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COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CONTROL

109372

HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 6, 1987

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HEARING ON COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CONTROL

WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1987

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:50 a.m., in room R-2257 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Charles B. Rangel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Mr. Charles B. Rangel, Chairman; Mr. Benjamin A. Gilman, Ranking Minority Member; Mr. William J. Hughes; Mr. Michael G. Oxley; Mr. Robert K. Dornan; and Mr. James Sensenbrenner.

Staff present: Mr. Edward Jurith, Staff Director; Mr. Elliott Brown, Minority Staff Director; Mr. George Gilbert, Counsel; Mr. Michael Kelley, Counsel; Ms. Rebecca Hedlund, Majority Staff Assistant; Mr. James Lawrence, Minority Staff Assistant; and Mr. John T. Cusack, Consultant.

Mr. RANGEL. The Committee will now come to order.

We are honored and pleased to have Ann Wroblewski, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotic Matters.

We've had several oversight hearings dealing with international narcotics control and I guess we will not be asking for an overview today. One of the reasons, Madam Secretary, that we are having this hearing is that the Committee at one point was planning a field trip to South America in connection with the cocaine problem and then the Speaker invited Congressman Gilman and I, as you well know, to participate in the Andean Conference and out of that the Presidents of the Andean Nations had hoped that our President might participate in a summit meeting.

Congressman Ben Gilman and I expanded on that by hoping he might even have a summit meeting for the entire hemisphere.

In any event, since the conference that we attended on behalf of the House of Representatives was held in Colombia, we took advantage of the opportunity and met with President Barco.

We left there with the impression that no drug trafficker was or has been in a long time prosecuted in the civil courts because of intimidation of the judiciary. We then asked the President was it true that as a result of a Supreme Court decision that the military could not try these Colombian drug traffickers. He said that was so. We then asked was it true that the Supreme Court had struck down the enabling clause to the extradition treaty and that we should not expect that the drug traffickers would be extradited?

He said it was true then, but they were trying to work on a solution to the problem. We then asked whether it was true that the processing plants were located in so-called FARC territory or rebel territory or people who were attempting to overthrow the Colombian government and he said yes.

And we asked whether those processing plants had been identified. He said yes. We asked whether or not it was a cease fire or truce, there's some question as to the language. They were very sensitive to it.

What was it truce or cease fire?

Mr. JURTH. Truce.

Mr. RANGEL. Whether or not the truce that they had entered in with the FARC had prevented them from fulfilling their national mandate to destroy the cocaine producing labs and he said if that was so, he would look into it because he had hoped that the truce would not be a cover for the failure of their law enforcement efforts to destroy the laboratories.

We then met with Peruvian and Bolivian legislators and we were thoroughly convinced that in every cocaine producing country that we would expect bumper crops, notwithstanding the cooperation that we hear we're getting from the Colombians or are, in fact, getting from the Colombians, that not one leaf of coca has been destroyed under eradication in Colombia, even though they were doing something with marijuana. The Bolivian government had not even banned the growing of coca until such time as they concluded negotiations for how much we're going to pay them for eradication. The Peruvians were watching to see what we give the Bolivians before there would be any efforts made in that area.

We left rather disappointed and we met with House Speaker Jim Wright. The Speaker joined us in asking the President to participate in the leadership effort in this part of the world to see what answers we can develop to encourage and support any eradication efforts and interdiction efforts in the United States.

We have read in the newspapers that the President is entertaining doing those things and so the reason I have such a long opening statement is because basically, I'm including the questions that I would normally ask and if, in the course of your opening statement; Ms. Wroblewski, you could respond to the reasons that we're having the hearings, then it would be enlightening to all of us and we thank you for being with us.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My Bureau has provided the Select Committee with a prepared statement, which I will not read, which we encourage you to keep as a background paper for your trip to Colombia this summer.

You and I both have made recent trips to Colombia and I think it would be appropriate to start this hearing by commending President Barco and his administration for the determination and the physical courage to continue the Colombian antinarcotics campaign.

As we reported in March, Colombia, in 1986, destroyed an estimated 69 to 75% of its marijuana crop through its herbicidal eradication program. In recent months we have seen an important new command level created for the Colombian national police and every

assurance that the commendable work of SANU and SAPO forces will continue.

I note that police raided 28 coca paste and base labs in the first two months of this year. Plans for 1987 include intensified efforts to stop coca paste from Bolivia and Peru, as well as chemicals from entering Colombia, which remains the major cocaine processing center in the world.

Six traffickers were extradited in 1986 despite the extradition treaty's political unpopularity and the threat of trafficker violence.

The extradition process reached a new dimension earlier this year when President Barco re-affirmed the treaty and Colombia then arrested and extradited cocaine kingpin Carlos Lehder.

All of these developments and program achievements are important, but the program prospects for 1987 are truly encouraging. As I contemplate your return to Colombia this summer, of all of the aspects of the anti-narcotics campaign that impressed me, none is more profound than the reality that Colombia is indeed in a war with the traffickers.

That phrase war on drugs, has been used so often it has almost lost its meaning. But in Colombia, perhaps unlike any other nation, it is a war by any definition. People die because they dare to uphold basic laws and defend essential freedoms.

The narco-traffickers and especially the Medellin cartel of which Lehder was a principal engaged ruthlessly in message sending revenge. The assassinations of Supreme Court justices, ministers, prominent journalists, police commanders and others are part of a sinister campaign of fear intended to drive public service away from the edge of a decision.

Recently, the Miami Herald ran a series of articles on the Medellin Cartel, the brutal mafia that controls the violent Colombian cocaine underworld. The authors tie the Cartel to the deaths of nearly thirty judges, a cabinet minister, the editor of Colombia's second most influential newspaper and hundreds of police officers and informants.

The article stated:

The Cartel once offered the Colombian government a deal promising to stop its activities in return for amnesty. The Cartel was powerful to enlist a former Colombian President to carry its messages. This, after the serving President, President Betancur, granted the Cartel enemies of humanity.

In the United States that would be the equivalent of former President Nixon negotiating with the murders of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and three other Supreme Court Justices, Attorney General Edwin Meese, Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradley and 500 Chicago police officers.

I think this comparison puts things in some perspective. I think too often we sit in judgment on other governments without considering fully the risks associated with our expectations. With few exceptions, we come to work each day, do our jobs and have every expectation of rejoining our families in the evening, threatened by nothing more sinister than Washington's rush hour traffic.

It is not mere coincidence that in Colombia, the country where the government has done the most of any nation in South America to control narcotics trafficking, that men and women risk their lives just by attempting to do their jobs.

The campaign of terror to mold public opinion has reached a stage where editors and journalists no longer use bylines, but instead use the general close "investigative unit of the Colombian press." They're winning the battle for public opinion in Colombia and much of the hopes and prospects that you and I have for reductions in the availability of cocaine and marijuana rest on the outcome of this battle.

It's being won by men and women who are willing to stand in harms way to achieve our mutual objectives. I think sometimes we forget how high that price is when we ask others to pay it and I think that we shouldn't.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Madam Secretary, I'm going to assume that your statement was prepared for the record, because I want to join with you in saying that there probably are people and perhaps members of Congress that don't fully appreciate the risk that is involved in enforcing the laws in the democracy of Colombia, but certainly members of this Committee are aware of them.

We are so aware that Congressman Ben Gilman introduced a resolution, which I cosponsored lauding the efforts of the Colombian Government for the courageous effort that they were making in this war against narcotraffickers we presented a framed copy of this to the widow of Colonel Ramirez, who gave up his life. We politically attempted and perhaps were successful in influencing the President to posthumously promote Colonel Ramirez.

Mr. John T. Cusack said that in all of his years in law enforcement, he had talked with widows of fallen law enforcement officials, but this is the first time he talked with a family that had been shot down by the narcotraffickers.

We know what's going on, and about the intimidation of Colombian journalists. We laud their efforts. We congratulate them. We tell Americans that we, too, could possibly be caught in this same thing as we find now Federal Judges and U.S. Attorneys being threatened.

I hope Ben Gilman tells you the story of how we felt when we saw this big hole in their Halls of Justice as they attempted to rescue their judges from the rebels.

Now comes the question as to whether or not the Colombian Government, before the assassination of their own people, fully realized the damage that they were causing to the world in ignoring the processing of cocaine in their country before their Attorney Generals were or Ministers of Justice were murdered.

Now comes the question as to whether or not those labs are still producing at 100% effectiveness, notwithstanding the fact that their Government is being held hostage. Now comes the question as to whether or not there's any effort being made to destroy those processing plants and if, indeed, Colombia now is being held hostage by drug traffickers, because of their inability to enforce the law. Should not we hear from the President of the United States on this issue?

Now, why do I say that, Madam Secretary? I say that because to me this isn't a question any longer of drug addicts and cocaine users. This is a question of our national security.

Ben Gilman says it far more eloquently than I, but you did this same thing in comparing the Nixon and the Chicago police. He says how would we feel as members of Congress and we were talking to members of the Colombian Parliament, to see United States Army tanks blowing a hole in the Supreme Court building? Would that not be concern for the world that if drug traffickers could capture the institutions of our government?

I say that it shocks me as an American citizen that you and I and this Committee would know the depths of the power of the narcotic traffickers in this part of the world and we have yet to hear from the President of the United States.

And, to my knowledge, have not heard publicly from the Secretary of State or from our Secretary of Defense on the question, not just the narcotics, but of national security.

It is my belief and maybe that of Ben Gilman that this issue strikes even in the Republic of Mexico that these people with millions of dollars have been able to influence their officials to such an extent that it may be difficult with the measures that we're using now, to overcome. So, we laud them for the courage and the lives that have been lost.

The question is, is this threat to our national security? Has the President of the United States spoken out against this type of arrogance by the drug traffickers? Has the Secretary of State publicly spoken out as we've heard him speak against communism and terrorism? Does the Secretary of Defense treat this as a threat to our national security?

And I ask that in a very general way because you're the only voice, with the exception of the First Lady, that I hear and what is more frightening is that there are people in this country that believe that I'm an expert and I don't know any more than you tell me.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think that—let me say I don't speak for the Secretary of Defense, although I certainly witnessed Secretary Weinberger, during the planning sessions for Operation Blast Furnace and when he briefed the National Drug Policy Board, and his bottom line on all of the briefings was the issue that you speak to, the national security implication of international drug trafficking and I don't for a minute doubt the Secretary of Defense's commitment.

I certainly understand and appreciate, as I'm sure you've heard him testify, to his mandate for military readiness and military preparedness and that when that coincides with or when they can be useful in other ways such as training or supplying equipment, that the Defense Department will be there.

Mr. RANGEL. If I said anything that in any remote way might infer that any citizen or member of the Cabinet or member of the administration lacks in commitment, I hope the record would reflect that that was not my intention. It's just that, Madam Secretary, I do know that Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz and the President of the United States command press attention whenever they want it.

I can't turn on the television on Sunday morning without seeing one or all of them and I think that's the way it should be. I just never heard them speak with the same urgency as I heard you

speak and in what we know that you speak the truth. I've never heard them talk about it publicly.

Now, Mr. Trott indicates that the National Drug Policy Board discussed these issues. I'm not arguing that. He says the Secretary of State and Defense, Education, Health & Human Services are cooperative. I don't deny that.

I'm just saying that you have told us that an emergency exists in Colombia. I agree. I'm asking could you share with me any public announcements by any of these people I've mentioned that support what you've said?

Ms. WROBLESKI. This is curious timing, I suppose, but the Secretary, on Monday, along with the Vice-President, publicly with press coverage spoke to the convening of our International Narcotics Coordinator's conference. Mr. Gilman spoke to us on Monday afternoon, and Mr. Gilman, at that time, asked me if I would bring the Secretary's remarks so that he could insert them into the record.

That was Monday. I don't know about you, but I didn't see any press coverage of it. It's certainly a very eloquent statement which speaks to the foreign policy and the national security considerations.

Mr. RANGEL. You know, people have said that we do these things, but it's not reported. Yesterday, Ben Gilman and I had the high honor of being with the President when he issued a statement announcing the appointment of the chairperson of the White House Conference on Drugs. This was taped live.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, sir, I was there.

Mr. RANGEL. I'm just saying that there are times when these people would want to get press coverage. I mean, these television shows that they are on, and I'm going to drop this as a line of questioning because it's not your fault. It's just that many of these shows are live. The people aren't going to edit Secretary Shultz if he wants to say at any time, you hold your point, because one of the things that you're not focusing on is what the drug traffickers are doing in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Central America. That they're working with terrorists and communists and it's a threat to our national security and the Congress has to do more in supporting the thrust of what we're trying to do.

Now, you're not saying it, but I just hope that nobody in the administration is suggesting that this type of thing has been done and that the newspaper people have edited these remarks. They don't make them.

Ms. WROBLESKI. No, that's not what I'm suggesting. I'm just pointing out that earlier this week, almost exactly 48 hours ago, the Secretary was on the record with extensive press in attendance on this issue, which I know concerns you and I share your interest in seeing consciousness raised in this country about what American drug use means overseas.

I am of the opinion and take every speaking opportunity that I'm afforded to run through and I just ran through for you on Colombia.

Mr. RANGEL. Okay.

Ms. WROBLESKI. And I know you know it and I know it.

Mr. RANGEL. And I must say, Madam Secretary, you are not getting much help from the other people that really command press attention.

Do we expect any lessening of the drugs, of the cocaine coming out of Colombia this year than last year?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think the fact that we've seen 28 labs hit in the first 60 days of this year is a good sign. I note that they seized 540 labs in all of 1986 and I hope that we're off to a good start.

Mr. RANGEL. How many labs in 1986?

Ms. WROBLESKI. In 1986, 540.

Mr. RANGEL. Why do I have four cocaine labs? What's the total number that we have in the Committee?

Ms. WROBLESKI. As we reported in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 540, and that, as you know, is an inter-agency document.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, we were under the impression that destroying labs this year is at a standstill.

Ms. WROBLESKI. The information that I show is that in the first two months of 1987, 28 laboratories were raided.

Mr. RANGEL. Okay. I guess the question is as relates to the estimates of the amount of cocaine being shipped out of Colombia, do we have any reason to believe that any less amount in our guesstimate will be shipped out in 1987 as opposed to 1986?

The reason I ask the question is because every year it appears as though the tonnage has dramatically increased.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I quite frankly don't know the answer to that question, will it numerically reduce at the end of the calendar year, I don't know. I can't tell you that if the Barco government continues its commitment, if they continue to hit the labs, if they continue to work on an integrated strategy to hit the narcos and the traffickers, if we get an herbicide that we can use against coca, will that make a difference?

Of course it will. It's made a difference in marijuana. We just need to translate it into cocaine.

Am I confident that we have their full support? Yes, but can I speak to the variables of the traffickers, of the guerrillas, of the truce, of the intimidation of the judges, I can't put a quantifier on that.

Mr. RANGEL. Madam Secretary, I've been in the Congress for 17 years. I've dealt with every administration, every Secretary of State and every State Department, and I don't recall ever having any executive official state that any government was not being cooperative in this effort.

With the exception of Cuba, it is unbelievable how cooperative foreign governments are, even the Mexicans, with our effort and each year Democrat and Republican administrations report bumper crops of cocaine and marijuana from all of these countries, but the cooperation continues. I think Bolivia may be an all time high in terms of the number of agreements that have been executed by a variety of presidents, but still the situation continues.

So, I'm with you in the upbeat feeling that if everything works the way we've promised or hoped or pray that it will, that something would happen, but the answer is that we have no reason to

suspect that there will be less cocaine coming out this year than last year.

The next question is, is anyone, any drug traffickers being prosecuted in any courts to your knowledge in Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure that I could answer that question.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, ask Rayburn.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I just don't have a sense of that. I know that the——

Mr. RANGEL. Because I understood for a long time there were no drug prosecutions.

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's what I was going to say. My historical understanding——

Mr. RANGEL. And the President said that the Supreme Court, again because of intimidation, has struck down civilians being tried by military courts. I can understand that as an American. That leaves what in Colombia? Nothing.

And so, we're presented with a cooperative country that has no ability to prosecute those people that are supplying arms to the rebels that want to overthrow their country and that are involved in the processing of drugs to be shipped with the United States being one of its targets.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Where that leaves you, unfortunately——

Mr. RANGEL. And there's no outrage in the administration, in our administration, you know, we can send troops to preserve democracy in Grenada, no problem.

We can lose soldiers with no one shooting at them, no problem. And Caspar Weinberger could say that has been a military success. I'm not arguing with him and here we find a sister democracy that can't even prosecute its drug traffickers, which are destroying our way of life, and not one word publicly being reported by our irresponsible press. It's tragic how they can run behind candidates for President and see who visited with them and when the President of the United States and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense talks about this threat to democracy, to Colombia, to South America, to the free world, the irresponsible press won't report a word of it.

Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for arranging this hearing on Colombia and I thank Ms. Wroblewski for attending today and I want to commend the Assistant Secretary for her good work in arranging a conference of the Deputy Chiefs of Missions (DCMs) and drug enforcement officers throughout the world who gathered here in Washington just this week.

I think that the conference has been an especially good one in helping to raise the priority of this issue amongst our Embassy personnel, something that our Chairman and myself have been trying to urge whenever we attend a conference in an Embassy overseas to try to keep that issue up amongst the top priorities.

I want to thank you too for addressing this issue on Colombia. I can't tell you the feeling of desperation and frustration that both the Chairman and I had as we stood out in front of the highest court of Colombia and saw that burned out building, that it re-

quired the military to enter the front door with their tanks in order to try to save some of the judicial personnel just after the narcotic terrorists had assassinated in cold blood 30 of the highest judges of that land.

When we look back over the record of the past few years in Colombia, you see how a sovereign state has virtually become hostage to the narcotics trafficking and recognize that this could happen throughout the world where a Minister of Justice, who had embarked on a campaign to rid that nation of narcotics, was shot in cold blood in front of his home.

Then, a subsequent Minister of Justice, in order to protect him from the threats that were made against his life, was shipped off to Hungary and was then the target of an attempted assassination by Colombians and then, fortunately, was able to come through a very critical period of hospitalization and I was so pleased that our people in Vienna made him the chairman of that Vienna conference as a worldwide protest to what was happening in Colombia.

And to see the courageous enforcement officer, General Ramirez, who had been attempting to get out there and eradicate, shot down in cold blood. To see the entire judiciary intimidated by the narcotic traffickers and virtually bring to a standstill any prosecution and any extradition, I think is abhorrent and something that should wake up the entire world. This could happen anywhere throughout the world today unless we dig out from under the sands and start addressing the problem in a forceful manner. Just stop talking about statistics, about how many fields we've eradicated and how much we've interdicted. We're not getting to the root causes of the problem and we're not doing it in an effective manner, neither here nor abroad and I hope that we wake up to the seriousness of it.

It's for that reason that we lauded the President's declaration of making this a national security interest last year. It's for that reason we lauded the efforts of the Congress in the work that we all were engaged in in bringing together an omnibus anti-drug act last year and providing some real funding in this effort.

But that's only a first step and we have so far to go to make this an effective campaign. I'm concerned about a couple of things that I'd like to ask you about with regard to Colombia.

First of all, just where do we stand on extradition? The President of Colombia told us just a few weeks ago that he had a great deal of reservations about what could be done with regard to extradition. The Chief Justice said he didn't think there could be any more extradition with the present state of the law and I know our people, some of our State Department attorneys, are engaged in trying to work it out and I know that you had a recent extradition in Mr. Garcia that may be an aberration of what the existing status is.

What are we doing to try to arrange so we can extradite them—I guess there are about 100 applications for extradition pending with regard to narcotics traffickers in Colombia. What are we doing to expedite and try to resolve the problems involved in extradition of traffickers in Colombia so that we can prosecute them here in our nation while they cannot prosecute or apparently their hands are tied in prosecutions in Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. My view, Mr. Gilman, is I think similar to yours, which is that extradition in the short term is the answer, but the answer over the long term, as the Chairman stated, is the strengthening of an independent judicial system in Colombia.

But let's take the extradition issue first. My understanding is that the criminal division of the Supreme Court had overturned, if you will, the extradition treaty.

Mr. GILMAN. That's on appeal and there's some question whether that appeal will be upheld.

Ms. WROBLESKI. We are now waiting for a full decision of the entire Supreme Court as to where the treaty will sit. Now, the treaty was overturned on a technicality in late December and President Barco moved swiftly to correct the technical mistake and resign the treaty and then, shortly after that, we had the later extradition.

As you know, we've had the Garcia extradition and I'm told that we have another extradition in the works and will probably have another—

Mr. GILMAN. Those may be one or two cases where they're trying to circumvent the present situation and that's not going to help the overall picture. What I'm concerned about is have our attorneys in the State Department in working with the attorneys in Colombia resolved the issue?

Have they found a way to bring out a resolution of all the obstacles standing in the way of extradition?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Mr. Gilman, we have sent legal teams down to work with the Colombians in an effort to sort out whatever technical problems we seem to have with the extradition treaty, but I must tell you that all of the lawyers in the world are not a match for the intimidation and the violence of the traffickers.

I understand that the negotiations are going well, but we're still awaiting this full Supreme Court decision. Will the traffickers pick off the Supreme Court one by one? You spoke very eloquently about the Palace of Justice. You know, you need to understand that we still have vacancies in Colombia on the Supreme Court. Nobody wants to—

Mr. GILMAN. What are we doing to protect the judges down there?

Ms. WROBLESKI. As you know, we've just gotten through the Foreign Affairs Committee a special \$3 million appropriation on the administration of justice campaign and we've used some of my money, we've used some AID money in an effort to try to come to grips with the Colombians on a judicial protection program.

We've looked at the Italian model. We think it's a good model as do the Colombians as a way to protect judges who would try just these narcotic offenders, but it is—I'm not going to kid you, you've been down there—A very difficult process.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we doing anything now to protect the judges?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, sir, we are, as well as witnesses.

Mr. GILMAN. All right. I won't get into the details of that. I would assume that that's something we'd prefer not to get into the details of.

Can you tell me about the eradication effort? I see in your statement you talk about the 15,000 to 17,000 hectares of coca and that

manual efforts are tough and they only got 600 hectares last year. My mathematics, and it's not the best in the world, it looks like in 25 years we may be able to eradicate at that rate. Well, that's certainly not something that's acceptable.

What are we doing—when we were in there a couple of years ago—your representative down there said that they had worked on a spraying method that looked good. The problem today is that the chemical company is worried about liability and therefore, was not using the spraying methods.

What are we doing to overcome that? Can't we provide some method so we can use that chemical spray and get over the liability problem and try to eradicate the crop of some 15,000 to 17,000 hectares?

Ms. WROBLESKI. You are absolutely right. As the Colombians have proved when they wiped out 85% of their marijuana crop, Colombian government is willing to use aerial herbicide applications. They've been anxious to test, to keep testing. They think they've found a chemical and the American chemical company concerned about liability will not give us or them the chemical.

We've been working with Justice Department and with the chemical company's lawyers looking for, and I fear this is all going to come back to you, looking for a legislative proposal.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, has one been suggested? We will be pleased to tackle it.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Nobody has—I haven't seen it. Have you, Mr. Chairman? We haven't seen that proposal. We would welcome seeing the proposal.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I know you would and we are at this point between the lawyers, if you will, trying to figure out what we, the administration would view as a reasonable proposal and what the chemical company would view as a reasonable proposal.

Mr. GILMAN. We'd welcome having that at the earliest possible date.

Ms. WROBLESKI. You have my promise. It is——

Mr. GILMAN. Manual eradication is certainly not the way to go.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Absolutely and Colombia, as you know, is the tip of the iceberg in terms of coca production up against Peru's 110,000 hectares, up against Bolivia's 38,000 hectares and we believe that if we can use it effectively and efficiently in Colombia, we can then move to other parts of the world.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that you could expedite that process. I'm going to have to run to another hearing and I hope I can return in a few moments.

I have another problem going on elsewhere, but I'd like to ask you, are there any equipment requests made by Colombia that we haven't fulfilled with regard to the drug war?

I understood that there had been a request for some helicopters that were still lingering. Can you tell us whether their requests have been met?

Ms. WROBLESKI. No, sir, in my travels and discussions in Colombia recently, the sense that I had on the police side, which as you know is where we do our work, is that the air wing, which now

rivals the Air Force air wing, is in good shape and is functioning and is being fully utilized.

Mr. GILMAN. Wasn't there some aircraft that the DEA had recommended that had not been delivered yet in the eradication effort? Are you aware of that?

Ms. WROBLESKI. No, the only thing that I could think that you might be referring to is the—is our MAP appropriation that you gave us last year, our special MAP appropriation to arm and armor aircraft in Colombia and we've reached closure just recently with the Colombians on how we will spend that appropriation.

Mr. GILMAN. It was my impression that there was an aero-commander that they had requested that hasn't been delivered yet, but I would hope that wherever we can be supportive of their equipment needs, that we'll make every effort to try to provide them with that assistance.

And just one other question. With regard to the private sector, as you know our Select Committee has been urging our U.S. Chambers of Commerce in every nation to help the host country and to help our own efforts in raising the public's consciousness in educating, trying to make their own personnel available in the war against drugs.

Is that working in Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. It's my impression that it is. I'll tell you, I think that speaking to the U.S. Chambers when you travel, I try to do it when I travel, is a very useful public awareness activity, if you will. These are people who know the country that they live in, but also know the United States. They're usually very respected business men—

Mr. GILMAN. And have the wherewithall to do a job.

Ms. WROBLESKI [continuing]. Have the wherewithall to do the job. Exactly. And for them to hear of the concern that you have, that your constituents have is a very useful exercise. I commend you and would hope that you continue to do it.

Mr. GILMAN. Were they pitching in and doing it?

Ms. WROBLESKI. In my view in Colombia they are and a lot of it, I think, is not so much that they're pitching in, but that they're joining in, particularly the media campaign in Colombia, but the Colombia businessmen's campaign.

Mr. GILMAN. And one last question. I know you have been working on the preparations for the important Vienna Conference at the U.N. Can you tell us what the status is of the U.N. conference and does it look like it will be in place and is it going to be a successful conference?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I would always hesitate to predict about a conference that 140 nations will be represented at a ministerial level, but from where I sit, preparations are ongoing, I know that we've briefed committee staff on a couple of occasions and are always willing to come back up and brief you again.

I note that we've received the Speaker's letter on appointing you and the Chairman as members of the delegation which we welcome and we're anxious to make sure that you have whatever information or briefings that you feel are necessary. The White House will soon be announcing the delegation list and at that point, I think that we'll probably pull together a couple of full delegation meet-

ings so that we can go through the schedule and get a sense of what we want to accomplish in Vienna.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that you would bring together that delegation at an early enough date so that they cannot just be briefed, but start doing their homework. Too often we find that these international conferences, they're pulled together at the last minute, there isn't enough briefing and preparation and they go into the battlefield not fully prepared, as compared to some of the other nations that do a better job of that.

I would urge you to please expedite that process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. The Committee's fortunate to have Bill Hughes, who is one of the outstanding members of Congress and leaders in this area, who sits on the Judiciary Committee, and I recognize him.

Mr. HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary.

I just have a couple of lines of inquiry, Mr. Chairman. I'm not really sure I understand just exactly what the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court of Colombia found unconstitutional. Can you enlighten me on just exactly what they found unconstitutional about the resolution which implemented the treaty?

Ms. WROBLESKI. As a lawyer, no. Since I am not a lawyer, I can't give you a legal definition, but it's my understanding that they had difficulties with certain definitions on nationals as well as what was an extraditable crime and what was not an extraditable crime. As a non-lawyer, I'm reluctant to go further with that, but that's my understanding of it.

Mr. HUGHES. I wonder if you could perhaps share that information with us, if you have people within your department that have access to that information?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I'd be happy to, yes.

Mr. HUGHES. That would be helpful.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes.

Mr. RANGEL. If the gentleman would yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I would be happy to.

Mr. RANGEL. There was some talk that it was no true legal basis, but that the court was intimidated, the Supreme Court was intimidated the same way the lower judges were intimidated, that it was fear.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think that's an overlay that you can't discount.

Mr. RANGEL. One of the considerations, not the legal basis, but the judges were scared.

Mr. HUGHES. Yes, and I have just received some additional information from counsel, but I understood that one of the challenges, and I had heard this previously, was because the original legislation was signed into law by the acting President and then, as I understand it, President Barco came back and resigned—

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's right.

Mr. HUGHES [continuing]. Reimplementing the legislation. Then just recently, in February, I believe, of this year, the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court which is a limited part of the Supreme Court of Colombia, found that the treaty was inoperable and unconstitutional and now that is going to be heard by the full Supreme Court.

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's right.

Mr. HUGHES. But I wonder if you can share with us if there was any other basis for that finding by the criminal chamber?

Ms. WROBLESKI. As I say, my understanding is that it was problems with definitions in terms of who's in national and what's an extraditable crime, but I think that the Chairman speaks to what I guess all of us instinctively know, but don't have a lot of evidence.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, I think that that's why we all want a little more information, because instinctively my own impression is that with the resignation of the second Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because of intimidation, there would appear to be some question as to whether or not the court is acting independently.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I spent a good bit of time the last time I was in Colombia with the second Supreme Court Justice to resign, Justice Eurebe and what I saw in him was real fear, a man, a respected jurist in Colombia who felt as though the court was very much exposed, more so than the rest of the—well, more so than the executive branch and my sense of it is that the court needs to get some more protection, both political protection as well as bureaucratic protection from the executive branch.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, that's understandable, I mean they've lost over thirty judges through assassination, not just judges, but their families. The Colombian criminal element is more brutal than even the Mafia in many respects in that they don't stop at just assassinating the target. They wipe out whole families, so I understand the intimidation.

But if you could share that, that might be somewhat enlightening.

The second part of my line of inquiry is, I'm not really sure I understand where prosecution stands in Colombia and I'm not sure I understood your answer. I have information that there are no criminal prosecutions under way in Colombia.

Is that the fact?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think that aside from extraditables, as they call them in Colombia, we're not seeing movement on other narcotics offenses.

Mr. HUGHES. I commend President Barco for signing the most recent extradition treaty, and I understand another one is about to be signed involving another matter, another Colombian national, but those extraditions, as I understand it, were approved back in the 1985-'86 time frame prior to the time that the treaty was declared unconstitutional and that the one appeal process has run. That's with regard to Oscar Garcia and the other one involves a man by the name of Gomez who now has an appeal process ahead of him.

But these all pre-date the finding by the court, isn't that a fact?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Those two do pre-date. Of course, the later decision was also pre-dated. I think what you've got is a President who's waiting for ratification if you will, or reaffirmation of the treaty by the Supreme Court and it is, of course, that same Supreme Court that passes on the extraditions themselves.

So, I think until we see a full court decision, we're not going to see a new, if you can separate them, a new extradition signed because they're not going to be processed.

Mr. HUGHES. Let me just say I think you observed that extradition might be a short-term solution, not a long-term solution. I'm not even sure how much of a short-term solution it's going to be if, in fact, the system is intimidated and it's brought to a halt. It's only a matter of time before the Supreme Court is once again intimidated.

If in fact they are at risk and they obviously are, it seems to me that even extradition isn't going to really address the problem that Colombia has and as the Chairman has indicated, it is a sister democracy. We obviously should be as concerned as we are about other developments that are taking place in Central America, it's as much of a threat to the democratic processes as certainly anything that's occurring in other parts of Central and South America at this point, and the answer is to attempt to work with Colombia, as I think you indicated, to try to strengthen the system and protect officials as much as we had to do in Palermo a number of years ago.

My question is, are we committing resources and assistance to Colombia at this point to try to do just that, to provide a cadre of trained law enforcement officials, protection for judges and witnesses, a witness protection act and I presume one doesn't exist in Colombia, and the necessary enclaves that have to be developed to begin treating it as if they had a major invasion and they have had?

Ms. WROBLESKI. We are and I think we could and will do more. We, last year, were able to scrape together, as I said earlier, some money out of my account and some money out of AID accounts on the judicial protection issue on things as basic as armored cars for members of the Supreme Court.

We have argued long and hard in front of the authorizing committees for some extra money for an administration of justice program in Colombia which would seek to train judges and train prosecutors and train investigators, as well as a professionalization, if you will, of the police forces.

I think that we—I agree with you, I mean, I think that we can lend not only our expertise, but the Italians' expertise, the Spanish expertise, on this issue and see if we can't collectively help the Colombians buttress their own system.

Mr. HUGHES. Do we have a game plan? Is there a strategy being developed or has one been developed to deal with what basically is almost international narcotics anarchy at the present time in Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. We have spent, all of us I guess on the narcotics issue as well as people who care about democracy in Latin America throughout the government, have spent a lot of time with various Colombian officials in small groups and in large groups, trying to get them to think through what their game plan, what their strategy should be so that we can plug in our assistance and our support.

Mr. HUGHES. Do they have one?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think that they're close. They are working on—

Mr. HUGHES. Is there anything in writing?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I don't know that I'd go that far. What they're faced with, unfortunately, is, as the Chairman mentioned, a terror-

ist threat that is both urban as well as rural, that is largely under the direction of the counter-terrorism efforts are largely under the direction of the military.

The narcotics threat has always been under the direction of the police, so much like our system, you've already got two competing bureaucracies. The third, of course, is the very independent judicial system in Colombia. The President of Colombia does not support, does not appoint Supreme Court members. They are nominated by the lower court judges. There is no interaction between the executive and the judicial.

One of the reasons they feel so exposed—also one of the reasons is they have one of the, traditionally, most independent and strongest judicial systems in Latin America.

So, you've got a range of bureaucracies who are trying to come together under President Barco's leadership to try to figure out how you deal with these twin evils, particularly in the face of a truce, as the Chairman had mentioned earlier, with the guerrillas in an effort to bring them into the government to avoid a civil war which plagued Colombia during the 1940s and 1950s.

It's not easy. It's not an easy process at all especially for a new government, but I'm convinced that they are making headway and they've been forced to make headway by their own population and their own media.

Mr. HUGHES. Was any of the additional money that we provided in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 committed to Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUGHES. We increased your budget, as I recall, from \$60 to about \$118 million, almost doubled it. How much of that went to Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. In Colombia this year, we'll spend between I'd say \$12, \$14 million, in that range.

Mr. HUGHES. \$12 and \$14 million? How does that compare with last year?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think it's up a little bit, not up significantly and let me explain that.

The reason is, that we took the bulk of the extra money that we received from your generosity in Congress to put it into capital assets. We were mandated by Congress to put a certain percentage of it into capital assets, but we've used a lot of it for equipment and for aircraft, which are incredibly expensive.

What we had in Colombia that we didn't have elsewhere in the region, was an already large air wing and basically what we need to do now, is keep that air wing flying and replace it as some of the equipment that was granted to them several years ago breaks down.

Mr. HUGHES. But who basically is the operations officer dealing with the Colombians on a day to day basis, dealing with the problem?

Who is it? Do we have anybody?

Ms. WROBLESKI. In Bogota or in Washington?

Mr. HUGHES. In Washington or Bogota.

Ms. WROBLESKI. The Ambassador in Bogota probably spends more of his time on narcotics and terrorism than any other Ambassador in the world.

Mr. HUGHES. How about in Washington?

Ms. WROBLESKI. In Washington, I spend a good part of my time on Colombia as does the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Mr. HUGHES. Do you deal directly with the Colombians?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, I do. I deal with the Colombians.

Mr. HUGHES. Who, specifically, are you dealing with in Colombia?

Ms. WROBLESKI. We deal through the Minister of Defense. Colombia, unlike a lot of other Latin countries, the police is under the Minister of Defense, so you've got a full command of the armed forces as well as the civilian forces with the Minister of Defense.

The Justice Department, I'm going to suppose, spends most of their time with the Justice Ministry, but we deal almost exclusively through Defense.

Mr. HUGHES. What role does the military play at the present time?

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's a good question. We have been urging—the problem that we have in the Llanos, the problem the Colombians have in the Llanos with the cocaine labs that are protected by guerrillas then faces the bureaucracy. Is this a police action against the narcos or is this a military action against the guerrillas?

What we've seen recently at our urging, is a joint command structure and a joint control structure.

Mr. HUGHES. You see, that's part of the problem that we have. We just can't seem to find anybody that we can point to that has responsibility for carrying out missions. The military is not carrying out any missions, as I understand it, in Colombia and yet, that's who we're dealing with because basically it's perceived and probably rightfully so in many respects, it's a law enforcement matter.

Ms. WROBLESKI. It's a police operation, that's true.

What do you do when the police are out-gunned by the guerrillas?

Mr. HUGHES. But then the other side of the coin is precisely, we have a situation where it requires probably a military or para-military response.

You know, it just seems to me that we go in circles.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I think they face—their tradition probably argues as strongly as our tradition against using military in law enforcement operations and to come to a joint command, as we saw in some of their recent raids, was not an easy thing for that government to do.

Mr. HUGHES. I suppose if we had thirty judges assassinated in our country and a couple of Chief Justices resigned because of threats and intimidation, we might rethink the role of the military in our country.

Ms. WROBLESKI. If we also—

Mr. HUGHES. You might be prepared to use them in more ways than we have so far under a modification of the posse comitatus law.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I agree with you.

Mr. HUGHES. But it seems to me that we have a communications problem. Who in the Ministry of Defense do we deal with?

Ms. WROBLESKI. The Minister.

Mr. HUGHES. The Minister himself.

Even though he, operationally, has no role?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, he, operationally, as Commander of the Armed Forces and as well as Commander of the police after a couple of chains, has control over the entire structure.

Mr. HUGHES. Of the military?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Of the military as well as the police. As I said, the police in Colombia, unlike a lot of other places in Latin America, are part of the Ministry of Defense.

To get back to your earlier analogy, which is a good one, would we rethink posse comitatus if we had thirty judges killed? I would like to think that we would, but if you add to thirty judges killed, if we also had armed insurgents who controlled the larger portion of the United States who we were trying to assimilate into the government through a peaceful process, it gets very, very, very dicey, very difficult.

Mr. HUGHES. But once again, I would think that that's all the more reason to attempt to use a para-military force to deal with both insurgency, while you might want to bring it within the system and try to deal with it, at the present time, Colombia lacks the tools. They don't have the laws, as I understand it, such as the witness protection laws and some of the other laws that are needed to deal with the problem. They haven't committed the resources. Third of all, they basically have a system, a criminal justice system, that has been neutralized.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think it's in crisis.

Mr. HUGHES. So, we probably have as much of a threat to democracy from within the country as they face from without.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Absolutely.

Mr. HUGHES. And I don't see that we're really making any major progress at this point in dealing with the problem.

Ms. WROBLESKI. One of the things that I think is encouraging, we spend a lot of time in the inter-agency process, with the Colombians talking about joint command structures and joint command and control structures, and I would note that in their most recent raid that I read about, they used the military to go in first and then used the police to come in afterward in a purely law enforcement move to arrest people.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, that's mostly when they seize laboratories, isn't it?

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's right.

Mr. HUGHES. Isn't that limited to that area?

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's when they seize labs.

Mr. HUGHES. The seizures the last year have been relatively small laboratories, have they not?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, the seizures, the lab seizures are the key point at which the narcos and the guerrillas intercept, particularly out in the Llanos. What you find are labs that are protected by the FARC, basically.

And that's the point at which their bureaucracy had been stymied, who's in control here, who's in charge and that gets to your earlier point about law enforcement.

Mr. HUGHES. But as you indicate in your statement, in chief, the Colombian narcotics trafficking organization or organizations are quite often very small and while there is a major cartel, we haven't begun to deal with that cartel.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I don't think we've begun to—I think we've just begun to understand—

Mr. HUGHES. The arrests we've made have been of the small laboratories.

Ms. WROBLESKI. We've just begun, I think, to understand how the cartel itself operates and it's, as I said in my statement, it's a small, close knit—I'm not going to lecture you about criminal justice, but I would guess that it's analagous to the early years of the American Mafia and I think we're just starting to understand how they work.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, I'm way beyond my time and my own impression is that, you know, we've lost a lot of ground even though President Barco is very courageous for signing the extradition treaty and he's to be commended for that, I just would be very interested in knowing a little more specifically from the people that are talking to the Colombians directly on a day-to-day basis, about a game plan as to what kind of a strategy is evolving.

It seems to me that it's in our interest to assist our sister democracy at this point, committing resources and assistance by providing protection, if need be, for witnesses as we've done for Italy in the past in our country, assistance in developing legislative tools that are needed if, in fact, there is a commitment to try to put in place an infra-structure to create enclaves to protect judges and lawyers and prosecutors that prosecute and witnesses and it sounds to me like we really haven't begun that process yet. I regret that, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Hughes.

Mr. Oxley who represents the Legislative Standing Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The recent U.S. News article that appeared as a cover story about narco terrorism, have you had a chance to look at that?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I skimmed through it. I have not read it closely.

Mr. OXLEY. The obvious—as a matter of fact, we had a Washington conference of people from our district Monday and we had, among the speakers, was Jean Kirkpatrick who talked specifically about narco terrorism and then I recommended that article to my constituents.

As a matter of fact, we're making copies and sending them out to all of the people who came out. In my estimation, it was a fairly accurate summary worldwide of the spread of narco terrorism and its rather startling growth over the last several months.

In your view, and I know this is strictly on Colombia, but in your view, compared to the other South American countries, is the Colombian situation perhaps the worst?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Absolutely.

Mr. OXLEY. There's nobody even close? Is that a fair statement?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, let me say I think that we've spent some time trying to get absolute evidence that linked the FARC and the M-19 to the traffickers and I think that we wasted a lot of time doing that, to be candid.

And, therefore, I'm not necessarily willing to wait for conclusive evidence in other parts of Latin America and therefore, I speak not from evidence or not from what you would call legal evidence, but from a sense of the problem.

I think we see some linkages in Peru between Sendero Luminosa and the traffickers, particularly in the upper Huallaga.

The Interior Minister in Guatemala has told me that he sees some linkages between traffickers and guerrillas in northern Guatemala.

I think there are—Ecuador, certainly there are terrorist groups and the traffickers. It's not so much a pact signed in the jungle. I think it's a marriage of convenience. It's two groups of people who profit from weak institutions, weak central government.

One profits monetarily from a weak legal system and the other profits, I suppose they think ideologically, from the weak central government, but they both operate sort of in the fringes and in the back alleys of society.

Mr. OXLEY. What are we doing to help combat that narco terrorist threat and what could we do that we're not doing?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I would say that certainly for our Ambassadors overseas who serve in those countries, we are trying to get the other governments to think about and to understand and to explore those linkages, just as we have done in Colombia.

As I say, part of the Washington bureaucracy, as well as the Bogota bureaucracy, didn't make the link fast enough, so I think we're putting a lot more intelligence resources into—

Mr. OXLEY. If I could interrupt, are our Ambassadors in those countries at risk?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think—well, I guess it depends on how you define risk.

Mr. OXLEY. Have they had threats?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Certainly. I think that anybody—well, U.S. Ambassadors are a target anywhere in the world because of what they stand for, which is the strength of the United States government, but I think that our Ambassador in Colombia has been threatened, our Ambassador in Peru has been threatened, our Ambassador in Bolivia. That's fairly common.

Mr. OXLEY. I'm sorry. You can continue on that.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I was talking about intelligence resources to try to—for us to understand and for the governments to understand what those linkages are and to try to understand how you manage and control and command your resources so that you can hit at both the narcotics traffickers as well as the guerrillas.

Mr. OXLEY. Do you feel that the Lehder case and the fact that he was successfully extradited and assuming that he's ultimately prosecuted, is that going to have any effect on the international narcotics markets?

Will there be any deterrents? Will there be any message sent in your estimation or do you have any information to help with this?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think the initial swiftness of the extradition caused quite a stir, not only in the anti-narcotic field, but also among the trafficking networks and I think that there was this assumption that the big five, the Medellin Cartel, were above anybody's law. That nobody could touch the Ochellus or Carlos Escobar or Carlos Lehder and the swiftness of the extradition turned that into the myth that it always was.

I think we're going to have to wait and see as his trial progresses what kind of evidence comes to light and that, I think, is going to have some bearing on how the traffickers regard the whole process of extradition as well as criminal proceedings.

Mr. OXLEY. There were a lot of threats, as you know, made immediately after the extradition. As far as I know, none of those threats have been carried out.

Ms. WROBLESKI. That's true.

Mr. OXLEY. That is true?

Ms. WROBLESKI. There was a threat that the Cartel would kill a judge a week as long as Lehder was in jail and that has not happened.

Mr. OXLEY. Let me ask you about the so-called Andean Summit or the proposed Andean Summit.

Where are we on that? What can we expect? When can we expect it?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I can't answer when. I would say that we're looking at the proposal, both at the State Department and at the NSC and it's under review.

Mr. OXLEY. Is the perception that the Andean Summit would cover more than just the drug trafficking issue?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think that, you know, the terms of the Summit, of course, will be defined by the Summit participants and not dictated by the United States, but—

Mr. OXLEY. Is the assumption that it would only be the South American countries and the United States?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, the original—I guess the original proposal and it's gone through several iterations, was an Andean Summit to look at the issue of democracy and how it is affected by narcotics and guerrillas.

Mr. OXLEY. That would be the general theme?

Ms. WROBLESKI. That was the original proposal and again, I want to underscore here that the scope of the Summit would be dictated by the participants and it is not a question that the United States is dictating to them.

Mr. OXLEY. Is it—would it be fair to expect some kind of a Summit yet this year?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I don't think I'd answer that question. It's under review and we're looking at it and I just wouldn't want to attach a time on to it.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Congressman Oxley talks about the Andean Summit and of course Ben Gilman and I participated at the request of the Speaker in the Andean Legislative Summit and we did come back sharing with your assistant the feeling that the participants had that our President should participate in a Summit of executives, Chiefs of State, Presidents.

When you refer to the original proposal, what proposal are you talking about?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I would say that we've thought about the idea of an Andean Summit several times in my tenure at the Department, but clearly, your trip and your discussions with the Andean Parliament gave new life to the proposal, absolutely, but I think that as you look at the various regional groupings and as you begin to think about how you deal with these issues on a regional basis, the Andes is clearly, when you think about narcotics trafficking, a reasonable regional sub-group.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, there is a letter on the President's desk from Jim Wright and minority leader Robert Michel trying to share with the President how important the House believes such a meeting will be and to discuss what support, if any, we could give toward him reaching a decision in this area.

Bob Dornan, who is one of the more active members on the Foreign Affairs Committee, has rejoined our Select Narcotic Committee and makes a great contribution and we welcome his appearance.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On this issue of narco terrorists, you commented in response to Congressman Oxley that you were thinking a great deal about it.

Without compromising any security measures, are we attempting to penetrate this at all? What are we doing in the way of action beyond thinking about the problem?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I think as I indicated to Mr. Oxley, we're looking at intelligence resources as a way to better understand the networks, I guess that you—you know, as we look at them and as the other governments look at them. You would then look at the networks in an operational framework. I think that's all I'd be prepared to say.

Mr. DORNAN. In traveling through these countries, I'm thinking of one visit to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia in 1982, I had an opportunity to meet with a lot of our legislative counterparts. In Bolivia, particularly, although they weren't really in session, some former congressmen and women told me at our Ambassador's house that the United States was the cause of all their problems because of our heavy use of narcotics.

Do we still run into that feeling, that we create this incredible demand and set up the whole supply chain through the mystique of the free market?

Ms. WROBLESKI. You hear it less and less for two reasons.

It is an unfortunate fact that producer and trafficker countries inevitably become consumer countries. I've seen recent surveys of Bolivia that show that as much as 20% of their population between the ages of 14 and 24 is either addicted to bazuco, which is basically crack, or has tried it in the last month.

Mr. DORNAN. 20 percent—

Ms. WROBLESKI. 20 percent.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. Of the Bolivian age group 14 to 24, one out of every five.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Again, this is survey material, but what you're seeing is concern, just like in this country, from the legislatures about the spread of drug abuse in the region. It's also true in Asia.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Could you stop right there? I have found this to be true, whether in Burma, or Bolivia, which used to be just transit points. I think one of our counsels was on this trip. Elliott, weren't you on the trip in 1979 where we went out to the high schools in Rangoon and they just were developing a tremendous user problem? Here they thought they were just a producing transit country.

This has happened in Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and just about every country that thought they were just growers suddenly ends up users.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Bahamas.

Mr. DORNAN. Now, in a country like Bolivia with this penetration into their youth, how do we know it wasn't always that way, that there was always a consumer, a large consumer percentage of the population and that it was just phony public relations—you know—the accusation that we're producers, you're the problem, you're the users?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I would say that what was seen in Bolivia may not be the best example. Maybe a more sophisticated country with a more sophisticated health system would be a better example, such as Colombia. It's been really in the last two, three, four years that the health system has seen the effects of drug abuse in Colombia and I suspect, I mean, I'm sure you're right, to a certain extent, people don't want to believe that they are part of the problem.

People want to believe that the problem is elsewhere, but you hear it less and less, that it's the big, bad west, it's the United States, it's the western Europeans. What you hear now is this is our problem. We've got a consuming population, now what are we and you going to do together to solve this problem?

Now, let me say the second issue that is, I think, as important as domestic drug—

Mr. DORNAN. Hold it one second because I think that's very important. You're hearing it less and less. Do you hear it at all, that it's America's fault?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, you do. You hear it—the Chairman sponsored a breakfast a couple of days ago for the OAS, their Commission on Drugs, and we heard a slight reference to—

Mr. RANGEL. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Mr. RANGEL. We had many differences of opinion with Associate Attorney General Trott, but one of them was that, and when their office gets locked into an idea, you can't even have a discussion, but he was saying that it was a great revolutionary concept that at long last these countries recognize that it wasn't just America's demand, but it was that they were victim countries as well as producing.

I don't have any problem with that and I do think it is dramatic that they discuss demand in these terms, but he resisted my position that each time you talk to them about money, each time you talk to them about eradication and each time you talk to them about resources, they turned right around and either for national pride or negotiating purposes say that they're doing it for America and Ben Gilman actually has seen good meetings, including the one with the Vice President from Bolivia, almost break up because

they can't resist when the meeting is about to conclude, to say that these efforts are being made for us as a consumer or, if you took care of consumption, we would have no problem.

Ms. WROBLESKI. And I will say that, you know, we have a tendency in this country to say just the reverse. I think we're both wrong, but I think that it's easy——

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I tell you this, that it's very embarrassing as an American to tell these foreigners what our Federal education program is.

I mean, after we leave Nancy Reagan, I'm out of it. I mean, I cannot tell them what is our Federal educational strategy to reduce demand and consumption except that red book that comes out of Secretary Bennett's office and the great efforts being made by the First Lady, but that's another subject.

Mr. DORNAN. You know the most over used degraded word in our language, as far as having any impact, is war. For the ten years on the Hill we've made war on everything. Now it's homeless, so you can't really talk about war. We need another synonym.

Does there exist a narcotics ward room somewhere in the Executive branch where you can visually see this on the walls, like war maps from World War II, showing the collapse of the axis and the fascist powers? Is there something that says here's where we're winning, here's where the percentages are going down, here's where the curve on the chart is dropping a little bit, here's educational films being run in London, here's what they're doing on the Continent, here's where they are educating the people?

I picked up a habit in my youth, which sticks with me and probably wastes more time in my life than anything else—watching movies. I see ten times more movies than I have to, 95% of them are absolute garbage, most movies are training films for young people that make light of narcotics abuse.

I don't care what Miami Vice does on television, the narcotics problem is handled with a light touch, as are all the films in the shopping market. I agree with my Chairman. I don't see any education program that embraces this concept of a war for survival against something that we point out in our resolution here is a scourge against all mankind.

Is there a ward room of some kind where you visually map out what you're trying to do to turn back some of these percentages?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I'm not sure that I would characterize anything as a ward room. I would say that we certainly, and particularly with the input of the Department of Defense, particularly now that we share and trade information with them, I think that the coordinating committee, which Mr. Trott chairs, which meets on a monthly basis, is the place where, if you will, where we share what we're doing in a range of countries.

We work closely on a day to day basis with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Where the real action takes place in terms, I guess, of a war room, would be at our embassies where the Ambassadors——

Mr. DORNAN. Well, your ward rooms sometimes can be the computer where you can punch up a certain code and out comes all the body of extant knowledge and information. It can be a published bulletin like a consensus group which specifies every month an in-

formation report, status report, or what military historians call the order of battle. Here's what we have. Here's what they got. We got Lehder in jail, and here's who is on the loose.

Sometimes when one of these famous organized crime trials comes to the forefront, you can pick up one of the news magazines and see a fascinating map of the Gambino family with the Bonano family and everything.

Is this Medellin Cartel taken over by other people? Did somebody just step in and say "hey, don't worry, Carlos, you know, it will all be here, when we get you out in ten years you know, you'll be here to inherit billions. We're investing the money well."

Is there something that I could say to a constituent or send for such and such consensus publication?

Let me give you an example. Every week on Thursday or Friday, I get a report from the Centers for Disease Control that tells me everything I'd ever want to know about AIDS, how many children died within the last seven days, how many people have been infected, the major causes of the disease.

Every week I can pick that up and say, we are getting deeper in trouble here. This is a scourge, AIDS.

Is there something on narcotics like that or a proposed publication?

Ms. WROBLESKI. There are multiple, multiple things on narcotics. I would say that the repository of not only past information, but current information, is what is called EPIC in El Paso, which I know the Chairman has visited, which is——

Mr. DORNAN. EPIC?

Ms. WROBLESKI. EPIC is what it is called.

It's an intelligence center in El Paso, but what's unique about it is that it is a Federal law enforcement intelligence center that State and locals also feed into. DEA chairs the committee, I guess, that runs EPIC, but they are also represented by Customs and Coast Guard and, you know, the range of agencies who deal with drug enforcement. They publish a variety of information, some of it public, some of it not, but there is certainly a stock taken, if you will, both domestically——

Mr. DORNAN. Is that an intelligence center for the entire border region plus the Caribbean?

Ms. WROBLESKI. It's an intelligence center for the entire world basically.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Ms. WROBLESKI. It is mostly domestic oriented because of the percentage of State and locals that feed in and therefore, the information is more domestic than overseas, but originally it was set up to look at the border and it has since expanded operations.

Let me also say, although I'm most familiar with the two C3I centers that were part of the omnibus drug bill that will go to Customs or Coast Guard, either jointly or separately, depending on who wins, also will pull together tactical, real time tactical intelligence that they can use against the smugglers on the border, so there's a variety of places where we collect this kind of information.

Mr. RANGEL. If the gentleman would yield?

Mr. DORNAN. Sure, I'm through, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I just would want to develop your point further. You may not be through.

If the war is declared and we have this intelligence center, as we do in El Paso that's doing a terrific job, and you have these monthly meetings and Mr. Trott's in charge of that, who is the person that would be the, using his analogy of a war, that would be the Commander in Chief and the strategist that would be able to say at any given time what is happening on every front in different parts of the world, as well as what's happening on the home front as in any war, which is an essential element of moral, education and defense?

Who would be that person that any American or Member of Congress could go to and be briefed on how we are doing?

Ms. WROBLESKI. I think you can look at a couple of places then.

First of all, I don't think that you can expect, given our system of government and the way that different agencies have different pieces of the narcotics effort, that you can expect one person to have totally detailed knowledge of the entire domestic and foreign supply side and demand side picture.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, strike out detail. I hope I didn't say that, but if I was to speculate that the person perceived to be the person in charge would be the Attorney General and if I was to speculate further and say that the number three man in Justice would be the hands-on person that would be in charge of this operation and if he testified that he spent only 20% of his time dealing with this problem and if he responded, not in detail, but in saying he had no knowledge of what our educational effort was and that I'd have to talk with Secretary Bennett, we're not talking about detail, Madam Secretary, we're just talking about someone that the Congress can help.

We ask—not in a critical way—we ask for informational purposes. You know, we can't get really many of the people that have the detailed information to come before the Committee and so we ask whoever's in charge to come and they, then, refer us to people who we can't get to.

So, it's difficult, but again his question is, do we have the strategy, do we have the war room, do we have the plan and you referred to Caspar Weinberger, but who's in charge of the whole operation in terms of the "national strategy" that's been so elusive and evasive for us?

Ms. WROBLESKI. You know, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, as you've stated, the Attorney General is Chairman of the National Drug Policy Board, renamed now that it has taken on the health and social and educational function. Under him, as you know, Otis Bowen is the Deputy Chair. There are two coordinating groups, one which Mr. Trott chairs, which I guess I would term enforcement and one which Dr. Macdonald will now chair on the health/prevention/treatment side of the aisle.

A point I want to make, I guess I've seen how we operate. We, the State Department, and how the other agencies operate before the coordinating groups and since the coordinating groups. I've been there two years and I think we do a better job of coordinating what we do under the coordinating groups.

My complaint is that it takes us longer, but I'm willing to abide by that if in the process I get a consensus around the room or if I know what—

Mr. RANGEL. I hope you don't think that we're criticizing what you think works. If you think it works, don't change it. We can't find out who's in charge of anything on a full-time basis to report to this Congress.

I never really thought that we needed a drug czar, that we're going to have a shotgun marriage with somebody and the President. If the President doesn't want any czar, you can name anything you want. You can legislate anybody you want, but it's not going to work. But I would challenge—I would bet you've never spoken to the special adviser on narcotics to the President in your life, have you?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Oh.

Mr. RANGEL. Who is it? Who is it?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Mac Macdonald. I spend a lot of time with Mac and I spent a lot of time with Carlton Turner.

Mr. RANGEL. Who was it before him?

How much time do you think the President spent with Carlton? I'm going to leave that alone.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I don't know.

Mr. RANGEL. No, I know, but anyway, what we're saying is that the Congress and America somehow is going to need some assurances that there's somebody in charge and I'm convinced and have enough respect for the Attorney General to believe that the President needs him on so many vital and important matters, both personal and political, that I would not bother him to ask him the results of his monthly meeting with the Coordinating Board on Drugs.

And, we hope that we can break through because I think it's a wasted effort for us to legislate a czar, but if it could show congressional intent, I'm afraid that I'll be supporting even that effort and I hate doing things like that, but it's clear to me that it's very, very difficult to find somebody that's on the job full time, coordinating our national strategy.

You're smiling, Rayburn Hesse. Is there somebody that I've missed that's on the job full time that I should have known of?

Mr. HESSE. Sorry, Mr. Chairman, I was just anticipating the completion of your remarks. [Laughter.]

Mr. RANGEL. Okay. Are there other questions you have?

Mr. DORNAN. Well, just an observation I have, Mr. Chairman.

When I was a freshman ten years ago, I voted against a special Cabinet officer and taking duties away from certain executive branches and forming the Department of Energy, but I was on the losing side. We've had it with us for over a decade and the President, in his wisdom in six and a half years, decided that he was going to break his campaign promise and he wasn't going to redelegate its duties back into other departments and the same story pertains to education. After six and a half years, that stays.

And I bet if we all got together and looked at the charts of where we're going and what's happened over the last four or five years we would see that the President should say, "I think I need a Cabinet officer here to handle nothing but this war on narcotics. It

drains so much out of our national treasury, billions and billions of dollars, and in fact, we could probably balance the budget if we were able to turn this thing back to the '40s, '50s, even the '60s."

I don't know. I agree with the Chairman, I'm still looking for a czar. We all hate that word, but I know if you're going to reach out to the popular culture, Phil Donahue doesn't know who to call. Neither does Opra Winfrey. Neither does anybody who has a national show where they would want to put on a man or a woman and say, what the heck is happening in this declared and then forgotten war on narcotics?

I know that Dr. Bowen's time is going to be consumed with AIDS more and more and more and—because it's always fatal and because it's growing exponentially, it's going to demand more and more of their time. But I'll bet we've lost more lives to narcotics last year than we did to AIDS.

Without even looking at the figures, I know for sure that one is chasing the other, but I just think that somehow or other this Congress is going to have to take the lead probably, and demand one person who we can turn to when we need fast answers.

And he doesn't have to have detail, although I don't think it's hard to get the big picture, but we're expected to get the big picture and do these hundred other things every day that a Congressman is asked to do. I think that this is going to have to happen sooner or later.

Mr. RANGEL. Politically, there's a campaign being waged by the White House against the Senate's opposition.

I would suggest that if this is going to succeed, that an alternative to it at least be presented so that those of us who are not locked into the Senate bill would at least know that we're getting someone full time or at least some suggestion.

You mentioned to Mr. Dornan that one of the places overseas that you thought the battle was taking place, a war room, would be in our embassies. Recently a few months ago, I attended—I participated in a Caribbean basin trip dealing with trade issues to Jamaica, Barbados, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic.

And in each of these countries, as you well know, we have what is called a country briefing, where the Ambassador tells us what the problems are and what we're doing about it and how we can be supportive of their position and with the exception of Jamaica, drugs was never raised by any of the Ambassadors.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I'm sorry. Where else did you go? I heard you say Costa Rica.

Mr. RANGEL. Dominican Republic, where we do have a terrific operation going on there.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Yes, exactly.

Mr. RANGEL. And certainly our Ambassador to Jamaica dramatically outlined the concerns in that he was working with the incumbents, the out of office, everybody, as to how important it is that they cooperate.

Costa Rica, Barbados. In all of the country briefings, with the exception of Jamaica, drugs was never mentioned and we had that same experience in Turkey and in Mexico. Mexico, I don't even want to tell you about it. It was so bad that the former Ambassador woke me up in the middle of the night asking us whether we

could start all over again and have a briefing the next day, which we did and it was a good briefing.

But my point is that we have had DEA agents thank us for asking to place them in United States embassies and to get into the receptions to meet some of the people in the country that they're assigned, so that they can get to know and to be more effective and it just seems to me that while I note recently the Secretary of State has called in our Ambassadors to indicate the priority in which our foreign policy mission is, as it relates to drugs, I hope it works because prior to that, the answers were that yes, we knew you were accompanying the Ways and Means Committee. Yes, we knew you were the Chairman of the Select Narcotic Committee, but we were advised that the nature of your mission was trade and needless to say, not being trained in diplomacy, I was outraged that a representative of my country could be in a narcotics-producing country and while he's briefing members of Congress that have passed a historic piece of legislation, that they did not think enough of the delegation or their mission to share with us the problems and the solutions they were having.

I say that hoping that the recent briefing that the Secretary has given will change all of that.

Contra aid and drugs, more and more I'm hearing over the year, over the radio and reading in the newspapers that individuals and planes that had been used to provide military assistance to the contras, have also been identified as planes that have been used to bring drugs into the United States.

Could you elaborate? Have you heard any or read any of these reports?

Ms. WROBLESKI. Well, I did not see "West 57th Street" or whatever it's called, but I read the transcript in preparation for today's hearing as well as some others last week, queried where we sat on this issue among the agencies involved, and my understanding is that we are taking the allegation seriously and that there is an inner agency investigation into that issue.

I'm further advised and I know it to be a fact that we have told the contras as a government, not just the State Department, but as a government, we have told the——

Mr. RANGEL. The government of the contras?

Ms. WROBLESKI. No, we have told—all of us in the government have told the contras that if we find anyone who is trafficking drugs for the cause or trafficking drugs for personal gain, we will cut them off and in fact, we had one incident where we had allegations, but not evidence, and the contras themselves separated that person from the contra.

Mr. RANGEL. In the case that I asked our staff to look into, there wasn't an allegation that the contras were involved in the drug trafficking even though I've heard that in other reports, but the one specifically that I listened to with great interest that came over one of the public broadcasting radio stations, FM88.5 that came across yesterday May 4 1987 at 9:30 a.m., in case you want to get the transcript, we're talking about specific pilots and specific planes that had been identified by Customs as planes that were, in fact, used to traffic in drugs and further identification showed that

they were also leased and used by the United States Government, the military, to transport arms and equipment to the contras.

So, in that radio report, it didn't come across that the contras were dealing in drugs, it was that we were dealing with people who were dealing in drugs and supporting the contras.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Perhaps I didn't make the distinction clear. I was trying to answer one question and anticipate the next one.

I have heard the same allegations that you have and we have an inner agency investigation going on into precisely that issue, you know, is there something funny going on here.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I would not want to get involved in national security questions, but I told Mr. Jurith, the staff director, that I can't understand why staff is having a big problem if Customs has identified a plane that's being used in drugs and they're saying that my Government is using a plane to do whatever mission that they're doing, why staff can't tell me whether or not this same employee is involved in two businesses.

Are you saying that it takes an inter-departmental investigation to determine as to whether or not, in fact, our Government is using drug traffickers in order to provide a service for another foreign policy mission.

I mean, has that been looked into and decided that it was too sensitive to verify?

Ms. WROBLESKI. No. Just the reverse. I would say that it's been taken so seriously that what we want is an entire look at the issue.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me put it this way. The plane has been identified with a serial number by Customs. They're on our side.

The Customs have definitely decided that this is a plane that's used to traffic drug, all of that EPIC, El Paso Intelligence Center information. Customs says that in further inquiring with the pilot-employee, that they produced documents to show that they were doing work for, to get your attention I would say State Department, but they really said for the military, I assume following through with a State Department mission.

I would want someone to say that that's wrong, that the press has distorted the facts that here is the plane number which we'll give to you today and we've checked it out and we can't find anybody in our Government that's using this plane for any legitimate purpose.

Actually, Customs let him go when they saw the military contract they had.

Ms. WROBLESKI. I'm not familiar with this specific case.

Mr. RANGEL. Okay, well, off the record, we're going to give you as much. That's 88.5. I'm not giving a commercial. It was on yesterday morning, FM, at 9:30 a.m. and it was a one half hour or more report with names of the people involved.

If there aren't any more questions, if you don't have any questions of us—

Ms. WROBLESKI. Oh, well, I didn't know I had that opportunity. [Laughter.]

Mr. RANGEL. We are so confused as to what's going on in the Executive Branch that if we can share with you the things that we will be doing and knowing that some of these things are going to be resisted, I can tell you that we don't believe that the House of Rep-

representatives should be formulating foreign policy. We don't believe that we should be demanding sanctions. We don't believe that we should be developing strategies, but we're going to keep coming until we can see that there's no need for us to do these things.

And it's a rough thing to say, because we may cripple a government by denying them funds at a time where they've made a commitment to actually do something in eradication, but we have a constituency and where we don't hear from your boss you know, the Secretary of State has said he doesn't believe in sanctions. The Attorney General has said he doesn't believe in sanctions.

And when we passed a law in the House and Senate, we didn't ask what the Executive believed in. We asked whether they intended to enforce the law once it's signed into law.

And if you don't believe in sanctions, what do you believe in, we asked the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.

Now, we know that you're out there every day, Madam Secretary, doing the best you can, but you're dealing with some people that have gone through a whole lot of United States Governments, a whole lot of Secretaries of State, a whole lot of Assistant Secretaries of State, and even that veteran that you sit next to, Mr. Hesse ask him to share with you some of the commitments made by the Bolivian government and it will bring you to tears—I mean when they actually stay in power for more than two weeks.

But we still will be supporting you and we hope when you see us legislating in an area that you don't believe it's necessary, such as czars, that you might share with us why you don't believe it's necessary and as Mr. Dornan would say, we're anxious to get out of over-legislating in this issue.

Thank you for your support. We'll send you more information on the contra and we hope that you might not wait to the next hearing to share with us what you can and if, indeed, you find that the information is sensitive and you cannot share it with us, we hope you would let us know because if we don't hear, we will have hearings and we're not here to embarrass our government.

Thank you.

Ms. WROBLESKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENT OF THE

HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL

CHAIRMAN

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

HEARING ON COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CONTROL

2257 RAYBURN HOB

9:30 AM

WEDNESDAY, MAY ⁶~~29~~, 1987

GOOD MORNING LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

TODAY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL WILL CONDUCT A HEARING ON OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA. WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE AS OUR WITNESS THIS MORNING THE HONORABLE ANN WROBLESKI, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS.

COLOMBIA IS A CRITICAL NATION IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 75% OF THE PROCESSED COCAINE THAT ENTERS THE UNITED STATES COMES FROM COLOMBIA.

HOWEVER, NOTWITHSTANDING SUSTAINED EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES, OUR DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA HAVE REACHED A DANGEROUSLY LOW POINT. RECENTLY, MR. GILMAN AND I HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF REPRESENTING HOUSE SPEAKER JIM WRIGHT AT A MEETING OF THE ANDEAN PARLIAMENT IN BOGOTA AND PAIPA, COLOMBIA. IN OUR MEETINGS WITH COLOMBIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT BARCO AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE THE FOLLOWING FACTS CAME TO LIGHT.

--BECAUSE OF FEAR AND INTIMIDATION THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE TO PROSECUTE MAJOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS IN THEIR OWN CIVILIAN COURTS.

-2-

--THE COLOMBIAN SUPREME COURT HAS STRUCK DOWN THE "STATE OF SIEGE" LAW THAT ALLOWED THE PROSECUTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS IN MILITARY COURTS.

--EXTRADITION AND PROSECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES WAS THE THREAT THE TRAFFICKERS FEARED MOST. YET, THE COLOMBIAN SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED VOID THE RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTING THE EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

--THERE WAS LITTLE PROGRESS ON THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT/ERADICATION EFFORT IN COLOMBIA IN 1986. ALTHOUGH THE MARIJUANA ERADICATION CAMPAIGN DESTROYED 9,700 HECTARES IN 1986, COCA ERADICATION WAS NONEXISTENT. MOREOVER, SINCE JANUARY 1, 1987, ONLY 4 COCAINE PROCESSING LABS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ALTHOUGH MANY MORE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. ARRESTS OF MAJOR FIGURES IN THE DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS ARE RARELY MADE.

--OVER 30 JUDGES HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED, AS WELL AS THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND JOURNALISTS WHO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NARCO-TERRORISTS ON THE EDITORIAL PAGES OF THE NATION'S NEWSPAPERS.

WHILE PRESIDENT BARCO HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO AN AGGRESSIVE FIGHT AGAINST THE COCAINE TRAFFICKERS AND TO THE CONTINUATION OF EXTRADITION OF DRUG CRIMINALS TO THE U.S. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT AN EXTRADITION WENT FORWARD LAST WEEK.

I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA WILL SIGNAL TO THE WORLD THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING AND DRUG ABUSE.

THE DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE DECLARED WAR ON COLOMBIA AND ARE ENGAGED IN AN ALL OUT EFFORT EMPLOYING FEAR, VIOLENCE, AND INTIMIDATION TO PERMANENTLY PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA FROM MOVING AGAINST THEM. THIS GRAVE SITUATION IS A FATAL THREAT TO THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN COLOMBIA AS WELL AS TO THE OTHER ANDEAN NATIONS WHERE THE TRAFFICKERS HOLD SWAY.

WE MUST RESPOND IN KIND TO THIS CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER PRESENTED BY THE TRAFFICKERS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. PRESIDENT BARCO AND OTHER ANDEAN LEADERS HAVE DISCUSSED CALLING A SUMMIT OF THE ANDEAN PRESIDENTS TO DISCUSS THE NARCO-TERRORIST THREAT. MR. GILMAN AND I ENCOURAGED PRESIDENT BARCO IN THE EFFORT. WE URGE PRESIDENT REAGAN TO EXPAND THIS EFFORT TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA TO JOIN IN THIS INITIATIVE. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO SIT DOWN WITH THE ANDEAN LEADERS AS ALLIES. BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA MUST STOP DEBATING WHO IS AT FAULT FOR THE DRUG PROBLEM, PRODUCER OR CONSUMER NATIONS, AND INSTEAD PLOT OUT A STRATEGY TO WIN THE WAR BEING WAGED AGAINST ALL OF US BY THE TRAFFICKERS.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT HOW OUR FEDERAL DRUG POLICIES ARE BEING COORDINATED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IN A HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE LAST WEEK, ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STEPHEN TROTT, WHO IS THE COORDINATOR OF THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING, COULD NOT EXPLAIN TO THE COMMITTEE OUR POLICY IN COLOMBIA OR IN OTHER DRUG PRODUCING NATIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO MS. WROBLESKI EXPLAINING TO THE COMMITTEE HER PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD HEADED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AS WELL AS HOW SHE COORDINATES INM'S PROGRAM WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
AT THE HEARING ON DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN COLOMBIA

MAY 6, 1987

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I ALSO WANT TO WELCOME OUR DISTINGUISHED ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE TODAY TO DISCUSS OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA. MS. WROBLESKI, I WANT TO COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR TIRELESS EFFORTS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS IN THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL.

HAVING RECENTLY RETURNED FROM COLOMBIA WITH SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN RANGEL, I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE FOUND A VERY BLEAK PICTURE. OVER THE YEARS, THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE A STRONG Foothold IN THAT NATION, AND AT THE PRESENT TIME, THEY VIRTUALLY HOLD THE ENTIRE NATION HOSTAGE. IN EFFECT, THEY HAVE DECLARED WAR ON THE NATION OF COLOMBIA BY EMPLOYING FEAR, VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION TO PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT FROM MOVING AGAINST THEM. IN RECENT TIMES, NEARLY 30 JUDGES, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE RODRIGO LARA BONILLA, THE EDITOR OF COLOMBIA'S SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWSPAPER AND HUNDREDS OF POLICE AND INFORMANTS HAVE BEEN MURDERED BY THE TRAFFICKERS. THIS SITUATION THREATENS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS NOT ONLY IN COLOMBIA, BUT ALL THE NATIONS OF THE ANDEAN REGION.

THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA HAS COME TO A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL. IN ADDITION TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN 1984, AND THE MURDER OF NUMEROUS OTHER JUDGES SINCE THAT TIME, THE TRAFFICKERS WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIRTUAL GUTTING OF THE PALACE OF JUSTICE IN 1985, IN WHICH IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PRIMARY MOTIVE IN THE ATTACK WAS THE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS RELATED TO NARCOTICS EXTRADITION CASES.

I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT THE SIGHT OF THAT GUTTED BUILDING WAS CHILLING AND A VIVID EXAMPLE OF THE RUTHLESS CONSEQUENCES OF THE STRONG TIES BETWEEN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND TERRORISTS GROUPS, NOT ONLY IN COLOMBIA, BUT AROUND THE WORLD.

THE STATUS OF OUR CURRENT EXTRADITION TREATY WITH COLOMBIA MUST BE GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION. COLOMBIA SIGNED THAT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES IN 1979, AND THEN COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT BETANCUR HANDED 17 COLOMBIANS OVER TO THE UNITED STATES, PLUS TWO AMERICANS AND ONE WEST GERMAN -- ALL SUSPECTED OF DRUG TRAFFICKING. SINCE 1982, THE UNITED STATES HAS REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL 177 EXTRADITIONS, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MUCH PUBLICIZED EXTRADITION OF DRUG-KINGPIN CARLOS LEHDER A FEW MONTHS AGO, THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ACT ON THE BULK OF THESE REQUESTS.

THE COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARE AFRAID OF BEING EXTRADITED TO THE UNITED STATES -- AND RIGHTFULLY SO. YET, A SERIES OF OPINIONS RECENTLY ISSUED BY THE COLOMBIAN SUPREME COURT HAS PLACED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY IN SERIOUS DOUBT, TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE IF ANY EXTRADITIONS CAN TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME. WHILE I FULLY RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHICH ARE RAISED ON THIS ISSUE, WE SIMPLY MUST FIND SOME WAY TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA TO SEE THAT THE TREATY BECOMES FULLY FUNCTIONAL. MS. WROBLESKI, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SHED SOME LIGHT ON THIS ISSUE FOR US HERE TODAY.

THE BLEAK PICTURE IN COLOMBIA GOES FAR BEYOND THE STATUS OF EXTRADITION. DESPITE THAT GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES IN REDUCING DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING, OUR RECENT VISIT YIELDED THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT THESE EFFORTS HAVE COME TO A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL. IN ADDITION TO THE VERY SERIOUS LEGAL PROBLEMS I HAVE MENTIONED, PROGRESS ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG ERADICATION WAS SLIM DURING 1986. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PROGRESS ON THE AERIAL HERBICIDAL ERADICATION OF MARIJUANA AS WELL AS ON THE SEIZURE OF BULK QUANTITIES OF PROCESSED MARIJUANA, COCA ERADICATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF COCAINE PROCESSING LABORATORIES WAS VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. ABOUT 9,700 HECTARES OF MARIJUANA WERE ERADICATED, OR ABOUT 70% OF THE ESTIMATED 12,000 TO 13,000 HECTARES OF MARIJUANA UNDER CULTIVATION, BUT ONLY 4 COCAINE PROCESSING LABORATORIES WERE DESTROYED, ALTHOUGH MANY MORE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. COLOMBIA SIMPLY HAS TO DO A BETTER JOB, AND I HOPE TO HEAR SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM MS. WROBLESKI IN THAT REGARD.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I ALSO WANT TO TOUCH ON SOME OF THE BRIGHT SPOTS WE OBSERVED ON OUR RECENT VISIT TO COLOMBIA. IN OUR MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT VIRGILIO BARCO, I WAS IMPRESSED BY HIS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO A MORE EFFECTIVE EXTRADITION POLICY, AND TO HIS INTENTION TO PRESS AHEAD IN HIS CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY COCAINE PROCESSING LABORATORIES.

THE COLOMBIAN PRESS ALSO DESERVES HIGH PRAISE FOR THEIR DEDICATION AND BRAVERY IN CONTINUING TO EXPOSE AND SPOTLIGHT THE CRIMES OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS, AND THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES THEY ARE HAVING ON THE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY OF COLOMBIA. THESE EFFORTS CONTINUE DESPITE THE MURDERS OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR RAUL ECHAVERRIA OF CALI'S LEADING NEWSPAPER, EL OCCIDENTE, AND GUILLERMO CANO, OWNER OF EL ESPECTADOR, FOR THEIR OUTSPOKEN WRITING AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS.

SHORTLY AFTER OUR DEPARTURE FROM COLOMBIA, SOME 700,000 STUDENTS PARADED IN THE STREETS ON MARCH 17, PROTESTING THE PERVASIVENESS OF DRUGS IN COLOMBIA AND URGING AN ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ANTI-NARCOTICS CAMPAIGN TO CLEAN HOUSE IN THAT GOVERNMENT. WE MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SUCH STRONG SUPPORT FOR OUR ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.

FINALLY, COLOMBIA IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR CONTINUING TO WORK WITH ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE ANDEAN REGION TO IMPROVE JOINT OPERATIONS AND MUTUAL SUPPORT ALONG THEIR COMMON BORDERS. REPORTS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A U.S. - LATIN AMERICAN SUMMIT ON DRUGS COULD FURTHER SUCH ESSENTIAL EFFORTS TO THE ENTIRE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

WE MUST BUILD ON THE SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION IN COLOMBIA AND PRODUCE SUSTAINED POSITIVE RESULTS. WE ARE CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN A COCAINE EPIDEMIC AND EUROPE STANDS ON THE BRINK OF SUCH AN EPIDEMIC.

LAST YEAR, THE SELECT COMMITTEE ESTIMATED THAT 178 TONS OF COCAINE WERE DIRECTED AT OUR SHORES, WITH 150 TONS BEING CONSUMED AND ONLY 28 TONS BEING SEIZED. THE SITUATION IS NOT PROJECTED TO BE ANY BETTER THIS YEAR. I HOPE THAT OUR HEARING TODAY WILL SHED LIGHT ON HOW THIS SITUATION CAN BE PROMPTLY REVERSED.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

TESTIMONY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANN B. WROBLESKI
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE & CONTROL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 6, 1987

CHAIRMAN RANGEL:

The Department of State is encouraged by the willingness of your Committee to continue to investigate at first hand the narcotics control issues confronting our government, and will work closely with you on preparations for your forthcoming trip to Latin America.

Today, we are providing a background briefing on Colombia. We have a formal text, which is actually an abridged, updated version of the Colombia chapter in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report which we submitted March 1. I encourage Members to retain their copies, and use them as background material for the actual study mission.

Status of Illicit Narcotics Production and Trafficking.

Colombia continued its effective attack on narcotics production and trafficking in 1986, despite increasing threats and violence by traffickers and the insurgents in league with them. Colombia destroyed an estimated 69-75 percent of its cannabis crop through aerial herbicide eradication, while continuing an experimental coca eradication program. Police seized 540 cocaine paste and hydrochloride (HCL) laboratories. In the first two months of 1987, police raided 28 laboratories.

There is no legal coca cultivation in Colombia, although there are indigenous tribes that grow and chew coca leaf. Illicit coca cultivation in 1986 was estimated at 15,000-17,000 hectares, but because crop surveys are not current, the figure may be higher. Flooding on the Guaviare River in June and July may have destroyed as much as 3,000 hectares.

Colombia is primarily involved in final stage processing and international distribution of cocaine HCL. Home-made cocaine base and larger quantities of base imported from Peru and Bolivia are refined into cocaine HCL in an estimated two dozen relatively sophisticated laboratories located sometimes hundreds of miles from the base laboratories. These larger sites are found near remote, clandestine airstrips, and because there are no roads, police can attack these sites only by

-2-

helicopter. Smaller operations apparently are being established on the north coast and on farms near major metropolitan areas. An estimated 2000-3000 primitive laboratories are used to convert coca leaves to cocaine base. Base processing labs are generally small, with one processing site serving a few fields covering several hectares.

Approximately 80 mt of Peruvian and Bolivian base entered Colombia in 1986. Operation Blast Furnace, the US-Bolivian interdiction effort, had no noticeable effect on paste/base availability in Colombia. Prices for base varied from a low of approximately \$3,100 per kilogram at processing centers in the south to about \$3,700 on the northern coast.

Acetone and ether, essential chemicals for the final stage of cocaine processing, are controlled substances. Neither is produced in Colombia and must be smuggled into the country for processing HCL. Ether is the more critical and since it has no significant industrial use in Colombia, legitimate imports are minimal. Most ether comes from European or Brazilian manufacturers and is smuggled in from Venezuela, Brazil or Ecuador. Fifty-five gallon drums of ether cost \$5,000-\$7,000 delivered to laboratories, although prices generally fell throughout 1986, due to the increasing use of other precursor chemicals.

Traffickers usually transport cocaine HCL by air to northern Colombia for further export, principally to the United States. Only an insignificant portion is believed to be consumed in country. International dealers normally use private aircraft or commercial air cargo to ship cocaine; the time delays involved using commercial maritime vessels or cargo make these modes less popular. Colombia's San Andres Island, close to the Nicaraguan coast, is a popular maritime transshipment point. Wholesale export prices for cocaine HCL ranged from \$4,200 to \$6,000 per kilogram at the end of 1986, compared to \$6,500-\$7,500 earlier in the year.

Most cannabis cultivation takes place on marginal public land in the Sierra Nevada and Perija mountains. The average field is less than a hectare, tended by an itinerant farmer who may grow a few subsistence crops as well. Yield per hectare per harvest averages 1.1 mt of commercially usable marijuana. Gross cultivation was 12-13,000 hectares. With 9,000 hectares eradicated, total production for 1986 is estimated at 2530-3630 mt. In 1986, Colombian police seized and destroyed 1,327 mt of processed marijuana. An estimated 70-90 percent of Colombian marijuana moves by private maritime vessels, with most of the remainder transported by private aircraft.

Opium poppy is cultivated in limited amounts, but no poppy fields or heroin laboratories were discovered in 1986. There were reports that opium gum sold in Bogota for approximately \$5,000 per kilogram or for \$4,000 per kilogram in lots of 10 kilograms or more.

The 1986 seizure of 30,000 methaqualone tablets was the first of this drug in approximately two years. The white tablets bearing the familiar "Lemon 714" marking were obviously counterfeit, reportedly tableted in Cartagena from raw material produced in Europe. This is consistent with 1970's trafficking patterns when Colombian traffickers imported methaqualone powder from Europe for clandestine tableting and smuggling to the world market.

Most Colombian trafficking organizations lack well-defined structures, and tend to consist of a small nucleus of family members related by blood or marriage, and a few close associates. Other participants, such as pilots and laboratory operators, apparently work under short-term contracts and may well serve the interests of several organizations.

The majority of cocaine trafficking is controlled by "the Medellin cartel", a tightly-knit group of Medellin-based families. This group is involved in all stages of the industry, including coca growing, importing paste and base from Peru and Bolivia, HCL processing, and money laundering.

Increasingly, cocaine shipments appear to belong to several organizations. This avoids sending half-empty planes or boats and, more importantly, minimizes individual losses in the event of seizure. It is reportedly now possible to insure a load against seizure, with even "legitimate" businessmen becoming involved.

As many as 35 independent marijuana organizations operate in Colombia. These organizations may be changing their methods -- traffickers are responding to maritime seizures in the Caribbean by flying loads via Mexico on aircraft belonging to cocaine traffickers. Other reports suggest that a weakening marijuana market, caused by eradication and interdiction, is prompting marijuana smugglers to turn to cocaine trafficking.

The traffickers' ties with political insurgent groups have become more apparent in recent years. Since the early 1980's, guerrillas have protected coca and marijuana fields, cocaine laboratories and clandestine air strips in exchange for cash and weapons. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped guerrilla organization in Colombia, is believed to be the most actively

-4-

involved. The FARC is primarily a rural organization, with half of its 33 fronts located in marijuana and coca cultivation zones. Recent information suggests that FARC involvement may extend to owning and operating some cocaine laboratories. The First FARC Front in the Intendencia of Guaviare controls the production and processing of coca base in that area, and reportedly has a laboratory in its headquarters. Other guerrilla groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the M-19, are also thought to be cooperating with traffickers.

Colombia is not a money laundering center. With the country's high inflation, lack of convertible currency and long-term insurgent problem, Colombia has limited attraction as an investment environment.

Accomplishments in 1986

Colombia sustained a strong, successful attack on marijuana, combining an effective aerial herbicidal eradication campaign and seizures of bulk quantities of processed marijuana. Eradication efforts through November destroyed 69-75% of the estimated 12,000-13,000 hectares under cultivation. About 9,000 hectares were fumigated, compared with 8,200 hectares in 1985. An estimated 1,327 mt of the net harvest was seized. Net marijuana available for export was estimated at 1161-2261 MT.

The traffickers mounted a strong media campaign to persuade government officials to halt eradication. Although the campaign aroused some opposition to herbicidal eradication, it did not achieve its objective.

Wholesale prices to the farmer rose 100 percent from late 1985 to late 1986. Export prices increased 60 percent. Vessel seizures decreased by 32 percent in 1986 and the quantity of bulk marijuana seized decreased by 23 percent.

Because key national police personnel are proceeding cautiously in the face of increasingly dangerous conditions, cocaine base and HCL seizures were a modest 3,979 kilograms. The cocaine traffickers stepped up their intimidation of Colombian officials, threatening and assassinating members of the Supreme Court, the legislature, high-ranking police officers, and journalists. The investigative agencies' lack of resources, wariness within the police ranks and corruption have also hampered law enforcement activities.

While few large-scale cocaine HCL laboratories were dismantled in 1986, the police maintained an active campaign

against base labs and some smaller HCL operations, destroying 540 such facilities. The National Police destroyed 40 clandestine airstrips.

Manual coca eradication is increasingly risky because most fields are in guerrilla territory accessible only by helicopter. Nevertheless, 600 hectares were manually destroyed; 15-17,000 hectares were under cultivation. In late 1985, the National Council of Dangerous Drugs (NCDD) authorized the herbicidal eradication of up to 1,000 hectares of coca on a broad-based experimental basis. Approximately 290 hectares were eradicated in early 1986 using a systemic herbicide identified as acceptable during 1985 experiments. Wholesale eradication was halted, however, when the U.S. manufacturer expressed various concerns including worry about potential law suits. U.S. officials are discussing possible solutions to these concerns with the manufacturer, as well as seeking alternative suppliers of effective herbicides.

As noted above, judges, police officers, Congressmen, journalists, and private citizens have become victims of assassination attempts. In July Magistrate Hernando Baquero Borda, who was a member of the delegation which negotiated the extradition treaty in 1979 and a member of the Supreme Court's penal chamber, was shot and killed on his way to work. In September, the national airline (Avianca) security chief, Carlos Arturo Luna Rojas, was shot and killed shortly after he discovered a cocaine shipment aboard a company plane.

Deputy Director Raul Echaverria of Cali's leading newspaper, El Occidente, was murdered September 17, the day after he wrote an editorial supporting the death penalty for traffickers. In October Medellin Superior Tribunal Magistrate Gustavo Zuluaga Serna was killed and his wife wounded by armed men, apparently hired by traffickers. In November Colonel Jaime Ramirez, ex-chief of SANU, was shot and killed by four armed men who fired repeatedly on his car. Guillermo Cano Isaza, owner of the newspaper, "El Espectador" was killed in December, due to his strong and vocal positions against the narcotics cartel. Early in 1987, Enrique Parejo Gonzales, Ambassador to Hungary and ex-Minister of Justice, was wounded but survived an assassination attempt in Budapest, linked to his role in supporting the US-Colombian extradition treaty. This shooting was a demonstration of Colombian traffickers' long reach and memory.

Six traffickers were extradited in 1986, despite the extradition treaty's political unpopularity and the traffickers' violence. President Barco showed his continued support for extradition by signing back into law the treaty's

enabling legislation, which the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional on a technicality in December. In February, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court declared the 1979 treaty no longer in effect, and a ruling by the whole court on the treaty's constitutionality is expected soon. The GOC, however, demonstrated its commitment to extradition by swiftly complying with the 1984 extradition order to return major trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas to the United States for prosecution.

Coordination with neighboring countries is improving, resulting in joint operations and mutual support along the borders. Regional cooperation is facilitated by a U.S.-funded regional communications network which consists of a secure voice/teletype system linking police headquarters in Bogota, Caracas, Lima and Quito.

The police have refurbished their tactical communications network, upgraded essential field gear, restored a five-year old fleet of vehicles and secured armor protection for helicopters and crews in the face of an increasingly hostile environment.

Plans, Programs and Timetables

Law enforcement agencies will intensify efforts in 1987 to stop the entry of coca paste and base and precursor chemicals into Colombia, to locate and destroy cocaine laboratories and processed marijuana, and to destroy clandestine airstrips. Having attacked laboratories and transit sites in areas where insurgent activity is low, the police need to be prepared to raid targets likely to be protected by guerrilla units.

The 1987 air program envisions the construction of more advanced bases, purchase of additional navigational equipment, acquisition of more equipment and body protective armor, and an upgrading of security and training.

The 1987 National Police strategy for the Special Anti-Narcotics Unit (SANU) calls for expanded operations in remote sections of the country. Improvement in SANU intelligence capabilities through development of a time-sensitive photo reconnaissance program and interpretation section is also planned.

Officials from Colombia and six other Latin American countries met to draft and implement drug control agreements, among them the Lara Bonilla Treaty, signed April 30 1986 and named after Colombia's slain Justice Minister. These wide-ranging agreements address surveillance mechanisms, border

controls, internal controls on production, precursor chemicals, extradition, sources of technical and financial assistance, and money laundering.

Colombia signed three new project agreements with UNFDAC for strengthening the NCDD, establishing a data bank, training drug education workers, and promoting a countrywide drug education program. West Germany and Italy have earmarked funds for UNFDAC crop substitution programs. ::

Adequacy of Legal and Law Enforcement Measures

Colombia's new drug statute, Law 30 of January 1986, provides for sentences of up to 12 years for trafficking and from one to three years for use. The law limits undercover police investigations but does include a conspiracy statute. It makes the NCDD the oversight committee responsible for regulating importation and manufacture of all controlled substances and for coordinating prevention campaigns and educational programs. The law allows police to seize privately owned airstrips, used in drug trafficking and provides penalties of two to five years' imprisonment for trafficking in precursor chemicals. There is a limited forfeiture provision, and seized property is turned over to the NCDD for distribution to appropriate government entities.

While the new law is stronger than its predecessor, its effectiveness depends upon the investigative ability of enforcement agencies. Undoubtedly the narcotics program's greatest weakness is the lack of an elite corps of investigators and prosecutors sufficiently trained, equipped, motivated and protected. To address this weakness, President Barco in March designated 39 judges to investigate and try narcotics offenses, and authorized the denial of bail or probation. In addition the ability of the courts to prosecute traffickers has been hampered by intimidation and corruption.

The NCDD sets much of Colombia's narcotics policy. It reviews abuse and prevention programs, eradication efforts, related environmental and health concerns, the disposition of seized assets, and seizure statistics. Nine ministries and agencies are represented on the NCDD.

The Colombian National Police (CNP) was designated in 1980 as the lead narcotics enforcement agency. This 60,000-man paramilitary force has nationwide security responsibilities. The CNP is organized under the Ministry of Defense and is headed by a major general. In 1980 the CNP established SANU, the principal agency with which the U.S. cooperates in interdiction and eradication. SANU consists of 1,500 personnel

-8-

divided into 12 companies in key narcotics trafficking regions. It also has 11 small intelligence units. F-2 (DIJIN) is the CNP's plain-clothes investigative arm, consisting of about 6,000 personnel nationwide. The F-2 has a hand-picked, 50-agent anti-narcotics unit to handle complex investigations. In January 1987, the CNP created a new command level to oversee all anti-narcotics activities, headed by Brigadier General Miguel Antonio Gomez Padilla. The new command has authority over SANU, SAPOL, and the narcotics sections of F-2, and should lead to more effective coordination.

Recently, there has been an encouraging upturn in local police involvement in anti-narcotics activities. Successes include Carlos Lehder's arrest by the Medellin unit, and two major seizures last week in the Cauca Valley, one of a high technology laboratory and the other of 11,000 gallons of ether in the outskirts of Cali. These two seizures netted enough precursor chemicals to convert 3.6 metric tons of cocaine; these seizures also indicate a trend of locating labs nearer centers of population.

SAPOL, the fastest growing element of Colombia's anti-narcotics program, has evolved into a highly professional organization. It has 255 personnel, 14 fixed-wing and 21 rotary-wing aircraft, a central base at Bogota, and three advanced bases in key narcotics areas. It runs its own flight school, maintenance program, automated inventory system and communications network. Because of its relatively new status, SAPOL relies on a number of experienced contracted civilians, but most personnel are active-duty police.

The Department of Administrative Security is a special investigative unit reporting directly to the President. It has enforcement authority in narcotics matters and recently has stepped up its participation in drug investigations.

Colombian Customs includes a 13 agent narcotics section which is one of four special sections dealing with investigations, fraud, intelligence and contraband in the Customs Directorate Division of Special Investigations. Neither the narcotics section nor the directorate has been notably successful in interdicting narcotics, due to recurring scandals and personnel upheavals.

The United States and Canada are the only countries with full-time narcotics enforcement officials assigned to Bogota. France plans to assign two agents in 1987. Other countries have narcotics police or customs agents in adjacent countries who monitor Colombia as well.

-9-

DEA provides an annual two-week investigative course for approximately 30 police agents. In 1986, 27 investigators from three agencies attended a drug identification course and 118 SAPOL personnel received 113 weeks of training. Of particular importance for the future is a mechanism to allow CNP personnel to receive U.S. military training. In particular, training is needed in small unit tactics, communications, air mobile operations, physical security, aviation operations, logistics, and maintenance.

Domestic Abuse Problem

Drug abuse is increasing in Colombia. Of greatest concern is bazuco (a mixture of dried coca paste or base, with tobacco or marijuana), which is cheap, widely available, and extremely addictive. A 1985 survey conducted in Medellin (the country's second largest city) indicated that 2.4 percent of the population uses bazuco, with most users under 30 years of age.

Colombia has an extensive drug awareness program. Much of the credit belongs to the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF), which has trained thousands of social workers, doctors and parents groups. It runs a widely-used narcotics information center in Bogota. Other involved government agencies include the Ministry of Education, which develops after-school programs, most involving sports; the Ministry of Communications, which broadcasts media spots; and the Ministry of Health, which works with limited success to convince doctors that drug abuse is not simply a form of mental illness. The Embassy has supported private, voluntary organizations which will be an umbrella for private sector narcotic public awareness efforts.

Surgir, a private foundation based in Medellin, publishes drug education materials, maintains a hot line, counsels parent and student groups, and regularly sponsors first-rate conferences on prevention and rehabilitation. The Red Cross has organized many student groups in Bogota whose primary goal is to reduce drug abuse. More than 50 other private groups, sponsor drug prevention programs.

Conclusion

There are many stories to tell about the war Colombia is waging against narcotics traffickers. Few if any examples are more telling than the precedent being set by the Colombian media. The Colombian traffickers engage in message sending revenge, and have killed and threatened the media to stifle public opinion. Despite these threats, the media's extensive coverage of narcotics issues is impressive, requiring real

-10-

courage by reporters and editors to report on traffickers. They must sign their stories as "the investigative unit of the Colombian press" to protect their families against reprisals. But, still they publish, and the citizens of Colombia got the true facts about the killing of Colonel Jaime Ramirez, the extradition of Lehder, and all the other sorry practices of the traffickers. One of the strongest assurances we have for the future of the anti-narcotics campaign in Colombia is that the traffickers have lost the battle for public opinion in Colombia to a brave cadre of editors and reporters, who have earned our lasting admiration.

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