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REDUCING THE FEAR OF DOWNTOWN CRIME

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Principal Investigator

The Executive Summary of the Final Report

of the

DOWNTOWN SAFETY, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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The principal investigator and designer of this project was N. David Milder, who also authored this report. Over the course of the project he was more than ably assisted by research associates Peter Haskel, Steven Fein and David Atik. Merle Wise skillfully helped conduct the research and do the administrative work needed to support task force operations. She is also responsible for editing the executive summary of this report. Dr. Harold Takoosian of Fordham University managed field operations for the 1984 trade area telephone survey.

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<u>REDUCING THE FEAR OF</u> <u>DOWNTOWN CRIME</u>

I. INTRODUCTION.

Regional Plan Association, a private, nonprofit, planning organization has been concerned with the growth and economic well-being of the 31 county New York-New Jersey-Connecticut Urban Region since the 1920s. Its Second Plan emphasizes the revitalization of metropolitan centers throughout the Region, and over the past two decades it has worked with local business and government leaders in numerous cities (e.g., Stamford, CT, Downtown Brooklyn, NY, Bridgeport, CT, New Brunswick, NJ, Paterson, NJ, Jamaica Center, NY) to devise and implement downtown revitalization strategies.

Regional Plan quickly found that crime and the fear of crime can be a major barrier to downtown revitalization. A 1984 survey of 47 major corporations headquartered in Manhattann showed that safety and security of the area surrounding potential sites was the third ranking criteria in back office locational decisions. And in other discussions with corporate leaders, Regional Plan heard that the fear of crime made many downtowns undesirable places to locate their new office or retail facilities.

In 1984 Regional Plan initiated the Downtown Safety, Security and Economic Development Program to combat this problem. Focusing at first on three downtowns in the outer boroughs of New York City, evidence drawn from surveys of trade area residents and downtown merchants, police records, interviews with key corporate executives and security directors, office worker focus sessions and countless days of field observation was analyzed to learn precisely how crime works to dampen downtown economic growth. Downtowns across the nation were then surveyed to find programs capable of weakening the negative affects of crime on downtown development. The results of this research were then used to assist task forces in Downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica Center to formulate and implement image enhancement programs.

Regional Plan's research indicates that the fear of crime makes people hesitant to walk on downtown streets, thus impeding development by reducing the number of downtown activities they will engage in. Our research also indicates that the fear of crime downtown, which is often exaggerated, can be reduced by dense, compact, multi-use development as well as by police patrol tactics that emphasize citizen contact and the control of quality of life crimes.

II. HOW CRIME THWARTS DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT

10

<u>A. How A Successful Downtown Functions.</u> As national surveys show, the most important factors influencing where people will shop are the variety and quality of stores. Successful shopping centers, whether downtown or in the suburbs, will have a large number of shops offering name brand or specialized high quality merchandise. Successful downtowns not only provide a comparatively large and diverse shopping environment, but also opportunities for people to visit in a wide range of other destinations, e.g., restaurants, theaters, movies, lecture and concert halls, museums, hospitals, colleges, professional offices, business and government offices, sports arenas and stadiums, train and bus terminals and housing.

These "central place functions" can draw substantial numbers of people, many of whom are middle-income-- even in downtowns where the revitalization process has not yet been completed. For example, Regional Plan's 1984 trade area telephone survey showed that 47 percent of those who reported regularly visiting Jamaica Center (NY) came from households with incomes of at least \$25,000.

When people visit successful commercial areas, they tend to go to more than one "destination". A shopper visiting a department store, for instance, is also likely to shop at other stores located in the shopping mall.

Successful downtowns share this trait, but again carry it even further; visits to healthy downtowns are likely to involve not only multiple destinations but also different kinds of destinations. The office employee works downtown, but he or she can also shop, go to a restaurant, attend a concert, visit a museum or doctors office, etc. Similarly, someone coming downtown to file a legal document may also shop, dine or visit the library. A study done in Denver, for example, found that 52 percent of those shopping downtown initially came there for other reasons such as work, visiting doctors, lawyers and government offices, conducting financial transactions, going to museums, etc.[Smith, Urban Land 1972 pp3-10].

It is the ability of downtowns to generate these "multiplepurpose" trips that gives them their true competitive advantage over other types of commercial districts.

In successful downtowns, walking becomes the quickest, easiest and least expensive way to go from one downtown destination to another, and such areas are consequently characterized by heavy pedestrian traffic.

<u>B. The Fear of Crime and Actual Crime Rates</u>. Many suppose that if people fear for their personal safety while in some residential neighborhood or business district, there must be a lot of crime in that area --especially crimes involving the threat of personal violence. But evidence provided by many studies suggests that the relationship between the fear of crime and actual crime rates is very "loose" and indirect. One study, for example, found that although the objective likelihood of being robbed was 20 times greater in Washington, D.C. than in Milwaukee, the residents in Milwaukee only felt slightly safer. Another recent study concludes that:

" the patterning of fear across areas does not match the patterning of crime levels. Although some studies do find that actual victims of crime are more fearful than nonvictims, it is not the case that areas with higher crime or victimization rates have residents who are more fearful." (Taylor and Hale, 1985:4-5)

Regional Plan structured its program to deal with the fear of crime, rather than actual crime, because fear has a closer impact upon the way people act downtown and consequently on how successful the downtown will be.

<u>C. Exaggerated Perceptions of Crime.</u> Regional Plan's survey of residents in the trade areas of Downtown Brooklyn, Fordham Road and Jamaica Center found (see Tables 1 and 2) that the perceived level of crime among trade area residents can be demonstrated to be substantially exaggerated. Table 2 demonstrates that 70 percent of the respondents had estimates of the number of street robberies in Jamaica Center that were between 2 and 7 times higher than a very conservative estimate

Table 1. RPA Estimate of Average Number of Street Robberies in Jamaica Center in 1983 Based On Police Reports And Compensating For Unreported Incidents Compared to Estimates Made by Trade Area Residents in June 1984

Average number of street robberies reported to the police per day	1.78
Estimated number of street robberies not reported to police each day	1.78
Estimated number of total street robberies each day in Jamaica	3.55

Table 2. Number of Street Robberies Per Day as Estimated by Jamaica Center Trade Area Residents in June 1984

Number of	street		
robberies	1		Percent
0			2.2
5			25.2
10			23.7
15			8.9
20			17.8
25			9.6
30			4.4
35			8.1
		Total	%=100

N=135


based on actual police department records. Fifty percent had estimates that were between 3 and 7 times higher than RPA's conservative estimate. The analysis of data from Downtown Brooklyn yielded almost exactly identical results; we did not have the appropriate information to replicate the analysis for Fordham Road.

<u>D. Fear and Visitation Rates.</u> Conventional wisdom holds that the fear of crime keeps people, especially the respectable middle class, from visiting downtowns. Thus, in many downtowns we visited during the course of this project, leaders were intent on devising anti-crime programs aimed at drawing new "traffic" downtown.


Regional Plan's trade area telephone surveys indicate, however, that the downtowns in our study were already drawing substantial traffic from their trade areas. Respondents were asked whether they visited their borough downtowns at least once a week, once a month, once in a while or never. As can be seen in Figure 1, in each trade area only between 20 percent (Brooklyn) and 30 percent (Fordham Road) report never going to their downtown. And overall among the "visitors", there is almost an even division between those who visit regularly on a weekly or monthly basis (38 percent) and those who just visit once in a while (37 percent).

Figure 2 shows that the vast majority of those from households with annual incomes in excess of \$25,000 visit their downtowns, although trade area residents with lower incomes are more likely to be visitors and to visit more often.

Regional Plan conducted a type of statistical analysis capable of showing the comparative impacts of the fear of crime and such other factors as the ease of getting downtown, the type Figure 1. Downtown Visitation in Three Outer Borough Downtowns



Visitation Frequency



of merchandise to be found there, the attractiveness of the downtown and the race of the respondent on downtown visitation. As Table 3 shows, the fear of crime is the strongest of a number of factors deterring the 25 percent of the respondents who never visit their downtowns, but only by a relatively narrow margin (look at the values of the partial correlations).

When we look at the majority of trade areas residents, the 75 percent who at one time or another visit their borough downtowns, and try to find out why some will visit with some regularity and others less frequently, we find that the only statistcally significant factors are the ease of getting downtown and how attractive the downtown is perceived to be (see Table 4). The fear of crime , along with the race of the respondent and the type of merchandise expected downtown, is not associated in a statistically significant way with how often visitors go to their downtowns.

The survey also asked respondents how likely they felt someone visiting their borough downtown would be a victim of an attack or rape, street robberies or car theft. A statistical analysis showed that these perceptions of risk had little or no impact on downtown visitation.

These results were confirmed in another Regional Plan study. A survey of 1,000 households in northern New Jersey conducted in March, 1987, found that how safe people felt their local parks to be had little impact on how often they used them. This finding suggests that the link between fear and the use of public spaces may be weak in non-downtown areas as well.

While people who never visit their downtowns may indeed be fearful, it is not simply the fear that keeps them away; if people are not coming downtown it is probably also because --as Tables 3 indicates -- the downtown can not compete with other nearby locations in terms of access, attractiveness, quality and quantity of shops and offices, etc. Conversely, there is some evidence that downtowns can draw more people --even those afraid of crime-- if they can offer attractions that are unique in terms of product, service or price. For example, three of New York City's most popular restaurants are located in such highly "crimeogenic" areas as East Harlem, under the Williamsburg Bridge and the Lower East Side .

But focusing solely on those who never visit their downtown diverts attention from the issue of why growth is impeded; 70 to 80 percent of the trade area residents --including many from middle-income households-- use their downtowns, and the rate they visit is not affected by their fear of crime.

<u>E. Fear Decreases Pedestrian Activity</u>. The fear of crime stimulates those using a downtown to alter their behavior by avoiding being a pedestrian or going into particular downtown

Table 3 The Comparative Impacts of the Perceived Downtown Safety During the Day, Race, the Perceived Attractiveness of the Downtown, the Ease of Getting Downtown and the Appropriateness of Downtown Merchandise on Whether Trade Area Residents Will Visit Their Borough Downtown. (Multiple Stepwise Regression Analysis).

Variables in Equation

Dependent Variable= Visit/not visit Multiple R= .3810 Adjusted R Square= .1385 F (Eqn)= 21.951 Significance F= .0005

Variable	Beta	SE Beta	Partial corr	Sig T
Safety, day	.1793	.0453	.1713	.0001
Attractiveness	.1294	.0458	.1232	.0049
Merchandise	.1473	.0424	.1508	.0006
Race	.1376	.0437	.1369	.0018

<u>Variables Not In Equation</u> Ease of Trip

.1985

(Analysis done in 1987 on z scores of dichotomized variables)

Table 4. The Comparative Impacts of the Fear of Crime, Race, the Perceived Attractiveness of the Downtown, the Ease of Getting Downtown and the Appropriateness of Downtown Merchandise on Whether Trade Area Residents Will Visit Their Borough Downtown Regularly or Just Once In a While. (Multiple Stepwise Regression Analysis).

Variables in Equation

Dependent Variable= Visit Once A Week or Month/ Visit Once In a While Multiple R= .2620 Adjusted R Square= .0639 F (Eqn)= 14.668 Significance F= .0005

Variable	Beta	SE Beta	Partial corr	Sig T
Ease of Trip	.2049	.0486	.2068	.0000
Attractiveness	.1442	.0486	.1471	.0032
•				

Variables Not In Equation

Fear of crime						.8347
Race					•	.0533
Merchandise						.3511
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						

(Analysis conducted on z scores of dichotomized variables)

areas or being downtown at certain times. Probably the most noticeable example of of this type of behavior is the "five o'clock flight" that is found all across the country: workers and shoppers rush to be out of the downtown before dark, leaving empty sidewalks and closed shops and restaurants.

Studies have shown that the fear of crime can do more to discourage walking in urban areas than the weather, condition of the sidewalks, heavy auto traffic or pollution (Maring,1972). In one outer borough downtown, for example, 54 percent of the office workers interviewed reported avoiding walking through a park during the day that was noted for drug use and sale, even though it would be far more convenient for them to do so (Boggs, 1984).

In the same downtown hundreds of visitors a day have been observed parking in a garage, crossing the street to do business at a government office and then immediately reversing the process on their way home. A similar pattern has been noted with regard to those visiting the nearby hospital and courts.

In 1985 RPA surveyed the users of two parks located in the heart of Manhattan's midtown central business district. In Bryant Park, which is widely known for its crime problems, respondents reported that some sections were safer than others, and frequent field visits showed that office workers eat and relax in the sunnier areas of the park while drugs are used and sold in the more shaded and harder to observe areas

The net result of all of these forms of avoidance behavior is far fewer pedestrians -- especially those that are respectable and law-abiding. And reduced pedestrian activity tends to confine downtown trips to a single purpose, thus impeding the downtown's ability to fully benefit from the substantial traffic it has already attracted.

III. WHAT MAKES PEOPLE AFRAID DOWNTOWN?

<u>A. Who Will Be There?</u> Regional Plan's 1984 trade area telephone surveys showed that how safe people feel in their downtown during the day is most influenced by the probability of finding the type of people they like to be with if they shopped downtown. (See Table 5). This finding is consistent with the "fear of strangers" theory which holds that people dissimilar to ourselves stimulate fear because we do not know what to expect of their behavior. For example, it has been found that perceived social similarity among neighborhood residents decreases the fear of crime (Kennedy and Silverman 1985; Skogan <u>et al</u> 1982).

<u>Table 5</u>. Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Perceptions of Downtown Safety and General Attitudes Towards the Downtown, Physical and Behavioral Signs of Disorder and Perceptions of Risk

	أجلهم مشقر بيهم فيهم جينك جنبنا بنبت بنبت وتنتا بتجع بنبت وتنك حيره وتنتر فكلة فيتم جلك وينه حالم وتنتا بنبته مالم عنائه ه	
A. General Attitudes	C.Perceived Risk of Specif	ic Crimes
Towards Downtown		
likelihood of .1339*	cars stolen/broken into	- 2677**
finding desired		
—	attacks, beatings, rapes	
merchandise	street robberies	1757**
how attractive .3698**		
they feel downtown	D. Demographics	
is	race	.2886**
ease of visiting .1781**	income	。1188 *
downtown	gender	.0983
likelihood of .3784**	5	
their type of	E. Behavioral Signs of Dis	order
people downtown	groups hanging out	1497**
beobre downrown		
	beggars and bag people	1531**
B. Physical Signs	drinking in public	1933 * *
of Disorder	gangs on the streets	
clean streets .2498**	drugs being used/sold	1791**
abandoned2105**	prostitutes on street	1173
buildings and		
stores		
well lit streets .0654		
broken windows1941**		
<u>graffiti</u> 1932**		

*Two-tailed significance = .01
**Two-tailed significance =.001
1987 analysis using z-scores_of_dichotomous_variables

<u>B. Attractiveness</u>. The second most influential factor Regional Plan found on downtown levels of fear is how attractive, overall, the downtown is perceived to be compared to other shopping areas that respondents use. (See Table 5). Far less important in explaining downtown fear are such particular aspects of its appearance as how clean the streets are, the presence of abandoned structures, how well the streets are lit or the presence of broken windows or graffiti. For example, the strongest of these, street cleanliness, has less than one half of the statistical explanatory power of how attractive overall a downtown is perceived to be on levels of downtown fear.

<u>C. Signs of Disorder</u>. Our trade area survey also revealed that people are much more likely to feel that they will be victims of street robberies and violence in downtowns where they perceive a lot of drug use and sale, prostitution and gangs hanging out on the streets (see Table 6). Such behavior downtown appears to communicate to the observing public a very important message: the authorities are not maintaining order here, this is a dangerous place. And the public, in this regard, displays good sense; a recent study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice confirms that drug users are more apt to be criminals and commit many more crimes than non-drug users.

Physical signs of decay and neglect such as broken windows, abandoned buildings, graffiti, poor lighting and dirty streets do not appear to be as strong indicators of a risky downtown environment as the "behavioral signs of disorder".

Table 6. Strength of Assoc					
Physical and Behavioral Sign	s of Disor	der and Exp	ectations		
About Certain Crimes (Pearso	n Correlat	ion Coeffic	ients)		

" Specific Crimes					
	•		Str.Robberies		
		•			
Signs of Disorder					
A. Physical					
Street Cleanliness	1532**	1991**	1458*		
Abandoned stores					
and buildings	.2456**	.2341**	.1418*		
Street lighting	2036**	1901**	1381		
Broken Windows	.2277**	.2872**	.1493*		
Graffiti	.1953≭≭	.2376**	.1333*		
B. Behavioral					
Groups hanging out	.2465**	.2717**	.2692**		
Beggars & bag people	.1646**	.2637**	.2161**		
Public drinking	.2891**				
Gangs on street	.2138=*				
Drug use and sale	.3225**				
Prostitution	.2263**	· •	.1281		

,

* Two-tailed significance= .01
** Two-tailed significance= .001
1987 analysis

IV. OVERCOMING THE FEAR OF CRIME AMONG DOWNTOWN USERS.

<u>A. Organize to Formulate and Implement A Downtown Security</u> <u>Program.</u> First create a Downtown Security Task Force with the mission of reducing the fear of crime and, to a lessor degree, helping to reduce the levels of crime.

An effective task force will require:

--a strong, prestigious chairperson --representation from key downtown organizations --appropriate technical and administrative support.

While a close working relationship between the task force and the police should be established as soon as possible, the police should not become task force members until the implementation stage of task force activities.

The task force will need appropriate information from police crime records and surveys of downtown users and trade area residents to identify security problems and establish priorities.

A key criterion in establishing priorities should be not just the severity of a security problem, but more importantly, its impact on the economic and social operation of the downtown.

Once the task force's agenda has been set through the initial needs assessment/priority-setting process, it can begin to work on developing solutions by forming subcommittees to handle specific subject areas. Each subcommittee should have its own chairperson, backed by appropriate administrative and technical support personnel.

Experience on the Downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica Center security task forces indicates that participation will diminish if meeting notices and agendas are not sent out in a timely fashion and if the chairpersons do not really have a clear idea of what is to be done. Conversely, participation and enthusiasm can be kindled by handing out reasonable "assignments" to task force members.

A plan collecting dust on a shelf is useless, if not wasteful. It is essential that the task force consider implementation factors for each recommendation it reviews, e.g., costs, political feasibility, timing, etc.

A security task force's report will stand little chance of being implemented if it is not formally adopted by an effective organization that is charged with the responsibility of "managing the downtown". A report will also stand little chance of implementation if sufficient funding is not available. An increasingly popular strategy for improving downtown management and raising funds for downtown programs is the creation of special downtown assessment districts. These areas are geographically defined parts of the downtown, usually including the commercial core, in which special tax assessments are levied to pay for additional municipal services, e.g., sanitation, parking, planning, sewage, police, etc. Cities of all sizes are forming them, including New Orleans, Tulsa, Downtown Brooklyn, Jamaica Center, Denver, Charlotte, Winchester (VA), Allentown (PA) and several smaller towns in North Carolina--one with a population of 7,800 (Milder, 1979).

Downtowns that have special assessment districts appear more likely to have strong downtown organizations.

A downtown lacking a strong organization and/or a special assessment district should probably consider addressing those problems before undertaking a downtown security program.


Downtown Security Briefing Papers available from Regional Plan are meant to support and facilitate task force deliberations by identifying and describing relevant solution options. They are best used if distributed at least one week prior to the appropriate task force meetings. Some of the information contained in these Briefing Papers is described in the following sections.

<u>B. Create A Dense, Compact, Multi-Function Core Area.</u> A downtown can be designed and developed to make people feel that it --or a significant portion of it - is attractive and the type of place that "respectable people" such as themselves are likely to visit. Once established, this core area can be the fulcrum for future expansion and improvement of the downtown's security image.

A core downtown area that is compact, densely developed and multi-functional will concentrate people, giving them more things to do, shorten distances between potential pedestrian destinations and, consequently, generate heightened pedestrian flows. The activities located in this core area will influence the "type" of people that will stroll along its sidewalks; by locating offices and middle- and upper-income housing in or near the core area one can assure that there will be a high percentage of "respectable," law-abiding pedestrians.

Such an attractive redeveloped core area would also be sufficiently large to impact upon the downtown's overall image.

The length of pedestrian trips in Manhattan's central business districts are about two times longer than in other downtowns, yet the median length of Manhattan shopping trips is



Jamaica Center is an emerging dense, compact, multifunctional core area in New York City.

only about 1200 feet; 75 percent of all pedestrian trips are under 2000 feet. This finding suggests that the diameter of a downtown core area should usually be well under one half mile.

What is emerging in Jamaica Center, NY is a good example of a dense, compact, multi-function core area (see Map 1). When development now under construction is completed in 1988 there will be within a 1,200 foot radius of the key intersection at Jamaica Avenue and Parsons Boulevard:

--7,000 office workers and 1.6 million square feet of new or rehabilitated office space with cleared, assembled sites for 1.4 million square feet of additional office space;

--a new subway station;

--the new campus of York College with its 4,500 students and 650 faculty and staff members;

--the Family Court;

--a 650 car garage;

-- the Jamaica Arts Center;

--a completely refurbished Rufus King Historical Mansion and Park;

--the YMCA;

--several historic churches;

--90,000 square feet of new or recently renovated retail space including a new Farmers Market similar to the Reading Market in Philadelphia;

--a hospital with 1,400 doctors and nurses on staff; --numerous renovated apartment buildings, many of which have been co-oped.

<u>C. Housing and Mixed-Use Development</u>. Mixed use developments have a variety of pedestrian traffic generators that have different periods of high activity. Residential peaks, for example, tend to occur with the surges of people returning home between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, a time by which most of the pedestrian activity in office buildings is over. More middle- and upper-income housing can possibly alleviate the frequent problem of workers becoming afraid as they leave their offices after the evening rush when downtown streets often seem to be deserted and threatening.

Restaurants can attract substantial traffic until 8:00 or 9:00 in the evening, but they need a reliable base of customers to stay open that late. Downtown workers may give local restaurants a hefty lunchtime trade, but not enough business for the restaurants to stay open in the evening. Residential customers can make staying open evenings economically viable.

<u>D. Off-Street Networks</u>? Through the use of overstreet bridges, often enclosed, and/or understreet tunnels, off-street networks in over 30 North American cities have linked together office buildings, retail stores, boutiques, department stores, restaurants, convention centers, hotels, apartment buildings and railway stations. Some get as large as 38 overstreet bridges and 5 miles of walkways. They have few pedestrian entrances to the street. They are often built to increase the ability of retailers to capture the retail dollars of downtown workers (Milder, 1985).

These networks can reduce pedestrian flows on downtown sidewalks, which in turn can make people more fearful to be "outside". They can also reduce the customer traffic of nonnetwork shops; a study of the impact of the off-street retailing network in Charlotte showed that 40 percent of the "on-street" merchants felt the network had hurt their businesses by taking away their clientele (Milder, 1979:4).

Some critics argue against these off-street networks on the grounds that they take pedestrians off the streets and represent a very non-traditional type of downtown in which the "automobile is victorious." Yet it must be noted that these networks do encourage pedestrian flows and multiple destination/multiple purpose downtown trips, the very things that make a downtown competitive, interesting and successful. As one developer in Charlotte put it: "the Overstreet Mall is Main Street Charlotte."

<u>E. Foot Patrols</u>. Downtowns are increasingly using foot patrols to make user populations feel more secure during the day. Such patrols are now being used, for example, in Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleveland, Downtown Brooklyn, Jamaica Center (NY). (See photo of foot patrolman in Jamaica.)

Interest in foot patrols derives from the findings of two systematic studies of neighborhood programs in Flint, Michigan and Newark, New Jersey (see Kelling et al, 1981 and Trojanowicz et al, 1983). These evaluations demonstrated that while foot patrols may not have reduced crime rates, they did:

--make local residents believe that crime rates had been reduced;

--stimulate local residents to feel more secure;

--generate very strong support from local merchants; --generate more favorable opinions of police performance among local residents;

--reduce previous discrepancies in the evaluations among blacks and whites of overall police performance;

--generate strong support across racial lines for the foot patrol program in particular.

Kelling and Wilson argue that foot patrols work because "they elevate the level of public order" and address two of the primary fears of urban pedestrians: the fear of being suddenly and violently attacked by a stranger and the fear of being bothered by disorderly people such as panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers and the mentally disturbed (1982:29-30). The foot patrolman keeps an eye on strangers and makes certain that the "disreputables" obey some informal, but widely understood rules. By setting and enforcing this set of rules the foot patrolman creates a sense of public order on his beat.

Reiss' research in Oakland found that downtown foot patrol officers made an impressive number of "soft" crime (quality-oflife) arrests (1984:36). Field interviews with large employers and retailers in downtown Oakland, where there is not a great number of office workers, indicate that the foot patrols have made office employees feel more secure and have increased their noon time pedestrian activities.

The Jamaica Center Security Task Force's experience strongly suggests that if foot patrols are to effectively stimulate people to use their downtown in ways conducive to its growth, then business leaders must be able to communicate often with police leaders and influence how some of the patrols are deployed.

The Jamaica experience also confirms the need reported in other research for consistent, sufficient support and proper training in downtown foot patrol programs. People must come to expect a foot patroller to be in the area and come to know the individual on patrol. To reduce fears, local residents must come to believe in the reliability of the patrol and their ability to depend on it. They must also come to trust the individual on patrol; the policeman may be walking his beat, but if residents do not trust and like him he may do little to reduce their fears.

In some departments foot patrols may be instituted, but only weakly or inadequately supported within the decision-making structure. This situation can both dissuade able persons from pursing a foot patrol career path and diminish the actual support a foot patrol person will get in the field.

A foot patrolman needs to have certain interpersonal skills and adequate training about the foot patrol program and his role within it. In one city Regional Plan visited, foot patrolmen were being placed in the field without any adequate training about their roles and how to interact with local residents and businessmen; a local nonprofit group has had to develop a program to overcome this shortcoming. A foot patrolman who can not work or get along with the people on his beat, either because of a lack of training or inappropriate personality traits, will not be successful.

<u>F. Mounted Patrols.</u> To increase the visibility of police officers in crowded downtowns as well as to reduce the fears of downtown pedestrians, cities are increasingly using "ten-foot cops", i.e. mounted patrols. During site visits to Atlanta, Cleveland and Oakland, merchants, corporate executives and police officials expressed positive attitudes toward horse patrols, maintaining that besides making people feel more secure they also help improve relations between police and downtown users. One of the first actions taken by the Jamaica task force was to help the Chamber of Commerce donate two horses to the NYPD for use as mounted patrols in Jamaica Center.

<u>G. Using Assessment Districts to Increase Police Manpower</u>. In Denver, Tulsa and New Orleans, revenues generated by special downtown assessment districts are paid to the city in return for additional police officers. In Denver, the district's management corporation contracts with the city for 10 additional officers and a supervising sergeant for its "Mall Patrol". In New Orleans, part of the district's revenue is used to provide 13 additional officers and a sergeant. In Jamaica Center, revenues are used to fund "information officers" on downtown streets. Dressed in blazers, these officers engage in many traditional private security functions.

<u>H. Problem Users</u>. Downtowns, especially those in decline, often attract types of people who --because of the way they act or appear-- make other downtown users feel uncomfortable. As RPA's survey showed, for example, drug users, prostitutes and gangs hanging out on downtown streets make other users feel the area is a risky place to be in. Dealing with some of these problem user groups such as "street people" and teenagers is frequently difficult because they are usually innocent of any crime and are often the victims of larger societal problems that are well beyond the abilities of any one downtown to resolve.

While the vast majority of teenagers are innocent and law abiding, they are the age group most likely to engage in criminal activities; many downtown stores report that teenagers are responsible for most shoplifting. For example, one recent study estimates that roughly one quarter of all income of inner city youths comes from criminal activities (Viscusi 1986:322) In addition, in their youthful exhuberance teenagers often go downtown in groups -- a tendency often reinforced by the downtown's role as a major bus transfer point for students on their way home. While this "congregating" may be entirely playful and innocent, it often makes other downtown users , especially the elderly, feel afraid. Some downtowns report that groups of as large as 300 teenagers have have disturbed pedestrians and disrupted nearby retailing on afternoons after school.

Another frequent problem group in downtowns is the "street people". This group, at times addicted to alcohol or drugs or mentally disoriented, can threaten other users by activities ranging from public drunkeness to aggressive panhandling to urinating in public. They also can be the source of more serious downtown crimes: the police in Charlotte report that the vast majority of street robberies and assaults in the central business district is caused by "derelicts". Yet many "street people" today are probably neither addicts nor mentally ill, but the victims of

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unemployment who can no longer afford the increasing costs of housing.

While dealing with these problem groups is often complicated by complex legal issues and the large amounts of resources that may be required, some downtown organizations have developed effective programs.

Street People. In New Orleans, \$30,000 of the funds raised by the downtown's special assessment district is used to support the activities of the city's alcoholic detoxification center in the doowntown area: In Tulsa, the HOW Foundation, sponsored by the City of Tulsa and the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, receives contracts for cleaning up the downtown while providing work for alcoholics, drug abusers and the unemployed. Participants in this voluntary program are provided with housing, food, clothing, medical care and stipends. Local officals claim that it has reduced the number of street people downtown by 70 percent.

Prostitutes. Prostitution was a major problem in the neighborhood business district of the Whittier area of Minneapolis. The Whittier Alliance, a community development organization, formulated an effective program to deal with it. Off-duty Minneapolis policemen were hired to patrol the area at key hours and the Alliance makes public the names of those arrested for using the local prostitutes (the "johns").

Teenagers. One of the prime reasons that youths litter, loiter and congregate in ways threatening to other downtown users is that they are often truants. The Oakland Police Department, in conjunction with the Oakland Unified Public School District, created a truancy reduction program that is both effective in controlling teenage behavior downtown and popular with parents in the community. Next to the foot patrol program, the truancy program is said to be the biggest reason for a substantial reduction of quality-of-life crime in downtown Oakland.

To deal with a serious problem of teenagers "hanging out" on the privately owned overstreet walkway system in Cincinnati, the Police Department, in conjunction with the Citizens Committee on Youth, developed a program that included stricter enforcement of existing ordinances, altering the use of bus passes so as to reduce the length of time students could stay downtown and the use of local sports stars to approach the kids in a friendly manner and explain why they can not hang out on the walkways.

As part of an experimental fear reduction program in Newark the police department arranged to have local schools kept open after hours for sports activities, counseling and classes in photography, crafts and design. Unfortunately, these elements of the fear reduction program were implemented too late to be covered by the program's evaluation. Few business district organizations have ventured into this type of program beacuse of the resources required and the uncertainty of the benefits. The Whittier Alliance's attempts in this area are fairly unique and instructive. It runs an odd-jobs placement program for area teenagers as well as a recreation program that uses public facilities. However, only a limited number of teenagers participate in these programs. Furthermore, there is no indication that these programs are targeted to those youths who are prone to engage in criminal activities.

Also, a study in New York City by the Vera Institute (1985), indicates that employment is not likely to substantially alter the criminal activities of youth until they are almost out of their teenage years. But the Downtown Brooklyn Enhancements Task Force concluded that the value of teenage employment and recreation programs may not rest simply on their abilities to reduce criminal behaviors; they would still be of considerable value if they could provide opportunities sufficiently positive and rewarding to divert local teenagers from hanging out downtown. The difficulty is for a downtown organization to be able either to design a well-targeted program or to raise the resources required by a more diffuse effort.

V. IMPROVING THE DOWNTOWN'S IMAGE AMONG NON-USERS

<u>A. The Challenge.</u> In almost every city Regional Plan contacted during the course of this project, complaints were voiced about the downtown's image as a safe and interesting place to work, shop or reside. The perceived consequences of this image problem were the rejection of the downtown by many middle income shoppers and the refusal of many large firms to consider downtown office and retail locations. These groups are "non-users" who seldom if ever visit downtown and consequently have no personal experiences to influence their image of the area. The fear reduction measures discussed above will be incapable of altering the downtown's image among non-users.

One of the accompanying laments concerns the behavior of the local media which are seen as reporting only the bad things happening downtown and doing so in an extremely distorted manner. The major responsibility for the downtown's undesirable safety image is often placed squarely at the door of the local media. Some downtown organization have tried to develop special programs to increase communications with local reporters and editors and to get them to improve their "understanding" of the area. The reported results of these efforts have not been entirely positive and some hidden costs were revealed; the media can demand such a degree of "coming clean" and avoidance of hyperbole that the downtown organization's public relations efforts are weakened.

<u>B. The Impact of the Media</u>. Research does show that the coverage of local violence --especially homicides-- by television and newspapers is frequent, consistent, and distorted (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981:142). Studies have shown newspaper coverage of local crime to be highly distorted "with respect to the relative frequency of different types of offenses and the locations of those crimes" (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981:130). Television coverage has been shown to over-represent whites as murder victims and the number of premeditated crimes, while underrepresenting the amount of intrafamily violence (Dominick, 1973).

While local leaders may be correct in suspecting that media coverage of downtown crime has definite biases, it still does not mean that this coverage --biased or not-- increases fear. And there is substantial evidence that it does not. Regional Plan's interviews in downtowns all across the country suggest that many downtown leaders have been diverted from effectively dealing with the "safety image" problem because of an incorrect analysis of how such an image is established.

<u>C. How A Downtown Image Is Established</u>. One astute student of the processes involved in downtown decline during the post World War II years noted that:

"Fear was fed ... by the network of regular [downtown] workers who passed information on victimization by crime.... Visitors often were cautioned against going about on foot, becoming prisoners of their hotels and hostelries" (Reiss,1985:3).

Downtown retailers, managers and office workers --indeed, anyone who visits the downtown on some consistent basis--can play key roles in establishing its safety image through their conversations with other people (in and out of the downtown). This point is supported by one of Regional Plan's trade area surveys. Table 3 shows that although residents in Downtown Brooklyn's trade area were more apt to receive crime related information about the downtown from the media, it is what they heard from their friends, relatives and neighbors that affected their perceptions of risk and danger there.

Looking at the media and personal conversations as possible sources of messages about crime in an area and their relative impacts on levels of fear, Skogan and Maxfield report:

"We find no discernible impact of the media, but [personal conversations] carried news of great significance to those we interviewed....

"Conversation about crime is... fear provoking. And unlike direct experience with crime, the secondhand information about crime that flows through the networks of interpersonal communication is not a rare event. Talk magnifies the importance of each local incident. Our analysis also documented that talk about crime spreads news widely in low crime neighborhoods as well as in high crime neighborhoods. Thus it accounts for the fears of people who live in areas where the actual incidence of personal crime is relatively low." (1982:260)

Based on these research findings it is possible to summarize in the following terms the way a downtown's safety and security image is created and disseminated:

Downtown Users: their image is created by what and who they see while downtown as well as by what they hear from downtown coworkers, fellow students, shopkeepers, etc.

Non-Users: their image will be most strongly influenced by what they hear through their informal, personal communication networks of friends, neighbors and relatives who do use the downtown.

D. Formulating A Strategy To Improve A Downtown's Safety <u>Image</u>. The formulation of a viable strategy to improve a downtown's image requires answers to three key questions:

-- which groups of people do you want to reach?

-- what messages should they be given or sent?

-- how are the messages going to be communicated to the targeted groups?

Target Groups. Ultimately, a downtown will want to improve its image among important non-users who are generally the middle and upper income groups throughout the surrounding trade area, and then among more specific groups of corporate investors, office and retail locators. But the above analysis suggests that, more immediately, current middle and upper income downtown users should be targeted, e.g., downtown corporate managers and office workers, retailers, university students, professionals, subscribers to downtown cultural events, etc.

Messages. Our research found that people who felt that a downtown was attractive or that they were likely to "meet their type of people" shopping there were more likely to feel that the downtown was safe compared to other shopping areas. Research has also found that people who believe that neighborhood conditions are improving or who are optimistic about its future are less likely to be fearful (Taub <u>et al</u> 1984; Skogan <u>et al</u> 1982:112-113).

Similarly, research has demonstrated that having a lot of very attractive things to buy or do can raise thresholds of fear (Taub et al 1984) and bring people downtown.

These findings suggest that information should be disseminated to demonstrate:

--that the downtown is getting increasingly attractive; e.g., show in photographs, slides or video tape new and charming parts of the downtown; but, only show facilities that are either under construction or already built -ignore "plans".

--that more and more middle-income people are coming downtown and that it is surrounded by middle income neighborhoods; e.g., mention the number of students and office workers who are already there and the thousands that will be there with the completion of projects now underway. Show visuals to reinforce the numbers. Stress the solidly middle-income residential areas abutting the downtown, showing visuals of attractive homes and statistics about household incomes and the cost of homes.

--that the downtown's future will be improving; e.g., by showing actual projects under construction and a list of major firms that are now committed to the downtown.

--that the downtown has museums, legitimate theaters, restaurants, boutiques, historic sites, etc., which are unique within the region.

Crime Statistics. A recent evaluation of experimental newsletter projects in Evanston (IL), Newark and Houston has found that disseminating crime statistics for a particular area, such as the neighborhood in which the person resides, will not increase fear levels and under some circumstances may even reduce them (Lavrakas 1986).

However, in many other instances, the use of crime statistics can involve a downtown organization in a morass from which extrication is difficult. This situation usually develops when a corporation looking at downtown space asks for <u>comparative</u> crime statistics.

Comparitive crime rates are usually computed on the basis of the number of crimes per 100,000 residents rather than "users" of an area. But how does one compare a downtown with another downtown or residential area when most downtown users are not residents? For example, roughly estimated, there are about 5,000 people who live in Downtown Brooklyn and somewhere in the vicinity of 150,000 who visit it for, one reason or another everyday. However, the estimate of daily visitors will have a considerable error factor associated with it. Moreover, many downtown visitors are transients; the 150,000 who use it on Monday will not be the same who visit on Tuesday or Thursday or next week, etc. Although roughly 150,000 may come every day, perhaps 500,000 will come over a year and the number of times they come will itself vary. Thus, although it is possible to ascertain the absolute number of crimes occurring in a downtown, it is extremely difficult to calculate its crime rate.

Getting The Messages To The Target Groups. Downtown safety images are a function both of what the person sees and what he or she hears from co-workers and friends, so public information campaigns are also necessary. Information campaigns during the early stages of revitalization may quicken changes in image by making downtowners more aware of what is really happening. In many downtowns, where trips are primarily focused on a single destination, numerous visitors may only be familiar with what is happening in the small portion of the downtown they use. And, unless told, some downtowners will not know, in development terms, whether they are looking at a pile of ice or the tip of an ice berg.

Below are descriptions of some programs recommended by the security task forces in Jamaica Center and Downtown Brooklyn to get key safety and security related information to various downtown user groups.

Downtown Office Worker Booster Groups. Both task forces have recommended the creation of downtown booster groups patterned after the "UpDowntowner" organizations that have become so popular and effective in Cincinnati and Columbus (OH). The Updowntowners in those cities draw their memberships from single, downtown office workers who meet once a month at a function where they have a chance to meet each other over drinks as well as to conduct more "official" downtown business such as planning for carrying out major downtown events. Members tend to be young professionals and are encouraged to join by their employers who indicate that participation in the organization will be a positive factor in their annual reviews. But reports indicate that the social incentives of possibly meeting attractive members of the opposite sex in a "non-meatmarket", or singles bar type setting, may be even stronger in stimulating participation and interest. It only takes an estimated \$5,000 to \$10,000 to get such an organization started after which it is financially selfsustaining. It is so popular in Cincinnati that there is a reported membership waiting list of 400 names.

In Jamaica and Downtown Brooklyn, the downtown development organization will provide suitable safety related information at each booster club meeting, which the members will then be expected to communicate to their colleagues at work and their friends, relatives and neighbors outside of the downtown.

Downtown Newsletters. Jamaica Center and Downtown Brooklyn plan to join the ranks of downtowns that distribute a newsletter to downtown workers. Some individuals will receive them, fully addressed, through the US Mail; others will receive them unaddressed through normal corporate mail channels. The booster clubs will help put the newsletters together, working with the local chamber of commerce.

Articles in University Student Papers. There are four major institutions of higher learning and 18,000 full time students in Downtown Brooklyn. The task force recommended that the Downtown Brooklyn Development Association prepare a column on what is happening downtown to be published in the local college papers.

The Brooklyn Academy of Music Audiences. The audiences at BAM events are often among the most prestigious and "wellconnected" of any of Downtown Brooklyn's visitors. Models of important projects that will soon be under construction, especially those near to BAM, will be placed for viewing in the BAM foyer. The Downtown Brooklyn Development Association will also prepare materials about new things to do and see in Downtown Brooklyn that BAM can distribute in its normal mailings to susberibers.