


URSA  
INSTITUTE



106313

San Francisco - Washington DC.

106313

U.S. Department of Justice  
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this ~~copyrighted~~ material has been granted by

Public Domain/NIJ

U.S. Department of Justice

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the ~~copyright~~ owner.

**INTENSIVE SUPERVISION FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS--  
THE TRANSITION FROM  
ADOLESCENCE TO EARLY ADULTHOOD**

**A Longitudinal Evaluation**

January, 1986

Jeffrey A. Fagan, Ph.D.  
Craig Reinerman, Ph.D.

NCJRS

JUL 28 1987

ACQUISITIONS

**INTENSIVE SUPERVISION FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS--  
THE TRANSITION FROM  
ADOLESCENCE TO EARLY ADULTHOOD**

**A Longitudinal Evaluation**

**January, 1986**

**Jeffrey A. Fagan, Ph.D.**

**Craig Reinerman, Ph.D.**

This research was supported by Grant 82-IJ-CX-K008 from the National Institute of Justice to The URSA Institute. The opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the U.S. Department of Justice.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Acknowledgements .....	iii
Executive Summary .....	vii
I. The Serious Offender Program .....	1
II. The Setting: An Overview of Contra Costa County .....	13
III. Evaluation Design, Methods, and Samples .....	25
IV. Violent Juvenile Offenders in Contra Costa County .....	41
V. Recidivism--Program Impacts on Crime and Arrests .....	67
VI. Urbanism, Community, and Violent Delinquency .....	103
VII. Social Development, Social Learning, and Violent Juvenile Crime .....	129
VIII. Intensive Supervision and the Social Control of Violent Delinquents: Implications for Policy and Research .....	163
References .....	203
Appendices	
A. Tables	
B. Instruments	

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In December, 1981, the Serious Offender Program concluded its three-year experiment. The evaluation staff of the URSA Institute was buoyed and optimistic for several reasons. The most significant was the fulfillment of a commitment by the Contra Costa County Probation Department to the conduct of experimental research to evaluate an innovative approach to handling the most difficult cases in the community. Second, the early indications were that the intervention was implemented successfully, and that there were significant reductions in subsequent crime as a result of intensive supervision. Third, the offender group was a cohort of serious and violent offenders, the population which was at the heart of the debate on the soundness of the *parens patriae* philosophy of the juvenile justice system. The difficulties in developing effective interventions for a later adolescent population of serious offenders, combining rehabilitation and punishment policies, were driving correctional policy toward harsher punishment through mandated terms of secure confinement or transfer to the criminal court.

Accordingly, we felt it both an opportunity and a challenge to study the long-term effects of the Serious Offender Program, for the results would contribute not only toward that County's probation efforts but also toward nationwide policies on community-based efforts to control violent juvenile crime. Also, we viewed the longitudinal study as a rare glimpse of the development of criminal careers in the transitional years from adolescence to adulthood, a time when many young offenders desist from delinquency while a small number go on to serious adult crime.

With these thoughts in mind, we designed the longitudinal study of the intensive supervision program as a policy study, not simply an extended program evaluation. We expanded the scope of the inquiry to include both theoretical and epidemiological concerns. Our investigation of social area effects in Chapter VI grew from our concern about the confounding of ecological influences with the different regions of the county where the caseloads were assigned. But it also grew from the rich and controversial history of Contra Costa County, an area of rapid population growth, extremes of poverty and wealth, a changing economic base, and a rash of ugly incidents of racial conflict. The analyses based on social development theories in Chapter VII reflected our concern that probation had too long overlooked theory in the development of intervention methods. The contribution to knowledge, policy, and practice from that inquiry include specific, theoretically grounded strategies to structure and improve intensive supervision for violent and serious juvenile offenders.

This cross-disciplinary effort required the collaboration of several individuals. Patricia Kelly conceptualized and supervised the development of the ecological study in Chapter VI. Her knowledge of strategic planning and economic development were the foundation of that effort. Her editorial comments are included in Chapter VI. Kari Kilstrom collected the data for that analysis as well as much of the archival data in Chapter II. Michael Jang analyzed the data and assisted in the construction of the several data bases in the study. Sandra Wexler was the data base manager, and provided invaluable assistance in data reduction and scale construction. Melinda Moore, Judy Rothschild, and Dan Broussard conducted the bulk of the interviews. Sally Jones chased down the official arrest histories in criminal and juvenile justice agencies in Sacramento and Martinez, California. It is her incredible tale of the records which is told in Chapter III. Martha Cheek, Ray Henton, and Betty Jean McNeil turned in outstanding contributions as production staff, with the leadership of Bonnie Stallings.

The officials of the Contra Costa County Probation Department opened their doors and records to us; their unqualified cooperation made the study possible. Gerald Buck, Chief Probation Officer, lent his support and approval to the experimental SOP program and the follow-up research. Errol Parrish, head of juvenile services, Everett Nice, SOP supervisor, and Charles Stephenson, supervisor in Richmond, made themselves available for interviews with our staff. They also provided invaluable assistance in constructing the juvenile offense histories of the SOP and probation clients. We thank them again. Dr. Richard Rau of the National Institute of Justice was the project monitor. We are grateful for his patience, support, and encouragement.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## CHAPTER I--THE SERIOUS OFFENDER PROGRAM

### POLICY CONTEXT AND PROJECT BACKGROUND

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the trend in California's criminal and juvenile justice systems was away from incarceration and toward community treatment and supervision. The most important legislative and institutional support for this trend was the probation subsidy program. Whereas previous proposals for strengthening probation had been rejected by the state legislature as too costly, the genius of the 1965 probation subsidy legislation was its subvention system which provided funds to counties in proportion to each county's reduction in commitments to state institutions. Thus, for every offender who was successfully supervised in the community, state funds were made available to county probation programs for various forms of special supervision. The fiscal savings from reduced institutional commitments, then, were used to finance special probation and other community-based treatment and intervention programs. These additional funds provided the resources needed to reduce caseload size, intensify probation supervision, and make better use of community services for offenders (cf. Smith, 1972; Lerman, 1975; and Lemert and Dill, 1978).

By the early 1970s, special supervision caseloads became largely assimilated into regular probation operations (Lemert and Dill, 1978). Average caseload sizes crept upward, and many judges gradually increased their commitments to the state institutions of the California Youth Authority. Thus, the amount of state funding available for the reduced caseloads of probation subsidy slowed to a trickle. Then, in 1976, drawing on the same correctional philosophy which had warned a decade earlier of the stigmatizing and counter-productive effects of incarcerating youthful offenders, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 3121, effectively prohibiting the incarceration of status offenders. This law, however, provided no funding for alternative forms of supervision or community services for such offenders. In a subsequent legislative session, Assembly Bill 90 was passed to provide, in a manner which clearly paralleled the earlier Probation Subsidy Program, funds for community-based programs for status offenders. Again, the level of such funding was made proportional to the level of reduction in commitments to California Youth Authority institutions. While the combined impact of both bills was generally heralded as much-needed and humane reform, it left probation departments with only more serious offenders on their caseloads.

It was this policy context in which the Contra Costa County Probation Department's "Serious 602 Offender Project" (SOP) came into being. In the late 1970s roughly one-third of the violent or serious crimes committed in the county were committed by juveniles. The vast majority of these youthful offenders ended up on probation--either immediately after adjudication or after short stays in a county juvenile facility. Despite the seriousness of many of their offenses and frequent histories of past violence, such offenders were routinely assigned to regular probation caseloads, with about 70 probationers assigned per deputy. This limited the quantity and quality of supervision to pro forma monthly contacts and crisis situations, and provided for no systematic assessment of client needs or the matching of such needs with community services.

In July 1978, Contra Costa County's Probation Department initiated a demonstration project of intensive probation supervision for youth charged with serious offenses. Federal funding was provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, through block grants administered by Contra Costa County's regional planning unit. The project utilized an experimental design which would allow a rigorous evaluation of the efficacy of this approach to the control and rehabilitation of serious juvenile offenders.



## THE THEORY OF SOP INTERVENTION

The experimental, intensive supervision SOP caseloads were to be reduced to a maximum of 20 "active" cases at any one time, with an expected supervision interval of six months. This would afford SOP deputies weekly rather than monthly contacts with all probationers, but within a time-limited interval. With this increased amount of time, probation officers could improve their knowledge of each client's situation, and thereby maximize the use and coordination of community services, tailored to the specialized needs of each juvenile offender. Under SOP, then, deputies would be expected to use individual counseling, family counseling, school follow-up, group activities, and specialized treatment services for substance abuse, all as part of more systematic, more intensive supervision.

This SOP model was designed to meet two related objectives: to improve the interpersonal and social functioning of clients and to reduce by a statistically significant margin the rate of recidivism for SOP clients below that of similar clients on regular probation supervision. In addition, because SOP probation was intensive, a third objective was to meet the primary program goals within a shorter (six months) probation period, thereby reducing the overall costs of the intensive, smaller caseload program.

To be eligible for the SOP pool, a youth had to have been on formal probation, less than 17.5 years of age, not in residential placement or another special probation program, and without court charges, termination, or a placement out of the area pending. Once such general criteria had been satisfied, the seriousness of the charge(s) against him or her was addressed. Violence was the "cutting edge" to determine SOP eligibility. To remain in the pool, a probationer had to be judged a "serious" offender who was a physical threat to others. This criterion of seriousness could be met by **either** of two definitions:

- o the probationer was charged with any one or more serious offenses; or
- o if not charged under "A" above, probationers were still referred to the SOP pool if the probation officer had knowledge of a ward's **violence potential** because of specific acts of violence, even if not charged, or if the probation officer had very clear reasons for feeling that the minor had a potential for violence.

## THE SERIOUS OFFENDER PROJECT IN PRACTICE

In 1978, Contra Costa County awarded a research contract to URSA Institute to evaluate SOP. According to the Final Evaluation Report (Jamison, 1981), SOP did meet or exceed both its operational and programmatic goals as measured six months after client intake. The Phase I Evaluation found that: clients did meet the selection criteria as specified in the proposal (and summarized above); they were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups; caseload size was kept to 20 or under per deputy; clients did receive intensive supervision (average contact at least once per week); and, finally, SOP clients did remain on probation for approximately the length of time specified (mean = 7 months; 26% less than the average for control group probationers).

The Phase I Evaluation also found that, six months after intake, the percentage of the experimental (SOP) group who had been charged with new offenses was 21% lower than the control group (although of those who did recidivate, the experimental clients had a somewhat higher average number of new offenses). After six months, 63% of the experimentals as opposed to 46% of the controls had not been charged with new offenses. Perhaps more critical, the experimental group showed a 48% reduction in the rate of recidivism for violent offenses compared to the control group (due to the small frequencies involved, this difference was not statistically significant).

## Shifts in the Intervention Design

Once the follow-up evaluation was underway, a variety of practical modifications in program implementation were uncovered. First, six months prior to the start of SOP, a similar experiment with small caseloads and intensive probation supervision was undertaken in West County. This project was for juvenile offenders who were returning to the community from short stays at juvenile hall facilities, and was called the "Saturation, Supervision, and Surveillance Project" (SSS). One year after its implementation, an unexpected reduction in funding for this special caseload required either that it be abandoned or folded into SOP. The latter option was chosen by Contra Costa Probation Department, thus incorporating the SSS caseload into the SOP caseload for West County (i.e., El Cerrito and Richmond).

A second deviation from the experimental design required similar consideration. As SOP operated in practice, the traditional primacy of public safety as a concern in the Probation Department made it difficult to adhere strictly to the random assignment procedure. Specifically, those juvenile offenders who were screened into the SOP pool and then chosen as members of control group caseloads (i.e., regular probation supervision) were in many cases in West County assigned instead to an "Intensive Supervision Unit" (ISU) caseload. The ISU caseloads were in most respects very similar to SOP caseloads, thus possibly contaminating the experimental design by providing control group clients with intensive supervision similar to that received by experimental group clients.

A final and more general modification concerns the nature of the treatment or supervision given to SOP clients vs. control group clients. However, interviews conducted in the course of the present study revealed that there was a strong consensus among SOP deputies, control group deputies, and SOP supervisors that the distinction between SOP and regular probation amounted to a quantitative difference of **degree** rather than a qualitative difference of **kind**. Thus, the evaluation reported in succeeding chapters is an evaluation of more **intensive** probation supervision, not of a substantively different type of supervision.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

Encouraged by such positive early evaluation results, the Office of Program Evaluation of the National Institute of Justice awarded a research grant to the URSA Institute to conduct a long-term (36-month) follow-up evaluation to determine whether these differences would sustain over time, and, if so, for what types of clients under what sorts of conditions. The primary objectives and purposes of the longitudinal research were:

- o to test the longitudinal impact on recidivism of a program of intensive probation supervision for violent young offenders during the transition from adolescence to adulthood;
- o to analyze the criminal career patterns of serious and/or violent youths during the period from 15-21 years of age, and compare the careers of serious/violent offenders to "cohorts" of similar ages;
- o to identify the relative contributions of intensive treatment/supervision compared to historical (personal) factors and other "critical life events" (e.g., marriage, job or educational achievements) on violent behavior, other criminality, criminal justice system involvement, and "life outcomes"; determine the factors which mediate criminal careers and discriminate those offenders whose criminal careers continue from those whose careers die out;
- o to analyze self-reported and official crime among violent offenders to further determine "predictors" of violent careers, such as age of onset, early childhood socialization experiences, peer influences, and social structural conditions.

## POLICY ISSUES

The SOP experiment examined critical policy issues with respect to public safety--the maintenance, control, and rehabilitation of violent juvenile offenders in the community. Probation officials stated that for many such probationers in Contra Costa County, their next offense or juvenile court appearance would likely result in a commitment to the state juvenile corrections agency (CYA). Put another way, SOP was seen as the "last chance before Youth Authority." In effect, SOP revived the debate as to whether intensive probation supervision could reduce incarceration rates for serious juveniles.

To many observers, SOP represented the "last chance" for intensive supervision and was the remaining legacy of the subvention policies. In an era of public pressure for harsher punishments, the redirection of resources to intensive supervision from secure placements for serious juvenile offenders was a bold policy experiment. SOP was designed to provide close supervision and public safety for serious offenders without confinement, a departure from the prevailing trends in juvenile justice in California in the last decade (see, for example, Greenwood et al., 1984). SOP failure could portend a two-tiered stratification of delinquency policy: community supervision (with large caseloads) for non-serious offenders, and secure confinement for more serious offenders. SOP was, in some ways, a test of the appropriateness of community supervision and alternatives to incarceration for violent delinquents.

Accordingly, the longer-term SOP effects might influence the current debates on age, crime, and sanction (Greenwood et al., 1980). Few studies of correctional effectiveness view treatment impact through a "window" which spans both adolescence and early adulthood. Understanding of the "normalization" or critical life events which redirect violent behavior could vastly improve the design of probation supervision and result in savings--both in costs of crime and future justice system involvement--from shortened delinquent careers. It may also help improve the probation/prison decision by identifying young offenders whose careers would expire with minimal intervention.

Though SOP was not borne from a particular theoretical orientation on the causes of delinquency, SOP nevertheless offered an opportunity to examine several factors--personal, social, and developmental--which may explain violent behavior. SOP deputies sought to establish and strengthen bonds between the offender and his or her community. The longitudinal evaluation generated data on transitions in criminal careers of violent delinquents as a function of the development or decay of conventional societal bonds. This provides not only direction for the nature of intervention, but knowledge on when it may no longer be appropriate.

## CHAPTER II--THE SETTING: AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

The diversity of the setting for SOP offers a unique opportunity to examine the influences of social area effects on delinquent and criminal careers. Crime, and responses to it, vary widely in Contra Costa County, as do the characteristics of its regions. It occupies 800 square miles from the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay, along the Sacramento River Delta, and inland over rolling hills toward the agricultural heartland of the state. It is bordered by Berkeley and Oakland to the South, the largely agricultural counties of Solano and San Joaquin to the North and East, and by the suburbs of Marin County to the west, across the Bay.

It is a county rich in contrasts. Just across the Bay from the lush beauty of Marin's affluent "bedroom" communities sits Richmond--the site of dozens of smoke stacks, oil storage tanks, warehouses and small factories--where ships, railroads, and trucks load and unload. During World War II, it was a hub of shipbuilding for the West Coast, attracting workers from across the country. This industry is now gone. Since that era, it has been something of an industrial "back closet" for the Bay Area. Alongside established, conservative, lower-middle-class towns on the county's western fringe sits the university community of Berkeley, a nationally renowned center of learning, together with student protest movements, political experimentation, and avant-gard culture. Just beyond Contra Costa's central corridor of new middle- to upper-middle-class suburbs and burgeoning office parks lie steel mills, delta port facilities, Navy bases, and miles of rich fruit orchards. The county's population in 1980 was approximately 660,000--the tenth largest in California in population on the ninth smallest land area.

Between 1950 and 1980, the county's population doubled with the aid of a transportation milestone--in 1972, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system linked Contra Costa still more closely to major Bay Area cities with fast, comfortable, state-of-the-art commuter trains. In less than a century, the county had been transformed from a sparsely populated ranching community, to a minor industrial and shipping center, to a mushrooming mosaic of suburban cities.

For the County as a whole, 1979 data show Contra Costa to have the sixth highest per capita income of the 58 counties in California. Moreover, State Franchise Tax Board figures for 1981 give it the highest median per capita income in the state--\$18,213, compared to a state-wide average of \$13,750. The "typical" Contra Costa resident is 30.6 years old, married, living in a household of 2.69 persons, and owns a home with a median price of \$94,000.

Beneath such positive overall indicators, however, lie pockets of poverty, social problems, and uneven development that are camouflaged by the general health of the area as a whole. When the above figures for the county are broken down to show the relative characteristics of its eight major cities and towns (over half the total population), some rather stark contrasts become visible. For example, the proportion of female-headed households with children and no spouse is four times higher in Richmond than in Walnut Creek, and the percentage of the population below poverty in Concord, Martinez, and Walnut Creek is but a fraction of that in Pittsburg, Brentwood, and Richmond. Similarly, median household income varies from a low of \$14,700 in Brentwood to a high of \$24,842 in Walnut Creek.

Such marked differences are reflected in the ethnic composition of these eight communities as well. Residential patterns are clearly segregated by race, as well as class. Communities like Antioch have very few Blacks, but substantial numbers of Latino and other minority families. Richmond, by contrast, is almost half Black, while Martinez, Walnut Creek, and Concord have very few residents from any ethnic minority group.

### Trends in Juvenile Crime

In addition to the demographic and socioeconomic portrait of the setting for this research, it is also important to note briefly the patterns of juvenile offenses which are another facet of that context. In recent years, there has been much attention to "epidemics" of juvenile crime. Political leaders, law enforcement officials, and, particularly, the media have repeatedly claimed that both the frequency and the seriousness of juvenile crime have been increasing at alarming rates. Some such as Strasburg (1984) claim that violent crime among juveniles nationally has remained stable despite drops in other categories. Indeed, Contra Costa County Probation Department's Serious Offender Program is said by

county officials to be ". . . a response to the growing number of serious and violent juvenile offenders on Probation caseloads."

However, the notion that juvenile crime in the nation as a whole has been increasing in both frequency and seriousness is *not* supported by empirical data--whether victimization surveys, self-report data, or official Uniform Crime Reports are used. This appears to be the case in Contra Costa County as well. Data on the frequency of juvenile arrests show that juvenile arrests increased between 1972 and 1975, but have declined steadily between 1975 and 1981--from a high of 13,912 in 1975 down to 8,202 in 1981 (a 41% decrease).

It would appear, therefore, that there is a trend toward less frequent and less serious juvenile crime in the county. As the County became a more varied social and economic region, the extent and severity of juvenile crime declined. For SOP, this portended two trends: the potential masking of treatment impacts by decelerating juvenile crime rates, and the likely disaggregation of crime rates by varying regions of the County. These themes are explored later in this research.

### CHAPTER III--EVALUATION DESIGN, METHODS, AND SAMPLES

The Serious Offender Program was designed both as a probation program and as an evaluation research experiment. The principal goal of the study was to conduct a rigorous test of the impact of SOP on the recidivism of serious and violent delinquents during the critical years of transition to adulthood. More formally, the core hypothesis to be tested by SOP evaluation was that intensive probation supervision (including increased use of community treatment services) of serious/violent juvenile offenders would result in lower rates of recidivism and improved social and interpersonal functioning. A secondary goal was an empirical assessment of the duration of treatment effects over time. The research attempted to measure the rate of "decay" of treatment effects during a transitional developmental period. Accordingly, the study was designed to examine recidivism rates of SOP clients three years after they had left the program. The research also attempted to determine:

- o If SOP is shown to have the hypothesized effect, what specific features of intervention, supervision, and treatment best account for it?
- o For what types of juvenile offenders are such effects found and not found?
- o What is the contribution of SOP intervention **relative** to personal background factors, critical life events, and community influences?

#### DATA SOURCES

The SOP research drew upon four major data sources for each client: Probation Department Intake ("Screening") and Termination Forms; U.S. Census Data; official arrest records from the state Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS); and the Follow-up Interview Questionnaire.

## Official Records

Project staff obtained photocopies of Probation Department Intake and Termination Forms for all SOP and control group clients (names, addresses, phone numbers and all other identifying information were blocked off). Intake forms contained the following data: date of birth, sex, and race; education and employment/school status at arrest; marital status, living situation; family history, composition, and household head; school attendance and performance; legal and probation status at arrest; client's drug/alcohol use and treatment experience; and family's drug/alcohol use and treatment experience. Termination forms contained the following additional data: duration of probation supervision, probation services rendered; probation and legal statuses at termination, reason for termination; employment/school status, attendance, and performance at termination; recidivism summary and drug/alcohol use history; probation officer assessment of social and family functioning; and probation officer prognosis regarding client's most difficult problem.

With the support and cooperation of Probation Department management and clerical staff, we obtained complete copies of both juvenile and adult criminal records for all SOP and control group clients. These records provided the data base from which the official crime variables were constructed: arrests, time to arrest, and dispositions (penetration). We began by examining the adult records of those members of our population who had become 18 years of age during the evaluation period. This task updated earlier recidivism data drawn from juvenile records.

## Self-Reports: Follow-Up Interview Data and Conceptual Framework

Probation Department Intake and Termination Forms and the BCS official criminal records were not designed for research or evaluation purposes. Accordingly, the Follow-Up Interview instrument was developed to provide the wide range of data required to describe the nature of clients' probation experience, and to test explanatory models of violent delinquency. The Follow-Up Interview contained a series of quantitative scalar measures as well as some 50 unstructured, open-ended items designed to elicit depth of detail and the subjects' accounts of and reasoning behind their own behavior. This instrument, then, is the principal source of structural, situational, behavioral, and attitudinal data used in this study, and provides data to describe and explain the analytic findings. The interview was constructed to elicit data from the 12 months preceding SOP (or control) assignment, and the 12 months preceding the interview.

Initially, we sought to contact all members of the sample: 267 SOP clients and 102 control cases. We expected to find that many cases were lost, and sample attrition increased with the length of the follow-up period. This was particularly true for young people at that stage of the life cycle in which mobility is highest, and for "deviant" or "hard-to-reach" populations. Because most of the potential interview subjects were between 17 and 21 years of age, a time when they could be expected to leave their parents' homes and enter into new stages of development, an elaborate subject location system was designed. We began with the last known addresses and nearest relative as listed in Probation Department files.

The reasons for non-participation in the follow-up included refusals by subjects, parents, or both; deceased; relocated and/or incarcerated out of state; unlocatable; and respondent failure to keep two consecutive interview appointments. Subtracting the (N=50) subjects who had moved out of state, died, or were unlocatable from the total sample (N=369), the remaining 311 subjects constituted the "net" pool of possible follow-up subjects. Of these, 53.1% (N=165) were successfully located and interviewed. The overall response rate from the total pool (N=369) was 44.7%. These cases were distributed proportionally to the ratio of experimentals to controls in the total pool: 72.1% SOP youths (N=119) and 28.9% controls (N=46).

## Community Context Variables: Census Data

In recent years, it has not been uncommon to find references in the crime and delinquency literature which claim that no significant relationship exists between social class and delinquency (e.g., Hirschi, 1969; Krohn, et al., 1980), or even that this relationship, so central to sociological theory, is in fact a "myth" (e.g., Tittle, et al., 1978). However, such reports invariably engender subsequent articles which argue at least as compellingly that there is just such a relationship (e.g., Elliott and Ageton, 1981; Braithwaite, 1981).

In an effort to assess the influence of socio-economic attributes of community on our subjects' behavior, we developed an additional variable domain called "community context." This inquiry is described in detail in Chapter VI. Briefly, we determined first the precise census tract in which each of our SOP and control group respondents resided. We then selected some 16 variables from the 1980 U.S. Census for Contra Costa County. Of the 50 some Census variables available, we chose those we judged to be most closely related to the socio-economic features of our subjects' communities.

## SAMPLE COMPARABILITY AND VALIDATION

As an additional check on the random case assignment procedures used by the Contra Costa County Probation Department, we compared the experimental group against the control group on seven intake variables, selected to represent basic social structural and criminal justice background factors. Although small (but statistically insignificant) variation was expected, no differences were found between the two groups. Such comparisons indicate that the two basic population groups in our sample are comparable, thus suggesting that cases were assigned randomly as per the research design.

As noted earlier, due to administrative events, a special caseload from another probation program for juvenile offenders entering the community from Boys' Ranch was folded into SOP as the Richmond-El Cerrito caseload. Because approximately two-thirds of both experimental and control cases had come to Probation from the Ranch or a similar institution, this fold-in created the possibility that the Richmond-El Cerrito cases (all from the Ranch) might have been involved more often in crime and/or in more serious crime than the rest of the SOP population. To check on this possibility, we created a separate experimental group category for the Richmond-El Cerrito caseload, and then compared this group against the rest of the experimental and control subjects.

The Richmond-El Cerrito experimental group (E<sub>2</sub>) was indeed significantly different from both the other experimental (SOP) subjects and the control group subjects. First, they tended to be older. The Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) subjects also included proportionately twice as many minorities as the other groups. With respect to Admission Status, the Richmond experimentals were three times more likely than other experimentals or controls to have come to SOP from an institution rather than directly (80% vs. 28.2% and 27.5%, respectively). This difference is to be expected because the SSS caseload which became the SOP-experimental group for Richmond was specifically designed to serve juvenile offenders who were about to be released from institutions and put on probation.

In sum, these differences constitute *de facto* deviation from the random assignment procedures required by the experimental design. These differences may have resulted from the type of cases added to the Richmond SOP office, or from alterations in the case assignment procedures to channel cases most in need of intensive supervision to Richmond. The reason is immaterial for analytic purposes. More importantly they indicate that the Richmond SOP group tended to have significantly higher incidence and rates of criminality--violent criminality in particular. Thus, this sub-group is treated

separately in subsequent analyses to control for the influence of these incidences, in effect controlling for prior criminality.

The first type of follow-up/non-follow-up comparability checks included several of the variables which we used to validate the random assignment procedures. No statistically significant differences were found between the follow-up sample and the remaining subjects who did not undergo the follow-up interview on demographic factors. However, the follow-up sample had a significantly higher mean number of arrests in the felony property category, and in the "other crime" category, compared to the nonfollow-up group. These differences seem to result from the somewhat higher likelihood that more frequently arrested subjects were more likely to have been incarcerated (and perhaps to have been still on probation as well). These "captive" subjects tended to be somewhat easier to locate, contact, and interview than others with no formal links to the criminal justice system during the follow-up period. On the other hand, one might assume that the more "successful" subjects are socially and personally more stable, and hence easier to locate, neutralizing other biases. However, many former probationers refused consent, instead wanting to forget what they described as a "closed chapter" in their lives. Response and sample bias in this study appears to be toward the more "problematic" youths, though the comparisons social structural reveal no such problems. The estimates of self-reported crime, then, may well be overstated compared to the total SOP cohort.

## CHAPTER IV--VIOLENT DELINQUENTS IN CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

The SOP population can be viewed in two ways. First, SOP probationers (and controls) presented the greatest challenge to the department's community protection mandate. Second, they also posed the most difficult treatment and control needs--at once requiring the lion's share of both remedial and supervision resources. Thus, the description of this population offers a profile of those probationers who are committing violent offenses, and who are the most visible offender group in the county.

### VIOLENT DELINQUENTS IN CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

#### Demographic and Background Characteristics

The average age of SOP clients was 15.02 years as of their intake into the program. Roughly one in six (16.5%) were 13 years old or younger; nearly two in five (39.1%) were 14 or 15; and almost half (44.4%) were 16 to 18. The modal age was 16. The group as a whole clustered heavily between the ages of 14 and 16, with approximately two-thirds (65%) falling into that category. SOP clients were overwhelmingly male (87.6%); only one in eight (12.4%) were female. Nearly one in four SOP clients were Black, while almost one in ten were Hispanic and over three in five were White. Overall, more than one-third of the SOP population were minorities.

Approximately two in five SOP clients (39.6%) grew up in homes with both parents present, and another 14.2% were raised by a parent and step-parent. Slightly more than two in five (42.1%) were raised by their mothers alone, while only 2.2% were raised by their fathers alone. Overall, roughly half the SOP population were raised in a two-parent household, while the other half were not.



The SOP clients were almost exclusively a high school population. Only about 1% had graduated from high school as of their intake into the program. Most (85%) were enrolled in school full-time, while an additional 7% were enrolled on a part-time basis. Only 5.5% were neither enrolled in school at least part-time nor employed at intake.

The pool of juvenile offenders for the SOP program consisted of only violent offenders-- the most serious or violent in the county, save a small number who were sentenced directly to state correctional facilities for youth. Roughly one in nine of the total arrests (11.2%) were for offenses categorized as "serious." Nearly six out of seven of these "serious" offenses were burglaries. Nearly one in seven (15.3%) of the total arrests fell into the "other property" category, with more than half of these being "petty larceny" and most of the remaining offenses being "receiving stolen property" and "malicious mischief."

Surprisingly, less than 3% of the total arrests of SOP subjects were for drug offenses, and most of these were for possession of marijuana. One of the highest-frequency categories of offenses was what we called "other," so named because it included a broad variety of delinquent acts. These include minor property offenses to public nuisance offenses. Slightly more than one in eight (13%) of the total arrests fell into this group of relatively minor offenses. Similarly, an additional one in 15 (6.6%) of the total arrests were for "status offenses," i.e., behaviors which would not be deemed illegal if engaged in by an adult and, therefore, a criminal act by virtue of the status of the offender.

Finally, by far the largest of our major categories was "probation violations." More than one-fourth (26.4%) of the total of all offenses committed by the SOP population as a whole fell into this category. Of these, nearly two-thirds (65%) consisted of technical violations of the conditions of probation or contempt-of-court citations. Although such offenses sound relatively non-serious and most consisted of non-criminal behavioral problems, the term "probation violations" covers a multitude of sins, some of which may have been more serious or potentially violent than their label implies.

### **Self-Reported Delinquency, Drug Use, and Deterrence**

For each type of delinquency, we asked respondents in the follow-up interviews, first, to think back to the period prior to the "instant offense" which resulted in their probation (T<sub>1</sub>) and say if they had **ever** engaged in that behavior. Then, they were asked if they had engaged in that behavior in the past year (T<sub>2</sub>).

First, the prevalence of both the less serious and the more serious delinquent acts appear high. For example, according to these self-reports for the pre-probation period, clear majorities had engaged in fist fights (85.5%) and been drunk or high in public places (68.5%). About half had engaged in breaking and entering (47.9%), selling stolen property (50.9%), and had carried a knife, club, or other non-firearm weapon for protection (49.1%). Second, the data indicate major declines in many self-reported delinquent acts during the past year. Although nearly two-thirds of the follow-up sample reported fist fights (63.6%), assaults, weapons offenses, or getting high or drunk in a public place (64.2%) in the past year, the only behavior for which the respondents reported an increase rather than the usual substantial decline was for driving a car while drunk or high.

Similarly marked declines are shown self-reported drug and alcohol use. Despite the clear pattern of declines in self-reported use across all categories of alcohol and drugs, respondents still reported recent drug-related **problems**. Two in five (40.6%) said they had gotten into at least one fight in the past year while drinking or using drugs, and one in five (21.3%) said they had been arrested at least once in the past year "partly because of drinking and/or drug use."

The same type of decline between the pre-probation period and the past year occurred in self-reported involvement in the juvenile justice system. Whereas three-fourths (74.5%) of our follow-up sample said they had been in local jails prior to probation, this figure drops to less than half (45.7%) with regard to the past year. Similarly, whereas nearly two-thirds (66.1%) reported having been in "The Ranch" (a residential rehabilitation center for juveniles run by Contra Costa County) prior to probation, only about one in six (16.5%) had been there in the year prior to our follow-up interview.

## CHAPTER V--IMPACTS ON RECIDIVISM

### REARRESTS: THE PREVALENCE OF RECIDIVISM

Richmond SOP youth ( $E_2$ ), the second experimental group, were arrested more for violent and serious offenses in both the pre- and post-project periods than were youth in the original experimental group or the control group. Accordingly, it seems at first glance that SOP had little impact in reducing either the number of youth rearrested or the severity of rearrests. However, a closer look reveals an important contradiction--though more often charged for **violent** offenses, the actual number of youth arrested for **any** offense ("total") was consistently lower for the Richmond SOP group. Though more  $E_2$  youth were arrested for violent offenses, the impact on "total" crime was largest for this same group. Apparently, more Richmond SOP youths were charged with the more severe crimes, though fewer were arrested at all. Conversely, other youths, though arrested more often, were charged with less serious offenses.

### SELF-REPORTED CRIME

ANOVA analyses show significant differences among these groups in self-reported crime (SRC) only for sex, not for treatment group, regardless of SRC measure. The SRC analyses present a stark contrast with the recidivism analyses utilizing official records. Whereas Richmond SOP youth had higher arrest rates and earlier arrests for **violent** crimes, no such differences exist when crimes are self-reported. Looking at **total** arrest rates compared to SRC data, the results between groups are comparable. It seems that though behaviors were nearly identical in frequency, there were differences in perceptions of severity between youth and police, especially for Richmond SOP youth.

### JUSTICE SYSTEM PENETRATION

The final measure of SOP impact was the extent of penetration into the justice system following the termination of probation supervision. For each arrest recorded from official records, the disposition was also recorded. The most serious disposition, or deepest penetration into the justice system, was calculated for each youth. Dispositions ranged from no court action through incarceration in a state prison or county jail. The data show that Richmond SOP youth ( $E_2$ ) fared more poorly in the post-intervention period. For other dispositions, the differences were less pronounced. Probation dispositions and in-county residential placements were in fact lowest for male Richmond SOP youth. Among youth not reaching court at all, SOP youth fared best and controls the poorest. Over half the SOP youth had either no court action or their charges were dismissed (44.2% and 14.2%).

However, the differences between groups were less dramatic than for incarceration rates. Once again, a pattern emerges where Richmond SOP youth were treated more harshly in the system, though not necessarily represented in the system in significantly greater numbers.

## **THE INFLUENCE OF SOP ON RECIDIVISM: NOTES ON THE TREATMENT VARIABLE**

### **The Probation Officer as Intervention**

SOP was comprised of four deputies--three in East County and one in Richmond. This led to some degree of variation in implementation between the offices, in terms of the basic philosophy and style of probation work.

**Philosophy and Self-Perceptions.** The three East County deputies viewed themselves as having a dual role: on one hand, they saw part of their jobs as enforcing limits, making clients adhere to the probation order; on the other, they were helpers, counselors, and resources for their clients. The lone PO in the Richmond unit stressed the social worker side of his role and did not mention the control function as basic to his style or philosophy. Instead, he emphasized vocational training and community college as the means to a job, and thus a "way out." He stressed positive feedback and support more than most probation officers.

**SOP Treatment.** Treatment was not a formal, identifiable feature of SOP in many cases, since it inevitably blended with supervision and general case management. Though "treatment" was to be an integral part of SOP (as per the original program documentation), there was little distinction by SOP deputies between regular probation interviews and counseling. Few journal referrals to counseling were recorded, since it was assumed to be part of the probation "agreement" between the youth and the deputy. Many referrals were informal. They rarely developed a specific "treatment plan" for each case, as per the program design. Beyond the court order, counseling was largely flexible and informal. Some clients were required to go to X number of therapy sessions, and this was at times followed up by the SOP deputies. But these instances were rare. No real treatment plans as such, independent of court orders, were drawn up. They saw all clients weekly as required by the design, and informal counseling was usually a part of this.

**Client Needs Assessments.** The program design called for a formal system of client needs assessment. This proved difficult to implement. All deputies relied heavily on the investigation done before trial for their basic information on client problems. From then on, they relied mainly on experience and common sense. This was not a formal needs assessment system, and resembled what regular probation officers do.

**Termination and Revocation Decision-Making.** The individual probation officers were fairly autonomous in termination decisions. SOP deputies and the unit supervisor agreed that deputies' judgements were nearly always approved by the supervisor, although on occasion colleagues and other supervisors were consulted.

The SOP deputies were always concerned with their credibility with the courts. Their "general" guideline was to recommend termination from probation if there was no "new beef" (either legal or technical) in six months. But this was qualified in two ways: if they thought it would be difficult to obtain approval from a judge, they either kept the client on SOP a bit longer, or transferred her or him to regular probation (which apparently required no judicial action). Even without a new offense, if there was no treatment progress and more "trouble" was seen subjectively as possible, then transfer to regular probation was usually effected at the end of the six month period.

The SOP design called for a six-month period of intensive supervision, but this policy was often, and sometimes systematically, overlooked. When the deputies had "reason to believe" that community protection was jeopardized, termination decisions were postponed or the youth was transferred to regular, less intensive, supervision caseloads. The SOP unit supervisor expressed this priority clearly: community protection was the driving force in the termination decision. And the operating principle was to avoid "false positives"--youths who may have appeared ready for termination but who were viewed as continued risks.

It is not surprising, then, that length of supervision did not explain recidivism. Overall, the length of probation supervision was possibly confounded in several ways. Longer supervision, whether on SOP or after transfer to regular probation, had both positive and negative connotations with respect to treatment outcome. Some youths who failed shortly after assignment were terminated early. Others who "succeeded" were kept on longer. Still others were kept on longer despite success, based on a subjective "risk assessment" by the SOP deputies and/or the unit supervisor. Accordingly, more global measures of SOP intervention will reveal more about its impact than such factors as length, frequency and type of contact, or legal status at SOP termination.

For this study, caseload size becomes the crucial discriminating treatment variable. Few other identifiable differences between SOP and regular probation could be discerned. In light of this, it is not surprising that SOP had little measureable impact on recidivism. It seems that community of origin and pre-intervention characteristics are the strongest predictors of outcome. The following chapters explore these themes.

## CHAPTER VI--URBANIZATION, COMMUNITY, AND VIOLENT DELINQUENCY

Regardless of the measure of crime, serious and violent delinquency appears to increase with urbanization (Kornhauser, 1978; Laub and Hindelang, 1981; Messner, 1983). For example, National Crime Survey victimization data show that the rate of offending declines from central cities to suburbs to outside SMSA's (Laub, 1983). Among juveniles, serious delinquency rates increase as our geographical focus approaches the inner city (Shannon, 1984). In other words, urbanism and serious crime, among both youth and adults, are closely related.

The relationship between urbanism and serious crime is evident in the analyses of pre- and post-project crime among SOP youth. The Richmond youth sample resides in an area which manifests several aspects of urbanism: unemployment, poverty, concentrations of minority groups, and more crowded living conditions. Accordingly, we must consider whether the urban conditions which separate the Richmond sample from the other groups are important factors which explain the criminal career patterns of this population.

Neighborhood offers a convenient and useful concept in which ecological influences on serious delinquency can be empirically analyzed. By isolating these spatial units which spawn and sustain delinquent involvement, we can begin also to understand the social processes within these areas and accordingly establish theoretical linkages between the acts of individuals and the environments in which such behaviors develop. In turn, such information can lead to effective allocation of resources and enlightened crime control policies.

## THE INFLUENCE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

To determine the environmental characteristics of each study youth, their census tract was recorded. Richmond SOP (E<sub>2</sub>) youth live in communities which significantly differ from the other youths' communities. In general, the differences reflect the social ecology and physical environment of Richmond, and offer graphic illustrations of the unique environmental conditions for the Richmond SOP youth. Moreover, these differences reflect the relative inequalities between Richmond and the other regions of the county. Richmond youth live in areas with higher concentrations of Blacks, households in poverty, lower median household income, higher levels of unemployment and undereducation, and more dense housing. The largest disparities are for demographic characteristics, income, unemployment, and housing. In each case, Richmond youth live in areas which differ by 75% to over 100% for these indicators.

Serious (felony property) and violent arrests are highly correlated with nearly all ecological indicators, including household poverty, labor force, and housing characteristics. Among population characteristics, serious and violent crime is correlated only with youth living in areas with higher concentrations of Black population. The relationships are most consistent for total arrests and violent arrests, and in the **pre-intervention** period. For the post-intervention period, the correlations are consistently present for serious and violent arrests, but not for total arrests. Few significant relationships were identified with **self-reported crime** in either period. In some cases, there is a (significant) negative correlation for SRC where the arrest data showed as positive correlation. Also, poverty was inversely related to drug use in the pre-project period--youth living in areas of less poverty or more homogeneous populations had higher self-reported drug use.

## SOCIAL AREA INFLUENCES ON TREATMENT IMPACT

ANOVA models were used to test the relationship between probation supervision and recidivism, with the ecological variables introduced as covariates. The results again show no intervention effects. Of interest are the influences of the four ecological domains. Few significant relationships were found. Only violent and total crimes varied by area effect--for housing and poverty factors, respectively. Overall, the absence of a discernable pattern of effects across crime types suggests that, for official arrests, treatment impacts on recidivism are not mediated by area effects. The first rearrest for a violent offense will likely occur more quickly for probationers residing in areas of high unemployment.

The analyses show a consistent relationship between area effects and self-reported crime. Youths in the neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of Blacks consistently report lower SRC scores in the post-project period. At the same time, these differences are the least for SRC-Violence, and greatest for SRC-Total. In general, the scores are lowest at the extremes of the demographic variable, and highest at "moderate" levels of integration (11-30% Black population). This suggests that neighborhood heterogeneity, rather than an offender's ethnicity, may be a correlate of crime. From a different perspective, this may suggest a relative inequality phenomenon. In areas with palpably contrasted populations, the effects of social differences may be associated with self-reported crime.

Finally, we sought to determine if the social area characteristics of each probationer varied according to his or her most serious post-project disposition--or justice system penetration--and if those relationships differed by treatment group. The patterns obtained in these analyses differed little from the other analyses using official records. SOP impact was minimal and not statistically significant. Irrespective of probation group, offenders receiving the most serious disposition (i.e., incarceration) often resided in areas

with many of the components of urbanism: poverty, high percentages of minority populations, unemployment, and crowded housing.

These trends suggest that it may not be the higher proportion of Blacks, or lower proportions of whites, which is related to serious and violent juvenile crime. Rather, it is the homogeneity of neighborhoods which may be significant. For probationers living in predominantly Black neighborhoods, arrests are more severe, though not more frequent. There is vulnerability here to discretion. Incarceration is more common for youth in heterogeneous neighborhoods where there are higher percentages of Blacks. And self-reported crime is lowest for youth in predominantly Black neighborhoods. Equally important is the development of an understanding of the social process and socialization experiences of these neighborhoods, as well as the responses of law enforcement and the courts. The role of ecological variables may be related more to the process of delinquent socialization than to the cause. Viewing neighborhood ecological factors within an anomie-strain paradigm, it appears that relative poverty and inequality indeed are factors at the social structural level which are central to the socialization of youths in inner cities.

## CHAPTER VII--SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL LEARNING, AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME

SOP intervention, like many other delinquency experiments, was built on assumptions about rehabilitative interventions. Though not specifically informed by theory, SOP practices were designed to reinforce societal bonds, "unlearn" deviant behaviors through quick response and sanctions, and equip probationers with the necessary social and personal skills to live crime-free. In this chapter, we examine the social control underpinnings of SOP intervention. The implications for SOP and the policy of intensive supervision lie in the identification of salient areas of social development--learning, environment, social and personal skills--which can become focal points for rehabilitative efforts by probation officers.

### SOP IMPACTS ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

#### Social Learning Effects

Analyses show that the pre-intervention differences in perception of social environment seem to disappear in the post-intervention period, while there is a similar convergence of SRC scores. Only PEER JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVEMENT is significantly different, with Richmond SOP youth reporting fewer peers in contact with the law.

Richmond SOP youth have comparable social and personal bonds, as well as perceptions of their neighborhoods, as their counterparts in other neighborhoods at this latter stage of development. Whether this is due to SOP or simply the maturing effects of emergence into adulthood, the fact remains that differences between groups in adolescence disappear in the early stages of adult life. Perhaps most important for this study is the absence of any differences in SRC scores for the three treatment groups. Instead, we turn to analyses of the sources of crime in these transitional years and an empirical assessment of the integrated theoretical framework.

## EXPLAINING VIOLENT DELINQUENCY

Multiple regression analyses were undertaken to examine the relationship among both environmental influences (social learning variables) and individual (control theory variables, or social and personal bonds) with official arrests and self-reported crime in the post-intervention period. Also, these models were further refined by introducing pre-intervention measures of criminality to control for individual differences and to determine the extent to which post-intervention explanations of criminality are influenced by earlier behaviors.

### Official Crime

The results show that only social bonds are significantly associated with official crime, and only for SERIOUS and TOTAL crimes. The remaining models, for personal bonds and social environment variables, are not significantly associated with official crime.

### Self-Reported Crime

The results of the SRC analysis stand in sharp contrast with the previous results. The predictive power of the equations is substantial--the percent variance explained ranges from a minimum of 15.47% (personal bonds and DRUG USE) to a maximum of 32.50% (social learning variables and VIOLENCE). The results for social learning models have a greater explanatory power than the models for the bonds, suggesting that the reinforcing and teaching properties of the respondents' immediate social milieu are powerful influences on the youth's behavior. Being victimized appears to increase the likelihood that a youth will engage in behaviors or crimes similar to those perpetrated on him.

It appears that self-reported crime may in fact be characterized less by the absence of pro-social bonds than by the presence of anti-social or crime-sympathetic bonds. Whether these are deviant or normative attributes is a separate but important question. The fact remains that where belief in the law is weakest and ties to others involved in crime are strongest, self-reported crime will be higher. Only strong ties to the neighborhood seems to detract from self-reported crime. Youth in this study are strongly bonded to their peers, and their peers are extensively involved in delinquency and in the justice system (as are the respondents themselves). Overall, it seems that crime occurs in a context where crime is the norm.

In sum, youth in this study report a wide range of offenses, and no single offense type is better understood than any other. We can conclude that specialization of offenses does not occur for this group in the post-intervention period. Accordingly, probation supervision strategies which rely on unique explanations of violence have little promise for reducing subsequent criminality. Perhaps this explains why the effects of treatment were minimal, and why instead social area effects seemed to be efficiently explain differences in behavior between the three treatment groups. Overall, environmental variables appear to be stronger correlates of crime than do individual level variables. These results suggest the primacy of social learning processes in the combined theoretical framework, and the need for complex models to accurately reflect the social worlds of young adults. The minimal influence of school, family, and work, together with the pervasive influence of peers, confirms the fact that youth in this era of their lives are caught between two worlds but are full participants in neither.

## CHAPTER VIII--SOCIAL CONTROL OF VIOLENT DELINQUENTS THROUGH INTENSIVE SUPERVISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

### IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE

Current state budgets cannot support the demand for more prison beds, residential programs, or clinical services. There is a need for alternatives in the community for those serious offenders whose behaviors require a different type of supervision than occurs now in probation, but who may not pose a public safety threat sufficient to invoke the costly option of imprisonment. Given current knowledge about serious juvenile crime, probation supervision, and the results of the SOP experient, which offenders should be targetted for such measures, and what options exist to respond to their behaviors?

#### **Intensive Supervision: A Cornerstone of Crime Policy**

It is infeasible to suggest that all offenders who cannot be handled on probation caseloads should be committed to a correctional institution. **For these offenders, what is needed is a new form of probation that offers stronger sanctions and more meaningful interventions.** This will increase the range of sanctions within the community to provide the types of control and punishment the public demands while avoiding the costs of another expansion of the prison population. **We suggest that intensive supervision continue to be a necessary and appropriate alternative for the those offenders who have failed in traditional probation supervision or even on reduced caseloads. For those offenders who require more control and intervention than regular supervision but can remain in the community, an intensive supervision strategy be designed to include the functions of control, case management, and reintegration into community interactions.**

Control and security should remain a cornerstone of this form of sanction. The strategy requires that probation officers be capable of detecting and responding to illegal behaviors quickly and with full knowledge of the context in which they occur. This type of "quick sanctioning" capability is necessary to establish the deterrent effect of surveillance, and accordingly raise the costs of crime. However, the control function is enhanced by linking it to other activities for the probationer, such as school, work, or mandated participation in community activities. By mandating these activities, the community and its social institutions become part of the control network.

The reintegration aspect of intensive supervision is perhaps the most important. Reintegration is a means for serious juvenile offenders to participate in community activities and social opportunities. The goal of this strategy is to build the kinds of relationships and interactions which will become the daily routine of the probationer once supervision ends. It establishes the probationer in a setting which teaches and rewards legal behaviors and offers resources to resolve inevitable problems without relying on illegal means. In effect, it transfers the social control of probationers from the criminal justice system to the community and establishes the legitimacy of the community's values for the offender.

**To make this strategy effective, the quality and extent of the information available to the probation officer must be improved. We suggest that to make this new form of supervision more effective, there needs to be greater attention to the assessment and analysis process.** First, there needs to be a thorough assessment of social and personal bonds in several domains: school and work, family ties, peer ties, drug use and self-report measures of crime, a detailed look at the official career reconciled with self-report measures, and a variety of attitudinal scales. Second, cross-validation should be a routine



step in the assessment process. Interviews with those people knowledgeable about the youth--school officials, employers, spouses or lovers, and close friends--should be a routine occurrence. Third, this information should be tied specifically to behaviors, skills, perceptions, goals, and values. The social processes and street values in the youth's neighborhood should also be included. **The information gathered in the assessment process should inform the supervision plan. The specific behavioral goals and community activities should derive from well validated information.**

Just as the courts must often decide between two extremes--remaining in the community or imprisonment--so too must probation officers often decide between two ends of a continuum. There is usually little sanctioning choice between revocation and a "slap on the wrist" for violations of behavior. **We suggest that intensive probation include a more diverse sanctioning capability. Probation deputies in intensive supervision programs must be able to invoke a range of sanctions commensurate with the nature and severity of the offenders behavior.** This may include such measures as ordering limited periods of home detention, short-term residential placements, or a modification of the supervision plan to include new goals or longer times. Revocation should remain in the court's domain, but must still be a part of the sanctioning system. **The response or sanction should be in proportion to the type of violation or behavior. Also, the sanctions or consequences should be defined at the outset so that contingencies are expected.** This will achieve two learning principles: objectification of the sanction process and linkage of behavior with consequences.

The same is true for rewards. If antisocial behaviors are learned from various environmental sources, intensive supervision should presume that these behaviors can be unlearned by sanction and new behaviors learned through reward. **Progress and achievement of behavioral or community reintegration goals should be rewarded by increasing degrees of freedom from supervision.** Eventually, meeting all specified goals should result in the end of intensive supervision.

**The decision to place an offender under the closer scrutiny and restriction of intensive supervision should be based on the committing offense and prior offense histories. In other words, a "just deserts" or retributive model of justice should drive the decision to place a violent or serious juvenile offender on intensive supervision. We suggest that for youth retained in the community, those offenders adjudicated for what would be index felony offenses as adults be eligible for intensive supervision, and that those with prior offense histories involving violent behaviors be so placed.** Then, the characteristics associated with recidivism in this study be used to determine the length of intensive supervision and the type of community activities which will comprise the intervention plan. Treatment intervention plans should follow from assessments keyed to the social and environmental characteristics described earlier.

Finally, if supervision and control of offenders is to be eventually transferred to the community, both probation and the community must participate in the development of responses to crime. **Probation policy should be linked to other policies regarding community development policies and activities.** The results in Chapter VII show that peer and community sanctioning networks are ineffective. There is a need to develop such mechanisms to counter the perceived norms and expectations of young offenders for criminal behavior. Arguably, if an offender fails in the community, the community may have failed the offender. **The development of local sanctioning mechanisms is necessary to convey community norms and transfer the task of social control from official agencies to neighborhoods.**

**The development of local neighborhood mechanisms for control and supervision of young offenders further empowers probation deputies and reinforces the legitimacy of the goals**

**of the intervention plan.** Local initiatives such as neighborhood dispute resolution centers or restitution programs can provide avenues for the gradual but planned shift of supervision responsibility from official agencies to neighborhoods. Naturally, the participation of the deputy with such neighborhood groups is necessary for cooperation to occur. Finally, the deputy can become a resource to the neighborhood in its efforts to control and supervise its youth.

**Program Design Considerations.** Intensive supervision implies a reduced caseload. Depending on the definition of deputy responsibilities, caseload size will vary. As described above, with the three domains of activity, deputies should not carry more than 20 probationers at any time. If intensive supervision is to depart from regular supervision in kind as well as degree, organizational and programmatic integrity are necessary. Intensive supervision will require a different type of deputy, trained and recruited in unique ways and with responsibilities which vary from regular deputies. This argues for an intensive supervision unit which is independent from other probation units, administered separately with its unique mission translated into decision-making, supervisory, and (most important) budgetary styles. Clear boundaries and an organizational commitment are needed to ensure that intensive supervision preserves the intent and integrity of its mission. Discretion and autonomy will be needed for movement of probationers through the program and for termination, recruitment (and termination) of staff, the administration of sanctions and rewards, a different type of working relationship with the justice system, and special relationships with the community.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

- o **Policy experiments to develop innovative methods to control and reintegrate serious juvenile offenders in the community should be undertaken.**

There is a pressing need to develop new ways to supervise and rehabilitate the changing probation population. In both juvenile and adult caseloads, the profile of the probationer is "hardening" to include more serious and violent offenders who previously might have been incarcerated. The continuing pressure on prison populations and correctional budgets, together with public sentiment for harsher punishment and more attention to community safety, converge on "high risk" or "high profile" in the community. New dispositions must be developed to respond to this need.

The results here suggest that policy experiments be developed which test intervention techniques which combine social learning principles with social skills development. Decisions on length of supervision and frequency of contact should be based on achievement of behavioral and reintegrative goals.

- o **Serious and violent juvenile offenders are appropriate for this new dispositional category in the community. Experiments to keep these "high risk" offenders in the community are necessary to reduce prison populations and limit costly expenditures.**

Our assessment of intensive and regular probation suggested that current probation policies have little impact on the desistance of crime among serious juvenile offenders in the transitional years before adulthood. Yet the results showed that nearly one in three desisted completely from crime, while most (fewer than one in five) avoided imprisonment. Accordingly, the SOP cohort seems appropriate for community-based interventions. Those few who went on to incarceration should be the target of the new dispositional category.

Because these dispositions carry harsher restrictions than regular probation, proportionality suggests that they be reserved for those having committed the most serious offenses--felony adjudications for violence. Other criteria should be empirically determined.

- o **Probation should be a full partner in the development not only of crime control policy, but also in neighborhood development and the creation of peer or normative sanctioning systems in the community.**

The importance of peer sanctioning networks and community ties lies not only in condemning criminal behavior but in teaching behaviors which fall within the law. There are limits to any correctional intervention, and eventually offenders must be reintegrated into their communities to successfully avoid crime. The community, therefore, must take up where corrections departs. Neighborhoods must develop the capacity to perform sanctioning and reintegration activities when correctional interventions end.

Programs such as the Community Adjustment Teams in Detroit, the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, or Mentor Homes in Newark and Community Board Programs in San Francisco, are examples of neighborhood groups which have developed social networks and community sanctioning systems for young offenders. Probation officials and deputies should participate fully in these efforts by facilitating the transfer of supervision responsibility to community groups, and helping to develop similar efforts in the various neighborhoods where their clients live or work. At the policy level, probation officials should participate in community development efforts to ensure that they address the problems which deputies face, and also invite the participation of community groups in the development of probation policies.

- o **Linkages with other components of the justice system will build support for complex and controversial innovations or experiments, and will facilitate the referral of clients and flow of information to support policy experiments.**

During the testing and development of new dispositional alternatives in the community, the cooperation and participation of other elements of the justice system and community service providers will be needed. Political support and strong working linkages can add to program management and decision making. Specifically, the flow of assessment data, participation with law enforcement in decisions when violations occur, credibility with the courts, and access to needed services are some of the benefits of such linkages.

- o **Probation must be willing to take risks in experimentation. Though the community protection mandate must be met, the willingness to learn from failure and value such knowledge is fundamental to developing new ways to work with offenders. Policy must acknowledge experimentation as a method to enhance services and ensure accountability.**

In most jurisdictions, innovation is often (and unfortunately) a response to crisis or failure. But under those conditions, the limits to experimentation are often narrow, due to public response and adverse opinion. To continually advance knowledge and practice, experimentation should be regarded as a standard part of quality assurance and good management. This requires a specific policy mandate to develop and test new ways to work with offenders, providing a statutory environment which will support the innovations of forward-looking administrators. From another view, good business practices and sound management stress both accountability (through results) and constant innovation to improve services. These principles apply well here.

## CHAPTER I--THE SERIOUS OFFENDER PROGRAM

### POLICY CONTEXT AND PROJECT BACKGROUND

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the trend in California's criminal and juvenile justice systems was away from incarceration and toward community treatment and supervision. The most important legislative and institutional support for this trend was the probation subsidy program. Whereas previous proposals for strengthening probation had been rejected by the state legislature as too costly, the genius of the 1965 probation subsidy legislation was its subvention system which provided funds to counties in proportion to each county's reduction in commitments to state institutions. Thus, for every offender who was successfully supervised in the community, state funds were made available to county probation programs for various forms of special supervision. The fiscal savings from reduced institutional commitments, then, were used to finance special probation and other community-based treatment and intervention programs. These additional funds provided the resources needed to reduce caseload size, intensify probation supervision, and make better use of community services for offenders (cf. Smith, 1972; Lerman, 1975; and Lemert and Dill, 1978).

From the viewpoint of juvenile probation officers, probation subsidy was a welcome development. Caseload sizes of 60 to 80 or more limited the amount of contact with and supervision of probationers. Under normal circumstances, supervision was limited to monthly check-ins and crisis situations. Little or no attention was given to the assessment of specific client needs or to matching these with available community services. Probation officers' capacity for supervision was further diluted by their pre-trial investigative responsibilities which often took precedence over supervisory duties.

Beginning in 1965 (1966 for Contra Costa County), the probation subsidy program provided both the philosophy and the fiscal resources to strengthen probation services. Depending on how greatly a given county could reduce costly commitments to state institutions, subvention funds were provided for smaller caseloads and special community services in probation programs. In theory this not only reduced costs but improved the chances for rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community without concomitant increases in risks to public safety.

By the early 1970s, resentment of, and corruption within, some probation subsidy caseloads, along with routinization in most others, led special supervision caseloads to become largely assimilated into regular probation operations (Lemert and Dill, 1978). Average caseload sizes crept upward, and many judges gradually increased their commitments to the state institutions of the California Youth Authority. Thus, the amount of state funding available for the reduced caseloads of probation subsidy slowed to a trickle.

Then, in 1976, drawing on the same correctional philosophy which had warned a decade earlier of the stigmatizing and counterproductive effects of incarcerating youthful offenders, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 3121, effectively prohibiting the incarceration of status offenders. This law, however, provided no funding for alternative forms of supervision or community services for such offenders. In a subsequent legislative session, Assembly Bill 90 was passed to provide, in a manner which clearly paralleled the earlier Probation Subsidy Program, funds for community-based programs for status offenders. Again, the level of such funding was made proportional to the level of reduction in commitments to California Youth Authority institutions. While the combined impact of both bills was generally heralded as much-needed and humane reform, it left probation departments with only more serious offenders on their caseloads.

Thus, by the late 1970s, probation subsidy had all but faded from view, caseload sizes had risen back to previous levels, and the bulk of the least serious youthful offenders had become wards of the Welfare Department rather than probation. At the same time, the rehabilitative ideal which had long characterized the dominant strain of California correctional philosophy and had supported the growth of community-based supervision and treatment, began to be eclipsed by rising public concern over violent crime and delinquency (Miller and Ohlin, 1980). In the shadow of the parens patriae of the recent past there emerged a punishment/incarceration-oriented philosophy which placed public safety as the highest priority of delinquency policy (Feld, 1983). Public perceptions of rising street crime and increasingly violent young offenders put a spotlight on the serious delinquent (Fagan and Hartstone, 1984).

It was this policy context in which the Contra Costa County Probation Department's "Serious 602 Offender Project" (SOP) came into being. In the late 1970s roughly one-third of the violent or serious crimes committed in the county were committed by juveniles, according to SOP planners. The vast majority of these youthful offenders ended up on probation--either immediately after adjudication or after short stays in a county juvenile facility. Despite the seriousness of many of their offenses and frequent histories of past

violence, such offenders were routinely assigned to regular probation caseloads, with about 70 probationers assigned per deputy. This limited the quantity and quality of supervision to pro forma monthly contacts and crisis situations, and provided for no systematic assessment of client needs or the matching of such needs with community services. Moreover, deputies' pre-trial investigative responsibilities often detracted from the time available for counseling and supervising probationers.

Despite experience with reduced caseloads under probation subsidy, special intensive-supervision caseloads had never been focused specifically on violent or serious juvenile offenders. Until then, there had been little incentive to differentiate probation caseloads in terms of the "seriousness" of the offender, nor theoretical grounds to guide such classification. Yet the burgeoning number of serious juvenile offenders placed on probation created a need for special types of supervision to maintain safety, the central mission of probation.

In July 1978, Contra Costa County's Probation Department initiated a demonstration project of intensive probation supervision for youth charged with serious offenses. Federal funding was provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, through block grants administered by Contra Costa County's regional planning unit. The project utilized an experimental design which would allow a rigorous evaluation of the efficacy of this approach to the control and rehabilitation of serious juvenile offenders.

### THE THEORY OF SOP INTERVENTION

The experimental, intensive supervision SOP caseloads were to be reduced to a maximum of 20 "active" cases at any one time, with an expected supervision interval of six months. This would afford SOP deputies weekly rather than monthly contacts with all probationers, but within a time-limited interval. With this increased amount of time, probation officers could improve their knowledge of each client's situation, and thereby maximize the use and coordination of community services, tailored to the specialized needs of each juvenile offender. Under SOP, then, deputies would be expected to use individual counseling, family counseling, school follow-up, group activities, and specialized treatment services for substance abuse, all as part of more systematic, more intensive supervision.

This SOP model was designed to meet two related objectives: to improve the interpersonal and social functioning of clients and to reduce by a statistically significant margin the rate of recidivism for SOP clients below that of similar clients on regular probation supervision. In addition, because SOP probation was intensive, a third objective was to meet the primary program goals within a shorter (six months) probation period, thereby reducing the overall costs of the intensive, smaller caseload program.

### **The Experimental Model: Case Selection and Assignment**

In order for a Contra Costa County probationer to be eligible for the SOP pool, he or she had to have been on formal probation, less than 17.5 years of age, not in residential placement or another special probation program, and without court charges, termination, or a placement out of the area pending.

Once such general criteria had been satisfied, the seriousness of the charge(s) against him or her was addressed. Violence was the "cutting edge" to determine SOP eligibility. To remain in the pool, a probationer had to be judged a "serious" offender who was a physical threat to others. This criterion of seriousness could be met by **either** of two definitions:

- o The probationer was charged with any one or more of the following offenses:
  - Homicide
  - Kidnapping for robbery, ransom, or with bodily harm
  - Robbery while armed with a deadly weapon or with the threat of bodily harm
  - Extortion under threat of bodily harm
  - Assault with intent to commit murder, rape, mayhem, robbery
  - Arson
  - Rape with force or violence or threat of bodily harm
  - Sex crimes against children
  - Accessory to 1 through 8 above
  - Assault with firearms or destructive device, caustic chemicals, or by any means likely to produce great bodily harm
  - Assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer or firefighter
  - Shooting at an inhabited building
  - Aggravated assault and battery against a school employee
  - Burglaries if the minor was armed and/or the victim injured
  - Any case where the victim suffers significant physical injury
- o If not charged under "A" above, probationers were still referred to the SOP pool if the probation officer had knowledge of a ward's **violence potential** because of specific acts of violence, even if not charged, or if the probation officer had very clear reasons for feeling that the minor had a potential for violence. For example:
  - Violence against family members
  - Violence against peers beyond what is socially acceptable
  - Violence against the elderly or very young
  - Violence at school
  - Unprovoked acts of violence

- Excessive damage to property during uncontrollable outbursts of temper
- Excessive cruelty to animals
- Excessive use of alcohol and/or drugs accompanied by aggressive behavior
- Exhibiting weapons in a threatening manner
- Background of repeated fighting and/or battery
- Information from psychological or psychiatric reports or tests that clearly indicate a high violence potential
- Other related or similar circumstances that indicate a high violence potential

Cases which successfully met either one or both of the above sets of criteria were placed into the SOP pool and randomly assigned to an experimental (SOP) caseload for intensive supervision or a control group (regular probation) caseload. At the outset, the ratio of experimental to control assignments was three to one, to ensure rapid caseload development. Eventually, the sampling ratio was changed to 50%. This experimental model was designed to allow for a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of SOP.

#### THE SERIOUS OFFENDER PROJECT IN PRACTICE

In compliance with its mandate to conduct an evaluation of all federally-assisted criminal and juvenile justice programs funded under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title I, Part C), Contra Costa County awarded a research contract to URSA Institute in 1978 to evaluate SOP. According to the Final Evaluation Report (Jamison, 1981), SOP did meet or exceed both its operational and programmatic goals as measured six months after client intake.

With regard to operational goals, the Phase I Evaluation found that: clients did meet the selection criteria as specified in the proposal (and summarized above); they were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups; caseload size was kept to 20 or under per deputy; clients did receive intensive supervision (average contact at least once per week); and, finally, SOP clients did remain on probation for approximately the length of time specified (mean = 7 months; 26% less than the average for control group probationers).

The Phase I evaluation also reported that SOP intervention was indeed unique from regular supervision. Probationers were assessed at intake vis-a-vis treatment intervention needs. Contacts were more frequent, and more often involved components of each probationer's social network--parents, teachers, and (occasionally) employers. The nature of contact was enriched as well. Structured activities were common and included cultural



and recreational activities plus special counseling services. In-home contacts were common, as were referrals to special remedial placements.

As for programmatic objectives, the Phase I Evaluation found that, six months after intake, the percentage of the experimental (SOP) group who had been charged with new offenses was 21% lower than the control group (although of those who did recidivate, the experimental clients had a somewhat higher average number of new offenses). After six months, 63% of the experimentals as opposed to 46% of the controls had not been charged with new offenses. Perhaps more critical, the experimental group showed a 48% reduction in the rate of recidivism for violent offenses compared to the control group (due to the small frequencies involved, this difference was not statistically significant).

Encouraged by such positive early evaluation results, the Office of Program Evaluation of the National Institute of Justice awarded a research grant to the URSA Institute for the purpose of conducting a long-term (36-month) follow-up evaluation to determine whether these differences would sustain over time, and if so, for what types of clients under what sorts of conditions.

### **Shifts in the Intervention Design**

Once the follow-up evaluation was underway, a variety of practical modifications in program implementation were uncovered. These must be noted here. First, six months prior to the start of SOP, a similar experiment with small caseloads and intensive probation supervision was undertaken in West County. This project was for juvenile offenders who were returning to the community from short stays at juvenile hall facilities, and was called the "Saturation, Supervision, and Surveillance Project" (SSS). One year after its implementation, an unexpected reduction in funding for this special caseload required either that it be abandoned or folded into SOP. The latter option was chosen by Contra Costa Probation Department, thus incorporating the SSS caseload into the SOP caseload for West County (i.e., El Cerrito and Richmond). The total number of SSS clients was small (a total of 21 for the entire year) and there is no evidence in the Phase I Evaluation that they had more serious criminal histories than SOP clients. But in fact the Richmond SOP group differed in several ways from other SOP probationers and regular (control) probationers. Chapter IV examines the unique composition of this group, and suggests that they be viewed as a second, but separate, experimental group.

A second deviation from the experimental design required similar consideration. As SOP operated in practice, the traditional primacy of public safety as a concern in the Probation Department made it difficult to adhere strictly to the random assignment procedure. Specifically, those juvenile offenders who were screened into the SOP pool and then chosen as members of control group caseloads (i.e., regular probation supervision) were in many cases in West County assigned instead to an "Intensive Supervision Unit" (ISU) caseload. The ISU caseloads were in most respects very similar to SOP caseloads, thus possibly contaminating the experimental design by providing control group clients with intensive supervision similar to that received by experimental group clients. In order to check for such possible contamination, separate sub-group analyses on this ISU group were conducted. However, the minimal differences between regular and ISU controls suggested no need to separately analyze the ISU control group.

A final and more general modification concerns the nature of the treatment or supervision given to SOP clients vs. control group clients. In order to assess the nature of probation supervision under SOP, UI staff conducted structured, in-depth interviews with SOP probation officers, control group probation officers, and the three probation supervisors in charge of the program. Our goal was to specify exactly how SOP supervision differed from control group or regular supervision so that our subsequent analyses of outcomes would be informed by more precise measures of the treatment or intervening variable.

With respect to the **needs assessment** process, our interview data show that the tools and procedures were very much the same--differing only insofar as SOP clients, by virtue of the extra time available in lower caseloads, went through a more thorough version of the traditional needs assessment process. Similarly, the procedures used to assign SOP clients to specific caseloads or deputies were the same. The geographical location of the client's residence and the relative balance among caseload sizes were the two principal criteria used for both SOP and regular cases. Thus, the match between the special problems and needs of the client and the special abilities of certain probation officers was generally no more tailored for SOP clients than for regular or control group clients.

There were important differences between SOP and control group cases in terms of **frequency of contact**. Whereas regular and control group clients were seen on an average of once per month, SOP clients were seen on an average of once per week (and often for a longer period of time). With respect to the **type of contact**, the lower caseload size in SOP and the more frequent contacts they made allowed SOP deputies to make more family and school contacts and to pay more attention to their clients' entire social

network than was possible for control group deputies. However, while this increased contact allowed greater follow-up on SOP clients than on control group clients, this did not entail a fundamentally discrete form of "treatment," i.e., supervision and counseling functions were generally indistinguishable in both types of caseload.

In short, there was a strong consensus among SOP deputies, control group deputies, and SOP supervisors that the distinction between SOP and regular probation amounted to a quantitative difference of **degree** rather than a qualitative difference of **kind**. Thus, the evaluation reported in succeeding chapters is an evaluation of more **intensive** probation supervision, not of a substantively different type of supervision.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

The primary objectives and purposes of the longitudinal research were:

- o to test the longitudinal impact on recidivism of a program of intensive probation supervision for violent young offenders during the transition from adolescence to adulthood;
- o to analyze the criminal career patterns of serious and/or violent youths during the period from 15-21 years of age, and compare the careers of serious/violent offenders to "cohorts" of similar ages;
- o to identify the relative contributions of intensive treatment/supervision compared to historical (personal) factors and other "critical life events" (e.g., marriage, job or educational achievements) on violent behavior, other criminality, criminal justice system involvement, and "life outcomes"; determine the factors which mediate criminal careers and discriminate those offenders whose criminal careers continue from those whose careers die out;
- o to analyze self-reported and official crime among violent offenders to further determine "predictors" of violent careers, such as age of onset, early childhood socialization experiences, peer influences, and social structural conditions.

The principal hypothesis tested in this research is that a program of intensive probation supervision including both surveillance and therapeutic interventions, designed for a youthful violent offender population, will reduce recidivism and improve the social and interpersonal functioning of SOP caseloads compared to regular probation caseloads.

## POLICY ISSUES

The SOP experiment examined critical policy issues with respect to public safety--the maintenance, control, and rehabilitation of violent juvenile offenders in the community. Probation officials stated that for many such probationers in Contra Costa County, their next offense or juvenile court appearance would likely result in a commitment to the state juvenile corrections agency (CYA). Put another way, SOP was seen as the "last chance before Youth Authority." In effect, SOP revived the debate as to whether intensive probation supervision could reduce incarceration rates for serious juveniles.

From a different perspective, SOP youth were the most problematic cases in the probation department--those requiring the most intensive surveillance and intervention services. The development of effective policies for this group--especially in terms of caseload size and probation interval--held major implications for probation policy throughout the county. It held the promise of a more cost effective allocation of resources through new methods of caseload assignment and case management.

To many observers, SOP represented the "last chance" for intensive supervision and was the remaining legacy of the subvention policies. In an era of public pressure for harsher punishments, the redirection of resources to intensive supervision from secure placements for serious juvenile offenders was a bold policy experiment. SOP was designed to provide close supervision and public safety for serious offenders without confinement, a departure from the prevailing trends in juvenile justice in California in the last decade (see, for example, Greenwood et al., 1984). SOP failure could portend a two-tiered stratification of delinquency policy: community supervision (with large caseloads) for non-serious offenders, and secure confinement for more serious offenders. SOP was, in some ways, a test of the appropriateness of community supervision and alternatives to incarceration for violent delinquents.

This study also was designed to assess the question of whether the effects of SOP intervention would carry over through adolescence to the adult years. Recent criminal career studies suggest that chronic violent juvenile offenders often go on to become adult offenders (Hamparian et al., 1978; Petersilia, 1980; Shannon, 1980). Could SOP intervention in the midst of a delinquent career including violent crime prevent the development of adult careers? Could SOP accelerate desistance in the delinquent careers of repeat adolescent offenders, leading to an abrupt end with adolescence?

This longitudinal evaluation examines whether the SOP population avoided further juvenile or adult criminality in comparison to their counterparts on regular supervision. Accordingly, the longer-term SOP effects might influence the current debates on age, crime, and sanction (Greenwood et al., 1980). Few studies of correctional effectiveness view treatment impact through a "window" which spans both adolescence and early adulthood. Understanding of the "normalization" or critical life events which redirect violent behavior could vastly improve the design of probation supervision and result in savings--both in costs of crime and future justice system involvement--from shortened delinquent careers. It may also help improve the probation/prison decision by identifying young offenders whose careers would expire with minimal intervention.

The SOP experiment took place in the midst of several paradigm shifts in juvenile justice--from rehabilitation to "just deserts," from counseling or therapy to "case management," from "supervision" to "control." Yet SOP embodied many of the historical elements of the principles upon which the juvenile justice system was founded (Platt, 1976). By returning to those practices in one of their original forms, well-supported and rigorously evaluated, SOP offered a "critical experiment" of the parens patriae philosophy and the rehabilitative ideal. In turn, SOP offered potential applications for classification of probationers, selection and training of deputies, and the length (and cost) of supervision.

Though SOP was not borne from a particular theoretical orientation on the causes of delinquency, SOP nevertheless offered an opportunity to examine several factors--personal, social, and developmental--which may explain violent behavior. SOP deputies sought to establish and strengthen bonds between the offender and his or her community. The longitudinal evaluation generated data on transitions in criminal careers of violent delinquents as a function of the development or decay of conventional societal bonds. This provides not only direction for the nature of intervention, but knowledge on when it may no longer be appropriate.

Finally, the study of violent delinquents in the transition to adulthood raised several other research questions of theoretical and practical significance for the correctional policy:

- o Can violent behavior be reduced or controlled? If so, does other criminal behavior also cease, or is there only a limited relationship between violence and other criminality?
- o What roles do "life events" (e.g., marriage, parenthood, job gain or loss) play in the extinction of criminal careers and violent behavior?

- o What are the relative contributions of developmental, social, and environmental conditions in the onset or cessation of violent behaviors?

Although this study focuses on one California county, its implications are significant for other jurisdictions and states. As we see in Chapter II, Contra Costa County is a microcosm of America--with metropolitan, suburban, and rural regions, a rich ethnic diversity, and economic activities from heavy industry to "high-tech" manufacturing to agriculture and service industries. Its people are young, and the county is in social and physical flux. This county's experiences with intensive probation supervision for violent delinquents is applicable to most other states and counties struggling with the development of cost-effective alternatives to institutions. In an era of shrinking justice system resources and public pressures for more severe punishment for serious offenders, the issues and questions for probation raised by this study will be vital to understanding the effectiveness and future of intensive probation supervision.

## THIS REPORT

The following chapters examine SOP's long-term impact. Chapter II looks behind SOP to outline present conditions in Contra Costa County. A changing region marked by rapid demographic and economic change, the county nevertheless is typical of many parts of this country. Also, we outline several controversies in the county over justice system policy, race relations, and economic development which bear on the outcome of the study. Chapter III reviews the study methodology. Chapter IV presents basic descriptive information on SOP clients. The results profile the "toughest" cases for Contra Costa County juvenile probation, those youth who are "one step from the Youth Authority."

Chapter V documents the impacts on recidivism for SOP and regular probationers, and its implications for public safety. Four measures of criminality are used, and several treatment variables are introduced to examine the effects of varying strengths of intervention. We return to qualitative data on the consistency and integrity of the program experience to understand the observed outcomes. Chapter VI analyzes SOP in the context of the ecological variables which differentiate the unique regions within the county. We determine the factors in a probationer's immediate social area which mediate the effects of intensive supervision. This information in turn suggests possible modifications in the experimental intervention which would accommodate such area influences to maximize SOP treatment.

In Chapter VII, we identify the developmental and social factors, as well as the "critical life events" which conjoin with SOP to impact on recidivism. These findings, like those in the previous chapter, suggest factors for intervention and possible methods to alter these bonds and attitudes. Both practical and theoretical implications are drawn from these analyses. Chapter VIII concludes with an overview of SOP's effectiveness and its appropriateness as a dispositional alternative for a population of violent delinquents. Its policy utility is also examined, as are practical applications to support efforts to achieve SOP goals. The study concludes with a policy and research agenda for intensive supervision with violent delinquents in the transition to adulthood.

## CHAPTER II--THE SETTING: AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

The diversity of the setting for SOP offers a unique opportunity to examine the influences of social area effects on delinquent and criminal careers. Crime, and responses to it, vary widely in Contra Costa County, as do the characteristics of its regions. It occupies 800 square miles from the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay, along the Sacramento River Delta, and inland over rolling hills toward the agricultural heartland of the state. It is bordered by Berkeley and Oakland to the South, the largely agricultural counties of Solano and San Joaquin to the North and East, and by the suburbs of Marin County to the west, across the Bay.

It is a county rich in contrasts. Just across the Bay from the lush beauty of Marin's affluent "bedroom" communities sits Richmond--the site of dozens of smoke stacks, oil storage tanks, warehouses and small factories--where ships, railroads, and trucks load and unload. During World War II, it was a hub of shipbuilding for the West Coast, attracting workers from across the country. This industry is now gone. Since that era, it has been something of an industrial "back closet" for the Bay Area. Alongside established, conservative, lower-middle-class towns on the county's western fringe sits the university community of Berkeley, a nationally renowned center of learning, together with student protest movements, political experimentation, and avant-gard culture. Just beyond Contra Costa's central corridor of new middle- to upper-middle-class suburbs and burgeoning office parks lie steel mills, delta port facilities, Navy bases, and miles of rich fruit orchards.

The county's population in 1980 was approximately 660,000--the tenth largest in California in population and the ninth smallest land area. Contra Costa was one of the original California counties, established in 1849 when its population was 2,000. It remained primarily a ranching and farming region until the late 1800's when Port Costa was opened as a major ocean shipping point for the valley's abundant agricultural products. It still accounts for almost half the Bay Area's ocean shipping.

From the turn of the century on, industry grew. Standard Oil established a major refinery in West County's Richmond in 1904. Shell and Union Oil companies as well as steel, paper, and chemical mills followed. Near the end of the Great Depression the Caldicott Tunnel was completed. This New Deal public works project linked the Eastern, rural sections of




the county to the San Francisco metropolitan area by a major freeway. In large measure because of this transportation breakthrough, the population of Contra Costa tripled between 1940 and 1950. The Tunnel made available to urban dwellers plentiful land and relatively inexpensive housing--both especially important to the young families who were in the process of creating the post-war "baby boom."

Between 1950 and 1980, the county's population doubled again with the aid of another transportation milestone--in 1972, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system linked Contra Costa still more closely to major Bay Area cities with fast, comfortable, state-of-the-art commuter trains. Thus, in less than a century, the county had been transformed from a sparsely populated ranching community, to a minor industrial and shipping center, to a mushrooming mosaic of suburban cities.


Contra Costa has been undergoing a fourth transformation since 1970. In addition to the rapid growth of the retail and service sectors which followed in the wake of population growth, the county is becoming a mecca for white collar office work. An abundant labor force, land, and low development and operating costs have drawn many businesses away from San Francisco and other, more urban centers. Between 1981 and 1982 alone there was a 73% increase in office space. Dozens of San Francisco businesses have relocated their clerical and data processing divisions to Contra Costa County. Chevron, Bank of America, Bechtel, Crocker Bank, and Firemen's Fund Insurance Company have all built major new office developments along the county's central corridor. In contrast to San Francisco, Contra Costa offers easy transportation, a pro-development attitude on the part of the local government, affordable housing for employees, and significantly lower costs. Office space, for example, is \$10 per square foot less expensive, and the total costs per employee are roughly half that of San Francisco (e.g., Concord's employee tax is \$57 per annum compared to \$305 in San Francisco). Thus, by the end of 1983 there will be some six million square feet of office space in Contra Costa, 90% of which will have been built since 1977. This total is projected to double before 1990.<sup>1</sup>

In keeping with such rapid economic growth, the number of non-agricultural jobs in the county has grown every year since 1972. Despite the recessions of 1973-75 and 1980-81, job opportunities have expanded at an average rate of 5.5% per year. While the rate of growth in high-skill, professional jobs and manufacturing jobs has slowed considerably in recent years, the number of retail jobs has grown from 27,200 in 1972 to 45,100 in 1980.<sup>2</sup> According to the Labor Market Survey published by the state's Employment Development Department, some 30,000 new private sector jobs will have been created in Contra Costa

15



ROAD MAP  
**CONTRA COSTA COUNTY**  
 CALIFORNIA



● INC. CITIES

COMPILED BY: *Victor W. Sauer*  
 VICTOR W. SAUER  
 DIRECTOR OF  
 PUBLIC WORKS

County between 1980 and 1985--two-thirds of them in the retail trades and services industries. Overall, the Bank of America's regional economic forecast concluded that "During the 1980s, Contra Costa is expected to be the area's fastest growing county." Indeed, if its major city, Concord, is any example, this will be true: its World War II population of 5,000 had expanded to more than 100,000 in 1980 and is still growing.

For the County as a whole, 1979 data show Contra Costa to have the sixth highest per capita income of the 58 counties in California.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, State Franchise Tax Board figures for 1981 give it the highest median per capita income in the state--\$18,213, compared to a state-wide average of \$13,750. The "typical" Contra Costa resident is 30.6 years old, married, living in a household of 2.69 persons, and owns a home with a median price of \$94,000.<sup>4</sup> The following table (2.1) presents county-wide data from the 1980 U.S. Census on household, labor force, and housing characteristics.

Consistent with the picture sketched thus far, these figures indicate an affluent, well-employed, and well-housed county. With continuing strong growth and easy access to San Francisco and other Bay Area cities, virtually all reports on Contra Costa's present and future economic outlook sound promising.

Beneath such positive overall indicators, however, lie pockets of poverty, social problems, and uneven development that are camouflaged by the general health of the area as a whole. When the above figures for the county are broken down to show the relative characteristics of its eight major cities and towns (over half the total population), some rather stark contrasts become visible. For example, the proportion of female-headed households with children and no spouse is four times higher in Richmond than in Walnut Creek, and the percentage of the population below poverty in Concord, Martinez, and Walnut Creek is but a fraction of that in Pittsburg, Brentwood, and Richmond. Similarly, median household income varies from a low of \$14,700 in Brentwood to a high of \$24,842 in Walnut Creek. (See Table A-2.1 for details.)

The same magnitude of variation also can be seen in the labor force characteristics. (See Table A-2.2 in appendix.) While over nine in ten adult residents of Walnut Creek have finished high school or more, only about half of those in Brentwood have reached or exceeded that level of educational attainment. Unemployment in 1979 was twice as high in Pittsburgh and Richmond as it was in Walnut Creek and Concord. Moreover, although more than two in five adult residents of Walnut Creek work in high-status occupations, less than one in five do so in Antioch, Brentwood, Pittsburg, and Richmond.

Table 2.1. Selected Characteristics of Contra Costa, 1980

<b>Household:</b>	<u>Median Household Income</u> \$22,875	<u>% of Families with Female-Headed Households with Children No Spouse</u> 7%	<u>% of Total Population Below Poverty</u> 8%	
<b>Labor Force:</b>	<u>% Finished High School or More</u> 82%	<u>% Unemployed (1979)</u> 6%	<u>% in High Status Occupations</u> 29%	
<b>Housing:</b>	<u>% Owner Occupied</u> 68%	<u>% Living in Same House as 5 years ago</u> 46%	<u>% of Housing Built Since 1970</u> 31%	<u>% Having More than 1.01 Persons Per Room</u> 3%

The housing data tell a similar story. Residents of more affluent cities are much more likely than those in lower income communities to own their homes and to live in newer homes. The figures on density or overcrowding are perhaps more telling. The percentage of families having more than 1.01 persons per room is two to ten times higher in Brentwood, Richmond, and Pittsburg, than in Concord, Martinez, and Walnut Creek. (See Table A-2.3 in appendix.)

Such marked differences are reflected in the ethnic composition of these eight communities as well. Residential patterns are clearly segregated by race, as well as class. Communities like Antioch have very few Blacks, but substantial numbers of Latino and other minority families. Richmond, by contrast, is almost half Black, while Martinez, Walnut Creek, and Concord have very few residents from any ethnic minority group. (See Table A-2.4 in appendix.)

The aggregate affluence suggested by county-wide indicators is belied as well by recurrent racial conflicts. According to a special 1981 report by the State Fair Employment and Housing Commission and various newspaper investigations, there has been an "upsurge in racial and ethnic violence" in Contra Costa County in recent years. These investigations were prompted by repeated reports of attacks on and harassment of minority families who attempted to move into predominantly white communities. There is an active chapter of the Ku Klux Klan in Contra Costa which was expelled from the national "Invisible Empire, Order of the White Knights" for being "too violent and too involved in illegal activities." The Commission report stated that the Klan and other groups used "terror tactics" against Black families and recruited in local schools, especially among white teenage gangs.<sup>5</sup>

The State Commission also found evidence of racial slurs by high school faculty and administrators in Pittsburg which had led to a boycott of classes by families with Latino students; persistent and growing segregation in housing and schools; hostile attitudes toward and inadequate response to minorities by local police departments; racial discrimination in hiring police officers; and local government and school officials reluctant to act on such problems.

Concurrently, related issues plagued the Richmond Police Department. Between 1980 and 1982, five Black suspects died while in the custody of Richmond Police. When the FBI, the U.S. Attorney, and the Contra Costa County District Attorney began independent investigations, some 27 other cases of alleged police brutality were uncovered. In the

course of one of three multi-million dollar law suits brought against the police and the city, six police officers broke the department's "code of silence" and testified against their fellow officers. Their testimony corroborated citizen complaints about a group of white officers known as "the Cowboys" for their Western attire and their affinity for taking "the law into their own hands late at night."<sup>6</sup> When subsequent trials and hearings substantiated most of the citizen complaints, a Federal Court ordered the Richmond Police Department to enact policies which restrained police violence and more fairly handled brutality complaints. The City settled one of the suits with a three million dollar payment to the families of two of the men slain by police.

Thus, within what is ostensibly a model suburban county, there exists a variety of urban problems. Although Contra Costa as a whole had the highest median income of all California counties, it also contains within its scenic boundaries four of the ten poorest communities in the entire six-county San Francisco Bay Area (San Pablo, the poorest, West Pittsburg, Brentwood, and Richmond).<sup>7</sup> Despite the generally healthy economy of the county, the county's Economic Task Force reported a variety of continuing problems:

... declining industry and resulting unemployment for skilled workers in East County, pockets of high unemployment in areas such as Pittsburg and Richmond, the need to develop affordable housing in the proximity of commercial and industrial facilities now being developed, and the impact of development on the transportation system and supporting public services.<sup>(8)</sup>

Further research indicates that the Task Force Report's summary is an apt one. Between 1980 and 1981, at least ten industrial plants closed their Contra Costa facilities, resulting in the loss of 300-400 jobs.<sup>9</sup> Home mortgage foreclosure notices increased 66% in the same period, from 3,027 to 5,014.<sup>10</sup> Between 1980 and 1982, some 1,500 industrial jobs were permanently lost to county residents due to layoffs at U.S. Steel, DuPont, Crown Zellerbach, and Allied Chemical.<sup>11</sup> One telltale result was a line of 1,300 workers stretching for blocks to apply for seven openings in the Richmond Fire Department.<sup>12</sup> On top of these developments, funding for jobs programs have suffered in the wake of the state-wide Proposition 13 tax limitation amendment of 1978 and the Reagan Administration cuts of 1981-83. County Manpower programs, for example, had their federal funding reduced in 1981. This resulted in the loss of an additional 400 jobs. Such public sector budget cuts have direct bearing on the main issues of this report inasmuch as youth unemployment in Contra Costa has been increasing. As noted in the County Administrator's 1981 Annual Report, Manpower programs have been cut 60-80%, and some 300 to 350 young people in On-the-Job Training, vocational education, and work experience programs lost their entry-level training positions as a consequence:<sup>13</sup>

. . . although youth unemployment is on the rise, the (Manpower) Department was forced to halt its job training for out-of-work and disadvantaged youth.  
(p. 17)

In short, Contra Costa is a study in contrasts, which affords a rich diversity of social and economic climates within which to examine serious crime and special interventions. The county is characterized by simultaneous affluence and poverty, growth and decay, mobility and mortality, pristine pastures and pollution problems.<sup>14</sup> The contributions of these factors to the development of criminal careers can be examined by incorporating them into our conceptual view of the origins of crime.

### Trends in Juvenile Crime

In addition to the demographic and socioeconomic portrait of the setting for this research, it is also important to note briefly the patterns of juvenile offenses which are another facet of that context. In recent years, there has been much attention to "epidemics" of juvenile crime. Political leaders, law enforcement officials, and, particularly, the media have repeatedly claimed that both the frequency and the seriousness of juvenile crime have been increasing at alarming rates. Some such as Strasburg (1984) claim that violent crime among juveniles nationally has remained stable despite drops in other categories. Indeed, Contra Costa County Probation Department's Serious Offender Program is said by county officials to be ". . . a response to the growing number of serious and violent juvenile offenders on Probation caseloads."<sup>15</sup>

However, as noted in Chapter I, the notion that juvenile crime in the nation as a whole has been increasing in both frequency and seriousness is not supported by empirical data--whether victimization surveys, self-report data, or official Uniform Crime Reports are used.<sup>16</sup> This appears to be the case in Contra Costa County as well. Table 2.2 displays the frequency of juvenile arrests reported to Contra Costa law enforcement agencies over the decade of 1972-1981. These data show that juvenile arrests increased between 1972 and 1975, but have declined steadily between 1975 and 1981--from a high of 13,912 in 1975 down to 8,202 in 1981 (a 41% decrease).

There are a variety of possible interpretations of such a trend which do not suggest that juvenile crime is on the wane in Contra Costa. First, some have argued that while overall juvenile arrests have been declining in recent years, serious and violent offenses have been rising. If true, this would help account for the growth of concern over delinquency. However, the data on **felony** juvenile arrests (Table 2.2) for Contra Costa County show a decline every year except 1978, the year of SOP inception. The level of felony arrests

declined from a high of 3,662 in 1973 to 2,347 in 1981 (a 35.9% drop). For this county, then, like the nation as a whole, neither the total frequency nor the frequency of serious juvenile offenses has been increasing.

The second alternative interpretation of these trends might posit that although total juvenile arrests and felony juvenile arrests have been decreasing in absolute terms, so has the proportion of juveniles in the county population. If true, then there may have been a **relative** increase in either the real frequency and/or seriousness of juvenile crime. But census data show that the proportion of the total Contra Costa County population between the ages 15-19 years has declined, by 5.6% from 1970 to 1980 when total juvenile arrests rose and then declined. This decline can account for only a small fraction of the much larger decline in juvenile crime in the later years of the decade. Thus, since total and felony juvenile arrests have been declining much more rapidly than the proportion of juveniles in the crime-prone years in the county population, this demographic interpretation cannot take us very far.

Finally, it is at least arguable that arrest rates, for a variety of reasons, may vary independently from crime rates. The most obvious possible interpretation of this type is that the funding reductions for local government agencies which followed the passage of Proposition 13 (the California property tax limitation measure) affected the capacities of county law enforcement agencies to make arrests. Although these cuts were often substantial and have since been exacerbated by federal funding cuts, the number of law enforcement officers has increased throughout the 1972-81 period. Similarly, total expenditures for both police and sheriffs has risen significantly and steadily in each of those years.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps most important, because Proposition 13 was passed by the voters in June, 1978, the first year it could have possibly affected law enforcement funding was FY 1979; yet the declines in both total and felony juvenile arrests began three years prior to that.

It would appear, therefore, that there is a trend toward less frequent and less serious juvenile crime in the county. As the County became a more varied social and economic region, the extent and severity of juvenile crime declined. For SOP, this portended two trends: the potential masking of treatment impacts by decelerating juvenile crime rates, and the likely disaggregation of crime rates by varying regions of the County. These themes are explored later in this research.



Table 2.2. Juvenile Arrests Reported by Law Enforcement Agencies  
Contra Costa County, 1973-81\*

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Total Juvenile Arrests	12,447	13,145	13,355	13,912	12,015	10,499	10,422	9,233	8,793	8,202
% Change	--	+5.6%	+1.6%	+4.2%	-13.6%	-12.6%	-.7%	-11.4%	-4.8%	-6.7%
Felony Juvenile Arrests	NA	3,662	3,522	3,202	2,343	2,536	2,456	2,455	2,347	
% Change	--	--	-3.8%	-9.1%	-22.6%	-5.4%	+8.2%	-3.2%	0%	-4.4%

\*1981 Criminal Justice Profile: Contra Costa County (California Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1981).

## FOOTNOTES

1. Regional Perspectives: Bay Area - 1982 Outlook, Economics-Policy Research, Regional Marketing, and Corporate Communications Departments, Bank of America; San Francisco, 1982; Northern Coastal California: Economic Issues in the Eighties, Research Department, Security Pacific Bank; San Francisco, 1982.
2. Labor Market Survey, report to the Contra Costa County Private Sector Initiatives Program (Sacramento: California Employment Development Department, 1981); Overall Economic Development Program: 1979-1980 Annual Report (Martinez, CA: Contra Costa County Planning Department, 1979).
3. Northern Coastal California, op cit.
4. Annual Report, Contra Costa County Administrator (Martinez, CA: 1981).
5. Public Hearings on Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Conflict and Violence in Contra Costa County, California Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Sacramento, CA: 1981); San Francisco Examiner, 4/18/82, 1/30/83.
6. San Francisco Examiner, 10/10/82, 10/17/82, 10/24/82, 1/2/83, 1/11/83, and 1/18/83; San Francisco Chronicle, 2/19/83.
7. San Francisco Examiner, 1/17/83.
8. Economic Task Force Report to Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors (Martinez, CA: 1983).
9. California Employment Development Department Report (Sacramento: August, 1982).
10. San Francisco Examiner, 5/30/82; note that completed foreclosures rose 241% from 120 to 410.
11. San Francisco Examiner, 3/9/83.
12. San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, 2/6/83.
13. Annual Report, op cit.
14. Environmental conflicts apparently are a recurrent feature of Contra Costa's political life. During the course of our research, several major air and water pollution controversies were front page news. For example, one worker was killed and twenty-eight others hospitalized after an accidental release of toxic substances in a chemical plant in West County. Occupational Safety and Health Administration fines and multi-million-dollar law suits against two multi-national chemical companies resulted (San Francisco Chronicle, 9/1/82). A more long-term pollution crisis also emerged during the study period: a state health agency study reported a 24% rate of birth defects in East County neighborhoods near heavy industrial sites and toxic waste dumps (San Francisco Examiner, 3/20/83).
15. Annual Report, op cit.

16. On the decline of juvenile crime see, Zimring, F. E., "American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends," in N. Morris and M. Tonry, Eds., Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research (Vol. I). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Duxbury, E. B., "Violence By Youth: Violence Against Youth," American Behavioral Scientist, 23 (1980); Smith, C. P. et al., A National Assessment of Serious Juvenile Crime and the Juvenile Justice System, Vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Justice: Before and After the Onset of Delinquency, paper presented by the U.S. at the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980); and Laub, J. H., "Trends in Serious Juvenile Crime," Criminal Justice and Behavior, 10/4 (1983).
17. 1981 Criminal Justice Profile: Contra Costa County (Sacramento: California Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1981).

## CHAPTER III—EVALUATION DESIGN, METHODS, AND SAMPLES

### INTRODUCTION

The Serious Offender Program was designed both as a probation program and as an evaluation research experiment. This twofold plan ensured a means of systematically evaluating the efficacy of SOP. By randomly assigning cases to experimental (SOP) and control (regular probation) groups, it was thought that whatever combinations of factors influence serious and violent delinquency would be evenly distributed among the two samples. Simply stated, the experimental design would allow inferences that differences would be attributable to the influence of SOP intervention.

The principal goal of the study, then, was to conduct a rigorous test of the impact of SOP on the recidivism of serious and violent delinquents during the critical years of transition to adulthood. More formally, the core hypothesis to be tested by SOP evaluation was that intensive probation supervision (including increased use of community treatment services) of serious/violent juvenile offenders would result in lower rates of recidivism and improved social and interpersonal functioning. A secondary goal was an empirical assessment of the duration of treatment effects over time. The research attempted to measure the rate of "decay" of treatment effects during a transitional developmental period. Accordingly, the study was designed to examine recidivism rates of SOP clients three years after they had left the program.

Beyond this core hypothesis, the study was designed to address additional program-specific issues and other, more general questions about the causes and correlates of serious delinquency. With respect to the program, the research reported below attempts to determine:

- o If SOP is shown to have the hypothesized effect, what specific features of intervention, supervision, and treatment best account for it?
- o For what types of juvenile offenders are such effects found and not found?
- o What is the contribution of SOP intervention **relative** to personal background factors, critical life events, and community influences?

More generally, the longitudinal design allows for the development of data to explore broader issues in the etiology of serious or violent delinquency. Succeeding chapters will:

- o analyze criminal career patterns to identify factors which inform desistance vs. escalation;
- o identify factors which predict violent offenses specifically;
- o determine the nature of relationship(s) between individual social-psychological factors and the social and personal bonds or attachments thought to flow from them and to influence delinquent and non-delinquent behavior; and
- o examine the nature of the relationship(s) between such bonds or attachments and external, community characteristics.

The remainder of this chapter provides a summary description of the specific methods, procedures, and data used in the study.

## DATA SOURCES

The SOP research drew upon four major data sources for each client: Probation Department Intake ("Screening") and Termination Forms; U.S. Census Data; official arrest records from the state Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS); and the Follow-up Interview Questionnaire.

### Probation Department Records

Project staff obtained photocopies of Probation Department Intake and Termination Forms for all SOP and control group clients (names, addresses, phone numbers and all other identifying information were blocked off). **Intake forms** contained the following data:

- o Date of birth, sex, and race
- o Education and employment/school status at arrest
- o Marital status, living situation
- o Family history, composition, and household head
- o School attendance and performance
- o Legal and probation status at arrest
- o Client's drug/alcohol use and treatment experience
- o Family's drug/alcohol use and treatment experience

**Termination forms** contained the following additional data:

- o Duration of probation supervision, probation services rendered
- o Probation and legal statuses at termination, reason for termination
- o Employment/school status, attendance, and performance at termination
- o Recidivism summary and drug/alcohol use history
- o Probation officer assessment of social and family functioning
- o Probation officer prognosis regarding client's most difficult problem

Unfortunately, this data base was poor. For many cases, this information was either incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistently coded. This was particularly true of records for control group cases. Those probation officers were not formally trained or involved in the SOP experiment, and did not have the additional time afforded SOP officers for supervision or data collection. Moreover, SOP recruited a data analyst who was responsible only for data collection for SOP youth. To preserve anonymity of the controls, the data collector did not approach regular probation deputies for information on control cases.

Given the nature of these data problems and with the assistance of Probation Department clerical staff, we devised a data augmentation process to either collect or correct the needed data. These procedures in combination with the availability of overlapping data from BCS arrest records and the Follow-Up Interviews resolved the bulk of such problems.

#### **Bureau of Criminal Statistics Arrest Records**

With the support and cooperation of Probation Department management and clerical staff, we obtained complete copies of both juvenile and adult criminal records for all SOP and control group clients. These records provided the data base from which the official crime variables were constructed: arrests, time to arrest, and dispositions (penetration). Through a series of fortuitous accidents in the data collection process, we discovered several ways in which official criminal records are incomplete and/or inaccurate. These gaps in archival data go beyond recent revelations by Sherman and Glick (1984) on inconsistencies in UCR arrest data. The policy implications for analysis of criminal justice records are significant.

We began by examining the adult records of those members of our population who had become 18 years of age during the evaluation period. This task updated earlier recidivism data drawn from juvenile records. We found a number of arrests listed for which there was "no subsequent action reported" (NSAR). Some of these were two or more years old. We then began interviewing various functionaries in each component institution in the record-keeping system in order to track down such anomalies. We learned early on from the data manager at the Bureau of Criminal Statistics in Sacramento and from a records clerk at one of Contra Costa's local police departments that at every step there are "traps" into which the official records of an arrest may fall. The problems which resulted ranged from simply lost data, to inaccurate data, to data that was recorded twice (i.e., as two separate arrests when only one occurred).

Subsequent investigations into all felony arrests for which no subsequent action had been recorded led to the discovery that of some 50 subjects with NSAR felony arrests on record, 25 had additional arrests shown on **local** records which did not show up on state BCS records. Moreover, our attempts to track down such data led us to one Assistant District Attorney in Richmond who claimed that up to 50% of the Municipal Court cases and approximately 40% of the Superior Court cases prosecuted (i.e., not NSAR) by his office did not appear on BCS records. It was clear to him which of these were simply late in being processed and recorded and which were lost. The data augmentation procedures did allow us to establish what happened to cases that were dismissed or dropped, but for cases that were prosecuted we had to examine court records as well.

We discovered myriad sources of such problems. At the BCS itself, the principal difficulty is simply a backlog in recording the raw arrest data that come in from all parts of the county. According to BCS officials, they tend to give priority to felonies, so that in addition to whatever "normal" delays exist in the reporting system, low-level felonies and misdemeanors can remain unrecorded at BCS for up to three years. At Contra Costa County courts, clerks also claim there is a backlog, albeit only three to four months, but maintain that all dispositions eventually get reported to BCS. It was their belief, therefore, that our missing data was the result of various prosecutorial delays prior to court disposition.

Our next step was to check with the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office. Officials there maintained that charges are frequently dropped or dismissed prior to court action. In such cases, the prosecutor is not responsible for reporting to BCS, but only for noting this on Form 8715 to BCS. (It is worth noting here, however, that at least one member of the clerical staff at the prosecutor's office claimed a batch of such NSAR cases were simply "thrown out" in 1982.)\*

We then interviewed the Records Lieutenant at the Concord Police Department, the largest, most central police department in Contra Costa County. He maintained that police departments are responsible only for **initiating** Form 8715, which documents the arrest. After formal booking, the form is forwarded to the District Attorney, and the police are no longer involved in the process.

---

\*We have obtained copies of official correspondence between the Richmond office of the County District Attorney and the Attorney General which document these data gaps.

Thus, we arrived at what appears to be the main gap in the criminal record-keeping process: arrests which do not culminate in swift dispositions often fall into a bureaucratic "Bermuda Triangle" between the courts, the District Attorney's office, and various county police departments--before they reach the BCS computer. According to the officials we spoke with, this tendency is greatest for weak cases, non-felonies, and arrests in which subsequent information establishes the innocence of the defendant. In such instances, dismissals, delays, and lack of subsequent action are common, and the original arrest data is at risk. With serious recording backlogs at nearly every stage, we must assume that priorities get set in favor of the most serious felonies and/or cases with clear and swift dispositions.

Thus, while this tendency varies from case to case, the incentive for rapid and complete reporting is reduced for cases which do not proceed through the criminal justice system according to an "ideal" arrest-prosecution-disposition model. For cases which do approximate this ideal, the tendency appears to be that they will get recorded and forwarded to BCS eventually. Thus, data on such cases is generally only vulnerable to backlogs, multiple booking errors, and missing disposition data. But other, more "low visibility" cases often remain unrecorded. Accordingly, our understanding not only of crime but of system performance is often incomplete. Systems present a "creamed" picture of their activities. More important, estimates of official crime are biased--the severity of crime appears greater due to the omission of less severe cases, and a significant number of dismissals remain unrecorded.

Accordingly, readers should bear in mind two paradoxical features of the criminal records which comprised the official crime variables: 1) arrests tend to be under-reported relative to actual arrests, but 2) due to incomplete and/or inaccurate disposition data, recorded arrests tend to overstate actual criminality relative to dispositions. There have been a variety of reports on similar problems with official arrest data which suggest, as does our experience in this study, that official recidivism may make for a dubious dependent variable (cf. Newman, 1962; Wheeler, 1967; Inciardi, 1979; Sherman and Glick, 1984).

#### **Self-Reports: Follow-Up Interview Data and Conceptual Framework**

Probation Department Intake and Termination Forms and the BCS official criminal records were not designed for research or evaluation purposes. Accordingly, the Follow-Up Interview instrument was developed to provide the wide range of data required to



describe the nature of clients' probation experience, and to test explanatory models of violent delinquency. The Follow-Up Interview contained a series of quantitative scalar measures as well as some 50 unstructured, open-ended items designed to elicit depth of detail and the subjects' accounts of and reasoning behind their own behavior. This instrument, then, is the principal source of structural, situational, behavioral, and attitudinal data used in this study, and provides data to describe and explain the analytic findings. The interview was constructed to elicit data from the 12 months preceding SOP (or control) assignment, and the 12 months preceding the interview.

The Follow-Up Interview instrument was intended to examine explanations of serious youth crime based on an integration of strain, control, and learning theories. By imposing a theoretical framework on the analyses of desistance or continuation of criminal careers, we hoped to develop specific recommendations for the design of probation strategies. The integrated theory is described in detail and tested in Chapter VII. A brief overview follows.

There have been several attempts recently to integrate theoretical explanations of juvenile delinquency. One common interface has been between social learning theory and control theory (Johnson, 1979; Akers, 1977; Conger, 1980; Hawkins and Weis, 1980); others have integrated strain with control perspectives (Elliott and Voss, 1974). Elliott et al. (1979) have proposed a combination of the control, strain and social learning approaches. The dynamic relationships among the variables and processes of these integrated models present opportunities to intervene with both the "causes" of delinquency (via control theory) and the manner in which these causes operate in the social bonding context (via social learning theory). Both strain theory and control theory, as originally conceived, apply systemic conditions to explain delinquent behavior in the aggregate, not the delinquency of individual youth (Kornhauser, 1978; Short, 1979). But data on individual differences indicate that individual behavior is mediated by other factors at the individual level (e.g., family, peers) (Conger, 1980).

For example, Fagan and Jones (1984) reviewed current explanations of violent delinquency and concluded that individual, interactional, and environmental influences should be considered in theory development. Elsewhere, Hawkins and Weis (1980), for example, reviewed ten self-reported delinquency data sets and concluded that there are multiple correlates and causes of delinquency and drug abuse within the domains of school, family, peers, and community.

The conceptual framework for this study integrates control, strain, and social learning theories of violent behavior (Akers et al., 1984). It identifies salient factors on which to focus policy by describing the processes that govern both social bonding and motivation (Conger, 1978). The incorporation of individual differences addresses those causal roots of violence and/or drug abuse that cannot be easily explained within a broad conceptualization of delinquency. Psychosocial factors that account for many of the individual variables that distinguish violent youth as a subset of delinquent youth include such predisposing variables as violent families (Fagan and Wexler, 1984; Alfaro, 1978), lack of empathy, and emotional disturbance (Sorrells, 1977; 1980).

The framework identifies two types of bonds which mediate delinquent, criminal, or violent conduct. "Integration," or external societal bonds, describes ties to conventional activities. "Commitment," or personal bonds, describes attitudes and beliefs about conventional norms or behaviors. These ties exist at various ages, in five primary social areas: education, peer groups, employment, family, and neighborhood. Bonds are modified by individual factors (such as early childhood socialization). They are strengthened or eroded by reinforcing factors in each social domain or social environment.

**Follow-Up Interviewing Procedures.** Initially, we sought to contact all members of the sample: 267 SOP clients and 102 control cases. We expected to find that many cases were lost, and sample attrition increased with the length of the follow-up period. This was particularly true for young people at that stage of the life cycle in which mobility is highest, and for "deviant" or "hard-to-reach" populations. Because most of the potential interview subjects were between 17 and 21 years of age, a time when they could be expected to leave their parents' homes and enter into new stages of development, an elaborate subject location system was designed. We began with the last known addresses and nearest relative as listed in Probation Department files, and then conducted a six-step locating process:

- o **Initial telephone search** (of Contra Costa and neighboring counties for all those cases for whom Probation files had become outdated).
- o **Secondary file search** (review of past and present Probation files and Probation Department-accessed juvenile justice system records to update location data and to identify cases who had been in more recent contact with the Probation Department and/or juvenile justice system agencies).
- o **Secondary telephone search** (new location data discovered in Step 2 used to aid process).
- o **Initial follow-up letters** (sent to last known address and/or nearest relative of all cases without viable telephone information and all cases who failed to return calls).

- o **Department of Motor Vehicles search** (for all remaining cases without validated phone numbers or addresses, and for all cases who had not responded to initial follow-up letters).
- o **Secondary follow-up letters** (sent via registered mail to all cases with potentially valid addresses who had not responded to either phone calls or initial follow-up letters).

In addition to these six standard steps, we also attempted to gain the participation of the many subjects who either remained reluctant to be interviewed or refused outright. For all such cases, "special plea" letters were sent via certified mail. These letters attempted to address whatever specific objections the subjects (or their parents) may have given as the reason they would not agree to be interviewed, and informed them that the respondent fee originally offered would be raised (from \$12 to \$20 and sometimes \$25).

For those subjects who fell into the other major category of non-participants, i.e., unlocated, a final search of the State Bureau of Criminal Statistics records was conducted so as to identify any sample members who might have been recently arrested and/or incarcerated somewhere in California. These additional steps allowed project staff to locate another ten respondents.

The reasons for non-participation in the follow-up included refusals by subjects, parents, or both; deceased; relocated and/or incarcerated out of state; unlocatable; and respondent failure to keep two consecutive interview appointments. Subtracting the (N=50) subjects who had moved out of state, died, or were unlocatable from the total sample (N=369), the remaining 311 subjects constituted the "net" pool of possible follow-up subjects. Of these, 53.1% (N=165) were successfully located and interviewed. The overall response rate from the total pool (N=369) was 44.7%. These cases were distributed proportionally to the ratio of experimentals to controls in the total pool: 72.1% SOP youths (N=119) and 28.9% controls (N=46).

Subjects who had been successfully located and had agreed to be interviewed were then contacted directly by a Field Interviewer to arrange a specific appointment. Interviewers explained the purpose and logic of the study, how respondents had been selected, confidentiality procedures, the topic areas to be covered and approximate duration of the interview. Each respondent was then given a copy of the Informed Consent Data Sheet and asked to sign a Consent Form (parents were asked to sign for respondents under 18 years of age) (see Appendix B). Respondents were paid in cash immediately upon completion of the interview and signed a Receipt Form.

Seven Field Interviewers were selected from a pool of twenty candidates on the basis of previous training and experience, and an assessment of their potential for both tracking respondents and developing rapport with them. Women and men, and Whites and Blacks, were chosen so that for most interview respondents, a Field Interviewer of the same gender and race could be chosen.\* Interviews were set up at the time and place of the respondent's choice. This was almost always his or her home after school or working hours or on weekends. The follow-up interviews lasted approximately two hours.

#### Community Context Variables: Census Data

In recent years, it has not been uncommon to find references in the crime and delinquency literature which claim that no significant relationship exists between social class and delinquency (e.g., Hirschi, 1969; Krohn et al., 1980), or even that this relationship, so central to sociological theory, is in fact a "myth" (e.g., Tittle et al., 1978). However, such reports invariably engender subsequent articles which argue at least as compellingly that there is just such a relationship (e.g., Elliott and Ageton, 1981; Braithwaite, 1981).

This study will attempt to assess the nature of the social class-delinquency relationship among the SOP sample so we might at least contribute to that debate. Our attempt was organized along two dimensions. The Follow-Up Interview variable domains employ traditional measures of socioeconomic status (SES) or social class, i.e., parental occupation and education, degree of unemployment, and use of public assistance programs. We added to this dimension measures of our respondents' subjective perceptions of their family's social class (perceived standard of living relative to peers and to community), as well as the social and economic conditions in their immediate neighborhood.

The second approach to the measurement of socioeconomic status attempts to tap the structural or environmental facets of class rather than individual or family attributes. The classic Chicago School studies of "delinquency areas" (Shaw et al., 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1942) established that communities and neighborhoods **themselves** have attributes which either facilitate or inhibit delinquency **independent** of the individual-level characteristics of the young people who live in them. Although such community-level attributes are never reducible to social class per se, they are generally regarded as important ecological correlates thereof.

---

\*There were very few Latino or Asian respondents in the pool. Accordingly, interviewers of these origins were not specifically sought.

In an effort to assess the influence of socio-economic attributes of community on our subjects' behavior, we developed an additional variable domain called "community context." This inquiry is described in detail in Chapter VI. Briefly, we determined first the precise census tract in which each of our SOP and control group respondents resided. We then selected some 16 variables from the 1980 U.S. Census for Contra Costa County. Of the 50 some Census variables available, we chose those we judged to be most closely related to the socio-economic features of our subjects' communities. These variables are:

- o **Ethnic Composition**
  - % Black
  - % Hispanic
  - % other minority
  
- o **Household Characteristics**
  - % families with female-headed households, no spouse, with children
  - % families with female-headed households, no spouse, with children, below poverty
  - % of total population below poverty
  - median household income
  
- o **Labor Force Characteristics**
  - % of adults who have finished high school or more
  - % unemployed (1979)
  - % unemployed more than 15 weeks (1979)
  - % of adults in high-status occupations
  
- o **Housing Characteristics**
  - % owner occupied
  - % living in same house as 5 years ago
  - % of housing stock built since 1970
  - % moved into their homes since 1970
  - % of housing units with more than 1.01 persons per room

These measures were subjected to a variety of multivariate analyses to determine their explanatory power as additional independent and intervening variables toward crime and violent behavior. The results are reported below in Chapter VI.

## **SAMPLE COMPARABILITY AND VALIDATION**

As an additional check on the random case assignment procedures used by the Contra Costa County Probation Department, we compared the experimental group against the control group on seven intake variables, selected to represent basic social structural and criminal justice background factors. Naturally, given the random assignment procedures, we expected to find no differences between experimentals and controls on these variables.

The data source was the Probation Department's Intake and Termination forms. The variables included:

- o Probation Office
- o Sex
- o Race
- o School/employment status
- o Educational attainment
- o Admission Status (direct to probation vs. institution to probation)
- o Legal status at intake (clear vs. already on probation)

Although small (but statistically insignificant) variation was expected, no differences were found between the two groups. Such comparisons indicate that the two basic population groups in our sample are comparable, thus suggesting that cases were assigned randomly as per the research design.

As noted in Chapter I, however, due to administrative events, a special caseload from another probation program for juvenile offenders entering the community from Boys' Ranch was folded into SOP as the Richmond-El Cerrito caseload. Because approximately two-thirds of both experimental and control cases had come to Probation from the Ranch or a similar institution, this fold-in created the possibility that the Richmond-El Cerrito cases (all from the Ranch) might have been involved more often in crime and/or in more serious crime than the rest of the SOP population. To check on this possibility, we created a separate experimental group category for the Richmond-El Cerrito caseload, and then compared this group against the rest of the experimental and control subjects across the following basic variables:

- o Age at intake
- o Sex
- o Race (white vs. minority)
- o Admission Status (direct to probation vs. institution to probation)
- o Legal status at intake (clear vs. already on probation)

As shown in Table 3.1, the Richmond-El Cerrito experimental group (E<sub>2</sub>) was indeed significantly different from both the other experimental (SOP) subjects and the control group subjects. First, they tended to be older (see Table 3.1). The Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) group included proportionately about half as many subjects aged 10 to 14 at intake than other experimentals (SOP) or controls, and almost twice as many (proportionately) in the older age category. These age differences can be important because they are proxies for greater time at risk and, to judge from previous research, greater likelihood of serious offenses. The Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) SOP group also contained proportionately more males than either the other experimentals or the controls (95.1% vs. 88.6% and 82.4% respectively). Conversely, that group also contained proportionately fewer females (4.9% vs. 11.4% and

17.6% respectively). Again, other research (e.g., Elliot and Ageton, 1981) portends a greater likelihood of more serious and/or more frequent criminal offenses among the Richmond experimental group.

**Table 3.1. Intake Characteristics by Probation Group**

	Experimental		Control		Richmond		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Age</b>								
10 - 14	84	(38.2)	43	(42.2)	7	(17.1)	134	(36.9)
15 - 16	96	(43.6)	45	(44.1)	21	(51.2)	162	(44.6)
17 - Over	40	(18.2)	14	(13.7)	13	(31.7)	67	(18.5)
<b>Sex</b>								
Female	25	(11.4)	18	(17.6)	2	(4.9)	45	(12.4)
Male	195	(88.6)	84	(82.4)	39	(95.1)	318	(87.6)
<b>Race<sup>a</sup></b>								
White	155	(70.8)	61	(60.4)	9	(22.0)	225	(62.3)
Minority	64	(29.2)	40	(39.6)	32	(78.0)	136	(37.7)
<b>Admission Status<sup>b</sup></b>								
Direct to Probation	158	(71.8)	74	(72.5)	8	(20.0)	240	(66.3)
Institution to Probation	62	(28.2)	28	(27.5)	32	(80.0)	122	(33.7)
<b>Legal Status at Intake<sup>b</sup></b>								
Clear	128	(58.2)	61	(59.8)	13	(32.5)	202	(55.8)
On Probation	92	(41.8)	41	(40.2)	27	(67.5)	160	(44.2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>(60.6)</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>(28.1)</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>(11.3)</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>(100)</b>

a. Missing data for two youths

b. Missing data for one youth

The Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) subjects also included proportionately twice as many minorities or half as many whites as the other groups. This may or may not be significant because it may be safely assumed that this difference is a function of geography--Richmond being a predominantly Black community. However, insofar as Black juveniles may be at greater risk of arrest than whites (particularly in Richmond where police have a long-standing reputation for discriminatory surveillance and arrest patterns--see Chapter 2), this racial difference too may be said to distinguish the Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) group in a way that could be analytically important. Moreover, to the extent that race may be a proxy for social class and that social class may influence criminal behavior, this difference is noteworthy above and beyond geographical considerations.

With respect to Admission Status (Table 3.1), the Richmond experimentals were three times more likely than other experimentals or controls to have come to SOP from an institution rather than directly (80% vs. 28.2% and 27.5%, respectively). This difference is to be expected because the SSS (Saturated Surveillance and Supervision) caseload which became the SOP-experimental group for Richmond was specifically designed to serve juvenile offenders who were about to be released from institutions and put on probation. However, despite the fact that such a difference could be expected by definition, it may still be analytically significant insofar as it suggests the Richmond experimentals could have been involved in more frequent or more serious offenses or both.

Table 3.1 also shows legal status at intake. The Richmond experimentals were roughly half as likely to have had "clear" status (i.e., neither already on probation nor having criminal charges pending) when they entered SOP than were other experimentals or controls. Put another way, the former SSS cases who came to constitute the bulk of the Richmond SOP caseload were much more likely to have been already on probation (or to have other charges pending) than either the other experimentals or the control group subjects (67.5% vs. 41.8% and 40.2%, respectively). This, too, indicates that the Richmond E<sub>2</sub> group were more likely to have been involved in previous criminal behavior than the others.

Because all these basic, objective independent variables indicate that the Richmond-EI Cerrito experimental caseload was indeed different than both the other experimental subjects and the control group subjects--and different in ways which have potential analytic significance--we then compared all three groups on a variety of measures of prior crime. The data on prior crime in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 were obtained from official arrest records covering the period prior to the offense which resulted in referral to the SOP pool.

Table 3.2 shows the percentage of probationers in each of the three groups who had ever been arrested (once or more) for any of the offenses comprising our five basic prior crime categories. Two statistically significant differences were found. The first, Total Crime (all categories), shows somewhat lower incidence of total prior crime among control subjects; no significant difference was found between the Richmond SOP group and the other experimentals. However, within the category of Violent Crime, the Richmond SOP group did have a significantly higher incidence of arrests than either the other experimentals or the controls.



With respect to rates of prior arrests, Table 3.3 shows that the Richmond SOP group had significantly higher mean number of arrests in the Total, Violent, and Serious categories than either the other Experimentals or controls.

**Table 3.2. Analysis of Variance of Prevalence of Prior Arrests:  
Percent Ever Arrested by Severity of Offense**

Type of Prior Crime	Experimental	Control	Richmond SOP	Significance
Total (all types)	98.6	93.1	97.6	.026
Felony Violent	50.0	32.7	81.0	.000
Felony Property	30.7	37.6	50.0	.045
Misdemeanor Violent	45.9	44.6	50.0	NS
Misdemeanor Property	25.7	22.8	28.6	NS
Other	71.1	72.3	78.6	NS

**Table 3.3. Analysis of Rates of Prior Crime:  
Mean Number of Arrests by Severity of Offense**

Initial Cases	Experimental	Control	Richmond SOP	Significance
Total (all types)	4.79	3.92	6.57	.003
Violent	.56	.37	1.02	.000
Property	.44	.58	1.10	.008
Other Violent	.66	.53	.81	NS
Other Property	.32	.25	.36	NS
Other	1.94	1.71	2.19	NS

In sum, these differences constitute de facto deviation from the random assignment procedures required by the experimental design. These differences may have resulted from the type of cases added to the Richmond SOP office, or from alterations in the case assignment procedures to channel cases most in need of intensive supervision to Richmond. The reason is immaterial for analytic purposes. More importantly they indicate that the Richmond SOP group tended to have significantly higher incidence and rates of criminality--violent criminality in particular. Thus, this sub-group will be treated separately in subsequent analyses to control for the influence of these incidences, in effect controlling for prior criminality.

#### **Comparability Between Follow-Up and Non-Follow-Up Cases**

Despite efforts to promote a maximum response rate, we had little influence on which probationers in the total sample were successfully interviewed. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to compare those who did undergo a follow-up interview with those who did not, to check for possible bias in the follow-up sample. This is particularly important with

respect to later analytic chapters which rely heavily on the extensive follow-up data for testing various theories of delinquent behavior.

The first type of follow-up/non-follow-up comparability checks included several of the variables which we used to validate the random assignment procedures. The variables included:

- o Group (experimental and control)
- o Office
- o Age
- o Sex
- o Race (white/non-white)
- o Educational Attainment
- o School Attendance
- o School Performance
- o Admission Status (directly to probation or institution to probation)

No statistically significant differences were found between the follow-up sample and the remaining subjects who did not undergo the follow-up interview.

Given the earlier results in Richmond cases, the second type of comparability checks examined prior crime. As shown in Table 3.4, the follow-up sample had a significantly higher mean number of arrests in the felony property category, and in the "other crime" category, compared to the nonfollow-up group.

These differences seem to result from the somewhat higher likelihood that more frequently arrested subjects were more likely to have been incarcerated (and perhaps to have been still on probation as well). These "captive" subjects tended to be somewhat easier to locate, contact, and interview than others with no formal links to the criminal justice system during the follow-up period. On the other hand, one might assume that the more "successful" subjects are socially and personally more stable, and hence easier to locate, neutralizing other biases. However, many former probationers refused consent, instead wanting to forget what they described as a "closed chapter" in their lives. Response and sample bias in this study appears to be toward the more "problematic" youths, though the comparisons social structural reveal no such problems. The estimates of self-reported crime, then, may well be overstated compared to the total SOP cohort. Because these differences suggest that the follow-up sample included subjects with somewhat higher rates of official arrest in two of the five categories, a new variable called "incarceration status" is employed in subsequent analyses to control for the possibility of sample bias.

**Table 3.4. Analysis of Variance of Mean Number of Prior Arrests for  
Non-Follow-Up and Follow-Up Sample**

<b>Type of Prior Crime</b>	<b>Non-Follow-Up Respondents</b>	<b>Follow-Up Respondents</b>	<b>Significance</b>
Felony Violent Crime	.53	.60	NS
Felony Property Crime	.45	.68	.041
Misdemeanor Violent Crime	.55	.74	.042
Misdemeanor Other Serious Crime	.27	.34	NS
Other Crime	1.94	1.85	NS

## CHAPTER IV--VIOLENT DELINQUENTS IN CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

The Serious Offender Program (SOP) was assigned adjudicated violent juvenile offenders placed on probation. Arguably, these were the "highest-risk" cases in the county. Those viewed as threats to public safety were committed to the Youth Authority. As discussed in Chapter I, the commitment rates had been edging up in the late 1970s. But the population of serious and violent delinquents had also been climbing. Accordingly, at the outset of SOP, the profile of probationers in the county had "hardened" to include a greater proportion of youths with felony offense backgrounds.

The SOP population, then, can be viewed in two ways. First, SOP probationers (and controls) presented the greatest challenge to the department's community protection mandate. Second, they also posed the most difficult treatment and control needs--at once requiring the lion's share of both remedial and supervision resources. Thus, the description of this population offers a profile of those probationers who are committing violent offenses, and who are the most visible offender group in the county. From the policy perspective, the analysis of SOP clients offers empirical information on the backgrounds of violent delinquents. Who are the juvenile offenders committing violent acts? What are their treatment and supervision needs? If, in fact, they are the "toughest" offenders, what can be said about juvenile delinquency in Contra Costa County?

The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize readers with the basic characteristics of the SOP population. This will take two forms. First, some basic descriptive characteristics are presented for the total SOP population at the time of their intake into the program. Second, a broader and more detailed set of descriptive characteristics will be presented for the follow-up sample (at the time of the follow-up interviews, approximately three years after termination from SOP or probation).

## VIOLENT DELINQUENTS IN CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

### Age at Intake

The average age of SOP clients was 15.02 years as of their intake into the program. Roughly one in six (16.5%) were 13 years old or younger; nearly two in five (39.1%) were 14 or 15; and almost half (44.4%) were 16 to 18. The modal age was 16. The group as a whole clustered heavily between the ages of 14 and 16, with approximately two-thirds (65%) falling into that category.

### Sex and Ethnicity

SOP clients were overwhelmingly male (87.6%); only one in eight (12.4%) were female. Table 4.1 shows the ethnic breakdown of the total SOP population. As shown, nearly one in four SOP clients were Black, while almost one in ten were Hispanic and over three in five were White. Overall, more than one-third of the SOP population were minorities.

Table 4.1. Ethnicity of SOP Clients  
(N=363)

	%
Asian	.6
Black	23.4
Caucasian	62.8
Latino	9.6
Native American	.8
Other	2.8

---

### Family Background

Approximately two in five SOP clients (39.6%) grew up in homes with both parents present, and another 14.2% were raised by a parent and step-parent. Slightly more than two in five (42.1%) were raised by their mothers alone, while only 2.2% were raised by their fathers alone. Overall, roughly half the SOP population were raised in a two-parent household, while the other half were not.

### Educational Attainment and Attendance

The SOP clients were almost exclusively a high school population. Only about 1% had graduated from high school as of their intake into the program. Most (85%) were enrolled in school full-time, while an additional 7% were enrolled on a part-time basis. Only 5.5% were neither enrolled in school at least part-time nor employed at intake.

Of the 338 SOP clients (93% of the total) who were in school, nearly three in five (199, or 58.4%) were only rarely or occasionally absent without a legitimate excuse, while the remaining two in five (139, or 40.8%) were regularly or frequently so absent. According to probation officers, nearly one-third (32.7%) of those attending school at intake had no known problems at school, while slightly more than one-third (34.7%) had at least occasional difficulties, and the remaining third (31.8%) had frequent difficulties.

### Substance Abuse

Table 4.2 presents a summary of the length of drug or alcohol involvement by SOP clients at intake, according to probation officer assessments. Data on length of drug or alcohol use from probation officer files was unavailable for 40 SOP clients. Of the remaining 328 cases, approximately one-third (33.5%) had no known drug or alcohol involvement, while an additional third (36.3%) had been involved with drugs and/or alcohol for three or more years, with the average length of involvement being 2.7 years.

**Table 4.2. Years of Drug and Alcohol Involvement  
Prior to SOP (N=328)**

	%
No Prior Involvement	33.5
0-2 Years	36.3
3-4 Years	23.2
5 or More Years	7.0

Probation officer data on the **primary** drug used at SOP entry showed that alcohol was by far the most frequently cited primary drug. More than two in five SOP probationers (41.6%) drank alcohol as their "primary" substance. This was followed by marijuana, the primary drug for more than one-fourth (27.2%) of the SOP population. The vast bulk of the remaining clients (108, or 30.6%) were reported to have had no primary drug. While there was scant evidence from probation officer records that SOP probationers used other drugs such as opiates, cocaine and hallucinogens, this information must be interpreted with extreme caution. Probation officers are rarely if ever privy to the full range of illicit drug and alcohol use among their wards; and the self-report data that will be presented later indicate that SOP clients engaged in both more types and greater frequency of drug use than implied by these early official data.

## Delinquent Careers of the SOP Population

The data presented in Table 4.3 show the total frequencies of all arrests--before, during, and after subjects' probation periods, through the end of data collection (July 31, 1983). Those data are drawn from the official arrest records of the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS), for all members of the SOP population, both experimental and control (N=363). All offense types are listed separately, but these have been grouped into nine major substantive categories for both clarity of presentation and as a means of data reduction for subsequent analyses. Thus, readers may get a better sense of the overall patterns of criminal behavior among the study population as a whole than would be possible with a list of some 60 specific offenses alone.

As Table 4.3 indicates, the 363 members of the SOP population had been charged with an aggregate total of 3,825 offenses throughout their "careers" to date. The mean number of arrests per offender was 10.54, but this figure must be interpreted with caution since actual figures for individuals ranged from a mere two arrests to more than two dozen.

Table 4.3. Three Most Serious Arrest Charges Per Incident for SOP Pool

<u>Offense</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
<b>Violent</b>		
Attempted Murder	2	.05
Manslaughter	1	.03
Rape	7	.2
Attempted Rape	8	.2
Sex Offenses	37	1.0
Kidnapping	8	.2
Armed Robbery	13	.3
Strong-Arm Robbery	110	3.1
Aggravated Assault	104	2.7
Arson	<u>18</u>	<u>.5</u>
<b>Total, Violent Offenses</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>8.3</b>
<b>Serious</b>		
Burglary	355	9.3
Larceny (over \$100)	55	1.4
Auto Theft	<u>18</u>	<u>.5</u>
<b>Total, Serious Offenses</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>11.2</b>
<b>Other Violent</b>		
Assault	372	9.7
Injury (no assault)	4	.1
Violence to Animals	<u>3</u>	<u>.1</u>
<b>Total, Other Violent Offenses</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>9.9</b>

Table 4.3 (continued)

<u>Offense</u>	N	%
<b>Other Property</b>		
Larceny (under \$100)	305	8.0
Receiving Stolen Property	107	2.8
Malicious Mischief	124	3.2
Vandalism	29	.8
Forgery and Counterfeiting	13	.3
Fraud	6	.2
<b>Total, Other Property Offenses</b>	<b>584</b>	<b>15.3</b>
<b>Other Serious</b>		
Reckless Driving	62	1.6
Driving While Intoxicated	20	.5
Hit and Run Driving	17	.4
Weapons Possession	112	2.9
Extortion	3	.1
Indecent Exposure	20	.8
<b>Total, Other Serious Offenses</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>6.4</b>
<b>Drugs</b>		
Marijuana	88	2.3
Narcotics	7	.2
Other Drug Offenses	17	.4
<b>Total, Drug Offenses</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>2.9</b>
<b>Other</b>		
Disorderly Conduct	121	3.2
Trespassing	62	1.6
Joyriding	77	2.0
Other Traffic	112	2.9
Drunkenness	26	.7
Intoxicants in Vehicle	3	.1
Tampering with Auto	20	.5
Resisting Arrest	29	.8
Conspiracy	8	.2
Gambling	1	.03
Miscellaneous	38	1.0
<b>Total, Other Offenses</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>13.0</b>
<b>Status</b>		
Running Away	73	1.9
Truancy	13	.3
Curfew Violation	39	1.0
Ungovernable Behavior	52	1.4
Possession/Liquor	75	2.0
<b>Total, Status Offenses</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>6.6</b>



Table 4.3 (continued)

<u>Offense</u>	N	%
<b>Probation Violations</b>		
Contempt of Court	659	17.2
Change of Placement, Court Hearing	<u>352</u>	<u>9.2</u>
<b>Total, Probation Violations</b>	1,011	26.4
<b>TOTAL OFFENSES</b>	3,825	100

As described in Chapter I, the pool of juvenile offenders for the SOP program consisted of only violent offenders--the most serious or violent in the county, save a small number who were sentenced directly to state correctional facilities for youth. Table 4.3 suggests that the pool actually was a diverse, and not always "serious," offender group. For example, only one in 12 charges (8.3%) were for offenses which fell into the "violent" category. Strong-arm robbery and aggravated assault comprise the vast bulk of these. If we add to this "violent" category all those arrests listed under the less serious "other violent" heading (9.9%), then we can say that almost one in five of the total arrests (18.2%) may be considered violent. By far the largest single offense category under any of our nine headings was assault (i.e., non-aggravated assault); this includes all manner of fights and accounts for more than half of the total "violent" and "other violent" arrests taken together. Given the fear-laden connotation of "violent juvenile offenders"--the concept used by policy-makers and program officials to describe the kind of delinquent for whom intensive supervision programs are designed--the relatively low frequencies of major, violent felony arrests is somewhat surprising.

Moving down the list in Table 4.3, we find that roughly one in nine of the total arrests (11.2%) were for offenses categorized as "serious." Nearly six out of seven of these "serious" offenses were burglaries. Nearly one in seven (15.3%) of the total arrests fell into the "other property" category, with more than half of these being "petty larceny" and most of the remaining offenses being "receiving stolen property" and "malicious mischief."

Surprisingly, less than 3% of the total arrests of SOP subjects were for drug offenses, and most of these were for possession of marijuana. Although the self-report data on drug and alcohol use (discussed later in this chapter) indicate that various forms of illicit drug use were common among the SOP follow-up sample and that many of these young people had experienced "trouble" or been arrested while using drugs or alcohol, it is noteworthy that only a very small fraction of their total arrests were for illicit drug or alcohol use.

One of the highest-frequency categories of offenses was what we called "other," so named because it included a broad variety of delinquent acts. These include minor property offenses to public nuisance offenses. Slightly more than one in eight (13%) of the total arrests fell into this group of relatively minor offenses. Similarly, an additional one in 15 (6.6%) of the total arrests were for "status offenses," i.e., behaviors which would not be deemed illegal if engaged in by an adult and, therefore, a criminal act by virtue of the status of the offender.

Finally, by far the largest of our major categories was "probation violations." More than one-fourth (26.4%) of the total of all offenses committed by the SOP population as a whole fell into this category. Of these, nearly two-thirds (65%) consisted of technical violations of the conditions of probation or contempt-of-court citations. Although such offenses sound relatively non-serious and most consisted of non-criminal behavioral problems, the term "probation violations" covers a multitude of sins, some of which may have been more serious or potentially violent than their label implies. Research staff were not aware of the details of such offenses; they were recorded in the official BCS arrest records only under that general heading. Probation staff kept few records of the exact nature of these problems. Thus, while it is safe to assume that the majority of arrests under this heading were neither violent nor serious in the technical, legal senses of those terms, the offense-specific data from which we might have shown this were unavailable.

Though it is well known that violent delinquents do not specialize in any one crime type, the generally low percentage of violent charges is surprising. Again, given the premise of an intensive probation supervision program for "violent" or at least "serious" juvenile offenders, what seems most striking about these frequency distributions of the total arrest charges is the high proportion of non-violent and relatively less serious offenses. Another way of understanding this point is to compare the total aggregate arrest patterns for the SOP population against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Crime Index," those offenses selected as a basic index of "street crime." In most public discussions about or media reports on crime in America, this is the referent. Although three of the seven offense types are for non-violent property crimes (including the relatively minor offenses of larceny and auto theft), the other four Index Crimes are thought to be the most commonly feared crimes against persons.

Table 4.4 presents the frequency of arrests among the SOP population for these Index Crimes. It shows that only about one in six (17.6%) of the total arrests of SOP subjects

was for an Index Crime, and that of these, nearly two-thirds (64%) were property crimes rather than crimes against persons.

Similarly, the eight most frequent offenses among the SOP population (Table 4.5) include only two Index Crimes--burglary, second most frequent with 9.3% of the total, and strong-arm robbery, the sixth most frequent offense comprising 3.1% of the 3,825 total arrests. (Note that these figures do not include the two most frequent categories of offense, probation violations, because these were not offense-specific.)

**Table 4.4. Distribution of Arrest Charges for Part I Index Crimes in SOP Population**

Offense	% Part I Offenses	% of All Offenses
Murder	.2	--
Rape	1.0	.2
Aggravated Assault	15.5	2.7
Robbery (Armed and Strong Arm)	19.5	3.4
Burglary	52.8	9.3
Auto Theft	2.7	.5
Larceny (over \$100)	<u>8.3</u>	<u>1.5</u>
<b>Total, Part I Offenses</b>	100.0 (N=672)	17.6 (N=3,825)

**Table 4.5. Eight Most Frequent Arrest Charges as a Percentage of All Charges**

Offense	%
Assault (excluding Aggravated)	9.7
Burglary	9.3
Larceny (under \$100)	8.0
Malicious Mischief	3.2
Disorderly Conduct	3.2
Robbery (Strong Arm)	3.1
Traffic Violations	2.9
Weapons (Possession)	<u>2.9</u>
<b>Total</b>	42.3 (N=1,619)

These results do not minimize the seriousness of the offenses committed by the SOP population. Indeed, 3,825 arrests by 363 youth are not to be taken lightly, even if most are neither violent nor extremely serious. The distribution of charges once again shows the diversity of behaviors among a cohort of "violent" offenders. Moreover, "violence" is only

marginally appropriate to describe their delinquent acts. "Violence" accounts for less than 10% of the total charges, while felony property offenses account for more than 11%. Accordingly, the apparent threat to the community posed by these offenders lies not in their physical violence, but in the frequency of delinquent behaviors and the presence of violence in a diverse delinquent career.

### **The Follow-Up Interview Data: A Closer Look at "Violent" Delinquents**

In this section, we provide readers with both a broader and a more precise picture of the juvenile offenders comprising the SOP pool. The descriptive data presented below are based upon follow-up interviews with 165 of the 363 SOP subjects. These subjects were proportionately drawn from the total population and are representative in all descriptive categories, both of the full sample and of each experimental group. Yet we wish to remind readers that, as noted in Chapter 3, the follow-up sample included subjects with slightly higher rates of arrest for prior "serious" crime and for prior "other" crime. In our judgment, the former follow-up subjects were somewhat more likely to have been incarcerated (or on probation) during the follow-up period and, therefore, somewhat more likely to have been successfully contacted and interviewed. These exceptions aside, the highlights of the follow-up data given below provide a more in-depth description of the SOP population than was possible with Probation Department and BCS arrest records alone. These follow-up data offer a picture of the sample some three years after intake, and they do so more extensively and in much richer detail than the Probation Department data in the preceding section. Also, they allow us to describe "violent" offenders in Contra Costa County in conceptual terms which lend themselves to the development of intervention theory and policy.

### **Family Characteristics**

Each of the follow-up respondents was asked to assess his or her family's socioeconomic status in terms of "lifestyle." Almost one in six (15.8%) reported that their families were "struggling to make ends meet," while more than a third (37.6%) said "working hard and getting by." Thus, just over half the follow-up sample assessed their families in terms that suggest working-class status or below. An additional 37% felt their families were "fairly comfortable middle-class," and another one in ten (9.7%) reported "well-off, financially secure" families. These two latter categories of assessments imply that nearly half came from families who were middle-class or above. More than two-fifths (42.5%) of the follow-up respondents reported that their families either had received or were receiving some form of public assistance.

As for the follow-up interviews, nearly one in six (15.9%) said that their fathers were then unemployed, while more than one-third (37.6%) said that their mothers were currently jobless. As a proxy for under-employment, we asked if parents were employed less than full time. More than one-sixth of the fathers (17.6%) and one-eighth of employed mothers (13.3%) were working either less than a full week and/or less than the full year as of the follow-up interviews.

Two-thirds of both SOP and control group follow-up interviewees were either born in Contra Costa County (38.8%) or in the San Francisco Bay Area (27.9%), and more than three-fourths (76.4%) had lived most of their lives in Contra Costa. Only about one-fifth were born outside California (21.3%), and only 6% had lived longest in a state other than California. In a rapidly growing county, such figures suggest that SOP and control clients came predominantly from what may be considered local rather than newly arrived families.

#### Family Composition and Relations

More than two-fifths of the follow-up respondents (43%) had one or two siblings, while almost half (46.7%) had three or more in their immediate family. Moreover, roughly two in three had step-siblings as well. Most (about two in three) lived with their natural parents, and 25% more lived with parent/step-parent families. Although the data on how well SOP and control clients got along with their families are subjective and, in the case of the pre-SOP period, retrospective, they clearly suggest improved family relations over the three years since probation. Respondents were asked to characterize their relationship with their families both before probation and at the time of the follow-up as "not very close," "somewhat close," or "very close." Their responses are shown in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6. Percent Responding to:  
 "How would you describe your relationship with your family?"  
 (N=165)

	Before Probation	3 Years Later
	%	%
"Not very close	27.3	8.5
"Somewhat close"	35.7	30.0
"Very close"	<u>37.0</u>	<u>60.0</u>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0

The improved family relations shown above were also supported by the pattern of responses to related items:

- o the percent who reported "sharing feelings" "regularly" or "all the time" with both their fathers and their mothers was much higher at the time of the follow-up than prior to probation;
- o the proportion who recalled "never" fighting with their parents prior to probation was 37.6%, while 63.6% chose this "never" response to characterize their relations currently; and
- o 29.4% recalled that, before probation, fights with siblings were "rare," while twice that number (60.6%) chose "rare" to describe the time of the follow-up interview.

Finally, it is worth noting that although about half (51.5%) the subjects felt they had spent "enough time" with their parents while they were "growing up," and one in eight (12.1%) felt they had spent "too much," more than one-third (35.2%) felt they had spent "not enough" time.

#### **Family Criminality and Drug/Alcohol Use**

Because of the increasing attention to "social learning" theories of violent, criminal, and generally deviant behaviors (see, for example, Elliott et al., 1979; Fagan and Jones, 1984), we asked the follow-up respondents if either parent had "ever been arrested." Slightly more than one-third (33.9%) replied that their fathers had been arrested, while only one in 12 (8.5%) said their mothers had been (4.2% reported that both parents had been arrested). Roughly one in three of such arrests were for offenses involving violence (physical injury). More than half (53%) reported that at least one sibling had been arrested, one in five of these offenses involving physical injury. More than a quarter (27.4%) said their fathers had gone to jail; yet only one in 20 (4.8%) replied that their mothers had (2.4% reported that both parents had been to jail). More than one-third (37%) of the follow-up respondents said that a sibling had gone to jail. Roughly two-thirds of the parents and half the siblings who had been to jail stayed for less than one month.

Thus, while most of the SOP and control group probationers came from families with no arrests or incarcerations, and although most others whose family members had been arrested and/or incarcerated had apparently committed relatively minor offense, the incidence of family criminality among our respondents was still markedly higher than among the general population (Elliott and Ageton, 1981).

In keeping with both social learning theory and the rather consistent pattern of research findings showing that parents' and siblings' "actual use" of drugs and alcohol are among the

strongest predictors of adolescent use, we asked our follow-up subjects about substance use in their families. Almost one in four (23.6%) reported that their fathers "rarely" or "never" drank alcohol, while over one-fifth (21.2%) said their fathers drank "daily." Drinking was much less prevalent for mothers, according to our subjects: nearly half (46.1%) reported that their mothers "rarely" or "never" drank, and only 7.9% said their mothers drank "daily."

Table 4.7 summarizes the responses to questions on family drug use. More than one-fifth of our follow-up subjects reported marijuana use by fathers, and the proportion was almost identical for mothers. Also noteworthy were the answers to questions on parental use of pharmaceutical drugs. Overall, about one in ten of our follow-up respondents said that their fathers or mothers had taken one or another variety of pills. In this case, however, mothers were far more likely to have been perceived as having used the drugs in both "upper" and "downer" categories. Despite these high incidences, we urge caution in interpreting these figures for several reasons: perceived use often varies substantially from actual use; the fathers of our subjects were absent from the home about 300% more often than were mothers, so respondents' knowledge can safely be assumed to have been much lower for fathers and much higher for mothers; and, in the case of pharmaceutical-type drugs, there is no way of determining the proportion of licit vs. illicit use among parents.

**Table 4.7. Percent Reporting Drug Use ("Ever")  
by Family Members**

Drug Type	Father	Mother	(One or More) Siblings
Marijuana	21.2	22.0	65.9
Cocaine	7.4	4.3	34.8
Downers*	7.4	18.3	16.5
Uppers**	8.0	12.8	29.9
Heroin/Opiates	3.0	.6	6.1

\*Respondents were asked about family members' use of "sleeping pills, barbiturates, tranquilizers, downers."

\*\*Respondents were asked about family members' use of "diet pills, speed, amphetamines."

Perhaps the most striking data in Table 4.7 are those on drug use by siblings. About two-thirds of our respondents said one or more of their siblings had used marijuana, more than one-third cocaine, and nearly one-third "uppers" (in the case of siblings, almost certainly

illicit). For all categories of drugs, our subjects more often reported use by their siblings than by their parents. Thus, while such perceptions are at best inexact indices of family members' actual drug use, it seems safe to say that at least a significant minority of SOP and control group probationers had exposure during adolescence to both alcohol and drug use **in the context of family life**. We stress the "context of family life" because the preponderance of research literature in this area points to the central role of "conditions favorable to drug use" as seen in the behaviors of "significant others" in influencing the probability that an adolescent will engage in drug use; and, relatedly, because such family influences in general causally precede and thus predispose young people toward what are thought to be causally significant associations with drug-using and delinquent peers.

### **School Experience**

The follow-up respondents' self-reports on their school experience indicate that they were not, as a group, particularly good students. Although more than half (55.2%) were 18 years of age or older at the time of our interview and therefore might have been expected to have completed high school, only about three-fourths (73.9%) had graduated. While one in five (21.9%) reported that their "usual" grades were "B" or better, most said their average grades had been "C" or below, and fully one in four (25%) reported getting grades that averaged "D" or "F."

Our follow-up questions explored a number of facets of their school experiences which may help make these relatively low levels of educational performance and attainment more comprehensible. For one thing, more than three in five (63%) of our follow-up probationers had attended three or more different schools since the 8th grade. Nearly one-third (32.8%) reported that they "got along" with "only some" or "almost none" of their school peers; nearly one in five (19.6%) said they "felt like an outsider" at their school. Although three-fifths (60%) reported that they attended school "pretty much every day," that means fully two-fifths attended less often; indeed, one in four (24.5%) attended "two or three days a week" or less. Nearly half felt there was "not enough" guidance counseling available in their schools.

According to control theory (Hirschi, 1969; Wiatrowski et al., 1981), an adolescent's "bonds" to conventional activities, norms, and values are critical influences on the likelihood of deviant or delinquent peer associations, and, thus, on his or her propensity for delinquency. The stronger the bonds to conventional society--for adolescents, school in particular--the lower the probability of delinquent behavior; conversely, the weaker those



bonds, the greater the likelihood of delinquency. The self-reports of the SOP and control group probationers in our follow-up interviews indicate relatively weak bonds to school. Two-fifths (40%) said they were generally "not satisfied" with the school they had been attending when their probation period began, and, again, two-fifths (40%) reported that it was "not very important" what their teachers thought of them. On a similar item, more than half (54.5%) claimed that "getting good grades" was "not very important" to them, and one-fifth (20.7%) agreed with the statement, "There isn't much point in working hard in school because there aren't many jobs anyway."

However, a variety of other attitudinal data on school experience suggest a more complex and equivocal picture. As Matza (1964) has argued, the tendency in social science to infer ideology from merely occasional behavior, or to categorize young law-breakers as committed to a subculture of delinquency such that their beliefs and behaviors are tacitly assumed to be consistently and unambiguously deviant, is a tendency that masks the ambivalence inherent in delinquency.\*

For example, alongside the above responses indicating weak bonds to conventional school goals and behaviors among many of our follow-up respondents, there were other answers indicating more conforming attitudes. Fully three-fifths (61.6%) agreed with the statement, "Doing well in school is the key to getting the kind of job I want." Nearly that many (59.4%) said they wanted to get at least some college education, and more than one in three (34.5%) hoped to earn a college degree. Moreover, attitudes and aspirations are apparently rather fluid, especially during adolescent development. More than seven in ten (71.5%) reported that they valued school more at the time of the follow-up interview than they had three years earlier when they began probation.

Such evidence of the coexistence of both deviant and conventional attitudes and actions should not be taken to mean our subjects behaved well in school. Seven of ten of the follow-up subjects told us they had been suspended at least once; half that many (35.2%) admitted that they had "damaged school property"; and nearly two-thirds (65.5%) reported having gone to school drunk or "high." Yet, their responses to a variety of other questions in our School Environment Scale suggest that they perceived other students' behavior as not very different from their own. However self-serving or rationalizing such subjective assessments of others may be, these reports on what went on in their schools still tend to cast their own misbehavior in a less deviant light.

---

\*This implicit lack of ambiguity in delinquent beliefs and behavior is, according to Matza, more an artifact of a widespread desire for quantifiable categories than an empirically observable feature of delinquency.

In short, then, the follow-up subjects reported a conflicting mix of school experiences. On one hand, their responses indicate substantial dissatisfaction with and alienation from school, poor academic performance, and frequent misbehavior or deviation from student role expectations. On the other hand, these coexist with majoritarian sentiments favoring conventional educational aspirations, surprisingly high frequency of beliefs and values which are conforming, and widespread perceptions that many if not most of their school cohorts believe and behave similarly.

### Work Experience

All follow-up respondents were asked to recall their work experience in the year prior to getting on probation and at the time of the follow-up interview three years later. Prior to the start of SOP (or, for the control group, before their equivalent "regular" probation began), over half (52.3%) did not have jobs. Thus, nearly half (47.6%) were employed then, and of these jobs, roughly one-third (34.6%) were part-time. As of the follow-up interview approximately three years later, only about three in ten (30.9%) reported having jobs (41.1% of which were part-time), despite the fact that one in five (20.6%) of the entire follow-up sample reported having completed some form of job training since their probationary period began.

In contrast to many of the follow-up responses about school, most of those who had work experiences found them positive. This is also noteworthy because the vast majority of the jobs held by our subjects fell into the categories of odd jobs, general unskilled labor, or fast foods. Briefly, more than two-thirds of those who had held jobs liked them either "a lot" (45.4%) or "somewhat" (24.5%); nearly two-thirds (63.5%) were "satisfied" with the skills they learned; about three-fifths (59.8%) felt they performed "very well" in those jobs; and almost two in three (65.9%) said they had "skipped" work "never or almost never."

Such self-reports on past work experience must be interpreted with caution, but unlike self-reported delinquency or drug use, for example, there are few incentives to exaggerate claims about work in either direction. If, then, we may infer that the consistently positive responses about work experience are at least generally accurate, the reduction in the number of follow-up respondents reporting jobs between the start of probation and the follow-up is puzzling. The respondents as a group were older and thus closer to employable age, and they had all--particularly the experimental group--been aided and encouraged in their job search by probation officers with considerable skills in such matters.

Although it was beyond the scope of our research to attempt to explain this puzzle, it may be helpful here to at least mention a recent study which addressed the relationship between crime and unemployment. Thornberry and Christenson (1984) report that the relationship between unemployment and crime is not unidirectional as most models assume. The empirical patterns they discovered did indeed show that unemployment increased the initial probability of criminal involvement, but also that such criminal involvement and its consequences, in turn, increased the likelihood of further unemployment.

Thus, the relationship between unemployment and crime is one of mutual or "reciprocal" causal influence, the specific direction and strength of which vary with the stage of an individual's career. This reciprocal model is logically consistent with social control, strain, and other theories of crime and delinquency, and in fact enhanced their empirical validity and power. Perhaps more research along these lines could help account for the **higher** rate of unemployment among our follow-up probationers when their more advanced age, education, and training would have led us to expect lower rates of unemployment.\*

A final point about work is that there was some indication of "strain" between the follow-up respondents' occupational aspirations and their perceptions of and concrete experience in the labor market. When asked what sort of job or career they would pick if they could "choose," the subjects mentioned skilled, blue-collar and construction work most often, followed by computer-related and white-collar occupations. About half (49.1%) felt that their chances of getting such jobs were "very good." However, when asked about their job-hunting experiences, three-fifths (60%) reported that they had to look "hard" or "very hard" to find anything; and about one in eight (13.3%) had given up looking. Perhaps most revealing was their view of the types of jobs they had seen people like them actually get. More than half chose the "fast food/minimum wage" category, while over one-third (35.2%) chose "unskilled." Only 3.8% claimed that people like them got the kind of skilled trade jobs most picked as their ideal.

This does not imply that because only 30.9% of our respondents were employed (at least part-time) at the point of our follow-up interviews there was a 69.1% rate of unemployment among the sample overall. Many were in school or job training on a part-time or

---

\*The specific social mechanisms through which crime and its consequences might increase unemployment would include but not be limited to the stigmatizing effects of the criminal label, education and work experience lost to incarceration, and the substitution of illicit for licit employment.

full-time basis. However, as Table 4.9 below suggests, less than half (48%) of the follow-up respondents were engaged full-time in work, school, or some combination of the two, and fully three in ten (30.5%) reported having no meaningful role in either the work or the school realm. Thus, to the extent that involvement or participation in some conventional institution is an essential hedge against further delinquency, as virtually all theories suggest, these figures appear less than promising.

**Table 4.8. Employment/School Status at Time of Follow-Up Interview**

	%
Employed full-time	15.2
In school full-time	24.8
Both employed and in school part-time	7.9
Employed part-time	9.7
In school part-time	7.9
Neither employed nor in school	30.3
Other	4.2

---

#### Peer Group Characteristics and Leisure Practices

Given the centrality of peer associations in virtually all major theoretical models of delinquency, it is important to know what the probationers do with their friends during leisure hours. Each of the follow-up respondents was asked, "About how often did you hang out with your friends four years ago?" (i.e., the period prior to their instant offenses and the start of probation). The vast majority (86.1%) recalled that during that period they hung out with their friends "almost every day or night." Interestingly, only one-third (33.3%) gave the same response when they were asked about the present period. Such a marked decrease seems to support the "maturing-out" concept, according to which the frequency (and thus, presumably, the influence) of peer contacts declines as age and adult commitments increase. Similarly, the proportion reporting that they had been gang members four years earlier was 29.1%, while only 6.7% claimed such membership at the time of the follow-up interview.

We also asked the follow-up sample how often in the last six months they engaged in each of eight leisure activities with their friends. The percent responding "about once a week" or "more than once a week" are shown below in Table 4.9 (listed from highest to lowest frequency):

**Table 4.9. Percent Reporting Leisure Activities Engaged in "Once per Week or More," During Past 6 Months**

Type of Activity	%
Cruise around	70.9
Get high or drink	64.3
Play sports	52.8
Play video games	52.1
Go to parties	41.8
Go to movies	32.7
Go to clubs, discos, or bars	32.7
Hang out on the streets	27.6

Despite these activities and the fact that more than three-fourths (78.2%) of the follow-up sample had easy access to an automobile and traveled the 30 miles to San Francisco more than once a year, more than one in four (28.7%) said they were "bored" "most" or "all the time." They watched television an average of 3.3 hours per day, with more than half the sample reporting that they watched more than two hours on a "typical day."

Follow-up subjects were asked about selected forms of delinquency engaged in by their friends, and the extent to which their friends had been involved in the criminal justice system. Their responses provide two rather striking but contrasting impressions of their peers' delinquency. First, even if we assume that many respondents may have tended to exaggerate their friends' delinquency so as to cast their own in a more favorable light, it is clear that at least some serious delinquency is perceived as normative in their social circles. Most of the respondents claimed that at least "some" of their friends as of the period preceding probation had engaged in a variety of criminal acts. This was supported by other responses which showed that 81.1% of the follow-up subjects had friends who had been in local jails, while 74.5% had friends who had been placed in "The Ranch," and 75.2% had at least one friend who had also been on formal probation. (See Table A-4.2 in appendix for specific findings.)

It is important to note that the respondents perceived less delinquency among their more recent friends (i.e., in the past year). This suggests a significant shift in their friendship networks away from delinquent peers, although the proportions of their friends which they perceived as having engaged in those acts could still be considered high by most standards.

## Neighborhood Life

About one-third (35.8%) of our follow-up sample characterized the neighborhood in which they lived prior to their instant offenses as fairly well-to-do; nearly half (44.8%) said their neighborhood at that time was "average or OK"; while almost one in five (19.4%) described their neighborhood then as relatively poor. More than one in five (22.1%) felt that "quite a few" of the adults in their communities were unemployed; nearly half (46.6%) thought that "not very many" were; and about one-fourth (26.4%) claimed that "none" of the neighborhood adults were jobless. Such proportions roughly parallel both the pattern of responses on community socioeconomic status above and, more generally, the socioeconomic characteristics for Contra Costa County as a whole, summarized in Chapter II.

Overall, the probationers in the follow-up sample recalled having fairly good relations with their neighbors during the period immediately prior to their instant offenses. About seven in ten said they had known "a lot" of people in their neighborhoods "well enough to say 'hello' to on the streets" (70.3%), that they had gotten along "OK" or "very well" with the adults in their communities (72.4%), and that they felt they could find "respected roles" for themselves there (70.9%).

Other responses, however, indicate that their feelings for their neighborhoods were less unambiguously positive and more complex than one might surmise from the picture painted above. For example, about two-fifths (40.6%) recalled that there were some people in their communities who "hassled" and/or "picked fights" with them, and nearly half (46.9%) said that the people there "cared about what happened" to them "not much" or "not at all." These last two figures help account for the fact that, despite what most recalled as positive relations, two-thirds (67.4%) of our respondents said they would not want to "settle down" in those communities.

## Critical Life Events and Victimization

An under-studied notion in delinquency research is the idea that critical life events might be significant in turning young offenders away from (or, for that matter, toward) delinquent careers, especially in the transitional years between adolescence and adulthood. The follow-up sample was asked whether any of a series of "crises that can happen to people" had happened to them or to a close family member during the past four years. Their responses suggest that our subjects have had more than their share of recent difficulties.

Over half (55.5%) replied "yes" to imprisonment, nearly two-thirds (64.2%) reported a bad accident or serious illness, and similar majorities had experienced the death of a close family member (57%) and the loss of a job (60.6%). In addition, nearly two in five (38.8%) said that a divorce or "break-up" had occurred, and one in three (33.9%) reported having gotten pregnant or gotten their girlfriend pregnant. Of these pregnancies, two-thirds resulted in adoptions or abortions.

The pattern of responses to our questions on victimization (Table 4.10) similarly suggests that these probationers more often than not have been victims of crimes as well as perpetrators:

**Table 4.10. Percent of Follow-Up Respondents Who Had Been Victims of Selected Crimes**

Type of Victimization	%
Beaten up by a stranger	73.3
Attacked with a weapon by a stranger	70.3
Personal property deliberately damaged	69.7
Robbed by force or threat of injury	64.8
Personal property stolen from car	60.0
Auto, motorcycle, or bicycle stolen	53.9
Personal property stolen from public place	51.5
Attempted sexual attack or rape	14.7
Beaten up by father or mother	14.5

These experiences have been shown to be important contributors to violent delinquency (Fagan et al., 1983). The experience of crime seems to lead to a higher prevalence of violent delinquency, especially among inner-city youth. However, the causal linkages remain ambiguous.

### **Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values**

Social science historically has had difficulty in demonstrating the relationship between professed beliefs or attitudes and behavior. Nevertheless, these factors are interesting, often-studied phenomena in their own right. Hirschi (1969) cited beliefs, attitudes, and values as components of attachment to conventional norms. At a minimum, the attitudinal data summarized in this section can enrich at least our descriptive understanding of the follow-up population in terms of their bonds to society and the law.

In a group of probationers who were in theory selected by virtue of their convictions for serious or violent offenses, it is reasonable or even likely to find some deviant beliefs or values expressed among their responses. Nearly one-third of the follow-up respondents (32.1%) agreed that "sometimes violence is the only way to deal with a problem." While somewhat less than one in five (18.9%) agreed that "people who make you mad deserve to get beaten up," fully three in five (61.8%) agreed that "if you don't physically fight back, people will walk all over you," and more than two in five (44.2%) said they would feel as good spending money obtained illegally as that obtained legally.

Yet there was much more attitudinal data suggesting conventional values and attitudes among this group. Most felt it was "very important" to them to have traditional material goods such as owning one's own home (71.5%) and wearing nice clothes (51.5%). More than half also said it was "very important" to them to marry and raise a family (51.5%). Three in five (60.6%) disagreed with the statement, "You can do just as well in life by working outside the law as you can working within the law," while more than two-thirds (71.3%) agreed that "our laws are basically just and fair, and they should be obeyed."

We do not wish to minimize the importance of the sizeable minority who responded negatively to such questions. But it is equally significant that for a majority of the County's "toughest" offender group, conforming or conventional attitudes and values were the norm, apparently coexisting alongside delinquent behavior and deviant beliefs. (See Matza, 1964, on how such contradictions demand far greater conceptual complexity than most theoretical perspectives on delinquency allow.)

The follow-up interview also contained a variety of other attitudinal items designed to give us a sense of how the respondents perceived the larger world around them. Three such questions were taken from a political efficacy scale which measures their beliefs in the legitimacy and effectiveness of social or legal systems. The responses suggest that this sample of probationers felt rather dissociated or alienated from the institutions of government. Nearly two-thirds (64.2%) agreed (most of them "strongly") both that "public officials don't care much what people like me think," and that "people like me don't have any say about what government does." Other related items from the political trust scale were built in to the follow-up interview. Again, our subjects' responses indicate low levels of trust in the government.

Similarly, their beliefs about other people in general were negative. Their responses indicated substantial cynicism. For example, more than one-third (35.8%) agreed with the



statement, "All the hard work in the world won't help you; it's who you know that counts." Similarly, only one in five agreed that "most people never steal anything," while two in five (41.8%) but still a minority agreed that "most people usually tell the truth."

### Self-Reported Delinquency, Drug Use, and Deterrence

In this final section, we present the responses of our follow-up subjects to a variety of questions on their past and recent delinquent behaviors. For each type of delinquency, we asked respondents, first, to think back to the period prior to the "instant offense" which resulted in their probation (T<sub>1</sub>) and say if they had ever engaged in that behavior. Then, they were asked if they had engaged in that behavior in the past year (T<sub>2</sub>). Readers should be aware of two caveats in these data. First, there were a small number of significant differences between the SOP-experimental group and the control group with respect to "prior" or pre-probation official crime, which were discussed in Chapter III and which will be further analyzed in subsequent chapters. Thus, for the descriptive purposes of this chapter, we will continue to present only the overall frequency distributions for the follow-up sample as a whole. Second, it should be noted that the T<sub>1</sub> data represent retrospective responses and must therefore be interpreted with caution. The data are shown in Table 4.11.

**Table 4.11. Prevalence of Self-Reported Crime:  
Pre-Probation and Past Year  
(N=165)**

Self-Reported Behavior	Pre-Probation (%)	Past 12 Months (%)
<b>Violence</b>		
Fist fights	85.5	63.6
Hit younger child in anger	19.4	8.5
Grabbed a purse and ran	12.7	2.4
Physically threaten to get something	23.6	8.5
Use weapon to get something	21.2	9.1
Strike one of your parents	15.8	4.2
Assault with injury	41.8	29.1
Hurt an animal	21.8	7.9
Use force to get money, drugs	23.6	9.1
Carry weapon to use in fight	40.6	25.5
Carry a gun for any reason	27.9	17.6
Threaten an adult with a weapon	21.2	17.0
Pull a weapon to show seriousness	32.7	22.4
Carry knife, club, etc., for protection	49.1	38.2
Shoot someone	8.5	3.6

Table 4.11 (continued)

Self-Reported Behavior	Pre-Probation (%)	Past 12 Months (%)
<b>Property</b>		
Purposeful damaging of family property	26.7	10.9
Purposeful damaging of another's property	44.2	18.2
Stealing money from family member	39.4	7.9
Stealing from another's wallet or purse	40.0	12.1
Shoplifting over \$50	29.7	11.5
Breaking and entering	47.9	14.5
Auto theft	23.0	9.1
Auto tampering	40.9	17.1
Selling stolen goods	50.9	24.2
Arson	14.5	2.4
<b>Drug</b>		
Driving car while high or drunk	41.8	47.3
Getting high or drunk in public place	68.5	64.2
Drunk or high at school or work	58.2	36.4

Two patterns in this table seem striking. First, the prevalence of both the less serious and the more serious delinquent acts appear high. For example, according to these self-reports for the pre-probation period, clear majorities had engaged in fist fights (85.5%) and been drunk or high in public places (68.5%). About half had engaged in breaking and entering (47.9%), selling stolen property (50.9%), and had carried a knife, club, or other non-firearm weapon for protection (49.1%). Second, however, the table indicates major declines in many self-reported delinquent acts during the past year. Although nearly two-thirds of the follow-up sample reported fist fights (63.6%), assaults, weapons offenses, or getting high or drunk in a public place (64.2%) in the past year, the only behavior for which the respondents reported an increase rather than the usual substantial decline was for driving a car while drunk or high. Given that the majority of our sample reached 16 and began to drive during the follow-up period, this was to be expected; and, given the rather marked drop in almost all other categories, this increase cannot signify anything broader in the way of increased delinquency.

Similarly marked declines are shown in Table 4.12 below on self-reported drug and alcohol use. For each category of alcohol or drug use, the follow-up respondents were asked to recall their frequency of use in the period prior to probation and in the past 12 months, and to characterize that use on a five-point scale ranging from "never" to "daily or almost daily." The percentages reported below are for the latter response only.

Despite the clear pattern of declines in self-reported use across all categories of alcohol and drugs, respondents still reported recent drug-related problems. Two in five (40.6%) said they had gotten into at least one fight in the past year while drinking or using drugs, and one in five (21.3%) said they had been arrested at least once in the past year "partly because of drinking and/or drug use." Other responses, however, offered support for the pattern of decreased use shown in the table. While about one-fourth reported that they were drinking (28.7%) and using drugs (25.5%) more at T<sub>2</sub> than at T<sub>1</sub>, nearly half said they were drinking and using drugs less (47.1% and 48.4%, respectively). Moreover, while more than two in five (44.3%) recalled experiencing problems because of drinking or drug use during T<sub>1</sub>, that figure dropped to less than one in five (17.8%) when we asked about such problems during the past year.

**Table 4.12. Prevalence of Self-Reported Drug and Alcohol Use: Pre-Probation and Past Year**

Percent Reporting "Daily or Almost Daily" Use of . . .	Pre- Probation (%)	Past 12 Months (%)
Beer and Wine	27.6	19.0
Hard Liquor	15.3	4.9
Marijuana	58.3	35.6
Psychedelics	5.5	1.2
Tranquilizers	8.0	2.5
Speed/Amphetamines	14.7	7.4
Depressants/Barbiturates	6.1	3.1
Cocaine	3.7	2.5
PCP	1.2	.6
Heroin	1.8	.6
Other Opiates	3.7	2.5

The same type of decline between the pre-probation period and the past year occurred in self-reported involvement in the juvenile justice system. Whereas three-fourths (74.5%) of our follow-up sample said they had been in local jails prior to probation, this figure drops to less than half (45.7%) with regard to the past year. Similarly, whereas nearly two-thirds (66.1%) reported having been in "The Ranch" (a residential rehabilitation center for juveniles run by Contra Costa County) prior to probation, only about one in six (16.5%) had been there in the year prior to our follow-up interview.

Did their arrests, incarcerations, and probation placements help account for the marked declines in self-reported delinquency and drug use between the two periods? This question will be addressed formally in the next chapter, particularly with respect to the influence

of SOP compared to regular probation experiences of the control group. For now, we can say that questions on deterrence indicate that--at least as far as expressed attitudes are concerned--these probationers **felt** deterred by their experiences in the legal system. Seven in ten (70%) agreed that "standing before a judge and being accused of a crime" made them feel "very badly" about themselves, and more than two-thirds (67.9%) agreed with the statement, "The punishment I got was rough, but it did help me control myself better." Again, more than half (53.3%) agreed that "being locked up was so horrible I'll never do anything that could put me there again"; and about nine in ten (89.1%) agreed that "the thought of going to adult prison" was so much more serious than "being in trouble as a kid" that it would keep them "out of trouble." Such perceived attitudinal-level deterrence was supported also by a later question designed to get at our respondents' self-prognosis. Three-fourths (75.2%) did **not** think they would be arrested for any crime in the future. Notwithstanding what may be considered the excessive optimism of such responses, they do suggest both the belief in their ability to "go straight" and the presence of conventional values which have been associated in previous research with the willingness to desist from crime of their own volition.

## CHAPTER V—IMPACTS ON RECIDIVISM

As a crime control project, the primary goal of the Serious Offender Program (SOP) was to "reduce the rate of recidivism of project cases by a statistically significant amount when compared to the control group receiving regular/standard probation services." The original program documentation specifically mentioned reductions in both the severity and number of subsequent law violations, court appearances, technical violations, and, of course, incarcerations. These multiple measures of recidivism are examined below, contrasting the two experimental groups with the control (regular) probationers.

Other aspects of recidivism are also examined. Changes in the extent and direction of delinquents' careers were measured more explicitly to define the impact of SOP intervention. Since many violent juvenile offenders "desist" during the transition to adulthood (cf. Wolfgang et al., 1972; Hamparian et al., 1978), a marginal dampening of criminal conduct was seen as a potential SOP impact. This was measured by utilizing both more global measures of criminal conduct and a broader time period in which criminal behavior was assessed.

In this chapter, recidivism impacts are presented in a variety of ways to provide detailed, multi-dimensional measures of SOP effectiveness. First, penal code offenses have been categorized by severity. Five grades of severity have been defined, plus a global measure which includes technical violations. Second, since probationers were enrolled and released from SOP at various time periods and at different ages, the age at intake and time at risk (from release to the end of the study period) were introduced as control factors. Third, the explicit SOP guideline of a six-month intervention period was routinely but non-systematically disregarded. Accordingly, time in treatment was also introduced as a control variable.

Fourth, both self-reported and official law-violating conduct was measured. Several authors (cf. Hirschi, Hindelang, and Weis, 1981; Elliott and Ageton, 1981) have noted the potential disparities between these two measures of crime. There is a lively debate over the comparative validity of each method. Both are presented in these analyses, with attendant comments on these issues. Fifth, the most serious dispositions--including incarceration--were measured to determine the furthest "penetration" into the justice system during the follow-up period. This serves as yet another view of the impact of SOP, specifically on its reduction of subsequent incarcerations.

The analysis flow proceeds from the general to the specific. The early parts of the chapter analyze the impact of SOP using the several recidivism measures. Later sections examine the relationships among the measures to identify patterns or types of impacts in terms of onset, severity and frequency of post-intervention criminality.

## REARRESTS: THE PREVALENCE OF RECIDIVISM

The number of youth with at least one post-intervention police contact for each type of law violation is shown in Table 5.1. The most serious charge for each arrest was secured from the records of the courts, probation departments and the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics. The percentages disregard the time at risk (the time on the street when a youth has an opportunity to commit a crime) or the total number of contacts for a youth. Readers should recall that E<sub>2</sub> in these tables is the Richmond experimental group, a SOP population which differed in several respects from SOP youth in eastern Contra Costa County (see Chapters III and IV).

Table 5.1. Number of Youths Committing Post-Project Crimes

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>		Total	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Violent***	30	(13.8)	12	(11.9)	13	(31.0)	35	(18.3)
Serious Property	56	(25.7)	26	(25.7)	16	(38.1)	98	(27.1)
Other Violent	43	(19.7)	22	(21.8)	5	(11.9)	70	(21.3)
Other Property	49	(22.5)	20	(19.8)	11	(26.2)	80	(22.2)
Other	128	(58.7)	53	(52.5)	22	(54.8)	203	(59.8)
Any	153	(72.5)	73	(72.3)	11	(26.2)	237	(65.7)
None	65	(29.8)	28	(27.7)	31	(73.8)	124	(34.3)

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table 5.1 shows clearly that more Richmond SOP youth were arrested for violent offenses. Accordingly, it seems at first glance that SOP had little impact in reducing either the number of youth rearrested or the severity of rearrests. However, a closer look reveals an important contradiction--though more often charged for **violent** offenses, the actual number of youth arrested for **any** offense ("total") was consistently lower for the Richmond SOP group. In the post-project period, nearly three-fourths (73.8%) were not arrested, compared to one-fourth (29.8% and 27.7%, respectively) in the other groups.

Table 5.2 shows these data as percent changes before and after intervention. Overall, the percent reductions were greatest for violent offenses and lowest for less serious offenses. Both felony and misdemeanor violence declined for all three groups by large percentages. However, property offenses appear to be less tractable. Both felony and misdemeanor property arrests declined by much smaller percentages. Serious (felony property) arrests declined most for controls, while lesser (misdemeanor) violence arrests declined most for experimentals.

As mentioned above, the largest differences between groups occurred in the "total" arrests for the Richmond SOP group. The percentage of the group rearrested for any offense declined by 71.4%, compared to less than 30% for the other two groups. Though more E2 youth were arrested for violent offenses, the impact on "total" crime was largest for this same group.

Apparently, more Richmond SOP youths were charged with the more severe crimes, though fewer were arrested at all. Conversely, other youths, though arrested more often, were charged with less serious offenses. Whether these differences are rooted in law enforcement practices or actual behaviors (or some combination of the two) will be discussed later on as we explore other measures of criminality. Recall from Chapters II and III that Richmond is qualitatively different from other parts of the county, both in terms of justice system and socioeconomic context. In Chapter VII, these themes are explored in greater detail.

## VARIABILITY IN TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS

In Chapter IV, differences between the two experimental groups and the control group were noted. In examining the effects of SOP intervention, three possible factors affecting program outcome were analyzed to see whether these groups in fact were subjected to variations in treatment. Differences were found, and were incorporated into subsequent analyses of recidivism. Table 5.3 presents data on these three factors: time at risk, time in treatment, and age at termination.

### Time at Risk

Table 5.3 shows the time at risk for each group, by sex of the participants. Time at risk is the time from program release (or termination) to the end of the study period--the

Table 5.2. Percent Difference in Number of Youth Re-Arrested for Each Type of Offense Before and After SOP Intervention (N=361)

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>			Control			E <sub>2</sub>			Total		
	Pre	Post	% Change	Pre	Post	% Change	Pre	Post	% Change	Pre	Post	% Change
Violent	50.0	13.8	72.4	32.7	11.9	63.6	80.6	31.0	61.5	48.8	18.3	62.5
Serious Property	30.7	25.7	16.3	37.6	25.7	31.6	50.0	38.1	23.8	34.1	27.1	20.5
Other Violent	45.9	10.1	78.0	44.6	21.8	51.1	50.0	11.9	76.2	46.0	21.3	53.7
Other Property	25.7	22.5	12.5	22.8	19.8	13.2	28.6	26.2	8.3	25.2	22.2	11.9
Other	71.1	58.7	17.4	72.3	52.5	27.3	78.6	54.8	30.2	72.3	59.8	17.3
Any	98.6	70.2	28.8	93.1	72.3	22.3	97.6	26.2	71.4	97.0	65.7	32.2



number of months in which a study youth could commit a new offense. Jail time was not subtracted, since records did not permit an accurate accounting of incarceration days.

**Table 5.3. Group and Sex by Mean Time at Risk, Mean Days in Treatment, and Mean Age at Termination**

Group	Sex	Mean Time at Risk (Months)*	Mean Days in Treatment**	Mean Age at Termination (Years)***
E1	Male	37.44	232.30	16.07
	Female	40.06	176.80	16.14
	<b>Total</b>	<b>37.75</b>	<b>225.88</b>	<b>16.08</b>
	(N)	(216)	(216)	(216)
C	Male	32.74	376.32	16.20
	Female	32.93	250.06	15.73
	<b>Total</b>	<b>32.77</b>	<b>353.49</b>	<b>16.12</b>
	(N)	(94)	(94)	(94)
E2	Male	33.80	289.70	16.74
	Female	31.45	241.00	17.40
	<b>Total</b>	<b>33.69</b>	<b>287.38</b>	<b>16.78</b>
	(N)	(42)	(42)	(41)

\*F = 11.254; df = 2; p = .000

\*\*F = 25.869; df = 2; p = .000

\*\*\*F = 3.617; df = 2; p = .03

The "regular" SOP youth had significantly longer time at risk periods than other groups, with the differences most pronounced for females. The Richmond SOP youth and controls averaged about 33 months, compared to nearly 38 months for the SOP youth.

#### Days in Treatment

The "strength and integrity of treatment" are acknowledged to be determinants of treatment impact (Sechrest and White, 1979). Control youth had significantly longer treatment periods (nearly 12 months) than East County SOP youth (about 7.5 months) or Richmond SOP youth (about 9.5 months). For females, the East County SOP youth received a shorter treatment interval than the other groups. Differences in policy between offices, caseworkers, and regions were in evidence here.

Perhaps most interesting and policy-relevant is the fact that both SOP groups routinely exceeded the six-month SOP target interval, especially for males. This was due in part to standard practices of transferring SOP youth to regular probation caseloads after the 180-day period was over. This confounding of the experimental design complicates a precise assessment of the policies underlying SOP--short periods of intensive supervision.

## Age at Termination

If one group were released from supervision at a later age than others, maturation effects could become another confounding factor in assessing treatment impacts. Table 5.3 shows that Richmond SOP youth were significantly older than other youth, by more than six months. These differences occur at an age when youths are at a high risk for both crime commission (Elliott and Ageton, 1981) and arrest (Strasburg, 1984) for violent offenses. Accordingly, age at termination is introduced as a covariate in subsequent analyses of treatment impacts on recidivism.

## THE INCIDENCE OF RECIDIVISM AND TIME TO FAILURE

Two measures of official arrests were examined: the mean number of rearrests per youth (by type of offense) and the time to first rearrest. For each measure, a series of analysis of variance models was constructed--an analysis of covariance with the three covariates, and separate ANOVA's with each covariate.

Table 5.4 shows the ANOVA model for rearrests. Treatment differences were observed only for violent offenses, consistent with Table 5.1. Differences by sex and time at risk were observed for all offense categories except "other violent." Age at termination was a significant covariate only for serious offenses and total rearrests. The length of treatment was not a significant covariate for any offense type. In general, though the covariates affected rearrest rates in different ways, SOP intervention was a significant variable only for violent offenses.

Table 5.5 shows that neither SOP nor any covariate was a consistent factor in delaying the first rearrest for any type of crime. Only for lesser, misdemeanor offenses--"other property" and "other" crimes--were there any measurable differences observed. Treatment-sex interaction effects were observed for "other" and "total" offenses.

## Rearrests

Tables 5.6-5.9 show ANOVA models for the mean number of rearrests by treatment group and each covariate. Table 5.6 shows no significant differences by length of treatment. The length of treatment was dichotomized at a six-month interval, consistent with the stated SOP policy goals. Though several differences were observed, none were statistically significant. Nevertheless, these differences were greatest for the most severe offenses.

Table 5.4. Analysis of Variance for Post-Project Re-Arrests by Treatment Group and Sex, Controlling for Time at Risk, Age at Termination, and Days in Treatment (N=351)

Source	df	Type of Crime											
		Violent		Serious Property		Other Violent		Other Property		Other		Total	
		F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Treatment Group	2	4.43	.013	0.65	--	0.79	--	0.04	--	0.92	--	1.21	--
Sex	1	6.09	.014	8.83	.003	0.07	--	6.22	.013	9.01	.003	10.38	.001
Time at Risk	1	5.06	.025	15.14	.000	1.86	--	4.16	.042	18.28	.000	10.19	.002
Age at Termination	1	0.56	--	4.43	.076	3.73	--	0.33	--	0.50	--	4.24	.028
Days in Treatment	1	1.29	--	1.23	--	0.93	--	1.32	--	2.56	--	2.07	--
Treatment by Sex	2	0.19	--	0.38	--	0.05	--	0.04	--	0.54	--	0.28	--
Explained	8	2.89	.004	3.71	.000	0.88	--	1.53	--	3.95	.000	3.66	.000

Table 5.5. Analysis of Variance for Time to First Re-Arrest by Treatment Group and Sex, Controlling for Time at Risk, Age at Termination, and Days in Treatment

Source	df	Type of Crime											
		Violent <sup>a</sup>		Serious Property <sup>b</sup>		Other Violent <sup>c</sup>		Other Property <sup>d</sup>		Other <sup>e</sup>		Total <sup>f</sup>	
		F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Treatment Group	2	0.94	--	1.49	--	0.78	--	0.77	--	0.50	--	0.11	--
Sex	1	--	--	2.14	--	1.58	--	1.01	.00	4.49	.036	6.42	.012
Time at Risk	1	3.37	--	3.68	--	2.27	--	10.97	.001	1.40	--	3.11	--
Age at Termination	1	2.99	--	0.07	--	2.08	--	4.77	.032	6.01	.015	0.01	--
Days in Treatment	1	0.32	--	0.44	--	0.12	--	0.06	--	2.73	--	6.25	.013
Treatment by Sex	1	--	--	--	--	1.12	--	0.88	--	6.14	.014	9.47	.002
Explained	7	1.76	--	1.41	--	1.45	--	2.54	.022	3.32	.002	4.14	.000

- a. N=51, model for males only--no females arrested for violent offenses
- b. N=92, interaction effects too small for inclusion
- c. N=64
- d. N=77
- e. N=195
- f. N=195

74

Overall, Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) youths had higher rates. They were more often rearrested when intervention was less than six months, especially for serious property and other violent offenses. This was also true for control youth. For other SOP youth, few differences were observed. Only for serious arrests was there any difference. However, the length of treatment had an unexpectedly adverse effect--the longer the treatment interval, the higher the arrest rate for "serious property" offenses.

**Time at Risk.** Again, differences were observed only for violent offenses--Richmond youth were quite different (Table 5.7). Time at risk was trichotomized into 0-2 years, 2-3 years, and 3+ year periods. No Richmond (E<sub>2</sub>) youths were rearrested who were at risk for less than two years. Their first arrests came at least two years after SOP termination! Yet once rearrested, their rates were consistently higher for violent and serious offenses. For E<sub>1</sub> youth, the highest arrest rates generally occurred for those with longer at-risk periods. For control youth, the highest rates were for those with the shortest at-risk periods.

Table 5.6. Mean Number of Re-Arrests by Type of Offense, Treatment Interval (Six Months), and Treatment Group

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>	
	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.
Violent*	0.14	0.19	0.14	0.17	0.50	0.40
Serious Property	0.32	0.57	0.50	0.33	0.83	0.47
Other Violent	0.29	0.30	0.36	0.21	0.33	0.07
Other Property	0.31	0.30	0.18	0.28	0.17	0.37
Other	1.30	1.63	1.05	1.10	1.00	1.17
Total	3.71	4.26	2.68	2.93	4.67	3.10

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

It is not difficult to assume that the unique finding for E<sub>2</sub> youth was the result of policy and not behavior. Fewer were rearrested at all (Table 5.1), but rearrests were more severely charged (Tables 5.1, 5.6, 5.7). There were few who were at risk for less than two years, and they were not rearrested at all! One possible explanation involves jurisdiction. These arrest data span both juvenile and adult records. It is possible that as juveniles, a policy was in effect to treat law violations as technical, not criminal, offenses. Thus, those at risk for more than two years, or beyond age 18, were charged criminally only when they were beyond juvenile jurisdiction! We will comment further on the uniqueness of this group in later chapters, and the possible explanations for this phenomenon.

Table 5.7. Mean Number of Re-Arrests by Type of Offense, Treatment Group, and Time at Risk

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>			Control			E <sub>2</sub>		
	0-24	25-36	36-Over	0-24	25-36	36-Over	0-24	25-36	36-Over
Violent*	0.23	0.07	0.25	0.22	0.19	0.24	0	0.41	0.47
Serious Property	0.23	0.22	0.68	0.47	0.39	0.59	0	0.52	0.67
Other Violent	0.31	0.20	0.39	0.42	0.28	0.14	0	0.15	0.13
Other Property	0.31	0.25	0.35	0.25	0.17	0.42	0	0.30	0.33
Other	1.46	1.09	1.85	1.25	0.78	1.72	0	1.19	1.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.92</b>	<b>3.01</b>	<b>4.95</b>	<b>4.42</b>	<b>2.33</b>	<b>3.41</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3.89</b>	<b>2.93</b>

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

**Sex.** Table 5.8 shows differences in number of rearrests by sex and by treatment group. Females were uniformly rearrested fewer times for all offense categories for nearly all groups, except "other violent" crimes. Here, for SOP and control youths, small or no differences were observed. Significant differences occurred once again for violent offenses--the Richmond SOP youth were consistently higher. This appears to be the highest risk group in the population, though a very small percentage of the total study population.

Table 5.8. Mean Number of Post-Project Arrests by Type of Offense, Treatment Group, and Sex

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Violent*	.20	0	.26	0	.45	0
Serious Property	.53	0	.55	0	.60	0
Other Violent	.31	.32	.30	.24	.15	0
Other Property	.33	.08	.31	.06	.33	0
Other	1.65	.56	1.35	.59	1.18	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.41</b>	<b>1.72</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>1.29</b>	<b>3.73</b>	<b>0</b>

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

**Age at Termination.** Again, treatment group differences were significant only for violent offenses (Table 5.9), but not by age. Those terminated at 18 years or more had a higher rearrest rate for SOP and control youth, while Richmond SOP youth had fewer age-related

differences. Among younger (less than 16 years) SOP youth, higher rates were observed for serious offenses. But this was not found for other groups. For total arrests, irrespective of crime type, those terminated at an earlier age had uniformly somewhat higher rearrest rates. This was true for all treatment groups. This group has the highest arrest rates in the general population (cf. Smith et al., 1980), as well as the highest rates of self-reported crimes (Elliott and Ageton, 1981). Apparently, SOP had little effect in altering these general trends in youth crime.

**Table 5.9. Mean Number of Post-Project Arrests by Type of Offense, Treatment Group, and Age at Termination**

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>			Control			E <sub>2</sub>		
	To 16	16-18	18-Over	To 16	16-18	18-Over	To 16	16-18	18-Over
Violent*	0.18	0.13	0.38	0.23	0.13	0.50	0.33	0.44	0.50
Serious Property	0.65	0.29	0.38	0.61	0.29	0.67	0.78	0.41	1.00
Other Violent	0.42	0.20	0.31	0.45	0.11	0.33	0.11	0.16	0
Other Property	0.25	0.33	0.44	0.25	0.18	0.67	0.11	0.33	0.50
Other	1.80	1.24	1.50	1.32	1.04	1.50	1.44	0.89	1.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.50</b>	<b>2.75</b>	<b>3.50</b>	<b>4.05</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>3.83</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.83</b>

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

#### Time to First Rearrest: Failure Rates

A series of ANOVA models were run comparing the time to first rearrest by treatment group and crime type, controlling for the same four variables as in the analyses of rearrest rates. This second dimension of recidivism provides useful information on the length of time which treatment intervention can delay subsequent criminality. From a different perspective, it reveals when intervention effects begin to decay.

**Time in Treatment.** Did the length of treatment delay recidivism? That was a central question in the SOP experiment. Contradictory trends emerged. For violent offenses, differences were observed only for control youth--longer treatment failed to delay rearrest. However, the results were not statistically significant (see appendix, Table A-5.1). For serious property crimes, a similar finding was observed for Richmond youth.

For "other violent" offenses, shorter treatment intervals were uniformly more effective, for all groups. These results were statistically significant. Similar results were obtained

for "other" and total offenses, with the exception of the Richmond group. For these youth, length of treatment made little difference. Conversely, for "other property" offenses, Richmond SOP youth and controls were rearrested more quickly.

The results present a "mixed bag" with respect to the length of treatment. It is important to note that the SOP officers, both in Richmond and elsewhere, routinely disregarded the six-month termination policy for those youth they deemed as "unresponsive" to treatment. As a result, the "higher risk" youth often were those who were kept in SOP or transferred to regular probation caseloads after the six month interval. Accordingly, this aspect of the SOP experiment was seriously confounded. It is not unrealistic to assume that for such youth, the additional time on probation contributed to a delay in recidivism. Whether SOP or this additional time was a causal factor is impossible to determine.

**Time at Risk.** The findings for the effects of time at risk parallel the analyses in Table 5.7. The longer at-risk period reflected earlier terminations, both in terms of the inception of the program and the youth's age (see appendix, Table A-5.2). Overall, no significant differences were obtained. Once again, those Richmond SOP youth at risk for less than two years had no arrests. The extreme variability by offense type and treatment group raises questions whether this factor has any explanatory power at all. It seems more likely that other factors--sex, age, and perhaps factors unstudied in these analyses--may better explain the delay rates.

**Sex.** Regarding time to first rearrest by treatment group and sex, significant differences were found only for "other" (minor) offenses, and only for controls (see appendix, Table A-5.3). Females in general had few rearrests, and none were recorded for Richmond SOP females. It seems that arrests of females in general were for non-felony offenses. Overall, for violent and serious offenses, male control youths had their first rearrest earlier than other males.

**Age at Termination.** As in the earlier analysis of age at termination, no consistent patterns were observed (see appendix, Table A-5.4). For violent offenses, younger controls were best able to delay rearrest. For serious offenses, the Richmond SOP group had better results for all age groups. This is an interesting contrast with their generally poorer performance for violent crimes. Overall, there were no discernable patterns to indicate that age at release more effectively delayed any group's criminal behavior. None of the results were statistically significant.



A series of survival analyses were conducted to determine overall treatment group differences. A survival analysis shows the percent of the study group not failing after a specified time interval. Significant differences were found only for violent offenses. Figures showing the curves for each group, and the corresponding data in table form are found in the appendix.

After 36 months, of those still in the E<sub>2</sub> group, the percent "surviving without a rearrest for a violent crime" was less than two in three for Richmond SOP youth (64.3%), compared to 81.9% for other SOP youth and 90.4% for controls. These findings are consistent with the results of previous analyses of rearrests. The trends for serious (felony) arrests were similar--less than half (46.0%) the Richmond SOP youth "survived" to 36 months, compared to over two in three (67.2%) of the east county SOP youth and nearly three-fourths of the controls. However, the differences for serious offenses were not significant.

The differences in risk period for violent offenses began between six and 12 months after release (see appendix, Table A-5.5). By 18 months, the difference in survival rate was nearly 10%; by 24 months it was nearly 17%. At 36 months, controls had clearly emerged as having a higher survival rate than either experimental group.

### **SELF-REPORTED CRIME**

Criminologists generally agree that self-reported crime is an important part of the measurement of law-violating behavior. Official records have numerous problems, from missing data to arbitrary and (methodologically) unreliable coding of behaviors into penal code categories. Recently, Sherman and Glick (1984) graphically illustrated the limitations of UCR crime reports. Our experience on this study with BCS data suggests that problems with official records extend well into the system, particularly for less serious offenses. Despite disagreement on the validity of self-reported crime and delinquency (e.g., Tittle, 1973; Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis, 1981; Elliott and Ageton, 1981), such measures provide an important and useful alternative measure of criminal behavior.

Tables 5.10-5.14 present data on post-intervention self-reported criminality (SRC). The methods are described in Chapter III. The scales are derived from the National Youth Survey (Elliott and Ageton, 1980), and include 31 items. Summary scales were developed for two crime types (violent, serious) and a total crime scale. In addition, a ten-item drug use scale was devised for this study.

Tables 5.10-13 compare SRC scales by treatment group, controlling for the three factors described above. Though differences appear, they were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, some interesting trends are noted. Richmond SOP youth with shorter treatment intervals fare better than the two other groups, where longer treatment resulted in lower SRC scores (Table 5.11). In Table 5.10, Richmond SOP females reported no SRC, quite different from the other groups. Also, Richmond SOP males were consistently lower than other males. In Table 5.12, SRC scores for subjects at risk less than two years were not reported, despite the existence of official arrests for that group. Clearly, there are validity problems here.

Table 5.14 summarizes ANOVA analyses, and again shows significant differences only for sex, not for treatment group, regardless of SRC measure. For drug use, no differences were found.

The SRC analyses present a stark contrast with the recidivism analyses utilizing official records. Whereas Richmond SOP youth had higher arrest rates and earlier arrests for **violent** crimes, no such differences exist when crimes are self-reported. Looking at **total** arrest rates compared to SRC data, the results between groups are comparable. It seems that though behaviors were nearly identical in frequency, there were differences in perceptions of severity between youth and police, especially for Richmond SOP youth. This is not surprising when one considers the complex and provocative Richmond environment (see Chapter II). For now, we can speculate that either these youth were indeed more violent (but not necessarily at higher rates), or they were charged with more serious offenses. These themes are explored further in later analyses.

Table 5.10. Self-Reported Crime (Post-Project) by Treatment Group and Sex  
(Mean Number of Incidents)  
(N=164)

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Violence	1.78	0.14	1.89	0.57	1.30	0
Property	3.38	0.29	3.46	1.14	2.60	0
Total	6.68	1.29	7.05	3.29	4.95	0
Drug Use	1.46	0.57	1.79	1.14	1.00	0

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table 5.11. Self-Reported Crime by Type of Crime and Days in Treatment  
(Mean Scale Score)  
(N=164)

Type of Crime	E1		Control		E2	
	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.
Violence	1.13	1.92	1.18	1.86	1.67	1.17
Property	2.75	3.35	1.55	3.60	4.33	2.17
Total	5.31	6.77	4.27	7.17	7.00	4.33
Drugs	1.31	1.43	1.18	1.86	0.67	1.00

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table 5.12. Self-Reported Crime by Type of Crime and Time at Risk  
(Mean Scale Scores)  
(N=164)

Type of Crime	E1			Control			E2		
	0-24	25-36	36- Over	0-24	25-36	36- Over	0-24	25-36	36- Over
Violence	0	1.58	1.73	0	1.71	1.67	0	1.53	1.30
Property	0	2.90	3.41	0	2.97	3.50	0	2.94	1.00
Total	0	6.04	6.53	0	6.32	6.92	0	5.38	2.60
Drugs	0	1.52	1.27	0	1.91	1.08	0	1.13	0.40

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table 5.13. Self-Reported Crime by Type of Crime and Age at Termination  
(Mean Scale Scores)  
(N=164)

Type of Crime	E1			Control			E2		
	To 16	16-18	18- Over	To 16	16-18	18- Over	To 16	16-18	18- Over
Violence	1.94	1.40	0.88	1.74	1.40	2.43	1.60	1.00	1.67
Property	3.74	2.54	1.88	2.84	2.70	5.00	3.00	2.62	1.00
Total	7.22	5.37	4.00	6.47	5.45	9.43	6.60	4.38	3.00
Drugs	1.59	1.17	1.00	1.68	1.65	1.86	1.60	0.77	0.67

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

**Table 5.14. Analysis of Variance on Post-Project Self-Reported Crime by Treatment Group and Sex, Controlling for Time at Risk, Age at Termination, and Time in Treatment (N=164)**

Source	df	Type of Self-Reported Crime							
		Violent		Property		Total		Drug Use	
		F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
Treatment Group	2	0.35	--	0.54	--	1.05	--	1.72	--
Sex	1	5.74	.018	9.66	.002	8.92	.003	.08	--
Time at Risk	1	0.02	--	2.25	--	0.04	--	1.52	--
Age at Termination	1	3.11	--	0.06	--	2.84	--	.37	--
Length of Treatment	1	0.40	--	3.39	.019	0.16	--	.12	--
Treatment by Sex	2	0.05	--	0.11	--	0.15	--	.04	--
Explained	8	1.20	--	1.59	--	1.68	--	1.03	--

## JUSTICE SYSTEM PENETRATION

The final measure of SOP impact was the extent of penetration into the justice system following the termination of probation supervision. For each arrest recorded from official records, the disposition was also recorded. The most serious disposition, or deepest penetration into the justice system, was calculated for each youth. Dispositions ranged from no court action through incarceration in a state prison or county jail. The results are shown in Table 5.15, by sex and treatment group.

The data show that Richmond SOP youth (E<sub>2</sub>) fared more poorly in the post-intervention period. Among males, over one in three (36.8%) were subsequently incarcerated. About one quarter of the controls were incarcerated, and less than one in seven of the SOP youth (east county) were incarcerated. Among females, there were stark differences, with controls having the highest incarceration rates. The results were statistically significant for both males and females.

For other dispositions, the differences were less pronounced. Probation dispositions and in-county residential placements were in fact lowest for male Richmond SOP youth. Among youth not reaching court at all, SOP youth fared best and controls the poorest. Over half the SOP youth had either no court action or their charges were dismissed (44.2% and 14.2%). However, the differences between groups were less dramatic than for incarceration rates.

Table 5.15. Most Serious Disposition of Post-Project Arrest by Treatment Group and Sex  
(N=356)

Most Serious Disposition	E1		Control		E2	
	Male N (%)	Female N (%)	Male N (%)	Female N (%)	Male N (%)	Female N (%)
No Court Action	84 (44.2)	19 (82.6)	30 (35.7)	6 (35.3)	9 (23.7)	2 (4.8)
Dismissed	27 (14.2)	2 (8.7)	7 (8.3)	-- --	8 (21.1)	-- --
Transfer Out of County	2 (1.1)	-- --	2 (2.4)	1 (5.9)	-- --	-- --
Informal Supervision	3 (1.6)	-- --	2 (2.4)	-- --	-- --	-- --
Probation	24 (12.6)	1 (4.3)	10 (11.9)	2 (11.8)	3 (7.9)	-- --
In-County Placement	24 (12.6)	1 (4.3)	11 (13.1)	4 (23.5)	4 (10.5)	-- --
Incarceration	<u>26 (13.7)</u>	<u>-- --</u>	<u>22 (26.2)</u>	<u>4 (23.5)</u>	<u>14 (36.8)</u>	<u>-- --</u>
<b>Total</b>	190 (60.9)	23 (54.8)	84 (26.9)	17 (40.5)	38 (12.2)	2 (4.8)

Males:  $\chi^2_{(2,6)}=21.0, p= .05$

Females:  $\chi^2_{(2,6)}=17.0, p=ns$

Once again, a pattern emerges where Richmond SOP youth were treated more harshly in the system, though not necessarily represented in the system in significantly greater numbers. And again this raises a fundamental question--did these youth in fact commit more serious offenses, or were there behaviors perceived and responded to more harshly by the juvenile and criminal justice system?

## RELATIONS AMONG RECIDIVISM VARIABLES

The next set of analyses examines the relationships among outcome variables. Criminologists and policy-makers have argued long and vigorously over the relative merits of various recidivism measures, and which "type" of success or failure is most useful. In particular, researchers generally have failed to reconcile the dimensions of time-to-failure and severity of rearrests. Is one assault after two years better or worse than two burglaries in one year? If a probationer avoids subsequent probation commitments or incarcerations, is the extent of other court involvement really an important factor?

Previously in this chapter, we have examined four recidivism categories, and sought to determine the underlying influences of treatment or background characteristics to explain the findings. In this section, we search for relationships among the recidivism variables. If in fact "types" or patterns of recidivism exist, we may better understand the impacts of SOP intervention and the nature of criminality on the cusp between adolescence and adulthood.

We begin with analyses for the three crime measures as a data reduction procedure to identify recidivism "types" within treatment groups, controlling for time at risk. (Because the "total" crime category subsumes the individual crime severity categories, it is excluded.) Next, the most salient variables in each factor are displayed in contingency analyses with justice system penetration variables. Finally, discriminant analyses identify those recidivism variables which contribute to justice system penetration.

The results of the factor analyses (with varimax rotation) are shown in Tables 5.16 and 5.17. The sample sizes (N=361, 164) differ due to pairwise deletions in Table 5.16 from the SRC scales and the smaller follow-up sample size. In Table 5.16, four factors explained 91.6% of the variance, and yielded four distinct patterns of recidivism. The first factor is dominated by self-reported crime variables. There are virtually no loadings for any arrest measures. Conversely, there are no significant loadings of SRC variables

on the other factors. Once again, the lack of correspondence between official and self-reported criminality suggests validity problems between these measures of criminal behavior.

**Table 5.16. Factor Loadings for Recidivism Variables for Rearrests Only (N=361)**

Recidivism Variables	Factor			
	I	II	III	IV
Time to First Rearrest for Violent Crime (TVCRIME)	.99	.06	.06	.08
Time to First Rearrest for Serious Crime (TSCRIME)	.24	.06	.23	.44
Time to First Rearrest for Other Violent Crime (TOVCRIME)	.10	.09	.56	.13
Time to First Rearrest for Other Serious Crime (TOSCRIME)	.16	.59	.12	.05
Time to First Rearrest for Other Crime (TOCRIME)	.17	.08	.13	.06
Rearrest Rate for Violent Crimes (TVRATE)	.58	.12	.08	.22
Rearrest Rate for Serious Crimes (TSRATE)	.10	.05	.06	.78
Rearrest Rate for Other Violent Crimes (TOVRATE)	-.05	.10	.75	.09
Rearrest Rate for Other Serious Crimes (TOSRATE)	.02	.92	.10	.09
Rearrest Rate for Other Crimes (TORATE)	.18	.32	.30	.36
<b>Eigenvalue</b>	2.44	1.08	0.81	0.59
<b>Percent of Variance Explained</b>	49.7	22.0	16.4	11.9

The second factor emphasizes arrests for violent crime, including both the rate of rearrests as well as the time to failure. Time to arrest for serious crimes is also weakly loaded. Earlier in this chapter, these trends appeared to be representative of the Richmond SOP population (see Table 5.1). Accordingly, we may tentatively assume that this factor represents the Richmond SOP group.

The third and fourth factors are dominated by loadings for "other violent" and "other serious" offense types, respectively. Both the number of rearrests and time to first rearrest are present in each factor for these crime types. These factors may well represent other treatment populations--the TOSRATE being highest for SOP youth in East County, and TOVRATE being highest for control females.

In Table 5.17, the SRC scales were deleted, more than doubling the sample size (to N=361). Accordingly, the resultant factors are based only on official arrests. There is a strong correspondence to those factors in Table 5.16 which are dominated by arrest variables. There is an additional factor which includes arrest rates and failure times for serious (felony property) arrests. The four factors account for 100% of the variance.

Table 5.17. Factor Loadings for Recidivism Variables  
(N=164)

Recidivism Variables	Factor			
	I	II	III	IV
Time to First Rearrest for Violent Crime (TVCRIME)	.03	.97	.05	.18
Time to First Rearrest for Serious Crime (TSCRIME)	.14	.28	-.04	.31
Time to First Rearrest for Other Violent Crime (TOVCRIME)	.01	.14	.09	.83
Time to First Rearrest for Other Serious Crime (TOSCRIME)	.02	.15	.80	.14
Time to First Rearrest for Other Crime (TOCRIME)	.17	.23	.10	.02
Rearrest Rates for Violent Crimes (TVRATE)	-.06	.51	.09	-.05
Rearrest Rates for Serious Crimes (TSRATE)	.08	.12	.02	.11
Rearrest Rates for Other Violent Crimes (TOVRATE)	.03	-.04	.01	.56
Rearrest Rates for Other Serious Crimes (TOSRATE)	-.01	.03	.74	.05
Rearrest Rates for Other Crimes (TORATE)	.14	.10	.23	.13
Self-Reported Violent Crime (SRCV)	.88	.01	.01	.05
Self-Reported Serious Crime (SRCS)	.80	.07	.03	.07
Self-Reported Drug Use (SRCD)	.57	.03	-.03	-.01
Eigenvalue	2.60	1.56	1.08	0.92
Percent of Variance Explained	38.7	23.2	16.0	13.7

In general, two trends emerge from the factor analyses:

- o the virtually orthogonal relationship between self-reported crime and arrests; and
- o the domination by particular crime types, as shown by the pairing of rate of rearrests and time to first rearrest for individual crime types.

The latter finding hints at "specialization" in crime careers, at least by type of crime or arrest charge. This is contrary to other studies of criminal careers of young violent offenders (Hamparian et al., 1978), which suggest that specialization is uncharacteristic even among youths with several violent offenses. But the findings for SRC scales contradict the specialization hypothesis, and once again underscore the potential validity problems of the various impact measures. SRC scores are higher for E<sub>1</sub> and control youth than Richmond youth, while current records suggest more criminality among Richmond SOP youth. It may be that charging practices, not behavior, convey a perception of specialization. Since Richmond is the major urban center and the locus of minority populations, these results once again raise disturbing questions about urbanism, race, differential justice system treatment, and crime.

### Patterns of Recidivism

Which types of offenses or behaviors are regarded most seriously by the courts? Though arrests may raise public concern, they represent only one dimension of recidivism. The



response of the courts determines which youth are placed under social control or removed from society. In effect, the courts evaluate the youth and his or her behavior to determine what criminal acts pose the gravest threats to public safety. By analyzing the severity of the courts' sanctions, we can construct preliminary typologies of recidivistic behavior. Such typologies may be based on the combined dimensions of crime and sanction.

Tables 5.18 and 5.19 represent some first steps toward such typologies for the SOP population. Stepwise discriminant function analyses were conducted to determine which arrestee types penetrated the justice system. Three sets of analyses were completed, each representing a deeper level of penetration:

- o those adjudicated or convicted for a crime versus those not arrested or whose cases were dismissed;
- o those who were removed from the public to either group homes, non-secure residential programs, or correctional institutions;
- o those sentenced to county jail or state (juvenile or adult) correctional institutions.\*

These analyses were first done using arrest variables only, and repeated with self-reported crime variables included. The variables were selected based on the factor loadings obtained in Tables 5.16 and 5.17.\*\* Stepwise discriminant function analysis (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971) provided coefficients to discriminate and typify those youth who penetrated the justice system to that point from those who avoided that extent of justice system involvement.

**Who Gets in Trouble?** In the eyes of the court, those adjudicated are viewed as having committed an offense. Tables 5.18 and 5.19 suggest no clear pattern to differentiate those who are convicted of subsequent crimes from those youth who avoid trouble. In fact, more than one type of youth may be present at each level of penetration. Table 5.18 suggests that the rates of violent and "other property" (e.g., petty theft) crimes are indicative of subsequent court involvement. Among age variables, TVAGE is also a strong factor--arrests for violence at a younger age is an important variable. But age at arrest

---

\*The small sample size made it necessary to collapse these categories. This was unfortunate, since those whose probation was revoked for minor offense often were sent to jail, while violent offenders were sent to prison. Yet these groups are treated as one.

\*\*Age-at-arrest variables were included as surrogates for the time-to-first arrest variables used in earlier analyses. This was done to maximize the sample sizes and avoid sample attrition due to pairwise deletions. For example, using TVCRIME instead of TVAGE would reduce the sample size to N=55.

for felony property (TSAGE) and "other" crimes seems to influence adjudication at a later age. These are likely to be two different populations, as suggested in the earlier factor analyses. One group appears to be young arrestees for violent crimes, while there may be a second group of older property offenders.

When self-reported crime variables are included, similar patterns emerge. In addition to the arrest variables in Table 5.18, both SRCV (violence) and SRCG (drug use) are part of this type. Interestingly, those with higher SRCP (property) scores are clearly not part of this group. Also, the discriminant coefficients for the salient arrest variables increase when SRC scales are included in the equation. In each equation, over 70% of the cases were correctly classified. Once again, it seems that utilizing court outcome data may resolve some of the underlying validity problems between official and self-reported crime data. In other words, higher SRC scores seem to "explain" the role of arrest variables in a youth's conviction.

**Who Is Removed from Home?** For many offenders, especially juveniles, removal from home is a qualitatively harsher disposition than probation supervision. This may include group homes, residential treatment, or non-secure correctional facilities. These analyses reveal a slightly different pattern from the analyses of adjudications. The arrest rates for minor crimes (TORATE) and the age at first arrest for lesser property crimes (TOSAGE) are important discriminants of who is removed from home, whereas they were negligible contributors to the "adjudication" functions. Perhaps these are youths whose probation was revoked for minor offenses. Among SRC variables, only SRCG remains as a strong coefficient. In each equation, over 75% of the cases are correctly classified.

Again, there may in fact be two groups represented here. As in the previous function, violent and serious (felony property) crimes are still important discriminators of whether a youth is removed from home. These are likely the offenders sent to prison. But higher rates for less serious crimes are also part of the function in both tables. The latter group may be the youthful population of minor offenders for whom some group home placement is a common disposition. For example, the ages of first arrest for lesser (non-felony) violence or miscellaneous offenses are important in adjudications, but not in out-of-home placement. However, TOSAGE is strongly loaded for younger probationers. This second, non-serious type of offender may include those whose probation is revoked, or those for whom group home placement matches the severity of their offenses.

Table 5.18. Discriminant Coefficients for Analysis of Most Serious Disposition  
as a Function of Rearrest Variables  
(N=361)

Arrest Variables	Most Serious Disposition		
	Adjudication	Out-of-Home Placement	Juvenile or Adult Incarceration
Rearrest Rate for Violent Crime (TVRATE)	.36	.23	.34
Rearrest Rate for Other Serious Crime (TOSRATE)	.43	.49	.65
Rearrest Rate for Other Violent Crime (TOVRATE)	-.07	.02	-.30
Rearrest Rate for Other Crime (TORATE)	.21	.52	.07
Age at First Rearrest for Violent Crime (TVAGE)	-.43	-.15	-.13
Age at First Rearrest for Serious Crime (TSAGE)	.37	.49	.61
Age at First Rearrest for Other Violent Crime (TOVAGE)	.17	.02	.39
Age at First Rearrest for Other Serious Crime (TOSAGE)	-.04	-.20	-.17
Age at First Rearrest for Other Crimes (TOAGE)	.53	.09	.14
$\chi^2$ (df=1,9)	112.96***	117.41***	106.08***
Percent Cases Correctly Classified	71.8	75.1	75.7

\*\*\*p .001  
\*\*p .01  
\*p .05

Table 5.19. Discriminant Coefficients for Analysis of Most Serious Disposition as a Function of Rearrest and Self-Reported Crime Variables (N=164)

Crime Variables	Most Serious Disposition		
	Adjudication	Out-of-Home Placement	Juvenile or Adult Incarceration
Rearrest Rate for Violent Crime (TVRATE)	.66	.40	.30
Rearrest Rate for Other Serious Crime (TOSRATE)	.56	.77	.97
Rearrest Rate for Other Violent Crime (TOVRATE)	-.20	-.04	-.51
Rearrest Rate for Other Crime (TORATE)	.21	.55	-.01
Age at First Rearrest for Violent Crime (TVAGE)	-.86	-.46	-.35
Age at First Rearrest for Serious Crime (TSAGE)	.22	.35	.60
Age at First Rearrest for Other Violent Crime (TOVAGE)	.41	.08	.45
Age at First Rearrest for Other Serious Crime (TOSAGE)	-.11	-.27	-.32
Age at First Rearrest for Other Crime (TOAGE)	.52	.02	.19
Self-Reported Violent Crime (SRCV)	.32	.07	.27
Self-Reported Property Crime (SRCP)	-.50	-.04	-.18
Self-Reported Drug Use (SRCG)	.39	.35	-.01
$\chi^2$ (df=1,12)	51.87***	48.01***	48.44**
Percent Cases Correctly Classified	76.4	77.0	75.8

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

**Who Is Incapacitated?** Obviously, imprisonment is the most serious sanction invoked by the court. For both juveniles and adults, incapacitation in a correctional institution, whether county jail or a state facility, is reserved for those offenders deemed most dangerous to society. Tables 5.18 and 5.19 present discriminant function analyses comparing those who are incarcerated following supervision with those youth receiving non-incapacitative dispositions.

Again, there appear to be two groups included in the analyses. Offenders with early arrests for, and high rates of, violent crime are one clear type. Also, offenders with high rates of "other serious" offenses seem to be present. These offenders may have been relatively older when arrested for these offenses, and in fact may again be offenders whose probation is revoked and are incarcerated in state prison or local jail facilities. Lesser violent offenders, in terms of rate, and younger non-serious offenders are least represented in this population. They seem to avoid the more severe sanctions. Finally, the incarcerated offenders seem to have a higher prevalence of self-reported violence. The discriminant functions for incarceration are significant, and again over 75% of the cases are correctly classified.

**Recidivism and Proportionality of Dispositions.** Do the courts mete out proportionately more severe dispositions for more serious offenses? If that were the case, one might reasonably expect to see higher discriminant coefficients for more serious offenses (both rate and age at first arrest) for deeper levels of penetration into the justice system, and increasingly weaker or negative coefficients for less serious offenses. The results were not quite that clear.

Indeed, violent and serious arrest rates were consistently strong coefficients for deeper justice system penetration. However, the influence was the same for all levels of justice system response! Also, there was some unexpected contribution for less serious offenses, both to out-of-home placements and imprisonment. For example, Tables 5.18 and 5.19 both show high discriminant coefficients for rates of "other" offenses in out-of-home placements. These coefficients return to near zero for incarceration. Apparently, this disposition is reserved for an offender type who appears often in court, irrespective of age, for a variety of non-serious offenses. Among juveniles, it is often a "treatment" placement, rather than a punitive or corrections placement.

Do the courts react based on age? There is a curious finding here. For violent offenses, younger age at first arrest influences penetration at all levels. Apparently, the courts

respond swiftly to the violent offender. But for serious (felony property) offenses, age works in a different direction. That is, older offenders are those who penetrate more deeply. It is possible that the courts react less seriously to the younger property offender. Yet "other serious" offenses, such as petty theft, drug possession, and shoplifting, also are discriminators of penetration. Though such offenses may not merit imprisonment, these results may indicate that they are part of an offense pattern together with more serious offenses for those who are more deeply involved in the justice system. Finally, for "nuisance" (other) offenses, age at arrest seems to matter only in adjudications.

Finally, the relationship between arrest charge and disposition should be central to the proportionality of responses to recidivism. In juvenile court, dispositions historically have reflected the "best interests of the child." This doctrine is based on a rehabilitative ideal and a unicausal model of delinquency (cf. Feld, 1983). Yet recent policy developments in juvenile court have shifted the emphasis to the offense, not the offender, in dispositional decisions (cf. Hamparian et al., 1982; Juvenile Code Revision Commission, 1984). Retribution and punishment have become explicit in the policy intent of delinquency policy. Decisions in the juvenile court, particularly with respect to disposition and punishment, now mirror the policies of the criminal courts. Accordingly, we should expect the more serious dispositions to be reserved for those youth charged with more severe offenses.

Table 5.20 shows the disposition of each type of rearrest charge by intervention group. The unit of analysis is the most serious charge per incident, not the youth. To simplify the table, county jail and institutional commitments are again collapsed. For SOP and controls, the percent of youth receiving incapacitative dispositions declines with the severity of offense. For Richmond SOP youth, however, the percent of youth incarcerated remains fairly constant across charge categories, though the cell sizes become rather small for minor offenses. For nearly all categories, the percent of charges for E<sub>2</sub> youth resulting in incapacitation is higher. For E<sub>1</sub> youth, only violent charges more often lead to jail or prison. In particular, the E<sub>2</sub> incarceration rates for the three least severe charge categories are much higher than the other groups. This includes technical violations (i.e., behaviors which are legal but violate probation conditions) resulting in probation revocation. At the same time, the percent of E<sub>2</sub> charges dismissed is higher for all charge categories except "other violent," where the cell sizes are negligible. It seems that for E<sub>2</sub> youth, charges more often are not substantiated in the courts. Once again, the courts appear to "filter" out many arrest charges, providing an important check on arrest charges and reconciling behavior and response.

Table 5.20. Dispositions of Rearrest Charges by Treatment Group and Type of Crime  
(N=1,024)

Disposition	<u>Violent</u>			<u>Serious Property</u>			<u>Other Violent</u>			<u>Other Property</u>		
	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)
None	11 (33.3)	8 (40.0)	12 (66.7)	20 (23.0)	14 (33.3)	11 (50.0)	30 (50.8)	13 (50.0)	1 (25.0)	32 (59.3)	9 (60.0)	7 (63.6)
Probation	5 (15.2)	3 (15.0)	--	25 (28.7)	10 (23.8)	1 (4.5)	15 (25.4)	8 (30.8)	1 (25.0)	12 (22.2)	4 (26.7)	--
Out-of-Home Placement	4 (12.1)	4 (20.0)	1 (5.6)	22 (25.3)	6 (14.3)	1 (4.5)	6 (10.2)	5 (19.2)	1 (25.0)	4 (7.4)	--	1 (9.1)
Incarceration	13 (39.4)	5 (25.0)	5 (27.8)	20 (23.0)	12 (28.6)	9 (40.9)	8 (13.6)	--	1 (25.0)	6 (11.1)	2 (13.3)	3 (27.3)
<b>Total</b>	33 (5.0)	20 (8.1)	18 (15.5)	87 (13.1)	42 (17.0)	22 (19.0)	59 (8.9)	26 (10.5)	4 (3.4)	54 (8.2)	15 (6.1)	11 (9.5)

E<sub>1</sub>:  $\chi^2=89.22$ , df=15, p=.000

E<sub>2</sub>:  $\chi^2=18.24$ , df=15, p=ns

Control:  $\chi^2=44$ , df=15, p=.000

Table 5.20  
(continued)

Disposition	<u>Other</u>			<u>Technical</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)	E <sub>1</sub> N (%)	Control N (%)	E <sub>2</sub> N (%)
None	139 (56.5)	64 (67.4)	28 (73.7)	73 (40.1)	21 (42.9)	12 (52.2)	305 (46.1)	129 (52.2)	71 (61.2)
Probation	60 (33.0)	20 (21.1)	2 (5.3)	60 (33.0)	18 (36.7)	3 (13.0)	175 (26.5)	63 (25.5)	7 (6.0)
Out-of-Home Placement	33 (13.4)	5 (5.3)	4 (10.5)	41 (22.5)	8 (16.3)	4 (17.4)	110 (16.6)	28 (11.3)	12 (10.3)
Incarceration	16 (6.5)	6 (6.3)	4 (10.5)	8 (4.4)	2 (4.1)	4 (17.4)	27 (10.7)	27 (10.9)	110 (22.4)
<b>Total</b>	246 (37.3)	95 (38.5)	38 (32.8)	182 (27.5)	49 (19.8)	23 (19.8)	661 (64.5)	247 (24.1)	116 (11.3)

E<sub>1</sub>:  $\chi^2=89.22$ ,  $df=15$ ,  $p=.000$

E<sub>2</sub>:  $\chi^2=18.24$ ,  $df=15$ ,  $p=ns$

Control:  $\chi^2=44$ ,  $df=15$ ,  $p=.000$



Most important, the courts appear to mete out harsher dispositions to Richmond SOP youth than their counterparts similarly charged elsewhere in the county. Table 5.20 suggests that proportionality varies according to the area where the youth was arrested. Incapacitation decreases for East County youth with severity of charge, but not for Richmond youth. But SRC data suggest no differences in the severity of behavior across areas. Recall that SRCV is higher for incapacitated youth overall, though not for Richmond SOP youth. In fact, Richmond SOP youth report SRCV scores comparable to SOP youth and controls, irrespective of disposition. There appears to be differential penetration of Richmond youth in the justice system.

In sum, both expected and unexpected findings were observed. Violent and serious property offenders were incarcerated, but perhaps at different ages. "Other property" offenders were also imprisoned. These probably include those whose probation is revoked for a variety of less serious offenses which otherwise would not result in jail or prison time. These results confirm the importance of using disposition and penetration variables to typify and measure recidivism. Such measures also offer an opportunity to reconcile the historically problematic validity problems of arrest and self-report data.

In terms of "patterns" of recidivism, three distinct groups emerge as one looks deeper into the justice system: younger violent offenders, older (felony) property offenders, and younger (misdemeanor) property offenders whose probation has been revoked. Moreover, self-reported violence also is descriptive of those penetrating further into the justice system. Most important, disposition by **charge** may be disproportionate for some youth and proportionate to severity of charge for others. Richmond youth are imprisoned more often, all other factors held constant.

#### **THE INFLUENCE OF SOP ON RECIDIVISM: NOTES ON THE TREATMENT VARIABLE**

SOP was a policy experiment in intensive probation supervision for violent offenders. It sought to maximize the effects of "saturated" supervision within a time limitation of 60 days. Though overall the probation cohort performed well in percent reductions in most types of criminality, SOP seemed to have only slightly better effects than regular supervision. In fact, violent crimes were well controlled by most probation officers, though SOP seems to have been not particularly effective here. Especially in Richmond, the effects of SOP were overshadowed by the jurisdiction in which the intervention was applied. SOP deputies were unable to reverse the pre-intervention arrest patterns for

violence, though self-reported crime seemed to decline. On the other hand, Richmond SOP deputies achieved the highest percent reductions in total crime. We must cautiously understand the effects of the community context itself, a topic to which we turn in the next chapter.

In this section, we attempt to explain the markedly different performance of the Richmond SOP caseload, as well as the negligible differences in recidivism between SOP and control youth in other parts of the county, in terms of the implementation of the SOP experiment. In an experimental design, these differences should be attributable to the intervention, not to characteristics of the subjects. Accordingly, we look to the dynamics of SOP--the style of supervision, the use of "treatment" referrals, and perceptions of SOP and regular probation by the deputies themselves. The data below were gathered through extensive open-ended, structured interviews with the four SOP deputies and their supervisor.

#### **The Probation Officer as Intervention**

SOP was comprised of four deputies--three in East County and one in Richmond. D.J., the Richmond deputy, joined SOP one year into the experiment, having supervised a caseload of Richmond youth who were released from the county Boys' Ranch. D.J. and his caseload were administratively transferred into SOP. Once part of SOP, D.J. operated both within and outside the unit. This led to some degree of variation in implementation between the offices, in terms of the basic philosophy and style of probation work.

**Philosophy and Self-Perceptions.** The three East County deputies viewed themselves as having a dual role: on one hand, they saw part of their jobs as enforcing limits, making clients adhere to the probation order; on the other, they were helpers, counselors, and resources for their clients. K.L. likened this to the "AA model: an arm around the shoulder and a kick in the butt when needed." R.K. and D.R. both saw themselves as "resource brokers," whose role it was to "hook them up to services that deal with their needs."

D.J., the lone PO in the Richmond unit, stressed the social worker side of his role and did not mention the control function as basic to his style or philosophy. Instead, he emphasized vocational training and community college as the means to a job, and thus a "way out." He stressed positive feedback and support more than most probation officers.

The differences among the East County deputies tended to be camouflaged by the fact that they worked as a closely-knit team. They "staffed" cases together, made decisions collectively, and knew each other's cases. However, R.K. stressed "establishing a structure," and seemed to put great emphasis on school performance as the one critical index of success, while D.R. noted that he enjoyed the new resource broker side of probation in which he "united the community" in order to "hook the kid up" instead of the "old, individualistic setting of limits."

Overall, the similarities among East County deputies outweigh the few identifiable differences, especially given the emphasis all of them placed on the "team approach." This approach extended to the assignment of cases in East County. Although K.L. preferred younger probationers, and D.R. claimed expertise with "serious delinquents," the randomness of case assignment remained intact. In Richmond, D.J. was older, more experienced, and saw his role a bit differently. However, we cannot justifiably attribute to him any markedly different characteristics that could successfully differentiate probation officer style from the radical differences in client populations or community between Richmond and East County caseloads.

**SOP Treatment.** Treatment was not a formal, identifiable feature of SOP in many cases, since it inevitably blended with supervision and general case management. Though "treatment" was to be an integral part of SOP (as per the original program documentation), there was little distinction by SOP deputies between regular probation interviews and counseling. Few journal referrals to counseling were recorded, since it was assumed to be part of the probation "agreement" between the youth and the deputy. Many referrals were informal.

D.J. said he never made mental health referrals, since he had the requisite skills and training. He preferred to "do it" himself. Others also made few referrals, but for different reasons. When asked whether they distinguished between just an interview and counseling for any given client contact, R.K. said 99% of his clients were unmotivated for therapy and many didn't have the funds, so he tried not to order it. D.R. said that all his cases got counseling, the question was what kind. For him, treatment was indistinguishable from other facets of casework.

They rarely developed a specific "treatment plan" for each case, as per the program design. Beyond the court order, counseling was largely flexible and informal. Some clients were required to go to X number of therapy sessions, and this was at times

followed up by the SOP deputies. But these instances were rare. No real treatment plans as such, independent of court orders, were drawn up. They saw all clients weekly as required by the design, and informal counseling was usually a part of this.

Similarly, the exigencies of casework required flexibility in regard to family visits. If parents were a strong influence, SOP officers just phoned to check in. If the family was weak, or a problem, they made family visits and often family therapy part of their approach to those cases. All families got some initial visits so as to get "a better picture" of the clients' situation. This differed from regular Probation, in which officers rarely have the time to visit the family. All SOP officers stressed that this is just the sort of difference that distinguished SOP: the ability to shore up the client's support network by consistently following through on what he was supposed to be doing at home, in school, and in other key life areas.

**Client Needs Assessments.** The program design called for a formal system of client needs assessment. This proved difficult to implement. D.J. worked alone in Richmond, leaving little alternative to his own assessment process. The East County deputies "conferenced" all their cases, which actually was a series of group discussions and shared thoughts. All deputies relied heavily on the investigation done before trial for their basic information on client problems. They all made home visits, though less often for D.J. who was not asked by the SOP supervisor to risk night trips in Richmond. All did lengthy initial interviews. From then on, they relied mainly on experience and common sense.

This was not a formal needs assessment system, and resembled what regular probation officers do. But it was different, according to SOP deputies, because they had the time to "put their heads together on what the kid needed." K.L. summed this all up when she said, "We used the same tools (for needs assessment), but SOP gave us the time to be more in-depth." Another said, "There is no assessment of needs in regular probation."

**Training.** According to the SOP supervisor, SOP deputies received "extensive" training which regular officers did not get. As they described it, this amounted to regularly scheduled sessions with outside consultants on how to handle various types of violent or drug abusing clients. Most of these outside consultants were psychotherapists who reviewed a series of specific cases brought up by the SOP officers. Other sessions included topics such as aggression, family therapy, and arson. At least one frequent consultant also gave them clinical support as treatment "professionals" dealing with a difficult population. Part of this involved how not to get personally "hooked" on a case.

The supervisor maintains this was made possible by extra funds from SOP which were not available to other probation officers. The East County SOP deputies had high praise for the utility of the training. D.J. in Richmond agreed, though with qualifications, that they got more classes and special training as well as consultants who helped them strategize about cases.

Thus, part of what makes SOP different from regular probation, and hence part of the treatment variable, is additional specialized training on how to handle cases. However, this training was not rigorously therapy-oriented, at least in so far as inferred from deputies' descriptions. That may have been only because the therapeutic mode was taken for granted.

**Termination and Revocation Decision-Making.** The individual probation officers were fairly autonomous in termination decisions. SOP deputies and the unit supervisor agreed that deputies' judgements were nearly always approved by the supervisor, although on occasion colleagues and other supervisors were consulted.

The SOP deputies were always concerned with their credibility with the courts. Their "general" guideline was to recommend termination from probation if there was no "new beef" (either legal or technical) in six months. But this was qualified in two ways: if they thought it would be difficult to obtain approval from a judge, they either kept the client on SOP a bit longer, or transferred her or him to regular probation (which apparently required no judicial action). Even without a new offense, if there was no treatment progress and more "trouble" was seen subjectively as possible, then transfer to regular probation was usually effected at the end of the six-month period. SOP deputies guessed this was the case with about one-third of SOP clients. The logic was all predicated on their estimates of the likelihood of a new offense (or a technical violation).

The SOP design called for a six-month period of intensive supervision, but this policy was often, and sometimes systematically, overlooked. When the deputies had "reason to believe" that community protection was jeopardized, termination decisions were postponed or the youth was transferred to regular, less intensive, supervision caseloads. The SOP unit supervisor expressed this priority clearly: community protection was the driving force in the termination decision. And the operating principle was to avoid "false positives"--youths who may have appeared ready for termination but who were viewed as continued risks.

In a few cases, treatment considerations mediated the termination decision. The SOP deputies, particularly in Richmond, relied heavily on a private school for "special" (i.e., "troubled") youth. Some youths reported in follow-up interviews that they were not released from SOP since the school's rules required such "special" status as a probation commitment. One youth, who was doing quite well in the school, said that the school would have had to drop him if he was released from probation. Neither the SOP deputy nor the youth wanted this, so the youth was transferred to regular probation after SOP intervention.

In another case, the youth's mother asked the SOP deputy to continue probation, even though the SOP deputy would have released him from supervision due to his "successful" adjustment. SOP deputies reported that this was not an isolated event.

It is not surprising, then, that length of supervision did not explain recidivism. Overall, the length of probation supervision was possibly confounded in several ways. Longer supervision, whether on SOP or after transfer to regular probation, had both positive and negative connotations with respect to treatment outcome. Some youths who failed shortly after assignment were terminated early. Others who "succeeded" were kept on longer. Still others were kept on longer despite success, based on a subjective "risk assessment" by the SOP deputies and/or the unit supervisor. Accordingly, more global measures of SOP intervention will reveal more about its impact than such factors as length, frequency and type of contact, or legal status at SOP termination.

### **Comparative Reflections on SOP and Regular Probation Supervision**

When asked the general questions about what they thought of SOP and how it was different than regular probation, all four SOP deputies had positive things to say. D.J. believed categorically that dollars spent on intensive caseloads were well spent, since prisons are so expensive and destructive. R.K. lauded the teamwork and the boost in morale that came from lower caseloads. D.R. liked the support from supervisors, the reduction in bureaucratic work, and being able to "really work with the kid." K.L. agreed with these and linked them all to lower caseloads and teamwork. All three East County deputies stressed this as the most unique feature of SOP. The other feature which set SOP off from regular was the ability to go out into the community (schools, family, etc.) and work with other parts of the youth's social networks. "You really had time to supervise. Now that we're back to regular probation, most of what we do is court work. Supervision suffers."

On the other hand, the SOP unit supervisor gave a different answer to the question about what was different about SOP: "The premise is different: it's heavy concentration on a small population. ISU (intensive supervision unit) is similar, but SOP is not just heavy supervision like ISU. It is activities, trying to really change the kid."

All three East County deputies noted that field trips (to San Quentin, SF, backpacking) were a different and unique feature of SOP, as were the special victim confrontations and the alcohol group sessions. The Supervisor noted that this did not suggest that SOP had more resources since such activities and groups could have been done by all deputies. However, it is likely that the ability to do such things hinged on the extra time SOP made available for supervision and treatment.

All four SOP deputies stressed that **increased contact** stemming from lower caseloads was the key difference. It allowed them to "really supervise. I can't do that now; I can't go to the school and show the kid school is important. It allowed more consistency and follow through." Two noted that this varied from client to client ("For some it was overkill."), but all stressed it.

The Supervisor summed up SOP intervention with the word "eclectic," a word often used to describe probation supervision (Lemert and Dill, 1978). He said no SOP deputy was required to use any particular mode of treatment. When they were asked directly whether their SOP cases got treatment or services which were different than what regular clients got, SOP deputies seemed to agree that they did little different, just more of it. R.K. noted that with more contacts, each became less threatening and more congenial, while this greater attention was harder (but not impossible) for regular probation officers to do. D.R. said that any real attention or services is more than regular probationers received. K.L. answered that yes, treatment was different in that it was more intensive; they had more time, and did more follow through.

For this study, caseload size becomes the crucial discriminating treatment variable. Few other identifiable differences between SOP and regular probation could be discerned. In light of this, it is not surprising that SOP had little measureable impact on recidivism. It seems that community of origin and pre-intervention characteristics are the strongest predictors of outcome. The following chapters explore these themes.

## CHAPTER VI--URBANIZATION, COMMUNITY, AND VIOLENT DELINQUENCY

In Chapters IV and V, it appeared that violent and serious arrest rates were higher in Richmond, the county's major metropolitan area. This is consistent with the strong empirical evidence that crime and delinquency are disproportionately urban phenomena. Regardless of the measure of crime, serious and violent delinquency appears to increase with urbanization (Kornhauser, 1978; Laub and Hindelang, 1981; Messner, 1983). For example, National Crime Survey victimization data show that the rate of offending declines from central cities to suburbs to outside SMSA's (Laub, 1983). Among juveniles, serious delinquency rates increase as our geographical focus approaches the inner city (Shannon, 1984). In other words, urbanism and serious crime, among both youth and adults, are closely related.

However, these associations in turn raise a host of questions regarding the components of urbanism. The concentration of serious delinquency in urban areas may be attributable to differences in demographic, socioeconomic and structural composites of urban areas, rather than simply to the unique socialization processes which are characteristic of urban settings. Or, it is possible that urban "form" determines socialization of youths and social behavior in urban areas. This possibly confounding effect may underlie the general reluctance of criminologists to resolve the question of whether higher delinquency rates result from the social structural characteristics of communities or the aggregate characteristics of individuals who cluster in urban areas.

The relationship between urbanism and serious crime is evident in the analyses of pre- and post-project crime among SOP youth. Chapters IV and V show clearly that Richmond SOP youth had higher arrest rates for serious and violent crime, both before and after probation supervision. This is not surprising, since Richmond is the major urban locale in Contra Costa County. The Richmond youth sample resides in an area which manifests several aspects of urbanism: unemployment, poverty, concentrations of minority groups, and more crowded living conditions. Accordingly, we must consider whether the urban conditions which separate the Richmond sample from the other groups are important factors which explain the criminal career patterns of this population. That is the purpose of this chapter.



An important issue for SOP is whether social area is a modifying influence on the impact of extensive supervision. This chapter examines the relationship between urbanism, community socioeconomic conditions, and rates of serious and violent crime for the SOP population. Ecological explanations of crime have not been widely accepted, due to a variety of theoretical problems as well as measurement and conceptualization issues (Fagan, Kelly and Jang, 1984). Yet the empirical information in Chapter V suggests that, for the SOP study, social area effects may be an important source of differential crime rates between urban and other areas. The consistently higher rates of crime in Richmond strongly suggest that, in the absence of significant treatment differences, area effects are a potential explanatory factor.

### THE TRADITION OF SOCIAL AREA STUDIES

Since the 1920s, ecological influences on crime rates have been a central theme in criminology. It has long been posited that social disorganization and economic displacement result in conditions which give rise to high rates of juvenile crime. Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942) demonstrated empirically that the highest delinquency rates were found in the central city areas of Chicago which were marked by "social disorganization." Shaw (1931) noted that:

"... in the process of city growth, the neighborhood organizations, cultural institutions and social standards in practically all of the areas adjacent to the central business district and the major industrial centers are subject to rapid change and disorganization. The gradual invasion of these areas by industry and commerce, the continuous movement of the older residents out of the area and the influx of newer groups, the confusion of many divergent cultural standards, the economic insecurity of the families, all combine to render difficult the development of a stable and efficient neighborhood organization for the education and control of the child and the suppression of lawlessness."\*

Shaw and McKay found that these areas were characterized by low socioeconomic status, population heterogeneity, and high rates of residential mobility. For several decades, researchers consistently validated the early work of Shaw and McKay (see, for example, Chilton, 1964; Gordon, 1971; and Laub and Hindelang, 1981). In addition to the three factors cited by Shaw and McKay, the more recent studies showed that other urban

---

\*National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Causes of Crime, vol. 2, no. 13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 387.

characteristics were also related to crime rates: population density, area unemployment, and family structure (see, for example, Danzinger, 1976). Weis and Sederstrom (1981) cited weakened social institutions (e.g., school, churches) in high-crime neighborhoods as strong correlates of serious and violent delinquency.

Unfortunately, ecological explanations of crime have not been widely accepted. In the past quarter century, both research and policy have focused on individual or societal explanations of crime, for a variety of reasons. First, ecological explanations were thought to have limited utility in explaining individual behaviors. They do not describe the processes by which juveniles come to engage in delinquent behavior, or whether they continue into adult years (Shannon, 1984). As such, ecological factors serve only as correlates or epidemiological locators of delinquency.

Second, ecological studies have not been useful in "predicting" which individuals from high crime rate neighborhoods actually engage in criminal behavior. This concern has been more urgently stated in recent years as justice system resources become scarcer, and has led to a search for "individual" explanations and predictors of delinquency. The "ecological fallacy" has been a consistent roadblock, both methodologically and substantively, to the application of ecological information in crime control policy. In its simplest form, this concept states that effects observed at the community level do not equally affect all individuals within that community. Laub and Hindelang (1981) suggest that this had artificially separated the study of environmental from situational or individual influences.

Third, ecological factors have generally been poorly conceptualized, and frequently appear to be confounded with the social characteristics of urban populations. For example, urban ecology and race are often confounded in crime analyses. Laub (1983) found that race was a stronger predictor of crime rates than urbanism. Blau and Blau (1982) suggest that race interacts with socioeconomic status to account for variations in violent crime rates in urban areas. Messner (1982) showed that poverty was a useful predictor of urban homicide rates, but only where poverty was concentrated and in sharp contrast to surrounding areas. Also, past ecological research has relied too often on national data for too few variables, limiting the depth of knowledge gained on local context. One must turn to local data to increase the range of indicators, particularly in the realm of housing and land use (i.e., spatial relations).

Fourth, most prior ecological research on crime has utilized official records from police and the courts. Several researchers have noted the instability and pitfalls of official records. Chilton (1982) notes instability over time and across jurisdictions for lesser (i.e., misdemeanor) crimes. Black (1970) and McCleary (1982), among others, have described organizational processes which minimize the validity of cross-jurisdictional analyses of official arrest data. Several researchers have questioned whether official records more accurately reflect the behavior of the justice system or criminal offenders. For ecological analyses in particular, police precinct differences may affect arrest data between neighborhoods, since less powerful groups may be disproportionately selected for official processing (see, for example, Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). Recent research has noted differential penetration rates for minority youth in the juvenile justice system (Reed, 1983). Accordingly, ecological correlations may in fact reflect differences in patrol practices for certain neighborhoods rather than the actual differences in behaviors of people in those neighborhoods.

Recognizing the limitations, some researchers have utilized other data sources, including self-reported crime and victimization data. Weis and Sederstrom (1981), for example, utilized self-report data to analyze "community context" effects, and found correlations between serious delinquency and weak social institutions. Linking these socializing influences to ecological dimensions, they argued that ecological effects were important components of serious and violent delinquency. However, most self-report data has important limitations: the absence of specific questions on both serious crime and ecological influences in the offender's neighborhood. Fagan et al. (1983) addressed these concerns, but the sample was limited to violent offenders. Nevertheless, that study did find significant environmental influences.

Laub and Hindelang (1981) used victimization data to identify neighborhood characteristics associated with serious and violent delinquency. They found that over a five year period, there were disproportionately high rates of victimization and offending in neighborhoods characterized by high residential mobility, high structural density, high unemployment, and a high percentage of Black populations. An important finding was that the ecological associations using victimization data were the same as those found by other researchers using official records. They concluded that ecological effects were not attributable to justice system influences.

Finally, ecological research has been limited by difficulties in determining the locus of ecological effects. While there is broad agreement on the importance of milieu effects,

there is little consensus on an appropriate area size for study purposes. A variety of units have been used, ranging from blocks to "natural areas," census tracts, police grids or precincts, neighborhoods, "communities" of several residential neighborhoods, and SMSA's. Ecological studies have relied on either absolute indicators of various spatial or social dimensions in these broadly defined areas, or on measures of dispersion within an area. These conflicting methodologies have often yielded contradictory findings (Messner, 1982).

Shannon (1984) states that only neighborhoods would be sufficiently homogeneous for a definitive test of ecological (or milieu) effects. The U.S. Census Bureau defined neighborhood as "usually contiguous . . . block groups with a population minimum of 4,000" (Shenk and McInerny, 1978:22). Laub and Hindelang (1981) analyzed neighborhoods defined in this manner, and found them to be "relatively compact, contiguous, and homogeneous areas approximately the size of a census tract" (p. 15).

In sum, it appears that neighborhood offers a convenient and useful concept in which ecological influences on serious delinquency can be empirically analyzed. By isolating these spatial units which spawn and sustain delinquent involvement, we can also begin to understand the social processes within these areas and accordingly to establish theoretical linkages between the acts of individuals and the environments in which such behaviors develop. In turn, such information can lead to effective allocation of resources and enlightened crime control policies.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

To determine the environmental characteristics of each study youth, their census tracts were recorded. From census data, 13 variables were selected representing four ecological domains: socioeconomic status, demographics, labor force characteristics, and housing. These domains have been linked to urban homicide (Messner, 1982), serious criminal behavior (Braithewaite, 1979), and serious delinquency (Laub and Hindelang, 1981; Shannon, 1984). A data file was created linking each youth's self-reported criminality, arrest and disposition data, and the ecological characteristics of the census tract in which the youth resided at the time of termination from SOP or regular probation supervision.

Table 6.1 shows the ecological characteristics of the SOP population by treatment group. Richmond SOP (E<sub>2</sub>) youth live in communities which significantly differ from the other

youths' communities. In general, the differences reflect the social ecology and physical environment of Richmond, and offer graphic illustrations of the unique environmental conditions for the Richmond SOP youth. Moreover, these differences reflect the relative inequalities between Richmond and the other regions of the county. Richmond youth live in areas with higher concentrations of Blacks, households in poverty, lower median household income, higher levels of unemployment and undereducation, and more dense housing.

Table 6.1. Ecological Characteristics by Treatment Group

Ecological Characteristics	Treatment Group		
	E <sub>1</sub> (N=215)	Control (N=102)	E <sub>2</sub> (N=42)
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>			
% Black***	7.4	15.2	59.1
% Hispanic	5.0	4.9	5.9
% Other Minority	5.1	5.7	3.1
<b>Household Characteristics</b>			
% Female-Headed Households with Children***	8.1	9.6	16.4
% Female-Headed Households Below Poverty***	4.3	5.5	13.5
% Total Population in Poverty***	9.2	11.1	22.6
Median Household Income***	\$21,259	\$20,244	\$12,894
<b>Labor Force Characteristics</b>			
% Adults with 4 years High School or More***	76.2	75.1	58.5
% Unemployed (1979)***	7.6	8.2	16.7
% Unemployed More than 15 Weeks (1979)***	36.0	37.5	49.0
% Adults Employed in High Status Occupations	20.0	20.1	14.1
<b>Housing Characteristics</b>			
% Living in Same House as 5 Years Ago*	41.6	43.3	53.8
% Moved into Home Since 1970	76.9	74.2	66.2
% Units with More than 1.01 Persons/Room***	3.3	4.3	9.7
***p .001			
**p .01			
*p .05			

The largest disparities are for demographic characteristics, income, unemployment, and housing. In each case, Richmond youth live in areas which differ by 75% to over 100% for these indicators. These rather stark differences suggest that Richmond youth live in conditions of **relative inequality**, as well as absolute poverty. Messner (1982, 1983) has linked such economic deprivation to crime rates, including urban homicide. Braithwaite (1979) and Blau and Blau (1982) conclude that relative poverty is a stronger predictor than absolute poverty in explaining criminal behavior. That these conditions of relative

deprivation apply to Richmond youth is evident in Table 6.1, and offers a potentially powerful explanation of the recidivism findings in Chapter V.

Table 6.2 shows the zero-order correlations of each of the ecological variables with arrest records, by type of crime for each time period. Serious (felony property) and violent arrests are highly correlated with nearly all ecological indicators, including household poverty, labor force, and housing characteristics. Among population characteristics, serious and violent crime is correlated only with youth living in areas with higher concentrations of Black population. The relationships are most consistent for total arrests and violent arrests, and in the **pre-intervention** period. For the post-intervention period, the correlations are consistently present for serious and violent arrests, but not for total arrests.

For misdemeanor arrests--other violent, other serious, and other--the zero-order correlations are generally not significant in either time period. Apparently, the distribution of more serious arrests is skewed toward poorer neighborhoods, especially in the post-project period. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter V, which show that total arrests for Richmond youth were no greater than for others, but that they were more often charged with serious arrests. But Richmond is a poor, largely Black area. Thus, it remains difficult to untangle the (potentially) interactive effects of race and urbanism in explaining total crime and the distribution of severity.

Table 6.3 presents the zero-order correlations of self-reported crime with the ecological variables. The differences between Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are dramatic. Few significant relationships were identified with self-reported crime in either period. In some cases, there is a (significant) negative correlation for SRC where the arrest data showed as positive correlation. Also, poverty was inversely related to drug use in the pre-project period--youth living in areas of less poverty or more homogeneous populations had higher self-reported drug use.

Table 6.2. Zero-Order Correlations of Ecological Characteristics and Official Arrests  
(N=298)

Ecological Characteristics	Pre-Project Arrests						Post-Project Arrests					
	Total	Violent	Serious	Other Violent	Other Serious	Other	Total	Violent	Serious	Other Violent	Other Serious	Other
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>												
% Black	.16**	.23**	.18**	.12*	.01	.07	.02	.21**	.10*	-.04	.06	.00
% Hispanic	-.12*	-.04	-.06	-.03	-.04	-.08	.00	.10*	.10*	-.06	.02	.00
% Other Minority	-.12*	-.15**	.03	-.14**	-.04	-.07	.05	-.05	.04	-.02	.11*	.09
<b>Household Characteristics</b>												
% Female-Headed Households With Children	.12*	.21**	.14**	.12*	.02	.07	.03	.18**	.07	.00	.06	.00
% Female-Headed Households in Poverty	.13**	.23**	.13*	.13**	.03	.07	.07	.21**	.12*	.01	.04	.02
% Total Population Below Poverty	.08	.19**	.12*	.09	.00*	.04	.07	.20**	.14**	-.01	.06	.03
Median Household Income	-.02	-.14**	-.08	-.02	.04	.00	-.07	-.14**	-.14**	-.02	-.02	-.01
<b>Labor Force Characteristics</b>												
% Adults with 4 Yrs. High School or More	-.01	-.16**	-.07	-.02	-.00	.04	.00	.13*	.10	-.06	-.03	-.03
% Unemployed (1979)	.11*	.20**	.14**	.07	.04	.03	.10*	.26**	.16**	.01	.05	.04
% Unemployed More Than 15 Weeks (1979)	.01	.19**	.05	.00	.01	-.04	-.04	-.16**	-.14**	-.01	-.07	.02
% Adults in High Status Occupations	.01	-.08	.00	-.04	.02	.01	-.03	-.07	-.08	-.05	-.04	.01
<b>Housing Characteristics</b>												
% Living in Same House as 5 Years Ago	.09	.10*	.10*	.03	.06	.04	.01	.13**	.08	.02	.00	.03
% Moved Into Home Since 1970	-.03	-.13*	-.10*	.01	-.03	.05	-.04	-.13**	-.11	-.04	.06	.02
% Units With More Than 1.01 Persons per Room	.05	.17**	.12*	.09	.00	.01	.05	.24**	.15**	.00	.03	-.01

\*\*\*p .001  
\*\*p .01  
\*p .05

110

Table 6.3. Zero-Order Correlations of Ecological Characteristics and Self-Reported Delinquency  
(N=158)

Ecological Characteristics	Pre-Project Self-Reported Delinquency				Post-Project Self-Reported Crime			
	Total	Violent	Property	Drug Use	Total	Violence	Property	Drug Use
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>								
% Black	-.15*	-.17*	-.06	-.27**	-.15*	-.10	-.09	-.16*
% Hispanic	.03	-.05	.09	-.10	.01	-.02	.10	-.05
% Other Minority	.03	.05	.01	.01	.07	.09	.05	.05
<b>Household Characteristics</b>								
% Female-Headed Households with Children	-.08	-.10	.01	-.21	-.09	-.04	-.04	-.10
% Female-Headed Households in Poverty	-.12	-.17*	.01	-.22**	-.05	-.02	.02	-.09
% Total Population in Poverty	-.11	-.16*	-.01	-.21**	-.05	-.01	.02	-.09
Median Household Income	.03	.11	-.08	.12	-.09	-.11	-.17*	-.04
<b>Socioeconomic Characteristics</b>								
% Adults with 4 Years High School or More	.04	.12	-.07	.19**	-.05	-.04	-.15*	-.01
% Unemployed (1979)	-.11	-.16*	-.03	-.19**	-.02	-.03	.06	-.05
% Unemployed More Than 15 Weeks (1979)	-.04	-.10	.05	-.22**	.02	.03	.10	-.03
% Adults in "High Status" Occupations	-.02	.08	-.13	.10	-.03	-.02	-.13	-.04
<b>Housing Characteristics</b>								
% Living in Same House as 5 Years Ago	-.03	-.07	.03	-.19**	-.13*	-.15*	-.04	-.12
% Move Into Home Since 1970	.05	.08	-.02	.20**	.02	.03	-.06	.05
% Units With More Than 1.01 Persons Per Room	-.10	-.16*	.00	-.20**	-.09	-.04	-.01	-.09

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05



These results parallel the differences found in Chapter V between self-reported and official crime. There is virtually no relationship between ecological characteristics and self-reported crime. Earlier, we found that Richmond SOP youth had equivalent self-reported crime scores with other youth. Here, the ecological characteristics associated with the Richmond population--poverty, unemployment, and high percentages of minorities--are also unrelated to self-reported crime. Once again, we are confronted with the weak validity between official and self-report measures of crime.

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 examine the relationship between crime measures and ecological characteristics using a different method. The ecological domains were transformed into categorical variables based on their distributions. Then, ANOVA routines were used to measure differences in scale scores by severity of crime for two time intervals--before and after SOP intervention. Table 6.4 examines official records for total arrests and the three most severe crime types. Table 6.5 examines self-reported crime.

For neighborhoods with high concentrations of Blacks, violent and serious crime is significantly higher in both periods (Table 6.4). Other violent crime is also higher in the pre-intervention period, but not later on. A similar trend was found for housing density--violent crime rates were higher for more crowded households in both periods. All socio-economic characteristics showed higher violent crime rates in both periods for youth in neighborhoods with poorer families. For example, violent arrests were nearly twice as high when the median neighborhood family income was below \$15,000. In a few instances, serious crime rates also were higher for poorer areas. Similar results were obtained for the influence of labor force characteristics--violent and serious crime was significantly higher among youths living in neighborhoods characterized by high unemployment.

The results in Table 6.5 parallel the results in Table 6.3, and show marked differences with the results of the analyses using official arrest data. Again, youths living in poorer neighborhoods with higher concentrations of Blacks reported no differences in self-reported crime and, in fact, lower incidences of drug use in the earlier time period.

Table 6.4. Rearrests at Two Time Intervals by Ecological Characteristics of Youths' Neighborhoods  
(Mean Number of Arrests—Prevalence)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample		Pre-Project Arrests			Post-Project Arrests			Other Violent
	N	Total	Violent	Serious	Other Violent	Total	Violent	Serious	
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>									
% Black									
- 0-2	97	4.60	0.45***	0.47*	0.67*	3.68	0.14**	0.31*	0.33
- 3-10	97	4.62	0.51	0.46	0.70	3.96	0.19	0.55	0.34
- 11-30	55	4.11	0.55	0.62	0.40	4.07	0.20	0.53	0.18
- 31-100	49	6.24	0.90	0.98	0.98	4.27	0.49	0.88	0.27
% Other Minority									
- 0-2	77	5.71	0.69	0.73	0.79	3.58	0.25	0.40	0.29
- 3-5	102	4.97	0.59	0.45	0.73	3.56	0.21	0.52	0.27
- 6-10	96	3.91	0.48	0.53	0.60	4.71	0.23	0.63	0.38
- 11-100	23	4.52	0.35	0.87	0.43	3.61	0.22	0.48	0.09
<b>Household Characteristics</b>									
% Living in Same House as 5 years ago									
- 0-35	80	3.80	0.51	0.45	0.55	3.85	0.14	0.39	0.24
- 36-45	70	5.26	0.44	0.59	0.76	4.36	0.17	0.53	0.47
- 46-55	91	5.31	0.65	0.48	0.76	3.70	0.29	0.60	0.21
- 56-100	57	4.75	0.63	0.91	0.65	3.93	0.32	0.56	0.30
% Moved In Since 1970									
- 0-65	59	5.53	0.59	0.88	0.76	4.20	0.36	0.58	0.37
- 66-75	83	4.63	0.63	0.55	0.70	3.92	0.27	0.70	0.27
- 76-85	112	4.61	0.53	0.46	0.64	3.88	0.15	0.44	0.31
- 86-100	42	4.71	0.45	0.57	0.67	3.88	0.17	0.33	0.21
% with GT 1.01 Persons per Room									
- 0-2	114	5.07	0.44**	0.53	0.74	3.63	0.11**	0.35*	0.30
- 3-5	100	4.34	0.58	0.50	0.58	3.97	0.20	0.50	0.30
- 6-10	51	4.33	0.59	0.63	0.61	4.55	0.39	0.71	0.33
- 11-100	31	6.16	0.87	1.00	0.97	4.10	0.45	0.94	0.23

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .05

\*p .01

Table 6.4 (continued)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample		Pre-Project Arrests			Post-Project Arrests			Other Violent
	N	Total	Violent	Serious	Other Violent	Total	Violent	Serious	
<b>Socioeconomic Characteristics</b>									
% Female-Headed Households with Children									
- 0-6	73	4.56*	0.58***	0.44	0.66*	3.26	0.19*	0.41	0.12**
- 7-10	147	4.62	0.45	0.59	0.64	4.31	0.18	0.45	0.44
- 11-20	63	4.68	0.68	0.57	0.64	4.00	0.29	0.86	0.19
- 21-100	15	7.93	1.07	1.27	1.40	3.40	0.60	0.33	0.20
% Female-Headed Households in Poverty									
- 0-2	87	4.44	0.51***	0.44	0.62**	3.60	0.17*	0.41*	0.29
- 3-5	91	4.98	0.44	0.60	0.74	4.44	0.14	0.34	0.29
- 6-15	90	4.36	0.60	0.64	0.52	4.61	0.28	0.71	0.31
- 16-100	30	6.50	0.97	0.73	1.17	4.43	0.47	0.80	0.30
% Persons Below Poverty									
- 0-5	67	5.37	0.51**	0.43	0.82	3.22	0.16*	0.30	0.27
- 6-10	88	4.68	0.50	0.61	0.57	4.00	0.15	0.44	0.34
- 11-15	81	3.57	0.46	0.48	0.56	4.48	0.23	0.68	0.33
- 16-100	62	5.89	0.83	0.82	0.85	3.92	0.39	0.66	0.21
Median Income (\$)									
- 8,000 - 14,999	59	5.92	0.86***	0.88	0.86	4.10	0.41*	0.76	0.22
- 15,000 - 19,999	112	4.64	0.43	0.56	0.59	4.27	0.18	0.53	0.36
- 20,000 - 24,999	79	4.25	0.54	0.44	0.67	3.84	0.16	0.44	0.30
- 25,000 - 45,000	48	5.02	0.52	0.48	0.69	3.15	0.21	0.33	0.23

\*\*\*p .001  
 \*\*p .05  
 \*p .01

#11

Table 6.4 (continued)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample		Pre-Project Arrests			Post-Project Arrests			Other Violent
	N	Total	Violent	Serious	Other Violent	Total	Violent	Serious	
<b>Labor Force Characteristics</b>									
% Adults with 4 Years of High School or More									
- 0-60	59	4.76	0.69**	0.68	0.73	3.95	0.41*	0.85	0.19
- 61-75	90	4.88	0.68	0.59	0.61	4.22	0.22	0.51	0.31
- 76-85	87	4.67	0.38	0.60	0.76	3.84	0.14	0.41	0.34
- 86-100	62	4.84	0.53	0.45	0.63	3.66	0.18	0.37	0.31
% Unemployed (1979)									
- 0-4	58	5.59**	0.43***	0.71**	0.74	4.45	0.17*	0.53	0.36
- 5-8	96	3.72	0.58	0.31	0.52	3.40	0.18	0.41	0.25
- 9-12	90	4.52	0.42	0.57	0.67	4.07	0.18	0.48	0.33
- 13-100	54	6.26	0.89	0.94	0.93	4.15	0.44	0.78	0.24
% Unemployed More Than 15 Weeks									
- 0-30	65	4.95	0.43*	0.58	0.78	3.32	0.11**	0.42**	0.25
- 31-35	67	4.52	0.42	0.51	0.58	3.91	0.07	0.31	0.39
- 36-45	100	4.75	0.67	0.49	0.63	3.73	0.22	0.44	0.21
- 46-100	66	4.94	0.67	0.79	0.76	4.89	0.50	0.95	0.38
% Adults in "High-Status" Occupations									
- 0-12	64	5.05	0.63	0.63	0.77	4.70	0.39*	0.89*	0.30
- 13-20	114	4.49	0.63	0.55	0.65	3.39	0.20	0.40	0.22
- 21-30	91	5.02	0.42	0.54	0.73	4.08	0.18	0.49	0.42
- 31-100	29	4.62	0.59	0.76	0.45	4.00	0.10	0.24	0.21

\*\*\*p .001  
 \*\*p .05  
 \*p .01

Table 6.5. Self-Reported Crime at Two Time Intervals, by Ecological Characteristics of Youths' Neighborhoods  
(Mean SRC Scores--Prevalence)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample N	Pre-Project Self-Reported Crime				Post-Project Self-Reported Crime			
		Total	Violent	Property	General	Total	Violent	Property	General
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>									
% Black									
- 0-2	51	11.39	4.18	5.35	2.73**	6.18	1.35	2.96	1.41
- 3-10	50	10.86	4.08	5.02	2.40	6.24	1.86	2.90	1.66
- 11-30	30	11.07	4.10	5.13	2.00	6.93	1.83	3.63	1.63
- 31-100	27	8.26	2.63	4.67	0.81	3.85	1.00	2.15	0.74
% Other Minority									
- 0-2	41	9.34	3.39	4.46	1.78	5.22	1.27	2.76	1.37
- 3-5	53	11.94	4.34	5.77	2.60	5.94	1.45	2.91	1.36
- 6-10	48	10.13	3.63	4.77	2.04	6.75	1.94	3.21	1.54
- 11-100	16	11.06	4.25	5.38	2.00	5.38	1.38	2.63	1.38
<b>Housing Characteristics</b>									
% Living in Same House as 5 Years Ago									
- 0-35	45	10.11	3.82	4.56	2.31*	6.77	1.98	3.07	1.44*
- 36-45	31	12.55	4.68	5.87	3.10	7.79	1.81	3.74	2.16
- 46-55	45	10.22	3.56	5.07	1.93	4.84	1.31	2.38	1.13
- 56-100	37	10.14	3.62	5.12	1.46	5.05	1.08	2.76	1.11
% Moved In Since 1970									
- 0-65	59	9.89	3.46	4.91	1.43	5.17	1.23	2.80	1.11
- 66-75	83	11.27	4.12	5.54	2.20	5.49	1.39	2.76	1.49
- 76-85	112	10.48	3.90	4.97	2.38	6.91	1.84	3.55	1.62
- 86-100	42	10.95	4.18	4.68	2.68	5.41	1.59	1.77	1.32
% With GT 1.01 Persons Per Room									
- 0-2	60	10.87	4.25*	4.72	2.57	5.63	1.40	2.37	1.38
- 3-5	53	10.51	3.72	5.15	2.15	6.66	1.77	3.55	1.58
- 6-10	29	11.97	4.41	6.00	1.93	6.28	1.76	3.31	1.62
- 11-100	14	7.21	2.00	4.29	0.93	3.79	0.93	2.14	0.64

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table 6.5 (continued)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample N	Pre-Project Self-Reported Crime				Post-Project Self-Reported Crime			
		Total	Violent	Property	General	Total	Violent	Property	General
Socioeconomic Characteristics									
% Female-Headed Households With Children									
- 0-6	44	10.68	3.84	4.91	2.52	5.59	1.16	2.64	1.27
- 7-10	71	10.94	4.07	5.13	2.32	6.73	1.94	3.25	1.66
- 11-20	35	10.31	3.36	5.31	1.66	5.48	1.43	2.91	1.20
- 21-100	8	8.88	3.25	4.75	0.88	3.13	0.63	1.75	0.88
% Persons Below Poverty									
- 0-5	67	10.89	3.97	5.05	2.35*	5.51	1.30	2.38	1.30
- 6-10	88	11.07	4.10	5.02	2.52	5.74	1.38	2.83	1.50
- 11-15	81	11.07	4.16	5.23	2.39	7.59	2.18	3.89	1.80
- 16-100	62	9.25	3.14	5.03	1.23	4.57	1.20	2.43	0.97
% Female-Headed Households in Poverty									
- 0-2	50	10.68	4.18	4.70	2.32	5.20	1.16	2.36	1.14
- 3-5	42	11.43	3.98	5.48	2.52	6.24	1.71	2.93	1.83
- 6-15	48	10.33	3.81	4.98	2.15	7.21	2.04	3.75	1.56
- 16-100	18	9.39	2.89	5.56	0.89	3.94	0.89	2.33	0.83
Median Income (\$)									
- 8,000-14,999	31	9.29	3.16	5.05	1.16*	4.94	1.23	2.81	0.87*
- 15,000-19,999	59	10.71	3.97	5.02	2.39	6.93	1.93	3.51	2.08
- 20,000-24,999	35	11.89	4.06	5.23	2.31	6.45	1.71	3.09	1.21
- 26,000-45,000	33	10.39	4.15	5.03	2.52	4.58	0.97	1.85	1.18

\*\*\*p .001  
 \*\*p .01  
 \*p .05

Table 6.5 (continued)

Ecological Characteristics	Sample N	Pre-Project Self-Reported Crime				Post-Project Self-Reported Crime			
		Total	Violent	Property	General	Total	Violent	Property	General
<b>Labor Force Characteristics</b>									
% Adults with 4 Years of High School or More									
- 0-60	31	9.81	3.29	5.16	1.16*	5.87	1.45	3.39	1.19
- 61-75	49	11.45	3.98	5.65	2.29	6.39	1.65	3.31	1.55
- 76-85	37	10.22	3.81	4.92	2.65	6.24	1.68	3.08	1.62
- 86-100	41	10.63	4.22	4.51	2.32	5.20	1.37	2.00	1.24
% Unemployed (1979)									
- 0-4	34	11.68	4.47	5.24	2.23	6.47	1.85	2.62	1.21
- 5-8	47	10.00	3.60	4.38	2.40	5.11	1.09	2.66	1.69
- 9-12	48	11.17	4.08	5.21	2.56	6.90	1.94	3.44	1.89
- 13-100	29	9.52	3.24	5.14	1.00	5.10	1.28	2.90	0.90
% Unemployed 15 Weeks									
- 0-30	42	10.55	3.95	4.76	2.67*	5.40	1.45	2.24	1.09
- 31-35	31	11.87	4.87	5.32	2.65	6.94	1.77	3.32	2.39
- 36-45	49	10.31	3.47	5.08	2.04	5.84	1.41	3.04	1.29
- 46-100	36	10.08	3.44	5.28	1.31	5.86	1.64	3.25	1.52
% Employed in "High-Status" Occupations									
- 0-12	36	10.25	3.44	5.33	1.67	5.50	2.25	2.89	1.55
- 13-20	53	11.28	3.98	5.55	2.21	6.25	1.88	3.23	1.32
- 21-30	48	10.38	3.81	4.96	2.42	6.29	1.99	3.10	2.01
- 31-100	21	10.19	4.43	3.81	2.29	5.14	2.41	1.86	1.04

\*\*\*p .001  
 \*\*p .01  
 \*p .05

## SOCIAL AREA INFLUENCES ON TREATMENT IMPACT

Chapter V showed that SOP youths, particularly in Richmond, had higher rates of arrest for violent crimes both before and after intervention. Thus far in this chapter, the relationship between urbanism and arrests for violent crime is again strong. Youths in areas marked by higher rates of unemployment, poverty, minority population, and denser housing are more often arrested for violent and serious crimes, both before and after probation supervision. Table 6.1 showed clearly that Richmond SOP youth reside in such areas. At the same time, there were no differences in pre- and post-supervision self-reported crime among the three treatment populations. And the relationship between urbanism and violent crime is reversed when crime is measured by self-reports!

Accordingly, an important policy issue is the relationship between probation supervision and social area effects. If both criminality and treatment impact vary by social area, a central question is whether the effects of SOP intervention are mediated by the ecological characteristics of the offender's neighborhood. The practical applications of such knowledge would include, at a minimum, the differentiation of intervention models, tailored to the area characteristics of a probation caseload. Tables 6.6-6.9 examine these relationships, repeating the recidivism measures used in Chapter V.

For each of the four domains of area effects, one variable was selected to represent the domain. The variables were selected using the analyses in Tables 6.1-6.5, as well as from stepwise multivariate regression analyses of the variables within each domain. Variables with significant relationships with the several crime measures, as well as those with maximum contributions to variance explained, were chosen to represent the domain. The variables included:

- o demographics--percent Black population;
- o poverty--percent female-headed households below poverty level;
- o housing--percent of housing with more than 1.01 persons per room;
- o labor force--percent unemployed 15 weeks or more.

ANOVA models were used to test the relationship between probation supervision and recidivism, with the ecological variables introduced as covariates. Time at risk, or street time, was used also as a covariate to control for varying career lengths. Main effects for sex also were tested.



Table 6.6. Analysis of Variance for Post-Project Rearrests by Treatment Group and Sex, Controlling for Time at Risk and Community Context Variables (N=289)

Source	df	Violent		Serious Property		Other Violent		Other Property		Other		Total	
		F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Treatment	2	0.51	--	0.36	--	0.66	--	0.20	--	0.58	--	1.06	--
Sex	1	6.40	.012	10.76	.001	0.00	--	5.78	.018	9.19	.003	11.95	.001
Time at Risk	1	6.76	.010	16.22	.000	0.90	--	2.87	--	15.75	.000	9.93	.002
Demographics	1	0.80	--	0.46	--	2.41	--	1.09	--	0.58	--	2.00	--
Poverty	1	0.00	--	0.90	--	3.04	--	0.14	--	2.50	--	4.75	.030
Labor Force	1	0.80	--	0.66	--	1.33	--	2.55	--	0.10	--	0.24	--
Housing	1	5.03	.026	0.24	--	0.01	--	0.04	--	0.78	--	0.17	--
Treatment by Sex	2	0.01	--	0.28	--	0.09	--	0.04	--	0.28	--	0.04	--
Explained	10	3.30	.000	3.43	.000	0.32	--	1.37	--	2.87	.002	2.93	.002

Table 6.7. Analysis of Variance for Time to First Re-Arrest by Treatment Group,  
Controlling for Time at Risk and Community Context Variables  
(N=314)

Source	df	Violent		Serious Property		Other Violent		Other Property		Other		Total	
		F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Treatment	2	1.27	--	2.04	--	1.06	--	0.87	--	0.81	--	0.03	--
Time at Risk	1	3.07	--	3.09	--	3.55	--	7.49	.008	0.92	--	4.50	.035
Demographics	1	0.45	--	0.02	--	2.04	--	0.21	--	0.21	--	0.08	--
Poverty	1	0.04	--	2.98	--	0.67	--	0.03	--	0.06	--	1.19	--
Labor Force	1	4.69	.036	1.64	--	1.09	--	0.72	--	0.05	--	0.64	--
Housing	1	0.22	--	1.68	--	0.43	--	0.04	--	0.04	--	0.89	--
Explained	7	1.52	--	1.95	--	1.71	--	1.89	--	0.72	--	1.45	--

### **Probation Supervision, Arrests and Social Effects**

Table 6.6 examines the influence of supervision on recidivism, using official arrest data. The results again show no intervention effects, but significant differences by sex and time at risk for nearly all types of crime. These results were examined previously in Chapter V and require no further discussion.

Of interest in these tables are the influences of the four ecological domains. Few significant relationships were found. Only violent and total crimes varied by area effect--for housing and poverty factors, respectively. Overall, the absence of a discernable **pattern** of effects across crime types suggests that, for official arrests, treatment impacts on recidivism are not mediated by area effects. Nevertheless, the overall explanatory power of the equations was consistently high, a finding easily attributed to the effects of sex differences and risk time.

### **Time to Rearrest and Social Area Effects**

Table 6.7 determines whether social area effects mediate the relationship between probation supervision and time to first rearrest. In these analyses, sex was excluded as a main effect to minimize sample attrition. The results show few significant relationships except time at risk. Area effects--labor force--mediate only time to first violent arrest. Together with Table 6.3 and 6.4, the results suggest that the first rearrest for a violent offense will likely occur more quickly for probationers residing in areas of high unemployment.

### **Probation Supervision, Self-Reported Crime, and Social Area Effects**

The relationship between area effects and self-reported crime is shown in Table 6.8. Again, there are significant post-supervision sex differences for each of the four SRC measures consistent with the analyses in Chapter V.

In these analyses, we see the first consistent relationship between area effects and crime. Area demographics--percent Black population--is significantly related to each type of crime. Tables 6.3 and 6.5 showed an **inverse** (though not significant) relationship between SRC and concentrations of Black population, irrespective of probation supervision group. Here, it appears that demographic composition apparently is a mediating influence on supervision effectiveness.

Table 6.8. Analysis of Variance for Post-Supervision Self-Reported Crime by Treatment Group and Sex, Controlling for Time at Risk and Community Context Variables (N=156)

Source	df	Violence		Property		Total		Drug Use	
		F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Treatment	2	0.13	--	0.51	--	0.42	--	1.25	--
Sex	1	5.98	.016	9.42	.003	8.95	.003	3.25	.073
Demographics	1	4.19	.042	9.26	.003	8.23	.005	4.74	.031
Poverty	1	2.33	--	3.68	--	3.42	--	0.74	--
Labor Force	1	0.03	--	2.16	--	0.88	--	0.78	--
Housing	1	0.53	--	0.99	--	1.76	--	0.50	--
Treatment by Sex	2	0.07	--	0.15	--	0.27	--	0.10	--
Explained	10	1.12	--	2.09	.029	1.97	.041	1.49	--

Table 6.9 examines these relationships. As in Table 6.5, the demographic variable was categorized and the mean SRC scales are computed by probation group. The results show no significant differences, possibly due to the transformation of the variable from continuous to categorical. Overall, the **lowest** scores by probation group **and** type of crime are reported by youths living in the neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of Blacks. However, the cell frequencies for the Richmond SOP (E<sub>2</sub>) group are quite low. Accordingly, the mean SRC scores may be unstable for this group. Yet these youth most often reside in neighborhoods with large Black populations, and their scores represent the youths from homogeneous neighborhoods. Thus, this particular analysis may be "underinformed."

Nevertheless, it is important to note that youths in the neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of Blacks consistently report lower SRC scores in the post-project period. At the same time, these differences are the least for SRC-Violence, and greatest for SRC-Total. In general, the scores are lowest at the extremes of the demographic variable, and highest at "moderate" levels of integration (11-30% Black population). This suggests that neighborhood heterogeneity, rather than an offender's ethnicity, may be a correlate of crime. From a different perspective, this may suggest a relative inequality phenomenon. In areas with palpably contrasted populations, the effects of social differences may be associated with self-reported crime.

Table 6.9. Mean SRC Scores by Treatment Group, Controlling for Area Demographic Characteristics (N=158)

% Minority Population	N (%)	Violent			Property			Total		Drug Use			
		E1	Control	E2	E1	Control	E2	E1	Control	E2	E1	Control	E2
0-2%	51 (32.3)	1.24	1.42	3.00	2.92	2.75	5.00	5.86	6.50	10.00	1.38	1.42	2.00
3-10%	50 (31.6)	2.06	1.60	1.00	3.22	2.40	2.00	6.69	5.73	4.00	1.50	2.07	1.33
11-30%	30 (19.0)	1.78	2.00	1.00	3.39	4.00	4.00	6.56	7.45	8.00	1.39	2.09	1.00
31-100%	27 (17.1)	1.17	0.67	1.07	1.83	2.50	2.13	3.67	3.83	3.93	0.83	0.67	0.73
<b>Total</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>1.62</b>	<b>1.52</b>	<b>1.24</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>2.91</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>6.14</b>	<b>6.11</b>	<b>4.71</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>1.70</b>	<b>0.95</b>

## Justice System Penetration and Social Area Effects

Finally, we sought to determine if the social area characteristics of each probationer varied according to his or her most serious post-project disposition--or justice system penetration--and if those relationships differed by treatment group. In other words, are youth from varying neighborhoods treated differently by the courts? Did SOP effect those patterns? Table 6.10 presents data showing the mean social area characteristics of youth in each treatment group, according to their furthest penetration into the justice system.

The patterns obtained in these analyses differed little from the other analyses using official records. SOP impact was minimal and not statistically significant. Irrespective of probation group, offenders receiving the most serious disposition (i.e., incarceration) often resided in areas with many of the components of urbanism: poverty, high percentages of minority populations, unemployment, and crowded housing. However, the differences were not statistically significant; the trends were not particularly systematic. In other words, "place" does not explain justice system penetration.

Overall, demographic characteristics most readily demarked those youth penetrating furthest. Youth living in areas with higher percentages of Black population more often were incarcerated. The trends for the remaining urban characteristics were quite varied, and indicated no strong relationship between urbanism and justice system response. For SOP and control youth, incarcerated youths tended to reside in neighborhoods with more Blacks. For Richmond SOP youth, few differences were observed. But this group was primarily a Black population.

The E<sub>2</sub> result is expected. There is little heterogeneity on these variables for the Richmond youths. In contrast, the other probation groups are quite homogeneous on these dimensions. Pittsburgh, for example, is a village in the East County area with a substantial Black population. Accordingly, the data suggest that social area characteristics, especially those related to Black population centers, may effect justice system penetration. In Chapter V, we saw that incarceration was more common for Richmond SOP youth. Here, we see a similar result. However, within each group (and across groups as well), the racial characteristics of an offender's neighborhood may bear more heavily on the outcome of his or her arrest charge and the severity of the subsequent disposition than the individual's ethnicity.

Table 6.10. Most Serious Disposition by Treatment Group and Community Context Variables  
(N=361)

Most Serious Disposition	E <sub>1</sub>				Control				E <sub>2</sub>			
	% Black	% Poor	% Out of Work	% Dense Housing	% Black	% Poor	% Out of Work	% Dense Housing	% Black	% Poor	% Out of Work	% Dense Housing
None	7.6	4.6	7.7	3.5	14.9	5.3	7.9	4.4	58.9	13.4	16.8	9.1
Probation	7.5	3.9	7.2	3.4	12.5	4.8	7.3	3.4	60.1	15.3	18.7	10.0
In-County Placement	3.7	3.6	7.5	2.9	6.8	4.5	7.5	3.2	47.3	12.5	18.8	10.0
Incarceration	10.0	4.1	7.3	2.9	20.8	6.4	9.1	5.1	63.9	13.9	15.4	10.4

## SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND VIOLENT CRIME

The absence of treatment-neighborhood relationships should not obscure the importance of the findings in this chapter. The relationship among urbanism, race, and crime is highly controversial. While they are closely related, it is possible that race interacts with socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty) to account for variations in crime rates (Blau and Blau, 1982). Gordon (1975) suggests that race-crime relationships are confounded by race-urbanism relationships. The interesting relationship in this section is not a race effect per se on crime, but a heterogeneity effect. That is, the **concentration** of minority populations (or, conversely, the absence of majority populations) appears to be correlated with juvenile arrest rates and subsequent incarcerations.

Overall, both sides of the "race or place" argument can find support in these analyses. Though race and crime are closely linked (see Silberman, 1978, and Laub, 1983 for thorough reviews of this relationship), the meaning of the relationship is unclear. These trends suggest that it may not be the higher proportion of Blacks, or lower proportions of Whites, which is related to serious and violent juvenile crime. Rather, it is the homogeneity of neighborhoods which may be significant. For probationers living in predominantly Black neighborhoods, arrests are more severe, though not more frequent. There is vulnerability here to discretion. Incarceration is more common for youth in heterogeneous neighborhoods where there are higher percentages of Blacks. And self-reported crime is lowest for youth in predominantly Black neighborhoods. As Silberman (1979) has suggested, the relationship between race and crime remains central to criminology but so too is the urban phenomenon central to both race and crime. Perhaps further study of the relationships between urbanism, ecology, race, and delinquency will unravel this web. Equally important is the development of an understanding of the social process and socialization experiences of these neighborhoods, as well as the responses of law enforcement and the courts.

The role of ecological variables may be related more to the **process** of delinquent socialization than to the cause. Laub (1983) suggests that urbanism may erode the restraints that inhibit criminal behavior, while Fagan et al. (1983) view environmental conditions primarily as reinforcers of criminality. These reinforcers are often cast as motivating influences in various social learning paradigms (Conger, 1978). Viewing neighborhood ecological factors within an anomie-strain paradigm, it appears that relative poverty and inequality indeed are factors at the social structural level which are central to the socialization of youths in inner cities.



The apparent relationships between crime and labor force, housing, demographics, and socioeconomic factors suggest that these may be part of a social process tied to urbanism and urban form. The relationship correlation between racial homogeneity and juvenile arrests may indicate a relationship between social structure and social process in neighborhoods with higher poverty levels. The apparent relationship between higher proportions of Blacks and arrests for violent delinquency may be explained alternatively by historically differential Black experiences in the United States (Silberman, 1978), selective enforcement and social control (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971), or the confounding of urbanism with Black population in American cities (Laub, 1983). The SRC results in this study suggest that discretion may play an active role in charging practices, and that this discretion is reversed in sentencing. All these explanations, themselves rooted in social structural variables, hold implications for socialization of urban youths and their apparently higher rates of violent crime. That we could separate SOP impact from social area suggests that we must attend to these factors in designing treatment interventions. What works in middle-class areas may require rethinking elsewhere.

## CHAPTER VII--SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL LEARNING, AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME

The parens patriae policy of the juvenile court has guided American delinquency policy since the development of the first Juvenile Court in 1899. According to this ideal, delinquent youth are viewed as having encountered family, social, or developmental problems on the road to maturity. Through the guidance of the juvenile court and its determination of appropriate services to correct the youth's problems, it is believed that the youth will be able to return to a prosocial developmental path as he or she moves into adulthood. Despite the emergence and downfall over time of numerous explanations of youthful deviance, each offering a unique promise to "cure" our society of juvenile crime, the juvenile court has maintained at its core an optimistic philosophy that juveniles can and should be "rehabilitated."

Rehabilitation and treatment are inextricably tied to assumptions about the etiology and process of delinquency. Yet there is widespread agreement that no single explanation of delinquency can adequately "explain" or predict juvenile crime (Hawkins and Weis, 1979; Fagan and Jones, 1984). Also, the recent and well-publicized criticisms of rehabilitative interventions, including probation, have raised new questions not only on the efficacy of treatment but also about our understanding of juvenile crime and ultimately on the wisdom of parens patriae as the guiding principle for delinquency policy (Feld, 1983). For many critics, the future of the rehabilitative ideal may depend on the emergence of new treatment technologies which reflect an understanding of the origins of serious and violent delinquency. If the sources or "causes" of serious delinquency can be identified, then rehabilitative interventions may reduce recidivism. If not, accepted assumptions about the mutability of etiology, rehabilitative policy, and crime may need to be reassessed.

SOP intervention, like many other delinquency experiments, was built on assumptions about rehabilitative interventions. SOP was developed in a social control paradigm, where specially trained staff with small caseloads intervened to provide services to strengthen the "social and family" functioning of violent offenders while quickly sanctioning anti-social or criminal behaviors. Though not specifically informed by theory, SOP practices were designed to reinforce societal bonds, "unlearn" deviant behaviors through quick response and sanctions, and equip probationers with the necessary social and personal

skills to live crime-free. SOP interventions occurred by referrals to providers as well as by the SOP deputies themselves.

In this chapter, we examine the social control underpinnings of SOP intervention. Using an integrated theoretical framework combining strain, control, and learning theories, we analyze the impact of SOP in terms of the relationship between societal bonds and criminality. The implications for SOP and the policy of intensive supervision lie in the identification of salient areas of social development--learning, environment, social and personal skills--which can become focal points for rehabilitative efforts by probation officers. This type of "strategic" intervention can inform the design of intensive probation supervision programs for violent offenders in the transition from adolescence to adulthood.

The data for this chapter were gathered from follow-up interviews conducted with 165 SOP youth from two to four years after the end of supervision. The scales and variables used were developed initially as part of a research program on violent delinquency (Hartstone and Fagan, 1982; Fagan and Jones, 1984). Many of the measures are standardized scales developed for a probability sample of youth ages 11-21 in a panel study on the etiology of delinquency (Elliott and Ageton, 1980). The theoretical framework is described below, followed by analyses of the impact of SOP intervention.

## THEORIES OF DELINQUENCY AND THEORIES OF VIOLENCE

A fundamental pursuit of criminology is the pursuit of causes (Haskell and Yablonsky, 1978). Since 1899, youths who violated the law were placed under the relatively benign wing of the juvenile court. There, the disapproved behavior was treated as a family or community problem, regardless of why the act occurred or whether it involved a violation of parental authority or a violent crime. The theories which guided the traditional juvenile court response are based on vague perceptions of all juvenile delinquents as products of various sets of causes, all of which were presumed to affect a broad range of youths equally and which lead to a predictable range of behaviors. Treatment responses to delinquent youth also reflected this "unicausal" view of widely varying behaviors.

Yet we now know that such views of violent offenders are not consistent with empirical evidence. Recent reviews of delinquency theory and supporting empirical research show that the current competing explanations of the causes of violent juvenile delinquency are in need of further elaboration and integration (e.g., Weis and Sederstrom, 1981). Juvenile

delinquency and violent juvenile crime are complex phenomena involving interactional, individual, situational, and environmental influences (Earls, 1979; Sadoff, 1978). Hawkins and Weis (1980), for example, reviewed ten self-reported delinquency data sets and concluded that there are multiple correlates and causes of delinquency operating within the institutional domains of family, schools, peers, and community. To the extent that any theory or set of theories fails to take into account and integrate each of these influences, its explanatory power and, thereby, its usefulness as an intervention theory--is limited.

### **Previous Attempts to Integrate Theory**

Over the past thirty years and particularly during the past decade, a number of theories have been advanced and modified to explain the causes of juvenile delinquency and, to a lesser extent, violence. Although there are several major schools of etiological thought and variations within each, two primary thrusts dominate both past and present research. One orientation focuses primarily on the individual personality. In this view, youth become delinquent through a predisposition (physical or psychic) and/or developmental trauma. This psychogenic thrust is evident in positions that ascribe the motivation for delinquency to such causes as faulty family interaction patterns, instinctual aggressiveness and neurological dysfunction. The second orientation stresses the contribution of social, economic, cultural, and situational factors in the development of delinquent behavior. These sociogenic theories address the correlation of high delinquency rates with rapid population turnover, minority and low-income status, and social disruption as reflected in broken homes, suicide, alcoholism, and child abuse and neglect.

There have been several attempts recently to integrate these theoretical orientations. One common interface has been between social learning theory and control theory (cf. Conger, 1980; Hawkins and Weis, 1980); others have integrated strain with control perspectives (Elliott and Voss, 1974). Elliott et al. (1979) have proposed a combination of the control, strain, and social learning approaches. The dynamic relationships among the variables and processes of these integrated models present opportunities to intervene with both the "causes" of delinquency (via control theory) and the manner in which these causes operate in the social development context (via social learning theory) (Hawkins and Weis, 1980).

In sum, an integrated theory that addresses the "special case" of violent delinquency includes both psychological and sociological approaches to violent behavior. It relies on

properties of both the individual and the environment to explain behavior and simultaneously identifies factors on which to focus treatment and intervention. Finally, it specifies both the factors that underlie violent delinquency and the processes by which youths may become delinquent and/or violent.

### **An Integrated Theory to Analyze SOP Intervention**

The theoretical model of violent delinquency for the SOP evaluation integrates control, strain, and social learning perspectives of delinquent behavior (as in Elliott et al., 1979). It identifies salient factors on which to focus treatment interventions by describing the processes that govern both socialization and delinquent behavior development (Hawkins and Weis, 1980) and by specifying a motivational component (Kornhauser, 1978; Conger, 1980). The incorporation of individual differences addresses those correlates of violence that cannot be easily explained within a broader conceptualization of delinquency. Thus, by specifying **violence** as the behavior to be studied, the intervention theory necessarily incorporates psychosocial factors unique to a population of violent adolescents (Sorrells, 1977; 1980).

The model includes two types of "control" bonds--integration and commitment--which are the elements of socialization (Elliott et al., 1979). Integration, or external bonds, includes such variables as social roles, participation in conventional activities, and the presence of effective sanctioning networks. Subsumed in these variables are involvement in, and attachment to, conventional groups such as family, schools, careers, peers, etc. Commitment, or internal bonds, includes such variables as conventional goals, norms, and values; personal attachment to parents and peers; social identification; and feelings of control.

Strain and learning theory focus on the processes (i.e., the specific experiences or conditions) that strengthen or weaken social bonds and allow for the "learning" of criminal values and behavior patterns vs. conventional values and behaviors. Attenuating processes include delinquent learning, negatively reinforcing failure experiences in conventional activities, blocked opportunities, and the effects of social disorganization at home, in school, or on the streets that threatens the stability and cohesion of one's conventional social groups. The learning component is also informed by certain labeling theorists who have noted the learning involved in the assignment of a negative label (Schur, 1973).

Integrated theory includes a variety of psychosocial factors which reflect early childhood socialization experiences. Factors which might distinguish violent youth as a subset of delinquent youth include predisposing variables such as violent families (Fagan et al., 1981; Alfaro, 1978), lack of empathy, and emotional disturbance (Sorrells, 1980).

The model includes variables which record delinquent socialization across social class. Although these do not obviate class distinctions they do attempt to examine similarities across class as well as differences. It prescribes factors on which to focus intervention: goals and opportunities, and the bonds of integration and commitment. It also prescribes a behavioral component (social learning) for intervention in the process of involvement in delinquent behavior. Finally, the inclusion of psychosocial factors introduces predisposing variables that may account for violent behavior in youths with either strong or weak bonds.

The theoretical model suggests that youth may become delinquent and/or violent in one of two ways. First, individual psychological factors or early socialization experiences can precipitate outbursts of violence--for example, the episodic dyscontrol described by Sorrells (1977; 1980). Second, youths may be "socialized" to become delinquent and/or violent. In this framework, social and personal bonds to "conformity" are underdeveloped or weakened, and youths are socialized (i.e., reinforced) to a delinquent lifestyle through peer influences. Hirschi (1969), in his formulation of control theory, suggests that peer influence is an important supplement to explanations of why delinquent behavior occurs when social bonds are weakened.

Social bonds develop in the units in which socialization occurs: family, school, law, and peers. If youths develop weak social bonds to schools, family, the law, or positive peers, they become free to associate with and be influenced by delinquent peers. Under such conditions, given individual factors, violent delinquency may occur. Even where youths have developed strong bonds, violence may occur due to individual factors, or because the bonds they have developed are to violent peers. Social environments are important reinforcing agents to strengthen or mitigate social bonds.

How do strong bonds develop? Strong external bonds result from positive labeling and reinforcement through school or job achievement, involvement in activities perceived as important, and a positive family environment. Strong internal bonds develop from an effective sanctioning network, setting and attainment of personal goals, and a belief in self-determination and control over one's environment. The development of social and

personal bonds is mediated by early socialization experiences (e.g., violence as model behavior) and psychosocial development (e.g., child rearing practices, child abuse, family cohesion). Violence can occur either when positive social bonds are weakened and the influence of violent peers becomes the youth's primary social bond, or when learned violent behavior takes over under feelings of stress, conflict, or anger/rage. The model is graphically depicted in Figure 7.1.

The following sections examine the impacts of SOP intervention in terms of the social development variables which comprise the integrated theory of violent delinquency. First, we examine the SOP and control groups during the pre-intervention period to assess the strength of their social and personal bonds at the time of referral to the program. Random assignment procedures suggested that no differences should exist between groups. Yet the pre-intervention SRD scores differed. Accordingly, we sought to determine possible contributors to these differences from the explanatory model.


Next, we analyzed the relationship of these baseline indicators to self-reported delinquency for each experimental group during this period. These analyses were designed to identify those variables and constructs which explain the differences in official and self-reported criminality prior to SOP.\* These variables are then introduced into later analyses of post-intervention criminality to control for pre-intervention between-group differences.

The analyses of SOP impact on post-intervention social functioning and criminality examines first differences between groups for each of the classes (domains) of theoretical variables in the post-intervention period, and also assesses the changes within domains for each group from before to after intensive supervision. Then, a combined model with variables from within each domain is tested to predict self-reported and official criminality in the post-intervention period for each treatment group and for the entire SOP cohort. The results not only provide an empirical test of this integrated theory for a cohort of offenders in the transition from adolescence to adulthood, but also suggest directions for the design of intensive supervision strategies for this high-risk group of young offenders.

---

\*In Chapter IV, we saw that there were differences between the experimental groups in their baseline criminality, and that the E<sub>2</sub> (Richmond) SOP groups had higher arrest rates in the pre-intervention period.

Figure 7.1. Integrated Theoretical Model of Violent Delinquency





## SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO SOP INTERVENTION

Tables 7.1 and 7.2 compare SOP with control and Richmond SOP groups on social development variables within each theoretical domain for the pre-intervention period. Mean scale scores were computed and differences analyzed using one-way ANOVA tests. Only SCHOOL INTEGRATION was significantly different among probation groups, with SOP (East County) youth having weaker attachments to school. Apparently, the other social and personal bonds for the three groups were generally of comparable strength.

**Table 7.1. Pre-Intervention Social and Personal Bonds and Self-Reported Crime (Mean Scale Scores) by Treatment Group**

	E <sub>1</sub> (N=99)	Control (N=46)	E <sub>2</sub> (N=20)
<b>Social Bonds</b>			
School Integration*	0.15	0.33	0.30
Family Integration	2.59	2.74	2.45
Peer Integration	0.87	0.87	0.80
Neighborhood Integration	1.20	1.20	1.30
Work Integration	1.20	1.20	1.30
Work Integration	NA	NA	NA
Juvenile Justice System Contact	1.54	1.61	2.00
<b>Personal Bonds</b>			
School Commitment	1.56	1.67	1.70
Family Commitment	1.17	1.11	1.40
<b>Behaviors</b>			
Gang Member	0.25	0.30	0.45
Drinking/Drug Problems	0.60	0.35	0.28
<b>Self-Reported Crime</b>			
o Violence	2.68	2.67	2.50
o Property**	1.90	2.17	1.30
o Total*	2.12	2.20	1.60
o General Drug Use*	1.61	1.37	1.00

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

There were significant differences for PROPERTY, TOTAL, and DRUG self-reported delinquency scales. It is important to note that Richmond SOP youth, whose arrest rates for violent crime were significantly higher (Table 5.1), had consistently lower SRD scores for non-violent crimes, and were no different for VIOLENCE.

Table 7.2 shows the mean scale scores for youths' perceptions of their social environments prior to the committing offense. These scales represent the socializing (reinforcing) properties of the youths' immediate social environments, including family, school, peers, and neighborhoods. Several differences appeared between SOP and control groups. Overall, Richmond SOP youth reported consistently lower scores for these influences in their social environments. There was less crime and conflict for Richmond SOP youth in each domain except NEIGHBORHOOD, where they reported a higher prevalence of crime and conflict.

Table 7.2 Pre-Intervention Social Environment Variables  
(Mean Scale Scores) by Treatment Group

Social Environment Variables	E <sub>1</sub> (N=99)	Control (N=46)	E <sub>2</sub> (N=20)
School Crime*	7.03	7.37	4.80
Family Conflict	1.41	1.46	0.60
Family Criminality	4.95	5.20	3.05
Sibling Drug Use*	1.65	1.65	0.60
Parent Drinking	1.67	1.33	0.70
Peer Delinquency***	2.34	2.39	0.90
Neighborhood Crime*	1.37	1.54	1.75

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

These results are consistent with the SRD results in Table 7.1. It appears that lower rates of self-reported crime correspond with social environments which are perceived as either less conflicted or characterized by less crime. Yet, it is difficult to reconcile these results with the results in earlier chapters. In Chapter V, we saw that the severity of arrests was greatest for Richmond SOP youth. In Chapter VI, the socioeconomic setting for Richmond SOP youth had the highest rates of crime, poverty and unemployment. Yet the data in Table 7.2 show that, at least for the pre-intervention period, Richmond SOP youth saw their social environments in a different light than other data would suggest. This in turn seems to be associated with lower rates of self-reported crime. If, in fact, these environmental variables represent socializing influences, there appear to be qualities in the Richmond area which exert a more positive influence on its youngsters than other parts of the county.

But these results also raise validity questions with respect both to the scales themselves as well as the reliance on retrospective reporting. It is important to remember that the

recall period is at least three, and as many as five, years. Accordingly, the analyses of pre-intervention data are used only for data reduction purposes to inform the analyses of post-intervention criminality. By identifying variables contributing to pre-intervention criminality, we can introduce appropriate statistical and conceptual controls to better understand the relationship between SOP, social development, and subsequent criminality.

### **Pre-Intervention Correlates of Delinquency**

To determine which variables were contributors to self-reported crime prior to SOP, step-wise multiple regression analyses were conducted within treatment groups for each of the pre-intervention SRC scores. The variables selected were those which were significantly different between treatment groups. From Tables 7.1 and 7.2, five variables were selected: SCHOOL INTEGRATION, SCHOOL CRIME, SIBLING DRUG USE, PEER DELINQUENCY (T<sub>1</sub>) and NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME (T<sub>1</sub>).

Readers should bear in mind the purpose of these analyses were not intended to explain delinquency prior to SOP (T<sub>1</sub>). Rather, the goal was to identify those theoretical variables which appear to be associated with T<sub>1</sub> self-reported crime for inclusion in subsequent analyses of post-intervention criminality. Accordingly, these analyses were limited to those in which variables differed across groups. This strategy was adopted in lieu of alternative analytic strategies relying either on change scores (between the pre- and post-intervention periods) or more elaborate analyses of data reduction strategies using the entire T<sub>1</sub> data set. Each of these was judged to be inherently weaker (due to small intra-group sample sizes) and inappropriate given the retrospective qualities of the T<sub>1</sub> variables.

The results are shown in Table 7.3, including the percent of variance explained by each variable for each SRC subscale. Each of the models explained at least 23% of the variance, and the maximum was 57% (TOTAL for controls). A consistent pattern emerges with respect to individual variables' contributions. For all three groups, PEER DELINQUENCY is the strongest contributor in nearly all models. Only SIBLING DRUG USE is strongly correlated with any SRC scale, and only for the E<sub>2</sub> group. In only one instance is NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME strongly associated with any SRC scores for any group (12% of the variance for VIOLENCE for the control group is explained).

**Table 7.3 Percent of Variance Explained in Stepwise Multiple Regression of Pre-Intervention Self-Reported Crime by Treatment Group**

Social Development Variables	Violence			Property			Total			Drug Use		
	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>
Peer Delinquency	.21	.26	.13	.18	.41	--	.26	.44	.12	.16	.15	.29
School Crime	--	--	.05	--	--	.04	.01	.01	--	--	--	.10
Neighborhood Crime	.03	.12	--	.03	--	.04	--	.03	--	--	.01	.03
Sibling Drug Use	--	--	.03	.02	--	.18	--	--	.24	.07	.01	.05
School Integration	--	.01	.02	--	.05	--	--	.07	--	.04	.06	--
<b>Variance Explained</b>	<b>.25</b>	<b>.40</b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.47</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.28</b>	<b>.57</b>	<b>.38</b>	<b>.28</b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.47</b>

N (E<sub>1</sub>)=99, N (C)=46, N (E<sub>2</sub>)=20

Accordingly, PEER DELINQUENCY was selected for inclusion in later analyses as representative of sources of pre-intervention criminality. These findings are consistent with the growing body of empirical research on serious and violent delinquency, and are not without importance by themselves. Recently, several studies (cf. Elliott and Huizinga, 1984; Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton, 1985; Fagan and Jang, 1984; Fagan, Hansen, and Jang, 1983) have found that serious juvenile crime and drug use is most strongly influenced by involvement with delinquent peers and the socializing properties of high-crime areas. Elliott and Huizinga (1984) studied over 1,000 youth from 11-16 years in a five-year panel. Their general youth population sample differs markedly from Fagan and Jang (1984), who studied 1,100 inner-city high school youth and school dropouts, and Fagan, Hansen, and Jang (1983), who studied 100 chronically violent juvenile offenders. Yet the results of these studies are consistent with the SOP research, a sample of violent probationers. In each study, a variety of measures of youths' perceptions of their "social environment" appeared to be stronger contributors to serious and violent delinquency than variables measuring their attachments to individual social domains such as school or family.

These results lend preliminary support to the importance--if not primacy--of the teaching/reinforcing properties of the social worlds which youth perceive and interact with daily. Whether these social learning influences carry over through SOP and into early adulthood is analyzed in the following sections of the chapter.

### **SOP IMPACTS ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

The impacts of SOP on social development variables in the post-intervention period can be seen in Tables 7.4-7.7. At the outset, we must ask whether SOP intervention, regular probation, or natural maturation processes are responsible for any observed shifts from the pre-intervention values in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Ideally, frequent measures during a three-year follow-up period would enable detection of incremental changes in any group. Unfortunately, the relatively small sample did not allow for comparisons by age or time at risk. Thus, the retrospective design with but one data collection point prevents us from sorting out transient influences which may have decayed over the study period. Nevertheless, these analyses offer insights into differences in social development variables which emerged at the conclusion of the follow-up period. The experimental design allows us to conclude with some confidence that such differences are the result of SOP.

## Social Bonds

Table 7.4 shows differences in social and personal bonds for the three groups, as well as differences in self-reported criminality for the 12 months prior to the interview. Comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.4, the significant differences between treatment groups before SOP (or probation) intervention generally disappeared in the years following intervention. SCHOOL INTEGRATION lagged for East County SOP youth prior to SOP; it lagged for Richmond SOP youth after intervention, though not significantly. Several new variables were added for the post-intervention period. Only DRINKING/DRUG PROBLEMS were significantly different, with Richmond SOP youth reporting fewer problems.

**Table 7.4. Post-Intervention Social and Personal Bonds and Self-Reported Crime (Mean Scale Scores) by Treatment Group (N=165)**

	E1 (N=99)	Control (N=46)	E2 (N=20)
<b>Social Bonds</b>			
School Integration	0.60	0.67	0.40
Family Integration	4.61	4.89	4.05
Neighborhood Integration	1.10	1.02	1.05
Work Integration	1.18	0.98	1.10
Justice System Contact	0.67	0.74	0.65
<b>Personal Bonds</b>			
School Commitment	3.67	3.85	3.90
Peer Attitudes to Crime	0.98	1.04	0.90
Family Commitment	1.63	1.59	1.50
Social Attitudes <sup>a</sup>			
o Pro-Social	-0.11	0.16	0.15
o Anti-Social	0.11	-0.29	0.14
<b>Behaviors</b>			
Drinking/Drug Problems**	0.07	0.07	0.05
Self-Reported Crime			
o Violence	1.46	1.48	1.30
o Property	0.83	0.89	0.70
o Total	1.76	1.91	1.45
o General Drug Use	0.70	0.89	0.65

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

a. Standardized Factor Scores

## Attitudes and Beliefs

A series of attitudinal variables leading to 12 scales were measured for the post-intervention period, and are presented as SOCIAL ATTITUDES in Table 7.4. These two variables are the mean standardized factor scores from a factor analysis of 12 separate attitudinal scales listed in Table 7.5. FAIRNESS measure the respondent's belief in the fairness of life events. ATTITUDE TOWARD VIOLENCE and ATTITUDE TOWARD LAW measure beliefs in those two areas. SEX ROLES taps attitudes on male-female societal roles--a higher score indicates a stronger belief in male dominance. EMPATHY measures such concepts as the respondent's willingness to intervene on behalf of a less fortunate or stricken neighbor.

Table 7.5. Factor Analysis of Social Attitude Scales at Post-Intervention

Social Attitude Scales	Factor	
	I	II
Fairness	-0.05903	0.07843
Attitude Toward Violence	0.71756	0.09967
Attitude Toward Law	-0.67110	0.25731
Sex Roles	-0.34674	0.08668
Empathy	-0.15720	0.38903
Materialism	0.09512	0.66560
Conventional Values	-0.09095	0.72475
Cynicism	0.70710	0.07571
Political Efficacy	0.42099	0.40132
Trust in Government	-0.63438	-0.19616
Futility	0.34714	0.18804
Respect	0.05542	-0.30487
Eigenvalue	2.38	1.66
Percent of Variance	18.3	12.8

MATERIALISM taps the extent to which respondents desire material goods which they currently do not have (e.g., stereos, jewelry). CONVENTIONAL VALUES measures the respondent's belief in (and importance of) such norms as marriage and love relationships. CYNICISM is self-explanatory, but the items specifically identify the rewards or expectations of conventional rules (e.g., the benefits of "hard work"). POLITICAL EFFICACY measures respondents' belief in their own ability or power to influence political affairs. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT asks whether the respondent believes that government will act in the citizens' best interests in several areas. FUTILITY is a measure of the respondent's belief in his or her ability to control one's own fate. Finally, RESPECT measures the respondent's expectation that personal respect is forthcoming in contemporary life.

A factor analysis was conducted with these 12 scales, and the results are shown in Table 7.5. The factors were orthogonally rotated using a varimax routine. Two factors explain over 30% of the variance. The first factor includes high loadings for ATTITUDE TOWARD VIOLENCE and CYNICISM, and strong negative loadings for ATTITUDE TOWARD LAW and TRUST IN GOVERNMENT. These factors seem to represent a consistent set of anti-social feelings characterized by lack of belief or trust in societal rules and behavioral norms.

The combination of weak beliefs in the law with strong beliefs in violence suggests a type which lives well apart from society's behavioral conventions. Cynicism and lack of trust in government further suggest weak beliefs in society's logic and institutions. This factor is labeled ANTI-SOCIAL in Table 7.4. The negative mean (standardized) factor scores for controls indicates their relatively weaker scores for this factor. In other words, they have weaker anti-social beliefs, though the differences are not significant.

The second factor is nearly the converse of the ANTI-SOCIAL factor. Called PRO-SOCIAL, it is characterized by "traditional" beliefs--MATERIALISM and CONVENTIONAL VALUES. This factor accounts for nearly 13% of the variance. The strong orientation in this factor toward a desire for both material wealth and traditional emotional well-being suggests an individual with strong beliefs in societal norms. Table 7.4 shows that the East County SOP youth had lower mean factor scores for this variable, though again the results were not significant.

Table 7.6 shows differences in mean scale scores between treatment groups for each attitude scale. Univariate F-tests were used to determine group variations. ATTITUDE TOWARD VIOLENCE was highest for controls, while SEX ROLES (i.e., belief in male supremacy) was significantly lower among Richmond SOP youth. This is easily understood in view of the higher rates of female-headed households in that area (see Chapter 6). CONVENTIONAL VALUES was highest for SOP youth, who lived primarily in eastern Contra Costa County, a higher income suburban area. There is a weak pattern here of social area influences on attitude variables, though it is inconsistent across scales.



Table 7.6. Mean Scale Scores for Social Attitude Scales  
at Post-Intervention Interview by Treatment Group

Social Attitude Scale	E <sub>1</sub> (N=99)	Control (N=46)	E <sub>2</sub> (N=20)
Fairness	1.52	1.50	1.40
Attitude Toward Violence*	0.98	1.43	1.15
Attitude Toward the Law	3.21	2.93	3.40
Sex Roles*	3.12	2.89	2.45
Empathy	4.65	4.13	4.65
Materialism	2.13	1.76	2.35
Conventional Values*	1.22	0.89	0.90
Cynicism	1.97	2.04	1.85
Political Efficacy	1.17	1.17	1.45
Trust in Government	0.60	0.59	0.40
Futility	0.89	0.83	1.20
Respect	0.78	0.74	0.75

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

### Social Learning Effects

Social learning influences are examined in Table 7.7. Again, univariate F-tests are used to determine between-group differences. Comparing Tables 7.2 and 7.7, we see that the pre-intervention differences in perception of social environment seem to disappear in the post-intervention period, while there is a similar convergence of SRC scores. Only PEER JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVEMENT is significantly different, with Richmond SOP youth reporting fewer peers in contact with the law. Due to age differences in the two time periods, work environment was substituted for school environment questions.

These findings may help dispel some of the validity questions regarding self-reports. Chapter V showed that Richmond youth were arrested for violent offenses more often, but total arrests were about the same as other groups. And yet their self-reports indicate no greater justice system contact or self-reported crime than any other group. Accordingly, it seems plausible to assume that in fact the number of youth (peers) with justice system "involvement" is similar for all three groups, both individuals and peers. The scale itself includes items asking about "friends involvement with the police," ". . . the courts," and ". . . on probation." That fewer Richmond youth perceive their friends as being involved with the justice system is unlikely--some validity problems do indeed remain. But these problems may be less pervasive or serious than previously thought.

Table 7.7. Post-Intervention Social Environment Variables  
(Mean Scale Scores) by Treatment Group

Social Environment Variables	E1 (N=99)	Control (N=65)	E2 (N=20)
Work Environment	5.47	4.80	5.95
Family Conflict	0.07	0.20	0.05
Parent Drinking	NA	NA	NA
Peer Delinquency	1.51	1.89	1.15
Peer Drug Use	2.20	2.17	2.20
Peer Justice System Involvement**	0.89	0.83	0.60
Victimization	4.69	4.91	4.50
Neighborhood Crime	0.74	0.80	1.00

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

The "correcting" nature of court decisions--as shown in the disposition analyses in Chapter V--helps reconcile apparent validity problems in the disparity between official arrests and self-reported criminality. Comparing self-reported criminality across treatment groups with the disposition/penetration findings in Chapter V, the similarity of SRC findings across groups is expected and understandable. In this light, it is not surprising that Richmond SOP youth have comparable social and personal bonds, as well as perceptions of their neighborhoods, as their counterparts in other neighborhoods at this latter stage of development. Whether this is due to SOP or simply the maturing effects of emergence into adulthood, the fact remains that differences between groups in adolescence disappear in the early stages of adult life. Moreover, we can arguably assume that these data have validity with respect to the criminal behaviors and theoretical constructs of interest.

Perhaps most important for this study is the absence of any differences in SRC scores for the three treatment groups as well as arrest differences attributable largely to differential police practices across the urban areas of the county. Accordingly, the following analyses leave behind the question of SOP impact. Instead, we turn to analyses of the sources of crime in these transitional years and an empirical assessment of the integrated theoretical framework.

## EXPLAINING VIOLENT DELINQUENCY

The theoretical framework which guided this inquiry suggests that two types of bonds as well as environmental influences will contribute to violent delinquency. Yet the model does not specify an ordering of the contributions, nor does it suggest from which domains (e.g., school, work, family, peers, justice system, or neighborhood) the strongest or most influential bonds will develop. Moreover, there is no specified order to the importance of these explanatory variables, and little to suggest their relative contributions. To examine this question, multiple regression analyses were undertaken to examine the relationship among both environmental influences (social learning variables) and individual (control theory variables, or social and personal bonds) with self-reported crime and official arrests in the post-intervention period. Also, these models were further refined by introducing pre-intervention measures of criminality to control for individual differences and to determine the extent to which post-intervention explanations of criminality are influenced by earlier behaviors.

The variables representing each type of bond and domain were selected based on scale construction and data reduction routines. For each domain (e.g., school), several variables were then analyzed within each bond-domain unit to identify the strongest contributor to cross-domain analyses of self-reported and official criminality. The selected variables are considered as representative of that domain. For example, family social bonds (FAMILY INTEGRATION) included scales and variables tapping family interaction patterns, affection, and types of activities among family members. Family personal bonds included trust and respect among family members, attitudes on the importance of families, and sex roles within the family. In some instances, a composite variable was constructed (e.g. FAMILY INTEGRATION) for the domain. In other instances, a representative variable was selected to represent the domain (e.g., FAMILY COMMITMENT represented family personal bonds). The selection criteria included those variables which contributed at least 2% of the variance in intra-domain regression analyses, excluding variables with high multicollinearity. Accordingly, some domains are represented by two variables (e.g., PEER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAW and GANG MEMBER both represent the peer domain for personal bonds; neighborhood is represented twice among environmental variables due to the individual contributions of the two variables-- NEIGHBORHOOD STRENGTH and NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME).

Stepwise multiple regression analyses (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971) were used to construct models for each type of bond or influence, and again for the integrated model and finally

for the model controlling for pre-intervention criminality. A criterion of a univariate F-statistic of 1.0 was employed for inclusion in the model. The models controlling for pre-intervention criminality were completed by stipulating the introduction of the control variable (PEER DELINQUENCY) as the final step; its relative contribution to variance was determined from the R-squared change in the last step.

### **Social Bonds, Personal Bond, and Social Environment**

The components of the integrated theoretical framework include social and personal bonds, and the learning influences of the youth's social environment. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the results of regression analyses for each of these potential sources of crime and delinquency, with variables included to represent each of the domains within which these bonds may form or be influenced. Table 7.8 shows the results of models constructed for official arrests, and Table 7.9 utilizes self-reported crime as the dependent variable. Each type of crime is predicted for each type of bond as well as the social environment. The results not only provide an understanding of the domains in which bonds--whether weak or strong--influence different types of crime, but they also provide a basis to compare the explanatory power of these different sources of behavior.

**Official Crime.** The results in Table 7.8 show that only social bonds are significantly associated with official crime, and only for SERIOUS and TOTAL crimes. For VIOLENCE, social bonds explain less than 9% of the variance; CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CONTACTS and PEER INTEGRATION are the only variables with coefficients greater than 0.10. For SERIOUS crime (i.e., felony property offenses), the model is significant at the  $p=.01$  level, explaining 14.08% of the variance. Again, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CONTACT is the strongest contributor, explaining approximately 10% of the variance in the model. NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION, a measure of the youth's involvement and attachment to his or her immediate neighborhood, is also associated, but negatively--weaker attachments to neighborhood apparently are weakly associated with arrests for property offenses. For TOTAL crimes, a similar pattern obtains, but with approximately equal contributions of the two strongest explanatory variables. FAMILY INTEGRATION and PEER INTEGRATION are also positively associated. This is a somewhat counter-intuitive finding, in that the strength of the youth's bond to his or her family (weakly) contributes to TOTAL arrests. This is easily regarded as a spurious finding, since the two strongest contributors account for over 18% of the 20.18% variance explained.

is substantial--the percent variance explained ranges from a minimum of 15.47% (personal bonds and DRUG USE) to a maximum of 32.50% (social learning variables and VIOLENCE).

**Table 7.9--Regression Coefficients for Post-Intervention Self-Reported Crime for Social Development Domains (N=165)**

Social Bonds	Violence	Property	Total	Drug Use
CJS Contact	.42	.35	.38	.24
Peer Integration	.29	.29	.30	.24
Neighborhood Integration	-.23	-.21	-.24	-.18
School Integration	-.08	-.14	-.17	-.14
Family Integration	.01	.08	.01	-.09
Work Integration	-.11	-.10	-.10	-.10
<b>Percent Variance</b>	<b>27.99</b>	<b>23.24</b>	<b>28.08</b>	<b>17.52</b>
F (6,158)	10.23	7.97	10.28	5.59
p	.01	.01	.01	.05
<b>Personal Bonds</b>				
Anti-Social Attitudes	.38	.28	.30	.19
Gang Member	.30	.29	.25	--
Peer Attitudes to Law	-.18	-.19	-.22	.09
Drug/Alcohol Problems	.15	.23	.25	.31
Family Commitment	-.22	-.13	-.23	-.04
School Commitment	-.14	-.08	-.19	-.20
Pro-Social Attitudes	-.05	-.09	-.06	-.02
<b>Percent Variance</b>	<b>23.10</b>	<b>20.48</b>	<b>21.56</b>	<b>15.47</b>
F (7,134)	5.75	4.93	5.26	4.12
p	.01	.01	.01	.01
<b>Social Environment Variables</b>				
Peer Delinquency	.47	.38	.46	.40
Victimization	.38	.27	.39	.20
Neighborhood Crime	.22	.16	.17	.10
Quality of Work Experience	-.17	-.04	-.12	--
Peer Drug Use	.24	.16	.22	.25
Peer CJS Experience	.21	.23	.23	.26
Family Conflict	.09	.14	.13	.04
Neighborhood Strength	.02	.01	.04	--
<b>Percent Variance</b>	<b>32.50</b>	<b>21.36</b>	<b>31.80</b>	
F (8,156)	9.39	5.29	9.09	7.00
p	.01	.01	.01	.01

The equations with the social bond variables reveal a consistent pattern for each SRC type. As in Table 7.8, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CONTACT is consistently the strongest contributor to all SRC types. Apparently, having a record of contacts with the justice system in the past year, whether juvenile or adult, is a strong contributor both to

official and self-reported crime. Accordingly, the validity of these measures may be higher than the literature leads one to believe. PEER INTEGRATION and NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION also are strong and consistent contributors to all SRC types. Strong bonds to peers and the absence of bonds to neighborhoods are part of the social fabric of criminality. The ordering of contributions is consistent for the three SRC crime types, though for DRUG USE the discrepancy in relative contributions for these three bonds lessens. The absence of bonds to school (SCHOOL INTEGRATION) also is worthy of mention. The regression coefficients are greater than  $-.14$  for all SRC types except VIOLENCE.

The models for personal bonds also reveal consistent and strong patterns of contribution for several variables. ANTI-SOCIAL ATTITUDES and GANG MEMBER are the strongest contributors to VIOLENT, PROPERTY, and TOTAL self-reported criminality, but not for DRUG USE. For DRUG USE, the presence of self-reported drug and alcohol problems is the strongest predictor of DRUG USE. Other variables with consistent and non-negligible contributions include PEER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAW (weaker beliefs in the law are associated with three types of SRC but not DRUG USE), DRUG AND ALCOHOL PROBLEMS, and the absence of strong personal bonds with families and school.

Three patterns of note are apparent in the personal bonds models. First, negative attitudes toward the law are present both for the respondent and for his or her peers. This can also be seen in the self-reports of gang membership, which are also strong contributors to SRC scores. Second, the weakness or absence of conventional bonds--to schools or families, for example--is consistent across SRC types. Not only are anti-social attitudes strong contributors, but the coefficients for PRO-SOCIAL are virtually nil. These results are consistent with Hirschi (1969) and later investigators (cf. Elliott and Huizinga, 1984), who have tested these constructs with a variety of samples. Belief in the law, not only for the respondent but also for his or her peers, is an important dimension of self-reported criminal behaviors for this sample of later adolescents and young adults. Third, there appears to be a different configuration of personal bonds for DRUG USE than for the other SRC scales. Though anti-social attitudes are present, they are not the strongest contributor to DRUG USE. Instead, the presence of self-reported "problems," such as fights when "high" or drunk, problems at home or in school due to substances, have the highest correlation with DRUG USE.

The results for social learning variables are consistent with the models for the two types of bonds. In general, these equations have a greater explanatory power than the models

for the bonds, suggesting that the reinforcing and teaching properties of the respondents' immediate social milieu are powerful influences on the youth's behavior. As in the previous analyses, the contributors are consistent and strong across all crime types. Strong bonds to peers and the absence of bonds to neighborhoods are part of the social fabric of criminality. The ordering of contributions is consistent for the three SRC crime types, though for DRUG USE the discrepancy in relative contributions for these three bonds lessens. The absence of bonds to school (SCHOOL INTEGRATION) also is worthy of mention. The regression coefficients are greater than  $-.14$  for all SRC types except VIOLENCE.

The models for personal bonds also reveal consistent and strong patterns of contribution for several variables. ANTI-SOCIAL ATTITUDES and GANG MEMBER are the strongest contributors to VIOLENT, PROPERTY, and TOTAL self-reported criminality, but not for DRUG USE. For DRUG USE, the presence of self-reported drug and alcohol problems is VICTIMIZATION is apparently an important part of the youth's social learning environment. The scale is a nine-item additive scale measuring the extent to which respondents had ever been victims of violent or serious property crimes. It is a measure of the extent to which the youth has been personally affected by serious crime, and we interpret it as a measure of the youth's environment. Included in the scale are items of victimization in the home, at school, and in the community in general. The results indicate that being victimized appears to increase the likelihood that a youth will engage in behaviors or crimes similar to those perpetrated on him. Yet we cannot go much beyond this hypothesis. Important questions remain as to the meaning and cognitive processes which occur as a result of victimization. Several social learning theorists (cf. Bandura, 1973; Akers et al., 1979) have suggested that one learns from such experiences and merely applies those lessons. Others, generally viewing victimization from a psychological perspective, hypothesize that victimization launches a process of internalizing rage which later finds its expression in subsequent acts of crime and violence (cf. Sorrells, 1977, 1980).

The models using the social learning scales are consistent with the models for the two types of bonds in specifying the role of delinquent peers in self-reported crime. Not only crime among peers, but also their drug use and justice system contacts are powerful influences on the respondents. Similarly, crime in the neighborhood and personal experiences with crime are major sources of influence on self-reported crime. For DRUG USE, the models are essentially the same, a departure from the earlier analyses of personal and social bonds. Recall that the contributions of these variables specified in the theoretical framework are as reinforcers of the development of bonds, as well as sources of decay of

pro-social attitudes and beliefs. They may also have a direct contribution. These data suggest that indeed the social milieu is a powerful socializing--teaching and reinforcing--influence on self-reported crime. Moreover, the more criminogenic aspects of the social milieu are the more important contributor. Experience with crime, as perpetrator, victim, or observer of it in one's immediate social setting, appears to be central to a variety of self-reported criminal behaviors. These findings suggest that self-reported crime and drug use may in fact be normative behaviors in an environment where they are commonplace, rather than deviant exceptions to an otherwise tranquil and secure setting. Crime is apparently a good teacher, and these youth learn well from their social classrooms.

### **An Integrated Model**

The previous analyses examined the components of the social and personal bonds and the social learning factors which comprise the theoretical framework. The variables which are the strongest contributors to official and self-reported criminality within each source of influence were then selected for inclusion in an integrated model. This model combines the potential contributions from each type of bond or social environment factor to determine the different combinations of individual and environmental variables which shape and influence criminality in the most recent twelve-month period following SOP intervention. Separate models were constructed for official and self-reported criminality. The variables for each model were selected from Tables 7.8 and 7.9 respectively. The selection criterion was based on contribution to explained variance in the previous analyses. Those variables explaining 2% or more of the variance in the regression models for any of the SRC scales was introduced into the integrated models.

In addition, the integrated models were further specified by including a variable measuring pre-intervention criminality. The models were controlled for prior crime by introducing prior crime as the final variable in the regression equation and determining both its contribution to explained variance and its zero-order correlation with post-intervention criminality. As discussed earlier, the variable representing prior criminality is PEER DELINQUENCY-T<sub>1</sub>. In the tables which follow, it is shown as PRE-INTERVENTION CRIMINALITY. The results for the models for each crime measure are shown in Tables 7.10 and 7.11, followed by a comparison of the relative explanatory of the models for each source of influence and each crime measure.



**Official Crime.** The results for the integrated model for official arrests are shown in Table 7.10. The model for violent arrests is not significant; less than 10% of the variance is explained both before and after prior crime is introduced. None of the variables has a regression coefficient greater than .20, and prior crime is only weakly associated with violent arrests in the post-intervention period. The models for serious (property) arrests and total arrests are significant at the  $p=.01$  level, both controlling for prior crime and without controlling.

For both serious and total arrests, the youth's CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPERIENCE clearly is the strongest contributor. Other similarities between these models occur for VICTIMIZATION and GANG MEMBER. The models have comparable explanatory power: 19.57% and 23.21% of the variance without controlling for prior crime, and 20.89% and 23.53% respectively after prior crime is introduced. At the same time, there are several dissimilarities between the models. NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION is a strong negative contributor to total arrests, but is a weaker contributor to serious arrest. Apparently, the absence of ties to the neighborhood increases the likelihood of a youth's official criminality.

**Table 7.10—Regression Coefficients for Post-Intervention Official Arrests for Integrated Social Development Model, Controlling for Pre-Intervention Criminality<sup>a</sup>**

Social Development Variables	Violent		Serious		Total	
	r	Beta	r	Beta	r	Beta
Youth's CJS Experience	.19	.14	.34	.32	.34	.28
Neighborhood Crime	.18	.15	--	--	.07	-.01
Neighborhood Integration	-.16	-.12	-.11	-.01	-.30	-.22
Peer Delinquency	.18	.12	.13	.09	.21	-.02
Gang Member	.02	.08	.24	-.18	.19	-.08
Youth's Victimization	.06	-.06	.21	-.02	.24	.09
Peer CJS Experience	.07	.04	.06	.02	.23	.15
Peer Attitudes to Law	.09	.02	.12	-.12	.12	-.08
Quality of Work Experience	--	--	-.19	-.13	--	--
<b>Pre-Intervention Criminality</b>	(.07) (-.04)		(.003)(-.14)		(.10) (-.07)	
<b>Percent Variance</b>	9.45 (9.56)		19.57(20.89)		23.21(23.53)	
<b>F (8,154)</b>	2.00 (1.79)		4.68 (4.48)		5.81 (5.23)	
<b>p</b>	NS NS		.01 (.01)		.01 (.01)	

a. Coefficients and Percent Variance for controlled model in parentheses.

A similar finding occurs for two peer-crime influences: PEER DELINQUENCY and PEER CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPERIENCE are strong contributors to total arrests, but are more weakly associated with serious property offenses. QUALITY OF WORK EXPERIENCE is a strong negative influence on serious arrests, but it fails to enter the regression equation for either violent or total arrests. This finding suggests that where working youth perceive personal growth and tangible rewards from their employment, they are likely to commit fewer serious property crimes. Finally, prior crime is weakly associated to all three types of arrests, adding little to the explained variance.

In general, these models have moderately high explanatory power for serious and total crimes but are insignificant for violent crimes. Recall that these were the behaviors to which the SOP intervention design was targeted, and that earlier chapters showed major reductions in violent crime between the pre- and post-intervention periods. Apparently, the constructs in this framework are either of little importance in explaining arrests for violence in the early adult years, or they are unrelated to the social processes which influence arrests for violence. Chapter VI suggests that indeed social area effects offer stronger explanations of arrests for violent offenses, which in turn appear to be associated with social structural variables. In other words, charges may be related to the social class of the arrestee. These models suggest that a combination of influences--including both bonds and social environment factors--comprise an explanatory framework for official crime. However, different types of offenses require different explanations.

For serious and total arrests, a blend of social and personal bonds and social environment influences explain the obtained results. The principles which informed the theoretical design seem to apply here--an integration of control and learning theories. The differences between the two significant models suggest that despite the absence of specialization in any one type of offense, there may be unique paths to specific crime types. For serious crimes, peer influences and peer criminality are less important influences than for total offenses. While the absence of strong neighborhood ties is of greater importance to total crime than to any specific crime type, the presence of positive work experiences seems to block property (but not total or violent) offenses. Finally, youths' prior experiences in the justice system as well as their prior experience as victims of crime are contributors to non-violent arrests. The causal ordering of these effects is obviously beyond the scope of this inquiry. Yet it seems that crime seems to feed upon itself--whether experience is the teacher or circumstance (in the form of peer influences) provides opportunity--and that crime may well beget crime.

**Self-Reported Crime.** The results for the integrated models for self-reported crime are shown in Table 7.11. The four equations are significant at the  $p=.01$  level, and the explained variance ranges from 27.30% for DRUG USE to 41.44% for VIOLENT behaviors. When prior criminality is introduced, the explanatory power of the models is increased by 0.5 to nearly 2% of the variance. Moreover, unlike the models for official criminality, prior criminality has strong, positive correlations with each SRC measure. Also unlike the previous models, the ordering of the variables and their regression coefficients are similar across crime types.

Several trends are noteworthy in these tables. First, the strongest contributors in each model are bonds to delinquent peers or attitudes indicative of the absence of belief in normative law-abiding behaviors. The theoretical framework suggests that the absence of positive bonds will create a context where bonds to delinquent peers and criminal lifestyles will form. That appears to be the case here. The models are important not for the negative loadings of PRO-SOCIAL attitudes, but for the strong positive loadings of a host of variables associated with social or personal bonds to crime. Among pro-social bonds, only NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION, PEER INTEGRATION, and SCHOOL INTEGRATION enter the model, and both load relatively weakly in the models. No positive loadings for pro-social variables were evident in the models.

This suggests that self-reported crime may be unrelated to the presence or absence of such bonds. Thus, living or working in a positive setting, where pro-social values are dominant, seems to neither add to nor block delinquent behavior. Accordingly, it appears that self-reported crime may in fact be characterized less by the absence of pro-social bonds but rather by the presence of anti-social or crime-sympathetic bonds. Whether these are deviant or normative attributes is a separate but important question. The fact remains that where belief in the law is weakest and ties to others involved in crime are strongest, self-reported crime will be higher. Only strong ties to the neighborhood seems to detract from self-reported crime. Youth in this study are strongly bonded to their peers, and their peers are extensively involved in delinquency and in the justice system (as are the respondents themselves). Overall, it seems that crime occurs in a context where crime is the norm.

Second, the notion of an integrated theoretical framework seems valid. The variables which enter the equations represent both bonds and social environment factors. They include several social bonds: PEER INTEGRATION, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION, and CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPERIENCE. Among personal bonds, indicative of

Table 7.11--Regression Coefficients for Post-Intervention Self-Reported Crime for Integrated Social Development Model, Controlling for Pre-Intervention Criminality\*

Social Development Variables	Violent		Property		Total		Drug Use	
	r	Beta	r	Beta	r	Beta	r	Beta
Peer Delinquency	.47	.15	.38	.09	.46	.10	.40	.21
CJS Experience	.42	.23	.34	.18	.38	.17	.24	.06
Anti-Social Attitudes	.38	.15	.28	.04	.30	.02	.20	.00
Victimization	.38	.15	.27	.04	.38	.15	.20	-.01
Gang Member	.30	-.12	.29	.09	.25	-.07	.08	.07
Peer Integration	.29	.14	.29	.20	.30	.20	.24	.17
Peer Attitudes to Law	.18	-.10	.19	-.14	.22	-.13	.09	-.01
Peer CJS Experience	.21	.03	.23	.08	.23	.03	.26	.12
Neighborhood Integration	-.23	-.05	-.21	-.05	-.24	-.07	-.18	-.07
Drug/Alcohol Problems	.15	.01	.23	.09	.25	.09	.31	.19
School Integration	-.08	.09	-.14	-.10	-.17	-.13	-.14	-.15
Pre-Intervention Criminality	(.34)	(.09)	(.29)	(.08)	(.38)	(.17)	(.28)	(.08)
Percent Variance	41.44 (41.93)		32.51 (32.94)		40.15 (42.07)		27.30 (27.74)	
F	8.36 (7.76)		5.69 (5.28)		7.92 (7.80)		4.43 (4.12)	
p	.01 (.01)		.01 (.01)		.01 (.01)		.01 (.01)	

\*Coefficients and Percent Variance for controlled model in parentheses.

attitudes and beliefs, the strongest contributors include: ANTI-SOCIAL ATTITUDES, DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEMS, and GANG MEMBER. Social environment factors which shape and influence the development of delinquent behaviors and bonds include: PEER DELINQUENCY, VICTIMIZATION, and PEER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAW.

Third, prior criminality is strongly correlated with current self-reported crime, but adds little to the explanatory power of the model. One is tempted to conclude that little has changed in the years since SOP intervention--the factors which were associated with prior criminality seem to still be associated with self-reported crime, but knowing the earlier behavior does little to help us understand the processes which lead to current behavior. More careful study of the factors which explained SRC in the pre-intervention period would help us to better understand the present factors influencing self-reported crime.

Fourth, the consistency of the models across crime types suggests that there may be little differentiation in the processes which lead to different types of behavior. The fact that the same variables contribute to violent behaviors as well as property and drug use behaviors suggests that there is little specialization in the types of acts by this particular sample. The behaviors are indicative more of a set of related behaviors which frequently co-occur (see the correlation matrix for SRC scores in Chapter V). In turn, this lends further support to the notion that they may be behaviors which are part of a normative socialization process among these youth, and not a set of uniquely specified behavioral outcomes of a developmental process. Indeed, the strong loadings of peer-related variables in each model suggests a social, not an individual, development process where strong bonds to delinquent peers leads to higher SRC scores.

Fifth, the fact that factors involving school, family, work, or for the most part neighborhood are of little importance in these models suggests that rehabilitative interventions focusing on concrete social skills may be limited in their ability to direct young adults away from crime and towards more productive lifestyles. Focusing on education, employment or family appears to have little significance for intervention in serious or violent delinquency, if it is not accompanied by attempts to set these skills or resources in a context with some socio-legal meaning. In other words, providing the skills necessary for a crime-free lifestyle will do little to inhibit self-reported crime absent an effort to link these skills with personal choices for crime-free behaviors based on a perceived value to those acts. Readers should recall the components of the ANTISOCIAL ATTITUDES factor to understand the types of values and choices which may underly the self-reported crime scores in these tables.

Table 7.12--Percent of Variance Explained by Social Development Domains in Stepwise Regression Analyses of Official and Self-Reported Recidivism

Social Development Domains	Violence		Serious/Property		Total	
	Official	Self-Report	Official	Self-Report	Official	Self-Report
159 Social Bonds (Integration)	8.37	27.99**	14.08**	23.24**	20.18**	28.08***
Personal Bonds (Commitment)	2.04	23.10**	10.42	20.48**	8.12	21.56***
Social Environment	6.86	32.50***	10.07	21.36**	11.04	31.80***
Integrated Model	9.45	41.44***	19.57**	32.52**	23.21**	40.15***

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

These results suggest that for a sample of young adult former probationers, self-reported crime may have greater external validity, based on the superior explanatory power of standardized scales for a range of social and attitudinal constructs (Elliott and Ageton, 1981) for self-reported crime. This is further supported by the fact that there are several common explanations in the two sets of models, but that the explanatory power for the SRC scores is consistently higher. Those wishing to accurately gauge the extent, severity, and frequency of crime may be better served by employing self-report methods to measure crime, especially when comparing crime across diverse groups of youth of varying races, social class, and from different neighborhoods in the same justice system jurisdictions.

Comparing the models for official and self-reported crime, there is a simple and striking pattern: prior justice system contacts explain official crime, while peer delinquency explains self-reported crime. Recall from Chapters V and VI that official crime seems to be concentrated in Richmond, while self-reported crime is distributed across the sample and throughout the county. Apparently, there is a thread from social area effects to the probability of justice system contact, to victimization, and in turn to the explanations of crime. Those youth already known to the law are arrested more often, but they may be actually committing crimes at similar rates to others. One must ask why this imbalance exists, and whether key social institutions--police and justice system--are also influenced by social area effects. Social environment and socio-economic factors may impact on the "socializers" as well as on youth themselves.

Finally, youth in this study report a wide range of offenses, and no single offense type is better understood than any other. We can conclude that specialization of offenses does not occur for this group in the post-intervention period. Recall that this sample was identified based on violent behavior, or at least the "propensity" for violence (see Chapter IV). From these results, violence does not appear to be unique from other offenses. The social development scales have no greater explanatory power for violence as for other crime types, regardless of which measure of crime is used. Accordingly, probation supervision strategies which rely on unique explanations of violence have little promise for reducing subsequent criminality. Perhaps this explains why the effects of treatment were minimal, and why instead social area effects seemed to be efficiently explain differences in behavior between the three treatment groups.

Overall, environmental variables appear to be stronger correlates of crime than do individual level variables. These results suggest the primacy of social learning processes in

the combined theoretical framework, and the need for complex models to accurately reflect the social worlds of young adults. The complexity of this framework makes it sensitive to the various sources of influence that shape criminal conduct for young people between the worlds of adolescence and adulthood. The minimal influence of school, family, and work, together with the pervasive influence of peers, confirms the fact that youth in this era of their lives are caught between two worlds but are full participants in neither. In this setting, experience with crime--as victim as well as observer or participant--is a powerful influence on the social development of youth. The implications for treatment intervention, and intensive supervision in particular, are discussed in the following chapter.



## CHAPTER VIII--SOCIAL CONTROL OF VIOLENT DELINQUENTS THROUGH INTENSIVE SUPERVISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

The Serious Offender Program was an effort of the Contra Costa County Probation Department to develop new ways to make probation supervision effective for the department's highest priority cases--violent juvenile offenders. When the project ended in September, 1981, the results of the initial three-year experiment suggested that intensive probation supervision and individualized "treatment" of violent juvenile offenders was an effective method for reducing subsequent criminality among this population. The early evaluation also showed improvements among SOP youth in several areas which traditionally are viewed as correlates of juvenile crime and the target of treatment efforts: school, family, and "community adjustment."

However, the evaluation ended shortly after the SOP experiment concluded. The "window" for observations of SOP and control probationers was limited to 18 months after intake into SOP, when most of the youth were still less than 18 years of age. Whether the effects of SOP sustained over the ensuing years, when youngsters make the often difficult transition from adolescence to adulthood, remained unknown. This question became the impetus for the research described in this report.

This chapter summarizes the findings of the longitudinal evaluation of the SOP experiment. Through interviews and record checks with SOP and control youth, we examined the longer-term effects of SOP over a three-year post-intervention period. We had a unique opportunity to determine the duration of treatment impacts, and to understand the factors which either sustain or erode its effects. The research also offered an opportunity to analyze the criminal careers of a cohort of violent juvenile offenders as they moved from adolescence to adulthood. The study examined the historic questions of desistance and maturation, and the social and personal events which may comprise these phenomena.

The chapter contains four sections. First, we briefly review the history and origins of the Serious Offender Program, including its impetus and the outcomes of the implementation of the experimental intervention. These antecedents are important to explain the subsequent results. The second section reviews the evaluation results, including impacts on recidivism and the factors which shaped and influenced the criminal careers of SOP and control youth. The third section examines the implications of the study for policy, practical knowledge, and research. Finally, a policy and research agenda is presented.

## THE SERIOUS OFFENDER PROGRAM--INTENTIONS AND PRACTICE

For both the juvenile and criminal justice systems, there have been two primary sentencing options for offenders adjudicated for a serious or violent crime: incarceration or probation. Over the past decade, as prison and juvenile corrections populations have risen and eventually exceeded capacity, there has been increasing interest in probation as an alternative to incarceration. But as prisons have become overcrowded and more offenders are placed on probation, the profile of the probationer has broadened considerably. Probation now includes a wide range of offender types. The armed robber, the felony burglar and the shoplifter are likely to be sentenced to probation if they have no prior record. Accordingly, there have been increasing demands on probation officials to exercise social control over a population that is increasing in size, diversity, but perhaps most importantly, in the severity of the crimes committed.

Despite the increased attention to probation, there has been little research on the effectiveness of different probation strategies (Petersilia, 1985). Moreover, there have been few experiments to develop new methods to work with particular types of probationers. The theoretical and empirical attention devoted to treatment interventions has been rare for probation. It remains relatively barren of theory or empirical knowledge to guide its future development. Yet with the increasing reliance on probation to alleviate prison overcrowding and protect public safety at the same time, experiments to improve probation supervision for more serious offenders are urgently needed.

It was with these goals in mind--to improve the effectiveness of probation supervision for serious juvenile offenders and thereby reduce commitments to the state juvenile corrections agency--that the SOP experiment was launched. This section traces the history and origins of SOP and examines its implementation and practices. Readers attempting to understand the impacts observed in Chapter V will quickly see the emergence of both old and new themes in probation which explain the results of the SOP experiment.

### **The Problem in Perspective: Intensive Supervision and Reductions in Commitments**

The Serious Offender Program for violent juvenile offenders can be traced directly to the California's Probation Subsidy Program. Recognizing the expense of incarceration and the varying use of prison sentences, the California legislature enacted a program in 1965 to reduce commitments of criminal and delinquent offenders by offering financial rewards to

local probation for maintaining the number of state commitments below an established guideline for each county. The funds in turn were to be used to develop new ways and means of supervision (Lemert and Dill, 1978). The guideline was a percentage reduction in the number of commitments to juvenile or adult facilities.

However, there were specifications for how the funds were to be spent. Originally, the rebate to counties was \$4,000 per commitment below the state-mandated threshold (actually, a formula) for that county. However, in order to qualify, counties had to meet minimum standards for their special probation programs funded with these dollars. These standards called for programs substantially "above usual or routine supervision techniques." The Youth Authority had overall administrative responsibility for promulgating and monitoring these standards. The original guidelines set a maximum of caseload size of 50, and no more than six probation deputies could be assigned to a supervisor. In addition, adequate secretarial support was required to ensure that proper records were maintained. The other components of the program included a classification program to determine appropriate assignments to the subsidized caseloads, and financial monitoring.

An additional selling point for the subsidy program was its presumed link to rehabilitation. Though research has yet to show conclusively that reduced caseloads can lower recidivism,\* smaller caseloads appear to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for more effective rehabilitation of offenders (Lemert and Dill, 1978). Yet it is unclear whether the rehabilitative effects are the result of increased contact with offenders or changes in the attitudes and responses of probation officers. The evidence remains inconclusive, and despite over two decades of experience with the subsidy program and reduced caseloads, the link to rehabilitation is difficult to establish. However, the promise of rehabilitative effects became an important feature of the subsidy program which was carried over to the goals and objectives of the SOP Program.

At first, the subsidy program was perceived as a success in reducing state commitments (California Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1971). But other factors were also given credit for the decrease in state commitments: improved indigent defense systems, changes in prosecutorial administration, and, for juveniles, shifts in local practices to expand the use of detention and local institutions. In some jurisdictions, the commitment reduction goals were achieved by increasing the number of probationers and accordingly adjusting the

---

\*Several experiments are in progress to determine the effectiveness of intensive community surveillance as a sentencing alternative for felony probationers. For a thorough discussion, see Petersilia, 1985.

arithmetical base upon which the percentage reduction was computed. Among both juveniles and adults, the shift to subsidy and the reduction in commitments led to intensified use of local incarceration and residential placements. Overall, though, the subsidy program in its first ten years helped to expand the overall capacity of the correctional system in California (Lemert and Dill, 1978).

**Violent Juvenile Crime: The Impetus for Experimentation.** By the late 1970s, national concern with increasing rates of serious and violent juvenile crime had entered the policy decisions of Contra Costa County probation officials. The subsidy program had led to increased probation caseloads, yet there was little differentiation in the classification and assignment of serious offenders to juvenile probation caseloads. With juveniles accounting for over 30% of the serious or violent crimes in the county, and with most being placed on probation or in county residential facilities prior to probation, there was a sense of urgency among probation officials to improve probation services for the most serious "high risk" youth in the county.\*

With juvenile caseloads averaging about 70 probationers, little differentiation of serious from other offenders, and increasing numbers of serious offenders entering probation caseloads, the need for specialized services was apparent. Also, general satisfaction with the concept of intensive supervision led to a desire to expand this concept to include the growing serious offender probation population. Existing intensive supervision caseloads in East and Central County were full, but did not specialize in serious or "high risk" youth. Accordingly, the SOP experiment was a conscious attempt to provide closer contact and supervision for the "highest risk" youth, plus improved treatment opportunities through coordinated community services and special treatment plans for this growing population.

Perhaps the most unique aspect of this design was the limitation of supervision to a six-month period. The SOP model presumed that a six-month period would be sufficient to effect behavioral change due to the intensive, treatment-oriented, and frequent contact between deputy and probationer. The potential cost savings from this policy obviously were significant. But it also was an ambitious concept, for it presumed that changes in

---

\*There was still at this time a policy objective to maintain the commitment rate at the levels established during the period of the subsidy program. The incentives of the subsidy program still were in effect. Also, Probation Department officials expressed little confidence in the rehabilitative services of the Youth Authority, and clearly preferred to retain serious juvenile offenders in the county. However, the commitment decision was a judicial one, and over the next several years, state legislation resulted in mandatory Youth Authority commitments for certain offenders and offenses.

basic attitudinal and socio-economic factors could occur in a relatively short period through intensive contact and well coordinated community services. In retrospect, there was little empirical support for this concept--there were few intervention programs for this population with reliable evaluation data to suggest that either a short-term or an intensive supervision effort would significantly reduce recidivism (see, for example, Romig, 1978, for review of intensive supervision programs for juvenile offenders).

Moreover, it may not have been feasible to expect probation deputies to relinquish social control over "high risk" offenders after a six-month supervision period. In fact, this was the case, and the length of supervision was confounded with deputies' predictions and prognoses of who would fare best after treatment. To hedge their bets, deputies often opted to transfer SOP youth to regular caseloads rather than terminate probation commitment. Nevertheless, the six-month limitation was built into the SOP design as a way to improve the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of probation supervision for violent delinquents.

Finally, the SOP offered an opportunity to conduct evaluation research to determine what types of probation services were effective. The structure of probation, with its undifferentiated caseloads and individualized discretionary decision-making allowed little opportunity to conduct research on probation's effectiveness. The decision to incorporate random sampling in the program design was an indicator of the commitment to experimentation which characterized the initiative at the outset. Moreover, evaluation began at the same time as the experiment, allowing for the inclusion of data collection as part of routine deputy transactions. Yet the difficulties of data collection for the control group, plus the administrative decisions described in Chapters I and III, diluted the strength and integrity of both the experimental intervention and the evaluation research. In effect, the impetus for experimentation was undermined from the outset by a host of factors which are intrinsic to the probation function. The questions this raises for experimentation in probation are discussed later in this chapter.

### **Merging the Old and the New: Issues in Implementation**

The creation of a second analytic treatment group for the SOP caseloads is illustrative of the many issues in implementation which arose over the course of the experiment. For many of the serious offenders assigned to the program, SOP was the "last stop" before a Youth Authority commitment. The perceived (and in some cases, actual) threat to the community of this offender group gave rise to shifts in several aspects of the intervention

design. From the six-month supervision interval, to the utilization of community resources, to administrative decisions supervision and training, to the treatment-surveillance dichotomy of intensive supervision, the differences between SOP and regular probation steadily but perceptibly narrowed over time to differences of degree, not of kind. These issues are examined below.

**Surveillance and Treatment.** SOP was designed to differ from regular supervision in two ways: **frequency** and **type** of contact. The vehicle for this was a reduced caseload for each deputy of a maximum of 20 youths, resulting in a minimum of at least one in-person contact weekly or four per month. Further, these contacts were to be in at least one of three treatment forms:

- o individual counseling or interview
- o family counseling or family contact
- o group activity or group counseling

Yet a variety of factors converged on SOP to complicate this design. The administrative addition of the SSS caseload after the first year brought into SOP an offender group with more serious criminal histories than other SOP probationers. What was originally intended to be treatment contacts became more surveillance-oriented for the Richmond SOP group. Both in Richmond and elsewhere in the county, surveillance and treatment in SOP became indistinguishable due to the perception of risk and the high profile assigned to these probationers. In effect, what was designed as a different kind of probation became an enhancement of conventional probation services for serious juvenile offenders. Throughout the experiment, treatment was confounded by the perception of the "seriousness" or dangerousness of SOP clients (Jamison, 1981).

For example, several outings to different activities were restricted for certain SOP clients who were viewed as too "hardcore" to be receptive to certain types of interventions. Others were deemed behavioral problems, or "disruptive" and were excluded from some treatment services. For these probationers, the only form of treatment was intensive supervision. Interview data suggested that SOP and control youth perceived probation as similar experiences, particularly with respect to tangible kinds of help such as job or school referrals. There were few differences perceived for treatment or counseling services, too. In general, there seemed to be an inverse relationship between "seriousness" (as seen by the SOP deputy) and the emphasis on treatment. Accordingly, the "toughest" cases received fewer treatment interventions (other than those afforded in a group setting), while the "easiest" cases received more special attention.

The differences in style among the three (and later four) SOP deputies contributed also to this confounding. The SSS-SOP deputy was an "old hand" and consequently more comfortable with surveillance than "therapeutic" interventions. He was the only deputy who carried a weapon. He worked almost exclusively in Richmond, and participated in few of the SOP training activities with the other deputies. There were considerable differences among the others as well, ranging from group intervention models patterned after Alcoholic Anonymous, to family interventions to more traditional social work/case management approaches.

Moreover, their skills and inclinations to use community contacts varied as well. Those who sought services for their probationers often ran into service barriers which they were ill-equipped to overcome. Others preferred to provide services (especially therapeutic interventions) alone and eschewed referrals. In more "serious" cases, surveillance supplanted rehabilitative contacts for the limited amount of time allotted to each youth. Like many other social interventions, those in need of the most service received the most attention. But these tended to be the more "serious" offenders, and the time spent with them was more often devoted to behavioral control and less often to needs assessment or service delivery. The tradeoff between control and rehabilitation resulted in greater efforts to avoid crimes in the short run, but at the cost of abandoning longer term investments in social development.

**Decisions and Case Management.** The SOP design called for a six-month intervention. Despite the autonomy of SOP deputies in determining whether to follow this guideline, it was often overlooked. At six months, decisions took one of two turns: either continue SOP probation beyond the six month interval, or transfer the probationer to a "regular" probation caseload. Rarely was a SOP youth terminated from probation supervision at the end of the six months.

Once again, the perception of the "seriousness" of the SOP probationers confounded the conduct of the SOP experiment. Deputies were rarely willing to entertain the possibility of a Type II error--an unacceptable risk in view of the experimental nature of the program, public attitudes toward serious youth crime, and the fact that they had to gain approval from the juvenile court for their recommendations. Accordingly, the decision to recommend termination from probation was mediated by each deputy's reading of public response, as expressed by the juvenile court. Though this was never stated as policy, it was a clear preference of the unit supervisor and was widely applied in termination decisions. The six-month guideline was often, and sometimes systematically, overlooked.

The behavior of the unit in this regard was not surprising. Under the circumstances, deputies rightfully felt that there would be a public response to the knowledge that the most "high risk" probationers in the county were being released from supervision after six months. Juvenile crime was a highly visible and emotional issue during the 1978-81 SOP experiment, a time when legislatures across the country were implementing more punitive and restrictive measures for serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders (Hamparian et al., 1982). Despite the experimental nature of the program, there were few benefits and significant costs to risk taking. The political realities of serious youth crime entered into the decisions of the SOP deputies, and the result was a blurring of the distinctions in the probation interval between the SOP and control groups. The most "successful" clients received the shortest supervision periods, and the most difficult or high profile cases were retained under supervision the longest.

As in the treatment decisions described earlier, SOP deputies were constrained by their explicit policy mandate with respect to community protection. Such mandates may be structural barriers to experimentation in probation. The public may view as unacceptable the decision to release from supervision serious delinquents, regardless of how stringent the intervention may have been or whether measurable behavioral change occurred. Deputies in SOP--and elsewhere, especially those supervising felony (adult) probationers, according to Petersilia (1985)--were unwilling to take the requisite risks to implement the program design. Both in the allocation of treatment hours and in decision making, the avoidance of risk was evident. Does this suggest that experimentation in probation will always be similarly constrained? The answers to these complex issues are discussed later on in the policy implications.

**Mirror Images: SOP and Intensive Probation.** SOP had its origins in the probation subsidy program, which also was essentially an intensive probation supervision unit. Looking back on the SOP experiment, there was little different in its experimental approach from its forerunners. Despite specialized training, unique intervention approaches, and the utilization on occasion of community resources, only caseload size and the attendant time for supervision became the critical discriminating treatment variable between the experimental and control groups. And once again, the community protection mandate intervened to confound the experiment. The Richmond controls were in many cases assigned to intensive probation caseloads, due to their extensive (and often serious) offense histories. These caseloads were very similar to SOP--a maximum of 20 cases, and frequent contact. Accordingly, for the Richmond youth in the study, there was virtually no difference between SOP and "control" supervision.



For others, the differences were more of **degree** than of **kind**. Yet, though SOP offered significantly more contact than regular supervision, the caseloads of 20 probationer still limited the amount of weekly contact. Assuming an average week of 40 hours, the "intensive supervision" program offered only about one to two hours a week of contact between deputy and client. It is hard to imagine that the complex factors underlying a youth's delinquent or violent conduct can be addressed in such limited time.

Public policy may hold unrealistically high expectations of probation in this light. The time and resources needed to address the multiple tasks of the probation officer--law enforcement, supervision, advocacy for remedial services, crisis intervention and counseling--require even more than what was allotted under the SOP design. SOP and regular probation were mirror images, and the outcomes reflect this reality. Despite the concentration of effort on fewer youths, SOP interventions fell well short of a threshold level to have more than a marginal impact on the lives of these serious young offenders. To be effective, probation officers will need not simply added time and unique skills, but access to a variety of services to address the range of needs which we can expect in a caseload of violent juvenile offenders. Moreover, they will require a clear mandate to provide those interventions as part of the concept and policy of probation. What is necessary is a rethinking of the design and role of the probation officer, particularly with respect to the violent or serious juvenile offender. These ideas are discussed below as implications of the study.

#### **FROM ADOLESCENCE TO ADULTHOOD: FACTORS AFFECTING RECIDIVISM**

The central purpose of the Serious Offender Program was to protect the community from further crimes committed by its most "high risk" probationers. If SOP could successfully demonstrate that offenders under intensive, treatment-oriented supervision commit fewer offenses than those in regular supervision, strong empirically based arguments could be made to keep serious and violent juvenile offenders in the community. This research had a related purpose--to determine if the early and promising effects of intensive supervision sustained as these serious juvenile offenders went through the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Did the indications of treatment impact hold true once young offenders were no longer in the midst of adolescent social development processes? Do crime control measures which are effective for youthful offenders promise additional returns when these offenders enter the years of highest risk for criminality? Are the intervention effects of intensive supervision consistent for a cohort of serious and violent offenders, or

are the effects so highly individual and conditional as to provide little policy direction for adult probation?

This section reviews the results of the longitudinal evaluation of the SOP experiment. Under ordinary circumstances, the violent delinquents in SOP would have either been placed in local institutions or committed to the Youth Authority. It was not surprising that these offenders were placed on probation, given the soaring commitment rates at the outset of the effort. And a substantial proportion of recidivating offenders was also expected, given the offender profile. What was hoped for was a marginal but significant reduction in recidivism from intensive supervision which would justify its additional costs while reducing correctional overcrowding and maintaining the public safety. The extent and sources of these impacts are reviewed below.

### **Intensive Supervision and Subsequent Criminality**

The most significant result of the long term look at the SOP experiment is that little changed after the first year of the study period. The differences between Richmond SOP, controls, and other SOP youth emerged after the first six months, and were confined largely to the incidence and failure time for **official arrests** for violent and serious charges. When the criterion measure shifted to **self-reported crimes**, the differences between treatment groups disappeared. And when we looked at justice system penetration, we found that Richmond SOP youth were incarcerated more often. What emerges at first glance is a disturbing and disappointing finding--increased recidivism for violent and serious offenses and shorter failure times for Richmond SOP youth, together with higher incarceration rates. But this result was neutralized or even reversed when the measure of crime changed to self-reported offenses.

It is well known that recidivism has no universally accepted meaning for criminal justice researchers (Petersilia, 1985); the results here suggest that the weight of evidence in the SOP experiment leans toward negative effects. The official measures of recidivism reported here were coded from police arrest reports, prosecutor records, and the files of the county probation department. These data have all the strengths and weaknesses of official records. In Chapter III, we described the unusual circumstances which surrounded the compilation and maintenance of these data bases. When the treatment differences obtained from arrest records failed to replicate for self-reported crime, and when arrests are more severe but not less frequent, we begin to question whether arrest has a different meaning in different areas of the study site. Not all arrests are alike, and it appears that

the construct validity of arrest varies from one part of Contra Costa County to another, and may well depend on the fundamental mix of offenders in a particular area. Moreover, such problems in measuring the severity of behavior may reappear later on in subsequent interpretations by the courts in rendering dispositions.

In this study, SOP appears to have failed if we look **only** at rearrest rates and times to rearrest for **violent** offenses among Richmond SOP youth. But though the incidence and prevalence of **violent** offenses was greater for Richmond SOP youth, the prevalence of rearrests for **any** offense among this group was actually lower. Fewer than three in ten Richmond SOP youth were rearrested at all, compared to nearly three in four among both East County SOP youth and controls. When viewed in terms of percent reductions from pre-intervention careers through the follow-up period, the Richmond SOP group had a 71% reduction in their recidivism rates, compared to 28% for controls and 22% for other SOP youth. In sum, more global measures of recidivism--dichotomous measures of rearrest--suggest that SOP youth fared better, especially in Richmond. However, more detailed measures of the severity of rearrest suggest a more complex finding, and these findings disappear when the measure of recidivism is self-reported crime.

Accordingly, the **overall** recidivism rates for the Richmond SOP group were in fact much lower at the same time that their recidivism rate for **violent** offenses was significantly higher. That is, the prevalence and severity of rearrests were inversely related. What appears at first to be a pattern of serious youth crime among one subsample actually may reflect differences attributable more to the local definition of crime in that area and the unique charging practices of law enforcement in Richmond. Perhaps more important is the abrupt shift in findings which occurs when we change the measure of recidivism. This raises important questions about the validity of arrest data; the implications are discussed later on.

The findings on **percent reductions** become even more significant when we recall that the Richmond SOP population had a higher incidence and prevalence of violent and serious arrests in the period preceding SOP assignment. This is due in large part to the administrative addition of the second caseload of institutionalized probationers to the Richmond SOP caseload. Each of the measures of recidivism--time to rearrest, number and rate of rearrests, prevalence of rearrest--suggest that SOP youth differed from others only in their violent behaviors. They were arrested faster and more often for violent offenses, and incarcerated in greater numbers. But these findings reflect the same behaviors which occurred before SOP intervention. These differences were not evident for other than violent crimes, nor were they evident for any other region of the county.

Accordingly, we must ask whether what was observed through arrest data is merely a continuation of the behaviors of the SOP clients or of the law enforcement practices which influence the pre-intervention rates. It is possible that the institutionalized population which was grafted onto the Richmond caseload may skew the arrest rates for the entire group. Monahan (1981) and a host of other researchers suggest that violent behavior is best predicted by prior violence. This may well be part of the explanation here.

The general implications are both distressing and reassuring. On one hand, these trends suggest that recidivism will not decrease appreciably, despite greater efforts to supervise and control high risk offenders. On the other hand, we found little evidence of increases in crime rates as violent juvenile offenders enter adulthood. The percentage of the entire cohort committing violent and/or serious offenses did not increase, and in fact declined significantly over the study period. Consequently, the public's demands for more severe punishment for violent offenders may not necessarily achieve better results than would otherwise be achieved by these less costly measures. Violence seems to decrease with age, and even the most intensive supervision seems no better than the most casual probation services in curtailing the most serious crimes. Moreover, there was no evidence of specialization of career, for any of the groups. The violent juvenile offender cohort was involved in a wide variety of offenses. In fact, the distribution of severity shifted markedly from serious and violent offenses in the pre-intervention period to more general, non-serious offenses in the post-intervention years. These shifts occurred regardless of the intensity of supervision. Such natural desistance (Wolfgang et al., 1972) appears to be evident in the violent juvenile cohort.

Finally, to place these findings in perspective, we compared the SOP sample to other felony probation populations. Though longitudinal studies of offender cohorts provide a wealth of useful knowledge, it is usually difficult to make valid comparisons to other offender populations. Overall, questions of the external validity of the results require contrasts with other samples of comparable offenders. Accordingly, we want to know if the violent juvenile offender cohort in Contra Costa County had higher recidivism rates than other populations. To place these findings in a broader perspective, we compared the recidivism rates of this population to the rates for felony (adult) probationers\* in Alameda County (Oakland) and Los Angeles County, California (Petersilia, 1985). These

---

\*The offenders in the Petersilia (1985) study were convicted for charges including: drug sale or possession, burglary, auto theft, robbery, and aggravated assault.

comparisons are especially important given the age distribution of the SOP cohort in the study period: young offenders subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts.

Overall, 65.7% of the SOP cohort was rearrested for one or more offenses, compared to 72% of the felony probationers in Alameda County and 64% in Los Angeles County. At first glance, the rates for felony probationers are comparable to the younger violent offender sample in Contra Costa County. However, the felony probationers were more often arrested for violent crimes (22%) compared to the SOP cohort (18%). Comparing conviction rates, 46% of the SOP cohort had one or more convictions, while 50% in Los Angeles County and 57% in Alameda County had at least one conviction. And there were major differences for incarceration in either jail or prison: 17% of the SOP cohort was subsequently incarcerated, compared to 34 % of the felony probationer cohort.

From these comparisons, it seems that the younger SOP cohort presents fewer public safety risks than the slightly older felony probationer cohorts. These comparisons should be viewed cautiously--the SOP cohort was younger, well below the years (ages 18-26, according to Strasburg, 1984, and others) of highest risk for violent and serious crime. Other characteristics which shape and influence criminal careers, particularly social structural variables, may not have been comparable across samples. Despite these limitations, the comparisons suggest that the SOP cohort may require less severe interventions than their slightly older counterparts. It may be that earlier intervention with violent delinquents can curtail slightly the incidence of subsequent imprisonment. This would increase the options available to respond to serious youth crime, and subsequently ease prison overcrowding. But it also appears that if we do the least amount possible, such as regular supervision, we may be able to achieve almost the same results. If in fact subsequent violence is the domain of the "violent few" (Hamparian et al., 1978; Shannon, 1980), then the optimal strategy involves a differentiated approach where resources are concentrated on those whose behavior defies even our best current efforts to change it. Policy to inform such strategies is discussed later in this chapter.

### **Explaining Crime in the Early Adult Years**

If intensive supervision has little influence on the prevalence of crime and delinquency, we must look elsewhere to develop salient responses to law violating behaviors. Analyses of the locations and correlates of recidivism offer clues to the potential sources of criminality in the transitional years. We have seen earlier that youth throughout Contra Costa County were arrested in roughly equal numbers, and that self-reported crime was

also evenly distributed throughout the county. But more severe arrests and convictions were skewed to the urban areas of the county, the areas most heavily populated by the poor and minority populations.

Arguably, arrest may have a different meaning in these areas--crimes which occur with equal frequencies in other locales are viewed (and labelled) as more severe behaviors when they occur in areas of poverty, unemployment, and concentrations of minority populations. This seems to be validated when we look at crime through self-report measures--there, offending seems to be well distributed and is only weakly related to social area. In other words, the severity, not the prevalence, of youth crime seems to be vary by locale or area. Accordingly, probation policy should examine both the attributes of youth who have the highest offense rates, as well as the factors which characterize areas of perceived high crime, to develop responses which will be effective for those areas.

At the same time, we observed that self-reported crime is well explained by social processes. The young adults in the SOP cohort view crime as a normative process reinforced by behaviors and contingencies which typify the areas where they live. Peer influences, so important in understanding delinquency and drug abuse, remains important in the transitional years. These are important considerations for the development of policy--this is an age cohort where many offenders desist while others sustain but shift their patterns of offending (Blumstein et al., 1985). This knowledge should bear on policy. It suggests that we rethink the social control and rehabilitative underpinnings of probation.

What must emerge from our understanding of the effects of social area and socialization processes are more highly specified models with clear direction for classification, supervision, and treatment interventions. The development of probation policy should include an understanding of the components of urbanism which are so closely correlated with official crime, as well as the social processes which explain self-reported offenses. Moreover, the reconciliation of these two seemingly divergent views of crime for youth in the transitional years may lie in our understanding of the effects of social area on socialization. The effects of social disorganization on the erosion of social and personal bonds imply a direct connection between the social area effects described in Chapter VI and the socialization processes identified in Chapter VII. Accordingly, the theoretical underpinnings for probation for serious young offenders must recognize the dual but perhaps related effects of socioeconomic conditions and socialization on the development of attachments to society.

In effect, our data suggest that the **sources** of crime in the transitional years may vary by social area, but the **correlates** may converge in the processes by which law-violating behavior is defined and reinforced in otherwise diverse areas. That arrests and charges are more severe in urban areas may reflect the larger societal problems which characterize those areas: poverty, unemployment, poor housing, and racial disparities. These factors are more visible and hence easier to understand and detect. The higher prevalence of serious crime in these areas suggests that offending among the SOP cohort varies by social class (poorer), race (Black), and gender (males). But once involved at all, the overall weight of the evidence suggest that they are no more extensively involved in crime than any other population group in the county. Thus, while the process of initiation suggests differences by social area, the processes of continuation may be more heterogeneous. This in turn suggests that while policy for **control** may be similar across areas, policies for remedial interventions may necessarily vary by areas.

At the same time, these phenomena also reflect not only what happens to individuals in areas of higher serious crime, but also what happens to such areas in the aggregate. Urban areas are marked by relative deprivation--stark contrasts in economic opportunity and need. And, they evidence higher rates of serious and violent crime. On the other hand, youth in areas with greater racial and economic heterogeneity have different patterns of offending, and the correlates of their criminal behaviors also differ from urban youth. They reside in areas which are not nearly so isolated economically, racially, and in terms of the social ecology. In such areas, socioeconomic characteristics (school integration, for example) are less important contributors to crime than are peer influences and perceived normative behaviors. In fact, these more classic sociological constructs, such as beliefs, attitudes, cultural and peer norms, are highly correlated with crime regardless of social area.

But our data suggest that these explanations apply equally well in poor and less deprived areas. What appears to vary by social area is the severity of crime, not its incidence. The key here is that Richmond is a homogeneous community, but is sharply different from its surrounding region. Here, where socioeconomic conditions are consistent within the community, serious youth crime is perceived as higher. Where the ecological terrain is more varied, so too is crime. And it is in these areas where the importance of the teaching/learning processes emerge as influences on crime. It is important to keep these two sets of influence separate--social area does not explain crime, only its perceived severity.

In other words, **official** selection into the violent offender cohort may indeed be a function of social area, socioeconomic status, or race. But there is ample evidence of differential law enforcement practices in poorer neighborhoods (Smith et al., 1984; McNeely and Pope, 1981). In this study, such practices relate more to how crime is perceived via charges (severity), but not to the probability of arrest. This may explain why **self-selection** as a violent offender, regardless of severity, seems to be a function of belief, attitude, and social expectations. The latter result seems to be general and not confined to a particular social area. Accordingly, the phenomenon of youth crime in the transitional years may in fact derive from different sources of the same behaviors, but with resultant similar processes with clear direction for policy, theory, and practice.

There obviously is no single explanation for serious youth crime, and accordingly no simple solutions. There may be two paths to the same behaviors, but they appear to converge at the point of peer cultures, beliefs and attitudes, and generally weak ties to conventional societal activities. One path may be traced to relative deprivation in urban areas and the resultant socialization processes which either block or erode societal ties. A second path includes peer influences and social isolation which exist regardless of social area but which have similar effects on social bonds. That different measures detect these different paths also hold implications for the assessment of probationers.

And what is less important, surprisingly, are the social skills which underly "traditional" rehabilitative models. This is not to say that employment and poverty are not part of a broader crime control policy. But to provide opportunities to an individual will not undo the effects of norms or processes in the aggregate. Relative deprivation of a community or a peer group will continue to drive processes which attack even modest social bonds. What seems evident is that solutions to crime in the transitional years must go beyond individuals to address social areas. In this study, social areas provide the strongest "explanation" of crime. Just as the problems of earlier areas are tied to larger societal issues, probation policies can only be effective when linked to broader social policy which addresses poor urban areas.

In sum, the majority of SOP youth went on after probation intervention to commit further crimes. There was a general reduction in the prevalence of crime regardless of the level of supervision. Serious offenders continued to evidence higher rates of serious and violent crime, but their prevalence went down sharply. Accordingly, the risks to community safety were reduced commensurately. This is an encouraging finding for probation in general, for it shows its ability to control offenders among a "high risk" population. Those



who were unaffected by these efforts--those who went on to commit further crimes--should be the targets of special efforts.

It is these youth who should become the focus of future efforts to improve probation, for neither regular nor intensive supervision was effective in its current forms to stop this group from going on to further crimes and threats to public safety. This group seems to have internalized a system of perceptions and beliefs where criminal behaviors are a norm. They are both victims and perpetrators of crime, and they have learned well the contingencies which lead to crime. It is not surprising, then, that this cohort was relatively unaffected by the SOP experiment, for the impacts of supervision were strongly mitigated by deeply embedded social processes. For some, the relative deprivation of inner city urban areas isolates them from conventional opportunities and prosocial behavioral norms. For others, they were socialized in a milieu where crime was commonplace. It is not reasonable to expect intensive supervision to contain these behaviors, nor to have any more than a transient impact on the lives of these probationers. Strategies to have longer lasting and more profound impacts are discussed below.

#### **IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE**

The SOP experiment suggests that serious and violent juvenile offenders were a good risk for probation, if the goal is a reduction in the rate and prevalence of serious youth crime. Indeed, there were general reductions in these indicators for all three supervision groups. But nearly two in three SOP youth committed at least one new offense, and countless other technical probation violations. The results are mixed, then, with respect to public safety. The general threat to the community was reduced but far from eliminated. On the other hand, this is good news in that these were arguably the most difficult cases on the probation caseloads, and that such reductions were achieved with either minimal or intensive supervision. Arrests for serious crimes and self-reported offenses will drop as a result of probation and the maturing effects of the transitional years. These findings suggest that there are viable options for probation to reorganize and redefine its efforts to intervene successfully with those youth whose violent behaviors persist through the transitional years.

The juvenile justice system has three options for youth adjudicated for serious and violent offenses: transfer to the more punishment-oriented criminal justice system, commitment to a secure correctional facility, or retention in the community under a variety of control

and supervision conditions. Despite shifts and trends in the rates of serious youth crime, it remains at a level requiring specific attention and policy alternatives. Transfer to the criminal system is an untested alternative with unknown and often unanticipated consequences. There is little evidence to suggest that criminal sanctions have a greater deterrent effect than the rehabilitative sanctions of the juvenile system. And there is some evidence to suggest that serious juvenile offenders in the adult system receive more lenient treatment than in the juvenile system (Roysher and Edelman, 1980). Others say that the punitive response of the juvenile system is about the same as the adult system, and that a "leniency gap" does not exist (Greenwood et al., 1984). Accordingly, for the youth in the SOP program, transfer to adult court does not offer closer control and supervision over the juvenile system.

The central policy question in the SOP experiment is how best to handle these offenders within the juvenile system, especially those who fail in regular or intensive supervision. Who are these youth? Can they be kept in the community without posing threats to public safety? How should we redefine probation practice to focus on this group? Can commitments to state correctional agencies be reduced through alternatives to incarceration? Can the public's demand for retribution and stronger control be satisfied without resorting to the costly imprisonment?

As Petersilia (1985) noted in a study of felony probationers in California, current state budgets cannot support the demand for more prison beds, residential programs, or clinical services. There is a need for alternatives in the community for those serious offenders whose behaviors require a different type of supervision than occurs now in probation, but who may not pose a public safety threat sufficient to invoke the costly option of imprisonment. Given current knowledge about serious juvenile crime, probation supervision, and the results of the SOP experiment, which offenders should be targeted for such measures, and what options exist to respond to their behaviors?

### **Intensive Supervision: A Cornerstone of Crime Policy**

Earlier, we suggested the need for a redefinition of the theory and practice of probation. In the SOP study, we found that most serious juvenile offenders can be supervised in regular caseloads, since the majority of recidivism is not threatening to community safety. But public opinion continues to demand more severe control and punishment for serious and violent offenders. Yet our choices continue to be limited to probation or some form of imprisonment. It is infeasible to suggest that all offenders who cannot be handled

on probation caseloads should be committed to a correctional institution. **For these offenders, what is needed is a new form of probation that offers stronger sanctions and more meaningful interventions.** This will increase the range of sanctions within the community to provide the types of control and punishment the public demands while avoiding the costs of another expansion of the prison population.

We suggest that intensive supervision continue to be a necessary and appropriate alternative for the those offenders who have failed in traditional probation supervision or even on reduced caseloads. But to structure intensive probation simply as a surveillance strategy would be to recreate the failed methods of SOP and similar past experiences. **Instead, we suggest that for those offenders who require more control and intervention than regular supervision but can remain in the community, an intensive supervision strategy be designed to include the functions of control, case management, and reintegration into community interactions.** These three functions offer avenues to address the social processes and other correlates which were linked to subsequent recidivism in the post-intervention period: social area effects on individual socialization, and bonds to delinquent values and behavioral norms. These functions should exist in a reduced caseload format, but the nature and purpose of this type of sanction will differ from other probation functions.

Control and security should remain a cornerstone of this form of sanction. The strategy requires that probation officers be capable of detecting and responding to illegal behaviors quickly and with full knowledge of the context in which they occur. This type of "quick sanctioning" capability is necessary to establish the deterrent effect of surveillance, and accordingly raise the costs of crime. A variety of methods to keep tabs on offenders have been documented, from "eyeball" security to home detention to electronic devices. However, the control function is enhanced by linking it to other activities for the probationer, such as school, work, or mandated participation in community activities. By mandating these activities, the community and its social institutions become part of the control network. This relieves probation officers of the unreasonable task of direct supervision of 10 or more people. Accordingly, a combination of close personal supervision with community participation will broaden the resources and methods for control of serious offenders on intensive supervision.

The case management function is necessary to address the social skill deficits which are endemic to youth from inner city urban areas, such as Richmond, and to implement a social learning process through sanctions and records. The benefits of social skills lie as

much in the learning which occurs from involvement with conventional activities as in any material resources which may be gained. Accordingly, case management functions serve a number of purposes. First, it provides a means to respond individually to each offender in a timely and efficient manner. Where particular services or interventions are needed, it empowers the probation officer to obtain those services. For example, if drug treatment or employment assistance is needed, the probation officer is clearly mandated to see that it occurs. Second, it builds in clear and consistent expectations regarding behavior, participation in community programs or activities, and establishes the rewards or gains which can accrue to the offender from meeting these expectations. In effect, the case manager becomes an instrument of social learning to begin a process of resocialization based on learning principles designed to neutralize and eventually supercede the reward system which earlier drove the youth's criminal behaviors. Third, it provides a resource or social network for the probationer which can identify opportunities for developing skills, building ties to groups outside delinquent peers, and planning for the future.

The reintegration aspect of intensive supervision is perhaps the most important. Our data suggest that those youth who fail on probation are isolated from conventional activities or participation in non-deviant social milieux. Reintegration is a means for serious juvenile offenders to participate in community activities and social opportunities. The goal of this strategy is to build the kinds of relationships and interactions which will become the daily routine of the probationer once supervision ends. It establishes the probationer in a setting which teaches and rewards legal behaviors and offers resources to resolve inevitable problems without relying on illegal means. In effect, it transfers the social control of probationers from the criminal justice system to the community and establishes the legitimacy of the community's values for the offender. The analysis of social development in Chapter VII literally established the importance of building social and personal bonds. Case management and reintegration provide a strategy to establish and reinforce such bonds.

This type of formal redefinition of intensive supervision is necessary to establish the unique nature of this sanction. It is far more than a supervision or even a surveillance strategy. It requires a fundamental rethinking of the role of the probation officer, the type of individual who takes on these tasks, the training necessary to equip such officers, and the organizational contingencies necessary to develop this function independently of the traditional duties of the probation department.

**To make this strategy effective, the quality and extent of the information available to the probation officer must be improved.** Our data suggest that the sources and types of data used in the assessment of probationers on regular supervision is inadequate to gain a full understanding of the behaviors and backgrounds of offenders. Such an understanding is needed to develop a strategy for the control, case management, and reintegration tasks described above. In the SOP experiment, we saw that officers used secondary data sources, often without cross-validation or independent corroboration. Rarely was original information developed.

**We suggest that to make this new form of supervision more effective, there needs to be greater attention to the assessment and analysis process.** First, there needs to be a thorough assessment of social and personal bonds in several domains: school and work, family ties, peer ties, drug use and self-report measures of crime, a detailed look at the official career reconciled with self-report measures, and a variety of attitudinal scales. Also, the youth's perceptions of the social milieu should also be assessed. The types of scales and indices used in this study appear to have strong explanatory power, and can serve as a starting point for the development of assessment tools.

Second, cross-validation should be a routine step in the assessment process. Interviews with those people knowledgeable about the youth--school officials, employers, spouses or lovers, and close friends--should be a routine occurrence. This information should be used as probes in subsequent sessions with the probationer to provide more valid and detailed information from which to plan strategy. Multiple data sources are essential. Third, this information should be tied specifically to behaviors, skills, perceptions, goals, and values. The social processes and street values in the youth's neighborhood should also be included. That is, if social milieu is the powerful reinforcer that our data suggest, then this should also be well understood by the probation officer. From this bank of knowledge, a realistic and concrete plan of action and timetable can be developed, including goals for behavior and community reintegration which can serve as objective management markers for the probation officer.

This type of information can also improve the decision as to who is placed on intensive supervision, and to help decide when the intervention might be discontinued. Petersilia (1985) suggests that this information be tied to the presentence investigation routinely conducted by probation officers before determining whether standard or intensive supervision is warranted. Certainly, this type of exhaustive investigation cannot be undertaken for all offenders. For juvenile offenders, particularly those being considered for

commitment to the state juvenile corrections agency, this review should be a routine occurrence. Certainly, a differentiated process should be developed where the most serious offenders--in terms of severity of offense and length of record--should receive the most thorough assessment. For those remaining in the community, it will help determine the appropriate nature and severity of intensive supervision.

**The information gathered in the assessment process should inform the supervision plan. The specific behavioral goals and community activities should derive from well validated information.** Most important, the timetable for achieving these goals should be set based on realistic and achievable outcomes. One of the shortcomings of the SOP process was its reliance on the good intentions and training of the deputies to make informed judgements regarding how best to proceed with each youth. Whether this was an empirical or a subjective process was unknown. But it was apparent that deputies lacked an objective yardstick to make decisions about probationers. They relied on secondary data sources to plan intervention, and rarely specified a course of action based on information. They (together with the SOP supervisor) decided when the probationer was no longer a risk. Such predictions were made without an interim assessment of change or progress.

Future efforts should rely on a broad knowledge base which translates into a specific plan for intervention. This includes the types of behavioral goals to pursue, other strategies and goals related to the assessment of social bonds, a listing of community services and activities to achieve these goals, the resources needed, and the timetable to achieve them. Most important, both the deputy and the probationer should know what rewards will accrue from meeting goals and expectations. **The purpose is the objectification of the decision making process, based on validated information and a process which results in a shared understanding of what is to take place and what goals are to be met.**

Just as the courts must often decide between two extremes--remaining in the community or imprisonment--so too must probation officers often decide between two ends of a continuum. There is usually little sanctioning choice between revocation and a "slap on the wrist" for violations of behavior. **We suggest that intensive probation include a more diverse sanctioning capability. Probation deputies in intensive supervision programs must be able to invoke a range of sanctions commensurate with the nature and severity of the offenders behavior.** This may include such measures as ordering limited periods of home detention, short-term residential placements, or a modification of the supervision plan to include new goals or longer times. Revocation should remain in the court's domain, but must still be a part of the sanctioning system.

By investing deputies with this authority, learning principles are built into the relationship between the deputy and the probationers. The effectiveness of a sanction system depends in part on making clear the link between behavior and consequence. If deputies in intensive supervision units are to deal effectively with young felons, they will require a measure of authority without the cumbersome task of seeking a court order. In other words, some types of policing powers should be granted (Petersilia, 1985). But proportionality is also important. **The response or sanction should be in proportion to the type of violation or behavior. Also, the sanctions or consequences should be defined at the outset so that contingencies are expected.** This will achieve two learning principles: objectification of the sanction process and linkage of behavior with consequences. The findings in Chapter VII suggest that interventions based on such learning principles offer some promise to reverse earlier negative socialization processes.

The same is true for rewards. If antisocial behaviors are learned from various environmental sources, intensive supervision should presume that these behaviors can be unlearned by sanction and new behaviors learned through reward. **Progress and achievement of behavioral or community reintegration goals should be rewarded by increasing degrees of freedom from supervision.** Eventually, meeting all specified goals should result in the end of intensive supervision. The nature of these rewards will vary, but in general will point toward a decreasing role for the deputy. Rewards can take various forms, from points earning decreased restrictions to early release from supervision. As with sanctions, rewards should be proportionate to what was achieved, and stated in advance to establish an unequivocal link between behavior and consequence.

The most difficult decision lies in determining which types of offenders are best suited for a redefined form of intensive supervision. These decisions are part of the difficult task of risk assessment and dangerousness. There is considerable interest in risk prediction currently, yet the field continues to fall short of acceptable levels of accuracy to satisfy ethical and legal considerations. Alternative strategies must be adopted. For SOP, the current eligibility criteria are but a beginning. Other assessment information is needed, for many SOP offenders went on to commit no further crimes, while others were eventually incarcerated. The analyses in Chapter V suggest that there is little to rely on other than subsequent behavior. Past behavior predicts not just future involvement in the justice system, but the extent of penetration.

**Accordingly, the decision to place an offender under the closer scrutiny and restriction of intensive supervision should be based on the committing offense and prior offense**

histories. In other words, a "just deserts" or retributive model of justice should drive the decision to place a violent or serious juvenile offender on intensive supervision. Petersilia (1985) analyzed felony probation in two California counties and concluded that conviction history and prior criminal history should inform the prison/probation decision. Other factors would determine the length and type of supervision. Our comments relate to juvenile offenders, and vary somewhat. **We suggest that for youth retained in the community, those offenders adjudicated for what would be index felony offenses as adults be eligible for intensive supervision, and that those with prior offense histories involving violent behaviors be so placed.** Then, the characteristics associated with recidivism in this study could be used to determine the length of intensive supervision and the type of community activities which will comprise the intervention plan.

We base these ideas on the fact that a substantial portion--nearly three in four SOP youth--failed to commit further violent offenses, despite the eligibility screening for violence. Violence was the cutting edge to enter SOP, and should be retained in this framework as a factor. Since we found that prior crime predicted "failure" in intensive supervision as practiced in SOP, we believe that these should be the criteria for a redesigned intensive supervision concept. Treatment intervention plans should follow from assessments keyed to the social and environmental characteristics described earlier.

Finally, if supervision and control of offenders is to be eventually transferred to the community, both probation and the community must participate in the development of responses to crime. **Probation policy should be linked to other policies regarding community development policies and activities.** The results in Chapter VII show that peer and community sanctioning networks are ineffective. There is a need to develop such mechanisms to counter the perceived norms and expectations of young offenders for criminal behavior. Arguably, if an offender fails in the community, the community may have failed the offender. **The development of local sanctioning mechanisms is necessary to convey community norms and transfer the task of social control from official agencies to neighborhoods.** The long-range solutions to violent crime cannot reside solely on the justice system. There must be efforts to address the well established societal problems which crime reflects--poverty, unemployment, and limited access to economic opportunity. And there needs to be strong socialization processes about behavior and values which are the responsibility of social institutions such as schools, families, the economic sector, and neighborhood and community.



**The development of local neighborhood mechanisms for control and supervision of young offenders further empowers probation deputies and reinforces the legitimacy of the goals of the intervention plan.** Local initiatives such as neighborhood dispute resolution centers or restitution programs can provide avenues for the gradual but planned shift of supervision responsibility from official agencies to neighborhoods. Naturally, the participation of the deputy with such neighborhood groups is necessary for cooperation to occur. But this will allow cultural factors specific to communities to become part of the intensive supervision plan, which in turn can influence the offender's behavior and reinforce the actions of the deputy. Styles of control and supervision will become consistent with the neighborhood where the probationer will live, thus increasing the chances for success.

Finally, the deputy can become a resource to the neighborhood in its efforts to control and supervise its youth. Official agencies become a potential sanctioning mechanism for communities attempting to respond on their own to youth crime. This secondary or resource role is in contrast to contemporary beliefs and practices which rely on the police as a first-line response to crime. This would allow intensive supervision deputies to concentrate their efforts on offenders newly assigned to their caseloads, while others in later stages of supervision will be more involved with community activities and organizations. In the end, the strengthening of such groups can help create the sanctioning and teaching systems needed to reverse the effects of delinquent peer groups.

**Program Design Considerations.** How would such an intensive supervision program take shape? The experience of SOP offers a knowledge base from which we can begin to address the complex organizational and conceptual issues in program design. Also, Petersilia (1985), Fagan et al. (1984), and others recently have listed a number of program design considerations for correctional efforts to reintegrate serious young offenders into the community. Their recommendations can be consolidated here to provide some preliminary suggestions for the shape of future efforts in intensive supervision.

Intensive supervision implies a reduced caseload. Depending on the definition of deputy responsibilities, caseload size will vary. As described above, with the three domains of activity, deputies should not carry more than 20 probationers at any time. The SOP unit had a similar caseload size, with a total of 80-100 probationers in SOP at one time. This accounted for about 10% of the juvenile probation population. Estimates will be necessary in any jurisdiction to determine the proportion of the population that meets the profile described earlier. Caseload size should be determined by a triangulation process including the size of the target population, available resources, and a caseload size based on the types of deputy activities included in the program concept.

The costs of intensive supervision will no doubt exceed that of regular supervision, but will also certainly be less than a comparable period in a juvenile or adult correctional facility. The continued reduction in commitments will earn revenue for Contra Costa County to defray the costs of such a unit, but other U.S. counties will require other resources. User fees are part of several programs currently underway (e.g., Pearson, 1984; Latessa and Vito, 1984; Petersilia, 1985). But probation officials cannot rely on user fees exclusively. The SOP experiment showed that perhaps a proportion of offenders currently on intensive caseloads may in fact fare equally well on regular caseloads, thereby freeing resources for use in intensive caseloads. The point is that there will necessarily be a redirection of current probation resources to supplement the revenue base for intensive supervision.

How should intensive probation be situated organizationally? The SOP experience suggests that as a "special unit" within probation, it was viewed as an extension of probation and susceptible to the traditional contingencies and constraints of regular supervision. The earlier discussion on decision-making provides several examples of such incursions. If intensive supervision is to depart from regular supervision in kind as well as degree, organizational and programmatic integrity are necessary. We agree with recent studies of felony probation which argue for more than simply adding intensive supervision as just another probation unit. SOP did that, and the experience is well documented. Intensive supervision will require a different type of deputy, trained and recruited in unique ways and with responsibilities which vary from regular deputies. The cases will be more difficult, and the deputy-probationer relationship will be different as well.

This argues for an intensive supervision unit which is independent from other probation units, administered separately with its unique mission translated into decision-making, supervisory, and (most important) budgetary styles. Clear boundaries and an organizational commitment are needed to ensure that intensive supervision preserves the intent and integrity of its mission. Discretion and autonomy will be needed for movement of probationers through the program and for termination, recruitment (and termination) of staff, the administration of sanctions and rewards, a different type of working relationship with the justice system, and special relationships with the community.

Finally, the program will become a special part of a local corrections system, charged with a public safety responsibility for the highest-risk offenders in the community. Accordingly, strong linkages with other parts of the justice system will be required. Eligible offenders should be identified quickly and accurately, and placed on the unit

without unique delay. The flow of information is also a part of these linkages. The assessment process described earlier requires accurate background information on the youths, their instant and prior offenses, validated information from families, schools or others, and prior treatment histories. Strong working relationships with other justice system agencies will not only aid these tasks, but will also improve the prospects for political support for a sensitive program.

### **Policy Experiments: Risk-Taking and Accountability**

In the past decade, growing pessimism about the wisdom of rehabilitative interventions stemmed in large part from two perspectives: surveys of treatment evaluations found as many problems with the evaluation designs as with the programs themselves. Research on rehabilitation techniques were troubled by weak evaluation design, problems with outcome measures, and study periods too short to detect longer term changes in behavior. Second, there consistently occurred what Sechrest et al. has called a "program failure"; that is, a general deviation or weakness to implementing the intended design. The natural track from theory to practice and measure was often lost, and what was measured was not what was either intended or implemented. In short, what was in effect was "no proof" of treatment impact was expressed as disproof and a general philosophy that "nothing works" (Martinson, 1974).

The SOP program, on the other hand, was designed from the outset as a policy experiment. Evaluation was implemented concurrently with the intervention program. The evaluators were asked to develop data collection instruments to incorporate the variables and measures necessary to fully analyze the program's process and impacts. Deputies were selected and fully trained to ensure that the program design was implemented with "strength and integrity" (Sechrest et al., 1979). Most important, an experimental design was developed to ensure that treatment impacts were determined with the strongest validity and certainty. Finally, the SOP unit was accorded a special status within Juvenile Probation to safeguard the integrity of the policy experiment.

Despite these careful steps, a variety of problems emerged over the three years of SOP and during the followup study which confounded the program and research design of the experiment. These were described earlier in Chapter III and V, and briefly include:

- o the administrative merger of the Saturated Surveillance and Supervision (SSS) program of Richmond probationers returning to the community from the County Boy's Ranch, a residential facility;

- o the assignment of control youth to Intensive Supervision Units whose caseload size and frequency of contact were very similar to the SOP model;
- o the systematic retention of SOP youth beyond the six month supervision interval; and
- o inconsistency in the intervention approaches of the three (and subsequently four) deputies.

In effect, these variances from the original design weakened the comparison between SOP and regular probation and contributed to the results in Chapter V. Probation remains the primary sentencing and disposition option for the justice systems. As prisons and juvenile facilities continue to be crowded beyond capacity, there will be even greater use of probation, but increasingly for serious and sometimes violent offenders. Certainly, the political risks are high, for SOP was assigned ostensibly the most difficult juvenile probationers in the County. But the types of situations encountered in the SOP experiment are representative of the tensions and competing demands in a policy setting. The challenge lies in finding a way to reconcile the public safety mandates of probation with the conduct of field-based experiments to yield valid and reliable results to inform program and policy.

To improve the effectiveness of probation, the types of experiments that were intended under SOP must continue. In effect, probation officials must make a commitment to the autonomy and integrity of experiments such as SOP. Several challenges are posed. Policy experiments in probation should by design depart from traditional practice. Yet the freedom to "do things differently" requires a willingness to both tolerate and learn from failure. Theory must combine with policy to determine program. This may entail some politically difficult situations, including "high visibility" cases of subsequent crime. The types of decisions made under SOP--for example, to assign controls to intensive supervision--may have served the probation mandate for public safety, but undermined the potential learning from the experimental effort. In effect, treatment effects may have been masked by this exigency.

One solution is to attempt to anticipate these implementation concerns at the outset, thereby minimizing situations where discretion and administrative concerns clash with the program design. There should be pre-agreements on the types of offenders assigned to the program, and a shared understanding as to what happens to those not assigned to the experimental condition. If there are risks, they should be acknowledged at the beginning, and all parties should enter the experiment with "eyes open and palms up." This requires political skill, strategic planning, and appropriate timing to know when to take risks or consolidate gains (Miller et al., 1982).

A second solution is the integration of program and research. It is not enough to design a program that is "researchable," for this is quite different from a program that is designed to be researched. The evaluation should be part of the theory-policy-practice-measurement process, and have a role in the design and management of the intervention. This would move policy experiments closer to research and development efforts, but would enhance the results of the study by linking practice to theory and outcomes. Some simple evaluation design considerations to enhance the results of policy experiments in probation include:

- o The underlying theories which inform the intervention design should be practically applied throughout the program and in the evaluation.
- o The evaluation design should measure the strength and nature of the intervention to assess the extent of implementation; in this way, continuous measures of implementation can more sensitively relate process with outcome.
- o Evaluators should participate in program management to offer feedback at an early stage on deviations from the program design and their potential consequences for the policy experiment.
- o Randomization and other research implementation issues should remain the task of the evaluation staff, allowing cases which fall outside the program's intent to be excluded from the sample rather than assigned inappropriately.

The improvement of the research aspects of policy experiments such as SOP is critical to the development of new methods to meet the probation mandate. In a simpler light, implementation and testing of innovation is a way of holding public systems accountable in the same way that probation is intended to hold offenders accountable for their crimes.

**Records and Data Archives: The State of Public Knowledge.** In the same way that the SOP experiment met implementation problems which confounded the research design, we encountered a variety of gaps and problems in the data bases used in the evaluation. At the outset, we relied on the records of the juvenile probation department to construct a data base of client characteristics and offense histories for baseline measures. Later on, we searched official records not only in probation but in the law enforcement and court administrators' offices throughout the County. In all locations, we discovered that records were incomplete, numerous cases were unreported or systematically overlooked, difficult to readily access, and rarely amenable to aggregation. Most alarming was the number of missing cases--for example, recorded arrests were not located in the prosecutor's records, and were kept "open" in both local and state records systems (see Chapter III for a review of these problems).

The effectiveness of SOP or other crime control policies was difficult to determine under these circumstances. There were several immediate impacts on this study. First, some assumptions were made which became a possible source of bias in the analyses. We found arrests with no subsequent entries--we assumed the charges were dropped. We found convictions with no arrest records--we assumed that the arrest and conviction charges were of comparable severity. And we located some offenders for follow-up interviews in prison, despite no record of any court involvement. For the research these gaps resulted in additional cost and effort to reconstruct complete criminal histories for the cohort. This was time-consuming and resulted in an extension of the study period. In other cases, we took steps to create data for social history variables. For example, we created retrospective scales for several variables (e.g., school achievement prior to intervention) for the follow-up interview to fill in gaps discovered in the SOP and regular probation records. This lengthened the interview and somewhat complicated the analyses.

Though these gaps were evenly distributed across SOP and regular probation groups, we believe that they led to more conservative estimates of the impact of SOP. Juvenile records for regular probationers were particularly problematic. Contacts with deputies were rarely recorded unless they resulted in a court petition. But SOP deputies dutifully recorded each contact, including numerous technical violations and minor offenses. The result was perhaps an imbalance in the reporting of subsequent violations--technical or legal--between SOP and control youth, especially for the Richmond SOP youth. Previous studies of intensive supervision confirm the generally closer scrutiny and detailed reporting of violations which occurs on reduced caseloads (see, for example, Lemert and Dill, 1978). It is quite likely that SOP youth experienced the same close drill. A significant result of this process, if not to underestimate the possible effects of intervention, was the possible masking of more subtle or incremental effects of intensive supervision.\*

The potential impacts on probation of such data gaps are profound. Assessment and risk prediction decisions require reliable and complete information. If these decisions are to improve, probation must take the necessary steps to ensure that records are timely and complete. Evaluation of policy innovations such as SOP also requires thorough and accurate information not only on criminal histories but for social backgrounds and prior interventions. The validity and reliability of evaluation data are linked to the record

---

\*Perhaps this explains the gap between official and self-report views of recidivism. SOP youth were scrutinized more closely, and more offenses were recorded. But crime occurs independently of probation supervision, and self-reports adjust for frequency of contact and, accordingly, deputies' knowledge (and reports) of subsequent crime.

keeping efforts of probation deputies. The priority of data and records should become policy for probation, and communicated through formal and cultural channels in the department.

Finally, records and data also become an accountability concern. How is the informed citizen to measure system performance? How can probation officials measure the results of their efforts? As part of the criminal justice system, probation has a mandate not only to supervise offenders in the community but to provide the information to assess the gains to the public from its investments.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

If SOP did not demonstrate its superiority over regular probation, what recommendations can we make for future efforts in keeping serious and violent juvenile offenders in the community? To restate briefly what has already been said, the SOP experiment was only partially implemented. Differences in degree, not in kind, of supervision led to findings of no treatment effect. The most reasonable conclusion is that serious and violent juvenile offenders were kept in the community with no greater threat to public safety than before. Where differences occurred in recidivism, they were attributable to social area effects and socialization. Rehabilitation took a backseat to control and supervision, due to the natural tension between rehabilitation and community safety. In effect, what we observed was simply a long-term look at the outcomes of probation supervision. The results were as expected--many offenders desisted from crime while others were eventually incarcerated. Accordingly, the SOP experiment must be recorded as an experiment that was not implemented.

But as stated in the previous section, experimentation must be a part of the policies of probation, especially if the responsibilities of probation are to expand in the coming decades. A new form of intervention in the community is needed which can effectively combine rehabilitative and control perspectives for "high risk" offenders. Policy experiments and innovative programs with rigorous evaluations will provide the empirical foundations for the design of new methods for probation. In turn, the dispositional options available to the court will be increased, relieving pressure from prisons and the limited public resources necessary to support them. The recommendations for policy and research in this section suggest avenues for the development of new dispositional alternatives to keep offenders in the community.

## Policy Recommendations

As discussed above, probation must undertake a process of experimentation and innovation to develop new ways to control and reintegrate serious young offenders in the community. The recommendations below identify steps to begin that process.

- o **Policy experiments to develop innovative methods to control and reintegrate serious juvenile offenders in the community should be undertaken.**

There is a pressing need to develop new ways to supervise and rehabilitate the changing probation population. In both juvenile and adult caseloads, the profile of the probationer is "hardening" to include more serious and violent offenders who previously might have been incarcerated. The continuing pressure on prison populations and correctional budgets, together with public sentiment for harsher punishment and more attention to community safety, converge on "high risk" or "high profile" in the community. New dispositions must be developed to respond to this need.

Probation is the natural location for such efforts. But there must be extensive thought given to the methods applied with this group. The results here suggest that policy experiments be developed which test intervention techniques which combine social learning principles with social skills development. The length of supervision should be based on a policy of "just rehabilitation" (Gottfredson, 1982), combining "just deserts" principles and punitive sanctions with rehabilitative interventions designed to develop social and personal bonds. Decisions on length of supervision and frequency of contact should be based on achievement of behavioral and reintegrative goals. Extensive assessment information, using multiple data sources, should inform the development of intervention plans and the goals to be pursued. In fact, one purpose of such tests should be the development of improved diagnostic/classification/assessment tools.

In this experimental approach, probation deputies should combine control, case management, and reintegration roles in reduced caseloads of 20 or less. And there should be a specific focus on community or neighborhood involvement in the reintegration process. Naturally, these experiments should include rigorous research designs with a wide net of outcome measures and sufficient study periods to assess short- and long-term gains.

- o **Serious and violent juvenile offenders are appropriate for this new dispositional category in the community. Experiments to keep these "high risk" offenders in the community are necessary to reduce prison populations and limit costly expenditures.**



Our assessment of intensive and regular probation suggested that current probation policies have little impact on the desistance of crime among serious juvenile offenders in the transitional years before adulthood. Yet the results showed that nearly one in three desisted completely from crime, while most (fewer than one in five) avoided imprisonment. Accordingly, the SOP cohort seems appropriate for community-based interventions. Those few who went on to incarceration should be the target of the new dispositional category.

Who are they? Because these dispositions carry harsher restrictions than regular probation, proportionality suggests that they be reserved for those having committed the most serious offenses--felony adjudications for violence. Other criteria should be empirically determined. Once again, prior crime predicts future offending--those with the longest juvenile records were arrested most often in the later years. For self-report crime, those who perceive their environments as having high crime rates seem most at risk for later criminal behaviors. Certainly, the assessment process should use these types of screening questions in planning interventions. Other factors, such as drug problems or gang membership, seem relatively unimportant. Further development of risk assessment instruments should be undertaken with population cohorts similar to the SOP group of older teenagers to determine empirically who goes on to commit further crimes and who desists with minimal intervention (see the research recommendations below).

- o **Probation should be a full partner in the development not only of crime control policy, but also in neighborhood development and the creation of peer or normative sanctioning systems in the community.**

Our results suggest that self-report crime is concentrated among young offenders whose social networks are marked by distance from conventional norms and few ties to the law. On the other hand, official crime seems to be located in poor neighborhoods where aggregate arrest rates are the highest. In either case, the importance of peer sanctioning networks and community ties lies not only in condemning criminal behavior but in teaching behaviors which fall within the law. There are limits to any correctional intervention, and eventually offenders must be reintegrated into their communities to successfully avoid crime. The community, therefore, must take up where corrections departs. Neighborhoods must develop the capacity to perform sanctioning and reintegration activities when correctional interventions end.

Probation deputies, especially those in intensive supervision units or working with high risk offenders, as well as administrators, must become part of the efforts of communities

to develop mechanisms to sanction and control offenders. Programs such as the Community Adjustment Teams in Detroit, the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, or Mentor Homes in Newark and Community Board Programs in San Francisco, are examples of neighborhood groups which have developed social networks and community sanctioning systems for young offenders. Probation officials and deputies should participate fully in these efforts by facilitating the transfer of supervision responsibility to community groups, and helping to develop similar efforts in the various neighborhoods where their clients live or work. Participation on boards of such programs, co-staffing cases with members of these groups, and public speaking are some avenues for partnership. At the policy level, probation officials should participate in community development efforts to ensure that they address the problems which deputies face, and also invite the participation of community groups in the development of probation policies.

- o **Linkages with other components of the justice system will build support for complex and controversial innovations or experiments, and will facilitate the referral of clients and flow of information to support policy experiments.**

During the testing and development of new dispositional alternatives in the community, the cooperation and participation of other elements of the justice system and community service providers will be needed. Political support and strong working linkages can add to program management and decision-making. Specifically, the flow of assessment data, participation with law enforcement in decisions when violations occur, credibility with the courts, and access to needed services are some of the benefits of such linkages. Just as participation with the community is needed at the latter stages of supervision, so too will front-end linkages be needed for the smooth operation of an experimental effort.

- o **Probation must be willing to take risks in experimentation. Though the community protection mandate must be met, the willingness to learn from failure and value such knowledge is fundamental to developing new ways to work with offenders. Policy must acknowledge experimentation as a method to enhance services and ensure accountability.**

In most jurisdictions, innovation is often (and unfortunately) a response to crisis or failure. But under those conditions, the limits to experimentation are often narrow, due to public response and adverse opinion. To continually advance knowledge and practice, experimentation should be regarded as a standard part of quality assurance and good management. This requires a specific policy mandate to develop and test new ways to work with offenders, providing a statutory environment which will support the innovations of forward-looking administrators. There should be wariness of quick answers with inadequate study periods, and patience will be needed to see experiments through to their conclusions. Of course, adequate community protection safeguards must be built in.

And we should expect incremental knowledge gains which will add to policy and practice, not simple solutions to complex problems. The cost of innovation and testing is justified in view of current expenditures for a variety of correctional interventions from probation to prison, whose social and fiscal costs continue to strain limited public resources. From another view, good business practices and sound management stress both accountability (through results) and constant innovation to improve services. These principles apply well here.

### **Research Recommendations**

Further research is needed to strengthen theory, policy, and practice in probation. Several types of inquiry should be undertaken, from experimental research to test innovations in intensive supervision, to longitudinal research on the development of criminal careers in young offenders in inner city urban areas, to ethnographic studies of socialization in different communities, to organizational studies of probation's efforts to redefine its purpose and methods. The following recommendations address these research needs.

- o **Probation departments should rigorously evaluate new methods to supervise offenders within a "just rehabilitation" framework.**

The SOP experiment was a first step in the routinization of evaluation research in testing new supervision methods. Research is needed to support similar tests of efforts to integrate rehabilitation and just deserts models within new dispositional categories for serious offenders on community supervision. These studies should be characterized by experimental designs with random assignment of eligible probationers to experimental and control conditions. However, it is also important to compare new supervision methods with both less restrictive conditions, such as regular supervision, and harsher conditions such as county jail or state prison. Ethical concerns dictate that offenders should not receive harsher dispositions only for experimental purposes. Accordingly, the prison group may necessarily be a retrospective or matched sample. Comparisons with other probation groups can be determined through classic experimental designs.

The SOP experiment also pointed out the need for more sensitive measures of intervention than simply frequency of contact. Future research should include the development of scales and measures to capture the transactional nature of deputy-probationer contact, as well as scales to measure the operationalization of theory in the practice of probation. These innovations in measurement will help generalize the experiences of each

experiment and contribute to the practical applications of theory in probation. Theory is too often absent in contemporary research and practice in probation.

Such research will support comparisons of intensive supervision with other dispositions to assess risk to the community posed by violent and serious offenders, controlling for age, race, and offense history. However, there are other issues of concern in this group. By casting a wide outcome net, we can determine the correlates of criminal behaviors including mental health, socioeconomic outcomes, participation in conventional activities and relationships, drug abuse, and general social integration.

- o **If probation's impact varies by social area, research is needed to understand the development of delinquent and criminal careers in different types of communities.**

There are several studies underway now to study the development of delinquency and crime over a study period of several years. But these panel studies use national probability samples, with the result that urbanism and serious crime are often compounded. These studies also tend to have few serious or chronic offenders since they are such a small percentage of the delinquent population. Research is needed that will allow us to study the development of delinquent careers controlling for the effects of urbanism. In a locale such as Contra Costa County, a study of this type would include birth cohorts from the three primary regions of the county: urban Richmond, industrial (but not populous) Antioch-Pittsburgh, and suburban Concord-Walnut Creek. Comparisons within and across these areas would identify the individual and social factors which explain the development of delinquency, controlling for ecological effects. Unlike national studies, these studies would be less costly by using centralized data collection and interviewing staff concentrating on a wider set of outcome measures.

Once a cohort has been identified, a variety of important questions can be explored. Comparisons between criminal and non-criminal offenders would provide useful information on inhibitors or "immunology" to social processes which seem to have such strong influence. The effects of different types of "official" interventions on delinquency, from child welfare to juvenile court intervention to events in the youth's family, can be studied. Transitional effects of neighborhood and family socialization can be measured. Using cohorts of earlier ages, we can look for behavioral signs which may precede delinquency, including for example, school problems. With cohorts of later adolescents, we can identify those who persist, desist, alter their patterns of offending, or those who may initiate criminal behavior at a later developmental stage. Multiple data sources, including interviews, school records, family interviews, and official records, should be used to address the validity problems identified earlier.

- o **If socialization at the neighborhood level is an important contributor to delinquency, ethnographic research should be undertaken to understand the processes which teach and reinforce delinquent conduct.**

The results of the SOP study are consistent with recent research on the importance of social learning in the development of serious and chronic delinquency (Elliott et al., 1985). But there is little beyond these effort to suggest how these processes are perceived by offenders and their teaching and reinforcing properties. Social learning theories have gained wide acceptance in the past decade. Research is needed to identify and describe the components of this theory. Early formulations mention four components: modeling, reinforcement, opportunities for practice, and functional value (Bandura, 1977). To develop effective interventions for offenders in the community, empirical knowledge is needed on the conditions which foster aggression. What are the implicit rules of conduct which determine behaviors in different neighborhoods or groups? How are they communicated and reinforced? What aversive factors (e.g., codes of conduct or consequences) are communicated by low-crime communities?

An understanding of the processes which underly social development will be needed to formulate probation strategies to counter these influences, develop reintegration methods to situate probationers in pro-social settings, and develop linkages with neighborhood groups who can provide a system of accountability for shaping behavior beyond probation. Placing ethnographers in several communities in a study site such as Contra Costa County will generate a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge to inform the development of probation practices.

- o **The assessment process in juvenile court should be expanded and improved to support probation classification decisions and intensive supervision strategies.**

Whether they are called social reports in juvenile court or pre-sentence investigations in criminal court, the assessment process which informs dispositions and correctional interventions should be improved through research. This study found serious validity problems in official arrest histories and several gaps in the assessments done by the deputies. Both inconsistency in the types of data gathered and quality control in data collection limited the knowledge base from which intervention decisions were made. Often, prognoses based on little more than the wisdom or experience of the deputy drove case management decisions. The recommendations in this study call for a redesign of intensive supervision to include both punitive and rehabilitative perspectives. Reliable and valid data to inform assignment and treatment planning are central to a new probation concept.

We suggest that research be undertaken to improve the assessment process. Meta-analyses of previous probation research should examine the types of offenders who have fared well or poorly on probation. Also, there is a growing knowledge base on social development indicators of delinquency, as well as clinical studies on early manifestations of behavior problems. From secondary analyses of data bases on different offender groups, standardized and cultural-specific scales and indicators can be developed to support the assessment process. What is needed is not necessarily new research. Rather, we need to improve on what we know now using more sensitive and elegant statistical methods complemented by qualitative data on social and clinical process.

**o Research on interventions at the institutional and neighborhood level is necessary to establish effective community- and neighborhood-based sanctioning systems.**

At the neighborhood level, residents can reduce the criminal behaviors that trouble their communities by instituting mechanisms to sanction such behaviors. The results of this study clearly show the importance of specific community actions to change the functional value of crime or aggression. Both preventive and remedial benefits should accrue. Changes at the neighborhood level can alter socialization processes through limiting opportunities for practice, offering prosocial models, and providing negative reinforcement for unacceptable behavior. Community control and reintegration of offenders beyond probation will require such mechanisms. Both public and private organizations should participate in these processes.

Several types of inquiry are needed to identify successful efforts at the community level to convey and enforce sanctions against crime. First, studies of high and low crime neighborhoods, controlling for socioeconomic conditions and urbanism, should contrast the informal and formal control mechanisms in these areas. The National Crime Survey and earlier research such as the Reactions to Crime study are a starting point for such research. Second, a naturalistic study of identified programs or efforts should document the central and replicable elements of their strategies. Several programs were previously identified. Third, the ties of formal and informal groups to the justice system should be examined to determine whether and how probation can participate in these efforts and eventually shift supervision responsibility to the community. Finally, further studies of the perceptions of offenders on community sanctions can identify more effective methods to communicate values and sanctions. We believe that this endeavor is a central part of a long-term strategy to reduce serious crime among young offenders in the transitional years between adolescence and adulthood. The continuing budget scarcity requires that we identify ways to supervise and control crime without costly official interventions.

- o **If probation departments are to develop new forms of supervision, rehabilitative interventions, and sanctions, studies of the organization of probation departments are needed to support the new efforts.**

The first task in organizational change and innovation is to gain the broad participation and support of people involved in the effort. The SOP study shows how organizational, political, and administrative factors combined to confound the experiment. And probation departments are under increasing pressure not only to justify their costs, but to do a better job at community protection and public safety. It is not surprising that change is a cautious and slow process in this environment. Contra Costa County's probation department should be commended for its first steps in such endeavors. To make change work, research is needed on the factors within and outside probation which support or impede change. Petersilia (1985) called for a similar study of attitudes toward probation's mission. We agree, and suggest that such studies go further to include case studies of successful and failed efforts to implement experimentation and change. From this knowledge, future efforts can be planned which are supported by key actors in the probation setting.

## REFERENCES

- Akers, R.L., 1977. Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Akers, R.L., M.K. Krohn, L. Lonza-Kaduce and M. Radosevich, 1979. "Social Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General Theory," American Sociological Review 44, 636-55.
- Alfaro, Jose, 1978. Child Abuse and Subsequent Delinquent Behavior. New York, NY: Select Committee on Child Abuse.
- Bandura, A., 1973. Aggression: A Social Learning Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Blau, J.R. and P.M. Blau, 1982. "The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime," American Sociological Review 47, 114-29.
- Blumstein, A., D. Farrington and S. Moitra. "Delinquency Careers: Innocents, Desistors, and Persistors." In Morris, N., and M. Tansy (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, Volume VI. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Braithwaite, J., 1979. Inequality, Crime, and Public Policy. London: Routledge and Paul.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 1981. "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered," American Sociological Review 46, 36-57.
- Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice, 1981.
- California Bureau of Justice Statistics, California Department of Justice, 1971.
- California Employment Development Department, Sacramento, CA, 1978.
- Canter, R., 1983. "Sex Differences in Self-Reported Delinquency," Criminology 20, 373-93.
- Chambliss, W.J. and R. Seidman, 1971. Law, Order and Power. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Cloward, R. and L.E. Ohlin, 1960. Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Cooley, W.W. and P.R. Lohnes, 1962. Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Conger, R.D., 1978. "From Social Learning to Criminal Behavior." In M.D. Krohn and R.L. Akers (eds.), Crime, Law and Sanctions: Theoretical Perspectives. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.



- Conger, R.D., 1980. "Juvenile Delinquency: Behavior Restraint or Behavior Facilitation?" in T. Hirschi and M. Gottfredson (eds.), Understanding Crime, 131-42. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Earls, F., 1979. "Social Reconstruction of Adolescence: Toward an Explanation for Increasing Rates of Violence in Youth." In Harold M. Rose (ed.), Lethal Aspects of Urban Violence. Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books.
- Elliott, D.S. and S.S. Ageton, 1980. "Reconciling Race and Class Differences in Self-Reported and Official Estimates of Delinquency," American Sociological Review 45, 95-110.
- Elliott, D., S. Ageton and R. Canter, 1979. "An Integrated Theoretical Perspective on Delinquent Behavior," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 16 (1), 3-27.
- Elliott, D.S. and D. Huizinga, 1984. "The Relationship Between Delinquent Behavior and ADM Problems," Proceedings of the ADAMHA/OJJDP Research Conference on Juvenile Offenders With Serious Drug, Alcohol, and Mental Health Problems. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Elliott, D.S., D. Huizinga and S. Ageton, 1985. Explaining Delinquency and Drug Use. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Elliott, D. and R. Voss, 1974. Delinquency and Dropout. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co.
- Fagan, Jeffrey, 1984. "Inner City Youth Crime." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology: Cincinnati, OH.
- Fagan, J., V. Lewis, S. Wexler and D. Stewart, 1981. National Family Violence Evaluation: Second Interim Report. San Francisco, CA: URSA Institute.
- Fagan, J., E. Friedman, D. Stewart and V. Lewis, 1983. National Family Violence Evaluation. San Francisco: URSA Institute.
- Fagan, J., K.V. Hansen and M. Jang, 1983. "Profiles of Chronically Violent Delinquents: An Empirical Test of an Integrated Theory." In J. Kleugal (ed.), Evaluating Juvenile Justice. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Fagan, J., and E. Hartstone, 1984. "Dilemmas in Juvenile Corrections: Treatment Interventions for Special Problem Youths." Presented at the NIJ/ADAMHA Conference on State-of-the-Art Research on Juvenile Offenders with Serious Drug Abuse, Alcohol, and Mental Health Problems. April 17-18, 1984, Rockville, MD.
- Fagan, J. and S. Jones, 1984. "Toward An Integrated Theoretical Model of Violent Delinquency." In R. Mathias (ed.), An Anthology on Violent Juvenile Offenders. Newark, NJ: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
- Fagan, J., P. Kelly and M. Jang, 1984. "The Social Ecology of Violent Delinquency." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Chicago, IL.
- Feld, B. 1983. "Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision," Criminology 21 (2), 195-212.

- Greenwood, P., 1984. Youth Crime and Juvenile Justice in California. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Greenwood, P., A.J. Lipson, A. Abrahams and F. Zimring, 1983. Youth Crime and Juvenile Justice in California: A Report to the Legislature. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Greenwood, P. et al., 1980. Selective Incapacitation. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Hamparian, D., R. Schuster, S. Dinitz and J. Conrad, 1978. The Violent Few. Lexington: Heath.
- Hamparian, D., 1982. Youth In Adult Courts: Between Two Worlds. Columbus, OH: Academy for Contemporary Problems.
- Hartstone, E. and J. Fagan, 1982. Research Design for Part I of the Violent Juvenile Offender Program. San Francisco: URSA Institute.
- Haskell, M.R. and L. Yablonsky, 1974. Crime and Delinquency. Rand McNally College Publishing Co.
- Hawkins, D. and J. Weis, 1980. A Social Development Model for Delinquency Prevention. Seattle, WA: Center for Law and Justice, University of Washington.
- Hindelang, M., T. Hirschi and J. Weiss, 1981. Measuring Delinquency. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Hirschi, T., 1969. Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Inciardi, J., 1979. "Heroin Use and Street Crime," Crime and Delinquency 2, 335-46.
- Jamison, M., 1981. Final Report: Evaluation of the Serious Offender Program. San Francisco: URSA Institute.
- Juvenile Code Revision Commission. Final Report. Sacramento, CA, January 1984.
- Kornhauser, R.R., 1978. Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krohn, M.D. and J. Massery, 1980. "Social Control and Delinquent Behavior: An Examination of the Elements of the Social Bond," Soc. Q. 21, 529-43.
- Latessa, E. and G. Vito, 1984. "The Effects of Intensive Supervision on Shock Probationers." Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences; Louisville, KY.
- Laub, J.H., 1983. "Urbanism, Race, and Crime," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 20 (2), 183-98.
- Laub, J.H. and M.J. Hindelang, 1981. Juvenile Criminal Behavior in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Lemert, E. and W. Dill, 1978. Offenders in the Community. Lexington: Heath.
- Lerman, P., 1975. Community Treatment and Social Control. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Martinson, R., 1974. "What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," Public Interest (3), 22-54.
- Matsueda, R.L., 1982. "Testing Control Theory and Differential Association," Amer. Soc. Rev. 47 (4), 489-504.
- Messner, S.F., 1982. "Poverty, Inequality, and the Urban Homicide Rate," Criminology 20 (1), 103-14.
- Messner, S.F., 1983. "Regional Differences in the Economic Correlates of the Urban Homicide Rate," Criminology 21 (4), 477-88.
- Merton R.K., 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Miller, A. and L. Ohlin, 1980. Decision-making About Secure Care for Juveniles. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Law School, Center for Criminal Justice.
- Miller, A., J. Taylor, L. Ohlin and R. Coates, 1982. Responding to Delinquency: Designing Youth Conventional Programs. Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, Center for Criminal Justice.
- Newman, C., 1962. "Concepts of Treatment in Probation and Parole Supervision," Federal Probation 25, 11-18.
- Pearson, F., 1984. "New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program" (unpublished paper). Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Institute for Criminological Research.
- Petersilia, J., 1980. "Criminal Career Research: A Review of Recent Evidence." In N. Morris and M. Tonry (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research Vol. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 1985. Granting Probation to Felony Offenders. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Platt, A., 1976. The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reed, W., 1983. Differential Processing of Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice System. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Romig, D., 1978. Justice for Our Children. Lexington: Heath.
- Roysher, M. and P. Edelman, 1980. "Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York." In J. Hall, et al (eds), Major Issues in Juvenile Justice Information and Training: Readings in Public Policy. Columbus, OH: The Academy for Contemporary Problems.
- Sadoff, R.L., 1978. "Violence in Juveniles." In Robert L. Sadoff (ed.), Violence and Responsibility. Flushing, NY: Spectrum Publications, Inc.
- Schur, E., 1973. Radical Non-Intervention: Re-Thinking the Delinquency Problem. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Sechrest, L., S.O. White and E. Brown (eds.), 1979. The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.

- Shannon, L.W., 1980. "Assessing the Relationship of Adult Careers to Juvenile Careers: The Transitional Years (16-24)." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco.
- Shannon, L., 1984. The Development of Serious Criminal Careers and the Delinquent Neighborhood. Washington, DC: National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Behavior, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Shaw, C.R., 1929. Delinquency Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shaw, C.R. and H.D. McKay, 1942. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shenk, F. and W. McInerney, 1978. "Issues Arising from Applications of the National Crime Survey," cited in Laub and Hindelang (op. cit.).
- Silberman, C.E., 1978. Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. New York: Random House.
- Smith, C., P. Alexander, T. Halatyn and C. Roberts, 1979. National Assessment of Serious Juvenile Crime and the Juvenile Justice System: The Need for a Rationale Response-- Vol. 2: Relationship to Substance Abuse. Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute.
- Smith, R., 1972. "A Quiet Revolution: Probation Subsidy." Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, pp. 33-47.
- Sorrels, J., 1977. "Kids Who Kill," Crime and Delinquency 23 (3), 312-320.
- Sorrels, J., Jr., 1980. "What Can Be Done About Juvenile Homicide?," Crime and Delinquency (April), 152-61.
- Strasberg, P., 1984. "Recent Trends in Serious Juvenile Crime." In R. Mathias et al. (eds.), Anthology on Violent Delinquents. Newark, NJ: NCCD.
- Sutherland, E.H. and D.R. Cressey, 1955 (1970). Criminology, eighth edition. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.
- Tittle, C.R. and D.A. Smith, 1978. "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality," American Sociological Review 43, 643-56.
- Weis, J. and J. Sederstrom, 1981. The Prevention of Serious Delinquency: What to Do? Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Wheeler, S., 1967. "Delinquency and Crime." In H.S. Becker (ed.), Social Problems: A Modern Approach, 201-76. New York: John Wiley.
- Wiatrowski, M.D., D.B. Griwdold and M.K. Roberts, 1981. "Social Control Theory and Delinquency." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
- Wolfgang, M.E., 1964. Crime and Race: Conceptions and Misconceptions. New York: Institute of Human Relations Press.
- Wolfgang, M.E., R. Figlio and T. Sellin, 1972. Delinquency in a Birth Cohort. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**APPENDIX A: TABLES**

**Table A-1. Post-Project Survival Rates for  
Youths Arrested for Violent Offenses  
(Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	Group		
	E <sub>1</sub>	Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	97.2	95.7	95.2
12	94.4	94.6	88.1
18	92.6	92.6	83.3
24	90.7	90.4	73.8
30	88.4	90.4	69.9
36	81.9	90.4	64.3
Median Survival Time	36.00	36.00	36.00

Lee-Desu = 10.642, df = 2, p .01

**Table A-2. Post-Project Survival Rates for  
Youths Arrested for Serious Offenses  
(Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	Group		
	E <sub>1</sub>	Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	91.2	91.5	92.9
12	85.7	84.0	83.3
18	83.3	80.9	76.2
24	79.2	78.7	76.2
30	77.4	74.9	68.2
36	67.2	74.9	46.0
Median Survival Time	36.00	36.00	36.00

Lee-Desu = 1.382, df = 2, p = ns

**Table A-3. Post-Project Survival Rates for Youths Arrested for Other Violent Offenses (Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	E <sub>1</sub>	Group	
		Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	92.1	92.6	92.9
12	90.3	88.3	92.9
18	86.6	87.2	88.1
24	84.2	83.9	88.1
30	83.0	82.0	88.1
36	77.3	71.1	88.1
Median Survival Time	36.00	36.00	36.00

Lee-Desu = 0.748, df = 2, p = ns

**Table A-4. Post-Project Survival Rates for Youths Arrested for Other Serious Offenses (Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	E <sub>1</sub>	Group	
		Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	94.0	94.7	90.5
12	88.9	89.4	85.7
18	86.6	86.2	81.0
24	82.8	81.7	73.8
30	81.6	81.7	73.8
36	69.3	81.7	73.8
Median Survival Time	36.00	36.00	36.00

Lee-Desu = 1.412, df = 2, p = ns

**Table A-5. Post-Project Survival Rates for  
Youths Arrested for Other Offenses  
(Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	E <sub>1</sub>	Group	
		Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	74.5	74.5	78.6
12	62.5	60.6	61.9
18	56.5	54.3	54.8
24	47.1	54.3	52.4
30	43.6	50.8	49.8
36	35.3	31.2	46.6
Median Survival Time	23.40	31.18	26.93

Lee-Desu = 0.632, df = 2, p = ns

**Table A-6. Post-Project Survival Rates for  
Youths Arrested for Any Offense  
(Percent not yet arrested at each interval)**

Month	E <sub>1</sub>	Group	
		Control	E <sub>2</sub>
6	55.6	58.6	50.0
12	43.5	43.6	35.7
18	39.3	36.2	28.6
24	32.7	35.1	28.6
30	30.4	30.5	26.1
36	21.6	24.6	26.1
Median Survival Time	8.57	10.75	6.00




SPSS MAIN SYSTEM

02/14/84

PAGE 26

FILE 000 (CREATION DATE = 02/07/84)

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL FUNCTION  
ACTIVEL VARIABLE VSURV MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO VIOLENT CRIME  
GROUPED BY MEMORUP




VALUES OF MEMORUP

GRAPH VALUE	GRAPH VALUE	GRAPH VALUE
SYMBOL LABEL	SYMBOL LABEL	SYMBOL LABEL
1	2	3
EXPERIMENTAL	CONTROL	JULIAN

MISSOURI State

FILE 666 (UNLATION DATE = 02/07/84)

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL FUNCTION MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO SERIOUS CRIME  
SURVIVAL VARIABLE SSURV UNLOPED BY HLROKUP




VALUES OF HLROKUP

GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE
SYMBOL	1	SYMBOL	2	SYMBOL	3
CONTROL	1	CONTROL	2	CONTROL	3
JULIAN	1	JULIAN	2	JULIAN	3

MISS DATA SYSTEM

FILE 000 (CREATION DATE = 02/07/84)

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL FUNCTION  
 SURVIVAL VARIABLE DVSURV MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO OTHER VIOLENT  
 UNPLP0 BY NLRGR00P



VALUES OF NLRGR00P

VALUE	GRAPH SYMBOL	VALUE LABEL
1	1	EXPERIMENTAL
2	2	CONTROL
3	3	JULIAN


AND THEIR GRAPH SYMBOLS

02/14/64

MISS WATER SYSTEM

FILE 000 CREATION DATE = 02/07/64

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL FUNCTION  
SURVIVAL VARIABLE LESSUY MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO OTHER SERIOUS  
GROUPED BY NEWGROUP



VALUES OF NEWGROUP


GROUP	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	4

AND THEIR GRAPH SYMBOLS

JESS BALECH SISLEY

FILE 000 CREATION DATE = 02/07/84

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL FUNCTION MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO OTHER CRIME  
 SURVIVAL VARIABLE USURV  
 GROUPED BY MEMORUP



VALUES OF MEMORUP

GRAPH LABEL	VALUE
1	1
2	2
3	3


AND THEIR GRAPH SYMBOLS

GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH SYMBOL
1	1	*
2	2	#
3	3	o

02/14/84

FILE UCC (CALCULATION DATE = 02/07/84)

GRAPH OF SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MONTHS FROM TERMINATION TO ANY CRIME  
SURVIVAL VARIABLE ISURY  
UNJPLED BY NERSUUP



VALUES OF NERSUUP

VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL	VALUE	GRAPH LABEL
0.0000	0	0.0000	2	0.0000	3
0.0000	1	0.0000	3	0.0000	4
0.0000	2	0.0000	4	0.0000	5
0.0000	3	0.0000	5	0.0000	6
0.0000	4	0.0000	6	0.0000	7
0.0000	5	0.0000	7	0.0000	8
0.0000	6	0.0000	8	0.0000	9
0.0000	7	0.0000	9	0.0000	10
0.0000	8	0.0000	10	0.0000	11
0.0000	9	0.0000	11	0.0000	12
0.0000	10	0.0000	12	0.0000	13
0.0000	11	0.0000	13	0.0000	14
0.0000	12	0.0000	14	0.0000	15
0.0000	13	0.0000	15	0.0000	16
0.0000	14	0.0000	16	0.0000	17
0.0000	15	0.0000	17	0.0000	18
0.0000	16	0.0000	18	0.0000	19
0.0000	17	0.0000	19	0.0000	20
0.0000	18	0.0000	20	0.0000	21
0.0000	19	0.0000	21	0.0000	22
0.0000	20	0.0000	22	0.0000	23
0.0000	21	0.0000	23	0.0000	24
0.0000	22	0.0000	24	0.0000	25
0.0000	23	0.0000	25	0.0000	26
0.0000	24	0.0000	26	0.0000	27
0.0000	25	0.0000	27	0.0000	28
0.0000	26	0.0000	28	0.0000	29
0.0000	27	0.0000	29	0.0000	30
0.0000	28	0.0000	30	0.0000	31
0.0000	29	0.0000	31	0.0000	32
0.0000	30	0.0000	32	0.0000	33
0.0000	31	0.0000	33	0.0000	34
0.0000	32	0.0000	34	0.0000	35
0.0000	33	0.0000	35	0.0000	36
0.0000	34	0.0000	36	0.0000	37
0.0000	35	0.0000	37	0.0000	38
0.0000	36	0.0000	38	0.0000	39
0.0000	37	0.0000	39	0.0000	40

AND THEIR GRAPH SYMBOLS

Table A-2.1. Household Characteristics

City	% Families with Female-Headed Households, No Spouse, with Children	% of Total Population Below Poverty	Median Household Income
Antioch	8	7	\$20,892
Brentwood	9	11	14,700
Concord	7	6	22,124
Martinez	6	6	24,069
Pittsburg	8	13	19,629
Richmond	12	17	15,597
Walnut Creek	3	4	24,842
Contra Costa County	7	8	22,875

---

Table A-2.2. Labor Force Characteristics

City	% Finished High School or More	% Unemployed (1979)	% in High Status Occupations
Antioch	75	7	15
Brentwood	53	7	15
Concord	85	5	26
Martinez	84	6	27
Pittsburg	71	8	16
Richmond	67	10	18
Walnut Creek	91	4	41
Contra Costa County	82	6	29

Table A-2.3. Housing Patterns

City	% Owner-Occupied	% Living in Same House as 5 Years Ago	% of Housing Built Since 1970	% Having More Than 1.01 Persons Per Room
Antioch	66	38	44	3
Brentwood	63	52	38	10
Concord	62	41	34	2
Martinez	67	43	37	1
Pittsburg	70	42	45	5
Richmond	57	55	12	7
Walnut Creek	98	45	39	1
Contra Costa County	68	46	31	3

---

Table A-2.4. Ethnic Composition

City	Total 1980 Population	% Black	% Spanish	% Other Minority
Antioch	\$ 43,559	1	15	9
Brentwood	4,434	.1	40	24
Concord	103,251	2	7	8
Martinez	22,882	2	8	6
Pittsburg	33,034	20	19	18
Richmond	74,676	48	10	12
Walnut Creek	53,643	.7	3	6
Contra Costa County	657,252	9	9	16



Table A-4.1. Percent Reporting Incidence of Selected Deviant Behaviors  
in School, by Self, and Others

Behavior	Self	"Some Kids"	"Nearly All Kids"
"Get into fights"	58.8	51.2	16.5
"Get suspended"	70.0	59.8	11.0
"Use marijuana/hash"	80.0	37.8	52.4
"Go to school drunk/high"	65.5	55.5	25.6
"Use hard drugs"	29.7	31.7	4.3
"Sell drugs"	35.8	51.8	12.8
"Carry weapons"	33.9	37.2	9.1
"Use physical force to get money from another student"	12.1	30.5	1.8
"Damage or destroy school property"	35.2	45.7	12.2

Table A-4.2. Percent of Perceived Peer Delinquency:  
Selected Behaviors\*

Approximate Proportion of Friends Who Ever . . .		Three Years Ago	Past Year
"Beat up, knifed, or robbed someone":	"none"	29.3	51.5
	"some"	53.0	39.9
	"most"	15.2	6.7
"Broke into homes or car":	"none"	20.2	43.2
	"some"	54.0	40.1
	"most"	23.9	14.2
"Stole things from stores":	"none"	15.9	43.6
	"some"	51.2	43.2
	"most"	31.7	12.3
"Got drunk or high":	"none"	7.3	8.0
	"some"	26.8	2.95
	"most"	65.2	61.3

\*Due to a small number of "don't know" or missing responses, totals may not always add to 100%.

Table A-5.1. Months to First Re-Arrest by Type of Crime, Treatment Group, and Treatment Interval

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>	
	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.	Under 6 mos.	Over 6 mos.
Violent	21.4	17.2	22.0	7.2	15.0	17.2
Serious Property	15.2	13.3	12.2	10.5	23.6	14.7
Other Violent*	10.2	15.9	10.9	15.7	3.8	19.0
Other Property	17.0	17.6	18.3	10.6	18.2	9.7
Other*	13.2	10.5	15.5	7.5	10.3	10.0
Total*	9.6	7.5	12.2	7.1	6.8	6.0

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table A-5.2. Months to First Re-Arrest by Type of Crime, Treatment Group, and Time at Risk

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>			Control			E <sub>2</sub>		
	0-24	25-36	36- Over	0-24	25-36	36- Over	0-24	25-36	36- Over
Violent	13.1	16.4	19.3	5.7	8.9	13.2	0	15.0	18.9
Serious Property	4.6	9.2	15.8	8.6	11.9	10.8	0	15.0	20.6
Other Violent	0	14.6	13.3	8.8	9.0	32.4	0	12.2	0.6
Other Property	14.8	9.0	22.3	12.6	8.9	13.1	0	16.7	4.7
Other	9.7	12.6	10.9	5.6	13.1	9.8	0	8.9	13.3
Total	5.3	8.2	8.6	4.5	9.5	11.4	0	6.0	6.7

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table A-5.3. Months to First Rearrest by Type of Offense, Treatment Group, and Sex

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>		Control		E <sub>2</sub>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Violent	18.49	0	10.47	0	16.52	0
Serious Property	13.95	0	10.67	14.97	17.49	0
Other Violent	14.72	4.01	14.37	12.74	9.84	0
Other Property	17.08	23.62	11.20	24.10	11.24	0
Other*	11.46	11.44	7.08	20.03	10.08	0
Total	8.43	6.28	6.99	15.14	6.20	0

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table A-5.4. Months to First Rearrest by Type of Crime and Age at Termination

Type of Crime	E <sub>1</sub>			Control			E <sub>2</sub>		
	To 16	16-18	18- Over	To 16	16-18	18- Over	To 16	16-18	18- Over
Violent	20.86	15.87	17.93	21.98	9.56	5.39	12.08	17.64	18.72
Serious Property	12.60	18.05	6.58	11.43	12.60	6.45	17.23	20.36	11.32
Other Violent	11.71	13.70	24.34	10.31	15.31	21.12	4.27	11.23	0
Other Property	16.74	17.27	20.78	19.08	11.05	4.49	16.73	12.27	7.00
Other	12.87	9.36	11.94	11.84	8.42	6.28	6.82	10.48	13.96
Total	8.15	8.15	11.22	9.14	7.63	8.86	6.00	7.22	1.93

\*\*\*p .001

\*\*p .01

\*p .05

Table A-5.5. Percent of Youths "Surviving" at Six Month Post-Project Intervals  
 (Percent Not Yet Arrested at Each Interval)  
 (N=361)

Post-Project Interval	Violent			Serious Property			Other Violent			Other Property			Other			Total		
	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>	E <sub>1</sub>	C	E <sub>2</sub>
0-6	97.2	95.7	95.2	91.2	91.5	92.9	92.1	92.6	92.9	94.0	94.7	90.5	74.5	74.5	78.6	55.6	58.6	50.0
7-12	94.4	94.6	88.1	85.7	84.0	83.3	90.3	88.3	92.9	88.9	89.4	85.7	62.5	60.6	61.9	43.5	43.6	35.7
13-18	92.6	92.6	83.3	83.3	80.9	76.2	86.6	87.2	88.1	86.6	86.2	96.0	56.5	54.3	54.8	39.3	36.2	28.6
19-24	90.7	90.4	73.8	79.2	78.7	76.2	84.2	83.9	88.1	82.8	81.7	73.8	47.1	54.3	52.4	32.7	35.1	28.6
25-30	88.4	90.4	69.9	77.4	74.9	68.2	83.0	82.0	88.1	81.6	81.7	73.8	43.6	50.8	49.8	30.4	30.5	26.1
30-36	81.9	90.4	64.3	67.2	74.9	46.0	77.3	71.1	88.1	69.3	81.7	73.8	35.3	31.2	46.6	21.6	24.6	26.1
Median	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	23.4	31.8	26.9	--	--	--
Lee-Desu	10.64**			1.38			0.75			1.41			0.63					

\*\*\*p .001  
 \*\*p .01  
 \*p .05

**APPENDIX B: INSTRUMENTS**

URSA Institute  
Pier 1 1/2  
San Francisco, CA 94111

**FOLLOW-UP EVALUATION  
OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY  
PROBATION DEPARTMENT'S SERIOUS OFFENDER  
PROJECT**

**3 YEAR  
FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date Checked

\_\_\_\_\_  
Supervisor's Initials

\_\_\_\_\_  
Interviewer Name

\_\_\_\_\_  
Respondent I.D. #

\_\_\_\_\_  
S.O.P. P.O. Name

\_\_\_\_\_  
S.O.P. Entry Date

INTERVIEWER'S NAME \_\_\_\_\_ I.D. # \_\_\_\_\_

RESPONDENT'S I.D. # \_\_\_\_\_

SOP Entry Date \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ (Month+Year)

Model Telephone Approach:

"Hello (R's name), my name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I'm part of a research team at URSA Institute. We are conducting a study of young people in Contra Costa who have had contact with the Probation Department. We'd like to interview you in depth about your experience and beliefs, and the Institute will pay you \$12.00 for talking with me for about two hours. I'd like to set up the interview with you now."

NOTE:

- Tell respondent you can meet him/her at any time or place that is comfortable and convenient as long as you can talk privately because the interview is confidential.
- Get a specific time, address, and directions, then read them back for accuracy.
- Get a phone number for him/her if needed and give him/her a phone number to call in case the appointment must be changed.
- Do not record respondent's name anywhere on this form. If you happen to know him/her, call URSA and arrange for another interviewer.

LOG OF CALLS

DATE	TIME	RESULTS (No answer; not home; when to call again; messages)

## CONTRA COSTA FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW

### Model Face-to-Face Introduction

First I'd like to thank you for agreeing to spend the time with me for this interview. As you may know, you are part of a study of young people in Contra Costa County who have had contact with the Probation Department. Our research is designed to find out all about the experiences which contribute to doing well and not doing well, and to discover whether the kinds of services Probation offers are helpful in keeping kids out of trouble. We believe that the more we find out about why people sometimes get in trouble and sometimes they don't, the more we can design programs which really help.

We also think it is especially important to ask young people themselves about these things rather than parents, teachers, cops or "experts." Your opinions and responses are the ones that matter the most to us, so please just tell us as truthfully as you can exactly what you feel.

I'll be asking you all sorts of questions: about your friends, your relationships with your family and your neighbors; about your experience in school, at work, and in your community; before probation and now; on what happened to you in the Juvenile Justice System and while you were on Probation; about what your hopes are for the future, and your opinions on politics and moral issues. Because some of the questions concern the period just prior to your probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name), try to think of something that will remind you of that period.

Remember, we don't work for the courts, or the cops, or the county. We are a private, non-profit research institute. I'd also like to remind you that this is nothing like a test. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, only honest ones. The information you give me will only be used in combination with information from 300 other young people and only for research purposes. All answers are secret. I won't put your name on this form anywhere, and we will not give out any of the information to anyone. I will pay you \$12.00 at the end of the interview.

Ok, the first part of the interview will be about your background; the second concerns your experience in the Juvenile Justice system; then I'll ask what you think influences young people; and the last sections are about your friends and your spare time. Any questions before we start? If you have any as we go through, just ask. The first thing to get out of the way is to have you read and sign the Consent Form (hand to respondent).



THE  
URSA  
INSTITUTE

PIER 1-1/2, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111

415 • 398-2040

INFORMED YOUTH CONSENT INFORMATION  
(if over 18)

Description of Study

The URSA Institute of San Francisco is conducting research on youthful offenders in Contra Costa County, California. The study is designed to generate information on the life histories, values, and conforming and delinquent behavior of young people who have had experience with the Probation Department. It will also obtain data on the needs and problems young people have and whether or not the Probation Department was helpful in that regard. The goal of all this information is to improve understanding of the situation young people face and design better programs to meet their needs.

Participation Guarantees

Each interview will last approximately two hours and you will be paid \$12.00 promptly upon completion. You are free to look at copies of all questions to be asked of you. You may also examine URSA Institute's agreements with the U.S. government which spell out in detail our guarantee of, and procedures for, keeping all answers secret, and why the study is important for improving programs for youth.

You are free to choose whether or not to answer any given questions or to continue the interview. Some of the questions may seem personal. However, we assure you that our goal is not to pry into private lives, but only to better understand the situation young people find themselves in and how they respond. Please remember that all answers will be strictly confidential. Your name will not appear anywhere on the interview form, and only the URSA Institute research team will even see the answers. The only notation of your name will be on a separate list which will be kept in a locked file and destroyed once the research is completed. Then all the young people who took part will be completely anonymous even to the research staff. No information you give can ever be used in any legal action or given to any other persons or agencies.

Each participant will be given a copy of this consent form. The interviewer will be happy to answer any questions you might have about taking part in the study. Should you have any questions later on you are free to call or write the interview supervisor:

Craig Reinerman  
The URSA Institute  
Pier 1-1/2  
San Francisco, CA 94111  
(415) 398/2040

INFORMED YOUTH CONSENT FORM

I have read the above description of the URSA Institute's Costa  
Costa County Follow-Up Study and the Participation Guarantees.  
I understand the procedures to be followed for guaranteeing com-  
plete confidentiality of all information I provide. I further  
understand that participation is voluntary and that I have the  
right to terminate the interview at any point. I was given the  
opportunity to examine UI's interview schedule and protection of  
human subjects agreements with the U.S. government. I hereby  
freely give my consent to be interviewed.

Respondent's Name (please print) \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent's Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

(Signed copies of this form will not be attached to the interview  
form and will be kept in locked files at the URSA Institute,  
San Francisco.)

RESPONDENT'S I.D. #

PROBATION OFFICER'S NAME \_\_\_\_\_, and I.D. #

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3	4
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	6	7	8

Interview was:

1. Refused (Why?) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
9

2. Started but not completed (Why?) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. Completed:

Date

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	11	12	13	14	15

Length of interview (minutes) \_ \_ \_

Where was interview conducted? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: 8 or 88 always = "don't know" or did not answer  
9 or 99 always = "does not apply"

DEMOGRAPHICS

This first set of questions just gets some basic information on you and your family, like your religion, your parents' occupations, and so forth.

1. First, how old are you? (code exact age)

16  17

2. Sex (DO NOT ASK)

1=female; 2=male

18

3. Are you currently:

- 1. single
- 2. married
- 3. living with lover
- 4. separated
- 5. divorced
- 6. other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

19

4. What ethnic group do you consider yourself a member of?

- 1=Asian
- 2=Black
- 3=Chicano
- 4=Latino (hispanic/Raza)
- 5=Native American
- 6=White
- 7=Other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

20

5. Are you currently attending school? Full-time or part-time?  
Are you currently employed? Full- or part-time? (Combine + Code)

- 1=employed full-time only
- 2=employed part-time only
- 3=full-time student/part-time job
- 4=part-time student/full-time job
- 5=full-time student only
- 6=part-time student only
- 7=no school, no job
- 8=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

21

Religion

6. What religion were you raised in?

- 1=Baptist
- 2=Catholic
- 3=Jewish
- 4=Protestant (specify \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5=Fundamentalist-Evangelical (specify \_\_\_\_\_)
- 6=Other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)
- 7=None

22

7. Thinking back to about 4 years ago, did you see yourself as a (3) very religious person?; (2) somewhat religious person?; or (1) not very religious person?

23

8. Do you now see yourself as a (3) very religious person; (2) somewhat religious person?; or (1) not very religious person? (4) not applicable

24

9. In the last year, about how often did you attend religious service?

- 1=weekly
- 2=monthly
- 3=two-three times a year
- 4=once a year
- 5=never

25

10. Is that: (1) more often than 4 years ago?; (2) about the same?; (3) less often than 4 years ago?

26

Parents' Education/Occupation

11. What was the last grade in school (or college) your mother completed?

(Record raw year, e.g., 1 year of college=13; M.A.=18)

27 28

12. What was the last grade in school (or college) your father completed?

(Record raw year.)

29 30

13. Which of the following terms describes your family's lifestyle:

- 1=struggling to make ends meet?
- 2=working hard and getting by?
- 3=fairly comfortable middle class?
- 4=well off and financially secure?

31

14. What kind of work does your father (step-father) usually do?  
Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

32

15. How long has he done this kind of work? (Code # of years.)

33  34

16. (If less than 5 years, ask:) What kind of work did he do before that? (Specify \_\_\_\_\_)

35

17. About what percent of the time in the last 3 years has your father (step-father) been steadily employed: (read choices)

- 1=1/4 of the time (or less)?
- 2=about half?
- 3=most of the time?
- 4=almost always, always?

36

18. Is he employed now? (If yes, "full- or part-time?")

- 1=no
- 2=yes, full-time, part year (seasonal)
- 3=yes, part-time, full year
- 4=yes, full-time, full year (self-employed)

37

19. What kind of work does your mother (step-mother) usually do?  
(Specify \_\_\_\_\_)

38

20. How long has she done this kind of work? (Code # of years)

39  40

21. (If less than 5 years, ask:) What kind of work did she do before that? (Specify \_\_\_\_\_)

41

22. About what percent of the time in the last three years has your mother (step-mother) been steadily employed : (read choices)

- 1=1/4 of the time (or less)?
- 2=about half the time?
- 3=most of the time?
- 4=almost always, always?

42

23. Is she employed now?

- 1=no
- 2=yes, all-time, part year (seasonal)
- 3=yes, part-time, full year
- 4=yes, full-time, full year

43

Family Living Situation

24. What city were you born in? (Specify \_\_\_\_\_)

- 1=Contra Costy County
- 2=Bay Area
- 3=Other California--non-urban
- 4=Other California--urban
- 5=Other state--non-urban
- 6=Other state--urban
- 7=Outside USA

44

25. Where did you live the longest while you were growing up?

- 1=Contra Costa County
- 2=Bay Area
- 3=Other California--non-urban
- 4=Other California--urban
- 5=Other state--non-urban
- 6=Other state--urban
- 7=Outside USA

45

26. Who did you live with most when you were growing up? That is, who mostly raised you?

- 01=both parents
- 02=Mom
- 03=Dad
- 04=One parent, then another
- 05=Mom and step-father
- 06=Dad and step-mother
- 07=Grandparents
- 08=Other relatives
- 09=Older siblings
- 10=Foster parents
- 11=Adopted
- 12=Group home (institution)
- 13=Other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

46 47

27. Who did you live with the most around the time you got on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?

- 01=alone
- 02=with birth mother and father
- 03=with mother
- 04=father
- 05=with mother and step-father
- 06=with father and step-mother
- 07=with one parent then another
- 08=with brothers and sisters
- 09=with other relatives
- 10=with grandparents
- 11=with girl/boy friend
- 12=with friends (non-lover, non-relative)
- 13=residential program, group home
- 14=foster home
- 15=adoptive home
- 16=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

48 49

28. In the past year, who did you live with the most?

- 01=alone
- 02=with birth mother and father
- 03=with mother
- 04=with father
- 05=with mother and stepfather
- 06=with father and stepmother
- 07=with one parent then another
- 08=with brothers and sisters
- 09=with other relatives
- 10=with grandparents
- 11=with girl-boy friend
- 12=with friends (non-lover, non-relative)
- 13=residential program, group home
- 14=foster home
- 15=adoptive home
- 16=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

50 51

29. How many brothers and sisters do you have by birth? (code #)

52 53

30. How many stepbrothers and stepsisters do you have? (code #)

54 55

31. Have you ever lived with them? (1=yes; 2=no)

56



FAMILY

The next set of questions are about your family--what your folks do for a living, how you all get along, and so forth.

32. What was your family life like just prior to when you got on probation with Mr./Ms. (P.O. name \_\_\_\_\_)?

---

---

---

57

33. Comparing your family to most of your friends' families, would you say your family was : (read choices)

- 1=not as financially well-off as most of your friends' families?
- 2=about the same? or
- 3=better off financially?
- (4=don't know; can't tell; depends on friends)

58

34. Has your family ever received any form of public assistance like Aid to Family with Dependent Children, food stamps, or welfare?

- 1=food stamp
- 2=welfare/AFDC/SSI/ATD
- 3=both of the above
- 4=none

59

35. (If ever,) When was the last time your family received any assistance like that?

- 1=currently
- 2=within last year
- 3=1-3 years ago
- 4=3-5 years ago
- 5=more than 5 years ago

60

36. Have you personally ever received any form of public assistance?

- 1=currently
- 2=within last year
- 3=1-3 years ago
- 4=3-5 years ago
- 5=more than 5 years ago

61

Family Relations

37. In the 6 months before you got on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ about 4 years ago, how would you describe your relationship with your family: (read choices)

- 4=very close
- 3=somewhat close
- 2=not very close
- 1=not close at all

62

38. How about now, how would you describe your relationship with your family:

- 4=very close
- 3=somewhat close
- 2=not very close
- 1=not close at all

63

39. (If different, ask:) Why did your relationship with your family get better/worse between then and now?

---

---

---

64

40. Thinking back to 4 years ago, about how often did you share your thoughts or feelings with your father?  
(if father never seen or not around, code=7)

- 4=all the time
- 3=regularly
- 2=sometimes
- 1=never, almost never

65

41. How often do you share your thoughts and feelings with your father (stepfather) now?  
(if father never seen or not around, code=7)

- 4=all the time
- 3=regularly
- 2=sometimes
- 1=never, almost never

66

42. Four years ago, about how often did you share your thoughts and feelings with your mother (stepmother):

- 4=all the time
- 3=regularly
- 2=sometimes
- 1=never, almost never

67

43. How often do you share your thoughts and feelings with your mother (stepmother) now:

- 4=all the time
- 3=regularly
- 2=sometimes
- 1=never, almost never

68

44. Again, thinking back to 4 years ago, when your parents felt you had done something wrong, how did they usually handle it?

- 01=no punishment at all
- 02=lecture/serious talk/disappointment
- 03=yell
- 04=put on restriction denial of privileges
- 05=any combination of lecture/yell, restrictions/ or denial of privileges
- 06=threats of getting kicked out of home, turned into probation, getting beaten up, etc.
- 07=hit/slap/spank
- 08=hit with belt, stick, other object
- 09=any combination which includes #07 (hitting) and 03, 04, 05, or 06
- 10=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

69 70

45. Now when your parents feel you've done something wrong, how do they usually handle it? (not applicable = 99)

- 01=no punishment at all
- 02=lecture/serious talk/disappointment
- 03=yell
- 04=put on restriction/denial of all privileges
- 05=any combination of lecture/yell, restrictions/ or denial of privileges
- 06=threats of getting kicked out of home, turned into probation, getting beaten up, etc.
- 07=hit/slap/spank
- 08=hit with belt, stick, other object
- 09=any combination which includes #07 (hitting) and 03, 04, 05, or 06
- 10=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

71 72

46. (If punished by any combination which included hitting,)  
What was it you had usually done to provoke that response  
from your parents?

- 01=staying out too late
- 02=cutting school
- 03=getting in trouble at school
- 04=low grades at school
- 05=coming home drunk
- 06=using drugs
- 07=fighting
- 08=talking back to parents
- 09=getting in trouble with the cops; crime
- 10=not doing household chores
- 11=hanging out with kids your parents don't like
- 12=multiple response
- 13=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

73  74

47. Four years ago, about how often did you get into fights (physical  
and verbal) with your brothers and sisters: (read choices)

- 1=almost never, or never
- 2=once or twice a year
- 3=about once a month
- 4=once a week or more

75

48. (If yes, fights:) Were these fights mostly yelling or did you  
hit each other?

- 1=yelling (verbal)
- 2=hitting (physical)
- 3=both yelling and hitting
- 4=neither/not applicable

76

49. (If ever hitting:) How often was anyone injured in these fights?

- 1=never
- 2=once or twice
- 3=3 or more times

77

50. How often do you get into fights (physical/verbal) with your  
brothers and sisters NOW?

- 1=almost never
- 2=once or twice a year
- 3=about once a month
- 4=once a week or more

78

51. 4 years ago, how often did you fight with your parents: (read choices)

- 1=never?
- 2=sometimes?
- 3=frequently, a lot?

(Dup 1-4)

  
5

52. How about now? How often do you fight with your parents?

- 1=never?
- 2=sometimes?
- 3=frequently, a lot?

  
6

53. 4 years ago, how often did your parents (step-parents) get angry with each other: (read choices)

- 1=never?
- 2=sometimes
- 3=frequently, a lot?

  
7

54. (If parents fought,) When your parents (step-parents) fought, did they mostly yell at each other or did they also hit each other, not talk to each other, or what? (GOAL = PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF HITTING)

- 1=didn't talk to each other/cold shoulder
- 2=yelled (verbal) only
- 3=hit (physical) as well as 1 or 2
- 7= other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

  
8

55. (If ever hitting,) How often did the fights between your parents (step-parents) involve hitting?

- 1=never
- 2=rarely
- 3=sometimes
- 4=usually
- 5=all the time

  
9

56. (If ever hitting,) How often was either of them injured in these fights: (read choices)

- 1=never?
- 2=once or twice?
- 3=three or more times?

  
10

57. Has either of your parents ever hit you or your brothers or sisters for no real reason? I mean to say, just punched you when you hadn't done anything?

- 1=yes
- 2=no

  
11

FAMILY PRACTICES

58. When you were growing up, about how many hours in a typical day did you spend with your parents? (not sleep time) (code actual # hours)

12  13

59. Did you feel that was enough time, =(1)  
too much time, or =(2)  
not enough time? =(3)

14

60. Thinking back again to four years ago, when you left the house to go out with your friends, did your parents want to know where you were going?

1=yes, always  
2=yes, sometimes  
3=no

15

61. How about now, do they want to know where you are going?

1=yes, always  
2=yes, sometimes  
3=no

16

62. Four years ago, would you say your parents tried to be strict with you, or did they let you do pretty much what you wanted to do?

1=strict  
2=let do what you want

17

63. How about now, are they strict or do they let you do pretty much what you want?

1=strict  
2=let do what you want

18

64. Would you say you learned from your parents to enjoy the present, or to build for the future?

1=enjoy present  
2=work for future

19

65. Four years ago, did your folks pressure you to study hard and get good grades?

- 1=heavy pressure
- 2=some
- 3=only a little
- 4=not at all

20

66. How about now, do they pressure you to study hard and get good grades?

- 1=heavy pressure
- 2=some
- 3=only a little
- 4=not at all

21

67. Four years ago, were either of your parents involved in any community organizations, like the Girl Scouts or Boy Scouts, the PTA, church groups, local clubs, softball or bowling teams, labor unions, etc.?

- 1=yes, more than one
- 2=yes, only one
- 3=none

22

68. Four years ago, what activities did you do with your parents?  
(PROBES: Watch T.V.? Visit relatives? Go on picnics?)

---

---

---

23

69. Are there activities you didn't do with your parents that you would have liked to do?

- 1=yes
- 2=no

24

70. If yes, what? \_\_\_\_\_

---

---

25

FAMILY ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE

71. How often would you say your father (stepfather) drinks beer, wine, or hard liquor?

- 1=never or rarely
- 2=once per month
- 3=once a week
- 4=two to three times per week
- 5=four to five times per week
- 6=daily

26

72. How often would you say your mother (stepmother) drinks beer, wine, or hard liquor?

- 1=never or rarely
- 2=once per month
- 3=once per week
- 4=two to three times per week
- 5=four to five times per week
- 6=daily

27

73. Has your father or mother ever used...(read list one by one):  
How about your brother(s) or sister(s)?

CODES: 1=YES; 2=NO

	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>How about your Brothers or Sisters?</u>
Marijuana or hash	<input type="checkbox"/> 28	<input type="checkbox"/> 33	<input type="checkbox"/> 38
Cocaine	<input type="checkbox"/> 29	<input type="checkbox"/> 34	<input type="checkbox"/> 39
Sleeping pills, barbiturates, tranquilizers, downers	<input type="checkbox"/> 30	<input type="checkbox"/> 35	<input type="checkbox"/> 40
Diet pills, speed, amphetamines	<input type="checkbox"/> 31	<input type="checkbox"/> 36	<input type="checkbox"/> 41
Heroin, methadone, or other opiates	<input type="checkbox"/> 32	<input type="checkbox"/> 37	<input type="checkbox"/> 42



74. Did either of your parents or your brother(s) or sister(s) ever try to get professional help or counseling for drug or drinking problems?

1=yes, father

2=yes, mother

3=yes, sibling

4=yes, mom and dad

5=yes, dad and siblings

6=yes, mom and siblings

7=yes, both parents & siblings

8=no

43

Parents' and Siblings' Criminal Histories

75. Has either of your parents (step-parents) ever been arrested?

1=no

2=yes, father

3=yes, mother

4=yes, both

44

76. (If yes) was it for something where somebody else was physically hurt?

1=yes

2=no

45

77. Did he/she/they ever go to jail?

1=no

2=yes, father

3=yes, mother

4=yes, both

46

78. (If yes) for about how long? (code # months for longest sentence)

47 48

79. Have any of your brothers or sisters ever been arrested?

1=yes

2=no

49

80. (If yes) was it for something where somebody else was physically hurt?

1=yes

2=no

50

81. Have any of them ever gone to jail or some other institution?

1=yes

2=no

51

82. For about how long? (code # months for longest sentence)

52 53

SCHOOL

83. Since the 8th grade, how many different schools have you been-to?

- 1=1 or 2
- 2=3 or 4
- 3=5 or more

54

84. What was the last grade in school you completed? (code exact grade, e.g. 1 yr. college=13, then code category below)

- 1=less than H.S. grad
- 2=H.S. grad
- 3=Some trade or technical school
- 4=some college

55

Four years ago, what kind of school were you in?

85. 

- 1=Regular Jr. H.S. or H.S./Community College/Trade School (full time)
- 2=Special school (full time)
- 3=Private/parochial H.S. (full time)
- 4=Institution/joint
- 5=Independent study
- 6=Taking classes part time
- 7=G.E.D. prep.
- 8=Not in school
- 9=Other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

56

86. What kind of school are you in now?

- 1=Regular Jr. H.S. or H.S./Community College/Trade School (full time)
- 2=Special school (full time)
- 3=Private/parochial H.S. (full time)
- 4=Institution/joint
- 5=Independent study
- 6=Taking classes part time
- 7=G.E.D. prep.
- 8=Not in school
- 9=Other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

57

87. Four years ago, how often did you attend school?

- 5=pretty much every day
- 4=3-4 days/week
- 3=2-3 days/week
- 2=once/week
- 1=not at all or infrequently

58

88. (If attending full-time now) how often do you now attend school?

- 5=pretty much every day
- 4=3 or 4 days/week
- 3=2 or 3 days/week
- 2=once a week
- 1=not at all or infrequently

59

89. What grades did you usually get in school back four years ago?

- 5=A average
- 4=B average
- 3=C average
- 2=D average
- 1=F average

60

90. How important to you was getting good grades back 4 years ago?

- 1=not very important
- 2=somewhat important
- 3=very important

61

91. (If still in school), What grades do you usually get now?

- 5=A average
- 4=B average
- 3=C average
- 2=D average
- 1=F average

62

(7=G.E.D. prep., no grading)

92. How important to you is getting good grades now?

- 5=A average
- 4=B average
- 3=C average
- 2=D average
- 1=F average

63

(7=G.E.D. prep., no grading)

93. Four years ago, did you feel like you got along with:  
(read choices)

- 1=almost all the other students?
- 2=most of them?
- 3=only some of them?
- 4=almost none of them?

64

94. In general, how satisfied were you with your school four years ago?

- 1=not satisfied
- 2=somewhat satisfied
- 3=very satisfied

65

95. (If in school now,) How satisfied are you with your school now?  
(or "...were you with your most recent school?")

- 1=not satisfied
- 2=somewhat satisfied
- 3=very satisfied

66

96. How important is it (or was it) to you what your teachers think/thought of you?

- 1=not very important
- 2=fairly important
- 3=very important

67

97. In high school, did you get:

- 1=as much guidance counseling as you wanted?
- 2=not enough?, or
- 3=more than enough guidance counseling?

68

98. Have your feelings about school changed from, say, four years ago to now? I mean, do you value school more now, less, or about the same as four years ago?

- 1=less now
- 2=same
- 3=more now

69

### SCHOOL ATTACHMENT SCALE

Now I'd like to read a list of statements students sometimes make about school, and I'd like you to think about the school you are in now (or most recent school) and tell me whether you personally agree or disagree. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers.

(1=agree; 2=disagree)

99. Most days I couldn't wait to get out of school.

70

100. I usually felt that I could do the work and succeed in school if I tried.

71

101. I was often scared to go to school because of fights, gangs, or people picking on me.

72

102. Doing well in school is the key to getting the kind of job I want.

73

103. I often felt proud when my school sports teams won their games.

74

104. Racial conflict in my school made it an unpleasant place.

75

105. There isn't much point in working hard in school because there aren't many jobs anyway.

76

106. I often felt like an outsider in my school.

77

School Environment Scale

Now I'd like to read you a list of things that kids sometimes do at school. Try to think back to the high school you attended the longest over the last 4 years, and tell me first, about how many kids at that school did each of the following:

Ok, how many kids at your school...(skip classes, etc.) and did you ever...(skip classes, etc.)  
(If subject is out of school now or referring to the past, use past tense.)

	Kids in <u>General</u>	(Codes: 1=none 2=hardly any 3=some 4=nearly all)	(Dup 1-4)	<u>You</u> (Codes: 1=yes 2=no)
107. skip classes without an excuse?	<input type="checkbox"/>	5		<input type="checkbox"/> 25
108. go to school dances & social events?	<input type="checkbox"/>	6		<input type="checkbox"/> 26
109. go to school sports events?	<input type="checkbox"/>	7		<input type="checkbox"/> 27
110. drink alcohol?	<input type="checkbox"/>	8		<input type="checkbox"/> 28
111. participate in student government, newspaper or clubs & organizations?	<input type="checkbox"/>	9		<input type="checkbox"/> 29
112. get into fights?	<input type="checkbox"/>	10		<input type="checkbox"/> 30
113. use soft drugs (marijuana or hash)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	11		<input type="checkbox"/> 31
114. stole furniture or equipment?	<input type="checkbox"/>	12		<input type="checkbox"/> 32
115. steal students possessions from their lockers?	<input type="checkbox"/>	13		<input type="checkbox"/> 33
116. get suspended from school?	<input type="checkbox"/>	14		<input type="checkbox"/> 34
117. hit a teacher or school official?	<input type="checkbox"/>	15		<input type="checkbox"/> 35
118. go to school while high or drunk?	<input type="checkbox"/>	16		<input type="checkbox"/> 36
119. sell drugs?	<input type="checkbox"/>	17		<input type="checkbox"/> 37
120. hit another student for no apparent reason?	<input type="checkbox"/>	18		<input type="checkbox"/> 38
121. carry weapons?	<input type="checkbox"/>	19		<input type="checkbox"/> 39
122. make verbal threats to teachers?	<input type="checkbox"/>	20		<input type="checkbox"/> 40
123. use physical force to get money or something from another student?	<input type="checkbox"/>	21		<input type="checkbox"/> 41
124. destroy or damage school property?	<input type="checkbox"/>	22		<input type="checkbox"/> 42
125. use "hard" drugs? (cocaine, PCP, heroin, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	23		<input type="checkbox"/> 43
126. make verbal threats to hurt another student to get money or something from them?	<input type="checkbox"/>	24		<input type="checkbox"/> 44

127. Four years ago, what was the biggest problem with your school?

---

---

---

45

128. What general type of courses were/are you taking in high school?

- 1=college preparation
- 2=basic, general studies
- 3=business/clerical
- 4=vocational/trade
- 5=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

46

129. If you had your choice, how far in school would you like to go eventually?

- 1=H.S. Grad
- 2=on-job training/apprenticeship
- 3=trade or business school
- 4=some college/junior college/associate's degree
- 5=college grad
- 6=professional or graduate school degree

47

130. Is this:

- 1=more than you wanted four years ago?
- 2=about the same as four years ago?
- 3=less than you wanted four years ago?

48

131. About how much progress do you feel you've made toward reaching that education goal?

- 1=none/not much
- 2=some
- 3=a lot

49

WORK

This next section covers your work experiences.

132. First of all, did you have any kind of job four years ago, before you first got on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?

1=yes  
2=no

50

133. (If yes) Doing what? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

51

134. Was that part-time (1) or full-time (2)?

52

135. How long did you keep that job? (Code number of months)

53 54

INTERVIEWER\*

If subject had a job four years ago, ask, "What was the next job you had after that? Part- or full-time? How long did you keep that job? What was the next job . . . , etc.," and record in the work history spaces below in chronological order.

If subject did not have a job four years ago, ask, "What was the first job you got after you first got on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name) four years ago? Part- or full-time? How long. . .? Next . . . , etc.," and record chronologically below.

136. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

55

56

57 58

136. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

59

60

61 62

137. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

63

64

65 66

138. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

67

68

69 70

139. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

71

72

73 74

140. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

75

76

77 78

(Card # 0 3)  
79 80

141. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

Dup 1-4

5

6

7 8

142. TYPE JOB \_\_\_\_\_

1=part-time  
2=full-time

Duration (code actual number of months)

9

10

11 12

143. (If not clear from above) Are you now employed, full-time or part-time?

1=no, unemployed  
2=yes, part-time  
3=yes, full-time

13

144. Have you been in any job training program in the last four years?

1=yes  
2=no

14

145. (If yes) Did you complete the training?

1=yes  
2=no

15

146. In the last two years or 24 months, about how many months have you been unemployed and not in school full-time? (code number of months)

16 17



147. How do you get by financially when you're out of work? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

18

148. What is the highest weekly take-home pay you have ever earned?  
(code dollar amount)

19 20 21

149. For how many hours work? (Code number of hours)

22 23

150. In general, when you have been hunting for a job, how hard do you have to look to find one?

- 1=not too hard
- 2=somewhat hard
- 3=very hard

24

151. When you have found jobs, has it usually been through friends and family, or through the newspapers and employment offices, or what?

- 1=friends/family/private sources
- 2=newspapers/employment offices/public sources
- 3=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

25

Next, I'd like you to think about the job you have held the longest in the past two years. The next few questions will be about that job.

152. First, what is/was the nature of that job? (Title and description)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

26

153. How much do/did you take home in pay for a typical week? (Code dollars)

27 28 29

154. For how many hours work?

30 31

155. How well did/do you like that job: (READ CHOICES)

- 1=a lot?
- 2=somewhat?
- 3=not much?
- 4=not at all?

32

156. How satisfied were/are you with the skills you were learning in that job?

- 1=very satisfied
- 2=somewhat satisfied
- 3=not satisfied

33

157. Now I'd like to read you a list of things people sometimes like about their jobs. Tell me which of the following you personally like(d) about the job you (have) held the longest. Would you say you liked...

(1=yes, 2=no)

- A) The money.
- B) The future it offered.
- C) The amount of supervision.
- D) It was interesting.
- E) You enjoyed it.
- F) It was easy.
- G) The hours.
- H) The people you worked with.
- I) That you learned a lot.
- J) Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

— 34  
 — 35  
 — 36  
 — 37  
 — 38  
 — 39  
 — 40  
 — 41  
 — 42  
 — 43

158. How well do you think you performed/are performing in that job?

- 1=poorly
- 2=not too well
- 3=OK, satisfactory
- 4=very well

44

159. Over the total time you have worked/worked at that job, about how often did/do you skip work when you were/are supposed to be there? (non-illness)

- 1=once per week (or more)
- 2=once every 2 or 3 weeks
- 3=once every couple of months
- 4=almost never, never

45

160. From what you've seen, what kinds of jobs do young people like you usually get?

- 1=white collar/professional
- 2=skilled trade
- 3=factory/industrial/shipyards
- 4=clerical, service, waiter/waitress, etc.
- 5=unskilled ("shit work," cleanup, etc.)
- 6=fast food/minimum wage
- 7=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

46

161. If you could choose your own job or career, what would it be?

(Specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

47

162. What do you like about that kind of work? (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

48

163. If you work hard, what are your chances of actually getting that kind of job?

- 1=very good
- 2=OK, or "depends"
- 3=not too good

49

164. How much progress do you think you've made toward getting the kind of job you want?

- 1=not much/none
- 2=same progress
- 3=a lot

50

165. In general, what is the most important thing you look for in a job?  
(Record and code two most important qualities, or first two mentioned.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

51

52

- 1=good pay
- 2=interesting, challenging work
- 3=security, steadiness
- 4=good future/career mobility
- 5=work I can handle
- 6=easy work/easy money
- 7=good people to work with
- 8=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

173. (If yes or maybe) In what way(s)? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

61

174. Did s/he make visits to your family or to your school to talk to your folks or to your teachers?  
1=no, neither  
2=yes, school  
3=yes, family  
4=yes, both

62

175. Did s/he ever make you feel you weren't trusted?  
1=yes  
2=no

63

176. All in all, do you think s/he really understands you?  
1=yes  
2=no

64

177. Do you think s/he was too harsh toward you most of the time?  
1=yes  
2=no

65

178. Do you think s/he really cared if you stayed out of jail or CYA?  
1=yes  
2=no

66

Now I'd like to ask you more specifically what Mr./Ms. \_\_\_\_\_  
(name of P.O.) did to try to assist you. Remember, this is also totally confidential.

CODES: 1=yes; 2=sometimes/somewhat/ambivalent; 3=no

179. Do you think s/he helped you stay out of trouble?

67

180. Was s/he easy to talk to about your problems and plans?

68

181. Did s/he help you get back into school or do better at school?

69

182. Did s/he ever get you into counseling for drug or alcohol problems?

70

183. Did s/he help you get job training or a job?

71

- 184. Did s/he help you solve personal problems or help you get counseling?
- 185. Did s/he help you deal with family problems?
- 186. Did s/he help you learn to deal with drug or alcohol-related problems?
- 187. Did s/he help you take responsibility for your life?
- 188. Did s/he turn you on to a hobby or spare time activity?
- 189. Did s/he help you learn to deal with people in authority?
- 190. Did s/he ever threaten you with being put in Juvenile Hall, CYA, or someplace like that?

1=yes  
2=no

(Card #  $\frac{0}{79} \frac{4}{80}$ )

72  
 73  
 74  
 75  
 76  
 77  
 78

Dup 1-4

- 191. Have you ever had another Probation officer?  
1=yes  
2=no

5

- 192. How did your experience with (P.O. name) compare with other probation officers you've had?

1=better  
2=same  
3=worse  
7=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

6

- 193. (If better, worse, or "other,") How? In what way?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

7

CRIMINALITY

Next I'd like to ask you some questions about unlawful behaviors young people sometimes get into, in fact, I've done a lot of these myself. I want to remind you again that everything you say will be held in strict confidence. Your name can never be identified with anything I check off on this form.

I'll read you a list of many different behaviors. For each one I'd like you to tell me first, if you had ever done it before 4 years ago or before you got on Probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. Name) and then if you've done it in the past year.

Prior to 4 years ago, did you ever...  
How about in the last year, did you...

	BEFORE 4 YEARS AGO (1=Yes, 2=No)	PAST YEAR (1-Yes, 2=No)
194. ...run away from home?	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
195. ...get into a fist fight?	<input type="checkbox"/> 10	<input type="checkbox"/> 11
196. ...purposely damage or destroy property belonging to your parents or other family members?	<input type="checkbox"/> 12	<input type="checkbox"/> 13
197. ...drive a car while high or drunk?	<input type="checkbox"/> 14	<input type="checkbox"/> 15
198. ...get drunk or high while in a public place?	<input type="checkbox"/> 16	<input type="checkbox"/> 17
199. ...go to school (or work) while drunk or high?	<input type="checkbox"/> 18	<input type="checkbox"/> 19
200. ...purposely damage other property which belonged to someone else (not family or school)?	<input type="checkbox"/> 20	<input type="checkbox"/> 21
201. ...buy stolen goods?	<input type="checkbox"/> 22	<input type="checkbox"/> 23

BEFORE 4  
YEARS AGO  
(1=Yes, 2=No)

PAST  
YEAR  
(1=Yes, 2=No)

202. ...take something from someone's wallet  
or purse?

  
24  
25

203. ...take something from a store worth  
over \$50.00?

  
26  
27

204. ...break into a house or building to  
take something?

  
28  
29

205. ...stolen money from your parents or  
other family members?

  
30  
31

206. ...get so angry with a little kid that  
you hit him or her?

  
32  
33

207. ...grabbed a purse and run with it?

  
34  
35

208. ...take or tried to take a stranger's  
car without permission?

  
36  
37

209. ...break into a car to take something?

  
38  
39

210. ...sell something you had stolen?

  
40  
41

211. ...threaten to hurt someone unless  
they gave you something?

  
42  
43

212. ...hit one of your parents?

  
44  
45

213. ...set fire to a house or building?

  
46  
47

214. ...hurt an animal?  
(If yes, "On Purpose?"  
If yes, Code=1)

  
48  
49

215. ...threaten an adult?

  
50  
51

BEFORE 4  
YEARS AGO  
(1=Yes, 2=No)

PAST  
YEAR  
(1=Yes, 2=No)

- |                                                                                                                 |                                |                                |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 216. ...beat someone up enough so they probably needed a doctor?                                                | <input type="checkbox"/><br>52 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>53 |
| 217. ...use physical force to get money, drugs, or something from someone (which didn't already belong to you)? | <input type="checkbox"/><br>54 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>55 |
| 218. ...carry a knife, a club, or some kind of weapon because you felt you needed protection?                   | <input type="checkbox"/><br>56 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>57 |
| 219. ...carry a weapon with the intention of using it in a fight?                                               | <input type="checkbox"/><br>58 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>59 |
| 220. ...threaten an adult with a weapon?                                                                        | <input type="checkbox"/><br>60 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>61 |
| 221. ...carry a gun for any reason?                                                                             | <input type="checkbox"/><br>62 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>63 |
| 222. ...pull a weapon to show you meant business?                                                               | <input type="checkbox"/><br>64 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>65 |
| 223. ...use a weapon to get something from someone?                                                             | <input type="checkbox"/><br>66 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>67 |
| 224. ...shoot anyone?                                                                                           | <input type="checkbox"/><br>68 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>69 |
| 225. ...kill anyone?                                                                                            | <input type="checkbox"/><br>70 | <input type="checkbox"/><br>71 |



Next I'll ask you just a few questions about your friends' behavior before 4 YEARS AGO and in the PAST YEAR.

Back 4 years, about how many of your friends...(READ ITEM + CODES)

In the past year, about how many of your friends...(READ ITEM + CODES)

CODES: 1=None  
2=A Few  
3=Some  
4=Most

	<u>BEFORE 4 YEARS AGO</u>	<u>PAST YEAR</u>	
216. ...ever beat up, knifed, or robbed somebody?	<input type="checkbox"/> 72	<input type="checkbox"/> 76	
217. ...ever broke into homes or cars?	<input type="checkbox"/> 73	<input type="checkbox"/> 77	
218. ...ever stolen things from stores?	<input type="checkbox"/> 74	<input type="checkbox"/> 78	(Card # 0 5) 79 80
219. ...ever got drunk or high?	<input type="checkbox"/> 75	Dup 1-4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5	

INSTANT OFFENSE

Now let me ask you about the incidents which ended up putting you on probation three years ago under Ms./Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. Name).

220. Do you remember what you did that resulted in your being put on probation with him/her?

- 1) Yes
- 2) Recall some, but not clear
- 3) No [SKIP TO QUESTION 227.]

6

221. IF YES OR SOME RECOLLECTION, ASK: "Tell me what happened."

{PROBES: What were you doing beforehand? What happened?; why did it happen?; whose idea was it?; how did you feel before?; after? Find out sequence of events that lead to the incident, and what the victim did to provoke it, if anything?; was incident planned or spontaneous?) (Record only)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

7

8

---

---

---

---

---

(DO NOT CODE: USE REVERSE SIDE IF NEEDED TO RECORD)

222. (INTERVIEWER: Was subject acting alone in incident(s), or were there other participants? 1=Alone; 2=Others)

  
9

223. (INTERVIEWER: Was act planned/premeditated, or spontaneous/situational? (1=Planned; 2=spontaneous)

  
10

224. Had you been drinking or using drugs before this (these) incident(s)?

  
11

- 1) No, neither
- 2) Yes, drinking but not drunk
- 3) Yes, using drugs but not enough to be loaded/high
- 4) Yes, drunk
- 5) Yes, using drugs and high/loaded
- 6) Yes, both drinking and using drugs

(If victim,)

225. Did you know the victim before the incident? [Probe for how well]

  
12

- 1) Known well
- 2) Acquaintance
- 3) Unknown, stranger

226. Looking back on this (these) incident(s), if you had to say now what you were thinking, why you did it, what would you say?

---

---

---

---

---

   
13 14

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPERIENCE

Next I'd like to ask you a few questions on the experiences you and your friends have had with the criminal justice system.

1=Yes  
2=No

227. Have you ever been put in a local jail?  15
228. How about in the last 12 months?  16
229. Have any of your friends ever been put in local jails?  17
230. Have you ever been in the Boys' (Girls') Center or "Ranch?"  18
231. How about in the last 12 months?  19
232. Have any of your friends ever been in the Boys'/Girls' Center or "Ranch?"  20
233. Have you ever been put in a group home or a foster home?  21
234. How about in the last 12 months?  22
235. Have any of your friends ever been put in a group home or foster home?  23

DETERRENCE SCALE

Now I'd like to read you a few statements people sometimes make about being in institutions. For each one, just tell me if you agree or disagree. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. OK, the first statement is:

236. "The experience of standing in court before a judge and being accused of a crime made me feel very badly about myself." Do you (1) agree or (2) disagree?  24
237. "Being in 'the joint' is no picnic, but I can handle whatever they dish out." (1) agree or (2) disagree?  25
238. "I was afraid for my personal safety in the joint (institution)." (1) agree or (2) disagree?  26
239. "Being locked up was so horrible I'll never do anything that could put me here again." (1) agree or (2) disagree?  27
240. "The punishment I got was rough, but it did help me control myself better." (1) agree or (2) disagree?  28
241. "Being in trouble as a kid is one thing, but the thought of going to adult prison is enough to keep me out of trouble." (1) agree or (2) disagree?  29

VICTIMIZATION

Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about whether or not you have ever been a victim of violence or crime. Remember, we don't want any names or dates, all this is strictly confidential.

1=Yes  
2=No

242. Has anyone ever tried to take something from you by force or by threatening to hurt you?  30
243. Have any of your things been damaged by someone on purpose (e.g., car/bike tires slashed or clothing ripped?)  31
244. Has anyone ever attempted to sexually attack or rape you?  32
245. Have you ever been attacked with a weapon (such as a gun, a knife, a bottle, or a club) by a non-family member?  33
246. Have you ever been beaten up (or threatened with being beaten up) by someone who is not in your family?  34
247. Have you ever been beaten up by your mother or father?  35
248. Has anyone ever attempted to steal a bicycle, motorcycle, or car from you?  36
249. Have you ever had any of your things taken from a car, motorcycle or bike (e.g., hubcaps, books or packages, or bike locks)?  37
250. Have any of your things ever been stolen from a public place (e.g., restaurant, school cafeteria)?  38

ATTITUDES AND VALUES

Now I'd like to read you a list of things some people think are important, other people may not. For each one please tell me how important it is to you:

- 1=Not Important
- 2=Somewhat Important
- 3=Very Important

How important is it...(REPEAT)

- 251.  
(strain) ...for you to own your own home? (READ CHOICES, REPEAT AS NEEDED)  39
- 252.  
(strain) ...for you to drive a really nice car?  40
- 253.  
(strain) ...for you to wear really nice clothes?  41
- 254.  
(strain) ...for you to own an expensive stereo?  42
- 255.  
(conv.) ...for you to get married and raise a family of your own?  43
- 256.  
(conv.) ...for you to have a romantic/love relationship?  44
- 257.  
(strain) How much progress do you feel you have made toward getting the material things you want?  45
  - 1=None/not much
  - 2=Some
  - 3=Alot

Next I will read you a list of statements people sometimes make. For each one, please tell me whether you personally agree or disagree. Again, there are no "right" or "wrong" answers.

- 1=Agree
- 2=Disagree

- 258.  
(cyn.) "Most people usually tell the truth."  46
- 259.  
(strain) "I never have enough money to do the things I want to do."  47
- 260.  
(conv.) "I would feel just as good spending money I got illegally as spending money I got legally."  48
- 261.  
(cyn.) "All the hard work in the world won't help you. It's who you know that counts."  49

- 262.  
(conv.) "Our laws are basically just and fair, and they should be obeyed."
- 263.  
(futility) "Since there may be a nuclear war, there's no point in working for the future."
- 264.  
(cyn.) "It's almost impossible to get to the top without cheating or stealing."
- 265.  
(conv.) "Any time I can get away with something I go for it."
- 266.  
(cyn.) "Most people never steal anything."

Next I'd like to ask you a few questions about your views on politics. First, I'll read you three statements people sometimes make. For each one, tell me if you personally agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

(REPEAT CHOICES EACH TIME)

OK, some people say that...(repeat each time)

- 267.  
(Efficacy) "Public officials don't care much what people like me think." Do you agree strongly...
- 268.  
(Efficacy) "People like me don't have any say about what government does." Do you agree strongly...
- 269.  
(Efficacy) Some folks also say, "Sometimes politics seem so complicated a person like me can't really understand what is going on." Do you agree strongly...
- 270.  
(Trust) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?: (1) just about always; (2) most of the time; or (3) only some of the time.
- 271.  
(Trust) Would you say the government is run for the benefit of everyone? (1), OR that it is run for the benefit of a few big interests (2)?
- 272.  
(futility) Do you think that you personally have (1) a good chance of succeeding under the American system, or (2) that the system will probably screw you over?

Agree Strongly = 4  
 Agree Somewhat = 3  
 Disagree Somewhat = 2  
 Disagree Strongly = 1

(power) 273. Do you feel that you get proper respect from people (1), or that you don't get enough respect (2)?  61

(power) 274. If you had a righteous complaint about something at home, do you think you could talk to your parents about it and get it resolved? (1=yes; 2=maybe; 3=no)  62

(power) 275. If you had a legitimate problem at work, could you go to your boss and get results? (1=yes; 2=maybe; 3=no)  63

(power) 276. How about if you had a valid complaint about a school policy? If you went to your teachers or the principal, would you get a fair hearing? (1=yes; 2=maybe; 3=no)  64

277. What does the work "democracy" mean to you? (RECORD ONLY, DO NOT CODE)  65

---

---

---

---

Next, I'll read you another list of statements, and for each one tell me whether you personally agree or disagree, keeping in mind that there are no "right" or "wrong" responses.

1=Agree  
2=Disagree

(viol.) 278. "Sometimes violence is the only way to deal with a problem."  66

(conv.) 279. "It's not worth breaking the rules just to keep your friends."  67

(sex roles) 280. "A mother's place is in the home, not at work."  68

(futility) 281. "I have no idea what I'll be doing six months from now."  69

(cyn.) 282. "People who break the law are almost always caught and punished."  70

(sex roles) 283. "I think women ought to have the same rights as men."  71

(viol.) 284. "If people do something to make you really mad, they deserve to be beaten up."  72

285.  
(futility) "I have some worthwhile abilities to bring to any task."  73
286.  
(conv.) "You can do just as well in life by working outside the law as you can working within the law."  74
287.  
(sex roles) "In relationships girls should generally let boys decide what to do and where to go."  75
288.  
(futility) "I have control over the direction my life is heading in."  76
289.  
(viol.) "If you don't physically fight back, people will walk all over you."  77
290.  
(sex roles) "If women do the same work as men, they should get the same pay."  78

(Card # 0 6)  
79 87

EMPATHY SCALE

Next, I'll read you a short list of things people sometimes do for other people. For each one, just tell me whether you've ever done it.

1=yes  
2=no

(Dup 1-4)

Have you ever...

291. ...tried to stop someone from being violent to prevent harm to a stranger?  5
292. ...personally felt the pain or suffering of someone you didn't know?  6
293. ...stopped along the road to help a stranger with car trouble?  7
294. ...given clothing, food, or money to someone who needed help?  8
295. ...helped out someone you didn't know who was hurt, say, in a fight or an accident?  9
296. ...decided not to do something you had planned to do to someone, because you would never want it done to you?  10



DESISTANCE AND CRITICAL EVENTS

Next, I'd like to get your opinion on young people who get into trouble. A lot of people your age get arrested for various crimes. A few seem to get deeper and deeper into crime, while others seem to stop at some point.

297. Did you personally ever have a period in your life when you got into more and more trouble with the law?  11  
1=yes  
2=no

298. (If yes) When was that? (PROBE: Before, during, or after probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?  12  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

299. Why do you think you got into more trouble then? \_\_\_\_\_  13  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

300. Have you ever gone through a period in your life when you changed and stopped doing things you could be arrested for, or at least did less serious things?  14  
1=Yes  
2=No

301. (If yes) When was that? (and) For how long? (PROBE: Before, during, or after Probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?; What things did you do differently?  15  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

302. (If yes) Why do you think you changed or stopped doing those things? (PROBE: Did you choose to stop for some reason?)  16  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

303. Can you recall anything else which seemed to keep you out of trouble with the law?

17

---

---

---

304. What is the best thing that has happened to you in the last couple of years? (PROBES: Who, what, when, and why was this important to you?)

18

---

---

---

---

---

(Use reverse side if needed)

305. What is the worst thing that's happened to you in the last couple of years? (PROBES: same as above)

19

---

---

---

---

---

Now I would like you to think back over the last 4 years. I'll read you a list of crises that can happen to people. For each one please tell me if it happened to you or anyone in your family.

CODES: 1=yes  
2=no

- 306. Bad accident/serious illness
- 307. Imprisonment
- 308. Death (of close family member)
- 309. Divorce or break-up
- 310. Loss of job

20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24

311. Over the last three years, have you fallen in love or gotten seriously involved with a new girl/boy friend?

25

1=yes  
2=no

312. (If yes) How has this changed your life? (PROBES: How you spend your time, who you hang around with, what is important to you, settled you down, etc.)

26

---

---

---

313. (If yes) Are you still involved/in love, or are you with someone new?

27

1=yes, still with same person  
2=yes, involved with new person  
3=not involved now

314. In the last couple of years, has your girlfriend/have you gotten pregnant?

28

1=no  
2=yes, but aborted or adopted  
3=yes, had child (or will soon)

315. In the last couple of years, have you become a parent or a step-parent to a baby?

29

1=yes  
2=no

316. How about any job or work you've had recently. Has that experience changed compared to a couple of years ago?

30

1=yes, better  
2=yes, worse  
3=no, no change

317. (If yes) Tell me about that. (PROBE: who, what, when, why important)

31

---

---

---

---

318. Has your circle of friends changed from what it was a couple of years ago?  
I mean, who you spent most of your time with.

  
32

1=yes  
2=no

319. (If yes) Why did it change? (PROBE: From whom to whom, when, how,  
why important)

  
33

---

---

---

---

(INTERVIEWER: Turn to page 1, note age, then insert as appropriate.)

320. Was turning 18/16 important to you? Did it make you feel or act differently?

1=yes  
2=no

  
34

321. (If yes) Why was turning 18/16 important in your life?

  
35

---

---

---

322. Have you had any periods in your life over the last couple of years when  
you hit rock bottom, got really down and depressed?

1=yes  
2=no

  
36

323. (If yes) What got you down? \_\_\_\_\_

  
37

---

---

---

---

324. Have you done anything in the last couple of years which you are really proud of, that you consider an accomplishment?

38

1=yes  
2=no

325. (If yes) What? (PROBE: when, how, why important) \_\_\_\_\_

39

---

---

---

326. In the last three years or so, do you feel like your life has improved, stayed the same, or gotten more difficult?

40

1=improved  
2=same  
3=more difficult

327. (If change) How has it improved/gotten more difficult? (PROBE: why, when, how did this happen, why important?)

41

---

---

---

328. What (else) do you think needs to happen to make your life better?

42

---

---

---

---

---

329. Did you ever wake up one day and make up your mind to live your life differently?

43

1=yes  
2=no

330. (If yes) Why? Tell me about it. (PROBE: What made you decide that?)

44

---

---

---

---

331. Aside from minor traffic beefs, do you think you'll be arrested for any crimes in the future?

45

- 1=no, won't happen again
- 2=maybe, might happen again
- 3=yes, probably will happen again

332. (If "yes" or "maybe":) What makes you think you'll be arrested again? (Do not code, just record.)

46

---



---



---

333. (If "no") Why not? What has changed or how have you changed so that you think you'll stay out of trouble? (Do not code, just record.)

47

---



---



---

PEER GROUPS AND LEISURE PRACTICES

The next set of questions is about your friends: what they are like, what they believe, what you do together, and so on.

334. First of all, about how many really good friends do you have, I mean the ones you spend most of your time with? (Code actual number)

48

335. Do you have more really good friends now than you had four years ago, about the same number, or less?

- 1=less
- 2=same
- 3=more

49

336. About how often did you hang out with your friends four years ago?

- 1=rarely
- 2=once a week
- 3=2-4 times a week
- 4=almost every day or every night

50

337. How about today?

- 1=rarely
- 2=once a week
- 3=2-4 times a week
- 4=almost every day or night

51

338. When you and your friends get together, what do you usually do? (PROBE: hang out, movies, parties, ride around, get high, nothing, etc.)

52

---

---

---

339. What did you usually do four years ago when you got together with your friends?

53

---

---

---

Now I'd like to read a short list of things young people sometimes do together. For each one please tell me about how often in the last six months or so you and your friends did these things: (Read codes as guide)

CODES: 1=less than once a month  
2=about once a month  
3=about once a week  
4=more than once a week

ABOUT HOW OFTEN IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS DID YOU AND YOUR FRIENDS:

340. Play sports?  54
341. Cruise around?  5
342. Go to clubs, discos, or bars?  56
343. Go to parties?  5
344. Get high or drink?  58
345. Go to movies?  5
346. Play video games?  6
347. Hang out on the streets?  61

348. Is it generally easy or difficult for you and your friends to get a car to go places in?  62

1=easy, most of us have access to car whenever we want  
2=sometimes easy, sometimes difficult; somebody can get a car usually  
3=difficult, most of us can't get a car when we want one

349. Four years ago, about how many times in one year did you and your friends travel to San Francisco or another big city? (Code actual number)  63  64

350. In the last year, about how often have you and your friends traveled to San Francisco or another big city? (Code actual number)  65  66

351. About how many of your really good friends have ever been on Probation?  67
- 1=none  
2=only 1  
3=2 or 3  
4=4 or more



352. Do you belong to a gang? (For Latinos, "Do you consider yourself a "home-boy?")

- 1=yes
- 2=no

68

353. Did you belong to a gang four years ago? (Latinos"...home-boy 4 years ago?)

- 1=yes
- 2=no

69

354. How do most of your friends get their money?

- 1=part-time jobs
- 2=full-time jobs
- 3=parents
- 4=deal marijuana/other drugs
- 5=steal, rob, crime, hustles
- 6=parents and job
- 7=job and dealing drugs, crimes
- 8=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

70

355. Which famous person do you admire most? (Record and code)

71

- 
- 1=show business figure/rock star
  - 2=professional athlete
  - 3=political leader
  - 4=religious/humanitarian leader
  - 5=wealthy person/business leader
  - 6=other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

356. Why do you admire him/her? (Do not code, record only)

72

Values

Next I'll read you a list of statements people sometimes make about their beliefs. They are neither "wrong" nor "right," they're just statements. For each one, please tell me whether your friends would generally agree or disagree. (1=agree; 2=disagree)

WOULD YOUR FRIENDS GENERALLY AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT: (repeat periodically)

357. When someone is in danger, it is OK to call the police.

73

358. Every kid gets in some trouble unless they are goody-goody or chicken-shit.

74

359. Eventually people should settle down and raise a family.

75

360. It is important to get a college education.

76

361. People who get in trouble with the law should probably be looked down on.

77

362. In general, who do you spend most of your spare time with?

1=alone

2=with girl/boyfriend

3=with friends

4=with family

5=other (specify \_\_\_\_\_)

78

(Card # 0  
79 80)

(Dup 1-4)

363. How often would you say you get bored: (read choices below)

1=hardly ever/never

2=only some of the time

3=most of the time

4=all of the time

5

364. In a typical day, about how many hours do you watch television?

(Help subject compute, code actual number)

6

7

365. What are your favorite programs? (List all mentioned, star (\*) favorites if noted.)

8

---

---

---

---

DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE

Now I'd like to ask you a series of questions about drug and alcohol use. Remember, everything you say is strictly confidential and can't be tied to your name. I'll read you a list of types of drugs. For each one, I'll ask you how often you used it four years ago, and then about how many times you have used it in the last year.

INTERVIEWER: For each type of drug, read the general category in caps, and then the specific names in parentheses.

CODES:           1=never  
                  2=very occasional  
                  3=once per month  
                  4=once per week  
                  5=daily, almost daily

	<u>4 Years Ago</u>	<u>Last 12 Months</u>
OK, 4 years ago, about how often did you use. . . ? And how about in the last 12 months . . . ?		
366. BEER AND WINE	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 21
367. HARD LIQUOR (whiskey, gin, vodka, tequila)	<input type="checkbox"/> 10	<input type="checkbox"/> 22
368. MARIJUANA (hashish)	<input type="checkbox"/> 11	<input type="checkbox"/> 23
369. PSYCHEDELICS (LSD, acid, MDA, peyote, mescaline, mushrooms)	<input type="checkbox"/> 12	<input type="checkbox"/> 24
370. TRANQUILIZERS (Valium, librium, thorazine, quaaludes)	<input type="checkbox"/> 13	<input type="checkbox"/> 25
371. SPEED/AMPHETAMINES (uppers, whites, crank, diet pills, dexedrine, benzedrine, black beauties)	<input type="checkbox"/> 14	<input type="checkbox"/> 26
372. DOWNERS/BARBITURATES/REDS (sleeping pills, phenobarbital, secanol, goofballs, yellowjackets, pain pills)	<input type="checkbox"/> 15	<input type="checkbox"/> 27
373. COCAINE	<input type="checkbox"/> 16	<input type="checkbox"/> 28
374. PCP/ANGEL DUST (phencyclidine, crystal, hog, sheets)	<input type="checkbox"/> 17	<input type="checkbox"/> 29
375. HEROIN (smack, junk, H, horse)	<input type="checkbox"/> 18	<input type="checkbox"/> 30
376. OTHER OPIATES (morphine, methodone, codiene, opium, percadan)	<input type="checkbox"/> 19	<input type="checkbox"/> 31
377. INHALANTS (glue, amyl and butyl nitrates, paint, nail polish)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20	<input type="checkbox"/> 32

(If no drug use at all, skip to next section)

378. In general, are most of your friends heavier into drug use than you, or are most of them less into it?

- 1=heavier
- 2=same/some heavier, some lighter
- 3=lighter

33

379. Before you got on Probation with Ms/Mr \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name), did you ever have problems at school, at work, or with your family because of your drinking or drug use?

- 1=never
- 2=occasionally/once or twice
- 3=frequently/several times

34

380. How about in the last year?

- 1=never
- 2=occasionally/once or twice
- 3=frequently/several times

35

381. How many times in the past year have you gotten into physical fights when you were drinking alcohol or using drugs? (Code actual number)

36 37

382. How many times in the past year have you gotten arrested by the police at least partly because you were drinking alcohol or using drugs? (Code actual number)

38 39

383. Would you say you were drinking more, the same, or less than you were four years ago when you started on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?

- 1=more
- 2=same
- 3=less

40

384. How about drugs. Are you using more, the same or less than you were four years ago when you started on probation with \_\_\_\_\_ (P.O. name)?

- 1=more
- 2=same
- 3=less

41

(INTERVIEWER: If above questions indicate curtailment or cessation of either alcohol or drug use compared with the past, ask:)

385. Why are you using drugs/drinking less now than in the past? (PROBES: Did something happen to make you cut down or quit? Was it creating problems for you? What made you decide to cut back/stop?) (Do not code)

---

---

---

---

42

(INTERVIEWER: If above questions indicate any onset or increase in alcohol or drug use compared with past, ask:)

386. Why are you drinking/using drugs more now than in the past? (PROBES: What do you like about alcohol/drugs? Did something happen that got you into alcohol/(name of drug) more? Why did you decide to drink/use (name of drug) more?) (Do not code)

---

---

---

---

43

COMMUNITY

387. What is the name of the area you lived in four years ago? (If not obvious, ask: "What town/city is that in?") (Do not code, record only)

44

388. Where do you live now? \_\_\_\_\_

45

389. In general, how would you describe the neighborhood you lived in four years ago: (Read choices)

46

- 1=wealthy, rich?
- 2=nice, above average? (upper middle class)
- 3=OK, average? (middle class)
- 4=fair, below average? or,
- 5=rundown/ghetto?

390. How would you describe the neighborhood you live in now:

47

- 1=wealthy, rich?
- 2=nice, above average? (upper middle class)
- 3=OK, average? (middle class)
- 4=fair, below average?
- 5=rundown/ghetto?
- (9=same neighborhood)

391. What did you like most about your neighborhood of 4 years ago? (Record only)

48

392. What did you like least about that neighborhood?

49

393. Would you like to settle down near that neighborhood or in that community?

50

- 1=no
- 2=doubtful
- 3=conditional yes
- 4=yes

394. Why/Why not? (Record only) \_\_\_\_\_

51

395. Do you feel that you could find a respected role for yourself in that community if you wanted to?  52  
 1=yes  
 2=maybe; conditional  
 3=no
396. Were there people in your neighborhood four years ago who picked fights with you or hassled you?  53  
 1=no  
 2=some  
 3=yes
397. (If yes) Why do you think this happens? \_\_\_\_\_  54  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
398. Is that true today as well?  55  
 1=no  
 2=some  
 3=yes
399. Four years ago, how well did you get along with the adults in your neighborhood?  56  
 1=very well  
 2=OK  
 3=don't know any adults  
 4=not too well
400. How about today?  57  
 1=very well  
 2=OK  
 3=don't know any  
 4=not too well
401. Four years ago, were there racial or ethnic groups living in your neighborhood which were different from yours?  58  
 1=none  
 2=only a few  
 3=yes, some  
 4=yes, a lot
402. (If yes) How did you get along with them?  59  
 1=fine  
 2=OK  
 3=no contact  
 4=don't get along very well

403. Four years ago, how many people in your neighborhood did you know well enough to say hello to on the streets?

- 1=a lot
- 2=some
- 3=a few
- 4=none

60

404. How many do you know today?

- 1=a lot
- 2=some
- 3=a few
- 4=none

61

405. Four years ago, did you know anyone in your neighborhood who had been mugged, robbed, assaulted, or raped?

- 1=no
- 2=yes, one or two incidents or people
- 3=yes, three or more incidents or people

62

406. Four years ago, was there gang-related violence in your neighborhood? (for Latinos: "violence between groups of home-boys")

- 1=yes
- 2=no

63

407. How about now?

- 1=yes
- 2=no

64

408. Did you feel safe in your neighborhood back four years ago?

- 1=yes
- 2=sometimes yes, sometimes no
- 3=no

65

409. How about now?

- 1=yes
- 2=sometimes yes, sometimes no
- 3=no

66

410. Was there more or less crime in your neighborhood four years ago than now?

- 1=more crime
- 2=same
- 3=less crime

67

411. Four years ago, were there recreational activities in your community like the YMCA, parks, gyms, baseball leagues, and so forth?

- 1=yes
- 2=no

68



412. Four years ago, who did you admire the most in your neighborhood?  
(Get a sense of role, and why admired.) (DO NOT CODE, JUST RECORD)

---

---

69

413. Four years ago, how often did the adults in your community get into physical fights?

- 1=never, almost never
- 2=occasionally
- 3=frequently
- 4=all the time

70

414. Of the adults you knew in your community four years ago, were quite a few unemployed, or not very many?

- 1=quite a few
- 2=not very many
- 3=none

71

415. How about the adults in your community today?

- 1=quite a few
- 2=not very many
- 3=none

72

416. Do you believe the people of your community care about you and what happens to you: (Read choices)

- 1=a lot?
- 2=somewhat?
- 3=not much?
- 4=don't care at all?

73

INTERVIEW CLOSURE

Before we end the interview, I just want to ask you if there were any answers or comments you made which you'd like to change or explain further? Anything you'd like to add?

---

---

---

Did any of these questions make you feel uncomfortable? (If yes, probe for which ones or which types).

---

---

Is there anything you want to ask me about all this?

---

---

If you wanted to find out why young people got in trouble with the law, what would you ask?

---

---

---

Why do you think a lot of kids mess up and get arrested for crimes?

---

---

That's it. Thank you for participating. We really appreciate your efforts. Just sign this receipt and fill in the information and I can give you your fee. (PAY SUBJECT.)

END INTERVIEW

RESPONDENT RECEIPT FORM

I have received \$12.00 in payment for completion of the URSA Institute  
Contra Costa Follow-Up Interview.

Respondent's Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE PRINT THE FOLLOWING:

Respondent's Full Name \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent's Address \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent's Phone # \_\_\_\_\_

Name, Address, and phone # of a RELATIVE who is not living with you who  
would always know how to contact you:

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Phone # \_\_\_\_\_

(The signed copies of this form will not be attached to the interview  
form and will be kept in locked files at the URSA Institute in San Francisco.)

FIELD DE-BRIEFING AND REFLECTION

TO INTERVIEWER: These last few questions should be answered fully, by you, immediately following the interview, but not in the presence of the respondent.

1. How would you describe his/her manner or demeanor? (e.g., shy, serious, angry/ hostile, smartass, macho, confused, sweet; what kind of "posturing" did she/he do? Naive or street-smart?, etc.)

---

---

---

---

2. In your judgement, what was the respondent's social class background?

1=poor  
2=working class  
3=middle class  
4=upper middle class or higher

3. Where was the interview conducted?

1=car  
2=coffee shop/restaurant  
3=public park  
4=house or apartment  
5=other \_\_\_\_\_

4. Was the interview interrupted, e.g., parents, friends, or were there other problems due to this setting?

1=interrupted by strangers  
2=interrupted by parents/friends  
3=not interrupted  
4=friends nearby distracting  
5=strangers nearby distracting  
6=other \_\_\_\_\_

5. Did these interruptions have any effect on the interview?

1=No  
2=Yes

If yes, describe: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. How would you judge the respondent's interest in the interview?

1=low; only in it for the money  
2=moderate  
3=high;curious, thoughtful

7. Did the subject seem to pay close attention to most questions?

1=noticeably inattentive at times  
2=attentive for most part  
3=very attentive

8. Was the subject articulate and insightful?

4=yes, very  
3=yes, some  
2=not very often  
1=rarely articulate at all

9. Was the subject hostile to you or the interview?

1=not generally hostile  
2=only hostile at first  
3=often hostile throughout

(If hostile often, any idea why?) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Did the subject have any difficulties understanding your questions?

1=yes, trouble with questions  
2=yes, trouble with english  
3=no

11. Did s/he object to or resist any questions?

1=yes  
2=no

(If yes, try to recall and list the questions or types of questions)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. Did the subject have difficulty recalling things about the past?  
(i.e., more than 2 or 3 times).

1=yes  
2=no

(If yes, describe briefly) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

13. In general, how honest do you think the respondent was?

1=very honest  
2=usually honest, but I was not always sure  
3=suspect fair amount of dishonesty

14. You have just been barraged by hundreds of responses by an unknown young person. Was there anything you noticed about him or her which you found particularly intriguing, telling, noteworthy? Describe.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

IMPORTANT: INTERVIEWER'S "GUT PROGNOSIS"

15. Reflecting back on the subject's comments on his/her criminal "career," family life, and "critical life events," did you notice anything which suggests his/her life will improve? Give specific areas: school, work, family, etc.) Explain briefly.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. Anything which suggests his/her life will continue to be troublesome crime-wise? Explain briefly.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

IMPORTANT: FURTHER STUDY

17. Finally, overall, do you think this respondent would make a good candidate for an open-ended, in-depth case study on the human side of delinquent careers? (i.e., articulate? willing? typical? unusual?, etc.) Explain.

---

---

---

IMPORTANT: ETHNOGRAPHIC FLASHES

18. If the interview took place near the subject's home community and/or if you travelled through it, briefly describe what you saw:

Name of Community: \_\_\_\_\_  
(e.g., Martinez--downtown; Concord--outskirts)

What did the area look like to you? (e.g., rich or poor? new or old? industrial, commercial, or residential? growing or decaying? Anything you saw or didn't see that gives the flavor of the community.)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---