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THE FUTURES OF POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

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Command College
Research Project

by: James L. Kennedy
April 1986

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This Command College Independent Study Project is a **FUTURES** study on a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is **NOT** to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Studying the future differs from studying the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future -- creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. **A futures study points the way.**

PROPOSED ARTICLE
THE FUTURES OF THE POLICE RESERVE

COMMAND COLLEGE

by: JAMES L. KENNEDY

**THE FUTURES OF POLICE RESERVE
PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What are the futures of police reserve programs in California? This study, conducted by Commander Jim Kennedy of the San Diego, California Police Department, attempts to answer this question. Using techniques learned as a member of Class Two of the Law Enforcement Command College, Commander Kennedy conducted this five month study which addresses the Definition of the Future; a Strategic Plan; an Implementation Plan; and a Transitional Management Plan.

The study identified several significant trends and events which will affect the futures of reserve programs. The number one concern was the increase in training requirements mandated by The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). Other concerns and trends were taxpayer demands for more effective and efficient service, a changing ethnicity, pre-employment training requirements, civilianization, and a departments' commitment to their reserve programs.

What are the futures of police reserve programs in California in the year 2000?

- o Reserve strength will remain somewhat static, well below allocated positions. With increased training requirements, difficulty in recruiting, changing ethnicity and lack of commitment by departments towards their reserve

programs, the future does not look promising. We will rely less on recruiting large numbers to be trained as Level I officers. Instead, we will be relying more on Level III officers to perform non-law enforcement type responsibilities to relieve the higher trained Level I's of those responsibilities, just as we have civilianized the more mundane, non-enforcement duties of regular officers.

- Efforts should be made to assure that we direct recruiting efforts towards the Hispanic and Asian populations now, to assure their representation in the future. As the Hispanic and Asian populations grow and are assimilated into the mainstream of society, they will possibly become easier to recruit.
- Most departments are not alarmed about the problems facing them at this time. Some very small departments in Northern California are very concerned, however. They will be seriously impacted by these trends. When the departments do become concerned, the author believes they will rise to the occasion and meet the challenge.

Reserve officer programs are not free. How much is invested is a decision to be made by the Police Chief or Sheriff in charge. The future is what we make it. The reserve programs have problems, none is unsolvable. The futures of the police reserve programs are what we want them to be.

THE FUTURES OF POLICE RESERVE
PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

INTRODUCTION

What are the futures of police reserve programs in California? Police reserve programs, as we know them, began appearing in California around the beginning of World War II. They were used as auxiliary police to supplement police departments that were losing officers to the military. Initially reserve duties were related primarily to civil defense; however, over the years, as the size and level of professionalism of reserve units grew, responsibilities increased, and today some police and sheriff's departments routinely depend on reserve officers to augment their regular daily activities and provide support services. Smaller departments often schedule reserve officers to work as full-duty police officers. Some departments pay their reserve officers. Other departments use reserve officers exclusively for special events, such as high school athletic games, parades, or other special events. Sheriff's departments find other uses for their reserve units, such as assigning reserve deputies to horse mounted posses, search and rescue missions, or crime prevention specialization. The list of possible duties for reserve officers is endless.

STUDY

As a member of Class Two of the P.O.S.T. Command College, I chose the Futures of the Reserve as my independent research project.

Questionnaires were mailed to all fifty-eight sheriff's offices and to eighty-six police departments in California. Police departments were selected from throughout the state and information was elicited from all sizes of departments ranging from the smallest to the largest.

Follow-up interviews were conducted with some respondents, police labor representatives, community leaders, politicians, city administrators and police reserve leaders.

TRENDS AND EVENTS

The study identified several significant trends and events which will affect the futures of reserve programs. The number one concern expressed in every response was the increase in training requirements mandated by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. Other concerns and trends were taxpayer demands for more effective and efficient service, a changing taxbase (Post-Proposition 13 pressures), changing ethnicity, pre-employment training requirements, civilianization, and a departments' commitment to their reserve programs.

DISCUSSION

Recent changes in P.O.S.T. mandated training have boosted training requirements to minimums of 200 hours of classroom instruction and 200 hours of structured field training in order to reach Level I Reserve status. Level I status refers to a trained reserve officer who may work alone in a law enforcement capacity. In follow-up interviews, no one questioned the necessity or wisdom of such requirements. Support for these requirements was

bolstered by recent civil damage awards against law enforcement agencies for negligent hiring, training and retention practices. The problem, as seen by these administrators, is how to implement the necessary requirements.

Some departments have adopted entrance requirements which mandate graduation from a P.O.S.T. accredited Basic Law Enforcement course before application. They then are able to draw from their reserve ranks selecting regular officers for their departments. Other departments rely entirely on a regional training academy to train potential applicants, then recruit from the ranks of the graduates. The large departments tend to completely dominate control over such training facilities.

Volunteers have shown a reluctance to undergo several months of training for a job they do without pay and for which they usually must spend several hundred dollars of their own money to obtain equipment.

Training can vary from several weeks as a full time academy to several months, attending at night and on weekends.

TAXPAYER DEMANDS

Taxpayers demand efficient and effective governments. Pressure has increased in the Post-Proposition 13 era. Programs not proven efficient and effective will be the first to go when a list of priorities is considered. Even though reserve units rely on volunteers or part time help, they have been considered an unneeded expense by some departments and thus eliminated. Other departments have had opposite reactions and increased their reserve allocation to take advantage of volunteer employees.

CHANGING TAXBASE

Some cities and counties have been seriously damaged by the Post-Proposition 13 effect. With few means to develop additional revenue sources aside from property taxes, many agencies face extinction. One sheriff, when answering the question about plans into the year 2000 wrote, "You've got to be kidding, we probably won't be in business then". Other areas -- those are growing and encouraging industry, or have great income from retail sales tax -- are not facing crises, and in fact do not seem overly concerned about their shrinking complement of reserves and recruiting difficulties. They can use regular officers exclusively, or Level III, non-enforcement reserves in specialized support programs which will tend to keep the regulars on the streets.


CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS

Projections by the California Department of Finance Population Research Unit² predict a large surge in population of Hispanics and Orientals. Additionally, the average age of the population will increase. The attitude of most police seems to be, "Yes, we are aware of the trends and we'll cross the recruitment bridge when we come to it". No department contacted has specific plans to deal with either concern. The changing ethnic balance will require concentrated efforts towards recruiting minorities for reserve programs. The aging population actually should help recruiting efforts using the data developed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office in a study conducted by their Reserve Unit in 1984-1985.³ Their study indicated we should be recruiting from the late 20's to early 30's group, settled, married with older children.

RECRUITING METHODS

VS

POPULATION LEVEL SERVED



PRE-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

There is a continuing trend toward requiring police officer and reserve officer recruits to have graduated from a P.O.S.T. approved training facility prior to employment. While uncommon with large agencies, the practice is very common among smaller agencies, which save thousands of dollars in training each year and develop a pool of reserves at the same time. The Ontario, California Police Department advised they obtain about 70% of their regular officers through their reserve program.

CIVILIANIZATION

There has been a continuing trend in some agencies to relegate duties, formerly held by regular officers, to civilians. Duties such as traffic control, special events, dispatching and desk duties to name a few, have been assumed by other than sworn officers.

DEPARTMENT COMMITMENT TO PROGRAM

If a police or sheriff's agency does not support a reserve program, the program will be ineffective. Few small agencies can afford to assign adequate personnel or commit resources to their programs. Few large departments commit adequate resources, although there are exceptions. Some departments have eliminated their programs altogether.

CHANGING PRIORITIES

For the same reasons departments have been adopting new strategies toward the deployment of regular forces, with an emphasis on civilianization, perhaps now is the time to consider greater use of Level III, non-law enforcement reserves who require much less

training. With a dwindling reserve force, a department will be hard-pressed to provide services for special events such as traffic control, and crowd control. This will leave other law enforcement duties to the difficult to recruit and retain, more highly trained Level I and II law enforcement reserves.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT APPLICATION

The recent United States Supreme Court Decision in Garcia vs. The City of San Antonio, which required cities and counties to adopt new overtime policies, has caused the demise of some reserve programs. Agencies that pay reserve officers find themselves caught in a "Catch 22" situation. They are prohibited from allowing an "employee" to work for nothing one time and be paid another. Rather than spend the time to develop an alternative plan, some agencies have discontinued their programs.

FORECASTS

What are the futures of police reserve programs in California in the year 2000?

- o Reserve strength will remain somewhat static, well below allocated positions. With increased training requirements, difficulty in recruiting, changing ethnicity and lack of commitment by departments towards their reserve programs, the future does not look promising. We will rely less on recruiting large numbers to be trained as Level I officers. Instead we will be relying more on Level III officers to perform non-law enforcement type responsibilities to relieve the higher-trained Level I's of these responsibilities, just as we have civilianized the more mundane, non-enforcement duties of regular officers.

- As the Hispanic and Asian population is assimilated into the mainstream of our society, they should become easier to recruit. Efforts should be made to assure that we direct recruiting programs toward these groups now so they will be well represented in the year 2000.
- I do have great faith in our ability to change direction and accommodate any contingency. California Law Enforcement has proven this over and over again. I expect that if an agency believes they need law enforcement reserve officers in greater numbers, they will commit themselves to recruiting and retaining as many as they believe they need. The larger departments are not alarmed about the problems at this time, nor are most small departments. The alarmed departments are the same ones that are worried about being able to exist at all due to very poor financial positions. We also are blessed with a group of dedicated men and women in the reserve ranks who can be expected to continue to perform commendably and can be a source of recruitment if asked and properly trained. A recent Gallup Survey indicated the best recruiters are those doing the job, who make personal contact with prospective recruits.

CONCLUSION

It is my opinion that any public administrator, including law enforcement leaders, who does not take advantage of volunteers from the community is derelict. Volunteers in the form of police reserve officers have a place in law enforcement. They are more

FOOTNOTES

¹California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, P.O.S.T. Administrative Manual, Commission Procedure H-1, Revised July 15, 1982. Definition 1-2.

²California Department of Finance, Population Research Unit, Sacramento, California, Report 86 P-4, projected total population for California by race/ethnicity July 1, 1980 to July 1, 2020.

³Reserve Study, 1984-1985, Los Angeles Sheriff's Office.

**DEFINING THE FUTURE
FUTURES OF THE POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000**

COMMAND COLLEGE

By: JAMES L. KENNEDY

DEFINING THE FUTURE

I. INTRODUCTION

Governments in this country have relied heavily upon volunteers since the Minutemen defended Bunker Hill in 1775. Without volunteers, our country could not have defended itself in 1812, 1918, 1941 or during times of other man-made and natural disasters. Local governments have also relied heavily on the help of volunteers, who are frequently seen working in hospitals, park and police departments.

Police reserves, as we now know them, began appearing in California around the beginning of World War II, when they were used as auxiliary police officers to supplement police departments which were losing many officers to the military war effort. Reserve duties were primarily related to civil defense at first, but over the years, as the size and level of professionalism of Reserve units have grown, their responsibilities have grown, their responsibilities have increased and today some police departments routinely depend on reserve officers to support their regular daily activities. Smaller departments often schedule reserve officers to work as full-time, full-duty police officers. Some of these departments pay their reserves and some do not. Other departments

use reserve officers only for special events, such as high school games or Halloween carnivals. Sheriff's departments find other uses for their reserve units, such as assigning reserve deputies to horse mounted posses, search and rescue missions, or as crime prevention specialists. The list of possible duties for reserve officers is endless. A recent trend toward more stringent training requirements has changed the way reserve officers are used. There are now three levels of reserve training, levels I, II and III. Again, different departments make use of each of these levels of reserve officers in different ways.

Additional training requirements, psychological screening, more comprehensive background investigations, and tighter physical requirements, some of which have been imposed by law, others by the various departments themselves, have caused recruiting and retention problems for many departments among their regular officers. Additionally, the passage of Proposition Thirteen, and later, Proposition Four, have resulted in shrinking local budgets. As money has become harder and harder to come by, local politicians and administrators have, of necessity, become more

alert to possible methods of saving tax dollars. One obvious solution to these budgetary problems is the increased use of unpaid volunteers. Police reserve officers fall into this category.

Reserve officers also want to play a stronger role in law enforcement and, to that end, are presenting more and more demands to the police administrator. Such demands are being met with acceptance from some administrators and resistance by others.

Since some departments expect them to be fully trained police officers, responsible for every aspect of law enforcement from routine patrol through investigations, while other departments use them only for security at special events, reserve officers themselves are receiving mixed messages as to just what their role in the law enforcement profession actually is.

It appears that police reserve officers will play a much more important role in California law enforcement in the future. With the ever-increasing pressure on administrators for funds, it would seem that the use of volunteers would be a natural solution to a critical

problem. However, the increased costs of training, demands by some reserve officers for pay and the resistance of some police administrators to the idea of allowing unpaid volunteers to conduct police duties in their jurisdictions suggests another future.

This research project will be limited to California reserve agencies. It will attempt to answer the question, "What are the futures of police reserve programs in California in the year 2000?"

II. SCOPE AND APPROACH

The study is limited to California. Questionnaires were mailed to all fifty-eight Sheriff's offices in the state and to eighty-six police departments. Police departments were selected from throughout the state and I attempted to obtain information from all sizes of departments ranging from the smallest to the largest. Questions were asked to elicit responses which tell us:

1. Where we are today.
2. Where we would like to be.
3. What we are doing to get there.

4. What future events could affect our ability to get there.

After the responses were analyzed, departments were selected to personally contact to ask more detailed questions to help us determine the future of reserve programs in the opinion of leaders throughout the state. Public administrators, politicians and labor leaders were also polled. Using the cross-impact evaluation, a group of police reserve leaders assisted this study.

III. EMERGING TRENDS AND EVENTS

<u>Trends</u>	<u>Potential Events</u>
Additional required training	Lack of interest
Changing ethnicity	Change of priorities
Taxpayer demands	Pressure from police unions
Retention difficulties	Developing industrial base
Changing tax base	Fair Labor Standards applications
Pre-employment training requirements	Emphasize Level III programs
Civilianization	

IV. SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

A. ADDITIONAL MANDATED TRAINING

Recent trends toward additional mandated training by Police Officers Standards and Training (POST) have resulted in recruiting difficulties.

Volunteers have shown a reluctance to undergo several months of training which, in some areas, parallels that of the regular officers. Training can amount to two night sessions and one weekend day for several months or a full-time session in a police academy setting.

B. CHANGING ETHNICITY

Ethnicity predictions in populations projections indicated a significant increase in Hispanics and Asians. Recruiting efforts in these communities must be given greater emphasis if we are going to recruit qualified candidates.

C. TAXPAYER DEMANDS

Continuing taxpayer demands for greater efficiency in government will put more pressure on public managers. Programs not proven efficient and

effective will be the first to go when a list of priorities is considered.

D. CHANGING TAX BASE

Propositions 4 and 13 caused governmental agencies to look for other than property tax revenues. They have encouraged the growth of business and industry of the type which raises revenues. By locating such monies, they have been able to overcome difficulties in recruiting reserve officers by being able to pay for regular officers. Other agencies, unable to take advantage of any changes in how they develop revenue sources, have merely eliminated their reserve programs.

E. PRE-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Many police departments have cut costs by requiring their applicants to have already graduated from a POST approved police training facility. By doing so, they avoid the expense of having to pay salaries to their recruits while in academic training and develop a trained reserve pool at the same time.

F. CIVILIANIZATION

There has been a continuing trend in some agencies to relegate duties formerly held by regular and reserve officers to civilians. Such duties as traffic control, special events, dispatching and desk duties have been assumed by other than sworn officers.

G. DEPARTMENT COMMITMENT TO PROGRAM

If a police department does not fully support their reserve program, it will wither and die. Some departments have made a full commitment to their programs and others have not. Some programs have been eliminated altogether.


IV. PRECURSOR EVENTS

Descriptions of critical events which could significantly impact the issues relating to the future of police reserve programs are provided in figure 1. The events are briefly discussed and rated in a percentage as to the probability of occurrence.

COMMITTMENT vs EXPECTATIONS

DEPARTMENTS WITH A FORMAL PLAN FOR RESERVE FUTURE (A)

DEPARTMENTS DESIRING MORE RESERVES (B)



TOTAL OF ALL DEPARTMENTS WITH A FORMAL PLAN FOR RESERVE FUTURE (A)

Figure 1

<u>EVENTS</u>	<u>PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE</u>
1. <u>Change of Priorities</u>	90%

Police departments must adopt a new strategy toward the deployment of police reserve forces. In the past, police reserves have been used for special events such as traffic control, crowd control at sporting events, etc. With a dwindling reserve force, a department will be hard-pressed to provide these services. A shift to greater use of Level III reserves for nonenforcement purposes, leaving other enforcement related services to the more highly trained, more difficult to recruit and retain Level I reserve officers.

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 2. <u>Pressure from Employee Organizations</u> | 10% |
|--|-----|

Strong pressure from police organizations could cause a manager to curtail his reserve program. Some organization members see the reserves as a threat to continued employment

of regular officers. They see the appointment of more reserve officers and fewer regular officers to take advantage of unpaid labor. This shortsighted approach has been advocated by some managers and elected officials.

3. Developing Industrial Base 20%

Those cities and counties which have been able to attract business and industry to increase their tax base have been able to accommodate their inability to recruit reserves. Although none are considering eliminating their programs, they are not under the pressure to place heavy reliance on volunteers as are those departments with uncertain funding.

4. Fair Labor Standards Act Application 100%

Some departments have done away with their reserve programs. The application of a recent United States Supreme Court decision which applied FLSA to cities and counties has caused those departments which paid Reserve

officers for hours they worked to reevaluate their programs.

5. Emphasize Level III Programs 81%

Level III reserves who have no enforcement authority are an alternative to other reserves for traffic control, search and rescue and other non-law enforcement duties.


V. FORECASTS

Forecasts were developed by use of a brainstorming session and a cross-impact evaluation with the San Diego Police Reserve Command staff, a questionnaire to 144 police agencies and fifteen individual interviews. The trends identified follow:

1. Reserve strength will remain somewhat static

Reserve compliments will continue to stay well below allocated strength. Although the Reserve Command staff believed the compliments must increase due to population increases, it is apparent that training requirements imposed by POST and the reality of ever-increasing civil liability imposed by recent

PERCENTAGE OF ALLOCATED STRENGTH



TOTAL OF ALL DEPARTMENTS 49%

court decisions will make recruiting very difficult
and actually has caused some departments to
eliminate their reserve programs.

SCENARIO #1

RESERVE FUTURE

A CHANGE IN RESERVE ROLE

The last part of the century saw a fundamental change in the form and function of the reserve system in California. In order to appreciate the change, one needs to remember the reserve concept as it existed in the late 70's. Then, the function of the reserve unit of a law enforcement agency was seen as an augmentation of the regular field force. The primary duty of the reserve was to ride along in patrol cars to assist and cover the regular officer. Although the reserves were also extensively used as a resource to staff special events and unusual occurrences, it was generally recognized that this was a secondary, if desirable, function. In one major urban agency in particular, the reserve unit underwent a major reorganization when the administration felt that this primary function was being superseded by other details.

Because of this philosophy, the screening and training processes for reserves became comparable to that of the regulars. Litigation and liability concerns made this a virtual mandate. In the late 80's, a trend in law

enforcement became evident. Various interest groups sponsored legislation that added duties and responsibilities to field officers that had never been considered to be a legitimate part of law enforcement. Field officers were required by law to take an active role in hitherto private domestic matters, in social problems, and in complex investigations traditionally left in the past to experienced, specialized investigators, such as child abuse and adult abuse and neglect. Training demands on regulars and reserves alike increased. This became a burden on the volunteer units within the departments. The commitment to keep Level I status reserves required an expensive and time consuming effort by the host agencies. In many cases, reserve units were disbanded. Those agencies that retained their programs were not comfortable with the investment/benefit ratio.

The last part of the 20th century saw a drastic change in the form and function of the reserve program in the State of California. Although many departments considered the disbandment of their reserve units, it was generally recognized that there was a large resource of talent that was available but not utilized.

The presence of the tiered reserve system (Levels I, II and III) provided the solution. Although utilized minimally in the 80's, the idea of having individuals who were not capable or desirous of performing enforcement duties available for assistance via their own specialized expertise was considered a valid one.

This idea reached maturity in the early 90's. Reserve organizations began developing separate, parallel structures, one for enforcement and one for general assistance. Level I reserves showed a preference towards law enforcement, while existing Levels II and III became more involved in the public service and public relations projects that their departments initiated. As the reserve officers got older, many crossed the line from enforcement to service because, although they felt uncomfortable or frightened in confrontive situations, they still felt a great deal of loyalty and desire to be part of the organization in whatever way they could. The growth of this second structure in turn attracted many more citizens who recognized the opportunity to fulfill a moral obligation to their communities, while not actually placing themselves in jeopardy. Computer specialists donated their expertise, saving their department's large consulting fees. Media

relations, financial and technical support personnel all contributed their knowledge.

This development had its greatest impact, not on the field level practices of law enforcement agencies, but on the image departments projected on society at large. The association with these volunteer professionals enhanced the perception of law enforcement as a respectable profession rather than a trade. This was something that had long been sought after by police managers, and its value was not lost on them.

Recognizing the reserve system as a cost-effective means of furthering their departments' goals, much more of the department's resources were channelled into this program. Recruiting and support were stepped up. The success of the service reserve concept began to eclipse the traditional image of the reserve. This, coupled with the ever increasing difficulty in training the Level I reserve, brought a gradual decline in the size and power of this aspect of the reserves.

At the end of the century, we see the emergence of a citizen assistance corps and the eventual loss of the enforcement oriented reserve in California law enforcement.

SCENARIO #2

RESERVE FUTURE

THE INCREASE

In the year 2000, California Reserve Peace Officer programs have become a vital and significant part of the law enforcement community. The success of the reserve program was linked with the economic upswing that occurred in California during the last part of the 20th century. This process followed two paths, one in southern and one in northern California.

The more dramatic of the two occurred in the former. The controlled growth interests in the political arena prevailed, causing the development of a balanced, stable tax base. The unemployment level reached the lowest level in decades. These events caused two things to happen. The populace, becoming more affluent, began to demand more services of their law enforcement agencies. Legislation was passed, beginning in 1985 with the Domestic Violence and Dependent Adult Abuse regulations, mandated the involvement of police and sheriff's departments in an ever-increasing range of responsibilities. This, coupled with the need for basic police services, caused governments to look for

innovative alternatives to provide those services. Rank and file regular officers took on more of a socially proactive role. A program developed on the east coast (Boston's C.O.P.E.) was adopted here, in which officers actively looked for social problems to be correct, on the premise that alleviation of these problems would diminish crime problems. The program was received favorably by the public.

It was into this state of affairs that the value of reserve units was revealed. Studies had shown that reserve officers were favorably predisposed toward public relations/community service programs. They looked on their own efforts as contributing to the positive image of their local departments. Organizations saw the reserve units as a valid vehicle for discharging their "social" responsibilities. Reserves took on public relations duties, crime prevention duties, community awareness programs and specialized support responsibilities in their departments. Agencies began to rely on their reserve units to a greater extent. This was made easier in an indirect manner through state legislation. Bills introduced in the late 80's to limit liability of governments in lawsuits and to further protect officers from punitive liability were passed. Insurance premiums for liability dropped, which made it feasible to allow greater volunteer participation in local government.

Because of the favorable light in which reserves were being viewed, agencies began to put more energy into recruiting new reserves. It was in this area that a dramatic breakthrough occurred due to three factors. A study in the 1980's had established the profile of the successful reserve officer: a male in his late 20's/early 30's, with a stable job or business, not interested in law enforcement as a career, who had a desire to contribute to the community in some way. Another study had established that as aggressive minority groups ascended the "prosperity" scale, they tended to assume the values of the middle class to which they aspired. The third factor was the changing ethnic cross-section of the population. As the century neared its end, minority populations approached the 50% level. These levels were even higher in the southern half of California. This group, middle class and ethnic, had not been approached for recruitment in the reserves or regular forces.

Once the connection was made, and drives were aimed at specific ethnic groups, most notably Hispanics and Asians. This effectively doubled the pool of potential applicants. This allowed the selection of high quality entrants which had been difficult in the past because of the stringent screening requirements and relatively small group from which to draw.

The wholesale enlistment of Hispanics and Asians into law enforcement, both regular and reserve had far reaching social consequences, in effect an upward spiral. The enmity towards law enforcement which had existed in the 70's and 80's in the minority communities dissipated in the 90's. As these groups became more involved in law enforcement, the familiarity dispelled the alienation felt between these two social forces. As this phenomenon developed, it was seen that the reserves were the primary focal point for the ethnic groups. The same drive that had brought them into the "mainstream" served to dispose them toward part-time community service as opposed to a full time career.

Although law enforcement was considered an acceptable part of life, it still did not offer the upward mobility to these groups, who were just "coming of age".

All of this led to an explosive growth, and subsequent increase in duties, of reserve organizations in Southern California. These factors, however, were not present to as great a degree in the northern counties. The increased use of reserves followed another path. The economic growth that the state as a whole experienced manifested itself differently here. In the early 90's, local governments launched a concerted effort to attract light manufacturing

and technical research and development firms. These organizations were seen as beneficial, providing maximum employment and tax revenues with minimal heavy industrial development. This economic base developed gradually, but with the increase in population and increased urbanization, demands for police service rose sharply. Departments were faced with this demand, and low levels of staffing with which to handle them. In the late 70's and early 80's, these departments had relied heavily on reserves to augment their field forces. It was to the reserves that they looked to for help. Fortunately, because of the optimistic economic picture, individuals were more likely to join the reserves. Reserves followed the historic northern pattern of being used both as volunteer and as part-time paid replacement relief. The need that the southern cities experienced for public relations programs was not evident in the largely rural northern communities, at least at first. The growth of the reserves into an auxiliary field force was viewed with suspicion by officers' organizations, but the immediate need for new services and the lack of regular officers led the associations to agree to this state of affairs.

SCENARIO #3
RESERVE FUTURE
THE DISBANDMENT

Early in 1986, a federal regulation went into effect that, in retrospect, was seen to be the first in a series of legal complications that led to the elimination of the reserve peace officer system in California by the year 2000. One provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibited employers from using employees in both a paid and voluntary capacity performing the same or similar function. Many small law enforcement organizations were in violation of this statute, in that they were using their reserve officers in a part-time paid replacement capacity for regular officers. In fact, many departments were dependent on this source of manpower to meet their service obligations.

FLSA brought an abrupt stop to this practice. Some Level I reserves immediately dropped out of their programs, because they viewed their reserve commitments as a source of supplemental income. They were not interested in supporting the "all volunteer" concept. Departments faced with the loss of the expertise and staffing resource these officers represented, responded with various strategies. A drive was

initiated to upgrade the existing Level II reserves to Level I, so that they could be used in the field for the "free manpower", upon which they relied so heavily. This attempt met with dubious success. Many Level II reserves were unwilling or unable to attend the additional schooling necessary to achieve Level I status. This was in turn due to a variety of factors. In the northern counties of California, the economy took a downturn in the late 80's. Rising agricultural labor costs caused many individuals and businesses to leave for the healthier Southern California economic prospects.

The resulting decline in tax revenues in the early 1990's created a double bind. It became increasingly important to local agencies to bring more reserves on board, but their shrinking budgets precluded recruitment drives, screening activities, or sponsorship of academies. Community colleges, faced with their own shrinking budgets, were not able to provide criminal justice courses without raising tuitions. Individuals were simply unable to afford to achieve Level I status.

The ranks of Level I reserves in Northern California began to shrink drastically. This was further aggravated by the

fact that departments were so hard pressed to provide the services to the community that in the past were handled by reserves, that they couldn't take the time to attract new reserve officers.

A second strategy used by these departments was to place Level II reserves in cars with regular officers much more than before. Other departments, uneasy with the potential liabilities incurred, refused to let their Level II reserves ride in the field at all. Departments that adopted this policy saw a further decrease in their reserve strength. Reserve officers, barred from riding along, lost interest in the program. Those "ride-alongs" were the reward for doing the other tasks asked of them by their departments.

The 1980's saw the development of a legal trend that was to also affect reserve programs detrimentally. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an officer could be held civilly liable for a false arrest. In 1988, this liability was expanded to include a liability for the consequences of a police investigation. The late 1980's also saw a reinforcement of the "deep pocket" concept that had been such a drain on government resources. The insurance premiums caused by these court decisions reached such

heights that most municipalities and county governments assumed a risky self-insured policy. In practice, for many small governments, this just meant the hope that lawsuits would not develop.

The crunch to put officers on the street and the legal climate in regards to suits combined in 1994 to virtually wipe out reserve programs in Northern California. A small city, pressed by demands by service, allowed Level II reserves to ride alone on certain occasions in an enforcement capacity. That officer was dispatched to take a burglary investigation. Based on physical evidence found at the scene, follow-up investigations sought and obtained a warrant for the arrest of a local citizen. During the ensuing trial, it was discovered that the reserve had committed some fundamental errors in handling the evidence. The charges were dropped, and the citizen brought suit against the city and the police department for damages. The reserve officer was found to be liable, and was required to pay damages. The reserve officer in turn sued the city, claiming inadequate training. He won the suit. The city, with no liability insurance, defaulted and went into bankruptcy.

Within a year of this decision, almost all northern law enforcement agencies had disbanded their reserve programs, being unwilling to assume the liabilities of fielding reserves.

Southern California, during the late 80's and early 90's, was not affected by the economic woes that beset the northern areas. The majority of departments had an adequate number of Level I reserves on hand to field two officer cars with regular reserve teams. However, in 1997, the legal precedents established in Northern California were used with crushing effect in the south. In spite of the demonstrated danger of doing so, many cities became self-insured. The inevitable tragedy occurred. A two officer car, driven by a reserve, was pursuing a car at high speeds. An accident occurred, in which a car with four family members were killed outright. The surviving family members brought suit, and the resulting damage awards were so severe as to convince California law enforcement that the maintenance of a reserve program carried more liabilities than advantages. By 1998, all reserve organizations in California had been disbanded.

STRATEGIC PLAN
FUTURES OF THE POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

COMMAND COLLEGE

by: JAMES L. KENNEDY

STRATEGIC PLAN

OUTLINE

I. SITUATION

A. Environment

1. Difficulty Recruiting
2. Mandated Training Requirements
3. Dwindling Resources
4. Changing Ethnicity

B. Resources

1. Community Colleges
2. Aging Population
3. Programs in Place

C. Stakeholder Demands

1. Reserve Units Augment Regular Forces
2. Public Demands for Efficient and Effective Services
3. Police Officer Standards and Training (POST)
4. Community (As opposed to taxpayers)

II. MISSION

A. Provide Police Reserve Services to Police Agencies

1. Change Approach
2. Redefine Priorities

B. Strengthen Commitment of Management Towards Reserve Programs

III. EXECUTION

A. Alternatives

1. Retain Status Quo
2. Abandon Reserve Programs

B. Recommendation

1. Police agencies reemphasize their commitment towards developing viable reserve programs
2. Set definitive Goals and Objectives
3. Develop Professional Recruiting Teams for Reserves
 - a. Utilize Level III Expertise
 - b. Take advantage of outside, professional recruiters

IV. SUPPORT REQUIRED

A. Administrative

1. A Commitment by both Police and Public Administrators
2.
 - a. Adequate Administrative Staff
 - b. Other Resources
3. Support of Reserve Officers

B. Logistical

1. Continuing Commitment by POST to Maintain Reasonable Standards
2. Implementation by Police Agencies

STRATEGIC PLAN

I. SITUATION

The futures of the Police Reserve Programs in California in the year 2000 depend upon the vision and determination of the police administrators of today. Of the over two-hundred local police agencies in California, all but a handful are below allocated strength in their police reserve units. Some agencies have elected to do without these citizen volunteers due to the myriad of problems faced by today's police administrators. What are these problems? Why are we facing such a major problem in the area of recruiting? When can we not keep them after we get them? Why do some departments believe they can get along without them? Why do others believe they cannot exist without them? What plans do we have to solve these problems?


Most police administrators interviewed said the major problem they face in their reserve program is the inability to recruit enough people to fill the positions allocated. The most common response as to why was the requirements for training adopted by the California Peace

Officer Standards and Training (POST). They believe there are few volunteers who wish to spend so much of their own time attending the required sessions which now amount to nearly 800 hours in some departments. Not one person interviewed, however, did not admit that to expect a person to assume the complicated role of a police reserve in today's society required at least the extensive training received. Civil liability in California has reached the point where any public manager is setting him/herself or the agency up for possible bankruptcy for failing to properly train an employee, especially one who carries a gun and drives a powerful police car.

The situation we face is not only the POST Training Requirements but a lack of commitment by police and public managers to commit the necessary resources to recruit and retain an adequate reserve force; the impact still being felt from Propositions 4 and 13; responding to an aging population with a different ethnic makeup; and the flexibility to experiment with innovative new programs.

RESERVE RECRUITING METHODS


WORD OF MOUTH



TOTAL OF ALL DEPARTMENTS 60%


RESERVE RECRUITING METHODS

MEDIA ADVERTISEMENTS



TOTAL OF ALL DEPARTMENTS 46%

RESERVE RECRUITING METHODS COLLEGES & ACADEMIES



TOTAL OF ALL DEPARTMENTS 39%

A. STAKEHOLDERS

The stakeholders in this situation are the police and public officials, the public and taxpayers, the police reserve officers, and the regular officers who depend, not only on the hardware and training they receive, but the quality of reserve officer who supports them in the field.

1. The police and public officials depend on police reserve officers to work as unpaid volunteers and help the officials stretch their dollars. They would be considered derelict if they did not think this way.

Each department faces its own problems peculiar to that entity and police chiefs must assess the needs of their departments. Some will say they believe they have the best possible organizational structure for their department. Others will make a decision to change.

The difference between departments' approach to allocation of reserve officers is remarkable. Some departments send Level I reserves into the

field in a one-officer patrol unit to perform the everyday tasks of a police officer. This staffing method is more commonly used by smaller departments and is seldom used by larger departments. Smaller departments rely on reserve officers on a daily basis, actually scheduling them to work a regular assignment. Large departments do not take this approach. Some small departments say they could not survive without reserves.

The Participation Method of negotiation is the method which will be used by most police chiefs to achieve their goals. They must have the input of all segments of their entity before making any decision to make radical change.

2. Public officials are obligated to get the most for the least. They are entrusted by the public to effectively and efficiently operate their government entity. If they believe that the intelligent use of reserve officers is the best way to go, that is what they will do. They too will use Participation.

3. The police reserve officers will generally go along with the decisions of the department, as long as their position is not threatened. They have volunteered their services to the departments and merely expect a fair shake in return.

However, when such changes as were caused by the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, resulting in some departments cancelling their reserve programs, reserve officers may tend to resist the change. Any such efforts, however, have been ineffective. Participation combined with Fait Accompli would be the most effective method.

II. MISSION

Steps must be taken to allow law enforcement in California to take full advantage of the large pool of potential volunteers waiting to be encouraged to become police or sheriff's reserves. The impact of additional mandatory training, the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and changing demographics must be overcome and utilized to our advantage. We must commit adequate staff and other resources to recruiting and administering our programs; designing reserve

organizations in such a way as to take full advantage of Level I, II and III designations; pay reserves, if necessary, or develop innovative methods to accommodate FLSA requirements. Some administrators believe we can get along without police reserves. I doubt it.

III. EXECUTION

Each local police and sheriff's agency must determine their needs. I would recommend a needs assessment to determine: 1) Where they are; 2) Where they want to be; 3) What it require to get there; 4) Is it worth it; 5) What course of action are they going to take?

A. ALTERNATIVES

1. Retain Status Quo Status Quo, as opposed to doing nothing, will require some aggressive action on the part of most departments. Most are losing ground. The inability to adequately recruit, coupled with a problem of retention, is causing a negative situation.
2. Do nothing. If we take no action, we will probably see the end of police reserve programs for the most part. Level III programs such as Search and Rescue Units in Sheriff's Departments and technical assistance will probably be expanded.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Police and Sheriff's Departments throughout the state must decide if they really do want a reserve unit. If they do, a commitment must be made by management to provide the resources necessary to make it successful.

1. A vigorous, aggressive recruitment program must be adopted. Those ethnic groups expanding in great numbers must be targeted for special attention.
2. Supervisory positions within the reserve units should be held to a minimum. If the purpose of the reserve is to supplement the officers on the street, an overabundance of supervisors detracts from this purpose.
3. The training standards imposed by POST are here to stay and recently it was recommended they be made somewhat more stringent. We must learn to live with them.
4. Consideration of utilizing Level III reserves for special events such as traffic direction, crowd control, etc. in addition to search and rescue and technical areas.

IV. SUPPORT REQUIRED

A. ADMINISTRATIVE

1. A strong commitment by management for personnel and other resources to make their programs successful.
2. Each member must fully understand and support the efforts of management.

B. LOGISTICAL

Every police department which makes the decision to keep or develop a reserve program should also develop an operations manual. A copy should be provided to all members.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
FUTURES OF THE POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

COMMAND COLLEGE

by: JAMES L. KENNEDY

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

INTRODUCTION

Research indicates police reserve programs in California will continue to lose personnel unless some concerted action is taken to reverse the trend. Lack of commitment by management towards recruitment and retention and possibly unrealistic goals are a contributing factor. Training requirements have put a tremendous burden on police and sheriff's agencies, but with recent civil awards by juries and courts for negligent training and retention, there is no doubt that although a burden, the training requirements are here to stay.

The time has come for each department to assess the need for reserve officers and make a commitment to either fully support the effort or possibly abandon it. Most departments in the state do maintain a reserve unit. Some do fully support them with a commitment for excellence. Most do not.

I. ADMINISTRATION

Each police chief and sheriff in California should assess the need for a reserve unit within his organization. After that decision is made, the next thing to do is decide what they will and will not do, how they will do it and develop an operations manual. Realistic goals and objectives must

be chosen for the unit. One of the most critical is size . . . How many people do you want in your unit? Of the 144 departments polled in this study, not one was up to allocated strength with the average being 49%! Less than one-half of the allocated reserve officers are actually on board.

II. RECRUITING

There are several methods used to recruit potential reserve officers. The larger departments recruit professionally. They have the money available for printed material and generally follow the same methods they do to recruit regular officers. The smaller departments make do with what resources they can devote. Colleges and regional academies are a good source.

Recommendations from officers, both regular and reserve, have proven very successful. Officers should be given some incentive for bringing qualified applicants to the department. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department conducted a study in 1984 which identified the successful reserve officer and could serve as a model for recruiting for every department.

Again, every department has its own needs and cannot expect to merely pick up a plan and adopt it verbatim for its own use. But, it can certainly use it as a guide.

III. TRAINING

With very few exceptions, departments train their reserve officers through a regional training facility which is sponsored by a local community college. Some departments process recruits before sponsoring them in the academy and others merely recruit out of the classroom. Although colleges tend to allow anyone to enroll in law enforcement courses, it seems to be a waste of resources to allow someone who cannot either pass the physical or background to occupy a seat possibly to the exclusion of a viable candidate.

Training for reserve officers should be kept current with what is being taught the regulars. If we are going to expect reserve officers to be on the street performing law enforcement functions, it is imperative from both an officer safety and a liability standpoint they be up to date on training.

IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Demographics are changing. Between now and 2000 A.D., both the age and ethnicity of our population will make remarkable changes. It is estimated the average will change from 29 to 35 years. Based on the Los Angeles Sheriff's report, this should aid our recruiting efforts. The changing ethnicity will require greater efforts in Hispanic and Asian recruiting. The most dramatic changes will occur in the Southern California area.

Another interesting consideration is the remarkable difference between Northern California and Southern and Central California. Those departments polled in Northern California generally are smaller and in remote areas. Most are having revenue problems. One Sheriff answered the question regarding plans to the year 2000, "Are you kidding? We probably won't be in business then."

As with other departments throughout the state, the very small departments in Northern California are finding it difficult to recruit, train and retain reserves. They rely very heavily on reserve officers, more it seems, than departments in Central and Southern California. Again, none have a plan, but seem to take things as they come on a day-to-day basis.

LEVEL I vs LEVEL II and LEVEL III

Due to the difficulties we are all experiencing recruiting and training reserve officers, perhaps it is time to examine our thinking towards the use of "Law Enforcement Reserves" as opposed to other volunteers in law enforcement. We do not need a fully trained and qualified law enforcement officer to operate a command van or assist with most duties at a mobile command post. Office duties and desk duties also do not require a fully qualified law enforcement officer.

We put explorer scouts in the street to direct traffic, why not Level III's?

If we maintain a smaller force of Level I's and expand the duties of Level III's, we possibly will relieve some of the pressure we all are experiencing.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN
THE FUTURES OF THE POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

COMMAND COLLEGE

by: JAMES L. KENNEDY

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

SUMMARY OF PLAN

Police and Sheriff's reserve programs are faced with severe recruiting and retention problems. Most agencies report they are facing these problems due to mandatory training requirements imposed by the Commission on Police Officers Standards and Training. Standards, most law enforcement managers admit, are necessary. Necessary because of recent court and jury awards in amounts which, if not taken seriously, will bankrupt some cities and counties.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs have been urged to reassess their need for reserve officers, to develop reasonable goals and objectives for their units if they do believe they have such needs and to seriously consider redefining the roles of their Level I, II and III reserves.

A. CRITICAL MASS

The persons considered the "Critical Mass" relevant to this plan are:

1. The Police Chiefs and Sheriffs of California agencies

No changes are going to take place in an agency unless the program is supported by the chief officers. The chief or sheriff must take the lead and be the motivating force.

Depending on the size of the agency and the commitment of the leader, he may or may not take a direct part in this plan.

2. The Commission on Police Officers Standards and Training

The Commission sets the training standards for each level of reserve officer. They recently conducted hearings regarding increasing training hours. They are responsible for maintaining reasonable standards and making certain they are enforced.

Although the Commission is very interested in the reserve programs throughout the state, they will not take a direct part in the changes as long as their requirements are met.

3. The Police Reserve Officers Association of California

PROAC has a considerable stake in any changes. They will closely monitor any planned changes. They are a dedicated group who will support any improvements in their position. They may resist a reduction in "Law Enforcement" level reserve numbers.

4. Police Officer's Research Association of California

PORAC recognizes the need for police reserve programs throughout the state and has no problem with them unless they believe the reserves are taking away jobs of regular police officers. The Executive Director of PORAC has been active for several years in developing standards for police reserves and supports them fully.

5. Local Police Organizations

The representative group of each department's officers must be dealt with as a separate entity. Every group can be expected to have its own agenda for dealing with the reserve situation. Some groups are more militant than others and can be expected to take a "Union vs Scab" position against what they could interpret as a threat to regular police officer positions. It is imperative that the administrator do nothing to unnecessarily spark this reaction.

If the regular force must be reduced for legitimate reasons, then the situation must be met head-on and dealt with in a professional manner.

B. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE: Refer to Figure-1, "Management Structure Flow Chart".

1. The above-mentioned chart was developed for use by the San Diego Police Department Reserve Restructuring. It is included merely as a model.

Each department endeavoring to redesign their reserve structure should design their model to meet their needs.

2. The Commander of Field Operations, a regular police commander, will be the operational leader of this transition. Someone must be in charge and his position, as the Executive Officer of Field Operations, is the most logical due to his position in the regular organization.
3. He will be assigned by the Reserve Deputy Chief in a staff (as opposed to line) position. This person can act as a troubleshooter and, because of his personality and the esteem by which he is held by reserve officers, will be used to extinguish fires when they break out. He can also expedite changes.

Figure 2
ACCOUNTABILITY CHART

	Chief of Police	Deputy Chief - Field Operations	Commander - Field Operations	Reserve Deputy Chief	Reserve Sergeants	Reserve Recruiters	Reserve Officers	Police Area Captains	Area Police Supervisors	Reserve Coordinator
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1 Chief Executive Officer - Sets goals and policy.	W									
2 Establishes and executes operating policy of all field operations.		W	C	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
3 Executes operating policy of all field operations including reserves.			W					C		C
4 Provides staff support to the commander. Acts as troubleshooter.				W						
5 Coordinates activities of Reserve Program with department.			S							W
6 Provides support to regular field officers.					W		W	W	W	
7 Specially trained recruiters lends support to program.						W				
8 Provides leadership to reserve officers at stations. Liaison.					W				W	
9 Supports program. Assists all levels to implement.								W	W	W

W Performs the work. Includes decision making necessary in the performance of the work.

A Must approve action taken or decision made.

C Must be consulted before action is taken or decision made. Advice significant, but not binding.

D Makes decisions on those matters submitted to him to resolve internal conflicts.

N Must be notified via direct communication of actions taken and decisions made by "W" person.

S Supervises but does not perform the work. Plans, organizes, and coordinates work; maintains contact with those doing the


Figure 3

Actors In Critical Mass	<u>Type of Commitment</u>		
	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
Chief of Police	XXX		XXX
Commander of Field Operations			XXX
Reserve Deputy Chief		XXX	
Reserve Sergeants			XXX
Reserve Recruiting Team		XXX	

CRITICAL MASS COMMITMENT CHART

Figure 4

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE



**MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
FLOW CHART**

4. The Regular Police Sergeant assigned as Reserve Coordinator will serve the commander as liaison between the reserve and regular officers. In his everyday function, he will be expected to oversee this transition as well as coordinate the overall reserve program. Since he is involved with the reserves on a daily basis, he is the logical person to be assigned this task.
5. The seven Reserve Sergeants assigned to each area command and the Traffic Division will be the key to the success of this operation. Each person has been thoughtfully selected for their personal attributes. Each is fully committed to the transition, is articulate and dynamic. They can relate well with reserve and regular officers alike. These officers will maintain work assignment schedules which are compatible with the needs of the regular area command officer, keeping within the guidelines set down by the centralized Office of Field Operations. They will assure active participation by reserve members and provide guidance and counselling to the officers. The input and feedback to the Reserve Coordinator will be valuable to management. By alerting the command to both operational and transitional problems, more serious organizational problems can be avoided.

C. TECHNOLOGIES

Each department must conduct their own needs assessment.

If it is determined they wish to make changes in their reserve programs, they must first develop their own set of plans similar to the plans I have developed for this project:

1. Define the Future;
2. Develop a Strategic Plan;
3. Develop an Implementation Plan;
4. Develop a Transitional Management

After the plans are developed, the success or failure depends upon the resolve of the leadership to make it work.


I recommend the chief or sheriff carefully choose the project director. Choose a person who is totally in tune with the chief and fully understands what he is supposed to accomplish.

The management team should be assembled and the project explained by the chief so each member has no doubt what the boss expects.

Periodic feedback must be provided to the chief, keeping him informed of progress or problems.


CURRENT ALLOCATION OF RESERVE FORCE

BY TYPE OF DUTY



MARCH 1985 ALLOCATION OF RESERVE FORCE

BY TYPE OF DUTY



Workshops with reserve officers should be held so each one of them understands what is taking place.

A Force-Field Analysis may be used to identify those factors which tend to work against success and they can be neutralized. Resistance to change "IRC" can be a strong negative factor. A strong transitional manager is of utmost importance to carry the project through.

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IN CALIFORNIA

YEAR 2000

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APPENDIX
THE FUTURES OF POLICE RESERVE PROGRAMS
IN CALIFORNIA
YEAR 2000

ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS

DEPARTMENT NAME _____

1. Population of area served? _____
2. Number of sworn personnel? _____
3. Number of Reserve personnel? _____
4. Allocated Reserve strength? _____
5. Has your Reserve membership grown within the last 10 years?
If so, has the growth kept pace with "sworn" increases?

RECRUITING AND PROCESSING

1. How do you recruit new Reserve candidates?
2. How often do you conduct recruiting?
3. Have you changed the qualifications for Reserve candidates in the past 10 years? If so, how?
4. Do you anticipate changing the qualifications in the future?
If so, how?

TRAINING

1. To what level does your agency train Reserves?
2. In addition to state requirements for field experience, do you have a structured F.T.O Program for Reserves?

UTILIZATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS

1. Do you use your Reserve officers in any of the following capacities?
 - o Work alone as an assigned unit for enforcement? YES___ NO___
 - o Work as a two person Reserve unit for Enforcement?
YES___ NO___
 - o Work as a one or two person unit for backup or cover?
YES___ NO___
 - o Work as Reserve unit for assistance as needed with little or no enforcement responsibilities? YES___ NO___
 - o Prohibited from working alone in a field situation?
YES___ NO___
 - o Work plain clothes details with regular officers?
YES___ NO___
 - o Work plain clothes details independently? YES___ NO___
 - o Work as a replacement for a regular unit (vacation or sick leave)? YES___ NO___
2. Do you assign Reserves or are they allowed to choose their work?
3. Do you use Reserves for technical support (electronics, computers, etc.)?
4. Do your Reserve officers receive any monetary compensation for the hours worked? If so, under what circumstances

FUTURE GOALS FOR RESERVES

1. Does your department have a plan, formal or otherwise, for the future of your Reserve Unit?

Reserve Unit Survey
Page 3

2. Do you see a need for fewer or additional Reserve officers in the future of your organization, and why?
3. Do you feel the state mandated training of Reserve officers should be more closely related to regular officer training?
4. Will pressure from police associations, PORAC or other labor organizations curtail uses of police Reserves in the future?
5. Briefly describe what your department plans, goals or expectations are for Reserve officers through the year 2000.

YOUR TITLE/RANK _____ LENGTH OF SERVICE _____

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE

FUTURE OF RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

1. How do you see ethnic population trends affecting your Reserve organization?
2. How do you see Prop. 13 and similar fiscal constraints affecting your Reserve organization?
3. How do you see more stringent training requirements affecting your Reserve organization?
4. How do you see more stringent entrance screening requirements affecting your Reserve organization?
5. Do you anticipate using your Reserve organization as an alternate vehicle for providing required services?
6. Do you anticipate development of pay structure for "part time officers" with your organization?
7. Does your officer's association have any input into your use of Reserves?
8. Do you see the "privatization of services" trend affecting your Reserve organization?
9. What is the extent of your organization's commitment to your Reserve program?
10. Do you foresee a significant role change for your Reserve organization?
11. Why are most police organizations, including your own, having so much trouble recruiting Reserve officers?

The percentage values listed in the following tables were compiled from responses to a questionnaire distributed in January 1986. 144 questionnaires were mailed to various municipal police and county sheriff's agencies.

91 responses were received. Three responses omitted population level served and were therefore not included. The sample size was 88.

The responses were categorized according to population level served:

1,000,000 and over	(3 responses)
500,000 - 999,999	(5 responses)
250,000 - 499,999	(7 responses)
100,000 - 249,999	(18 responses)
50,000 - 99,999	(19 responses)
25,000 - 49,999	(16 responses)
10,000 - 24,999	(13 responses)
less than 10,000	(7 responses)

The question regarding whether or not Reserve growth has kept pace with regular growth was not answered by 36% of respondents. This appeared to be due to confusion regarding its structure. Therefore, the data from this question was not included.

RESERVE FUTURE STUDY
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	TOTAL	1,000,000 and up	500,000- 999,999
1. <u>STAFFING</u>			
A. Percentage of allocated Reserve strength:	49%	38%	69%
B. Reserve membership has grown in last 10 years:	30%	33%	20%
2. <u>RECRUITMENT</u>			
A. Respondents indicating inclusion of tactic in Reserve recruitment strategy:			
1. Colleges and academies:	39%	33%	20%
2. Media advertisements:	46%	67%	60%
3. Word of mouth:	60%	0%	80%
B. Presence of an ongoing recruitment program:	70%	100%	80%
3. <u>QUALIFICATIONS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating a change in Reserve qualifications in the last 10 years:	87%	100%	100%
B. Anticipating a change in Reserve qualifications in the future:	11%	0%	20%
4. <u>TRAINING</u>			
A. Respondents certifying Reserves to Level I status:	47%	67%	60%
B. Utilizing a structured Field Training program for Reserves:	85%	67%	60%

Reserve Future Study
Questionnaire Response

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	TOTAL	1,000,000 and up	500,000- 999,999
<u>5. UTILIZATION</u>			
A. Respondents using Reserves alone for enforcement:	51%	67%	60%
B. Using Reserves in two-officer units for enforcement:	45%	33%	60%
C. Using Reserves in 1 or 2 officer backup units:	59%	33%	40%
D. Using Reserves for assistance with minimal enforcement duties:	55%	100%	60
E. Reserves prohibited from working alone in the field:	49%	33%	40%
F. Using Reserves in plain clothes situations with Regular officers:	24%	0%	40%
G. Using Reserves in plain clothes independently:	15%	67%	40%
H. Using Reserves as replacement relief for Regular officers:	26%	33%	20%
I. Reserves are always assigned to details:	38%	0%	20%
J. Using Reserves for technical support:	40%	67%	40%
K. Compensating Reserves (excluding uniform reimbursement):	49%	0%	0%
<u>6. FUTURE GOALS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating presence of specific future plans for Reserve unit:	44%	33%	20%

Reserve Future Study
Questionnaire Response

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	TOTAL	1,000,000 and up	500,000- 999,999
B. Indicating an anticipated need for more Reserves in the future:	86%	100%	100%
C. Anticipating training of Reserves closer to Regular standards:	57%	100%	60%
D. Anticipating curtailment of Reserve activity due to labor organization pressure:	45%	67%	60%
E. Indicating specific plans for Reserves through year 2000:	44%	100%	0%

RESERVE FUTURE STUDY
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	250,000- 499,999	100,000- 249,999	50,000- 99,999
1. <u>STAFFING</u>			
A. Percentage of allocated Reserve strength:	57%	53%	64%
B. Reserve membership has grown in last 10 years:	14%	44%	32%
2. <u>RECRUITMENT</u>			
A. Respondents indicating inclusion of tactic in Reserve recruitment strategy:			
1. Colleges and academies:	43%	61%	21%
2. Media advertisements:	43%	44%	74%
3. Word of mouth:	43%	67%	63%
B. Presence of an ongoing recruitment program:	71%	78%	74%
3. <u>QUALIFICATIONS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating a change in Reserve qualifications in the last 10 years:	86%	95%	74%
B. Anticipating a change in Reserve qualifications in the future:	29%	23%	16%
4. <u>TRAINING</u>			
A. Respondents certifying Reserves to Level I status:	57%	50%	53%
B. Utilizing a structured Field Training program for Reserves:	86%	94%	95%

Reserve Future Study
Questionnaire Response

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	250,000- 499,999	100,000- 249,999	50,000- 99,999
<u>5. UTILIZATION</u>			
A. Respondents using Reserves alone for enforcement:	43%	56%	42%
B. Using Reserves in two-officer units for enforcement:	43%	56%	53%
C. Using Reserves in 1 or 2 officer backup units:	86%	50%	79%
D. Using Reserves for assistance with minimal enforcement duties:	43%	33%	74%
E. Reserves prohibited from working alone in the field:	57%	50%	52%
F. Using Reserves in plain clothes situations with Regular officers:	29%	11%	37%
G. Using Reserves in plain clothes independently:	14%	22%	5%
H. Using Reserves as replacement relief for Regular officers:	43%	17%	21%
I. Reserves are always assigned to details:	43%	22%	53%
J. Using Reserves for technical support:	29%	44%	63%
K. Compensating Reserves (excluding uniform reimbursement):	57%	53%	47%
<u>6. FUTURE GOALS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating presence of specific future plans for Reserve unit:	29%	39%	58%

Reserve Future Study
Questionnaire Response

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	250,000- 499,999	100,000- 249,999	50,000- 99,999
B. Indicating an anticipated need for more Reserves in the future:	86%	89%	84%
C. Anticipating training of Reserves closer to Regular standards:	71%	72%	63%
D. Anticipating curtailment of Reserve activity due to labor organization pressure:	43%	33%	42%
E. Indicating specific plans for Reserves through year 2000:	43%	56%	58%

RESERVE FUTURE STUDY

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	25,000- 49,999	10,000- 24,999	9,999 & below
<u>1. STAFFING</u>			
A. Percentage of allocated Reserve strength:	55%	59%	50%
B. Reserve membership has grown in last 10 years:	31%	7%	43%
<u>2. RECRUITMENT</u>			
A. Respondents indicating inclusion of tactic in Reserve recruitment strategy:			
1. Colleges and academies:	37%	61%	14%
2. Media advertisements:	6%	46%	57%
3. Word of mouth:	62%	69%	43%
B. Presence of an ongoing recruitment program:	69%	61%	14%
<u>3. QUALIFICATIONS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating a change in Reserve qualifications in the last 10 years:	94%	77%	86%
B. Anticipating a change in Reserve qualifications in the future:	32%	8%	29%
<u>4. TRAINING</u>			
A. Respondents certifying Reserves to Level I status:	37%	46%	14%
B. Utilizing a structured Field Training program for Reserves:	81%	85%	71%

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Reserve Future Study
Questionnaire Response

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>POPULATION LEVEL SERVED</u>		
	25,000- 49,999	10,000- 24,999	9,999- & below
<u>5. UTILIZATION</u>			
A. Respondents using Reserves alone for enforcement:	56%	46%	57%
B. Using Reserves in two-officer units for enforcement:	25%	46%	43%
C. Using Reserves in 1 or 2 officer backup units:	31%	62%	86%
D. Using Reserves for assistance with minimal enforcement duties:	50%	54%	57%
E. Reserves prohibited from working alone in the field:	50%	38%	57%
F. Using Reserves in plain clothes situations with Regular officers:	19%	23%	29%
G. Using Reserves in plain clothes independently:	13%	14%	0%
H. Using Reserves as replacement relief for Regular officers:	38%	30%	14%
I. Reserves are always assigned to details:	50%	23%	57%
J. Using Reserves for technical support:	25%	15%	43%
K. Compensating Reserves (excluding uniform reimbursement):	44%	69%	57%
<u>6. FUTURE GOALS</u>			
A. Respondents indicating presence of specific future plans for Reserve unit:	38%	61%	43%