NORTHUMBRIA POLICE

CRIME PREVENTION MANUAL

Introduction

Crime Prevention is defined as:-

"THE ANTICIPATION, RECOGNITION AND APPRAISAL OF A RISK OF CRIME AND THE INITIATION OF ACTION TO REMOVE OR REDUCE IT"

The purpose of this manual is to assist officers when giving advice on Crime Prevention and to give operational staff an insight into the many facets of the subject including practical hints which will help in their day to day duties.

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CHIEF CONSTABLE

THIS MANUAL CONTAINS RESTRICTED INFORMATION

CONTENTS

SECTION ONE

Facts Established at the Outset

It is very difficult to make a building, (commercial or domestic) and even more so, a complete site area, inaccessible to determined thieves.

To carry protection to extremes would be to make individual premises into virtual 'Banks of England'. The disadvantages of this are the cost and the reduction of amenities to staff to an unacceptable level. The necessity for some major structural alterations in themselves may be prohibitive, because of expense. Apart from getting into the premises, the thief has also to get his proceeds out. This can be the more tricky or dangerous part, particularly when heavy or bulky goods are to be removed. Additionally he wants to attract as little attention as possible. To summarize, he wants to get in and out as quietly, safely and quickly as he can, with a minimum of effort for the removal of the property.

The ideal would be to achieve a condition where prospective thieves would consider the difficulties and risk too great.

If it is accepted that the criminal cannot be stopped from entering, it follows that the objectives of the defence are to make him as uncomfortable and apprehensive as possible when entering or leaving and to make the attractive goods on the premises as inaccessible to him as possible. This latter point is especially applicable to cash and small valuable objects, which should always be kept in the protection of a suitable modern safe.

When implementing security measures, the ultimate is to have the measures incorporated by architects at the design stage. Sadly this rarely occurs, and the resultant costs involved in carrying out structural alterations usually means that they are not considered. Even if they were considered, they would rarely be carried out in full.

Bearing all these facts in mind we arrive at the topic of **Perimeter** Protection. Perimeter Protection is important and the following points are to be considered when discussing and deciding upon it.

The need for a Definable Perimeter

It is essential to have a definable perimeter. The perimeter — a wall or fence — is designed solely as a barrier to make access and exit more difficult. For dwelling houses it should not be so high as to provide concealment for the intruders. Similarly, any bushes, shrubs or trees around the perimeter should be kept to a minimum and well tended to prevent easy concealment and enable better surveillance. Ideally, they should be sited away from the wall or fence, so as not to be of assistance for climbing. The wall or fence should be well constructed and kept in good order. Gates should be kept to a minimum and be of the same height and the same construction.

The Highways Act 1959, Section 143 (4) provides legislation about barbed wire, Quote:- "Deemed to be a nuisance if likely to injure persons or animals using the highway".

British Standards 1722 Part 10 of 1963 deals with all aspects of security fencing. Other methods considered are the use of anti-climb paint and glass embedded in concrete on the tops of walls.

Lighting

Good lighting, strategically placed, is a great deterrent to thieves.

It can be divided into the following categories:-

Perimeter Lighting With consideration to external approach routes.

Area Lighting Useful for car or lorry parks.

Floodlighting Providing illumination over buildings and walls.

Internal Lighting Will permit supervision of the ground floor and render viewing assistance to the immediate exterior.

Garage and Outhouse Security

This is as important as the security required for the actual house. Stored in the garage or outhouse will be all the equipment required by the burglar to effect an easier entry into the house, ie, spades, hammers, chisels etc. Doors should be kept locked with good quality locks or padlocks. Remember that external padlocks are exposed to attacks and therefore should be of very high quality. Windows should be secured by means of security fittings attached to all accessible casements, transomes and sashes. Those not required for ventilation purposes should be secured permanently. Ladders are often found in garages and outhouses. These should be secured in a rack if possible, with a chain and padlock, or some other practical and suitable device. The whole idea is to prevent gaining easy access and removal.

Roofs and Fallpipes

Roofs are used as another means of entry to the house and, therefore, a thorough examination is required. Consider access from adjoining property. Bear in mind that the modern types of roof tile are usually not secured effectively. Anti-climb paint can be effective to prevent access via the roof.

Fallpipes are often used as a means of gaining access to upper floors. If pipes are of solid cast iron construction they can be climbed easily. If they are close to windows then they can be protected by wrapping barbed wire around the pipe, starting at 8' from the ground. Umbrella spikes can be fitted at infrequent intervals or anti-climb paint can be used, starting at 7' from the ground. If consulting architects about new buildings, suggest that fall pipes be revealed into the outline, or built in completely.

Cellars and Yards

Cellar flaps or doors should be secured internally by means of tie-bars and padlock. The external surface of the door should be lined with sheet steel. If no internal access is possible to the flap or door, then they should be secured externally with a good quality padlock bar close shackle padlock of high quality.

Yards provide excellent cover to the thief. If possible, have a door fitted which permits viewing inside the yard. Use lighting as an extra deterrent.

To summarise: good perimeter protection to walls and fences, assisted by lighting with security fittings fixed to

outhouses, garages and external fallpipes, door, roofs and windows will cause doubts to enter, in the thief's mind, will make him work longer and harder to gain entry and in the majority of cases will cause him to, leave your premises alone and transfer his attentions to someone who has not had the good sense to implement security measures.

SECTION TWO

How to Survey Dwelling House

Surveying a dwelling house may be easier and less complicated than business premises, but never the less it is just as important.

Burglary of someones house is in **All** cases, a very disturbing experience. In fact, some people find it so distressing that they are prepared to sell up and move house. The thought of strangers having been in their home rummaging through personal belongings is too much for them.

On approaching the house to be surveyed, pay particular attention to things which may help you when giving your final recommendations, such as:-

1. Type of area.
2. Street lighting.
3. Is property isolated.
4. Likely entry — exit points (side path, open fields, railway lines).
5. Property shielded by high fencing—hedges.
6. Caravan or boats parked in drive (advise use of caravan park).
7. Very valuable goods on display for any person passing by to see.
8. **Always** produce warrant card and observe if householder uses door chain or door viewer. Point out the importance of always asking callers for identification and the use of door security.

Out-of-the-Ordinary Risks

Establish that there is no out-of-the-ordinary risk to the premises. For example:-

1. Status of occupier. Such people as MPs, political extremists and minority group spokesmen may require additional or different protection.
2. Are there any business interests involved in the premises besides the obvious? The surveying officer should ensure that none of the occupiers carry on a trade or business, such as self employed milkmen, market trader, bookmaker, money collector, where cash is or might reasonably be expected to be stored on the premises at any time.
3. Establish if there are any valuable antiques or collections stored in the house. Householders may sometimes consider items as only heirlooms, where in fact they are valuable antiques. There can be no monetary value given as a guideline as to when antiques or collections increase the risk factor of property, only a common sense approach by the surveying officer.

   If the surveying officer suspects that the premises fall into any of the above categories, the advice of a crime prevention officer should be sought before giving final recommendations.

Points to look for

1. Establish which is the final exit door of the dwelling.
2. Always start your survey from the final exit door **Externally** and work round the perimeter of the building. It is a good idea to get into the habit of always working one way.
3. Don't forget boundary fences, outbuildings, garages, roofs, cellars, fallpipes. Observe whether the householder keeps valuables in these buildings and make sure ladders are not left insecure.
4. **Internally,** again start from the final exit door, use the same systematic survey pattern of the interior of the house, visiting all rooms necessary for your advice.
5. Keep the occupier or his representative with you whilst doing your survey.
6. Be aware of the condition, type and quality of doors and windows, e.g. rotting framework, glazed doors, aluminium doors/windows and internal construction of doors.

Advice to be given

1. Be reasonable about the suggested protection and consider the cost of implementing your recommendations. In some cases it will be necessary to make recommendations which are unlikely to be implemented, but never the less they should be made to draw weaknesses etc., to the attention of the occupier and so offset any criticism of inadequate advice originally given.
2. Remember, the cost will invariably be the uppermost factor in the mind of the person to whom you are trying to sell crime prevention. Rather than have no safeguards at all, it may be possible to limit the protection and therefore costs. It is better to have something rather than nothing.
3. Some people (especially the elderly living alone) have devices fitted, perhaps by a well meaning relative, that gives little or no protection, yet psychologically the person has a lot of faith in. Try to give your recommendations to include these devices.

SECTION THREE

LOCKS

How they work

Locks, in one form or another, have been with us now for a long time. Perhaps the oldest known example is the Egyptian pin lock. This operates on the principle of several pins, which by gravity drop into a series of corresponding holes in the locking bar. As the pins can only drop so far, they effectively secure the post and bar together. The pins are released by a rather large tooth brush-like key which pushes the pins up, so releasing the bar.

The Romans advanced this technique using metal keys and lock parts. The art of the locksmith developed in this country during the middle ages.

The Lever operated lock

The method of ensuring one key only will open a lock is to use levers. These are a series of thin plates of differing shapes. Only when the correct key is inserted in the lock will all the levers be set at the correct position, allowing the bolt to be thrown or withdrawn.

The bolt is held in position within the levers by a bolt stub. This travels back and forth through a gate (similar to the letter H). Therefore, anyone attempting to pick the lock must get all the levers in exactly the correct position before the bolt stub will cross the gate. Other devices ensure that any unauthorised tampering with the lock will jam the bolt, thereby requiring a reverse of the key to clear it.

The greater number of levers, the better the security obtainable from the lock. By multiplying the number of levers by the number of lifts the maximum number of variations can be obtained. A two lever lock has only six variations.

British Standard 3621 sets down the minimum standards for thief resistant locks. The lock must be able to withstand a set amount of usage as well as an attack on its bolt up to a given pressure. B.S. 3621 also requires the bolt to withstand the use of a padsaw for a total of five minutes. The bolts therefore are strengthened by either inserting hardened steel rollers or by ceramic inserts. The importance can therefore be seen of recommending a good quality lock.

Mortice Deadlocks

A good quality 5 lever mortice deadlock has few of the defects which are inherent in the rim lock, cylinder rim nightlatch or the poor quality 2 lever mortice lock. The mortice lock and its bolt housing are fitted inside the woodwork of the door and frame and if properly installed, will resist all but the most extreme pressure. Its main qualities are:-

1. The large number of key differences.
2. Hardened steel rollers or inserts in the bolt to prevent cutting.
3. Boxed striking plate to prevent force being used to force back the bolt.

Note

Before recommending the mortice lock, it is essential to ensure that the door and frame are strong enough to accommodate the lock and striking plate. The door should be at least 1⅞" thick. If the lock is fitted to any door less than 1¾" thick it will only weaken the door around the lock.

5 Lever Deadlock



Mortice Sash Lock

The most common type of lock fitted to rear doors in recent years is the mortice sash lock. These locks in the main have only a two lever mechanism and, therefore, there is little scope for the number of key differences. The locking bolt is extremely weak and yields readily to bodily pressure. The striking plate or bolt housing is only a flat plate which can be forced from the frame with little pressure.

It should be recommended that this lock be replaced, or additional protection fitted.

The mortice latch lock can be replaced by fitting the Ingersoll 'Upgrader'. You can remove the old lock and replace it with their good quality 5 lever lock within a short period of time without having to make alterations to the door.

3 Lever Sash Lock



Ingersoll Upgrader



Cylinder Rim Nightlatch

Because this lock is capable of masss production. thereby ensuring low price. it is the most commonly fitted lock used. It has the following disadvantages.

- **a.** It can be operated from inside without a key.
- **b.** The latch can be forced back with celluloid clip or screwdriver.
- **c.** The lock and housing are fastened to the face of the door and the jamb. and yield easily to bodily pressure.



The following examples should be considered if the construction of the door would be weakened by fitting a mortice lock:-

Union 1332

A deadlock is thrown by use of a key from inside and outside.



Yale No.1

When the door is closed. the latch is secured in place. The lock is secured by the turn of the key and can only be opened by a key whether from inside or outside.



Ingersoll No 80

Similar to the Yale No. 1



Sliding Door Locks

The following mortice locks can be used to secure sliding doors. **Note.** Before recommending mortice locks, always ensure that the door is strong enough to take the lock without weakening the door structure.

Examples

Close Bolt Mortice Lock



Single Hook Bolt Mortice Lock



Double Hook Bolt Mortice Lock



Patio Door Locks

In general, the locks fitted to patio doors are poor and offer little resistance to force. All patio doors should be fitted with extra locking devices.

There are a number of makes on the market which in the main, work on the same principle.

The example lock shown below secures the door by pressing the bolt home and a key is required to release the bolt.



FRONT DOOR SECURITY

Door Viewer

This device incorporates a wide angled lens, which is fitted into the door and allows the householder to view any caller without being observed.



Door Chain

A security chain attached to the door and its frame enables the door to be opened fractionally, without allowing access to the caller.



Hinges and Hinge Bolt

Strap hinge. These are mostly found on ledged and braced doors. They are fitted externally and therefore, the door can be opened by removing the screws. To prevent this, the hinges should be bolted on or fixed with non-return clutch head screws.



Hinge Bolt

A hinge bolt should always be fitted to the hinge side of the door when the door is outward opening, and the hinges are exposed. Ledged and braced doors are usually unsuitable for this type of bolt.





Non return Clutch Head Screws

These screws cannot be unscrewed once fitted.



Door Bolt

This is the most common of bolts used to secure doors. It has the disadvantages of being able to be opened without the use of a key and is unsuitable for glass doors.



The Mortice Security Bolt

Both the bolt and its housing are concealed when the door is closed. It operates by use of a key which gives it a great advantage over the slide bolt shown above.



Padlocks

Examples of two poor quality padlocks. Note the open shackle which would allow the use of a crowbar to force it open. This lock has a poor quality casing with exposed rivets and offers little or no protection.





Close Shackled Padlock

Note shackle completely enclosed with a solid case. It must always be used with a good quality padlock bar with security bolts.



Heavy Duty Close Shackled Padlock

5 Levers for key security.



Padlock Bars and Bolt

Poor quality locking bar. Note exposed screws and thin wire hasp. Only suitable for garden sheds. It has no security value.



Good quality padlock bar. Note concealed bolt holes and back plates for extra strength.





SECTION FOUR

PROTECTION OF WINDOWS

The modern architectural trend is towards the ever increasing use of large areas of glass, in order to provide maximum light for display.
The problem of its protection is one which is faced in a large proportion of surveys.
Broadly speaking, there are six main ways in which protection can be achieved, namely the use of:-

1. Bars.
2. Grilles.
3. Special glass.
4. Glass substitutes.
5. Alarm installations.
6. Fastenings.

Bars

The best method of improving the security of windows and preventing access to premises thereby, is the fitting of protection bars.
Although one of the best physical deterrents, bars are somewhat impractical, unsightly and costly in the normal low risk dwelling.
If they are desired to be fitted, e.g., at pantry or toilet windows, the following rules should apply:-

1. They should be manufactured as a complete unit.
2. Steel rod with a minimum diameter of ¾" should be used.
3. Bars to be spaced not more than 4" apart.
4. Cross members to be fitted to prevent "Spring", these not to be more than 2'6" apart and welded to the uprights.
5. The complete unit to be securely fastened inside the window into the masonry or concrete, the ends to be gauged and bedded to a depth of at least 3" and fixed not less than 2" from the exterior surface of the wall — they should not be secured by screws or bolts in woodwork.

Grilles

Physical protection for windows can be obtained by the use of grilles of which there are many types such as collapsible, expanded metal, welded wire, etc. The type of grille to be recommended will depend upon the nature of the premises concerned and the type of goods to be protected.

Ornamental Grilles

Ornamental grilles, made of wrought iron or other metals, can be obtained. They are usually made to order by local craftsmen and their cost is fairly high. It should be remembered that generally they are produced more for decoration than for security but they can offer a measure of protection and are more acceptable in a dwelling house.
When used on fully glazed doors, they have the added advantage of giving safety in preventing young children falling or walking through the glass.

Shutters

Wooden window shutters, fitted externally, provide a good standard of security and, where they are made available, their use is to be recommended.
These may be of plywood, not less than ½" thick.

Glass

Although glass has many security applications, "unbreakable" glass does not exist. Several methods have been devised by manufacturers to ensure that an expanse of glass will not shatter when subjected to violence.
The most common of these is the introduction of wire mesh into the glass, and this product is widely used, because of the improved safety it affords, as fire protection medium (i.e. in smoke doors) and to provide extensive glazing in schools and industry. **Georgian wired glass, however, has very little security application and often makes it easier for the thief.**
Toughened glass, with a strength about five times that of plate glass of comparable thickness, is widely used for security purposes in windows, as "protective" glass screens and in the form of external doors.
It should be remembered, however that this glass depends for its strength upon the maintenance of an intact surface. If punctured, internal forces will cause the entire piece of glass to disintegrate.
Increasing security use is being made today of laminated glass. This usually takes the form of a sheet of transparent plastic sandwiched between two layers of glass and gives a high level of resistance against manual attack. Special adhesives must be used for glazing with laminated glass.

Glass Substitutes

Several types of glass substitutes are used for security purposes and have special application against vandalism. They have a high impact strength. These materials can be **polycarbonates** (makrolan and lexan), **acrylic** (oroglas), **butrate** (cabulite), **polyvinylcholoride** (PVC Darvic) and **fibrelite translucent sheet of polyester resin reinforced with glass fibre with insert of steel mesh.** It should be remembered that some of these materials can easily be scratched and marked.

Alarm Installations

The types of alarm protection available will be discussed later under "Alarm Equipment". It should be remembered that protection does not prevent entry. However, it may deter and advise that an entry attempt has been made.

Fastenings

Numerous security fastenings are available on the market. A section of these devices is included against the type of windows they are most often used upon.
Different types of windows require different protection. The more common type of windows are described and the various methods of improving security outlined.

Sash Windows

Comprise two windows fitted to a box frame, each of which can be raised or lowered.
There are many patent devices to add to the security of

these. The simplest way to secure them is to drill a hole through the wood of the top rail of the bottom sash, and partly into the lower rail of the top sash. Nails can be cut to the appropriate length and inserted in to the holes. This can prevent the two frames being separated even though the sash fastener has been tampered with, such as by the insertion of a knife between the two frames.
Wood blocks can be placed in the tracks of the lower windows so that the window can only be raised 4" — 6". It should be remembered that the top window can still be lowered unhindered.



The Dual Screw

The dual screw consists of a brass outer barrel, which is screwed into the wooden frame of the window. A steel threaded rod screws into the brass barrel and acts as a bolt.
Large windows should be fitted with two such screws and placed well apart.



Casement Window

This is a modern type of window in metal or wood and can be hung either vertically or horizontally.
If hung vertically at the stiles, it is fastened by means of a 'Cockspur" handle.



Other Types of Locks







Wooden and Metal Frames

Transome arms can be easily and inexpensively secured by using catches that lock the arm in the closed position.





Mortice Rack Bolts

Mortice rack bolts are specially designed for the narrow frames of windows. The key turns the bolts into the stile of the window.



Sliding Windows (for horizontal sash)

These work on the same principle as vertical sash windows but they pass in the horizontal plane. Usually they will be found made of aluminium.

Small or thin windows can be locked by snapping a simple device on the runner of the inner window.

Larger windows can be secured by locks that have a retractable bolt which goes into the outer window frame. Care should be taken when drilling the hole that it does not go right through or make contact with the glazing.

The basic problem with these windows is that that they can be easily lifted up out of the lower track, even from the outside. One way of preventing this is to, open up the window fully and insert two or three self tapping screws into the runner. These screws should then be screwed in just far enough to enable the window to slide over them.

Acorn Stop

Recessed into upper sliding sash and extended or fitted by the key to stop the top and bottom sash passing each other. May be fitted in different positions, as shown, to allow the window to be locked, shut or slightly open for ventilation.



Fanlights

These are small windows fitted over the frames of doorways. Cradle bars or expanded metal grilles are usually the most satisfactory way of preventing entrance via them.

Skylights and Lantern Lights

These windows are fitted into the roofs of buildings and glass or perspex is used to permit entrance of light. It is virtually impossible to obtain any security in the windows themselves. The only form of protection worthwhile is the fitting of substantial protection bars below them at ceiling level.

SECTION FIVE

INTRUDER ALARMS — GENERAL

What is an alarm?

An alarm is something that gives a warning of danger or attracts attention to a situation.

Alarms are not intended to solve a situation, but are to advise that a situation exists, so that necessary action can be taken by a third party.

An alarm does not substitute human action. It is an extension of the sensory capabilities.

How Does an Alarm Work?

An electronic intruder alarm requires four basic ingredients:-

1. Electric power.
2. Control switch.
3. Signalling device (e.g. bell).
4. A sensor.

Sensors

The various types of sensors in use today will be shown and explained in greater detail later. For the present, we will consider the sensor as being basically nothing more than a switch which the intruder activates.

This switch then completes the circuit and rings the bell.

Electric Power

The best combination is a system run on mains supply with sealed re-chargeable batteries in case of mains interruption.

Control Switch

The control switch turns an alarm system on and off. Between the on and off position is usually a test position. This position lets the alarm holder see what condition the sensors are in. If a sensor is in the activated state, an indication will be given without ringing the bell. It should not be possible to go from test to **On** if a sensor is activated.

Most domestic systems also have a 'night' position. This allows the alarm holder to set up most of the system leaving certain sensors isolated (e.g. bedroom and bathroom areas).

Certain circuits of the alarm will activate even though the alarm is turned off. These are the tamper circuits and any raid buttons.

Bell

The bell is the normal method of indicating that an alarm has activated. One bell or sounder is positioned inside, near the control panel.

The bell serves 3 functions:-

1. It advertises the alarm (deterrent).
2. It tells the intruder he has been detected (preventive).
3. It tells others a crime has been committed (informative). Outside at least one bell should be positioned high up in a position where it can be seen and can clearly heard. An alarm system is used as a deterrent device and, therefore, it is important that the bell should be housed in a protective yet clearly visible case. A second bell cover (with or without bell) should be put on the other side of the house.

It is usually better to have the real bell at the front as it is then more likely to be heard by people next door and opposite.

The alarm need not have a bell. It could be a sounder, siren or klaxon. Small companies tend to fit the siren type of sounder, basically as it is cheaper and easier to install. Bells are more readily identifiable as an 'alarm' and less likely to annoy neighbours in the event of prolonged ringing. All types of sounders should be contained in a protective case. This case should be tamper proofed to prevent the removal of the cover. However, as the power for the bell comes up the supply wire, if this wire can be cut, the bell will be silenced. To prevent this, the bell can have its own set of rechargeable batteries and its own mini control panel inside the box. This is known as a self-activating bell.

Any attempt to cut wires or pull it off the wall will start the bell ringing and very little short of total destruction will stop it.

Signalling

Besides the bell, systems on higher risk premises often have a **"remote" signalling method** as well. These fall into five main groups.

1. **Direct Line to a Police Station**

   This system connects by dedicated Post Office lines, the premises and the nearest police station. The alarm terminates on a panel in the police control room. This is referred to as a "Home Office Panel".

   The Northumbria force along with most others, no longer permits direct lines, under any circumstances. With four exceptions, all present direct line alarms in control rooms are being phased out.

2. **Dedicated Line to a Commercial Central Station**

   This is currently the most secure form of signalling available.

   The connection, by way of a dedicated telephone line, is to the control room of a commercial alarm company. In this area there are five:-

   a. Thorn (EMI) Protech Ltd., Eldon Square, Newcastle.
   b. Group 4, Felling, Gateshead.
   c. Securicor, Heaton, Newcastle.
   d. Chubb, Cleveland.
   e. Lander, Tynemouth.

   The line (also in direct lines to police stations) is electronically checked several times each second by sending a signal back and forth along it. If the line should be tampered with it creates an alarm condition.

   Central stations can also provide an even more secure system in that they can monitor the opening and closing procedures of the premises.

   For very high risk premises, such as banks

etc., it gives additional security against thieves or dishonest staff illegitimately turning off the alarm at night or weekends.

3. **Telegrouper**
   A less secure type of line termination in this force is found only in Sunderland. All activations give a print out on a machine in the control room.

4. **'999' Dialler**
   The most common and least expensive method. The machine automatically dials '999' and then plays a pre-recorded message, such as, "Police, Police, Police, intruders are entering....."
   The problems of this system are:-
   a. Time — it must go through the operator and control room and be fully listened to.
   b. Susceptibility to attack. Unlike the systems above, any attack on the line will not create an alarm condition and therefore it leaves '999' dialler ineffective.

5. **Digital Dialler**
   A more sophisticated version of the above that sends an electronic signal to a machine in an alarm company control room. It is still very susceptible to attack.

Delay on Bells

Wherever possible on the above systems, the audible bells are delayed for anything up to 15 minutes, to enable police to respond. Should the sending device sense that it is unable to connect with the other end (e.g. line failure) the bells ring instantly.

Criminal Attacks on Intruder Alarms

There are many criminals today, who have the expertise to defeat intruder alarms and, as the years go by, more and more attacks on these systems are to be expected. In an effort to counter this trend it is important that police officers are aware of the basic principles of intruder alarms and some of the more common methods used to defeat them:-

1. The British Telecom line may be cut either at a nearby pole, on the external wall of the protected premises **Or** by lifting the lid off the underground junction box, cutting the lines and then replacing the lid.
   This form of attack will defeat the '999' dialler and the 'digital dialler' and will give no warning whatsoever that an attack has been carried out.
2. By cutting nearby telephone lines, this not only stops the alarm from signalling to the police but in many cases cuts off the telephones in surrounding premises and so reduces the risk of members of the public reporting anything to the Police.
3. On some older '999' systems the line can be dialled from a call box and this engages the line, stopping any signal going out. Most alarm systems are now fitted with ex-directory lines outgoing only (not capable of receiving incoming calls).
4. Alarm bells situated externally on premises can be defeated in a number of ways:-
   a. By removing from walls and physically destroying them.
   b. By filling with 'cavity wall insulation', or other material.
   c. By removing from wall and placing in water, oil or other liquid (look for removed bell boxes in street drains or other likely places).
5. Direct lines to the police and lines to central stations **Will,** if cut, signal a fault to the central station. These faults are always treated as attack situations, and action initiated.
6. Should a police officer be called to an intruder alarm activation and, on arrival at the scene no alarm is sounding or he cannot ascertain the reason for an alarm, it may well be that a GPO line has been cut.
   On gaining entry to the premises concerned, all officers should first of all check the telephone system for a dialling tone. If there is no tone on the line it indicates either a line fault **Or** a cut line, in a position previously described
   Attention should then be given to the premises as thieves may be waiting for the police to withdraw prior to carrying out an attack.
   This method has been used successfully on many occasions, normally on central station lines protecting cigarette stores or other vulnerable and valuable targets.

Attending Intruder Alarm Calls

1. Remember the **Silent Approach** will catch more thieves.
2. As you approach the premises, switch off 'blue lights' or warning devices.
3. Engine noises carry a long way at night — reduce engine revs.
4. When leaving vehicles turn down radios and don't slam car doors.
5. If sufficient manpower available, surround premises.
6. Familiarize yourself with the more vulnerable and valuable risks on the area, this will help in the event of an alarm situation.
7. Don't assume that it will be a 'false call'.

The fact that we withdraw our response to recognised faulty intruder alarm systems is a situation which we all are required to take very seriously indeed.
A great burden falls on operational officers when they attend an intruder alarm call, particularly when carrying out examinations at the premises in order to establish the cause of the activation.
I cannot emphasise too strongly the need to check premises thoroughly in the presence of the keyholder.
Close examination should be made for any sign of a

forced or attempted forced entry. If there is none, the intruder alarm panel will almost certainly verify the cause of the activation.

In this respect, it is vital that the correct sequel and cause of activation is given to the area operations room. Any mistaken recording of the cause of an alarm activation results in a false call being recorded against the subscriber, and thereby putting his premises ultimately in danger of being withdrawn from police response.

SECTION SIX

INTRUDER ALARM FORCE POLICY

Introduction

This policy has been formulated with a view to improving the general service provided for the benefit of the public by intruder alarm companies and the police.

This policy will relate to all intruder alarm systems installed in the Northumbria Police area.

As a general rule, **direct line terminations in police stations will not be accepted.**

The police will prepare a list of alarm companies for circulation to members of the public. This list will contain the names of companies who agree to abide by this policy and install **All alarm systems** (audible signalling as well as remote signalling) according to the **relevant British Standard** and this policy. These companies will be required to sign a declaration to this effect. The chief constable reserves the right to refuse to include a Company on the list without giving his reasons. The list will be reviewed periodically and any company which in the opinion of the chief constable, disregards the requirement of this policy will be removed from the list.

Testing and Commissioning

Only the following procedure will be adopted for the testing of an alarm system with a remote signalling device to a police operations room, either after installation or as part of a maintenance visit.

1. **The alarm company's engineer** will call at the manned police station nearest to the installation, give proof of his identity and the location of the installation to be tested.
2. Proof of identity should be shown to anyone reasonably requiring it. **Identification should be in the form of a sealed card, bearing the holder's photograph.**
3. Immediately **prior to the test being made, the engineer must** contact the **operations room** concerned and obtain permission to test the alarm, stating if necessary that it is a new installation.
4. After the test the operations room should again be contacted and informed of the completion of the test, and that the alarm is working correctly.
5. If any arranged test is not carried out, the operations room must be notified by the engineer.

Equipment

All alarm systems with remote signalling devices, including those with direct lines to central stations must be fitted **with an engineer reset facility.** In exceptional circumstances the chief constable may consider a request for customer reset. If this is granted, every alarm activation, for whatever reason, **Must be reported to the installer.**

Failure to comply with this requirement will result in a withdrawal of police response until notification in writing is received that your system has been converted to engineer reset.

Where a **remote signalling** system works by the operation of **personal attack devices alone,** response will only be made to those premises if:-

1. People in the premises are engaged in the handling of cash.

   and

2. There is public access.

   and

3. There is a real risk of attack on those people so engaged.

   and

4. Until a British Standard for personal attack alarms is produced, the system is installed to the principles of **BS4737 wherever possible** and thereafter to the appropriate British Standard.

Engineering reset of personal attack alarms will not normally be insisted on upon, provided:-

a. The personal attack alarm is completely independent of any intruder detection equipment.

   and

b. The signal generated by the remote signalling device clearly indicated that it originates from a personal attack alarm.

Where an external audible warning device is fitted in addition to a remote signalling device, there will be **a delay of at least five minutes between alarm activation and the device sounding.**

In special circumstances, this time period may be varied at the discretion of the chief constable.

All external audible signalling units shall be fitted with an **automatic cut-out device.** This cut-out must stop the unit sounding after a period of not more than **20 minutes** following the activation of the sounding device. A cut-out device can be supplemented with a **flashing light** which will continue to operate after automatic termination of the sounding, and indicates that the premises are still in an alarm condition.

In exceptional circumstances, the chief constable may consider a request to extend or suspend this cut-out period, subject to there being no order made or pending, under any legislation.

Any request to vary the procedures laid down must be made in writing to the chief constable.

Keyholders

The subscriber responsible for an alarm installation shall.

1. Within 48 hours before the system becomes operative, or of taking over an existing system, **notify the local police** in writing of the name, address and telephone number of **at**

least two keyholders for the premises.

2. Ensure that the **premier keyholder is a telephone subscriber.**
3. Notify all changes in nominated keyholders at least 24 hours before they take effect.
4. **Ensure that a keyholder is available at all times.**

Keyholders and changes of keyholders shall be notified to the police.

Once a keyholder has been notified that his attendance at the premises is required, it is **his responsibility** to ensure **prompt response.** The police **Will not transport keyholders** to and from their premises.

Where there has been an alarm activation and there does not appear to have been a criminal attack on the premises, the police will maintain a presence at those premises **for no more than 30 minutes,** following the notification of alarm to the keyholder or from failure to be able to contact any of the nominated keyholders. If the keyholder has not arrived during this time, **police personnel will be withdrawn** and the keyholder will have to contact the police to request attendance at the premises.

False Alarms

If 3 false calls are received from any installation in the period of **28 days from the first of such calls, or 5 false** calls are received in a period of **6 months** from the first of such calls, a notice will be sent to the subscriber requiring him to state measures he has taken to prevent the continuation of false alarms. This notification to the subscriber will require a **positive written response** within **14 days** of the date of posting.

A copy of this letter will be sent to the alarm installer, together with a request for confirmation report of engineer reset.

Following the procedure mentioned, the chief constable may send a further letter to the subscriber and the installer giving requirements with which the subscriber and the installer shall comply. The subscriber shall notify completion of the requirements in writing to the chief constable within the period stated in the letter, which shall not be less than 14 days.

In the following circumstances, police response to alarm activations from premises will be withdrawn, where a subscriber:-

1. **Fails to convert to engineer reset** as required.
2. **Fails to reply by the date stipulated in notice** served with **The Policy.**
3. **Fails to respond reasonably to the notice served** under **The Policy.**
4. **Fails to comply with any requirements or conditions in the notice served under The Policy.**

Or in respect of the premises:-

1. Without justification fails to comply with the requirements in **The Policy** or **within three months** of receiving a warning letter regarding false calls.
2. **The keyholder unjustifiably fails to respond to** the premises at the request of the police.

Withdrawal of response will be notified in writing to the subscriber and to a designated person nominated by the installer.

When police respond to an intruder alarm system which has been withdrawn, any activations of the system will be monitored and notified to the keyholder or his delegated representative by telephone or by other suitable methods at the discretion of the Officer in charge of the force area operations room.

Police response will only be **restored after written application** to the chief constable, confirming that any faults on the systems, have been rectified and that police requirements have been carried out. Restoration will not be considered before a period of **two months** has elapsed since withdrawal and following a satisfactory inspection of the installation by an authorised representative of the chief constable.

Notification of restoration of response will be sent to the subscriber and the installer.

False Call

An activation of the alarm system by anything other than:-

1. **A Criminal Attack upon or Damage** to the protected premises, the alarm equipment or the line carrying the alarm signal. Activation of sensors without damage or entry to the premises will be considered to be a false alarm, unless proved otherwise. All line faults must be reported to British Telecommunications by the alarm company in accordance with their procedures and reference number obtained.

   or

2. An intentional and justifiable operation of a personal attack facility.

SECTION SEVEN

RADIO ALARMS AND OTHER TECHNICAL AIDS

A radio alarm is a battery operated device which, on activation, remains silent at the premises where it is installed but signals via a UHF or VHF signal to the force area operations rooms.

A number of these alarms are held at divisional level by the community services department and it is the responsibility of the crime prevention officers to install and circulate information regarding their location. They are installed as a temporary measure to save manpower in watching suspect premises and should not be used as commercial alarms. There are various means of activating these alarms and these are called 'detection devices'. It may be that a simple 'pressure mat' is connected to the alarm and concealed underneath a floor covering which will activate when someone stands on it. Other means of activating the alarm would be the installation of some type of detection device designated to detect movement or body heat. These alarms are also used to protect against 'personal attack'. In this instant a 'personal attack' button or switch is connected to the alarm which will activate when pressed.

Guidelines for Installation

1. Information received by uniformed or CID officers that premises will be attacked.
2. To protect high value property temporarily stored.
3. To protect property which has been attacked on several occasions.
4. To protect court witnesses or other persons from 'personal attack'.

Procedure re Installation

If a radio alarm is required, the officer concerned should contact the crime prevention officer and explain the full circumstances of the request. The crime prevention officer will then survey the premises involved and taking into account technical and other difficulties will decide if an alarm is to be installed. **On no account will any officer, other than the crime prevention officer promise a member of the public that a radio alarm will be installed.**

This is to save disappointment, as only the CPO knows the current availability of equipment and the possible technical difficulties involved in the installation.

Approach

Radio alarms have, in the past, resulted in many arrests for crime and this has only been achieved because of the sensible approach to the protected premises by officers responding to the alarm.

The procedure to be adopted when approaching any alarm calls is described in the 'alarms' section of this manual and if adhered to will result in the arrest rate from these alarms continuing.

Officers are reminded that information regarding the installation and location of radio alarms is available at subdivisional level and they should find out before going onto any patrol area, if in fact there are radio alarms installed. By doing this, they will be able to improve their knowledge of the location of the alarm, which will result in a quicker response to activation, and so increase the chance of thieves being arrested.

The Technical Support Unit

The technical support unit located at the Durham Police Headquarters at Aykley Heads, Durham City, is one of five regional units. The Durham unit covers, Northumbria, Durham, Cleveland, North Yorks and the Cumbria police forces.

It was originally a branch of the Home Office Research and Development Department based at Sandbridge in Herts and opened in 1973.

It has now evolved from its experimental status, and is funded by the police forces situated within its area of responsibility, Northumbria Police being the largest force in the area is also its largest contributor.

The unit is manned by a staff of five which consists of a technical officer (Home Office employee), one police inspector and three police constables. The police staff are recruited from forces within the unit's area and are seconded for not more than two years.

The unit is equipped to deal with a variety of demands made from contributing Forces, ranging from simple "wallet alarms" designed to detect thefts from changing rooms etc., up to all equipment required in seige situation. The day to day demands from police forces for equipment is mainly for simple surveillance devices, binoculars etc.

A request for this type of equipment must be from a police officer, not below the rank of inspector.

A large number of video and still cameras are available but permission, to use any equipment whereby a visual record is required must be authorised by the head of the force CID.

The use of video cameras has proved most successful within the force area during recent years and the demand for this type of equipment will no doubt increase in the future.

Crime prevention officers maintain a very close liaison with the technical support units as much of the equipment available can be used in conjunction with radio alarms installed by these officers. The unit also holds a variety of audio surveillance devices, such as body work "tape recorders, radio transmission equipment and telephone recorders". Permission to install any of this equipment must be obtained from an assistant chief constable.

To obtain the assistance of the technical support unit, the officer concerned should at first obtain the necessary permission from his own supervision. Having done this, staff from the TSU will assess the situation and install any equipment thought to be required.

This unit has been very successful in the past, and the range of equipment it holds continues to expand. It is there to assist operational police officers and should be used accordingly.

SECTION EIGHT

PERSONAL PROTECTION

At Home

The physical security of a person's house should be of an adequate standard. When alone in the house, particularly at night, doors should be kept locked.
When house lights are on, the curtains should be drawn.
Front doors should be fitted with door chains. Where 'solid' doors are fitted, door viewers should be installed.
There should also be adequate lighting outside the door.
The door chain should be used at all times when the occupant is alone.

Women at Home

Women living alone should list their surnames and initials only in telephone directories.
They should be wary about answering the door and should **always** use the door chain. Strangers should never be admitted to the house. Before admitting anyone not personally known to them, their identities should be checked.
Where practical, they should arrange some sort of 'help' signal (e.g. by means of a light or placing something in a window) to alert neighbours. When going out at night, they should leave a light on inside the house and also an outside light above the door which they will use on their return.
Lights can be operated by time switches.
If a woman returns home to find a window or door forced open, she should not enter, but should contact the police and wait their arrival.
If a woman living alone wakes during the night to find an intruder in the house, she should make no attempt to apprehend him, but she should lie still and observe as much as possible. If threatened, she should do as she is told and avoid annoying or startling the intruder.

The Elderly

The elderly are particularly at risk, both at home and outside. When talking to the elderly, one has to make them aware that they are at risk, without frightening them. It is often difficult to make them realise that basic security measures, such as locking doors and using door chains, can protect them and their homes.
Elderly people are prey to 'con men' and people who force their way past at the door. They should not open their doors to strangers at night. If they must open the door, it should always be opened onto the chain.
Many old people keep quite large amounts of cash in their houses. They should be advised to use a bank and to keep only enough cash at home as is sufficient for their needs.
When supposed 'antique collectors' call, they should not be admitted into the house. They should be asked for their business card so that an appointment can be made. This allows time to check on them and to have a member of the family or a friend present if an appointment is arranged.
Odd-job men should be similarly treated, so that an independent estimate of the work can be made. Money should never be handed over to casual callers as a 'deposit' or to allow them to buy materials.
During the summer, children often call at old peoples' houses for drinks of water. While the occupant is getting them a drink they frequently steal. Children should be left outside and the door shut while getting them a drink.
It is often possible to arrange 'help signals' with co-operative and caring neighours.

Children

Never leave young children at home alone. Babysitters should be known and be responsible people. They should be aware of the location of the locks and keys in the house where they are babysitting. Parents should make their children aware of the dangers of accepting sweets or lifts from strangers, male or female, and encourage them to report any such offers.

Walking

When out walking, one should be alert to who is around and who is walking past. One should walk briskly and confidently. Shortcuts through unlit tunnels, subways, etc., should be avoided. A well-lit route passing inhabited buildings is safest, even though it may be a longer walk.
Large sums of money should not be carried. If it is, then it should not be advertised, by showing it in public.
Walk in the centre of the pavement away from shrubbery and other places of possible concealment.

Women

Women are particularly vulnerable when walking, being at risk of handbag snatches, robbery or sexual attacks. The best advice is to avoid walking alone after dark.
Women should carry a small torch, particularly useful for illuminating the doorway and lock when arriving home. When approaching home, the house keys should be at hand so the door can be opened quickly.
To reduce losses, in the event of a handbag snatch:-

1. Purse, valuables and house keys should be placed inside the coat, **Not** in the handbag.
2. Handbags should be carried in the palm of the hand and tucked into the elbow and body.

Lifts should not be accepted from strangers.
If a woman has to use a subway she should try to enter it with other persons — either 'respectable' looking individuals or ideally with couples.
If a woman suspects she is being followed, she should check this by crossing and re-crossing the street. If she is still being followed she should run to the busiest place available.
It is difficult to tell a woman what she should do in the event of her being attacked, as people react in different ways. Generally, the advice is to make as much noise as possible and run as fast as possible. Many women carry an article in their handbags which could be used to ward off an attack. They should be aware of the use of such an article but when giving advice on this subject they should not be encouraged to carry offensive weapons.
Most attackers can be repelled by making a loud noise. Screaming is the obvious method of making a noise but hand-operated alarms are available in the shops. They fall into two types:-

1. Battery operated 'buzzers', often incorporated into a small torch.
2. 'Shrill' alarms which are, in effect, an aerosol operating a high pitched whistle.

The 'shrill' alarms are probably the better of the two, as they are light, look attractive (resembling a perfume spray) and make a very loud unmistakable sound.
The battery operated buzzers are heavier and not so loud in the open air. There is always the possibility of discharged or corroded batteries when they are needed. Their advantages are that they will continue to sound, even when knocked out of hand.

Women Driving Cars

Travel on main or busy well lit roads. Car doors should be kept locked. Women should not pick up hitch hikers, nor stop to help others.
If a woman's car breaks down she should stay with it and wait for help. Cars should be parked in well lit areas. When returning to a parked car, a woman should check the back seat before getting into the vehicle.

SECTION NINE

CASH CARRYING

Anyone, who as part of their job or business has to carry cash is **at risk.** It must be our primary objective to advise companies and business away from cash carrying thereby reducing the risks of losing money and more importantly, injury to staff.

More and more companies are now paying their staff by cheque or bankers order, and that way the need for cash carrying is removed. Alternatively, it makes good sense to employ a recognised security firm to collect cash takings or staff wage payrolls.

If a company is committed by its policies to carrying cash through whatever reasons then we **must** advise them of the following procedures which should be carried out:—

1. **Send the right person —** Don't send elderly or infirm employees or immature youths.
2. **Send at least one escort —** Choose an able bodied person to observe what is happening on the journey.
3. **Vary the time of the journey —**Don't be predictable, and vary the times of journeys as much as possible.
4. **Vary the route taken —** It is important to keep the thief guessing. Remember, that the starting and finishing points need extra vigilance.
5. **Use a vehicle if possible —**If vehicles are to be used, they should be changed at regular intervals so as not to become recognizable. Those who are using vehicles for cash carrying purposes **should be locked inside!**
6. **Use special cash carrying equipment —**There are several devices on the market for use when cash is being carried. Most are equipped with audible alarms and/or smoke and dye bombs. Even if the money is stolen it is rendered useless.

SECTION TEN

MOTOR VEHICLE SECURITY

The attention of all officers is drawn to the increasing number of motor cars and cycles stolen each year in the Northumbria Police area and **Never recovered.**
Every sub-division has places which are particularly vulnerable and favoured by motor vehicle thieves, e.g. car parks, metro stations, college precincts, etc., and officers are directed to identify these places and pay particular attention to them during their patrol duty time.
Similarly, where areas have been identified as favoured locations for leaving stolen vehicles, periodic attention should be given in an effort to detect offenders. It should be noted that over half the motor vehicles stolen yearly in this force area are motorcycles.
It is known that some vehicles which are stolen, quickly have their identities changed and are fitted with false registration plates. Such vehicles can then be used quite openly and they will continue to be used almost with immunity as long as the police continue to rely entirely on registration mark PNC checks only.
Many more stolen vehicles would be recovered if patrol officers followed a routine of checking more than the vehicle registration mark on PNC. Officers must use their discretion and take into account the needs of obviously innocent drivers. In respect of suspect vehicles and persons, however, patrol officers should check PNC as follows:-

1. Vehicle registration number.
2. Engine and chassis number.
3. Persons in possession of the vehicles.

Each sub-divisional police station has been issued with an illustrated wall chart to guide officers in checking suspect vehicles. Additional assistance can be obtained from the force stolen motor vehicle section, attached to Northumbria Crime Squad.
When vehicles are **reported stolen** the officer recording details of the vehicle on the PNC/V/150 Stolen Vehicle Form must be meticulously thorough in completing the form, otherwise the data subsequently stored on the PNC file may be insufficient to satisfy a later PNC enquiry. If PNC 'bank data' is incomplete or inaccurate, all efforts to reduce the SMV problem by adopting more thorough vehicle examination will fail.
The most common errors or omissions which occur in the completion of the form PNC/V/150 are:-

1. **Incorrect Station Codes.**
2. Incorrect vehicle registration number.
3. Year of manufacture left blank.
4. Colours given do not comply with those indicated, in the notes of guidance.
5. Engine and chassis number incorrect. If unknown, leave blank.
6. Crime numbers not quoted and name of OIC left blank.
7. **Most important —** distinguishing points, such as damage or repairs not included.

Remember

The problem genuinely exists, but you can help prevent opportunities for this type of theft and increase the prospect of detection if you.

1. Familiarise yourself with the problem in your sub-division.
2. Identify vulnerable locations and favoured dumping grounds.
3. Use PNC thoroughly but intelligently for checking registration mark, engine and chassis number.
4. Complete PNC/V/150 form thoroughly and accurately.
5. At all times be polite, persistent and profsional.

Vehicle Security Consists of Three Problems

1. The theft or taking of vehicles.
2. The theft from within vehicles.
3. The theft of component parts and accessories from vehicles.

How can we Tackle these Problems

1. Whenever possible **park vehicles** in supervised car parks and **avoid** where possible **dimly lit streets —** thieves don't like to work in well lit areas.
2. **Always remove ignition keys** and lock all doors and windows (even though parking outside of home for only a few minutes).
3. **Remove all valuable** items from vehicle, if not possible place them in the boot, out of sight.
4. **Make a note of serial numbers** of any items left in your car, **radio, cassettes** etc.

If these steps are carried out, then the car owner will have provided himself with initial security.
Having said this, the average car does not present any great challenge to a thief who is given the time and is able to work unobserved. The next step then is to use vehicle protection devices.
Most modern cars are now fitted with some form of steering lock and we find that this does in fact deter joyriders.
A 'Krooklok' type of fitting can be used and these are also a viable deterrent to would be thieves.
Another device is the 'Gear Lever' lock which locks the gear lever into neutral.
Some motorists fit a concealed switch which isolates the vehicle ignition.
Handbrake locks are also available to immobilize vehicles.
Removal of the Rotor Arm will render the vehicle safe.
More vehicles than ever are now being protected with some form of intruder alarm system. There are many on the market and all are worthwhile. Some are connected to the vehicle warning instrument and some have their own siren type warning, they can be adapted to activate when the doors are opened or the boot or bonnet raised.

Petrol Locking Cap

The theft of petrol from vehicles is now becoming very worthwhile for the thief as the price steadily increases. A

good method of protection against this crime is the petrol locking cap. These are manufactured for most vehicles on the road today.

Wheels

This again is an increasing type of crime as the cost of motoring soars, more wheels and tyres are being stolen. Special nuts can be purchased which need a special 'Key Nut' to release them. One on each wheel will be good protection.

SECTION ELEVEN

PROPERTY AND POST CODE IDENTIFICATION

The theme of this chapter is the identification of property and, in particular, the identification of stolen property.

For many years, the problem of identifying property suspected of having been stolen has been a source of much trouble and irritation. There is nothing more aggravating than recovering suspected stolen property from known thieves and when, all enquiries have failed to reveal an owner and because there has been no admission by the suspect, having to return the property to the suspect.

As regards the matters which make property readily identifiable, the best examples would be those things of which there are only one in the world — for example, original paintings by famous artists, such as the Mona Lisa by Leonardo De Vinci. This can also be related to all kinds of objects of art, including gold and silver, jewellery of all kinds, pottery, porcelain, furniture etc., many of which were specially commissioned from the makers and as such are unique.

In order to identify things which are unique, there are several aids, the use of which has grown throughout the centuries.

The simplest and most readily identifiable mark is the makers' signature which appears on his work. Many artists do sign their work.

Another example in this country is the use of a mark to indicate the identity of the maker of items of silver and gold which has been in use since the earliest times.

In 1697 an act of Parliament ordered the registration of a maker's mark must consist of the first two letters of the maker's surname and these are recorded at Goldsmiths Hall in the City of London. In addition, hallmarks on silver include a date letter and a town symbol. So from hallmarks, it is possible to establish the year of assay, the maker and the town in which it was made.

A record of hallmarks is therefore extremely useful as a means of assisting in the identification of silver and gold.

The next thing to consider is encouraging members of the public to keep an accurate descriptive record of their property, particularly those things of special or sentimental value. These could include jewellery, silver, glass, china, porcelain, painting, clocks etc., all of which are attractive to thieves.

In addition to a written descriptive record, an invaluable aid to identification are photgraphic records, particularly of things difficult to describe. Although the photographs taken need not be done by a professional photographer, the importance of placing a rule beside the object to be photographed should not be overlooked.

I have so far mentioned things which are more unusual. We now turn our attention to all kinds of general property including those items like TVs, radios, binoculars, cameras, bicycles, firearms etc., which are usually manufactured in large numbers, each identical. In a lot of cases, the only thing that distinguishes one from another is the maker's serial number allocated to each unit produced. It is important that members of the public be encouraged to list such items and record the makers serial number and also put the list in a safe place with business papers, birth certificates etc. All too often, people record serial numbers appearing on their property and, some years later, following a burglary at their home, discover the list has been mislaid or lost.

There is, of course, much property which is unique and which bears no identification marks and with such items we have to think of other ways to mark them so that they can be identified by the loser in the event of theft. **(See post code identification).**

For a number of years now, one method of marking property has been with the use of identity paints. These paints are specially manufactured so that each can be individually identified under examination by forensic scientists. The paint composition is formulated indivi-dually for each person and the formulae is never repeated. The use of identity paints is widespread in the marking of construction site plant, scaffolding and the like.

A similar idea is the use of dyes to stain petrol or diesel fuel at those firms who have fuel pumps installed to fuel company vehicles. This is, of course, wide open to abuse by employees who can syphon off fuel from the company vehicles for use in their own private vehicles. In the same way as with identification paints, the chemical formula of the fuel stain compound is slightly varied for each customer so that it can be identified by forensic examination.

Where the property to be protected by use of identif-ication marks contain areas of glass i.e., motor vehicles, caravans, boats etc., a useful method of affixing identif-ication marks is by etching the mark onto the glass.

One type of crime which you may have come in contact with is the theft of riding tackle usually stolen from riding stables. Again, the problem of identifying tackle to the satisfaction of a court can be difficult. In order to overcome this problem the British Horse Society have established a saddle security scheme. This involves marking tack, using special cold die stamps with an unremovable number which is registered with the BHS. In the event of such marked stolen tack being recovered, the owner is easily traced and, in addition, acts as a deterrent to theft and reluctance to receivers to handle tack so marked.

The marking of livestock in this country is usually restricted to dye marking, notching of ears and ear tags. There is however a new method of marking livestock and, in particular, horses, using a method called freeze branding. This involves using a super chilled marker which is applied to a clipped area on the animal. This process kills the pigment cells in the hair and this grows in white within a few weeks. On white or grey coloured animals, the same method is used to produce a bald mark. The advantage of this method is that it is humane and does not damage hides. In the case of horses, the identification mark can be allocated and registered by the British Horse Society.

Post Code Identification

The post code has been devised to readily identify addresses of all premises in the British Isles.

Every area of the country is covered by a regional post office letter sorting office and each of these offices is allocated a letter code.

Thus the first letter(s) of the post code indicate the

regional sorting office, i.e., YO is York, M is Manchester and this area based at Newcastle upon Tyne is NE.
Each region is then subdivided into numbered districts and the first number(s) following the regional code indicate a particular district.
Each district is then further subdivided into numbered sectors and this is indicated by the first number(s) in the second part of the post code.
Finally, each street or part of a street to a maximum of 50 houses is allocated a letter code.
Thus, the post office code for a house at Bridgewater Close, West Dentor Park, Lemington, Newcastle upon Tyne, is as follows:-

Region	NE — Newcastle upon Tyne
District	15 — Lemington
Sector	8 — West Denton Park
Street	UT — Bridgewater Close

By adding the street number of the premises you then obtain a unique combination of letters and numbers which can only relate to one particular premises in the British Isles.
Where no number exists, i.e., Rose Cottage, White House, etc., this can be indicated by RC, WH, etc.
Thus the post code, street number or name of the premises can be likened to a fingerprint for the premises, the advantage being that it is unique to those premises, there is no need for the occupier to keep a record of the number.

Methods

Property can be post code marked in all kinds of ways using felt tip pens, engraving tools, die stamps etc.
However, one way in which the public too can post code mark their property is by the use of security marking pens. These pens write wet but when they dry the marks are invisible to the naked eye. The marking however, will show up bright purple when exposed to ulra-violet light.
Almost any property large enough to write on can be marked in this way. One of the great difficulties we have as police officers is the tracing of owners of property which we suspect has been stolen.
We now have a method by which owners of such suspected stolen property can be readily traced. In this force, ultra-violet lights are held at all divisional and subdivisional police stations. When suspected stolen property is recovered, the ultra violet lamps should be used to scan the property with a view to tracing post code marks.
The post code identification scheme is one of the most important crime prevention measures to have been discovered in recent years and you can assist in educating the public of its importance.

SECTION TWELVE

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

The Neighbourhood Watch scheme rests on the concept of the good neighbour. The basic idea of Neighbourhood Watch is simple.

Neighbours join together to keep watch on each other's homes and their immediate surroundings. For example, they might remove newspapers and milk bottles where these are accumulating, during holidays, report suspicious persons and unusual activities or events to the police. Essentially then, it concerns crime prevention in the sense of individuals attempting to protect themselves and their property from criminal activity. Underlying this is the belief that there is lying dormant within the community a potential for crime prevention. Neighbourhood Watch provides a way of tapping this and of drawing the community together and making it more aware of its environment and of its mutual dependency and responsibility. In short, it is a vehicle by which a community can move towards becoming self policing, in a strict preventive sense. It does not mean an individual or community taking direct action against would be criminals, nor risking personal injury.

There is no Place for Vigilante Groups

Neighbourhood Watch is an awareness on the part of the community that crime is not just a matter to be left to the police. It is a matter for everyone to aid the police in their task.

Underlying Principles

1. Although Neighbourhood Watch is a recent innovation here, it has been operating in America for some years. There are common features between the two systems, but ours is not repetition of the American system.

Benefits

1. It provides the Police with the information about the nature of crime in a particular area, so that crime prevention methods can be tailored to suit the area.
2. It provides a platform for closer police/public co-operation in responding to crime.
3. The scheme provides a deterrent value — increased information leads to increased detection and will tend to deter the would be criminal.
4. It provides a better line of communication, so that the police can more easily pass on information and advice to the public.

Neighbourhood Watch provides a channel of communication. If we work together, more is likely to be achieved.

Police can explain their objectives to the public and the public can tell the Police of their concerns and fears. **After all they may differ.**

Aims of Neighbourhood Watch

There are 4 aims of the scheme.

1. **To reduce the opportunity for crime.**
2. **To develop community spirit.**
3. **To enhance police/public relationships.**
4. **To encourage residents to help themselves by helping the police prevent and detect the crime.**

Area Selection/Suitability

Schemes arise in two ways.

Police Initiated

The advantage of this type of scheme is that the police are in a better position to know which type of area will benefit from a scheme. The area should have a significant level of crime, particularly burglary. However, a significant number of burglaries is not the sole criteria. Fear of crime may well make an area suitable for a scheme.

Public Demand

The advantage of this kind of scheme is that where it has been generated from public demand the continued life of the scheme should be assured. However, initial enthusiasm should not be allowed to lead to hasty implementation.

The interested parties should be asked to return when they have a viable number of residents to support the scheme (20-30) they should then be issued with explanatory booklets and meetings should be arranged in the same way as the police initiated scheme. If support is forthcoming, the sub-divisional commander calls a meeting with local community leaders, residents associations chairmen, churchmen etc. The meeting will also be attended by the community services inspector and crime prevention sergeant. The meeting should be used to explain the scheme, assess its feasibility and prepare the way for the questionnaire. The number of persons attending this meeting should be kept as small as possible.

Public Meeting

This meeting should be called by community leaders, with police as invited speakers. The meeting should be structured but informal. Police attendance **Must Include**

subdivisional commander/or deputy
local crime prevention officer
permanent beat officer(s)

Police officers should not promise more resources than they can provide and adequate time must be allowed for questions from the audience.

It should now be possible to begin the scheme in the target area. This area selected should be as small as possible, in order to keep the community/neighbourhood compact (e.g. 100-150 houses). However, larger areas should not be dismissed, as they may be divided into sub-areas with several complementary schemes.

HOW THE SCHEME OPERATES

What is a Contact Person

Contact persons should spend much of their time at home. They are not police informers. They are respected members of the community who are prepared to act as an intermediary between the police and the local residents.

Functions of a Contact Person

1. To receive information from the residents about incidents in their area.
2. Act as intermediaries between the residents and the police.
3. Recruit new members to act as contacts.

Obligations of the Contact Persons

1. Encourage full participation in the scheme amongst 'their residents'.
2. Welcome any new residents and introduce them to the scheme.
3. Serve as a liaison person between the residents and the local police.
4. Pass on to the police relevant information concerning suspicious incidents or persons seen in the area, or other matters requiring attention.
5. Circulate information received from the police to residents.
6. Attend Neighbourhood Watch meetings.
7. Collate requests for the marking of property and pass on to the police.
8. Develop liaison with other contact persons in adjacent areas.

This all may appear rather daunting. However, contacts will have separate meetings and instructions to assist them.

Future Initiatives for Groups

When well established, groups may want to expand.

1. They may wish to provide a newsletter.
2. They may wish to arrange talks/films from the crime prevention officer for residents.
3. They may wish to arrange talks from outside speakers, such as home/road safety officers or fire prevention officers.

It is up to each group how they wish to develop.

The local police will still be there. This is not a means of delegating our job, but encouraging the community towards self help, by assisting the police to accomplish more.

SECTION THIRTEEN

FIREARMS

It is not the purpose of this section to go into the law relating to the firearms Act 1968 as to what is and what is not a firearm but rather to look at the points we must consider when a certificate is to be issued, renewed or varied.

The policy now is for any enquiries regarding applications for a certificate for up to five weapons to be done by divisional beat duty officers. For more than five and up to ten weapons to be done by divisional crime prevention officers; and for more than ten weapons to be done by the explosive sergeant at force headquarters.

It is hoped that this policy will provide better standardisation of enquiries and that recommendations will be similar for the various categories mentioned above.

On what grounds may the certificate be granted or refused? A firearm certificate shall be granted by the chief officer of police if he is satisfied that the applicant has a good reason for having it in his possession, or for purchasing or acquiring the firearm or ammunition in respect of which the application is made, and can be permitted to have it in his possession without danger to the public safety or to the peace.

Provided that a firearm certificate shall not be granted to a person whom the chief officer of police has reason to believe to be prohibited by this act from possessing, because of intemperate habits or unsound mind, or to be for any reason unfit to be entrusted with such a firearm.

Points to Consider

1. These must be good reasons for possessing, purchasing or acquiring the weapon. Enquire for what purposes he requires the weapon. If for sporting purposes, does he have facilities and opportunity to use it.

Revolvers and automatic pistols should only be granted if a member of a gun club, and used for target practice. It should not be necessary for anyone to possess for protection of person or property. The number of weapons should be limited by the reason for which they are required.

2. Permitted to possess without danger to public safety or to the peace.

To comply with this, weapons should be kept in a secure place to prevent theft and the obtaining by unauthorised persons, e.g., other persons especially children within the same house.

What is a secure place?

This can vary depending on the type of building, location and use. Where a metal gun cabinet is provided which is either secured to a wall or floor, this may in itself provide sufficient security. It is not always advisable to rely on one line of defence, therefore it would be better if the cabinet is secured within a built in cupboard, or, that the perimeter of the house is made more secure by fitting of deadlocks and security catches.

If a gun cabinet is not provided, then the weapons should be secured in some way to the wall or floor with either a chain or steel wire and a good quality padlock, again this should be done within a locked cupboard or an area with limited access such as an attic.

Free standing wardrobes are totally inadequate. Likewise, internal cupboard doors, normally of hollow construction, on their own, provide very poor protection.

Ammunition should be kept separate and kept in secure boxes in a similar manner to the weapons.

3. The applicant should not be of intemperate habits, i.e., habitual drunkenness, or alcoholic.
4. The enquiring officer must be absolutely satisfied that the applicant is not of unsound mind.

Section (c) and (d) above have to be assessed by you at the time of interview. Your local knowledge is of great importance and collators checks are vital.

5. Someone not to be entrusted with a firearm, i.e., a person who is notoriously careless in the use of, or in the safe keeping of a firearm.

N.B. **It is no good providing good security if it is not used.**

Conditions on which Certificate is Issued

1. The holder must, on receipt of the certificate, sign it in ink with his usual signature
2. The firearms and ammunition to which the certificate relates must at all times, when not in use be kept in a secure place with a view to preventing access to them by unauthorised persons.
3. The holder must inform at once the chief officer of police by whom, the certificate was granted of any change in his permanent address.

EXPLOSIVES ACTS 1875 and 1923

EXPLOSIVES — ACQUIRING AND KEEPING

The chief officer of police controls the acquisition of explosives by granting a police licence or a certificate to the applicant who must be a **fit person** (Of good character and suitably experienced, with explosives).

Explosives

Includes any substance which produces an explosion or firework effect by sudden combustion or decomposition and includes, dynamite, blasting powder, gunpowder, ammunition, detonators, cartridges, guncotton and safety fuse.

Licenced Explosives Stores

The storage of explosives is the responsibility of the local authority.

All stores are required to be licensed by the local authority and they are divided into five positions depending upon the quantity of explosives to be stored. The stores are required to conform to Home Office Circular 113/72.

Division

'A' 75 Kgs.
'B' 136 Kgs.
'C' 454 Kgs.
'D' 907 Kgs.
'E' 1,815 Kgs.

Police Certificate Form A

Normally for a period of one year to correspond with local authority licencing period.

Registered Premises

For storage of explosives up to a maximum of thirty kilos mixed explosives or 100 Kgs. of gunpowder if only gunpowder is kept.

Premises must be registered with the local authority by the occupier if explosives are to be stored and the premises are either Mode 'B' or Mode 'A' depending upon maximum amount to be stored.

Mode 'B' 7 Kgs. mixed explosives (including gunpowder).
Mode 'A' 30 Kgs. mixed explosives or 100 Kgs. of gunpowder.

Police Certificate Form LP67, normally one year as above.

Storage facilities must be adequate.

Private Use Certificate

Permits the holder to acquire and keep 5 Kgs. of mixed explosives and 100 detonators for his own and not for sale.

No legal restriction on method of storage.

Police Certificate LP62.

Certificate was normally for one year but now generally issued for a very limited period where small quantities are required for a specific task.

Immediate Use Certificate

A certificate issued by the chief constable to fit persons who require more than 5 Kgs. and who either have no storage facilities or who have a licensed store or registered premises which allows them to obtain a lesser quantity than they require for a specific task to be completed at a specified time.

NO STORAGE ALLOWED

All explosives to be used, destroyed or returned to the supplier on date of issue.

If returned to supplier a further immediate use certificate must be obtained when the explosives are required.

Licence to be endorsed by supplier and returned to police.

For 5 Kgs. or less a private use certificate can be issued for one day, with the same effect.

CONTROL OF EXPLOSIVES ORDER 1953

Gunpowder and Safety Fuse

1. The control of Explosives Order, 1953, allows the chief constable to control the acquisition and storage of gunpowder and safety fuse.

Occupiers of Licensed Explosive Stores.
Police Licence Form F (1)

Occupiers and Registered Premises.
Normally 1 year conditions as per mixed explosives.

2. For persons other than occupiers of stores or registered premises
Private use and immediate use.
The chief officer can grant a licence to acquire gun powder and/or safety fuse and specify the number of acquisitions, the amount to be acquired and the use to which it will be put and whether storage is allowed.

Exceptions

The following do not require licenses or certificates.

1. Government Departments.
2. Persons licensed to have magazines, (Storage in excess of 1,815 Kgs.)
3. Persons licensed to have explosives factories.
4. Holder of firearm certificates or registered firearms dealers keeping ammunition for their own use.
5. Persons purchasing small arms nitro powder, fireworks and shotgun cartridges.

The purchaser of explosives must be in possession of the appropriate certificate or license.

Responsibility rests with the supplier to verify that purchaser is authorised to acquire explosives.

Occupiers of license stores and registered premises are only permitted to possess or purchase amounts not exceeding the category of store or premises they occupy.