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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER - LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

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INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study on a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Studying the future differs from studying the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future — creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER - LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

There exists in the law enforcement community a critical need for an "all-risk" management system capable of dealing effectively with those situations that create demands over and above those required in dealing with "normal" day-to-day operations.

This need projects into the immediate and long-range future. The predictions of an earthquake of considerable magnitude, the threat of volcanic activity, the increased risks of major incidents involving hazardous materials, ever-increasing air traffic over and around urban areas, the potential for terrorist activity to extend to the United States, the heavy utilization of recreational areas with the attendant search and rescue implications: these factors, and more, tell us that law enforcement and allied public service agencies will increasingly be called upon to plan for, and manage, major incidents that pose extreme threat to life and property.

There exists within the fire services, a technology - the Incident Command System (I.C.S.), that has provided an effective means of managing critical incidents of varying size, complexity, and multi-agency involvement. The System, tried and proven through years of use and refinement, has much to offer to law enforcement.

This paper represents an effort to transfer that technology to law enforcement. This paper is not a definitive statement on what I.C.S. is or is not; it is designed to offer the System for consideration based on user needs and a brief overview of where the System came from and what it is about. Further, it hopefully will generate interest in the System by presenting information on the experiences of other users and present possible strategy for implementation of the System on a local or statewide basis. There is much more to be learned about the practical application of the Incident Command System - and there is a wealth of information available in that respect. There is no need here to re-invent the wheel - just to refine its metal and true it into a law enforcement perspective.

The main product presented here is the Law Enforcement Incident Command System Field Operations Guide. That document, separately bound, is the "heart and soul" of this work.
The Field Operations Guide is designed to aid law enforcement and allied agency personnel in their understanding, learning, implementing, and operating under the Law Enforcement Incident Command System. The Field Operations Guide is not intended to "stand alone". It is designed to be an integral part of a comprehensive training program. After such training, its role is to serve as a ready reference for those involved in the actual use of the Incident Command System. Such training, while beyond the scope of this paper, will be developed and made available through the foresight, leadership, and resources of The Commission On Peace Officer Standards And Training, Center For Executive Development.
THE FUTURE - A NEED FOR INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Law enforcement and allied emergency services professionals; those who have "been there" - on the line - during riots, floods, major spills of hazardous materials, hostage situations, SWAT operations, major crime scene investigations, search and rescue operations, major wildland fires, evacuations; tend to agree that all too often there is a considerable amount of confusion involved in operational performance at major incidents. The ability of the responsible agency to manage the incident appears to decrease in direct proportion to the complexity of the situation and the number of agencies involved.

Notwithstanding the fact that critical incidents are inherently difficult to manage, problems often arise due to different methods of operation, basic mission differences, incompatible communications as well as conflicts in actual or perceived authority or responsibility. When agencies of differing types, such as law enforcement, fire services, health departments, search and rescue groups, and forestry services, become involved in the same incident the potential for problems multiplies. Add to such a situation the presence of several political jurisdictions mutually threatened by the incident, and perhaps several levels of government agencies, and the confusion, if not outright conflict, can reach critical proportions.

Each agency participating at an incident may have only the vaguest notion of the others' legal responsibilities and authority, let alone understand their tactics, operational procedures, communications, equipment, protocols, etc. Yet, there may be considerable overlapping of jurisdiction and authority among those agencies.

Even when those misunderstandings do not exist, an acknowledged leader in charge of the incident may have considerable difficulty communicating strategy or a plan of action to deal with the situation. Agencies arriving to assist, or already on scene when command is designated or assumed, often are uncertain as to what is expected of them or how they fit into the organization. The net result may well be a degree of confusion that seriously detracts from the ability of the organization to deal with the incident.

It is not to say that emergency services have been unsuccessful in dealing with the critical incidents that have occurred - that is certainly far from the fact of the matter; but, those successes have been hard-won because of the needs of those emergency services to overcome such difficulties as mentioned above in addition to dealing with the threatening incident!
Not only does the need exist, here and now, to deal with these concerns that affect our emergency service providers—hampering their ability to manage critical incidents—the need projects into the immediate and long range future when one considers that implementation of an incident management system that will embrace multiple disciplines and all nature of hazards may take a decade to accomplish!

Add to that time framework; the predictions of an earthquake of considerable magnitude, the threat of volcanic activity, the increased risks of major incidents involving hazardous materials, ever increasing air traffic over and around urban areas, the heavy utilization of recreational areas and facilities with the attendant search and rescue implications, the potential of terrorist activity, increasing commercial and residential construction in areas subject to flooding. These factors, and many more, indicate that law enforcement and allied agencies will have a greater than ever critical need to efficiently work in harmony to plan for, and manage, major incidents that pose extreme threat to life and property.

Consider the implications for incident management of the following scenarios: think about them in terms of the problems and considerations just discussed.

The Long Valley-Mono Lake area of California has been the site of volcanic eruptions for millions of years. The area is part of a large volcanic depression, called the Long Valley Caldera, which formed as a result of colossal eruptions about 700,000 years ago.

The most recent eruptions known, from the Inyo chain of vents a short distance north of the Town of Mammoth Lakes include steam explosions that ejected rock debris and explosive ash flow eruptions of rhyolitic pumice and ash. Those eruptions occurred about 550 years ago.

In 1978 earthquake activity began to increase in the Long Valley area.

In 1980 intense earthquake swarms occurred some 10 days before the Mammoth Lakes area was subjected to a series of earthquakes, including 4 of Richter magnitude 6, within one 48 hour period.

Later the same year a topographic survey along U.S. Highway 395, the north-south route along the east flank of the Sierras, across the Long Valley Caldera revealed a 10" upward bulge along the Caldera floor—a bulge that had quite possibly occurred within the preceding two years.
In early 1983, along with the occurrence of an intense swarm of earthquakes, increased fumarolic activity was noticed near the Casa Diablo Hot Springs.

According to the United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, "Preliminary interpretation of . . . evidence is that magma beneath the Long Valley Caldera moved upward about the time of the . . . earthquakes. This was accompanied by a bulging of the resurgent dome and the opening of fractures at depth in the southern part of the Caldera, which allowed a tongue of magma to move toward the surface beneath the epicentral site."

7:00PM, December 19, 1987; a 40,000 plus visitor weekend for the town of Mammoth Lakes and the nearby June Lake community: an initial phreatic eruption centered near the Sherwin Creek Campground, two miles southeast showers an area up to 4 miles distant with rocks, mud, and debris. Highway 203 is completely buried in many locations, the intersection of highway 203 and U.S. 395 severely damaged but passable to 4-wheel drive vehicles; the Town of Mammoth Lakes is bombarded with debris; power lines and telephone lines are down. The U.S. Forest Service Station, Mono County Sheriff's Sub-station, and the nearby airport are severely damaged by falling debris. Tourist's vehicles quickly and completely clog the few remaining passable roads.

8:10PM: A sudden explosive magmatic eruption ejects large quantities of magma in the form of ash and pumice 50,000 feet into the air in a great eruptive column; some of this comes to earth as wind-blown debris while a considerable amount forms hot pyroclastic flows at the base of the eruptive column. These pyroclastic flows flood across the land surface of Long Valley at up to 90 miles per hour for a distance of 12 to 15 miles. The Town of Mammoth Lakes, highways, campgrounds, and ranches east of the vent, and to a lesser degree to the north, disappear under hot ash and pumice.

The ash and pumice ejected falls to earth in an elongated downwind plume building to a depth of several yards thick near the vent, 8 inches thick at a distance of 20 miles, and about 2 inches thick 50 miles distant. The airborne ashfall effects vehicle travel as distant as 200 miles as air filters clog and carburetors become inoperative; power lines just as far away are shorted out. Lightning accompanying the ash cloud causes numerous fires in lands not covered by snowpack.
Snowmelt resulting from the ash eruption causes mudflows and flooding such as seen during the November, 1983, eruption of Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia where over 25,000 lives were lost. Lake Crowley is severely impacted; pyroclastic flows move across the surface of the lake overtopping the dam and spill into the Owens River drainage below. The dam fails, due to the erosive effect of the overtopping combined with the shaking caused by continuing earthquakes associated with the eruption, and the Owens River gorge downstream becomes a conduit for a massive volcanic mudflow. That mudflow destroys the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power facilities in the gorge and inundates the lowlands north of the city of Bishop. The eastern half of Bishop, including the airport, is temporarily flooded.

Consider the potential for confusion, and loss of the ability of the responsible agency to effectively control this situation:

3:10PM, any Friday; a teller at a small branch of a major California Bank, located in an unincorporated town of about 9,000 population, triggers a silent robbery alarm. The alarm is received on the enunciator panel at the local Sheriff’s Substation; one patrol unit, backed up by the local Constable, is dispatched. The deputy, a 10 year veteran who knows that all bank robbery alarms are false, does not wait for his back-up, fails to make an "invisible" approach, and upon arrival - parking directly in front of the bank and inadvertently blocking in the get-away vehicle - comes under fire from two suspects armed with semi-automatic rifles. The deputy is fatally wounded but does manage to radio a "999" call for help.

The Constable, arriving seconds later, engages the suspects in a firefight; one suspect goes down in front of the bank, seriously wounded. The second suspect retreats into the bank and barricades. There are two tellers, the branch manager, operations officer, and one secretary; along with six customers, three children, and a baby trapped inside the bank with the robber. The Constable radios a brief description of the situation to the Sheriff’s Dispatcher.

Two neighboring police department dispatchers hear the deputy’s dying broadcast, and the Constable’s radio traffic, on their scanners and without being asked to do so dispatch “any available units” to the bank. Three patrol units and a detective unit respond from one police department, one patrol unit and a K9 unit respond from the other police department. Neither of
the police department’s units have radio capability with the sheriff’s department, the Constable, or the other police department.

The Sheriff’s Dispatcher’s supervisor telephones the local fire department (a Fire Chief - all other members are volunteers) and an engine, manned by the Chief and three volunteers, responds to the bank to provide medical aid. The fire department does not have radio capability with any of the units at the scene (with the exception of the local private ambulance company - their driver has heard the radio broadcasts on his mobile scanner and has driven to the bank).

The Sheriff’s Substation Watch Commander, a corporal, notifies Headquarters that a bank robbery has occurred; a deputy is "down", a suspect is "down", and a barricaded suspect is holding hostages inside the bank. The Headquarters Watch Commander rolls the department SWAT Unit, a team of robbery detectives, an officer-involved shooting team, and notifies the local FBI Field Office.

The Sheriff, learning of the situation, and being advised that the FBI is responding to the scene, proceeds Code 3 to the location.

Consider the multi-agency, multiple layer of government, response required by this scenario:

April, 1998: with the Santa Anna Canyon dam still two years from completion, and following three months of heavy rainfall, the Santa Anna River is on a rampage unexcelled except by the flood that occurred in 1862 when an estimated 317,000 cubic feet of water per second poured through the river near the entrance to Santa Anna Canyon.

In the area of San Bernardino, Norton Air Force Base runways are under two feet of water. Floodwaters three to four feet deep run swiftly through the Hospitality Lane and South E Street industrial/commercial areas. All north-south streets crossing the river have been wiped out, the Guthrie Interchange carrying Interstate freeways 215 and 10 across the river has collapsed. Flooding extends north to the vicinity of 3rd Street.

North of the city of San Bernardino the soaking foothills, denuded by wildland fires over the past two years, can hold no more and millions of cubic yards of mud and debris rush down on homeowners in a scene reminiscent of the 1980 Harrison Canyon floods where 5000,000 cubic yards of mud flowed down that canyon and filled 40 homes. An estimated 20,000 homes have been
totally or partially filled with mud county-wide. Major highways and city streets have been blocked, power and telephone lines are down. Loss of life cannot be determined.

Downstream, in Orange County, where most of the three million people affected by the flood live and work, the flooding situation (although without the major mudslide factor) is even worse. Flooding, at an average depth of three feet, covers 100,000 acres of Central Orange County. It covers all or portions of the communities of Santa Anna, Anaheim, Stanton, Garden Grove, Westminster, Orange, Costa Mesa, Fountain Valley, Seal Beach, and Huntington Beach. Over 500,000 homes, thousands of businesses and industries, as well as thousands of schools are inundated. While loss of life has still not been determined, economic loss has been estimated in excess of 11 billion dollars.

Consider just the intra-agency planning, coordination, and control aspects of the following situation:

January, any year: a young couple attempting a mid-winter hike of the Pacific Crest Trail from Mexico to the Canadian border are reported as overdue. The girl's mother reports, by telephone from New York, that she last heard from her daughter the past Thanksgiving day when the daughter telephoned her from Big Bear Lake.

The mother reports that the daughter and her companion were planning on leaving Big Bear the following weekend to continue the hike north and east out of the San Bernardino Mountains, crossing Cajon Pass into the San Gabriel Mountains. Their next scheduled destination was to be the vicinity of Wrightwood. The daughter had failed to call home on Christmas as she had promised her mother, and a check with the Postmaster at Wrightwood revealed that a package mailed to her, c/o General Delivery, had not been called for.

Sheriff's authorities have no idea as to where along the 90 mile stretch of trail between Big Bear Lake and Wrightwood the couple might have gotten into difficulty. Helicopter overflights of the entire section of trail have not produced any information helpful in narrowing the search effort. Because of the size and location of the search area, four separate Sheriff's Station commands are involved as portions of the trail between Big Bear Lake and Wrightwood pass through their jurisdictions. A massive, combined search effort is decided upon; the trail will be covered from both ends as well as working outwards from from several points along the 90 mile section.
Over 150 members of nine separate Sheriff’s Department SAR Teams, from as many separate departmental commands, are to be deployed in the search. While planning is accomplished with little real difficulty, other considerations of logistics and control pose considerable areas for concern. Communications over 90 linear miles of difficult terrain (magnified by the requirement for ground and air coordination throughout the search area); as well as requirements for food, fuel, feed for horses, transportation of teams and equipment to remote locations along the trail— with subsequent pick-up at other remote locations—all create tremendous potential for confusion and management breakdown.

Finally, what happens when the "Big One" hits?

August __, 198_, San Bernardino: An earthquake measuring 8.3, with the epicenter near Cajon Pass, struck at 8:10AM and lasted for 203 seconds today. The sideward movement of the earth leveled homes within a mile of the south fork of the San Andreas Fault. The downtown sections of San Bernardino, Colton, and Rialto were 85% destroyed. Norton Air Force Base sustained heavy damage—all runways were broken up, aircraft on the ground did not survive.

Loss of life and serious injury was tremendous—an estimated 25,000 lives were lost within the first five minutes of the disaster—the injury rate seem to be in the 40-50% range and increasing hourly as information becomes available.

Fires which started in the downtown areas have been burning uncontrolled ever since. The majority of firefighting equipment was trapped in buildings that crumbled on top of it. Movement of heavy equipment has been severely limited by the downed utility poles and trees fallen on roads that for the most part have broken up. Gas lines were broken all over the area, igniting small fires which continue to burn out of control throughout the city. Main natural gas transmission lines in Cajon Pass ruptured during the initial shock so continued flow of gas into the broken local lines does not continue to be a problem. (However, a raging inferno exists in the Cajon Pass area, where parallel transmission lines carrying natural gas and jet fuel for area air bases, ruptured just beneath a major electrical transmission line. system—the fireball could be seen as far away as Riverside.) Main water lines were broken open and there has been no water pressure; sewage from broken mains contaminate what little water supply does exist.
A heavy cloud of dust blocks the sunlight presenting an eerie feeling of impending doom for the survivors. Each person is on their own to obtain necessary medical attention, food, water, and other provisions. Scattered reports of looting are passed on by a few ham radio operators.

Los Angeles and Orange counties reported that 30% of the high rise building located in their areas crumbled to the earth; another 20-30% sustained severe structural damage. The Los Angeles system of 26 freeways covering 700 miles went into instant gridlock with the collapsing of nearly every main interchange. Surface street transportation in hindered by downed trees and utility poles; building rubble blocks many streets.

Aftershocks registering around 7.7 were felt within the late morning hours adding more destruction to the already battered areas.

Summary

Summarizing this section necessitates going back to its introduction for a basic statement of the problem - "Law enforcement and allied emergency services professionals; those who have "been there" - on the line - during riots, floods, major spills of hazardous materials, hostage situations, SWAT operations, major crime scene investigations, search and rescue operations, major wildland fires, evacuations; tend to agree that all too often there is a considerable amount of confusion involved in operational performance at major incidents. The ability of the responsible agency to manage the incident appears to decrease in direct proportion to the complexity of the situation and the number of agencies involved."

The scenarios presented certainly represent complex situations with large numbers of agencies, or units of the same agency, being involved. The futures scenarios could go on and on but the bottom line would always be the same - there is a crying need for a system that will overcome, or compensate for, the organizational and relationship problems inherent in law enforcement agencies dealing with complex critical incidents; that system may well exist as the Incident Command System.
FOOTNOTES


N.3 "Harnessing the 'worst flood threat in the West'," The Sun, June 9, 1985, sec. F, p. 1.
After reviewing the dozens of documents that exist at various private, local, state, and federal organizations which attempt, with one degree of success or another, to describe the origins of the Incident Command System; and having struggled with an attempt to create such a document, I have concluded that the best effort is a paper representing the work of Robert L. Irwin.

Irwin, a 30 plus year United States Forest Service veteran, is now a private consultant doing business as Basic Intergovernmental Services out of Sonora, California. He was heavily involved in the creation of I.C.S. and, along with Terrance P. Haney, owner of TEMJAM Corporation - a public policy and intergovernmental operations consulting firm - is known as the "father of I.C.S.

According to Irwin: "ICS began as a result of the disastrous fires in southern California in the fall of 1970. Almost 600,000 acres burned in 13 days, destroying 772 structures and killing 16 people. There were over 100 fire agencies involved, along with dozens of law enforcement departments, health services, etc."

During the course of the 13 days, a lot of really excellent work was done by all, but a lot of things went wrong too. In a post-disaster analysis, conducted by the U.S. Forest Service, the fire services identified the root causes of the most serious problems. These were:

1. Lack of a common organizational structure. With so many agencies called to help, there was considerable confusion as to who to report to, what procedures to follow, what the plans were, etc. The result was a severe loss of effectiveness simply because the assisting forces did not understand what was happening in many cases.

   This was further compounded by the fact that under the existing conditions, agencies from different levels of government were working on the same fires. State and Federal, Federal and local, and all possible combinations. At times, all four levels were trying to work together. The traditional differences between agencies made real understanding of the critical situations very difficult.

2. Lack of coordinated and co-located planning. Each responsible agency followed old procedures and set up their own command posts on their own ground and did their planning and directing unilaterally. Some
agencies made written plans, some did not. Some agencies passed their plans to cooperators, some did not. Some agencies did not know who else was working on the other side of the fire.

This multiple, uncoordinated planning and direction resulted in huge overlaps in some cases—two or more agencies manning the same ground; and drastic omissions in other cases—large areas of unattended fire, assumed to be covered by the "other guy".

3. Poor fireline communications. With so many agencies trying to work together, interagency communications was practically non-existent. Most radio traffic was confined to units within the same agency, and any information flow between agencies was limited to verbal or written messages, sometimes delivered, sometimes not.

Existing agency frequencies were overloaded because all traffic (command, logistical, and tactical) was being transmitted more or less simultaneously. Confusion was increasing because many mutual aid units from northern California were on various fires at the same time, using frequencies that were the same. Units on one fire would pick up messages that sounded like "the real thing" only to find out hours later that the traffic concerned another incident entirely.

4. Lack of valid, timely information. This lack was related to both the uncoordinated planning mentioned above, but also resulted from traditional neglect of fast accurate intelligence in planning procedures. That is, the continual collection of information had not been a real priority for many agencies. As a result, many plans were based on outdated, erroneous information: many units were assigned to areas the fire had passed through 12 to 24 hours earlier.

The fact that entirely different maps were being used by the separate agencies confounded both the gathering and dissemination of information.

Other problems were identified, such as poor utilization of resources, failure to use the closest appropriate forces, and almost total absence of technological aids, but these were problems associated with "off-incident" activities. These stemmed from the inability of upper echelon folks at agency headquarters to do any better at their levels than the troops out on the ground were doing.

All of these data were examined closely by fire services after the analysis was completed. They reached some important conclusions about what needed to be done to
improve their mutual performance in the future. The agencies agreed that, in order to avoid confusion and waste during disaster situations, it would be necessary to develop a standardized system.

The system would contain:

- common organizational structure
- common terminology
- uniform and consistent procedures
- coordinated communications

The system would be "constructed" (developed) around the best theory bases available at the time:

- Management by Objectives (MBO)
- Critical Path planning process
- Span-of-control considerations
- Communications and information flow procedures

These requirements became the framework for what we know as the ICS. It took southern California fire services five years to develop the system that would meet the criteria. Since its first real trial in 1976, the system has proven itself on thousands of incidents. It is the most comprehensive emergency management system in use today, and its applications are spreading...

The system was further refined through use in actual firefighting operations within California, as well as in other areas in which it was adopted. I.C.S. is the on-scene management structure approved by The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) which is a total systems approach to incident management. (The major components of NIIMS are: Training; Qualifications and Certification; Publications Management; and Supporting Technology). While NIIMS was developed to provide a common system to be used at federal, state, and local levels by fire protection agencies there is no reason to believe that it is not compatible with law enforcement, and allied agency requirements - the point however, is that I.C.S., not some other system, was the management system of choice. That fact has caused a much broader base of actual experience to be generated beyond the borders of California.

Erwin describes the system that evolved from the design process and was then refined through use "in the field":
"Because the ICS was constructed around sound management principles, it is one which can be applied to any type of emergency. At present, one drawback to applying the system results from the fact that only the fire aspects are thoroughly (emphasis supplied) documented. However, if we focus on management concepts, it will not be difficult to make transition from fire to other disciplines.

The ICS has these major characteristics:

1. It can accommodate multiple agencies, and many disciplines (law, health, public works, etc.)

2. It protects jurisdictional and fiscal authorities and responsibilities.

3. The System can be used on a daily basis, for less than critical incidents. This not only provides for greater in-depth knowledge of the System, but it smooths the transition from "local" to "extensive" emergencies.

4. It can expand to fit increasing demands without change to its basic structure or procedures. It can be demobilized in the same manner.

5. ICS is a common sense System: there are no "razzle-dazzle" elements. It is flexible, and can be modified to meet particular circumstances.

6. It utilizes basic experience and training. No matter what public service discipline is involved, the basic journeyman training required for that discipline remains unchanged. Only re-training at supervisory levels is required.

7. While the System has tremendous flexibility, it is designed to use only ONE Incident Command Post, ONE planning process, and ONE logistical operation."

Before leaving this introduction to the Incident Command System one further relationship should be explained. Because major disasters may well bring about Federal involvement, quite likely through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the question may arise as to the relationship between a local I.C.S. organization and FEMA’s Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS).

The Integrated Emergency Management System is FEMA’s long-term, all hazard strategy to integrate and develop emergency management capabilities at the local and state levels; it is a basic foundation for planning for the mitigation of, planning for, response and recovery from
hazard and disaster. FEMA is providing funds to states and local communities to support their planning efforts - through this process communities are to identify emergency preparedness deficiencies and plan how to correct them. It is important to understand that IEMS does not include any response mechanism or organization for managing emergencies - the choice of a management system to deal with the emergencies is thus left to local discretion. This is where the Incident Command System comes into play; remember - it is the management system of choice of NIIMS and thus familiar and acceptable on the Federal level.3

This Federal posture is similar to the role of the State Office of Emergency Services (OES) in California; while OES stands ready, willing, and able to assist local agencies in time of need they do not dictate the form of organization that the local agency use to deal with the incident - once again, an excellent opportunity for the Incident Command System as it quite handily deals with multiple layers of government involvement in an incident.
FOOTNOTES

N. 1 Irwin, Robert L., "The Incident Command System", presented at Inyo-Mono Seminars, Mammouth, California, date unknown. p I-1 - I-3

N. 2 Ibid. p I-3

N. 3 Byrne, John P., Director, State of Colorado, Department of Military Affairs, Division of Disaster Emergency Services, "Policy Statement on NIIMS, ICS, IMS, IEMS and Their Inter-Relationship", Memorandum, 22 February 1984.
The Law Enforcement Incident Command System (LEISC) Field Operations Guide represents an effort to transfer the technology of the Incident Command System to the law enforcement community. It is a selective adaptation of the System designed to create a truly generic organization capable of effectively managing critical incidents of any magnitude or nature.

This Field Operations Guide, the main product of this work, was accomplished — not in isolation — but in concert with potential law enforcement users, acknowledged experts in ICS design and use, and with public service agencies already using the System and/or making inroads in the transfer of its technology to law enforcement.

The Field Operations Guide, separately bound, is designed to aid law enforcement and allied agency personnel in their understanding, learning, implementing, and operating under the Incident Command System. The Field Operations Guide is not intended to "stand alone". It is designed to be an integral part of a comprehensive training program; after such training, its role is to serve as a ready reference for those involved in the actual use of the System.
EXPERIENCES OF OTHER I.C.S. USERS

Following its genesis in the California FIRESCOPE project, I.C.S. use in the fire services spread, more or less in a leapfrog manner, across the United States. The prime mover, for the most part, being the United States Forest Service. Examples of I.C.S. being utilized, for law enforcement purposes, however, proved to be almost non-existent.

Colorado, one of the first states to attempt I.C.S. implementation and utilization on a state-wide basis, was "rumored" to have numerous examples of law enforcement use of I.C.S. While that rumor, as rumors so often do, proved less than accurate, Colorado has proved to be of value in producing several such examples as well as an implementation strategy design that is quite worthy of mention. The law enforcement examples will be discussed in this section and the implementation strategy considered in the section of this document that deals with that topic.

Nationwide, California and Colorado, along with Florida, are the bellwether states; it was not unexpected then to learn that Florida had closely followed Colorado in state-wide implementation of I.C.S. in the fire services. Ramroding that state's efforts is the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. Once again, rumors of law enforcement use of I.C.S. in Florida were heard - those rumors were investigated and will be discussed in this section.

One lead to I.C.S. use in a law enforcement milieu that did prove to have a firm foundation in fact was the experience of the California based Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP), "A Multi-Agency Marijuana Enforcement and Eradication Task Force", operating in Northern California counties, since 1983, under the Incident Command System. That experience is discussed in this section.

FLORIDA

Information was received from the U.S. Forest Service that in Florida the Incident Command System was being used, on a regular basis, by law enforcement agencies.

During the period of May 17th thru 22nd, 1985, Florida had experienced devastating wildland fires throughout the state. At one point on "Black Friday" (as May 17th became know) 109 separate fires of varying size and nature were burning. 47 separate major wildland fires consumed in excess of 141,937 acres, destroyed 157 homes, and took the lives of two firefighters! One of the hardest hit areas was the portion
of Flagler County known as "Palm Coast". Adjoining Volusia County also suffered greatly during the fires.

Based on telephone contacts with Flagler and Volusia County officials I was led to believe that the Incident Command System had been used by both counties to deal with the tremendous fire related problems. Reportedly both counties used the system, with the greatest success being in Volusia County where ICS had been practiced prior to the actual need for the system to deal with a "real" emergency. As it turned out the initial information was somewhat less than accurate. I believe the reason for the inaccuracies may well have been a natural reluctance of the Florida officials to share the story of their actual difficulties and lack of preparation "over the telephone" with a California official. Once personal contacts were established the truth of the matter quickly came out.

Flagler County

I traveled to Flagler County with Captain Mike Cardwell, San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department SWAT Commander, and Lieutenant Bob Bailes, Commander of the Department's Disaster Preparedness Division. We contacted the Flagler County Director of Civil Defense, Mr. Bob Barzelogna; Forest Ranger Supervisor Jim Marquis, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry; and Flagler County Sheriff Robert E. McCarthy.

Flagler County, some 485 square miles, is located on the East Coast of Florida approx. 24 miles north of Daytona Beach. It is bounded on the East by 20 miles of beaches and on the West by forests and farms. It includes a 4,400 acre subdivision, Palm Coast; the municipalities of Bunnell, Flagler Beach, Beverly Beach, Painters Hill; and the town of Marineland. The current estimated population is 15,000.

The Sheriff's Department is 39 strong with 21 sworn positions, including the Sheriff. The Sheriff polices only the unincorporated areas of the county; each incorporated jurisdiction maintains its own small police department.

In addition to the State Division of Forestry station at Bunnell there are 8 volunteer Fire Departments within the county. There are only 3 paid, full-time firefighters - all other firefighters are volunteers.

In the three days following "Black Friday" Flagler County lost 29,965 acres to wildland fires along with the destruction of 99 homes (primarily in the Palm Coast Subdivision). 3,000-3,500 persons were evacuated from the Palm Coast area and 2,000-2,5000 persons evacuated from the beach areas. In addition to local resources the Sheriff called upon the Florida Highway Patrol and the Florida
Department of Fish & Game to establish roadblocks; as well as the Florida National Guard, which was used as an anti-looting patrol in the evacuated residential areas. The Director of Civil Defense called upon the Red Cross to manage the shelters to which the evacuees were relocated.

All Flagler County officials agree that the number one problem during the fires centered around COMMUNICATIONS. It was obvious that even with communications improvements a critical shortfall would have existed in the area of Command and Control. Although the county fire agencies do have mutual aid agreements they do not, with the exception of the State Division of Forestry, have I.C.S. in place. From the description of their activities during the fire it does not seem that they have in place any type of a management system to handle emergencies the magnitude of which they dealt with during these fires.

Under normal conditions the Sheriff’s Department dispatches from their base radio room which is located in the County Jail in Bunnell. The Sheriff is authorized to operate on a frequency of 158.910 MHZ. He also dispatches for the cities of Bunnell (6 sworn) and Flagler Beach (4 sworn). Even though the Sheriff’s Department dispatches for these two cities they maintain their own "secret frequencies" for internal communications. The Sheriff also dispatches for the County Ambulance Service and the eight fire agencies (which also maintain their own frequencies). There is one teletype terminal in the county; it is located in the Sheriff’s radio room. There is no radio communication capability with state agencies from that location.

During the fire situation we were told that the "locals were dead in the water" due to communication problems. Concurrent with the first reports of fire in Flagler County the long distance lines all went out! A state communications van finally arrived but experienced problems that made it ineffective. It was not made clear exactly what those problems were. While the Division of Forestry was theoretically in charge of the fire aspect of the situation they can communicate only with their own units! Forestry Division supervisors do have Wilson programmable radios in their vehicles but no central communications center exists and we were told that the volunteer fire services simply raced about, from fire to fire, often passing in opposite directions while enroute to suspected or actual fire locations that could have been handled more quickly by the closer unit.

While the fire service was reacting on a local level the State Division of Forestry was sending a trained I.C.S. "Team" into Flagler County as well as into other counties involved. (Jim Marquis, Forest Ranger Supervisor from Flagler County actually ended up as Operations Chief in
Volusia County.) According to Marquis, "It took about 24 hours to integrate locals into the ICS teams".

The Sheriff meanwhile, in charge of evacuations, "ejection of undesirables", traffic control and escort, and looting patrol, as well as normal law enforcement duties, was attempting to direct and manage the various state agencies assisting (Fish & Game, Highway Patrol, National Guard) by holding morning briefings at the Sheriff's Department and then sending the personnel out to perform various duties without the communications to respond and react to additional situations as they arose.

As previously stated it is obvious that pre-planning had not been accomplished.

According to Civil Defense Director Barzelogna the number one priority for the county is to obtain a centralized communications facility that has the capability to communicate with all local agencies as well as state agencies. Plans are underway to obtain land near the County Jail or Sheriff's Headquarters for this facility. Secondary to this need is the establishment of a management system to deal with emergencies. The Incident Command System now in use by the State Forestry seems to be the system of choice. The communications facility would be planned with sufficient space to operate a a true Emergency Control Center under the I.C.S. format.

Forest Ranger Supervisor Marquis advises that the Division of Forestry plans to teach the Incident Command System, state-wide, to law enforcement agencies as well as local fire agencies. I.C.S. will be included in a 300 hour course mandated for "paid" firefighters and a 40 hour course mandated for volunteer firefighters. Marquis is convinced that the system is of value and is needed to cope with the threats faced by his agency and local agencies. Marquis has worked on I.C.S. Teams on five occasions during the first half of 1985. In his opinion the fire situation in Volusia County was handled much better (than in Flagler County) due to prior experience working under I.C.S. during a 1981 major fire in that county. Marquis feels that I.C.S., "Works wonderfully - if everyone is trained."

Sheriff McCartney had "heard" about ICS prior to the fires, "hadn't really given it much thought" but now realizes that "something has to be done" and believes that the local agencies "must overcome their pettiness if any plan is to take place." The Sheriff is faced with a constant threat of hurricane along the 20 miles of coastline of his county. The flatness of the terrain (perhaps 30' is the highest elevation in the county) could cause severe flooding inland as well as vast destruction along the beaches and beach communities. Like Civil Defense Director Barzelogna
he believes that the communications problem must be solved before any command system will be workable.

One last problem, mentioned by all officials in Flagler County: lack of a centralized means of dealing with the media caused considerable operational difficulty. Radio and television stations that could have been utilized to give instructions to the citizens were not utilized; worse yet, media aircraft and helicopters frequently interfered with actual operations. Note: I.C.S. deals with these issues through a Press Information Officer who is a member of the Incident Command Staff.

Volusia County

In Volusia County we met with Sheriff's Lieutenant Marvin E. Jones, Communications Supervisor and second-in-command of the Civil Defense and Communications Division of the Sheriff's Department. We toured the modern, completely self-contained, Emergency Operations Center that was in use during the fires and is the department's day-to-day dispatch center.

Volusia is a prosperous county of some 1,400 square miles with a population of 260,000. While the City of Daytona Beach is the largest of the incorporated cities there are 13 other incorporated jurisdictions of varying sizes. As in Flagler County the Sheriff polices only the unincorporated areas; each incorporated jurisdiction has a police department. The Sheriff's Department, headquartered in DeLand, some 18 miles West of Daytona Beach, has 150 sworn personnel. There are 37 personnel assigned to the Civil Defense and Communications Division.

Firefighting responsibility rests with the State Division of Forestry ("Forest" fires on state or private lands), 12 City Fire Departments (fires within their boundaries), and 20 County Fire Stations located throughout the unincorporated areas and manned mostly by volunteers with a "few" paid firefighters (fires arising on unincorporated lands).

The Sheriff's Dispatch Center handles radio dispatch for all sheriff's units as well as the 20 county fire stations. The 12 city fire departments handle their own dispatching as do the various city police departments and the county subsidized ambulance service. The Dispatch Center does not have the capability to dispatch on the fire mutual aid frequency. The Center also handles all county government dispatching as well as purchasing and maintaining all county communications equipment.

During the "Black Friday" fire period Volusia County lost 32,200 acres of wildlands, 6 homes destroyed, 5 homes damaged. There was no loss of life or injury due to fire.
Apparently, due to the nature of the wildlands areas in which the fires burned evacuations were not a problem in Volusia County.

According to Lieutenant Jones the number 1 problem in Volusia was COMMUNICATIONS. Despite their modern EOC/Dispatch Center no common communications existed with the deployed agencies (Sheriff’s Department, State Division of Forestry, County Fire Service, County Roads Department, City Fire Departments, State Highway Patrol).

Lt. Jones related that several years prior their department had experience working with the State Division of Forestry during the Crane Swamp Fire and had therefore been exposed to the Incident Command System. During the recent fire situation the state moved an I.C.S. Team into the EOC after the first day of fires. Lt. Jones commented, "Things went much better after Forestry showed up with I.C.S. - a coordinated effort - it took a couple of hours to set up but then it was clockwork!" "There was advanced planning for everything involved - press, lodging, everything!"

The State Forestry I.C.S. Team (as you recall Jim Marquis, Forest Ranger Supervisor from Flagler County was the I.C.S. Operations Chief on this Team) integrated into the Sheriff’s EOC which was fully staffed with all assigned personnel who were placed on shifts of 6 hours on duty and 6 hours off duty; an interesting concept made possible by the self-contained nature of the EOC/Dispatch Center. It is possible that at least some of the difference in fire loss statistics between Volusia and Flagler Counties may have been a function of the ability of Volusia County to integrate the Incident Command System into an existing EOC operation and that counties prior experience with ICS.

Volusia County is attempting to locate and obtain additional radio frequencies to improve the EOC ability to communicate with all allied agencies on a routine basis as well as during time of emergency.

The Volusia County Sheriff’s Department is faced with hurricane potential for damage and loss of life far greater than Flagler County due to the population concentrations along the beaches as well as the barrier islands which have been completely built up with extensive commercial development including numerous hi-rise complexes. Because of this threat, which like the California 8.3 earthquake, is not a question of if but only a question of when, Volusia County plans on developing an I.C.S. Lt. Jones states, "We are definitely going to establish our own!"
Florida Summary

While Florida did not provide an example of an on-line law enforcement Incident Command System who's technology could be considered for transfer; and who's experiences could be utilized in structuring such a system, sufficient reason was found to reinforce the belief that the Incident Command System holds great promise and potential value for utilization by law enforcement. Officials of law enforcement, civil defense, and fire service who had experienced a devastating emergency situation that called for maximum command, control, and coordination of multiple agencies of varying disciplines - and who are all faced with the potential for far greater destruction and loss of life due to hurricane and flooding, believe that the Incident Command System offered, and will offer, the maximum chance for effectively dealing with such situations.

As a not unrelated collateral matter considerable incentive was found to "push" for additional radio channels for law enforcement use throughout California. In addition to the requirement for the availability of additional radio frequencies, and the need for combined communications capabilities, the value of an in-place Emergency Operations Center, for daily as well as I.C.S. use, was clearly demonstrated.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING

Operating in northern California since 1983, the "Multi-Agency Marijuana Enforcement and Eradication Task Force" known as CAMP has successfully used the Incident Command System as their planning and management organizational framework.

Utilizing the Incident Command System, CAMP, in 1983, carried out enforcement or eradication raids at 524 separate sites in 14 counties. 64,579 marijuana plants, valued at $130 million were eradicated or seized for evidence in the prosecution of 128 arrests. The program involved 13 separate federal and state agencies in addition to the agencies of the 14 participating California counties.

During the 1984 season CAMP once again utilized the Incident Command System to manage the activities of 91 local, state, and federal law enforcement and resource agencies. Activities made quite complex because of the multiplicity of agency configurations operating under diverse legal and political authorities and constraints were successfully planned for and accomplished through the benefits of I.C.S.

398 sites in 37 counties were raided; over a million pounds of marijuana, valued at over $320 million were seized. 218 arrests were made, 524 firearms seized, 47 vehicles and
almost $80,000.00 in cash confiscated in a program that bore a federal and state price tag of $2.3 million.2

Based on prior year experiences with the Incident Command System CAMP, in 1985, once again decided on that form of management system as that best suiting the many and varied needs of this unusual law enforcement endeavor.

In 1985 one additional county, for a total of 38, participated with 63 other agencies providing varying amounts of manpower, equipment, training, financial, and other means of support. During the season of operation, CAMP resources raided a record 684 sites seizing marijuana crops valued at over $332 million. 147 physical arrests were made and warrants, based on raids and related investigations, were obtained for an additional 60 suspects. 240 firearms were confiscated along with 52 vehicles and over $80,000.00 in cash. Program costs administered under I.C.S. concepts amounted to $3 million.3

In their "1984 Final Report" CAMP discusses their use of the Incident Command System:

"Because of the magnitude of the marijuana cultivation problem in California, no one government agency has been able to deal effectively with the problem on a statewide basis. County sheriffs are responsible for dealing with most crime problems in their counties, including the marijuana problem. CAMP was created to provide a supplemental resource to local sheriffs to help eradicate marijuana. In most central and northern rural counties, where population is sparse, tax bases are relatively low and marijuana cultivation is extensive, most sheriffs do not have sufficient resources to effectively grapple with the cultivation problem. Although in most counties this problem is a high priority for law enforcement, the sheriff must allocate his resources to the courts, jails, patrols and investigations of other high priority crimes, i.e., homicides, robberies, rapes and burglaries. Thus, CAMP attempts to channel both the resources and funds in a manner which will directly eliminate the problem at its source.

The Incident Command System (ICS), used for years by agencies like the United States Forest Service and the California Department of Forestry for fighting forest fires, is a organization command system in which a diverse array of resources are brought together under a single organizational structure to deal with a major incident/problem. In the case of CAMP, the "incident" is California's marijuana cultivation problem. Ninety-one (101 in 1985-JCR) organizations and agencies provide the necessary resources to make CAMP work.
The CAMP ICS is governed by a Steering Committee made up of representatives from CAMP's state and federal agencies and the California State Sheriff's Association (CSSA). The CAMP Headquarters command structure, which administers and directs the program's day to day operations, is staffed by an Incident Command System Commander, Deputy Commander, Operations Commander and other staff with special expertise in air operations, criminal intelligence, planning, logistics, asset seizure, legal, finance and media relations. The Headquarters operation provides the necessary support to the decentralized field operation headed by regional coordinators, strike team leaders, and lead deputies.4

A copy of the CAMP organizational chart showing the 1985 ICS structure for the organization as a whole and the organizational structure for a 1985 specialized operation known as Operation Emerald Triangle, follows. A review of those charts will reveal that CAMP is actually using a modification of the ICS structure rather than a "pure" form. While that does not present a "problem" - after all, success is itself the "proof of the pudding" in this case - there are some structural adjustments that are being contemplated for completion prior to the 1986 CAMP season. Those structural adjustments will bring CAMP into closer alignment with ICS as it exists today, and with the Law Enforcement Incident Command System (L.E.I.C.S.) as it is now being proposed, in order to create an organization that is even more efficient than CAMP '83, '84, or '85.

CAMP Summary

Multi-agency configurations are cumbersome at best; at their worst they are disfunctional or even counterproductive! Here we find a multi-year effort of a highly complex, action oriented organization that currently brings together 101 law enforcement, and allied agencies from the federal level down thru local municipalities - and, it works! Much of the credit is given to the use of the Incident Command System; it is the "glue" that helps CAMP stick together and function successfully year after year.
OPERATION – EMERALD TRIANGLE
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (OP-ET, ICS)

INCIDENT COMMANDER

- FACILITIES CHIEF
- PLANNING CHIEF
- OPERATIONS COMMANDER
- LOGISTICS CHIEF
- AIR OPERATIONS COMMANDER

- ASSISTANT OPERATIONS COMMANDER HUMBOLDT
- LOGISTICS ASSISTANT
- ASSISTANT OPERATIONS COMMANDER MENDOCINO
- LOGISTICS ASSISTANT
- ASSISTANT OPERATIONS COMMANDER TRINITY

TEAM LEADER TEAM I
TEAM LEADER TEAM II
TEAM LEADER TEAM III
TEAM LEADER TEAM IV
TEAM LEADER TEAM V

CLERICAL (3)
COLORADO

Information regarding generalized I.C.S. use within Colorado will be discussed in the section of this paper that deals with implementation strategy; this section will discuss the specific use of I.C.S. by the Boulder County, Colorado, Sheriff’s Department.

Boulder County

After a considerable amount of research into law enforcement uses of the Incident Command System, the Boulder County Sheriff’s Department stands out, nationwide, as perhaps the “best” example of such use.

Located approx. 25 miles Northwest of Denver, along the East slope “Front Range Country” of the Continental Divide, 800 square mile Boulder County presents a rich mixture of industry, farming, recreation, education, housing and commercial development in one of the most pleasant settings imaginable. This mixture, along with the locales weather and varied terrain, present the Sheriff’s Department with a wide range of law enforcement, and related duties with numerous potential applications for I.C.S. use.

The Sheriff’s Department, a first class, modern law enforcement agency, has a strength of just under 200 and operates with a budget (1984 data) of just over $5 million. Sheriff Brad Leach has been the head of that agency since 1971.

In addition to the usual range of law enforcement duties, sheriffs in Colorado are also given the responsibility of suppressing wildland fires, coordinating search and rescue duties, and controlling hazardous materials incidents. It is the “suppressing wildland fires” aspect of a Colorado sheriff’s job that brought Sheriff Leach and Boulder County into a close association with the Incident Command System.

The association with I.C.S. is closest within the department’s Emergency Services Division which is under the management of Director Don Van Wie. The division’s mission is, “to provide consolidated public safety services, which are not associated with the traditional law enforcement role. Emergency Services is responsible for preparation for and coordinated response to flood, wildland fire, hazardous materials, search and rescue, and emergency medical services, as well as fire investigation.”

While the sheriff of the county is charged with the wildland fire suppression responsibility he does not have an actual fire fighting agency under his direction; the sheriff’s department is a management force, not a suppression force.
Firefighting operations, as well as command in localized events, fall to the local fire agencies within the county.

Within the county are 20 fire protection districts, 26 fire departments, 3 emergency rescue units, and 5 ambulance services. While state and federal lands exist within the county those agencies do not maintain local initial attack fire suppression organizations but depend upon, and reimburse, local fire agencies who respond to state and federal lands fires.

The Sheriff’s obligation is met through the efforts of his Emergency Services Division which, "focuses on providing support and a common base of understanding and operations. Through the development of common terminology, training, protocols and standards, in the framework of the Incident Command System (emphasis supplied), individual agencies are able to operate as components of a larger organization in an emergency situation. In this context, Emergency Services provides the coordination, dispute resolution, and planning which makes the system effective."6

Based on positive experiences with I.C.S. application in fire, flood, search and rescue, and hazardous materials events, Sheriff Leach expanded the use of that system to day to day events of a law enforcement nature. Deputies carry I.C.S. forms with them as they carry out their normal duties and should a law enforcement situation meet the department’s implementation criteria the deputy will proceed to implement the I.C.S. Current guidelines define an "incident" calling for I.C.S. implementation as an event that; is non-routine (e.g. barricaded subject, hostage situation, major crime), involves a large number of agencies (e.g. sheriff’s deputies, local police department officers, state police, ambulance services, fire service, etc. cooperating at the scene of a high-risk building entry to rescue hostages), the situation may well extend for several hours or longer, the situation will require a considerable amount of information flow between Communications and field units.7

Department members at all levels have been trained in I.C.S. implementation and utilization. The process, according to the users, works well.

One of the primary factors that helps the system to work well in Boulder County is the same factor that caused the counties studied in Florida to experience tremendous difficulties - COMMUNICATIONS!

The Boulder Communications Center, located in the Boulder County Sheriff’s Department/Boulder Police Department headquarters building in the city of Boulder, is a combined public safety communications operation that services a number of agencies. The Center currently provides law
enforcement communications services for the Boulder County Sheriff's Department, Boulder Police Department, Lafayette Police, Louisville Police, Nederland Marshall's Office, Lyons Police, and the Town of Ward. The Center also provides communications services for the City of Boulder Fire Department, several ambulance companies, approx. 30 volunteer fire and rescue agencies, including support communications services for the University of Colorado Police, state and federal Forest Services, the State Parks Department, and the City and County Public Works Departments.

The Center operates under the direction of the Sheriff and the Boulder Chief of Police, and is staffed by personnel who's salaries are paid out of the budgets of the various city and county agencies who participate in the center. Center personnel work under a common director, David Atherton.

The thoroughly modern and efficiently configured Center is located directly adjacent to a large room, off of the office space of the Emergency Services Division, utilized during critical events as an Emergency Operations Control Center.

The net effect is an efficient, well organized and equipped, communications system staffed by competent personnel in a setting that lends itself to efficient emergency management. None of the things that go together to make up this county-wide system just fell into place; they obviously represent a considerable amount of foresight, planning, and just plain hard work. Boulder County appears to be ready and able to deal with any event that might befall it.

It is not, however, just communications that makes Boulder County a winner - among many other aspects, the formation of the Multi-Agency Resource System (MARS); a group organized to assist with the integration of I.C.S. throughout the county and to maintain all organizations in a state of readiness through cooperation, training, and mutual problem solving, has provided much of the "spark" that it takes to maintain the posture of preparedness.

Colorado Summary

Perhaps the best summary of this aspect of I.C.S. use in Colorado is provided by a statement prepared by Sheriff Brad Leach, for an I.C.S. Executive Orientation Seminar presented by the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department, funded by P.O.S.T., and held at Mammoth, California in October, 1984.

According the Sheriff Leach: "Boulder County's experience with the use of ICS as an all-risk management tool has been highly positive. Adoption has stressed the application of
ICS principles, and has deemphasized technical exactness and terminology at the early stages.

The use of ICS allows the application of modern management practices to emergencies and short term public safety projects. These practices include management by objectives, maintaining accountability, identifying management responsibilities, and providing for jurisdictional input in multi-jurisdictional operations.

ICS adoption has given us an opportunity to focus on incident management styles and techniques as a legitimate training topic. Ineffective management of emergencies by volunteer and professional agencies alike in Boulder County has probably been a greater problem than either limitations on manpower or equipment. ICS training and simulation, conducted in a multi-disciplinary setting, has allowed us to confront many of the traditional interagency problems with success. The role and "image" of command personnel is being substantially altered.

A number of adaptations of the ICS have been made for our purposes. Most notably, we have been developing guidelines for the use of ICS on an initiating incident. This includes guides for recognizing situations that should be handled under a formalized ICS, and guides for the filling of positions and structuring of the organization. Adaptation of the operations section to include events other than fires has not been particularly difficult. As deputies and others have internalized the principles of ICS, its application has become a part of the response process - without particular regard to the type or nature of the emergency. Thus ICS is being extended to other risks and situations by the responders themselves, as well as by the planned effort.

The management role assigned to the Incident Commander is consistent with the way we perceive our statutory public safety responsibilities. Thus ICS application reinforces departmental policy. The training received on command process and organization-building given as part of the ICS training has increased officer effectiveness, while reducing the stress of the early phases of response. The tactical latitude left to Operations Section personnel allows other agencies - medical, rescue, fire, etc. to operate within the system without resentment of a non-specialist at the helm. The successful application of Incident Command System in multi-agency operations is producing a team sense among emergency personnel, and is increasing trust across agency lines.

Difficulties with the Incident Command System have been minor. As with any new system, there is resistance to new terminology. In some cases, there have been conflicts with internal procedure on rank and succession of command.
all, the transition is going very smoothly because ICS gives the responding officer better skills and tools for dealing with difficult and threatening situations than he has had before.
FOOTNOTES


N. 6 Ibid.

N. 7 Boulder County Sheriff’s Department, "Incident Command System Implementation Guidelines", Boulder, Colorado, not dated.

STRATEGY FOR L.E.I.C.S. IMPLEMENTATION

The National Interagency Incident Mangement System (NIIMS), briefly discussed in the "Introduction to I.C.S." section of this paper, has gone to considerable effort and expense to prepare an "Implementation Sequence Outline" and an "Interagency Implementation Plan Guide" in an effort to encourage and assist fire services agencies to adopt and utilize their "total systems approach" as the preferred method of all-risk incident management at a federal, state, and local level.

The NIIMS "package", specifically designed with the fire services in mind, consists of five subsystems:

1. **Incident Command System** An on-scene management structure which includes:
   a. Operating Requirements
   b. Interagency Management Components
   c. An Organizational and Operational Structure

2. **Training** The Training subsystem includes:
   a. Development and delivery of courses in support of the ICS organizational and operational structure.
   b. Development and delivery of agency specific courses related to the subsystems of NIIMS.
   c. Training as required for supporting technologies.

3. **Qualification and Certification** NIIMS will foster national qualifications and certification standards in wildland firefighting, and may eventually foster standards in urban firefighting and other emergency public services. Standards typically include training, experience, and physical fitness.

4. **Publications Management** A Publications Management subsystem which will include:
   a. Materials development
   b. Publications control
   c. Publications Sources/Suppliers
   d. Distribution

5. **Supporting Technology** Technologies that may be used to support NIIMS include, but are not limited to:
   a. Orthophoto Mapping
   b. National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS)
   c. Remote Automatic Weather Stations (RAWS)
   d. Automatic Lightning Detection Systems (ALDS)
   e. Infrared Technology
   f. Communications
While it is true that NIIMS exists for the fire services, and their materials are designed to be fire agency specific, there is much of value in NIIMS. NIIMS materials can be easily obtained and utilized with the L.E.I.C.S. Field Operations Guide to provide law enforcement with a specific, yet still generic, all-risk incident management system that has been selectively adapted to remove the firefighting agency specific materials and references that might well prevent, or impede an adoption of I.C.S. by the law enforcement community.

NIIMS quite appropriately suggests that implementation requires planning, leadership, training, and a great deal of follow-up. On a state, regional, or local level it is critical that some individual, group of individuals, or agency takes the lead in implementation. Usually, this leadership is provided by those who have been exposed, most frequently by fire services interrelationships, to Incident Command System use, have seen the benefits, and wish to extend those benefits to their own discipline.

Hopefully, those with the commitment will also fall into the "natural leader" category, who have the confidence and trust of a large number of their colleagues and can "deliver a constituency" when it comes to the selling of the System.

If law enforcement implementation is to stand a chance of success it is absolutely critical that it be sold from the "top down". Agency heads must be convinced, by the leadership noted above (hopefully they are among that group of leaders or perhaps one agency head may even assume the role as the "prime mover" for implementation), that I.C.S. implementation will allow their law enforcement agency to easily become more effective in carrying out their own primary mission and will result in vast improvement in responding to multi-agency critical incidents. It is critical to convince the agency head that I.C.S. does not infringe on the daily routine, responsibilities, or authority given his agency by statute, agreement, or customary practice; what it can do is provide for him effective management of small daily incidents as well as the large, complex multi-jurisdictional disasters that every agency dreads.

Once the leadership is determined, it is necessary to determine general interest for implementation within the state or region. (Local agency implementation has separate and distinct concerns that will be discussed later.) Leaders should make personal contacts with their counterparts in other agencies, provide materials about I.C.S., and insure that follow-ups of all contacted parties take place. Once sufficient interest has been generated through the personal contacts of the leadership group, they should schedule an information sharing meeting to provide...
accurate information about I.C.S. to the interested parties and their agency heads.

Following this meeting the leadership group should seek to formalize an implementation structure of those agencies appearing ready and willing to proceed. The first goal of such a group should be to form an organizational cadre of individuals from each interested agency to learn about I.C.S. so as to better prepare themselves for the actual implementation within their organization, the state, or region.

After such cadre has been trained they should begin to expose their own agencies, informally, to the concepts of I.C.S. to determine a local agency strategy. Once sufficient time has been allowed for the cadre to gain a feel of the organizational state of receptivity, the leadership group should analyze the data, meet with all interested agencies, and make a final determination of agency participation. The geography and/or politics of the implementation area must be considered: shall implementation be state-wide, county-wide, encompass a particular mutual aid region, neighboring police departments, or perhaps be limited to one particular local government or just one agency of that governmental entity?

Once the composition of the implementation area/agencies has been determined, an executive orientation seminar should be held to acquaint the administrators and their top staff members with the System, the implementation process, and their responsibilities and roles in that process. Ideally, the seminar should:

1. Acquaint them with I.C.S. as an "on-line" system that has successfully been utilized to manage incidents of varied size, complexity, and multi-agency involvement.

2. Provide them with examples of how that System did, and can, handle such incidents.

3. Present to them the plan to implement I.C.S. as the management system of choice within the area/agency grouping configuration previously decided upon.

4. Solicit from them support, encouragement, input, and cooperation so that the process of implementation will be actually accomplished.

It essential that each agency involved in implementation develop their individual implementation plan which should outline their goals, objectives, responsibilities, and the time framework in which all of this must be accomplished. Those individual plans should then be integrated into an
overall implementation plan/time frame for the target area/group.

Model interagency implementation plans are available from NIIMS. These model plans include sample implementation agreements and charters that spell out, in detail, exactly what must be done by cooperating agencies to effect implementation. Individual agency plans are simply based on, and meet the mutual requirements of, the interagency plans.

A copy of the NIIMS "Interagency Implementation Plan - A Guide" and "Implementation Charters - A Guide" are attached to this paper.

These materials, which with minor adaptation are applicable to law enforcement agency use, are available from:

Boise Interagency Fire Center
3905 Vista Avenue
Boise, ID 83709

The implementation organization for the state of Colorado, Colorado Incident Command System (CICS) finalized their "Implementation Plan" in early 1983 and have been making excellent progress since that time. Their plan essentially follows the NIIMS model and has proved effective for their use.

One technique that has proved to be of significant value in the Colorado implementation process is the newsletter. The CICS NEWSLETTER is devoted to the dissemination of I.C.S. training information but actually accomplishes much more than that; it keeps all participants informed of progress, significant events, and in general establishes a climate for success in the implementation process. A copy of a CICS NEWSLETTER is attached to this paper. The publication can be obtained from the Colorado Incident Command System, Box 271, Manitou Springs, CO 80829.

When considering individual agency implementation, either alone or as part of an interagency implementation plan, special dynamics and needs are involved. A structure to manage the transition state must be decided upon. The top executive needs to determine just what structure would be the most appropriate to manage the transition so as to create the least amount of friction with the existing system and yet provide the greatest likelihood that the new system will be encouraged and actually develop.

"Some considerations in determining the particular management structure are finding someone who:
1. Can have the clout to mobilize the resources necessary to keep the change moving. Usually in such a situation, one is competing for resources with others who have ongoing work to do.

2. Can have the respect of the existing operating leadership and the change advocates. A great deal of wisdom, objectivity, and linkage may be needed in order to make the balancing decisions, e.g. how much resources to put into the new activity and at what pace.

3. Has effective interpersonal skills. A great deal of the leadership at this time requires persuasion rather than force or formal power.4

After those considerations have been dealt with there are several alternatives that the top executive may consider as the actual form of the transition management structure. He can personally manage the implementation effort - an approach not compatible with reality in the business of law enforcement - but nevertheless an option. He can appoint a "project manager" to oversee and implement the process of change, acting with the authority of the top executive, but having to rely on resources within the "usual" parts of the organization to help him get the job done. He can have the existing organizational structure simply take on the change as an added part of their workload - once again not the best idea given the nature of law enforcement - but a possibility to consider. He might form a working group of representatives of the major parts of the organization to be effected by the implementation to plan, monitor, oversee, and manage the implementation.

Whichever option the top executive takes he must let everyone in the organization know what the structure is and must communicate his commitment to the implementation.

The structure decided upon must next develop an activity plan that spells out in detail just what must be done to get the organization "from here to there" in the implementation process.

Working with the NIIMS "guides" is a helpful way to organize the work to be done in the implementation process; the following characteristics of an effective process plan should be considered:

1. It is purposeful - the activities are clearly linked to the change goals and priorities.

2. It is task specific - the types of activities involved are clearly identified rather than broadly generalized.
3. It is integrated - the discrete activities are linked.

4. It is temporal - it is time sequenced.

5. It is adaptable - there are contingency plans and ways of adapting to unexpected forces.

6. It is agreed to by the top of the organization.

7. It is cost-effective in terms of the investment of both time and people.5

Keep in mind that the plan must be specific, and the results observable as progress is made; without those qualities the plan is nothing more than a set of desired objectives - there must be a requirement for action.

One last point: law enforcement, being conservative and reactionary by nature, creates a special need for commitment to change if that change is to take place. It is essential that those charged with I.C.S. implementation determine who within the organization must be "on board".

A conscious effort must be made, going in, to analyze the organization and sort out the individuals, units, commands, informal power groups, etc. who must "buy into", or at the very least not actively oppose, the implementation process. That number may be small, but it is critical!

Law enforcement administrators and ranking officers are no strangers to the means of bringing that "critical mass" "on board" - it is just that the potential for problems with implementation are so great in a reactionary organization that the issue cannot be ignored and must be dealt with in an organized and pre-planned manner. Once again, the total commitment of the top agency administrator is one of the greatest assurances of downstream compliance and successful implementation - if the considerations discussed in this section are kept in mind.
FOOTNOTES


N.2 Ibid.


N.4 Ibid. p 46

N.5 Ibid. p 51-52
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This guide has been prepared as an aid in helping a group of agencies implement NIIMS. The material presented here has been extracted from other implementation plans which are in some stage of action.

This guide is presented only for your use and as a reference guide in the preparation of your local plan. Materials contained may be altered or deleted as your situation dictates. Additional material may be added to fit a particular need.

A critical item in NIIMS implementation is to establish a decisionmaking process with interagency participation (see the Decisionmaking Process Users Guide) early in the process. A second critical item is to have a single person (State Forester) who is dedicated to the success of NIIMS and will take the leadership in implementation. A third critical item is to have a coordinator or facilitator who will coordinate all of the activities within the decision process.

Interagency implementation of NIIMS will not be an easy task. The results, however, can bring many agencies into a cooperative association previously unknown in emergency services.
The National Interagency Incident Management System
Interagency Implementation Plan
A Guide

PURPOSE: The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) provides an efficient system for agencies to cope with various emergency incidents.

Many different emergency organizations exist throughout the country. It is difficult for most of these organizations to function cooperatively in an efficient manner because of different terminology, varying personnel qualifications, different standards of equipment, and lack of common radio frequencies.

The purpose of this plan is to outline steps for the implementation of the National Interagency Incident Management System.

GOAL: Adopt NIIMS, develop and implement by __ Date __ so that multiagency incidents will use NIIMS by __ Date __.

OBJECTIVES:

I. Administrative

   A. Introduce NIIMS to multiagency groups to develop understanding and commitment by agencies:

      1
      2
      3
      4
      5

      Who ___ Name ___
      When ___ Date ___

   B. Develop a decisionmaking process and present to those agencies participating in NIIMS:

      Who ___
      When ___
C. Establish an administrative board for NIIMS. The board will consist of the following agencies:

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 

Who ____________
When ____________

D. The Administrative Board will:

1. Establish and define its organization.
2. Develop a charter and set policy for the Board.
3. Within the decision process, establish a second level or "Task Force" composed of representative agencies participating in NIIMS.
4. Within the decision process, establish a third level "Working Teams" to be composed of agency specialists, such as:

   (a) Communications Working Team
   (b) Finance Working Team
   (c) Training Working Team
   (d) Information Working Team
   (e) Logistics Working Team
   (f) Other, as needed

Who ____________
When ____________

E. Appoint a NIIMS Coordinator whose duties will be:

1. Keep abreast of all developments in NIIMS
2. Present NIIMS programs
3. Timely reports to the Board
4. Coordinate work of Task Force and Working Teams
5. Act as facilitator on all NIIMS projects

Who ____________
When ____________
F. The Task Force will:

1. Develop a Charter and elect a Chairman
2. Establish and define its organization
3. Be responsible to screen all work products developed by the Working Teams and make recommendations to the Board
4. Determine geographical areas or project areas for initial implementation
5. Establish timetables for all work products accomplished by the Working Teams.
6. Develop new mutual aid agreements with participating agencies
   Who
   When

G. Involve participating agencies in initial implementation of NIIMS.

1. Slide/Tape presentations
2. Handout materials
3. Training sessions
4. Seminars
   Who
   When

H. Identify barriers to implementation of NIIMS, both interagency and intraagency. Begin actions to resolve barriers.
   Who
   When

I. Serve as a clearinghouse for the consideration and adoption of new technologies, such as, orthophoto mapping, etc.
   Who
   When
II. COMMUNICATIONS WORKING TEAM

A. Develop an interagency communications plan.
   Who
   When

B. Prepare individual agency communications plans for both short range and long range implementation.
   Who
   When

C. Prepare a financial plan by agency for communications equipment and supplies for both short range and long range implementation.
   Who
   When

D. Prepare frequency management cooperative agreements.
   Who
   When

E. Develop an interagency "Clear Text" radio procedure guide.
   Who
   When

III. FINANCIAL WORKING TEAM

A. From the various working teams, prepare a Financial Plan for the implementation of NIIMS.
   Who
   When

B. Insure that appropriate cost collection requirements will be met by participating agencies as specified in interagency agreements or memorandum of understanding.
1. Provide guidance into all agreements
2. Establish timely and accurate guidelines to reimburse cooperating agencies.

Who

When

IV. TRAINING WORKING TEAM

A. Obtain materials from FIRETIP and NWCG, plan for and provide NIIMS training.

Who

When

B. Prepare comprehensive training plan for the implementation of NIIMS.

1. What training is needed to implement NIIMS
2. Who needs training
3. Course materials, source and availability
4. Schedule of training to meet goal and objectives
5. Develop agency training assignments

Who

When

C. Prepare a comprehensive financial plan for meeting agency training needs.

Who

When

D. Select and train a cadre of NIIMS instructors

Who

When

E. Objective

1. Identify locally trained people who will qualify for specific equivalency training. (Position to equivalent position)
2. Evaluate local training standards.

Who

When
F. Maintain coordination with NWCG Training and Q&C Working Teams to ensure minimum standards for qualification and certification.

  Who
  When

G. Identify key interagency personnel who will be NIIMS advisors.

  Who
  When

V. INFORMATION WORKING TEAM

A. Develop a comprehensive I&E Plan for NIIMS implementation.

  Who
  When

B. Upon request from other working teams develop training aids, informational kits, publications, etc. necessary to implement NIIMS.

  Who
  When

C. Develop a financial plan for materials and supplies necessary to implement NIIMS.

  Who
  When

D. Prepare and distribute timely interagency news articles concerning NIIMS implementation.

  Who
  When

E. Coordinate with FIRETIP and others on current NIIMS information.

VI. LOGISTICS WORKING TEAM

A. Develop a local glossary of terms for equipment and procedures that adds to the national standards.

  Who
  When
B. Develop a comprehensive directory of resources by type capability and manning. Identify alternative systems for keeping information upto-date.

Who
When

D. Begin converting to NIIMS terminology command post, functional kits, forms, signs, etc.

Who
When

E. Prepare a financial plan for supplies and equipment needed to implement NIIMS.

Who
When

VII. EVALUATION

A. Conduct an evaluation to determine success of NIIMS implementation. Evaluation will include:

1. Plans accuracy, effectiveness, need for revision
2. Interagency coordination commitment weak links informed and involved
3. Schedules on target where emphasis needed
4. Implementation materials items available, not available in preparation

Who
Board Biannually
Task Force Quarterly
Coordinator Weekly
This Guide has been prepared as an aid in helping a group of agencies implement NIIMS. The material presented here has been extracted from other charters which are in some stage or action.

This guide is presented only for your use and as a reference in the preparation of your local charters. Materials contained in this guide may be altered or deleted as your situation dictates. Additional material may be added to fit a particular need.
AGREEMENT

The undersigned, acting as the (state) NIIMS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, approve and accept this CHARTER as an instrument to initiate the implementation of the NIIMS program in this state. Provided, that nothing herein is intended to require any partner agency to act in any way which is contrary to its legal, fiscal, or policy constraints.

agency

agency

agency

agency

agency

agency

Date _________________, 198
NIIMS BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHARTER

I. INTRODUCTION

The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) is the result of a study made by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, a group comprised of representatives from all Federal agencies having forest and wildland fire responsibilities and two representatives from State Forestry agencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency also participates. NIIMS is a combination of the best features of two tried and tested systems: the typical forestry Large Fire Organization, combined with the National Interagency Fire Qualification System, and the Incident Command System. Implementation of the NIIMS concept is planned to commence in (state) on (date).

Implementation of NIIMS will involve many autonomous agencies, each with its own policies, jurisdictional responsibilities, funding differences and other special abilities and limitations. In order to bring all of these agencies together into an effective association, it is necessary to have an efficient system for decision making, coordination and cooperation.

A number of decisions and agreements will be made over the next few years which will bear significantly on the course of NIIMS implementation in (state). These agreements will provide the following:

A. Common terminology for organizational functions, resources, and facilities.

B. A modular organization flexible enough to meet greatly varied needs in command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance.

C. Integrated communications using special equipment and/or shared frequencies. Includes adoption of "clear text" phrases in place of codes and signals.

D. A predetermined method of developing a unified command to deal with multiagency or multijurisdictional situations.

E. A method of developing consolidated action plans to set incident priorities satisfactory to all agencies with a responsibility to fulfill.

F. Instilling accepted span of control procedures to provide for adequate supervision while avoiding a top heavy organization.

G. Standardizing the methods of organizing and committing resources to an incident to simplify management and staff.
support to them, and to provide for more efficient operations of the resource itself.

**ADMINISTRATION**

Responsibility for administration of NIIMS will be vested in a Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall consist of the representatives of the major emergency and fire agencies who are participating in the NIIMS effort. The assignment of an alternate to periodically attend for an Agency is acceptable provided that the alternate has been delegated authority to commit his agency in decision matters before the Board. Additional members may be added to the Board as the need arises.

To carry out the NIIMS goals and objectives, a decisionmaking process having the following characteristics has been designed for implementing NIIMS:

A. A "Directors" level for policy decisions.

B. A "Task Force" level which processes information and formulates policy for consideration by the Board of Directors.

C. A "Working Team" level to perform staff work and carry out the decisions processed at the two upper levels.

It is anticipated that the Working Teams can assume responsibility in the implementation of NIIMS after a period of familiarization. Participation in these teams will give all agencies a voice in the implementation of NIIMS. In execution of the NIIMS program, most field level problems will be identified by the Working Teams or by the Task Force. Once an inter-agency problem has been recognized by any level of the partnership, the problem must be completely defined by the group perceiving the problem of others, and assigned by either the Task Force or the Board of Directors. The Task Force or Board of Directors may assign the most qualified persons to investigate the problem singly or as a team and recommend alternative solutions. These investigators will report their findings and recommendations to the Task Force and/or Board of Directors for review. The Task Force or Board of Directors will either make an appropriate decision or return the problem to the investigators for further study.

Approval for some Working Team findings can be accomplished at the Task Force level. For example, certain decisions on NIIMS terminology, procedures and field actions may be made. In general, recommendations on operational expenditures within overall budget commitments should be made at the Task Force level for their respective agencies. Policy decisions, fiscal commitments, and long range implementation plans will require Board of Directors' approval, after which such action will be carried out by the Task Force. Board members agree that agency exceptions to Board decisions may from time to time be necessary and that any such agency exceptions to recommendations of the Task Force or Board level decisions will be confirmed in writing.

The goals and objectives as outlined in the Implementation Plan provide guidelines and directions for the decision team.
III. GOALS OF THE BOARD

A. To establish an active, decisive body that will guide the implementation of NIIMS.

B. To assure that necessary actions are taken to maintain an agreed to NIIMS operational capability.

C. To provide an agency commitment.

D. To accept a charter and set policy.

E. To appoint a Task Force composed of representatives of the Board of Directors and other organizations participating in NIIMS.

F. To establish Working Teams and set objectives for these Teams.

G. To identify barriers to the implementation of NIIMS, both interagency and by individual agencies, and act to resolve barriers.

IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES

A. The Board of Directors will appoint one of its members to serve as Chairman.

B. The Board will meet at the call of the Chairman. The frequency of meetings and allotted time should be consistent with decisions to be made.

C. Board members will strive for consensus in decision making. Proposed actions will be based upon consideration of common concern for each agency's needs, commitments and capabilities. Decision making will be by majority vote using Roberts' Rules of Order.

V. AUTHORITY

Authority for directing the statewide NIIMS program is vested in the Board of Directors.
The Task Force shall consist of a representative from the agencies listed below who has authority to speak for his agency, subject to final policy level approval by his department or agency head:

1. agency
2. agency
3. agency
4. agency
5. agency
6. agency
7. agency

Other members may be appointed as become necessary. Agency alternates may serve provided they are informed and can speak for their agency.

II. GOALS

1. To provide the Board of Directors with studies, statements, and other recommendations for decision making.

2. To implement within their respective agencies agreements which are adopted.

III. OBJECTIVES

1. Identify problem areas in interagency coordination.

2. To assign working teams to address problems. Functional teams could be as follows:
   a) Communications Working Team
   b) Logistics Working Team
   c) Finance Working Team
   d) Training Working Team
   e) Information Working Team
   f) Operations Working Team
3. To analyze working team reports and forward their recommendations to the Board.

4. To determine geographic and/or jurisdictional areas for implementation and timetables for proceeding.

5. To assist their own and other agencies in the implementation process.

IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. The Chairman shall be ___ (How is appointment made?) ___.

   His staff shall provide clerical needs of the Task Force.

2. The Task Force shall meet as requested by the Board of Directors or at the request of the Task Force Chairman consistent with the work in progress. Scheduled meetings are expected on a ___ (weekly/monthly, etc.) ___ basis.

3. Depending on the task at hand, the Task Force may function in either a management or staff role.

4. Decisionmaking on development issues, and recommendations to the Board will be by majority vote, recording votes by agencies. The procedure shall be carried out by Roberts' Rules of Order.

V. AUTHORITY

The Task Force functions both in a management and staff role. In a management role, the Task Force formulates policy for NIIMS implementation and prepares "action plans" for the Board of Directors decision. In a staff role, the Task Force assists the Board of Directors in all activities which will lead to an orderly implementation of NIIMS.
NIIMS (NAME) WORKING TEAM

CHARTER

I. MEMBERSHIP

The membership of the (name) working team shall be made up of key specialists from participating agencies who are knowledgeable in this specific discipline and also able to assess the effects of the actions under study on their respective agency.

II. GOALS

1. To Provide the NIIMS decision teams with detailed expertise in this specific discipline.

2. To be able to identify and solve agency problems associated with the varied details of NIIMS implementation.

III. OBJECTIVES

1. To conduct studies necessary to ensure the compatibility of NIIMS systems, subsystems, concepts, and principles with agency operations.

2. To prepare a documentation for use within each agency in NIIMS concepts and operations.

3. To provide planning, fiscal, and technical information to the Board of Directors and Task Force for use in long range and daytoday planning for NIIMS implementation.

IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. The working team shall convene as necessary to accomplish their assignments.

2. Each working team will operate as agreed by its members. They will respond to requests for:
   a) Technical expertise.
   b) Fiscal data required for long range planning.
   c) Planning information required to synchronize the implementation of NIIMS between agencies.
   d) Internal needs of each agency to assure an orderly transition from "statusquo" to NIIMS.

V. AUTHORITIES

The working team will operate primarily in a staff role to the Task Force or Board of Directors. Actions taken by the working team will be coordinated.
through the Task Force Chairman to assure that such actions are compatible with the overall NIIMS concept. Each working team member must have the authority to commit their respective agencies in technical matters involving the implementation of NIIMS.
Mock Catastrophe a Success in Disaster Services Exercise

By Kathryn Martin

Five were killed and 35 were injured Saturday when a tornado swept through the Security-Widefield area trapping students and faculty inside Watson Junior High School.

But the "injured" quickly recovered and the "dead" miraculously came back to life following the conclusion of this year's first El Paso County Disaster Services exercise.

William F. Schroff, deputy director of the Disaster Emergency Services Agency for El Paso County, said the training exercise "went very well. I'm pleased with how everything turned out."

Rescue units involved were the Security Village Volunteer Fire Department, Fountain Volunteer Fire Department, Professional Paramedic Service, A-1 Ambulance, St. Francis Hospital's Flight for Life, Red Cross, Pikes Peak Region Incident Command System Implementation Tactical Group, El Paso County Sheriff's Department and the Disaster Emergency Service Agency.

Disaster victims included members of area Boy Scout and Explorer scout troops and their leaders, and emergency response family members.

"It went much better than I think any of the organizers originally thought it would," Schroff said. "This is the first free-flow type exercise that we've done in a long time. It was fantastic."

"I personally said to the people today the term 'volunteer' is a misnomer. They're non-paid professionals," Schroff said. "They are a great bunch of people."

The free-flow exercise places the professional units in a disaster situation, then lets them progress through the situation in a manner they choose.

For example, they are not told how many "dead" are among the "injured." They must make that determination for themselves by reading cards pinned to the victims' clothing.

The units must also decide what additional backup to call and, if the backup is later found to be unnecessary, must make corrections on their own.

Although pleased with the overall outcome, some problem spots did arise from the exercise.

"What we're looking for is identifying training needs," Schroff said. "One thing noticed that needs work is a triage training program. It did not go badly today, but we saw where we could streamline it."

Continued on next page.
Mock Catastrophe

Continued from page one.

He said that if the "tornado" disaster had been real, everyone would receive the needed treatment.

"We were just a little backlogged. We would just like to see it go a little better."

Schroff said that he has seen larger organizations in the state conduct exercises, but "they are highly scripted so there is no room for error. The people today had to make all those decisions and those decisions were 99 percent correct."

Schroff said that the exercise in the Security-Widefield-Fountain area was the first exercise in at least two years that was outside of the Colorado Springs city limits.

"It's been so long since we've moved out to the county," he said. "They (county agencies) respond very well but they've never responded to 50 victims."

He said the exercise helped them see how to deploy available resources and to at least expose the non-paid professionals and professionals alike to emergency circumstances.

Another problem that came up during the disaster was where to locate a temporary morgue.

"One suggestion was made... to bring them outside," Schroff said. "I recommended to the commander that it was not the thing to do to bring them in front of the parents and other civilians standing by."

"We decided to move those that were obviously dead to a classroom as a temporary morgue until the coroner got there," he said.

Larimer County Rehearses with Flash Flood Exercise

Larimer County conducted a flash flood exercise this spring to rehearse current emergency operations plans and to test the readiness of county and local emergency response agencies to meet the impact of a flash flood disaster.

The exercise was conducted in the Emergency Operations Center in the basement of the County Courthouse. In addition, the Sheriff dispatched his communications van to the scene of the simulated disaster as a field command post in which the Incident Commander officiated and from which realistic input was contributed to the disaster scenario.

Other participants included representatives from the Office of the Board of County Commissioners, the Public Works, Social Services, Health, Information Management and other county departments as well as the American Red Cross and the Amateur Radio Emergency Service. Observers from the State Division of Disaster Emergency Services and neighboring counties also attended.

The scenario simulated a flash flood inundating a portion of Larimer County and, at the critique held the week after, there was general agreement that the exercise was tremendously useful and productive. Of interest to the Front Range ICS was the use of ICS terminology to better acquaint county officials and emergency response agencies with the functioning of the system.

Practice leads to preparation as a rescue worker helps in an El Paso County drill.

Schroff said the exercises were taken so realistically that two firemen were overcome with a minor case of heat prostration.

He also said two directors from the Golden Disaster Emergency Service Agency were watching the disaster and "praised the exercise very well. In fact, they would like to videotape our next exercise," he said.

Schroff said the most important aspect of the exercise was the merging of the non-paid professionals with the professionals and evaluating them as one.

"The sheriff came in and took over command, which is how it should be in a disaster. We also had fire working for law enforcement, and that doesn't happen very often," he said.

This article originally appeared in the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph and is reprinted with its permission.
The Planning Process

Emphasis is placed on the planning process to bring to a successful completion any type of an emergency. A planning process has been developed as part of the Incident Command System (ICS) to assist in the development of an action plan in an orderly and systematic manner. The plan can be verbal or in written form.

The planning process is a series of basic planning steps which are appropriate for use in any incident situation. The determination of the need for written action plans and attachments is based on the requirements of the incident and the judgement of the Incident Commander.

To develop an on scene action plan for an incident several items must be taken into consideration such as:

- Control objectives and strategy
- Any cost implications of the control objectives if required
- Determine work assignments and resource requirements
- Insure that incident facilities are adequate
- Evaluate current situation and determine if existing plan is adequate, make any revisions that are needed.

All these items must be considered at an incident regardless of type.

The detail of an action plan will be determined by the type, complexity, duration of the incident, and requirements of the Incident Commander.

On a simple incident which is routine in response, the action plan can be verbal. In this case the Incident Commander has not delegated the planning process to anyone. Once the incident becomes complex the Incident Commander may delegate the planning function to a Planning Section Chief who would become responsible for the planning process and the development of the action plan. In the case where a Planning Section Chief would be utilized, the incident in most cases would require that the action plan be in writing.

There are several ICS forms that are available to assist with the on-scene planning process. The details of the planning process can be found in the ICS Planning Section Chief Job Description ICS-221-1 which can be obtained from Fire Service Publications, Oklahoma State University at Stillwater, Oklahoma.

State Patrol Receives ICS Training

The Hazardous Material Division of the Colorado State Patrol received eight hours of Basic Incident Command Training this spring. Charles G. Heister CSP Hazardous Material Coordinator indicated that the Colorado State Patrol will be using ICS on all incidents that are on Federal and State Highways.

Heister feels that with the use of ICS concepts State Patrol officers will be able to manage all on scene activities easier and identify roles of each responding agency during a hazmat incident.

Forty officers attended a special training session in Denver that was held at the Colorado Training Institute. One full day was devoted to ICS which included lecture and simulation exercises. A review of the Big Thompson Flood was made, discussing where ICS would have been beneficial in the operation of the Colorado State Patrol.

Colorado State Patrol intends to use ICS as their own scene management system. He also indicated that with the Colorado State Patrol using ICS, routine responses, such as vehicle fires, auto accidents and other incidents should operate much more effectively.

Instructors for the State Patrol Training Session were an Interagency Cadre from Colorado State Patrol, Colorado Springs Fire Department, Colorado Training Institute, and Colorado State Forest Service.

Happenings Elsewhere

Wildlife Fire Protection agencies are busy planning for ICS implementation in many states, including Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, California, Kansas, Minnesota, Florida and New Jersey.

There has been increasing interest by emergency services within counties and cities. In many cases, the agencies see that NIIMS provides a way to become more deeply involved in Interagency Emergency Management. National organizations such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs, International Fire Service Training Association and the National Association of Search and Rescue are interested and are providing NIIMS information to their members.

Transition training packages are available from the Boise Interagency Fire Center.
Front Range Implementation Group Board Members

**Jefferson County:** Bruce Coulter, Jefferson County Sheriff's Dept., P.O. Box 471, Boulder, CO 80306-441-3637
**Douglas County:** George Durkop, Dept. of Emergency Services, 335 South Wilcox St., Castle Rock, CO 80104 888-3403
**Front Range Group:** Michael Bahm, Colorado State Forest Service, Left Hand Canyon, J.S.R., Boulder, CO 80302-4428
**Teller County:** Colorado State Forest Service, P.O. Box Y, Woodland Park, CO 80863 687-2921
**Gilpin County:** Open

Larimer County: Dick Speiss, Sheriff's Dept., P.O. Box 4190, Fort Collins, CO 80522-221-7118

United States Forest Service:
- Arapahoe-Roosevelt NF, Red Feather Ranger District, 1800 N. College, Fort Collins, CO 80522 482-3834
- Gary Shaffer, Pike-San Isabel NF, South Platte Ranger District, 393 South Harlan, Suite 107, Lakewood, CO 80228 234-5707

National Park Service:
- Dan Davis, Rocky Mt. National Park, Headquarters Building, Estes Park, CO 80517 556-2371
- Clear Creek County: Open
- Park County: Open

The Front Range Board meets the third Thursday of every month at the CSFS Golden District Office, 1504 Quaker Avenue, Golden, Colorado 80401. Phone 273-9757. Visitors welcome.

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Statewide CICS Administrative Board Members

**John Chapman**, National Parks Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Box 25287, Lakewood, CO 80225 (303) 234-3088
**Fire Management Specialist, Colorado Bureau of Land Management, 1037 20th Street, Denver, CO 80202 (303) 837-3414
**Lloyd Todd**, Air, Aviation Fire Management, USDA Forest Service, A-2, Box 25127, Lakewood, CO 80225 (303) 234-7152
**Len Boulas**, Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services, Camp George West, Golden, CO 80401 (303) 273-1765
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**Steve Olsen**, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 8 Building 710, Denver Federal Center, Denver, CO 80225 (303) 234-2553
**Ron Zeleny**, Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins, CO 80522 (303) 482-8165
**Charles Recker**, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern Ute Agency, Box 315, Ignacio, CO 81137 (303) 583-4511
**Bruce Bounds**, County Sheriffs of Colorado, 2111 N. 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 (303) 570-2270
**Jack Wilson**, Colorado Fire Chiefs' Association, Box 507 Wheat Ridge, CO 80034 (303) 424-7323

The Statewide Board meets the 1st Friday of each month. Contact Steve Hart, NIMS Coordinator (303) 985-5203 for each month's meeting location. Visitors welcome.

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ICS TEAMWORK—
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Colorado Incident Command System
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Manitou Springs, CO 80829

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A full color cachetted envelope (first day cover) is being issued by the National Association of State Foresters to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Smokey Bear Cooperative Forest Fire Prevention Campaign. A Smokey Bear stamp will be affixed and cancelled on the first day of issue. The cost of the covers is $2.50 each, which include postage and handling. To order, send name, address, number of covers desired, and payment to Allane Wilson, Alabama Forestry Commission, 513 Madison Ave., Montgomery, AL 36130.

Check of money order should be made payable to the National Association of State Foresters.