be prosecuted.

**May 15**

**Lima, Peru:** Simultaneous bombings occurred at a number of targets in the city, including the residence of the U.S. Ambassador, where an explosive device, which was thrown over a wall, detonated near the swimming pool. The blast broke windows in the residence, which was occupied by the Ambassador at the time, but there were no casualties. Police blamed Sendero Luminoso for the attacks, which came on the eve of the fifth anniversary of their war with the Peruvian Government.

**April 12**

**Madrid, Spain:** A bomb exploded in the El Descanso restaurant, which is frequented by U.S. military personnel from a nearby airbase. Eighteen Spaniards were killed, and 15 Americans were wounded. The blast was caused by a 12-pound homemade bomb. Several groups claimed responsibility, including the Islamic Jihad organization.

**April 9**

**Santiago, Chile:** Two explosive devices were almost simultaneously detonated in a small pedestrian shopping arcade where six banks, a few restaurants, and several businesses were located. The blasts caused only minor damages but wounded eight patrons of a restaurant and passersby. The Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National City Bank have branch offices at this location. On this same night, five other bombs exploded in four other cities in Chile. The targets include the U.S. Bank Moran Finance in La Serna, a supermarket, a tourist office, and a telephone booth.

**February 21**

**Barranquilla, Colombia:** A bomb exploded outside the Binational Center, killing the night watchman and causing extensive damage to the administrative offices. The bomb apparently was placed against a side wall of the center, just minutes before the explosion, by two men on a white motorcycle. The explosive, believed to have been dynamite in a metal container, blew a large hole in the exterior wall adjacent to the office of the center's director. The watchman was some distance from the blast and was killed by shrapnel. The explosion also broke windows in the surrounding neighborhood.

**February 7**

**Medellin, Colombia:** Terrorists simultaneously bombed seven establishments, most of which were U.S. firms. One policeman was killed, and another was wounded. Explosions occurred at or near the offices of Union Carbide, Xerox, IBM, GTE, Tradition Family and Property, and a Hare Krishna temple. Extensive damage was reported at some of the establishments. The Che Guevara Faction of the National Liberation Army and the Ricardo Franco Front, a dissident group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, claimed responsibility for the multiple bombings.

**Guadalajara, Mexico:** Enrique Camarena Salazar, a DEA agent work-

ing in Mexico, was abducted by four gunmen just after leaving the U.S. consulate. He was brutally killed, and his body was found a few weeks later. Three hours after Salazar's abduction, Alfredo Zavala Avelar, a Mexican pilot for the DEA, was also kidnaped and later killed. Among those arrested were two major Mexican drug traffickers, Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca.

**February 2**

**Glyfada, Greece:** A bomb exploded in a nightclub frequented by U.S. military personnel. Sixty-nine Americans were injured. A group called the "National Front" claimed the bombing was

in protest of U.S. support for Turkey over the Cyprus issue.

**January 30**

**Guadalajara, Mexico:** American John Walker and Cuban companion Alberto Radelat disappeared after being seen at a Guadalajara restaurant frequented by members of Mexico's drug underworld. On June 19, police found their bodies in a well north of the city. The bodies were wrapped in tablecloths and carpeting and riddled with bullets. Before the bodies were found, two drug kingpins, Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca were arraigned based on the testimony of a witness. Both have admitted killing Walker and Radelat, whom they may have mistaken for DEA agents. ■

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