U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Corrections

MF-1

Guidelines for the Development of a Security Program

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OCT 14 1987

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July 1987

National Institute of Corrections

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Foreword

The National Institute of Corrections is happy to provide you with this guideline for the development of a correctional security manual.

A universal problem in the administration of American correctional facilities is the need to combine adequate security practices with the program and service areas. Cooperative relationships between operating staff (education, classification, industrial, etc.) and security personnel have often been difficult to establish. When this divergence of roles is present in a correctional facility, it creates conditions which are difficult and even life threatening for both staff and inmates.

This pu' ..ation presents ideas and concepts for developing security practices which can help to meld all employees into a team of professionals with one single goal—"the operation of an efficient and effective correctional system."

Raymond C. Brown
Director
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Preface

The basic security procedures outlined in this manual have been widely tested and are in use in many American institutions. When used, the practices described in this manual will enhance the total program of a correctional facility and will provide other benefits—the public will be better served, the inmates will benefit from a safer and more humane atmosphere, and the staff will be able to meet their responsibilities more effectively, expanding their professional opportunities and increasing their job satisfaction.

The goal of this manual is to assist correctional professionals in the humane and efficient operation of secure facilities, and the first step in this process is restating three national correctional policies which have had a dramatic impact upon institutional security and which appear on the following pages.

American Correctional Association Public Correctional Policy On Purpose of Corrections

In order to establish the goals and objectives of any correctional system, there must be a universal statement of purpose which all members of the correctional community can use in goal setting and daily operations.

Policy Statement:

The overall mission of criminal and juvenile justice, which consists of law enforcement, courts, and corrections, is to enhance social order and public safety. As a component of the justice system, the role of corrections is:

A. To implement court-ordered supervision and, when necessary, detention of those accused of unlawful behavior prior to adjudication;

B. To assist in maintaining the integrity of law by administering sanctions and punishments imposed by courts for unlawful behavior;

C. To offer the widest range of correctional options, including community corrections, probation, institutions, and parole services, necessary to meet the needs of both society and the individual; and

D. To provide humane program and service opportunities for accused and adjudicated offenders which will enhance their community integration and economic self-sufficiency, and which are administered in a just and equitable manner within the least restrictive environment consistent with public safety.

American Correctional Association National Public Correctional Policy On Conditions of Confinement

Correctional systems must administer the detention, sanctions, and punishments ordered by the courts in an environment that protects public safety and provides for the safety, rights, and dignity of staff, accused or adjudicated offenders, and citizens involved in programs.

Policy Statement:

Maintaining acceptable conditions of confinement requires adequate resources and effective management of the physical plant, operational procedures, programs, and staff. To provide acceptable conditions, agencies should:

A. Establish and maintain a safe and humane population limit for each institution based upon recognized professional standards;

B. Provide an environment that will support the health and safety of staff, confined persons, and citizens participating in programs. Such an environment results from appropriate design, construction, and maintenance of the physical plant as well as the effective operation of the facility;

C. Maintain a professional and accountable work environment for staff that includes necessary training and supervision as well as sufficient staffing to carry out the mission of the facility;

D. Maintain a fair and disciplined environment that provides programs and services in a climate that encourages responsible behavior.

American Correctional Association National Public Correctional Policy on Use of Appropriate Sanctions and Controls

In developing, selecting and administering sanctions and punishments, decision-makers must balance concern for individual dignity, public safety, and maintenance of social order. Correctional programs and facilities are a costly and limited resource; the most restrictive are generally the most expensive. Therefore, it is good public policy to use these resources wisely and economically.

Policy Statement

The sanctions and controls imposed by courts and administered by corrections should not be so restrictive that they are inconsistent with public and individual safety and maintenance of social order. Selection of the least restrictive sanctions and punishments in specific cases inherently requires balancing several important objectives—individual dignity, fiscal responsibility, and effective correctional operations. To meet these objectives, correctional agencies should:

A. Advocate the development and appropriate use of the least restrictive sanctions, punishments, programs, and facilities;

B. Recommend the use of the least restrictive appropriate dispositions in judicial decisions;

C. Classify persons under correctional jurisdiction to the least restrictive appropriate programs and facilities; and

D. Employ only the level of regulation and control necessary for the safe and efficient operation of programs, services and facilities.

Part I

The Philosophy of Security

Introduction

Maintaining effective security in a correctional facility is no simple task. There are many factors involved in operating a secure facility, and they are covered in this section of *Guidelines for the Development of a Security Program*.

Included in Part I are discussions of facility security levels, inmate custody categories, the unit management system, staff training, inmate classification, and institution programs. The foundation for an effective security program can be laid by properly using all these factors.

Chapter 1

Foundation of Security

The Philosophy of Security

During this century, the role of security staff in prison systems has changed dramatically. This change is most noticeable in those systems which have encouraged cooperation among their departments and have recognized the synthesis of common goals as important to the successful operation of the correctional team.

During the 1800's and early 1900's, various segments of correctional systems often operated separate from (if not in conflict with) other segments. This divergence was especially noticeable between the "security team" and the "treatment team." The nomenclature itself implied separate groups with differing goals.

This trend began to decline during the middle of this century when it became increasingly obvious that the effective, efficient, and successful correctional system relies upon all of its components working together. The increased interaction among groups in the correctional system has played a major role in the reduction of tension in prisons. This is especially notable when considering the recent unprecedented growth of the incarcerated population.

One of the major functions of a prison is to protect the public through the safekeeping of inmates until their sentences are served. Therefore, security is of primary importance. Any agency that cannot prevent escapes and control violence within its institutions is not regarded as successful by the community. Good security is a duty of correctional employees; however, security must be maintained in a setting which enables other programs and services to operate in as normal a fashion as possible.

The level of an agency's security is based on a variety of integrated, delicately balanced factors and conditions, including:

- Central office organization. The headquarters staff is responsible for policy establishment and review.

- Institutional organization of inmate management. The establishment of centralized or decentralized inmate management systems.

- Personnel management. Work force quality is a primary factor in the level of security maintained.

> *The successful correctional system relies upon all of its components working together.*

○ Staff training. Correctional employees represent a wide variety of educational and occupational backgrounds. The skills necessary to maintain a secure, safe, and humane correctional institution must be developed through training.

○ Physical plant. The layout, design, age, and level of maintenance have a direct impact on the level of security.

○ Inmate classification. Through effective, objective classification procedures, inmates can be placed in institutions that provide the appropriate level of security.

○ Inmate program levels. Carefully planned and supervised activities enhance security by involving inmates in productive use of their time.

○ Security equipment. The quality and quantity of locking devices, door and window hardware, perimeter security devices, and other materials used for monitoring and control are significant factors in determining security levels.

Security is of primary importance but must allow for other programs and services.

Fundamental Institutional Security and Inmate Custody Specifications

A crucial link between the maintenance of control and good inmate programming is the utilization of a uniform agency-wide system defining facility security levels and inmate custody categories.

Effective operations depend upon clearly established rules regarding the relationships between inmate custody categories and facility security. When prisoners with high security needs are placed in a low security facility, escapes and security-related incidents are inevitable. Conversely, when prisoners requiring minimal security are assigned to high security institutions, expensive resources are wasted and they are exposed to potential harm.

Standardizing Concepts and Definitions

One of the main goals of objective classification systems is to increase consistency in decision-making. Accomplishing this requires an agency-wide foundation of clear definitions and standard concepts. Unfortunately, inconsistency often exists in the approaches used by various component agency departments, and fundamental conflicts even cause confusion within jurisdictions.

As a base for further discussion, we offer these two core definitions:

○ Inmate Custody Category: The degree of staff supervision necessary to ensure adequate control of the inmate.

○ Facility Security Level: The nature and number of physical design barriers available to prevent escape and control inmate behavior.

These definitions have been based on a survey of the custody and security approaches used in the classification systems of many jurisdictions.

In addition, the following three fundamental guidelines should affect the determination of inmate custody category and facility security level for each person entering supervision under a correctional agency:

○ Custody and security assignments must specify the placement of prisoners in the least restrictive environment necessary to guarantee adequate control of the individual and the protection of society.

- Custody assignments are not to be imposed as a form of punishment.

- Custody and security level placements must have valid, reliable, and objective behavior-oriented foundations.

The Five Facility Security Levels

The following descriptions provide a guide for establishing custody category and security level definitions. Agencies are urged to take the explicit requirements of specific departments, state statutes, and institutional physical structures into consideration in the application of these concepts.

Publications of the American Correctional Association (ACA) describe five different facility security levels: (I) Community, (II) Minimum, (III) Medium, (IV) Close, and (V) Maximum. The labels typically are used to refer to institution security. They are also used in many jurisdictions to describe inmate custody categories. This double use of the terminology is inaccurate and leads to confusion and frequent misunderstandings. The majority of correctional institutions have more than one custody category.

In order to maintain a clear distinction between facility security (design) and *inmate* custody (supervision), facility security should be referred to by numerical levels; e.g., I (low) to V (high). This approach will be followed in the remainder of this document.

Some jurisdictions use names for facility security levels and letter grades (e.g., (low) AA, A, B, C, D, (high)) to indicate degree of inmate custody or supervision. While it would greatly facilitate cross-jurisdiction communication if the same general approach was adopted by all Departments of Corrections, the most important point is that facility security labels differ from inmate custody nomenclature. Table 1 outlines criteria used to differentiate institutions by security level. The factors to be considered in establishing a security level include:

Five facility security levels:

| (I) Community |
| (II) Minimum |
| (III) Medium |
| (IV) Close |
| (V) Maximum |

- Type of perimeter security.

- Existence and operation of towers.

- Use of external mobile patrols.

- Use of detection devices.

- Type of housing arrangements.

- Internal architecture—reinforced concrete construction, security glazing, corridor grilles, control booths, electronically controlled steel cell doors, etc.

These factors relate primarily to an institution's physical or environmental configuration rather than the degree and type of staff supervision; the number of staff and the amount of supervision available also have an impact upon institutional security.

The following discussion provides a more complete description for each of the five security levels, starting with Level V (the most secure).

Level V—Maximum Security

Level V represents the highest security level facility of a correctional system. It is an end-of-the-line placement requiring secure housing within the most secure perimeter. This level of supervision may also imply separate

management procedures for its activities, including food services and exercise. Level V facilities should be small, with maximum populations of 500 inmates.

Inmates should be housed in single cells. Cells should be secured by heavy duty hardware, including security doors and windows, locks and other equipment. Level V housing units should be supervised by at least one officer at all times, including the periods when inmates are locked in their cells. Frequent searches for contraband and weapons should be conducted.

All out-of-cell movement should be restricted to movement inside the facility and should be carefully controlled and supervised by the staff. Restraints such as handcuffs, leg irons, and waist chains may be used as required by department policy. Inmate work assignments should be closely supervised, with inmates being required to pass through metal detectors before leaving the work area.

Double fences with razor wire and/or a wall with detection devices should separate the Level V facility from the community. The entire perimeter should be supervised by armed tower officers or by an external mobile patrol. Thorough searches of all vehicles leaving or entering the facility should be performed in accordance with department policy. All persons entering the facility should be required to pass through a metal detector.

TABLE 1 — Typical Design Features Which Indicate Facility Security Levels

SECURITY LEVELS	I	II	III	IV	V
PERIMETER	None	Single fence and/or unarmed "posts"	Double fence Secure entrance/ exits	Double fence and/or wall and secure entry/exits	Same as IV
TOWERS	None	None*	Combination of intermittent tower and/or patrol surveillance	Combination of tower and/or patrol surveillance	Same as IV
EXTERNAL PATROL	None	Intermittent	Yes	Yes	Yes
DETECTION DEVICES	None	Optional	Yes, at least one type	Yes, more than one type	Yes, extensive
HOUSING	Single rooms and/or multiple rooms or dorms	Single rooms and/or multiple rooms and/or dorms	Single cells or rooms	Single outside or inside cells	Single inside cells

*Towers may be used for control of traffic and/or pedestrian movement.

DEFINITIONS: INSIDE CELL: A cell which is contained on four sides within a cellblock: i.e., if an inmate escapes from the cell, he is still confined within the building.

OUTSIDE CELL: A cell with a wall or window immediately adjacent to the outside of the building; i.e., if an inmate escapes from the cell, he has escaped from the building.

Level IV and Level V facilities require secure external perimeters with double fences.

Level IV—Close Security

Level IV institution security requires a facility with securely designed housing and a secure external perimeter similar to that of a Level V institution. Although there may be little difference between the physical requirements of the two highest security classifications, Level IV facilities may house larger inmate populations. In addition, the custody categories of the inmates in Level IV facilities are different from the custody categories of inmates in Level V institutions.

Inmates should be housed in single cells secured by heavy duty hardware, including security doors and windows. These cells may be outside cells, and the equipment employed need not be as secure as that used for Level V.

Direct supervision should be provided at all times when the inmates are outside their cells. While correctional officer/inmate ratios remain high, Level IV facilities should place greater emphasis on program staff than do Level V institutions. In addition, inmates should only be placed in full restraints under armed escort when they are outside the facility itself.

Level III—Medium Security

Housing in Level III institutions should consist of living units with single cells, rooms, or dormitories. Level III facilities should have a secure perimeter with a double fence, outside mobile patrols, and detection devices. Typically, Level III facilities provide a wide variety of programs and activities.

Level II—Minimum Security

Level II housing may consist of either single cells or rooms, multiple units, or dormitories, according to the facility's physical design. These open units should lie within an appropriate institution perimeter. The perimeter may consist of a single fence, or clearly designated unarmed "posts." While Level II facilities employ no detection devices, they may use intermittent external mobile patrols. Almost all Level II facilities place a strong emphasis on programs and activities.

Level I—Community Security

Level I facilities include the following types of institutions. They make only limited use of prison staff members for supervision.

- Institutions employing no perimeter security systems.

- Pre-release units with access to the community

- Residential schools or colleges.

- Hospitals or nursing homes.

- Private residences.

- Other nonsecure community correctional program settings appropriate to the needs of the inmate.

These Level I facilities employ open housing within a defined perimeter. They do not employ detection devices, and they do not have external patrols.

The Five Inmate Custody Categories

In addition to the following descriptions, Table 2 outlines the amount and type of supervision given to each inmate custody category.

Maximum Custody

Inmates assigned this designation require constant supervision. Inmates accorded this status present serious escape risks or pose serious threats to themselves, to other inmates, or to the staff. Maximum custody inmates should be confined one to a cell. They should remain in their cells at all times, except when they are removed for authorized activities. When outside of their cells, maximum custody inmates should be escorted by at least one staff member. When these inmates must go outside the institution, they should be placed in full physical restraints, including handcuffs and waist chains, and should be accompanied by at least two armed escorts.

Close Custody

Like maximum custody inmates, close custody inmates should be under constant supervision. All movement for close custody inmates should be restricted. During the day, these inmates should move on a check-out basis. Night movement should be under escort and occur only with the approval of the watch commander. When leaving institutional grounds, close custody inmates should be placed in full restraints. Inmates in this group should not be eligible for furloughs. They should be given only selected day jobs in activities and programs conducted inside the institution's perimeter.

Medium Custody

Prisoners assigned this designation should be permitted to move around the facility during the day, provided they remain within view of a staff member. Supervision of medium custody prisoners should be frequent, with direct observation of program and activity areas. During the night, the movement of medium custody inmates should be regulated by a check-out system. These inmates should be placed in handcuffs and accompanied by an escort when they travel outside the institution. Prisoners in this group should be eligible for all programs and activities occurring inside the perimeter.

Minimum Custody

This custody category is reserved for inmates who do not pose as serious a risk to safety or confinement as the prisoners classified under maximum, close, or medium categories. Inmates accorded minimum custody status should be able to move around the institution during the day without the requirement of remaining in view of a staff member at all times. At night, however, they should remain within direct observation. Minimum custody inmates should be eligible for escorted furloughs and supervised assignments outside the facility perimeter.

Community Custody

This designation is accorded to those inmates who do not pose the risks associated with the other custody categories. Direct supervision of these inmates is not required, but intermittent observation may be appropriate under certain conditions. Community custody prisoners should be permitted to participate in jobs and programs outside the facility's perimeter.

TABLE 2 — Typical Levels of Supervision Applicable to Inmate Custody Categories

ACTIVITY	COMMUNITY	MINIMUM	MEDIUM	CLOSE	MAXIMUM
Observation	Occasional; appropriate to situation	Checked at least every hour	Frequent and direct	Always observed and supervised when outside cell	Direct, always supervised
Day Movement	Unrestricted	Unrestricted	Unescorted but observed by staff	Restricted, on a check-out/ check-in basis	Always escorted when outside cell, hand-cuffed, leg irons
Night Movement	Unrestricted	Under staff observation	Restricted, on a check-out/ check-in basis	Escorted and only on order of Watch Commander	Out of cells only in emergencies, with approval of Watch Commander
Meal Movement	Unrestricted	Under staff observation	Supervised	Supervised and may be escorted or fed in cell or on cellblock	In cell
Access to Jobs	All, both inside and outside perimeter	All inside perimeter and supervised outside jobs	All inside perimeter, only	Only selected day jobs inside perimeter	In cell or directly supervised within unit
Access to Programs	Unrestricted, including community-based activities	All inside peri-meter and selected outside perimeter	All inside perimeter; none outside perimeter	Selected pro-grams/activities; none outside perimeter	Limited to programs within unit
Visits	Contact; periodic supervision; indoor and outdoor	Contact; supervised	Contact; supervised; indoor only	Non-contact	Non-contact
Leave the Institution	Unescorted	Unescorted	One-on-one es-cort; inmate in at least handcuffs	Armed Escort optional; inmate restraints	Armed escort; full restraints; strip search
Furlough	Eligible for day pass* and unescorted furlough	Not eligible for pass* and/or escorted furlough	Not eligible for day pass* or furlough	Not eligible for day pass*	Not eligible

DEFINITIONS: Day Pass ------ Permits inmate to be away from institution only during daylight hours; whereas a furlough means overnight for at least one (or more) nights.

They should be allowed unescorted furloughs. Minimal supervision is considered an important element of the administration of programs for community custody inmates.

The Role of the Central Office in Security

The establishment and management of security practices and procedures are the responsibility of the central office. Although security is incumbent upon everyone, some individuals are more directly responsible than others.

Security policy planning usually begins at the agency's headquarters with an assistant director of field operations. On the assistant director's staff, serving as one of several technical specialists, is the chief of security. The chief of security is assigned overall management of security operations in the agency. He or she is usually a career employee, having been promoted through the ranks to progressively more responsible positions.

Central Office Security Administrator

The administration of security programs in contemporary correctional facilities is a complex task. At facility locations, senior staff members are not only faced with the day-to-day problems of inmate and staff management, they also must keep up with emerging technologies and policy improvements in the field. Recognizing limitations on time and resources, many agencies have established the position of central office security administrator. He or she fulfills a coordinative function, acting as liaison with the greater field of corrections and serving as an internal resource for recent security management information. In some agencies, central office security administrators serve in an external audit capacity, conducting security and staffing reviews at institutional sites.

The central office security administrator usually has the following duties:

- Reports to the agency director and serves as a technical resource in matters of institutional security.

- Develops, reviews, and updates a comprehensive body of central office policy in security related areas. Reviews the security related policies of other disciplines.

- Serves as an advisor for the development of local institutional policies, building on central office security directives.

- Reviews all locally issued policy statements for compliance with central office security directives. Reviews locally issued policy for innovative features which can be incorporated into central office policy or disseminated to other institutions.

- Maintains a clearinghouse of technical information on security practices, hardware, and devices. Supplies field locations with specifications, product data, and other information to support local acquisition of security technology, equipment, and supplies.

- Coordinates aggregate purchases of security equipment and supplies when large purchase orders are cost efficient or beneficial for administrative reasons.

- Develops standards of agency-wide uniformity for security equipment including firearms, chemical agents, and protective gear.

- Maintains a collection of contemporary journals, publications and professional materials for the use of field security personnel. Acts as resource reference for field security personnel.

- Conducts special investigations on behalf of the agency head in cases of serious disturbances, escape, or conditions of emergency requiring high-level administrative inquiry.

- Provides on-site technical assistance to institutional staff on new procedures, new equipment, and redesign of existing facilities.

- Serves as resource adjunct for architectural and design staff in the conceptualization and execution of new agency facilities.

- Represents the agency at state and national conferences of security managers.

- Advises the head of the agency on security personnel matters.

- Conducts special security training and management activities for field staff.

- Provides input on security issues in overall agency staff training.

Where regional security offices are organizational features, the primary responsibilities of those offices include the interpretation of security policy and the monitoring of security procedures, plans and practices in the facilities within their jurisdiction. Other areas of regional oversight may overlap central office responsibilities. The list of regional security office administrators' duties that may reflect this intersection include:

- Conducting management assistance audits at regional institutions to ensure compliance with agency security policy and procedures.

- Assisting in the training of the security staff.

- Participating in policy and procedure meetings with other regional security administrators and central office staff members.

- Making recommendations for policy change.

- Coordinating security operations and changes with other regional service disciplines.

- Responding to all emergencies at institutions within the region. Being on call to respond to other emergencies within the system. Providing technical assistance to regional investigations.

- Coordinating physical plant changes.

The Security Manual

The central office security manual, developed and published by the chief of security, contains all policies for agency security and control as well as detailed instructions for their implementation. The manual should contain, but not be limited to: information on inmate classification, inmate counts, physical plant inspections, weapon and chemical agent control, control of contraband, key control, tool and equipment control, cell equipment, emergency procedures, and inmate programs and activities. The manual is

reviewed and, if necessary, revised annually.

The development and maintenance of institutional security manuals are the responsibility of each correctional facility's chief of security. Institutional security manuals contain local policy and procedures pertinent to the unique characteristics of the facility. Local policy and procedures should be consistent with those described in the central office security manual. For reasons of institutional security, the contents of institutional security manuals must be kept confidential. Local manuals must be maintained in locations convenient to key staff.

Reports

Reports on all critical incidents and other security activities are submitted to the central office on a regular monthly basis. Subjects of these reports should include, but not be limited to: escapes, assaults, use of force, use of chemical agents, use of firearms, a summary of all disciplinary incidents, referrals to authorities for prosecution, urine surveillance, equipment inventories, meetings, training, major contraband, employee misconduct, and staffing levels.

News Media

Correctional systems are often a focal point of public interest. Members of the news media frequently gather facts on incidents, programs, and correctional security issues. The agency head, warden, or public information officer or a specific designated spokesperson should be the authorized point of contact. No comment on agency welfare or statement of an official nature should be disseminated by anyone other than one of these authorized persons. All employees contacted by the news media should refer inquiries to the designated information contact.

Administrative Staff Visibility

Policies and procedures often stress the importance of supervisory and administrative staff making regular rounds, walking tours, and inspections of

Supervisory and administrative staff should get out and about the facility regularly to let inmates and line staff know they're aware of what's going on outside their offices.

Supervisory and administrative staff should make regular rounds, walking tours, and inspections.

all areas of the institution. These activities reinforce security procedures through constant observation and ensure that the administrative staff comes into contact with as many of the facility's operational employees as possible.

The regular appearance of supervisory staff in and around the institution assures line staff and inmates of the administration's continuing interest in the facility's operation. Managerial employees should do more than just tour. Each administrator should pay special attention to operational detail that lies within his or her special field of expertise. In addition, administrators should be aware of any unusual activities or procedures in other areas that may require further action. They should also make an effort to converse with line staff, soliciting suggestions and concerns.

While it is more convenient for supervisors and administrators to observe work, training, recreation, and eating areas, they should also make regular tours of inmate living areas, paying special attention to the conditions in restricted housing units.

Chapter 2

Organization and Management of Security

Organization of Inmate Management

In the 1800's and early 1900's, the structure of correctional systems provided great autonomy to individual facility wardens. Wardens had "departmentalized" assistance—administrators with jurisdiction over security, education, food services, medical services, religion, and farming. Departmental organization tended to separate employees into groups more interested in internal department goals than in the broader concerns of the criminal justice community.

More recently, correctional systems have tried to encourage a wider vision for their employees, refocusing attention on systemwide objectives. Unit management, the organizational structure developed to meet this need, stresses a total team approach to corrections.

Unit Management

Requirements

Most manuals on unit management list the following as requirements for success:

- ○ Leadership. A commitment to unit management at the central office, regional office, institution, and unit levels is imperative to its successful implementation.

- ○ Unit plan and mission. Each unit must have a written mission plan that specifically defines the unit purpose. Written plans are necessary because they provide documentation of the goals against which reviewers measure progress.

- ○ Adequate resources. These include time, money, manpower, and material resources in addition to personal commitment and individual resolve.

- ○ Selection and assignment staff. This is perhaps the most critical resource. Competency skills should include the commitment and personal resolve necessary to implement the principles of unit management.

- ○ Quality performance. Competent staff must give a quality performance if the process is going to be fully effective.

○ Interdepartmental cooperation. Unit management cannot work in a vacuum. Cooperation and assistance between various correctional disciplines are absolute needs.

○ Monitoring and evaluation. A systematic approach to the evaluation of unit management is necessary to determine if its goals have been attained.

○ Analysis and refinement. Outcome needs to be evaluated and analyzed with an eye toward refinement of activities, programs, and efforts in order to maximize overall effectiveness and efficiency.

Objectives

Management manuals list the following major objectives of unit management:

○ To divide large groups of inmates into smaller, well-defined clusters whose members are encouraged to develop a common identity and close association with each other and with unit staff members.

○ To increase the frequency of contact and the quality of relationships between staff members and inmates by placing decision-making personnel in close proximity to the inmates being controlled.

○ To provide better observation of inmate activities, detecting problems before they become critical.

○ To improve inmate accountability and control by holding inmates accountable for their actions and self-conduct.

○ To provide different programs, strategies, and interventions for each inmate depending on his needs, abilities, and ambitions.

○ To place special emphasis on institutional adjustment, work skill acquisition and performance, interpersonal communications, positive self-esteem, self-motivation, problem-solving techniques, realistic goal setting, education, and training.

One goal of unit management is to divide large groups of inmates into smaller groups whose members develop a sense of identity and closer relationships with staff.

Unit Staffing

*The unit manager is
responsible for the daily
operations of the unit.*

Unit Manager

The unit manager is the administrator and supervisor of a multidisciplinary team of staff members assigned to work in the unit. Minimum staffing guidelines suggest no less than one unit manager for every 200 inmates. As a department head, the unit manager sits on institution committees and promotion boards, serves as institution duty officer, and performs other related administrative functions. The unit manager is responsible for the daily operation of the unit, including all matters pertaining to case management, security, correctional programs, safety, sanitation, and applicable aspects of unit financial management. The unit manager serves as an ongoing advisor to the administration on inmate management and programs. In matters of security, the captain and unit manager consult and use each other's expertise to maintain adequate security measures. A cooperative relationship among unit managers and other department heads is essential to ensure effective unit operation.

Case Manager

The case manager is directly accountable to the unit manager. He or she has major responsibility for case management matters within the unit and assists in other unit operations as directed by the unit manager. Minimum staffing guidelines suggest no less than one case manager for every 100 inmates. Supervision, training, and technical assistance for case managers are the responsibility of unit managers. They cannot delegate these duties to others, except when case management specialists or senior case managers are used by the institution to assist with the training and technical development of case managers. The degree of case management technical assistance required by each unit may be related to the level of expertise possessed by unit and case managers.

Correctional Counselor

Correctional counselors, selected from the security service, are responsible for inmate counseling. Counseling may include unplanned sessions and/or formal group and individual interaction. These sessions, along with being directly available to unit inmates, will consume the majority of each correctional counselor's workday. The recommended staffing ratio is at least one correctional counselor for every 100 inmates.

The unit manager is responsible for developing work schedules for the correctional counselors in his or her unit. This practice maximizes inmate contact with the counselors by ensuring that they are not reassigned by other staff members without prior consultation and permission from the unit manager.

Unit Secretary

The unit secretary, whose duties are clerical and secretarial, should be permanently assigned to the unit. The unit manager may broaden the secretary's duties to include participation in unit team meetings, disciplinary committee meetings, or other activities when these duties are within the scope of the position description and do not conflict with primary clerical and secretarial responsibilities. Minimum staffing guidelines suggest no less than one unit secretary for every 200 inmates.

Unit Correctional Officer

In facilities that regularly rotate correctional staff, unit correctional officers should not be assigned to any unit for a period of less than nine months. Correctional officers have primary 24 hour responsibility for unit security and sanitation, as well as other duties essential to carrying out the rules and regulations of the institution and the unit. Beyond this, correctional officers interact freely with other members of the unit staff and are called on to perform outside duties that do not interfere with their primary responsibilities of custody, security, and control.

Education Advisor

The education advisor is the unit's consultant on inmate education and vocational training. He or she is usually permanently assigned to one or more unit teams. The responsibilities of the education advisor include ensuring that all inmates are properly tested and are informed of available educational and vocational opportunities. He or she is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the progress of inmates involved in those programs and providing counseling on educational and vocational matters when needed.

Mental Health Representative

The mental health representative is responsible for performing diagnostic, therapeutic, research, educational, and evaluative functions relating to the unit's mental health services. This person organizes, participates in, and provides professional expertise for unit counseling programs. These functions include the assessment of inmate needs and the design of programs to meet specific needs. All mental health representatives should work under the technical supervision of the chief of mental health, even though general day-to-day supervision is provided by the unit manager. The amount of supervision provided to the mental health representative depends on whether this person is assigned to the unit on a full-time or part-time basis.

Unit Operations

Unit Security

Unit management results in the delegation of many security responsibilities to unit managers and their staff. These responsibilities may include providing security shakedowns, counts, inspections, contraband control, daily notations in unit logs, and security inspections of the unit. Unit staff members must complete all security checks as required by local policy. Continuous cooperation between the unit staff and the security department ensures that security duties are accepted, practiced, monitored, and upgraded. While unit staff members have many responsibilities, maintaining high security standards will always be a prime consideration.

Delegated Authority

A unit is a small but complex organization and unit staff members have major decision-making responsibilities. The unit manager has administrative accountability in areas including security, case management, personnel, training, safety, sanitation, budget, research, and unit programming. The unit staff is delegated authority to make decisions in inmate discipline, work programs, educational and vocational training assignments, leisure time activities, orientation programs, and release plans.

Special Management Units

Units are frequently organized around special program needs of inmates: drug or alcohol abuse, chronic medical problems, or work assignments such as food service or industries. However, the units presenting the most concern to the security staff are those that are highly restricted and monitored, such as segregation and protective custody. The administration of special units readily lends itself to the unit management approach. Better control, accountability, and programming result from the adoption of the unit management system.

The Correctional Service

The correctional service is usually the largest and most complex department in an institution. It is responsible for security in all institutional areas, twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. Correctional service staff members are responsible for the institution's security program. The chief security officer, as manager of the security service, must maintain proper working relationships with other institutional departments. During times of emergency, the chief security officer is responsible for all security matters, subject to the approval of the assistant warden and warden. The section that follows describes the duties and responsibilities of the chief security officer and provides guidelines to assist in managing the institutional correctional service.

Security Managers

The chief security officer of a facility is the key to maintaining the institution's security. He or she must supervise all aspects of security. This person's responsibilities include the performance of regular inspections and audits and the written documentation of inspection and audit findings. He or she has the option of personally conducting these reviews or delegating them to other security supervisors. The chief security officer is also responsible for continuously reviewing and updating all security policies and procedures.

The local security manager must regularly review all the major areas addressed in this manual. These areas include emergency plans, post orders, security inspections, key and lock control, tool control, arms and armory control, transportation, maintenance of logs, reports, counts, staff rosters, staff training, staff discipline, and relationships with other departments within and outside the facility.

Senior Correctional Officers

Correctional officers rotate to the most responsible assignments in the institution, including, but not limited to, control center, entrance posts, and high-security or special housing units. They are required to train and supervise subordinate correctional officers. The following assignments also characterize their responsibilities:

- Orientation and supervision of new inmates.

- Officer-in-charge of living quarters or specified group of quarters.

- Supervision and disciplinary control of inmates segregated for administrative or punitive purposes.

The chief security officer is responsible for every aspect of security in the facility, including regular security inspections and audits.

○ Officer-in-charge of entrances or exits from walled or large fenced institutions.

○ Proper disposition of personal property and funds of newly committed inmates.

○ Short-term assignment to any post to act as troubleshooter or to improve operation.

Shift Supervisors of Security

A shift supervisor of security is assigned to each of the three main shifts. A subordinate supervisor can be assigned to the position of day shift supervisor if required for training or relief. When this occurs, the acting day shift supervisor must be under the direct supervision of the chief of security. In addition, if circumstances warrant, a senior correctional officer can be assigned as an acting shift supervisor. Ordinarily such a placement would occur on the midnight to 8 a.m. shift, or on the day shift Monday through Friday. A senior correctional officer can also be assigned as the acting supervisor of security responsible for a particular area of duty, provided he or she is under the direction of the shift supervisor.

A correctional supervisor is most effective out of the office and among line employees and the inmate population. Although paperwork is a vital part of a supervisor's responsibility, it should never be so overwhelming as to preclude his or her spending the majority of the time in direct contact with staff and inmates. Through accessibility, the supervisor can recognize the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate employees and provide the direction and support required by personal observations.

Special Investigations Supervisor

The special investigations supervisor coordinates the investigation of criminal acts committed by inmates, staff, or other persons on institution property. The authority of this position is established by the central or regional office, after review by the agency's legal counsel. The incumbent func-

tions as a liaison between the institution and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Under the direction of the chief security officer, the special investigations supervisor is responsible for investigating all major crimes within the institution. He or she works in conjunction with other agencies having jurisdiction over such crimes.

The responsibilities of this position include, but are not limited to, gathering intelligence; taking appropriate action to curtail illicit activities; investigating criminal activity, acts of violence, and escapes or attempted escapes; providing accurate and detailed accounts of incidents to appropriate agencies; maintaining information on gang activity (including organized crime figures); and training staff in the protection of crimes scenes, preservation of evidence, and proper documentation. This position should be of at least equal rank and status to that of shift supervisor of security.

Correctional Counselors

Correctional counselors are assigned from the correctional complement and are required to devote their duty time to counseling activities with individual inmates or inmate groups. A counselor is responsible for the following:

- ◉ Conducting individual and group counseling to encourage and assist inmates in developing insight, self-reliance, and the motivation necessary to effect a satisfactory adjustment to society.

- ◉ Providing assistance in the inmate's evaluation. Through his or her contact with the inmate, the counselor can gather useful information regarding adjustment and recommend custodial classification, work assignments, housing, etc.

- ◉ Informing the security supervisor of problems requiring professional attention, as well as those that may be alleviated by administrative action.

- ◉ Improving communications between inmates and staff. Inmates are able to obtain authoritative information through the counselors. The counselor, through his or her availability, can counteract rumors, eliminate a primary source of misinformation and unrest, and serve as a major contact between the inmates and the administration. By establishing a meaningful relationship with inmates, the counselor can, through judicial use of information, assist in preventing disturbances and escapes. The counselor's working hours should be scheduled to minimize interruptions of inmate programs. Most contacts should coincide with the inmates' nonworking hours.

Staffing

Master Assignment Rosters

Master Assignment rosters should be prepared at regular intervals corresponding with pay periods. Regularly scheduled eight-hour shifts are designed to begin and end in the same calendar day.

Officers are rotated from one type of duty to another at regular intervals, 3-12 months each, depending on local conditions, union regulations, etc., except for assignments of the most responsible nature. No assignment exceeds a 52-week period. Tower duty does not ordinarily exceed 12 weeks.

Shift security supervisors are rotated two weeks prior to the effective date of the regular assignment roster. Probationary officers are rotated every

four weeks during their probationary year to provide broad correctional experience on all posts and shifts. Training posts are designated on the quarterly roster.

Terms such as *utility* and *escort,* as assignment designations, are not used. Post titles should more clearly reflect the duties actually performed by the officers. If the duties of an assignment are widely varied, the post is named to identify the major responsibilities identified in the post orders. To ensure maximum alertness and efficiency, an officer is not required to assume a post without at least 7.5 hours off duty.

Determination of Correctional Complement

To effectively manage the correctional service and provide the necessary supervision for security and welfare in all areas, a master quarterly and daily assignment roster should be developed in each institution. From these rosters, the number of correctional staff needed is determined. To make this determination, the following formulas and guidelines are suggested.

- Base year: The base year is 365 days.
- Post coverages:
  - 7-day post, coverage provided for 365 days per year (52 weeks x 7 days)
  - 6-day post, coverage provided for 312 days per year (52x6)
  - 5-day post, coverage provided for 260 days per year (52x5)
  - 4-day post, coverage provided for 208 days per year (52x4)
  - 3-day post, coverage provided for 156 days per year (52x3)
  - 2-day post, coverage provided for 104 days per year (52x2)
  - 1-day post, coverage provided for 52 days per year (52x1)
- Positions: A position is considered to be 260 days per year. This figure is then reduced by days off, vacation days, holidays, sick days, and other leave days such as funerals, injury, discipline time, relief to other departments, etc. The days remaining are what each position provides.
- Computation: The total number of specific posts, multiplied by the days of required coverage, indicates the total days required. Dividing this total by the number of days remaining in each position indicates the total number of employees required to cover all posts and provide necessary leave as determined in the paragraph above.

To substantiate the number of days used for any of the above reasons, the chief security officer maintains a log to record such days.

Assignment Records

An assignment record is maintained on each employee, beginning with the first day of employment. This record is maintained on a 5x8

card and includes the employee's full name, date of birth (DOB), date of entry on duty (EOD), dates of promotion, and chronological listing of posts assigned. Deviation from normal rotation is noted after the assignment entry (i.e., job-related self-improvement, training to assume more responsible posts, limited assignments for health reasons, specific need of the institution, etc.).

Personnel Evaluations

A record of performance is maintained in the shift supervisor's office to document each officer's quarterly performance. If the institution is operating under unit management principles, all correctional officers assigned to a functional unit for the majority of the rating period and supervised primarily by the unit manager are rated by the unit manager. Evening and midnight shift correctional officers assigned to units not under direct supervision of the unit manager are rated by the shift supervisor, with review by the unit manager. All other posts are rated by the shift supervisor. All ratings are reviewed by the chief security officer. A statement is placed on each record card indicating the review of all emergency plans—this is initialed by the employee. Evaluations should include personal characteristics and appearance (maintenance and appearance of uniform), job interest, weaknesses, strengths, dependability, and current job performance.

In addition to the quarterly reports, comments are entered on the performance card as necessary. Each entry is called to the officer's attention at the time of notation, and the officer initials it. If an officer refuses to initial an entry, a notation to that effect is made. An officer may see his or her card at any time, but is not permitted to see another employee's performance evaluation, except when authorized in writing by the employee concerned.

Properly documented evaluations serve as a guide when completing annual performance ratings, which are completed on the employee's anniversary date (i.e., date of entry on duty or date of promotion to present grade). A new card is started to coincide with the beginning of the new rating period. The old card is retained in the chief security officer's file for one year, after which it is removed and destroyed. A monthly evaluation form is completed on each employee on probationary status. A security supervisor reviews the evaluation monthly with the probationary employee.

Post Orders

Post orders for each custodial post are prepared, kept current, and distributed. Post orders, based on the policies and procedures issued by the warden, specifically state the hours of duty for each post. They are prepared under the supervision and direction of the chief security officer.

Scope of Post Orders

Post orders describe routine procedures, special duties and responsibilities. Each should contain a specific chronological activities schedule. Post orders emphasize custody and security and cover the employee's responsibilities to the institution, other employees, the general public, and the inmate population. All post orders and subsequent changes are reviewed and signed by the chief of security. Where the unit

management system is utilized, the unit manager develops and signs unit post orders.

Each housing unit's post orders specify that the assigned shift officer maintains detailed records of pertinent information regarding inmate activity. This information is submitted to the shift security supervisor for review and possible inclusion in the respective shift report. Where the unit management system is utilized, the unit manager receives a copy of reports on any inmate activity in the unit. These evaluations are not for general distribution and are only disseminated on a need-to-know basis.

In institutions having armed posts, the post orders contain instructions for the proper care and safe handling of firearms and specific instructions stating when and under what circumstances their use is authorized. All officers assigned to armed posts must be thoroughly familiar with the firearms assigned to that post. Except in emergencies, armed employees are assigned only to towers, gun walks, mobile patrols, or other positions that are inaccessible to inmates. Post orders for armed posts and those controlling access to the institution perimeter contain a statement that any employee taken hostage is without authority regardless of rank.

A list of all program statements relative to the post are included in the description of duties for that post. Post orders for outside details contain the type of supervision appropriate for the custody of the inmates and the schedule of watch calls or other periodic accountability checks.

Review and Revision of Post Orders

Post orders must be current and up-to-date at all times. All changes are authenticated by the signature or initials of the chief security officer and, where appropriate, the unit manager. Post orders are prepared in loose leaf form, with each page numbered, dated, and initialed by the chief security officer and unit manager. When any page becomes difficult to read, the entire page is retyped and then initialed as indicated above.

Post orders must be current and up-to-date at all times.

Before assigning the duties of a post, the shift security supervisor must be certain all officers read and initial the post orders for their assigned post. Shift security supervisors ascertain that each officer under their supervision has reviewed the post orders of his or her current assignment prior to each quarterly rotation period. All post orders are updated quarterly by a formal audit review procedure. As a part of that review, the officer lists changes or recommendations for improvements and submits these with the post orders to the shift security supervisor. If no changes are needed, the officer notifies the supervisor in writing that the post orders are accurate and up-to-date. The shift supervisor reviews all suggested changes in post orders and submits them with comments to the chief security officer at the time a change in post orders is initiated.

Distribution of Post Orders

A master file of post orders is kept in a convenient central location (staff lounge, shift supervisor's office, control center, front entrance post, etc.) designated by the chief security officer. Copies of post orders

SIGNATURE SHEET

POST: _____

I certify that I have read and fully understand the post orders both general and specific for this post. I have also read and fully understand all operations statements and memorandums, which are attached to these post orders, affecting the operation of this post. TO BE MADE A PART OF ALL POST ORDERS.

Employee Name	Date	Supervisor's Initials	Employee Name	Date	Supervisor's Initials

A post order signature sheet such as this ensures that personnel staffing a post know what their duties entail.

are continuously available there for inspection or reference by any interested employee. This enables an employee assigned to an unfamiliar post on very short notice an opportunity to study the orders before assuming the duties of the post. Copies of the post orders are kept at each post concerned (if security is adequate to prohibit inmate access). The heads of other services or departments are given copies of post orders when they are involved.

Hours of Duty

All institution rosters and post orders clearly state the hours of duty for the employee assigned to a specific post so maximum efficiency and equity will be achieved. The basic hours of duty for a workday ordinarily should not exceed eight hours, excluding lunch.

Rotation Patterns

Rotating staff between posts is desirable for several reasons. Employees gain a broader perspective of the total function of the institution, enabling them to better understand how each post interrelates with others. Rotation also provides a fresh view of the post's function and is an important part of an ongoing internal review of institution operations. Rotation allows officers to share the responsibilities of the more stressful jobs and alleviate the boredom of certain posts.

Correctional officers are subject to a regular rotation schedule (intervals ranging from 3 to 12 months, depending on local conditions). In

the course of a year, a correctional officer is typically assigned to the midnight (12-8 a.m.) shift for one interval, the evening (4 p.m.-12 a.m.) shift for an interval, and the day (8 a.m.-4 p.m.) shift for two intervals.

Determinations are made regarding which posts require the most experienced officers, and assignments are made accordingly. Because an employee can only gain experience and expertise by training and exposure to these critical posts, less experienced officers are assigned to these areas under the supervision of experienced officers. This should be an essential part of any rotation program.

Security Supervisors' Meetings

Security supervisors' meetings are held periodically, ideally at least once a month, to discuss programs and problem areas of general concern. A definite time and date is established for these meetings (e.g., 8:30 a.m. on the first Wednesday of each month). An agenda, prepared and distributed in advance, is desirable. The warden and assistant warden(s) of the institution are invited to attend, as are department supervisors and other interested persons. The chief security officer is responsible for the agenda and chairs the meeting. A reporter records the minutes, which are forwarded to the warden and assistant warden(s). At each meeting, supervisors review and evaluate the progress and performance of all probationary employees and make a written evaluation of each, including performance and training needs, as an attachment to the minutes of the supervisors' meeting. Specific comments regarding performance and progress and the advisability of retention or termination are forwarded to the regional/central office monthly.

Uniform Regulations

In recent years, uniforms for correctional officers have been modernized in both material and style. In line with the updating of the uniform, some officers tend to substitute personal clothing for various items of the uniform. In many instances, the substitute clothing detracts from the professional appearance. Therefore, established guidelines recommend that correctional service uniforms are worn by staff at all times while on duty. In the interest of professionalism, correctional employees should not wear jewelry or ornaments that detract from the overall professional appearance of the uniform (e.g., necklaces worn outside the shirt or blouse and badges or symbols denoting organizations, causes, or political beliefs).

Each organization makes provisions to issue foul weather clothing to correctional officers assigned to outside posts during inclement weather. Procedures for issuing and accounting for all clothing should be established.

Leave Policy

Annual Leave

Annual leave should be scheduled according to the needs of the institutional agency and administratively determined with due regard for the employee's needs and wishes. Insofar as practical, the chief security officer grants leave as requested by the employee. Allowing for some variation in total complement, an equal number of employees should be on leave each period throughout the year.

Sick Leave

Sick leave should be granted only when the employee is incapacitated for duty. The chief security officer monitors each individual's case to prevent abuse of sick leave. Medical certificates are required to substantiate sick leave of more than three days. Questionable circumstances, such as repetitive use of sick leave before or after holidays, may require the employee to justify *any* sick leave taken. Prior warning in writing is given the employee before requiring such justification.

In instances where an employee was on sick leave in excess of three days and did not require medical attention, the chief security officer can accept a written statement from the employee in lieu of a medical certificate. All employees must notify the institution as early as possible, preferably before the start of their shift, of their inability to report for duty due to illness.

Staff Training

Working in corrections is a complex and difficult occupation. Various parts of the correctional process may seem contradictory at times. Issues, including the humanity of incarceration and the value of treatment programs, are widely debated. While this debate continues, facilities must continue to be effectively managed and securely operated. In the face of public controversy, hostility, and indifference, correctional officers must perform their jobs in a competent, professional manner.

Responsibilities of the Correctional Officer

The role of today's correctional officer is more involved than simply providing custody. To perform their many tasks, officers must understand the philosophy and function of the correctional institution. They must recognize the boundaries of their responsibility, as well as limitations on the amount of authority they may assume when performing their duties. In addition, correctional officers must understand their job as it relates to the responsibilities of other employees. Ultimately, the correctional officer is accountable for the enforcement of agency policy and rules and must be able to interpret those standards correctly to maintain a safe and secure institution for inmates and staff.

Enforcement of agency policies also requires an understanding of the court and legislative decisions upon which they are based. A correctional officer's awareness of legal issues is important for the protection of all concerned. The correctional officer should have a general understanding of prisoners' rights, as well as the rights and responsibilities of correctional staff.

The correctional officer is the most important employee contact in an inmate's life.

The correctional officer is the most important employee contact in an inmate's life. He or she occupies a critical position to assist the inmate in making positive life changes. In addition, decisions on institutional operation, the maintenance of discipline, and prisoner treatment, all made by the correctional officer, directly affect each inmate on an individual basis. Other responsibilities of the correctional officer, including cell assignment, supervision of meal shifts, security, isolation and punitive segregation, verbal reprimands, classification, and work and program assignments, combine to form a total program for inmates.

Simple inmate behavior changes can signal progress or tension that might lead to a disturbance.

A correctional officer must be able to communicate inmates' actions, reactions, and interactions to supervisors. Simple behavior changes can signal progress resulting from positive treatment or can be indicative of prison tension that might lead to a disturbance.

Supervisory responsibilities, expectations of loyalty, and daily inter-action with inmates create a difficult and demanding environment for the correctional officer. In order to cope with a variety of duties, the officer must acquire appropriate skills and knowledge through training.

Training Guidelines

Many correctional officers enter service with little or no training due to limited educational opportunity in the corrections career market. This lack of training, together with a corresponding lack of experience, can cause problems in both security and programs.

The American Correctional Association standards and guidelines for the development of policies and procedures in adult correctional institutions require that all new correctional officers receive 40 hours of orientation and training prior to independent assignment. This orienta-tion and training should include orientation to the purpose, goals, poli-cies and procedures of the institution and parent agency; working con-ditions and regulations; responsibilities; rights of the confined; and an overview of the correctional field.

New correctional officers should also receive an additional 120 hours of training during the first year of employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. This training should include:

- Security procedures.

- Supervision of inmates.

- Regulations and tactics for the use of force.

- Report writing.

- Inmate rules and regulations.

- Rights and responsibilities of inmates.

- Fire and emergency procedures.

- Firearms training.

- Key control.

- Interpersonal relations.

- Social and cultural lifestyles of the inmate population.

- Communication skills.

- First aid.

- Self-defense.

- Race relations.

Training for the development of knowledge and skills is an ongoing process. For correctional officers, the goals of training are:

- An improvement in the skills of supervising, classifying, and interacting with inmates.

- An increase in personal effectiveness, with a resulting increase in organizational efficiency and economy.

- An increase in the ability to recognize, understand, and solve problems common to correctional institutions.

- An opportunity for greater job satisfaction and broader career service.

Training and proper, efficient management — primary agents for achieving progress and change.

Benefits of Training

In view of these general goals, correctional officers should also consider the following benefits of training:

- Advancement in rank and salary.

- Personal development.

- Greater ease in handling work assignments.

- Development of sound judgment.

- Greater knowledge of occupational hazards.

- Improvement in working conditions.

- Increased dignity and pride in employment — the development of a professional attitude.

- Greater understanding and practice of institutional philosophy and policies.

- Greater job satisfaction.

Training Constraints

High staff turnover rates, tight budgets, and an atmosphere of crisis management all contribute to the type of training offered in correctional institutions. In many states, high turnover rates are responsible for up to 90 percent of staff training time being devoted to pre-service orientation and security personnel preparation. In many instances, there is little or no orientation or training for the clerical, support, or program staff. In smaller jurisdictions, state and local departments of corrections have experienced even greater training deficiencies. This pattern, although common in corrections, is not tolerated in other government agencies or in private industry.

An increase in the emphasis on training is extremely important to counter ever-growing rates of staff turnover. Lack of familiarity with the job has been cited as a major contributor to high turnover. Most agencies are developing training strategies devised to combat this. The primary focuses of these training processes are basic staff functions, performance, quality, and agency programs.

During the last few decades, the attitude of correctional administrators toward the significance of training has changed considerably. A new generation of correctional administrators has emerged. These administrators have more experience in dealing with the forces which affect the management of correctional agencies — inmate litigation, the

A good staff training program offers many benefits — lower staff turnover, more efficient operation of the facility, and protection against liability in lawsuits.

implementation of EEO/Affirmative Action Programs, the growth of unions, etc. They are not only experienced in corrections, but have received training in the principles and practices of management and supervision. This has led to greater recognition of the importance of training for the proper, efficient management of the organization and as a primary agent for achieving progress and change.

Some significant developments in correctional law have created pressures to establish rational written operating procedures, to clarify lines of authority, and to better focus responsibility. The training function has also risen in importance as a key element for effective compliance and maintenance of proactive policies and procedures by the staff. Wardens are regularly called upon to testify in court. Their decisions and practices are being subjected to careful scrutiny and thorough cross-examination. Staff training, its curriculum content, hours of delivery, mode of delivery (centralized, local, institutional, or on-the-job), and the credentials and skills of the training supervisor and staff are critical factors in the potential liability of the agency and of its administration and employees regarding possible violation of the civil rights of inmates.

Liability for Lack of Training

In recent years the courts have held that supervisors can be found liable for the actions of their staff. Lawsuits filed by inmates often name supervisors or management personnel as defendants for failure to train, failure to supervise, or negligent retention of employees. This has led to a growing recognition of the importance of training for the proper and efficient management of correctional agencies. Training is a managerial tool for proper and efficient employee conduct. This recognition of the mission of training and the qualifications and orientation of the training staff has become a priority item for the management of correctional operations.

Training Standards and Accreditation

Other factors which have increased the importance of training have been the recent development of standards and the establishment of an accreditation process for corrections. The American Correctional Association (ACA) and allied organizations — the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections and the American Committee on Correctional Standards — serve as an external pool of knowledge and expertise upon which individual institutions can draw. Currently there are over 600 agencies and institutions undergoing the accreditation process.

The need to meet new requirements and the creation of monitoring procedures to measure performance against those standards have emphasized the importance of task oriented training design, thus increasing the responsibility of institutional training supervisors and instructors. The neutral framework of the standards establishes curriculum parameters, designates classroom and on-the-job training needs, and specifies personnel participation categories. Accreditation requirements and the standards quantify goals and objectives and should result in less ambiguous role definitions for both the correctional training staff and the employee groups served.

Training requirements include the development of a curriculum and the delivery of approximately 160 hours of training to all new employees with direct inmate contact. This has required correctional officials to direct more time, resources, and attention to the objectives and importance of training. It is significant to note that the standards categorize training as "essential," and, in life-sustaining areas, "mandatory" for agency personnel. The standards also stipulate that training programs must be secured by written policy and procedures providing a training program for all employees (ACA Standard 2-4088) and that the training program be supervised by a qualified employee at the supervisory level. Correctional training staff must receive specialized in-service preparation for their positions, with, at a minimum, full-time personnel completing 40 hours of training-for-trainers each year (ACA Standard 2-4089). The standards and accreditation process also mandates the existence of an advisory training committee, specifying committee composition, terms of office, and membership duties. The standards provide guidelines for training program evaluation, provision of adequate library and reference services, and the utilization of resources available from other public and private agencies. Training and staff development equipment, space allocation, and budget requirements are also described.

The importance of training is also stressed in guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association, the Department of Justice, and many state legislatures. The training function, widely acknowledged as vital, is now based soundly on national professional standards.

While published standards for the training and development of correctional personnel may not be constitutionally mandated (see *Bell v. Wolfish,* 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1986 (1979)), some courts have utilized the ACA standards in determining the steps needed to remedy deficiencies. For example, the following excerpt from the consent decree entered into by the Clark County, Nevada Commissioners to resolve litigation challenging conditions of confinement in the County Jail (*Capel v. Lamb,* Civil Lv. 77–118, consent decree July 19, 1978) stipulates that there shall be:

STAFF AND TRAINING PROCEDURES—All training for correctional staff personnel shall be oriented to corrections as distinct from law enforcement training; there shall be written training and staff development plans for all staff employees; all jail and correctional officers shall receive on-the-job orientation training. In addition, the administrative and management staff shall receive at least forty hours of management and/or professional training; all employees who work in direct and continuing contact with inmates shall receive training that is relevant to corrections; there shall be an advisory training committee composed of the facility training officer and representatives from each department; all security personnel shall be trained in methods of applying physical force to control inmates; the budgets shall contain proposals for adequate funds for sufficient staff training. Said procedures and programs shall be reduced to writing.

Failure to recognize inmate rights may subject correctional personnel to civil liability despite their lack of knowledge about specific court decisions.

This case clearly illustrates that the implementation of structured, ongoing training is the most appropriate method of meeting constitutional minimums as well as achieving compliance with the standards. Training, given quantifiable objectives for assessment, course content, and administration, can serve as the common denominator for standards compliance and conformation to accreditation specifications. At the same time, training can facilitate required improvements in agency operations.

Training and Lawsuit Defense

Litigation continues to shape corrections training and staff development. Legal actions have been initiated against state and local government by inmates, individual employees, unions, and the federal government. Court decisions and consent agreements reached as a result of these cases have caused dramatic changes, not only in prison administration and capital construction, but, as cited in the Nevada case, the necessity of training itself has been judicially mandated.

The old adage "ignorance of the law is no excuse" has particular relevance in corrections. The numerous constitutional rights to which inmates are entitled will be monitored by Public Law 96-247, The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1979). Failure to recognize inmate rights may subject correctional personnel to civil liability despite their lack of knowledge about specific court decisions. It is imperative that agency training personnel be thoroughly informed of correctional law developments and their significance for both agency administrative rules and regulations and the instruction provided in staff training programs. Correctional personnel confront the law directly in all facets of their work. Laws affect every interaction a line officer has with an inmate and every policy decision made by supervisory personnel. Correctional agencies have a direct responsibility to provide training in specific job functions as well as on the rights and responsibilities of staff and inmates.

The chief executive officer of a correctional facility may be held liable for the failure to train or to supervise the training of subordinate employees under 42 USC Section 1983, where such failure results in the denial of constitutionally protected rights. State court and federal claims can be brought for negligence in training. For example, if a correctional officer misuses a weapon against an inmate without receiving

proper training, the superior officers may be held responsible for the injury. Proper training and supervision of training will reduce the legal risk, even in cases where a properly trained officer does not act in accordance with his training. Appropriate and effective training is one of the best methods of reducing potential legal liability.

The Value of Training

Staff training is one of the major means of maintaining and improving security operations in an institution. The commitment to training can be measured by examining these factors:

- Administrative support or endorsement of staff training.
- Qualifications of the personnel conducting the training program.
- Facilities and equipment provided for training.
- Minimum training hours required.
- Time available for training.
- Special training for emergency situations.
- Evaluation procedures for determining if the training program meets its goals and objectives.

Administrative Support

The program should be supervised at the assistant warden level, and an advisory training committee made up of the various disciplines in the institution should exist. A comprehensive plan that provides for pre-service and in-service training for all staff should be developed and revised annually, if necessary.

Staff Qualifications

The training staff should be assigned full time and have specialized preparation for their positions. Only well-qualified trainers should direct the program. The more successful staff training programs are managed and operated by persons who have the combination of an educational background and practical experience in corrections.

Facilities and Equipment

The space provided for training should be easily accessible and large enough to meet the needs of the agency or institution. The setting should provide a climate conducive to training. Equipment for various types of presentations should be available and reference materials should be up-to-date and in good repair. Special areas and equipment for such training as firearms, use of chemical agents, and self-defense also should be provided.

Minimum Hours

All correctional officers should receive a minimum of 40 hours orientation training prior to being independently assigned to a specific post. A review of all emergency plans should be an essential element of this initial program. After independent placement on an assignment, correctional officers should receive an additional 120 hours of training

during their first year of employment. During subsequent years, 40 hours of additional in-service training should be provided. Supervisory staff should receive 40 hours of in-service training each year. In addition to assisting them in responding to emergency situations, the training should help them deal more effectively with the new staff they supervise.

Time Available

Whenever practical, training should be conducted during staff duty hours. Since operating an institution is a 24 hour per day activity, this is not always possible. Therefore, funds should be available to pay staff for time spent in training during off-duty hours.

Specialty Training

In cases where it is not practical to train all correctional staff in handling emergency situations, a special unit or squad should be selected and prepared. Such emergency units should receive extra training in methods of confrontation and hostage negotiation techniques. Because of the volatile nature of crisis situations, care should be taken to select well-qualified personnel for service in emergency squads.

Evaluation

Training programs should be evaluated annually to determine if all aspects of these operations meet the agency's needs. Such evaluations help in program revision and activity planning.

Summary

In today's complex correctional environment, the correctional officer is viewed more and more as a professional, and in that role requires a wide variety of skills. A comprehensive, well organized training program which strives to meet the previously mentioned goals and objectives is essential. In conjunction with the institutional training program required by ACA standards, correctional officers should also consider outside training sources such as community colleges, etc., to improve their skills.

Problems in Supervision and Control

Crimes Committed in Prisons

When it is believed an offense has been committed in an institution, whether by an inmate, staff member, visitor, or others having business with the institution, it is reported promptly to the appropriate investigative authority. Any staff member receiving information or observing actions that indicate a crime has been committed must report it to a supervisor immediately. Local policy specifies what steps are to be taken to notify local law enforcement agencies. All personnel must cooperate fully with the investigative agency and make available any information or evidence bearing on an offense being investigated.

Incidents involving acts that may be prosecuted in court require special considerations. The first step is to isolate the crime scene. All inmates should be removed from the area and it should be secured. The first employees to arrive at a crime scene must be sure the area is not crowded by curious onlookers. Staff who are not involved in protecting the crime scene should not be permitted in the area. Items at the scene

should remain in the exact position where they are found until trained investigators properly process the evidence. The scene should remain fully isolated until the warden or designee authorizes qualified investigative personnel to enter the area and begin an investigation. Each institution should outline specific procedures to be followed in the event it becomes necessary to conduct searches that are not routine and that may result in criminal prosecution.

Constitutional Requirements in the Investigation of Crime

Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the constitutional rights regarding self-incrimination and right to counsel (*Miranda v. Arizona,* 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and that "the accused shall have the assistance of counsel." (See attachment entitled "Your Rights.")

The two main considerations in the investigation of a crime committed in a prison are the identification and isolation of the suspected offender as a matter of internal security, discipline, and morale and the prosecution of the offender.

In order to achieve the second consideration, successful prosecution, staff members must carefully comply with applicable constitutional requirements. The particular requirements concerning confessions and the right to counsel deal with evidence developed in the course of the investigation which may be used.

In the usual case where prosecution is a possibility, institutional staff should not conduct questioning of suspects. When the investigation has narrowed down to several suspects, they may be isolated from the rest of the population until the arrival of the appropriate investigative officials. These officials assume the responsibility of the investigation for purposes of prosecution.

Certain statements are not affected by this procedure. The Supreme Court is concerned with the questioning of a suspect; a suspect may, however, freely volunteer a statement about the offense without being asked any questions. This may be taken down and used as a confession. A suspect should not be questioned further about the statement without being given the required warning regarding his rights. Also, nothing prevents the questioning of witnesses. It is only when a person is suspected of involvement in the offense that the constitutional warning must be given.

There are times when the customary method of investigation—completely turning over the interrogation of suspects to the appropriate investigative agency—may break down. On such occasions the first consideration, isolating and questioning the suspect for internal security purposes, overrides the prospect of successful prosecution of the inmate offender. There are occasions when the warden may decide that staff must promptly pursue questioning of suspects before the arrival of appropriate outside investigative authorities in order to frustrate escape plans, disrupt plans for mass disturbances, or prevent retaliation by associates of the assault victim.

Prior to such investigations, the suspect must read and have read to him or her the *Miranda* warning, which advises suspects of their rights.

This must be done before any questioning begins in order to comply with constitutional standards. In addition to reading the warning to suspects and permitting them to read it themselves, suspects should be asked to sign a form containing the warning, indicating that they do understand their rights and whether or not they waive them. If circumstances do not permit the use of a written form, the warning and waiver can be made orally. If these steps are followed, the results of the questioning should not interfere with later law enforcement investigations, and any statements taken by institution staff should be admissible at the trial.

If it is believed that giving the *Miranda* warning to a particular suspect would discourage the disclosure of vitally needed information, questioning may continue without the warning. In these circumstances, however, the statement taken will be inadmissible in court, and any tangible evidence such as weapons or escape tools located as a result of such a statement will probably be inadmissible at trial. Also, any statement subsequently given to any other investigative agency will be so tainted that it will be inadmissible, and the prospect of a successful prosecution is therefore endangered. Failure to properly advise suspects of their rights is permissible only when the benefits gained outweigh the value lost by the inability to properly prosecute the case.

It is impossible in this brief statement of guidelines on confessions to spell out the complete legal background and details and to anticipate all the problems that may arise. Troublesome cases and local problems not covered here should be discussed with the appropriate investigative agency and the agency's general counsel.

When the investigative agency has completed its investigation, institution disciplinary action may be taken. It is generally not necessary to await the outcome of a criminal trial before institution disciplinary action is taken, especially if there will be a long delay before the trial.

> *Failure to properly advise suspects of their rights is permissible only when the benefits gained outweigh the value lost by the inability to properly prosecute the case.*

Your Rights

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.

- You have the right to remain silent.

- Anything you say can be used against you in court.

- You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning.

- If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish.

- If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

Waiver of Rights

I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed _____

Witness _____

Witness _____

Date & Time _____

The **Miranda** *warning — rights which suspects must understand before answering investigators' questions.*

Acts of Violence

Acts of Violence

The chief security officer, in coordination with the assistant wardens and department supervisors, is responsible for establishing procedures to be followed in the event of serious assaults, homicides, and other acts of violence committed in the institution. Inasmuch as laws, legal procedures, and legal opinions differ in each state or district, establishment of firm guidelines at central or regional offices is not always practical. All guidelines formulated at the local level should be reviewed and approved by the regional or central office legal staff.

Procedures to handle acts of violence should be developed to include, but not be restricted to, the following topics:

- Responsibility of the shift security supervisor and the department supervisor involved.

- Preservation of evidence.

- Notification of appropriate investigative and law enforcement agencies.

- Interrogation, prosecution, and segregation of witnesses and suspects.

- Notification of next of kin.

- Notification of regional and central office.

Since acts of violence can occur anywhere within the institution and can be discovered or witnessed by any member of the staff, it is imperative that all staff members are thoroughly familiar with the procedures developed by the institution.

Security Audits

It is essential that security operations be conducted to ensure adherence to the policies and procedures of the institution and agency. Audit guidelines should be established at the agency level and updated as policies change. The audit guidelines should be developed to ensure that institutions are in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, and that they conform to the standards of regulatory bodies and professional organizations, such as the ACA.

External Audits

External audits should be conducted by agency staff who are well versed in the agency policy and procedures governing the department being audited. Identification of resource utilization, policy compliance, and management effectiveness are specific functions of the audit process. These audits should be conducted at least annually, more frequently if indicated. A fully documented report of the findings of the audit should be provided to the warden of the institution within a reasonable period of time, preferably 30 days. Particular attention should be given to repeat deviations or shortcomings. The agency should request a report from the institution of action taken as a result of the audit within 60 days of the initial audit.

Internal Audits

Policies and procedures should be formulated at the institution

It is essential that security operations be conducted to ensure adherence to the policies and procedures of the institution and agency.

level to ensure that an internal correctional services audit is accomplished at least annually. These internal audits should be scheduled at intervals midway between agency audits so that the department is audited at least once every six months. The criteria for both internal (institution) and external (agency) audits should be the same.

Audits

Institutional security audits should include, but not be restricted to, the following areas:

- Security office.
- Control center.
- Front entrance.
- Rear entrance
- Emergency entrances.
- Tool control.
- Weapons control.
- Perimeter security.
- Towers.
- Armory.
- Key control.
  - emergency keys.
  - restricted keys.
  - key storage.
- Living quarters.
- Admission and orientation.
- Official counts.
  - census.
  - pass system.
  - emergency counts.
  - unofficial counts.
  - outcounts.

- Clothing services.
- Inmate personal property.
- Visiting.
- Receiving and discharge.
- Mail room.
- Urine surveillance.
- Segregation.
- Food service.
- Warehouse.
- General observation areas.
- Hospital.
  - drug control.
  - needle and syringe control.

- Emergency plans.
- Transportation of inmates.
- Security inspections.
- Staffing.
- Equipment.
- Training.
- Scheduling and use of annual and sick leave.

Continuing Concerns in Staffing and Supervision

Staffing Patterns

Many administrators believe they never have enough staff members to cover institutional needs. In an attempt to resolve this issue, formulas have been designed to determine the number of positions needed for adequate institutional operation.

As programs and inmate populations change, appropriate adjustments must be made in the staffing pattern. In many agencies, the failure to respond to constantly rising inmate populations with corresponding increases in staffing has led to serious security problems. Because the increase in inmate numbers may be gradual and the mechanisms for securing additional staff members can be cumbersome, most institutions cannot balance their interim needs without incurring large overtime expenses.

Possible methods for avoiding extreme overtime expense and achieving balance within present staffing levels include the implementation of two strategies:

- Unit management. Unit management, described throughout this manual, assists in maintaining the staff/inmate population equilibrium by assigning a multidisciplinary staff to each housing unit. By focusing on the work hours of staff members other than those of the uniformed security officers assigned to inmate living areas, additional coverage is achieved. Greater attention to inmate problems is another positive outcome of the application of unit management.

- Direct supervision by security staff in lieu of indirect supervision. Officers involved in direct supervision circulate among the inmates in the housing areas instead of remaining behind locked doors in small control rooms. Proponents of this style of supervision assert that security problems can be avoided and better observation can be maintained by increasing contact between inmates and officers. The better staff/inmate relations that occur when officers and prisoners get to know each other as individuals usually promotes more effective security.

> *Close personal observation of and interaction with inmates are valuable tools in the maintenance of safety and security.*

Overreliance on physical security devices, including locks, grilles, and small control rooms can be a consequence of improper levels of staffing. The lack of attention paid to interpersonal controls and relationships in a facility suffering such overreliance can leave the system unbalanced. Close personal observation of and interaction with inmates are valuable tools in the maintenance of safety and security. Balanced systems are safe systems; appropriate levels of staffing cannot be approached in a haphazard manner.

Institutional Overcrowding

There is no simple solution to the problems posed by overcrowding in institutions. Exceeding a facility's population design limits has serious impacts on the safety of the staff and inmates alike. Many agencies use these guidelines to manage overcrowding:

- Long range planning should be undertaken, including inmate population projections, projection of increase over time, and provisions for new institutions or modification of existing facilities.

- The assessment of the dangers of overcrowding must be weighed at each level of institutional security. Overcrowding may present less risk in medium security facilities than in maximum or minimum security facilities.

- An objective and uniform classification system should be implemented. The inmate population should be divided among the various custody classification groups. Each inmate should be assigned to the least restrictive custody level possible. He or she should undergo classification reviews throughout the length of his or her sentence to determine whether that classification should be increased or decreased.

- The central office staff should closely monitor the prison population, easing possible overcrowding by making appropriate adjustments in inmate classification by transfer.

Security is enhanced in institutions that involve inmates in programs.

○ As population density increases, additional staff members must be added to maintain a continuing level of supervision and programming.

◎ Conditions essential to humane prison conditions, including medical services, food services, the canteen, laundry services, and visiting programs, must be maintained at adequate levels of safety, sanitation, and supervision as the incarcerated population grows.

○ Increased training in interpersonal communication skills.

○ Adequate numbers of inmate jobs should be provided. Good work programs are critical to security.

○ Alternatives to incarceration, including early release programs, parole, work release, halfway houses, and probation, should be fully utilized.

Inmate Activity Level

Security is enhanced in institutions that involve inmates in programs, particularly in those facilities that offer a reasonable freedom of choice and positive incentives for involvement.

Although many correctional administrators believe that the most important inmate program is institutional work, the possibility exists for preoccupation with daily maintenance and sanitation. Facilities should also offer more rewarding activities, including work in prison industrial operations, educational and vocational classes, recreational activities, and religious instruction.

The development and delivery of a variety of inmate programs within the framework of security and discipline is a major challenge facing today's correctional administrators. The existence of these programs reduces tensions among inmates but at the same time program implementation presents new security risks. Balance must be sought—a reasonable level of inmate activity that does not present a great risk to security must be found.

It is important to the smooth operation of any facility that inmates have plenty of opportunity for recreation and other activities.

Atmosphere

Overemphasis on security can create a cycle of repression. Intensive security procedures can create an impersonal atmosphere conducive to counterproductive staff and inmate behavior, which can then necessitate the implementation of even more strict security measures.

For example, institutional regulations often closely control the manner and times of inmate movement. These restrictions may be tightened as part of an official response to an otherwise isolated incident. The increased prohibitions on movement then lead to greater inmate frustration and discontent on the part of staff members assigned to implement the new policies. The result of such policies is a greater atmosphere of repression, increased feelings of resentment among inmates, and a breakdown in communication between inmates and staff.

Administrators should establish policies that help avoid such self-reinforcing cycles of discipline and recrimination. Institutions should be designed to operate in as "normal" a fashion as possible. Positive incentives must be developed to reward staff members and inmates who comply with necessary security restrictions. Decisions should be fair, taking into account the rights of both inmates and staff. The American Correctional Association Standards are intended to aid officials in arriving at fair decisions, just policies, and appropriate application of procedures.

The Inmate Classification Process

Diversion of the less violent and more stable inmates from institutions into community programs has left prisons with a larger proportion of hardened and dangerous prisoners. Therefore, administrators in secure facilities are confronted with volatile concentrations of the most difficult offenders, whose hostility is frequently directed against other inmates as well as against the staff. While classification cannot solve the problems of hostility or overcrowding, it can assist administrators in using existing facilities to their best advantage. Classification provides a sorting-out procedure that results in the placement of inmates in the most appropriate security level of an institution under the proper degree of staff supervision. Classification also aids decisions on which programs and services are most likely to be beneficial for individual inmates.

The classification process deals with many aspects of prisoners' needs and staff planning. The most important aspect, as it relates to this manual, is the determination (at intake) of which inmates are most likely to be dangerous to others or represent severe escape risks. This classification process is referred to by various names: security screening, custody determination, escape potential, or violence prediction. By any name, classification serves the same vital function—assisting staff members in determining which inmates are most likely to disrupt the orderly operation of the institution.

While this manual is concerned mainly with the security aspect of classification, staff members must remain ever alert to the balance that must be achieved between security placement or control on the one hand, and program or treatment needs on the other. The ACA Standards describe 14 principles that must apply to a prison classification

system. While all of these principles are of great importance, there are seven which are particularly meaningful to the issue of security.

Written Classification Policies

There must be detailed written policies and procedures governing the classification process. An essential component of classification systems is a policy statement setting forth the agency's goals and purposes in accomplishing the following objectives:

- Minimize risk to the public.

- Minimize risk to institution staff and inmates.

- Minimize security breaches.

- Minimize system risk.

- Minimize security levels.

- Maximize fairness, with similar offenders being treated in a similar manner.

- Maximize the impartial and quantitative nature of all classification criteria.

- Maximize inmate understanding of and participation in the classification system and program assignments.

Data Collection for Classification

The classification process must provide for the collection of data that is complete, accurate, verified, and standardized. It must define the data needed and the format in which information is to be collected and analyzed.

Screening and Evaluation

There must be a provision for screening and further evaluating prisoners who are management problems or who have special needs. Inmates who are management problems and require special consideration in placement or programming fall into several categories:

- Those who require protection and separation because they may be in danger from other prisoners.

- Those who, by reason of their offense, criminal record, or institutional behavior, require particularly close supervision.

- Those who received unusual publicity because of the nature of their crime, arrest, or trial, or who are involved in criminal activity of a sophisticated nature, such as organized crime.

Violent inmates must be separated from less violent individuals. Thus, the effective classification process includes procedures to determine which prisoners are potentially dangerous, such as those who have a history of assault or predatory behavior.

In addition to screening and further evaluating inmates who are management problems, the correctional system's central office must provide programs and facilities for prisoners who have special needs.

Among the special needs determined by screening are age and infirmity, mental illness and retardation, and other medical problems.

One of the most efficient tools for separating prisoners into appropriate categories is described in detail in the American Correctional Association publication "Managing Adult Inmates" by Herbert C. Quay, Ph.D., 1981. The ACA/Quay manual brings together data on the development, validation and utility of a behavioral classification system for adult offenders. ACA/Quay model classification systems have been in operation for more than 15 years. During that time they have proved to be effective tools in grouping inmates for management and treatment. The information provided by the manual enables correctional administrators to understand the ACA/Quay system and helps them make intelligent choices on its suitability for their own institutions.

Inmate-Program Match

There must be provisions consistent with risk classification needs to match offenders with programs. This process involves the establishment of clear, operational definitions of the various types of offenders and available institutional programs. Risk as well as other factors must be considered when decisions are made.

Classification and Custody Level

There must be provisions to classify each inmate at the least possible restrictive level of custody. Custody level classification remains a widespread problem. Clearly understandable custody definitions and supervision guidelines should be devised and applied throughout the system. At the minimum, definitions should be given for traditional levels of custody: maximum, close, medium, minimum, and community; and for the different uses of segregation, including disciplinary use.

A basic premise is that every inmate should be in the lowest custody level believed suitable for adequate supervision and warranted by his or her behavior.

Inmate Involvement in Classification

There must be provisions for involving inmates in the classification process. Each new inmate should be provided with a copy of the custody criteria, including written explanations of the classification process. He or she should also receive written descriptions of the health care, employment, vocational training, education, transfer, and special programs available, including the selection criteria for each.

Correctional systems should also provide for classification teams at each of their institutions, so that all inmates can participate in the classification decision making process. ACA standards call for maximum involvement of inmates in their classification reviews. Inmates should be present except during deliberations of the classification team.

Reclassification Hearings

There must be provisions for systematic, periodic reclassification hearings. Providing for reclassification on a regularly scheduled basis is another essential standard recommended by the American Correctional Association. Periodic review and reclassification is a cornerstone of any

model classification system. The adoption of the following guidelines is suggested:

- Review and reclassification within two weeks following the prisoner's transfer from another institution within the system.

- Review every three months for prisoners serving terms of 18 months or less.

- Review every six months for prisoners serving terms of 18 months and one day, to five years.

- Annual review for prisoners serving terms of five years or more.

If suitable manpower is available, reviews can be conducted more frequently. Optimally, prisoners should be permitted to initiate special reviews of their progress, status, and programming.

Screening for Risk

Inmates vary widely in their potential for violent behavior within the institution. Some may pose a relatively low threat of violence in the outside community, but have a history of continuously assaultive behavior in an institution. Other individuals may never have been a disciplinary problem in prison yet demonstrate an inability to stay out of trouble with law enforcement authorities in the community. With knowledge of an inmate's problems in both the community and institution, classification staff can determine the type of security perimeter control and the custody supervision level for housing and work placements required for that inmate.

The most crucial aspect of inmate classification is to determine at intake which persons are likely to be dangerous to others. The classification system must be able to identify and deal with inmates who pose a threat of violence, escape, or other management problems. Determination of these classification issues relates directly to the amount and type of data available for making placement decisions. In some prison systems presentence reports are not available, while in others they vary so widely in format as to not be generally useful. Delays in getting FBI reports to the proper personnel is another area of concern for many systems. Because past conduct is a critical factor in any assessment of potential for dangerous behavior, case history reports are essential to the overall risk screening process. If data from sources documenting past behavior are unobtainable, internally inconsistent, or unreliable, then the prison administration may need to be informed that adequate decisions cannot be made until the information gathered is made consistent.

As previously indicated, custody decisions should be based to the extent possible on actual relevant behavior. The frequency, recency, and severity of past behavior is the best indicator of future similar behavior. At intake, the following criteria are most frequently reviewed:

- Type of detainer.

- Severity of current offense.

- Length of sentence.

○ Type of prior commitments.

○ History of escapes and attempts.

○ History of violence.

No classification device will correctly recognize all individuals.

The use of these criteria in a risk screening instrument permits the prediction of the security needed for each inmate. However, no classification device will correctly recognize all individuals—there will always be cases not addressed by normal classification criteria. Thus, an override capability must be built into the system and must be continuously monitored by staff to prevent abuses. A standard reclassification process that addresses both custody and program needs is an essential element of any classification system. The following factors are frequently assessed in reclassification reviews:

○ Percent of time served.

○ Involvement with drugs or alcohol.

○ Mental and psychological stability.

○ Type of most serious disciplinary report.

○ Frequency of disciplinary reports.

○ Responsibility.

○ Family or community ties.

The use of objective, current factors such as these in a reclassification instrument permits staff to assess the need for changes in an inmate's program. However, as with the initial classification instrument, this process will not correctly reclassify all individuals. Thus, staff judgment is a significant factor and override capability must be included as a part of the system. While such procedures cannot end overcrowding and eliminate prison violence or escapes, they will ensure that decisions relating directly to these issues are being made in the best interest of the inmates, the agency, and the public.

Inmate Programs

Preserve the individual identity of inmates.

Recent prison history has shown that a good blend of programming and security enhances the smooth overall operation of the facility. One of the soundest and safest security measures is a well-balanced program of inmate activities. Such a program includes work, recreation, education, and treatment. These multifaceted programs are sometimes referred to as "calculated risks" against security. Actually, well-balanced programs have become important security factors in well-managed institutions of all types and have become primary security features in many of the most efficient and effective institutions.

Inmates who are receiving decent food and humane treatment and who are busily engaged in useful work programs, carefully organized and purposeful recreation activities, and education are less prone to resort to disturbances. No matter how modern the buildings, how secure the facilities, how efficient the operating procedures, or how well-trained the staff security *cannot* be ensured if it is based entirely on procedures which are operated against the will of inmates. If the inmates

are subjected to inactivity, moral degradation, and humiliation, then the desire to escape or to revolt will become so strong that security facilities and procedures will sooner or late be breached.

The fundamental custodial procedures outlined in this chapter have been tested in day-to-day prison operation. When combined with proper security procedures these practices will enhance and improve a correctional system.

For inmate programs to be effective in high security institutions, security controls must be closely maintained by careful design of activity areas that allows effective supervision and separation of activities. Well-defined indoor and outdoor movement paths are also needed, as well as careful attention to scheduling and counts.

The positive contributions that inmate programs make to the environment of an institution are immeasurable. Several guidelines in this area are:

- An institution should adopt policies and practices that will preserve the individual identity of inmates. These typically should provide that:

  - Each offender be involved in program decisions affecting him or her.

  - Offenders be identified by name rather than prison number.

  - Rules governing grooming respect cultural trends and individuality, within the limits of necessary security.

  - Inmate uniforms be supplemented by civilian dress where possible in less secure facilities.

  - Institution visits be contact visits in pleasant surroundings.

  - Telephone privileges be extended to all inmates, on the condition of responsible use of the telephone system.

  - Reasonable limits be placed on the amount of mail sent or received.

- Institutions should make these or similar provisions for programs for minority groups:

  - Provide ethnic studies.

  - Hire staff members representing minority groups.

  - Involve minority residents in the community in institutional programs.

Relationships between the facility and the inmate group are often enhanced by opening the flow of information between staff and prisoners through the use of one or more of the following:

- A formal inmate grievance procedure. This procedure allows for a documented means of examining inmate problems and reduces the potential for litigation.

- Inmate newspapers. The newspaper permits open discussion of inmate programs and conditions within the institution.

Educational and counseling programs, as well as other inmate activities, can help communication between staff and inmates.

● Traditional treatment programs such as education, vocational training, and counseling should be available in the institution to stimulate inmates to improve their skills and change their behaviors. Participation in these programs should basically be voluntary but well-designed incentive programs may be used.

● Leisure time programs are absolutely necessary. Well-equipped gymnasiums, recreation yards, and dayrooms should be readily available to inmates on a daily basis. Qualified recreation staff should be available to plan, organize, and carry out these programs.

● Religious counseling services and programs, directed by a well-trained chaplain in suitable surroundings, are also a necessity.

● Work opportunities in a variety of jobs should be offered to every inmate capable of such activity. To the greatest extent possible, job assignments should be available with a system of compensation in the form of money, good time, or other reward.

● Mental health, dental, and medical programs must be provided to the inmate population in keeping with local policies, standards, and legal or constitutional requirements.

Inmate Discipline

Effective, fair, and consistent inmate discipline is imperative in any effective correctional system. Effective discipline is directed toward the development of behavior patterns which will help the prisoner with future adjustments in the free community. In this sense, discipline is a major component of corrections. The security staff may be immediately concerned with discipline in the narrow sense of prevention of misconduct and disturbances, but the long-term objectives of discipline cannot be separated from the immediate concerns of the security staff. Thus discipline is a key element of correctional programs.

But even more important than imposed discipline and rules is the necessary development of inmates' self-discipline and self-control — not merely the ability to conform to institutional rules and regulations, but the ability and the desire to conform to accepted standards for society.

Electronic Security, Communications and Monitoring

During the past five decades, correctional facilities have expanded the use of technological advances to improve security. While electronic equipment should never be intended to totally replace staff, it should be used to improve staff efficiency and to provide a higher level of security, safety, and operational efficiency.

Closed Circuit Television

The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) as a security tool is very cost-effective for many applications. CCTV is an excellent device for monitoring fence lines, roof tops, tunnels, and corridors, and aids in the identification of people passing through sally ports. Some types of CCTV cameras detect motion in their field of view and alert the control center if someone is in an unauthorized area.

CCTV should not be used alone to monitor inmates in their regu-

lar duties and functions. There is no electronic substitute for personal interaction between inmates and staff.

Paging Systems

Paging systems allow the control center officer or other designated staff members to make general announcements throughout the institution, to summon individuals, and to alert staff to emergencies. Because institution-wide paging causes unnecessary disruption in areas unaffected by specific announcements, zone paging is recommended. A listen-in/talk-back function adds the capability to monitor a specific location or to conduct conversation.

Two-Way Radios

A combination of portable or car radios and a base station provide instantaneous two-way communications over an assigned radio frequency. The power output of the base station and the portable radio sets should be sufficient to establish a clear communications link between sets anywhere near the institution, including the maximum distance staff are expected to travel during an escape search.

Authorization must be obtained from the Federal Communications Commission before staff can operate on any radio frequency.

Institution staff should pick up portable radios at the control center and return them for storage and recharging at the end of their work shift. An adequate pass-through system must be installed in the front wall of the control center to allow an officer to issue and receive radios.

Staff Body Alarms

Alarms are provided to selected staff to enable them to summon assistance in an emergency. These alarms are worn on the body and when activated transmit a signal to the control center.

Two basic types of body alarms are currently available. One is an ultrasonic system that transmits an inaudible signal to receivers spaced every 30 linear feet throughout the institution. The receivers are connected to the control center. When a broadcast ultrasonic signal is picked up by a receiver, an alert is sounded in the control center identifying the location of the alarm.

The second type of body alarm operates on a radio frequency. This alarm produces a tone-coded FM signal that identifies which body alarm has been activated. An even more effective but more costly variation of this alarm is equipped with an audio feature that, when activated, enables the control room officer to hear the ambient sounds near the activated instrument for a 10-second period. This instance of communication informs the control center officer of both the nature and location of the problem.

Telephone Equipment

Telephone equipment in correctional facilities has usually consisted of two separate systems, one operating inside the institution, and the other operating outside the institution. The outside system was normally provided by the local telephone company and was comparable to most regular business systems. Telephones with access to outside com-

munications were located in secure areas, and inmates were restricted from using them.

The inside telephone system is specifically designed for correctional facilities and is considered an integral part of the institution's security system. Special features include watch call, emergency alert, no-dial alarm, and executive right-of-way. The watch call feature enables each officer making an inmate count to call a special number. These calls "stack" onto an open line in the control center for continuous and simultaneous communication until the count clears. The emergency alert feature, also initiated by dialing a special number, activates an emergency network that simultaneously rings pre-designated phones including those in the control center, CEO's office, and the chief of security's office. The no-dial alarm is activated when a handset is removed from its base instrument for at least 15 seconds prior to dialing. This alarm also indicates the location of the instrument being dialed. The executive right-of-way feature allows staff at certain phones, such as those in the CEO's office or the control center, to interrupt calls if lines are busy, thus enabling an emergency call to be completed immediately.

It is recommended that planners consider a single solid-state telephone system that combines the security features of the inside telephone system with the flexibility of the outside system. This system is now being marketed and has proven successful. The single solid-state system resolves many of the installation, interface, operational, and maintenance problems associated with the traditional dual system.

A battery-operated backup for operating telephones must be provided for maintaining communications in case of an interruption in the institution's electrical supply.

Electronically Monitored Inmate Activity

During the past decade there have been significant improvements in systems which enable supervisors to monitor the movement of inmates. While most of these innovations have been devised to meet the needs of probation and parole programs, there is increasing interest in using them for monitoring inmate activity.

In some jurisdictions, electronic and computer technology is used to monitor offenders placed in community corrections programs. Through the electronic monitoring devices, officials can verify that an offender is at home or in a community correctional center during specified curfew hours.

Generally, offenders chosen for electronic monitoring have been convicted of nonviolent offenses. Those sentenced to home confinement typically serve longer sentences than they would have had they been incarcerated: a 10-day jail sentence, for example, might translate into 30 days of house arrest during non-working hours.

The technology involved in electronic monitoring is new and still being developed. Interest in the electronic monitoring of offenders goes back at least to 1966, when Ralph K. Schwitzgebel described a telemetry system in the *Harvard Law Review*. A prototype of "Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine" was tried in 1968, using multiple receivers to trace the wearer's movements through a building. More recently, the concept of electronic monitoring has moved beyond passive observation to include active systems. Active systems are intended to monitor an offender's

presence in a given environment—usually the home or a community corrections center—where the offender is required to remain for specified periods of time.

By 1983, workable active monitors had been developed by Michael Goss in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Thomas Moody in Key Largo, Florida. Each consisted of three elements:

- A miniaturized *transmitter,* strapped to the offender's ankle and broadcasting an encoded signal at regular intervals over a range of about 200 feet.

- A *receiver-dialer* located in the offender's home, to detect signals from the transmitter and to report periodically to a central computer.

- A *central computer* to accept reports from the receiver-dialer over the telephone lines, compare them with the offender's curfew schedule, and alert correctional officials to unauthorized absences.

In Albuquerque, Judge Jack Love ordered the Goss transmitter attached to the ankle of a 30-year-old probation violator for a one month period starting in April 1983. He later sentenced four other offenders to monitored home confinement. An appraisal funded by the National Institute of Justice concluded that:

- The equipment operated successfully.

- Monitored home confinement appeared to be acceptable to the local criminal justice community.

- The concept did not appear to pose legal problems when used as an alternative to detention.

- As compared to detention, monitoring resulted in "substantial savings" to the criminal justice system.

Active Monitor System

transmitter

(offender)

⬇

receiver-dialer

⬇

central computer

Part II

Security and the Institution

Introduction

In Part I of this manual, the general relationship between the correctional philosophies of adequate security and inmate programs was explored. Now attention can be turned to specific practices that support institutional security.

Part II deals more directly with those specific issues and their impact on institutional security. Among the detailed practices discussed in this section are policies concerning the physical plant, search procedures, security inspections, control center operations, the armory, control of keys, tools, and entrances, inmate accountability, special management units, and prisoner transportation.

Selected areas of concern in this section are described in detail, with elaborations of the duties and responsibilities associated with security. The areas singled out for detailed descriptions were chosen because alternative sources of information were not readily available to correctional professionals.

Chapter 3

Security and the Institution

Physical Plant

Physical plant design is one of the most important features affecting security. Current American Correctional Association standards recommend that institutions be designed for no more than 500 inmates, primarily because programs conducted in facilities of that size or smaller will be of manageable scale. When inmate population exceeds 500, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a healthy atmosphere, promote open communications, provide programs tailored to individual needs, control tensions, and ensure the safety of both staff and inmates.

Correctional systems requiring larger inmate capacity have sometimes resorted to "clustering" two or more 500 inmate facilities on a common site. Reasons for this strategy include the economies of scale inherent in larger operations, capital savings incurred in the sharing of certain service functions, and the difficulty of obtaining sites, particularly ones close to major urban centers.

Despite this rationale, decision-makers are urged to avoid clustering two or more institutions on a common site if possible. While the direct savings are apparent, the indirect costs, although not readily measurable, are substantial. The tendency to maximize direct savings often produces a "superadministration" and a "superwarden," with many of the management problems inherent in larger, older institutions. If clustering is planned, organizational structures and security policy should be designed to ensure the independent operation of programs in each facility.

Landscaping

Landscaping is an integral part of overall security design. Good landscaping contributes to the noncorrectional atmosphere desired by today's institutions by "softening" their appearance. The selection of plants, trees, and shrubs should be compatible with the site terrain and surrounding area. All shrubs and trees should be placed to ensure that institutional security is not jeopardized. In developing the landscaping scheme, designers should pay careful attention to *sight lines* to ensure that views of the perimeter are not obscured. Clear lines of vision must be maintained to facilitate supervision of the compound from the control center and other staff offices.

Building Layout

Designers must be aware of the general configuration on security supervision. Yet, with proper management and adequate staff, it is not necessary to align corridors and buildings in sterile configurations that enhance "universal surveillance" from a limited number of points. The lack of sensory stimuli and the overbearing atmosphere of watchful intrusion produced by some overly security conscious prison designs add to tension and stress among staff and inmates alike.

The goal of correctional design and planning in relation to security should be to achieve a proper balance between good supervision and sound functional relationships in as normal an environment as is possible in an institutional setting.

Campus plans, versus corridor-system plans, are particularly appropriate for attaining a balance between surveillance needs and the maintenance of a non-institutional environment. In an institution with a campus layout, inmates in the general compound can be easily observed by staff members whose main responsibility does not include direct supervision. In fact, several recently built institutions have been designed so that the warden, superintendent, and other top staff members can survey virtually the entire inner compound from their offices.

The perimeter of buildings should reflect a balance between design requirements and the need for proper supervision. It is not necessary, for example, that buildings have absolutely straight walls without recesses, so long as those recesses are visible by moving patrols.

Building roofs should be reasonably free of potential hiding places. This general requirement is imperative for structures that are part of the secure perimeter system—for example, an entrance structure that is aligned with the perimeter fence system and is an integral element of the perimeter security system.

Facility Perimeters

Secure perimeters surrounding both the institution and inmate residential areas allow for more relaxed internal operations and a reduced need for constant inmate observation. In the event of a general disturbance, strong perimeters give the staff time to address the emergency and bring it under control before unrest extends to other housing units or the nearby community.

It is better to forego state-of-the-art technology unless there is a commitment to upkeep.

Electronic Perimeter Security Systems

An electronic perimeter detection system is recommended for secure correctional facilities. When properly designed, installed, and operated, a perimeter system immediately alerts staff to a breach of the perimeter. Because conditions vary from site to site, no single system is best for all situations. Options include microwave, infrared, electric field, seismic, and fence disturbance systems. Proper selection depends on multiple factors, including topography, vegetation, wildlife, weather, soil conditions, background noise, and staff response time. The job of the design engineer is to find the best match of individual system characteristics with local conditions.

During the 1970s, numerous misapplications of electronic technology occurred, largely because of the eagerness of both clients and vendors, all of whom genuinely believed in the viability of technologies not yet broadly tested in the field of corrections. In addition, a frequent problem in the

early deployment of electronic security systems was the lack of technical specialists who could maintain the systems on a daily basis, or at least on very short notice. The importance of this point should not be overlooked. It is better to forego state-of-the-art electronic technology unless there is a commitment to adequate upkeep of the system, including the capability for quick response in the event of malfunctions.

Fortunately, experience and research have led to a better understanding of how to use electronic perimeter detection systems. One source of information is the Intrusion Detection Systems Handbook, a publication of the Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. This publication is updated periodically and presents an evaluation of many electronic systems based on extensive research under varying conditions.

Watch Towers and Mobile Perimeter Patrols

Twenty-four hour surveillance of the outside perimeter fence is generally provided for both medium and higher security institutions through either watch towers or mobile vehicular patrols. Watch towers provide a good view of the perimeter but are very expensive to construct and operate. To be adequately staffed, each tower that is employed for twenty-four hour coverage requires the assignment of over five persons when vacation, sick leave, and relief time are considered. Towers are reasonably secure from ground assault and are safe for weapons storage. Officers in towers must rely on the threat of gunfire to prevent escapes while mobile patrols can intercept and apprehend escapees without using gunfire. In addition, the relatively boring job of watch tower duty renders tower personnel less alert and responsive compared to employees on mobile patrol duty.

Watch towers must be securely constructed and designed for maximum visibility in all directions. Windows must be designed to open quickly to accommodate the firing of weapons. Storage space for weapons and ammunition is included in the tower cabs. Searchlights are usually affixed to the tops of towers. Communications devices that permit continuous contact with other towers, patrols, and the control center are also needed. If meals are not brought to the officer, a small refrigerator is usually provided for food storage. Toilet facilities must be included and designed so that a tower officer using the facilities can still see outside and along the fence lines. These provisions make towers very costly to construct.

Generally, towers are located outside truncated fence corners to provide clear sight lines between the fences in both directions. Additional towers may be needed because of the facility's configuration or to maintain a maximum distance between towers of 600 feet. Any greater distance between towers renders them virtually useless for accurate gunfire and serviceable only for observation. To ensure good sight lines, tower floors should be a minimum of 30 feet above the ground level at the adjacent fence line. If a perimeter lighting system is used, the design should provide that the eye level of tower officers is above the level of the lights.

The primary alternative perimeter surveillance system, now in growing use, is the mobile patrol. Typically, two mobile patrol vehicles, each manned by one officer, survey the perimeter during active program hours. During sleeping hours, only one patrol vehicle is usually employed since inmates are locked in their housing units and the probability of escape attempts is substantially reduced.

Each mobile patrol vehicle is equipped with a continuously active two-

way radio in order to allow patrol officers to stay in constant contact with the control center officer and other mobile patrols, including any foot patrols. The vehicle as well as the control center is equipped with a monitor that visually presents the site plan of the institution, including the perimeter fence. The perimeter is divided into zones. If a zone is violated, electronic sensors simultaneously alert the patrol and control center officers by an audible tone and a visual signal. The visual alarm, displayed on the car and control center monitors, indicates in which zone activity is occurring. The patrol car officer responds to the alarm, investigating the violated zone and taking appropriate action.

Perimeter Lighting

Effective perimeter security also requires a good exterior lighting system. The traditional method is to place lights at 100-foot intervals along the entire perimeter, with additional lights placed at building locations both inside and outside the fence and at other locations around the compound. In recent years, "high-mast" lighting systems have become popular. Each fixture in these systems illuminates a very large area and provides a minimum of one-half foot candle power at ground level. By using only a few high-mast light poles — usually five to eight, each 100 to 120 feet tall — the entire compound and perimeter can be adequately lighted with considerable savings in both capital and operating costs. An economical method of providing satisfactory light quality is to combine equal numbers of sodium vapor and metal halide lamps in each high-mast light fixture. The lamps on each high-mast pole should be wired in two groups individually operated from the control room. Additional operating costs can be saved by using this feature to reduce light levels and power used from midnight to dawn, while inmates are locked in their housing units.

Other Physical Features That Enhance Security

No security feature or system is completely safe or escape-proof.

Security within the institution is also better maintained when secure features are built into areas such as control centers, armories, canteens, mailrooms, pharmacies, locksmith shops, and cashier's offices.

It is important to remember that there is no security feature or system that is completely safe or escape-proof. Continuous maintenance of buildings and security devices is absolutely necessary, and general staff supervision, including standard security checks, must be done on a regular basis.

Costly barriers that separate staff from inmates, such as individual control rooms in each housing area, can actually hinder effective staff supervision. Good staff/inmate relations are effective security tools. When the physical plant permits staff to mix with and talk to inmates, staff can intervene in potential problems before they become serious.

The physical plant must also include adequate space for staff offices and inmate programs and services. Work areas must be provided so that each inmate has a worthwhile job. All of these factors have an important impact on an institution's security and must be taken into consideration when designing and operating a security system.

Chapter 4

The Control Center

The Nerve Center of the Facility

The control center is the "nerve center" for the entire facility. Control center activities include observing and controlling the institution's entrance and exit traffic, recording all inmate counts, monitoring fire and security alarm systems, operating central communication systems, issuing and maintaining an inventory of institution keys, operating electrically controlled doors, monitoring the perimeter, and operating telephone equipment. Each of these activities has a critical impact on the institution's orderly and secure operation.

The control center integrates all internal and external security communications networks. It must be secure from outside assault and at the same time afford good visibility of the areas it is designed to monitor. Its size is determined largely by the type and amount of equipment used and by the extent of the duties assigned to its staff. The equipment should be organized so that one person can monitor and operate it easily.

Since a large amount of equipment is required, display panels and annunciation equipment are miniaturized and located in the control center, while supporting electronic equipment should be located in a nearby equipment room. The control center should have raised-access flooring like that used in a computer room to facilitate wiring and maintenance of the equipment. Because the center is a crucial and highly specialized 24-hour operation, a separate heating and cooling system should be provided to ensure uninterrupted climate control.

All control center activities are under the supervision of the chief of security, and the center is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, by at least one staff member. During periods of peak activity, including inmate counts and staff shift changes, additional security officers are often assigned to this area. To alleviate the heavy daytime work load, incoming telephone calls to the institution are often answered by a receptionist stationed in the front entrance building (see "Entrances" later in this chapter). At night, when the receptionist is not needed, incoming calls are switched to the control center.

The control center must maintain records of all inmates and institution personnel.

The control center is often a part of the administration building and is preferably located about 50 feet from the front pedestrian sally port so that staff assigned to the control center can observe the entrance area. Closed

The institution's control center integrates all internal and external security communications networks.

circuit television in the control center allows close visual coverage of both the pedestrian and vehicular sally ports. The control center usually occupies about 450 square feet and uses large amounts of secure glazing to ensure clear sight lines to the front entrance and permit observation of people passing from the sally port to various buildings. Its location should provide a view of as much of the main compound as possible, adding to the control center officer's ability to casually survey general inmate activity and circulation. Its location should also permit observation of entrances to the visiting, admissions/discharge, and administration facilities.

Because the officer must remain inside the control center at all times, a toilet and janitor's closet should be provided inside the secure envelope of the control center complex. Storage space is provided in the control center for certain emergency equipment, including riot sticks, helmets, shields, first aid kits, and perhaps tear gas.

Access

To prevent unauthorized access, a small port provides entrance security into the complex. The outer door should be operated electrically by the control center officer, precluding staff outside the control center from opening the door. The inner door should be operated manually so that the control center officer must go to the sally port and visually verify the identity of persons before admitting them into the control center. An emergency key to the center should be kept inside the institution's secure perimeter so that the control center can be opened if the officer is suddenly incapacitated.

A second room of about 400 square feet is needed to house the equipment required to operate the control center, including telephone and alarm switching equipment, battery backups, and computers. The equipment room should be adjacent to, or one floor below or above, the control center. Locating it below the control center normally provides the easiest access for the necessary electrical wiring. It is advisable to provide a sally port entrance to this room. If the equipment room is adjacent to the control center, the sally

port to the control center can serve as a secure entrance for both spaces; if the room is below or above the control center, a second sally port is recommended, as is closed circuit television monitoring of this entrance.

The entire envelope surrounding this complex—control center, toilet, janitor's closet, sally port, and electronic equipment room—should be of secure construction to prevent unauthorized admittance. The inner walls, such as those between the janitor's closet and the control center, do not require security construction.

Equipment Issue

The control center officer should have clear instructions as to what equipment should be issued, to whom, and under what circumstances. Equipment such as batons, chemical agents, gas masks, and bolt cutters should only be issued under specified circumstances. Flashlights, restraints, pagers, radios, keys, and other regular use items can be issued on a durable chit system, in order to ensure proper accountability.

Inventories

Inventory procedures for control center equipment should be clearly established. Inventories should be required every shift on some items, and daily on others. Every shift change should involve signing over all chemical agents permanently stored in the control center, but for items in continual circulation, like keys, a daily inventory (ordinarily on the morning watch) provides the necessary safeguards. A shadow board is desirable for storage of items like bolt cutters, restraints, and batons. Bulky equipment, like portable cutting saws or hydraulic rams, cannot be stored on the shadow board.

Storage

Storage of gas and other hazardous items requires careful monitoring by supervisory staff to ensure proper handling. Policy should ensure that chemical agents, in particular, are stored under controlled conditions that preclude casual handling or accidental discharge. Procedures should provide that controlled items like gas are stored in a separate area of the control center, with a posted inventory that reflects a running total of the amounts on hand at all times.

Access

Policy should clearly state who is authorized to enter this area. Casual traffic in the control center results in lowered efficiency and distracts staff from assigned duties. In most cases, visitors are not allowed in this area, whether they are official personnel or not. Institution staff are admitted only for a legitimate purpose, and in many cases, only then with supervisory approval. Inmates should never be permitted to enter the control center. When cleaning or repairs are necessary, staff should perform these tasks.

Windows

If the control center has windows, they should be carefully constructed with reinforced frames and ballistics-resistant glazing. It is highly recommended that the glass in the control center be tested extensively to ensure durability and impenetrability during a major riot. Some of the most tragic correctional incidents occur after a control center is commandeered by inmates during a major riot or disturbance. With careful design and proper

use, security glass or other transparent materials *can* be made secure; however, the design, materials, and construction must combine to preserve control unit integrity.

Sally Port

The control center entrance must have a sally port — a vestibule entrance with two doors that are interlocked so only one can be opened at a time. The sally port must be constructed so the control center officer can see inside to ensure that no unauthorized persons have entered.

In certain circumstances, it may not be possible or practical to construct a new sally port in the control center. However, it may be feasible to install grilles in the adjacent corridor on either side of the entrance door to the control center to provide an improved level of isolation.

Walls

All walls should be constructed of reinforced block or poured concrete. There should be no partial walls with nonsecure extensions to the ceiling. Dropped, unreinforced ceilings should be strengthened to prevent unauthorized entry from adjacent rooms. Any ventilation grilles or other openings within the control center should be secured with appropriate security bars.

Armory Access

In some facilities, where the armory entrance is reached through the control center, special attention should be given to security during weapon or other emergency gear issue. A split or dutch door precludes casual access to the armory during these periods.

Climate Control Systems

By its very nature, the control center should not have opening windows through which access can be gained. Therefore, it should have its own heating and air conditioning system. In addition, temperature and air exchange conditions must be regulated to prevent deterioration of chemical agents and minimize danger in the event of leakage. In certain climates, dehumidification equipment may be necessary for gas supplies to be maintained under optimum conditions and to supplement the air conditioning system.

Toilet Facilities

Since the control center is a self-contained operation, it should have a restroom to avoid additional traffic in and out of the area.

Emergency Lighting and Power

Emergency lighting and power, a critical control center feature, should have an access line to the emergency power generation system. In addition to the power for various emergency, communications, and security systems, a separate, stand-alone lighting system should be included. These battery-powered units continue to light the control center even if the backup generation system fails. There should be at least one battery-operated radio in the control center at all times, as well as a direct phone line to the outside. This is particularly important with the advent of more complex electronic phone switching and PBX systems. Although most of these systems have separate battery backup, their main boards may fail due to power surges or other problems associated with a major power blackout. Therefore, at least one

direct outside line, which does not go through the main board, is a valuable asset.

Control Center Procedures

In most institutions the control center is a key traffic point for staff and often for inmates. In order to ensure that no unauthorized persons enter or leave the institution, control center procedures must clearly state the types of identification and conditions required for passage through the control center area.

Identifying staff and inmates entering and leaving the institution is only part of the problem. Inmate visitors, contract employees, volunteers, and repair personnel must also pass through this point. A well-defined system must be established to ensure that only those with proper authorization enter the secure portion of the institution or leave the premises.

The control center officer must be able to identify each individual passing through his or her post. He or she must rely on personal acquaintance or the use of picture cards to identify those seeking admittance. In the event that an individual cannot be satisfactorily identified by these means, control center officers must get another staff member to confirm the entrant's identity. If no one can identify the individual, then he or she should not be allowed to pass through. To aid in the identification process, a picture card system should be in use. This system should contain photographic documentation of all staff, authorized volunteers, contract employees, and student interns, as well as gate passes for inmates permitted to pass through. Ideally, the control center should have a picture card for every inmate.

Identification procedures for inmate visitors do not ordinarily include photographs. Blacklight (and sometimes fingerprint comparison) systems are used and are effective in preventing inmates from leaving the facility disguised as visitors.

Crew Kit Storage

The crew kit containing inmate picture cards for each work crew member should be returned to the control center at the end of the workday by the crew supervisor. If the crew continues its work past the change of shifts, the new supervisor should return the crew kit. Crew kit folders should be stored in a rolling rack. A rolling rack can be easily moved into the control center for updating and rolled out again the following day for access by staff members drawing crew assignments.

Inmate Counts

In most institutions, counts are taken in the control center or an adjacent, equally secure area. All record-keeping activities associated with count procedures should be stated out in detail in the inmate accountability policy statement.

Key Issue

Key issue is a typical activity in most control centers. Procedures should specify the various categories of keys, the issue procedures for each category, and the persons to whom the keys may be issued. In addition, the procedure for issuing restricted and emergency keys should be a prominent part of the key control policy. A log or other permanent record must be kept of keys issued.

The policy must also clearly specify the persons to whom keys may not be issued. Ordinarily, volunteers, contract staff, and other part-time government employees may not be issued keys. Inmates should not be issued keys, except where limited access to vehicle keys is permitted for official purposes.

The Key Board

The institution's key board should be located in the control center close to a window with a secure pass-through. The key board should have separate, color-coded sections for regular, emergency, and restricted keys. It may be designed with folding doors to conceal its contents or placed on a rolling base so that it can be moved out of the way during nonpeak issue periods.

The pass-through should have a drive-in-bank-type drawer or some other form of baffled construction to prevent the introduction of a bomb or incendiary device into the control center. It should, however, be large enough to accommodate radios and other typical issue items. Due to their size, gas equipment, bolt cutters, and other items are to be issued through the sally port.

Key Drop

Every control center should have a means for the emergency disposal of keys if a takeover is imminent. In most cases, this need is met by a trap or chute in the floor to a secure vault below, or an appropriately constructed vault with a tamper-proof drop chute securely affixed to the control center floor.

Control Center Communications

The control center post orders should clearly state staff responsibility in maintaining communications within the institution. Since most, if not all, of the communications equipment is centralized at this point, it is important that the staff knows how to use it effectively.

Ordinarily this equipment includes radios, teletypes or computer terminals, pagers, personal body alarm receivers, intercoms, telephones and telephone-based emergency alarm systems, and closed circuit television equipment. There should be instructional information for each of these systems in the post orders and, if necessary, in separate manuals. When and if incidents or other specialized activity must be logged, the post orders should clearly describe both the circumstances and the recording procedures. Phone numbers for repair services or on-call repair staff should be readily available.

One specialized communications area is the monitoring of telephone conversations. In facilities where phone call intercept capability is provided, staff must have clear instructions on its proper use. In jurisdictions where taping of random calls is permitted, the regulations should clearly define the parameters for legal interception.

Staff using radio equipment should be aware of the FCC regulations on the official use of assigned radio frequencies.

All communications equipment should be conveniently clustered for efficient staff utilization. Racks of battery chargers and other items related to issue equipment should be located near the issue window. Phone equipment (including emergency phone devices that ring an alarm when a prearranged number is dialed), personal body alarm receivers, and radios should be placed in logical locations. In many cases when the officer is not able to

It is important that staff know how to use radio equipment properly and effectively. Familiarity with FCC regulations is a must.

answer a hand-held instrument immediately, a speaker phone speeds responsiveness. An open intercom to all towers enhances the emergency response of tower staff when necessary.

Radio Alarm Systems

Radio alarm systems are typically composed of a receiver/decoder installed in the institution control center, with individual transmitters issued to employees assigned in living quarters, and other areas deemed appropriate by the administration. These systems sound an instantaneous alarm in case of emergency. Each facility should test the radio alarm systems at the beginning of each shift. Under no circumstances should this equipment be left unattended.

Two-Way Radios

Two-way radio systems should be established to enhance the facility's communications capability. Generally, inmates should not be permitted to use voice radios, but in certain situations, such as work release programs, selected inmate drivers may be granted authorization.

Proper Radio Procedures

Facilities must instruct all personnel in the proper use of communications equipment.

Brevity in radio communications should be encouraged.

○ The Federal Communications Commission requires that all assigned frequencies be used for the purpose intended.

○ The Federal Communications Commission requires base station operators to identify the station by using assigned call letters and numbers.

⊛ If call codes and signals are used, personnel must be trained in their proper use.

⊚ The Federal Communications Commission prohibits the use of foul or obscene language in radio transmissions.

Brevity in radio communication should be encouraged. In addition to being trained in the use of communications equipment, employees should also understand its purpose and the restrictions on its use.

Intercom Systems

In facilities with towers, intercom capability among the towers and between the towers and the control center is strongly recommended. Intercom capability permits staff on perimeter posts and in the control center to be aware of the activities at all other posts. When an emergency occurs on the fence or wall, staff in the control center do not have to wait for a phone call or radio transmission; they can hear what is happening and respond accordingly.

Closed Circuit Television

The institution's closed circuit television monitors are typically located in the control center. The monitors should be placed so as to allow easy viewing for staff performing other security duties and to minimize inmates' ability to see the monitor from outside.

Placing closed circuit television monitors in selected areas of the institution increases overall security. Because continuous observation of the monitors cannot take place during high traffic or key issue periods when the regular control center staff is distracted, the assignment of additional personnel or the redistribution of duties may be desirable. In some cases this additional coverage has been provided by moving the switchboard into the control center and having the switchboard operator assist in the monitoring. Alternatively, a second set of monitors can be installed in another location, and monitoring activity switched to that location during peak activity periods in the control center. Post orders should clearly state the parameters for this activity.

Public Address Systems

Public address systems with both transmitting and listening capabilities are recommended for routine communications with the inmate population. The base station should be established in the control or message center, allowing one person to transmit all messages, as well as allowing monitoring of selected areas such as inmate living units. It is recommended that speakers be installed in living units, detention units, and inmate activity areas, including gymnasium/recreation buildings and yards.

Control Center Emergency Procedures and Equipment

Control center post orders must clearly state the necessary steps in case of fire, riot, hostage situation, work or food strike, escape, power failure, or other institutional emergency. Copies of the emergency plans for each of these situations should be in the control center. Staff assigned there must be trained in the procedures outlined in these policies and be prepared to carry them out without notice. Staff readiness is particularly important, because, in an emergency, supervisory personnel may be preoccupied with containing

or responding to the problem and must rely on control center staff to initiate emergency plans.

Hostage Policy Statements

It is important that a comprehensive hostage statement be included in the control center post orders because of the possibility of a hostage-type escape attempt at that location. Control center staff should thoroughly understand that *no person under duress has any authority,* and that *no inmates will be released with hostages in their custody.*

Staff Call-Up Procedures

A staff call-up procedure is an important feature of emergency response procedures. A clearly defined system must be established for notifying off-duty staff of possible call-up or summoning them to duty in an emergency.

Many institutions have automatic sequential dialing equipment. With this type of telephone, the control center officer activates the dialer, and every staff member whose phone number is logged into the dialer is automatically called. Usually, the call sequence is in command order, so that supervisory staff, emergency response teams, and medical personnel can be called first.

An alternate method, which has been effectively used for years, is the pyramid system. In this method, staff are assigned a specific group of employees to call, and they in turn call another group, who call yet another. In this way, a relatively small number of calls by any one person still results in a large number of staff being contacted.

Emergency Equipment

Control center staff must have access to gas masks that have voice capability. Without these units, it would be impossible to keep the post functioning if chemical agents were used to repel an attempted takeover. Several types of gas masks have battery-powered microphones in the face mask and small speakers on the outside of the mask to amplify the user's voice and enable communication without removing the mask.

Emergency equipment must be strictly controlled.

Each agency should establish the types and quantities of chemical agents stored in the control center. For simplification of inventory and control, these quantities should be kept to a minimum, and staff members should have firm guidelines on the circumstances that warrant the use of each kind of gas, as well as a clear understanding of which officials may authorize such use.

Other items of emergency equipment may include batons, additional restraints, bolt cutters, tool kits, fire extinguishers, or in rare cases, gas guns. All of these items must be strictly controlled and issued only under necessary circumstances.

Control Center Record-Keeping

Control center record-keeping involves maintaining detailed information about the institution in which it operates. In general, record-keeping should cover the following areas.

Inmate Counts

Local policy should specify the requirements for maintaining records of inmate movement. Forms should structure all count records and enable ac-

curate tracking of inmates at all times. Assembling and conducting an emergency count at any time is a critical capability.

Inmate Traffic

Records of inmate traffic fall into two categories. The first is commitment or discharge activity which should be subsumed into the count records. The second, a picture card system, is necessary when the control center monitors inmate traffic from one area of the facility to another. The picture card system is coupled with a tabulation of inmates in and out of specified areas.

Visitors

In facilities where the control center manages the inmate visitor flow, an accurate count of all visitor traffic is imperative. Maintaining an accurate visitor count requires close coordination among staff who process visitors and visiting room officers. The control center officer should have minimal involvement with visitor processing and should be concerned only with visitor identification.

Incident Logs

A systematic log of events occurring on the control center post is vitally important. These events include, but are not limited to, all commitments and discharges, alarms, miscounts, and the issue of restricted and emergency keys. These entries should be made in addition to any other record system required, such as the separate logging of emergency or restricted key issuance.

Staff Identification

The control center should maintain a complete picture file of all staff. This file enables new employees and officers recently assigned to different shifts to identify legitimate staff members with whom they have not become familiar.

Inmate Identification

The control center must maintain proper records on all inmates so that the control center officer can retrieve the name, number, housing assignment, job, and picture of every inmate in the facility. These pictures can be useful in controlling inmate movement, although it is preferable to have a separate gate pass system for that purpose.

Control Center Staffing

Control center staffing requires flexibility in response to changing work loads throughout the day. It is difficult to generalize on this topic because facilities vary widely in design and security requirements. However, a few principles are common to most institutions. Control centers typically require additional staff at shift change time and during periods of heavy inmate or staff program activity and traffic. The assignment of an activities officer or some other staff member to handle key issue frees the regular officer to monitor communications and traffic flow in and out of the facility.

If closed circuit television is used to monitor the visiting area, an additional staff member will often be needed during visiting hours. Similarly, if there are other high traffic or high activity areas that are monitored by

closed circuit television, more manpower is necessary during peak usage times.

Generally, the control center needs a minimum of two staff members during significant parts of the day and evening. The morning watch rarely requires more than one officer between midnight and the time when inmates are unlocked for the day or when the first main shift comes on duty.

In institutions where armory operations are consolidated with those of the control center, additional manpower is required when firearms or other equipment are issued. The armory officer could, in many cases, provide this assistance, but when that person is not available additional help must be assigned.

Chapter 5

The Armory

Storage Requirements

Virtually all secure correctional institutions require space for storing firearms, ammunition, and other security equipment. This area, usually known as the armory, must not be accessible to inmates. The entrance to the armory should be outside the institution's perimeter security. The armory can be located with any "outside" structure, but it is usually best to include it as part of the front entrance since this location is easily accessible to staff in emergencies. Because they have similar security requirements, the armory and locksmith shop are sometimes located in the same area. The materials used to construct the armory must provide maximum security and safety.

An armory of about 150 square feet is normally sufficient for the storage, cleaning, and maintenance of weapons and equipment. The room should be equipped with metal storage shelving and a pass window sized to issue all weapons safely. The armory should be climate-controlled to preserve chemicals and ammunition in storage.

The armory is supervised by a security officer who is specially trained in handling and maintaining weapons. Additional officers are assigned to assist in the armory during emergencies.

Location and Organization

Armory location is critical; it must be secure from inmate takeover.

Armory location is a critical decision in institutional design. It must be totally secure from inmate takeover, but not so remote from the main staff traffic patterns that issue is inconvenient. It must have sufficient storage capacity for all equipment as well as spare parts and extra supplies of ammunition, defensive equipment, and chemical agents. A workbench area for cleaning and maintaining weapons is essential, as are proper storage racks and locking cabinets. Ammunition should be stored in metal cabinets or cases, and the entire area should be climate controlled to minimize deterioration of supplies by temperature or humidity variations.

This chapter will not specify exact types of weapons for use in institutions — weapon specifications should be developed by the agency for each facility. This individualized approach is necessary because a facility with difficult terrain or a very limited buffer zone in an urban area would not need the same weapons as one in a rural area, where long-range shoot-

ing outside the perimeter would not jeopardize public safety. However, even in urban settings, a limited quantity of long-range weapons may be appropriate in the hands of trained staff for use inside the compound in order to protect lives. Thus, firearms selection and deployment decisions are best made by the local agency.

Firearms in use throughout the system should be standardized as much as possible. While every type of firearm may not be used in every institution, all pistols, shotguns, and rifles should be the same caliber and type. This uniformity simplifies training and facilitates cross-assignment of staff between institutions and during emergencies.

Firearms should be standardized as much as possible.

Gas equipment can be standardized more easily in view of the range of items available on the market. The 37-mm projectile is a standard for shoulder-held weapons, and although specialized adapters are available for 12-gauge shotguns, their use reduces the weapon's flexibility for its prime purpose. Larger facilities should have a gasoline-powered high-volume dispenser in order to generate extremely large quantities of gas without using pyrotechnics or projectiles. Agency policy should specify the types of gas to be used, CS or CN, and the circumstances under which it is to be employed. Except in the most life-threatening emergency, CS gas should not be used indoors.

All chemical agents should be stored in the armory, except for authorized amounts in the control center, towers, or designated subarmory. Inventories should reflect the actual amounts on hand at all times. Receipts should be given for all chemical agents issued, and all staff having access to the storage area should be approved by a designated official, with a log maintained to provide a permanent record of access to the area. Local policy should specify storage and use conditions for any aerosol gas dispensers employed for forced cell moves or other specialized purposes. In no case should aerosol dispensers be stored in housing units or carried on a regular basis by staff in contact with inmates.

Gas should be separated in storage and clearly marked as to type to avoid incorrect issue and use in an emergency. For the same reason, outdated gas being saved for training purposes should be stored separately from current supplies to prevent inadvertent issue and potentially hazardous use.

The chief security officer should be responsible for supervising overall operation of the institution armory. During regular business hours, Monday through Friday, a security officer designated by the chief security officer should be responsible for the armory's operation. Outside of regular business hours, the shift supervisor should assume this responsibility.

Inventory

Arms, ammunition, chemical agents, and defensive, detection, and communication equipment should be inspected at least once each month and an official inventory made at least once each year. Chemical agents usually have a shelf life of no more than 36 months from date of receipt; the expiration date should be etched on the container at the time it is received. A report of the inspections and inventories, with any discrepancies noted, should be directed to the chief security officer.

The security officer and shift supervisor should conduct quarterly inventories of all ammunition, chemical agents, firearms, and emergency equipment. The quarterly inventory is then certified in a bound ledger and

REQUEST FOR STORAGE OF PERSONAL WEAPON

I request that I be permitted to store the following weapon(s) in the institution's armory:

Manufacturer   Model & Caliber   Serial #

_____   _____   _____

_____   _____   _____

_____   _____   _____

_____   _____   _____

_____   _____
(Date)   (Requesting Employee)

Approved _____ Date _____
                    (Chief Security Officer)

Strict security for the armory is an absolute must. No deviation from policy or procedure should be tolerated.

reviewed by the chief security officer; reports are forwarded to the central office if required by written policy. All equipment stored in the armory must be approved by the chief security officer.

All weapons stored in the armory must be unloaded. The security officer should maintain a perpetual inventory on all expendable items, ammunition, and chemical agents, which should be kept and recorded in a bound ledger and on bin cards. Periodic reviews should be conducted by the chief security officer. This inventory should include the amount on hand, amount issued, purpose of issue, and to whom issued. Exact inventories will be maintained on all arms including serial numbers, brand names, and assigned location of the equipment. The same procedure will apply to all defensive equipment (e.g., gas masks, handcuffs, helmets, leg irons, riot batons, etc.). Although these items do not have serial numbers, their exact location and quantity must be known.

Any personal weapons or ammunition owned by staff members and stored in the armory should be checked in by the security officer, who should maintain strict accountability. Staff members should be required to sign for personal weapons when checked out. A receipt should be issued for each personal weapon stored and a copy provided to the owner. Additional record-keeping may be required to comply with fiscal policy.

Immediately following an emergency, the security officer should conduct an inventory to ascertain that all equipment is accounted for and properly cleaned. The security officer and one other employee should be assigned to issue equipment during emergencies.

Anytime a firearm is discharged, the shift supervisor of security should be notified immediately. A complete written report should be submitted to the chief security officer.

Only the security officer should be authorized to enter the armory alone; all others must be accompanied by a second staff member approved by a security supervisor. All personnel entering the armory should be required to sign the entrance log book each time they enter, filling in the date, time in and out, and purpose for entering. All ammunition and weapons should be signed for on issue slips. Issue slips should list the serial number of the weapon, rounds of ammunition, and the receiving officer's signature. Escape kits should have prepared issue slips attached. It is absolutely necessary that written records be maintained for routine and emergency distributions of all security equipment.

CHECKING OUT AND IN OF ARMORY EQUIPMENT

Type of Equipment Issued	Signature of Person Receiving Equipment	Time Out	Time In	Initials of Person Issuing Equipment	Date

Written records must be maintained for distribution of all security equipment.

Firearms should not be permitted inside the institution unless authorized by the warden. Provisions should be made to store law enforcement officers' weapons and ammunition. Law enforcement officers should be questioned about possession of firearms or ammunition prior to entering the institution. They should be required to place any arms or ammunition in a weapons depository located outside the institution.

Inventory of tower equipment should be conducted at each shift change, with a weekly report submitted to the chief security officer.

Inspections and Equipment Repair System

All institutions should establish an inspection system to ensure proper functioning of all communications equipment. Any equipment failures should be reported to the designated person or persons. The inspection and maintenance of communications equipment are generally the duties of a specialist in the maintenance department. He or she should establish an inspection system to ensure that all equipment is functioning properly at all times. Communications equipment should be inspected annually. Maintenance contracts should be considered for highly technical or specialized equipment items that require elaborate testing or repair.

The chief security officer should establish an inspection system to ensure that all arms and defensive equipment are serviced, cleaned, and functioning properly. All weapons should be inspected at least semi-annually.

Normally, these functions are delegated to a security officer, with periodic inspections conducted by the chief security officer or a security supervisor. Unserviceable weapons must either be repaired or replaced. Items in need of replacement must be decommissioned according to agency policy. After the survey is completed, serviceable parts may be stripped to repair other weapons. If the weapon is unserviceable and discarding is necessary, the serial number must be destroyed and the item rendered completely unusable by cutting it apart with a cutting torch or saw. In all such instances, the inventory should reflect any changes.

Armory Equipment

Standardization of armory equipment is encouraged in all institutions. This is especially advisable within each state system for reasons of training, economical purchasing, and exchange of equipment between institutions in certain situations. Ideally each city, county, and any other facilities within a particular state should conform with the state system for the same reasons. The standard items are listed below:

- Ammunition (for all weapons)
- Chemical agents and related equipment
    - Gas masks with speakers
    - Gas masks without speakers
    - Gas mask canisters
    - Grenade, Smoke #110
    - Grenade, CN 112, CS555
    - Grenade, CN 115, CS515
    - Grenade, CN 119, CS519
    - Projectile, CN 265, CS565
    - Projectile, long-range, CN 206, CS560
    - Projectile, short-range, CN 203, CS501
    - Projectile, 37 MM, Parachute Flash
    - Projectile, CN 230, CS530

- Chemical agents, indoor use
    - Grenade, CN 117, CS517
    - Grenade, CN 122, CS522
    - Aerosol Dispensers
        * Pistol 287 CN
        * LEH 105 Silent Partner-CS
        * Pepper fogger

- Communications equipment
    - Audio dialer
    - Body alarms, tone decoder, voice
    - Pages, tone and/or voice
    - Radios, mobile vehicles
    - Receiver, decoder (body alarm) S. P. 5503721
    - Radios, two-way, battery-rechargeable two frequency
    - Radio base station, two frequency
    - Body alarms
    - Radio, portable, multiband, civil defense
    - Radio, eight channel for buses and vans
    - Tower intercoms
    - Public address systems

○ Defense equipment
- Riot helmet and face guard
- Night sticks, standard
- Riot control sticks, wood
- 31" mob control stick
- Jump suits, coverall type
- Riot shield, plastic, 2 1/2" X 3 1/2" inches
- Riot shield, institutional
- Bullet-proof vest
- Portable cutting torch, back-pack type
- Plastic cuff
- Handcuff
- Handcuff, hinged
- Waist chain
- Handcuff covers
- Leg irons

○ Detection equipment
- Walk-through metal detectors
- Hand-held metal detectors

○ Firearms and gas weapons

○ Restraint equipment
- Handcuffs, standard, nickel plated steel 10 oz.
- Handcuffs, hinged, nickel plated steel
- Leg irons: standard, nickel plated steel with approximately 14 1/2" chain
- Waist chains: chains should be made of case hardened steel

Chapter 6
Special Management Units

Options for Special Management

There are advantages and disadvantages in housing all special management inmates in a separate institution. In some jurisdictions, the small number of inmates requiring this type of incarceration renders the construction and maintenance of a separate facility economically impractical. Custody classifications of the inmates involved may encourage the establishment of smaller specialized units. The following discussion of special management units outlines the administration of a separate segregation unit within a larger institution.

The concepts that make up the foundation for administration of the rest of the correctional system also apply to the supervision of special management units.

Unit Management

The strategy of unit management places most or all staff members involved in the operation of a special management unit within the immediate area where the inmates are housed. The management team directly responsible for the welfare of a segregation unit of 150 inmates should include the following full-time staff members:

- One unit manager.
- Two case workers.
- Three counselors.
- One secretary or clerk.
- Fifteen correctional officers providing 24-hour correctional coverage.

Other support essential to the special management unit can be provided on a part-time basis, and space should be allocated within the unit for functions including medical and psychological services, food services, educational and recreation programs, maintenance, and the inmate services of the commissary, laundry, etc.

Program and security decisions concerning each inmate must be made based on well-founded classification data.

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Design of Special Management Units

Classification

Classification is recognized by correctional administrators as an indispensible element of effective correctional management. The equitable application of a uniform, behavior-based classification system is of paramount importance in the administration of a segregation unit. Program and security decisions concerning each inmate must be made on well-founded classification data.

Operating Policies and Procedures

The development of a clear set of operational procedures is critical to the special management unit because of the high importance of security in segregation units. Failure to maintain unit security can greatly diminish the integrity of the unit, the program, and the institution. To ensure consistency in implementing all procedures, they should be well documented and thoroughly understood by each member of the staff.

Special management units have different needs than the rest of the correctional facility. Consideration of these needs should be taken during the institution's design stage. Well thought out statements of purpose and good planning will expedite the construction and facilitation of special management units.

Perimeter Security

Special management units need to be secure both from internal escape and external intrusion. Perimeter security must be maintained, allowing the movement of personnel and materials while retaining the inmate population and denying unauthorized access to the unit. Movement should be controlled without diminishing unit security by using a sally port and a control center. The control center function for special management units may be a part of the institutional control function.

Barriers to Staff/Inmate Interaction

Where possible, design that places barriers between staff and prisoners should be avoided. The unit should be designed and constructed in a manner that facilitates interaction between staff members and inmates. Inmates should have easy access to the staff and be encouraged to voice their concerns. This opportunity to air problems and reach solutions before crises develop is critical to safe and efficient administration of a special management unit.

Housing

The nature of the segregation unit and the need for separation dictate that housing within special management units should consist of individual rooms. These rooms should be grouped to allow the clustering of similarly classified inmates and should accommodate, with some flexibility, groups of individuals requiring separation within the unit. Individual rooms should be arranged to permit good visual supervision using a minimal number of staff. The total number of inmates within one housing or management unit will depend on staffing patterns, population pressures, and resources, but in general it should not exceed 150 prisoners.

Recreation

Space should be provided within the unit for leisure-time activities. In addition, it is necessary to provide for physical activities for those confined to this unit. These activities may include indoor sports (such as weight lifting) within the unit, but should also include larger spaces for other sports.

Medical Services

Provisions should be made to include an infirmary or sick call function within the unit. The size of the special management unit will dictate whether full-time medical staffing is required. More extensive medical coverage may be provided by a larger hospital in the main institution. Provisions for routine medical services within the unit will minimize inmate movement through, and exposure to, the general population.

Food Service

The provision of good food service is critical to the undisturbed daily operation of the unit. One major concern should be that food reaches inmates in segregation without having been tampered with or adulterated by other inmates. A solution to this problem is to provide full facilities for preparing, serving, and dining within the special management unit. This may be economically impractical, requiring sizeable space for duplication of services and staff for a relatively smaller number of inmates. If the size of the unit precludes a separate preparation area, there should be special procedures for food handling by staff members, ensuring that food reaches the inmates in the unit without having been disturbed by general population inmates.

Food served to inmates in segregation should be comparable to that served to the general population. Portions and servings available should reflect those in the institution's dining room, with similar restrictions and choices.

Food served to inmates in segregation should be comparable to that served to the general population.

Food service administrators must ensure that food served to inmates in segregation has not been tampered with.

The Control Function

Staff offices should be located in the unit. They should be designed so that staff members have the opportunity to visually monitor inmate movement and activities but still have the privacy for confidential discussions.

Space should also be provided to accommodate the processing activities required when inmates enter or leave the unit. This space should be located to expedite the flow of inmates to and from the unit. This function is particularly critical when inmates are moved regularly to and from the courts.

Special Management Categories

Special management units are necessary in most institutions housing maximum, close, and medium security inmates. These special management units can generally be divided into three categories.

Disciplinary Detention

Disciplinary detention is the separation from the general population of an inmate who has been found guilty by the disciplinary committee of serious violation of regulations. An inmate should be placed in disciplinary detention only after an impartial hearing establishes that there is no adequate alternative to control or regulate the inmate's behavior. Placement in disciplinary detention should be for short periods of time (not more than 30 days for all violations arising out of one incident) and as a result of serious rule violations.

The disciplinary detention unit is a section of the institution designed to house inmates convicted of serious rule violations. The facilities, programs, and services provided in disciplinary detention should fulfill basic personal needs, but in a more limited fashion than in administrative segregation units, witness protection units, or the general population.

Administrative Segregation

Administrative segregation is separation of inmates who pose a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, other inmates, or institution security. It is the result of a classification committee action and is not imposed as a punishment for specific acts. Usually, these inmates can be involved in more activities than those confined in disciplinary detention. There should be no limitation on the length of time inmates can be placed in administrative segregation, but regular classification committee review should be required at least every 30 days to ensure that the restricted environment continues to be appropriate. A psychologist should make a 30-day evaluation to ensure that the inmate is not deteriorating. Inmates pending investigation or trial for a criminal act or pending transfer can also be housed in this unit.

The administrative segregation unit is a section of the institution designed to separate inmates from the general population. Long-term assignment should be approved by the classification committee; short-term assignment may be ordered by the warden, superintendent, or shift security supervisor. The controls and program activities in the administrative segregation unit are usually less restrictive than those in disciplinary detention. Inmates requiring protection from other inmates may also be housed in this unit.

Witness Protection

The witness protection unit provides protection and security for wit-

nesses and potential witnesses whose safety and well-being is in jeopardy. This unit should separate witnesses from the general population and protect their identity during the period of their cooperation and testimony and throughout their confinement.

The witness protection unit should be designed to afford complete anonymity for witnesses and to provide appropriate security for inmates who require various degrees of staff supervision. Since the unit will be composed of inmates with various security and custody classifications, internal procedures should be flexible while at the same time providing higher security inmates with the supervision they require. Assignment to witness protection units should be made very carefully to screen out individuals who may attempt to enter the unit to harm witnesses. An inmate should be admitted to the unit only after the warden receives written authorization from his central office.

Care must be taken to protect the identities of witness protection inmates.

Guidelines for Protection Units

Placement in a witness protection unit should occur only when other housing would not afford adequate protection for the witness or for the convenience of the agency to facilitate debriefing, testimony, and grand jury proceedings. To the extent possible, unit operations and programs should be self-contained or independent of the rest of the institution to ensure inmate anonymity and security. Every effort should be made to protect the witnesses' identities and location and to maintain their security during confinement. Efforts should also be made to promote consistency among units with similar or identical missions.

Protective Custody

The number of inmates housed in protective custody should be minimized whenever possible, but there may be instances where the need for this unit cannot be eliminated. When inmates have a legitimate need for separation and protection from other members of the population, the manner in which these individuals are housed must be considered carefully. Whether an existing facility is used or new space is constructed to house these inmates, there are many philosophical, programmatic, and operational aspects to be considered. These considerations will vary from correctional system to correctional system and should be dealt with on an individual basis.

Confinement Conditions in All Special Management Units

All units must be well ventilated, adequately lighted, appropriately heated, and maintained in a sanitary condition at all times. All cells should be equipped with beds securely fastened to the floor or wall. Strip cells are a part of the medical facility and under the supervision and control of health care personnel. Except in emergencies, only one inmate should be confined in each cell or room. If an emergency arises and this occupancy level must be exceeded, an immediate report should be forwarded to the warden.

After being thoroughly searched, all inmates admitted should be dressed in institution clothing, without a belt, and furnished a mattress and bedding. Cloth or paper slippers may be substituted for shoes if desired. Inmates should not be segregated without clothing, mattresses, blankets, or pillows, except when prescribed by the medical officer for medical or psychiatric reasons. If inmates are so seriously disturbed that they are likely to

destroy clothing or bedding or to create a disturbance that would be seriously detrimental to others, the medical department should be notified immediately. A regiment of treatment and control should be instituted with the medical officer's concurrence.

Records should be maintained in a secure location and access restricted to authorized staff. Published rosters should omit the names of all inmates housed in witness protection units. Administrative and legal issues such as inmate discipline, administrative remedy procedures, service of process, and contacts with the media must be handled in a manner that protects the identity of witness protection inmates.

Food

Special management units should be served the same institution meals provided to the general population. An officer should transport and thoroughly search all food for the unit. Care should be taken to serve food at proper temperatures.

Personal Hygiene

Each special management unit should have an organized, scheduled program for maintaining sanitation and hygiene, including arrangement of items in the cell, proper bed making, general unit sanitation, etc. Unit inmates should be able to maintain an acceptable level of personal hygiene—toilet tissue, soap, toothbrush, etc. should be provided. For safety and security, a retrievable kit of toilet articles may be issued. Each inmate should have the opportunity to shave and shower at least three times each week, unless these procedures present an undue safety or security hazard. In some new facilities, there are showers in the cells. Laundry and barbering services should be provided on the same schedule as for the general population.

Provisions should be made for allowing inmates in segregation access to law library materials.

Exercise

Unless safety or security dictates otherwise, security management unit inmates should exercise outside their cells a minimum of one hour per day, five days per week. Indoor and outdoor exercise should be provided. Outdoor exercise yards should be square in shape and should be searched every day prior to use. Except in special cases, no more than two inmates should be out at a time.

Personal Property

Excessive personal property should be impounded. Inmates in long-term special management units should be permitted additional personal property commensurate with that permitted to the general population.

Legal Library

A satellite law library should be maintained in each long-term unit. It should contain basic legal materials and be supplemented from the main institution law library. Short-term units may have law materials delivered from the main institution law library as deemed necessary.

Reading Material

Reading material may be provided on a circulating basis or on request from the institution library.

Medical Care

Each special management unit inmate should be seen daily by a member of the medical staff, and the individual log sheet of each inmate should be so noted. Each unit should have a urine testing program for detecting unauthorized drug use. At the minimum, this program should test a random sample of the unit population each month.

Correspondence and Visits

Special management unit inmates should have social correspondence privileges unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Social visitors should be notified of any necessary restriction to ordinary visiting procedures to spare them disappointment and unnecessary inconvenience. If ample time for correspondence exists, the burden of notification may be placed on the inmate. Legal correspondence and contacts with attorneys should be permitted.

Phone calls for inmates in disciplinary segregation should be restricted to those specifically related to legal matters that cannot be handled through correspondence. Witness protection units should have a separate post office box for inmate mail. Only unit staff should receive, inspect, and deliver incoming and outgoing mail for inmates.

Commissary

Commissary privileges should be afforded all special unit inmates, consistent with those available to general population inmates.

Other Details of Security Administration

A picture file should be maintained on each inmate. A special picture file should be maintained to identify inmates who may be disruptive to the orderly running of the unit.

All units should have a sally port entrance that precludes unauthorized entrance or exit. Nonpermanent, part-time, contract, consultant, and volunteer personnel should be permitted access only upon the warden's approval and should be directly supervised at all times.

There should be a written plan for evacuation of the unit in the event of emergency. Inmates should receive instructions regarding evacuation procedures as a part of the admissions procedure. Each unit must meet applicable fire and safety requirements.

Procedures in Special Management Units

Review of Inmates

The classification team, unit team, or disciplinary committee should review the status of all inmates in special housing units at least every 7 days for the first 30 days, and every 30 days thereafter. The inmate must be offered the opportunity to attend these review meetings and be accorded the same rights available to inmates in initial segregation meetings. The committee should provide the inmate with a written decision stating the basis for the decision, as well as a summary of the information presented to and considered by the committee. If the review committee determines the inmate should remain in the unit, the inmate should be able to appeal that decision to the warden.

Committee reviews should consider the original reason for segregating the individual and his or her behavior during that segregation, including

reports from the unit staff. If an individual has been held in a unit longer than 90 days, the warden should review and take action on the case. The committee should consider all available alternatives and what assistance, if any, could be provided to hasten the inmate's return to the general population. Each review should include an evaluation of the inmate with the following information:

- Disciplinary record.

- Past criminal record.

- Prison record from other institutions.

- Psychological makeup.

- Involvement in criminal activity while in prison.

- Attitude toward authority.

- Institutional record on work assignments.

- Adjustment to institution programs.

- Willingness and ability to live with other inmates.

- Record of violent reactions to stressful situations.

- Habitual conduct or language that may provoke or instigate stressful, perhaps violent, situations.

Records

Permanent logs should be maintained by the senior officer on duty. These records should include the following:

- A record of all admissions and releases including:
  - Date of action.
  - Time of action.
  - Reason for admission or release.
  - Authorizing official or committee.

- A record of visitors, including all official visits by staff members, notations of unusual observations, and the time, date, and signature of the visitor.

- Notations on unusual behavior by individual inmates or the unit as a whole.

- Information from and observations by staff members which should be forwarded for staff action and observation on future shifts.

- Individual records for each inmate should provide a document of daily activities. These records should:
  - Be completed by each shift.
  - Contain a record of all activities required by policy, such as showering, exercise, medical visits, administration of medication, and program activities (including library access, education programs, religious activity, and visits).
  - Be signed by the officer in charge of each shift.
  - Cite medical observations or visits, with the initials of the medical officer conducting the visit.
  - Include comments on unusual occurrences or behavior.

An inmate should not remain in a special management unit longer than 90 days without the warden's attention.

INDIVIDUAL SEGREGATION RECORD SHEET

_____
(Institution)

Team/Caseworker _____ Regular Quarters _____

Inmate Name _____ Reg. No. _____ Cell _____
Violation   Date   Time
or Reason _____ Received _____ Received _____
Admittance   Date   Time
Authorized _____ Released _____ Released _____

Date	Shift	Meals B D S	SH	EX	Medical PA Signature	Comments (Use reverse if needed)	OIC Signature
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						
	MORN						
	DAY						
	EVE						

Pertinent Information = Epileptic, Diabetic, Suicidal, Homosexual, Assaultive, etc.
Meals: B = Breakfast, D = Dinner, S = Supper
SH = Shower—Yes (Y), No (N), Refused (R)
EX = Exercise (enter actual time period, and inside or outside—i.e., 9:30/10:00 IN; 2:00/2:30 OUT)
Medical PA = Medical Physician's Assistant (nurse) will sign the seg log each shift and the record sheet each time the inmate is seen by him or her.
Comments = Conduct, Attitude, etc. Additional comments documented on reverse side must include date, signature, and title.
Officer in Charge Signature = OIC (Unit Officer) must sign all record sheets each shift.

Individual record sheets (such as this sample) should be kept on all inmates in segregation.

Release

Release from some special management units may require the warden's written approval. Release from some units may be authorized by the following officials or groups:

- The committee or person authorizing the inmate's placement in the unit.

- The disciplinary committee.

- The classification committee.

- The inmate's unit management team.

Releases are usually authorized when one or more of the following conditions exist:

- The condition requiring the inmate's placement in the unit no longer exists.

- New information or evidence indicates that the inmate is no longer a threat to himself or others.

- The inmate is found guilty by the disciplinary committee and is transferred to a more restrictive unit as dictated by committee findings.

Local policy should specify which level of authority may release inmates in each category; ordinarily the classification team would not release inmates held at the order of the disciplinary committee.

Unit Inspection

The unit should be monitored on a regular basis, enabling officials to observe and evaluate confinement conditions and discuss individual program problems with the inmates. Monitoring visits should be conducted in accordance with the following schedule:

- Shift security supervisor—once each shift.

- Health care official—daily.

- Social worker—daily.

- Counselor—daily.

- Psychologist or psychiatrist
    - As requested by staff or inmate.
    - Should interview each inmate confined for more than 30 days and prepare an evaluation report with recommendations.

- Chief security officer—not less than weekly.

- Assistant warden (custody)—weekly.

- Religious representative—weekly.

- Warden—weekly.

Temporary Placement in Disciplinary Detention

An inmate who is causing a serious disruption or threat to life or property in administrative segregation, who cannot be controlled within the physical confines of administrative segregation, and who cannot be safely transferred to the institution hospital may be moved temporarily to disciplinary detention for a period not to exceed three days, pending a hearing before the institution's disciplinary committee. The authority to order a temporary move into disciplinary detention is limited to the official in charge of the institution. A fully documented report of every such move should be forwarded to the warden immediately.

Chapter 7

Food Service

Food Service Operations

ACA Standards specify that these be met in providing adequate food services to inmates: meals should be served under conditions that minimize regimentation, tables should be arranged in a manner that permits free seating and ease of movement while retaining ready supervision, and a minimum of two hot meals should be served each day with no more than fourteen hours elapsing between the evening meal and breakfast.

The food service manager and/or the assistant food service manager should be responsible for dining room supervision. Inmate conduct within the dining room is the responsibility of the food service and custodial staff.

Dining room workers are responsible for keeping the floors and tables clean. Major cleaning should be postponed until all inmates have been served, have eaten, and have left the dining room. The chef in charge is responsible for instructing the dining room workers in the performance of their duties.

Food Service Custody and Security

Food service personnel should work in close cooperation with other institutional staff members to maintain proper custody, control, and security. The food service manager and the administrative staff should jointly develop written institutional procedures on custody and security for the food service department. These policies should include:

- Buildings over which the food service department has supervisory, management, and maintenance control.

- Provisions for inmate traffic in and out of the food service department, including procedures dealing with inmate workers.

- Specifications on inmate behavior and the posting and enforcement of dining hall rules and regulations.

- Procedures on the control and handling of supplies, including outlines for ordering, receiving, storing, moving, and properly utilizing equipment and food supplies.

◉ Procedures for the control of hazardous equipment and materials representing potential custodial risks, including cutlery, saws, and cleaning solutions.

Control of Knives and Hazardous Tools

Knives, tools, and hazardous solutions should be stored securely in locked cabinets. Within the food service department, shadowboards should be used when appropriate to highlight the presence or absence of tools. All hazardous tools should be marked with an identification symbol.

One person should be designated as responsible for the control, safe-keeping, and tracking of all knives and hazardous tools. He or she should be in possession of the only key to the storage cabinet. This person should maintain a complete and accurate inventory of all knives, hazardous tools, and solutions, keeping a copy in the food service department and furnishing another copy to the control center. Local institutional policy may require additional record-keeping procedures.

As with all controlled tools, knives and other implements should be issued to authorized inmates only. The person in charge of controlled items should maintain a log containing the name and number of the inmates to whom items were issued, along with the time of withdrawal and return.

Broken or worn items should be disposed of under the supervision of the food service manager. Replacement tools should be marked and inventoried prior to being used.

In the event of loss or misplacement of a knive or hazardous tool, the food service manager and the chief administrator of the institution should be informed immediately. A thorough search should be made, including the questioning and search of all inmates who may have had access to the item. These inmates should be detained in the food service department until the item is found or they are cleared. A written report to the chief administrator should be prepared following any loss.

Keep an accurate inventory of all knives and hazardous tools.

Knives and other kitchen tools are among the most hazardous forms of contraband an inmate can possess.

Key Control

Key control is an area requiring special attention. At no time should inmates be permitted to use keys. Food service department employees should affix keys in their custody to their belts with choker chains and keep their key rings in pouches or pockets, out of inmate sight as much as possible.

Food service department keys should be handled in the same manner as other institution keys. They should be issued through the control center under the chit system to employees as they enter shift duty. When going off duty, food service personnel should return their keys to the control center. At no time should institutional keys be permitted outside the institution.

Yeast and Hot Item Control

Because of its potential for misuse in the fermentation of unauthorized beverages, yeast should be used under tight controls. Yeast should be handled by only one food service employee. It should be kept under close supervision until such time as it is thoroughly incorporated into the food stuff being prepared. Yeast should be stored in a secure box in the refrigerator or other suitable designated area. The yeast storage box should be anchored to the floor or wall. Inventory records should be kept in the yeast storage box, including the date and quantity of issue, balance on hand, receipt for withdrawal, and the initials of the employee making the withdrawal.

Nutmeg, mace, and other "hot" food items used in the institution should be handled in the same manner as yeast.

Shakedowns and Searches

Inmate work areas should be the subject of daily searches and shakedowns. Control of hazardous tools, "hot" food items, and other contraband can be maintained effectively only through the use of these procedures. Inmates should be searched on both entering and leaving the food service department for every meal and for every inmate work shift. At no time should inmates be allowed outside the food service department with food items not issued on the regular service line for that meal unless previous permission was obtained.

The control of contraband is the responsibility of all employees. Because of the presence of inmate workers and the number and type of dangerous, hazardous, and "hot" items found in food services, the food service department has special responsibility for conducting effective inmate searches and area shakedowns.

Census and Counts

Enumeration of inmates in the food service department is as important as it is elsewhere in the correctional institution. Procedures should be developed to ensure accuracy of the count or census. One method specifies that inmates sit in one section of the dining area and move to another area when their names are called. No matter what counting method is used, no inmates should remain in the work areas during enumeration unless their presence is essential to the preparation of the meal. Provisions should be made for a staff person to back up food service personnel when counts are made.

Safety in Food Service Departments

Food service managers or their designees are responsible for departmental safety instruction. They should make sure all food service personnel are thoroughly familiar with safety standards, including fire prevention and

control. In addition, managers are responsible for close supervision to ensure adherence to all safety procedures.

The food service managers should make sure appropriate operating procedures are posted near all equipment and that employees fully understand all instructions.

Employees share in the responsibility for the maintenance of safety and must work closely with the food service managers and supervisors. Employees are responsible for reporting all defective equipment to their manager. They should use the safeguards provided, avoiding hazardous shortcuts and should report all accidents, even if the mishaps seem inconsequential at the time.

Communication between employees, managers, and supervisors is essential. Interaction should not be limited to reporting of accidents and defective equipment. Employees should adhere to established working procedures and be required to discuss all deviations from standard procedures with their supervisors. In addition, employees should be encouraged to discuss work hazards and provide suggestions for safer and more efficient operations.

Good Housekeeping Techniques

The importance of good housekeeping techniques to safety should be stressed to all kitchen personnel. Among the safety and security-conscious habits that should be highlighted are:

Report defective equipment; Avoid hazardous shortcuts.

- ○ Keeping aisles, stairs, and paths of travel free from obstructions.

- ○ Storing supplies and materials neatly, avoiding the danger of overhanging and falling objects.

- ○ Maintaining orderly work areas, with no objects protruding over the edges of counters, ranges, or shelves.

- ○ Labeling all cleaning supplies clearly and storing them separately from food supplies.

- ○ Disposing of bottles, trash, and scraps in the appropriate manner.

- ○ Avoiding slips and falls by mopping floors in sections to leave dry areas of passage, and cleaning all spillage immediately.

- ○ Using the proper tool for each job.

- ○ Maintaining proper lighting levels in hallways, stairs, and storage areas.

Fire Prevention and Control

Fires, always dangerous and destructive, present acute problems in correctional facilities. Food service personnel must be sensitized to the extreme importance of fire prevention not only to safety, but to institutional security as well. Compliance with fire regulations is mandated by federal, state, and local legislation. All food service personnel are responsible for adherence to these laws.

Among the procedures necessary for fire prevention are rules banning smoking in warehouse areas, specification of storage area contents and arrangement to keep aisles of escape clear in the case of emergency and minimize dangers of fire and explosion, and maintenance of unobstructed passageways and aisles in the working areas to facilitate emergency exits.

Sanitation

A clean environment is a prerequisite to good sanitation practices. An up-to-date food service facility includes equipment, materials, and a layout design that facilitate easy cleaning with hot water, detergents, and sanitizing agents. Floors should be constructed with materials that do not absorb grease or moisture. An adequate number of drains, conveniently located, facilitate washing. Walls, ceilings, and ventilation equipment must be designed and constructed for frequent, thorough cleaning.

In the purchase and placement of equipment, sanitation features should be a major consideration. Equipment should be installed in a manner that allows easy removal of soil, food materials, or other debris that collects between pieces of equipment or between the equipment and walls or floors. Although older institutions may not have the advantage of new design and equipment, the food service department can be maintained effectively by careful planning, training, and supervising. Cleaning of equipment must be regularly scheduled to prevent accumulation of dirt and spilled food. Effective cleaning reduces the possibility of food contamination by microorganisms and is of particular importance in pest control.

Standards

The following practices are recommended to maintain high environmental sanitation standards:

- All work and storage areas must be clean, well lighted, and orderly.

- Overhead pipes should be eliminated or covered by a false ceiling. These pipes are a hazard in food preparation areas because they collect dust and might leak, thus leading to possible contamination of food.

- Walls, floors, and ceilings in all areas must be cleaned routinely.

- Ventilation hoods should be designed to prevent grease build-up or condensation that collects on walls and ceilings or drips into food or on food-contact surfaces. Filters or other grease extracting equipment should be readily removeable for cleaning and replacement if they have not been designed for easy cleaning in place.

- To prevent cross-contamination, kitchenware and food-contact surfaces of equipment should be washed, rinsed, and sanitized after each use and after any interruption of operations during which contamination could occur. Manufacturers' instructions should be followed for cleaning of all equipment.

- Food-contact surfaces of grills, griddles, and similar cooking equipment plus the cavities and door seals of microwave ovens should be cleaned at least once a day. This does not apply to deep-fat cooking equipment or filtering systems. Surfaces that do not come into contact with food should be cleaned as often as necessary to keep the equipment free from the accumulation of dust, dirt, food particles, and other debris.

- A ready supply of hot water (120 to 140° F or 49 to 60° C+) must be available.

- An adequate number of containers for garbage and refuse disposal must be available, kept covered, cleaned frequently, and insect/

SANITATION CHECKLIST

DINING ROOM

1. Are the floors clean and repaired?
2. Are the tables clean?
3. Are the seats clean?
4. Are the walls clean?
5. Are the beverage areas clean?

KITCHEN PRODUCTION AREA

1. Does the general appearance of the department indicate frequent cleaning?
2. Are the floors clean and repaired?
3. Are the walls and ceiling clean and repaired?
4. Are there any overhead pipes that might leak into food or equipment?
5. Are potentially hazardous foods meeting temperature requirements during storage, preparation, display, service, and transportation?
6. Are there adequate facilities for maintaining the food at cold temperatures?

SANITATION CHECKLIST

KITCHEN PRODUCTION AREAS	YES	NO	COMMENTS
7. Are hands washed and good hygienic practices observed?			
8. Is equipment used in the production area properly cleaned (steam kettle, ovens, grills, can opener, deep fat fryers, mixers, slicing machine)?			
9. Are rolling carts and hot food carts clean?			
10. Are all utensils and equipment in good repair; that is, free of breaks, open seams, cracks, and chips?			
11. Are food contact surfaces of equipment clean to sight and touch?			
12. Are wiping cloths available and clean?			
13. Are wiping cloths properly stored?			
14. Is the importance of frequent handwashing stressed?			
15. Is chewing of tobacco or smoking observed in food production area?			
16. Are the ice and ice handling utensils properly stored?			
17. Is the supply of hot water and cold water adequate?			

The use of sanitation checklists such as these can help ensure that the food service area is properly maintained.

rodent proof. Disposal of such materials should be in accord with local institution supplements.

- At least 20 footcandles of light should be provided on all food preparation surfaces and at equipment or utensil washing stations. Protective shields to prevent broken glass from falling onto food should be provided for all lighting fixtures located over, by, or within food storage, preparation, service, and display areas, and in areas where equipment or utensils are washed and stored.

Objectives

Flies, ants, roaches, and silverfish can be kept to a minimum when food service personnel adhere to the following:

- Keep floors and walls clean.
- Keep shelves, cupboards, and floors dry.
- Keep all food covered.
- See that screens and windows fit tightly and are in good repair.
- Keep doors closed.
- Screen supplies upon delivery.
- Store all food supplies on pallets, skids, or in covered containers.
- Spray, when allowed by the institution, at night when all food, dishes, utensils, etc. are stored and covered.

Chapter 8

Institutional Security Procedures

Key Control

Effective control of keys is one of the most essential security elements of any correctional operation, regardless of facility type or security level, In order to maintain effective security, the staff must control the doors, grilles, and other locking devices that comprise physical security both inside and outside the perimeter. To do so, staff must have total command of all keys and locking devices and the supplies, equipment, and storage areas that support the key control program.

Good key control is not only a program or system, it is a skill that every staff member must learn and practice. Its fundamentals must be incorporated into every institution's operations and ingrained into every staff member's work habits.

Policies and Procedures

All institutional policies and procedures regarding key control must be clearly written and available for staff to reference, but inmates must not have access to these policies or to the record-keeping systems that support them. Inmates should not be permitted to establish any base of information about the institution's locking system; inmates can use seemingly insignificant information to the detriment of the institution and may breach the facility's security.

Within larger systems where common locking systems are used, an information exchange policy should be established for security managers. That way, if locks are compromised in one facility and similar locks are used elsewhere, the other facilities can make appropriate changes before inmates become aware of the situation. Staff should never underestimate the capability of inmates to acquire knowledge of locking system technology and to pass that knowledge on to other inmates.

All policies relating to the key control system and supporting record systems should be confidential and restricted, available only to staff on a need-to-know basis. The agency should classify all record systems to shield them from disclosure or publication under state or local freedom of information act requirements.

In addition to initial policy formulation, the institution must establish a documented method for annual review and revision. As portions of the in-

Key control is vital in maintaining effective security.

stitution are used for different purposes, or as inmate programs or custody classifications change, the array of locks and the procedures that support the locking system must also change. An annual review program is necessary for all policies and procedures to ensure that the system's documentation is consistent with practice and that the policies themselves reflect the most effective, functional means of enforcing security.

Descriptions and Categories of Keys

Policy must clearly define the various categories of keys used in the institution so that staff is aware of the different accountability requirements for each category. These categories ordinarily include:

- Emergency keys: Keys maintained on key rings and kept separate from all regular-issue keys. They provide prompt access to all parts of the institution during fires, riots, or other urgent situations.

- Inactive keys: Keys no longer used but which are retained as spares and backups for unused locking devices. These are also keys maintained separately for other purposes, including storage for other institutions within the system.

- Master keys: Cut so that one key may actuate more than one locking device in a series of locks from a single manufacturer.

- Nonsecurity keys: Do not require urgent security response if lost or stolen.

- Pattern keys: Those from which all other keys for a particular lock or series of locks are cut. They are maintained separately from all other spare or blank keys.

- Restricted keys: Allow access to sensitive areas of the institution. Special authorization must be obtained before they are issued to anyone other than the employee designated to draw them on a regular basis.

- Security keys: If lost or duplicated by inmates, these would facilitate an escape or jeopardize the security of the institution, institutional property, employees, visitors, or inmates. Urgent remedial action is necessary if a security key is lost, compromised, or missing.

- Vehicle keys: Typically actuate motorized vehicles operated by institution staff for official purposes, including tractors and other specialized machines located inside or outside the secure perimeter of the facility.

- Key chit: A metal tag usually about 1 inch wide x 3 inches long which contains an imprint of an employee's name or identifying number. The chit is used as a receipt issued by an employee to the key issue officer. Chits are designed to make counterfeiting difficult.

The Key Issue System

Institutional policy should specify that keys are issued from a central, secure location. A centralized issue system should be operated from the control center or a similar reinforced area not accessible to inmates. All keys must be returned to this location either at the end of the workday or when the employee to whom a key was issued leaves the facility.

Portable key boards, although less desirable, are sometimes used in small departments or issue zones but should be approved in advance by the warden. The portable board must be returned to the key issue area daily, and full accountability for the keys must be maintained. Vehicle keys may be maintained separately in a secure area if available; a parallel accountability system for vehicle keys must be employed using durable chits, inventories, and documented daily counts.

Durable chit issue systems, mentioned above, use metal or plastic tags inscribed with a staff member's name or identifying number. Only a controlled number of chits should be issued. If the chit system uses identifying numbers on the tags, a log book containing employee names and number assignments should be maintained. No temporary chits or paper receipts for keys should be used without the approval of the security department head. Loss of a chit should be verbally reported immediately, followed by a written report. All chits are to be turned in when an employee is terminated, resigns, retires, or otherwise leaves the facility.

Some keys may be issued permanently. Typically, these include keys to the warden's and associate warden's offices, staff housing, the cashier's office, etc. Chits should be submitted for these keys as well. However, special identification should be provided on the key board hooks for permanently issued keys. Security keys are never issued permanently. In general, personal keys issued to staff should be limited to those situations and personnel specifically approved by the warden.

The institution should have clearly developed procedures for reporting and taking remedial action on lost and broken keys. These should include an immediate verbal report, a written follow-up report, search procedures, immediate inventory of any affected areas, and identification and change of other locks using the key(s) in question. In large correctional systems where the same lock may be used in other facilities, information regarding the compromised key should be conveyed to those institutions as well. Any parts of a broken key should be recovered, if possible, and turned in to supervisory staff.

All staff post orders should clearly outline the key control responsibilities particular to that post, including checking the number of keys on a ring at the time of exchange and calling in a key count at an established time.

For assignments where keys do not leave the post, procedures should clearly explain the procedures for exchanging chits. This should take place at the key issue point: the oncoming staff member turns in chits to receive keys while the staff member going off duty receives his or her chit in exchange for the keys turned in.

Key Handling

Written procedures should prescribe key handling requirements. When keys are carried, they should be concealed either in a pocket or in a pouch secured to the employee's belt by a metal chip or chain. A chain should be used to attach the key ring of large security keys to the clip so that the keys remain connected to the clip when in use. A keychain is recommended for all keys to reduce the possibility of theft or loss.

Procedures must be established to ensure that perimeter keys are not carried into the secure compound and interior security keys are not carried outside the perimeter. Security keys *never* leave the institution grounds. Pol-

Officers who carry keys must ensure that they are properly secured at all times.

icy must specify steps to be taken if keys are inadvertently taken out of the institution.

Keys should never be thrown from one staff member to another or slid from one point to another across a desk or floor. Keys should never be left in locks or used to lift or pull open a lockable door or hatch. No force should be used to operate any locks. If locking mechanisms bind or malfunction, supervisory staff must be notified at once.

Inmates must never handle security keys. Disciplinary procedures should provide penalties for inmates possessing, fabricating, or otherwise attempting to duplicate locks, keys, or other items. Duplication, alteration, marking, manufacture, or making impressions of locks or keys should be prohibited. Similarly, any key-impression material, lock picks, key blanks, or other lock or key making paraphernalia should be declared contraband.

Staff should not reference key or lock identifying information in the presence of inmates. With the exception of some proprietary information on several prominent brands of prison-type locks, no manufacturers' code numbers should be stamped on keys; a local institution code number should be used instead. The key cut combination code will not be stamped on keys.

Security keys never leave the institution grounds.

Restricted Key Use

Restricted key issue procedures should be established for the following areas of the institution:

- Commissary sales and storage areas.
- Property and valuable storage rooms.
- Evidence storage areas.
- Personnel records storage rooms.
- Warehouse (general and food service).
- Armory and/or vault.
- Lockshop and any other key or lock storage areas.
- Cashier's office.
- Inmate records office.
- Pharmacy.
- Other areas designated by the warden or superintendent as having special security requirements.

Keys to the above areas should be issued only to authorized staff and only after supervisory approval. Access to these areas by other personnel should be on a sign-in basis and require the approval of the shift supervisor.

A record should be maintained to document the issue of restricted keys. At a minimum, it should reflect the key ring number, date, time of issue and return, the person to whom issued, the purpose of issue, and the person authorizing the issue. Different levels of restriction may be established, according to the sensitivity of different areas the keys allow access to. In some cases, sealed envelopes or glass door compartments should be used to secure critical keys such as those for the lockshop, armory, and pharmacy vault. For critical keys, the log should also contain the signature of the person authorizing the key issue. In many cases it may be desirable to have a

separate form documenting such issuances; this form should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing official by the next working day.

Appropriate procedures must be established to restrict access to all key depositories, especially the storage cabinets used for pattern or restricted keys. Keys to these areas should be maintained separately, on separate rings, in glass lockboxes in the control center or key issue room. The locksmith only should have a 24-hour issue key to the box; such access should be restricted for everyone else. If the armory is in a separate location, its keys should be maintained in similar fashion on the armory officer's and shift commander's 24-hour checkout rings, with access to other personnel limited.

Certain keys may be restricted during fog or limited visibility conditions. This will ensure that critical departments or sensitive sections of the facility are not activated until all necessary inmate supervision procedures are in place, or until the weather abates.

Emergency Key System

Emergency key procedures are critical in a correctional facility and must be clearly detailed in institution policy. Staff must be able to access every part of the facility without delay during a fire, disturbance, or other crisis. To allow for this, a separate set of emergency keys must be available. Each ring should contain identifying information enabling the responding employees to quickly and easily determine which lock each key opens. Keys on each ring should provide responding staff access from the last secure gate controlled from outside the perimeter completely through the area or zone the key ring is intended to serve. In an emergency, employees who are unfamiliar with the area and its key system may be the only ones responding, so the system must be virtually foolproof.

The coding or identifying system employed is not as important as staff familiarity with the method. There are a number of methods to quickly and easily identify which key fits which lock. These include the following:

- A color-coded system, with each key handle dipped in colored plastic to match a colored dot or painted area located at the lock site where that key is used.

- Attachment of a simple floor plan drawing on a durable tag attached to the key ring, reflecting the location of all locks opened by the keys on that emergency ring.

- Use of metal tags with lock/key identifying information on the tag, usually in tabular form.

- Notched keys to assist staff in matching lock and key in smoke, the dark, or other low visibility situations.

Emergency keys must be maintained on a separate key board or on a separate section of the main key board. In either case, the storage area allotted should be made distinct from other key storage areas by being painted red. An alphabetical listing posted adjacent to the board should indicate the locations served by each ring and the corresponding key ring number.

Keys to the perimeter locks and gates must not be stored inside the facility on the emergency board. Instead, they should be kept in a secure tower or armory located outside the perimeter, only accessible to appropriately identified and authorized personnel. This prevents inmates from escap-

The key board for emergency keys should be separate from the main key board.

ing directly through the entrances if they were to gain control of the emergency key board.

A duplicate set of emergency keys should be kept in an outside armory or tower. This is particularly necessary when the control center or other key issue point is inside the secure portion of the facility. Duplicate emergency keys could also be crucial in the event of other problems, including illness of the officer in the control center or key issue area. Procedures for controlling these keys should include restrictions on access to sensitive areas, including separate maintenance of the armory and lockshop keys.

Emergency keys must be rotated in use to equalize wear on locks and keys thus ensuring serviceability at all times. The locksmith should be responsible for establishing and implementing this system of rotation. In addition, the locksmith and the safety or fire control officer should test all emergency exits and entrance locks by actual use not less than quarterly, and preferably once a month. These checks must be documented in a bound ledger and cosigned by the security department head. Any deficiencies or repairs should be noted in the ledger and appropriate follow-up actions should be taken.

Someone other than the locksmith should test emergency keys because it is important that staff unfamiliar with the system be able to open the locks. If only the locksmith test the keys, it is difficult to ascertain if they will function for all of the staff.

Inmate Key Issue

Inmate use of nonsecurity keys should be covered by written policy, issued by the warden, that clearly describes the limits of inmate key handling. Inmates should only be issued nonsecurity keys; issue of these keys is done through staff supervisors. Inmates must be required to use a durable chit system, returning all keys at the end of each day. A key and pass system can be used in maintaining accountability for keys used by inmates. Inmates issued room keys must sign a receipt. Depending upon the staffing pattern and institution configuration, there is an additional option of establishing daily turn-in procedures in housing units.

Locks secured by keys issued to inmates must be unique. No other similarly keyed lock should be in use anywhere else in the institution. These locks should have a different keyway than other facility locks. Staff should recover all keys when inmates are moved for any reason.

Procedures for key issue to inmates who drive institution vehicles should include appropriate check-in and check-out as well as interim accountability or key counts by supervising staff members. Additional procedures should be developed for inmates who are permitted to drive personal vehicles when involved in approved community activities. It is recommended that the facility retain a duplicate key set, enabling staff members to move such vehicles for reasons including reparking, recovery in the event of rearrest, or placement of the inmate in segregation.

Key Issue Centers

Centralized key issue should take place from a secure location inaccessible to inmates. The windows of the center should be of attack-resistant glazing, reinforced with security bars. The ceiling and walls should be reinforced block or poured concrete. All points of penetration, such as plumbing chases, ventilators, and air conditioner openings should be appropriately grilled. All doors or entry passages should include a sally port with electrically interlocked doors. If the sally port is manually operated, the controls should ensure that both doors are not opened at the same time.

The pass-through used to issue keys and other small items of security equipment should be a sliding drawer similar to a bank deposit bin. This will prevent the introduction of a bomb or incendiary device into the area through the pass-through.

Key Board Storage

The main key board should be organized either alphanumerically or by facility department or zone. To enhance accountability, each key ring should have its own hook. When a key ring has been removed for authorized use, a chit should replace it. Special "not in use" chits should occupy all empty hooks that are not needed for active key storage.

Under alphanumeric key board organization (the most commonly used system), each key ring has two metal tags attached. One tag is engraved with the key ring designation, including the alphanumeric hook assignment on the key board. The other tag should indicate the number of keys on the ring. Both tags should be permanently affixed to the key ring. The key rings themselves should be bonded closed, either by welding, epoxying, or soldering. Only the locksmith should be able to remove keys from the rings.

Key board assignments can be further identified by color coding the hooks according to the level of access permitted for each key ring. For example, in one color-coded system a white strip of adhesive plastic over a hook indicates that the ring assigned to that position contains only general issue keys; black identifies keys restricted to preauthorized personnel; blue designates keys restricted to all personnel without written approval of the shift supervisor; and red indicates emergency keys. Color coded chits matching these security levels are used to mark the empty hooks when key rings are in use.

It is desirable to maintain restricted and emergency keys on board sections that are separate and distinct from less critical keys. Color coding the

The main key board should be well organized and provide a hook for each key ring.

sections reduces the possibility of inadvertent issue of keys under the wrong circumstances or to the wrong individuals.

The Lockshop

All spare and pattern keys, locks, parts, and key-making equipment should be maintained in a secure area. Key making, whether located in the armory or another area, must be a completely secure operation. Ideally, it should not be immediately adjacent to the key issue point, but if it is, complete and secure physical separation must be provided.

If a separate lockshop is maintained, its physical security should be equal to that of the control center or key issue area. It should be located outside the secure perimeter of the facility, if possible; otherwise in an area where there is no inmate traffic and other traffic can be easily monitored and controlled. The lockshop should have adequate space not only for the basic tools necessary for lock repair, but also for neat, orderly storage of all spare parts and other minor equipment incidental to the maintenance of the institution's locking systems.

The typical lockshop should contain the following equipment, the minimum needed for a comprehensive storage and maintenance program:

- Key duplication machine.
- Proprietary or local key storage cabinet system.
- Drill press.
- Vice.
- Hand drills and bits.
- Assorted files, saws, and hand tools.
- File cabinet.
- Card files.
- Assorted shelving and cabinet storage area.
- Portable tool box.

Both pattern and duplicate keys as well as stocks of blank keys should be kept in the lockshop. Adequate storage cabinets must be provided for pattern and spare keys, with appropriate cross-referencing capability. Spare parts for locks and supplies of padlocks for the institution should be maintained in a neat and orderly manner.

A pattern key plus at least one additional key should be maintained in a specified secure storage cabinet or key board. Many jurisdictions have constructed their own cabinets to fulfill this purpose, while others have purchased commercially designed units. Whatever choice is made, the storage system should have the basic capability for the cross-indexing and cross-referencing specified in the record keeping section of this chapter.

Worn or discarded locks and keys should be cut up and disposed of by the locksmith. Inactive keys should be stored in a secure area or vault with appropriate restrictions on access. A written inventory of inactive and discarded locks and keys should be maintained.

Adequate safeguards should be established for the delivery of lock and key supplies and equipment. These materials should not be present inside the facility without proper controls. All locking supply purchase orders specify delivery procedures, including requests for hazardous materials labeling. Clear delivery information will help avoid the routing of sensitive materials through the general institution warehouse.

Types of Locking Devices

Procurement of locking devices and keys should be centralized. Keys or locks should not be purchased or put into use except by the locksmith. Only dead bolt or dead lock mechanisms should be used in areas accessible to inmates; snap or dead latch mechanisms should not be permitted in those areas. Padlocks should not be used on doors in lieu of or in addition to a lock.

The double lock door sally ports at all front and rear entrance doors and gates, control centers, and other high-security locations should be electrically interlocked or have appropriate safeguards to ensure that both doors are not opened at the same time. In the case of nonelectrical locks, procedures should specify the method for preventing both doors from being opened at once.

Entrance and exit doors to inmate living quarters must conform to the specifications listed in the fire code. Removable core lock cylinders should be phased out and replaced by standard lock cylinders.

Institution-wide grand master keying or other systems where a single key can open many doors should not be permitted because of the considerable security risk the presence of master keys represents. In addition, the prohibitive cost of rekeying the many doors involved when master keys are compromised or lost offsets any transient advantage of staff convenience. Master keying should be permitted only when necessary, in controlled circumstances involving a minimum number of doors. A suitable setting for master keying is a dormitory in which inmates are permitted to carry their own keys.

Padlocks used by inmates to secure their own belongings should be of a single type sold in the inmate commissary or store. These locks should belong to a master key series so they can be opened by staff members during routine searches or in other appropriate circumstances. The use of non-

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    RESTRICTED KEY FORM                          │
│                                                                 │
│  Key Ring Number and Title _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  Institution _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  Date _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  Time Out _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  Time In _____ │
│                         (Signature)          (Print Name)       │
│  Authorized By _____ │
│                         (Signature)          (Print Name)       │
│  Employee _____  │
│                         (Signature)          (Print Name)       │
│  Control Center Officer _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  Reason Key Was Issued _____ │
│                                                                 │
│  _____   │
│                                                                 │
│  _____   │
│                                                                 │
│  Copies to: Chief Security Officer                              │
│             Department Head Concerned                           │
│             Security Officer                                    │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Sample key form to be used in key card file.

standard locks by inmates should be prohibited. Nonstandard locks and locks that have been plugged or rendered inoperative by the master key should be cut from their hasps and confiscated.

Record-Keeping

Records at Point of Key Issue

At a minimum, record-keeping in the control center or key issue room should include a continuously maintained index system for tracking the keys on the issue board. An alphabetical card file or other equally effective system should be established, cross-referenced on the following information:

- Key ring number (number of assigned keys).
- Key ring hook number (title of the key ring).
- Key number (lock and location).
- Location of lock (key number).

A daily check-out log should be kept in the control center or key issue room documenting the issue of all keys. In most instances, a durable chit system is necessary only for restricted and emergency keys. Record-keeping for restricted and emergency keys must be kept separate from the log for permanently issued keys. The log procedures for these special keys should include:

- Name of employee to whom the key was issued.
- Date and time issued and returned.
- Number of the ring issued.
- Name of supervisor authorizing the issue.
- Signature of employee drawing the ring (selected categories).
- Signature of an authorizing official (selected categories).

The control center staff should check the key board for completeness and accuracy at the beginning of each shift. Once a day, on the morning shift, all of the institution's keys should be accounted for. To enable this, the locksmith should provide the control center with the current institutional key count. All staff members having keys on their post should call their counts in to a designated point. At the collection point these totals should be added to the number of keys remaining on the key board. The final total should agree with the key count calculated by the locksmith. Documentation of this process should be forwarded daily to the security department head.

Records In The Lockshop

Records in the lockshop must be more complete than those at the point of key issue. These records must be sufficient to reconstruct not only the facility's entire lock system, but also the history of lock utilization. They must also provide a basis for projection of procurement activity.

Changes in key rings, locations, or locks should be made by the locksmith only. The security department head is the only staff member who may authorize key duplication or lock changes.

Any changes in inventory, lock deployment, or key utilization should be immediately accompanied by a notation in the appropriate records. All key blanks and other critical items should be on perpetual inventory. This means that as items are added or subtracted from stock in the storage area the inventory record is updated.

The lockshop should contain a blueprint of the entire facility, indicating the location and type of all locks in use. This is an invaluable aid in planning facility utilization, and is also critical in an emergency, when emergency keys or other contingency plans may need to be modified.

Procedures should be established for maintaining a complete ongoing inventory of all keys, blanks, pattern keys, and locks in the institution. The concise storage and inventory of pattern keys and blanks are particularly important and should be done by a systematic filing method utilizing either a locally devised or a commercial key file system. Pattern keys and blanks must be strictly accounted for at all times.

Record-keeping for each key should be cross-referenced by the following:

- Location, filed alphabetically, indicating:
  - Which lock is fitted by the key. Perimeter locks and keys should be identified separately.
  - Lock make and model, including brand name and manufacturer's number.
  - Key code number.
  - Key rings on which the key is included.
  - Key ring hook number of each ring containing the key.
  - Emergency key rings containing the key (if any).
  - Hook number of the key in the storage cabinet (if used).

- Hook number in the storage cabinet, filed numerically, indexed to:
  - Location
  - Which lock is fitted by the key assigned to this hook number.

- Lock make and model, including brand name and manufacturer's number, indicating:

— All blanks indexed by manufacturer's number for blank key stock.
— Hook number in the storage cabinet.

This information should be kept in the locksmith's shop. The control center should have a duplicate copy of the alphabetical location listing which does not indicate the storage cabinet hook numbers.

All cut keys and key blanks should be assigned a storage hook number. These keys should be kept in the storage cabinet with a copy of the current inventory. In addition, the locksmith should maintain inventories for all other storage areas, including those for inactive or space keys. These inventories can be kept by hook or bin number as appropriate. All key inventories must be perpetual. At all times the actual number of copies and blanks for any given key in the storage area should agree with the information on its record card.

An internal inventory of the lockshop should be conducted quarterly by a supervisory staff member other than the locksmith. An inventory report, with all discrepancies and recommendations for improvements and changes, should be forwarded to the security department head. In addition, an inventory of all permanently issued keys should be made and logged quarterly. An inventory should be maintained of all locks stored in the lockshop. The master inventory of all the institution's padlocks should reflect their number, type, and location.

The locksmith should maintain a copy of all purchase orders to aid in preparing future budgets. In addition, a keying history should be maintained in a permanent log so that the rationale for the original keying scheme, or previous schemes, is available for review.

Staffing

In most institutions, "locksmith" is a separate job position. Occasionally he or she also has the responsibilities of the armory officer. However, reliance on the locksmith to perform maintenance or custodial duties is inappropriate in all but the small institutions, and should be permitted only in cases of emergency.

Some facilities also employ an assistant or part-time locksmith. In many large, older institutions, maintenance of aging locking systems requires additional manpower on a regular basis and justifies another position.

It is also advisable to have one or more alternate locksmiths who are either detailed for assistance on special projects or major lock renovation jobs or who are being trained by the senior locksmith. These persons can be evaluated for future career development as they work with the locksmith and can fill in when sick leave, annual leave, or training takes the regular locksmith away from the institution.

A complete position description and thorough post orders clearly describing the duties of the locksmith must be developed and reviewed regularly.

Supervision and Monitoring

All key control activities must be organized under the supervision of a security officer responsible for the development and implementation of the institution's key control policy. The security department head has complete responsibility for all institutional keys and locks. Policy and other written

Learn and implement key control policy.

procedures developed in this department should specify that information and training systems are established and that all employees are familiar with the key and lock control policy and procedures.

The chief of security should regularly review the procedures issued by other departments to ensure compliance with acceptable key control. He or she should attend other department staff meetings and conduct regularly scheduled training sessions to enhance institutional key control effectiveness.

Other department heads are responsible for implementing key control procedures in cooperation with the security department head. Each department head should adhere to the principles of sound key control and promote these principles within the department. Each employee, in turn, is responsible for learning and implementing the local procedures for carrying out key control policy.

A complete audit of the entire program should be done annually and will necessarily involve someone familiar with, but not associated with, the key control program. Ordinarily such audits are done internally by a senior supervisory official in the security department. If there is a central office security specialist, he or she can perform the audit either as an independent project or as part of a complete security audit of the facility.

Reports of quarterly inventories and summary reports of audit findings should be provided to the security department head, with copies routed to the warden and assistant warden supervising the institution's security operations. Recommendations for policy change or deviations from standard practice deserve a written response, describing a rationale for accepting or rejecting the suggestion and describing any plans for corrective action.

Training

Training is an extremely important part of key control. Once the system is established, thorough staff training is needed. All staff members should receive training in the fundamentals at the time the system is implemented or early in their institutional orientation. They should also receive regular refresher training. The members of the supervisory staff should ensure that all employees are familiar with the provisions and application of key control policy.

The importance of training for those who handle keys on a regular basis cannot be overemphasized. Supervisory personnel and control center officers in particular need the assistance of training. Supervisors should be familiar with every aspect of local policies and procedures in order to effectively communicate them to subordinate staff. In particular, because the handling of emergency keys is critical, control center, key room, and supervisory staff must be ready and able to use these keys proficiently.

Agency training should focus on several levels of activity. First, new staff members need to be properly indoctrinated in key control principles. This indoctrination prevents them from picking up incorrect habits and enables them to carry out their duties more effectively.

All employees tend to lose their skills over time unless they are provided with refresher training. Accordingly, the periodic refresher training provided to employees should include a major segment on key control.

Proper training will enhance employee self-confidence and confidence in co-workers. Moreover, by providing the appropriate training in key control, the agency will reduce the possibility that a lapse will occur and create a major problem in the institution.

Tool Control

All employees are equally responsible for tool control.

Tool control is necessary in all institutions, from minimum security camps to maximum security penitentiaries. Tool control is designed to assist in preventing escapes, assaults, and the manufacture of weapons, to reduce the replacement cost for tools, and to maintain tools in good repair. Procedures and regulations should be developed to cover all forseeable situations and should be observed in conjunction with other regulations, directives, and situational orders.

Tool control regulates the purchase, storage, inventory, issue, use, and replacement of all tools in the institution. Tool control is necessary to:

- Control unauthorized or improper use.

- Provide adequate supervision.

- Provide economical control by preventing loss or damage.

- Provide a positive means of tool identification.

- Establish accountability, responsibility, and methods of purchase, issue, receipt, survey, and disposal for tools.

- Control excess tools.

- Identify the need for specific tools.

Tool Control Responsibility

The chief security officer should have primary responsibility for developing and supervising the tool control program. All employees are equally responsible for adhering to established policies and procedures. The chief security officer should provide advisory assistance to other department supervisors in the implementation of control practices. He or she should provide the checks and inspections necessary for the effective operation of the program. The chief security officer or a designated staff member should make frequent inspections of tool control implementation in all areas of the institution. Although responsible for the overall operation of the program, the chief security officer should be aided by the department heads, each of whom is responsible for control in his or her own area. Department heads should ensure compliance with established policy by the employees under their supervision.

Disposal of Excess or Unserviceable Tools

A procedure for the disposal of excess or unserviceable tools must be part of any tool control program. These tools must be surveyed and disposed of in accordance with procedures designed to ensure that they remain unavailable to staff and inmates. Each department head should determine what tools are excess or unserviceable. The list of these tools should be submitted to the chief security officer, who will arrange for their disposal.

Classification of Tools

In general, tools are classified as hazardous (class A) or nonhazardous (class B). The hazardous category includes tools most likely to be used in an escape attempt, to manufacture or serve as weapons, or to pose a threat to institution security or personal safety. All other tools belong in the nonhazardous category. The classification of tools as hazardous or nonhazardous differs significantly between maximum and minimum security institutions.

For example, ladders would be considered hazardous in a secure institution, but nonhazardous in an open camp setting. In view of this, each institution should develop its own lists of hazardous and nonhazardous tools.

Among the many items that should always be included in inventories of hazardous tools (class A) are emery wheels, portable grinders, and similar machines. Poisonous chemicals, dangerous drugs, acids, and hypodermic apparatus are hazardous in all institutions and should be included in class A as well.

The classification of a tool determines the degree of staff control needed over inmate use of that piece of equipment. However, it must not be assumed that a particular tool, by virtue of its classification as nonhazardous, does not represent a risk to institutional security or personal safety. Each and every tool must be considered as potentially hazardous and treated accordingly.

Storage

The location and design of tool storage should be determined by the institution's layout, taking into consideration the needs of various shops and departments. The chief of security should approve storage facility design and placement. Tools should be kept only in the designated locations. Exceptions to this policy should not be made without the prior approval of the chief security officer or his or her designee.

The shadow board is the best storage device for tools that can be adapted to suspension from a rack, hook, or peg. Each tool should have its own hanging device and silhouette on the board. Tools of the same type should be stored individually and never be stacked. The silhouettes should closely mimic the outline of each tool so that quick inspection of the board will reveal the exact nature of any missing tools. All shadow boards accessible to inmates should be secured by an expanded metal locked screen.

Tools that cannot be adapted to the shadow board should be stored in a locked cabinet. A careful inventory of these tools should be maintained. Hazardous tools, regardless of type or location, should always be stored separately from nonhazardous tools.

Hacksaws, files, and other metal cutting blades should be stored in an area outside the secure perimeter of the institution and issued only as they are needed. The control center is the only acceptable storage area within the perimeter for these hazardous tools.

If a tool is removed from the inventory, the corresponding shadow should immediately be removed from the shadow board. Tools on repair or checked out to a job site should be replaced by a tool chit or durable tag. Temporary or paper tags are not acceptable.

Identification

All tools should be marked with a symbol identifying the department and/or work detail to which the tool is assigned. This symbol should be etched onto the tool. Tools that cannot be marked without damage, such as surgical instruments, micrometers, and small drill bits, should be inventoried and kept in locked storage when not in use.

Inventory

All tools must be inventoried according to category—hazardous or nonhazardous. A minimum of three copies of the inventory should be pre-

> *Each institution should develop its own lists of hazardous and nonhazardous tools.*

> *Hazardous tools should always be stored separately from nonhazardous tools.*

TOOL INVENTORY

(Institution)

Shop or Area _____ Marking _____ Calendar Year _____ Date Prepared _____

Page ___ of ___ Pages

Qn.	Tool Description	Size	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter

Certified correct _____ *(Shop Area Foreman)*

_____ *(Tool Control Officer)*

Approved _____ *(Chief Security Officer)*

Quarterly Audits

January _____ C.S.

April _____ C.S.

July _____ C.S.

October _____ C.S.

pared, with copies going to the chief security officer, mechanical services supervisor, and the shop, department, or detail concerned. Any addition to or deletion from an inventory should be followed immediately by a typewritten explanatory inventory supplement and circulated to each of these departments. A complete audit of each inventory should be conducted by the chief security officer or his or her designated representative at least every three months. The supervisory officer making the audit should forward a complete report listing any discrepancies.

Local tool inventories should be numbered and posted on all corresponding shadow boards, tool boxes, and tool kits. The chief security officer should maintain a separate file folder for each area in which tools are stored. Audit sheets, with the signature of the periodic audit official and date of audit, should be maintained in each folder. All lost or replacement tool reports should also be kept in this folder.

Inventories should be made of all tools and equipment used by civilian contractors working inside the institution. Appropriate controls should be established by the chief security officer for all outside items while they are in the facility. These inventories should be maintained by the chief security officer, the maintenance supervisor, and the job supervisor.

REPORT OF HAZARDOUS TOOLS

Front Entrances ☐
Rear Gate ☐

Security Supervisor _____ representing _____ (Company)

Subject _____

AM
PM

The following tools were brought into the institution at _____
AM
PM.
and were taken out of the institution at _____

_____
_____
_____

The tools were under the supervision of _____

ing their use.

The visitor/mechanic was instructed in the b

Any discrepancies and/or comments _____

_____

Notice: It is a crime to bring any unauthorized contraband on these premises.

_____
Date

WEEKLY TOOL REPORT

To: Chief of Security

From: _____
(Name) _____ (Title)

I have verified the presence of all tools charged to _____ by _____ and the fact that such tools are stored in the approved and/or prescribed manner as of the end of my workday on _____ .

Tool storage areas identified for warehousing of tool stocks are excluded from the daily accountability, except when there is evidence of forcible entry.

Note: Lost Tool Report
When ANY TOOL is lost, stolen, or misplaced, the chief of security, tool control officer, and shift supervisor shall be notified immediately, by telephone.

A written report covering the details of the loss of tools will be submitted as quickly as time permits. Forward the report to the chief of security with copies to the tool control officer and the shift supervisor. (See Lost Tool Report Form)

Copies to: Tool Control Officer
Shift Supervisor

Although not actually classified as tools, certain equipment such as weapons, chemical agents, disturbance control equipment, binoculars, restraint equipment, and communications apparatus require close property management controls. Therefore, all such items should be inventoried, maintained, issued, and disposed of in the same manner as that outlined for tools. Items that cannot be stored on shadow boards should be maintained in appropriately secure areas. Bin cards or other inventory records for those items should be kept.

Tool Issue

Metal or plastic tags bearing employees' names should be used for issuing tools. Each employee should have a name tag, and records of the tags should be maintained to avoid loss or misuse. If a name tag system is not used, each employee should have an identifying number coded to a log containing names and code numbers for all employees. Temporary or paper receipts should not be used without the chief security officer's approval. When an employee is terminated, resigns, retires, or is separated from service, he or she must turn in all name tags and code numbers. Loss of a name tag must be reported to the chief security officer and immediately followed by a written report.

Hazardous (class A) tools should be issued only to employees. They should be used only under the direct visual supervision of an employee. Nonhazardous (class B) tools may be issued to inmates under a name tag

> *Missing tools should be reported immediately.*

system similar to the one outlined for employees. Inmate name tags must be easily distinguishable from employee name tags. Nonhazardous tools may be used by inmates without the direct supervision of an employee, but must be accounted for at the end of each work period by an employee.

Lost Tools

Missing tools should be reported immediately to the chief security officer and the shift supervisor of security. Written reports should follow as soon as possible, preferably no later than the end of the shift during which the loss was discovered. The report should identify the missing item(s) and describe the circumstances of the incident. The chief security officer, shift supervisor of security, and the department involved should maintain copies of the report until the tool is found or the incident is closed. Inmates who had access to the missing tool should be detained at the site of the loss until a thorough search is made.

When a lost tool is recovered, a report detailing the circumstances of the discovery should be submitted to the chief security officer. Procedures should be established for periodic formal evaluations to ensure that reasonable efforts are made to recover lost tools.

LOST TOOL REPORT

To: Chief Security Officer

From _____
(Name)

_____
(Department)   (Title)

The tool(s) listed below have been lost/stolen from this worksite on _____
(Date)

Description of Tool(s)   Number Missing

Circumstances surrounding this loss are as described below:

Copies to: Tool Control Officer
           Shift Supervisor
           Work Area Supervisor

Control of Entrances

Institutional entrances are areas vulnerable to serious security breaches, possibly involving inmate escape and the introduction of contraband. It is important that procedures exist to ensure security at entrances. Entrances

are usually categorized into four groups: front, rear, pedestrian, and vehicular. Some facilities combine pedestrian and vehicular functions with that of the front entrance. For purposes of this manual, front entrances will be defined as encompassing only pedestrian traffic involving staff, visitors, or inmates. Rear gate operations will include other pedestrian activity as well as the vehicular traffic uncommon at the facility's main entrance.

Operating Procedures

Every entrance post must have a clearly written set of post orders containing, at a minimum:

- A description of general duties.

- A chronological list of duties to be performed during the shift.

- A standard agency hostage statement, specifying that no hostage has any authority while under control of inmates.

- Other specialized information particular to that institution or post.

In addition to these basic instructions, there should be a collection of relevant institutional and agency policies such as those defining contraband and those that describe the processing of visitors. Instructions for handling and storing firearms should be made clear at any entrance post where weapons are used.

Procedures for each perimeter post should be written in sufficient detail to enable any staff member assuming that post to perform the required duties with minimal supervisory assistance. The instructions, however, should include clearly described procedures for requesting supervisory assistance. This is especially important for entrance posts, because errors made there can have serious repercussions. All post orders and institutional policies relating to entrance operations must be reviewed annually. The supervisory security staff is required to personally review entrance post orders on a regular basis. All staff members assigned to the post must review the post orders and acknowledge their understanding in writing. Both of these procedures are easily documented by the use of a sign-in review sheet included as a preface to every set of post orders.

Rear Gate Operations

Staff vehicles parked in close proximity to any vehicular gate must be restricted to a designated parking area. Personal staff vehicles should not be permitted to enter the institution. When vehicles are unattended, they should be securely locked and should contain no contraband, weapons, ammunition, or other hazardous items. Staff should be advised that vehicles are subject to search within the laws of the jurisdiction involved.

No inmates should be in the sally port when a vehicle is passing through or being searched. Employees escorting inmates through the gate area must stand clear of the gate before signalling the officer controlling the gate to open it. Inmates should never be permitted to loiter in the gate area or to obtain possession of the keys to gates. Rear gate traffic, including inmates, drivers, and others, should be processed through a metal detector.

Vehicular Traffic

Signs should be posted at all traffic locations approaching the institu-

All vehicles should be searched when entering and leaving the facility.

tion entrances. The signs should include information about prohibited acts and contraband, as well as directions for inmate visitors, deliveries, and authorized official guests.

At a minimum, documentation of all drivers presenting themselves for entrance to the institution with a delivery of any type should include the following information:

- Name of driver.

- Company represented.

- License number.

- Time in and out.

- Purpose of entry.

- Name of escorting employee.

- Signature of person clearing vehicle in and out.

Drivers of commercial delivery vehicles should declare their entire cargo to avoid placing firearms and other hazardous materials intended for other locations in proximity to inmates.

The gate officer should search the vehicle for contraband. This inspection must include all compartments, under the hood, and other areas where contraband is likely to be hidden. Use of a pit or inspection well is recommended, but mirrors and automotive "creepers" can also be used. The driver should be required to sign a statement that he or she is aware of the items considered contraband and that none are in his or her possession or in the vehicle in question. Only once this is done should the truck be permitted to enter the facility.

Once approved for entrance into the facility, all commercial vehicles must remain under constant staff escort. Trucks are loaded under direct supervision and remain under direct staff escort until returned to the gate area. There should be a designated point short of the gate at which the vehicles

> *Only one gate of any sally port should be opened at a time.*

stop and the drivers exit so that the vehicle can be searched. If it is not possible to thoroughly search a vehicle before it leaves the compound, it should be either unloaded or held in the sally port through a count.

An officer is responsible for properly identifying and searching the vehicle and driver as required before clearing them through. Inspection before release involves a thorough security check of all compartments, including the engine, the underbody, the inside of the cab, and the rear cargo box. The officer must inspect the trailer of a semi-trailer or the body of a straight truck from the inside to ensure that no false compartments or other hiding places have been concealed. He or she should use an inspection well or creeper in conjunction with a mirror to perform the underbody inspection. Probing rubbish and other materials for hidden inmates should be a regular procedure for dumpsters, garbage trucks, and other bulk cargo loads that are loose enough to penetrate with a long pole. Once the inspection is complete the driver and officer conducting the search should stand clear and the officer should indicate that it is clear to pass the vehicle through.

Only one gate of any sally port should be opened at a time and there should be only one vehicle at a time in the sally port. Ideally, gates should be interlocked, making it mechanically or electrically impossible to open without using an authorized override procedure. In cases when a vehicle is too long for the sally port, supervisory staff will deploy additional staff to ensure the institution's security.

Any vehicles left unattended inside the secure perimeter must be disabled by removal of the rotor, distributor cap, or other means. These vehicles must be locked and parked within view of a tower.

Inventories should be taken on all tools going into the facility from outside, whether they be institutional or contractor tools. Stun guns, Ramset guns, and bottled gas, torches, and accessories should not be permitted without stringent controls.

Rail traffic is rare but when it occurs, it is handled by similar procedures. Considering the power of a typical locomotive, a small tractor-style vehicle of limited power is preferable for use inside a compound. These smaller vehicles can either be rail or rubber tire based units of sufficient capacity to slowly pull a loaded rail car out of the facility with regular sally-porting, but not so powerful as to create an unusual risk of ramming a gate if inmates are able to commandeer it in an escape attempt.

Emergency vehicle entry is also an important consideration. Although procedures should not unduly delay entry and exit, staff should not open both sally port gates at the same time. Normal identification and search procedures may be dispensed with. However, supervisors should notify the gate that the vehicle is on the way and provide an escort to stay with it the entire time it is in the facility. Ambulances (carrying medications and needles) and fire trucks (carrying many potential weapons) require close supervision. Staff members should question drivers about weapons, but not delay the entry process unless a weapon is declared and must be secured.

> *Proper identification procedures should be posted prominently in the pedestrian entry area.*

Pedestrian Traffic

Proper identification procedures should be posted prominently in the pedestrian entry area. Individuals who do not have a photographic ID or other approved identification should be denied visiting privileges, or, in questionable cases, referred to a supervisor for a final determination.

Front entrances in particular should use ultraviolet ink stamping procedures, with randomly varying stamps. Staff members clearing visitors out of the facility should check for the presence of the stamp using an ultraviolet lamp.

Inmate identification cards may be of limited use. A better system is for staff to control gate cards. These cards, with basic identifying information and a picture, should be kept in the entrance area and secured from inmate access. When used in a properly devised system, the card is moved from one area of a slotted status board to another to reflect the inmate's location in or out of the institution.

Inmates who are to be officially released from custody require a different system. The release order should be prepared in advance and properly authenticated by a supervising official. The control center officer and the officer manning the entrance post should have identical copies of the order, including a picture for direct identification purposes.

Institution Vehicles

All institution vehicles moving in or out of the secure perimeter are governed by the same rules and regulations prescribed for commercial and other traffic. Searches, sallyporting, and driver activities must conform to the aforementioned pattern of security procedures. Constant staff escort may be a local option, depending on the security level of the facility.

Inmates

All inmates entering or leaving the facility should be searched. Searches of individual inmates and work details should be a regular feature of gate operations. These searches should go beyond requiring the inmate to walk through a metal detector and should include regular pat searches and irregular but frequent strip searches in a private area adjacent to the entrance.

Inmates entering and leaving the facility should be limited in the items they are permitted to carry. Local regulations specifying a minimum amount of personal effects reduces the likelihood of contraband movement through the entrance.

Identification Procedures

The officer controlling the entrance gates should never open them unless he knows the identity of the individual approaching the gate. When the gate officer is in doubt, the person seeking admittance should not pass through the control point and other staff should be called to investigate.

All gate controls, both for pedestrian and vehicular entrances, must be in a secure location, typically in the control center or tower. When a sally port is in use, the gate controls should be interlocked so that both gates cannot be opened at the same time. Visibility from the control center or tower is important for proper identification and, if distances are great, installation of closed circuit television may be considered.

Ideally, package deliveries should take place at the gate and the delivery personnel should not enter the facility. To expedite this process, a weather-protected storage and inspection area should be constructed as a part of the entrance complex.

Because the entrance post must be manned at all times, it should have rest room facilities, running water, and other personal comfort fixtures. The

The officer controlling the entrance gates should never open them unless he knows the identity of the individual approaching the gate.

entire gate area should be well lighted, with clear lines of sight from any tower controlling the gates to the ground post area. A deadman barrier should be installed in all vehicular gate areas so that a commandeered vehicle cannot ram through the gates in an escape attempt.

Equipment and Supplies

Entrance staff should have metal detection equipment, a phone and/or radio, a roster of inmates, and an ultraviolet light for inspection of black-light imprints on visitors. Gates where inmates are processed out on a regular basis need a crew-kit card board. This board holds the inmate crew-kit cards or gate cards and helps in accounting for inmates. Constructing this board on rollers allows easy movement from the inner to the outer gate, facilitating movement of the card to the appropriate section of the board as the inmates are actually processed.

Storage lockers must be provided for items that visitors cannot take into the visiting room. These lockers should have individual locks, with a removable key that visitors take with them into the visiting room and return to the locker after the visit. A secure coat rack must be available, with a check-out system to prevent theft by other visitors.

A high-security weapons locker should be provided for law enforcement personnel and staff authorized to carry weapons outside the facility. Ideally, tower staff should retain control over the outer door of the weapons repository. Inner compartments with individual locks and keys keep weapons safe from tampering by others accessing the main gun locker.

Metal detection equipment should be provided and tested on a regular basis, with recalibration as necessary. Many units of metal detectors are affected by the proximity of large moving metal objects. Care should be taken in installation to shield against such interference. Staff members should also be aware of the possible effects of perimeter detection devices on the operation of metal detection equipment.

Record-Keeping

All visitors should be required to sign into the facility in a bound log book, which is maintained for official record-keeping purposes. To ensure that those entering the institution are informed of the applicable rules and regulations, a standard sign-in form should be used, stating out restrictions on contraband, cameras, recorders, drugs, medications, and other items that apply at that particular facility.

The record of incoming individuals should be subdivided into categories including official visitors, volunteers and contract employees, inmate visitors, repairmen and salespersons, and others. The log book for visitors should contain at least the following information:

- Name.
- Date.
- Time in and out.
- Purpose of visit.
- Means of identification (driver's license, birth certificate, state identification, or other means).
- Department or person visited.
- Remarks.

All visitors should be required to sign into the facility.

Visiting logs should be retained for a minimum of 30 days to enable staff to reconstruct visiting patterns of a particular inmate or investigate a particular visiting day. These records should be turned in daily to the chief of security.

A current inmate roster should be available to staff at the entrance processing inmate visitors. A card or file folder system may be used for tracking visits, although some facilities are automating this entire process. Computer-assisted systems are certainly acceptable.

Staffing

The number of staff required at each entrance post depends on the design of the facility. Clearly, it is necessary that staff either be close enough to the gates to properly identify traffic through the area or use closed circuit television to enable proper identification.

Schedules or rosters should fit the prime activity periods for each entrance post. In the case of a rear gate, weekends off is logical, since most delivery and work detail traffic is during the week. If the post were manned at all on a weekend, it would be ideal for a relief officer. Conversely, the front entrance officer should be on duty on weekends, when visiting traffic is heaviest.

Tact, diplomacy, and familiarity with regulations are necessary for staff manning entrance posts.

Tact, diplomacy, and familiarity with regulations are necessary for staff manning entrance posts. At armed posts, employees must not only be properly trained in the type of weapon involved, but also have the maturity and good judgment to handle the additional responsibility weapon use may entail. Alertness, good power of observation, and a knowledge of overall institution policies are also useful.

Supervision and Monitoring

Supervisory staff must actively oversee entrance operations to ensure staff are following policy closely; the on-site visit is the best method for doing so. There is no other effective means of determining whether or not searches are thorough, inmates are processed carefully, or records are current throughout the day. Shift supervisors should visit entrance posts during heavy traffic times to provide advice and assistance and to observe activity when breakdowns are most likely to occur.

Supervisors visiting the posts must review the post orders and discuss them periodically with the staff member(s) working the post. This enables post orders to be changed through natural evolution of duties or as a result of routines and procedures in other departments that have affected the entrance and change procedures.

Since visitor processing is a particularly sensitive activity, shift supervisors should pay special attention to it, as well as to the visiting operation in general. In cases where visits must be denied, terminated, or otherwise disrupted, supervisory personnel must be available to assist line staff. The shift supervisor should make certain decisions, including the decision to search or detain a visitor or to notify law enforcement personnel of a possible law violation.

Training

Skills necessary for manning entrance posts must be taught and refreshed on a regular basis. Ordinarily, annual or refresher training is conducted by the local institution, although academy courses are also available.

Search techniques are a major concern at entrance posts, and training should focus on hands-on experience in searching persons and vehicles. If the entrance post is armed, weapons qualification is critical. Other training activities necessary for entrance posts are those dealing with interpersonal skills and maintenance of the record-keeping systems for inmates and visitors.

Chapter 9

Inmate Management and Control

Locating and Identifying Inmates

In the public's eye, one of the primary functions of a correctional facility is to confine inmates, to keep them off the streets and out of society until they are ready to return. Correctional administrators accept this responsibility and recognize the fact that effective inmate management and control are critical factors in the smooth operation of their facilities.

A key element in inmate management is accountability—the staff's ability to locate and identify inmates at any point in time. Correctional administrators need to develop and maintain a clear and practical set of procedures to ensure accurate accountability for the entire inmate population. Implementing the concepts outlined in this section will aid in achieving this accountability.

Inmate Accountability

Inmate accountability is the fundamental responsibility of all correctional facilities, from minimum security camps to maximum security penitentiaries. It is the statutory obligation of correctional professionals to maintain committed offenders in custody. To do so effectively, institutions must have well-developed, comprehensive systems of accounting for all inmates at all times. Accountability procedures fall into two general categories:

- Counts and other regularly scheduled procedures for tracking the number of inmates in custody, including all routine and emergency counts and census checks.

- Supporting procedures that provide interim accountability throughout the institution. Pass systems, gate passes and cards, and other support systems fall into this category.

Counts

All institutional policies and procedures for counts should be clearly written and available for staff members to reference. The guidelines for conducting counts must cover all necessary procedures to ensure full accountability. They should include specifications for both regular and emergency counts, as well as census checks or some other form of interim accountability.

American Correctional Association (ACA) standards require a minimum of one count per shift. Agency policy varies, but the preferred system includes five counts each day. The recommended sequencing is:

- Midnight, or as close to midnight as possible. This count should yield the official institution count for the day.

- Middle of the morning watch. Because staffing levels are low on the morning watch, a count in the middle of this shift reduces the possibility of an escape remaining undetected during the long morning period of a relatively low level of supervision.

- Before opening the institution for the day. This early count, usually held between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m., ensures that all inmates are accounted for before heavy activity periods commence.

- End of workday. This count, taken late in the afternoon, ensures that all inmates are present and that none are hiding and waiting for nightfall in order to breach the perimeter.

- Lockup count. Taken when all inmates are secured for the night, the lockup count ensures that the entire population is accounted for before the morning watch, when staff levels will be low.

Specific times to conduct these counts should be established by each institution with the maintenance of security as a top priority. In most cases, count times should not interfere with regularly scheduled programs or meals. At the end of the day, a standup count may be required. In standup counts, inmates are required to stand at the doors of their cells or at the ends of their beds to demonstrate that they are physically present and are not deceiving observers through the use of dummies or other simulations.

American Correctional Association standards provide guidelines for counts, security inspections, and all other aspects of institution security.

Record-keeping

A master count should be maintained, with all counts being called into the control center or other designated count room. Throughout the day, the control center should be advised of moves of any kind, including housing changes, work assignment changes, hospital admissions, etc. In addition to housing unit staff tracking internal transfers, the gate officers must keep track of all inmate movement outside the perimeter and both departments should keep the control center advised of all movement.

The official count should be maintained as a running count. It should be arranged in the same categories as the master count sheet so an emergency count can be calculated at all times. This perpetual record should be maintained continuously throughout the day, using a master tally sheet combined with a cell location book or other comparable system for tracking each inmate. A standardized master count form should be devised for each institution. An outcount form and count slips should be distributed to all staff involved in the count process.

The master count sheet should be subdivided by unit, range, and floor, and should also provide space to list any departments with outcounts. No count is considered cleared until all signed count slips are in and verified against the master count sheet. The control center officer should retain all count slips, outcount slips, and official count sheets for at least 30 days.

Any errors in the official count records should be crossed out in red, with the correct number entered above. Any errors, corrections, or other unusual circumstances should be documented in a specified addition to the count sheet.

If a unit's physical head count does not agree with the recorded number on the master count sheet, the officer receiving the count should order a recount without informing the staff member performing the count of the recorded number. Agency policy should state whether a picture is needed and how many recounts are necessary after an incorrect number is reported. The officer receiving the count should advise staff when the official count is in agreement with the master count. After a correct count is called in, it should be followed by a count slip, with no alterations or corrections, signed in ink by the staff member(s) conducting the count.

A base reference number for the correct count in each unit is arrived at by subtracting the number of outcounts (inmates away from the unit—see below) and empty beds from actual unit capacity figures. Unit capacity is the number of habitable spaces. At the time of the count, these baseline figures should agree with the total head count of each unit.

Outcounts should be listed in a separate column of the master count sheet. They should not be aggregated with the counts of the units from which the inmates originated. Unit count totals when added to outcounts should equal the total count of the institution.

Outcounts

An outcount is an enumeration of inmates outside their assigned housing at the time of the institutional count. Supervisory staff should minimize outcounts, limiting the number of inmates outside their housing units to those who are necessary to institutional operation at the time of the count. Outcounts should be submitted for supervisory approval no less than one hour before the time of the count. This lead time is necessary to facilitate

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Recommended count schedule

- ⊛ *Midnight*
- ⊛ *Morning*
- ⊛ *Start of workday*
- ⊛ *End of workday*
- ⊛ *Lockups*

Counts and count forms allow administrators to know where all inmates are at all times.

OFFICIAL COUNT FORM

_____
(Institution)

Date _____

Time _____ PM AM

Unit	Unit Census	Food Service	Hospital	Clothing Room	Industries	Commissary	Power Plant	Barber Shop				Out-Count	Count Verification	Unit Count	Unit

Outcount Section

TOTAL

Count Verification

Official preparing count _____
Official taking count _____
Count cleared—time _____

The shift supervisor should take at least one count on each shift.

accurate compilation of the master count and to avoid last minute changes that create bookkeeping problems and delay the count clearing.

Outcount approval should be given using a standardized outcount form requiring the name, register number, and unit of each inmate who will be outcounted. Once the outcount information is approved by the designated supervisor, the form should be taken to the control center, and its figures should be included in the master count sheet undergoing compilation.

Inmates involved in an outcount should not be permitted to return to their assigned unit or leave the outcount area until the official count has been cleared.

Count Procedures

The shift supervisor should take at least one count on each shift. Counts should be announced on the institution's public address system, other available audible devices, and the institution radio system. No inmate movement should be permitted during counts. Nothing should distract staff during a count except major emergencies such as escape attempts, fires, or life-threatening medical crises.

In institutions or units where inmates are not locked in rooms for the count, at least one covering officer should be assigned to aid the regularly assigned staff member. Both officers should count the inmates and compare their findings. The unit count should be called in by phone and the unit count slip prepared. The counting staff should remain in the area until the institution count is officially cleared.

Staff must be sure that they are counting living, breathing flesh, as dummies have been used successfully in many escapes. Flashlights should be used at night to ascertain that each inmate is still in place, but consideration should be taken not to wake the inmate. No inmates should be involved in taking counts or maintaining count records. Counts are critical to the accountability system. It is essential that no inmates be in the position to modify or otherwise affect count records as this would allow an inmate to facilitate or conceal an escape.

Institutional disciplinary procedures should clearly specify the consequences for inmate actions that disrupt or delay a count.

Emergency Counts

Emergency counts are official counts taken at unscheduled times, after unforeseen events including:

- Disturbances.

- When inmates are believed to be missing.

- After lengthy power failures.

- Following or during periods of heavy fog or other inclement weather that might facilitate an escape.

The shift supervisor should be authorized to call for a count at any time for these reasons, or when in his or her professional judgment there is cause to do so.

Control center records should be organized so that an emergency count can be completed quickly and accurately. If an emergency count is necessary, recall should be sounded and inmates should be required to return to their housing areas. The master count sheet should be prepared immediately, with verbal or telephone outcounts approved by the designated supervisor. Emergency counts taken at night should disrupt inmates as little as possible. Lights should not be turned on unless a picture count is necessary.

Picture Counts

A picture count involves direct comparison of every inmate with his or her photograph, in a given area or the entire facility if necessary, to determine which inmates are not in their assigned locations. A prerequisite for the picture count is an accurate, up-to-date picture card system for the entire institution. This system should include picture cards for all housing areas, as well as crew-kit picture cards for all inmate work details.

A picture count should be taken whenever an inmate is believed missing or when repeated recounts create a problem in verifying the count. The number of recounts necessary to trigger the picture count should be established by agency policy.

Situations that call for emergency counts

- *Disturbances*
- *Missing inmate*
- *Power failure*
- *Inclement weather*

Situations that call for picture counts

- *Missing inmate*
- *Repeated recounts*

For a picture count, inmates should be required to stand at the doors of their cells or, in dormitory-type quarters, at the ends of their beds. Each inmate's picture should be carefully compared with the occupant of the cell or bed to ascertain that every inmate is present in his or her assigned living space. Picture counts help determine the identity of any inmate missing or out of place.

Census Checks

The purpose of a census check is to verify that inmates are in the proper location during the periods between counts. It should be conducted both in housing units and on the site of all work details. At the minimum, census checks should be conducted at the beginning and end of each work period.

Lay-ins, idles, sick call cases, and all other inmates without assignments should be accounted for in their housing units. Census checks on the job should involve an informal count of all inmates present and a reconciliation of that number with the number of inmates assigned.

Ordinarily, a report of the census check should be made only if an inmate is missing, although in housing units the officer should note the census in the unit log. Censuses can be conducted during nighttime hours as well, taking on the features of a count, since all inmates should be in their housing units except for the few who may be on night job assignments such as the powerhouse.

Census sheets help verify inmates' locations between counts.

Every facility should conduct a general census once a month, on a random basis, for the entire institution. This procedure involves stopping inmate movement and counting the inmates where they are located at that time. In high security settings, each unit and department should have a running accountability record for all inmates in that location at all times, so the actual number of inmates counted should agree with the predetermined figure. All of the separate count totals called in to the control center should be combined into a total facility count.

Even in facilities where running totals are not kept, taking this census on a regular basis, without notice, keeps staff and inmates more aware of the institution's accountability requirements. The census will help staff learn if inmates are hiding during the day, perfecting escape routes, engaging in sexual activity, or fabricating contraband. Supervisors and administrative staff will learn which departments or staff are deficient in their procedures and weak in accountability.

Supporting Accountability Procedures

Pass Systems

Whether an institution's inmate movement program is based on controlled movement, individual movement, mass movement, or a combination of all three, pass systems can improve accountability between counts. Passes can be required at specified times, for movement between specific parts of the institution, or for selected categories of inmates. All passes should be signed, dated, and timed at the point of departure and the destination.

Movement on a pass should always be preceded by a phone call. In many situations, phone calls for routine movements such as callouts may not be practical. In these cases, phone authorization should still be used for noncallout passes. All passes should include:

- The inmate's name.
- Register number.
- Department originating the pass.
- Name and signature of staff member originating the pass.
- Time and date of issue.
- Destination.
- Time of arrival.
- Signature of receiving employee.

All pass books should be strictly controlled. They should be issued from and returned to a central location, usually the control center. Passes should be issued only by staff members. Staff members receiving inmates moving on passes should examine all passes used, determining if the travel time taken was excessive and investigating all significant delays. Local policy should indicate which employee should take follow-up actions if the inmate does not arrive on time and should clearly state the travel time considered excessive. The inmate should surrender each pass upon return to the originating area. Institutional policy should clearly establish that inmates moving without passes during periods of controlled movement are subject to disciplinary action.

At the end of every day passes must be reconciled against all stubs to ascertain if any inmates are missing and to ensure that no passes have been lost or stolen. Passes also can be reconciled against the unit log if the local unit accountability system records permit a second check of this type.

Picture Card Systems

Accountability systems for traffic points, such as perimeter gates and critical internal access points, should include a picture card system to positively identify every inmate entering or leaving the facility. This picture card system should require a gate pass, approved by the captain or associate warden, for every inmate regularly going out of the gate for work assignments or programs. The pass should bear the inmate's name, register number, custody classification, job, and a current photograph and should be laminated or embossed with a seal over the authorizing signature to prevent forgery.

In order to maintain these passes in an orderly manner, a gate pass board should be used. The typical board has two sections, one organized either alphabetically or by work detail for inmates who are in the facility, and the other for inmates who are outside. When an inmate passes through the gate, the gate pass should be moved to the corresponding section, providing a ready check on the status of all inmates with approved passes.

Inmates who are moving through gates or other control points without gate passes, such as those who are being released or are going out to court, should be subject to a different identification process. The gate staff should be provided in advance with a release list with pictures of all prospective releases. Exceptions to this requirement may be made in emergencies.

When a staff member escorts the inmate to the gate for release, several steps should be taken. First, the gate officer should confirm the release by phone with the control center or the receiving and discharge staff. Second, the releasing officer should carefully compare the inmate with the photograph provided to ensure that the proper individual is being released.

In emergencies, local procedures should dictate the steps to properly identify an inmate being removed from the institution. This may include having someone from the records office, or a supervisor, come to the gate

Inmate picture cards are useful for accounting for inmates on work details and identifying inmates by housing units.

personally to deliver a photo and take a fingerprint of one finger for official records.

Running counts should be maintained at gates where inmates enter and leave the facility on a regular basis. This system can be kept in conjunction with the use of the gate passes mentioned above.

Housing Unit Identification Systems

Housing units should maintain a picture card for each assigned inmate. The minimum information on the card should be the inmate's name, register number, job, cell or bed assignment, and photograph. In addition, sentencing data or other internal details that aid in the management of the unit may be added. The bed assignment information should be current so that the cards may be relied upon in picture counts.

Crew-Kit Card Systems

Work detail supervisors need a picture card for every inmate on their detail. This card should be issued in a binder, packet, or organized folder when the employee picks up his or her keys. This card should have, at the minimum, the inmate's name, register number, photograph, custody classification, and minimum sentence. The job supervisor should carry these cards at all times, keeping them inaccessible to inmates. The crew-kit folders or packets should be stored in the control center when not in use and should be updated during morning watch to ensure that they accurately reflect all inmates in every job category.

Callouts

Every facility should have a callout system to record and authorize certain categories of inmate movement. Inmates traveling for prearranged activities, such as school, medical or dental appointments, interviews, or other necessary programs, should be subject to this system.

Callout systems or master pass lists are compiled from lists of inmates, submitted by staff who have appointments with inmates. These lists indicate the dates and times of inmate appointments and include the signature(s) of the requesting staff member(s). Callouts are ordinarily submitted in advance to the control center or other centralized location such as the captain's office. There they are compiled into a master callout sheet. This sheet should be distributed to the various areas of the institution each morning. All staff members supervising inmates are responsible for issuing passes to the inmates designated on the callout sheet.

In facilities where standing passes are issued for regular programs (such as school), a standing pass list should be issued, providing staff with an easy means of verifying the authorization of all inmate movement on passes.

Lockdowns

Lockdown is the most extreme form of inmate accountability. During lockdowns, inmates should be fed in their cells or in the central dining area on a very limited basis. Under the most strict conditions, all inmates moving out of their cells should be escorted or placed in restraints. Lockdowns are ordinarily predicated on an unusual incident or emergency in the institution or on a staffing crisis. Historically they have been used in the aftermath of killings, riots, strikes, or other major disturbances to preempt future problems while the staff regains control. As inmate tensions or other emergency conditions abate, the level of control is gradually reduced.

The callout system authorizes inmate movement for prearranged activities.

Contraband

One of the basic requirements for maintaining control in an institution is close control of the fabrication, storage, transportation, and use of contraband. Internal searches are therefore an integral part of institutional security and cannot be done by remote surveillance or simple cursory inspections. Control of contraband can only be accomplished by thorough searches by trained professional staff of the entire institution and its population. Search activity must also be extended to include visitors and occasionally employees. In this chapter, searches of inmates, visitors, and the physical areas of the institution will be discussed.

Contraband Policies

Institution policy and procedure should describe the types of items considered contraband and should contain general instructions on how to search particular areas. These policies indicate specific locations, traffic points, and categories of individuals to be searched. Policies for inmates, visitors, and areas may be written separately in recognition of the differing procedures and limitations for each. However, search practices must be founded on a well-written, current body of policy that gives sufficient guidance for day-to-day operations while leaving staff with enough flexibility to make necessary adjustments for individual situations.

The purpose of searches in a correctional facility is to prevent the introduction, fabrication, or transportation of contraband and to locate contraband brought into or manufactured within the institution. Inmates, visitors, mail, packages, vendors, delivery vehicles, and other persons and vehicles are subject to search in furtherance of this effort. Searches emphasize the following:

- Detection and prevention of the manufacture of weapons, escape paraphernalia, etc. within the institution.

- Discovery and suppression of traffic in contraband among staff and inmates.

- Recovery of stolen or lost items.

- Discovery of waste or destruction of government property.

- Discovery of hazardous areas or circumstances that might otherwise remain undetected in other inspection programs.

In most jurisdictions, contraband is defined as any item in the following categories:

- Items not issued through approved channels.

- Items not approved by the appropriate staff member.

- Items not approved for purchase in the institution commissary or store.

- Items not approved by the appropriate staff member for special purchase.

- Items not approved for mail delivery to the inmate.

- Items not approved for a visitor to introduce.

- Items otherwise approved but altered from their original approved condition.

The purpose of searches is to locate and control contraband.

- Unauthorized items passed from one inmate to another.

- Any weapon, gun, firearm, unauthorized tool, drug, intoxicant, explosive, corrosive, flammable, or other item not issued by or under the direct supervision of a staff member using prescribed procedures.

- Any other article specifically prohibited by statute, policy, or regulation.

- Items reasonably believed to be usable to assist in or effect an escape.

- Cash, currency, or items of value not permitted within the institution.

- Personal items or valuables whose ownership cannot be determined.

- Excessive amounts of any authorized item.

The disposition of contraband is a particularly serious concern in a correctional facility, and one that requires a clear policy covering the following areas:

- Disposition of inmate personal property, typically giving the options of sending it home, destroying it, or donating it to the state.

- Preservation of the chain of evidence of any confiscated items likely to be used in prosecution or any other litigation.

- Issuance of a receipt to the inmate or other person from whom the contraband was confiscated.

- Disposition of any state property located among the contraband items.

- Designation of a secure storage area for use prior to referring the case to an internal disciplinary body or to court.

- Account, storage, and disposition of money and stamps.

- Handling contraband received in the mail—this often includes returning item to sender if it is not otherwise illegal.

- Accounting for all items, particularly weapons, drugs, money, or anything of inherent value.

- Assurance that all appeals have been properly exhausted before any property is destroyed or otherwise disposed of.

- Provision of proper legal opinion on any items belonging to non-inmates.

- Disposal schedule to prevent accumulation of contraband for which there is no retention value.

- Adequate records of witnesses of property disposition.

- Method of reconciling inventory records with items disposed of.

- Assurance that disposition methods are of no personal benefit to any staff member.

Searches should be frequent and unannounced.

Inmate Searches

Inmate searches, a critical element of the contraband suppression effort in a correctional facility, fall into several categories:

- Frisk or pat searches.
- Strip or visual searches.
- Cavity searches.
- Instrument searches.

Searches should be frequent and unannounced and should be conducted in a professional, dignified manner in a private location if possible. Staff of the same sex as the inmate should conduct searches whenever practical, but in cases where assault, escape, or loss of contraband is imminent, any staff member may search an inmate.

Frisk or Pat Search

A frisk or pat search involves a manual search by staff of a fully clothed inmate. A metal detector may also be used to conduct this search, in addition to the staff member running his or her hands over the clothing of the inmate to detect concealed contraband. This search can be conducted on either a routine or random basis in any part of the institution. While privacy is advantageous and under certain circumstances even desirable for pat searches, they may be conducted in any location of the institution.

Frisk or pat searches may be conducted in any location of the institution.

The general guidelines for conducting a frisk or pat search are:

- Inform the inmate that he or she is to be searched.

- Have the inmate empty all pockets and remove any coats, hats, or other outer clothing items.

- Be careful at this early stage to ensure that the inmate does not throw away any item that may contain contraband.

- No item should be returned to the inmate until is has been thoroughly searched and the search of the inmate is complete.

- To begin the actual search, have the inmate face away from the searching officer and spread the arms horizontally to the side and the legs approximately shoulder width. This stance reduces the inmate's ability to assault the officer conducting the search. In cases necessitating improved controls, the inmate may be required to place hands against a wall or other surface and move feet back from the surface to further improve staff safety.

- From the back, with the inmate's arms and feet spread, start at the inmate's head and neck and move hands across the shoulders and down the arms, thoroughly passing over every part of the arms, including into the armpits.

- Moving back to the torso, pass the hands over the back, the entire chest, and the abdominal region. Waist, waistband, and belt, as well as collars, cuffs, seams, and linings of all clothes are carefully searched.

- Next, move down the outside and inside of each leg, including the crotch.

- Inspect shoes, soles, linings, insoles, and heels as time and circumstances allow.

- Follow essentially the same procedures for female inmates, with particular attention to items that may be concealed in the brassiere.

Strip or Visual Search

A strip or visual search requires the inmate to remove all clothing and submit to a visual inspection of the body, including the outer portions of all orifices and cavities. This search requires a higher level of presumption of guilt in some jurisdictions. However, most states and the Federal Prison System permit these more thorough searches if there is any reasonable belief that an inmate may be conveying contraband. Because of the inmate's increased sensitivity to these more personal types of body searches, the utmost in professionalism should be displayed during this and successively more intrusive searches. Categories of inmates usually strip searched to ensure adequate security are:

- Newly committed inmates following sentencing.

- All inmate transfers from other facilities.

- All inmates after visits involving contact.

- All inmates returning from court or other appearances outside the institution.

- Inmates suspected of attempting to introduce contraband.

- Inmates admitted to or discharged from detention or segregation units.

- Inmates who participated in a disturbance or escape attempt.

- Inmates returning from outside work assignments.

- Any inmate believed to be transporting contraband.

Strip searches do not always include minimum or community custody inmates. These searches should ordinarily be conducted by an employee of the same sex as the inmate, although in an emergency, where there is imminent likelihood of escape, assault, or serious contraband being introduced, this condition does not apply. A suitably private area should be used for the search.

The general guidelines for conducting a strip or visual search are:

- Inform the inmate that he or she is to be searched.

- Instruct the inmate to remove all clothing, including hat, scarf, headband, false teeth, and wig.

- Conduct a thorough search of the clothing, including shoes, for contraband.

- Examine all bandages and casts, using a hand-held metal detector if available.

- Instruct the inmate, once unclothed, to face the officer and spread arms and legs for visual search.

A suitably private area should be used for the strip or visual search.

○ Have the inmate run his or her hands through hair vigorously to dislodge anything hidden in the hair or scalp. Alternatively, the staff member may do this using disposable plastic gloves if necessary.

○ Have the inmate open his or her mouth and remove any dentures or bridgework. Use a flashlight to inspect the inside of the mouth, including under the tongue.

○ Check the inmate's nose and ears, again using a flashlight if necessary.

○ Have male inmates raise the scrotal sac and peel back the foreskin, if present. Have female inmates lift breasts to ensure nothing is hidden underneath.

○ Have the inmate bend over and spread the buttocks for a visual inspection of the anal area for any protruding objects or other signs of contraband. Have females spread the vaginal opening for the same purpose.

○ Have inmate spread all fingers and display both open hands at the same time, turning them over for inspection of top and bottom.

○ Finally, have the inmate raise each foot and wiggle the toes, turning the foot up for an inspection of the bottom.

○ Have the inmate dress after all clothing is inspected.

Cavity Search

Cavity searches require probable cause.

A cavity search includes the manual or instrument inspection of oral, anal, or vaginal cavities by medical staff to detect the presence of contraband. Because of the sensitive and potentially embarrassing nature of this search technique, it must be done in privacy, with dignity and professionalism on the staff's part. The procedures relating to a visual search should be implemented prior to the cavity search. However, because of the intrusive and potentially harmful effects of a cavity search, the following additional conditions need to be in place:

○ The agency should have a clear written policy explaining the legal grounds and specific procedures for conducting a cavity search.

○ This search is ordinarily authorized in advance, in writing, by the chief executive officer.

○ Staff may not conduct a cavity search if it is likely to cause injury to the inmate.

○ Cavity searches should only be conducted by a member of the medical staff.

○ These searches should be restricted to digital intrusions and the use of instruments such as anascope, otoscope, vaginal speculum, nasal speculum, tongue blade, and simple forceps.

Instrument searches may only be used for medical reasons.

○ Whenever possible the written consent of the inmate should be secured before attempting the cavity search.

○ If an item is located, it may be removed if the removal is easily effected by means of one of the simple instruments noted above or digitally.

○ Strict documentation should be maintained of the probable cause, inmate consent (if given), authorizing official, witnesses, and findings of the inspection.

Instrument Search

An instrument search involves the use by medical personnel of x-ray, sonogram, fluoroscopic equipment, or surgical examination to detect contraband. This is the most intrusive of examinations, and should be used only for medical reasons and only with the consent of the inmate. The agency should develop carefully researched guidelines for institutional staff to use in implementing policy in this area. Rationales for this examination include the presence of a foreign object that may perforate an internal organ or ingestion of contraband substances in balloons that, if not removed, may rupture and cause the death of the inmate.

A qualified medical person is required to conduct an instrument search, which should not ordinarily be performed without approval of the chief executive officer or head of the agency. Again, documentation is extremely important as to probable cause, inmate consent (if given), authorizing official, witnesses, and findings of the inspection or surgical procedure.

Search Location

Inmate searches can and should take place at any time and in any location in the institution. However, certain locations in a correctional facility are prime for fixed search programs. In certain areas and through selected traffic points, the knowledge of the inevitability of certain searches deters or detects contraband. However, the predictability of searches aids evasion tactics, and so with the few preceding exceptions, all other searches need to be unpredictable. Standard search locations are receiving and discharge areas, all gates to the institution, entrances to segregation units, key traffic points to and from industrial and shop areas, other key internal traffic points such as a corridor intersection or other post segmenting the housing areas from all other areas of the facility, and the entrance to the visiting room.

Predictability of searches aids evasion tactics.

Visitor Searches

Inmate Visitors

Inmates' visitors are subjected to a careful search of their persons, packages, purses, and other items entering the secure portion of the facility. The flow of traffic should ensure that a visitor awaiting search procedures cannot pass contraband to a visitor already processed or hide contraband in an entrance area for later removal by an inmate. A walk-through metal detector supplemented by a hand-held monitor are two pieces of virtually indispensable equipment. All nonstaff persons entering the institution are required to pass through the metal detector without activating the alarm. Those who activate it are searched more thoroughly with the transfrisker. If necessary to ensure that no contraband is being introduced and if provided for by department policy, a pat search may be required to gain entry. An official notice concerning contraband and searches should be posted in English and Spanish at all entrances.

A blacklight procedure should be utilized for all nonstaff entering the facility. For this procedure, the institution maintains a supply of several different hand stamps with varying patterns. These stamps are used in conjunction with an ultraviolet reflecting ink and pad to stamp the back of

each entering visitor's hand. When a visitor exits the visiting area and before he or she leaves the secure portion of the facility, an ultraviolet or black-light is used to examine his or her hand to authenticate the person's status as a visitor. By varying the stamp daily, the possibility of a duplicate being obtained and used in an escape attempt is reduced.

If a staff member suspects that a prospective visitor is under the influence of any substance, that employee has the authority to deny the visit. Appropriate supervisory review and procedural safeguards may be included in local policy as well as the entrance and visiting room post orders.

Official Visitors

Each agency should establish a uniform policy for the search of official visitors, including other law enforcement and correctional personnel, probation officers, judges, lawyers, and members of the legislature. These procedures specify which individuals will be searched, as well as any other limitations or requirements for processing them into the facility.

Vendors, Repairmen, Volunteers, and Contract Employees

While agency policy varies among these categories, in general, all of these individuals should be required to pass inspection by metal detection equipment and to leave any unnecessary packages or other items outside the secure portion of the institution. For the most part, vendors and repair personnel are under direct staff escort at all times. All tools and repair equipment are inventoried and searched before being allowed into the institution.

In the case of volunteers and contract employees, purses and like items may be allowable, depending on the degree of background investigation and staff supervision provided. In higher security facilities, a greater measure of restriction will apply to these individuals. Local policy should be clear on the areas of the institution that volunteers and contract employees may access. Color-coded pass or ID card systems can be utilized to facilitate travel in and around the institution, although they should never be substitutes for proper identification procedures authorizing anyone to leave the institution.

Staff Searches

In most correctional facilities, staff are not searched on a regular basis before entering the institution. Staff searches are generally ineffective in detecting contraband and serve to demoralize staff by conveying the impression that they and their fellow employees cannot be trusted.

While the deterrent value of these procedures is arguable, the adverse morale factor cannot be ignored. Since most jurisdictions permit searches of anyone, including staff members, with probable cause, and in view of the fact that most cases against staff are developed from either inmate or outside informants, regular staff searches are not recommended except when evidence exists that the employee is probably involved in the traffic of contraband or other illegal activity.

> *Staff searches for contraband are generally ineffective and demoralize staff.*

Area Searches

Cell Search

Because cell searching is a time-consuming operation, it is important to proceed systematically and methodically. The officer must examine everything that should be examined in order to avoid wasting time in reexamination.

The following is a systematic procedure of searching for general contraband in a typical cell furnished with a bunk, wash basin, ventilation duct cover, toilet, locker, and window, as well as looking for indications of preparations for an escape attempt or other threat to the security of the facility:

○ Remove the inmate from the cell, strip search and escort him or her to another secure area. When your search is complete, strip search the inmate again before he or she returns to cell.

○ Before entering the cell, lock the cell door in the open position so you are not accidentally locked in the cell.

○ Before searching the cell, look at the items you are about to search and see if anything is out of the ordinary. If so, examine that item carefully.

○ Start the search with the bed and utilize it as a work bench when you are finished searching it. Remove the mattress and other bedding and examine above and below the bunk and in any crevices between the bunk frame and the wall. Look under the bed and check for items suspended from springs or fastened to the bed frame. With the mattress removed, examine the upper side of bed frame and springs. Examine the bed frame supports to ensure that they have not been partially sawed through for easy removal.

○ Examine the mattress and pillows by rolling them lengthwise and widthwise. Check the sides and ends for cuts or tears in their covering. If you find any cuts or tears or any indication of resewed seams, examine the items carefully for concealed contraband. You may need to open seams for extensive probing.

○ Examine the remaining bedding, paying special attention to any seams or double thickness of cloth.

○ Search the lockers next, one shelf at a time, returning all items to their original positions. Examine all surfaces of the locker. Contraband may be taped to the underside of shelves or concealed in shelf ledges, supports, legs, or false sides or backs of the shelves. Also examine any paper used to line shelves. Check all clothing (including dirty laundry) piece by piece, paying special attention to seams, double thickness of material, and pockets. Open and check individually every item (letters, books, magazines, toilet articles, etc.). Examine coat hangers; plastic hangers are excellent places to conceal contraband. Check all footgear, including linings, soles, and heels; feel inside shoes all the way to the toe and remove the inner soles and any removable arch supports.

○ Shake talcum powder containers and squeeze toothpaste tubes. Remove a small portion of the contents of commonplace items to check for illegal substitutions. Check to see that cakes of soap have not been hollowed out.

○ Look in, under, and behind the wash basin and in the drain, overflow, and gooseneck water seal if accessible. Contraband may be suspended in the pipes or hollows on wires or threads or stuck on with glue or tape.

All searches help locate contraband and uncover escape attempts or other threats to security.

- Examine the toilet carefully, inside and out. Because the inmates are aware of the officers' reluctance to examine these fixtures, they are favorite hiding places. Check under the base of the toilet, behind the toilet where it connects to wall, and the toilet drain. Contraband may also be passed through the gooseneck of the toilet into the sewer pipe and be suspended by wire or string, the other end of which is tied to a small block wedged in the water seal. Examine the toilet paper holder and all rolls of toilet paper to make certain that currency or other contraband is not rolled up within the roll.

- If there is a radio, examine it carefully. Remove the back, check the battery well, and examine the electric cord. Carefully remove any pictures from frames and examine the frame and the backing material. Examine any brooms or mops for items concealed in broom straws or mop heads.

- Carefully scrutinize the walls, ceiling, and floor for indications of sawing, digging, cutting, or defacing — possible signs of an escape attempt. Inmates take great pains to disguise their illicit acts; you must make a greater effort to penetrate the disguises.

- Look for indications that mortar has been removed and replaced with a substitute. If the concrete is poor quality, it is easy for the inmate to gouge out holes as hiding places for contraband. Remove all wall coverings; remember, even steel walls may be cut and the cuts concealed behind calenders and pictures.

- Check heat or ventilation duct openings for indications of tampering and for concealed contraband. Look for strings, thread, or wire holding something suspended in the duct.

- Look around interior and exterior window frames and the outside window ledge. If this ledge has a covering of any sort, be sure that nothing is concealed beneath it. Examine the window bars for evidence of tampering, being alert for any wires, strings, or thread fastened to the bars and suspended outside the window.

- Carefully examine the cell door and the grille wall in which it is set, paying particular attention to the areas above eye level. Examine the bars and cell door locking device for signs of tampering. The door examination is not complete until it is done with the door in both the open and closed positions.

Searches must be systematic.

Searches must be systematic. An officer should search the same way every time until it becomes automatic. The motivation for conducting a search is the need to discover and eliminate contraband, discover and repair damage to the cell, and reduce clutter. Usually, the inmate accepts a search as a necessary part of facility operations and will not indicate much resentment. What an inmate does resent, and sometimes violently, is unnecessary damage to a cell and its contents during the search.

Officers must remember that inmates are people who appreciate courtesy and consideration but resent inconsiderate treatment. Inmates' personal property, including clothing, letters, photographs, and store purchases are usually important to them even though the items have little monetary value.

Inmates' cells are their homes, and inmates resent having their homes ransacked. Once an inmate's belongings have been searched, they should be put back where they were found. Not only is it good security (let the inmate wonder about where exactly you searched), but it may foster some goodwill and a lessening of hostility among staff and inmates.

Preservation of evidence and chain of custody is of paramount importance. All articles removed from the cell should be carefully documented in the following manner: day, date, and approximate time of discovery; exact location in the cell where each item was found; name and social security number of the inmate(s) or occupant(s) of the cell; and a precise description of each item found. If money is recovered, list it by denomination and serial number. Handle all evidence as little as possible to preserve fingerprints.

Searches of Non-Housing Areas

When conducted by staff from outside the department, inspections in other areas of the institution should ideally be conducted in the company of the department head or administrator of that section. This facilitates access to otherwise secured areas and assists in advising the staff conducting the search on questionable items. All areas should be inspected at least weekly. Staff must immediately isolate and report any security hazards discovered such as weapons, tools, homebrew, and escape paraphernalia.

The following general areas should serve as a guide for developing a local search plan for a correctional institution:

All non-housing areas should be inspected at least weekly.

- ◎ Common areas of housing units and all shop and program spaces where inmates may hide items without risk of being identified with them if they are discovered should be searched.

- ◎ Visiting areas, including trash, furniture, all search areas, and toilets, should be thoroughly searched before and after visits.

- ◎ The perimeter should be searched for items hidden next to or under fences.

- ◎ Yards should be inspected carefully, using a metal detector to locate buried weapons and other contraband. Yards adjacent to roadways should be inspected for items thrown over the fences.

- ◎ The vicinity of all visitor traffic points should be searched regularly to discover items hidden or thrown by visitors that are intended for inmates. Visitor holding areas and gates should be carefully scrutinized.

- ◎ Air chambers in all housing units and other buildings should be searched on a regular basis, not only for breaches in security, but for signs that they are being used as places of concealment for contraband.

- ◎ Tunnels should be searched for contraband since they provide a poorly supervised area where inmates have an opportunity to fabricate and conceal unauthorized items often used in a tunnel-related escape attempts.

- ◎ Areas outside the secure perimeter should be searched for contraband to help stem the flow of contraband into the institution.

○ Inside and outside receiving areas should be searched regularly. They are areas likely to be used for concealing contraband coming into the institution or escape paraphernalia about to be used.

○ Inside and outside areas near outside doorways and gates require regular searches.

○ Shop, vocational training, and industrial areas have a wide range of possible contraband hiding places and should be searched regularly. These hiding places include trash cans, toilets, supplies, plumbing chases, vents, block and brick walls, work benches, machinery, lockers, spare clothing, bins, tool boxes, covered openings, elevator shafts, outbuildings, lockers, and staff-only areas.

Searches of Mobile Equipment

Normal search procedures at the gate include removal and storage of all hazardous items outside the perimeter. Escort of vehicles reduces the likelihood that contraband is concealed on board. However, the movement of supplies and other items in and out of an institution is a prime avenue for contraband introduction.

Mobile equipment such as trailers, towmotors, mowers, and other vehicles provide unlikely locations for contraband at first glance. Staff must be conscious of the possibility that they can be used as mobile contraband depositories, and any vehicle regularly entering the institution should be searched for hidden compartments and contraband. However, searches of all mobile equipment entering and leaving the institution cannot be depended on to totally eliminate contraband from entering in this manner.

Equipment and Supplies

Shakedown crews and other staff members conducting searches should be equipped with the following items:

○ Suitable walk-through metal detection units for fixed search points.

○ Metal detectors (transfriskers and portable ground-type).

○ Flashlights.

○ Extension mirrors.

○ Jumpsuits or overalls.

○ Plastic or rubber gloves.

○ A secure storage area for all contraband items.

○ A supply of zip-lock and other plastic bags for securing contraband pending disposition or for use in preserving items as evidence.

Record-Keeping

Documentation of searches enables staff to reconstruct patterns of contraband fabrication, storage, and movement and provides a ready means of ensuring that no particular area is either ignored or oversaturated with searches. Local procedures should clearly outline the reporting systems that are necessary to support the search program. These procedures should include the following features:

○ Description of reporting requirements for each search category.

- Establishment of standard reporting periods for cyclical searches.

- Distribution method for all required standard forms.

- Identification of a system for turning in required reports.

- Description of all searches in housing units, including documentation of date, time, cell number, person inspecting, remarks, inmate's name and number, and contraband found.

- Requirements for supervisory review of all record-keeping systems.

- Description of a follow-up record-keeping system for disposition of confiscated items.

Supervision and Monitoring

The chief of security has overall responsibility for the search program. He or she assigns search duties to staff on the custodial roster, assigns any centralized shakedown or search crews, and coordinates individual staff searches. This department head is also responsible for all record-keeping systems related to searches and the accounting, storage, and disposition of contraband.

The chief of security may delegate operational responsibility for portions of the program to other supervisory staff in the security department, including:

- The investigative supervisor, for evidence-type contraband.

- The locksmith or armorer, for broken files, blades, and other tool or weapon-type items.

- The shift supervisor, for day-to-day record-keeping functions.

- Other department heads with specific search-related responsibilities such as unit managers, industries superintendents, or shop supervisors.

All other department heads must be properly responsive to the needs of this program and supportive of its goals. To that end, other departments may be called upon to provide manpower for regular searches in their own area or in other areas in time of institutional emergency.

However, first line supervisors must continually be active in reviewing line staff search activity. They need to be sure that the proper techniques are used, that searches are properly distributed throughout the area in question, and that accountability and corrective action for items discovered are complete and in accord with policy. By showing an active interest in this vital program, they will convey to their subordinates the importance it has for overall security and safety in the institution.

Training of Search Teams

As with many other aspects of institutional operations, every newly hired employee does not have the correctional skills necessary to conduct thorough searches. In fact, new staff members rarely acquire these skills before reaching the correctional environment. These skills must be instilled through an initial hands-on training exercise using model cells, actual searches of other persons, and demonstrations of actual contraband concealment techniques.

Moreover, new staff are not initially attuned to the sophisticated concealment techniques used by inmates, nor do they have a clear picture of the ways that seemingly innocuous items can be used for unauthorized purposes. Initial training concentrates heavily on familiarizing them with this way of thinking, in addition to conveying the actual skills involved in conducting a search.

The annual or refresher training provided to all *on-board* staff should have a section on searches that focuses on actual search procedures and techniques and includes staff performing actual searches in both controlled and real situations. In concert with the live aspect of this training should be sessions that familiarize staff with the latest techniques used by inmates to conceal and fabricate contraband. As inmates develop new methods for this purpose, the staff needs to be updated on them.

Security Inspections

The security inspection is an integral part of the custodial operation in a correctional facility. Without actual hands-on inspection, there is no way to ensure the complete integrity of the devices and physical features that comprise the physical security of an institution. To provide a successful method of accomplishing these inspections, a carefully supervised, structured program must be set up for each specific facility.

WEEKLY INS...

Area/Post _____ Shift _____

I certify that I personally checked the items liste
The shift supervisor was notified immediately of an
where needed.

Locks
Bars
Doors
Grilles
Windows
Walls

Floor
Vents
Secu
Fire
Fire
Fir

Discrepancies _____

The key rings listed below were issue
each key and found all to be in good co
the key count tag. Any discrepancies fo

Key Ring # _____
Key Ring # _____
Key Ring # _____
Key Ring # _____
Key Ring # _____

The officer's signature below cert
of his/her knowledge, found them
space and action has been taken to

Monday _____
Tuesday _____
Wednesday _____
Thursday _____
Friday _____

This form will be turned i

DAILY INSPECTION REPORT

Area/Post _____ Shift _____ Date _____

I certify that I personally checked the items listed below and that all discrepancies are noted below. The shift supervisor was notified immediately of any serious security hazards and work orders were submitted where needed.

Locks	Floor	Tools and Equipment
Bars	Vents	Needles
Doors	Security Screens	Syringes
Grilles	Fire Extinguishers	Narcotics
Windows	Fire Hoses	Other
Walls	Fire Hazards	

Discrepancies _____

Officers responsible for the weekly security inspection of the tunnel areas will complete this section on the last workday of the week.

Powerhouse officer's signature _____ Date _____

Security officer's signature _____ Date _____

The key rings listed below were issued to me during my tour of duty. I personally checked and counted each key and found all to be in good condition with the correct number of keys on each ring, as indicated on the key count tag. Any discrepancies found in the condition or count of keys is noted in the space provided.

Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____

The officer's signature indicates that he/she made the above security check and key check, and to the best of his/her knowledge, found them secure and in proper condition. Any discrepancies are noted in the appropriate space and action taken to correct these discrepancies.

Morning shift officer's signature _____

Day shift officer's signature _____

Evening shift officer's signature _____

A security inspection is the systematic physical inspection of the hardware and construction features of a correctional facility. It is conducted in an organized manner to ensure that these security elements are not breached, compromised, or tampered with. Security inspections can also facilitate the discovery of larger contraband caches hidden in areas such as walls, ventilators, and tunnels.

The security inspection program is the responsibility of the chief security officer. Security inspections are separate and distinct from all other systems of regular search and shakedown of inmate rooms and other parts of the facility and are recorded separately.

Policy and Procedure

A well-defined and widely distributed policy on security inspections is necessary to describe the program and to call staff attention to the importance of this effort. The facility must have a general policy along with specific procedures that describe the security inspection system in detail, including the intervals of inspections, zones to be identified, staff responsible for each zone, and the reporting system to be followed.

Local policy can be patterned on the agencywide issuance, but it must be tailored to meet the needs of the facility in which it is applied. General policy cannot substitute for specific applications. The policy should first define the system and its purpose and be followed by a detailed description of the system's operation. The policy should then identify the responsible staff members at each level of the program and the reporting requirements that are attached to their roles. It should break the institution into manageable inspection zones and specify the staff responsible for coverage in those zones. It must also accurately describe the reporting system that supports the actual inspections.

Each zone identified for the system should have the following characteristics:

> *Hands-on inspection ensures the integrity of the devices and physical features that comprise the physical security of an institution.*

- The zones generally should be in one area or in adjoining areas reasonably related to each other. Exceptions can be made for roving posts that logically cover scattered areas of the institution, but as much as is possible, each zone should be relatively self-contained.

- The zones should be of a reasonable size—not so large as to overburden a staff member or encourage shortcutting.

- The zones should be reasonably related to the duties of the post to which they are assigned. Employees should whenever possible be assigned to inspect their own workplace and its immediate environs as opposed to other departments. Convenience and familiarity with the area result in better inspections.

Policy should clearly establish the timing of the inspections for each department or zone. Each zone, and components of some zones, may require different inspection intervals. For instance, in segregation or detention units, inspections every shift are appropriate for critical security fixtures; in less secure portions of the facility, a daily inspection is sufficient; for lower security institutions or areas of less concern, a weekly inspection is sufficient. The policy and supporting forms should specify these intervals.

Local policy should state the method for inspecting various parts of the institution, and should state which areas and security features will be visu-

Visual inspection of bars, locks, doors, security fittings, etc. is the first step in a thorough security inspection.

Three methods of inspection:
- **Visual inspection**
- **Tapping**
- **Probing**

ally inspected, which will be tapped, and which will be probed or checked by other means. These inspection methods are:

- Visual inspection: Look for bent bars, irregular surfaces, broken or cracked fittings or parts, loose mortar fillers such as putty or paper maché, uneven wear or use patterns, fresh paint, and other signs of tampering or damage. Any irregularities in color, texture, shape, or appearance warrants closer inspection. Mirrors can be used to assist in visual searches.

- Tapping: Vigorous hammer strokes set up sound waves that assist in distinguishing between solid and otherwise damaged or tampered bars, sashes, and other solid metallic security fixtures. Leather, plastic, or wooden mallets should be used for this purpose. Any inconsistency in sound produced from bar to bar in a set of adjacent bars warrants closer inspection.

- Probing with instruments: Putty knives and other metallic probes are used to inspect the edges and corners of surfaces that might otherwise escape notice. Particular attention should be paid to locating loose mortar, cracks or cuts in metal surfaces, and other irregularities that indicate a security breach.

The items to be inspected should, at a minimum, include:

- Locks and lock boxes.
- All security fittings such as screws, bolts, hinges, bars, window mullions, and sashes.
- Doors, screens, grilles, braces, brackets, windows and frames, fences, walls, ceilings, and floors.
- Drains, manhole covers, air chambers, tunnels, and mortar joints in key locations.

- All exits, gates, and internal cutoff fences.

- All perimeter wire and detection and surveillance systems.

- All electrical junction and transformer equipment servicing perimeter lighting and detection systems, as well as the perimeter fence or wall itself.

A clearly established method must be in place for annual review and revision of the security inspection policy and procedures. As portions of the institution are assigned different purposes or as actual physical plant changes take place, the procedures that support the security inspection system must be reviewed and revised. Post orders and other supporting documents must be written to include the inspection system, and they must be revised when changes are made in the overall system.

Written procedures should prescribe the techniques for inspecting each type of security feature. For example, they should specify that all bars will be tapped with a certain type of mallet and struck with a force sufficient to generate a solid sound indicating that the bar has not been cut, sawed, or otherwise tampered with. Variances in sound from bar to bar should be noted and investigated in order to locate the cause. Similar and more elaborate descriptions of the inspection techniques should be included in the written procedures available to staff for reference.

Equipment necessary for inspections:

- *Mallet*
- *Mirrors*
- *Metal probes or shims*

WEEKLY MASTER SECURITY CHECKSHEET

(Month) _____ (Year) _____

Area	1st week	2nd week	3rd week	4th week	5th week
Business office					
Warehouse					
Laundry					
Commissary					
Chapel					
Food service (except cook/dining room foreman)					
Dental clinic					
Industries (except tool room)					
Safety office					
Education (except VT shops/classrooms)					
CMS (except shop foreman)					
Administrative systems (except R&D/mail room)					

Equipment and Supplies

Inspection staff must have easy access to hammers, mirrors, probes, and other devices necessary for thorough inspections. This equipment, essential to effective and efficient searches, should readily be available to staff conducting the inspections. In some locations, or for inspections of selected areas, overalls or jumpsuits may be provided to the staff involved.

The following equipment should be available for inspections:

- Mallet: A mallet, used in bar tapping, is made of wood, plastic, wound leather, or other material of local preference. It should be used by vigorously striking each bar, mullion, or other fitting to ensure by the similar sounds produced that no cutting or other tampering has taken place.

- Mirrors: Mirrors on extendable handles or poles should be issued to inspect out-of-the-way locations such as the underside of beds, insides of ventilator openings, and other less accessible portions of the institution. By making mirrors available to staff, they will be more likely to thoroughly inspect these areas.

- Metal probes or shims: These tools can be used to detect tampered bars, screens, and other security fixtures and to reinspect bars that may have sounded irregular when tapped.

When not in use, these tools should be secured in an area inaccessible to inmates. When in use, they should be under staff control and in no case should an inmate be issued this equipment for the purpose of performing any inspections.

Record-Keeping

Every effective security inspection system must have appropriate inspection forms, follow-up forms on necessary repairs, and memo reports on serious breaches that are discovered. The basic security inspection form should contain, at a minimum, the name of the zone, the inspecting staff member's name, the various component areas of the assigned zone, and the results of the inspection of each component. It is insufficient to sign off for the entire zone; the inspecting staff member must certify to the complete inspection of each specific area noted on the form.

The system must also delineate specific time frames for inspections. In high security areas, such as detention/segregation units, certain security fixtures should be inspected on each shift, while in a less secure area, once a day or once a week might be sufficient. Similarly, in most higher security institutions, a staff member on foot should inspect the fence or perimeter not less than once a day.

It should be a standard element in all written procedures that any staff member discovering a critical breach of security during an inspection should notify specified officials at once. Noncritical discrepancies can be handled through routine channels. At the end of their shift, all assigned staff members must turn in the forms to a predetermined area (i.e., the control center, the shift commander's office, or the chief security officer's office). In all cases, these forms must be promptly reviewed for compliance and any noted discrepancies should be followed up immediately. Any persistent unrepaired

Security is everyone's business.

Monthly Security/Sanitation Inspection Schedule		
Area Inspected	Day of Week	Inspection Team
Business office and personnel department	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (operations), chairman, business manager, fire and safety officer
Inmate housing units	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (programs), chairman, unit manager (of each unit), assistant fire and safety officer
Food service department	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Health care director, chairman, food service manager, chief security officer
Health care program	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Industrial director, chairman, hospital administrator, personnel officer
Academic and vocational areas	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Classification manager, chairman, supervisor of education, chaplain
Industrial operations	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (programs), chairman, industrial director, fire and safety officer
Mechanical services and shop areas	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (operations), chairman, physical plant manager, assistant fire and safety officer
Special service areas: laundry, clothing room, admissions unit, mail and visiting rooms.	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Chief security officer, chairman, chief psychologist, general foreman

Warden

Each facility should establish an inspection schedule.

breaches should be called to the appropriate department head's attention by the chief security officer coordinating the program.

Critical breaches ordinarily require more complete investigation. In those cases, procedures should clearly state the responsibility of the staff member discovering them to supply any additional information or memoranda to complete the investigative effort.

Staff

Typically, staff in different departments, not just the security section, carry out security inspections. A comprehensive inspection system specifies the post in all zones where assigned staff perform inspections and identifies who is to perform inspection during an assigned staff member's absence. The importance of this cannot be overstated; security is everyone's business. The responsible staff members in a well-designed inspection system will include not only correctional staff, but also the job supervisors and other employees who are responsible for specific areas of the facility. It is reasonable to expect that staff members in a given area—the maintenance shops, for example—will conduct the inspections in that area. They are in those areas daily and are required to conduct contraband searches. Such activity develops a security awareness supportive of the overall security inspection program. Another advantage is that by spending more time in their area, they may notice unusual inmate activity or other differences in normal routine that indicate an attempted breach of security; a staff member from another area might not be so perceptive.

Staff members should conduct inspections in their own areas.

INSPECTION OF QUARTERS SHEET

Date _____

Note: This form will be submitted daily to the shift supervisor by day and evening shift officers.

The following item will be inspected in each cell:

Item	S	U	Discrepancies noted
Walls and ledges			
Shelves			
Floors			
Toilet and sink			
Bars (if applicable)			
Window glass			

In addition to the above, the officer in each housing area will also inspect the following:

Item	S	U	Discrepancies noted
Dayroom floor			
Pillars and walls			
Ceiling and grillework			
Counseling room			
Showers (all areas)			
Ledge above doors			
All other window glass			
Other (as needed)			

INSTRUCTIONS   This check sheet is to be used as a guide by officers making daily security and sanitation inspections. A check mark will be placed in the appropriate column as to the general condition of all areas. Discrepancies should be noted in the proper column. Where more space is needed, the reverse side may be used. When making a comment on the reverse side, please indicate on the front that you have done so.

Shift _____ Area _____ Signature _____

Abbreviations   S = Satisfactory   U = Unsatisfactory

Note: Shift supervisor will note discrepancies and alleviate them if possible, then forward to chief of security for further action.

Checklists are useful in ensuring that all areas are covered during inspections.

In designing the inspection system, the chief security officer should consult with other department heads and select the staff to conduct the inspections. Any replacements or relief coverage should come from within the affected department.

Supervision and Monitoring

The chief security officer should supervise the program and maintain all reports and attendant records. Follow-up on delinquent reports, even if originating in other departments, should be part of the written procedure, as well as a means to promptly correct noted deficiencies. The chief security officer's office should maintain a list of staff assignments for security inspections. Any inspection form not turned in on schedule should be reported to the responsible department head for prompt action.

The support of all department heads is critical to the program's success. The department heads must emphasize to staff during in-house training

and other supervisory contacts the importance of compliance with the system. When the chief security officer reports a problem to a department head, prompt resolution should be given a high priority.

Training

Staff cannot perform security inspections effectively without training. New employees require training in professional techniques; more experienced staff require a regular program of refresher training. These sessions should not only cover the mechanics of searches, but also new contraband production or escape technologies devised by inmates. Staff who are aware of new, more ingenious means of breaching security are better prepared to detect them.

Transportation of Inmates

All correctional systems must transport inmates outside the secure perimeter of the facility to meet the needs of a variety of other criminal justice agencies and comply with interdepartmental requirements. When inmates are outside the secure perimeter of the facility, they are in a position to escape from custody unless carefully planned security measures are precisely followed.

Escort Officers

Officers assigned to escort duty should be carefully selected. They should have completed their probationary period, and the officer-in-charge should have a minimum of three years' experience. When groups of three or more inmates are transported, a shift security supervisor level employee should be in charge. The chief security officer, subject to the approval of the warden, should select the escorting officers and provide them with instructions governing their responsibilities.

Escort Conduct

Staff members selected for escort duty should remember that they are representatives of their institution and agency. They should conduct themselves in a professional manner that does not discredit their organization. They should treat inquiring citizens courteously without divulging information about inmate movement. A friendly, objective, and professional attitude toward the public and inmates will leave a favorable impression on the public. Transportation of people in restraints should be carried out quietly, with as little public display as possible. Administrative and legal penalties for negligence should be carefully explained to all escort personnel.

Inmate Contacts

Inmates in transit between institutions or under escort must not be permitted to visit with anyone or to make any public statements. Specific plans and schedules should never be discussed with the inmates involved. They should only be notified of the trip just prior to leaving the institution. After notification, the inmate should not make or receive any phone calls.

Inmates in transit between institutions or under escort must not be permitted to visit with anyone or make any public statements.

Warden Notification

Prior to leaving any institution with an inmate being transferred to another institution, staff should notify the warden of the receiving institu-

tion, giving the departure time, expected arrival time, number of inmates, and all other pertinent information. If difficulties delay the arrival, the warden at the receiving institution must be notified by telephone or teletype. If the delay is serious or lengthy, both institutions should be notified.

Inmate Personal Property

A minimum of personal property should be permitted to the inmate on the trip. The type and amount will depend on the duration of the trip. Items accompanying the inmate should ordinarily be limited to toilet articles, combs, hair brushes, and eyeglasses; other items should be limited to the amount that can be packed and sealed in a box measuring approximately 12 x 12 x 15 inches. All personal property should be closely inspected for contraband. Disposition and processing of other personal property belonging to inmates being transferred will depend on whether the transfer is permanent or the result of a bedside or funeral trip from which the inmate will return. In the case of a bedside or funeral trip, property should be inventoried and stored in a secure area of the institution. In the case of a residential transfer, it should be forwarded to the receiving institution.

On bedside visits or funeral trips where the escort officer is responsible for money belonging to the inmate under supervision, the officer should provide a receipt for inmate funds at the time the money is received. At the conclusion of the trip, a complete itemized report of the expenditures should be submitted.

Inmate Search

The officer-in-charge of the trip should be present when the inmate dresses for the excursion. That officer should thoroughly search the inmate. All clothing should be removed. No part of the body where keys, money, razor blades, or small bits of metal might be concealed should be overlooked. Hair, mouth, interstices of fingers and toes, soles of the feet, all bandages, dentures, custom built shoes, canes, crutches, and artificial limbs

Prior to transporting an inmate, a thorough inspection by the escort officer is required.

should be thoroughly inspected. A final search of the inmate should be made by a hand-held metal detector. A second set of inspected clothing should be furnished. Care should be taken to make certain the inmate does not acquire any unauthorized items after the search.

Restraint Equipment

Being legally responsible for inmate custody, the officer is usually unrestricted in the application of restraint equipment. Restraint equipment consists of leg irons, handcuffs, handcuff covers, and waist chains, as well as restraint belts and leather cuffs for psychotic inmates. All restraint equipment should be double-locked.

The inmate should not be shackled to a stationary object in a moving vehicle unless the inmate's past conduct indicates that the procedure is imperative to safeguard the security of persons and property. If it is necessary for him or her to be shackled to a stationary object, the reasons should be documented in full, setting forth the facts on which the decision is based. This option is to be used only in the most extreme cases.

All institutions should maintain an adequate supply of restraint equipment. This equipment should be of a standard type and brand, maintained in good operating condition. However, the use of restraint equipment does not eliminate the need for continuous, alert supervision.

Firearms

Except for the transfer of large groups of inmates, such as by bus, the use of firearms by an escorting officer should have the warden's prior approval. Firearms must be kept in a safe and secure place or on the person of an officer who will not come in direct contact with the inmates at any time during the trip. Firearms should not be carried by officers traveling in the same car with inmates unless prior approval of the warden has been obtained.

In the event of an escape attempt, firearms should be used to disable only after the inmate disregards orders to halt and after a warning shot has been fired. Firearms should not be used to prevent escape of inmates recognized or known to have been committed as juveniles. Firearms must always be carried and used in conformance with applicable county, state, and federal law.

Trip Arrangements

Trip planning and arrangements should be directed by the officer-in-charge of the trip, with the cooperation and support of the chief of security. These arrangements should include conferring with other staff members regarding trip date, departure time, financial arrangements, transportation, type of accommodations reserved, whether or not special provisions have been made for sick or bedridden inmates, who to contact in the event of unusual incidents or emergencies, and receipt books. Escorting staff members should obtain other pertinent information regarding the inmate, his adjustments while in confinement, and other data. All escorts should read and sign the escort instructions prior to departing on the trip.

Records

The record office should furnish the necessary records, including commitment papers or a copy thereof, a photograph, and a brief description of

Firearms must be kept in a safe and secure place.

the inmate. Central file records should be furnished in the case of a permanent transfer to another institution. The hospital supervisor should furnish a report on medical or psychiatric cases, setting forth any prescribed medication or suggestions for special handling.

Medical Clearance

Health services staff should determine the need for medical attendance in conjunction with the transfer of inmates. In special situations, a member of the health services staff may be detailed to the trip to provide treatment for any medical problems that may arise. In the absence of a health services staff member, a medical kit should be provided to the trip supervisor along with full training in its use. Specific instructions from the medical department should accompany any prescribed medication.

Modes of Transportation For Small Groups

Rest stops should be made where there is no building or traffic congestion.

Motor Vehicles

A safety shield should be installed between the front and rear seats of institutional vehicles used to transport inmates. Additional brackets should be installed in additional institutional vehicles so, if necessary, the shield may be transferred between vehicles. If shields are not available, one escorting officer should sit in the back seat with the inmate. Rest stops should be made where there is no building or traffic congestion. Isolated gas stations in rural areas involve the fewest hazards. Inmates should not be taken into public dining rooms. If stops for meals are necessary, carry-out or drive-through service is recommended.

Commercial or Chartered Airplanes

The mode of transportation best suited to the situation and nature of the trip is always recommended. Normally, bus or automobile is most appropriate. When travel by plane is necessary, the movement must be completed within the guidelines of the Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, and Air Security. All questions regarding restraints, firearms, etc. should be referred to the FAA prior to scheduling a trip by airplane.

Train

Train transportation involves the hazards of inaccessibility to rest rooms and there being no security bars over windows. Extreme alertness is constantly required. The passenger section and storage area of the coach or pullman should be thoroughly searched prior to admitting the inmate. The close, restricted quarters encountered in trains may facilitate an assault by the inmate upon escorting officers.

The officer-in-charge should be familiar with the train schedule and should seek the conductor's help in anticipating train stops and avoiding contact with the public.

The officer-in-charge should consult the steward regarding meals, meal times, and service. All inmates being transported in restraints should be served in the stateroom or compartment. If possible, plastic cutlery should be provided. All items used to serve the inmate should be accounted for after the meal.

Inmates should not make contact with people other than prison personnel and should be instructed not to leave their seats for any reason with-

out approval. Inmates should be under constant supervision while in the rest room. In the event of an emergency requiring special assistance, the supervising officer should contact the conductor and request the services of a special agent.

Special Situations

Bedside and Funeral Trips

Inmates are sometimes escorted to the funeral of a dead relative or to the bedside of a dying one. As in other transportation situations, maximum supervision is required. It may not be necessary to use restraint equipment on minimum custody inmates. Any question regarding the use of restraint equipment should be referred to the warden. Depending on the situations that may confront the escorting officer, additional restraints may be utilized if warranted.

An officer-in-charge of a funeral or bedside visit should carefully review the central file prior to departure to determine whether or not any special or significant factors exist that may compromise security. The officer should instruct the inmate regarding forbidden practices such as statements to news media or unauthorized contact with the public. The inmate and the escort should be inseparable. Layovers should be planned to ensure that acceptable jail facilities are available. The inmate should be returned to the institution immediately following the termination of the visit by the most expeditious route and means.

Escort to and from Court or Depot

Transportation of inmates between an institution and court should be accomplished inconspicuously. The most direct route should be taken, avoiding traffic congestion, signal lights, railroad crossings, and other delays. Parking problems should be anticipated so that officers and inmates are not separated for any reason. While transporting inmates from the institution to the depot, it is suggested that a vehicle with an armed officer follow the vehicle carrying the inmate. Constant alertness is necessary to avoid contact between the inmate and reporters, photographers, lawyers, the general public, or others who may be interested in the inmate.

When the inmate is being transported for a court appearance, the officer-in-charge should be thoroughly familiar with the general floor plan, stairways, elevators, and hallways of the building in which the courtroom is located. With thorough knowledge of the building, the officer-in-charge can place assistants at strategic points to foil escape attempts. Offenders usually appear in court without restraint equipment; therefore, officers should be properly stationed to cut off every avenue of escape.

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Inmate Illness or Death

If an inmate becomes ill en route and no health services staff is available, arrangements should be made for an examination by a qualified medical specialist as soon as possible. If necessary, the home institution should be contacted for further instructions.

If an inmate dies while in transit, it will be necessary to arrange for the coroner and local and state police authorities to make arrangements for removal of the body. The body must be removed from the conveyance within the state in which the death occurred. A receipt for the body should be obtained from the coroner. The officer-in-charge should immediately no-

tify the institution and provide a statement of the time, place, and cause of death. If death occurred by violence or under other unusual circumstances, the nearest law enforcement officer should be notified to meet the escorting officer at the scene of the death.

Inmate Escape

If an inmate escapes while in transit, the officer-in-charge should use all resources immediately available to apprehend the inmate. The officer-in-charge should also take immediate action to notify the nearest law enforcement agency. The officer should notify by telephone the institution from which the transfer originated so that a description of the inmate can be provided to the police. Notification should include a summary of the circumstances surrounding the escape and any information that might be useful in conducting the search. The supervision of other inmates should never be relaxed in order to pursue an escaping inmate.

Coordination of Bus Transportation

Transportation by bus can pose special problems, many of which cannot be anticipated; therefore, the following is not intended to be all inclusive, but should be used as a guide in developing local operating procedures.

Employees selected for assignment to bus duty should have a minimum of three years' experience in a correctional or penal institution. They should be required to complete training in bus operations and pass the state drivers' examination in the state in which the bus is based. They should also be required to complete training courses in the use of restraint and defensive equipment.

A shift supervisor should be in charge of each bus and should be responsible for following the schedule approved by the institution or agency, the supervision and instruction of personnel assigned, the supervision of inmates, maintenance of discipline and orders, and the secure, safe transportation of inmates. Preparation and arrangement for all approved transfers by bus should be the responsibility of the bus supervisor. The supervisor should submit written reports to the chief of security, including any unusual incidents, at the completion of each trip.

Drivers should be responsible for the safe and economical operation of the bus.

Bus Supervision and Operation

The headquarters for each bus should be determined by the head of the agency. Officers should ordinarily be assigned to a bus as part of the rotation program of the custodial service of the institution designated as the bus headquarters. They should be assigned by the chief security officer to provide coverage for sick, annual, and emergency leave while at the institution.

The bus should be operated safely at all times; the bus supervisor is responsible for passenger safety. The maximum cruising speed should not exceed the speed limit of the road on which the bus is traveling. The driver should be in complete control of the bus at all times, obeying all posted speed limits and exercising extreme care when traveling downhill. Each officer assigned to the bus should be familiar with *Interstate Commerce Commission Motor Carriers' Safety Regulations* and should be able to operate the bus in accordance with these regulations.

No effort has been made to enumerate the mechanical defects drivers will be expected to correct. Drivers should be responsible for the safe and

economical operation of the bus and should make every effort to familiarize themselves with the necessary mechanical details. A bus should never be taken on a trip unless it is in proper running order and good repair. The bus supervisor is responsible for inspecting the bus prior to leaving on a trip to ensure that it is in good running order and that there has been no sabotage or concealment of weapons. In the event of an emergency situation, the bus supervisor should notify the originating and receiving institutions. Both institutions should then notify their regional or central offices.

Coordination Between Buses and Institution

When a bus is away from official headquarters, the employees responsible for its operation need sufficient time to enable them to keep the bus in good sanitary and mechanical condition. The warden of each institution along the planned route should assist the bus supervisors in the following ways:

- Supply inmate details for cleaning the vehicles.

- Make available institution garages and mechanics for needed repairs and supply material for repairs.

- Furnish gasoline, oil, and lubricants as needed.

- Furnish meals for inmates en route.

- Furnish transportation for bus officers to the nearest suitable motel or place of lodging.

- Provide a safe and secure place for bus storage and parking.

- Furnish receipts promptly for inmates, whether holdovers or transfers. Suitable receipts for property and gas should also be completed and promptly delivered to the bus supervisor.

- Inmates being transferred should be furnished one seasonal, well-fitting outfit of clothing; they should not be required to wear obsolete, unserviceable clothing.

Each institution benefiting from the bus transfer operation should contribute to operational expenses and should be required to furnish the material and supplies without reimbursement.

Food

To maintain a tranquil atmosphere, it is important to provide meals during transit. Lunches and their contents are important factors to be considered, particularly for inmates being transported by bus. The highest possible food service standards should be met in preparation of lunches. Lunches for inmate transportation should be prepared by a civilian food service staff member. Lunches should be picked up by a designated member of the bus crew, who will inspect them for such things as quality of contents, proper wrapping, proper packaging of box lunches in thermo-transport containers, and correct individual counts. Prior to taking the lunches to the departure point, the crew member should discuss discrepancies with the food service supervisor or the employee-in-charge at the time; any discrepancy should be immediately corrected.

Bus thermo-containers should be cleaned by a designated staff member

and locked in a secure area, such as the control center, until they are used. They should be filled only by a staff member.

Schedules

Bus departures should be scheduled so as to arrive at the designated institution during working hours, if possible. Before starting a day's travel, the bus supervisor should communicate with each institution to be visited that day. Where facilities are available, the supervisor should request the warden of the institution from which they are departing to notify the other institutions concerned. Notification should include the following information:

- Estimated time of arrival.

- Total number of inmates to be received or housed overnight and number of those to be taken on the next day.

- Proposed departure time and next day's destination.

- Number of seats that will be available on departure.

- Types of inmates on the bus so that the institution will be prepared to handle any problems or special cases.

When a bus is to arrive at an institution on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the supervisor should notify the institution as far ahead of time as possible, giving whatever information is available about the route and number of inmate seats available.

Bus supervisors should cooperate fully with the institutions involved in the transferring of inmates. It is incumbent upon them to promptly report arrival of the bus to institutions and give ample notice concerning the time of departure.

It is imperative that personnel responsible for the bus operation have proper rest intervals between trips to ensure the safe, secure transportation of inmates. The bus supervisor should report to the warden any delay in departure, indicating the estimated length of the delay and the reason. If there is an unexplained delay in arrival of a bus, institutions should take appropriate action to locate the bus and determine its status.

The bus supervisor should be responsible for reporting any difficulties meeting policy and procedure requirements and should recommend corrective action when necessary.

Bus Communication

All buses should have two-way radios with two or more frequencies, one of which allows access to state law enforcement officials. Bus officers should also have portable radios for maintaining contact with any officer who has to leave the bus.

Bus Supervision

Officers assigned to supervise inmates should have a clear view of the entire bus compartment occupied by inmates. Supervision should include prevention of contact with civilians or introduction of contraband from the outside. At least two officers should remain aboard the bus while inmates are in transit, including rest and lunch stops. Vehicle stops should be short.

All buses should have two-way radios.

Officers assigned to supervise inmates should have a clear view of the entire bus compartment.

They should be kept to a minimum by obtaining take-out lunches for all crew members. These lunches should be eaten on the bus.

Inmates should not be permitted to make contact with unauthorized persons, make telephone calls, or mail letters in transit or at stopovers except when an inmate is held over for several days. Inmates should not have access to packages containing their personal effects while in transit.

Inmate Identification

Each inmate taken aboard a bus should carry an identification photograph. Records should be prepared so they may accompany the inmate in transit.

Inmates should be assigned seats when admitted to the bus, and should not be permitted to leave them without the bus supervisor's authorization.

Medication In Transit

The hospital supervisor or representative should furnish to the bus supervisor sufficient medication to adequately care for any inmate needs while in transit.

Inmate Personal Property

Personal property should not be given to inmates while on board a bus. Personal property includes such items as Record of Trial, personal legal papers, records of correspondence, photographs, pens and pencils, excess smoking materials, musical instruments, instrument cases, toilet articles, etc.

Use of Restraints

The bus supervisor should handcuff all inmate passengers; discretion may be used for handcuffing minimum custody inmates being transferred to minimum security prison camps. Handcuffs should be used as a security measure and not as punishment. Handcuffs should not be tightened to the point where they cut off circulation. Leg irons should be used at the discretion of the bus supervisor.

Handcuff covers should be on board each bus for the following situations:

Handcuffs should be used as a security measure and not as a punishment.

- For use on special runs, when a bus is required to transport unruly inmates to another institution because of a disturbance.

- For use on inmates who are considered extreme escape risks.

- For use on inmates with severe assaultive behavior patterns.

- For use on individual inmates who are disruptive at the beginning of the transfer or become disruptive during the transfer.

Discretion should be exercised in using handcuff covers. They should be used only as a last resort for added control and security. The problems they create when eating and drinking or using toilet facilities should be kept in mind.

Inmate Searches

The supervisor of the bus should be certain a thorough visual strip search is performed on each inmate during processing and again before

boarding the bus. A portable transfrisker should be utilized to determine if offenders are secreting any metal objects within their body cavities. The supervisor should check all restraint equipment placed on each offender to determine whether or not it is applied correctly.

Official Records and Officers' Property

Individual records of inmates, correspondence, or other official records, as well as clothing and other personal effects of officers, fire extinguishers, or any articles that may be used as weapons should not be permitted in the inmate compartment of the bus. Such articles should be stored in a secure place accessible only by the bus crew.

Storage of Firearms and Restraints

Firearms, handcuffs, leg irons, hacksaw blades, or other devices for removal of defective restraints should be stored in a secure compartment inaccessible to inmates. Officers carrying firearms should not come in contact with inmates. Firearms should be carried in shoulder or belt holsters and not exhibited to inmate passengers. The .38 caliber revolver should be standard equipment for security personnel escorting the bus.

The bus supervisor should be responsible to see that adequate arms, ammunition, handcuffs, leg irons, flashlights, flares, red flags, and fire suppression equipment are provided and are properly issued or stored before the bus is operated. He or she should be responsible for storing arms, ammunition, and other equipment in institution armories on stopovers or at the end of the trip. The supervisor should be certain that more than one officer has keys to the handcuffs and/or leg irons. Officers holding keys should not come in direct contact with inmates except when directed by the bus supervisor to remove handcuffs or leg irons.

Officers carrying firearms should not come in contact with inmates.

Use of Firearms

Firearms should only be used when absolutely necessary to prevent escapes and serious assaults. Before firing at an individual, officers should give due verbal warning and should fire a shot into the air. When it is necessary to fire at an individual, the shots should be directed to disable. Employees with firearms should be held strictly accountable for the condition of their weapons and for their proper use.

Bus Security

Bus windows should be blocked from the outside limiting window movement to a four-inch opening. The bus supervisor should make certain that the bus is locked when left unattended. Close supervision should be exercised by one of the bus officers over any inmate cleaning detail. The bus must never be left standing with keys in the ignition or loose on board. Buses should not be parked in areas where they would attract undue attention. When staff quarters are not provided by institutions where stopovers are made, the bus should be left at the institution. Alternate transportation should be arranged for commuting to and from a motel.

Sanitary Facilities

The bus should be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition and should be ready for operation at all times. The toilets must be kept clean and the supervisor should see that inmates use them in a sanitary manner.

An adequate supply of water for the toilets should be kept in the tanks at all times.

The drinking water tanks should be kept filled with pure water and a supply of ice, paper cups, and disposable containers for used cups should be furnished for inmate use.

Stopovers

Only necessary stops should be made. Inmates should not be permitted to leave the bus unless properly supervised. Stopovers at night should generally be at institutions. When making overnight stopovers at a jail, the sheriffs and jailers should be fully instructed on proper procedures for handling the inmates. Law enforcement personnel should be advised that visitors should not be permitted; any letters written by inmates should be held for the bus supervisor. The inmates should not be permitted to receive communications, packages, money, or articles from anyone.

Special Situations

Special situations may arise on a bus that require specific additional actions be taken.

Escape

If an escape occurs, the bus supervisor should request assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agencies, notify the originating and receiving institutions, and attempt to apprehend the escapee without sacrificing the security of the remaining prisoners.

Attack on the Bus

If the bus is attacked, the bus supervisor should request assistance from the nearest law enforcement agency. The bus should continue moving unless it is crippled by breakdown or sabotage. The bus supervisor should provide for the safety and well-being of the inmates and staff.

Hostages

If a hostage situation occurs on a bus, the bus supervisor should secure the bus perimeter, request assistance from the nearest law enforcement agency, determine the number of staff and inmates involved, determine what weapons the hostage takers have available, and identify the resources available to gain release of the hostages.

Illness or Death of Inmate or Staff Member

If a staff member or an inmate becomes ill, the bus supervisor should request assistance from the nearest appropriate medical facility and, if necessary, request assistance from the local law enforcement agency. If a staff member or an inmate dies, the bus supervisor should notify the local coroner or medical examiner, secure a body receipt from him or her, and record the pertinent data, including name of the deceased and time, date, cause, and place of death.

Internal Fire

In the event of a fire of any size on board the bus, the bus supervisor should stop the bus and utilize the available firefighting equipment. He or she should also immediately request assistance from local fire and police authorities. If the fire necessitates evacuation of the bus, the bus supervisor

should secure the bus perimeter, provide for weapons control, and evacuate the inmates. He or she has the primary responsibility for maintaining inmate accountability. The bus staff should fight the fire only if it seems possible for them to do so and also maintain security.

Riot

If a riot occurs on board the bus, the bus supervisor should command inmates to cease participation in the disturbance. He or she should isolate the bus from civilians, request assistance from the nearest law enforcement agency, and determine the number of inmates involved. When sufficient assistance is available, the bus supervisor should attempt to regain control of the situation utilizing the equipment available, including chemical agents, restraints, and riot sticks. Firearms should only be used to protect life and to prevent escapes. Only the minimum force necessary to control the situation should be used.

Traffic Accident

If a bus transporting inmates is involved in a traffic accident, the bus supervisor should secure the bus perimeter, request assistance from the local law enforcement agency, and secure medical assistance for any injured. If the bus is disabled, the bus supervisor should request advice from the home institution.

Natural Disaster

If a flood, snow storm or ice storm occurs, the bus supervisor should contact the highway patrol to determine road conditions along the planned route. If the weather precludes safe operation of the bus, the bus supervisor should request further instructions from the home institution.

If tornado activity occurs, the bus should not proceed into the area of danger. The bus supervisor should maintain radio contact with law enforcement agencies along the bus route. If a tornado is sighted, the supervisor should stop the bus beneath a highway overpass or in as safe an area as is possible. He or she should command inmates to exit the bus and lie flat on the ground. Officers on board should form a secure perimeter and try to maintain full visibility of all inmates. When the emergency has passed, the supervisor should return all inmates to the bus and take a careful census of all prisoners and staff members. He or she should advise local authorities of the situation.

Vehicle Failure

If a bus fails to operate at the institution, the bus supervisor should notify the chief security supervisor and other appropriate personnel. If a bus fails to operate on the road, the supervisor should request assistance from the nearest law enforcement agency. If the failure is such that temporary housing is required, the supervisor should request assistance and advice from the home institution.

Prison Gangs

Prison gangs first attracted national attention during the 1970's and 1980's because of the increasing incidence of gang-related violence in correctional institutions. Murders, assaults, and other disruptions in correctional facilities have often been gang-related. It has been calculated that gang mem-

bership includes three percent of the population of all inmates in state and federal institutions, and this percentage is growing. Gang members' actions are surprisingly disruptive despite the small proportion of gang members to the entire prison population.

The information in this section has been abstracted from *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons,* a 1985 report prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice by the Criminal Justice Institute in South Salem, New York.

Gang Organization

Research into gang structure has determined that gangs are generally somewhat disorganized. The number of inmates involved in a typical prison gang varies widely. Although their members are unsophisticated in their methods, gangs use violent tactics to carry out their activities. Gangs are evenly divided into groups that use impersonal styles of operation and groups that model their dealings after those of a family business. Rule making within gangs varies, with a significant number of groups dependent on the whims of their leaders. Most of the gangs display a high degree of macho camaraderie. The nature of financial and service transactions varies widely among gangs.

Gang Membership

Membership in gangs is most often based on race. Prior association with a home-group also plays a significant role in influencing membership decisions. Other factors of strong importance are shared political or religious beliefs or shared lifestyles.

An individual inmate's membership in a gang is influenced by past association with current gang members or through general acceptance of current gang values. Membership in a gang is often perceived as a lifetime commitment. Leaving the gang is an act of betrayal and, in many cases, evokes harsh punishment. It is usual, however, for gang membership to dissipate when the participating inmate leaves prison.

Gang Leadership

Leaders are distinguishable from their followers. Criteria for leadership include physical prowess, seniority, the commission of violent acts, and the display of charismatic qualities. In some gangs, the leader shares authority with, or derives his power from, a council or committee. Succession is periodic, with leaders rarely holding their positions longer than two years. Change occurs either by the assertion of a stronger personality or by central committee choice. A minority of gangs appears to function without permanent leadership.

Gang Behavior

The essential elements of gang member behavior include loyalty to the group, adherence to a code of secrecy, and display of an outwardly cooperative attitude towards prison authority. Gangs maintain obedience through fear, intimidation, and threats of violence. In many cases, gang discipline has little regard for human life. The consequences of murdering fellow inmates do not hinder gang members from performing acts of violence.

Gang members derive their prestige from their ability to control other

inmates and activities in the institution. Money, drugs, and personal property are tools to gain power and status and are used to demonstrate the gang's ability to control and dominate others while providing protection, goods, and services to its members.

With the exception of business transactions, gang members avoid association with inmates who are not part of their group. To the gang member, business is the process by which he or she dominates or controls the outsider. Because non-members can be controlled, gang participants view them as passive, weak, and worthless, justifying the members' self-image of superiority.

Prison gangs tolerate members of the correctional staff. They avoid contact with the staff as much as possible, although the incidence of gang-related assaults on officers has increased. Institutional staff members are viewed by participants as hindrances to, but not constraints on, gang-related activities.

Gang membership and behavior dominates the lives of gang participants. While some members participate in institutional pastimes, the demands of a career as a prison gangster leave them little time for less deviant activities.

Problems Caused by Prison Gangs

The degree to which gangs cause administrative problems varies widely from gang to gang and from institution to institution. Estimates of the portion of serious inmate problems related to gangs range as high as eighty–five percent.

Prison Operation and Activity

Gangs have been responsible for problems including:

- The introduction and distribution of drugs.

- Intimidation of weaker inmates.

- Extortion and strong-arming.

- Internal gang violence.

- Violence between gangs.

- An increase in racial and ethnic tensions, leading to wider disturbances.

- Contract inmate murders.

These problems are more often the result of activities directed by gang members against other inmates in the course of their business transactions, rather than actions taken against the institution or staff. Gangs seem to exploit prison operations instead of hampering them.

Because gang activity is not directed at disrupting the institution, many correctional agencies perceive them as having very little negative impact on prison operations. Areas that seem the most affected include legitimate clubs and programs, since these clubs are excellent vehicles for concealing gang activities. Visiting is the institutional activity least affected by gang operations. Indeed, gangs take care to preserve visiting privileges; administrators have reported visiting is a major means of trafficking communications, money, and drugs between the gangs and the street.

Inmate-Inmate Problems

Gang members tend to confront non-members more frequently than members of their own or other gangs. While confrontations between members of different gangs occasionally bring severe retribution, in some cases little resulting actions have been taken. The presence of inter-gang alliances within institutions seems to account for instances when little revenge occurred. Although communication between gangs and gang members in different institutions has been minimal, it presents a great concern to administrators.

Drug Traffic

Gangs are responsible for the majority of the drug traffic in the institutions in which they occur. Drugs are the major commodity tool of the gangs.

Relationship of the Gangs to the Outside

Most prison gangs have counterpart gangs on the street. While its occurrence has not been universal, there has been evidence that some gangs use the prisons as a base for criminal activity in the community. One special concern has been the occurrence of murders of retribution outside the prison.

Identifying and Tracking Gang Members and Activities

There has been no reliable method developed for identifying, tracking, and maintaining ongoing intelligence on gang activity inside prisons. Accepted methods of systematic intelligence gathering do not work. In addition, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, little attention has been paid to developing systems for identifying, tracking, documenting, and sharing information on gangs.

Identification

Methods used to make positive identification of gang membership include self admission, visual evidence (including tattoos, clothing, and colors), case histories, reports of other agencies, possession of gang literature, hit lists, association with other gang members, correspondence, home address, photographs, visitors, and informants. One indicator of gang membership that has proved reliable has been an inmate's prior association with a motorcycle gang.

Surveillance methods to uncover gang activities include direct observation, monitoring of correspondence, examining records to reveal patterns of activity, and informants.

Strategies Used to Combat Gang Activity

Because the nature of individual gangs, institutions, and jurisdictions varies so widely, many different approaches have been taken to limiting gang activity. The most effective procedures have been the early identification of gang members and curative measures, including the separation of gang members and the isolation of gang leadership. Some administrators have highlighted the importance of good inmate-staff communications as an effective means of uncovering and minimizing gang operation. Other tactics that have been used to greater or lesser effect have been the movement of gang members to different facilities both inside and outside the state, prosecution, paying closer attention to job and housing assignments, the control

of visiting privileges, preventing recruitment, and institution-wide lockdowns. Among the actions perceived as most successful are preventing recruitment and institution-wide lockdowns. Among the actions perceived as least successful in preventing gang activity are regular shakedowns, housing inmates in small units, extending release dates as a sanction, the interception of communications and enforcement of mail regulations, and minimizing attention paid to the problem.

Recommendations

Agencies should develop a general philosophical policy and strategy for dealing with gangs. Two approaches to the control of gangs have been popular. One position advocates preemption, protecting victimized inmates by locking the gang members in segregation. The other approach perceives the prison as a community in which everyone must coexist and deals with incidents of misbehavior as they occur. It must be noted that the first method has led to more violence than the second, which places greater stress on communication for control.

Administrators should consider the formation of Prison Gang Task Forces to help examine the gang phenomenon more closely and provide local solutions to the problems raised by these deviant groups. They should make inquiries into the findings of such groups in other areas of the country where gangs may be more prevalent. In the search for better intelligence on gang operations, debriefing procedures for former gang members should be instituted, along with methods of processing and using the resulting data.

Administrators should learn to make early identification of gang membership and activity. Effective systems for identifying and tracking gang members should be instituted or improved. Agencies should cooperate, sharing information on gang participation and operations among their component facilities, with law enforcement organizations, and with parallel groups in other jurisdictions.

Also, information on both strategic gang control success and failure should be shared among agencies to minimize the use of inferior approaches and provide positive methods for emulation. Models of gang control that have not proved effective should be discarded. An interstate clearinghouse should be developed to aid in the spread of successful screening, tracking, and documentation systems.

Administrators of prison facilities organized under older systems, with large or overcrowded inmate populations, should consider adopting newer systems of supervision that place staff members in closer contact with the inmate community. Increased staff-inmate interaction and communication reduces the prisoners' perception of the facility as their own "turf" and raises the likelihood that gang activity will be observed or curtailed.

Part III

Security and Emergency Preparedness

Introduction

Volatile conditions resulting from overcrowding, inmate idleness, understaffing, budget constraints, and other stresses endemic to the management of correctional systems require extraordinary vigilance. Security personnel should be aware of the potential for and responses to emergency situations. Emergency response plans should be developed to aid security personnel in making the rapid decisions often necessary during a crisis. Response networks should be established that integrate agency-wide critical managerial personnel and physical plants.

Response plans should not only address the actual emergency, but the periods before and after the crisis as well. It is imperative to understand the importance of the following factors:

- O Necessity of due process.

- O Preservation of evidence for future prosecution.

- O Maintenance of security during evacuation.

- O Cooperation with local, state, and federal agencies.

- O Establishment of appropriate access for public and press inquiry.

Security staff should also understand the procedure for enlisting the help of state and local law enforcement agencies during an emergency and should be familiar with the roles employees of those groups play in a crisis and in a post-emergency investigation. Cooperation with the team approach to crisis management and inquiry has proven critical in lawsuits stemming from emergencies.

The implementation of emergency operating plans, including the temporary suspension of specified administrative rules, temporary reassignment of staff, transfer of inmates, and the involvement of key officers from other agencies, is crucial to the effective management of crises. Order is most quickly and efficiently restored through immediate, professional response.

A true challenge to emergency planners is to create strategies that are decent and humane for use in crises. Both public support and institutional control are harmed by overly severe, poorly timed measures. Section III of this manual deals with the establishment of effective yet humane methods for dealing with emergencies.

Chapter 10

General Emergency Response

Emergency Procedures

Although each emergency situation involves a unique combination of incident, facility security level, inmate custody category, and departmental or legal restraints, there are common procedures that may be followed in most crises.

Notification of Personnel

Each institution should develop an emergency alert system. Autodialers and pyramid style telephone trees described in the chapter on communications are good methods for alerting large numbers of employees of an emergency situation on short notice. Institutions employing autodialers should have a back-up telephone tree system in the event the autodialer mechanism is rendered inaccessible or inoperative.

Use of Force

Only the minimal amount of force necessary to control a situation should be employed. The use of force as retribution or punishment should be prohibited. Training programs should stress the proper use of force in emergency situations.

In some emergencies, it may be appropriate to display formations of correctional officers and non-institution personnel in tactical gear. In situations when chemical agents are employed, authorization must come from the warden or his or her designee. Chemical agents should not be used in confined areas or in housing units without first establishing avenues of retreat to facilitate the clearing of the area.

Use of Firearms

Firearms should only be used as a last resort, and then only in cases where there is no other avenue to prevent inmate escape or the death of hostages or correctional personnel. The decision to use firearms should not be taken lightly and should be governed by such considerations as the location of the incident and the effectiveness of firearms in the situation.

An emergency command post should be established to coordinate the management of the crisis.

Emergency Command Post

Emergency situations often create conditions which disrupt the normal operation of the rest of the institution. As soon as it is practical, an emergency command post should be established to coordinate the management of the crisis. Such a post, in an area of the institution not likely to be disturbed during a crisis, should be identified in the institution's emergency operating plans.

The area chosen for a command post should be resistant to inmate takeover while affording the best possible access to the emergency. It should be equipped with the basic materials that might be needed in the event of a crisis. In addition, contingency plans should be formulated to install additional materials as they become necessary. Basic furnishings should include:

- Desks, chairs, file cabinets, and other necessary office fittings.

- Written copies of all emergency plans.

- Current maps of the facility and the local area.

- A telephone directory listing all numbers for outside assistance and emergency equipment.

- Telephone and communications equipment enabling telephone and/ or radio contact with the control room, towers, facility warden, security staff, and local law enforcement agency personnel.

- A public address system.

The primary purpose of the emergency command post is to enable the control center and other sections of the facility to function as normally as possible during the crisis by reducing conflict between everyday procedures and emergency procedures. Careful planning and coordination are required to ensure that conflicting orders are not issued to staff or other persons involved in both everyday and emergency operations.

The Armory

In the event of an emergency, the warden or a designee should assign one employee to the armory. This employee should assume command of the armory and remain there until the "All Clear" signal is given. Weapons and equipment should be issued in accordance with the post orders.

Hostages

In the event of a hostage situation, no action should be directed against the inmates involved without the approval of the warden or a designee. Exceptions to this policy may be made if there is an immediate threat to life or the strong possibility of serious injury to the hostages. The judgment of the officer-in-charge at this time is critical. His or her decision on possible actions can be crucial to the rapid de-escalation of the situation.

Vulnerable Areas

The following areas and commodities are particularly vulnerable during emergencies. Crisis plans should specify that they be reinforced by additional staffing and barricades before an actual threat to their security materializes:

- Record rooms—files.
- Medical areas—medicines, supplies, and equipment.
- Officer uniform rooms—clothing, uniforms, and personal belongings.
- The commissary—food and other commodities.
- The power plant—tools and access to institutional power systems.
- The warehouse—equipment and food.
- The kitchen—equipment, weapons, and food.
- The barber shop—weapons.
- Mechanical shops—tools and weapons.
- Other sensitive areas designated by the institution.

Probable routes of inmate escape should be anticipated and included on the roster of vulnerable areas in the order of likelihood of use.

Evacuation

When notified of an emergency, employees supervising inmates outside of the housing areas should obtain permission from the emergency command post to return the inmates to their cells or dormitories. If there are problems in the housing units, the employees should keep inmates in other secure areas until further instructions are received. Staff members who are not manning critical posts or who do not have inmates under their supervision at the time of an emergency should report to a predesignated location and await further instructions.

Bargaining with Inmates

If resistance to authority has been nonviolent, a short initial discussion with the prisoner group is desirable. Inmates should be advised that their grievances will be considered if they return to their normal activities. As a general rule, bargaining with inmates who are resisting authority is not encouraged, but a situation may arise in which the warden deems negotiation appropriate. Bargaining should occur only in cases where the warden believes no other option is available.

Support Forces

If a disturbance reaches a level requiring action beyond the capability of available personnel, it may be necessary to request assistance from other correctional institutions or other agencies. These requests should be coordinated through the head of the agency. If, in the warden's judgment, the severity of the situation justifies the use of force at levels not available from institutional resources, he or she should call in support forces. In cases of extreme immediacy, the warden may not have time to consult with agency administration and will be acting on his or her own authority. When this occurs, the warden should notify his or her immediate superiors of actions taken as soon as possible.

If a disturbance occurs during normal working hours—Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., all off-duty security personnel

Bargaining with inmates who are resisting authority is not encouraged.

should be alerted and be required to return to the institution to await emergency orders from the emergency command post. In addition, unless otherwise instructed, all administrative and miscellaneous personnel on duty should report for further instructions. On-duty administrative and security personnel with inmates under their supervision should call the control center for their instructions.

If a disturbance occurs outside normal working hours, the shift supervisor or a designee should notify all off-duty employees and, if necessary, request them to report to the institution. All recalled personnel should report to a prearranged area and await further instructions from the warden or a designee.

Recalled personnel should never enter the facility without explicit direction to do so. No one should be permitted to enter or leave the institution without presenting valid identification. The emergency contingency plans should specify a priority order for identifying personnel from noncorrectional support and law enforcement agencies.

Parking areas and marshalling points should be established to handle the increased vehicular traffic common in emergencies. Separate areas should be designated for media and emergency vehicle parking to reduce confusion and promote safety.

> *All contact with representatives of the news media should be made by the warden or an authorized information officer.*

Utilities

Emergency plans should include the location of utility lines and mains both inside and leading to the institution. This list should contain up-to-date documentation of water mains and valves, electrical lines and switches, and switching mechanisms. It may be necessary to quickly shut down utility service to reduce waste or fire hazard in the event of natural disaster, sabotage, occupation, or other crisis situation.

Documentation of Response

Institutional response to unusual occurrences should be fully documented. An employee should be designated to work with the chief of security in preparing video, audio tape, and written records of the emergency and all resulting institutional actions. Another employee should be assigned the duty of keeping a written chronological log of events. He or she should be stationed in the emergency command post and relieved if the emergency continues beyond the length of the current shift. Employees responsible for making these records should receive any necessary clerical assistance.

Information resources used should include employee statements of observations, actions, and activities. Employee statements should be clear enough to aid in the identification of inmate participants. Debriefing should occur as soon after the emergency as is possible.

The recordings and documents made should be used to analyze the actions taken and to prepare for future crises.

Review

The emergency plan should be reviewed, evaluated, and, if necessary, revised immediately following each disturbance.

Chapter 11

Escape and Apprehension

The Escape Prevention and Apprehension Plan

The escape-proof jail has yet to be built, but good correctional planning and effective security practices can reduce the probability of escape and increase the rate of recapture after an escape has occurred.

The chief security officer of each facility should develop an up-to-date escape prevention and apprehension plan. This plan, signed by the chief executive officer, should be approved by the agency's central office.

The chief security officer should implement the plan when an escape occurs. In his or her absence, the senior security supervisor should take charge. The warden, assistant wardens or assistant superintendents, chief security officer, and duty officer (if applicable) should be notified immediately of any escape or recapture.

The chief security officer should be responsible for annual review and update of the escape prevention and apprehension plan. The plan itself should be classified as restricted information; controlled copies should be made available to staff members who sign a receipt roster. The chief security officer should develop procedures to ensure that all employees are aware of the provisions of the escape plan. It is, however, the responsibility of employees to read this material and become familiar with escape prevention and apprehension procedures.

Escape Prevention Methodology

Prevention, the preferred method for dealing with escapes, is the result of sound security policies. In spite of adherence to security policies, escapes may occur. Measures that help reduce the occurrence of escape attempts include:

- Alert detection and prompt report of unrest or tension.

- Observation and report of abnormal changes in inmate behavior.

- Prompt correction of construction- or damage-related security breaches and the provision of adequate interim security coverage between the time a weakness is discovered and the time final repairs are made.

> *Any unauthorized inmate*
> *absence should be reported*
> *immediately to the central*
> *control room and to the*
> *shift supervisor.*

- Provision of full-time work, recreation, and self improvement programs for the inmates.

- Appropriate classification and classification review of all prisoners in or entering the facility, including accurate designation of inmates likely to pose an escape threat.

- Proper consideration of legitimate inmate complaints or needs.

- Prompt, decisive, and suitable action in response to the situation at hand.

- Implementation of a system of security inspections, frequent counts, and supervised movement.

- Provision of appropriate work and living assignments in accord with inmate custody classification.

- The appropriate use of qualified and trained personnel.

Sounding the Alarm

The escape and apprehension plan should specify that any unauthorized absence be reported immediately to the central control room and to the shift supervisor. When it is determined that an escape has occurred, prearranged signals should be sounded to notify appropriate employees living in the vicinity of the facility. The facility administrator should determine the method for sounding a general alarm, because alarms can cause increased tension and excitement in the facility and in the surrounding community. In addition, advertising the knowledge of an unauthorized absence could interfere with apprehension plans.

Notification of Off-Duty Employees

An accurate, up-to-date list of all employee addresses and telephone numbers should be maintained. The chief security officer is responsible for keeping this list and arranging autodialer and pyramid telephone tree notification systems.

As soon as an escape occurs, the warden should decide if off-duty employees are needed to reinforce the on-duty staff. If the decision is made to call in off-duty personnel, one employee should be assigned to contact the off-duty employees required and have them report for immediate duty. Plans should include which positions are critical to the immediate operation of the facility and which positions may be vacated, freeing staff members to assist in the search. Adequate staff coverage should be maintained in order to provide normal supervision of inmates not involved in the emergency.

Essential Maintenance Posts

Inmate-staffed maintenance posts essential to the continued operation of the facility should be identified. When an alarm is sounded, employees supervising these posts should take immediate counts of the inmates in their care. These counts should be reported to the control center as soon as they are made. Contingency plans should include provisions for the operation of these critical posts during escapes and other emergencies. The plans should specify the conditions under which essential inmate workers are to be returned to their quarters or are to remain at their job sites.

Nonessential Duty Posts

Emergency plans should also identify those posts that are not critical to the facility's continued operation. In the event of an escape, both security and nonsecurity personnel staffing these posts may assist in the search for the escapee. When the escape alarm sounds, employees from nonessential posts should report to a designated location and await further instructions. Employees staffing these posts should be aware of their duties and responsibilities in the event of an escape or other emergency. These posts should not be vacated without receiving the specific signal or order to do so. Any nonessential post employee who is involved in the supervision of work crews should first ensure that all tools are secured and all prisoners are returned to their housing units as quickly as possible before leaving his or her post.

The specification "essential" or "nonessential" should be a part of the post orders for each staffing position. The master list of these attributions should be kept in the control room records.

Specific Essential Post Duties

In the event of an escape, the armory officer should immediately prepare for the issue of arms, ammunition, and other controlled equipment. He or she should issue weapons only to authorized personnel. Authorization to issue and receive arms should come from the warden, assistant warden, or chief security officer. All employees receiving weapons should be thoroughly familiar with their appropriate and safe use. Employees may be issued batons or similar devices in lieu of firearms. All equipment that is issued should be logged and signed for in order to facilitate control and return.

One employee should be detailed to obtain current identification pictures of the escapees. Copies of these photographs and an accompanying description should be given to the search leader, all local law enforcement agencies, and any nearby residents.

Another employee should be assigned to collect all personal property belonging to the escapees. The items found, including personal mail and visiting lists, should be taken to the office of the chief security officer for investigation, inventory, and safekeeping.

Notification of the Central Office

The warden is responsible for ensuring that the commissioner and assistant commissioner are promptly informed of any escape. Completed Escape and Apprehension Reports should be forwarded to the central office on a same-day basis. Serious escapes—those involving violence, destruction of property, or notorious offenders—should be followed by detailed narrative reports including:

- The method of escape, including mention of how the inmate accessed the area from which the escape occurred, whether or not other non-escaping inmates were involved, and a complete description of the appearance and clothing of all escaping prisoners.

- An evaluation of the factors which may have led to or enabled the escape.

- Proposed changes to institutional policy or procedures designed to thwart similar escapes in the future.

Less serious escape attempts need not be followed up by detailed reports. It should be sufficient to describe them as a part of the warden's and chief security officer's monthly reports.

Notification of Law Enforcement Agencies

The escape and apprehension plan should designate one employee as responsible for the notification of all law enforcement agencies in the surrounding area. These agencies should be contacted by telephone after the warden has authorized that the notification take place. Telephone numbers of the agencies to be contacted should be listed as a part of the plan.

Information given to law enforcement agencies at the time of escape should include:

- Name of the escapee.

- Escapee's sex, race, nationality, date of birth, age, weight, hair and eye color, social security number, and state of residence.

- Photographs of the escapee.

- Escapee's crime of sentence, date sentenced, and length of sentence.

- A Federal Bureau of Investigation case number, if available.

- A State Patrol case number, if available.

- Fingerprint classification.

- Escapee's last known residence, past associates, or other likely places or groups to which he or she might return.

- Escapee's driver's license and vehicle information, if known.

- A statement of whether or not the escapee is considered dangerous.

- Institutional contact who should receive notice of apprehension.

Contingency plans should also require the prompt notification of all alerted agencies when recapture of an escapee takes place. If the escape has involved another crime, such as assault, the taking of hostages, kidnapping, theft, or the destruction of property, local law enforcement agencies should be informed that a substantive violation has occurred within their jurisdiction.

Notification of the News Media

The escape and apprehension plan should include a list of contacts at local newspapers and television and radio stations. The public information officer should be responsible for notifying the media of escapes after the central office and local law enforcement and other government agencies have been informed.

When the public information officer makes contact with the media representatives, he or she should establish the method and schedule for the provision of subsequent information. Updates may be accomplished by hourly briefings in a designated area, by telephone, or by other suitable means. Data shared on escapees should include: name, age, place of conviction, crime committed, and sentence. Other information that does not violate inmate privacy protection statutes may be issued. By cooperating with

the news media and keeping them informed, the institution enhances its credibility and ensures the accuracy of accounts reaching the public.

Escape Posts and Assignments

The escape and apprehension plan should contain a list of posts that must be manned during a search for escapees. The list order may reflect the relative importance of each post and may carry designations including "primary," "secondary," "mobile," "stationary," or other labels meaningful to administration. The priority in which these posts are covered should depend on particulars of the escape at hand. The time of occurrence, means of departure, and direction of travel should all be considered.

Search officers should be provided with an instruction kit containing a city and area map, telephone location list, and descriptions of post duties with search area assignments. Instruction kits should be given to each officer at the time he or she is assigned to a specific escape post. Escape post orders should include the proper method for covering that post, the importance of concealment and avoiding unnecessary conversation, and specific radio frequencies and volumes. The chief security officer is responsible for the identification of escape posts and development and maintenance of these kits.

Firearms

The warden, assistant warden, or chief security officer should be the only officials permitted to authorize the carrying of firearms during a search. Firearms should only be used to apprehend the escapee. The responsibility of carrying weapons includes the obligation to exercise discipline, restraint, and good judgment. Armed employees should be aware that firing their weapons endangers innocent parties.

Firearms should be used only as a last resort. Their use is appropriate for the following:

○ The prevention of loss of life or grievous bodily harm.

○ The prevention of escapes.

○ The protection of government property.

A verbal warning of "halt" should precede the use of firearms. If the command is disobeyed, the armed officer should discharge a warning shot before resorting to firing a shot intended to disable the escapee. If, in any situation, the employee believes there is an immediate and overriding threat to life, a shot to disable may be fired without warning.

Under normal circumstances firearms should not be issued during escapes from community security facilities. An exception to this policy may be made when a substantial crime has been committed during the escape.

Hostages

The escape and apprehension plan should include the institutional hostage statement. In the event hostages are taken, the following guidelines should be adhered to:

○ Any official who is taken hostage, regardless of rank or position, loses all command authority. No order from any hostage should be honored.

> *The warden, assistant warden, or chief security officer should be the only officials permitted to authorize the carrying of firearms during the search for escapees.*

- No inmate or group of inmates using hostages should be permitted to leave the facility. No inmate should be permitted to leave the area within which he or she is secured.

- Hostages should never be exchanged.

- No weapons should be given to offenders in exchange for hostages.

Officer Conduct in the Event of an Escape

All correctional employees should be instructed in the use of tact and good judgment for their contacts with the public. The escape and apprehension plan should clearly state the limits of authority possessed by correctional personnel when they are not accompanied by law enforcement officers. The plan should specify their legal limitations in vehicle and house searches as well as in other areas where the search for escapees intrudes on community privacy. Correctional personnel should be trained to cooperate fully with law enforcement officers who do possess the authority to make arrests.

Employees should be instructed in recognizing and preserving evidence so that the evidence they discover can retain its value for prosecution and be turned over intact to the appropriate officials.

Training should also include the proper use of telephone and radio lines. Communication should be maintained by search leaders in emergencies. Instruction should also stress the importance of abiding by the law during searches. Speeding and other infractions should be avoided.

Apprehension

When an institution receives word that an escapee has been recaptured or is in the custody of another agency or jurisdiction, the central office should be notified. An officer should be designated as responsible for transmitting notice of the recapture to the law enforcement agencies notified of the original escape. The public information officer should provide details of the apprehension to the news media.

Damage to the Facility's Security Features

A carefully written report should be made when an escapee has cut bars, window sashes, or fences or has caused other damage to the security features of the institution. The report should be accompanied by photographs illustrating the damage.

An expert should be assigned to make any repairs involving the welding of tool-resistant bars. Until all repairs are completed, sufficient manpower should be assigned to the damaged area to preclude other escape attempts exploiting the temporary breach in security.

Preparation of Reports

Comprehensive and accurate reports are essential in the subsequent prosecution of escapees. Whenever possible, reports should contain photographs documenting the damages, additional crimes committed, and the method or path of escape. The following individuals should submit reports to the central office at the end of the search or, if the search is protracted, prior to leaving the facility at the end of their shift:

- Employees witnessing the escape or who were responsible for the detail or area from which the escape occurred.

Comprehensive and accurate reports are essential in the subsequent prosecution of escapees.

- Civilian or law enforcement agency witnesses to the escape or subsequent flight.

- Employees to whom the escape was reported.

- Employees assigned to transmit notification of the escape to other agencies.

- Senior shift supervisors.

- Employees and law enforcement officers involved in the actual search.

- Employees, civilians, and law enforcement officers held as hostages.

- Perimeter guards.

- Other staff members with pertinent areas of responsibility or having relevant information.

STANDARD ESCAPE REPORT

_____
(Institution)

Inmate's name _____ Age ____ Number _____ Date of escape _____

Sentence _____ Offense _____ Custody classification _____

Approximate time remaining to serve _____

Escaped from: Inside perimeter ( ); Outside perimeter ( ); Work release ( ); Other ( )

Number of inmates involved _____ Time of escape _____

Supervising employee (if none, state none) _____

Person first reporting escape _____ Time reported _____

Fired on Yes ( ); No ( )

Central Office/Regional Office notified _____ Date _____ Time _____

Apprehended _____ Date _____ Time _____

Circumstances surrounding escape _____

_____

_____

_____

Evaluation (staff analysis) _____

_____

_____

Changes in facilities or procedures to prevent similar occurrences: _____

_____

_____

Date report submitted _____ Signature _____

A SEPARATE ESCAPE REPORT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR EACH INMATE INVOLVED

Chapter 12

Inmate Disturbances

Causes of Riots and Disturbances

Living conditions almost always play a part in the cause of riots.

Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are too complex and varied to be attributed to any one cause or group of causes, although overcrowding, idleness, faulty security, lack of staff and staff training, substandard facilities, and lack of programs all play contributory roles. It is not possible to identify a single cause which always precipitates a riot or disturbance. Although many riots and disturbances have been triggered by a single incident, the incidents are most likely only sparks igniting an already volatile, riot-prone situation.

The causes of riots and disturbances should be viewed as a collection of complex, interrelated variables contributing to a total problem—one that can erupt in violence when left uncontrolled. Many of these variables are well known. A relationship can be identified between one or more of the variables discussed in this chapter and most major riots and disturbances in American correctional institutions. Generally these factors can be divided into institutional and non-institutional causes.

Correctional administrators must be aware of the potential causes of riots and disturbances. Institutional conditions causing disturbances are of primary concern to correctional administrators. If these conditions can be corrected, the possibility of major disturbances can be substantially reduced.

For that reason, this chapter focuses on the institutional causes of riots and disturbances with emphasis on those which can be attributed to the institutional environment, certain inmate characteristics, and administrative policies and procedures.

The Institutional Environment

The correctional institution is an unnatural environment and contributes to the emotional stress of the incarcerated. Even in the most efficient prison, there is an atmosphere of monotony and boredom, regimentation, frustration, and hopelessness.

Frustration and stress, the inevitable results of incarceration, can easily reach explosive levels when compounded by factors such as substandard and overcrowded physical space, bad food, brutality, racial conflict, unfair or capricious treatment, poor management, and inadequate security and supervision.

*Constructive programs
and meaningful activities
reduce tension.*

Substandard Facilities

Inmates are responsive to their physical environment. Living conditions almost always play a part in the cause of riots. In some instances, dissatisfaction with the physical environment is the detonator setting off an explosive disturbance. Long standing conventions in the architectural design of correctional institutions and the attendant concepts of efficiency and functionality have sometimes contributed to the dehumanization of the prison environment. Long corridors, repeated doorways, and hard finishes are hypnotic and result in depersonalization.

Not only is prison architecture frequently drab and dehumanizing, but many correctional institutions are very old. Most correctional institutions were built prior to 1900, and their repressive atmosphere affects both staff and inmates. These outmoded facilities, together with a lack of programs, can cause an increase in emotional tension and lead to a disturbance. Plumbing, heating, lighting, and ventilation are sometimes inadequate. Noise control is often nonexistent. The result is that thousands of inmates live in environments that are not only uncomfortable, but frequently unhealthy.

Riots and disturbances are not confined to outmoded facilities. Obviously, disturbances occur in some of our most modern facilities, but the physical inadequacy of an institution is a contributing factor which can lead to disturbances.

Since many riots have occurred in old institutions with excessive populations and many inmates are still held in facilities of this type, it is apparent that the most pressing problem is improving living conditions in established facilities.

Overcrowding

Overcrowding in correctional institutions is an ever-increasing problem. The U.S. prison population is over 500,000 inmates—an all time high. There is every indication that the population will continue to grow. In many prisons, two or more inmates live in cells designed for one. When correctional institutions are large and overcrowded and when inmates are confined in dormitories rather than single cells, the possibility of a violent eruption increases dramatically. Support facilities in overcrowded institutions, including gymnasiums, kitchens, dining rooms, industries, and medical facilities are all severely stressed. Program resources easily become inadequate for the increased numbers they must serve, and the inmate/staff ratios often increase. These changes result in depersonalization of services and inadequate security within many institutions.

Antiquated facilities, isolated from the community and with large, overcrowded populations, are conducive to the development of inmate frustration and anger. As institutions and living quarters increase in size, the ease with which their inmates are controlled decrease. Small, well-designed institutions with individual cells are more effective in reducing tension and disturbances within the institution.

Unfortunately, large, overcrowded, poorly designed correctional institutions with open dormitories are what many correctional administrators must deal with. Therefore, administrators should be aware of innovative methods for improving such institutional facilities.

Idleness and Lack of Programming

Constructive programs and meaningful activities reduce tension and

have proven successful in many institutions. Interesting and satisfying work helps maintain inmates' emotional stability, and programs for constructive, meaningful activities for the institution population can be justified on many levels. Primarily, work programs and activities provide an alternative to enforced idleness and thus decrease institutional tension.

Characteristics of the Inmate Population

The characteristics of the inmate population cannot be overlooked as a basic factor to be considered when dealing with riots and disturbances. American correctional institutions are populated primarily by young, unmarried males from the lower social and economic strata of society. A disproportionate share of the individuals in correctional institutions are educationally deficient, emotionally unstable, and prone to violence or other socially deviant behavior. They are frequently the products of broken homes, unskilled, and have unstable work records. They are apt to have prior criminal records, low self-esteem, and no major goals in life. Personal failure in a culture firmly oriented toward material success is the most common denominator among offenders.

Despite the fact that inmates in correctional facilities have committed serious violations of the law, most tend to become responsible members of the *institutional* community. In general, they want the prison to run smoothly, and they want their lives to be as pleasant and as safe as possible given the circumstances. No one stands to lose more in a riot than the inmates. They have the greatest risk of being injured or killed. In most riots the majority of the prisoners want order restored and the issues resolved as quickly as possible.

There are also some special groups within the general prison population who, for a variety of reasons, are especially prone to cause problems which may erupt into violence and disorder.

Antisocial Inmates

Some inmates are diagnosed sociopaths, angry at society and lacking normal ethical values. They are prone to destroying property and injuring others. Frequently scheming to overthrow authority, represented in prison society by the administration, they seek out breaches of security, becoming astute students of the physical plant and institutional procedure. Since they spend 24 hours each day within the institution, their knowledge of security weaknesses can exceed that of the staff. These inmates should be of special concern to the security staff.

A growing number of inmates in the correctional system are mentally disordered.

Mentally Ill Inmates

Due to legislation making commitments to mental hospitals for the criminally insane more difficult to obtain, a growing number of inmates in the correctional system are disordered.

The disturbed population is expanded by adding inmates who experience psychotic episodes in which they lose contact with reality. In some cases their erratic and unpredictable behavior can represent a danger to the staff or other prisoners. They also have a tendency to create unrest among the remainder of the inmate population.

Prison Gangs

In recent years, prison gang membership has increased and gangs have been reported in an increasing number of correctional institutions. Gangs

are a cause of great concern. Frequently formed along racial lines, gangs have become increasingly politicized. Although they seem to have started when inmates banded together for self-protection, gangs have been implicated in brutal killings and violent intergroup warfare. In some cases, gangs have extended their influence into surrounding communities, competing with more traditional organized crime.

Prison gangs have been implicated in brutal killings and violent warfare . . . and are of great concern to correctional institutions.

Revolutionary Organizations

Revolutionary organizations have found prison populations fertile fields for recruitment. The ease with which inmates can be recruited is a reflection of the antisocial attitudes common in prisons. In addition, the widespread belief among inmates that they are political prisoners creates a sympathy between the inmates and the recruiting organizations.

Recent evidence has suggested that some revolutionary organizations have attempted to infiltrate or influence existing prison gangs. Joint activities have included political indoctrination and the training of gang members in terrorist tactics. Acts of terrorism in correctional institutions have become more frequent.

Fear

Fear is pervasive within some correctional institutions. A real "Catch 22" situation exists. If inmates are totally isolated and confined away from each other, both mental and social problems may develop. If they are allowed to mingle, occasional violence is almost inevitable. Continuous close supervision might solve the problem, but budget constraints often result in inmate/staff ratios that make it difficult to provide continuous supervision throughout the institution.

Collective Behavior

Prisoners often display a difficulty in sharing goals and objectives and are unlikely to unite over minor issues. It is common for an inmate leader to command a large following of loyal supporters, but it is unusual for such a leader to control an entire institution for any length of time. When prisoners become frustrated, however, agitative leaders have an easier time convincing others to join them in aggressive acts.

When tension builds, a condition of emotional contagion often develops. Rumors run rampant and crowds become mobs. At such times, sirens, news helicopters, and fire engines tend to increase excitement. Emotionally stimulated, with heightened suggestibility, inmates may experience an unusual sense of psychological unity while losing a sense of self-discipline. The climate becomes ripe for riots and disturbances.

Administrative Problems

While many riots and disturbances can be traced to circumstances beyond the control of correctional administrators, a significant number can be directly attributed to poor management practices. A correctional institution, like any other business, industry, or agency of government, must be guided by competent, professional management. Poor managerial practices found in correctional institutions have included undefined lines of authority and responsibility, the absence of clearly described and commonly understood rules and regulations, poor communications, partiality or favoritism in dealings with inmates and staff members, and indecisive response to legitimate grievances.

A significant number [of riots] can be directly attributed to poor management practices.

The staff of a correctional institution is the foundation upon which all programs are established and administered. If the personnel practices of an institution are inadequate, the quality of its operation will be adversely affected. Shortcomings in personnel management have been revealed as fundamental contributors to growing unrest in many correctional institutions. While the following discussion of the administrative causes of riots is not all-inclusive, it does highlight some continuing problems in hiring, training, and retaining qualified personnel. Other variables under the control of correctional administrators that may lead to heightened tensions are broken promises, precipitous change in policy or procedures, the recession or revoking of privileges, and the ignoring of legitimate grievances.

Frequent Turnover of Management

A common and serious problem has been the high rate of turnover in correctional management. A survey taken by the American Correctional Association in 1978 found that only six of the 50 chief correctional administrators in the U.S. had been in their positions for more than three years. This extreme transience can contribute to instability.

Correctional appointments are becoming more political. Those in charge of appointing correctional officials should ensure that they put competent individuals at the helm and then protect the chosen administrators from needless political interference.

System-wide improvements may be needed, but constant and sudden change is almost always detrimental to the stability of agencies and institutions.

Frequent Turnover of Staff

High rate of turnover in staff and management is a serious problem.

The high turnover of correctional officers has been another serious problem. In most jurisdictions pay is low, stress is high, and new staff members are often given the least desirable jobs and shifts. It is hardly surprising that in many institutions more than fifty percent of all new correctional officers fail to complete their first year on the job. Inexperienced officers cannot be expected to deal with serious crises as wisely and effectively as more seasoned staff members.

Breaches of Security

In most correctional institutions, considerable attention has been paid to establishing security procedures to prevent, or at least discourage, disturbances and riots. In too many cases, existing security procedures have proven inadequate or, if adequate, have not been followed. Inmates quickly become aware of breaches of security. There are always a few inmates in every institution who will try to take advantage of any weakness in the security system. Sound security procedures need to be established and continuously monitored to ensure compliance.

Non-Institutional Causes of Disturbances

Just as correctional administrators must be aware of the conditions and practices within the institution which precipitate riots and disturbances, they must also be aware of factors outside the facility that may lie beneath tension and hostility in the institution. Steps may be taken to remedy institutional causes through proper management, but the administrator may be

severely handicapped in managing factors arising in the larger community. A constant awareness and understanding of these conditions must be maintained. Correctional staff should be educated about their importance and possible consequences.

Public Apathy

In many cases, the public has been interested in having offenders committed, removing the disruptive agents from society. There has been little public concern for treatment methods and policies in correctional institutions. Public apathy can pervade an institution, even instilling lethargy and greater hopelessness in the inmates. The staff of a facility can also be infected by this apathy. With little or no community support, many correctional administrators find it difficult to maintain morale and implement realistic programs.

Punitive Attitude

In an era of ever-increasing violent crime, it is not surprising that society has responded by demanding greater punishment and retribution. The growing punitive attitude is another factor which underlies many major disturbances. Often correctional staff reflect this attitude of punishment as opposed to treatment. The correctional administrator must use in-service training to educate the staff members in the philosophy and the goals of the institution. A balance must be established between retribution and treatment. It is the job of the correctional administrator to understand the punitive attitude of the community and to recruit and train a staff which is committed to the positive values of correctional treatment.

Correctional Budgets

Although many stresses may contribute to the unrest that sparks a riot, a common factor in many disturbances has been inadequate financing. Hand-to-mouth budget practices and deficit financing, usually stemming from political considerations, have been found to be at the root of many of personnel, plant, and program inadequacies that have led to riots.

Inequities in the System

Finally, there are many inequities and complexities in the criminal justice system. The most frequent target of attack is disparity in sentencing practices. States with the least problems in this area are those in which sentences are indeterminate by law and in which central boards set individual terms of confinement and determine eligibility for parole. Complex systems with inflexible legislated restrictions on sentence length increase the likelihood of disparity. Other inequities include the maxim "the rich man goes free while the poor man goes to prison." Rationalization may help explain the presence of inequities, but it cannot solve the problems they cause.

> *A balance must be established between retribution and treatment.*

Patterns of Riots and Disturbances

Prison rebellions are generally categorized as either nonviolent or violent. Spontaneous, unorganized disturbances tend to be violent and result in considerable personal injury and property damage. Organized, well planned disturbances tend to be nonviolent and involve such activities as work stoppages, food strikes, sit-downs, and sabotage.

Nonviolent Disturbances

Generally, nonviolent disturbances are easier to deal with. They can be anticipated, usually occurring during business hours when the employee force is greatest in number. These disturbances do not present the complications associated with violence and destruction. Since nonviolent disturbances usually involve planning, leadership, and organization within the inmate population, institution intelligence measures and informants can alert personnel to organized prisoner actions. Intelligence gathered gives the administration an opportunity to take action to abort the pending disturbance before it occurs or to be better prepared to handle it.

Continual vigilance on the part of institution personnel is necessary to detect pending disturbances. During the developmental stage of a disturbance, appropriate staff actions may often thwart further development. During the planning stages of a disturbance, only a minority of inmates are usually enthusiastic, aware, and prepared to become involved in rebellious behavior. Prompt response to prevent further planning, organization, and recruitment can be accomplished by:

- Effective communication about the prisoners' concerns.

- Apprehending inmate leaders and isolating them from the general population.

Institutional leaders should convey to the inmates their position — preparedness to deal with real or perceived grievances in a rational manner, but a refusal to tolerate disruptive activities or individuals. It should be clear that inmates who do become involved in rebellious behavior will be disciplined accordingly.

While this policy is being made clear, action should be undertaken to correct real and imagined grievances. Remedial actions should be specific and visible. Promises and inflated rhetoric tend to convince the inmate population that nothing will actually happen, heightening their frustration and exacerbating the volatile situation. Something tangible should be part of the remedial action. Tangible actions include the alteration of some daily routine, regulation, or privilege.

Violent disturbances in an institution are very dangerous and difficult to anticipate.

Violent Disturbances

Violent disturbances tend to be more spontaneous, more poorly organized, and more dangerous. They are harder to anticipate and defuse. This does not mean they are never accompanied by forewarning or design and planning, but they do not possess these features to the same degree as nonviolent disturbances. If staff has had prior warning, the same actions that tend to thwart nonviolent disturbances may be successfully applied. With the exception of clashes between inmates and major escape attempts, violent rebellions usually follow certain predictable stages.

Prior to a riot, there is usually a perceptible change in the institutional environment. Tensions may be high, and those familiar with prisons can sense the explosive nature of the atmosphere. This condition is often caused by inmate leaders who foment unrest by magnifying perceived administrative failures or other circumstances that have had a negative impact on prison life. In this volatile climate, any incident may serve as a catalyst and a riot may erupt.

Developing Policy and Procedure

Administrative policy and institutional procedure relating to riot control should be clearly written and be available for staff reference. Inmates should not have access to these statements or to the record-keeping system that supports them. Prisoners must not be able to establish any base of information about the institution's riot control plan. Even seemingly insignificant information in inmate hands can be used to the institution's detriment, thwarting staff efforts to exert control and resulting in costly damage to the facility and, possibly, the loss of lives. Staff should never underestimate inmate ability to acquire and transmit information and to perpetuate that knowledge through successive hands.

All plans relating to riot control and all supporting record systems are sensitive, security-related information. The agency should classify all such records accordingly and shield them from disclosure or publication under any state or local freedom of information act inquiry.

In addition to the initial formulation of procedures, a documented method for annual review and revision should be instituted. Review will ensure that the written riot control plan is consistent with its actual utilization and that the procedures themselves reflect the most effective and functional means of implementing all appropriate measures.

Public safety should be an overriding concern of all disturbance plans.

Public Safety

Public safety should be an overriding concern of all disturbance plans. When a disturbance begins, immediate steps should be taken to remove all nonemployees from the institution in a rapid and orderly manner.

The institution's perimeter or fence line should be reinforced. Towers should be manned by at least two officers. Gate areas should be secured and manned by experienced, reliable personnel. The riot plan sections dealing with outside assistance should make provisions for the quick summoning of local law enforcement officers or the national guard to assist in maintaining the perimeter.

Safety of Hostages

Each facility should have a clearly stated hostage plan that conforms to agency policy. All hostage plans should stress that anyone taken hostage

loses all authority. These should also mandate that under no circumstances should inmates be released while holding hostages.

Safety of Personnel

The safety of institutional personnel during disturbances is another prime consideration. Employees involved in the restoration of order should be properly equipped to do their jobs. Members of the staff should be well trained and provided with competent leadership. In a crisis, officers and administrators in command must be recognized as leaders and respected for solid decision-making skills. Employees should be confident that, in spite of the problems at hand, appropriate force is available and will be applied to resolve the situation.

Safety of Inmates

At the outset of any disturbance, immediate steps should be taken to remove all nonparticipating inmates from the area to be secured. Nonparticipants left with rioters can be intimidated, coerced into joining the insurrection, or harmed. To the extent allowed by the situation, nonparticipants should be provided with shelter, clothing, food, and medical attention. They should be isolated in an area protected from the disturbance. If rioters jeopardize the life of other inmates, the procedures followed should be the same as those used to aid employees in danger.

Safeguarding Property

Early in the disturbance, participating inmates should be informed that institutional property will be protected by weapons. Although all parts of the facility should be safeguarded, special attention should be given to the areas that are frequent targets of rioters. These endangered areas include drug rooms, pharmacies, records offices, commissaries, storerooms and warehouses, knife cabinets, control centers, power plants, and vehicle pools. Staff members should be prepared to fight fires occurring in any section of the institution.

Restoration of Order

Although every effort to regain control must be made from the beginning of a disturbance, actions taken should be based on careful analysis and should follow a planned strategy. Squads assigned to riot areas should be properly equipped. Personnel should be deployed in sufficient numbers to restore order.

Although each facility should develop its own plan to suit its particular needs, certain precautionary measures should be taken in all institutions. Birdshot should be used inside buildings instead of double ought buckshot, which can be lethal when used at close range. Rifles should be used only in specific missions and handled exclusively by staff members trained in their use. Whenever possible, large groups of inmates should be split into smaller groups for easier control. Leaders should be isolated from the rest of the group at the first opportunity. Under proper conditions, smoke should be used to cover moves and to confuse rioters. High pressure fire hoses may be useful in controlling inmate movement. Photographs and videotapes should be made whenever possible to provide information for subsequent prosecution or internal investigations.

Key staff members should be available at the emergency command

If rioters jeopardize the lives of other inmates, the procedures used to aid employees in danger should be followed.

post. These specialists and administrators should include maintenance department employees familiar with the utility and water system switches and valves, employees qualified to use welding and cutting torches and other specialized tools, doctors who can manage medical supplies and provide needed assistance, a public information officer to handle news releases and media representatives, and the commanding officers of local enforcement agencies, National Guard, fire departments, or civil defense agencies responding to the emergency.

All negotiating should be conducted by people who have the respect of the inmate population. Negotiators should make it clear at the outset of any talks that they have no authority for making final decisions. Few promises should be made before normal operations are restored, but any promises made should be kept. When a final ultimatum is made, it should be carefully thought out and worded in a manner the will not be misinterpreted.

Identification, Segregation, and Prosecution of Rioters

During a disturbance, all staff should attempt to identify inmate participants, paying special attention to leaders, agitators, those displaying aggressive behavior, prisoners destroying property, and inmates holding hostages or committing felonious acts. Positive identification is essential and accurate records must be kept. Whenever possible, an employee witnessing an incident should ask another staff member to corroborate it. Photographs, videotapes, and films are admissible as evidence when proper procedures have been followed and the chain of evidence has not been broken.

Once the disturbance has ended, prisoners who took an active role should be segregated from the rest of the population as soon as possible. Inmates or staff who have been injured should be identified and attended to immediately. Retaliation by employees against inmates should be specifically banned. The main participants in the disturbance should be referred for possible prosecution; others should be handled by the institution's Rules Infraction Board according to local disciplinary policy.

Factors Contributing to Disturbances

Many factors aid in detecting disturbances that can be prevented. The following are among the most important.

Tension

There usually are signs of growing tension that signal a group disturbance. Promptness in detecting and reporting a bad institutional climate may enable the forestalling of a riot by pinpointing the source of trouble. Some indications of bad institutional climate are:

- An atmosphere of sullenness or restlessness among the prisoners.

- Lack of communication between the inmates and the staff.

- Large numbers of requests for cell, dormitory, or job transfer.

- Large numbers of requests for institutional transfer.

- Inmate avoidance of meals.

- An increase in commissary purchases.

- An increase in inmate self-segregation by race or ethnic group, or an increase in unusual inmate gatherings.

Rivalry Between Gangs

Despite staff's best efforts, rival gangs develop in prisons. Employees must be alert to signs of gang activity and report any unusual incidents immediately. Inmate-organized martial arts activities operating without institutional sponsorship or supervision should not be permitted. Controls should be established that limit the number of prisoners allowed to congregate in halls, yards, gymnasiums, libraries, and other common areas. Known gang leaders should be under close observation and supervision. Accurate systems should be devised for recording, reporting, and tracking gang activities.

Racial Balance

Racial segregation should not be present anywhere in the operation of an institution. Management should be alert to the possibility that particular prisoner subgroups may come to dominate specific living areas, job assignments, or recreational activities. Steps should be taken to prevent disproportionate representation in all of these areas. In addition, efforts should be made to hire and promote minority group employees, ensuring a balanced staff at all levels of authority.

Food

In almost all disturbances, food has been included on the list of inmate grievances. Although food quality has been usually only a minor part of a larger list of complaints, efforts should be made to ensure that food is properly prepared and served. Food, kitchen equipment, and utensils should be handled in a hygienic manner. Servers should be clean and neatly dressed. The dining area should be pleasant and sanitary. Portions should be equally divided; precautions should be taken against shortages of popular items. When substitutions are made, equally desirable foods should be selected as replacements.

A rotation system should be devised which enables each housing unit to be served first occasionally. Complaints presented to supervisors or food service workers should not be ignored. Daily menus should be posted, clearly indicating items that certain religious groups avoid. At meals where pork is a featured entree, an equally attractive substitute should be provided.

Medical Services

Every inmate should have equal access to adequate medical attention. Daily sick call, seven days a week, must be a part of normal operations. Medical emergencies should be handled promptly. Provisions should be made for prompt care for dental problems, with special attention for emergencies. A staff member should schedule all dental and medical treatment. Pills and medication should be dispensed under strict control. Drugs and narcotics should be securely locked in a safe area. All issue of drugs should be recorded in compliance with state and federal requirements.

Recreation

Each institution should have a wholesome recreation program to provide an energy outlet for as many inmates as possible. Athletic programs that involve few participants and/or that require a large area should be avoided. Good sportsmanship should be encouraged and acknowledged through awards and recognition in institution publications. Poor sportsman-

ship should be discouraged by restricting any disruptive individuals from participating in subsequent events over specified periods of time. Racial mixture in athletic events should be encouraged at every opportunity. If outside teams are invited to participate, they should be provided with separate dressing rooms and they should be given an orientation to the institution's rules. Prisoners who are allowed to participate in activities away from the institution should meet all custody eligibility requirements. Also, they should receive a thorough shakedown when leaving and returning to the facility.

Mail Operations

Mail operation is another area often appearing on grievance lists presented during disturbances. In some cases, written correspondence is the only contact the inmate has with loved ones. To ensure prompt delivery, a reasonable effort should be made to process mail on the day it is received. Packages should be delivered to the recipient as soon as possible, but since parcels are a source of contraband, they should be thoroughly searched before being delivered. Corrugated boxes should not be passed on to inmates. Legal mail should be opened in the presence of the prisoner to whom it is addressed, but if it is inadvertently opened, it should be clearly marked "Opened By Mistake." All mail should be handled carefully to ensure delivery in good condition to the proper party.

Visiting Policy

Visiting with family members and close friends should be encouraged. Although some visiting areas are limited in size, an effort should be made to allow a reasonable amount of time for each inmate to visit with family and friends. Visitors should be handled with courtesy, but positive identification and proper procedures to minimize the introduction of contraband are essential.

Prisoners should have limitations placed on what items they are allowed to carry on their person during a visit. All inmates should be required to submit to a shakedown prior to a visit and a strip search after the visit. All visits should be conducted under constant surveillance, in a manner that will not be offensive. When visiting hours are over, a thorough inspection should be conducted of all areas to which visitors and inmates had access before other prisoners or parties are permitted to use the same areas.

Commissaries

Ideally, all commissaries within a given corrections department should be stocked alike and have the same price structure. Care should be taken not to overstock unpopular items or to allow popular items to fall into short supply. An unusual run on commissary food items may indicate a hunger strike or a disturbance in the near future. The staff handling commissary sales should promptly report unusual purchasing patterns.

Communications

Open communication is essential to a correctional operation. Every effort should be made to ensure that the staff and inmates understand all issues of general concern. Too often, word-of-mouth transmission is used to distribute information. This leads to misinformation and facts being overlooked or reported out of context. Even correct information, when picked

up as rumor, can take on a distorted meaning. Rumors and lack of information may create uneasiness among both staff and inmates.

Outside Incidents

Incidents outside the institution may have a direct influence on the atmosphere inside. Care must be exercised to keep out programs and groups that may incite disturbances. On the other hand, groups and programs that have a stabilizing effect on the population should be welcomed.

Essentials of a Riot Control Plan

Each facility should develop a comprehensive riot control plan that conforms to agency policy. The warden is responsible for the development of the riot control plan and must approve all procedural changes before they are incorporated. Each supervisor should be required to review these procedures annually and must be sure that all subordinate staff members have also reviewed them. These reviews should be documented.

The plan should be confidential and should be stored in secure areas of the facility, but it should be available in an emergency. The contents of the plan should not be discussed with inmates.

Because no two institutions are the same, each facility must develop its own detailed riot control plan. Because the warden is responsible for development, the plan should bear his or her signature. The plan should be approved by the Department of Corrections' Security Coordinator. Each plan should be formulated in agreement with provisions outlined in central office directives. Copies of changes to an existing plan should be sent to the security administrator's office at the central office for approval prior to inclusion.

It is essential that every prison have established plans and procedures to follow during an emergency. Responsibilities should be defined and techniques set forth to meet all possible situations. In order to ensure the institution's security and the welfare of the staff, inmates, and surrounding community, the riot control plan must be understood by all staff.

Defining the Situation

A disturbance may arise as the consequence of any overt act that is detrimental to the institution's orderly routine. The seriousness of a situation should be determined by the warden or the person in charge at the particular time an event occurs.

Establishing the Chain of Command

A chain of command should be established in the descending order of ranking staff who may assume command of the institution and who may direct operations during the emergency. The overall operational control and authority in an emergency situation should remain with the head of the agency or a designee. Specific support missions, tasks, and responsibilities should be assigned by the warden to local staff and supporting agencies with the concurrence of the commissioner or a designee.

Establishing the Command Posts

Properly equipped primary and secondary areas from which emergency operations are directed should be established. Each emergency command post should be furnished with:

> ### *The command post is the nerve center for the entire riot control operation.*

- Inside-outside telephones.
- Radio equipment.
- Floor and utility plans of the institution.
- Maps of escape post assignments.
- Copies of the institutional emergency and contingency plans.

The command post is the nerve center for the entire riot control operation. Assignment and placement of reserve personnel should be made from this location. All units should keep this post informed of disruptive activity in their areas. Outside patrol vehicles should keep this post informed of disturbances in their areas and should keep in constant contact, serving as trouble area spotters.

Emergency command post personnel should be responsible for keeping accurate records of all incidents and actions. An area map should be posted in the command post so that areas involved in riot or control activity can be pinpointed. Keeping careful track of the disturbance and the assignment of personnel can minimize confusion and the duplication of orders.

All available reserve security personnel should be called in and report to a room convenient to the command post. They should wait for further instructions from the officer in charge of the command post. That officer should also be responsible for deploying nonsecurity personnel as needed.

External Command Posts

As soon as possible, an external command post should be established by the appropriate regional administrator. The external command post should be close to the disturbance. Personnel staffing this post should include the regional director, any regional program supervisors, the regional administrative director, and other administrators and officers as appropriate. The regional director or his or her designee should serve as the head of the post. The delegated representatives or heads of requested state, county, and municipal agencies should report to the external command post for briefings and instruction. The regional administrator is also responsible for the establishment of staging areas from which employees of assisting agencies should base their operations.

Internal Command Posts

A primary and secondary site for an internal command post should be specified and prepared in advance of any emergency. If the conditions of a disturbance preclude the use of the primary site, operations should be based at the alternate location. All ranking personnel of the facility should assemble at the active command post. Many institutions have designated the office of the superintendent as their primary internal command post site.

Command Post Personnel

The three to five individuals staffing the command post should be experienced corrections administrators, including the following:

- The warden.
- The assistant warden or wardens.

- The assistant warden for treatment.

- The assistant warden for operations.

- Other administrative personnel or specialists vital to the restoration of order and safety.

The prescribed order of succession should be firmly established and provide a chain of command in the event the warden and the assistant warden are taken hostage or become incapacitated.

Notifying the Authorities

The warden or designee shall notify the agency central office when it is determined that an emergency has arisen. The original communication should contain as much background and basic facts as are known. Notification should be followed by updates when new information becomes available. When agency central office personnel receive word of a disturbance, they should relay the information to the agency head and pertinent central office staff members. The agency head is responsible for informing the governor and other designated officials.

The initial notification may be made by telephone. However, as soon as possible, a formal written report covering the incident should be submitted to the agency head. This report should cover the incident, any actions taken, and any resolution or outcomes reached. In the event a disturbance occurs during a weekend or after regular business hours, notification and reports must be sent to the duty officer and administrative officer in charge. At these times, if the duty officer cannot be reached with the original notification at the central office, a call should be placed to his or her home.

Assembling the Staff

A formal list of telephone numbers of institution staff members should be available to expedite calling in off-duty personnel. This list should be updated on a regular basis. An area such as a visiting room or other location out of sight of the inmate population should be designated for staff assembly.

Extra staff should be placed in the control room, in the armory, on ground posts between towers, in the towers, in the power plant, and on strategic points on overlooking buildings. The staff members securing the power plant may be assisted by personnel from other agencies when they become available. All inside posts should be manned by institutional personnel. Utility and water cutoffs should be protected if they are threatened by the location or the type of disorder. Members of the maintenance staff familiar with the utility layout and operation should be available in case they are needed.

As additional assistance becomes available, it should be deployed to other parts of the institution to meet threats or to secure areas. This additional control should include:

- Reinforcement of the fence line. Vehicle headlights should be used for illumination if the lighting or power system has been sabotaged.

- Assignment of a civilian clerk to keep time and duty records.

- Assignment of additional manpower to cellblocks, kitchen corridors, and other areas.

○ Assignment of at least one staff member to coordinate the use of fire equipment.

○ Deployment of a security supervisor to assume command of personnel in the disturbance area.

○ Formation of emergency reaction teams and preparation of equipment they might need.

○ Deployment of leadership in the visiting room or staff assembly location.

The warden or a designated representative should go to the disturbance area to determine the actions necessary to regain control. He or she should direct those actions.

Assessment of the Situation

The type of response made to an emergency situation will depend on the nature of the disturbance. Assessment of the emergency, including an appraisal of the severity of violence involved and the level of inmate participation, will be made by the warden or a designee.

Nonviolent Disturbance

When a nonviolent disturbance continues or grows, efforts should be made to isolate the protesters from the nonparticipating population. Security personnel should be deployed to prevent the spread of the problem and to observe and react if violence should occur.

Generally, it is preferable to establish a dialogue and negotiate with the participants. Dialogue and negotiation may end the immediate problem, but care must be exercised to avoid reinforcing disruptive behavior. The institution administrators should maintain the image of being in command of the situation. Inmates are aware that the administrators cannot permit rebellion and need not negotiate with them. No bargaining or concessions should be made with prisoners who continue in a state of insurrection. This policy should not preclude administrators from talking to the leaders of a disturbance in an effort to regain control by peaceful means. In the event hostages are involved, dialogue should supercede all other types of intervention. Inmate demands to negotiate with the governor or the news media should be refused. Care should be exercised in making any promises to inmate groups. Promises made should be kept in good faith; indiscreet promises can lead to awkward or dangerous situations in the future. If the disturbance continues beyond the dialogue level, the situation enters into the next phase of containment.

When sufficient personnel and equipment have been assembled and related preparations made, inmates should be issued an order to terminate their actions and obey the security personnel. If resistance continues, the participants should be removed from the area of the disturbance and housed in maximum security. If the use of force becomes necessary, the minimum amount required should be employed. Inmates participating in the disturbance should not be returned to their assigned living quarters unless their numbers justify ordering a "lockdown," under which a major housing unit or the entire institution is treated as maximum security housing.

Violent Disturbances

As in less dangerous confrontations, only the minimum amount of force required to restore order should be employed during violent protest. The decision to use chemical agents, firearms, or physical force should be made in accordance with the warden's assessment of the situation. The exact type of weapons authorized for use should be stated. A description of the increasing levels of force follows.

First Level Response

The warden should attempt to reason, but not negotiate, with the disorderly group. All inmate grievances should be heard and consideration should be given to those that are legitimate. The entire disturbance may be brought to a conclusion at this time if a reasonable agreement is to be reached.

Second Level Response

A formal order to disperse and return to quarters should be issued. Inmates should be instructed to release any hostages they hold. They should also be told to return to their living quarters or to report to an alternate location. The order should specify a time limit for compliance and offer no alternatives. These instructions should be repeated at reasonable intervals to ensure that all inmates are aware of what is required of them. Care should be taken to avoid repeating the order so many times it loses its impact.

Third Level Response

The third level of action is characterized by a show of force. Staff members clearly capable of handling the situation should be assembled in close proximity to the individual issuing the order to disperse. The show of force should be organized to achieve the greatest psychological effect. A psychological advantage should be maintained throughout the operation by firm decisive actions appropriate to the situation.

Fourth Level Response

Chemical agents including gas, smoke, and water represent the fourth level of intervention. As with the use of other types of force, only the minimum amount and least severe variety of agents required should be employed to disperse the inmates. Chemical agents should be used only to gain prisoner compliance with issued orders. They should never be used for punitive or retaliatory purposes.

Fifth Level Response

Emergency squads or response teams are to be used at the fifth level of action. These units should be used only when deemed absolutely necessary by the warden. The unit formation and strength deployed should be specified by the officer-in-charge. The patterns of deployment should depend on the area in which the disturbance occurs.

Sixth Level Response

Firearms should be used only at the sixth level intervention, and then only as a method of last resort. Weapons should be issued only under the specific authorization and direct command of the warden. The use of weapons may be appropriate in these cases:

Emergency response teams contain and control the immediate crisis area or regain control of the area by force if necessary.

○ Arson.

○ Escape.

○ Assault with danger of bodily harm to inmates or institutional employees.

Creation of an Emergency Response Team

The warden is responsible for developing riot control procedures that include tactical squads or emergency response teams. These procedures, reviewed annually to ensure their accuracy, should be signed by the warden and approved by the head of the agency. Employees should familiarize themselves with the plan and review it annually; copies of the procedures should be made and kept at designated places for employee review. These plans should be confidential so accountability procedures for all copies should be developed.

Emergency response teams should be trained in tactical skills and in the use of force. The purpose of these teams is to contain and control the immediate crisis area or to regain control of the area by force if so directed. The teams should consist of twelve-member squads, including a squad leader and an assistant squad leader. A list of all members and their telephone numbers should be located near each member's home telephone and on the person of each squad leader. Each team should also have a member specially trained and proficient in the use of chemical agents and a member specially trained and proficient in weapons. Team rosters should be a part of the riot control plan, and a quarterly evaluation should be made to determine that each squad member meets the criteria described below. These evaluations should be in written form and maintained in the master contingency plan folder.

Emergency Response Team

The warden, assistant warden of security, chief of security, and certified emergency procedures trainer should evaluate the members of the tactical squad on performance criteria. Each squad member should receive quarterly reevaluation. All evaluation forms should be forwarded to the personnel office and placed in the official personnel file.

Personnel

Participation in an emergency response team should be voluntary. Employees should not be required to enter this program against their wishes.

Criteria

Each employee volunteering to participate as a team member should meet the following criteria:

○ Reside within 45 minutes of the institution.

○ Have a home telephone.

○ Be able to withstand physical stress.

○ Be able to withstand mental stress.

○ Be qualified in the use of weapons, chemical agents, and batons.

Participation in an emergency response team should be voluntary.

- Be thoroughly familiar with all emergency plans of the institution.

- Be able to remain on duty for extended periods of time.

- Have completed a minimum of 40 hours in-service training annually for the past two years and taken specialty courses in the use of gas and firearms.

Member Evaluation

Each team member should be continuously evaluated to ensure that he or she meets emergency team standards. Failure to meet these standards should result in removal from the team. Evaluation sheets completed by team leaders should remain on file in the chief of security's office. In addition, team leaders should ensure that appropriate comments are included on annual employee service rating forms. Team rosters should be maintained and reviewed monthly, with copies reproduced as needed.

Training Schedules

Emergency team members should attend at least one monthly training class to ensure they retain the minimal degree of proficiency necessary for their special assignment. Copies of training agendas and attendance records should be forwarded to the agency's central office security administrator. The officers selected for the team should participate as a group in annual refresher training. The certified trainer qualified in emergency procedures should instruct, observe, and evaluate the emergency response team.

Minimum Standards

In order to maintain an acceptable degree of efficiency, team members should receive the required training necessary to meet the following minimum standards:

- Possess a valid course completion certificate issued by a recognized training facility for the 160-hour in-service training program.

- Meet firearms training certification requirements specified by the agency.

- Remain aware of all agency rules and regulations pertaining to use of force, firearms, and chemical agents.

- Be familiar at all times with the institution's emergency plans.

Support and Reserve Forces

Manpower from other agencies is sometimes necessary to supplement the institutional security force. Support forces should be requested by the command post. This request may be made by telephone, teletype, radio, telegram, or messenger. Receipt or confirmation of an assistance request should be immediately relayed to the command post with the following pertinent information:

- Time of request.

- Number of officers or personnel requested.

- Additional equipment requested.

- Estimated time of arrival, route of transit, and what, if any, escort is required.

> *The performance of each member of an emergency response team should be evaluated regularly.*

☺ Any special request that may have been transmitted by the augmenting forces.

Assistance from the following sources may be requested by the warden:

☺ Department of Corrections Security Coordinator.

☺ Control or emergency squads from other institutions.

☺ The state highway patrol.

☺ Municipal police departments.

☺ The county sheriff's department.

☺ The local fire department.

☺ The local ambulance service.

☺ Civil Defense.

Only agency employees should be used within the secure confines of the institution. Assisting personnel from other agencies should be utilized outside the perimeter unless the situation warrants otherwise. Should the crisis escalate to the point where the emergency management committee finds it necessary to request additional support from the National Guard, a request should be submitted to the head of the correctional agency with complete details of the present situation and an outline of the additional support needed. The head of the correctional agency should then initiate a formal request to the governor's office for support from the National Guard.

Upon arrival at the institution, the officer-in-charge of each agency or outside detail should report to the command post, where he or she will receive a thorough briefing on:

☺ The current situation.

☺ Housing and food arrangements.

☺ Current policy on news releases, the use of force, and control.

☺ All supporting materials needed to ensure that outside forces receive thorough and complete familiarization with all sections of the institution.

All support and reserve forces should be under the operational control of the warden or a designee during their presence at the institution.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Strict security should be maintained at all levels, with particular attention paid to the handling of documents, maps, phone and radio traffic, or any other form of communication that might convey information to unauthorized personnel. No release of information should be made concerning any aspect of operations except by the duly appointed public information officer.

Specific staff members should be assigned as intelligence officers to the areas of the disturbance to collect information on the probable location, nature, extent, and effects of the riotous situation. This information permits appropriate and effective operational planning to meet emergency condi-

tions. Speed of collection, evaluation, and transmission of information is vital to the success of the emergency operation.

Intelligence officers should report the following information:

○ Location and nature of the riot or disorder.

○ Extent of damage to the area.

○ Hostages held.

○ Number of persons needing aid.

○ Availability of communications to the area.

○ Approximate number of inmates involved.

○ Type of weapons and equipment being used by inmates causing the disturbance.

Videotape and Cameras

Staff trained in proper use and maintenance of video equipment and cameras should be available during an emergency. A current list of these employees should be part of the emergency plans and be maintained in the command center. Videotape recorders should be used to document riotous conditions, including situations where physical confrontation is probable, as well as to record scenes of areas before entry by response teams. Photographing these events provides evidence and documentation and may provide an element of control by acting as a deterrent to violence. Care should be taken to protect the operator of the camera or videotape recorder.

Public Relations and News Media

Each institution should designate a public information officer. No employee should give any information to the news media without the authority of the warden or agency head. It is the warden's responsibility to approve information for release.

The institution should designate an area in which news media personnel can gather. The waiting area for media representatives should contain telephones, access to toilet facilities, and adequate seating. It should be located out of the main flow of staff traffic so civilians are not exposed to response activities.

Post-Emergency Procedures

As soon as the disturbance is under control, steps should be taken to ensure that no one has escaped and that the facility is secure. In order to accomplish this, the warden should order the following:

○ Confine all non-participants and assign sufficient supervision to prevent a reoccurrence.

○ Account for all inmates and staff members.

○ Provide appropriate medical screening and care; document all injuries.

○ Segregate all leaders and agitators.

○ Curtail work and recreation activities. Rearrange dining schedules to ensure that inmates dine in small groups under adequate supervi-

sion; arrange for participants in the disturbance to receive meals in their cells.

- ○ Conduct a thorough investigation into the cause and course of the disturbance; interview ringleaders and active participants.

- ○ Interview employees and outside agency participants who were involved or witnessed the disturbance; secure their statements for subsequent prosecutions.

- ○ Immediately repair damage done to institutional physical security features, making sure to photograph all damaged areas before making the repairs.

- ○ Secure and label participants' personal belongings.

- ○ Investigate and gather written reports of incident.

Any investigation not specifically referred to outside agency personnel should be conducted by the institutional investigator. The institutional investigator should furnish the warden, assistant warden, chief security officer, and state attorney's office (when applicable) with formal and informal written reports of all investigative findings. The classification supervisor is responsible for ensuring proper follow-up procedures to transfer requests, disciplinary reports, or any other documentation affecting changes in inmates' status.

Chapter 13

Hostage Situations

The Hostage Situation

A hostage is defined as any person (an employee, visitor, or inmate) who is held against his or her will by another person for purposes of escape or monetary gain or in any other manner that places the hostage in danger of bodily injury or death. The unlawful detention or abduction of a hostage may occur in a location where aid or assistance cannot be rendered by outside forces without danger of injury or death to the hostage, the abductor, or other individuals. While each incident is different, there are many common factors. This chapter describes the typical hostage situation that may occur within a correctional institution.

Taking hostages, while always an extremely dangerous action, is not necessarily premeditated. Hostage taking is usually a desperate or spur-of-the-moment reaction. The abductor may have been caught in a wrongdoing or in an escape attempt or may be attempting to intensify pressure on those thought responsible for granting demands. An inmate desperate enough to take a captive may finally express his or her desperation or seriousness of intent by killing the hostage(s). All possible steps should be taken to neutralize the danger to captives, inmates, staff members, and others involved in a hostage situation.

The Abductors

Hostage takers usually fall into one or more of four major categories: the mentally disturbed, criminals trapped during the commission of a crime, prisoners who are rebelling, or political terrorists attempting to produce a social change through the threat or use of violence. Current information indicates that approximately 52 percent of all hostage incidents involve abductors classified as mentally disturbed.

The Paranoid Schizophrenic

Paranoid schizophrenics exhibit extreme suspiciousness and distrust of others to the extent that they blame them for their own mistakes and failures. They go to abnormal lengths to validate prejudices, attitudes, or biases. Symptoms include hypersensitivity, rigidity, hostility, stubbornness, envy, exaggerated self-importance, extreme argumentativeness, and tenseness.

Negotiators should never promise things that they cannot deliver.

The paranoid schizophrenic often takes hostages in order to carry out what he or she believes is a "master plan," in compliance with "orders" from some "special person." Paranoid schizophrenics are usually of above-average intelligence; care must be taken not to attempt to deceive them through tricks or lies. It is best to accept their statements without trying to argue or convince them that their perceptions are wrong. Individuals handling paranoid schizophrenics should not go so far as to agree that they also hear the voices or share the same beliefs. An appropriate response might be a statement such as, "I can't hear the voice that you do, but I understand what you are saying."

The Severely Depressed Inmate

Severely depressed inmates are usually out of touch with reality and are therefore suffering from a psychosis. They may consider themselves unworthy to live, feel guilty for past sins, and display delusional beliefs. Severely depressed inmates also display extremely slow speech and movement, both centered around their feelings of unworthiness, sinfulness, or guilt.

The potential for both suicide and the killing of hostages is extremely high. The severely depressed inmate may believe that he or she would be doing the hostages a service by removing them from this life.

Negotiations with severely depressed inmates should be carried out by trained specialists. Understanding, support, and constant reinforcement or reassurance of self-worth are especially important tools in gaining the trust of people with this disorder. Long statements on sin or death from the abductor should be interrupted. Conversation on interests, hobbies, or anything positive relating to self-worth and image should be encouraged. Declarations by the abductor that "everything is fine now" or other assertions of spontaneous improvement are causes for increased concern. These may be indications that the severely depressed inmate has decided to commit suicide. Gradual improvement over many hours of negotiation is a more encouraging sign. Once rapport has been established between the abductor and the trained negotiator, direct questioning may be appropriate.

The Antisocial Personality

Sociopaths comprise 40 percent of the inmate population. Such people are classic "manipulators" or "con artists." One of the most significant symptoms of this personality disorder is the absence of any conscience or feelings of guilt. Sociopaths have not incorporated the morals and values of our society into their lives. Often glib and convincing, the sociopaths are not likely to be concerned for hostages as human beings. They may be selfish, strive for physical pleasure, be impulsive, and demand immediate satisfaction. Sociopaths seem unable to profit from past experiences.

When negotiating with sociopaths, it is important to remember that they are self-centered and will attempt to make things easier for themselves. They are perceptive and expect negotiators to use tricks. Negotiators should never promise things that they cannot deliver. If an antisocial person does not receive frequent stimulation, he or she may turn to taking hostages for excitement.

The Inadequate Personality

People displaying the inadequate personality have shown ineffective and inept responses to social, emotional, and physical stress throughout most of

their lives. They see themselves as losers, and taking hostages may be the last attempt to prove to a spouse, parent, or other significant acquaintance that they can succeed at something. The hostage incident, including the attention from authority figures and the media, may be the high point in their lives.

Because people displaying inadequate personalities are in contact with reality, are thinking clearly—although immaturely—and can understand the consequences of their actions, negotiations can be conducted successfully. During negotiations, understanding and uncritical acceptance of the abductor should be provided. Negotiators should help the individual displaying the inadequate personality find a path to ending his or her confrontation that does not present the burden of additional failure. To avoid evoking stronger feelings of embarrassment or failure and cause possible retaliation against hostages, the parents and friends of abductors with this disorder should not be brought to the scene.

Hostages may eventually support their abductors and thus provide incorrect information to the authorities.

The Hostages

The hostages themselves play an important part in the negotiation process. Although the reaction of every individual to being taken hostage is unique, a common set of behaviors, labelled the Stockholm Syndrome, is a likely occurrence. The Stockholm Syndrome is characterized by one or more of the following behaviors:

- The hostages develop positive feelings toward their captors.

- The hostages develop negative feelings toward the authorities.

- The hostage takers begin to develop positive feelings toward their hostages.

All three of the behaviors do not have to be present. Although it may not occur to the same extent with all hostages, it should be assumed that at least some features of this syndrome will be displayed unless the hostage has been abused or isolated. From the standpoint of the negotiators, this behavior set has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is that the stronger the manifestation of the Stockholm Syndrome, the less likely it is that the abductor will kill the hostages. Negative aspects include:

- Information coming from the hostages during and after the crisis may be unreliable.

- The hostages may deliberately or unconsciously misrepresent the armament of the hostage taker. They may become de facto advocates of their captors.

- The hostages may act in a manner counter to the commands of the person in charge of their rescue, causing interference with rescue plans. The syndrome may affect the performance of the negotiator. If, after hours of attempting to build rapport and establish trust, it becomes evident that an assault is necessary, it may be emotionally difficult for a negotiator to distract the hostage taker during the initiation of an assault.

Guidelines for Hostages

It is important for persons being held hostage to remember that, what-

ever their position in the agency, they have no authority while under duress, and their orders will not be obeyed. Hostages must also remember the following:

- Be cautious of heroics; do not act foolishly.

- Be cooperative and obey the abductor's demands without appearing either servile or antagonistic.

- Look for a protected place to take shelter in case either authorities or inmates assault your location.

- Keep calm. Think about pleasant scenes or memories; try to recollect books or movies. A calm mind will help you remain functional.

- Keep a low profile. Avoid the appearance of observing any crimes that rioters commit. Look down or away. Avoid interfering with their discussions or activities.

- Do not threaten the abductors or indicate that you intend to testify against them. If the abductors are attempting to conceal their identities, make no indication that you recognize them.

- Be reluctant to give up your identification or clothes; loss of these things is demoralizing. Inmates will use these items in bargaining. Be especially resistant to exchanging clothing with an inmate. Being indistinguishable from the inmates could put you in extreme danger during an assault.

- Because of the stress of the situation, you may have difficulty retaining fluids. Drink water and eat, even if you are not hungry. It is important to maintain strength.

- Be conscious of your body language as well as your speech. Do not say or do anything to arouse the abductor's hostility or suspicions. Act neutral and be a good listener if your captors want to talk. Be cautious about making suggestions; you may be held responsible if something you suggest goes wrong.

- Think of persuasive reasons the abductors should keep you and any other hostages alive and unharmed. Encourage captors to let the authorities know your whereabouts and condition. Suggest possible ways in which you or other hostages may help in negotiations.

- If you, as a hostage, serve as negotiator between the abductor and the authorities, convey all messages accurately.

- If there is a rescue assault stage and shots are fired, drop quickly to the floor and seek cover. Keep your hands on your head. When appropriate, identify yourself, but do not resist being apprehended.

- There is a feeling of tremendous psychological and physiological relief when you are released. Debriefing gives you the opportunity to discuss what happened to you and your reactions. Express your feelings freely. Deal openly with your reactions and any problems you may have subsequently. You have nothing to be ashamed of.

- Although you must appear disinterested while being held hostage, observe all you can. Ensure that you are thoroughly debriefed. To

aid in this process make your own notes after your release. These actions will help in the subsequent prosecution of the abductors.

Command Post

The emergency command post should be located in a secure area of the facility, as described in Chapters 10 and 12. It should be activated immediately upon notification of a hostage situation. The tactical squad should obtain equipment and prepare for forceful entry then and await the command of the warden or a designee.

Maturity, good judgment, and sound security practices are the principle guidelines for bringing about the safe release of hostages. The force used should not exceed the amount necessary to prevent an abductor from escaping or causing bodily harm or death to a hostage.

Whenever a hostage situation or a barricaded inmate situation exists, the warden or a designee must consider the following possible approaches to the situation:

The force used should not exceed the amount necessary to prevent an abductor from escaping or causing bodily harm or death to a hostage.

- Contain the situation and demand surrender.

- Negotiate release of all hostages and demand surrender.

- Use chemical agents to force surrender.

- Use snipers or sharpshooters to disable the subject.

- Use special weapons and tactical assault (SWAT) team.

If any of these alternatives are employed, the decision-maker should progress from one of the lower level responses to the higher level response. It is virtually impossible to return to negotiation after an assault has taken place. Therefore, the initial response taken may preclude the use of other actions later on.

An application of techniques using deadly force requires that an informed judgment be made by the warden regarding the situation at hand. Assessment should be based upon agency policy and follow established procedures. Careful deliberation should be pursued before resorting to firing for effect. Any shooting may involve the full spectrum of deadly force, ranging from firing-to-wound-or-disable to center-mass assault techniques.

Emergency Actions

Immediately upon learning of a hostage situation, the shift supervisor should isolate the crisis area in order to restrict the abductor's movement, to prevent the spread of the insurrection, and to preclude additional staff or inmates being taken hostage. To do so, the shift supervisor should order a general lockdown of all inmates and order full evacuation of the area. The warden should activate the command post and summon a trained hostage negotiator. The responsibility of the negotiator is to convince the abductor to release the hostage and surrender. The warden should appoint an employee to retrieve all records on the abductor. A psychiatrist or mental health professional should be standing by for consultation if an extended hostage situation develops.

The abductor's family or friends should not be brought to the scene; their presence may adversely affect the abductor's mental state and provoke

a violent act directed at the hostage. The decision to involve family or friends should be made only by the agency head or a designee, and only as a last resort.

The area where the incident is contained should never be opened to let the abductor and his or her captives go out without a direct order from the warden or designee. No action should be taken against the inmate(s) involved without the approval of the warden unless there is a threat to life or the definite possibility of serious injury being inflicted upon the hostages.

Guidelines for Negotiations

The likelihood that hostages will be released unharmed increases as time passes because:

- Basic human needs for food, water, sleep, and elimination increase.

- Anxiety tends to be reduced over time.

- Most persons begin to think more rationally and less emotionally after the first moments of a crisis passes.

- The Stockholm Syndrome begins to develop.

- Hostages have increased opportunity to escape.

- Intelligence gathering permits better decision-making.

- Increased rapport and trust develop between the negotiator and abductor.

- The abductor's expectations may be reduced.

- The incident may simply fade. Some abductors have allowed hostages to walk out with no expectation of something in return.

Mode of Contact

A bull horn or public address system is impersonal and may interfere with the development of trust and rapport in the negotiation process. Negotiation over the telephone allows a personal, private conversation and provides the negotiator with a maximum amount of protection and safety. It also enables the isolation and simplification of the negotiation process. Face-to-face contact allows a more accurate assessment of the mental state of the hostage taker, but should be undertaken only after rapport has been established through some other mode of communication. For reasons of safety, face-to-face meetings should be carried out only from a barricaded position.

If you are conducting face-to-face negotiations, the following guidelines are suggested:

- Get a verbal agreement from the abductor guaranteeing that you will not be harmed.

- Do not talk to an abductor who is pointing a gun at you.

- Never meet face-to-face with more than one hostage taker.

- Always maintain direct eye contact.

- Always have an escape route.

- Never turn your back on an abductor.

- Be aware of body space. Estimate what the abductor's body space needs are and how much pressure you will put on by encroaching on that space.

- Do not push the abductor into taking desperate measures. As long as he or she believes there is a hope of achieving something in the negotiation process, talks will be likely to continue.

Principles of Hostage Negotiation

The following are important in hostage negotiation:

- Be conscious of both verbal and nonverbal communication.

- Listen actively, but discreetly.

- Avoid deadlines.

- Give hostages only minimal attention.

- Do not give away advantages you can use as bargaining chips.

- Do not negotiate on demands for additional weapons.

- Be honest.

- Be wary of civilian negotiators.

- Approach face-to-face negotiations cautiously.

- Be authoritative.

If the warden determines that a tactical entry is essential, planning and implementation should be directed by the associate warden of security in consultation with the warden.

Debriefing Process

Debriefing following a hostage situation is the formal and systematic questioning of a witness, released hostage, or perpetrator to obtain useful information that will assist in the successful outcome of this or a future hostage situation. Debriefing requires the same degree of planning as do tactical maneuvers. Accurate information will contribute to future successful outcomes.

Three reasons for maximizing information gathered during the initial debriefing session are:

- The short time interval between the incident and the debriefing session.

- Thoroughness in questioning eliminates having to recall the subject after he or she has been reunited with family and has turned attention to different concerns.

- The information obtained is available not only for any continuing negotiations, but also later when paperwork is prepared for criminal charges.

Chapter 14

Fire Control

The Fire Control Plan

A fire control plan should outline institutional fire policy and procedures and identify equipment and training necessary to provide a safe environment for employees, inmates, and visitors. In order to implement an effective fire control plan, employees should be familiar with the following terms:

- *Class A Fires*: Fires consuming ordinary combustible material such as wood, paper, or clothing. A pressurized, water-based fire extinguisher is appropriate for this type fire.

- *Class B Fires*: Fires consuming flammable and combustible liquids, grease, and gases. A foam, dry chemical, or carbon dioxide (CO_2) extinguisher is appropriate for this type fire.

- *Class C Fires*: Fires burning in energized electrical equipment. A dry chemical or CO_2 extinguisher is appropriate for this type fire. A water-based extinguisher must never be used on a Class C fire.

- *Class D Fires*: Fires consuming combustible metals such as magnesium, titanium, zirconium, and sodium. A dry powder extinguisher is necessary to extinguish such a fire.

- *Standpipe*: A vertical hydrant into which water is forced by mechanical means to obtain pressure sufficient to reach the top of the institution's tallest building.

- *Hydrostatic test*: A type of fire extinguisher examination intended to determine the balance of its chemical contents.

Policy and Procedure

Employees, inmates, and visitors should be provided with a safe environment through proper fire equipment utilization and safety procedures. To accomplish this, local procedures should, at a minimum, require that:

- Specifications should be established for the selection and purchase of furnishings that meet the minimum requirements for fire and safety performance (ACA Standard 2-4166).

⊚ Noncombustible receptacles should be accessible throughout the institution for smoking materials (ACA Standard 2-4167).

⊚ Noncombustible containers should be readily accessible in living quarters and throughout the institution as special containers for flammable liquids, rags, etc., and other burnables. These containers should be capped by tightly fitted lids, except when in use. A plan for daily disposal of contents and cleaning of the containers should be formulated (ACA Standard 2-4167).

⊚ All exits should be clearly and permanently marked and be visible, kept clear, and maintained in usable condition (ACA Standard 2-4168).

⊚ Travel distance to all exits should be certified as being in compliance with the National Fire Safety Code. This certification should be made by a qualified inspector (ACA Standard 2-4169).

⊚ An emergency power generator and radio transmitter should be maintained inside a secure area such as the power house to provide essential lights, power, and communication during emergencies. The power generator should be tested at least once every two weeks (ACA Standard 2-4170, 2-4171).

⊚ All personnel should be trained in emergency procedures and in the use of emergency equipment during basic training. Refresher training should be scheduled by the training supervisor to ensure that all employees continue to be familiar with emergency plan operations (ACA Standard 2-4174).

⊚ Written policy and procedures should be formulated that specify a means for the orderly release of inmates from locked areas in case of an emergency (ACA Standard 2-4173).

⊚ A written evacuation plan should be drawn up for use in the event of a fire or major emergency. It should be certified by an independent, outside inspector trained in the application of National Fire Safety Codes (ACA Standard 2-4172).

> *The most important aspect of any fire protection program is fire prevention.*

The most important aspect of any fire protection program is fire prevention. All employees must be aware of potential fire hazards. The first and foremost ingredient of a good fire protection program is to ascertain that safe building materials are utilized for inmate housing. The materials used in constructing and furnishing inmate housing units must meet NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, ACA Standard 2-4166. ACA Standards 2-4162 through 2-4175 should be reviewed and adhered to in developing a fire plan for any institution.

Procedures and plans should be devised to control fires, whether they occur during a disturbance or as a separate incident. The cooperation and assistance of local fire authorities should be solicited in the development of these plans. Plans should contain a system of fire protection through the use of efficient fire prevention and control, as well as the use of efficient fire protection services and equipment, fire drills, and application of appropriate fire safety codes. Regular documented monitoring is needed to ensure compliance by employees, inmates, and visitors.

Fire Hazards

Fires often occur in unoccupied areas such as shops, warehouses, and industries buildings. Inspection procedures should ensure that these areas are free of fire hazards at the end of the regular workday. Some corrective actions for specific dangers are:

- All flammable liquids must be stored and dispensed in accordance with ACA Standard 2-4175.

- Oily rags and other waste subject to spontaneous combustion should be disposed of in self-closing containers (ACA Standard 2-4167).

- Paper or cardboard containers should never be used for trash storage; only noncombustible containers should be used (ACA Standard 2-4167).

- Flammable waste should not be stored in shops at night (ACA Standard 2-4167).

- Exposed wiring should be promptly reported and repaired (ACA Standard 2-4167).

Training

Each facility should develop and implement a training program to acquaint staff with fire safety, fire prevention, and firefighting techniques. Further training should be provided to selected personnel in the use of fire control equipment. Ideally, this training should be given to all personnel. In any event, employees should be thoroughly familiar with proper methods of maintaining security and control during any fire emergency or fire rescue situation. Staff and inmates should be made familiar with all fire evacuation plans (ACA Standard 2-4174).

Documented fire drills should be conducted at least monthly. The designated fire or safety supervisor, in cooperation with all department heads, should schedule the drills. Prior notification of the drills should be limited, in order to increase the naturalness of response. The fire or safety supervisor and chief security officer should supervise these drills.

The possibility of an escape attempt is ever-present, especially during an emergency such as a fire. Therefore, this possibility should be addressed in the fire training program. Established precautionary measures to be instituted during a fire emergency should be reviewed during all training situations. Escape attempts are a very real possibility when inmates are evacuated from the housing units. During emergencies, perimeter security should be enhanced to the extent necessary to prevent escapes. Emphasis on the importance of good housekeeping standards must be a part of any staff or inmate fire prevention training.

Fire Inspections

Regular inspection of fire and emergency equipment and regular review of procedures should be required to ensure compliance with agency policy and institutional procedures as well as federal, state, and local fire codes. Monitoring and inspections should include:

- Documentation by an independent, qualified source that the institution complies with all applicable fire safety codes (ACA Standard 2-4162).

Staff and inmates should be made familiar with all fire evacuation plans.

The possibility of an escape attempt is ever-present, especially during an emergency such as a fire.

- Regular inspection by the fire or safety officer (ACA Standard 2-4163).

- Annual review of the entire fire control plan (ACA Standard 2-4163).

- Weekly fire and safety inspections by a member of the administrative staff (ACA Standard 2-4163).

- Quarterly testing of fire equipment, including the fire alarm and smoke detection systems (ACA Standard 2-4165).

- Certification by a qualified inspector that travel distance to exits are in compliance with the National Fire Safety Code (ACA Standard 2-4169).

- Power generators tested at least every two weeks (ACA Standard 2-4171).

- Defective or inoperable fire equipment repaired or replaced, if necessary.

Utilities

All supervisors and employees should be familiar with the utility switches and control valves.

Fire Investigations

Regardless of fire magnitude, all investigations of fires should be conducted by a fire or safety supervisor. In cases where the cause of the fire is not easily determined, the state fire marshall's office should assist in the investigation. Reports of all fire investigations should be prepared and forwarded to the warden.

Inspections of the institution's nonhousing areas should be made on each shift where regularly assigned employees are not on duty. These inspections should be documented in the shift log, and the fire or safety supervisor should be immediately advised, in writing, of any deficiencies noted.

Weekly, quarterly, and annual inspections should be conducted for the entire institution. These inspectors should evaluate the following conditions:

- Compliance with safety codes.

- Results of fire drills.

- Visual observation of all emergency equipment and facilities.

- Degree of readiness of all fire extinguishing equipment.

- Placement and operational readiness of alarm and detection systems.

- Compliance with requirements for fire-resistant furnishings and facilities.

- Trash collection procedures.

- Condition of exit signs.

- Travel distance to exits.

- Emergency lighting.

- Evacuation plans.

Fire Equipment

Adequate fire control equipment is an absolute necessity. It is usually more economical to arrange for a local fire department to provide the facility's major fire protection. When this is not practical, the facility should secure the services of experts in the fire safety field to advise on the fire prevention measures and equipment necessary to provide adequate protection. Fire protection equipment to be considered should include:

- A firetruck equipped with lined hose, nozzles, ladders, hydrant wrenches, small tools, etc.

- Fire extinguishers of all types.

- Fire hydrants, properly located, and with sufficient water pressure and supply.

- Fire hose standpipes, strategically located with sufficient fire hose to reach desired areas of the facility.

- Automatic smoke detectors.

- Automatic fire alarms.

- Emergency telephone capability; i.e., dialing a predetermined number to report an emergency.

- Emergency lighting that provides sufficient illumination for exit areas and stairwells during emergencies.

- Automatic sprinklers.

Emergency Keys

As indicated in the chapter on key control, emergency keys should be available. They should be tested at least once a month to ascertain the working condition of all locks. The location of these keys should be identified in the institutional fire plan.

Chapter 15

Bomb Threats

Bomb Emergency Plans

All bomb threats should be taken seriously and any employee receiving a telephone bomb threat should attempt to remember all details of the conversation. Employees should never take safety for granted.

All bomb emergency plans should include agreements with qualified police agencies staffed with trained bomb disposal units. These trained units should conduct or supervise all necessary bomb searches. The emergency plan for bomb threats should be executed in the most expedient manner possible. These plans should consider safety in the following priority:

- Public safety.

- Employee safety.

- Inmate safety.

- Protection of property.

- Restoration of order and control.

After receiving a bomb threat, the warden should determine whether or not the crisis is a false alarm before ordering an evacuation. If evacuation is deemed necessary, the warden should ensure that employees and inmates are removed by the safest means possible. In all cases, staff must be aware of the need to safeguard people, not seek out bombs.

Command Post

The command post should be located at the farthest point from the suspected or reported location of the bomb. The warden should be in charge of the command post.

Support Forces

When an employee receives a telephoned bomb threat, the control center or shift supervisor should be notified immediately. The supervisor receiving that notification should secure the area and contact the warden or designee and other staff identified in the facility's bomb plan. The warden should notify the agency head, who in turn should notify the required additional agency personnel.

BOMB THREAT INFORMATION SHEET

Name of recipient _____

Address _____

Telephone number _____

Obtain the following information as quickly as possible when you receive a bomb threat.

1. Exact location of the device _____

2. Time set for denotation _____

3. Description of device or packaging _____

4. Reason for call or threat _____

In Addition, the following details should be noted:

5. Time and date of call _____

6. Exact language used by caller _____

7. Sex of caller _____

8. Estimated age of caller _____

9. Peculiar or identifiable accent of caller _____

10. Describe any identifiable background noises or "off-phone" voices _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

It is important to document as much information as possible when a bomb threat is received.

Receiving Bomb Threats

The person receiving a telephoned bomb threat should try to keep the caller on the line and elicit as much of the following information as is possible.

○ Time of detonation. He or she should try to find out the exact time at which the bomb is set to go off. The current time should be confirmed with the caller to establish the interval remaining.

○ The exact location and appearance of the bomb. The specific location of the bomb should be determined. Hiding places should be inquired about. Potential hiding places include under vehicles, in trash cans, etc. The bomb's container or packaging should also be determined. Briefcases, cardboard boxes, lunch pails, mailed parcels, or service vehicles are all possible camouflages.

○ The exact nature of the explosive device. The employee receiving the call should try to determine the bomb type (pipe bomb, satchel charge, molotov cocktail, etc.) and the activating mechanism used, including a description of the timing device, pressure detonator, trip wire, or battery detonator. Other vital information includes the type of combustible or explosive used (nitroglycerine, dynamite, gasoline, plastic explosive), whether or not the detonator is active, passive,

works by battery depletion or other scheme, and if the bomb is booby trapped to explode when defused or moved or is packed with acid, shrapnel or other hazardous materials.

⊙ What individual or organization claims responsibility for the bomb threat. The listener should also note the caller's sex and voice, the time of the telephone call, any background noises, and whether or not the person placing the call sounds familiar. Motive can be an important clue to the placement of the explosive.

When the employee receiving the call tries to elicit this information, he or she should remain as calm as possible. The best way of getting as many details as possible is to avoid spending too much time on any one line of questioning. If a caller readily shares the time the device is set to go off, but hesitates to reveal its location, the listener should direct the line of questioning away from bomb placement to other details. Later in the call, the listener can return to the original subject.

After a Bomb Threat is Received

The control center or shift supervisor should be advised of telephoned bomb threats as soon as calls are received. The shift supervisor should then notify the warden or a designee. The warden or the designee should be responsible for all subsequent decisions regarding evacuation or other safety precautions that need to be taken before the arrival of a tactical bomb squad.

Any announcements made after the threat is received should be broadcast on the public address system. All two-way radio transmission should be avoided because the signals broadcast from radio sets can trigger bombs' detonating devices. Because magnetic fields can also set off an explosion, hand-held metal detectors should not be used in the bomb search unless they are specifically cleared for use by the bomb squad.

Bomb Searches

If the caller discloses the location of the bomb or clues indicate a probable location, the threatened area should be evacuated and sealed off for investigation by the tactical bomb squad. Homemade bombs are extremely unstable because they are usually poorly made. Under no circumstances should anyone other than a qualified bomb squad professional try to move, defuse, cover, disconnect, hose down, or tamper with any object suspected of being a bomb. If a suspicious item is discovered, it should not be touched. Instead, the discoverer should make sure the area is cleared and the person in charge of the search is notified. When the bomb squad determines that a bomb exists, they have the option of deciding whether or not it is appropriate to remove the device from within the institution.

Evacuation

The evacuation routes used during a bomb emergency should be the same as those planned for use during natural disasters (Chapter 16). Elevators should not be used to evacuate the building. If an entire building is to be cleared, all inmates and employees should be moved to a safe place away from the building but inside the facility perimeter. If the complete evacuation of the institution is required, the warden should consult the emergency

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Two-way radios and hand-held metal detectors should not be used during a bomb crisis.

plan and should decide where the prisoners are to be moved and how it is to be done.

In the event of an evacuation, the only personnel authorized to remain in the cleared area are police, firemen, officials asked to assist in the search, and volunteers requested by the warden or the designee.

Post-Emergency Actions

An all-clear signal should be given when it has been determined that it is safe to reenter the facility. Before the all-clear is sounded, the warden should notify the operations officer. A complete head count and identification of the inmates by name and number should be taken when the prisoners are returned to their units. All employees should remain on duty to assist in the return of the inmates. After the prisoners are secured, all employees should report back to their own work areas. The warden should follow up every bomb threat with a complete report listing all actions taken during the initial receipt of the threat, the evacuation, the search, and the return to normal operations.

Chapter 16

Natural Disasters

Disaster Emergency Policy and Procedure

Correctional administrators can anticipate some emergency situations and prepare contingency plans for coping with them. Predictable natural disasters are brought about by the forces of nature—severe storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or floods. Man-made disasters include fires, explosions, hazardous chemical spills, toxic waste or radioactive contamination.

Every facility should have a written disaster plan to ensure that predetermined, tested, and approved procedures can be swiftly implemented should an emergency arise. The plan should be in accordance with central office policy and should be reviewed annually in writing. It should contain sufficient detail to guide staff actions from the initial notification of a potential disaster until the final cleanup has occurred and the institution has returned to normal operation. Staff and inmates should be made aware of the plans through orientation and training.

Declaration of an Emergency or Disaster

The institution's emergency plan should clearly indicate who has the authority to declare a state of emergency. Typically, this authority belongs jointly to the warden and the agency head. When it is determined that an emergency exists, a previously written and approved disaster plan should be activated.

In addition to informing the regional director (if there is one), the warden should notify the commissioner, who, in turn, contacts the governor's office. The governor's office alerts the National Guard and civil defense so their assistance is available if necessary. Therefore, the disaster plan should become part of the local civil defense emergency response plan and be coordinated accordingly. In a crisis, the National Guard may be asked to provide transportation, perimeter lighting equipment, emergency generators, and additional manpower. The civil defense agency may supply other needed equipment, feeding facilities, and emergency medical treatment.

Development of a Disaster Plan

The disaster plan should describe methods for providing food, clothing, shelter, security, and necessary treatment and care of inmates, as well as protecting staff, inmates, and property. Consequently, the plan may require changes in personnel assignments, reassignment of authority for the direct purchasing of goods and services, and partial or complete reallocation of prisoners to other appropriate institutions.

The disaster plan should contain specific instructions for notifying both on- and off-duty staff for emergency duty. There are a number of components that need to be included in all plans:

- Alerting of affected areas to enable evacuation if necessary.

- Notification of all radio units and direction of all available personnel to the affected areas. All outside perimeter posts should be alerted to maintain high levels of watchfulness so that security will not be breached.

- Notification of personnel on the emergency roster and the commencement of a staff emergency call.

- Alerting of the medical staff and, if necessary, medical resources in the surrounding community.

- Recording of all notification activities and the times of their occurrence.

If a crisis has been officially declared and evacuation is necessary, emergency keys should be issued to appropriate personnel to permit the orderly clearing of specific areas of the institution.

Training

It is the warden's responsibility to ensure that all staff are familiar with the institution's disaster plan and receive annual training on the plan's details. Additionally, as part of their initial orientation to the facility, all newly admitted prisoners should be made aware of the features of the plan that directly affect them.

All employees should be expected to respond appropriately during an emergency, in accordance with their prior training and in compliance with orders issued by appropriate administrative staff. During an emergency, staff members are expected to perform duties outside of their normal job classification and duty periods.

News Media

As discussed under Riot Control, the disaster plan should provide for the establishment of a news media center staffed by institutional personnel designated by the warden. This news media center should have access to members of the attorney general's staff for any necessary legal advice.

Levels of Emergency

To avoid overreaction to a crisis situation, it is important to identify levels of emergency. The warden establishes the severity of any given situation, generally using one of three recognized emergency levels:

- Level I — Secure facility without evacuation.

- Level II — Secure facility with partial evacuation.
- Level III — Secure facility with total evacuation.

The Level I Crisis

Buildings and Equipment

All buildings on the grounds of the affected institution should be secured to prevent or minimize damage during the emergency. Only buildings providing a necessary service to the immediate operation of the facility should remain occupied by staff and inmates. Hazardous material, including firearms and ammunition, should be stored or removed. All portable equipment not in use should be stored within buildings. If an item cannot be stored inside, it should be secured in a logical and safe place. Personnel should be assigned to inspect both buildings and equipment to ensure their continued security throughout the emergency.

Essential and Nonessential Services

A determination should be made as to which services will be considered essential and will continue during an emergency. Inmates whose normal assignments have been identified as nonessential should be secured in a housing unit but remain available for assignment to areas that provide essential services.

Staff Resources

A list should be compiled of personnel whose routine functions are nonessential during a declared emergency and who can be reassigned to areas providing necessary services. Plans should be developed specifying to which of these essential services individual staff members will be assigned. The list of nonessential service posts and employees should include:

- Job assignment.

- Location where employee can be reached.
  - building.
  - work and vacation schedule.
  - work and home telephone numbers.

- Employee's supervisor.

- Assignment status during emergencies.
  - essential service duty assignment during emergencies.
  - time placed on emergency standby at the facility.
  - time placed on emergency standby at home.
  - time relieved of duty and new assignment.

Essential security posts must be staffed during all emergencies.

Security

Plans should include a predetermined list of all security posts deemed absolutely necessary. These posts should be staffed during all emergencies. Rosters indicating post numbers and descriptions should be established during the plan's development. Employee rosters should be maintained and continually updated to permit immediate notification of those personnel whose services may be needed during the emergency. An emergency count of the prison population should be made. Security devices (handcuffs, chains, etc.) should be readily available. Depending on the conditions, the

officer-in-charge should activate a roving patrol to maintain perimeter security.

Command Post

The disaster plan should provide for a primary command post, specifying its location, staffing requirements, specific personnel assignments, and necessary equipment. The natural disaster command post should be similar to command centers for riot control (see chapter 12). The plan should also identify an alternate command post should the primary location become available.

Communications

Clearly defined lines of communication should be established for use during an emergency. The telephone is the primary method for maintaining continuous communication, while the radio can be as an alternate means. The communication equipment to be used should be specified in the disaster plan.

Emergency Power

Disaster plans should anticipate the loss of commercial electric power and specify alternate means for providing electricity. The maintenance department should ensure that all emergency generators are maintained in working order and are readily available for prolonged service during emergency situations. The maintenance supervisor should assign this responsibility to a specific staff member.

Food Service

The disaster plan should establish procedures to ensure that the food service department functions as normally as possible. Inventories should be maintained on all food items. Menus should be planned to obtain maximum utilization of existing inventories. If necessary, additional staff members from nonessential posts may be assigned to food services. If conditions permit, inmates should continue to eat in the dining room. Provision should be made to feed staff at the facility for the duration of the crisis. Prearranged procedures should be made for obtaining additional food during the emergency.

Water and Sewage

Procedures should include collection and storage of as much drinking and sanitary water as possible. Plans for waste product removal and disposal should also be included in the disaster plan.

Maintenance

The maintenance department supervisor should ensure that water, sewage, steam, and electrical systems continue functioning during the emergency. This department also should provide needed staff and inmates to make any emergency repairs.

Medical Services

Although the type and severity of the emergency will determine the amount of deviation from normal routine, the disaster plan must specify

procedures to accommodate the medical needs of inmates and of any staff injured on the job during the emergency. The head of the medical department should prepare a written medical emergency plan that includes:

- ◎ Around-the-clock staff coverage with reassignment of medical personnel, including those from other institutions or other state and local facilities.

- ◎ An inventory of necessary medical supplies, as well as a prearranged means for obtaining additional supplies from other state and local facilities.

- ◎ Procedures for the medical evacuation of sick or injured inmates or staff to appropriate state, local, or private facilities.

Clothing and Laundry

Inventories should be maintained of all clothing and laundry supplies that may be needed during the emergency. Only essential laundry services should be continued during the crisis.

Emergency Equipment

The disaster plan should contain a detailed list of all available emergency equipment, including its location and the names of personnel responsible for equipment collection, storage, issuance, and recovery. If the available equipment is insufficient, alternative resources should be listed and arrangements made for obtaining items for use during a crisis.

Transportation

The disaster plan should list all facility vehicles appropriate for emergency use, listing the seating capacity of each vehicle. A designated area should serve as a "pool" or concentration point during declared emergencies. Responsible staff members should supervise coordination of all activities involving vehicles, dispatching them on an as-needed basis and ensuring their prompt return to the pool. Fuel tanks should be kept at least half full at all times. Additional sources of transportation should be identified and prior arrangements made for their appropriation, if necessary.

Work Squad Availability

The warden should make inmate work squads available to the local community to assist civil defense and other specified authorities during public emergencies. An action plan based on prior arrangements should be written.

Official Public Relations Releases

The disaster plan should establish procedures to coordinate public information releases with the central office. However, institutions should be authorized to make additional releases on their own.

The Level II Crisis

The disaster plan should detail procedures appropriate to meet the needs of emergencies severe enough to warrant partial evacuation. Steps similar to those described for Level I crises should be followed in these areas: Buildings and Equipment, Essential and Nonessential Services, Com-

mand Post, Communications, Emergency Power, Water and Sewage, Maintenance, Medical Services, Emergency Equipment, Work Squad Availability, and Official Public Information Releases. In addition to these procedures, additional activities are detailed below.

Staff Resources

At Level II the warden may decide that it is necessary to request additional support from the National Guard. To obtain this aid a request should be made to the agency head, containing complete details of the situation and specifying the amount of additional support required. The agency head should then forward a formal request to the governor's office to obtain National Guard support.

Security

The rosters and post descriptions required at Level I should be augmented to include the positions needed for transporting evacuated inmates to alternate locations. It will also be necessary to provide personnel to ensure security at the alternative sites. A written internal search plan of the institution should be implemented and the inmate count verified.

Evacuation Plan

To aid in transportation, all inmates should be listed by category or supervisor category.

To aid in safe and efficient transportation, the prisoners should be listed on a roster by custody or supervision categories. Knowing the number of inmates in each category will enable the selection of appropriate vehicles, alternate housing sites, and assignment of sufficient personnel to provide the necessary security. Evacuation priority should be given to inmates with medical problems, followed by prisoners whose services are not needed. Remaining staff and inmates should be reassigned to safe and secure areas within the institution. Because of the high escape risk they represent, inmates under close and maximum custody and those under death sentences should be secured in a separate area with extra supervision.

Food Service

In addition to following Level I procedures, food service staff should be reassigned to the sites receiving evacuated inmates. Contingency plans should be activated that allow the provision of additional food at evacuation locations.

Clothing and Laundry

There should be provisions for sufficient clothing and bedding at the alternative locations to meet the needs of the evacuated inmates.

Transportation

A partial evacuation requires procedures beyond those needed at Level I. A detailed staff/inmate transportation schedule should be prepared to facilitate the movement. Prior arrangements should be made for transporting injured staff and inmates to other state and local facilities. Each vehicle containing inmates leaving the institution should be counted when loading and unloading to ensure the accuracy of the count.

The Level III Crisis

If, in the warden's estimation, the crisis situation warrants total evacuation of the facility, additional procedures are needed in the disaster plan. While many of the procedures required at Levels I and II can be initiated, additional planning is needed.

Buildings and Equipment

If conditions permit, some employees should remain at the facility to conduct periodic surveillance of buildings and equipment.

Essential and Nonessential Services

If conditions permit, some prisoners with knowledge about maintaining essential services may be permitted to volunteer and remain at the facility.

Evacuation Plan

The plan should allow some staff and selected prisoners to remain at the affected facility, but must also provide for their evacuation if the situation worsens. In cases of total evacuation a written plan for the orderly shutdown of all utilities should be implemented. Inmates under the death sentence should be transported in full chain restraints and, upon arrival at a temporary site, be housed separately from the rest of the population. Provision should be made at the temporary evacuation site to establish a staff rotation roster to maintain security and provide necessary services during the crisis. The Chief Security Officer should be prepared to utilize the interstate compact, if, at a later time, it becomes necessary to arrange for other types of temporary housing for the prisoners. Lastly, there should be a plan for returning evacuated prisoners to their original institution after the emergency is over.

During an emergency, staff members are expected to perform duties outside their normal job classification and duty periods.

Tornado

A tornado is an erratically moving, funnel-shaped windstorm capable of enormous destruction. Tornadoes follow a general pattern, but may vary as shown in the following chart:

Condition	Norm	Possible Range
Ground speed	10-25 mph	2-65 mph
Duration	2-40 minutes	up to 180 minutes
Width of Path	200-500 feet	up to 2 miles
Length of Path	1200-2500 yards	250 miles
Wind speed	150 mph +	75-300 + mph
Direction	northeast	96% true

Tornadoes form from thunderstorms, are always accompanied by rain, hail, and 40-60 mph gusts of winds, and always rotate counterclockwise. Depending on their strength, they are capable of lifting objects weighing several tons, tossing them to great heights, and depositing them far from their point of origin. Certain geographic areas seem prone to tornadoes, but no location is exempt. Tornadoes cause their greatest damage not by wind speed, but by massive and sudden reductions of air pressure. When the air

pressure outside a structure or object is reduced drastically, the structure will explode if it is not capable of equalizing the pressure loss rapidly. The severe pressure imbalance combined with very strong circular winds results in great destruction.

Several minutes prior to and after a tornado, large clouds of dirt and dust may be generated by the storm, reducing the visibility to zero. The tornado may be accompanied by very heavy rain or hail. Although communications within the institution are not likely to be interrupted, outside telephone lines may be severely damaged. Exterior base station antennas may also be destroyed, limiting radio communication to the use of portable or mobile sets. An electrical blackout can occur if the emergency generator is rendered nonfunctional and outside power sources, lines, or substations are damaged.

The Command Post

The warden or a designee should establish the location of a command post prior to the arrival of a tornado. All damage and injury reports and other important information should be routed to the command post. It may be necessary to establish two command posts; one in an area removed from the destruction and another close to the location of medical or operation triage. The warden may encounter a multitude of problems at the same time. He or she should establish command in a quiet controlled area with sufficient communications equipment.

Personnel Assignments

Assignments of on-duty and off-duty personnel must be made on a minute-to-minute basis, as needs arise. The severity of the disaster at the institution and in the surrounding community, the time of occurrence, and the staff and inmate reaction will determine the manpower available and the level of assistance required.

Emergency Actions

If the institution receives sufficient warning that it is in the path of a tornado, the warden or designee should immediately take the following actions:

- Discontinue all outside exercise, recall all inmates from the yards, recall all work crews, and return all inmates to their housing units.

- Discontinue all visiting or volunteer group activities and present those persons with the option of either leaving the institution or taking shelter in area designated by the warden. Visitors or volunteer groups should not be allowed to remain with the inmates. Visitors or volunteers should be allowed to leave at any time, regardless of the location of the storm.

- Order total lockdown of the institution.

- Instruct all employees not otherwise assigned to take shelter.

- After the storm passes, order a headcount taken and an immediate radio check between the control center and each unit officer to ascertain if the officer is incapacitated. Immediately check any area that fails to respond.

○ Order the senior medical employee on duty to organize a medical triage in the event of injuries and to follow appropriate procedures contained in health services policy.

○ Order at least two officers to make a walking check of the perimeter. If damage to any perimeter structures has occurred, lockdown should remain in effect until repairs are completed or until an armed officer is assigned to provide security at the point of damage.

○ If all outside communications are destroyed, dispatch an officer to seek the nearest operable telephone and notify the personnel and agencies deemed appropriate.

○ Make the facility manager solely responsible for damage assessment, clearance to enter obviously damaged areas, or operation of a damaged system or piece of equipment. Damaged areas should be completely photographed before work is started, and cleanup should not commence without the warden's permission.

Post-emergency Actions

An all-clear signal should be broadcast only after the control center officer has been officially notified of the crisis' end by the warden or a designee. After a tornado, the warden should forward a complete report to the agency head.

When officially notified of a crisis' end, an all-clear signal should be broadcast.

Earthquake

An earthquake is a sudden disturbance in the earth's surface that may result in topographic changes. Earthquake movement is caused by an increase in or cessation of pressure beneath the surface of the earth. Depending on the severity and time of the occurrence, the facility may experience total isolation from all forms of relief, support, or communications for an

extended period of time. The danger of aftershocks or additional tremors pose an everpresent hazard. Severe quakes may cause discharges of geothermal steam, natural gas, sulfuric gas, pumice, ash, or dust and—due to the creation of electromagnetic fields—the cessation of all two-way communications. In addition, proximity to large bodies of water may result in flooding.

The following is a simple scale of severity for use in determining the damage to expect:

- Minor earthquake: Cracked or broken windows; separation of water, sewer, steam, and gas and/or oil pipes; total or partial power failures; total or partial telephone and/or radio disruption; and minimal structural damage or loss of life.

- Moderate earthquake: Any or all of the above, plus small fissures in the earth; cracked walls and/or floors; large scale glass breakage; severe window and door jamming due to foundation support shifts; breaches in security fencing; and some injuries or loss of life.

- Severe to massive earthquake: Any or all of the above, plus extensive building damage; violent and severe changes in topographical references; large earth fissures or shears resulting in total disruption of all ground transportation; gas or particulate discharge; moderate to severe flooding; and multiple injuries and moderate to heavy loss of life.

Each facility should establish a command post and contingency plans for use during an earthquake.

The Command Post

The command post location will depend on several factors which cannot be determined until after the earthquake has occurred. Placement may be temporary, with the command post being moved as conditions permit. These factors are:

- Severity of damage to the facility.

- Number and severity of injuries.

- Number of employees on duty.

- Number and severity of aftershocks.

- Level of outside support available.

In a moderate to severe quake, multiple injuries may occur and structural damage may prevent health services personnel from administering aid to the injured. Officers in affected units may be required to provide first aid until assistance arrives and may have to render aid through the bars due to jammed doors and/or nonfunctional locks on cell or unit doors.

In some cases, the command post may be a designated individual rather than a specific location, and that person may have to be mobile, particularly in view of reduced or nonexistent communications. Outside communication may be difficult; however, every effort must be made to contact the appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity. All available communications media must be used to attempt contact with outside agencies. Every

In some cases, the command post may be a designated individual rather than a specific location. . .

telephone and radio in the institution should be tried as failure may not be system-wide. The following is a reference list of communication assets:

- FM base station, 2 frequencies.
- FM portables, 2 frequencies each.
- FM portables, 1 frequency each.
- FM mobiles, 2 frequencies each.
- HF mobiles, 5 frequencies each.
- CB mobiles, 40 channels each.
- Telephones capable of outside communication.
- Pay telephones.

Personnel Assignments

Assignments of both on- and off-duty personnel must be made as developments occur. The severity of the disaster and number of injuries at the institution and in the surrounding community, the time of occurrence, and the type of communication available will determine manpower usage and response.

Support Forces

The warden or designee should notify the agency head who should notify other personnel or outside agencies as necessary.

Emergency Actions

Earthquakes do not follow a pattern or profile. The initial shock may be massive with less violent aftershocks or the opposite pattern may occur. There may be only one shock of minimal to massive proportions. Aftershocks may occur at intervals or not at all. Consequently, it may be impossible to declare an "all clear." The warden should direct actions with this in mind, as continuing danger may alter planning or executing subsequent actions. Immediate actions should include but not be limited to:

- Obtaining reports of injuries and damage from all areas of the institution.

- Determining the status of operations and control functions including damage, if any, to communications, power, lighting, and video security systems.

- Ordering lockdown of the institution and obtaining a unit-by-unit assessment of injuries. If conditions allow, health services personnel should provide triage for injuries, either at a central location or in the individual units.

- Ordering a walking perimeter inspection by not less than two officers to ascertain if security has been breached. If weakness is found, post armed officers until repairs are completed.

- Determining the amount of structural damage in each cell to ascertain if an escape could occur or if further shocks could cause life-threatening danger.

● Dispatching officers to nonhousing buildings to assess injuries and damage and to control inmate movement. Inmate workers are the largest source of manpower for emergency maintenance and should be used accordingly. Smoking and the use of electrical appliances should be banned to limit the fire hazard.

● Maintaining order until communications to and from the outside are reestablished and relief personnel arrive.

Three factors in an earthquake that will cause great fear and trepidation in humans, particularly in disturbed inmates, are: sudden occurrence, massive destruction, and the uncertainty of knowing when the earthquake has subsided. Employees and inmates should expect unusual behavior from some prisoners and should empathize with affected individuals. Communication of accurate information to all concerned is of utmost importance.

Post-emergency Actions

Depending on the type and severity of the earthquake, ordinary services may be disrupted for an extended period of time. Toilet fixtures may back up or not operate, creating unsanitary and possibly dangerous health problems. Disruption of all potable water services may occur. All approved drinking fluids should be conserved and rationed once a survey of supplies on hand is obtained. After an earthquake, the warden should forward a complete report to the agency head.

Flood

A flood is a high-water level of major proportions. Major floods may have the most impact on three diverse, but critical, areas of a correctional operation—communications, urban services, and normal personnel relief.

Communications

Telephone lines to the outside may be rendered inoperative because of major flooding. Inside lines will likely function as long as electrical power is supplied.

Urban Services

Water and electricity may be disrupted after flood conditions begin. The contamination of water may occur before indications of intrusion are noticed. Evidence of contamination includes the presence of air in lines, rust or debris in water, or excessive hydrostatic pressure. The staff member expected to serve as the warden's designee should be familiar with the location of, and procedures for, shutting off the water supply to the institution.

Each institution should be equipped with an emergency generator capable of continuous operation for 100 hours. The length of actual operation may depend on the fuel available. In the event of a flood, the fuel supply on hand should be determined by a maintenance employee or an inmate maintenance worker under supervision. The warden should be advised of the anticipated period of generator operation.

Normal Personnel Relief

Major floods may impede or disrupt travel by foot or vehicle. In addition, attempts by personnel to reach the facility may be thwarted by the disaster preparations of other state agencies including the National Guard or

Highway Patrol under orders of the governor. As a result, relief may be delayed for hours or even days and creative patterns of rotating personnel already on duty may be required to maintain proper security.

The condition of the ground water table (GWT) prior to the precipitation, the length of the period of precipitation, and the size of the catch basin determine the flood crest time and easement relief. Since these factors may be impossible to ascertain locally, it is generally safe to assume that the water level will rise with accumulated run-off for a period after the precipitation stops. The warden or a designee must ensure that all inmate workers are housed inside the main structure because flowing water can rapidly undercut or wash away soil, resulting in the breach of security fencing. Additionally, the presence of debris washed into the area provides an avenue for escape. Personnel allowed outside the building should be especially watchful for dogs, cats, horses, livestock, wild animals, rodents, and reptiles that might have been washed onto the property. Animals under these conditions are extremely fearful, possibly injured, and should not be approached.

Personnel inside the institution, particularly those on the ground floor, should watch for rodents, reptiles, and other vermin seeking shelter and safety.

Rescue attempts should occur only if there are enough personnel present to physically retrieve the would-be rescuer.

Command Post

The warden or a designee should determine the location of the command post. A centralized location for information gathering may suit one situation and a mobile profile may fit another. The importance of the command post function is paramount, the precise location is unimportant.

Personnel Assignments

Assignments of both on- and off-duty personnel should be made as developments occur. The amount of advance warning, the personnel response, and the severity of the disaster will determine staff assignments.

Support Forces

The warden or designee should notify the agency head, who in turn should notify other personnel and outside agencies deemed appropriate. After consultation with the appropriate authority, the warden or a designee should decide whether to notify other noncorrectional agencies for support.

Emergency Actions

The warden or designee will normally have sufficient warning to receive, process, and announce information pertinent to flood conditions. However, the warden should ensure that the following actions are taken:

- A weather information log should be kept, which includes time of each entry, forecast conditions, anticipated arrival of flood condition, and the person to whom the information has been relayed. Information sources that must be monitored frequently are:
  - Television channels.
  - AM and FM commercial radio stations.
  - U.S. Weather Bureau.
  - State police district headquarters.
  - State emergency management agency.

- If a major flood is forecast, efforts should be taken to stockpile potable water. All available clean containers should be filled with tap water, covered, and sealed for future use. To maximize the stored resource, hot water should be stored. It will cool by the time it is used.

- Severely ill inmates should be assessed by health service personnel to ascertain if any are borderline hospital transfer cases. If so, they should be transported while vehicular traffic is still moving.

- Staff at command post or a designated timekeeper should record and notify appropriate personnel of the departure or arrival of any employee, in order to keep an up-to-date list of personnel within the institution.

- If a lockdown of the institution is necessary, several cold meals and snacks need to be prepared while utilities are still functional. However, if a hot meal is planned, it is important that enough hot food for all inmates is ready before serving begins, as interruption of utility service during serving may adversely affect security routines.

Post-emergency Actions

Excessive hydrostatic pressure may occur during flood conditions causing toilets, sinks, and basins to back up and overflow, particularly on the ground or first-floor levels. The resultant raw sewage contamination is very hazardous to health. Areas where backup occurs should be emptied and isolated until cleanup efforts are undertaken. Inmates assigned to clean up should be supplied with rubber gloves and boots. After a flood, the warden should forward a complete report of all aspects of the incident to the agency head.

Chapter 17

Employee Work Stoppage

Work Stoppages and Sick-Ins

Emergency plans should be implemented during work stoppages.

An employee work stoppage may result when a group of staff members walk off assigned posts or fail to report for duty at the scheduled time. As previously stated, approved emergency staffing plans should be implemented under these circumstances. Any discussion with employees involved in a work stoppage should be for informational purposes only. All grievances should be defined and reported to the agency head or labor-management official designated by the warden. Any agreement reached at one facility will ultimately affect all institutions; therefore, only the agency head should make commitments to employees.

Responses

In the event of work stoppage or a serious work slowdown, such as a sick-in, the institution should continue to operate its programs on a limited basis to the extent that public safety and other factors are not placed at risk. The support and goodwill of the inmate population is of utmost importance during this time of crisis. Therefore, based on staff availability and the level of compliance of the prisoner population, responses may be implemented in the following order:

- Maintenance of a normal program schedule.

- Adoption of a regular holiday schedule.

- Selective lockdown with routine serving of inmate meals in the dining room.

- Total lockdown with serving of inmate meals in cells.

Priorities

Due to the critical nature of institutional security and the small number of specialized personnel, the following suggestions will concentrate on an employee work stoppage by correctional officers. The approach should be implemented with a priority of concern as follows:

- General public safety.

- Safety of correctional personnel.

- Inmate welfare and safety.

- Protection of property.

- Resumption of normal working schedules.

Conditions to Expect

During an employee work stoppage, vehicular traffic at the institution may be greatly increased. In addition, employees directly taking part in the work stoppage may be near the prison entrance interrupting vehicular traffic. Delivery truck drivers may refuse to cross what they perceive to be a picket line, although a formal strike may not have been declared. If this occurs, personnel may be required to make pickups of food, medicines, and supplies. Local police should direct traffic and see that the employees involved in the work stoppage do not cause property damage or bodily harm to individuals entering the institution.

The news media often give extensive coverage to any employee work stoppage at a prison. The warden, as the institution's official spokesperson, should designate a media representative to keep the news media informed of current developments. No other employee should be authorized to speak for the institution. The decision to allow media representatives inside the institution should be made by the warden.

Activities should continue in a routine manner, depending on the number and abilities of available staff members. It may be necessary to postpone or eliminate some activities until enough personnel are available to staff necessary posts and supervise all programs within the institution. The warden will decide whether to continue or cancel specific activities.

The lack of personnel may lead inmates to believe there is diminished security, thus increasing the possibility of an escape attempt. Areas susceptible to inmate escape attempts that must be closely observed should be identified in each institution's plan.

Emergency Procedures

The Command Post

The command post, if one is necessary, should be located in an area that is secure from both inmates and striking employees.

Support Forces

If, in the warden's judgment, there are not enough personnel to staff all essential posts, it may be necessary to request assistance from other resources. If the work stoppage has spread to other institutions, support forces from outside the agency may be called in to assist. If possible, the decision to call support forces should be coordinated through the agency head. If that person is not immediately available and the warden believes that the situation has caused a serious breach in security, the warden should call in outside agencies and notify superiors of the actions taken at the earliest opportunity.

Emergency Actions

In the event of a work stoppage by line correctional officers, all other available staff members and supervisory correctional officers should be utilized in staffing necessary areas. Case managers should be assigned to their

respective units when possible. Only personnel qualified with weapons should be assigned to towers, outside hospitals, and transportation duties. Upon arrival at assigned posts, all personnel should read the post orders. Any questions should be directed to the chief of security or to the shift supervisor on duty.

Food service employees should report to their regular work areas under the food service manager's supervision. Inmate food service workers should be utilized in their normal capacities if, in the warden's opinion, their presence does not involve a security risk. The food service manager should plan on preparing and serving three meals per day to inmates and employees. Serving schedules should be coordinated through the associate warden.

All off-duty personnel should be notified of the work stoppage and advised to report as required. A current list of all employees and their telephone numbers should be available for emergencies. Minimum staffing requirements and essential posts that must be filled should be listed. That list should be made a part of the plan. Perimeter security and the welfare and safety of duty personnel and inmates should be the primary concerns in a work stoppage.

Equipment

Equipment necessary to properly fulfill the duties of the assigned posts should be determined and provided to the designated employees. This equipment may include, but not be limited to, firearms, flashlights, keys, radios, batons, and gas.

Should a disturbance by the inmate population arise in conjunction with an employee work stoppage, the institution's contingency plan for major disturbances should be implemented without delay. A duty roster which assumes 8-, 12-, and 16-hour shifts should be prepared as part of that plan.

Summary

After reading the past few hundred pages, you've no doubt gained an appreciation for all that's involved in an effective security program. From facility design to natural disasters—the list of security factors to be considered is awesome. Designing an effective, comprehensive security system for your facility will be a hefty task. We hope these guidelines will benefit your efforts.

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Appendix I

The following forms have been used throughout the manual. They are reproduced here in full size for your use. You may adapt and reproduce them as your needs require.

SIGNATURE SHEET

POST: _____

I certify that I have read and fully understand the post orders both general and specific for this post. I have also read and fully understand all operations statements and memorandums, which are attached to these post orders, affecting the operation of this post. TO BE MADE A PART OF ALL POST ORDERS.

Employee Name	Date	Supervisor's Initials	Employee Name	Date	Supervisor's Initials

Your Rights

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.

- You have the right to remain silent.

- Anything you say can be used against you in court.

- You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning.

- If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish.

- If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

Waiver of Rights

I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed _____

Witness   _____

Witness   _____

Date & Time _____

REQUEST FOR STORAGE OF PERSONAL WEAPON

I request that I be permitted to store the following weapon(s) in the institution's armory:

Manufacturer   Model & Caliber   Serial #

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____   _____

(Date)   (Requesting Employee)

Approved _____ Date _____

(Chief Security Officer)

CHECKING ARMORY EQUIPMENT IN AND OUT

Type of Equipment Issued	Signature of Person Receiving Equipment	Time Out	Time In	Initials of Person Issuing Equipment	Date

INDIVIDUAL SEGREGATION RECORD SHEET

(Institution)

Team/Caseworker _____   Regular Quarters _____

Inmate Name _____   Reg. No. _____   Cell _____

Violation   Date   Time
or Reason _____   Received _____   Received _____

Admittance   Date   Time
Authorized _____   Released _____   Released _____

Date	Shift	Meals B	D	S	SH	EX	Medical PA Signature	Comments (Use reverse if needed)	OIC Signature
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								
	MORN								
	DAY								
	EVE								

Pertinent Information = Epileptic, Diabetic, Suicidal, Homosexual, Assaultive, etc.
Meals: B = Breakfast, D = Dinner, S = Supper
SH = Shower—Yes (Y), No (N), Refused (R)
EX = Exercise (enter actual time period, and inside or outside—i.e., 9:30/10:00 IN; 2:00/2:30 OUT)
Medical PA = Medical Physician's Assistant (nurse) will sign the seg log each shift and the record sheet each time the inmate is seen by him or her.
Comments = Conduct, Attitude, etc. Additional comments documented on reverse side must include date, signature, and title.
Officer in Charge Signature = OIC (Unit Officer) must sign all record sheets each shift.

INDIVIDUAL SEGREGATION RECORD SHEET

1. Inmate discipline requires that an individual record sheet be maintained on each inmate in segregation. The individual record sheet will reflect all activities affecting each inmate and will be sent regularly to the institution's central file. A standard form has been devised as a result of recommendations received.

2. The Individual Segregation Record Sheet will be completed and maintained in accordance with the following:

   a. The key at the bottom of the sheet is self-explanatory.

   b. The basic information at the top of the sheet, with the exception of the date and time of release, will be completed by the officer in charge/unit officer at time of admittance.

   c. The sheet provides space for a period of up to seven (7) days. The date column will be recorded daily; the shift line will be completed to coincide with the date and time received, recorded at the top of the sheet.

   d. The officer-in-charge/unit officer will sign the sheet in the space provided on line with the shift as indicated. Initials are not acceptable.

   e. The physician's assistant (nurse) will indicate by his/her signature in the proper space when an inmate receives medication, is examined by a medical officer or physician's assistant, or requests to see a member of the medical staff. If no medication is received or request made during a shift, the officer indicates by recording No (N) in the column.

   f. The record sheet is designed for a 7-day period. If confinement to segregation continues beyond a 7-day period, a new sheet will be prepared and the completed form forwarded to central file. Date and time of release will be recorded on the final form.

   g. Additional comments may be noted on the reverse of the form and in each case must be dated and include signature and title of person making the comment.

SANITATION CHECKLIST

SERVING LINE	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Are the serving lines clean, including sneeze guards?			
2. Are staff members wearing hair nets or caps and clean dress?			
3. Are inmate servers wearing hair nets or caps and clean dress?			
4. Are the *hot foods* served at 140°?			
Food Items _____ °F _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
5. Are *cold foods* served at 45°F?			
Food Items _____ °F _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			
_____ _____			

SANITATION CHECKLIST

DINING ROOM	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Are the floors clean and repaired?			
2. Are the tables clean?			
3. Are the seats clean?			
4. Are the walls clean?			
5. Are the beverage areas clean?			

KITCHEN PRODUCTION AREAS	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Does the general appearance of the department indicate frequent cleaning?			
2. Are the floors clean and repaired?			
3. Are the walls and ceiling clean and repaired?			
4. Are there any overhead pipes that might leak into food or equipment?			
5. Are potentially hazardous foods meeting temperature requirements during storage, preparation, display, service, and transportation?			
6. Are there adequate facilities for maintaining the food at hot or cold temperatures?			

SANITATION CHECKLIST

KITCHEN PRODUCTION AREAS	YES	NO	COMMENTS
7. Are hands washed and good hygienic practices observed?			
8. Is equipment used in the production area properly cleaned (steam kettle, ovens, grills, can opener, deep fat fryers, mixers, slicing machine)?			
9. Are rolling carts and hot food carts clean?			
10. Are all utensils and equipment in good repair; that is, free of breaks, open seams, cracks, and chips?			
11. Are food contact surfaces of equipment clean to sight and touch?			
12. Are wiping cloths available and clean?			
13. Are wiping cloths properly stored?			
14. Is the importance of frequent handwashing stressed?			
15. Is chewing of tobacco or smoking observed in food production area?			
16. Are the ice and ice handling utensils properly stored?			
17. Is the supply of hot water and cold water adequate?			

SANITATION CHECKLIST

FOOD STORAGE	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Are all food products protected from contamination?			
2. Are the containers of food stored off the floor and on a clean surface?			
3. Is all perishable food kept at proper temperature?			
4. Are the potentially hazardous foods stored at 45° or below (for cold food) or 140° or above (for hot food) as required?			
5. Are the frozen foods kept at 0° to 20°?			
6. Are the potentially hazardous frozen foods thawed at refrigerated temperature of 45° or below?			
7. Are cereals, sugars, and so forth kept in tightly covered and labeled containers?			
8. Are the refrigerators equipped with thermometers?			

SANITATION CHECKLIST

DISH WASHING/POT WASHING	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Are all dishes properly scraped and, if necessary, soaked before washing?			
2. Are adequate and suitable detergents used?			
3. If the dishes are machine washed: a. Are they washed at 140° or higher for 20 seconds? b. Are they rinsed at 180° or higher for 10 seconds?			
4. If the chemical sanitizer is used for the final rinse, was it properly dispensed and approved?			
5. If the dishes are washed manually, are they washed in water at 110° or higher?			
Are dishes sanitized by immersion in:			
a. water maintained at 170° for 30 seconds; or			
b. chlorine rinse at a temperature of not less than 75°; or			
c. solution containing at least 12.5 ppm of available iodine with ph of not higher than 5.0 and a temperature of not less than 75°?			

SANITATION CHECKLIST

GARBAGE DISPOSAL	YES	NO	COMMENTS
1. Is garbage removed in a timely manner?			
2. Are receptacles and liners non-absorbent?			
3. Are the receptacles covered by tight fitting lids?			
4. Are the receptacles washed and emptied?			
5. Are the receptacles disinfected frequently?			

RESTRICTED KEY FORM

Key Ring Number and Title _____

Institution _____

Date _____

Time Out _____

Time In _____

                             (Signature)   (Print Name)

Authorized By _____

                             (Signature)   (Print Name)

Employee _____

                             (Signature)   (Print Name)

Control Center Officer _____

Reason Key Was Issued _____

_____

_____

Copies to: Chief Security Officer
            Department Head Concerned
            Security Officer

TOOL INVENTORY

_____
(Institution)

Shop or Area _____ Marking _____ Calendar Year _____ Date Prepared _____

Page ___ of ___ Pages

Qty.	Tool Description	Size	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter

Certified correct _____
(Shop Area Foreman)

_____
(Tool Control Officer)

Approved _____
(Chief Security Officer)

Quarterly Audits

January _____ C.S.

April _____ C.S.

July _____ C.S.

October _____ C.S.

TOOL RECEIVING REPORT

To: Assistant Warden (Custody)

From: Tool Control Officer

On _____ , a _____
   (date)   (name and number of tools)

for _____ , was received at the institution.
      (department)

The classification for this tool is _____ .

This tool was etched and/or coded to conform to policy statement, _____ .

Signature _____
       (Tool Control Officer)

Copies to: Tool Control Officer
    Work Area Supervisor for whom the tool was purchased

WEEKLY TOOL REPORT

To: Chief of Security

From: _____

          (Name)   (Title)

I have verified the presence of all tools charged to _____ by _____ and the fact that such tools are stored in the approved and/or prescribed manner as of the end of my workday on _____.

Tool storage areas identified for warehousing of tool stocks are excluded from the daily accountability, except when there is evidence of forcible entry.

Note: Lost Tool Report

When ANY TOOL is lost, stolen, or misplaced, the chief of security, tool control officer, and shift supervisor shall be notified immediately, by telephone.

A written report covering the details of the loss of tools will be submitted as quickly as time permits. Forward the report to the chief of security with copies to the tool control officer and the shift supervisor. (See Lost Tool Report Form)

Copies to: Tool Control Officer
               Shift Supervisor

REPORT OF HAZARDOUS TOOLS

Front Entrances   ☐

Rear Gate   ☐

Security Supervisor

Subject _____ representing _____
(Company)

                                                    AM
The following tools were brought into the institution at _____ PM

                                 AM
and were taken out of the institution at _____ PM.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

    The tools were under the supervision of _____ dur-

ing their use.

    The visitor/mechanic was instructed in the basic supervisory requirements.

                        _____
                                    (Gate Officer)

    Any discrepancies and/or comments _____

_____

_____

Notice: It is a crime to bring any unauthorized weapons, narcotics, ammunition, knives, or other
contraband on these premises.

_____   _____
        Date   (Signature of Visitor/Mechanic)

                              _____
                                      (Company Represented)

                              _____
                                            (Phone)

TOOL TURN-IN RECEIPT

To: Tool Control Officer _____ Date _____

The tool(s) described below have been turned in to the tool control officer.

Signature _____
(Employee turning in tool(s))

Description of Tool(s)   **Number Missing**

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

Turned in by _____
(Work Area Supervisor)

Received in _____
(Tool Control Officer)

Copies to Work Area Supervisor
Chief of Security

LOST TOOL REPORT

To: Chief Security Officer

From _____   _____
                    (Name)   (Title)

_____
         (Department)

The tool(s) listed below have been lost/stolen from this worksite on _____
                                                                                                    (Date)

Description of Tool(s)   **Number Missing**

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

Circumstances surrounding this loss are as described below:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Copies to: Tool Control Officer
            Shift Supervisor
            Work Area Supervisor

OFFICIAL COUNT FORM

_____
(Institution)

Date _____

Time _____ PM / AM

Unit	Unit Census	Outcount Section											Out-Count	Count Verification	Unit Count	Unit
		Food Service	Hospital	Clothing Room	Industries	Commissary	Power Plant	Barber Shop								
TOTAL																
Count Verification																

Official preparing count _____

Official taking count _____

Count cleared — time _____

SPECIAL CENSUS

A special census is an inmate count taken at an unscheduled time on any day chosen at random. The specific reason for such a census is to let us know if our policy on inmate accountability is being adhered to and to deter inmates from being in unauthorized areas.

When a staff member takes a special census four things have to be noted:

1. Names and numbers of all inmates in your area at the time of census (including inmates assigned to that area on a detail).

2. The determination must be made if the inmates listed are authorized in the area or unauthorized.

3. If an inmate is in the area on vacation, medically unassigned, A & O, etc., this must be noted.

4. Census is to be turned into the Security Supervisor as soon as completed.

Area _____   Date _____   Time _____

Name	Number	Job Assignment	Authorized	Unauthorized	Explain

Note: If more space is needed, attach extra sheet.

Total in area   = _____
Total authorized   = _____
Total unauthorized   = _____

SPECIAL CENSUS

Day _____ Date _____ Time Started _____ Time Cleared _____

Detail	Count Called In	Count on Special Census Form	Remarks
* Auto body (383)			
* Auto V.T. (383)			
* AW clerk (216)			
* Business office (214)			
* Commissary (219)			
* C.C.S. office (217)			
* Chapel (230)			
* Dental (238)			
* Education (380)			
Food service			
* Hospital (235)			
* Industry (277)			
Labor 1			
* Laundry (270)			
* CMS office (260)			
* Carpenter shop			
* Construction 2			
* Electric shop			
* Electronics shop			
* Garage (264)			
Landscape			
* Machine shop (263)			
* Paint shop			
* Plumbing shop			
* Power plant (392)			
* Steamfitting (390)			
* Front entrance (348)			
* Visiting room (352)			
Corridor			
* B-Cellhouse (316)			
C-Cellhouse			
D-Cellhouse			
E-Cellhouse			
F-Cellhouse			
G-Dormitory			
J-Dormitory			
K-Dormitory			
L-Dormitory			
M-Dormitory			
* Psychology dept. (242)			
* Record office (365)			
Safety office			
* Storeroom (245)			
* Welding V.T. (385)			
Recreation dept. (gym)			
Recreation dept. (yard)			
* Clothing issue (272)			

(continued)

(Special Census, continued)

+			

  * Must be notified by telephone.

  Total _____

  Total' _____

Institution count _____

Control room officer _____
                              (Signature)

Security Supervisor _____
                            (Signature)

WEEKLY MASTER SECURITY CHECKSHEET

_____
(Month)   (Year)

Area	1st week	2nd week	3rd week	4th week	5th week
Business office					
Warehouse					
Laundry					
Commissary					
Chapel					
Food service (except cook/dining room foreman)					
Dental clinic					
Industries (except tool room)					
Safety office					
Education (except VT shops/ classrooms)					
CMS (except shop foreman)					
Administrative systems (except R&D/mail room)					

DAILY INSPECTION REPORT

Area/Post _____ Shift _____ Date _____

    I certify that I personally checked the items listed below and that all discrepancies are noted below. The shift supervisor was notified immediately of any serious security hazards and work orders were submitted where needed.

_____ Locks	_____ Floor	_____ Tools and Equipment
_____ Bars	_____ Vents	_____ Needles
_____ Doors	_____ Security Screens	_____ Syringes
_____ Grilles	_____ Fire Extinguishers	_____ Narcotics
_____ Windows	_____ Fire Hoses	_____ Other
_____ Walls	_____ Fire Hazards	_____

Discrepancies _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

    Officers responsible for the weekly security inspection of the tunnel areas will complete this section on the last workday of the week.

Powerhouse officer's signature _____ Date _____

Security officer's signature _____ Date _____

    The key rings listed below were issued to me during my tour of duty. I personally checked and counted each key and found all to be in good condition with the correct number of keys on each ring, as indicated on the key count tag. Any discrepancies found in the condition or count of keys is noted in the space provided.

Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____

    The officer's signature indicates that he/she made the above security check and key check, and to the best of his/her knowledge, found them secure and in proper condition. Any discrepancies are noted in the appropriate space and action taken to correct these discrepancies.

Morning shift officer's signature _____

Day shift officer's signature _____

Evening shift officer's signature _____

WEEKLY INSPECTION REPORT

Area/Post _____ Shift _____ Date _____

I certify that I personally checked the items listed below and that all discrepancies are noted below. The shift supervisor was notified immediately of any serious security hazards and work orders were submitted where needed.

_____ Locks	_____ Floor	_____ Tools and Equipment
_____ Bars	_____ Vents	_____ Other
_____ Doors	_____ Security Screens	_____
_____ Grilles	_____ Fire Extinguishers	_____
_____ Windows	_____ Fire Hoses	_____
_____ Walls	_____ Fire Hazards	_____

Discrepancies _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

The key rings listed below were issued to me during my tour of duty. I personally checked and counted each key and found all to be in good condition with the correct number of keys on each ring, as indicated on the key count tag. Any discrepancies found in the condition or count of keys is noted in the space provided.

Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____
Key Ring # _____ Count _____ Discrepancies _____

The officer's signature below certifies that he/she made the above security check and key check and, to the best of his/her knowledge, found them secure and in proper condition. Any discrepancies are noted in the appropriate space and action has been taken to correct these discrepancies.

Monday _____

Tuesday _____

Wednesday _____

Thursday _____

Friday _____

This form will be turned in to the operations lieutenant on the last workday of the week.

SAMPLE

Monthly Security/Sanitation Inspection Schedule

Area Inspected	Day of Week	Inspection Team
Business office and personnel department	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (operations), chairman, business manager, fire and safety officer
Inmate housing units	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (programs), chairman, unit manager (of each unit), assistant fire and safety officer
Food service department	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Health care director, chairman, food service manager, chief security officer
Health care program	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Industrial director, chairman, hospital administrator, personnel officer
Academic and vocational areas	Mondays 10:00 A.M.	Classification manager, chairman, supervisor of education, chaplain
Industrial operations	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (programs), chairman, industrial director, fire and safety officer
Mechanical services and shop areas	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Assistant warden (operations), chairman, physical plant manager, assistant fire and safety officer
Special service areas: laundry, clothing room, admissions unit, mail and visiting rooms.	Tuesdays 10:00 A.M.	Chief security officer, chairman, chief psychologist, general foreman

_____
Warden

INSPECTION OF QUARTERS SHEET

Date _____

Note: This form will be submitted daily to the shift supervisor by day and evening shift officers.

The following item will be inspected in each cell:

Item	S	U	Discrepancies noted
Walls and ledges			
Shelves			
Floors			
Toilet and sink			
Bars (if applicable)			
Window glass			

In addition to the above, the officer in each housing area will also inspect the following:

Item	S	U	Discrepancies noted
Dayroom floor			
Pillars and walls			
Ceiling and grillework			
Counseling room			
Showers (all areas)			
Ledge above doors			
All other window glass			
Other (as needed)			

INSTRUCTIONS   This check sheet is to be used as a guide by officers making daily security and sanitation inspections. A check mark will be placed in the appropriate column as to the general condition of all areas. Discrepancies should be noted in the proper column. Where more space is needed, the reverse side may be used. When making a comment on the reverse side, please indicate on the front that you have done so.

Shift _____ Area _____ Signature _____

Abbreviations   S = Satisfactory   U = Unsatisfactory

Note: Shift supervisor will note discrepancies and alleviate them if possible, then forward to chief of security for further action.

DAILY SECURITY, SANITATION, AND FIRE SLIP

Post _____

Shift _____ Date _____

Areas checked _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Discrepancies _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Use reverse side if additional space required.

_____

(Signature)

Remarks _____

_____

_____

_____

STANDARD ESCAPE REPORT

_____
(Institution)

Inmate's name _____ Age _____ Number _____ Date of escape _____

Sentence _____ Offense _____ Custody classification _____

Approximate time remaining to serve _____

Escaped from: Inside perimeter (   );   Outside perimeter (   );   Work release (   );   Other (   )

Number of inmates involved _____ Time of escape _____

Supervising employee (if none, state none) _____

Person first reporting escape _____ Time reported _____

Fired on   Yes (   );   No (   )

Central Office/Regional Office notified _____ Date _____ Time _____

Apprehended _____ Date _____ Time _____

Circumstances surrounding escape _____

_____

_____

_____

Evaluation (staff analysis) _____

_____

_____

_____

Changes in facilities or procedures to prevent similar occurrences: _____

_____

_____

_____

Date report submitted _____ Signature _____

A SEPARATE ESCAPE REPORT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR EACH INMATE INVOLVED

DAILY FIRE, SECURITY, AND ENERGY CHECKS
(Policy Statement #_____)

To Safety Manager   Date _____

From _____   Time _____
       (Department)

    I have checked my area of responsibility. All trash receptacles are emptied or covered. Flammable liquids are properly stored or removed. Fire extinguishers are unobstructed. No aisleways are blocked. No known hazards are present. All windows and doors are secure. All windows are closed in heating season. All lighting is off in unoccupied areas. All air-conditioning systems are off when area is unoccupied. Exhaust systems are off when not needed.

Remarks _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(Use reverse side for additional remarks)

Officer's name _____
                 (Print)   (Signature)

BOMB THREAT INFORMATION SHEET

Name of recipient _____

Address _____

Telephone number _____

Obtain the following information as quickly as possible when you receive a bomb threat.

1. Exact location of the device _____
_____

2. Time set for denotation _____
_____

3. Description of device or packaging _____
_____

4. Reason for call or threat _____
_____

In Addition, the following details should be noted:

5. Time and date of call _____
_____

6. Exact language used by caller _____
_____

7. Sex of caller _____
_____

8. Estimated age of caller _____
_____

9. Peculiar or identifiable accent of caller _____
_____

10. Describe any identifiable background noises or "off-phone" voices _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Appendix III

Staffing Guidelines

A number of methods can be used to determine personnel needs. The guidelines given below are those developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and currently in force in federal institutions. The guidelines are based on a research design that incorporated the opinions and experiences of all federal managers of functional correctional programs while taking into account the existing limitations on available resources. They are presented as a reference point from which individual correctional managers can analyze their unique staffing needs and develop staffing guidelines tailored to their own particular institutions and resource capabilities.

To develop its staffing guidelines, the Bureau appointed a special task force that solicited the opinions of all functional program managers. Each manager was asked to submit a proposed staffing pattern based on a realistic assessment of the number of staff needed to operate the program effectively. The number of positions requested had to be justified on the basis of existing standards, needs assessments, and other supporting documentation. In addition, managers were cautioned to neither overstate nor understate their needs, but to formulate proposals within the framework of limited public resources. In short, the Bureau was seeking practical judgments on what it takes to run an effective program rather than statements of optimum or minimum staff size.

Once the guidelines were established, they were compared with existing staffing patterns in state correctional systems. The comparison revealed that about half of the states had a higher staff-to-inmate ratio and about half had a lower ratio. The widest variations occurred within security force staffing patterns. This is probably due to two factors: 1) differences in the use of watch towers versus mobile patrols for perimeter security, and 2) the varying use of decentralized inmate management programs, which allow some correctional officer positions to be converted to positions for correctional counselors, caseworkers, or team managers.

The guidelines are presented in the form of tables that indicate how to determine and apply the appropriate guideline for each program area. The

following terms as used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons appear in the tables:

Metropolitan Correctional Centers (MCCs) — Urban jail-type centers used for housing pre-trial detainees and sentenced offenders serving short sentences or awaiting transfer to another federal institution.

Security Level — The federal security designation system ranking institutions from 1 (least secure) to 6 (most secure). Camps and minimum security institutions are rated 1. Levels 2, 3, and 4 designate medium security institutions. Levels 5 and 6 designate maximum security institutions.

Administrative (A) Facility — An institution housing offenders at several or all levels of security.

Camps — Minimum security (Level 1) facilities operating at varying levels of independence.

Independent camp: An autonomous, self-contained operation.

Military camp: An independent camp located on a military base.

Satellite camp: A camp operated adjacent to a correctional facility and using at least some of the institution's resources.

While some of the exceptions noted for particular guidelines apply to specific federal institutions, the guidelines are presented in full in hopes that they will be of interest to the field as a whole and of use to administrators and managers at all levels.

Background

Determining and defending an efficient level of staffing for correctional institutions is an extremely formidable task. Few standards address the number of personnel required for a given type of institution. Present standards in the field of corrections generally express personnel needs in terms of the number of staff needed to attain ultimate goals rather than the specific personnel needed to provide, for example, 24-hour coverage. In addition, physical plants, missions, and programs of correctional facilities differ from institution to institution. Consequently, personnel needs are varied and multifaceted.

Nonetheless, the development of uniform criteria for equitable distribution of resources is viewed as necessary for the continued effective and efficient operation of the Bureau of Prisons and for the immediate and practical purpose of redistributing existing resources wherever appropriate.

Methodology

Although several methodological approaches are available for determining personnel needs, it was initially determined to utilize the expert opinion of program managers to establish a baseline for developing staffing patterns. Program managers were asked to determine how many personnel they would need to operate their program in a minimum, medium, and maximum security institution with a rated capacity of 500, and all were required to justify the number of positions proposed by citing standards, needs assessments, task force reports, and/or any other documentation that would support their positions.

To prevent overstatement of needs, the managers were instructed to take into account the limited amount of public resources available and to request only the number of staff needed to operate their programs effectively, i.e., not the ideal or optimum staff, but also not a skeleton staff.

Given the general climate of cutback management, managers in some program areas were instructed to develop their guidelines at existing levels even though they could demonstrate the need for additional staff. For example, Financial Management and Maintenance program managers were instructed to hold their staffing guidelines within currently authorized and approved full-time positions.

As a means of assessing these responses, information on existing staffing patterns by program area was assembled for federal and state institutions. Comparison of the program managers' preliminary submissions indicated that the initial staffing guidelines were a reasonable approximation of existing staffing practices in federal institutions.

In addition, it was determined that the Bureau's level of staffing compared favorably with existing staffing patterns in state correctional systems; About half of the states had a higher staff-to-inmate ratio than the Bureau and about half had a lower ratio.

Following the establishment of a baseline staffing pattern for a facility with a rated capacity of 500, the staffing patterns were submitted to the Bureau's management for review and approval. After some minor revisions, the preliminary set of staffing guidelines was pilot-tested at several institutions in the Bureau's Western Region. This evaluation substantiated the basic soundness of the staffing pattern approach and revealed that staffing for most program areas met the requirements of the guidelines. Considerable deviations were found in the area of institutional security due to the special needs of each institution, e.g., manned towers and walls versus chain link fence and electronic security devices. This was expected, and evaluation and refinement of the guidelines continued.

To further evaluate the guidelines' accuracy and utility, a full-field study was conducted. All of the Bureau's chief executive officers were asked to compare their current authorized positions to the guidelines and to justify or explain any deviations. The study provided a wealth of information about staffing and staffing needs. Using the comments and information gained, the Executive Staff Personnel Sub-Committee reviewed and further refined the staffing guidelines. Several sets of guidelines were also referred to the program managers for further refinement. The guidelines for the institutional security program received an intensive full-field study and reevaluation. As a further test of validity, the Bureau's regional directors were also asked to review and comment on the guidelines. After additional refinements and reviews, the following set of guidelines was ultimately approved.

This, however, will not be the final answer. The development of staffing guidelines is a continuous adaptive-learning process. Corrections is a dynamic business and staffing guidelines must continue to adapt to the changing needs of the field.

Intent of the Staffing Guidelines

The staffing guidelines serve as a reference point from which staffing needs can be determined. Where specific need and circumstance dictate, deviations from the guidelines will be made; these deviations, however, must be fully documented and justified. Another important function of the guidelines is to conserve resources. Every effort should be made to operate within the guidelines or to operate with fewer personnel wherever possible.

Resource Allocation

Personnel resources are distributed according to both program priorities and the total amount of resources available. For example, if the total resources available Bureau-wide equal only 90 percent of the total resources required, each region can expect to receive 90 percent of their total calculated resource requirements. The percentage of resources allocated to various program areas, however, can be changed to meet priorities. If, for instance, it is a regional or national priority to upgrade the medical program, this program could be staffed at 100 percent, even though only 90 percent of needed resources are available, as long as staffing for other programs could be reduced to less than 90 percent.

Using the Staffing Guidelines

The staffing guidelines are listed in tables according to the Bureau's decision unit structure (e.g., Food Service, Medical Service, Staff Training). Each table provides specific guidance for determining the appropriate number and kinds of personnel needed to staff the decision unit and is divided into three sections:

○ *Guidelines* — a listing and/or formula for determining the number and type of positions for an institutional program.

○ *Exceptions* — situations in which exceptions are made to the guidelines.

○ *Application* — a description of how to apply the guidelines.

Computation of Staffing Requirements

The staffing requirements are expressed in terms of a series of indexes that indicate the proper staffing requirement at a given level of workload. For example, in Financial Management the workload measure is the institution's rated capacity. The first index of this workload is a rated capacity of 200, and the required number of staff for this workload level is 11.

Staffing requirements for workloads falling between the indexes given may be determined by arithmetic interpolation. Those for workload levels falling above or below the indexes given can be determined by arithmetic extrapolation. Each process requires three steps. The following examples are based on Table 1, Food Service.

Interpolation — between intervals: An institution with a rated capacity of 300 lies in the interval between the given indexes of 250 and 350.

1. Determine the difference between the rated capacity of the institution and the lower index.

$$300 - 250 = 50$$

2. Multiply the difference by the given interval rate and round to the nearest whole number.

$$50 \times .020 = 1$$

3. Add this amount to the total staffing requirements of the lower index.

$$6 + 1 = 7$$

Therefore the staffing requirement for Food Service at an institution with a rated capacity of 300 is 7.

Extrapolation — above intervals: An institution with a rated capacity of 1095 is above 900, the highest given index.

1. Determine the difference between the rated capacity of the institution and the highest index.

$$1095 - 900 = 195$$

2. Multiply the difference by the given interval rate and round to the nearest whole number.

$$195 \times .004 = .78 = 1$$

3. Add this amount to the staffing requirements for the highest index.

$$11 + 1 = 12$$

Extrapolation — below intervals: An institution with a rated capacity of 185 is below 250, the lowest given index.

1. Determine the difference between the rated capacity of the institution and the lowest index.

$$250 - 185 = 65$$

2. Multiply the difference by the given interval rate and round to the nearest whole number.

$$65 \times .020 = 1.3 = 1$$

3. Subtract this amount from the staffing requirements for the lowest given index.

$$6 - 1 = 5$$

Procedures for Determining Current Authorized Staffing Levels

To determine the current authorized staffing level the following categories of positions will be counted:

○ All authorized full-time equivalent Salary and Expense positions.

○ All Public Health Service positions.

○ All Commissary non-appropriated positions.

○ All vocational training positions funded by Federal Prison Industries.

Table 1
Food Service

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity				Satellite Camps
	250	350	650	900	
Food Service Admin.	1	1	1	1	0
Asst. Food Service Admin.	0	1	1	1	0
Dining Room Supervisor	0	1	3	4	0
Cook Foreman	3	3	3	3	2
Bakery	1	1	1	1	0
Relief	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	6	8	10	11	3
INTERVAL RATE	.020	.007	.004		

II. EXCEPTIONS

MCCs: Delete 3 positions due to no dining rooms.

Springfield: Add 2 positions for special medical diet preparation; add 2 positions for ward feeding.

Institutions that purchase baked goods: Delete 1 position.

Meat cutter positions: Count under farm program.

Institutions without full-scale bakeries or bakery supervisors: *Northeast:* New York, Otisville, Ray Brook. *Southeast:* Butner,* Memphis,* Miami,* Talladega.* *North Central:* Chicago. *South Central:* Big Spring, Bastrop. *Western:* San Diego, Boron, Florence, Pleasanton.

*Institutions have planned bakeries; positions will be adjusted when the bakeries become operational.

III. APPLICATION

Determine rated capacity of the institution (excluding satellite camp) and select appropriate guideline. If the institution has a satellite camp, use satellite camp column to determine number of positions for camp.

Table 2
Medical Service

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Independent Camps 100–500	375	500	625	750	875	950
				Institution Capacity			
Physician	0	1	1	2	2	2	3
Psychiatrist	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Dentist	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Dental Asst.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HAO*	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asst. HAO	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Health Records	1	1	1	1	2	2	3
Physician Asst.**	4	7	8	8	8	9	10
TOTAL	7	11	13	15	16	19	22
INTERVAL RATE		.016	.016	.008	.024	.040	.003

*Hospital Administrative Officer
**Includes Lab/X-Ray and pharmacist positions.

II. EXCEPTIONS

Special studies to be conducted to determine the medical staffing requirements at Fort Worth, Springfield, Butner, Lexington, Terminal Island, Eglin, Montgomery, and Marion.

New York MCC medical needs: Determined by court decision.

III. APPLICATION

Determine rated capacity of the institution and select appropriate guideline. If the institution has a satellite camp, use the combined rated capacity of the institution and the satellite camp.

Table 3
Institutional
Security

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Security Levels						Independent Camps	Satellite Camps[b]
	1	2	3/ Admin[a]	4	5	6		
Chief Corr. Supv.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
CCS* Clerk	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	
Corr. Supv.	7	7	7	8	9	10	4	
Security Officer	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Spec. Invest. Supv.	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	
Front Entrance	2.8	1.4	1.4	2.8	2.8	2.8	0	
Control Center	4.2	4.2	4.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	4.2	
Rear Entrance	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	
Inside Patrol	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	
Corridor Officer	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	7	7	0	
Unit Officers[c]								
Activities Officers[d]								
Segregation Officers[e]								
Visiting Room[f]								
Perimeter Security[g]								
Tool Control	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	
Industry Control	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	
Subtotals								
Loans to Other Serv.[h]								
Sick & Ann. Rlf.[i]								
Training Rlf.[j]								

*Chief Correctional Supervisor

[a] Use 2.8 officers for front entrance in Administrative facilities.

[b] Use minimum of 5.2 officers for up to 100 rated capacity. Add 4.2 officers for each additional increment of rated capacity greater than 40 but not more than 100.

[c] Use 4.2 officers per unit. A unit is considered the entire housing area that can be supervised without breaking building security.

[d] Use 1 officer per 200 rated capacity for Levels 1-2-3; 1.5 officers per 200 rated capacity for Level 4; 2 officers per 200 rated capacity for Levels 5-6; 4 officers per 200 rated capacity for Level 6. Multiply the result rounded to a whole number by 1.4 for a seven-day shift.

[e] Base guideline is a total of 5 officers (2 officers each day and evening shift plus 1 morning shift officer). If 10% of institution's rated capacity is over 30 inmates, add 1 officer for each additional 20 inmates. (Drop if overage is under 10; add if over 10.) Multiply the rounded result by 1.4 for a seven-day shift.

[f] Use minimum of 2 officers up to 400 rated capacity. Add 1 officer for each additional 400 rated capacity. (Drop if under 200, add if over 200.) Based on five-day visiting. Multiply the rounded result by 1.4 for seven-day visiting.

[g] Multiply the number of required perimeter posts (towers and patrol) by the appropriate amounts:

Number of 1-day posts × .02
Number of 5-day posts × 1.0
Number of 7-day posts × 1.4

ʰ3% of subtotal on work sheet.

ⁱUse 28 days per officer per year.

ʲUse 12 days per officer per year. NOTE: 1 position = 220 workdays per year.

II. EXCEPTIONS

Bus operations: Add 3 positions.

Airlift operations: Add 2 positions.

III. APPLICATION

Determine security level, type, and rated capacity of institution. Evaluate each position against need and determine number of positions required. Where there is no corresponding position, no position will be authorized, e.g., if the institution has no corridor officer, then no positions will be allowed for this post. Calculate loans to other service, training relief, sick relief, and annual leave relief according to *Custodial Manual* procedures. Sum total positions required.

Table 4 Unit Management

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	General Unit Capacity		Specialized Unit Capacity	
	100	200	75	150
Unit Manager	1	1	1	1
Case Manager	1	2	1	2
Corr. Counselor	2	3	2	3
Secretary	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	5	7	5	7
INTERVAL RATE	.020		.027	

Positions	Number of Institutions
	1
Case Management Coordinator	1
TOTAL	1

II. EXCEPTIONS

Butner: Add 2 positions to the psychiatric unit.

III. APPLICATION

Determine number, type, and rated capacity of each unit and select appropriate staffing level.

Each institution will also receive 1 case management coordinator.

For the purpose of guideline comparisons, psychologists in the Unit Management decision unit who do not function as unit or case managers will be counted in the Psychology decision unit.

Table 5
Education

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Independent Camps & MCCs	Level 1, 5, & 6 Institutions	Level A, 2, 3, & 4 Institutions
Administrative	1	3	3
ABE	1	1	1
GED	1	1	1
College Coordinator	0	1	1
Voc. Training	0	2	4
Related Trades	0	1	2
Social Education	0	1	1
Unit/Team/Relief	0	1	1
TOTAL	3	11	14

II. EXCEPTIONS

Add 1 administrative staff position if camp capacity exceeds 300.

Only 2 vocational training and 1 related trade teachers are allowed at Springfield and level A, 2, 3, and 4 institutions with less than 400 rated capacity.

Add 1 Unit/Team/Relief position for an institution with 7 or more units.

Add 1 position for satellite camps.

III. APPLICATION

Determine security level or type of institution and select appropriate guideline.

Table 6
Leisure

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity				
	200	400	600	800	1000
Recreation Specialist	1	2	3	4	5
TOTAL	1	2	3	4	5
INTERVAL RATE	.005	.005	.005	.005	

II. EXCEPTIONS

MCCs: Delete 1 leisure program position regardless of capacity.
Independent camps: Minimum of 2 leisure program positions.
Satellite camps: Minimum of 1 leisure program position.

III. APPLICATION

Determine rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline. If there is a satellite camp, determine the rated capacity of the camp and select the appropriate standard (minimum of 1 position).

Table 7
Religion

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity 500	1000
Staff Chaplain	1	1
Assistant	—	1
TOTAL	1	2
INTERVAL RATE	.002	

II. EXCEPTIONS
Minimum of one chaplain per institution regardless of capacity.
Assistant need not be chaplain.

III. APPLICATION
Determine rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline. If there is a satellite camp, include rated capacity of the camp with the institution's rated capacity.

Table 8
Psychology

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Number of General Units 2	4	Number of Specialized Units 1	2
Psychologist*	1	2	1	2
TOTAL	1	2	1	2
INTERVAL RATE	.500		1.000	

*In addition to other assigned duties, one psychologist at each institution will be designated as chief psychologist.

II. EXCEPTIONS
Non-unitized institutions: Provide 1 psychologist for every 225 inmates.

Lexington, Springfield, Butner, and Terminal Island: Require special studies due to their special mental health programs.

Regional psychology administrators based in institutions: Count as half-time position in staffing guidelines.

III. APPLICATION
Determine number and type of units and select appropriate guideline.

For the purpose of guideline comparisons, psychologists in the Unit Management decision unit who do not function as unit or case managers will be counted in the Psychology decision unit.

Table 9
Executive
Office

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity	
	300–750	750 & above
Warden	1	1
Secretary	1	1
Executive Assistant*	1	1
Paralegal*	1	1
Assistant Warden	2	2
Research*	1	1
Secretary	1	2
TOTAL	8	9

Positions	Independent Camps & Satellite Camps	
	100–300	300–500
Superintendent	1	1
Assistant	0	1
Secretary	1	1
TOTAL	2	3

II. EXCEPTIONS

Petersburg satellite camp: No executive office staff because of small size of camp.

*Executive Assistant, paralegal, and research positions: Include these positions only where they presently exist. These positions will be counted in the Executive Office cost center for the purposes of guideline comparisons.

Three associate wardens: Leavenworth and Springfield only.

III. APPLICATION

Determine type and rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline.

Table 10
Financial
Management

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity					
	200	400	600	800	900	1100 & & Over
Controller	1	1	1	1	1	1
Budget & Accounting Officer	1	1	1	1	1	1
Budget Analyst	0	1	1	1	1	1
Supv. Accountant	1	1	1	1	1	1
Operating Accounting	0	0	0	1	1	1

Accounting Technician	2	2	2	2	2	2
Property Management & Procurement Officer	1	1	1	1	1	1
Property Management Officer	1	1	1	1	1	1
Contracting Officer	0	1	1	1	1	1
Procurement Officer	0	0	0	0	1	1
Supv. Warehouse Foreman	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asst. Warehouse Foreman	1	1	1	1	1	2
Warehouseman	1	1	2	3	3	3
Laundry Plant Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asst. Laundry Plant Supv.	0	1	1	1	1	1
Laundry Plant Manager	0	0	0	0	1	2
TOTAL	11	14	15	17	19	21
INTERVAL RATE		.015	.005	.010	.020	.010

II. EXCEPTIONS

Independent Camps: Delete 2 positions because of low staffing levels.

MCCs: Delete 2 positions because of the compactness of operation except for New York where only 1 position will be deleted because of uniqueness of operation.

Pleasanton, Seagoville, Lewisburg, Atlanta, and Leavenworth regional accounting centers: Add 1 position.

Allenwood: Delete 1 warehouse position because of small operation.

III. APPLICATION

Determine rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline. Include rated capacity of satellite camp in determination of total institutional capacity.

Table 11
Personnel

I. GUIDELINES

	Institution Personnel		
Positions	100	200	350
Personnel Officer	1	1	1
Personnel Specialist	1	1	2
Personnel Clerk	0	1	1
TOTAL	2	3	4
INTERVAL RATE		.010	.007

II. EXCEPTIONS

None

III. APPLICATION

Determine total number of positions required under the staffing guidelines for all programs except personnel, plus the total number of Federal Prison Industries positions currently assigned to the institution, and then select appropriate guideline for Personnel unit.

Table 12
Administrative
Systems

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity		
	200	450	750
Admin. Systems Manager	1	1	1
Admin. Systems Supervisor	1	1	1
Admin. Systems Technician	4	5	6
TOTAL	6	7	8
INTERVAL RATE		.004	.003

II. EXCEPTIONS
Satellite camp: Add 1 position.
MCCs: Add 6 positions.
Detention operations: Add 1 position.
Independent camps: Subtract 2 positions.
Bus operation: Add 1 position.
Airlift operation: Add 1 position.

III. APPLICATION
Determine rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline. Include rated capacity of satellite camp in determination of total institutional capacity.

Table 13
Safety

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Capacity		
	190	525	925
Safety Manager	1	1	1
Safety Clerk	—	1	1
Asst. Safety Manager	—	—	1
TOTAL	1	2	3
INTERVAL RATE		.003	.003

II. EXCEPTIONS
MCCs will be limited to 1 safety position.
All institutions will be limited to 3 positions.

III. APPLICATION
Determine rated capacity of institution and select appropriate guideline. Include rated capacity of satellite camp in determination of total institutional capacity.

Table 14
Staff Training

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Number of Institutions 1
Training Coordinator	1
TOTAL	1

II. EXCEPTIONS
None

III. APPLICATION
Each institution and each independent camp will have one training coordinator.

Table 15
Maintenance

I. GUIDELINES

Positions	Institution Security Levels 1–2	3	Admin/ 4	5	6	MCC	Ind. Camp	Mil. Camp
Base Staff*	11	12	13	14	15	10	4	3
If Motor Pool	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	—	+1	—
If Power Plant	+7	+7	+7	+7	+7	+6	+5	—
If Sewage Plant	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	—	—	—

*For specific positions, see staffing list following the Application section.

Size Factor: Apply the following size factors to all institutions except independent camps, military camps, and MCCs. For satellite camps, include camp's square footage in institution's square footage.

Sq. Footage in Thousands Positions		Sq. Footage in Thousands Positions	
0 - 50	−4	700 - 750	8
50 - 100	−3	750 - 800	9
100 - 150	−2	800 - 850	10
150 - 200	−1	850 - 900	11
200 - 350	—	900 - 950	12
350 - 400	+1	950 - 1000	13
400 - 450	2	1000 - 1050	14
450 - 500	3	1050 - 1100	15
500 - 550	4	1100 - 1150	16
550 - 600	5	1150 - 1200	17
600 - 650	6	1200 - 1250	18
650 - 700	7		

II. EXCEPTIONS

Institutions built before 1940: Add 2 positions.

Satellite camp: Add 1 position (General Mechanic).

El Reno: Add 1 position because of large number of buildings.

Seagoville and Allenwood: Consider as Level 1 institutions.

Florence: Consider as a camp but reduce to 1 position because of size.

Big Spring: Add 3 positions because of size.

III. APPLICATION

Determine type and total square footage (including satellite camp) of institution and select appropriate guideline.

Maintenance staff required to meet guidelines: *Base Staff* (11 positions. For increases above this base, add General Mechanics): Facility Manager, Clerk, General Foreman, Painter, Plumber, Carpenter, Electrician, Electronics Technician, Landscaper/Gardener, Machine and Welding, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. *Power Plant* (7 positions): Chief Engineer, Operating Engineers (5), Steamfitter. *Motor Pool* (1 position): Garage Mechanic. *Sewage Plant* (1 position): Plant Operator. *Satellite Camp* (1 position): General Mechanic.

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