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FINAL REPORT
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND UTILIZATION
OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAMS

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ABSTRACT

A national study aimed at finding ways to improve the effectiveness and utilization of Neighborhood Watch programs has concluded that: (a) such programs can be effective in reducing certain types of crime, particularly residential burglary, (b) program sponsors have difficulty in maintaining interest and participation in the programs, and (c) revitalization of Neighborhood Watch can best be accomplished by encouraging flexibility and innovation in programs and by integrating crime prevention with efforts to address other neighborhood concerns. The researchers utilized a survey of a national sample of Neighborhood Watch programs, site visits to selected jurisdictions, and a review of existing evaluation reports, manuals, and other documents to examine a range of issues related to how the programs are initiated, organized, and operated. The study was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and conducted by the Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center (State University of New York at Albany) in conjunction with the National Sheriffs' Association and the National Crime Prevention Council.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Citizen involvement in crime prevention has grown enormously during the last ten years in the United States. While this involvement takes many forms, the primary approach consists of programs designed to increase the quantity and quality of surveillance that residents exercise in their own neighborhoods. Encouragement of increased surveillance is coupled with encouragement to contact the police immediately whenever suspicious circumstances are detected. Along with instructions on how to surveil and report, residents are invariably given tips on how to make their individual households more secure against crime. The names of these programs vary from place to place: Crime Watch, Block Watch, Community Alert, for example. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to all of them with the most commonly used name, Neighborhood Watch.

It is not far-fetched to say that Neighborhood Watch is the "heart and soul" of community crime prevention in the United States. The basic imperatives of Neighborhood Watch are that residents should get to know each other better and communicate with each other, be alert for suspicious activities and persons in their neighborhoods, and be willing to take some kind of action (usually, calling the police) when they detect something suspicious. Thus, Neighborhood Watch, at least in theory, is a vehicle for attaining a number of the major goals of community crime prevention: enhancing the "sense of community" among neighbors, raising the level of informal social control, overcoming people's feelings of powerlessness in the face of crime, decreasing opportunities for offenders to act undetected, and improving relationships between citizens and the police.

Furthermore, Neighborhood Watch provides a starting point for more extensive crime prevention activities. In its simplest form, Neighborhood Watch does not demand a great deal from residents. But it is a way to begin to get people aware and involved. The meetings and communication structures of Neighborhood Watch programs are channels through which more individualized crime prevention techniques can be passed along: home security surveys, property engraving, "street-smart" behaviors, for example. Successful attainment of a relatively undemanding Neighborhood Watch operation can engender the motivation and positive outlook necessary for the neighborhood to take on more complex, time-consuming activities such as drug prevention programs, escort services, dispute resolution, and so forth.

There are thousands of Neighborhood Watch programs operating in the United States today. They range from the most basic, informal "eyes-and-ears" programs to programs sponsored by multipurpose neighborhood organizations which include citizen patrols and other crime prevention activities as well as a variety of community improvement projects not related directly to crime. Despite the frequency of these programs and their centrality to the whole area of crime prevention, there is little systematic knowledge about how they operate and what problems they

encounter. Yet this is exactly the type of knowledge that is needed as a basis for improving Neighborhood Watch programs so that they have better possibilities of achieving their worthwhile goals.

This report presents the findings of a national study of Neighborhood Watch (which will be abbreviated as NW in the remainder of the report). The study began in the Summer of 1984. It was funded by the National Institute of Justice and conducted by the Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center (State University of New York at Albany), in conjunction with the National Sheriffs' Association and the National Crime Prevention Council.

The goals of the study have been to assess the "state of the art" in NW and to identify ways for improving existing NW programs and facilitating the development of new NW programs. The study has not attempted to evaluate the outcomes of Neighborhood Watch programs, such as possible impacts on levels of crime and the fear of crime. A meaningful evaluation of outcomes requires an in-depth examination of a small number of programs. Our study called for less detailed examinations of a larger number of programs in order to identify and explore issues and problems that are common in a variety of settings. In short, our study emphasizes breadth rather than depth and tends to ask the question "What are you doing?" rather than "What have you accomplished?"

The research had three major components. A national survey was conducted to gather descriptive data about the structures and operations of a reasonably representative sample of NW programs. Site visits were made to ten programs with varying approaches to NW. The site visits gave us opportunities to develop observational and interview information that built on and gave more substance and meaning to the national survey findings. Existing assessment and evaluation reports (published and unpublished) on NW programs were examined to identify common themes and findings.

The three components of the research produced the bulk of the information on which this report is based. However, we drew on other sources as well. In addition to the formal site visits to ten programs, we discussed in detail with program representatives the features and problems of at least a dozen other programs. These discussions occurred via the mail, over the telephone, or at various meetings and conferences. At one point during the research we were given access to the "raw data" generated by a questionnaire that had been mailed to all of a city's nearly 500 block captains. In one state, which has a statewide funding program for local community crime prevention efforts, we were permitted to review the grant applications submitted by local groups seeking funds for NW activities. It is fair to say that we immersed ourselves in NW for about two years.

The remainder of this report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 confronts the issue of whether or not NW programs have been shown to be effective in reducing crime. As noted, our research was not designed to evaluate NW outcomes. Nevertheless, the issue of program outcomes cannot be ignored because the goals of our study assume that it is worthwhile to improve and expand NW operations. Thus, Chapter 2 draws on existing evaluations to determine the viability of this assumption.

Chapter 3 discusses the definitions used in this study, describes the methodology used in the national survey, and presents capsule descriptions of the ten programs that were subjects of site visits.

In Chapter 4, the national survey data are drawn upon to paint a descriptive portrait of NW in the United States. The administrative, operational, and contextual characteristics of the programs in the national sample are analyzed and discussed.

Chapter 5 focuses on citizen patrol programs. Most NW programs do not use actual patrols, and the issues pertaining to patrols differ somewhat from the issues pertaining to more common, and more passive, forms of NW activity.

Chapter 6 brings together and discusses the common problems faced by NW programs. The approach in Chapter 6 is to raise issues that span many programs and to illustrate how different programs have chosen to deal with those issues.

The final chapter presents recommendations for improving NW. There are a number of recommendations that appear reasonable in light of the findings of this study. However, unanswered questions remain, so a few directions for future research are also proposed in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH

During the course of this study, we have had numerous occasions to discuss what we were doing with others. When we described the study as a national assessment of NW program, the typical response was a question, "Does NW work?" In reply, we explained that the research was not meant to be the kind of systematic evaluation necessary to determine whether NW does or does not produce outcomes such as lower crime rates and lower levels of citizen fear. The topics examined in the research relate to how NW programs operate; our investigation was not focused on the "bottom line" of outcomes but on the process of getting to the "bottom line".

The value of developing a greater understanding of NW structures and operations is readily understood from a pure social science perspective but, from a pure policy perspective, it is not as clear. Efforts to improve a program do require knowledge about the program's structure and operations, but before putting a lot of resources into developing the knowledge and implementing improvements, the policy analyst wants some assurance at the outset that the program is not a waste of time.

Thus, from a policy perspective, there is an underlying assumption in our research that NW programs have some ameliorative effects on crime (and, secondarily, on the fear of crime), or at least that the programs are not utter failures without any potential for producing positive effects. NW is very popular and has been implemented, in some form or other, in virtually every part of the United States. Our research assumes that NW is not the "white elephant" of crime prevention. Since this assumption underlies our entire study, it is worth examining before we begin the presentation of results from our primary data collection.

Some information bearing on the outcomes of NW programs does exist, and a few rigorous evaluations have been conducted. In this chapter, we first discuss the rationale for NW outcomes -- why NW is expected to produce certain outcomes. Then, the limited available information relating to whether or not NW achieves its desired outcomes is reviewed, along with the problems involved in interpreting the information. This review concludes with a discussion of how our research relates to the issue of outcomes.

The Logic of Neighborhood Watch

The essence of NW is captured in a catch-phrase often used by NW organizers: "observe and report". When a NW program is implemented, the residents make a commitment to be more watchful of each other's households and of the common areas in their neighborhood (streets, sidewalks, playgrounds, and so forth). The watchfulness may be exercised during regular daily activities, through organized citizen patrols, or by both means. The participants receive some instruction concerning the cues associated with suspicious situations and activities. When they detect such cues, they are supposed to note important details (e.g., exact location, subject descriptions, license plate numbers) and notify the police immediately.

In many programs, notification of the police is followed by notification of other program participants via a telephone chain. When a program is in place, its existence is announced on signs posted at natural entry points to the area and sometimes by individual stickers for households and vehicles.

What are the mechanisms through which these kinds of activities are expected to reduce crime? There are basically two mechanisms: opportunity reduction and deterrence.

Opportunity reduction, in this case, refers to the effects NW activities are meant to have on decreasing the chances for offenders to operate undetected. By exercising more attentive and informed surveillance of their surroundings, residents increase the level of guardianship over people and property in their neighborhoods (see Cohen and Felson, 1979). Residents can alert the police and/or each other while a crime is in its early stages -- or even before the actual criminal act is initiated -- so that intervention can thwart the crime.

NW programs are also supposed to reduce crime by deterring offenders. The posting of easily visible signs at access points to the neighborhood is meant to communicate to potential offenders that they face higher risks of being detected if they try to commit crimes in the neighborhood. Of course, this kind of deterrence assumes certain perceptions by potential offenders: that they see the signs, know what NW is, believe that the residents practice NW, and believe that NW activities increase the risk of detection. It also assumes that a perceived increase in the risk of detection is a disincentive to engaging in criminal behavior.

In the long run, an active NW program is supposed to deter potential offenders by building a reputation about the neighborhood in which the program exists. The reputation hoped for is one of vigilance and an unwillingness to tolerate criminal activities.

So far, we have mentioned the direct effects that primary NW activities (surveillance, reporting, posting signs) are expected to have on reducing criminal opportunities and deterring would-be offenders. But there are also indirect effects that are expected to derive from other crime prevention activities that are not part of the core definition of NW but that are virtually always implemented in conjunction with NW. For example, premise security surveys, or at least lectures and demonstrations on improving household security, are made available to the participants of NW programs. To the extent that the participants follow the recommendations of the surveys or lectures, they should make their households more resistant to entry by offenders and the areas around their households more secure as well. This type of "target hardening" is a form of opportunity reduction.

Enhanced deterrence is also expected to stem from NW-related activities. Both premise security surveys and the engraving of property with identification numbers (Operation ID) are generally followed by the placing of stickers on the windows and/or doors of participating households. These stickers are meant to deter potential offenders.

The discussion to this point has dealt with ways in which the mechanics of both primary and associated NW activities are logically related to reducing neighborhood crime. The logic is very straightforward; it makes no claims about how NW might influence resident's perceptions and attitudes or about what effects NW might have on the overall quality of life in a neighborhood. But the rationale for NW goes deeper than the expected direct benefits of opportunity reduction and deterrence.

Although often implicit, the full rationale for NW is based on a series of connected assumptions about crime and community (see Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant, 1985; Feins, 1983; Kohfeld, Salert, and Schoenberg, 1983; DeJong and Goolkasian, 1982):

- * Citizen involvement with their neighbors -- particularly involvement with informal social control functions -- has declined over the long term in the United States.

- * Lack of involvement is associated with feelings of isolation, helplessness, and fear, all of which are conducive to crime because they allow offenders to act with impunity.

- * NW is a vehicle for citizens to become involved, collectively, in helping to deal with the problem of crime in their neighborhoods.

- * The processes of initiating and conducting NW will produce greater solidarity among residents, greater attachment to the neighborhood, an enhanced sense of self-responsibility for dealing with crime, and more positive feelings about the neighborhood's potential for the future.

- * These changes will lead to crime reduction because the growth of concern and mutual responsibility will enhance the effectiveness of direct crime prevention efforts such as surveillance, reporting, and target hardening.

- * The changes will also lead to reduction in the fear of crime, both by dispelling feelings of isolation and helplessness and by producing a decrease in actual and perceived levels of crime.

- * Finally, successful citizen involvement in preventing crime through NW is seen as a stimulus for generating citizen action on other neighborhood issues.

Thus, NW is expected to reduce crime via increased surveillance and reporting, target hardening, and visible warnings to potential offenders. But NW efforts are also expected to have a general community-building effect which not only decreases crime and the fear of crime but also improves the overall quality of life in the neighborhood.

Impact of NW on Crime

The existing evidence concerning the impact of NW on crime is encouraging but far from conclusive. It suggests that NW can produce at least short-term declines in certain types of crime, particularly

residential burglary. Other outcomes -- such as reduced fear of crime and increased neighborhood cohesiveness -- have been examined only rarely, and it is difficult to detect a pattern in the results.

There are two primary reasons why we do not find the evidence concerning crime reduction to be conclusive. First, most of the evaluations are not very rigorous, and they are susceptible to several methodological/measurement problems; in general, the most rigorous evaluations that have been conducted tend to show less impact of NW on crime than do the more common, less rigorous evaluations. Second, despite the elegant logic leading to the expectation that NW will reduce crime and fear, there are equally compelling counter-arguments that cast doubt on the ability of NW, as it is usually implemented and practiced, to have substantial, sustained effects on crime and fear.

1. Methodological/Measurement Problems

A recent, thorough search of documents revealed more than a hundred instances in which NW programs claimed success in reducing crime (Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1986). However, most of these claims are based solely on recitations of statistics on reported crime before and after NW implementation. Sometimes change is not even examined; comparisons are made of the crime rates for areas with and without NW at one point in time. It is primarily these very simple types of comparisons that underlie reports of crime reduction running from 25 to 60 percent, and occasionally higher. Often finding their way into the mass media, such claims of substantial reductions in crime have undoubtedly helped to produce widespread public support for NW programs (see McGarrell and Flanagan, 1985:182).

It is probable that unsuccessful findings (no change or an increase in crime following introduction of NW) are less likely to be reported than are successful findings. In addition, crime has been following a general downward trend in the United States in the early to mid 1980s. But even allowing for these factors, one cannot simply ignore the large number of claims of successful crime reduction. At the same time, there are a few methodological/measurement problems that are likely to impinge on evaluations of NW effectiveness and, for the most part, the simplest forms of evaluation do not deal with these problems. Below, we examine two primary problems: selection bias and regression toward the mean. Then, crime displacement and changes in citizen reporting practices are discussed.

Selection bias - We are unaware of any study comparing outcomes in areas with NW to areas without NW in which the areas for each category were selected randomly from within a jurisdiction. In the absence of randomization, and especially when NW areas are self-selected, it is reasonable to assume that there are pre-existing differences between areas that do and do not have NW programs.

Comparisons of crime rates, at one point in time, between NW and non-NW areas is particularly problematic because even the crime rates of the areas before program implementation may have differed substantially.

More common are studies that compare changes in crime rates for areas with and without NW. When the NW areas show greater crime rate declines than do the non-NW areas, the difference is attributed to the effects of NW. But if the areas were not selected randomly, it is possible that other differences between the areas created the disparate crime rate trends -- differences that are related to both crime patterns and the adoption of NW. For example, Henig (1984) evaluated NW in one police district in Washington, D.C. Crime rates spanning the period before and after NW implementation declined in the city as a whole, in the police district, and in a sample of blocks participating in NW, but the decline was greater in the NW sample. However, Henig also found that blocks that adopted NW were more likely to be undergoing the kinds of changes associated with gentrification than were blocks that did not adopt NW. The factors characterizing the gentrification process can produce both lower crime rates and the motivation to form NW programs. Furthermore, when Henig divided his sample of NW blocks into those that had active and inactive NW programs, he found that the decline in crime rates was similar for both categories, suggesting that NW activity itself was not responsible for the declines.

When NW and non-NW areas are not selected randomly, some attempt can be made to match each NW area with a corresponding comparison area in the same jurisdiction on factors such as population characteristics, mix of housing types, and so forth. Although such attempts to control for preexisting differences between areas are necessary in the absence of randomization, there is always the possibility that important factors may be missed in the matching process. Some important factors may be overlooked, data may not be available for others, and the supply of potential comparison areas may limit the number of factors that can be taken into account simultaneously in the matching.

The benefits of even a careful matching of areas can be defeated by steps taken in later analyses. For example, an evaluation of NW in Baltimore County (Balt. Co. Neighborhood Action Team, 1982) matched 12 control areas with 12 target areas in which the police organized NW programs. Most of the NW organizing activity was conducted in 1980, and changes in crime levels from 1979 to 1981 were examined. Overall, the number of Part I offenses increased by 13 percent in the control areas but by only 5 percent in the target areas. However, for breaking and entering, which is a primary concern of NW programs, the target areas showed a 20 percent increase, compared to a 9 percent increase in the control areas.

The evaluators then eliminated two of the target areas, and their respective control areas, from the analysis. The rationale was that implementation of NW was not considered successful unless 60 percent of the residents in the neighborhood participated initially. A "maintenance program", consisting of sign installation, lectures, follow-up contacts, and a newsletter, was conducted only in the neighborhoods that achieved 60 percent initial participation. The two target areas that were eliminated from the analyses were deemed unsuccessful. The recomputed figures showed a 19 percent decline in breaking and entering for the ten remaining target areas and a 23 percent rise in breaking and entering for the ten remaining control areas.

An examination of the Baltimore County data proves interesting. Among the 12 original target areas, only 3 showed increases in breaking and entering, and the 2 areas that were deleted from the analysis had the greatest increases by far. Among the 12 original control areas, 3 had decreases in breaking and entering, and 2 of these were deleted from the analysis. Obviously, this elimination of extreme cases (extreme in opposing directions) had a major impact on the findings.

By eliminating the two target areas, the evaluators were defeating the purpose of matching. If certain factors are related to both crime decreases and receptivity to NW, then the evaluators retained the ten target areas in which a spurious relationship between NW and crime reduction would be most likely to occur. This does not explain why the two deleted control areas experienced substantial reductions in breaking and entering, although the breaking and entering figures for the deleted target and control areas are consistent with the somewhat outrageous explanation that unsuccessful attempts to organize NW are extremely deleterious to neighborhoods.

Regression toward the mean - A special form of selection bias often produces misleading evaluation results because of a natural variation process called regression toward the mean (see Campbell and Stanley, 1963: 10-12).

Over a period of time, in even the most stable geographic areas, social indicators -- such as crime rates -- are not perfectly "flat". Rather, the indicators fluctuate. Charting them over time will reveal periodic, apparently random peaks and valleys. The average level of an indicator over time can be viewed as the "normal" level for an area. Substantial departures from the average level tend to be brief; the indicator generally turns back toward the average level rather quickly. Thus, whenever a substantial deviation (high or low) shows up in an indicator's trend, the best prediction would be that, in subsequent time periods, the indicator will move back toward its average level.

Regression toward the mean has long been an issue in evaluations of crime control programs (McCleary et al., 1979). Crime is a social problem, and it receives the most attention when it seems to be at a high point. Programs are often implemented because crime has reached an unusually high level. But, if the high level of crime is part of the natural variation described above, rather than the result of some underlying change that is raising the long-term average of crime, then the evaluation of a program instituted during a peak crime period can show a subsequent decrease in crime, even if the program has no actual effect on crime. The level of crime will regress to its mean during the post-test period, regardless of program operation.

Random selection of experimental and control sites is one way evaluations deal with regression toward the mean, but random selection is not always possible. Matching each experimental site with a control site that has a similar level of crime in the pre-test period does not deal with the problem adequately because the level may be at a high point of its natural variation in the experimental site but at a low or average point in the

over a reasonably long period of time before intervention to determine where the level of crime is in its cycle of natural variation.

Evaluations of NW programs are particularly prone to being misled by regression toward the mean because programs are often implemented as a response to an unusual jump in the number of crimes in the area. If the police take the initiative in trying to organize NW programs, they have an understandable tendency to target neighborhoods where crime levels indicate a need for NW. Similarly, when citizens take the initiative, a sudden spurt in crime may be the catalyst for their organizing efforts.

Table 1, taken from a report on NW in Tampa, FL, illustrates how the phenomenon of regression toward the mean can complicate an evaluation. The table shows the annual number of residential burglaries from 1977 through 1983 for geographic grids in the city that had organized NW programs at some point in the 1980's. The year in which NW was started in each grid is indicated with an asterisk.

Apparently, 1981 was the big year for organizing NW programs in Tampa; half of the grids listed in Table 1 started their programs in 1981. An examination of the burglary figures for the eight grids that began NW in 1981 indicates that, in all but one of the grids, 1981 was a peak year for residential burglary during the 1977-1983 period. In the grid where this was not the case (#080), the peak occurred in 1980, the year before NW was started.

One grid listed in Table 1 started its program in 1980, at the beginning of an increase in residential burglaries. The patterns for the six grids that began NW in 1982 and 1983 are not as clear. One can speculate that the organization of NW programs in these six grids was motivated less by a perception of peaking crime and more by a general momentum favorable to the idea of NW.

All of the grids that started programs in 1980 or 1981 show impressive declines in the numbers of residential burglaries when the initial program year is compared to 1983 (although the results are much less impressive when the year just prior to program initiation is compared to 1983). The issue is: Can the declines be attributed to the effects of NW or do they represent regressions toward the grids' means? The available data do not allow us to answer this question definitively. It is probably the case that both processes were at work: NW was helping somewhat, but the grids also experienced cyclical returns to average burglary levels from unusual high points.

Tampa was chosen for this example simply because the police department's evaluation report, which they graciously shared with us, contains data in a form that is useful for illustrating the issue of regression toward the mean. Tampa's program is not unusual and is probably as effective as the NW programs in other U.S. cities. We also do not presume to suggest through the example that regression toward the mean accounts for all of the positive NW outcomes that have been reported. Our point is that, while NW may well affect crime levels, the phenomenon of regression toward the mean probably contributes to a general overstatement of the size of this effect in a substantial number of evaluation reports.

Table 1

Numbers of residential burglaries in geographic grids
that started Neighborhood Watch programs,
Tampa, FL, 1977-83^a

Grid	Year							Percent Change ^b
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	
001	16	23	3	21	68*	33	20	-70%
009	14	14	9	29	39*	37	16	-58%
015	15	12	7	22	41*	32	25	-39%
024	22	31	18	53	56	58	35*	NA
043	14	23	20	32	34*	34	30	-11%
079	17	16	33	44	47*	29	17	-63%
080	16	22	33	97	62*	57	36	-41%
133	76	76	76	121	122	111	91	-25%
150	9	17	28	57	40	30	27*	NA
159	33	47	46	71	40	53*	48	-9%
164	8	9	8	15	10	10	9*	NA
165	16	20	16	43*	50	45	30	-12%
168	23	24	27	47	25	39*	16	-58%
176	18	20	16	19	25*	18	17	-23%
178	9	11	17	24	32	19	21*	NA
180	25	16	43	40	32	15	26*	NA

^aThe year in which NW was started in each grid is indicated by an asterisk.

^bPercent change in number of residential burglaries from year NW was started to 1983. Not applicable for programs started in 1983.

Source: Holley, 1984: Exhibit 8A

Displacement - Crime displacement can occur within a given, limited geographic area or from one area to another. Within-area displacement can involve offenders switching from one type of crime to another (e.g., burglary to robbery), from one type of target to another (e.g., households to businesses), or from a target of a certain type to another target of the same type that is more vulnerable (e.g., households with alarm systems to those without alarms).

As far as we can determine, only the third form of within-area displacement has received any attention in NW evaluations. The evaluation of the Seattle, WA, Community Crime Prevention Program -- in which NW was the primary element -- examined the pre-test and post-test victimization experiences of households in the same neighborhoods that did and did not participate in the program. Although the data are open to other interpretations, the evaluators concluded that burglaries were not displaced from participating to non-participating households within the program areas (Cirel et al., 1977:51).

Actually, the basic surveillance and reporting functions of NW are not the kinds of crime prevention measures that should lead us to expect to find within-area displacement of crime. These measures should affect the entire area rather than individual targets (or types of crime) within the area, especially if the area is relatively limited in size, which is the case for most NW programs. Some of the measures instituted in conjunction with NW, such as individualized home security improvements, might produce displacement from participating to non-participating households, but it seems unlikely that a NW participant would ignore suspicious activities occurring at a house across the street simply because the residents of that house did not enroll in the NW program. The same is true for within-area displacement from households to businesses. As long as businesses are interspersed among NW households rather than clustered and isolated from the households, one would expect them to be included in the general effects of neighborhood-wide surveillance and reporting measures. Finally, although most NW programs concentrate on residential burglary, the programs' functions should be equally effective against other types of common property crimes.

In sum, successful practice of the surveillance and reporting functions of NW should be associated with the absence of within-area displacement. On the other hand, the occurrence of displacement from one geographic area to another -- from a NW area to a nearby area without NW -- can be interpreted logically as an indicator of NW success. While displacement of crime from one area to another is an important issue (as will be discussed below), a NW program should not be deemed unsuccessful if it results in some displacement of crime to non-NW areas. Where it operates, NW can be expected to reduce criminal opportunities and deter offenders, but it cannot influence the decisions of thwarted offenders about whether to cease offending or look elsewhere for targets; other factors, such as mobility, skill, and countervailing legitimate opportunities, will shape those decisions.

The general research literature on the displacement of crime from one area to another (crime "spillover") as the result of various crime control programs has not uncovered major displacement effects (see, for example,

Hakim and Rengert, 1981). A few evaluations of NW programs contain data that are pertinent to this form of displacement, but the results are ambiguous. In the first place, finding displacement from NW to non-NW areas presumes finding successful crime reduction in the NW areas -- absent the unlikely phenomenon of "replacement" offenders being attracted to the NW area. An evaluation of Chicago programs by Rosenbaum and his colleagues (1985) did not uncover evidence of displacement, but neither did it find any effect of NW on crime rates in the program areas.

The evaluation of the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program examined non-program census tracts adjacent to the census tracts in which the program was implemented. Residential burglary victimization declined by 36 percent in the program tracts and by 5 percent in the non-program tracts. The evaluators admit that the data "are not conclusive", but they interpret the data as suggesting "that displacement is not occurring" (Cirel et al., 1977:51). One could argue, however, that displacement had occurred, keeping the non-program tracts from experiencing as great a decline in burglary as they would have if the program had not been implemented. This ambiguity illustrates a problem in measuring displacement to non-program areas when program areas appear to be successful in dealing with crime. By definition, success in dealing with crime means that the program areas fared better than their nearby control areas in terms of crime trends. But does one attribute the poorer performance of the nearby control areas to simply not having a program or to being located near areas that do have programs (or both)? A possible solution to this quandary is to include additional control areas -- areas have characteristics similar to the program and nearby control areas, but that are distant enough from the program areas to make displacement highly unlikely (see Maltz, 1972).

We have to conclude that displacement of crime as a result of NW has not been examined sufficiently, either in conceptual terms (what should happen and why) or in terms of actual outcomes. The question of displacement from one geographic area to another is particularly relevant for NW. Other evidence indicates that NW programs are more difficult to organize in the neighborhoods that need them most -- low income, deteriorated, heterogeneous neighborhoods with high residential turnover and relatively high crime rates (see Roehl and Cook, 1984; Henig, 1984; Silloway and McPherson, 1985; Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams, 1985). If NW has a tendency to displace crime from more advantaged to less advantaged neighborhoods, then the issue of equity is pertinent. However, even if such displacement is found to occur, it does not mean that NW should be abandoned; it does mean that additional steps should be taken to try to prevent the displacement.

Changes in citizen reporting - One of the primary features of NW is the encouragement of residents to call the police whenever their suspicions are even slightly aroused. The imperative organizers often give to residents is: "When in doubt, call!"

It is well established that not all crimes that come to citizens' attention are reported to the police; victimization surveys have shown this quite clearly. The emphasis that NW programs place on calling the police could result in an increased propensity for NW participants to report crimes to the police. Since most evaluations of NW use counts of

crimes known to the police as their measures of the amount of crime, a NW program might show an increase in crime simply because a larger proportion of crimes are being reported to the police. Note that, if such a phenomenon occurs, it will make NW programs appear less effective than they really are. A decrease in crime might be offset by a greater tendency to report crimes, resulting in no change or even an increase in the number of crimes known to the police.

Two quality evaluations of NW programs used victimization survey data to measure crime before and after implementation, and both examined changes in the proportions of crimes reported to the police in experimental and control areas. The Seattle evaluation found a slightly increased tendency to report burglaries, although the numbers of cases on which the estimates were based were very small (Cirel et al., 1977: 50-51). The Chicago evaluation, using panel and independently drawn samples with larger numbers of cases, found no evidence that NW produced a greater propensity to report crimes to the police (Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant, 1985:141-144).

Our conclusion with respect to citizen reporting is that the encouragement to call the police in NW programs probably does not, in itself, have a major impact on the "crimes known to the police" data typically used to evaluate NW programs. In the first place, NW participants are encouraged to call at the first sign of suspicious activity. If the police respond to a call about a suspicious person in the neighborhood, they may end up questioning and deterring the person, but they may not have the evidence necessary to make an arrest or even to record the occurrence of a crime. Second, even if the police -- in response to a NW call -- apprehend an offender who is trying to enter a dwelling, the incident will not necessarily be recorded as a burglary because of the difficulty in proving intent in an attempted burglary. Third, completed burglaries are already reported to the police at a relatively high rate. Finally, because the police are usually involved in the establishment and maintenance of NW programs, there is a disincentive to record an incident as a significant crime (e.g., a burglary rather than a trespass) when the incident occurs in a NW area.

2. What can be expected from NW?

The two most rigorous evaluations of NW programs came to conflicting conclusions. Cirel et al. (1977) found that census tracts in which the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program operated had a 36 percent reduction in residential burglary from 1974 to 1975, while adjacent control tracts without the program experienced only a 5 percent decline. They also found that, within the program census tracts, the decline in residential burglary victimizations was greater for households that actually participated in the program than for households that did not, although this finding was much weaker in a subsequent, more extensive survey of residents in program census tracts (Cirel et al., 1977:53-54).

In Chicago, Rosenbaum and his colleagues (1985) used two pairs of victimization surveys in 1984 and 1985 to evaluate programs in four neighborhoods. One pair of surveys was a panel sample, the other consisted of samples drawn independently in each year. For each treatment area, they selected three comparison areas that had similar characteristics but that

were located in various parts of the city. Using panel data to examine victimization rate changes in the program areas relative to changes in the comparison areas, they found that three program areas had no change, while one had a significant increase in victimization. With the independently drawn samples, no significant differences were found. The patterns were similar when relative changes in vicarious victimization (whether respondents personally knew others who had been victimized) were examined (Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant, 1985:106-115).

The Chicago researchers carried their evaluation a step further by looking at the results within one of the four program areas. In this area, the NW approach was applied more vigorously than in the other three areas, and the evaluators were able to compare treated blocks (those that had been organized into NW programs) with untreated blocks (those that had not). Although the treated blocks experienced slightly greater declines in actual and vicarious victimization than did the untreated blocks, the differences were not statistically significant (Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant, 1985:156-159).

It is easy to find ways in which the Seattle and Chicago evaluations differed: selection of program and comparison areas, data collection procedures, definition of victimization (residential burglary in Seattle vs. a scale comprised of a wider range of victimization types in Chicago), sample sizes, and so forth. The evaluators were also looking at programs that differed somewhat. For example, the Seattle program was implemented by a city agency working closely with the police department, while the Chicago program was implemented by voluntary citizen associations that received funds from a private foundation. Nevertheless, we are still left in the quandary of finding that the two most rigorous evaluations of NW to date disagree on whether NW is successful in reducing crime.

Were it not for the large number of other studies claiming to show crime reductions from NW programs, the conflicting findings of the Seattle and Chicago studies would force us to conclude that NW has not demonstrated a capacity to reduce crime. Admittedly, almost all of the evaluations that report very positive outcomes have serious methodological flaws which increase the likelihood of finding positive outcomes. Furthermore, negative, or "no difference" findings are less apt to be published and disseminated. Still, the sheer number of positive reports convinces us that NW programs are having some preventive effects on crime in some places, although the effects are probably not nearly as large as they are often touted to be.

We accept, as a working assumption for the remainder of this report, that NW has demonstrated some effectiveness in preventing crime, particularly residential burglary and other common property crimes that occur around households. Given this assumption, our task becomes one of addressing the question: How can NW be made more effective? Answering this question requires a focus on program operations in order to deal with the problems and solutions that hinder and facilitate the goal of getting NW programs to work the way they are supposed to. In identifying and examining the relevant problems and solutions, we have been guided by three sources: (1) the logic of how NW operations are meant to accomplish their goals, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, (2) insights developed from our own interviews with NW participants and observations of

NW programs, and (3) the findings of evaluators who have looked at more than the "bottom line" issue of crime reduction.

Drawing on these sources, we seek to explore the problems that NW organizers and participants have encountered, and to discuss the way various programs have tried to deal with those problems. The problems of interest to us are ones that seem to crop up repeatedly, not ones that are unique to specific locales. It is not often the case that our findings allow us to say: "Problem A will be solved by implementing approach X." Rather, we try to suggest options for dealing with problems.

In some places in the United States, NW has stagnated; it has become a predetermined, fully outlined program that is implanted in areas without modification and with few changes over time. In other places, fresh approaches are being tried. The underlying purpose of our state-of-the-art assessment is open up NW for reexamination and renewal. By identifying problems and discussing options for dealing with them, we hope to encourage people to reconsider what they are doing and to try new approaches.

CHAPTER 3

DEFINITIONS AND METHODS

How does one begin to analyze NW? Optimally, project staff would spend an extended period of time in each NW location. During the visit, interviews would be scheduled with program administrators, area residents, and local law enforcement personnel. At the same time, efforts would be made to gather systematic information on local crime trends, community characteristics, and population demography.

Project resources did not allow for a study of this magnitude. Within budget limitations, then, what is the preferable research design for maximizing information on NW? Would the project be better served by gathering as much data as possible on a few dozen carefully selected NW programs or by gathering less information on as many programs as possible?

Both methodological approaches have merit. On the one hand, intensive site visits allow project staff the luxury of individualizing the research process. Problems encountered in the initiation and maintenance of NW operations could be probed in-depth. Unfortunately, the applicability of the resultant research findings to communities in other settings would be limited substantially. On the other hand, the systematic collection of data on neighborhoods, programs, and residents via the distribution of a structured questionnaire to a large number of NW programs enhances the generalizability of project conclusions and recommendations. In the process, however, information on program individuality is sacrificed.

With these considerations in mind, project staff adopted a multi-faceted approach to the study of NW administration and operations. A structured survey instrument, eliciting information on program, neighborhood, and respondent characteristics, was designed and distributed to all NW programs that satisfied minimal inclusional criteria. As part of this coverage, sampled programs were asked to supply written documents (e.g., program descriptions, evaluations) that would allow researchers to better assess program capabilities and activities. Finally, based upon information derived through the survey and through contact with other crime prevention experts, a few programs were chosen for intensive site visitation.

The study's methods are outlined in this chapter. Specifically, information is provided on (1) the establishment and refinement of definitions of NW (2) the identification of programs for survey inclusion, (3) the construction and distribution of survey instruments, and (4) the selection and description of field sites.

Definition of "Neighborhood Watch" Program

In the initial study proposal, three minimal criteria were set for determining whether or not programs fit within the category of "Neighborhood Watch":

First, the primary participants in the programs live and/or work in the program area, and their participation in the activities of the program is not the primary aspect of their major activities; thus, local hiring of security guards does not constitute Neighborhood Watch. Second, the programs are collective, rather than individual, attempts at crime prevention; thus, the participants must be involved in some sort of systematic effort in which their activities are coordinated. Third, the programs are aimed at increasing the level of surveillance directed at criminal behaviors and suspicious behaviors that appear to be precursors of criminal behavior.

Early in the research, project staff found it necessary to modify these criteria somewhat, based on an emerging understanding of the structures and activities of existing programs. On one hand, the second criterion had to be relaxed. The focus on collective programs remained, but the requirements that efforts be "systematic" and that activities be "coordinated" implied a higher level of organization than was found to exist in many places. On the other hand, a criterion was added specifying that there be at least some provision for continuing activity or organization. This was necessary to exclude the not uncommon scenario in which a neighborhood meeting is held (in response to initiative by either residents or the local police department), residents are instructed about what cues to look for in their neighborhoods and how to respond to suspicious circumstances -- but no further meetings are planned, no leaders are elected, no provisions are made for subsequent communications or feedback. Claims that NW programs existed, based solely on such one-time, informational meetings, were encountered. While not questioning the potential value of these meetings, it was decided that they did not provide a sufficient basis for the creation of a NW program for the purposes of this study.

The criteria for identifying NW programs are purposely broad so they can accommodate a variety of operational approaches. While surveillance solely by paid security guards has been excluded, a particular method of surveillance, such as citizen patrols, was not demanded. In fact, most programs that utilize the NW label (or Block Watch, Community Watch, Community Alert, etc.) are what are generally called "eyes and ears" programs; surveillance is conducted by participating residents as they go about their normal daily activities in the neighborhood. Programs that field actual citizen patrols -- whether on foot or in vehicles, on streets or in the common areas of apartment buildings -- constitute a definite minority.

As it turned out, the refined definition was easy to apply when trying to determine whether or not a program was engaging in activities that fell under the rubric of NW; that is, the definition worked well in terms of functions. The biggest problem did not involve deciding what constituted NW activities; rather, it involved deciding what constituted a "program".

The problems that arise in trying to identify a "program" can be illustrated with a few examples. A common situation is one in which a

city police department encourages NW activities in all the city's natural neighborhoods or precincts. In order to distribute the leadership burden within neighborhoods/precincts, block leaders or block captains are designated to oversee activities in small areas. Some coordinating structure is established at the neighborhood level, and the police department's crime prevention unit is a common source of encouragement, assistance, information, feedback, and other services for all the neighborhoods and blocks that are organized. At what level does one identify the "program"? Does the city have hundreds of block-level programs? Does it have a dozen or so neighborhood-level programs? Or does it have one city-wide program under the police department?

Another situation concerns organizations that have NW as one of a variety of functions. Neighborhood associations, for example, deal with issues ranging from trash collection to zoning, in addition to crime prevention. When NW activities are sponsored by such associations, the various activities often have distinct leadership sub-structures within the associations. When this occurs, is the "program" the neighborhood association, or is it the sub-structure of the association directly responsible for NW activities?

While these definitional issues may seem trivial, or at least mundane, they became very important in the national survey of NW programs. The issues had to be dealt with in order to determine: (a) who should be contacted for information about the program, and (b) what questions about structure and function would be relevant to ask.

Our solution for the survey was to direct project attention to the organizational level closest to the actual NW activities. However, there is really no correct solution. One cannot ignore the role a police department's crime prevention unit plays vis-a-vis the numerous block-level operations in its jurisdiction. Likewise, one cannot ignore the possible negative or positive effects of running NW activities within the context of a multi-purpose neighborhood association. Thus, while the national survey was directed toward the lowest organizational level, other project data collection strategies -- particularly the site visits-- were geared to be sensitive to all levels of organization and to the implications of differing organizational configurations.

Program Identification

Estimates of the number of active Neighborhood Watch programs in the United States run into the tens of thousands. An examination of each of these groups would prove to be a costly and time-consuming venture. Thus, three approaches were adopted for identifying samples of programs: (1) a geographic sampling process, (2) a nomination process, and (3) a review of existent lists of crime prevention contacts.

The first approach was devised to generate a nationally representative sample of programs. Using counties as sampling units, the counties in the 48 contiguous states were grouped into the nine Census Bureau divisions. Within each division, counties were weighted according to 1980 population estimates. Counties were then randomly selected from within each division until the cumulative sum of the populations of the selected counties approximated 15 percent of the total population of that

geographic division. A preset criterion was that each state was to be represented by a minimum of one county. If, after the initial selection, a state was not represented, one county was selected randomly from the unrepresented state and that county was substituted for a similarly sized county that had previously been selected. In this manner 117 counties were selected nationally for study. The listing of selected counties is presented in Appendix A.

The second approach involved contacting individuals who have relatively broad knowledge and experience in the area of crime prevention. Nomination petitions were mailed to approximately 500 individuals, asking them to refer: (a) NW programs that were located within the sample counties, (b) NW programs that, while not within the sample counties, would be of interest to the research team because they had unique features, had been particularly successful, or had been the subjects of evaluations, and (c) additional contacts who might provide valuable NW nominations.

In addition to the nomination process, program identification in the sampled counties was facilitated by a review of: (a) responses to a survey of crime prevention programs conducted by the National Crime Prevention Council, (b) county-level contacts established by the National Sheriffs' Association, and (c) local law enforcement agencies in larger cities and towns within each sampled county.

In total, nearly 2700 NW programs were identified. Despite repeated attempts to locate a minimum of one program in each of the sample counties, no NW programs were found in several (primarily rural) counties or, indeed, in some states. Project staff were unable to identify any NW programs within the sample counties of New Hampshire, Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, or Wyoming. The absence of data on NW programs for these states does not mean that there are no viable NW programs in the states. It only means that we were unable to identify any eligible programs in the counties sampled from these states.

Survey Construction and Distribution

A detailed survey packet was designed for distribution to contact personnel of identified NW programs. This packet consisted of a letter outlining the project's sponsors and intent, an in-depth questionnaire to be completed by an individual involved in the administration of the NW program, and a self-addressed stamped envelope to facilitate and encourage the return of completed packets. The survey instrument and the accompanying cover letter are reproduced in Appendix B.

The survey instrument was comprised of seven sections, each of which corresponded to a particular aspect of the administration, operation, or evaluation of the NW program. The first section of the survey was a Crime Prevention Inventory. Respondents were presented with a listing of thirteen crime prevention techniques and services and were asked to indicate which were offered by their NW programs. Respondents were also asked to specify additional crime prevention services employed by their group.

The second survey component examined various facets of the program's administrative structure. In particular, information was elicited on program organization, extent and nature of law enforcement assistance, staffing levels, funding sources, and budgetary allocations.

The third section of the survey was designed for programs that engage in actual patrol activities. Survey items focused on the following: (1) patrol administration, including patrol organization, the nature and extent of law enforcement assistance, activities to increase or maintain member interest, and staffing levels; (2) characteristics of the organized surveillance activity, including frequency and area of operation, inclusion and exclusion criteria for patrol membership, recruit training, availability of equipment for patrol usage, and nature and estimated level of surveillance activities; (3) characteristics of surveillance activity participants, including extent and length of resident involvement and demographic characteristics.

The characteristics of neighborhoods with NW programs were recorded in the next section. Of interest were questions relating to geographic setting, population demography, land use, and respondents' perceptions of the level of crime in the community relative to the level of crime in adjacent areas. Indicators of residential stability included items on socioeconomic status, housing structures, household composition, estimated extent of home ownership, and average length of residence.

The final three sections elicited (1) information on the existence and availability of printed materials describing or evaluating program operations, (2) the characteristics of the individual completing the survey, and (3) respondent commentary on the structure and contents of the survey instrument.

Whenever possible, program personnel were contacted by telephone prior to survey distribution. This initial screening served three purposes. It allowed project staff to (1) exclude from further study consideration those programs that did not meet the definitional criteria established for NW, (2) ascertain whether the section of the survey pertaining to patrol activities was relevant to a particular program, and (3) verify mailing information.

Between May and October 1985, survey packets were distributed to 2300 NW programs in 39 states. The listing of survey recipients is admittedly a very conservative estimate of the actual number of programs in the sampled jurisdictions. This is due partially to the fact that nearly 98 percent of the original contacts were umbrella organizations (e.g., police department crime prevention units) that represent numerous Neighborhood Watch groups. Several contacts, primarily those in densely populated areas, indicated that they sponsor hundreds, or even thousands, of programs.

Umbrella organizations were asked to provide a printout of program contacts, generally block captains or area coordinators. Rather than contact each of these individual programs, many of which have similar administrative and operational features, we chose to subsample. The general rule was to sample 25 programs or 10 percent of the total number of programs sponsored by a single organization, whichever figure was

smaller. This limit was exceeded in a few jurisdictions in which project staff believed there might be greater program diversity. In these exceptional cases, a maximum of 50 programs was subsampled.

The task of subsampling was fairly easy where umbrella organizations provided a complete listing of NW contacts. The agreed-upon number of programs was selected and contact persons were screened in a routine manner. Where umbrella organizations indicated an unwillingness to release the names and addresses of individual program contacts (or where such a listing was nonexistent or not easily accessible), a quantity of survey packets was shipped to the sponsoring group for confidential distribution to a random sample of programs. This procedure posed several problems that compromised the integrity of the distribution process.

First was the issue of subsampling. A random subsample could not be assured if the selection process remained totally in the hands of the umbrella organization, even though project staff successfully negotiated with several of these organizations to allow selection of the study programs via a random numbers table.

Two additional problems surfaced as a result of refusals of umbrella organizations to provide identifying information on individual programs. Because initial phone contacts could not be established, as was the case with 94.7 percent of the programs sponsored by umbrella organizations, it was impossible to determine which programs, if any, in a sample were to receive the section of the questionnaire pertaining to patrol activities. The decision was made to err on the side of overinclusion by adding this section to all survey packets distributed in this manner.

Address verification was also hindered by the inability to screen contacts by telephone. Approximately one dozen packets were returned by the postal authorities due to the inaccuracy or insufficiency of mailing information attached by sponsoring groups.

A fourth, and more pressing, problem was the inability of project staff to ascertain whether survey packets had, in fact, been distributed. Since no completed packets were returned from programs in some sites, it was suspected that some umbrella organizations had not disseminated the survey packets. Through follow-up phone contacts, we determined that at least 170 packets did not reach the desired destination because the sponsoring group would not or could not distribute the questionnaires. Reasons given for nonparticipation included staff turnover and cut backs, forgetfulness, lack of interest, outdated mailing lists, and a belief that area coordinators or block captains would be unable to adequately complete the survey.

Site Visits

While the completed surveys provided valuable data on the diversity of NW programs throughout the United States, survey research, by its nature, cannot adequately detect the dynamic processes of these citizens' groups. In an attempt to examine administrative and operational practices in depth, and to verify by observation the effect of key factors on program survivability, a series of field visits to selected

sites was planned. Project staff identified several NW programs that had been particularly successful or that had demonstrated distinctive features. Site selection was based on information from several sources: (1) data generated from the national survey, (2) newsletters and program documentation that accompanied returned packets or that were forwarded by NW contacts, (3) recommendations offered by local and national crime prevention practitioners, and (4) the findings of other researchers.

Between September 1985 and March 1986, site visits were conducted in 10 locations by senior staff of the Hindelang Research Center, the National Sheriffs' Association, and the National Crime Prevention Council. In each site, the initial visit (generally of 2 to 3 days duration) involved identifying key actors, conducting preliminary interviews, and locating any relevant documents about the program that might be available. An abbreviated listing of the types of information sought by project staff is presented in Table 2. Follow-up visits were scheduled when deemed necessary.

The NW programs selected for intensive examination included Alexandria, VA; Operation StreetSAFE in Boston, MA; Buncombe County, NC; Clifton, NJ; Detroit, MI; Greene County, MO; Norfolk, VA; Orlando, FL; San Diego, CA; and Operation SafeStreet in St. Louis, MO (See Table 3). A brief description of each of the program environments is presented below.

1. Operation StreetSAFE, Boston, MA

Operation StreetSAFE (Street Safety Alliance for Everyone) is the crime prevention component of the Boston-Fenway Program, Inc., a non-profit corporation established in 1977 by residents of the Fenway neighborhood of Boston. The driving forces, operations, and administration of this group are better understood within a broader discussion of the history, geography, and demography of this distinctive community.

The Fenway section of Boston is located just south and west of the downtown area. Although its three neighborhoods -- East Fens, West Fens, and St. Botolph's -- house only 3 percent of the city's approximately 565,000 residents, the Fenway draws many students, travelers, and employees to its borders daily.

The East Fens is a cultural mecca; nearly half of the area's 119 acres are institutionally owned. A demographic survey conducted in 1978 by Northeastern University's Center for Applied Social Research highlights the mobility of the 11,221 East Fens residents: 70 percent are under 30 years of age; 41 percent are students; less than 20 percent have lived at the same address for more than 5 years. In 1980, 98 percent of the East Fens housing units were rental units.

The West Fens is an older residential area of approximately 109 acres that is located across the Fens (a large urban park) from the East Fens. Over 99 percent of its 4,323 inhabitants are renters (compared with a rental rate of 73 percent for all of Boston).

Table 2

Information sought during project site visits

- I. Physical environment
 1. Size and population of program area
 2. Demographic characteristics of residents
 3. Housing characteristics
 4. Extent of commercialization
 5. Presence of unusual/notable geographic barriers (e.g., railroad tracks, major thoroughfares)

- II. Program history
 1. Date of initiation
 2. Neighborhood and law enforcement objectives
 3. Problems encountered
 4. Funding and staffing levels

- III. Current program administration
 1. Funding and staffing
 2. Recordkeeping
 3. Frequency and nature of meetings
 4. Publicity
 5. Program maintenance
 6. Availability of documentation on program guidelines or by-laws

- IV. Program operations
 1. Description of activities
 2. Equipment availability
 3. Extent and nature of resident participation
 4. Participant training

- V. Program linkages
 1. Relationship with law enforcement components (i.e., crime prevention unit, police department in general, local patrol officers, departmental policy mandates, dispatcher)
 2. Relationship with community organizations
 3. Relationship with local government
 4. Relationship with commercial establishments
 5. Relationship with cultural institutions

- VI. Program effectiveness
 1. Subjective assessment of program effectiveness
 2. Attribution for success/failure
 3. Program strengths and weaknesses
 4. Extent and nature of feedback from residents
 5. Extent and nature of feedback from law enforcement
 6. Availability of documentation describing planning efforts or evaluation

Table 3

Sites selected for visitation,
by geographic division and setting

<u>Site</u>	<u>Geographic division</u>	<u>Setting</u>
Alexandria, VA	South Atlantic	Suburban
Boston, MA	New England	Urban
Buncombe Co., NC	South Atlantic	Rural
Clifton, NJ	Middle Atlantic	Urban
Detroit, MI	East North Central	Urban
Greene Co., MO	West North Central	Rural
Norfolk, VA	South Atlantic	Urban
Orlando, FL	South Atlantic	Urban
St. Louis, MO	West North Central	Urban
San Diego, CA	Pacific	Urban

St. Botolph's is the smallest of the three neighborhoods. It includes the Prudential Center and houses approximately 2,000 persons.

Home of the Boston Symphony, the Boston Opera, Fenway Park, and a multitude of academic, health-related, and cultural institutions, the Fenway has charted an impressive history. The area experienced rapid expansion in the late 19th Century when overcrowding and a major urban fire forced residents out of Boston's peninsular downtown. In the 1950's, the Fenway, like other urban areas, suffered from the post-war exodus of families to the suburbs. Reapportionment of housing led to burgeoning tax assessments and forced longtime residents to flee in search of cheaper housing. Increasingly, buildings stood vacant and arson grew as a threat to community safety.

Residents of the Fenway organized in the late 1960's to express their concerns about the deterioration of their community. In 1977, this concerted citizen effort resulted in the creation of the Boston-Fenway Program to address key neighborhood issues of housing, urban planning, and public safety.

The Boston-Fenway Program is a parent organization whose member institutions pay semi-annual dues to underwrite the salaries of the organization's full-time urban planner and its administrative staff and to finance various community projects undertaken by the group. Included as members are the following:

Educational institutions

- Northeastern University
- Wentworth Institute of Technology
- Roxbury Community College
- Simmons College
- Boston University
- Emmanuel College
- Massachusetts College of Art
- New England Conservatory of Music
- Cotting School for Handicapped Children

Health care institutions

- Forsyth Dental Center
- Harvard School of Public Health

Cultural institutions

- Boston Museum of Fine Arts
- Boston Symphony Orchestra
- Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum

Other institutions and agencies

- Greater Boston Y.M.C.A.
- Christian Science Church
- Boston Housing Authority

The Board of Directors of the Boston-Fenway Program first proposed the development of a public safety program in 1981 in response to a series of victimizations of women. In its bid to enunciate program goals and objectives, the program's Advisory Board soon realized that safety for women could be secured most effectively by ensuring the safety of all. In December 1982, with the expansion of project focus from women's safety to community safety, Operation StreetSAFE was born.

The Fenway is not an area that lends itself easily to the "eyes and ears" approach of traditional NW programs. Residents, most of whom are renters and change addresses frequently, do not know their neighbors. The physical layout of apartments in multiple unit buildings hinders the observation of events and persons on the street. Extreme traffic congestion, resulting in endless parking problems, is an accepted fact in Boston. Residents are forced to park their vehicles several blocks away from their homes. Consequently, the presence of unfamiliar faces and automobiles is a daily occurrence.

Nevertheless, StreetSAFE is an active NW program that engages in a broad range of crime prevention activities. The program promotes home security and Project Identification, works with other community groups to alter traffic patterns, and refers crime victims to the prosecutor's office.

Five areas of specialized program concern are street lighting improvement, street telephone service, abandoned and stolen cars, safe houses, and citizen foot patrol.

One site visit was made to Boston. Formal interviews were conducted with the director and assistant director of StreetSAFE, and with the crime prevention liaison officer of the Boston Police Department. Informal conversations were held with Mr. Clare Cotton, president of the Boston-Fenway Program; a patrol shift coordinator; two patrol volunteers; and several neighborhood volunteers. Several hours were spent on patrol with one team in West Fens.

2. Clifton, NJ

Clifton is a city of about 75,000 people located in a densely populated area of northeastern New Jersey, about 15 miles west of New York City. It borders on 11 other municipalities. To the south and west are primarily low-crime municipalities such as Little Falls, Montclair, and Nutley. To the north and east are the high-crime cities of Paterson and Passaic. A major segment of Clifton lies between Passaic and Paterson. The people in Clifton are very aware of this geographical situation, which is described either as hemmed in by Paterson and Passaic or as a buffer between Paterson/ Passaic and communities such as Montclair, Bloomfield, and Nutley.

Clifton itself has been described as a "mature" community. With a median household income in 1980 of \$23,400, it is relatively well-off economically. It is also thoroughly settled, with very low vacancy rates in both owner-occupied and rental housing, and less than 3 percent of the land area vacant. At the same time, its population and housing stock are aging. The median age of the population in 1980 was 39.9 (up from 38.2

in 1970); 17 percent of the population was 65 or older in 1980; 40 percent of Clifton's homes were built before 1940.

Within the context described above, it is not surprising that a strong underlying motivation in Clifton's community action projects (including crime prevention) is maintaining the quality of life that exists, i.e., protecting the community from decline.

The city administration is very active in working with the relatively well-defined Clifton neighborhoods. Crime prevention appears to be one of the top priorities in the city's Community Development Department. Some financial support is provided for the city's Crime Watch program, which operates out of the Police Department. Overall, the city strongly encourages citizen involvement and participation by volunteers in solving community problems.

The concept of NW has been given strong verbal support by the Chief of Police. Although only one officer is assigned to crime prevention, plans that were beginning to be implemented during the research should result in the assignment of another full-time uniformed officer to crime prevention along with nine "special", i.e., quasi-civilian, officers.

Because the police department's crime prevention effort is basically a one-man show, the philosophy and activities reflect the opinions and practices of that one person, who has been the Crime Prevention Officer for the full 8 years of the position's existence.

Two aspects of this officer's approach are important to note. First, he stresses to NW participants (or potential participants) that NW is not a police program; it is a program that relies on citizen initiative. Initially, he tried going door-to-door to get residents to organize; this was not very successful. His tactics now consist of making NW well known throughout the city (via the media and frequent speaking engagements) and letting people know that the police department is ready to help them organize and to provide technical advice. When people contact him about getting programs started in their neighborhoods, he puts the burden on them to canvass their areas and to organize an initial meeting. He makes his pitch about the importance and mechanics of NW at the meeting and explains what they have to do to implement a program. He makes it clear that he is constantly available for advice and assistance. Any meetings or other activities after the initial organizing meeting depend on the group's own initiative.

His availability to community groups and the media is part of the second important aspect of his approach. He views his role as a liaison between citizens and the police. This role extends beyond offering continuing assistance with NW and other crime prevention functions. For example, he stresses that a crime prevention officer must be able to deal with issues that are peripherally related, or even unrelated, to crime prevention. Because the crime prevention officer is in direct contact with citizens all the time, he must deal with their priorities. These priorities often involve issues such as traffic, trash collection, and park improvements.

Two site visits were made to Clifton. Interviews were conducted with the Chief of Police, the Director of the Department of Housing and Community Development, the City's Crime Prevention Officer, five block captains/ coordinators, and two local business people. Observations were conducted in several relatively high- and low-crime neighborhoods (with and without NW programs), the Police Department's central facilities, and the Crime Prevention Officer's neighborhood office.

3. Detroit, MI

Detroit, with a 1984 population estimate of 1,133,647, is the largest city in Michigan and the sixth largest city in the United States. With easy access to the iron ranges of northern Michigan and Minnesota and to the shipping lanes of the St. Lawrence Seaway, Detroit's location makes it a major international port and a logical production site for the nation's auto industry. The expansion of that industry in the post-war era brought wealth and workers to the area. As plants were erected in outlying areas, businesses and housing followed to meet the needs of the burgeoning populace.

At an increasing rate, the population and the tax base shifted from the city to the suburbs. The deterioration of some Detroit neighborhoods was aggravated by the problems of the auto industry in the 1970's. Massive layoffs forced workers to leave the area in large numbers in search of employment opportunities elsewhere. Businesses closed their doors. Housing units and commercial structures stood vacant and posed an increasing arson threat.

Census Bureau data for Detroit in 1980 reflect the effect of a turbulent decade. Over 18 percent of the civilian labor force were unemployed; the median household income was \$13,981; and just slightly over half (54.2 percent) of Detroit residents (25 or older) were high school graduates.

Official crime rates for Part I offenses, as reported in the 1984 Uniform Crime Reports, depict Detroit as one of the most crime-prone urban areas in America. Detroit's rates of motor vehicle theft, homicide, robbery, and burglary are among the highest in the nation.

The Detroit crime prevention model is nationally recognized for its breadth and vitality. It is a comprehensive effort that receives impetus from the Detroit Police Department but which could not survive without the extensive involvement of residents, volunteers, city employees, commercial enterprises, and community groups.

Police involvement in crime prevention, and in NW in particular, has assumed a multi-faceted approach. At the time of the field visits, the Detroit Police Department boasted a staff of approximately 120 trained crime prevention specialists. This figure represents the staffing levels of the three administrative units (Crime Prevention Section, Mini-Station Section, and Patrol Operations) that share responsibility for delivering crime prevention services to the community. It is the assignment of department resources and administrative accountability to these three units that makes Detroit's program so distinctive.

The mini-station concept was first introduced in 1975 as part of a broader departmental effort to improve police-community relations by placing officers in neighborhood substations. Initially, the mini-station officers were under precinct control. The assignment of an officer to this post was generally viewed as a punitive measure. In Detroit, as in other large cities, community relations was not considered to be "real" police work. Officers had little stake in making the concept work and little time to devote to these "non-police" activities.

In 1976, Commander James Humphrey of the Community Services Division actively campaigned for a major redefinition of the police role. He argued that public safety concerns could better be addressed by a department that engaged in and encouraged activities designed to prevent crime. The newly appointed chief of police, William Hart, embraced the idea and committed himself to developing a comprehensive crime prevention model for Detroit.

The following year the city's mini-stations were incorporated into the crime prevention effort. The function of the mini-station officer shifted to include a viable crime prevention component, the basis of which was NW. In 1980, the Mini-Station Section was removed from local precinct command and shifted into the Community Services Division. Department policy was updated to reflect the renewed commitment to this program. Currently, over half of the crime prevention personnel are involved in the administration of mini-station operations. The 55 uniformed officers who provide direct service at the local level (one in each mini-station) are accountable to supervisory personnel at police headquarters. They are not expected to respond to routine radio runs; their primary function is the provision of crime prevention services. Within this dictate, officers have great flexibility in the individualization of community programs.

In the mid 1970's two other developments were shaping the future of crime prevention in Detroit. The first was the transformation of the newly created Crime Prevention Section, under the direction of Commander Humphrey. A core group of specialists was assigned to organize and monitor NW groups city-wide, develop instructional literature and filmstrips, and initiate other related crime prevention techniques. In 1978, the Crime Prevention Section further asserted itself by targeting a West side neighborhood for intensive, community-based intervention. The sole function of the officers assigned to this community was to be crime prevention. They were to educate residents about home and personal security and actively encourage residents to organize NW groups. The dramatic success of this venture led to the selection of two additional communities to receive similar attention.

The second major development in departmental policy was the designation of one officer in each of the city's 12 precincts as the precinct crime prevention specialist. These officers, accountable to their commanding officers, are responsible for crime prevention efforts within their precinct boundaries.

The Detroit crime prevention model has been evolving for more than a decade. During this time, the quality of the services offered has improved markedly. And, while NW remains the cornerstone of the crime

prevention plan, it is only one of many techniques that have been implemented. Other measures include citizen radio patrols, auto theft deterrence programs, and specialized crime prevention efforts directed at children and seniors.

Two site visits were made to Detroit. Interviews were conducted with the Commander of the Community Services Division (who oversees both the Crime Prevention Section and the Mini-Station Section), the Commander of the Mini-Station Section, several crime prevention and mini-station officers, and the police facilitator of the city's CB radio patrols. Informal conversations were held with six specialists from the Crime Prevention Section, neighborhood volunteers in 4 mini-stations, and several officers who are members of the Crime Prevention Task Force.

4. San Diego, CA

San Diego is a rapidly growing city in southern California. Its 1984 population of 952,933 represents an increase of 8.8 percent over the 1980 Census estimate. If the present rate of increase continues, San Diego's population will surpass the 1 million mark by 1988.

Although the 1980 Census Bureau figure for median household income (\$16,408) does not suggest that San Diego is a particularly affluent city, other Census Bureau statistics project a more positive image. For example, nearly four-fifths of the residents (25 or older) are high school graduates, a figure that is more than double the national average.

San Diego's topography results in distinct, geographical neighborhoods. Expressways, valleys, and hills create and separate many enclosed and limited-access communities. In the decade 1970-1980 the total number of housing units increased by 60 percent. Nearly half of these housing units are rental properties. This rate is undoubtedly influenced by the large number of military personnel assigned to the naval bases and by San Diego's reputation as a vacationer's haven.

Crime prevention efforts in San Diego are firmly rooted in the San Diego Police Department and are closely linked with public affairs and community relations. This linkage is evident both in the development of crime prevention policies and in the administrative placement of crime prevention officers (both direct service and administrative/developmental) within the Public Affairs Unit.

The first Community Alert programs (San Diego's nomenclature for NW) were established in 1976 as part of an experiment to test the effectiveness of community crime prevention. The initial promise of this experiment led to the application for and receipt of an LEAA grant (1978-81) to organize NW groups city-wide. Initially, personnel of the Crime Prevention Section were to serve as a resource development staff. The three assigned officers were to develop crime prevention literature and films and administer the delivery of these services.

The main provider of direct crime prevention services was to be the beat officer. There were several problems with this approach. First was the issue of officer enthusiasm. Because of officers' other responsibilities, their practical commitment to crime prevention was substantially

limited. As has been seen in other locales, officers viewed this additional duty as a passing fad and not as "real" police work.

The logistical problems associated with implementing NW were perhaps even more pressing. Were NW meetings to be conducted during an officer's regular tour of duty? If not, the police department had to provide for overtime compensation. If yes, there was the issue of reduced patrol coverage. An officer could not simultaneously maintain routine coverage and attend a meeting. Furthermore, what was the officer to do if called away during a meeting for law enforcement duties? Transfers, staff turnover, and shift rotations added to the implementation problems by disrupting service continuity.

In 1979, the crime prevention function was shifted from beat officers to Community Relations Officers (direct-service crime prevention officers). These officers, too, were accountable to the Patrol Division. Unlike beat officers, however, Community Relations Officers were assigned to storefronts, were not expected to perform routine law enforcement duties, and, thus, could more efficiently conduct their crime prevention activities.

In 1980, the San Diego Police Department decentralized its operations into seven area commands. The Community Relations Officers, as well as patrol personnel, reported to substation commanders. It was not until November 1981 that Community Relations Officers were taken out of the substation chain of command and recentralized under the Public Affairs Unit, a unit newly created to coordinate crime prevention and community relations activities.

The crime prevention budget for fiscal year 1985, excluding salaries, was \$46,270. At that time, the Crime Prevention Section was budgeted for six Crime Prevention Specialist (administrative/developmental) positions, of which only three were filled. The Community Relations Section employs supervisory staff, 9 non-uniformed Community Relations Officers (1 in each storefront plus 1 Indo-Chinese liaison officer), 11 Community Service Officers (civil service appointments who receive an abbreviated 80-hour training course at the police academy), and several clerical personnel.

The San Diego Police Department boasts that its Community Alert network is the largest such network in California and the second largest in the nation. As of November 1985 approximately 4,600 groups had been organized within the city limits. In 1982, the program was cited by the California Crime Resistance Task Force as the state's exemplary crime prevention program of the year.

Crime prevention personnel stress that Community Alert is not a police program. It is a neighborhood program and, as such, is only as good as its resident leaders. In line with this philosophy, the police are reactive ... their approach to community organization. No attempt is made to target unorganized blocks for special attention. Rather, the storefront officers, in their performance of other community relations duties, respond to citizens' requests for Community Alert informational meetings. When such a request is received, citizens are notified that a meeting will be scheduled as soon as that individual is able to contact

neighbors and arrange a date, time, and place for the meeting. At the organizational meeting the objectives of Community Alert are outlined and pertinent information is distributed. There is no further formal contact between the block group and storefront staff unless requested by citizens.

One visit was made to San Diego. Interviews were conducted with the three officers currently assigned to the Crime Prevention Section, one officer assigned to the Community Relations Section as a storefront officer, and one Community Service Officer.

5. Alexandria, VA

Alexandria is an historic city which lies six miles south of the District of Columbia. It is bounded by the Potomac River and the heavily travelled Capitol Beltway on three sides. Sections of the city are densely populated; 108,000 people inhabit slightly less than 16 square miles.

Alexandria can best be described as an upper-income commuter suburb. The number of condominiums is increasing rapidly, and the conversion of rental units to condominiums has caused low-income and larger households to seek housing outside of Alexandria. A 30 percent annual turnover of population is not uncommon in many neighborhoods.

Approximately 23 percent of the population is Black. In 1984, the unemployment rate was less than 5 percent, and the average household income was \$38,722. The average assessed value of a single-family house was \$119,000; rental apartments comprise nearly half of the housing units.

In the mid-1970's, following the lead of towns and cities across the nation, the Alexandria Police Department increased patrols and tried to combat crime by reaching out into the community, being more visible, and involving citizens.

At present, the Police Department Crime Prevention Unit consists of four officers. The Police Department does not try to recruit new NW groups but will respond to citizens' requests to begin crime prevention programs. Crime prevention staff supply literature and manuals, then continue in an advisory capacity. The officers hold monthly meetings for block captains, at which they routinely distribute reports of offenses reported in NW areas and oftentimes make a presentation on a topic such as victim/witness assistance, auto theft prevention, and so forth.

Nearly 100 active NW programs have been formed in Alexandria since 1981. Project staff made site visits to two of these programs. Interviews were conducted with program coordinators and blocks leaders at each site. In addition, project staff interviewed Police Department Crime Prevention Unit personnel.

The first successful NW program in Alexandria was established in 1979 in Warwick Village, an area of 650 homes, mostly older row houses with six townhouse-type units per building. Fewer than half are owner-occupied, and the transient nature of the community is reflected in the

high percentage of rental units. Concerned about assaultive street violence, especially incidents occurring near the bus stop as commuters returned home in the evenings, the Warwick Village group initiated a Visible Citizens Program. Two residents with a CB radio park near the bus stop each weekday between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. Their presence has contributed to a dramatic decrease in incidents as well as a highly increased sense of security in the area.

The second NW program selected for site visitation is located in Newport Village, a large complex consisting of 95 well-maintained apartment buildings with approximately 1,000 rental units and 2,350 residents. The area is highly transient. Most residents are in their 20's and 30's; there are more women than men, and more singles than young married couples.

Residents who park at some distance from their apartments must walk through areas that are not well-lit and that are bordered by shrubs and trees. The crime watch program began in May 1983 after a series of violent sexual assaults in parking lots and apartment buildings.

Since the group began, incidents have decreased sharply. There have been no forced entry burglaries or personal attacks, although residents who lived there during the time of the rapes are still concerned. Of the 95 buildings, 63 are NW participants. A building arrives at this status when 70 percent of the residents engrave their valuables, have a security survey of the premises conducted, and exchange emergency information with others in the building and with the building coordinator.

Several of the block captains have arranged telephone trees; they notify a building coordinator of any incidents or suspicious activities, and that person, in turn, notifies the next person on the list. Each tenant is encouraged to notify the block captain if he or she will be away. Residents of some buildings provide an escort service to distant parking areas for neighbors who desire this service after dark.

The program coordinator expressed frustration at the lack of cooperation by the management of the complex. Management has opposed the erection of NW signs and has moved slowly to make changes in response to the original rape problems. Those interviewed surmised that the lack of cooperation stemmed from an unwillingness to call attention to the problem and perhaps lose tenants. Nevertheless, a core group of tenants continues to press for better locks and lighting, and they have urged that some of the large shrubs and trees be cut down or severely pruned. Other tenants joined the management in opposing this action for aesthetic reasons and to combat noise from the highway. Because tenants cannot control the physical environment, the coordinator believes that the program can never be a total success.

6. Norfolk, VA

Norfolk is the site of the largest naval base in the United States and is an important shipping and ship-building center. It is a sprawling city with residential, industrial, and commercial areas in close proximity. The population grew dramatically during World War II, when the rapid military buildup brought great numbers of new residents to the

region. The results of the rapid, uncontrolled growth are still quite apparent; zoning is a rather recent innovation in Norfolk, and the random development has contributed to problems for crime prevention programs.

Civic League groups in Norfolk neighborhoods have been strong since the 1950's. There is a longstanding Council of Civic Leagues, and most communities have active programs. With few exceptions, neighborhood crime prevention efforts sprang from and developed through the Civic Leagues.

Prior to 1980, the link between community crime prevention and law enforcement activities was very informal. The Norfolk Police Department held meetings and distributed literature, working with citizen groups at their request. No records were kept and, generally, there was no on-going contact. In 1982, a more formalized and comprehensive program was instituted. The "Community Relations Program" of the 1970's became the "Block Security Program" of the 1980's.

Block Security has the full support of the new police chief. However, despite strong philosophical support, active law enforcement involvement in NW functions is minimal due to fiscal and personnel shortages. Operating with a 1985 budget of approximately \$33,000, Norfolk's Block Security program has three full-time officers. The feeling of the crime prevention officers is that each officer can only deal effectively with about ten programs. With 54 Block Security programs currently operational in Norfolk, the crime prevention staff is overworked and there is a swelling list of programs waiting for NW training and information.

In the past, when the Police Department received requests to form new programs, the first step had been to schedule an area informational meeting. Now the police suggest that the neighborhood take the initiative and form a small committee of concerned citizens. This committee meets at the Police Department for orientation and discussion of the scope of the program and the responsibilities of both citizens and police. After studying the materials, the committee returns to the community to canvass neighbors and determine the level of interest.

Home security surveys are encouraged, and the usual procedure is for the crime prevention officers to perform home security checks for the block captains, who then can replicate this service for their neighbors.

The NW concept is not new to Norfolk, but it has undergone several changes in focus and scope. Reorganization of the Norfolk Police Department is once more underway, with rumored personnel, leadership, and budget changes. The existing Crime Prevention Officers would like more manpower. They claim success, even though the program is not as large, nor as strong as they would like. Despite an increase in vandalism and larcenies in 1985, there was a 7 percent reduction in residential burglaries citywide and a 30 percent reduction in the Block Security neighborhoods.

Two site visits were made to Norfolk. Interviews were conducted with various personnel from the Norfolk Police Department and with eight Block Security coordinators.

7. Operation SafeStreet, St. Louis, MO

St. Louis, a city of approximately 65 square miles, is the largest city in Missouri and a leading industrial and transportation center. It is also a city in transition. During the past three decades tens of thousands of residents have fled to the suburbs. The population, which had approached the one million mark, fell to 750,000 by 1960; a decade later it had dropped further to 622,200. As of the 1980 Census, there were 480,000 residents.

Problems of urban decay became increasingly serious during the 1950's, and the city is still fighting these difficulties. Low-, middle-, and high-income residential neighborhoods are interspersed randomly so that even the more affluent neighborhoods are not far from distressed and depressed areas. Citizens perceive that no neighborhood is isolated from problems, and the police department confirms that the majority of the burglaries and break-ins are committed by "neighbors".

As St. Louis struggled with the problems related to loss of population and a declining tax base, a newly elected mayor commissioned a group of businessmen and philanthropists to enumerate the problems of greatest concern to city residents. A survey conducted by this group identified filth in the city as the most pressing problem. The municipal response took the form of Operation BrightSide. Young people were hired to sweep the streets and pick up trash. Highly publicized clean-up campaigns for neighborhoods were scheduled for spring weekends. Vacant lots were cleared, levelled, and planted with grass and flowers, giving them the appearance of mini-parks.

The second most frequently cited problem, crime, was attacked via Operation SafeStreet. Funding for this program was obtained from the Community Development Agency, using Block Grant funds from HUD. SafeStreet is a high-level enterprise. Its multi-disciplinary emphasis relies upon the continued cooperation of elected officials, resident groups, the St. Louis Police Department, and other anti-crime associations. The program's Advisory Board includes the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the Circuit Attorney, city public safety officials, and community leaders. SafeStreet staff perceive that, for the first time, the municipal administration has fully committed itself to a crime prevention effort.

In addition to traditional NW activities, Operation SafeStreet promotes Project Porchlight, an after-dark security effort; Project Home Security, the provision of residential hardware free of charge or at reasonable cost to residents; and Project Quiet Street, a controversial measure designed to discourage non-resident traffic by modifying traffic patterns.

SafeStreet launched its program in 9 of the city's 130 targeted areas in January 1984. The program's goal is to organize increasing numbers of areas at six-month intervals such that all of the areas will be canvassed within a four-year period.

At the beginning of each implementation phase, all registered voters are mailed an informational packet and an invitation to the kickoff meeting. Each packet includes a postage-paid postcard requesting that those interested in assuming leadership (block captains, neighborhood coordinators, etc.) reply.

The initial meeting serves as an information exchange. Citizens have an opportunity to voice their concerns, problems, and complaints to local and city officials. The administrators, in turn, are provided a forum to inform citizens about the scope of the program and to elicit their help.

The Operation SafeStreet newsletter plays an important part in the education of citizens in target areas. All residents receive newsletters monthly in the initial six-month implementation period and quarterly thereafter.

After the organizational period, on-going contact is maintained via quarterly meetings with community leaders and semi-annual meetings with block captains. Meetings with community leaders are always attended by SafeStreet staff and a police liaison.

At the time of the site visit, Operation SafeStreet had entered the fifth of eight scheduled phases. Fifty-four target areas had been saturated and there are now more than 12,000 active participants in 351 NW groups.

City officials plan that SafeStreet, like BrightSide, will be a permanent fixture in St. Louis. Although three-fourths of the funding is still provided from Block Grant monies, private donations and project income derived from the sale of home security packages are increasing. Leaders believe that a spirit of cooperation is reemerging in the city, and they give SafeStreet much of the credit.

8. Greene County, MO

Greene County lies at the edge of the Ozark Mountains in southwestern Missouri. It covers 677 square miles and has a population in excess of 185,000, making it the third largest county in the state. Fifty-seven percent of the population resides in Springfield, the county seat; the remainder live in the primarily rural areas surrounding the city.

The residents are predominantly middle-class, racially homogeneous homeowners. In 1979, the median household income was \$17,583. Less than 2 percent of the county's population is non-white.

The geographic location of Greene County makes it a prime target for property crime. Two main railway lines intersect there, and it is within three-hour drive of Kansas City, Memphis, and St. Louis. During the 1970's, the county was plagued with increasing numbers of home burglaries and the theft of farm machinery and cattle. On average, 200 burglaries per month were reported to Greene County law enforcement officials.

NW was introduced into the county by the Sheriff's Department in an attempt to address the burglary problem by involving the community in crime prevention efforts. Initially the Sheriff started two or three new programs each week. He met personally with each group and expressed his conviction that, with citizen cooperation, there could be a dramatic change in the rate of crime.

As the NW program developed, the county was divided into four districts for patrol purposes. To combat the sense of alienation from law enforcement, the Sheriff instructed his deputies to get to know the residents in their areas and to be friendly, approachable, and responsive. According to the Sheriff, the constant patrolling and personal contact have combined with NW efforts to reduce the fear of crime in the county and to reduce the reluctance to report suspicious persons and activity. Before NW began, the Sheriff's Department received approximately 25 suspicious-activity calls per day. It now averages 50-75 daily calls. Between 1981 and 1984 there was a 64 percent decrease in the reported number of residential burglaries.

Nearly one-third of the individuals in Greene County currently live in an active NW community. Each of the 270 groups is operated by the citizens with support from the Sheriff's Department. Members contribute money to buy signs, which are produced by a local business and made available at nominal cost. The number and location of these signs are determined by citizens. In some areas where farm houses are located far from the public roads, each participating family posts a sign near the entrance to the farm drive.

Each program is encouraged to compile a booklet outlining relevant information on area residents. These booklets list the name of each family member, telephone number, description and license tag number of each family vehicle, name and telephone number of the family doctor, location and number of employer, and whether there is someone home during the day. Some groups have had vinyl decals printed to enable the Sheriff's Department and other residents to quickly and easily spot automobiles that do not belong in a neighborhood or community. The small identifying stickers are unique to the community and are placed on the front and back windshields.

Many of the Greene County NW groups also have formal patrol components. In one rural community where 15 families live along a five-mile farm road, families take turns patrolling at irregular hours, day and night, during the week. Two families are on duty each weekend. The chairman of the NW committee boasted that there have been no burglaries since the program began.

A walking patrol has been instituted in an affluent subdivision where 54 families live in large homes on multiple-acre lots. Located just off a major highway, the homes abut a wooded area that provides an easy means of escape for burglars. In past years, 65 percent of the local households have been burglarized, several more than once. Paired patrollers walk the length of the road carrying pencil and paper to note anything suspicious. The group recommends that residents use the redial

button on the telephone to forward all calls to a neighbor's home so that a stranger dialing to check on a home's occupancy will not know that the house is unoccupied.

In a second suburban setting, where 32 homes have been built in the last five years, citizens organized after a series of break-ins. All homeowners share the patrol duties, riding in the winter and walking in the summer. Since the full NW patrol was established, there have been no burglaries.

Greene County was visited once. Project staff met with the Sheriff and travelled through the county to speak with leaders of six NW groups.

9. Orlando, FL

Orlando is a thriving city in central Florida. Its population, currently about 130,000, grew by 30 percent between 1970 and 1980. The unemployment rate in 1980 was 5.6 percent, well below the national average. Blacks comprise 30 percent of Orlando's population, and 4 percent is Hispanic. Despite the large elderly population in Florida, Orlando's populace is relatively young; the median age is 28.6 (versus 34.7 for Florida and 30.0 for the United States).

NW in Orlando is basically one in which residents exercise surveillance during the course of their regular daily activities. Citizen patrols are neither encouraged nor supported.

At the time of our site visit, Orlando's NW program was in a period of transition. NW groups have been existing in the city since about the mid 1970s under the sponsorship of the Orlando Police Department (OPD). In a move to revitalize NW, administrative and organizing responsibilities were transferred in late 1983 from the OPD to the newly formed Citizens for Neighborhood Watch (CNW), which was established within the private, non-profit Orlando Crime Prevention Commission.

CNW has a small paid staff (basically, a director and secretarial support) and receives city funds through the Crime Prevention Commission. It has a Steering Committee to set overall policy, and it works closely with the police department. For the past few years, CNW and the OPD have been sorting out their roles under the new organizational arrangement.

Although CNW is beginning to become more proactive in trying to stimulate formation of NW groups in neighborhoods that are difficult to organize, the process of starting a NW group usually begins with a citizen contacting either CNW or the OPD. CNW sends the citizen a packet of materials explaining NW and describing how to set up an initial meeting. Representatives from CNW and the OPD attend the initial meeting as well as a follow-up meeting about a month later.

Certification as a NW group requires 40 percent participation of the area's households at the first two meetings, home security surveys, and a telephone contact chain. After initial certification, two meetings per year, with continuing evidence of 40 percent participation, are required to maintain certification. When a group is certified, CNW provides one NW sign for free; additional signs will be installed for \$17.00 each.

Communication is an integral feature of Orlando's NW effort. The telephone chains are emphasized. In addition, there is a hierarchical structure based on the notion that no one person should have to communicate with more than ten others. Above the participating households, there are block captains, area coordinators, and district chairs; CNW is planning to insert watch leaders between the block captains and area coordinators.

The NW structure is also integrated with the political structure of the city. The district chairs (who also serve on the CNW advisory council) represent geographic areas that correspond to the six city commissioner districts. The police department's Community Relations Section, in which crime prevention responsibilities are lodged, has six officers, a sergeant, and a lieutenant. Each of the six officers has primary responsibility for one of the commissioner districts, even though each has more general crime prevention duties as well. The city commissioners take an interest in NW and tend to keep in contact with CNW and with the Community Relations Officers assigned to their districts.

In addition to helping to organize new NW groups and trying to keep existing ones active, CNW publishes a newsletter, maintains a speakers bureau, conducts leadership training for block captains, and organizes special events to publicize NW and to give recognition to citizens who participate. CNW relies heavily on volunteers in performing these tasks.

As noted, NW groups were placed under the umbrella of CNW in late 1983; prior to that, the program had been managed by the OPD. The change was an outgrowth of recommendations made by a Neighborhood Watch Study Task Force consisting of civic leaders, educators, and law enforcement representatives. Formation of the Task Force was a response to the perception that the city's NW effort was floundering: new groups were not emerging in unorganized neighborhoods, and participation was faltering in existing groups.

It is too early to tell whether or not the new organizational structure is revitalizing NW in Orlando. However, our site visit did note that the transition from OPD to CNW management has not been devoid of friction. Disagreements center primarily around the importance of imposing a hierarchical structure on the city's NW effort and the degree to which decertification should be enforced against programs that drop below the 40 percent participation level. CNW is continuing to build the structure, and it plans to enforce decertification more vigorously, while the Community Relations Officers tend to favor a more informal structure and a less vigorous approach to decertification.

One site visit was made to Orlando. Interviews were conducted with the director of CNW, one area coordinator, one district chairperson, three block captains, two officers in the OPD's Community Relations Section, and one city commissioner. The research staff also attended a neighborhood association meeting in which the director of CNW made a presentation about NW, and interviewed a resident who had been trying unsuccessfully to initiate NW in her neighborhood.

10. Buncombe County, NC

Buncombe County covers 649 square miles in the western part of North Carolina in the Blue Ridge Mountains. The county seat, Asheville, and the unincorporated areas of the county have a joint population of 169,000. During the summer months the population swells by about 8,000 seasonal residents and another estimated 20,000 tourists and transients.

The area is characterized by a diversity of cultures and a rapidly changing economy. The very stable Appalachian culture is interspersed with a more cosmopolitan group as the number of newcomers increases. The traditional jobs in agriculture and forestry are decreasing as more small manufacturing firms move into the county, attracted by lower area wage rates, the continued availability of labor and prime industrial land, and the highly touted living environment of the county and region. It is predicted that the growing tourism industry will be the major employer in the county by the end of the century.

The county does not reflect the effects of zoning, as business, industrial, and residential areas are mixed. Low-income homes, trailer parks, farms, convenience stores, and new housing appear to be intermixed randomly.

As the population base of the county increases, law enforcement faces new difficulties. Buncombe County, which has the seventh largest population in North Carolina and the third largest area covered by a Sheriff's Department, ranks twentieth in the number of personnel.

The crime prevention section began in 1974 with funding from LEAA. With five officers, a part-time secretary, and no other budget, the Sheriff feels that it is necessary to rely on community assistance in order to offset the personnel disadvantage which his department experiences. To tap local resources, he approached service organizations like the Lions Club and some of the larger industries in Buncombe and nearby counties for contributions of money and services. One firm donated a large used van, which the Sheriff's Department refurbished and converted into a mobile crime prevention vehicle with displays on home security, drugs and alcohol, and other subjects. It is used for child fingerprinting programs as well. Another firm built the crime prevention robot which is widely used in school and community programs. Local colleges have supplied films, computer services, writers, graphic arts services, and actors and costumes for Crime Stoppers television dramatizations. Law enforcement personnel stressed the fact that the lack of departmental funding is no deterrent to an active crime prevention program.

Buncombe County currently has 562 NW groups which meet the Sheriff's Department requirements as organized groups. Records for the groups are kept in the crime prevention section and carefully monitored. More than 50 percent of the residents of a community must participate actively; at least one member of each participating household must attend five of the six meetings held over the first six months of a program.

The six-meeting regimen was developed to provide sufficient crime prevention training to the involved citizens, to acquaint them with law

enforcement representatives and procedures, and to enable communities to congeal through close involvement of the citizens over a period of time. At the first meeting, which is usually publicized by door-to-door invitations to neighbors by the organizing individual, one of the crime prevention officers explains the scope of the program and what will be involved and required. The next two meetings stress home security. After the third meeting, the group is ready to incorporate, choose officers, and order NW signs, which are funded by the group but the acquisition and placement of which are controlled by the Sheriff's Department. The subject of the fourth meeting is the crime of bunco, while the fifth meeting focuses on personal protection (child safety, rape prevention, crimes against senior citizens). The final meetings is usually a tour of the Sheriff's Department.

The crime prevention deputies maintain contact with the officers of the groups and schedule annual meetings to ensure continued interest and participation and to reaffirm the home security and surveillance aspects of the program. A newsletter with crime statistics and crime prevention tips is printed for distribution to all groups.

Most of the NW groups began for crime prevention purposes and have gone on to deal with other issues. Many have requested and obtained additional lighting for the community. Some have worked to achieve state road status for their roads. One watch group in an area of mixed housing has worked on problems of speeding and a nearby area of drug trafficking.

Project staff made one visit to Buncombe County. Interviews were conducted with the Sheriff, the Investigator who heads the crime prevention unit, and six local NW leaders.

CHAPTER 4

PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS

Completed instruments were returned by 550 respondents in our national survey. A more detailed account of the number of respondents, by geographic division and state, is displayed in Table 4. The greatest number of completed packets were received from residents of Florida (N=110), Texas (N=75), and California (N=52), representing state response rates of 40.1 percent, 26.9 percent, and 24.2 percent, respectively. A state response rate of 100 percent was reported for five states, each of which had received a maximum of three questionnaires. The lowest rate of response was recorded for Louisiana, where NW contacts failed to return any of the 51 packets that were distributed. The overall response rate of 26 percent, while lower than desired, nevertheless allows cautious statements bearing on the administration, operations, and environments of NW programs.

Administrative Characteristics

1. Relationship with Law Enforcement

The role played by law personnel in the initiation of NW programs is extensive. At the time of inception, 98 percent of the programs received police assistance. Table 5 indicates that the predominant forms of law enforcement assistance included the provision of speakers, the appointment of a liaison officer, the preparation of local crime statistics for citizen perusal, and crime prevention training. Equipment (CB radios, property engravers, etc.) was provided to about 44 percent of the groups.

Both the surveys and conversations with NW participants suggest that the relationships between NW groups and police departments remain relatively stable. Despite varying departmental philosophies on the intensity of police involvement in on-going NW activities, neither the extent nor the type of law enforcement assistance have evidenced marked changes over time (see Table 6).

NW groups currently receive assistance from law enforcement personnel at several levels. Nearly three-fourths of the programs acknowledged the continued assistance of their local police departments, and a third noted that county law enforcement officials are providing some aid. This latter figure is not at all surprising as 27 percent of the respondents described their program settings as small cities, towns, or rural areas, and thus most likely falling within the jurisdiction of a county sheriff's department.

Although most groups received some substantive assistance, less than half reported the receipt of any monetary assistance for start-up purposes. Table 7 shows that, for those programs that did receive financial assistance, the primary source of funding was private contributions. Respondent commentary explained that, in most instances,

Table 4

Survey respondents, by
geographic division and state

<u>Division and state</u>	<u>Number of respondents</u>	<u>Division and state</u>	<u>Number of respondents</u>
New England	(12)	West North Central	(69)
Connecticut	0	Iowa	23
Maine	1	Kansas	6
Massachusetts	7	Minnesota	16
New Hampshire	0	Missouri	16
Rhode Island	1	Nebraska	8
Vermont	3	North Dakota	0
		South Dakota	0
Middle Atlantic	(41)	East South Central	(12)
New Jersey	14	Alabama	1
New York	9	Kentucky	0
Pennsylvania	18	Mississippi	7
		Tennessee	4
South Atlantic	(180)	West South Central	(78)
Delaware	0	Arkansas	3
Florida	110	Louisiana	0
Georgia	12	Oklahoma	0
Maryland	4	Texas	75
North Carolina	8		
South Carolina	1	Mountain	(48)
Virginia	38	Arizona	31
West Virginia	7	Colorado	1
East North Central	(44)	Idaho	7
Illinois	2	Montana	0
Indiana	2	Nevada	0
Michigan	29	New Mexico	0
Ohio	6	Utah	9
Wisconsin	5	Wyoming	0
		Pacific	(66)
		California	52
		Oregon	13
		Washington	1

Table 5

Law enforcement assistance provided to Neighborhood Watch groups
at time of program inception, by type of assistance

<u>Type of assistance</u>	<u>Number^a</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Some assistance	525	97.9
Equipment	238	44.4
Training	336	62.7
Operating space	83	15.5
Speakers	440	82.1
Liaison officer	371	69.2
Local crime statistics	369	68.8
Other	117	21.8
No assistance	11	2.1

^aSubcategories may add to more than the total due to multiple responses.

Table 6

Law enforcement assistance currently provided to
Neighborhood Watch groups, by type of assistance

<u>Type of assistance</u>	<u>Number^a</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Some assistance	508	94.2
Equipment	213	39.5
Training	273	50.6
Operating space	92	17.1
Speakers	383	71.1
Liaison officer	357	66.2
Local crime statistics	371	68.8
Other	94	17.4
No assistance	31	5.8

^aSubcategories may add to more than the total due to multiple responses.

Table 7

Neighborhood Watch groups receiving funding
at time of program inception, by source of funding

<u>Source of funding</u>	<u>Number</u> ^a	<u>Percent</u>
Some funding	216	45.5
Federal government	11	2.3
State government	30	6.3
County government	7	1.5
Local government	48	10.1
Private contributions	91	19.2
Organization dues	40	8.4
Commercial contributions	17	3.6
Fund raising	19	4.0
Other funding	29	6.1
No funding	259	54.5

^aSubcategories may add to more than the total due to multiple responses.

the funding consisted of one-time or "as needed" resident donations for the purchase of NW signs.

2. Budgets and Staffing

The distribution of program budgets is highly skewed. Although the average annual program budget was found to be \$7,272, 71 percent of the respondents noted that their programs had no formal budget. In sharp contrast, 37 programs had annual budgets in excess of \$25,000, with one city-wide program citing an allotment of \$184,238. Only 58 programs listed budgets of intermediary amounts (in the range of \$1-24,999).

Budget data were collapsed into four expenditure levels (no formal budget, \$1-499; \$500-999; \$1,000 and over) and the relationship between the resulting variable and racial characteristics of the serviced areas was examined. While the racial homogeneity of the community was not related to budget allocation, analysis showed that, when racial homogeneity was further specified, the relationship was statistically significant ($p < .000$). Although programs in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods comprised less than 7 percent of the total sample, these programs account for 38 percent of the programs with budgets of \$1,000 or more. Programs with no formalized budgets are disproportionately found in predominantly Black neighborhoods. No explanation for this finding is immediately apparent.

Staffing levels, like budgetary allocations, are widely variable due to program sizes, administrative structures, and organizational objectives and origins. Programs that are organized in response to grassroots efforts at neighborhood crime prevention may view the loci of responsibility to be evenly distributed among area residents. Consequently, residents may contend that traditional NW activities require no administration and, therefore, no administrators. On the other hand, citizens whose programs are products of concerted police department efforts to organize vast numbers of urban communities can easily draw upon police resources. These citizens may regard departmental personnel to be administrators of their local NW programs. Paid staff, many of whom are local and county law enforcement employees, represent 19 percent of the total staffing levels reported in the national survey.

The contribution of volunteers in the administration of NW can not be overlooked (see Figure 1). On average, respondents recorded an administrative staff of eight persons, almost three-fifths of whom were part-time volunteers. Full-time volunteers comprised the second largest source of administrative personnel, accounting for nearly a quarter of all program staff. In total, 81 percent of NW administrators were unpaid personnel.


3. Program Age

The programs represented in the survey ranged in age from a few months to 74 years. Despite this apparent variability, the majority of the programs are relatively young. At the time of the survey, nearly

Figure 1

Staffing of Neighborhood Watch groups,
by status of employment

[Percent]



half of all responding groups were 2 years old or younger; over 80 percent were 4 years or younger. Only five programs indicated they had been in existence for longer than 10 years.

With two exceptions, NW is a product of the past two decades. As depicted in Figure 2, the number of new programs fluctuated during the early 1970's. Clearly, the increase in the number of NW groups over the 6-year period 1978-1983 has been more consistent and more dramatic. This surge may reflect the successes of various national projects to educate the public on the value of crime prevention and to promote NW.

One such media blitz, sponsored by the Crime Prevention Coalition in conjunction with the Advertising Council, was instituted in late 1979. The television and radio public service announcements were designed, in part, to encourage citizens to "take a bite out of crime" by working collectively with neighbors and law enforcement personnel in a community crime prevention effort. Two years after the inception of the campaign, 22 percent of a nationally surveyed sample of individuals reported that they had, as a result of the public service announcements, altered their behaviors to correspond with one or more media suggestions. Of these respondents, 21 percent indicated that they were more observant of neighborhood activities and/or more likely to report suspicious behaviors (O'Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984: Table 4).

A second, nationally acclaimed project was the Urban Crime Prevention Program, which was sponsored jointly by ACTION and LEAA. Initiated in 1980, the program had as one of its objectives a reduction in urban crime. To this end, funding was awarded to 85 projects in nine American cities. Post-grant evaluations concluded that NW was the most effective of the crime prevention approaches. Consequently, it was recommended that citizen organization be considered a primary strategy in the implementation of future crime prevention initiatives.


The abrupt downward trend in the number of programs established after 1983 is not so easily explained. Possibly, the sharp decline is a reflection of resource reallocations within local and county law enforcement agencies. Although programs established in 1984 and 1985 comprise 26 percent of the total sample, these programs account for 48 percent of the programs that are not currently receiving some form of substantive police assistance.

A second explanation might derive from the more generalized reduction in the diversity of funding sources or the availability of start-up funds. The average 1985 budget for programs initiated in 1984 or 1985 was \$2,227, which is less than one-fourth the mean budget (\$9,086) for programs organized in earlier years.

A third explanation is that the figures for 1984 and 1985 are artificially deflated due to response bias. In several instances, incomplete survey packets were returned to project staff with the explanation that respondents could not adequately complete the questionnaire because of the newness of their programs. If others who shared this sentiment failed to respond in any manner, data for programs established in 1984 and 1985 could be disproportionately missing.

Figure 2

Neighborhood Watch programs,
by year of inception



Year of inception	Number	Percent
1911	1	0.2
1966	2	0.4
1972	1	0.2
1973	0	0.0
1974	1	0.2
1975	6	1.2
1976	3	0.6
1977	5	1.0
1978	12	2.5
1979	22	4.5
1980	44	9.1
1981	60	12.4
1982	94	19.4
1983	107	22.1
1984	78	16.1
1985	50	10.3

Operational Characteristics

When asked to comment on the motivation behind their program's initiation, respondents, by a margin of nearly 2 to 1, remarked that NW was implemented to prevent crime rather than to combat an existing crime problem. This is consistent with previous research. For example, in his telephone survey of residents of the Chicago metropolitan area, Lavrakas observed that "[n]early two-thirds of these respondents stated that the [Neighborhood Watch] meeting in their neighborhood had been held for 'proactive' reasons, i.e., to keep crime from becoming a problem, rather than due to the fact that crime was already a serious problem" (1983:21).

A number of the respondents in the national survey were able to identify specific criminal activities as foci of neighborhood concern. Elderly residents of a mobile home park in a southern state voiced their concern over what they perceived as an escalating rate of bicycle and golf cart theft. In contrast, program participants in transitional urban areas have concentrated their efforts on the prevention of assaultive street violence. By and large, however, the predominant concern of NW participants is residential burglary.

1. Publicity and Information

The existence of NW is announced to the public in several ways. Non-residents are alerted to the existence of local NW groups by means of street signs or window stickers. Ninety-four percent of the responding programs claimed to employ one or both of these visual cues.

The utilization of street signs is dependent on several factors, two of which are cost and public acceptance. Printed materials submitted by surveyed NW programs reported that, in many locations, signs are provided without cost to established NW groups by local or county law enforcement agencies. This is not a universal policy, however, as other citizens' groups are required to purchase their own signs.

In at least two of our site visit locales, the display of signs has been a subject of debate. Management in one apartment complex opposed the erection of signs, presumably because they would suggest that the community was in the throes of a crime problem, and consequently, potential tenants might be reluctant to rent there. At a second site, city officials were concerned that the signs would detract from the aesthetics of the landscape. It was only after a lengthy exchange that the municipal planning committee approved the selective erection of smaller signs.

Residents can learn about local group operations through newsletters or at meetings. Newsletters and scheduled meetings are employed by 54 percent and 61 percent of programs, respectively; 40 percent of the groups utilize both measures.


As shown in Figure 3, over two-fifths of the programs that publish newsletters do so on a weekly or monthly schedule; 78 percent distribute updates at least quarterly. Group meetings are scheduled less

Figure 3


Frequency of scheduled meetings
and newsletter distribution

[Percent]

SCHEDULED MEETINGS
[N=270]



NEWSLETTER
DISTRIBUTION
[N=311]



frequently, with over half of those with meetings observing that meetings were scheduled irregularly, annually, or "as needed".

In communities where meetings are scheduled, contacts were asked to respond to several survey items describing the nature of the meetings. On average, 39 residents attend, and regular police attendance was reported by over two-thirds of the groups. Eighty-four percent of those with meetings noted that recent crime statistics were generally available for review and 79 percent observed that meeting agendas "always" included a discussion of crime prevention techniques.

Several factors appear to be related to the use of newsletters and meetings. Of particular interest are program setting, program age, and the perceived level of crime in the neighborhood. These three factors are examined below.

Although the relationship between geographic setting and the scheduling of meetings is not statistically significant, the data reveal that meetings are disproportionately scheduled by NW groups in suburban areas and in medium sized cities (i.e., populations of 50,000-250,000). It is reasonable to suggest that racial and cultural homogeneity account, in part, for these findings. It may be that meetings, requiring meaningful social interaction, are most productive in areas where neighbors know each other and share common values and concerns.

This hypothesis is supported by the ancillary finding that meetings are least likely to be scheduled in large cities (i.e., populations of 250,000 and over). A crime prevention officer in one urban site expressed frustration at his inability to persuade residents of a transitional neighborhood to attend a block meeting. Residents were hesitant to host a meeting for fear that others in attendance might "case" the home to determine its value as a burglary prospect. Residents were similarly reluctant to attend a well publicized meeting at a neutral site (e.g., community building, police department) for fear that their homes might be burglarized during their absence. The officer resolved the issue to everyone's satisfaction by arranging to temporarily close the street to traffic. He then invited residents to bring lawn chairs and join him in the middle of the street.


Newsletters are much more individualized and less threatening means of information dissemination than are meetings. In view of the discussion above, it is not surprising that newsletters are disproportionately published by NW groups in large cities and their suburbs.

Newsletters and meetings are more prevalent in established, older, programs. While 55 percent of the programs established prior to 1982 reported having both newsletters and meetings, 31 percent of the programs established in the period 1982-1985 use both. Similar trends are evident when newsletters and meetings are viewed independently (see Figure 4). For each calendar year since 1980 there has been a decrease in the percentage of new programs that elect to publish newsletters; the 1985 figure is less than half of the correspondfigure for 1980. Similarly,

Figure 4

Neighborhood Watch groups that published newsletters and scheduled meetings, by year of program inception, 1978-1985

[Percent]



the percentages of programs that were initiated in 1981-85 and that schedule meetings are consistently below the sample mean, although there is no discernible pattern to these yearly figures.

In the past few years, debate about the intended and actual functions of neighborhood meetings has surfaced. It is often assumed that open discussions of criminal occurrences sensitize citizens to local crime patterns and, therefore, promote the adoption of crime preventive behaviors. This, in turn, may translate to a decrease in the actual rate of crime as citizens exhibit behavioral changes, and opportunities for crime are eliminated. Some practitioners and researchers contend that informational and educational campaigns may also produce a decrease in both the public's fear of crime and the perceived level of crime. Through the sharing of common concerns and group recognition of ameliorative strategies, residents may be convinced that they are individually and collectively empowered to combat crime in their communities.

The data in Table 8 suggest that residents are disproportionately likely to schedule meetings in neighborhoods where the crime level is judged to be higher than in adjacent neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the assumptions noted above, about the ameliorative effects of meetings on perceived crime levels, cannot be assessed with cross-sectional data.

This is particularly important because there are those who argue that meetings can increase perceived levels of crime. Several researchers have noted that, because personal victimization is a relatively rare event, fear of crime is determined primarily by indirect experiences with crime, and particularly by talking about local crimes (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Greenberg et al. 1982; Skogan et al., 1985; Rosenbaum, forthcoming).

NW meetings provide a forum in which neighbors can exchange accounts of their own or other's victimizations and during which law enforcement officials can confirm (or refute) these disclosures by presenting recent statistics on the nature and frequency of offenses reported to the police. Skogan and Maxfield have reported that "being linked to local communication networks is another source of ...'vicarious victimization'" (1981:153). Based on observations of NW activities in urban settings they concluded that "knowledge of local victims seemed to have a cumulative effect on fear... Successively greater and more diverse information about local crime was associated with higher levels of fear..." (1981:169).

The above examination of the intended and actual functions of scheduled NW meetings can be extended to include a discussion of the functions of local newsletters. In contrast to general newspaper reading, which has been shown not to be associated with levels of fear (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), neighborhood newsletters (a) devote a larger proportion of their overall content to a discussion of crime related activities and (b) concentrate crime coverage on offenses occurring within a limited geographic area. Project staff reviewed dozens of local newsletters submitted by NW groups nationwide. All provided crime prevention tips or encouraged the adoption of a particular crime prevention technique; nearly all also summarized area crime statistics.

Table 8

Neighborhood Watch groups with scheduled meetings,
by perceived level of crime

[Percent]

Scheduled meetings	Perceived level of crime			Total
	Lower	Same	Higher	
No	37.3	40.4	14.8	36.7
Yes	62.7	59.6	85.2	63.3

Newsletters, like NW meetings, are devices through which residents can learn of local victimizations. To what extent, if any, is the regular dissemination of crime data correlated with perceptions of crime?

The relationship between perceived level of crime and newsletter publication is similar to the relationship between perceived level of crime and the scheduling of neighborhood meetings. Although not statistically significant, the data in Table 9 suggest that, where the perception of crime is high, citizens are more likely to distribute newsletters. Again, the order of causality is unclear with cross-sectional data. Are citizens who perceive crime to be a serious problem more likely to institute local newsletters? Alternately, do crime oriented publications enhance residents' perceptions of crime?

Research by Lavrakas et al. (1983) supports the latter hypothesis. In their study, two versions of a neighborhood newsletter were distributed in different regions of a Chicago suburb. In both areas, the newsletter provided crime prevention tips, described successful anti-crime behaviors, and detailed relevant community activities. Residents in one of the areas also received a listing of crimes reported locally during the previous month.

After several months of newsletter distribution, the researchers interviewed a random sample of residents receiving (a) the general newsletter, (b) the newsletter with the crime attachment, and (c) neither version of the publication. Respondents who received the crime attachment were substantially more likely than were respondents in either of the comparison groups to perceive an increase in the level of neighborhood crime in the past year (p. 469). This increase in concern about crime was not accompanied by any appreciable increase in residents' fear of crime, leading the researchers to note optimistically that:

...if the newsletter with the crime attachment can raise the public's concern for crime without increasing fear at the same time, one could expect exposure to the newsletter to contribute to the public's propensity to engage in proactive, rather than restrictive, anti-crime responses... those residents who received the newsletter -- again, especially those who received the version with the crime attachment, were most likely to report taking a variety of proactive anti-crime measures (pp. 469-470).

2. Related Activities

Although NW is most often thought of as an "eyes and ears" approach to crime prevention (and, by definition, each of the programs surveyed performed this function), only 9 percent of the respondents reported utilizing this technique to the exclusion of other activities. On average, NW groups engage in at least two organized activities beyond informal surveillance. The range of activities reported is quite diverse. In addition to techniques geared specifically toward crime prevention, NW groups promote citizen participation in both crime related and community oriented activities. The nature and extent of citizen involvement in these program components are detailed below.

Table 9

Neighborhood Watch groups with published newsletters, by perceived level of crime

[Percent]

Perceived level of crime

Published newsletters	Perceived level of crime			Total
	Lower	Same	Higher	
No	43.5	52.0	30.8	44.7
Yes	56.5	48.0	69.2	55.3

Crime prevention specific activities - Of the crime prevention specific activities, the most frequently cited were Operation Identification and home security surveys. These two techniques have garnered extensive national attention and acceptance in recent years. Indeed, the operational distinction between the utilization of these techniques and of informal surveillance has become so blurred in some areas that NW has been redefined to incorporate one or both of the related activities.

As an extension to home security surveys, several programs are involved in the provision and/or installation of residential security hardware. The percentage of programs listing this activity (less than 1 percent in Table 10) is probably a low estimate of the proportion of programs that offer the service. Our site visits found a sizeable number of groups that provide hardware (e.g., locks, nonbreakable glass substitutes for windows, window bars) to senior citizens who satisfy minimal criteria, such as financial need, home ownership, or participation in local NW activities.

Installation of hardware appears to be an activity that is increasingly being dropped from programs. Law enforcement officials have remarked that police departments do not have the personnel necessary to install security devices and cannot afford either to hire others to perform this task or to bear the burden of liability should structural damage result from faulty or negligent workmanship. Consequently, while many programs noted that they will continue to provide security hardware free of charge or well below cost, some eligible residents may be unable to take advantage of the offer because of the cost of installation.

More than a third of the respondents indicated that street lighting improvement was a focal program concern. From information gleaned during site visits, project staff were able to identify three distinct methods by which street lighting improvement, as a crime prevention technique, is promoted. These include (1) the replacement of malfunctioning lights, (2) an increase in the quantity of lights, and (3) an increase in the quality of lights.

In most areas, expected citizen activity is limited to the reporting of malfunctioning street lights to the block captain/area coordinator who then notifies either the community crime prevention officer or the appropriate utility company. More formalized procedures have been instituted in some neighborhoods. In one site that we visited, the program director pointed out that local street lights are installed and maintained by three agencies. All three may have utility poles on a single block, and malfunctioning lights are often reported to the wrong agency, delaying repair. As part of the NW group's campaign to decrease the incidence of assaultive street violence, the program staff asked each of the utility companies to provide visual descriptions of their equipment. A pictorial guide to the more than 14 different street light models has been distributed so that malfunctioning equipment can be quickly and accurately reported to the proper authorities. Program staff have prepared a form letter that is mailed to the appropriate utility, identifying the location and model of broken lamps.

Table 10

Activities engaged in by Neighborhood Watch
groups, by type of activity

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Neighborhood Watch only	49	8.9
Crime Prevention Specific		
Project/Operation Identification	425	80.6
Home security surveys	357	67.9
Street lighting improvement	183	34.7
Block parenting	144	27.3
Organized surveillance	66	12.0
Traffic alteration	37	7.0
Emergency telephones	24	4.6
Project Whistle Stop	18	3.4
Specialized informal surveillance	18	3.4
Escort service	12	2.3
Hired guards	11	2.1
Environmental design	7	1.3
Lock provision/installation	4	0.7
Self defense/rape prevention	3	0.5
Crime Related		
Crime tip hotline	197	37.5
Victim/witness assistance	101	19.2
Court watch	17	3.2
Telephone chain	7	1.3
Child fingerprinting	2	0.4
Puppets on patrol	1	0.2
Community Oriented		
Physical environmental concerns	201	38.1
Insurance premium deduction survey	20	3.6
Quality of life measures	9	1.6
Medical emergency measures	4	0.7

NW groups in a second site sought to deter crime by increasing the quantity of lights, and thus visibility, on residential blocks. An arrangement was made with a local merchant who would provide and install a gas or electric globe light in the front yard at a drastically reduced price if each homeowner on the block agreed to the purchase of similar equipment. On participating blocks, the globe lamps not only promote resident safety via improved visibility, but also create a visual impression of community solidarity and add to the neighborhood's charm.

A third site has focused its crime prevention efforts on the improvement of the quality of the municipal lighting system. Until recently, the streets were illuminated by high visibility mercury vapor lights. A few years ago the city, contrary to the advice of the police department's crime prevention unit, switched to low sodium bulbs. City officials cited cost and a request from a nearby observatory (the brightness of the city interfered with scientific observations) as reasons for the transition. Crime prevention staff have been unanimous in their dislike of the new lighting scheme. They contend that the low sodium lights thwart crime prevention efforts because they (a) are too dim and (b) cause persons/things to appear monochromatic (i.e., regardless of actual color, everything looks brown).

Slightly more than 3 percent of the survey respondents specified that their groups engage in specialized but informal surveillance activities (see Table 10). Vacation Watch and Funeral Watch stem from the realization that a significant number burglaries occur while residents are temporarily and predictably absent. Because funeral arrangements are normally public information, potential burglars are alerted that a residence may be vacant for a few hours. Citizens participating in this function, or its related Wedding Watch, may simply observe a home or may volunteer to house sit.

Vacation Watch is a seasonal intensification of the more traditional NW program. Citizens notify their neighbors or the local police department as to expected dates of departure and return. The nonvacationing residents may choose to observe the neighbor's home in a more systematic fashion or may more actively participate by maintaining the home in a manner suggesting current occupancy (e.g., mow lawn, collect mail and newspapers, turn radios and lamps on and off, park a car in driveway).

Twelve percent of the surveyed programs engage in formalized surveillance activities, i.e., citizen patrols. This topic is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Crime related activities - Many groups also noted their participation in crime related (but not necessarily crime preventive) activities. These are activities that are meant to accomplish goals such as assisting in the apprehension of offenders, helping victims, and facilitating prosecutorial services. The two most widely employed activities of this kind are victim/witness assistance and crime tip hotlines. One of every five respondents listed victim/witness assistance as a program component; more than one-third mentioned the use of a crime tip hotline (see Table 10).

Crime tip hotlines are rapidly being implemented across the nation on a city-wide or town-wide scale. Despite variable applications, the common thrust is that persons with information on a particular criminal incident can contact a well publicized hotline and exchange an anonymous tip for an identifying code to be used for obtaining reimbursement should the tip result in a specified outcome. Procedural variations include, but are not limited to, (1) the amount of compensation, (2) the source of compensatory funding (e.g., citizens' donations, fundraising events, corporate contributions, municipal budget allocations), (3) frequency of hotline employment (routine use vs. specialized use in response to a notable event), and (4) criteria for reimbursement (e.g., arrest, indictment, or conviction of perpetrator; verified location of stolen goods or missing persons).

Community oriented activities - Community oriented activities comprise a third type of techniques and services employed by NW groups. These are activities that contribute to neighborhood cohesion and to the physical well-being of the community's residents. Thirty-eight percent of the survey respondents indicated that their programs were concerned with environmental issues such as graffiti, litter, and abandoned vehicles. Other community oriented activities include medical emergency measures (e.g., Vial of Life program, CPR training sessions), more generalized quality of life measures (e.g., senior citizen checks, firearms safety courses, zoning, social service referrals), and insurance premium deduction surveys.

3. Program Comprehensiveness

Previous research has suggested that participation in collective crime prevention efforts is primarily a middle-class phenomenon (Lavrakas et al., 1983; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Roehl and Cook, 1984; Greenberg et al., 1983). Such participation is said to be a function of residential income levels, social homogeneity, and social integration. Roehl and Cook have summarized concisely:

"[t]here are indications that where neighborhoods were relatively stable and/or of moderate income, citizens were more likely to participate in project activities. It seems reasonable that in neighborhoods where a substantial proportion of residents have roots in the community, own their homes, feel some identification with the community, plan to stay in the neighborhood, etc. -- and have adequate social and economic resources -- they would be more willing to assist in efforts to protect and strengthen their neighborhood" (1984:12).

Initiation of community crime prevention approaches in low income areas is viewed as particularly difficult:

"Since low income people are likely to have more restricted mobility than others in their daily activities, this means that they cannot easily avoid contact with people of different and possibly conflicting lifestyles or physical deterioration... Understandably, residents of these neighborhoods may not want to cooperate with each other to address local problems; in

fact, interaction with people with whom one feels little in common may lead to increased hostility, conflict, and fear... Thus, residents of low income, culturally heterogeneous neighborhoods are unlikely to develop either the strong informal controls that are characteristic of homogeneous lower and middle class neighborhoods or formal community organizations that are typically found in middle class neighborhoods" (Greenberg et al., 1983:7)

While these factors are apparently related to the existence of crime prevention efforts, do they also explain variability in the breadth of collective efforts? Nine percent of the responding NW groups indicated that their programs focus exclusively on informal surveillance. Other groups, however, engage in a broad range of crime preventive, crime related, and community oriented activities, with one group specifying participation in ten activities beyond NW. We pose two questions: Are there identifiable factors that are associated with a group's decision to limit its activities to informal surveillance techniques? In what ways are these groups distinguishable from NW groups that have established more in-depth programs?

For purposes of this discussion, program comprehensiveness is defined as the number of activities engaged in by NW programs in addition to traditional "eyes and ears" surveillance. This variable is the simple summation of the number of items indicated on the returned surveys in response to the following item: "Please indicate which of the following crime prevention techniques and services are offered by your Neighborhood Watch program." Response choices were: Project Identification, block parenting, hired guards, escort service, Project Whistle Stop, home security surveys, crime tip hotline, victim/witness assistance, court watch, street lighting improvement, provision of emergency telephones on street, alteration of traffic patterns, physical environmental concerns, other. The distribution of responses is displayed in Table 11.

NW groups that engage only in informal surveillance are disproportionately situated in small towns and rural settings. In general, the serviced areas are racially homogeneous, and White in particular. There is a high degree of home ownership; on average, it was estimated that 90 percent of residents are non-renters (compared to 79 percent in the overall sample). The predominant housing structures are owner-occupied residences (e.g., single family homes, condominiums, and mobile homes). The mean extent of commercialization (8 percent) is lower than that found for groups in general (13 percent).

The single-focus programs are disproportionately ones serving relatively small populations and operating with minimal budgets (i.e., less than \$500) or with no formal budgets. Overall, respondents reported that their NW programs operated in areas servicing an average of 1,718 persons. For groups that engage in informal surveillance only, this figure drops to 587 persons.

Table 11

Number of activities engaged in by
Neighborhood Watch groups

<u>Number of activities^a</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0	49	8.9
1	46	8.4
2	95	17.3
3	114	20.7
4	116	21.1
5	68	12.4
6	34	6.2
7	17	3.1
8	8	1.5
9	2	0.4
10	1	0.2

^aIn addition to informal surveillance.

The extent to which budget allocations and program comprehensiveness are interrelated could be examined only partially due to survey design. This relationship, while statistically significant ($R = .2164$; $p < .000$) is not particularly strong; indeed, the variables are statistically independent in predominantly Black neighborhoods and in areas in which it was estimated that the average annual household income was less than \$10,000 or greater than \$30,000. In the absence of additional information, the order of causality is uncertain. It is debatable whether limited program focus is a consequence of insufficient fiscal resources or to participants' decisions to restrict program expansion (for whatever reasons).

The above discussion has outlined several administrative and environmental factors that are related to the existence of single-faceted, collective crime prevention efforts. Do these variables similarly reflect the geographic and demographic environments of NW programs that engage in a greater number of activities?

The relationships between program breadth and selected environmental characteristics are not as predictable and, consequently, pose some interesting questions. Comprehensive NW groups tend to be located in urban settings in which the extent of home ownership is significantly lower ($R = -.1488$; $p < .001$) than was evidenced in NW-only areas.

The disproportionate placement of comprehensive NW programs in urban settings (see Table 12) is not contrary to expectation. Clearly, some of the activities (e.g., block parenting, street lighting improvement) are not compatible with rural settings where residences are not geographically proximate. Other activities (e.g., victim/witness assistance, court watch, crime tip hotline) are designed for environs with crime rates that are sufficiently high to warrant the initiation of these functions.

Other research has documented the prevalence of collective crime prevention efforts in racially homogeneous areas. As already noted, data analysis for this project has also revealed that citizen groups that participate only in informal surveillance activities are disproportionately located in settings identified as having a predominant racial group. In view of this, the data displayed in Table 13 are rather interesting. Although NW groups at all levels of comprehensiveness are found overwhelmingly in racially homogeneous areas, a disproportionate number of the most comprehensive programs are operating in heterogeneous neighborhoods. Whereas 23 percent of all respondents reported group participation in five or more activities, 33 percent of the programs in heterogeneous neighborhoods, but only 21 percent of the programs in homogeneous areas, claimed this breadth.

The relationship in Table 12 is not statistically significant, and the distributions may simply be methodological artifacts. Nevertheless, the data suggest that the existence and breadth of crime prevention efforts may be distinct research foci warranting separate attention.

Table 12

Number of activities engaged in by Neighborhood
Watch groups, by geographic setting

[Percent]

Number of activities ^a	Geographic setting			
	Urban [N=219]	Suburban [N=159]	Rural/ small town [N=139]	Total [N=517]
0	3.2	10.7	13.7	8.3
1 to 2	21.5	31.4	25.2	25.5
3 to 4	43.8	37.1	46.0	42.4
5 and more	31.5	20.8	15.1	23.8

^aIn addition to informal surveillance.

Table 13

Number of activities engaged in by Neighborhood Watch groups, by racial composition of serviced area

[Percent]

Number of activities ^a	Racial composition		
	Homogeneous ^b [N=430]	Heterogeneous [N=88]	Total [N=518]
0	10.0	4.5	9.1
1 to 2	27.2	22.7	26.4
3 to 4	41.9	39.8	41.5
5 and more	20.9	33.0	23.0

^aIn addition to informal surveillance.

^bRacial homogeneity was defined as the stated predominance of a particular racial group of residents within the serviced area.

Data analysis suggests that program comprehensiveness is unrelated to the perceived level of crime in the serviced area. The finding of statistical independence supports previous research by Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) and Greenberg et al. (1982). The first two researchers, employing a variety of indicators to measure fear of crime and crime perceptions, posited that neither her motivated residents to participate in collective crime prevention efforts. Greenberg et al. reported similar findings. Based on observations of NW groups in several urban sites, they concluded that there is "little relationship between the perception of the amount of crime in the neighborhood and protective behavior. While people could fairly accurately assess the amount of crime, this awareness was not necessarily translated into action" (1982:123).

Environmental Characteristics

1. Geographic Setting

Interactions with NW participants confirmed that the reporting of suspicious persons and events to law enforcement agencies, though it may be operationalized differently in various locales, has been adopted by city and farm dwellers alike. The surveyed programs represent a cross-section of geographical regions and settings with 42 percent of programs located in urban areas, 31 percent situated in suburban settings, and 27 percent in small towns or rural communities (see Table 14).

This distribution is consistent with the recently released findings of the Victimization Risk Survey, administered to over 11,000 households nationwide in 1984. That study showed that households in metropolitan areas (and those in the central cities more than in the suburbs of the metropolitan areas) were more likely than their non-metropolitan counterparts to report the existence of a NW program in their areas (Whitaker, 1986).

To better understand the association between environmental factors and NW organization and implementation, respondents were asked to characterize the geographic area serviced by the NW program. A few respondents specified city-wide boundaries. The vast majority (68 percent), however, described their programs as providing neighborhood coverage; 17 percent indicated that their programs had been organized at the block level; and 15 percent observed that NW had been adopted to deter crime in an enclosed community such as an apartment complex, a high-rise structure, or a mobile home park.

Certainly, geographic settings and housing modalities are related to the number of persons residing within a community. Estimates of the populations of serviced areas ranged from 12 to 45,000, with an average estimated population of 1,719 persons. Approximately one-third each of the survey respondents estimated the population of NW communities to be 100 or fewer persons, 101 to 499 persons, and 500 and more persons.

Respondents describe their program milieus in terms suggesting neighborhood stability. Serviced areas tend to be non-commercial

Table 14

Neighborhood Watch programs, by geographic setting

<u>Setting</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Large city (over 250,000 population)	108	20.9
Suburb of a large city	100	19.3
Medium city (50,000 to 250,000 population)	111	21.5
Suburb of a medium city	59	11.4
Small city or town	106	20.5
Rural	33	6.4

settings with a high proportion of single family dwellings, most of which are owner-occupied. Nearly three-fourths of the programs are located in communities with no commercial establishments. Where some commercialization is present, respondents estimated that, on average, only 13 percent of the serviced areas were used for commercial purposes. The types of businesses most frequently specified included shopping malls, fast-food restaurants, and bars (see Table 15).

While no respondents indicated that area merchants were opposed to the activities of the local NW group, one-fourth noted that the relationship between the citizens' group and the commercial establishments was one of nonintrusive coexistence, i.e., businesses neither supported nor impeded group functions. Ninety-three of the 142 programs that are set in communities with some commercialization characterized local businesses as being generally supportive of NW.

Merchants support NW in a variety of manners. Foremost is the provision of support services such as printing and postage. Forty-two percent of the programs that reported a relationship with local businesses cited this form of assistance. Funding and meeting space were each provided to 36 percent of the groups. Merchants also supply refreshments, moral support, equipment, and operating space.

Communities with NW programs are clearly not heterogeneous in terms of housing structures. Fewer than 4 percent of the survey respondents characterized their areas as having no predominant form of housing. Single-family dwellings were cited as the predominant type of housing more than 13 times as frequently as were apartments, townhouses and condominiums, or mobile homes.

On average, 79 percent of the homes in the serviced areas were reported to be owner-occupied, with 7 out of every 10 respondents estimating the extent of home ownership to exceed this baseline figure. This is well above the national rate of 64 percent owner occupancy that was reported by the Census Bureau in 1980.

2. Population Demography

The national survey depicts the population of NW communities as racially homogeneous (83 percent) and disproportionately upper-income wage earners (40 percent), most of whom have resided in the community for at least 5 years (see Table 16). Where a predominant racial group was indicated, White was specified most often (91 percent), with the specification of Black (5 percent) and Hispanic (4 percent) below the levels expected from 1980 Census Bureau population estimates. Fewer than 4 percent of the respondents estimated average annual household incomes to fall below \$10,000. Responses were evenly divided between the \$10,000-29,999 income bracket and the \$30,000 and over bracket.

To a certain degree, these findings are not surprising. They support previous research on the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and community organization. Indeed, Greenberg et al., in reanalyzing data from a number of paired neighborhoods, concluded that "...community crime prevention programs that require frequent contact and

Table 15

Characteristics of areas serviced by
Neighborhood Watch programs

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Predominant housing	
Apartments	5.8
Single family homes	79.2
Townhouses/condominiums	5.4
Mobile homes	5.8
No predominance	3.9
Occupancy status	
Owners	79.3
Renters	20.7
Commercialization	
Some commercial establishments	26.8
No commercial establishments	73.2

Table 16

Characteristics of residents of areas
serviced by Neighborhood Watch programs

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Predominant racial composition	
White	75.1
Black	4.4
Hispanic	3.5
No predominance	17.0
Predominant income level	
Under \$10,000	3.7
\$10,000 to \$29,999	38.5
\$30,000 and over	40.1
No predominance	17.7
Average length of residence	
1 to 2 years	8.1
3 to 5 years	23.1
5 years and longer	68.8

cooperation among neighbors, such as neighborhood watch, were less likely to be found in racially or economically heterogeneous areas" (1985: 22).

One explanation that can be advanced is that transient populations are reluctant to become involved in organized efforts to confront long-standing community concerns. This participatory void may stem from (1) the assignment of decreased significance to a problem due to limited exposure, or (2) a sense that conditions, however aversive, are tolerable because exposure is to be short-term. It should be evident, however, that, in view of findings reported in earlier sections of this report, this issue is far from settled.

3. Perceptions of Crime

There is a growing body of empirical research linking fear of crime with social disorganization. The general consensus has been that fear is an urban phenomenon and that community crime prevention efforts can promote social interaction, strengthen interpersonal bonds and, consequently, contribute to reductions in fear of crime and perceptions of crime (DuBow and Emmons, 1981; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas, 1983; Roehl and Cook, 1984; Greenberg et al., 1985; National Crime Prevention Council, 1985; Rosenbaum, 1985).²

We did not have sufficient resources to measure actual levels of crime or fear of crime. However, survey respondents were asked to assess the level of crime in the NW area relative to the level of crime in other local areas. Seventy-two percent of the contacts perceived the rate of crime in their NW areas to be lower than in adjacent neighborhoods.

To what can these perceptions be attributed? Public perception may be an accurate assessment of comparatively low levels of crime. On the other hand, it may be that the basis for the observation is false (i.e., the crime rate, in reality, is the same or higher than in adjacent areas), but public perception is, nevertheless, one of diminished vulnerability. Proponents of the social disorganization perspective emphasize the role of collective crime prevention activities in shaping public opinion. Rosenbaum, in his review of theoretical models supporting these community efforts, notes that:

[p]erhaps the biggest hope for [NW]...is that it will reduce fear of crime via this collective process. Residents would be stripped of their reasons for social isolation and distrust after developing friendship patterns with neighbors and working jointly toward reducing the common problem of crime (1985: 3-4).

Putting aside for the moment the accuracy of public perceptions about levels of crime in their neighborhoods, what social and environmental factors are associated with varying crime perceptions?

Respondents who perceived local crime levels to be relatively higher than in adjacent areas tended to describe their NW areas in terms consistent with the social disorganization perspective. The rate of crime was judged to be highest in urban settings and in areas in which

the extent of home ownership is low ($Tau_b = -.2441$; $p < .000$), the average annual household income is below \$10,000 ($Tau_b = -.1637$; $p < .000$), and the average length of residency is less than 3 years ($Tau_b = -.1024$; $p < .02$).

These findings parallel those advanced with regard to correlates of the fear of crime and, thus, are not contrary to expectation. Other findings, however, are incongruous with previous research. For example, sex and race have consistently been observed to be associated with greater fear of crime (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Baumer, 1978; Garofalo and Laub, 1978). In the present study, crime perceptions were found to be statistically independent of both the racial composition of the serviced area and the sex of the respondent.

It is plausible that respondents, who typically are spokespersons for the sampled programs and who have greater access to official police statistics on the nature and frequency of local crime, are capable of rendering judgments based on objective criteria more so than on subjective assessments of personal vulnerability. However, in the absence of additional information on rates of personal victimization, environmental conditions, and measures of social stability, our explanations are speculative at best.

CHAPTER 5

CITIZEN PATROL

Introduction

There has been a substantial increase in the number of citizen patrols during the past quarter century (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981; Yin et al., 1977). The organization of these formal surveillance groups follows no particular pattern. Patrols have been in urban, suburban, and rural settings. They involve participants from all walks of life who engage in a wide variety of activities.

This chapter begins by providing an overview of patrol objectives and functions. A general presentation of patrol typologies is followed by a discussion of the definitional criteria established for inclusion in the national survey.

Only after setting this basic framework is there a more specific presentation of administrative, operational, and environmental characteristics of sampled patrol groups. The data presentation parallels the discussion in the previous chapter and, thus, facilitates a comparison between NW programs with and without formalized surveillance components.

Patrol Typologies

Any review of citizen patrol strategies necessarily entails a basic understanding of the diversity of patrol structures, operations, and participants. The development of descriptive typologies can be useful in providing this baseline information. Accordingly, four programmatic schemes are presented below. They describe citizen patrols from the perspectives of (1) intended functions, (2) geography of the serviced area, (3) methods of operation, and (4) characteristics of patrol participants. These four classification dimensions are used for illustrative purposes only. Other equally useful classifications could be, and have been, devised (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981; Yin et al., 1977).

1. Patrol Function

While most citizen patrols focus on the prevention of crime, others are designed to deal with prevailing social conditions or civil emergencies. This first classification dimension focuses on intended patrol functions and examines the underlying purposes for patrol initiation.

In the 1960's, with civil unrest rampant, citizens often organized to protect and insulate themselves from forces that were viewed as detrimental or threatening. Black communities in the South, for example, patrolled nightly to thwart the advances of segregationist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. In the North, widening rifts between citizens and

police united urban neighborhoods. Roving patrols monitored police activities to shield against what residents believed to be racially motivated abuses of power (Yin et al., 1977).

The optimism of the late 1960's was checked by the sharp realities of the following decade. The 1970's were marked by an enhanced citizen perception of spiralling crime rates, a nationwide appeal for a return to law and order, and a growing recognition that police staffing levels were insufficient to adequately deal with an escalating crime problem. Neighborhood groups, alarmed by the rise in crime and, in some instances, by a rash of some particular type of crime, increasingly assumed responsibility for local crime control. Crime prevention served as a primary objective in the formation of a great number of these patrols. To this end, many worked closely with police personnel, sharing information and resources; others (e.g., posses, vigilantes) operated outside of and, sometimes, in conflict with, official law enforcement channels.

In the absence of a crime problem, other neighborhoods have formed patrols to maintain existing, and presumably acceptable, levels of social control. These proactive ventures may be meant to insulate a community from high crime rates in adjacent areas. This is particularly evident in clearly defined, homogeneous communities whose residents perceive themselves to be different from residents of adjacent communities.

In the past two decades, many neighborhoods have initiated patrols that address social conditions that are not directly crime oriented. In the 1960's and 1970's, suburban development, with its associated urban exodus, hastened the physical of inner-city neighborhoods. Vacant buildings fell prey to arsonists. Litter, graffiti, and abandoned vehicles were commonplace. Offensive activities -- prostitution, drug trafficking, pornography -- dotted heavily travelled thoroughfares.

Grassroots efforts to combat these conditions developed gradually within the affected communities. Neighborhood associations, concerned with a wide range of community issues, emerged and flourished. Citizens demanded more consistent law enforcement responses to illicit activities, lobbied for urban renewal funds, and patrolled the streets in an attempt to identify and rectify negative features of the environment.

Still other communities have organized citizen patrols that are trained and equipped to handle certain types of civil emergencies. In Western states, for example, CB radio groups may be activated in the event of floods, mudslides, or earthquakes. Urban emergency patrols may respond to law enforcement requests for assistance with traffic or crowd control during holidays or at major spectator events.

2. Geography of Serviced Area

A second patrol program dimension is the geography of the area serviced by the surveillance group. Area size and physical layout affect not only the administration and operation of the surveillance function but also the number and types of services offered.

Most restrictive are groups that limit their activity to the confines of one or more structures. Frequently, these building patrols are established in response to a highly publicized or particularly reprehensible crime or series of crimes. Consequently, crime prevention may be their sole objective.

Less restrictive than building patrols are patrols that have been established at the block or neighborhood level, and that encompass areas ranging in size from several homes to several square miles. These groups are typically affiliated with NW programs. Often, both crime prevention components (NW and citizen patrol) are features of a more broadly based community organization that addresses a multitude of social and environmental issues.

Groups whose circuits are defined by the geographic boundaries of some enclosed environment (e.g., mobile home park, apartment complex) exhibit similarities to both building patrols and neighborhood/block patrols. On the one hand, inhabitants of these areas, like occupants of high-rise buildings, may share values, attributes, and concerns which, while common to their residential lifestyles, may be distinctly different from the values, attributes, and concerns of persons living beyond the community's borders. Tenants in a modern apartment complex that caters to young professionals, for example, may be socially and economically distanced from the homeowners who reside in a surrounding family-oriented neighborhood. On the other hand, residents of enclosed communities, like residents of more traditional neighborhoods/blocks, may be forced to contend with social problems -- e.g., juvenile vandalism, assaultive street violence, abandoned vehicles -- that normally do not pose as great a threat to building occupants.

3. Method of Operation

The method by which surveillance activities are operationalized serves as the basis for a third patrol classification dimension. Patrols may be stationary or mobile. Mobile patrollers travel on foot or by any one of a number of modes of vehicular transportation, including automobiles, bicycles, motor scooters, and golf carts.

The scheduling of stationary patrols has been reported in geographically limited areas (e.g., lobbies of high rise apartment buildings) and in areas whose residents, because of an unacceptably high incidence of some criminal behavior, elect to post guards at high-crime sites (e.g., bus stops, darkened parking lots, recreation facilities).

In comparison, mobile patrols (foot and vehicular) are found in a wider range of settings. While some decisions regarding the method of mobility are based on financial considerations, others reflect attempts to achieve some stated objective. In densely populated urban neighborhoods, guards may patrol on foot so as to better establish rapport with local youths and merchants. Vehicular surveillance may be preferred in other areas because it (a) facilitates movement, permitting participants to cover more acreage with less difficulty, and (b) shields the participants from inclement weather conditions and potential harm. As such, vehicle patrols are popular in rural settings, geographically

large expanse, high crime zones, northern climates, hilly regions, and areas where senior citizens comprise a substantial proportion of patrol participants.

4. Patrol Participation

A fourth dimension characterizing formal surveillance activities focuses on the relationship between patrol participants and patrol operations. For our purposes, four classes of patrol participants are noted: (1) paid or unpaid residents of the area; (2) paid non-residents, i.e., hired guards; (3) unpaid non-residents, e.g., auxiliary police; and (4) paid or unpaid merchants or employees of commercial enterprises within the serviced area.

Any combination of these participation categories may be operating in a single neighborhood. Merchant associations that schedule employee patrols during normal business hours may opt for hired guards during evening and weekend shifts. A second example would be the mixed-zone neighborhood in which homes and shops are interspersed. Residents and merchants, equally concerned about arson threats, juvenile vandalism, or other criminal behavior, might join forces in establishing a nightly patrol to safeguard their persons and property.

Clearly, the relationship of the patroller to the surveillance activity bears on the quality and quantity of program services. It should not be surprising to discover that indigenous guards (residents or merchants) express a more active interest in maintaining community standards than do salaried non-residents or auxiliary police who live across town. Similarly, associations that represent merchants in high-crime districts may pay substantial premiums to ensure comprehensive customer security during peak business periods but may be minimally concerned about the safety of these same persons when shops are closed.

Definitions

Because of the diversity of patrol types and functions, research must necessarily set criteria that assist in the identification of a pool of subjects for study. Yin et al. (1976), in a comprehensive review of over 200 resident patrols in 16 urban areas, established four defining criteria. In order to be included within their study, it was required that a patrol (1) maintain a regular, fixed surveillance schedule, (2) focus on the prevention of criminal acts, (3) be administered by a citizen or resident organization, and (4) direct its activities primarily toward residential rather than commercial structures (1976:3-4).

The definition employed by this project, while similar, is both more restrictive and more inclusive than that utilized by Yin et al. For purposes of this study, a citizen patrol component of a NW program was defined by five criteria. First, surveillance is organized and systematic and focuses on a defined area. This emphasis on systematic organization precludes inclusion of groups whose members patrol only "when convenient". Patrols that assemble on an ad hoc basis following the commission of a notable event (i.e., posse, vigilantes) are similarly

excluded. This criterion specifies that surveillance shifts are to be systematically scheduled in advance with particular individuals assigned for each shift.

Second, the purpose of the surveillance is to detect criminal incidents and suspicious behaviors/situations. This criterion is similar to one employed by Yin et al. and excludes from the study groups that have been organized solely for purposes other than crime prevention. Examples are groups that only serve as social service referrals, lobby for zoning modifications, or search for missing children or animals. Any group that engaged in these or similar activities in addition to crime prevention surveillance was eligible for study inclusion.

Third, participation in the surveillance activity involves vigilance beyond the realm of routine daily activities. This condition emphasizes the primacy of the surveillance function. Utility employees, appliance repair personnel, taxi drivers, postal carriers, and others who may be trained to recognize and report suspicious situations are specifically excluded. While the value of these programs to community crime prevention is not questioned, their surveillance function is, at best, ancillary to their other activities.

Fourth, most of the program participants live or work in the serviced area. The intent of this condition was to identify groups whose memberships have a personal interest in maintaining the quality of the patrol activity. Thus, responses from auxiliary police units (which can be assigned to tasks anywhere within the jurisdiction of the presiding law enforcement agency) were not analyzed. In order to satisfy this condition a patrol need not be primarily (or even tangentially) concerned with residential crime. Indeed, a merchant patrol established to protect commercial interests could be included. This standard is less restrictive than that set by Yin et al. in their exclusion of activities directed primarily towards commercial areas.

Fifth, participation in the surveillance activity of the program does not constitute a primary source of employment for these individuals. Here, too, the definition of patrol deviates from that employed by Yin et al. While this final criterion does not exclude the employment of some paid administrative staff or full-time volunteers, it does preclude from consideration those programs that rely predominantly on paid security guards.

Using the above five criteria as a screening mechanism, project staff identified 66 surveillance activities within the sampled counties. This figure is not intended to be an accurate assessment of the total number of organized surveillance activities within the selected areas; nor does it provide a basis for extrapolation of the number of patrols in the nation or in the sample counties. Organized surveillance groups that are not specifically linked with NW, or that are associated with NW programs that failed to satisfy our criteria for survey inclusion, are not represented in this count. Patrols that have been organized for reasons other than crime prevention (e.g., civil emergencies) are likewise missing. The reader is therefore cautioned about making comparisons between these findings and those of previous research endeavors.

Many of the findings presented in this chapter are based upon an analysis of survey responses. Respondents were asked to detail various administrative, operational, and environmental characteristics of the patrol program. In particular, information was elicited on relationships with law enforcement; budget and staffing; program age; patrol patterns, schedules, and activities; and membership qualifications and training. Additional information was gleaned from interviews with police department personnel and patrol administrators, program manuals, crime prevention literature distributed in patrolled areas, and informal conversations with patrol members. Together these pieces of information allow us to examine attitudinal, demographic, and geographic factors characteristic of areas with patrols and to establish a profile of patrolled areas and patrol participants.

Analysis of the survey data revealed broad diversity in the administration and operation of patrol programs. Groups patrol both on foot and by vehicle. While some programs are operational only on weekends in the evening hours, others provide around-the-clock coverage. Clearly, strength of membership and budgetary allocations are instrumental in defining the breadth and intensity of surveillance activities. Active membership lists were estimated to carry between 2 and 700 names. Annual budgets were reported to range from \$0 to \$70,000. The administrative, operational, and environmental characteristics of these programs are discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this chapter.

Administrative Characteristics

1. Budget and Staffing

NW programs with patrol components have more formalized structures and specialized needs than do NW programs in general. The nature of the surveillance activity often necessitates the purchase of equipment for communication and identification purposes (e.g., CB radios, walky-talkys, magnetic signs). Consequently, it is reasonable to hypothesize that these groups operate with larger budgets than do their informal counterparts. Surprisingly, the reverse is true. Patrol programs reported substantially smaller annual budgets for 1985 than did nonpatrol programs. Although one program acknowledged an allocation of \$70,000, more than three-fourths of the groups operated with yearly allocations of less than \$500. The average annual budget was computed to be \$2,082, an amount that is markedly lower than the corresponding calculation of \$7,272 for all NW groups.

The effects of small budgets are evident in program staffing levels and reimbursement policies. To a greater extent than is the case with NW programs in general, volunteerism is crucial. More than 99 percent of administrative personnel are unpaid staff. Only five patrol groups supply any monetary reimbursement to participants. Three of these groups compensate patrollers for fuel expenses; equipment expenditures are reimbursable by four groups. No patrol provides remuneration for time spent on patrol, i.e., there are no "paid" patrollers.

Citizen patrols are typically products of community resources. Yin et al. observed that "most of the patrols are carried out without any direct support from public sources... Most of the patrols relied on association fees, voluntary contributions, or fund-raising drives to provide financial support" (1976:17). Our findings were concordant. One very active community organization routinely sponsors raffles and conducts garage sales to raise money for its crime prevention efforts. Another has opened a thrift shop, the proceeds from which support patrol activities.

While most citizen patrols are products of community resources, a few are supported by legislative mandate. In 1973, for example, the Detroit City Council approved an ordinance authorizing municipal subsidy of local patrols. The annual allocation of \$50,000 is to be used to reimburse citizen groups for mileage, equipment purchases, and related patrol expenditures. To be eligible for funding consideration, a patrol must satisfy certain legislatively prescribed criteria. A group must (1) be chartered by the state as a non-profit corporation, (2) have a written constitution or by-laws, (3) be organized primarily for the purpose of community crime prevention, and (4) keep detailed records of volunteer hours and corporation expenditures. Patrollers may not (1) carry weapons, (2) wear uniforms resembling those of sworn officers, or (3) employ physical force except in the face of substantial harm to self or others (see Appendix C).

2. Relationship with Law Enforcement

Among all the NW programs in our survey, 94 percent receive some substantive assistance from law enforcement agencies, and all appear to have tacit approval. The strength of the relationship between law enforcement and programs with patrol components is only slightly less. Ninety-one percent of the surveillance groups received police assistance at inception. At the time of the survey 88 percent of the patrols reported continuing police assistance.

The observations of Yin et al. suggest that police assistance is provided less often to building patrols (excepting large public housing projects) than to neighborhood or block patrols. They concluded that:

"Inasmuch as the local police do not, as a rule, protect specific buildings, they are not usually consulted when the building patrols are established. Moreover, once the patrol has begun operations, there is minimal contact in the field between the patrol members and the regular police" (1976:58).

Data from the national survey are not inconsistent with this observation. Building patrols (established in single buildings or in adjacent buildings) were less likely than were neighborhood patrols (75 percent vs. 90 percent) to have received any law enforcement assistance at initiation. With the passage of time, these figures have remained relatively unchanged: 75 percent of the building patrols and 85 percent of the neighborhood patrols receive substantive police assistance for on-going operations.

The nature of police involvement with patrol programs is quite diversified. It ranges from extensive administrative and operational support to reactive assistance to active discouragement. Each of these departmental postures was represented in one or more of our site visit locales.

Active support for surveillance activities was evident in several jurisdictions. Over three-fourths of the groups benefit from police sponsored training and three-fifths are the recipients of purchased or loaned equipment (e.g., patrol vehicle, CB radio, search light). Administrative and operational services provided to patrol groups include the screening of patrol candidates by means of computerized background checks, the provision of local crime statistics, and the donation of space for base station operations. In one site, university-based law enforcement personnel not only supplied radio equipment to patrol members on a routine basis but also employed their communications control center for patching messages between patrol teams and/or a shift supervisor. Perhaps the most visible support offered to patrol groups has been the departmental recognition of outstanding patrol activities/members in the media and at award luncheons.

Based on field observations and informal communications with various individuals, reactive assistance appears to be departmental policy in one-fourth to one-half of the surveyed jurisdictions. In these, sites police personnel provide limited assistance (e.g., speakers, liaisons) when requested, but they do not assume participatory or leadership roles in patrol administration or operations. The police remain relatively neutral in that they neither encourage nor discourage patrol organization.

The departmental stance that was least frequently observed was that of active resistance to patrol organization. Personnel with whom we spoke cited liability concerns and a fear of vigilantism as the bases for this position.


Of those patrol groups that receive any form of law enforcement assistance, seven out of ten cited county agencies as the suppliers. Local authorities and state police were mentioned by substantially fewer programs (36 percent and 5 percent, respectively). As illustrated in Figure 5, the extent of local and county level assistance provided to patrol groups is nearly the reverse of that provided to NW programs in general. These dramatic differences reflect the nature of the geographic settings in which the programs are situated. Whereas NW programs are predominately organized in urban areas, programs with patrol components are disproportionately located in rural, small town, and suburban environs (see discussion below).

3. Program Age

The age distribution of citizen patrol programs is presented in Figure 6. While yearly fluctuations appear exaggerated due to the small sample size, the overall chart is noticeably similar to the one for all NW programs (see Figure 2). The most active period for patrol inception was the 4-year span 1981-84, during which 72 percent of all surveyed patrols became operational.

Figure 5


Law enforcement assistance currently provided to Neighborhood Watch groups, by level of law enforcement



^a"Other" law enforcement includes game wardens and immigration officials.

Figure 6

Citizen patrol programs,
by year of inception



Year of inception	Number	Percent
1966	1	1.6
1972	1	1.6
1976	1	1.6
1977	1	1.6
1978	2	3.1
1979	5	7.8
1980	4	6.3
1981	11	17.2
1982	10	15.6
1983	14	21.9
1984	11	17.2
1985	3	4.7

The annual initiation rate crested in 1983, dropped moderately in 1984, and plummeted in 1985. This pattern parallels the abrupt downward trend in the establishment of all NW programs. Possible reasons for the trend were discussed in Chapter 4 and will not be repeated here.

Operational Characteristics

1. Publicity and Information

Communities with citizen patrols are more likely to promote the existence and operational characteristics of their programs than are communities without formalized surveillance activities. Survey data show that all patrolled areas (compared to 94 percent of the total sample) employ identifying signs and/or window decals to advertise their group's presence. Furthermore, a larger percentage of patrol groups schedule neighborhood meetings (68 percent vs. 61 percent) and publish newsletters (65 percent vs. 54 percent). Because of a heavy reliance on active participation by residents, these forums are needed to promote volunteerism and to assist with administrative tasks such as team scheduling.

Approximately one-third of the citizen patrols sponsor activities to maintain participant interest. Examples include award banquets, neighborhood parties, prize raffles, commercial discounts for volunteers, and media recognition.

2. Patrol Schedules

Table 17 summarizes the survey findings on the frequency of patrol coverage. Fifty-six percent of the responding patrol groups indicated that they are operational 7 days per week; over three-fourths of the respondents schedule patrols a minimum of 5 days per week. As expected, weekends are the most popular nights for coverage. Nearly all (98 percent) of the groups patrol on Friday night and 91 percent are active on Saturday. The least frequently patrolled day is Sunday and, even then, over two-thirds of the groups are operational.

On average, patrol coverage is provided 4 hours daily. A closer examination reveals that the extent of activity is quite variable. One group in a condominium complex patrols for only 30 minutes each evening, and then only in the vicinity of the recreational center. A second group in a southern retirement community reported that, on any given day, six consecutive patrol teams are scheduled, each working a 4-hour shift. Thus, around-the-clock coverage is ensured.

This discussion of the number of hours of daily coverage is somewhat misleading in that it does not provide an accurate picture of the intensity of surveillance activities. Depending upon the physical size of the patrol jurisdiction, the number of teams assigned for any shift will vary. As shown in Table 17, 57 percent of the surveillance groups routinely schedule only one team per shift. Others, however, have as many as eight teams on the streets at any one time.

Table 17

Frequency and strength of patrol coverage

	<u>Percent</u>
Frequency of operation	
2 days/wk	7.3
3 days/wk	9.1
4 days/wk	5.5
5 days/wk	9.1
6 days/wk	12.7
7 days/wk	56.4
Days of operation	
Monday	78.2
Tuesday	78.2
Wednesday	87.3
Thursday	81.8
Friday	98.2
Saturday	90.9
Sunday	65.5
Seasonal variation	
Yes	39.3
No	60.7
Minimum number of teams per shift	
1	80.7
2	14.0
3	3.5
4 or more	1.8
Maximum number of teams per shift	
1	57.1
2	23.2
3	14.3
4 or more	5.4

Also variable is the number of persons assigned to each team. The most frequently reported model is the two-person team, utilized by 71 percent of the survey respondents. This partner approach promotes individual safety and provides companionship. While it can be argued that teams of more than two persons could better deter crime, emphasize safety, and alleviate boredom, such composition is not a realistic goal in many locations due to the limited availability of volunteers.

Four out of ten programs reported that the frequency of surveillance (the number of days per week as well as the number of hours per day) is subject to seasonal variation. Southern resort communities schedule additional coverage during the winter months as tourists and seasonal residents flee northern climates in search of warmer temperatures. Similarly, the resort areas in northern states increase surveillance from Memorial Day through Labor Day due to substantial fluctuations in resident populations.

3. Patrol Patterns

In most cases, the geographic bounds of the area subject to formalized surveillance are consistent with those of the overall NW program (see Table 18). In other sites, coverage may be limited to a specifically targeted locale. Generally, these localized patrols are instituted in response to a series of criminal incidents. Offense-targeted patrols of this type were observed in several sites. One such citizens group organized to deter assaultive violence at a bus stop. Teams park and observe the area daily at rush hour. A second group was initiated in an urban rental neighborhood after a number of women were raped. Groups of residents now take turns walking the streets in the late evening hours.

Ninety-four percent of citizen patrols conduct vehicular surveillance. Although the primary mode of transportation is an automobile, several groups use bicycles, motor scooters, or golf carts during their tours of duty. Foot patrol is the method of surveillance specified by 6 percent of the respondents, with 28 percent indicating that both foot and vehicular patrols are scheduled.

Just over one-fifth of the respondents described their group's patrol pattern as regular, i.e., predetermined and repetitive. Most groups prefer irregular coverage for two reasons. First, irregularity (and, thus, unpredictability) of surveillance is believed to be a more effective deterrent to criminal behavior. This principle, although not specifically tested within the NW context, has been demonstrated in studies of behavior modification techniques. Second, it counters the monotony that accompanies any inflexible routine. In one city, patrol members walk their assigned beats in random fashion. One observed team made a point of patrolling alleys and subway stations where criminal activity could be more easily concealed. Other teams preferred to walk major arteries where their presence is more visible.

Surveillance activities are directed primarily towards residential security, with only 22 percent of the responding programs reporting that commercial security is given comparable emphasis. This distribution of

Table 18

Characteristics of patrol coverage

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Size of patrolled area relative to size of overall Neighborhood Watch program	
Smaller	29.8
Same	63.2
Larger	7.0
Method of patrol	
Foot	6.2
Vehicle	66.2
Both foot and vehicle	27.7
Patrol pattern	
Regular	21.1
Irregular	78.9
Patrol focus	
Residential	78.5
Residential and commercial	21.5

surveillance focus is not so much a conscious decision to exclude commercial structures from patrol coverage as it is a reflection of the extent of commercialization in patrolled communities. Seventy-one percent of the neighborhoods with active patrol components report no commercial establishments.

4. Patrol Operations

While on patrol, citizens engage in diverse activities, the quintessence of which is simple observation. Twenty-eight percent of the groups reported that, in a typical month, shift rotations were uneventful, i.e., no suspicious persons or incidents were observed. In total, two-thirds of the patrols noted that three or fewer suspicions were logged monthly. Crimes in progress were observed far less frequently. Three-fifths of the groups do not encounter any criminal activities in an average month; less than 10 percent observe three or more crimes; one group estimated encountering ten such occurrences each month.

When a crime in progress or an otherwise suspicious activity is discovered, what action is to be taken? In either instance, approximately 85 percent of the patrols have instructed their members to relay the information directly to law enforcement officials. Another 14 percent have been directed to transmit relevant information to a base station operator who, in turn, will notify the police. Only one program advocates personal intervention or investigation.


In addition to surveillance, citizen groups assume other responsibilities. As depicted in Figure 7, 56 percent of the patrols report malfunctioning street lights. Nearly half monitor household security. In most neighborhoods this is accomplished by repeated passes by a home that is known to be unoccupied. A more proactive stance has been adopted in other locations where patrol members physically test residential hardware and make note of conditions conducive to victimization (e.g., darkened homes, obstructive shrubbery, garage doors left open, valuables left in plain view). This individualized list of "violations" is then forwarded to the homeowner in question.

Most (86 percent) patrol operations entail both a field team(s) and a base station. Establishment of base station operations serves multiple purposes. First, it exists as a central post for inter-team communications. Survey data reveal that, where multiple teams are scheduled simultaneously, three-fourths of the teams maintain contact with each other. Of these, 77 percent communicate directly via CB radios. Others must rely on in-person contacts or limited range transmission devices such as walky-talkys. Base stations can facilitate inter-team relays if centrally located so as to be within walking and transmission distances of individual teams. Teams can thus maintain contact indirectly.

Second, base stations facilitate communications between patrol teams and emergency personnel. If a patrol encounters a situation requiring immediate assistance, base operators can quickly relay pertinent

Figure 7

Activities engaged in by citizen patrols, by type of activity



^a"Other" activities included the reporting of potholes, missing street signs, stray cattle, and vehicles blocking wheelchair ramps and fire hydrants.

information to law enforcement, fire, or medical emergency personnel. This link is invaluable for patrols that have limited communication capabilities.

Finally, base station staff can monitor team safety. This function is particularly salient in urban settings where volunteers patrol crime-ridden neighborhoods. One walking patrol requires team members to check in with the shift supervisor every 30 minutes and to specify their current location. Failure to comply with this routine procedure triggers a base station effort to ascertain team status.

Patrol operations employ a broad range of equipment, including automobiles, radios, search lights, and sirens (see Table 19). As a rule, members of vehicular patrols provide their own transportation and fuel, although several programs reimburse volunteers for logged mileage. CB radios are provided equally as frequently by the volunteer as by the NW program itself. Two-way radios are generally purchased by the program and loaned out to the scheduled teams.

Programs are fairly flexible in their delineation of allowable equipment for patrol usage. A few programs permit participants to carry a nightstick and to leash an attack dog if the individual supplies them. And, while several respondents reacted negatively to the mere suggestion that their volunteers might carry firearms, one program not only allows such possession but encourages its membership to be armed when on duty.

There is some question as to whether individuals on patrol should be visibly identifiable. One position is that there is greater deterrent potential if the existence of the patrol is highly publicized but if the frequency and pattern of surveillance activities remain unknown. Under this model, the deterrent effect associated with unmarked personnel is easily generalizable to times and areas when no patrol is operational. The competing model is that high visibility is a more effective deterrent to crime. Although the deterrent value created by this approach varies depending upon the presence of identifiable patrols, there is an additional benefit in that residents who observe the patrol may feel safer in their homes.

One patrol that was encountered during a field visit adopted an approach that is a synthesis of the two models. During daylight hours, surveillance vehicles are clearly identified by magnetic signs that carry the patrol's name. At dusk the signs are removed and the patrol team completes its tour in what is now an unmarked automobile.

In total, 74 percent of the mobile patrols employ some form of vehicle identification. In addition, 10 groups require their membership to carry identification cards, and 4 mandate identifiable clothing (armbands, patches, or caps).

5. Training and Qualifications

Because there are no "paid" patrollers, the stability of organized surveillance activities is necessarily dependent upon the continued availability of volunteers. Consequently, the majority of programs have

Table 19

Equipment provided for patrol usage,
by source of provision

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Source of provision</u>				<u>Not provided</u>
	<u>Individual</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	
CB Radio	12	12	8	4	30
2-way radio/walky-talky	2	22	9	1	32
Search light/flashlight	16	25	6	2	17
Camera	2	0	0	0	64
Horn/siren	6	1	0	1	58
Whistle	2	1	0	0	62
Automobile	51	1	0	4	8
Automobile fuel	44	2	1	9	8
Trained dog	1	0	0	0	65
Gun	1	0	0	0	65
Nightstick	3	0	0	0	63

no agreed upon criteria for accepting or rejecting an individual who applies for group membership. Acceptance is pro forma.

Where selection standards have been established, they are typically of two types: (a) necessary conditions for qualification, and (b) conditions which, if present, are sufficient to disqualify an individual for membership consideration. Examples of qualification criteria are minimum age requirements (usually 18 or 21), residency, and production of solid references. Exclusion criteria are exemplified by prior criminal record, a history of alcohol or drug dependency, and inability to demonstrate physical agility (see Table 20).

Eighty-seven percent of all citizen patrols mandate some form of training for new recruits. Two-thirds of the groups have adopted informal training mechanisms whereby volunteers receive "on the job" training or are simply given literature detailing proper patrol procedures.

Nearly three-fourths of the groups also provide formal training sessions, often conducted by law enforcement or private security personnel. Two examples of formalized training were observed during site visits. In Detroit, the Crime Prevention Section of the Detroit Police Department offers an optional 8-hour course for patrol volunteers at the police academy. The semi-annual training sessions cover a variety of topics including first aid, patrol techniques, liability issues, and auto theft recognition and prevention. Boston patrol volunteers are required to attend 12 hours of intensive training. These training sessions are conducted thrice annually by StreetSAFE personnel with additional input from guest speakers. Information is provided on program history and objectives; law enforcement and judicial processes; technical use of police radios; classification of criminal activity; and authorized arrest procedures. Instruction is given on proper patrol procedures, observation skills, and self-defense techniques. Volunteers also learn the proper procedure to be followed in dealing with medical emergencies and with victims of violent crime. Presentations are given on racism, sexism, and homophobia.

Few patrols have had to remove volunteers from active duty and less than a third have adopted specific removal standards. Rule violations constitute the greatest proportion of dismissal standards (see Table 20). Accounts of the range of behaviors that fall within this criterion describe excessive display of authoritarianism, vigilantism, and attempts at wresting control of patrol operations. Other removal standards include the use or possession of drugs, alcohol, or weapons while on duty; involvement in criminal activity; and failure to appear during scheduled shifts.

6. Patrol Membership

The strength of patrol memberships, as reported by surveyed programs, varies from 2 to 700 persons. Nearly half of the groups have 50 or fewer active participants. In contrast, nine programs estimate their membership rolls to be in excess of 200 persons; among these is one program in a mobile home park where all 700 adult residents were said to be active patrollers.

Table 20

Standards used in the selection and
removal of patrol members

<u>Standard</u>	<u>Percent^a</u>
Selection standards	
Qualification criteria	
Minimum age for acceptance	30
Area residency	10
References	5
No specified criteria	61
Exclusion criteria	
Criminal record	38
Alcohol/drug history	6
Physical disability	4
Acceptance of other members	2
Undesirability	2
No specified criteria	54
Removal standards	
Rule violation	31
Alcohol/drug use	18
Weapon possession	10
Criminal activity	16
Unreliability	13
No specified criteria	68

^aPercents may not add to 100 due to multiple responses.

The demography of individuals involved in organized surveillance activities is outlined in Table 21. The disproportionate representation of participants within the "50 years and older" age group reflects the active involvement of senior citizens in local patrols. However, the generalizability of this finding is debatable. It may be that, because elderly persons have fewer time commitments, they have more time to devote to patrol activities. This hypothesis is supported by data on the employment status of patrol volunteers, which indicate that 50 percent of all volunteers are retired. A related explanation is that senior citizens are drawn to patrol participation because it serves a social-psychological function in some retirement communities. Volunteerism allows residents to derive enjoyment through social interaction while also enhancing self-worth by providing a useful service to the community.

On the other hand, the disproportionate representation of the elderly among patrol participants may be an artifact of survey response patterns. Fifty-five percent of the responding patrol programs are from Florida. Not all are retirement communities (or even inhabited predominantly by older populations). Nevertheless, many are, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that seniors are more likely to complete and return a detailed questionnaire because (a) they have fewer pressing time commitments and (b) their programs may be more centrally focused facets of their daily routines.

Patrol members are predominantly White, male, and have annual household incomes of \$10,000-29,999. This profile parallels the broader demographic profile of all persons (regardless of patrol membership) who reside in patrolled areas. These data, albeit sketchy, nevertheless suggest that persons who volunteer for patrol duty are representative of the populations of their communities. Data on the average length of citizen involvement in surveillance activities parallels the age profile of patrol programs. Thus, it appears that most currently active participants have been patrol members since group inception.

7. Related Activities

As indicated in Table 22, one-third of the NW programs with patrol components engage in no activities beyond formal and informal surveillance. This is a substantially more exclusivity of focus than was evidenced by NW groups in general (9 percent). Of the additional techniques that are employed, Project Identification and home security surveys are cited most frequently. Neither, however, is promoted as vigorously by patrol groups as by the total groups (for a comparison, see Table 10). Patrol groups are also less likely to institute either block parenting or a crime tip hotline. However, they are more likely than other NW groups to provide escort services, hire security personnel, and mobilize the citizenry in response to physical environmental concerns.

In view of both earlier discussions and available information on the geography and demography of surveilled environments, the finding about exclusivity of focus is not particularly surprising. Several factors appear to be relevant.

Table 21

Characteristics of persons participating
in citizen patrols

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Age	
Under 20 years	1.5
20 to 29 years	8.5
30 to 49 years	26.8
50 years and older	63.6
Sex	
Male	57.0
Female	43.0
Race	
White	91.3
Black	8.1
Other	0.6
Annual household income	
Under \$10,000	7.0
\$10,000 to \$29,999	52.3
\$30,000 and over	40.7
Employment	
Employed	44.6
Unemployed	5.2
Retired	50.3
Other	0.8
Average length of citizen involvement in patrol activities	
Less than 1 year	11.9
1 year	20.3
2 years	28.8
3 years	15.3
4 years	16.9
5 years or longer	6.8

Table 22

Activities engaged in by Neighborhood Watch groups with patrol components, by type of activity

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Neighborhood Watch Only	22	33.3
Project/Operation Identification	33	64.7
Home security surveys	32	62.7
Physical environmental concerns	24	47.1
Crime tip hotline	10	19.6
Street lighting improvement	19	37.3
Block parenting	4	7.8
Victim witness assistance	9	17.6
Traffic alteration	6	11.8
Emergency telephones on street	2	3.9
Project Whistle Stop	1	2.0
Court watch	1	2.0
Escort service	5	9.8
Hired guards	3	5.9
Other	3	6.0

One factor that immediately comes to mind is human resources. Enduring patrol operations require continuing community cooperation. The salience of this alliance is apparent. In order to maintain a specified level of surveillance a program must be able to draw repeatedly on its constituency. Patrol members, particularly those in groups with limited enrollment, are asked to commit time and energy on a regular basis. Residents who assume leadership roles must be willing and able to respond quickly and efficiently to immediate concerns such as base station operations, scheduling conflicts, and equipment maintenance. This continual drain on human resources may preclude group involvement in a broader range of activities.

Two additional factors are geographic setting and population homogeneity. In an earlier discussion of the activity level of all NW programs, it was noted that the programs engaging in the fewest activities were those that were established in rural settings and that have racially and socially homogeneous populations. The relative absence of classic urban problems (e.g., litter, youth gangs, residential burglaries) may underlie this association. Similarly, population heterogeneity has been linked with reductions in social cohesion. In the absence of informal social control, more formalized measures may be engendered. In contradistinction, racial and social homogeneity may be indicative of an environment in which deviance is controlled within the basic kinship or social unit. Consequently, community crime prevention measures may be viewed as unnecessary and, possibly, intrusive. To a greater degree than was the case with the overall sample, NW programs with patrol components are disproportionately found in rural and suburban areas. In addition, the homogeneity of the populace is fairly well documented. The potential effect of these findings should be clear in light of the above commentary.

The lesser involvement of patrol groups in related crime prevention activities can be attributed, in part, to the composition of households in neighborhoods with organized surveillance activities. The predominant household composition in 37 percent of the patrolled areas is occupation by elderly couples or individuals. The corresponding figure for all NW groups was 10 percent. Furthermore, only 14 percent of the responding programs reported the predominance of households with children (compared with 32 percent overall). In such "adult" environments, block parenting could not be expected to be widely promoted. Similarly, the five-fold increase in the provision of escort service can be explicated by the large proportion of senior citizens.

Environmental Characteristics

1. Geographic Setting

In sharp contrast to the locations of all NW programs, patrol programs are disproportionately situated in nonurban settings. As displayed in Table 23, large and medium cities account for only 12 percent of surveillance groups, a decrease of 30 percentage points from the geographic distribution for all NW activities. The shift in representation is assumed equally by suburban areas (46 percent) and smalltown/rural settings (42 percent), with each increasing by 15 percentage points.

Table 23

Neighborhood Watch programs with citizen
patrols, by geographic setting

<u>Setting</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Large city (over 250,000 population)	5	8.5
Suburb of a large city	10	16.9
Medium city (50,000 to 250,000 population)	2	3.4
Suburb of a medium city	17	28.8
Small city or town	15	25.4
Rural	10	16.9

Despite the vast differences in geographic placement, Table 24 demonstrates that, in many respects, the physical characteristics of patrolled areas parallel those of NW groups in general. The mean extent of commercialization is similar to that reported for all groups (29 percent vs. 27 percent), and the level of home ownership is likewise relatively unchanged (81 percent vs. 79 percent).

There is, however, a marked difference in the types of available housing. Single-family homes are less prevalent, although still predominant in patrolled settings; townhouses/condominiums and mobile homes have an increased presence. This is consistent with the previously stated finding that household compositions are disproportionately elderly. Townhouses and condominiums are generally situated in complexes where routine maintenance, social calendars, and recreational facilities are provided by the management corporation in exchange for an annual or monthly fee. Elderly residents oftentimes prefer this arrangement because it maximizes opportunities for social interaction while minimizing stress inducing responsibilities. Some mobile home parks, particularly those in retirement communities, provide similar amenities.

2. Population Demography

Characteristics of persons residing in areas serviced by organized surveillance activities are displayed in Table 25. In brief, these individuals are predominantly long-term, middle-class homeowners.

The patrolled neighborhoods tend to be more racially homogeneous than NW neighborhoods in general, a fact that is clearly related to their geographic situation in nonurban settings. Fewer than 10 percent of the respondents indicated that their areas had no predominant racial groups. Where a racial predominance was indicated, White was specified by most often (by 95 percent of the responding patrol groups).

Whereas residential income levels in NW areas were fairly evenly distributed between the \$10,000-29,999 and \$30,000 and over income categories (see Table 16), such is not the case in patrolled areas. In patrolled neighborhoods, more than half of the residents were estimated to be middle-income (\$10,000-29,000) wage earners, with only 26 percent in the upper-income bracket.

3. Perceptions of Crime

The greater concentration of patrol groups in middle-income neighborhoods might be accounted for by a relationship between income levels and crime levels (perceived or actual). However, further data analyses fail to support this hypothesis. The relationship between income and the perceived level of neighborhood crime is statistically significant among NW programs without patrol components; a disproportionate number of respondents in neighborhoods with average annual household incomes of \$30,000 or more perceived area crime levels to be lower than in adjacent neighborhoods. However, the corresponding association among NW programs with patrol components is not significant. While only 8 percent of the respondents from middle-income neighborhoods perceived local crime rates to be the same or higher, 28 percent of the

Table 24

Characteristics of areas serviced by Neighborhood
Watch programs with citizen patrols

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Predominant housing	
Apartments	4.8
Single family homes	62.9
Townhouses/condominiums	9.7
Mobile home park	21.0
No predominance	1.6
Occupancy status	
Owners	80.6
Renters	19.4
Commercialization	
Some commercial establishments	28.6
No commercial establishments	71.4

Table 25

Characteristics of residents of areas serviced by
 Neighborhood Watch programs with citizen patrols

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Predominant racial composition	
White	85.9
Black	4.7
No predominance	9.4
Predominant income level	
Under \$10,000	3.8
\$10,000 to \$29,999	50.9
\$30,000 and over	26.4
No predominance	18.9
Average length of residence	
1 to 2 years	9.8
3 to 5 years	27.9
5 years and longer	62.3

respondents from upper-income areas shared this perception. Furthermore, despite the fact that all respondents from lower-income settings perceived local crime to be higher than in neighboring areas, the representation of these areas among patrol programs (4 percent) simply mirrors their distribution in the overall sample.

This is not the first time such a paradox has been reported. Other researchers have found that relationships among crime, fear of crime, perceptions of crime, and crime preventive behaviors are obtuse (Furstenberg, 1972; Maxfield, 1977).

Clearly, the decision as to whether or not patrol operations are initiated in a particular neighborhood is dependent upon the interaction of a wide range of variables that are not easily quantifiable. The nature of our survey did not allow us to conduct in-depth examinations of social control mechanisms, community transition, fear of crime, or actual crime trends. Thus, we make no conclusions about causality. However, our analyses do suggest strongly that factors underlying the adoption of informal NW activities may be very distinct from those supporting more formalized surveillance strategies. Additional research on this issue is needed.

CHAPTER 6

ISSUES IN THE OPERATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH

The basic idea of NW seems to be relatively simple: citizens help to protect their own communities by becoming more sensitive to what constitutes suspicious behaviors and activities, by increasing the amount of surveillance of their environments, and by calling the police as soon as they detect anything suspicious. But when the idea is put into practice, a number of complex issues arise. Indications of the underlying complexity appear in some of the descriptive survey findings that have been presented already. For example, NW programs are more diversified in functions and tend to endure longer in some neighborhoods than in others. When NW is conceived as a vehicle for achieving goals beyond the reduction of crime and fear -- goals such as improving the sense of community and overall quality of life in a neighborhood -- then the complexities are even greater.

One of the primary purposes that has guided this research is to uncover and examine the issues bearing on the smooth and successful operations of NW programs. The goal is to articulate the issues and the various options for dealing with them so that program planners and managers have a better knowledge base upon which to draw in trying to improve program operations. Of course, this goal is based on the premise that effective operation of NW programs is a prerequisite for achieving desired outcomes such as reduced crime, reduced fear, and increased neighborhood cohesion.

Since all of the issues bearing on NW operations could not be known at the outset of the research, the discussion in this section draws mostly on the site visits, which occurred throughout the study, rather than on responses to the survey questionnaire, which was designed relatively early in the study. It was during the site visits that we had opportunities to observe and to conduct wide-ranging interviews with people who had varying types of involvement with NW activities. Where appropriate, our survey findings, the findings of other researchers, and the contents of locally produced reports and documents are integrated with the discussion of operational issues.

Role of the Police

As the survey findings indicated (Table 6), it is difficult to find NW programs in which local police departments are not involved. However, the site visits revealed that the nature of police involvement takes many different forms, both in terms of program initiation and on-going program activities.

1. Program Initiation

Typically, police crime prevention officers play a major role in "getting the ball rolling." At the risk of over-simplifying a bit, two general approaches can be described.

In some places the role is primarily reactive: Crime prevention officers use pamphlets, posters, and public service advertising to sell the virtues of NW, then make themselves available to speak at meetings of community groups which express an interest in crime prevention. In other places, the role is highly proactive: officers go door-to-door in neighborhoods trying to organize programs, and they solicit invitations to speak to community groups that do not have crime prevention agendas.

Both approaches disseminate information; portray NW as a positive, desirable program; and offer technical assistance in establishing and running NW. The main difference between the two approaches lies in the way in which initial citizen commitment to forming a NW program is obtained. Using the reactive mode, the officer waits for some expression of commitment from the residents before helping to guide them through the organizing process. Proactive crime prevention officers try to talk people into making commitments, and they tend to become intimately involved in planning and conducting at least the initial meetings of nascent programs. To some extent, the two approaches reflect differences in resources; proactive organizing can be much more time-consuming. But the crime prevention officers employing each strategy tend to express preferences for the approach they use.

Practitioners of the reactive approach claim that "going door-to-door" tends to be futile. A NW program cannot be forced on residents, and unless the residents take the initiative in starting the program, it is destined for failure. If the police department takes too much of the initiative upon itself, residents will not develop a sense that NW is their program and that they have primary responsibility for it.

In contrast, adherents of a more proactive approach view it as necessary to overcome natural inertia and to dispel the feeling that there is little citizens can do about crime. People are disinclined to get involved; they are busy; they have their own lives to lead; they are reluctant to take leadership roles in crime prevention. Only by challenging and cajoling, while simultaneously demonstrating a thorough commitment by the police department, can residents be motivated to organize and run NW programs.

In jurisdictions where NW has been implemented in a number of, but not all, locations, there is a difference in how adherents of the two approaches tend to view neighborhoods or areas that have not yet started NW programs. From the perspective of the reactive crime prevention officer, 100 percent NW coverage in a jurisdiction is not a realistic goal. In some areas, NW is not needed, not appropriate, or not wanted. In contrast, officers employing a proactive style tend to see all neighborhoods as appropriate NW sites. But they admit that some neighborhoods are more difficult to organize than others; very low income, a high proportion of renters, and other factors necessitate more intensive efforts and, perhaps, organizing techniques that have not yet been tried.

Our interviews with citizens who have taken leadership roles in NW (including some whose efforts were not successful) lead us to conclude that the views of officers who lean toward both approaches have a degree

of validity under certain circumstances. Many jurisdictions in the United States contain few -- if any -- of the high-crime, economically depressed, extremely disorganized neighborhoods in which citizen-based action seems nearly impossible to stimulate and maintain. In these jurisdictions, a reactive approach to NW initiation may be possible, even preferable. A not uncommon scenario appears to be that an unusual number of crimes -- often burglaries or sexual assaults -- occurs over a short period of time in a normally quiet, non-NW area. The residents become concerned, and one or two take the initiative to contact the police department. The crime prevention officer then works with these neighborhood representatives to help plan and publicize an initial NW meeting. The initial meeting often results in the formation of a NW program, with the individuals who contacted the police being designated as leaders (block captains, area coordinators).

Residents of neighborhoods in which the barriers to collective, voluntary action are not strong can usually be counted on to contact the police (or other appropriate organization) when they feel that they need a NW program. There may be a sudden spurt of burglaries in the neighborhood, or the residents may hear favorable reports about NW in the media or from friends. The capacity and inclination to take collective action, which is particularly prevalent in middle-class and stable working-class neighborhoods, make it unnecessary for the police to play a highly proactive role. In these types of neighborhoods, the imperatives for crime prevention officers are to educate residents about NW and to let them know that the department will help them get started.

It is possible that proactive attempts to stimulate NW in relatively placid areas can produce unintended negative results when the residents do not perceive, on their own, an unusual increase in the number of crimes. There is some evidence that initiation of NW can lead to increases in the fear of crime (Rosenbaum et al., 1985; Black Federation of San Diego, 1981). Although we are reaching beyond the bounds of our data, we suspect that this effect is more likely when residents who do not perceive a particular crime problem are given a "hard sell" about NW or other crime prevention activities. Under such a condition, the pitch for NW almost has to include an effort to convince the residents that the threat of crime in their neighborhood is greater than they think: Nobody is safe from crime; it can strike anyone at any time. In other words, the residents have to be convinced that they have a problem before they can be convinced that they need a solution such as NW. Crime prevention officers who take a low-key, reactive approach to these types of neighborhoods are probably right on target.

However, there are neighborhoods for which a reactive approach may not be most useful. Crime is already such a recognized problem that pointing it out is not likely to increase fear. At the same time, the neighborhood has a variety of severe problems in addition to crime, and the individual residents have so few resources that they probably view the prospects for effective citizen action as relatively bleak. In such neighborhoods, a proactive approach to initiating NW, or any other community program, is more likely to be appropriate, and crime prevention officers need to have the skills and personalities suited for community organizing (see Lavrakas, 1985:103-105).

Whether the approach is reactive or proactive, another issue remains: How necessary is police involvement in the initiation of NW programs? The fact that we have found sites in which NW programs have developed independently of police involvement and other sites in which crime prevention officers have had mixed success in trying to develop NW in some areas, indicates that police involvement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the initiation of NW. On the other hand, the absence of police involvement is quite uncommon. NW-type programs appear to be initiated without police involvement only when some other strong, credible institutional actor takes the lead. One reason for this situation is simply that police departments are the organizations most heavily involved in trying to get NW programs going -- they are there and they are active. But this does not appear to be the only reason.

Our interviews with NW participants detected a sense that police involvement in program initiation is viewed as both desirable and appropriate. Even though the notion of community crime prevention stresses the responsibility that citizens have for social control in their own neighborhoods, the problem being addressed is crime, and people almost unanimously associate the police with any attempt to deal with crime. At the very least, the police are the on-scene representatives of the state's authority for dealing with crime, and there seems to be a basic reluctance among citizens to engage the issue of crime without having the support of the police. An exception would seem to be citizen-initiated efforts aimed at pressuring the police to deal with crime in certain ways (e.g., add more patrols to an area, respond more quickly to calls). But this is an exception that tends to support the rule that citizens associate crime control with the police. In short, it appears difficult to find some replacement for the legitimacy that police involvement lends to citizen efforts to initiate crime prevention programs.

Active involvement by the police in the initiation of NW programs carries with it the implicit promise that the police will continue to assist the programs that are formed. Many crime prevention officers, when trying to stimulate programs, describe NW as a partnership between citizens and the police. Citizens who respond to this message and become involved in NW have an expectation that the police will reciprocate and be more responsive to their neighborhood concerns. Thus, some form of on-going involvement with NW program is virtually a necessity for police departments that actively encourage the formation of such programs.

2. On-going Operations

During the period immediately following the formation of a NW group, police crime prevention officers often have a great deal of contact with the participants. This contact usually consists of technical advice and assistance: demonstrating how to engrave property with identifying numbers and making equipment available for that purpose, conducting home security surveys and instructing residents about how to make their homes more resistant to intruders, supplying NW signs to be erected at access points to the area.

However, these activities do not provide a good basis for on-going involvement of the police in NW operations. Turnover of residents periodically creates the need for additional assistance with property-marking and premise surveys, and signs may have to be replaced or relocated on occasion, but such follow-up activities are reactive, sporadic, and infrequent for any single neighborhood. In some police departments, the initial advice-and-assistance role, followed by informal, periodic contact between crime prevention officers and NW participants, is viewed as sufficient. Most departments appear to feel that a structure for on-going police involvement is necessary to prevent a waning of citizen interest and participation.

Before discussing some of the ways that police departments maintain their involvement with NW groups, it is important to note the possible consequences of not maintaining on-going involvement, or of not being very clear about what the nature of the on-going involvement will be.

As mentioned earlier, when departments actively encourage citizens to form and join NW groups, the citizens come to expect something in return. At a minimum, they expect to be listened to and be kept informed. A department that encourages participation in NW but does not continue to be involved with NW groups after they have formed risks a rapid deterioration of citizen interest.

On the other hand, a department cannot promise -- or imply a promise of -- more than it can deliver. Such action can create a backlash of distrust. As an example, several police departments told us that they encouraged NW participants to identify themselves as such when calling the police to report something. Some departments even assigned identifying numbers to the NW groups that were to be used when calling. The identifiers were supposed to help the departments track the numbers of calls from NW participants and the geographic areas generating the calls.

No department had any evidence that a useful purpose had been served by having callers identify themselves as NW participants. But at least two departments that we visited had decided to stop encouraging the practice because it was leading some NW participants to expect that their calls would, and should, get priority treatment. The crime prevention officers had never really promised priority treatment and, of course, dispatches continued to be based on the relative seriousness of calls for service and the availability of patrol units. However, it is easy to understand how some NW participants could infer that they would get priority response, based on the encouragement to identify their affiliation when calling the police. After detecting some disgruntlement about a lack of change in responsiveness to calls, crime prevention officers began to make it clear that NW groups could not expect priority treatment because of the nature of the dispatching process.

The example does not mean that police departments cannot give special attention to NW groups; it simply means that the nature and extent of any special attention should be made explicit. Furthermore, until community crime prevention functions become engrained within all of the roles of a police department (which is not likely to occur in the

near future), any special attention to NW groups will come from crime prevention specialists rather than from the department's regular patrol and investigative units. Thus, the following discussion pertains to how police crime prevention units maintain a continuing involvement with NW groups.

The most common means for maintaining police involvement with NW is the establishment of lines of communication between the police and participants. The most common mode of communication is the regular distribution of a newsletter by the department to NW participants. Newsletters have features that vary among jurisdictions. Some are simply mimeographed while others are professionally type-set. Some are distributed quarterly, while others are distributed monthly or even bi-weekly. While newsletters in some jurisdictions some are mailed to all NW participants, directed distribution to just block captains (or higher) is more likely when numerous NW's exist in a locale.

Despite these variable features, the content of NW newsletters is strikingly similar from one jurisdiction to another. The content consists primarily of motivational messages and crime prevention tips. The motivational messages announce the formation of new NW groups, publicize award presentations, describe how crime statistics reflect the impact of NW, and generally exhort people to try harder. Crime prevention tips usually deal with specific types of crime (e.g., con games, rape, child kidnapping) or present seasonal reminders to take special care during vacations, holidays, and so forth.

One item of newsletter content that does vary among jurisdictions is listings of specific crimes that have occurred in the area. Some newsletters do not include such lists; others do, but in varying formats. Issues concerning the distribution and content of newsletters will be discussed later in the section on "Tools of the Trade".

A few police departments are carrying the newsletter notion a step further by installing computer-aided telephoning capabilities. The devices automatically dial each of the programmed numbers (e.g., all participants, block captains), "remembering" which numbers are busy or unanswered so that they can be re-dialed later. When someone answers, a prerecorded message is presented. This may be a crime prevention tip, notification of a meeting, a warning about a con-game or other kind of crime that is becoming prevalent in the area, or a solicitation for information about a missing child. Some systems are set up to ask people for their opinions about a community issue, record the replies, and tally the results. Despite the utility of these "demon dialers" for some purposes, it appears unlikely that they will replace newsletters as the primary channel of regular police-to-participant communication, at least in the foreseeable future.

The NW participants we talked to during our visits to sites with police-sponsored programs were virtually unanimous in their desire to be kept informed by the police. Our interviews and one city's survey of block captains, to which we had access, confirmed the popularity of newsletters. However, participants often expressed a desire for personalized communication as well; that is, they wanted to hear from and see "their officer".

In fact, NW groups in some places appear to persist because of rapport with individual crime prevention officers rather than because of any formal communication structure. This kind of personalization can work well where out-going, dynamic crime prevention officers are freed from other law enforcement duties and are given the latitude to work intensively, yet informally, with residents of reasonably sized areas. Establishing rapport takes a lot of time and energy, as well a particular temperament and organizing skills. Where crime prevention officers must cover large geographic areas, where their roles include a range of law enforcement (and public relations) functions, and where they are not chosen because of their particular suitability for working with community groups, they are unlikely to play strong motivational and leadership roles with NW groups.

Given sufficient departmental support and a great deal of flexibility, dedicated crime prevention officers can be the stimuli for innovative crime prevention approaches that attract enthusiastic citizen participation. This type of outcome was particularly evident in the areas covered by some of the Detroit Police Department mini-stations that we visited. Few departments make the commitment of freeing crime prevention officers from other duties, making them responsible for relatively compact geographic areas, and letting them operate with substantial independence within those areas. Rather, departments rely on more formal means for their on-going involvement with NW groups.

The potential disadvantage of relying on the dynamism of individual crime prevention officers to stimulate and maintain citizen involvement is that personalized networks can disintegrate when these officers are replaced by others. We did not detect much of this in our site visits, but this may simply reflect the general state of community crime prevention in police departments today. The community crime prevention emphasis is relatively new, so most of the crime prevention officers we interviewed had been involved since their department started its emphasis. Furthermore, since crime prevention is still a special and expanding concern in many departments, recruitment of new crime prevention officers can be somewhat selective; it is not yet fully constrained by seniority and transfer rules, for example.

Two other devices that police departments use to maintain their involvement with NW groups are the establishment of organizational structures that facilitate communication and the setting of standards. The organization of NW into a hierarchical structure with layers of leadership roles (e.g., block captains, area coordinators) makes it possible for crime prevention officers to meet regularly with a relatively small number of the most active participants. Any advice or information the officers give will then be passed along, down the pyramid, to other NW participants -- at least in theory. As we will point out later, in the section on "Tools of the Trade", the subsequent diffusion of information given to leaders can be problematic.

Standard-setting involves establishing a set of criteria that residents must meet before they are recognized officially by the police department as constituting a NW group. Our site visits and discussions

with crime prevention officers in other jurisdictions indicate that, whenever the police are active in helping to establish NW groups, they use some standards to decide when a group has actually formed. However, these standards are often informal, based more on the subjective sense of the crime prevention officer than on a well-defined set of criteria. Other jurisdictions establish formal, written criteria. The process of being assessed vis-a-vis these formal criteria is called certification.

The question of certification was not included in our national survey because it was not recognized as an important issue when the survey was designed. Nonetheless, our view, developed from site visits and speaking to representatives of other programs, is that while programs that use certification are in a minority (just barely), their numbers are growing. Certification appears to be part of a movement toward formalization and standard-setting in the crime prevention field, a topic that will be addressed in the final chapter of this report.

Of course, certification by the police department is only meaningful when the department has something to offer NW groups that are certified and, conversely, things to withhold from groups that do not meet certification criteria. The primary "carrot" in the certification process is the provision of signs identifying the neighborhood as a NW area, or at least permission for signs to be erected. Other benefits contingent on certification in various places are the receipt of newsletters and other printed materials, the right to participate in meetings with representatives of other NW groups, and the opportunity to be considered for periodic awards and other forms of recognition.

The relevant criteria vary somewhat among jurisdictions that use certification, but all of the criteria are meant as indicators of commitment to NW participation by residents. Some form of expression of willingness to participate by a minimum percentage of the area's residents is generally required. One of our site visit jurisdictions, for example, requires that 40 percent of the area's households participate by (a) attending two initial meetings, (b) having home security surveys conducted, and (c) being listed on the group's telephone contact chain with accurate name, address and telephone number.

Not surprisingly, the more rigorous the certification requirements, the more controversial they are. But initial certification, no matter how rigorous, is less controversial than decertification of NW programs that do not continue to meet the established criteria. Among the jurisdictions that we visited or with which we had other extensive contacts, provisions for periodic (usually annual) recertification of NW groups existed in almost all of the places that had formal criteria for initial certification.

As a rule, recertification requires the NW group to hold a meeting and to demonstrate that levels of participation are being maintained. In theory, if recertification criteria are not met, the group can be decertified and its NW sign(s) can be removed, it will stop receiving newsletters, and so forth. In practice, recertification guidelines are rarely enforced. Most jurisdictions that require recertification prefer to work with faltering NW groups in the hope of revitalizing them, the underlying justification being that "some activity is better than none."

Compromise is not the stance of all jurisdictions on the recertification-decertification issue. One jurisdiction that we contacted (but which was not among the site-visit locales) reports taking a hard line on decertification. If a NW group fails to meet recertification standards, the police crime prevention unit simply has the group's signs removed. Then the officers wait for someone to notice that the signs are gone and to contact them --"if no one notices, the group couldn't have been doing very much watching." Another jurisdiction, which was the subject of one of our site visits, is planning to tighten up its recertification process, which has been "on the books" but virtually unenforced in the past.

Formal certification criteria and periodic recertification give police departments (or other agencies managing community crime prevention programs) a great deal of influence on NW groups. While NW groups can, and occasionally do, form without the active involvement of the police department, this is not very common. On the other hand, active involvement and assistance by a police department frequently occurs without the existence of formal certification and recertification processes.

Certification and recertification, when used, appear to serve three purposes: (1) provide incentives for residents to join NW and to remain active, (2) give NW groups a stamp of legitimacy in the community, and (3) bring some degree of standardization to the structure and functions of NW groups.

Balanced against these purposes are the dangers that rigorous certification/recertification processes might: (1) decrease the chances that NW groups will form or be maintained in highly disorganized neighborhoods, which may find it more difficult to meet certification and recertification criteria, (2) decrease the opportunities for innovation by NW groups, (3) interfere with the development of a sense of ownership of crime prevention activities by residents, and (4) foster the dependence of NW groups on continued leadership and support by the police.

The fourth potentially negative factor -- relating to continuing police support for crime prevention -- leads us to turn our attention to the internal structure and operations of police departments as they relate to crime prevention functions.

3. The Crime Prevention Role within Police Departments

Virtually every police department in the United States has incorporated some form of a community crime prevention role. But even in departments that devote substantial proportions of their resources to crime prevention, it generally remains a special side-line rather than an integrated part of the department's primary functions. Police crime prevention units are often staffed minimally and have low priorities for resource allocations. There is a widespread perception within police ranks that community crime prevention is not "real police work." These factors have implications for NW programs because they affect the

organizational viability and the functioning of the crime prevention units that service NW programs and because they influence the morale, outlook, and quality of crime prevention officers.

A crime prevention unit that is an "add-on", i.e., that is not integrated with the overall philosophy and operation of the police department, has an uncertain future. It may be one of the first functions scaled back or eliminated when the department faces cuts in resources. Because of this uncertainty, NW groups should not become completely dependent on police departments for their organizational identities, an issue that will be addressed more fully later in this chapter.

There is variation among police departments in the organizational placement of crime prevention units. Perhaps the major issue is whether crime prevention officers follow the same chain of command as regular patrol and investigative personnel or comprise a separate unit that reports directly to central police headquarters.

An example from one of our site visit jurisdictions illustrates why integrating crime prevention and traditional police functions by placing them in the same command structure may not be as simple and attractive as it sounds. Detroit has had a crime prevention officer assigned to each precinct for some time. Each officer is under the direct control of the precinct commander. More recently, mini-stations were created which cover sub-areas of the city that are not necessarily constrained by precinct boundaries. The mini-station officers report to a unit in central police headquarters rather than to precinct commanders. The experience leading to this shift was that, in the precincts, the manpower demands of patrol and routine follow-up investigations took precedence over community crime prevention functions. Consequently, the time of the precincts' crime prevention officers was frequently diverted to traditional police duties.

In another large city (not one of our project's site visit jurisdictions, but one that we visited for other purposes), officers with crime prevention and community organizing responsibilities are assigned to precinct commands. These officers have foot patrol beats, and they handle a variety of citizen complaint calls (noise, disturbances, etc.) that would otherwise be handled by regular vehicle patrol officers. The crime prevention officers have a greater degree of routine contact and sharing of information with regular patrol officers than do the mini-station officers in Detroit. On the other hand, even in this city, precinct commanders express mixed feelings about the program. Although generally in favor of the functions it performs, they have reservations about the unavailability of a significant number of officers for more routine police functions, such as responding to calls for service and conducting investigations.

At present, particularly in urban areas, the issue of integrating crime prevention with traditional police functions is a very difficult one. The demand for routine police services is so pressing that any attempt to place the crime prevention function within the command structure responsible for routine services creates a temptation to divert crime prevention officers to other tasks. On the other hand, crime

prevention units should not be completely isolated within their departments. Not only does isolation make the units vulnerable to cut-backs, as mentioned earlier, it also hampers their effectiveness in responding to the needs of the citizen crime prevention groups with which they work.

Sometimes working effectively with a citizen group requires a crime prevention officer to call upon traditional police services because citizens who get involved with NW often expect the crime prevention officer to be their liaison to the rest of the department. This expectation generally takes the form of wanting the crime prevention officer to mobilize regular police patrol or investigative resources for particular problems in the neighborhood. It would be helpful if the crime prevention officer had a sufficiently strong working relationship with other departmental functions to ensure, for example, that a tip about drug sales received from a NW participant gets some follow-up investigation or that a NW block on which residents are being harassed by boisterous teenagers gets some extra patrol attention.

A good example of a type of situation in which the effectiveness of crime prevention officers can be enhanced by an ability to marshal traditional police functions came up in several of our site visits. Some neighborhoods have one or two people who are well known to residents as troublemakers: people who are chronic (though often petty) lawbreakers and who intimidate other residents. In situations such as this, many residents are reluctant to come forward and participate in NW.

During one of our site visits, we sat in the living room of a woman who had tried several times to organize a NW group in her area. She attributed her lack of success to the presence of the _____ family in the neighborhood. Other residents, she reported, were afraid to be identified as being involved in crime prevention by attending meetings or displaying stickers on their homes. She described several occasions on which the son in the _____ family and his friends had retaliated against residents by slashing tires and breaking windows belonging to people who had reported their misdeeds. In her words, the attitude of many residents was: "Why should I stick my neck out? The police won't do anything when we need them."

Another of our site visit jurisdictions has a scheme for dealing with neighborhoods in which residents are intimidated by local toughs. The police department has two special task forces to help neighborhoods get started with NW. Most task force time is devoted to going door-to-door and getting a NW organization off the ground, but the task forces also have surveillance capabilities. During their community organizing efforts, the officers determine the identities of chronic troublemakers in the neighborhood. They then place an identified individual under covert surveillance until they catch him for an arrestable offense. After arrest, they follow-up through the prosecution and sentencing processes to ensure that the case does not slip through the cracks of the criminal justice system. The police in this jurisdiction view the task forces as a marriage between community crime prevention and "old-time law enforcement." As one task force officer noted, the people in the target neighborhoods "want crime prevention, but they also want the thugs out of their neighborhoods."

In sum, to be effective, the crime prevention unit in a police department cannot be completely isolated from traditional police patrol and investigative functions. Citizens involved in NW generally realize that crime prevention officers do not have regular police duties, but they see the officers as representatives of the departments. When citizens agree to become involved in NW, in response to a pitch from a crime prevention officer, they expect reciprocation from the police. They want to be kept informed and be consulted, and they want the police to respond to the special law enforcement needs of their neighborhoods. Note that this expectation for more individualized responsiveness is not the same as the problem that was discussed earlier: a false expectation of receiving priority treatment in routine calls for service simply by virtue of being a NW participant.

Achieving a workable integration of crime prevention and traditional police functions presents difficulties. Crime prevention is usually not viewed as main-line police work, and large workloads create pressure to divert crime prevention personnel to more traditional duties. Our research has not discovered an answer to this dilemma. Our observations, however, and the observations of others (e.g., Skolnick and Bayley, 1986), suggest that at least two factors are important: (1) a clear commitment to crime prevention from the department's brass, emphasizing that crime prevention is not a temporary, secondary function of the department, and (2) selection of officers for the crime prevention unit who not only have community organizing skills but who have already earned the respect of their peers as regular police officers.

4. Potential Liability as a Constraint

Before turning our attention from the police role in NW, we raise an issue that was mentioned in several of our site visits. There appears to be a tendency -- probably a growing tendency -- for police departments to shy away from direct involvement in some NW-related activities because of concerns about civil liability.

The hesitancy that we detected was most pronounced with respect to citizen patrol programs. In more than half of our site visit jurisdictions, the formation of citizen patrols was not encouraged or assisted; if a patrol program originated via citizen initiative, the police department avoided offering praise and direct support. Where citizen patrols have the support of the police, the departments often establish guidelines under which patrols must operate (see Chapter 5). While some departments view citizen patrols as interference with professional police work, our site visits detected a more frequent concern with the potential legal liability of the department for actions taken by citizen patrols which had received departmental approval.

Another activity that some departments have curtailed is the installation of security devices, particularly locks. A number of departments have provided, or still provide, assistance to residents who purchase improved locks or other devices. In other cases, they provide civilian volunteers who do the installation for free or for a nominal charge. Similar arrangements exist for helping residents engrave their property with identification numbers. Because of the possibility

(however slim) that accidental property damage can occur during installation of devices or engraving of property, some police departments have ceased offering such assistance.

The threat of incurring civil liability through crime prevention efforts is an evolving legal issue that goes beyond the scope of this report. The concern being shown by police departments at this time is undoubtedly a reflection of the more general and growing liability problems being faced by municipalities. Nevertheless, a number of departments still provide encouragement and direct support for citizen patrols, and a larger number still assist residents with security precautions. The constraints of legal liability will only become clear as court cases are decided and as remedial legislation dealing with municipal liability is enacted.

Our discussion of the police role in NW has been an extended one. Some of the issues that were covered pertain equally to programs that are sponsored and managed by private or public organizations other than the police: issues such as certification-decertification, modes of communication, proactive vs. reactive organizing efforts. However, most NW programs fall under police sponsorship, so these issues generally arise in the context of police crime prevention units. In addition, the authority represented by the police gives special meaning to issues such as certification and sharing of information.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, we focus directly on NW groups themselves: their initiation, structure, activities, and survival. It is unavoidable that some of the issues mentioned in this section will arise again, but we will also cover the need for NW groups to maintain some independence from the police.

Starting a Neighborhood Watch

There are a variety of issues that pertain to the early stages in the development of a NW program. Admittedly, the information that we gathered on the initiation of programs is retrospective. Our national survey covered programs already in existence. Most of our site visit interviews were with active NW participants, although we did observe some initial meetings of people interested in NW and talked to some people who were involved in trying to initiate programs. Nevertheless, the findings from our site visits have proven to be consistent both across jurisdictions and with the findings from other sources.

Of the many issues that pertain to program initiation, we have chosen three that appear to be important and recurring: (1) whether citizens' motivations are reactive or proactive, (2) the extent to which program initiation is easier in some neighborhoods than in others, and (3) the effects of initial organizing meetings.

1. Reactive vs. Proactive

In discussing the role of the police in NW, we characterized the approaches of crime prevention officers who try to stimulate NW programs as either proactive or reactive, depending on whether they generally sought out citizens or waited for citizens to seek them out. The same

terminology can be used to characterize the motivations of residents who try to form NW programs. They can be reacting to what they perceive to be a crime problem that is getting out of hand or they can be "proacting" to prevent the development of a crime problem. Our own survey of NW groups found that proactive motivations were cited by a 2 to 1 margin (see Chapter 4).

A survey of Chicago-area residents in 1979 asked respondents who were aware of crime prevention efforts in their neighborhoods whether the efforts had been initiated "to keep crime from becoming a problem, or was it that crime had already become a problem in your neighborhood?" Most respondents chose the proactive alternative in describing the origins of all the types of crime prevention activities covered by the survey; the figure was about two-thirds for "Blockwatch" programs and 60 percent for "neighborhood patrols." A reactive origin was claimed by a sizable proportion (45 percent) of respondents for "Beat Rep Programs", which have features similar to NW. However, the "Beat Rep" program existed only within the city of Chicago, and for programs that existed in both the city and suburbs, city respondents were more likely than suburban respondents to say that program origins were reactive (Lavrakas and Herz, 1982:485-7).

The responses to a survey of block captains to which we had access paint a somewhat different picture. Two-thirds of the responding block captains gave affirmative replies to the question: "When you and your neighbors decided to start a Neighborhood Watch program, was there a general feeling that crime was getting out of hand in the community?"

There are so many differences between these surveys that it is impossible to judge whether their findings are actually contradictory. Our survey was national, while another was conducted in Chicago and its suburbs, and the third took place in a small eastern city. The wording of the questions differs substantially. Furthermore, the Chicago survey covered residents who were aware of crime prevention efforts in their neighborhoods but who may not have been participants, while the other two surveys dealt only with central participants in NW.

We cannot definitively say that one type of motivation predominates, although the weight of the evidence favors the predominance of proactive motivations. However, as indicated in all three surveys described above, and as detected in our site visits, both types of motivations occur. Further research will be needed to determine the differing contexts that give rise to proactive and reactive motivations to start NW and the differing implications of these initial motivations for the subsequent operations of programs. Since these motivations reflect, to some extent, what participants set out to accomplish, taking them into account in organizing NW programs would appear to have some importance.

We can speculate that when reactive motivations predominate initially, the outlook for maintaining a stable NW program in the long run will not be bright. If successful in reducing crime, the participants might feel they have accomplished their goal and lose interest. If the crime problem is very severe, the relatively mild intervention of a NW program might have little impact, making the participants disheartened and frustrated. Lavrakas and Herz (1982)

report preliminary findings indicating that reactive origins are more prevalent in high-crime, low-income, densely populated neighborhoods with concentrations of minorities. While this did not appear to be the case in the survey of block captains we examined, it raises the possibility that NW programs are occasionally created in reaction to severe underlying problems -- problems which NW is not, by itself, suited to address.

2. Differential Neighborhood Receptiveness

Some neighborhoods seem to form NW programs almost spontaneously, but others seem to be virtually immune to organizing efforts. Receptivity to NW is enhanced when there is some degree of mutual trust and common interests among a relatively large proportion of the residents of an area. As Rosenbaum (forthcoming) has pointed out:

"For neighborhoods that are divided into racial, ethnic, or age groups, the crime issue may become an expression of conflict between these groups. For example, efforts to 'watch' for 'suspicious strangers' may become synonymous with watching for blacks or hispanics. In this context, crime prevention programs may support one side or the other and thus intensify intergroup conflict."

The question in heterogeneous neighborhoods is whether crime prevention can become a unifying issue that supercedes existing conflicts and disagreements between groups. NW programs, in trying to accomplish a goal such as reducing residential burglary, encourage residents to increase the degree of general social control they exercise in their neighborhoods. If there are serious divisions among residents about what constitutes acceptable social behavior, NW will be difficult to implement. We previously mentioned an example from one city in which the police department began holding NW meetings in the street because residents had so much distrust of others in the neighborhood that they were wary of leaving their homes unattended.

Obviously, neighborhoods with deep-seated conflicts among relatively substantial proportions of their residents are extreme cases. But the difficulty of organizing NW programs in low-income, heterogeneous neighborhoods appears to be more general. In Minneapolis, for example, Silloway and McPherson (1985:30) found that "low socio-economic status, more heterogeneous neighborhoods where crime-related problems are the greatest" had the least success in initiating NW-type programs, despite greater than average efforts by organizers to stimulate programs in these areas. For a broader range of crime prevention efforts, evaluators of the Urban Crime Prevention Program, which involved nine cities, had a similar observation (Roehl and Cook, 1984: 12-13).

The Silloway and McPherson research, in particular, suggests that it may not be enough to conclude that certain neighborhoods need greater efforts in order to get NW programs started. A common interest in crime prevention may be insufficient to overcome other barriers to collective action, and a more wide-ranging approach to community problem-solving may

be required. In short, the development of some minimal level of attachment to the neighborhood and agreement about goals for the neighborhood may be necessary before NW can be implemented successfully.

To some extent, NW organizers recognize that crime, by itself, can be too narrow an issue to generate responsiveness in some neighborhoods. During our site visits, we observed that particularly active organizers -- both police and civilians -- try to deal, as best they can, with residents' concerns that go beyond crime. A number of these organizers have taken on the roles of facilitation and referral. They steer residents toward the proper agency or organization to get solutions to problems relating to trash pick-up, street repair, education, and so forth. Occasionally they intervene, using their own network of contacts to get action.

In other jurisdictions, NW is being sponsored by organizations that have a range of other problem-solving functions. This was the case in several of the sites we visited, and the combining of crime prevention with various community concerns within the same organization has been described by others (see DeJong and Goolkasian, 1982).

Thus, we view the receptiveness of areas to NW as a continuum. The locations of areas along this continuum appear to be determined by a variety of factors -- such as income, opportunity, racial/ethnic distributions, home ownership, and so forth -- which converge to produce certain levels of trust/distrust among residents and attachment of residents to the neighborhood. The relatively common, police-sponsored, jurisdiction-wide approach to NW, which does not emphasize proactive organizing efforts, is well received in relatively stable, homogeneous neighborhoods that are not plagued by a variety of difficult problems. In fact, this probably describes the majority of American neighborhoods.

However, where barriers to NW initiation exist, organizing efforts must take cognizance of other neighborhood problems. To some extent, this can be accomplished by police crime prevention officers who have (or are trained in) community organizing skills and who have the latitude and inclination to help residents deal with problems that are not directly related to crime. But police departments are not structured or expected to deal with deep-seated problems pertaining to unemployment, housing, residential transition, and so forth. Therefore, we suspect that organizations with the capabilities of helping residents with a broad range of problems will have the most success in neighborhoods that are highly resistant to the development of NW.

3. Effects of Initial Meetings

Having addressed the issue of neighborhoods that are very difficult to organize, we turn our attention back to more typical situations.

The usual scenario for the initiation of a NW program involves inviting residents to attend a block-level or neighborhood-level meeting. A few residents take the lead, and following the advice of a police crime prevention officer or representative from some other umbrella group, they deliver invitations, arrange for a place to meet, and establish an agenda

for the meeting. Actual presentations at the meeting are given primarily by outsiders -- crime prevention officers or other community organizers.

Our research staff observed some of these meetings, interviewed NW participants about their past experiences in the meetings, and reviewed dozens of agendas, reports, guidelines, and handbooks pertaining to how the meetings are conducted. The similarities are striking.

After being introduced, outsiders (usually crime prevention officers) try to raise attendees' consciousness about crime. They present some large numbers, describe crime as something to which no neighborhood is immune, give some examples of the craftiness of burglars or other thieves, and encourage attendees to talk about their own first- or second-hand experiences with crime. After arousing interest, the speaker explains that the police cannot solve the crime problem alone, that citizens and the police must work as partners. Then NW and its related components are described and offered as a way of dealing with crime; claims are made about NW successes in other places. Finally, the speaker describes the procedures for establishing a program -- including criteria for formal certification, if applicable -- and turns the floor back to the residents who organized the meeting. Residents enroll in the program and designate block captains at the initial meeting or at a follow-up meeting shortly thereafter.

In theory, these initial meetings are meant to educate residents and communicate the message that they can make a difference through their own efforts. However, our research leads us to agree with Rosenbaum's view that the initial meetings sometimes increase levels of fear and distrust, and make residents less sanguine about the possibilities for improvement. This view is consistent with a number of research findings from NW programs and from the more general fear of crime literature (see Rosenbaum, forthcoming). Our site visit interviews elicited numerous comments reinforcing this view: "I didn't realize how much crime there really was in the neighborhood." "I learned that we have to protect ourselves; anything suspicious can be a crime about to happen." "I hadn't heard about the two rapes before; that scares the hell out of me."

Organizers, of course, have a stake in getting citizens to form NW groups, and dramatic messages may be better short-term motivators than more balanced presentations. Raising levels of fear and distrust (of "suspicious persons" who may be outsiders or other neighborhood residents) may mobilize NW participants to prevent crime in a defensive sort of way, but it is a questionable approach if the hope is to use NW as a vehicle for helping to build a stronger sense of community and a greater willingness to become involved in more general neighborhood improvement activities.

NW organizers are not unaware that what they present at initial meetings differs from what they would present if asked to give an objective, balanced, detailed account of the extent and nature of crime in an area. But their role is to try to motivate people, not bore them with a long, dry description that is full of caveats. There is a definite need for research to help NW organizers out of this dilemma. Ways must be found to combine motivational messages with descriptions of

the crime problem that are realistic, that put the problem in context, and that clear up -- rather than add to -- misconceptions.

Another issue that arises in initial meetings is the danger of fostering unrealistic expectations about NW. Earlier, in discussing the role of the police, we described how some NW participants had come to expect priority treatment in their calls for service. A related question is whether some organizers go too far in encouraging people to call the police. When participants are exhorted to call whenever they have even the slightest suspicion that something is amiss, one wonders how regular patrol officers will react to an increase in seemingly minor calls. At the very least, the existing workload of calls for service should be taken into account when presentations are made at initial NW meetings, and the regular patrol force should be kept informed about what participants are being urged to do and what new neighborhoods are coming "on line" with programs.

The desire to sell the idea of NW can also lead organizers to describe the program in ways that encourage residents to over-estimate the program's potential for reducing crime. This can be a particular problem in high-crime neighborhoods, not only because crime is more deeply ingrained, but also because there is a greater temptation to oversell NW in order to breach the barriers to collective action that exist in the areas. Unrealistic expectations about crime reduction will be addressed again when we discuss the survival of NW programs.

Organization and Sponsorship

The typical structure of NW in the United States involves a sponsoring agency covering the entire jurisdiction, neighborhoods with Watch operations, and individually organized blocks within these neighborhoods. This section describes some of the variations of and exceptions to the typical structure. Most of the pros and cons of different structures relate to issues such as participation by residents, program survival, and the range of activities in which programs engage. These issues are addressed later.

1. Jurisdiction-wide Sponsorship

When an organization provides jurisdiction-wide sponsorship and management support for NW, the organization is usually the police department. However, in some places these functions are lodged in other agencies of the local government or in private, non-profit entities supported by the local government. The primary purpose for using an agency other than the police department is to give community crime prevention the undivided attention of a sponsoring agency. As discussed earlier, community crime prevention is a secondary function in most police departments, often losing resources to the more traditional patrol and investigative functions. By lodging jurisdiction-wide sponsorship elsewhere, NW does not have to compete for resources within the sponsoring agency itself, and the agency's staff is not prone to being diverted to non-NW functions.

On the other hand, recall our earlier discussion of how NW participants view police involvement as positive. Most people associate

the police with any attempt to deal with crime, and police involvement lends an aura of authority and legitimacy to NW efforts. In practice, this means that non-police sponsoring agencies will have to work closely with the police.

We have had contact with a number of non-police agencies that provide jurisdiction-wide sponsorship of NW, and we conducted site visits to two (in Orlando and St. Louis). Most of the agencies report excellent working relationships with the police. However, we have detected some indications of friction, and it would have been surprising if we had not. After all, non-police sponsoring agencies are dedicated completely to organizing and maintaining community crime prevention programs, while police crime prevention units view the programs in the context of the whole range of law enforcement functions.

Thus, there are pluses and minuses associated with placing jurisdiction-wide sponsorship of NW in non-police agencies. The agencies can give more focused attention to NW programs than can police crime prevention units. The agencies can recruit staff based on the skills and temperament needed for community organizing; staff need not possess the other qualities required to be a good police officer. Peers within the agency can be expected to be supportive of community organizing while, as mentioned earlier, fellow police officers often view their crime prevention colleagues as not being involved in "real police work."

But the agencies lack the aura of authority possessed by the police. Although this may be a positive factor in some neighborhoods where distrust of the police runs deep, most NW participants appear to want a demonstration that they are being supported by the police. In the long run, perhaps the biggest drawback of placing sponsorship outside the police department is that it relieves some of the pressure on the police to reorient their practices toward crime prevention. If community crime prevention is to become a central, routine function of the police, then the police have to be given the responsibility to perform that function.

2. Sub-Jurisdictional Sponsorship

Particularly in large cities, private organizations that service sizable segments of a city -- spanning several identifiable neighborhoods -- sponsor NW programs within the areas they cover. Among the places where we conducted site visits, the StreetSAFE program in Boston's Fenway section falls into this category. The Midwood Kings Highway Development Corporation in Brooklyn, described by DeJong and Goolkasian (1982), is another example, as are some of the Chicago programs evaluated by Rosenbaum and his colleagues (1985).

Sponsorship by sub-jurisdictional organizations has some advantages. The organizations are close to and familiar with the neighborhoods in the geographic areas they cover. They also tend to take on a variety of community improvement projects in addition to crime prevention. This multi-issue approach can be very helpful in neighborhoods that have a number of problems and that are difficult to organize around the single issue of crime (see Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981:224-225).

On the other hand, since these organizations are not governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, they have further to go in working out relationships with the police. The Boston StreetSAFE program operates almost independently of the police, although there does not appear to be any antagonism between the two. The Midwood Kings Highway Development Corporation developed a much closer working relationship with the police, but the process was neither easy nor completely successful (see DeJong and Goolkasian, 1982:14-16).

At a more limited geographical level than organizations spanning major sections of cities, one finds a plethora of local organizations: neighborhood associations, homeowners' associations, and block clubs. These groups are voluntary membership organizations. They generally do not receive external funds. Their limited expenditures are derived from dues or special solicitations from members. They address issues of immediate local interest, such as zoning and traffic problems, and they usually have a strong social component as well -- sponsoring do-it-yourself lectures, cook-outs, and so forth.

Where they exist, these neighborhood-level or block-level groups provide a natural home for NW. The most concerned, active residents belong to the group, and the group already has an identity. Getting an existing group to take on NW as an additional function can be much easier than starting from scratch in an unorganized neighborhood. Of course, the mere existence of a neighborhood association is an indicator that the neighborhood is not saddled with the levels of heterogeneity and transiency that interfere with the development of collective action.

It is not surprising that other researchers have uncovered evidence of the central role played by local residents' associations in sponsoring community crime prevention activities such as NW (Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981). This was confirmed in our site visits. In NW areas that had local organizations, the NW program was almost always part of the organization. In fact, we found only one exception: a homeowners' association that preferred to keep the NW structure separate from the association so as not to dilute the focus of the association on matters such as zoning.

3. Linkages with Other Organizations

Linkages of NW to other organizations, institutions, and agencies can occur at all of the levels just discussed: jurisdiction-wide, in major sub-sections of a jurisdiction, or at the immediate neighborhood level. For example, police crime prevention units that sponsor NW programs often try to work with the media and local businesses to elicit publicity and support for NW. They also try to maintain a network of contacts with other city agencies so they can help NW groups that ask for assistance in dealing with problems such as street lighting, abandoned buildings, and trash collection.

Organizations covering major sections of a jurisdiction tend to develop a variety of linkages because they deal with multiple issues (e.g., housing, education, recreation) in their areas.

Neighborhood-level and block-level associations that sponsor NW also address other issues. However, the linkages between these associations and other organizations/institutions tend to be more personalized and informal, stemming from the affiliations of their members. For example, an association member whose occupation brings him/her into contact with a number of local businesses will solicit donations for purchasing NW signs or pamphlets; members who also belong to the local parent-teachers association will work with the schools in disseminating information about crime prevention to students. Also, neighborhood association members who participate in NW often deal with other issues that come before the association, so they are in a position to integrate NW with other concerns (e.g., by disseminating information about emerging neighborhood concerns through block captains).

While all of these kinds of linkages have been reported by others and observed during our site visits, our experience tells us that the majority of NW groups do not have linkages with organizations/institutions other than the police. A very large number of NW programs consist of single-purpose local groups sponsored by the police department. Even when the NW function is placed within an existing association of local residents -- as it almost always is when such an association does exist -- the integration of NW with other concerns may simply mean that the coordinator of the NW block captains periodically reports on the status of NW during meetings of the association.

4. The NW Hierarchy

The typical NW program is based on organized blocks. Each organized block has a block captain who is responsible for upkeep of the effort: making sure that information exchanged by participants is kept up to date (e.g., block maps with residents' names, street numbers, telephone numbers, makes and plate numbers of vehicles), introducing new arrivals to the program, and so forth.

A set of blocks forming a natural neighborhood has an area (or neighborhood) coordinator who may be selected by the sponsoring agency or elected by the participants. Whether periodic NW meetings -- if held at all -- are conducted at the block or neighborhood level depends, to a great extent, on the population density of the blocks.

Parallel structures generally exist for apartment buildings that have watch programs. Individual floors might have captains in a large high-rise apartment building. In low-rise garden apartment complexes, each building within the complex might have a watch captain.

In some places, there is another level of the hierarchy between the neighborhood level and the ultimate sponsoring agency. People at this level represent major segments of the jurisdiction which contain multiple neighborhoods.

The rationale for the hierarchical structure is based on three notions. First, at the base, organization is most easily accomplished at the block level (residences facing each other on the same street). The number of residents on a block is small enough for people to know each

other, and the territory encompassed by a block is amenable to surveillance by the residents. Second, individual block groups that are isolated from each other will not be able to deal with crime problems that span blocks and encompass an entire neighborhood or city, so a structure to coordinate activities and share information is needed. Third, coordination and dissemination of information is facilitated when a few individuals are not burdened with the responsibility of communicating with a large number of others. Thus, a jurisdiction-wide sponsoring agency can communicate with a limited number of district representatives, who communicate with area coordinators, who communicate with block captains, who only have to communicate with participants on their own blocks.

We must comment, however, that this neat structure often does not hold up, especially in large urban areas. City-wide, police-sponsored programs can co-exist with independent programs sponsored by organizations representing large, natural segments of the city and even with independently operated block-level programs. Some city areas can be almost small cities in themselves, with strong ethnic ties, their own shopping areas, and so forth. It makes little sense to try to combine such "mini-cities" in a hierarchical, interconnected organizational structure.

It is in small to medium sized cities and in suburban areas that the hierarchical, jurisdiction-wide structure described above is most likely to occur. Among our site visit jurisdictions, Orlando, FL and Clifton, NJ are good examples. Based on our site visits, our survey, and our communications with a number of other jurisdictions, our impression is that, outside of the major cities -- Chicago, New York, Detroit, etc. -- where numerous programs cross-out each other, the jurisdiction-wide hierarchical structure predominates for NW in the United States.

Participation and Survival

Because NW basically involves neighbors watching out for each other, it is logical to assume that the higher the proportion of residents who participate, the more effective the program will be (all other things being equal). In addition, the minimum levels of participation required in most NW certification processes imply that if participation drops below some level, it might as well not exist. Getting people to participate and to continue their participation, then, are key issues for NW. In this section we address the individual, household, and neighborhood characteristics associated with participation, what is meant by "participation", how much participation is needed, and what factors are related to continued participation.

1. Characteristics Associated with Participation

A recent supplement to the National Crime Survey (NCS) was administered to respondents in more than 11,000 households in February 1984 (see Whitaker, 1986). For anyone hoping that NW can have an impact on aggregate national crime trends, it is disappointing to discover that only 7 percent of U.S. households report that they have joined a NW program, and only 19 percent report that a program even exists in their area. Among only those households that live in areas where a program

exists, 38 percent report that they participate in NW. This statistic, too, can be interpreted as disappointing, given that certification criteria, where used, require participation levels ranging from 40 to 70 percent.

Several characteristics differentiate households that do and do not report the existence of a NW program in their areas. As reported by Whitaker, households reporting the presence of a program tend to have higher incomes, be owner-occupied, be single-unit structures, and be located in metropolitan areas (central cities or suburbs) rather than in nonmetropolitan areas. Race and ethnicity show minor differences, although Hispanic households are less likely than others to be located in a NW area.

Looking at participation levels only for households that have NW programs in their areas, similar patterns exist. For example, households with family incomes of \$25,000 or higher are more likely to participate than are households with family incomes of less than \$10,000 (44 percent vs. 29 percent), and homeowners participate at a much higher rate than do renters (45 percent vs. 23 percent). Again, Hispanic households are slightly less likely to participate. However, unlike the figures for the availability of programs, households in nonmetropolitan areas are slightly more likely to participate in NW programs when one exists in their areas, than are central city residents in metropolitan areas; households in the suburbs of metropolitan areas fall in between.

The findings from the NCS are not completely consistent with the findings of Lavrakas and Herz (1982). Their survey of Chicago and its suburbs indicated that areas with NW-type programs had lower median incomes, higher population densities, greater proportions of non-whites, and higher crime rates (both in police statistics and as perceived by respondents) than did areas without such programs. At the individual level, they found that Blacks and people with higher levels of formal education were overrepresented as participators in programs (Lavrakas and Herz, 1982:486, 491).

Others, however, have found that participatory responses are lower in poor, deteriorated, heterogeneous, high-crime areas (Silloway and McPherson, 1985; Roehl and Cook, 1984). Our site visit observations were more consistent with these findings. The neighborhoods in which organizers had the most difficulties in starting and maintaining programs were invariably the poorest, highest crime rate areas of the jurisdiction.

At the individual and household levels, the general literature on participation in local community organizations has found participation to be higher for home-owners, people with children in the home, higher income residents, those with more education, and Blacks (after controlling for socioeconomic status). Furthermore, participants are more likely to be concerned about problems in their areas (but not more fearful), have a stronger sense of territoriality, and feel more attached to and plan to stay in their communities (see Greenberg et al., 1985; Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981).

The temptation is to interpret the above findings as indicating that participation in NW is most difficult to generate in the areas where it is most needed. We do not fully agree with this interpretation because it assumes that NW would be as effective in these areas as it is in more stable, lower-crime neighborhoods populated by people who feel a greater stake in their communities. This assumption is questionable.

It is perhaps more likely that, if the residents of problem neighborhoods could be convinced to enroll in a NW program, active participation would be minimal and the program would have little effect vis-a-vis the countervailing influences generating crime. The low receptiveness to NW in these neighborhoods is a reflection of underlying problems that NW cannot solve, and a more diversified approach to community improvement and organizing is needed.

2. What is "Participation"

When people respond affirmatively to survey questions about whether or not they participate in NW programs, the replies can mean many different things. For many, it may simply mean that they attended one meeting and have their names listed on NW sign-up sheets. In jurisdictions that have formal certification criteria, participation means that a household member has attended a meeting, that the household has been listed on a telephone contact chain, and that it has conducted a home security survey. While we may infer that people who attend meetings, display stickers, and mark property are more likely than others to engage in the surveillance and informal social control behaviors that NW seeks to encourage, it is preferable to have direct measures of these behaviors.

In programs that field actual patrols, there are readily available indicators of surveillance behaviors. Most such programs not only keep records of the times during which patrols operate, but the patrol participants maintain logs of the activities in which they engage.

It is more difficult to judge the nature of participation in the more common, more passive "eyes-and-ears" programs. In one limited examination of 25 NW blocks in Washington, DC, Henig attempted to rate each block systematically on its level of activity using four dimensions: (1) regular meetings, (2) regularized channels for communicating information to members, (3) a subjective belief by the block captain or other representative that there was "a broad interest and growing sense of community surrounding the watch," and (4) a method for recruiting new residents into the watch program. He found great variability among the blocks, with about one-third having perfect scores and another third showing virtually no activity at all (Henig, 1984:24-25).

The evaluation of the Community Crime Prevention Program in Seattle examined burglary calls made to the police from program areas and comparison areas. Because NW encourages residents to report suspicious circumstances and instructs them about what items of information to report, changes in the nature of burglary calls should be expected.

The evaluators found that the proportion of all burglary calls that were burglary-in-progress calls increased by a somewhat greater amount in

the program areas (9.1 percent to 11.6 percent) than in the comparison areas. However, the burglary-in-progress calls in the comparison areas showed an increase in the proportion that included descriptions of suspects (55.2 percent to 64.8 percent), while this proportion increased less in the program areas (60.6 percent to 65.6 percent). Finally, the proportions of burglary-in progress calls that resulted in arrests increased from 17.5 percent to 19.2 percent in the program areas, while a decrease from 18.1 percent to 16.9 percent occurred in the comparison areas (Cirel et al., 1977: 125-127).

The most extensive examination of behavioral changes induced by NW programs is found in the Chicago evaluation conducted by Rosenbaum et al. They looked at a variety of social control and neighborhood integration indicators that NW is meant to increase. Basically, pre-test to post-test changes in the program areas were not significantly different from changes in comparison areas for: percentage of victimizations reported to the police, asking neighbors to watch one's home while away, frequency of chatting with neighbors, and number of block residents known by name.

An examination of differences in changes between treated and untreated blocks within a single program area in which the NW concept was most closely adhered to produced only slightly more encouraging results. Again, reporting victimizations, asking neighbors to watch homes, chatting with neighbors, and knowing neighbors by name showed no significant differential changes. However, compared to untreated blocks, the residents of treated blocks reported somewhat greater use of individualized home protective behaviors and a somewhat greater tendency to take action against a broad range of neighborhood problems (Rosenbaum et al., 1985:141-144, 155-160).

In our site visit interviews, NW participants invariably expressed the belief that they and their neighbors were more sensitive to crime related cues in their environments. They felt that the safety of their neighborhoods had been enhanced and that they could count on their neighbors for help. At the same time, we often heard rueful descriptions of overt crimes that had gone undetected by NW, crimes ranging from simple theft of a garden hose from a front yard to a rape-murder. And block captains frequently related how they wished that they could keep people more interested and involved in the program.

Thus, the translation of participation in meetings and telephone chains into participation in effective social control behaviors appears to be a problematic issue for NW.

3. How Much Participation is Needed?

Jurisdictions that use formal certification criteria give the impression that there is some minimum level of participation needed in order to make a NW program effective. However, the very fact that we have found minimum participation criteria ranging from 40 to 70 percent suggests that the criteria are selected somewhat arbitrarily.

During our site visits and communications with other program managers, we asked about minimum participation criteria. One person, in a jurisdiction that used a 40 percent criterion, noted that too many

areas had trouble getting half of their residents to participate. Another person, where the criterion was 50 percent, claimed that "a program doesn't really take off unless at least half of the residents join." While these opinions may be based on valuable, extended (but unsystematic) experiences in dealing with NW, no one offered evidence to support the correctness of any particular criterion for a minimum level of participation.

Attainment of a minimum participation level under a certification process may not even be an accurate indication of the proportion of residents who actually engage in the surveillance behavior that NW seeks to encourage. Some of the enrollees may not follow through with increased attentiveness. On the other hand, some residents who never enroll might increase their attentiveness after hearing about the program and seeing NW signs put in place.

None of this means that the establishment of a minimum participation criterion is a waste of time. Such a criterion can be a goal toward which managers and participants strive; it may motivate residents who want a program to put more effort into soliciting their neighbors' involvement than they otherwise would. Also, we adhere to the basic notion that higher levels of participation are better. The logic of NW -- whether in its simplest "eyes-and-ears" form or in its more extended form in which goals include increased community attachment and neighborhood problem-solving -- implies a connection between the breadth of participation and the level of success. We are merely trying to point out that there is no evidence to judge the minimum amount of participation needed to make a program effective.

Our research does suggest that the minimum level of needed participation varies according to a number of factors. First, the program's goals are important. The more ambitious the goals, in terms of increasing a sense of community and getting people involved with range of neighborhood issues, the higher the level of participation needed.

Second, the type of surveillance can make a difference. Citizen patrols, for example, appear to demand more depth than breadth of participation. Depending on the areas to be covered and the frequency of patrols, a relatively small proportion of highly motivated residents can field citizen patrols.

Finally, various aspects of the program's setting must be considered. The physical layout of some neighborhoods or blocks make them amenable to surveillance by a small proportion of residents, while other neighborhoods have numerous "blind spots" that require many eyes and ears. Also, the amount and nature of crime in the setting can influence the proportion of active participants needed among the residents.

4. Maintaining Participation

Because it is a collective response to crime, the survival of a NW program depends on maintaining the participation of residents in the program. The amount of crime can affect survival negatively in two different ways. First, the crime problem is so severe that NW, in

itself, has little impact, and the program participants become discouraged. Second, the crime problem is relatively small, and the participants have very few occasions to put their NW skills into practice, so they lose interest.

Highly disorganized neighborhoods with acute crime rates need assistance with a whole range of quality of life problems. In order to get residents involved and keep them involved in community problem-solving, some hope for improvement must be generated and periodic successes are vital. We have seen a few places where police-sponsored NW programs have been implemented in high-crime, deteriorated areas. The key seems to be a very visible effort that devotes substantial resources to the area, which helps to convince residents that the police department is serious in trying to assist them and that the police will not abandon them if they begin to take action.

On the other hand, NW may not be the best vehicle for maintaining the involvement of residents in high-crime neighborhoods. Other research has indicated that, in urban areas at least, community crime prevention efforts are generally taken on by multi-purpose citizen groups that already exist. A single-purpose community crime prevention group evolving into a multi-purpose organization appears to be an exception, occurring only when substantial external support is present (see the example described in DeJong and Goolkasian, 1982). Our site visits did find a few cases in which NW groups grew to become general neighborhood associations, but not in neighborhoods characterized by instability, crime, and deterioration.

Most neighborhoods in the United States do not have severe, chronic crime problems. Thus, maintaining citizen involvement is most often a matter of dealing with lapses in interest due to infrequent activity. The problem of keeping people mobilized for rare events soon becomes apparent for programs in relatively placid areas that restrict their activities to the encouragement of attentiveness and watchfulness. Time and time again during our research, NW organizers, block leaders, and participants told us that their biggest problem was the waning of interest among residents, or the growth of complacency -- not withdrawal from participation because of frustration in being unable to deal with crime.

The root of the issue is that, in many places, NW does not give participants enough to do. This may be because crime is already infrequent in the neighborhood, because the program has succeeded in bringing the numbers of crimes down, or because the program was stimulated initially by an unusual spurt in the number of crimes which eventually ran its course. The obvious solution is to provide other meaningful reasons for participants to remain involved.

At the neighborhood or block level, organizing NW under the auspices of a multi-purpose association appears to be one of the primary solutions to maintaining residents' involvement in NW. These groups provide a continuity of structure and leadership that is not dependent on crime remaining a salient issue. When interest in crime is low, members can devote their energies to other neighborhood improvement efforts, yet the regular meetings of the organization offer a forum to keep members at

least minimally attuned to NW. When crime does resurface as a salient issue, NW does not have to be reformed from scratch. Local multi-purpose associations generally have routine mechanisms for contacting new residents and inviting them to participate in the association's activities. Finally, the associations usually serve social functions -- both through sponsorship of periodic social gatherings and through opportunities for informal chatting before and after regular business meetings -- that are important reasons for members to continue participation.

Some NW programs that are not connected to existing multi-purpose associations have been able to create some of the same kinds of incentives for continued participation that the associations provide. Jurisdiction-wide sponsoring agencies use a number of approaches: providing attractive, entertaining newsletters; increasing the diversity of crime prevention techniques they offer to participants (particularly techniques geared toward children); making participation in NW a matter of community pride by giving awards and other forms of public recognition to individuals and groups; and organizing social events around crime prevention themes, often with the support of local businesses.

Individual crime prevention officers at the jurisdiction and neighborhood levels may go beyond their basic crime prevention roles and become more general resources for NW groups to draw upon. By using their network of contacts within the police department and in other city agencies, they assist NW groups that try to deal with issues indirectly related to crime: street lighting, renovations of playgrounds, and so forth. One crime prevention officer, working at the jurisdiction-wide level, told us that maintaining his network of contacts was one of the most important parts of his job. When he succeeds in stimulating people to form NW groups he finds that the groups soon begin to express other concerns, and "you have to be able to help deal with those concerns if you want to have credibility; you just can't say that it not your job."

In Detroit, some of the more successful mini-stations have become quasi community centers within their neighborhoods. They provide outlets for the talents and energies of volunteers; they welcome people who drop in to discuss neighborhood problems; they are havens for regular patrol officers who drop in for a cup of coffee or for an extra incident report when their supply of forms runs low; they are libraries of crime prevention literature.

Thus, the key to maintaining involvement in NW appears to be the willingness and ability to go beyond a narrow focus on NW. This is the case both in unusually high-crime, disorganized neighborhoods, where NW is not sufficient in itself to deal with the multitude of existing problems, and in more average, relatively low-crime neighborhoods, where lack of activity can lead to a waning of interest.

Diversifying the activities and functions of NW groups requires strong, creative leadership. Our site visits have found that, at the neighborhood level, the leadership role is often assumed by one energetic, dynamic individual. We frequently heard statements to the effect that: "If it wasn't for _____, there wouldn't be a program in that neighborhood." Local leaders themselves sometimes attribute

program survival to their own personal influence. One block captain, when asked whether his program had ever been terminated or suspended since its inception, responded affirmatively and explained, "I was out of town for a while."

Dedicated individuals are important to the continued operation of NW programs. However, to the extent that a program depends on the tenacity of one or two individuals, the program is vulnerable to collapse if the person(s) moves, switches interests, or is disabled for any significant length of time. In addition, when other residents sense that a particular individual is willing to devote enough time and energy to maintain the program almost single-handedly, it can be a deterrent to participation. The easy attitude of "don't worry, _____ will take care of it" is more likely when, in fact, _____ is doing it, and doing it well.

The problem is even more difficult when the role of program-sustaining leadership falls on a police crime prevention officer or representative of some other agency responsible for managing NW. These people have even less permanence in the neighborhood, and dependence on their leadership can interfere with the emergence of indigenous citizen leadership.

Perhaps the most effective leaders we talked to are ones who not only motivated others to follow but also motivated others to lead. Some crime prevention officers, for example, have a knack for stimulating action combined with a good sense of when to begin a slow withdrawal of leadership, transferring it to program participants themselves.

Tools of the Trade

This section discusses a miscellany of activities, approaches, and enhancements that NW programs have developed. They range from minor innovations to overall policies, but all are intended to facilitate the attainment of NW goals in some way: by stimulating and maintaining participation, by making surveillance easier or more effective, or by building upon the base provided by NW.

One of the most exciting aspects of this study has been the opportunity to see the diversity of approaches people use. Although there is a general NW model that operates in most jurisdictions -- and most of this report is devoted to examining that model -- each jurisdiction implements devices and procedures that make it unique. Because each of the unique feature is designed to attain goals that are common to all NW programs, every program can benefit by learning more about the experiences of others.

1. Internal Communications

Internal communications alert people during emergencies and pass along routine information (meeting dates, crime patterns, crime prevention tips) and motivational messages. In previous portions of this report, we have touched on a variety of approaches meant to facilitate communications. These have included the hierarchical structure in which participants are only responsible for contacting a relatively small

number of other people, the related idea of telephone chains within neighborhoods or blocks, periodic meetings, and newsletters.

Use of a hierarchical structure is only effective to the extent that people at each level follow-through with the communications. This may not be a problem for brief communications (e.g., notifying participants about a meeting), but it can be problematic when the information to be passed along is more extensive.

For example, a number of jurisdictions distribute newsletters only to block captains and depend on the block captains to keep their neighbors informed. The survey of one city's block captains, to which we had access, asked respondents about the usefulness of two aspects of the newsletters (listings of recent crimes and crime prevention tips) and about whether or not they routinely passed newsletter information along to other participants. Respondents were virtually unanimous in rating both aspects of the newsletter as helpful, but were far less unanimous in passing information along. The proportion reporting that they routinely passed recent crime data along was 59 percent, and it was 66 percent for crime prevention tips.

There was, however, a subset of block captains who conveyed the information at nearly a 100 percent rate: those who indicated that their groups met about once a month. Thus, the transmission of newsletter information only approached certainty when regular forums were available in which block captains could communicate to other participants.

When regular, frequent meetings of NW participants occur, they are likely to be meetings within the context of a multi-purpose neighborhood or block association under which NW is organized. At such meetings, NW leaders are generally given an opportunity to report to the association. It is rare for single-purpose NW groups to meet frequently, so some programs print a sufficient number of newsletters for all NW participants. To save mailing costs, newsletters are delivered to block captains who then distribute them to individual homes, often with the assistance of neighborhood children.

As for newsletters themselves, there is some debate about whether they should include listings of recent crimes. Most do not, because of concern about the listings inducing fear or concern about privacy if the listings are to have location identifiers that are specific enough to be useful to neighborhood-level or block-level NW groups.

The former concern was addressed in a study conducted by Lavrakas et al. (1983). We discussed this study in Chapter 4, and its main features and findings can be reviewed briefly. In Evanston, IL, a crime prevention newsletter containing block-level crime information was distributed to program participants in three regions of the city, while participants in three other regions received the same newsletter without the crime listings. The newsletter was distributed monthly and, after three months, a survey was conducted of samples of residents who received the two versions. From a city-wide sample, a comparison group of residents who received neither version of the newsletter was also interviewed.

The results were encouraging. First, neither version of the newsletter was found to be associated with higher levels of fear, but newsletter recipients were more likely to express concern about crime (e.g., view crime as a neighborhood problem), and this effect was greater for respondents who received the newsletters that included the crime listings. Second, those who received the version with the crime attachment were more likely than those who received the abbreviated version to rate the newsletters as informative and interesting, to accept citizen responsibility for crime prevention, and to be motivated to take several specific crime prevention measures. Finally, of those who received the newsletters with crime listings, 83 percent said that the listings should be continued in future newsletters.

The last finding noted above implies that recipients of newsletters containing block-level crime information were not concerned about possible threats to victim privacy. The Evanston newsletter, like most others we have seen with crime listings, identified crime locations at the block level (e.g., the 1400 block of Oak Street). However, we have seen a few newsletters in which specific addresses were listed and, during our site visits, we heard occasional reservations about the listings expressed by NW participants.

A telephone chain or tree, another form of internal communication, is a predetermined series of contacts in which one participant is to call one other, who calls another, and so forth, until all participants have been contacted. Block captains are usually responsible for keeping telephone chains up to date. When a NW participant spots something suspicious, he/she is first supposed to call the police and then set the telephone chain into operation so that other participants are alerted.

In one of our site visit jurisdictions, where telephone chains are given strong emphasis, several participants complained that others were initiating the calling sequence for non-emergency communications (e.g., to notify people about a NW meeting) or even for social communications. In another of our site visit jurisdictions, the telephone chains on some blocks were being used to initiate action that went beyond surveillance; this example will be discussed a little later.

2. NW Signs

It is no longer an oddity in the U.S. to see metal signs announcing the existence of NW-type programs. There are few variations in the design and size of the signs; they do, of course, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the title of the program being announced -- Block Watch, Neighborhood Watch, Community Alert, etc. Jurisdictions also vary in determining when signs should go up (and when they should be removed), where they should be placed, and who should pay for them.

As discussed earlier, jurisdictions with formal certification criteria have specific guidelines for deciding when signs should be erected. However, even in places where criteria exist, crime prevention officers (or civilian program managers) often exercise a great deal of discretion in bestowing the official NW emblem. In many jurisdictions, a neighborhood or block meeting with a reasonable turn-out is sufficient to gain permission for placement of a sign.

Determining exactly where to place signs has raised issues in some places. As noted in Chapter 3, our Alexandria (VA) site visit found that a NW group in an apartment complex encountered resistance from the apartment owners toward erecting signs on the grounds of the complex. In neighborhoods of single-family, owner-occupied homes, we received reports of people being dissatisfied with the idea of having signs placed in front of their houses.

Fortunately, there is not much latitude for disagreement about where to place signs in most areas. If groups are organized at the block level, signs are posted at the corners where cross-streets define the block's boundaries. If the program exists in an identifiable housing development, signs are posted at the access roads to the development and at the most heavily traveled intersections within it.

Jurisdictions also have mixed answers to the question of who pays for NW signs, although most jurisdictions provide some form of public subsidy, even if only for the poorest neighborhoods. One of our site visit jurisdictions requires that residents pay for signs (which the city installs) unless the neighborhood meets certain criteria under Community Development Block Grant guidelines. Another provides one free sign to each neighborhood and allows residents to purchase additional signs. A widespread view is that, whenever residents are not in dire poverty, they should raise some money for signs themselves as an indication of commitment to the program.

Our final observation concerning NW signs pertains to the use of unique identifiers on the signs in some jurisdictions (e.g., lettering the street name and block number on the sign or engraving an identifying number on the back of the sign). Evidently, and unfortunately, NW signs are tempting targets for vandals, perhaps because of the irony involved in tearing down and carting away a NW sign. Identifying numbers help NW managers to return a discarded sign to its proper location or, if the sign is damaged, to determine where a replacement sign needs to be installed.

3. Enhancing Surveillance

While increased attentiveness to their surroundings by residents of a neighborhood, without any other changes, can be an effective crime prevention technique, a number of jurisdictions have implemented modifications and practices meant to further enhance the effectiveness and amount of surveillance.

One obvious step that can be taken is the improvement of external lighting. Our national survey indicated that improved street lighting was a concern in more than a third of the programs that responded. If anything, the prevalence of concern over street lighting was even greater in our site visit jurisdictions. In one jurisdiction, almost every new NW group that formed soon began to lobby the city for improved street lighting. In another jurisdiction, arrangements were made with a local merchant to install a yard light on the front lawn of each housing unit at a substantial discount, on the condition that each home would agree to having a light installed.

Other measures which NW groups have tried to implement as ways to improve the visibility of suspicious persons and activities include trimming or removing shrubbery in common areas, banning on-street parking, and distributing descriptions (makes, colors, plate numbers) of the vehicles belonging to residents in the area being surveilled.

Surveillance can also be enhanced by increasing the number of eyes and ears devoted to it. Toward this end, jurisdictions have encouraged programs that try to involve non-residents in watching for suspicious circumstances. Mail carriers and utility workers (meter readers and repair personnel) are being instructed in observational techniques in a growing number of jurisdictions.

4. Facilitating Police Response

NW participants who detect suspicious activities are directed to notify the police immediately. It is logical that the effectiveness of police response to such calls can be improved by providing the police with as much useful information as possible. Accordingly, many programs put a great deal of effort into instructing NW participants about what information to note -- particularly, exact addresses and descriptions of subjects and vehicles. It is not uncommon for programs to provide booklets or pamphlets that include pictorial representations of hypothetical suspects and vehicles, indicating quite clearly what identifying characteristics the NW participants should note. These handouts even contain hints on how to go about estimating a person's height and weight.

At least three of our site visit jurisdictions emphasized making building addresses clearly visible, with the hope of avoiding situations in which the police have difficulty locating particular addresses. In one of the sites, visibility requirements for street numbers were part of the city's housing code, and the advent of NW was tied into more vigorous enforcement of the standards.

5. Beyond Watching and Reporting

Although the basic role of NW is to observe and report to the police, we have observed several examples of groups taking on more active roles. We are not referring here to situations in which NW groups assume additional kinds of activities (such as victim assistance or youth recreation) but, rather, to natural extensions of surveillance -- that is, taking action on what is observed beyond notifying the police.

Perhaps the most natural extension of surveillance by residents is to let themselves be seen so that offenders know they are being watched. Most jurisdictions encourage participation in special events -- "night out", "porch night", etc. -- that are basically symbolic. But some NW groups have begun to make their physical presence known in response to specific suspicious circumstances. When a participant detects something amiss, he/she calls the police and then activates the telephone tree to notify other participants. In most places that use telephone trees, the other participants are simply supposed to turn their attention to the

suspicious circumstances, so that they can pick up additional information for the police and/or take individualized precautions, such as locking their doors.

However, in a few groups, the participants turn on their front lights and come outside to make their presence visible. During our site visits, we even detected two instances in which groups had purchased cameras that rotated among the group's members. When they went outside in response to a message on the telephone chain, the participants with cameras would take pictures of suspicious activities, vehicles, or persons. One watch group of merchants in the same jurisdiction even posted signs warning that they would "photograph and report all suspicious activities in or near all of our businesses."

Citizen patrols, generally tend to make themselves highly visible. Patrols also appear to have a natural tendency to extend their functions beyond simple observation and reporting of suspicious circumstances to the police. They often take on broader quality of life issues, much like the watchmen of a bygone era or the beat patrolman of the more recent past. We earlier described some of these functions as performed by walking patrols in Boston's StreetSAFE program. DeJong and Goolkasian (1982) note a similar pattern in an area of Brooklyn:

"Patrollers take note of neighborhood conditions, watching for potholes, broken street lights, poor sanitation, and non-functioning traffic lights.... These complaints are recorded by patrollers or radioed to the base station operator and forwarded the next day to the appropriate city agencies for corrective action. Examination of the base station logs reveals that the bulk of reports to the operator concern these types of neighborhood conditions. While the original purpose of having the car patrollers make these reports was to help relieve their boredom, it is clear that this procedure has contributed to the residents' feelings of control over the quality of their neighborhood" (p. 20).

Clearly, any activity beyond passive watching and calling the police increases the likelihood that NW participants will get involved in conflict situations. Police departments have been very firm in their instructions to citizen crime prevention groups: "Don't get involved; that is our job." While recognizing the risks to citizens associated with more direct involvement, and the possibility of vigilante-like actions occurring, our research suggests that citizens can move beyond passive surveillance in creative, limited ways, and that the strong warnings against involvement may be somewhat overstated.

6. Police Innovations

Crime prevention officers at both the jurisdiction and neighborhood level have proven to be innovators in a number of places. This appears to occur only under certain circumstances: (1) the officers are carefully chosen because of their ability to work with community groups, (2) the officers have already established their reputations as "good cops" among their peers, (3) the officers are given a great deal of

freedom to operate, (4) the upper-echelons of the department clearly demonstrate the commitment of the department to community crime prevention.

Among our site visit locales, it was in Detroit that we found the most impressive convergence of these factors, although they occurred on a more limited scale in other sites as well. During earlier discussions, we have mentioned some of the innovative features implemented in Detroit. The special task forces that combine intensive organizing with covert surveillance focused on neighborhood troublemakers is a creative attempt to integrate crime prevention with more traditional police functions. The Detroit officers can be credited with the idea of conducting initial block meetings in the middle of the street in neighborhoods where residents are reluctant to leave their homes unwatched.

Within Detroit, the mini-station concept has been responsible for unleashing a great deal of creative leadership from crime prevention officers. By placing dynamic officers in community-based settings, structuring the situation in a way that virtually forces the officers to recruit volunteers to help them fulfill their day-to-day responsibilities, freeing the officers from the regular chain of command, and giving them latitude to experiment with new approaches, the police department has given a major boost to its community crime prevention efforts.

Although there are variations, the mini-station officers tend to become very involved in the local areas that they serve. They attend social functions, sit on boards of neighborhood associations, and come to be seen as a resource for general community problem-solving. The best of the officers have a friendly, out-going, informal relationship with residents that is always tempered with the understanding that they are police officers -- representatives of the state who are prepared to enforce the law vigorously whenever necessary. Again, it is the combining of community organizing functions with the traditional police role -- in this case within the same individuals -- that makes the mini-station officers so effective.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, we synthesize the wealth of descriptive information generated during our research to draw conclusions and make a series of recommendations pertaining to both substantive issues and future research needs. At various places in the earlier chapters, we have commented on conclusions suggested by our data, and we have made several tentative recommendations about options that seem to make sense for NW programs. Our approach in this chapter is relatively conservative. The conclusions and recommendations presented are primarily ones that derive rather unambiguously from our study and from the research of others.

Conclusions

1. NW Effectiveness

NW programs, under certain circumstances, have had some success in reducing property crimes, particularly residential burglary. However, publicly stated claims about the crime reduction efficacy of NW programs are often greatly overstated because many of the attempts to evaluate programs have had methodological flaws of the type that tend to inflate findings of effectiveness.

We also conclude that NW programs are more likely to have some effects on crime in neighborhoods that are not already characterized by high crime rates, instability, and deterioration. This conclusion does not derive directly from studies of crime rate changes. Rather, we infer it from evidence indicating that the stimulation and maintenance of NW is less likely to succeed in neighborhoods with high crime, instability, and deterioration.

While there are reasons for optimism about the potential for NW to reduce property crime, we have found little evidence of its success in producing increased neighborhood attachment or sense of community among residents.

Our conclusion is that these more general, wide-ranging effects are not common because NW, as implemented in most places, is a relatively mild intervention. The treatment "dosage" (Rosenbaum, forthcoming) in NW often consists of only a few meetings and an increased sensitivity of residents to crime prevention concerns -- not the type of intervention that one would expect to produce major changes in social environments. Where we have observed community-building effects associated with NW, they are found in programs characterized by dynamic leadership, the commitment of much more than average resources, and innovative approaches that link NW with other community concerns.

2. Maintaining Participation

The major concern today among existing NW programs is maintaining the participation of residents. In those neighborhoods where populations are relatively stable and crime rates are relatively low, the problem is that residents simply lose interest because of the infrequency of the types of circumstances to which participants are supposed to react. The programs that are most successful in maintaining participation are ones that are organized within existing multi-purpose organizations or ones that expand their activities to encompass a range of crime-related, quality of life concerns.

3. Jurisdiction-Wide Sponsorship

We cannot make a cut-and-dried conclusion that sponsorship by a police agency is superior to sponsorship by a civilian agency, or vice-versa. Police agencies provide the aura of state authority which most NW participants want to have associated with their programs. But civilian agencies have a more single-purpose mission. Unlike police departments, their commitment to community crime prevention is not secondary to other established and important functions.

In very large urban areas jurisdiction-wide sponsorship of NW, whether by police or civilian agencies, has to co-exist with independent programs sponsored by sub-jurisdictional organizations. Some segments of large cities have such well established voluntary organizations and are so attuned to their own unique identities and concerns that trying to bring them under a jurisdiction-wide program could well prove to be counter-productive.

There is a tendency for jurisdiction-wide sponsorship to impose a level of uniformity on programs initiated within the jurisdiction. While the agencies can efficiently coordinate everyday management details (e.g., seeing that new programs get signs, distributing a newsletter, organizing special events), they also tend, in the process, to develop a single model with certification criteria that are applied to all neighborhoods. This does not mean that there are not jurisdiction-wide agencies -- police and civilian -- with creative, innovative staffs. In fact, there are. But this creativity and innovation flows from personal dedication and energy, and not from anything inherent in the organizational structures in which the people work.

Our conclusion is that, on balance, the tendency toward setting standards that apply uniformly to all programs within a jurisdiction is not a positive development. It closes off some possibilities for the official recognition and support of innovative approaches and for the tailoring of activities to the needs of specific neighborhoods. In the long run, it is our view that flexibility and innovation, in addition to dynamic leadership, are necessary to achieve revitalization of NW, a goal that is at the forefront for virtually everyone involved in NW.

Recommendations

1. Flexibility

The final conclusion stated above leads directly to our most general recommendation: Give the people who organize, manage, lead, and participate in NW programs as much latitude as possible. Most of the remaining recommendations relate to ways of enhancing this flexibility.

Before proceeding, we take note of one important point. There can be a tension between exercising strong leadership -- which is important to the initiation and maintenance of NW programs -- and encouraging flexibility. Leadership can be exercised in ways that constrain and limit the adaptability and innovative potential of the people and programs under its influence. Thus, the most successful examples of leadership we have observed are exercised with sufficient clarity of direction to motivate others, but also with an openness to new ideas, a willingness to share leadership and credit, and the perceptiveness to recognize and encourage new ideas that originate with others. It is this type of leadership that makes maximum use of its most valuable resource: the people it is trying to lead.

2. Standard-Setting

In line with our encouragement of flexibility, we recommend that the use of formal standards, primarily certification and recertification criteria, be minimized, or at least that program managers exercise discretion in applying them. The greater the number and specificity of standards, the more they define a single version of NW to the exclusion of others. When a particular neighborhood fails to meet a set of rigorous criteria, either initially or at some predetermined interval, the neighborhood's program is likely to be deemed a failure. However, it may mean that the model defined by the standards is simply not the best model for that neighborhood and that some other model would be more successful.

3. Tailoring Programs to Neighborhoods

Carrying the second recommendation further, we suggest that NW organizers and managers make greater efforts to take the characteristics and needs of specific neighborhoods into account and to tailor NW efforts to those characteristics and needs.

We suspect that many organizers/managers would be quite willing to do this if they had good information on which to base the development of neighborhood-specific policies. This report has presented some findings that bear on the relationships between neighborhood characteristics and various aspects of NW, but additional research that is specifically designed to address these issues in terms of what organizers/managers can realistically accomplish is needed.

4. Local Voluntary Associations

Whenever local associations already exist at the neighborhood or block level, NW functions should be lodged within their structures. To a great extent, this is a recommendation that is already being practiced; in areas that have both NW and local associations, the two are most likely connected.

However, we state the recommendation in order to emphasize the value of the marriage between NW and local associations and to encourage NW organizers to seek out and consult the local associations in the areas where they are trying to stimulate the emergence of NW. Not only do local associations have the organizational structure, leadership, and multiplicity of interests/activities that can help ensure the maintenance of participation in NW, they also have the knowledge that NW organizers need in their efforts to tailor NW programs to the needs of particular areas.

There will be cases in which local associations act as impediments to NW. We did find a relatively wealthy neighborhood in one of our site visit jurisdictions where the homeowners' association preferred to remain at arm's length from the NW program that was operating in the neighborhood. As explained to us, some key members of the association felt that sponsorship of NW would imply the existence of a crime problem in the area, that dealing with crime was properly the role of the police, and that the collective surveillance feature of NW was inconsistent with residents' desires for privacy.

Our site visits also found an instance in which two local associations covered the same neighborhood. NW became an issue in the already existing competition between the two associations. The situation ended when the association not sponsoring NW disbanded, but it is easy to realize that local associations with conflicting views can overlap in heterogeneous urban areas. When that occurs, NW organizers must take care that NW does not polarize the area even further by becoming identified with one group to the exclusion of others. The ideal outcome would be to take the views of all legitimate groups into consideration and design a program in which all groups can participate and which can be sponsored jointly.

When NW groups form in the absence of a local multi-issue association, the process of forming NW has the potential for stimulating the creation of one. We have seen this occur in site visit locations, but only rarely. Our recommendation is that, in such situations, NW organizers explain the benefits of a multi-issue association to the nascent NW group (pointing out, for example, the interrelationship of crime with other neighborhood problems) and encourage the group to broaden its focus.

5. Extending the Surveillance Function

In Chapter 6, we noted some examples of watch group participants who have extended the surveillance function into more active roles: regular NW groups in which members collectively make the fact of their surveillance visible to suspicious persons, and citizen patrols that expand their surveil-and-report functions to cover a broad range of neighborhood conditions.

We recognize the concerns that NW sponsors, particularly police departments, have about the potential development of vigilantism. This concern leads sponsors to stress non-intervention to such an extent that watch participants are encouraged to keep an exceedingly low profile.

Our study is consistent with prior research (Yin et al., 1977) in finding little inclination among watch participants to get involved in direct confrontations. Thus, we recommend that NW sponsors soften their stances against non-intervention somewhat. This can be accomplished by carefully explaining the potential dangers involved in confronting suspicious persons (including the negative implications of confronting people who have every right to be doing what they are doing), but by balancing the explanation with examples of more active, but still limited, extensions of surveillance that have been employed elsewhere.

6. The Police

It seems almost too obvious for us to point out that we recommend the organizational strengthening of police crime prevention units and a greater recognition by departments of the importance of community crime prevention within the overall police role. Nevertheless, the recommendation needs to be stated because too many police departments support crime prevention with words more than deeds.

Crime prevention units should have a core staff of dedicated, motivated officers who have already established themselves within the department. Given the current realities of how police personnel view crime prevention, there should be no opportunity for peers to question the capacity of key crime prevention officers for "real police work".

Other officers in the unit should come from two sources: new recruits and the existing patrol force. An advantage of bringing relatively new officers directly into crime prevention is that it encourages the development of a cadre of officers who are committed to crime prevention. Rotating regular patrol officers into the unit for temporary, but significant, tours (e.g., a year or two) gives these officers the opportunity to experience first-hand the importance of the difficult, but rewarding, job of working with citizen groups.

In the long run, rotation of regular patrol officers into crime prevention units should increase the mutual understanding and cooperation between officers involved in traditional police functions and those involved in crime prevention. As we noted earlier in this report, this can enhance the crime prevention function considerably.

Departments should also recognize that organizing and maintaining community groups is time consuming and requires special skills and attitudes. A small crime prevention unit cannot be expected to devote enough time to community organizing if it is continually assigned other tasks (e.g., security seminars for business groups, drug prevention lectures, general public relations functions) without increases in staff.

There is a well-developed body of knowledge outlining various strategies for community organizing, yet few departments provide training in these techniques. People who conduct regular police training are generally not well versed in these techniques, so departments should be encouraged to seek outside assistance. The New York City Police Department, for example, uses the services of a private non-profit organization that works with neighborhood groups throughout the pity. This organization conducts training for the department's Community Patrol Officers.

There are other qualities of good community crime prevention officers that are not readily transferable skills, but rather matters of attitude and temperament. Some officers simply are not suited for work with community groups, which involves things such as public speaking, great restraint in the exercise of authority, motivating others to do things rather than doing them yourself, and sharing most of one's work time with relatively large numbers of diverse citizens rather than with a small number of like-minded peers. We would not be surprised to find out, for example, that the attitudes and temperaments of effective detectives differ greatly from those of effective crime prevention officers. Thus, departments should consider attitudes and temperament in their selection of crime prevention officers, although we recognize that there is a need for research to help departments develop relevant selection criteria.

Finally, we recommend that crime prevention units themselves recognize the importance of fostering independence, self-sustaining organizational structures, and indigenous leadership in the community groups with which they work. As we have noted, leadership can be exercised in ways that interfere with the emergence of independence among those being led; often it is easier for a leader to make all the important decisions unilaterally than to elicit and foster decision-making from others. But the development of self-sustaining community groups is important to the continued survival of crime prevention. The support of police departments for crime prevention is still tenuous in many places. In view of this, community groups need to be able to operate independently of strong police leadership. Conversely, encouraging the strength and independence of community groups can help to ensure departmental commitment to crime prevention because the groups become an organized constituency supporting police involvement in crime prevention.

7. Revitalizing NW

In jurisdictions where NW programs exist, we found the most common concern to be that interest, participation, and activity among participants were weakening. There was widespread belief that programs

needed a "shot in the arm". Two frequently observed responses to this concern are somewhat negative. One response has been to use newsletters to tell participants that they are becoming lax. Crime figures are announced, showing an increase or the end of a decrease, and the trend is at least partially attributed to complacency among NW participants. The participants are urged not to slip back into bad habits of carelessness and inattentiveness.

The second response has been to "clean house". Program sponsors announce that they are instituting (or reviving) standards that programs will be required to meet at regular intervals, and that official recognition will be withdrawn from any program not meeting the standards. There is a strong negative aspect to this message; namely, the threat to decertify. Admittedly, this approach may achieve positive results by giving programs well-defined goals toward which they can strive.

We do not view either approach as likely to achieve a major revitalization of flagging NW programs, although the institution (or revival) of certification/decertification processes undoubtedly has a better chance of attaining some successes than does the beratement approach.

A third response we have observed is motivational. Program managers elicit positive media coverage, present awards, and convince local businesses to sponsor special events with crime prevention themes. This response is most likely to be useful when programs are already operating fairly well. Periodic boosterism, regardless of its level of intensity, is not likely to revitalize moribund programs.

We recommend that sponsors begin to view declines in NW interest, participation, and activity as indications of program weakness rather than as indications that citizens are basically lackadaisical in dealing with crime prevention.

When NW seems to be waning, chances are that the reasons vary from one type of neighborhood to another. In high-crime, unstable neighborhoods, the inability of the basic NW model to have much effect on severe crime and crime-related problems can be frustrating and discouraging. In neighborhoods that are not affected by high-crime and deterioration but that consist primarily of rental units with high tenant turnover rates, the basic NW model may not generate the kind of organizational structure needed to ensure continuity of effort. In low-crime, middle-class neighborhoods inhabited primarily by homeowners, the basic NW model may simply not give participants enough to do; they become bored or they decide that their crime problem is so minimal that it is outweighed by the value they place on privacy and the attractiveness of other things they could do with their time (in economists' terminology, the opportunity costs are too high).

Thus, our suggestion is that efforts to revitalize NW concentrate more on what we discussed in Item #1 above: Create flexible programs that can be tailored to the different needs and concerns of specific neighborhoods.

8. Information Exchange

Throughout this report -- particularly in the "Tools of the Trade" section of Chapter 6 -- we have discussed differing ways that various jurisdictions have dealt with NW issues, and we have described innovations that make each approach to NW somewhat unique. Implementing our suggestions about maintaining program flexibility and tailoring programs to neighborhood needs would be facilitated if NW organizers and managers could be kept informed about the innovations being developed by their colleagues.

To some extent, our research served the purpose of information exchange. But our study was a one-time, state-of-the-art assessment, and it concentrated on broad, general issues more than on "nuts-and-bolts." In addition, the study was time-delimited; while we made contact with a sizable number of NW programs, our coverage was far from comprehensive.

We recommend that on-going processes for information exchange be developed. Two possibilities that build on existing frameworks are suggested. First, newsletters could be used. Most NW jurisdictions already have some form of newsletter. Some statewide crime prevention agencies publish newsletters that report on developments within and beyond their state's borders. The National Crime Prevention Council publishes Catalyst, a nationally distributed newsletter. Thus, the basis for a network of newsletters already exists. What is needed is a central clearinghouse that individual programs can draw upon to keep informed about new developments and that would ensure routine distribution of this information to the rest of the newsletter network.

We realize that some national clearinghouses have developed into rather expensive undertakings. However, we believe that costs can be minimized by keeping functions focused and by relying on voluntary cooperation from NW programs throughout the country. We do not make a recommendation about where this clearinghouse should be lodged; several national organizations might be considered as appropriate sponsors.

The second possibility, which can be implemented in conjunction with, or in the absence of, a clearinghouse, is to build NW information exchanges into national, regional, and statewide meetings of crime prevention groups. As with the newsletter network suggestion, an underlying structure of meetings exists, and the need is to increase the interrelationships among the meetings.

Future Research

As professional researchers, we could present a lengthy list of suggestions for future research because, during the course of this study, our professional curiosity was continually being stimulated. We were never satisfied that we had enough high-quality information to answer any question without reservations. Alas, an unlimited supply of additional questions is both the bane and the joy of being a researcher.

However, in the following recommendations we exercise restraint, addressing a relatively small number of research directions that should

have immediate, direct implications for organizers and managers of NW programs. For the most part, the research directions suggested are ones that will help to enhance the kinds of knowledge that will be useful for implementing the substantive suggestions we have made above.

1. Needs-based Programming

At several points, we have stressed the desirability of tailoring NW programs to the needs of specific neighborhoods. Accomplishing this requires the development of an appropriate needs assessment technology and research on the fit between various neighborhood needs and various program options.

We add one further point. The idea of matching program features to neighborhood needs can be extended to individuals. People participate (or do not participate) in NW because participation satisfies various needs -- needs for social interaction, feelings of accomplishment, sense of security, and so forth. Research that investigates how various program elements tap into these needs can be quite useful in devising ways to increase levels of participation in NW.

2. Understanding Participation

Surveys that have tried to determine the amount of participation in NW have generally defined participation as an either-or phenomenon. Our position is that participation varies substantially in terms of form and extensiveness. Research is needed on the definition and measurement of participation, followed by exploration of the factors related to differing forms and extent of participation.

3. Linking NW with Broader Neighborhood Concerns

The integration of NW with efforts to deal with other neighborhood problems (even problems that are directly crime-related) does not occur automatically. People have to perceive the linkages between problems, and organizational structures must facilitate the coordination of efforts. How these perceptions and structures can be fostered is an important area for research because the effectiveness and survival of NW programs are enhanced when NW is integrated with other concerns.

4. Integration With Traditional Police Functions

Another type of integration that requires investigation is the integration between crime prevention and traditional police functions within police departments. The research question is: How can crime prevention benefit from being able to work with regular police functions (particularly patrol) without the resources of crime prevention units being absorbed by the enormous demand for traditional police services?

5. Selection of Crime Prevention Officers

Another item on the research agenda that pertains to police departments is selection criteria for crime prevention officers. We have noted that, to work effectively with citizen groups, crime prevention officers need to possess certain attitudes and a certain temperament, in

addition to a set of particular skills. Yet we have been able to describe the attitudes and temperament in only vague terms, based on our subjective impressions during the observational portions of our research. To be useful as selection criteria, these vague descriptions have to be made specific, and ways of measuring them reliably must be developed.

6. Communication Within NW Programs

Finally, we recommend that research be conducted on the effects of various forms of communication used in NW programs. In particular, the reactions of citizens to NW meetings should be studied. As a specific example, one might employ a quasi-experimental model similar to the one used by Lavrakas and his colleagues (1983) in their study of newsletters to examine the effects of different initial presentations used by NW organizers. The purpose would be to find presentational forms and contents that stimulate a desire to participate without increasing fear or raising unrealistic expectations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Due to a variety of factors, it was established that, at a minimum, 182 questionnaires never reached their intended recipients. While project staff suspect that this figure represents a very conservative estimate of the actual number of packets that were improperly disseminated, the base figure for the total number of mailed questionnaires has been adjusted downwards (from 2300 to 2118) to reflect only those packets known not to have been distributed.

2. The operationalization and interpretation of indicators of the fear of crime continue to be topics of controversy. It has been documented elsewhere that fear of crime and perceptions about relative levels of crime may measure discrete attitudes (see, e.g., Garofalo and Laub, 1978; Stinchcombe et al., 1978; Furstenberg, 1972; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas et al., 1983). The terms are not used synonymously here.

3. This statistic represents the strength of the relationship between perceived levels of crime and income levels for all surveyed NW programs. Interestingly, the relationship is slightly stronger for NW programs without formalized surveillance activities ($\text{Tau } b = -.1872, p < .001$), but spurious for those programs with patrol components.

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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE COUNTIES

Counties selected for inclusion in the national Neighborhood Watch survey, by geographic division and state

I. New England

Connecticut
Litchfield
New London

Maine
Penobscot
York

Massachusetts
Berkshire
Suffolk

New Hampshire
Rockingham

Rhode Island
Kent

Vermont
Rutland

II. Middle Atlantic

New Jersey
Morris
Somerset

New York
Albany
Madison
Queens
Westchester

Pennsylvania
Allegheny
Greene
Lackawanna

III. South Atlantic

Delaware
Sussex

Florida
Broward
Escambia
Hernando
Orange
Sarasota
St. Lucie

Georgia
DeKalb
Lowndes
Washington

Maryland
Frederick
Prince George's

North Carolina
Buncombe
Edgecombe
Gaston
Henderson
New Hanover

South Carolina
Anderson

Virginia
Alexandria City
Alleghany
Appomattox
Fairfax
Norfolk City
Virginia Beach City

West Virginia
Wood

IV. East North Central

Illinois

Tazewell
Winnebago

Indiana

Allen
Elkhart
Porter
Posey

Michigan

Macomb
Oakland
Wayne

Ohio

Butler
Summit

Wisconsin

Racine
Rock

V. West North Central

Iowa

Lee
Linn
Pottawattamie

Kansas

Ford
Riley

Minnesota

Anoka
Hennepin

Missouri

Greene
Lafayette
Newton
St. Louis City

Nebraska

Lancaster
Scotts Bluff

North Dakota

Ward

South Dakota

Codington

VI. East South Central

Alabama

DeKalb
Jefferson
Shelby

Kentucky

Anderson
Henderson
Warren

Mississippi

Adams
Hinds
Jones
Leflore

Tennessee

Blount
Shelby
Tipton

VII. West South Central

Arkansas

Benton

Louisiana

Caddo
East Baton Rouge
Jefferson
Terrebonne

Oklahoma

LeFlore

Texas

Camp
Dallas
El Paso
Fort Bend
Webb

VIII. Mountain

Arizona

Pima

Colorado

Douglas

Larimer

Idaho

Ada

Idaho

Montana

Ravalli

Nevada

Lyon

New Mexico

Dona Ana

Socorro

Utah

Duchesne

Salt Lake

Wyoming

Big Horn

IX. Pacific

California

El Dorado

Sacramento

San Diego

San Luis Obispo

Solano

Tulare

Ventura

Oregon

Marion

Washington

Benton

Spokane

APPENDIX B
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH SURVEY INSTRUMENT

**THE HINDELANG
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CENTER**

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY
135 WESTERN AVENUE
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12222
(518) 442-5600

Dear Crime Prevention Practitioner:


We would like to draw on your knowledge and experience in the area of community crime prevention. The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, in association with the National Sheriffs' Association and the National Crime Prevention Council, is conducting a national study of Neighborhood Watch programs. This project is funded by the National Institute of Justice.

Your Neighborhood Watch program has been selected to be included in this important study. Please read and carefully complete the enclosed sections of our questionnaire. Return the completed packet in the self-addressed stamped envelope which has been provided. This survey elicits information on (1) the administration and operations of your Neighborhood Watch program, (2) the characteristics of the geographic area serviced by your program, and (3) the availability of evaluations and/or other printed materials pertinent to your program.

Our purpose in seeking this information is to better understand the factors associated with the initial development and on-going success of Neighborhood Watch programs. Based on the responses to this questionnaire, a small number of distinctive programs will be selected for intensive on-site examination.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor. We wish you and your program continued success. If you have any questions about this survey or about the project in general, please contact us.

Sincerely,


James Garofalo, Maureen McLeod
Project Directors

CRIME PREVENTION INVENTORY

ID# _____

PROGRAM NAME _____

PLEASE INDICATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING CRIME PREVENTION TECHNIQUES AND SERVICES ARE OFFERED BY YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM. (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROJECT IDENTIFICATION
- BLOCK PARENTING
- HIRED GUARDS
- ESCORT SERVICE
- PROJECT WHISTLE STOP
- HOME SECURITY SURVEYS
- CRIME TIP HOTLINE
- VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE
- COURT WATCH
- STREET LIGHTING IMPROVEMENT
- PROVISION OF EMERGENCY TELEPHONES ON STREET
- ALTERATION OF TRAFFIC PATTERNS
- PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS (e.g., GRAFFITI, LITTER, ABANDONED CARS/HOUSES, ETC.)
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION A

ID# _____
PROGRAM NAME: _____
MAILING ADDRESS: _____

PHONE: _____
COUNTY: _____
PERSON COMPLETING SURVEY: _____
TITLE: _____

ADMINISTRATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM

PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

1. ON WHAT DATE DID THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM BEGIN OPERATIONS?

2. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, HAS THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM EVER SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED OPERATIONS?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, DURING WHAT PERIOD AND FOR WHAT REASONS WERE OPERATIONS SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED?

3. DID THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM AT ITS INCEPTION?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 5]
- YES
- DON'T KNOW [SKIP TO QUESTION 5]

4. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE, IF ANY, PROVIDED BY THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AT THE INCEPTION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT
- PROVISION OF TRAINING
- PROVISION OF OPERATING SPACE
- PROVISION OF SPEAKERS
- PROVISION OF LIAISON OFFICER
- PROVISION OF CRIME STATISTICS FOR GROUP USE
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

5. DOES THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT CURRENTLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 8]
- YES
- DON'T KNOW [SKIP TO QUESTION 8]

6. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE CURRENTLY PROVIDED BY THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT
- PROVISION OF TRAINING
- PROVISION OF OPERATING SPACE
- PROVISION OF SPEAKERS
- PROVISION OF LIAISON OFFICER
- PROVISION OF CRIME STATISTICS FOR GROUP USE
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

7. WHICH LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT, IF ANY, PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- LOCAL
- COUNTY
- STATE
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

8. FOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM INITIALLY INTENDED?

- TO PREVENT CRIME FROM BECOMING A PROBLEM
- TO COMBAT AN EXISTING CRIME PROBLEM
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- DON'T KNOW

9. WAS THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM INITIALLY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?

- NO
- YES
IF YES, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

- DON'T KNOW

10. IS THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM CURRENTLY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?

- NO
- YES
IF YES, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

- DON'T KNOW

11. HOW ARE NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS MADE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE AND OPERATIONS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

12. ARE THERE ANY SIGNS POSTED EITHER ON THE STREETS OR ON WINDOWS INDICATING THAT THIS IS A NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH COMMUNITY?

NO

YES, SPECIFY _____

13. DOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM PUBLISH A NEWSLETTER THAT IS DISTRIBUTED TO RESIDENTS?

NO

YES

14. HOW OFTEN IS THIS NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED?

15. DOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM HAVE SCHEDULED MEETINGS?

NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 22]

YES

16. HOW OFTEN ARE THESE MEETINGS HELD?

WEEKLY

BI-WEEKLY

MONTHLY

BI-MONTHLY

OTHER, SPECIFY _____

17. WHERE ARE THESE MEETINGS HELD?

MEMBER'S HOME

STOREFRONT

ROOM IN LOCAL CHURCH

ROOM IN LOCAL COMMUNITY BUILDING, SPECIFY _____

OTHER, SPECIFY _____

18. ON THE AVERAGE, HOW MANY RESIDENTS ATTEND THESE MEETINGS?

19. DO POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY ATTEND THESE MEETINGS?

NO

YES

20. HOW OFTEN ARE CRIME PREVENTION TECHNIQUES DISCUSSED AT THESE MEETINGS?

ALWAYS

SOMETIMES

RARELY

NEVER

21. ARE RECENT LOCAL CRIME STATISTICS PRESENTED AT THESE MEETINGS?

NO

YES

PROGRAM STAFFING

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS EXAMINE SOME ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURES OF YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM.

22. HOW MANY PERSONS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

23. HOW MANY OF THESE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL ARE:

- a. FULL-TIME PAID STAFF _____
- b. PART-TIME PAID STAFF _____
- c. FULL-TIME VOLUNTEER STAFF _____
- d. PART-TIME VOLUNTEER STAFF _____

PROGRAM FUNDING

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOCUS ON THE HISTORY AND PATTERN OF FUNDING FOR YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM.

24. AT ITS INCEPTION, DID THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM RECEIVE ANY FUNDING?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 26]
- YES
- DON'T KNOW [SKIP TO QUESTION 26]

25. WHAT WERE THE SOURCES OF FUNDING? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
- STATE GOVERNMENT
- COUNTY GOVERNMENT
- LOCAL GOVERNMENT
- PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
- ORGANIZATION DUES
- COMMERCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
- FUND RAISING ACTIVITIES
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- DON'T KNOW

26. WHAT IS THE TOTAL BUDGET FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR?

27. WHAT IS THE PROJECTED BUDGET FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION B

ID# _____

PROGRAM NAME: _____

FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY, WE DEFINE AN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE COMPONENT OF A NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM BY FIVE CRITERIA. FIRST, THE ORGANIZED SYSTEMATIC SURVEILLANCE FOCUSES ON A DEFINED AREA. SECOND, THE PURPOSE OF THE SURVEILLANCE IS TO DETECT CRIMINAL INCIDENTS AND SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIORS/SITUATIONS. THIRD, PARTICIPATION IN THE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY INVOLVES VIGILANCE BEYOND THE REALM OF ROUTINE DAILY ACTIVITIES. FOURTH, MOST OF THE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS LIVE OR WORK IN THE SERVICED AREA. FIFTH, PARTICIPATION IN THE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY OF THE PROGRAM DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRIMARY SOURCE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS. WHILE THIS FINAL CRITERION DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USE OF SOME PAID STAFF OR FULL-TIME VOLUNTEERS, IT DOES EXCLUDE FROM CONSIDERATION THOSE PROGRAMS THAT RELY PREDOMINANTLY ON PAID SECURITY GUARDS.

YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM MAY ENGAGE IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT SATISFY THE ABOVE CRITERIA. THIS SECTION OF THE SURVEY ASKS QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO THESE FORMALIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES. IF YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM DOES NOT ENGAGE IN SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT SATISFY THE ABOVE CRITERIA, PLEASE CHECK "NO" BELOW AND RETURN THIS COVER SHEET WITH YOUR COMPLETED SURVEY PACKET.

- NO, MY NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM DOES NOT ENGAGE IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT SATISFY THE CRITERIA OUTLINED ABOVE. [DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION. CONTINUE ON TO NEXT SECTION.]
- YES, MY NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM ENGAGES IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT SATISFY THE CRITERIA OUTLINED ABOVE. [PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION.]

ADMINISTRATION OF ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY

PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

1. ON WHAT DATE DID THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY BEGIN OPERATIONS?

2. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, HAS THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY EVER EXPERIENCED SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED OPERATIONS?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, DURING WHAT PERIOD AND FOR WHAT REASONS WERE OPERATIONS SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED?

3. DID THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AT ITS INCEPTION?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 5]
 YES
 DON'T KNOW [SKIP TO QUESTION 5]

4. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AT THE INCEPTION OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT
 PROVISION OF TRAINING
 PROVISION OF OPERATING SPACE
 PROVISION OF SPEAKERS
 PROVISION OF LIAISON OFFICER
 PROVISION OF CRIME STATISTICS FOR GROUP USE
 OTHER, SPECIFY _____

5. DOES THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT CURRENTLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 8]
 YES
 DON'T KNOW [SKIP TO QUESTION 8]

6. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE CURRENTLY PROVIDED BY THE POLICE OR SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT
 PROVISION OF TRAINING
 PROVISION OF OPERATING SPACE
 PROVISION OF SPEAKERS
 PROVISION OF LIAISON OFFICER
 PROVISION OF CRIME STATISTICS FOR GROUP USE
 OTHER, SPECIFY _____

7. WHICH LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT, IF ANY, PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

- LOCAL
- COUNTY
- STATE
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

8. FOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY INITIALLY INTENDED?

- TO PREVENT CRIME FROM BECOMING A PROBLEM
- TO COMBAT AN EXISTING CRIME PROBLEM
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- DON'T KNOW

9. WAS THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY INITIALLY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?

- NO
 - YES
- IF YES, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

DON'T KNOW _____

10. IS THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY CURRENTLY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?

- NO
 - YES
- IF YES, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

DON'T KNOW _____

11. HOW ARE NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS MADE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE AND OPERATIONS OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

12. DOES THE PROGRAM SPONSOR ACTIVITIES THAT ARE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO INCREASE/MAINTAIN RESIDENT INTEREST IN THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY (E.G., AWARDS, MEDIA PROMOTIONS)?

- NO
 - YES
- IF YES, SPECIFY _____

PROGRAM STAFFING

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS EXAMINE SOME ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURES OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY.

13. HOW MANY PERSONS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY? (DO NOT INCLUDE PERSONS WHO ARE INVOLVED ONLY IN THE SURVEILLANCE COMPONENT OF THE PROGRAM OR WHO ARE INVOLVED ONLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF OTHER CRIME PREVENTION TECHNIQUES/SERVICES.)

14. HOW MANY OF THESE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL ARE:

- a. FULL-TIME PAID STAFF _____
- b. PART-TIME PAID STAFF _____
- c. FULL-TIME VOLUNTEER STAFF _____
- d. PART-TIME VOLUNTEER STAFF _____

15. WHAT TYPES OF FORMAL RECORDS, IF ANY, ARE KEPT BY PROGRAM STAFF?

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY

16. IS THIS ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY:

- MOBILE
- STATIONARY
- BOTH MOBILE AND STATIONARY

17. IS THIS ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY:

- BY FOOT
- BY VEHICLE
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

18. IS THE FREQUENCY OF SURVEILLANCE SUBJECT TO SEASONAL VARIATION?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN _____

[NOTE: IF YOU CHECKED "YES" IN QUESTION 18, PLEASE RESPOND TO QUESTIONS 19-23 AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE MOST CHARACTERISTIC PERIOD OF SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY.]

19. DURING WHAT DAYS OF THE WEEK AND WHAT HOURS OF THE DAY IS THE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY SCHEDULED? ON THE AVERAGE, HOW MANY SHIFTS ARE SCHEDULED FOR EACH OF THESE DAYS? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY; PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER THE SCHEDULED TIME IS A.M. OR P.M. BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE TIME DESIGNATION.)

DAYS	HOURS OF OPERATION				NUMBER OF SHIFTS
	HOURS	A.M.	P.M.	TO	
<input type="checkbox"/> MONDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> TUESDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> WEDNESDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> THURSDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> FRIDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> SATURDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> SUNDAY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

20. HOW MANY INDIVIDUALS COMPRISE A SCHEDULED SURVEILLANCE TEAM OR UNIT?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

21. WHAT IS THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS SCHEDULED FOR EACH SHIFT?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

22. WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS SCHEDULED FOR EACH SHIFT?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

23. HOW WOULD YOU BEST DESCRIBE THE PATROL PATTERN OF THE SCHEDULED SURVEILLANCE TEAM OR UNIT?

- REGULAR (I.E., TEAM/UNIT PATROLS IN A ROUTINE PREDETERMINED PATTERN)
- IRREGULAR (I.E., TEAM/UNIT DOES NOT PATROL IN ANY PREDETERMINED PATTERN)
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

24. HOW DOES THE SIZE OF THE AREA SERVICED BY THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY COMPARE WITH THE SIZE OF THE AREA SERVICED BY THE OVERALL NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

- SMALLER
- SAME
- LARGER
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

25. ON WHAT TYPES OF STRUCTURES DOES THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY FOCUS?

- RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURES
 COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES
 RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES ARE EMPHASIZED EQUALLY

26. HOW ARE NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS RECRUITED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

27. ARE THERE SPECIFIC CRITERIA THAT A RESIDENT MUST SATISFY IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY (E.G., AGE, SEX, HEIGHT, REFERENCES)?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, SPECIFY _____

28. ARE THERE SPECIFIC CRITERIA THAT MAY AUTOMATICALLY DISQUALIFY A RESIDENT FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY (E.G., AGE, OCCUPATION, PRIOR RECORD)?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, SPECIFY _____

29. WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING, IF ANY, IS PROVIDED FOR RECRUITS? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- FORMAL TRAINING
 BY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
 BY PRIVATE SECURITY
 BY OTHER ORGANIZED GROUP, SPECIFY _____
 INFORMAL TRAINING
 BY CURRENT PATROL MEMBERS
 BY OTHERS, SPECIFY _____
 NO TRAINING [SKIP TO QUESTION 32]

30. IS THIS TRAINING MANDATORY FOR RECRUITS?

- NO
 YES

31. WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON ANY ASPECTS OF THE RECRUIT TRAINING PROCEDURE? (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.)

32. WHAT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE PERFORMED BY INDIVIDUALS WHILE ON PATROL? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- OBSERVATION
- CHECKING SECURITY OF HOUSEHOLDS WHOSE RESIDENTS ARE ABSENT
- CHECKING SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AFTER HOURS
- REPORTING OF MALFUNCTIONING STREET LIGHTS
- ESCORT SERVICE
- ASSISTANCE IN TRAFFIC CONTROL
- ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL EMERGENCIES
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

33. WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE TO INDIVIDUALS WHILE ON PATROL? WHO PROVIDES THIS EQUIPMENT? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- | <u>EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>PROVIDED BY</u> |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> CITIZEN BAND RADIO | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> WALKY-TALKY | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SEARCH LIGHT | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CAMERA | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> HORN | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> WHISTLE | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> AUTOMOBILE | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> FUEL FOR VEHICLE | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TRAINED DOG | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> GUN | <input type="checkbox"/> INDIVIDUAL
<input type="checkbox"/> PROGRAM
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, SPECIFY _____ |

NIGHTSTICK

INDIVIDUAL
 PROGRAM
 OTHER, SPECIFY _____

OTHER,
SPECIFY _____

INDIVIDUAL
 PROGRAM
 OTHER, SPECIFY _____

34. WHILE ON PATROL, DO SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 36]
 YES
 NOT APPLICABLE, ONLY ONE TEAM OR UNIT ACTIVE AT ANY TIME [SKIP TO QUESTION 36]

35. HOW DO SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- CITIZEN BAND RADIO
 WALKY-TALKY
 IN-PERSON COMMUNICATION
 INFORMATION RELAYED THROUGH BASE STATION
 OTHER METHOD OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIFY _____

36. WHILE ON PATROL, DO SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS COMMUNICATE TO THE BASE STATION?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 38]
 YES
 NOT APPLICABLE, NO BASE STATION [SKIP TO QUESTION 38]

37. HOW DO SURVEILLANCE TEAMS OR UNITS COMMUNICATE TO THE BASE STATION? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- CITIZEN BAND RADIO
 WALKY-TALKY
 IN-PERSON COMMUNICATION
 OTHER METHOD OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIFY _____

38. HOW ARE PATROL MEMBERS DIRECTED TO RESPOND TO THE OBSERVATION OF SUSPICIOUS PERSONS OR INCIDENTS?

- PERSONAL INTERVENTION/INVESTIGATION
 RELAY INFORMATION TO BASE STATION
 RELAY INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO POLICE
 OTHER RESPONSE, SPECIFY _____
 PATROL MEMBERS NOT GIVEN SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS ABOUT APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IN THIS SITUATION

39. HOW ARE PATROL MEMBERS DIRECTED TO RESPOND TO THE OBSERVATION OF A CRIME IN PROGRESS?

- PERSONAL INTERVENTION
 RELAY INFORMATION TO BASE STATION
 RELAY INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO POLICE
 OTHER RESPONSE, SPECIFY _____
 PATROL MEMBERS NOT GIVEN SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS ABOUT APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IN THIS SITUATION

40. ARE INDIVIDUALS ON PATROL UNIFORMED OR OTHERWISE IDENTIFIABLE?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE METHOD OF IDENTIFICATION _____

41. IF SURVEILLANCE IS BY VEHICLE, IS THE VEHICLE EASILY IDENTIFIABLE?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE METHOD OF IDENTIFICATION _____
NOT APPLICABLE, NO VEHICLE INVOLVED

42. IN AN AVERAGE MONTH, WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS?

- a. NUMBER OF SUSPICIOUS PERSONS/INCIDENTS REPORTED TO THE POLICE
- b. NUMBER OF CRIMES DISCOVERED IN PROGRESS
- c. PREDOMINANT TYPE(S) OF CRIME DISCOVERED IN PROGRESS

43. ARE THERE ANY OTHER FEATURES OF THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY THAT YOU FEEL ARE DISTINCTIVE AND ABOUT WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT? (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.)

44. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL AND/OR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY? (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.)

CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY PARTICIPANTS

45. APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES?

46. IS ANY MONETARY REIMBURSEMENT PROVIDED TO PERSONS WHO ARE INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 48]
- YES

47. WHAT TYPE OF MONETARY REIMBURSEMENT IS PROVIDED TO PERSONS WHO ARE INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- FOR EXPENSES
 - FUEL
 - EQUIPMENT
 - OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- FOR TIME, SPECIFY _____
- FOR OTHER PURPOSES, SPECIFY _____

48. PLEASE ESTIMATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS WHO ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS. (FOR EACH CHARACTERISTIC, PERCENTAGES SHOULD TOTAL TO 100%.)

<u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>
a. AGE	
UNDER 20 YEARS	_____
20 TO 29 YEARS	_____
30 TO 49 YEARS	_____
50 YEARS AND OLDER	_____
b. SEX	
MALE	_____
FEMALE	_____
c. RACE	
WHITE	_____
BLACK	_____
HISPANIC	_____
OTHER, _____	_____
d. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME	
UNDER \$10,000	_____
\$10,000 TO \$29,999	_____
\$30,000 AND OVER	_____
e. EMPLOYMENT	
EMPLOYED	_____
UNEMPLOYED	_____
RETIRED	_____
OTHER, SPECIFY _____	_____

49. FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE OR HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES, WHAT IS THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACTIVITY?

- LESS THAN 1 YEAR
- 1 YEAR
- 2 YEARS
- 3 YEARS
- 4 YEARS
- 5 YEARS OR LONGER
- DON'T KNOW

50. OF THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES, WHAT PROPORTION WOULD YOU ESTIMATE WILL STILL BE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS 1 YEAR FROM NOW?

PROPORTION STILL ACTIVE IN 1 YEAR

- LESS THAN 50 PERCENT
- 50 TO 75 PERCENT
- 76 TO 100 PERCENT

51. WHAT REASONS ARE GIVEN BY PERSONS WHO CEASE TO BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES?

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____

52. ARE THERE ANY REASONS FOR WHICH A PERSON WOULD BE REMOVED FROM ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, SPECIFY _____

53. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CHARACTERISTICS THAT YOU THINK ARE IMPORTANT IN DESCRIBING THE NUMBERS OR TYPES OF PERSONS WHO ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZED SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES? (FOR EXAMPLE, OCCUPATION, ETHNICITY, SOCIAL AFFILIATIONS, ETC.)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION C

ID# _____

PROGRAM NAME: _____

NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

1. HOW WOULD YOU BEST CHARACTERIZE THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERVICED BY THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

- SINGLE BUILDING
- ADJACENT BUILDINGS (E.G., APARTMENT COMPLEX, HOUSING PROJECT)
- BLOCK
- NEIGHBORHOOD
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

2. APPROXIMATELY HOW LARGE IS THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA COVERED BY THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM? (IF THE SERVICED AREA IS A SINGLE BUILDING OR A GROUP OF BUILDINGS, PLEASE GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE SIZE OF THE BUILDING(S).)

3. WHAT IS THE APPROXIMATE POPULATION OF THE AREA SERVICED BY THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

4. IN WHAT TYPE OF SETTING IS THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM LOCATED?

- LARGE CITY (OVER 250,000 POPULATION)
- SUBURB OF A LARGE CITY
- MEDIUM SIZE CITY (50,000 TO 250,000 POPULATION)
- SUBURB OF A MEDIUM SIZE CITY
- SMALL CITY OR TOWN (LESS THAN 50,000 POPULATION)
- RURAL
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____

5. MANY NEIGHBORHOODS AND AREAS CAN BE DESCRIBED BY THE PRESENCE OF RESIDENTS WITH PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTICS--FOR EXAMPLE, A LARGE ELDERLY POPULATION, A HIGH OR LOW RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT, THE PREDOMINANCE OF ONE RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP. PLEASE EXAMINE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS, AND CHECK THE CATEGORIES THAT BEST DESCRIBE THE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA SERVICED BY YOUR PROGRAM.

CHARACTERISTIC

a. AGE

- HIGH PROPORTION OF TEENAGERS
- HIGH PROPORTION OF ELDERLY
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- NO PREDOMINANCE

b. SEX

- MALE
- FEMALE
- NO PREDOMINANCE

c. RACE

- WHITE
- BLACK
- HISPANIC
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- NO PREDOMINANCE

d. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME

- UNDER \$10,000
- \$10,000 TO \$29,999
- \$30,000 AND OVER
- NO PREDOMINANCE

e. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

- COUPLES WITH CHILDREN
- COUPLES WITHOUT CHILDREN
- ELDERLY PERSONS (COUPLES OR INDIVIDUALS)
- UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS LIVING TOGETHER (E.G., STUDENT DORMS, ROOMING HOUSES, MILITARY BARRACKS)
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- NO PREDOMINANCE

6. IN THIS AREA IS THERE A PREDOMINANT ETHNIC GROUP?

- NO
 - YES
- IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

7. IN THIS AREA IS THERE A PREDOMINANT RELIGIOUS GROUP?

- NO
 - YES
- IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

8. COMPARED TO THE NATIONAL AVERAGE, IS UNEMPLOYMENT IN THIS AREA:

- HIGHER
- ABOUT THE SAME
- LOWER
- DON'T KNOW

9. WHAT IS THE PREDOMINANT TYPE OF HOUSING IN THIS AREA?

- APARTMENT COMPLEXES
- APARTMENTS (NOT IN A COMPLEX)
- SINGLE FAMILY HOMES
- TOWNHOUSES/CONDOMINIUMS
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- NO PREDOMINANCE

10. APPROXIMATELY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE RESIDENTS IN THE SERVICED AREA:

RENT THEIR HOMES

_____ %

OWN THEIR HOMES

_____ %

11. ON THE AVERAGE, HOW LONG WOULD YOU SAY THAT CURRENT RESIDENTS HAVE LIVED IN THE SERVICED AREA?

- LESS THAN 1 YEAR
- 1 TO 2 YEARS
- 3 TO 5 YEARS
- MORE THAN 5 YEARS
- DON'T KNOW

12. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS IN THIS AREA THAT YOU THINK ARE IMPORTANT IN DESCRIBING THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THE AREA? (FOR EXAMPLE, A LARGE NUMBER OF TRANSIENTS, A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR THE SAME COMPANY, ETC.)

13. ARE THERE ANY COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE SERVICED AREA?

- NO [SKIP TO QUESTION 19]
- YES

14. APPROXIMATELY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE SERVICED AREA IS USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES? _____ %

15. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TYPES OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS THAT ARE COMMON TO THE SERVICED AREA (E.G., BARS, SHOPPING MALLS)?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

16. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM?

- COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS SUPPORTIVE OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM
- COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OPPOSED TO NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM
- COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM
- DON'T KNOW

17. IF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM, IN WHAT WAY(S) IS THIS SUPPORT DEMONSTRATED? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.)

- PROVISION OF FUNDING
- PROVISION OF SPACE FOR MEETINGS
- PROVISION OF OPERATING SPACE (E.G., BASE STATION)
- PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT
- PROVISION OF SUPPORT SERVICES (E.G., PRINTING)
- OTHER, SPECIFY _____
- NOT APPLICABLE, COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS NOT SUPPORTIVE OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM

18. IS ANY SURVEILLANCE PROVIDED FOR COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE SERVICED AREA (E.G., SECURITY CHECKS)?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

19. ARE THERE ANY OTHER MAJOR NON-RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURES IN THE SERVICED AREA (E.G., SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS)?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

20. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR PLACES WITHIN THE SERVICED AREA THAT PRESENT MORE OF A CRIME PROBLEM THAN DO OTHER AREAS (E.G., PARKS, RAILROAD TRACKS, BARS)?

- NO
- YES

IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY _____

21. HOW DOES THE LEVEL OF CRIME IN THE SERVICED AREA COMPARE WITH THE LEVEL OF CRIME IN OTHER LOCAL AREAS?

- HIGHER
- ABOUT THE SAME
- LOWER
- DON'T KNOW

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PARTICULAR COMMENTS ABOUT THE LEVEL OR PATTERN OF CRIME IN YOUR AREA? (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION D

ID#

PROGRAM NAME: _____

REQUEST FOR PRINTED MATERIALS

1. ARE THERE MATERIALS AVAILABLE THAT DESCRIBE THE GUIDELINES OR THE BY-LAWS OF THE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, MAY WE OBTAIN COPIES OF THESE MATERIALS? ANY REPRODUCTION AND POSTAGE COSTS WILL BE REIMBURSED.

2. ARE THERE MATERIALS AVAILABLE THAT DESCRIBE THE OPERATIONS OR ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING OF THE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, MAY WE OBTAIN COPIES OF THESE MATERIALS? ANY REPRODUCTION AND POSTAGE COSTS WILL BE REIMBURSED.

3. ARE THERE DATA AVAILABLE THAT SUMMARIZE STAFF ACTIVITIES OR NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PATTERNS?

- NO
 YES

IF YES, MAY WE OBTAIN COPIES OF THESE DATA? ANY REPRODUCTION AND POSTAGE COSTS WILL BE REIMBURSED.

4. EVALUATIONS

a. HAS YOUR SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY FORMAL EVALUATIONS?

- NO [SKIP TO NEXT SECTION]
 YES

b. BY WHOM WAS THE EVALUATION CONDUCTED?

c. WHEN WAS THE EVALUATION COMPLETED?

d. MAY WE OBTAIN A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT? ANY REPRODUCTION AND POSTAGE COSTS WILL BE REIMBURSED.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION E

ID# _____

PROGRAM NAME: _____

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT

A GREAT DEAL CAN BE LEARNED ABOUT NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAMS BY EXAMINING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSON(S) RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND/OR SCHEDULING OF ACTIVITIES. THUS, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU WOULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF. ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

1. AGE _____

2. SEX

- MALE
 FEMALE

3. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED _____

4. EMPLOYMENT

- EMPLOYED
 UNEMPLOYED, LOOKING FOR WORK
 UNEMPLOYED, NOT LOOKING FOR WORK (E.G., ATTENDING SCHOOL, KEEPING HOUSE)
 RETIRED
 OTHER, SPECIFY _____

5. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN NEIGHBORHOOD

NUMBER OF YEARS _____

6. LENGTH OF INVOLVEMENT WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM

NUMBER OF YEARS _____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT SECTION.

SECTION F

ID# _____
PROGRAM NAME: _____

REQUEST FOR COMMENTS

IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE UTILITY OF THIS SURVEY INSTRUMENT WE ARE ELICITING YOUR COMMENTS ON THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. YOUR COMMENTS WILL BE USED TO REDESIGN THIS SURVEY FOR FUTURE MAILINGS. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY.)

1. WERE THERE ANY ITEMS ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE THAT YOU FOUND TO BE PROBLEMATIC? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

2. WERE THERE ANY ITEMS ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE THAT YOU FELT WERE UNNECESSARY? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

3. ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU FEEL SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE SURVEY? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

4. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS (GENERAL OR SPECIFIC) ABOUT THE CONTENT OR STRUCTURE OF THIS SURVEY? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS FINAL SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE SEAL ALL COMPLETED SECTIONS IN THE ENCLOSED SELF-ADDRESSED STAMPED ENVELOPE AND RETURN THE PACKAGE TO US AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

APPENDIX C

CODE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
CHAPTER 14A

ORDINANCE NO. 192-H
CHAPTER 14A
ARTICLE I

CITIZENS COMMUNITY RADIO
PATROL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

AN ORDINANCE to amend the Code of the City of Detroit by adding a new chapter to be known as Chapter 14A, to provide for a citizens community radio patrol assistance program.

IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT:

Section 1. That the Code of the City of Detroit be amended by adding a new chapter, to be known as Chapter 14A, as follows:

Sec. 14A-1-1. There is hereby established a citizens community patrol as follows:

Sec. 14A-1-2. Form of Assistance. Assistance shall be provided in the form of a limited account whereby each eligible patrol is reimbursed monthly for all eligible expenditures up to the patrol's quarterly allocation balance (including any unexpended carryover from prior quarters); a radio equipment vendor also shall be provided; such vendor shall have a stocking outlet in the City of Detroit.

Assistance shall be allocated on a quarterly basis, and patrols shall be free to use their accounts for any combination of eligible expenditures.

Eligible patrols shall have the option of purchasing radio equipment from a supplier of their choosing or from the designated vendor; for purchases made from the designated vendor, payment shall be made by the city directly to the vendor (for contract items only).

Sec. 14A-1-3. Eligible Expenditures. The following shall be deemed eligible for reimbursement:

(a) All citizens band radios and auxiliary equipment reasonably necessary for patrol operations, including but not limited to base stations, mobile transceivers, "Walkie-Talkies," "Porta-Pak" power supplies, batteries, battery chargers, crystals, antennae, and antenna cable.

(b) All citizens band radio repair services reasonably required by patrol operations.

(c) Base station rental not to exceed prevailing market rates.

(d) Base station utilities, including and limited to electric, heat, water and telephone.

(e) Patrol member mileage reimbursement; rate not to exceed mileage paid to City of Detroit employees (as specified in the administering agency's guidelines).

(f) Emergency equipment, including and limited to flashlights, flares, reflectors, portable spotlights, portable red or amber flashing lights (as permitted by state law), reflective vests, and fire extinguishers.

(g) Patrol liability insurance premiums (only for insurance covering liabilities of Patrol Corporation or Parent Corporation (for patrol activities), not for insurance covering liabilities of individual patrol members).

(h) Patrol personal property insurance premiums (only for insurance covering equipment of Patrol Corporation or Parent Corporation (for patrol activities), not for insurance covering equipment of individual patrol members).

(i) Office supply and printing expenses incurred in connection with patrol operations (as provided for in the administering agency's guidelines).

Sec. 14A-1-4. Allocation of Assistance.

The annual appropriation for the assistance program shall be allocated quarterly or in such other manner as the administering agency shall recommend and the City Council approve. For each quarter or other assistance period, assistance funds shall be allocated among eligible patrols generally on the basis of their projected effort in Detroit for that period. The chief criterion of effort shall be man-hours of Detroit, on-street patrol time (including base station operators' time and monthly administrative time as permitted by the administering agency's guidelines).

Projections may be based on either actual man-hours of patrol for a period preceding the assistance period or actual patrol membership and written commitments to put in the patrol time during the upcoming period. However, in no event will a patrol's allocated share of assistance funds exceed its approved estimate of eligible expenses for that period. New patrols—even those with little or no equipment—shall be eligible for assistance on the same basis as established patrols; no "Waiting Period" shall be imposed on new patrols. Any unexpended funds shall revert to the city at the end of the fiscal year or whenever a patrol is no longer eligible for assistance, whichever occurs sooner.

Sec. 14A-1-5. Conditions of Assistance.

(a) Mission

Assistance shall be available only to those patrols whose primary mission

is to make neighborhoods more secure from criminal acts by patrolling and reporting observations calling for police attention to the Police Department.

(b) Use of Vehicles

(1) Use of vehicles in patrolling shall not be a condition of assistance.

(2) Vehicles used for patrolling shall be in good mechanical condition.

(3) Vehicles used in patrolling shall be insured in accordance with state law.

(c) Non-Profit Corporation Status; Other Financial Limitations

(1) To be eligible for assistance, patrols must be incorporated under state law as non-profit corporations.

(2) Patrolling shall not be done for hire.

(3) No salary shall be paid to any member, officer or staff of a patrol.

(d) FCC License and Regulations

(1) Patrols shall hold a class D citizens band license in the name of the Patrol or Parent Corporation.

(2) Patrols shall comply with all applicable state and federal laws and regulations governing radio operations.

(e) Ties to Community and Other Patrol Membership Qualifications

(1) At least 80 percent of active patrol members shall be persons residing in or owning businesses in the regularly patrolled community.

(2) Patrols shall not discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, sex or national origin in selecting members.

(3) Patrols shall not employ proprietary ownership or its equivalent as a condition of membership.

(4) A patrol may establish a minimum age for patrol membership eligibility, but the age set shall be not greater than 18 years; members under 18 must be accompanied by a parent or guardian when operating base station or when on street patrol duty.

(5) The Police Department shall, upon the request of a patrol and with the consent of the applicant, run a records check on an applicant for patrol membership.

(f) Identification

(1) All patrols shall use a uniform, city-wide identification card to be developed by the administering agency and the patrols, a copy of which shall be furnished to the Police Department; patrols shall issue such identification cards to their members and sample cards shall be filed with each police precinct in which the patrols operate.

(2) Patrols shall file with each police precinct in which they operate a complete listing of patrol personnel and vehicles.

(3) Prior to commencing patrol operations each day, patrols shall notify each police precinct in which they intend to operate of the names and vehicle descriptions for units which will be operating in that precinct.

(4) No identification, including uniforms, worn by patrol members shall resemble in any way that worn by police officers.

(g) Training

All patrol members shall be required to attend a Police Department orientation program prior to taking part in patrol operations; the department may waive this condition with respect to members of established patrols who have accumulated some minimum number of in-service hours.

(h) Patrol Areas

Patrol boundaries shall be subject to city approval.

(i) Patrol Conduct Rules

(1) No patrol member, including those holding concealed weapons permits, shall carry any weapons on their person or in a patrol vehicle (including the luggage compartment) during patrol operations. Prohibited weapons shall include, but not be limited to guns of any type, knives, chains, clubs, tire irons and chemical dispensers; prohibited weapons shall not include a standard jack handle, properly stowed.

(2) Attack dogs shall not be carried in any patrol vehicle during patrol operations.

(3) During vehicular patrol operations, patrol members shall remain in their vehicles except while performing good samaritan acts or where exit from the vehicle is necessary to protect or defend other persons against the threat of immediate bodily harm; nothing herein shall be construed to impose a duty on patrol members to leave their vehicles under any circumstances.

(4) While on patrol, members shall conduct no interrogations of persons suspected of criminal activity.

(5) No patrol member shall, during patrol operations, attempt to make any citizens arrest except in the course of protecting or defending other persons against the threat of immediate bodily harm; nothing herein shall be construed to impose a duty on patrol members to make a citizens arrest under any circumstances.

(6) No emergency signalling lights or other signalling devices, E.G., amber flashing lights or sirens, may be

In operation in or on a moving patrol vehicle during patrol operations; this prohibition shall not include the standard factory-installed flasher system or its equivalent.

(7) Patrol members shall not be present at the scene of police criminal investigations or apprehension efforts except where they have relevant information to furnish; and when present for that purpose, no other involvement shall be undertaken.

(8) No police monitor shall be used in any patrol vehicle unless the owner or operator has secured a permit from the Department of State Police.

(9) Patrol members shall not be under the influence of or consume alcoholic beverages or narcotic medication while on patrol duty.

(10) Patrol members who are off-duty police officers shall be exempt from these rules and all other conditions of assistance to the extent of any conflict with departmental regulations.

(j) Accountability for and Disposition of Equipment Purchased or Repaired with City Assistance

(1) Each patrol shall hold title to equipment purchased with city assistance funds and shall be accountable for such equipment.

(2) Patrols shall secure from any member who has his or her radio repaired in whole or in part with city assistance funds an agreement that if he or she should cease to be an active patrol member for any reason within a three-month period following the completion of repairs, he or she shall be liable to the patrol for the city's share of the repair costs.

(3) Any patrol which ceases active patrol operations or is dissolved after receiving city assistance shall deliver title and possession of any equipment purchased in whole or in part with city assistance funds to the administering agency or an agency designated by it to dispose of such equipment.

(4) Any equipment purchased with city assistance funds which is determined by a patrol to be unserviceable may be sold for fair market value and the proceeds used to purchase new citizens band radios and equipment reasonably necessary for patrol operations. Reports of such sales and purchases must be submitted to the administering agency.

(k) Additional Conditions

Patrols shall be subject to such additional eligibility conditions as the administering agency shall promulgate and the City Council shall, by resolution, approve.

(1) Applications for Assistance and Records Keeping

(1) Patrols shall provide all requested information with applications for assistance; any deliberate falsification of material information shall result in automatic termination of assistance and ineligibility for future assistance.

(2) Patrols shall maintain records to support information contained in their applications for assistance and to account for the use and disposition of equipment purchased or repaired in whole or in part with city assistance funds.

(3) Patrols shall, when initially applying for assistance, and annually at the beginning of each fiscal year, provide a list of all the citizens band radio equipment in their possession, distinguishing which equipment was bought with city assistance funds and which was not.

Sec. 14A-1-6. Violations of Conditions of Assistance

Violation of the conditions of assistance shall be grounds for termination of assistance or a future denial of eligibility. In deciding whether to terminate current assistance or deny a future application for assistance, the administering agency shall consider the seriousness of the violation, the patrol's record of past violations and corrective action taken or planned by the patrol. However, a first violation of conditions relating to carrying weapons, remaining in the vehicle, interrogation and citizens arrest shall result in automatic termination of current assistance and a second violation shall result in automatic and irrevocable ineligibility for future assistance, and where a patrol member has violated the patrol conduct rules by carrying a gun on his or her person or in a patrol vehicle, that patrol shall not be eligible for assistance so long as that individual remains a member.

Sec. 14A-1-7. Administration

(a) The City Clerk shall act as administering agency and receive applications for assistance and review the applications for compliance with the conditions of assistance.

(b) When a patrol is initially applying for assistance, and annually at the beginning of each fiscal year, the City Clerk shall forward a copy of the patrol's application to the Police Department for review and recommendation.

(c) The Police Department shall review each application for assistance forwarded by the City Clerk, particularly with respect to compatibility of

patrol boundaries with one another and with respect to any police requirements; the department shall recommend approval or disapproval to the City Clerk.

(d) The City Clerk after considering any Police Department recommendations, shall approve or disapprove applications for assistance and apportion the quarterly allocation among eligible patrols on the basis of projected effort modified by whatever other criteria may be deemed appropriate.

(e) The City Clerk shall process monthly reports of expenditures from eligible patrols and expedite reimbursement for all eligible expenditures supported by proper receipts or other appropriate documentation up to the amount of each patrol's allocation balance.

(f) The City Clerk shall effect direct payment to the designated vendor for charges made by patrols against their accounts for purchases from said vendor.

(g) The Police Department shall provide timely orientation programs for new patrol members.

(h) The Police Department shall provide instruction to the patrols on procedures for reporting observations to the department.

(i) The Police Department shall maintain and provide to the administering agency, insofar as practicable, records of patrol effectiveness.

Sec. 14A-1-8.

Under no circumstances shall the Police Department or any other City Agency assume supervision and control of any citizens community radio patrol.

Section 2. The City Council resolution of December 11, 1973 establishing a revised citizens community radio patrol assistance program (J.C.C. pp. 3017-50) be and is hereby repealed.

Section 3. This ordinance is hereby given immediate effect.

(JCC P. 1305-09, June 15, 1977)

Passed July 13, 1977.

Approved July 25, 1977.

Published July 29, 1977.

Effective July 29, 1977.

JAMES H. BRADLEY,
City Clerk

