


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HOMICIDE POLICY AND PROGRAM
ANALYSIS:
UNDERSTANDING AND COPING IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT

by
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ACQUISITIONS

INTRODUCTION

What should local governments do to reduce the incidence of homicide? Why do they find it difficult to do what clearly can be done? This paper presents two arguments for those interested in reducing the carnage. The first is that an index of urban homicide policies can be identified and that some policies can be expected to produce better results than others. The second is that not enough politicians and police officials recognize the potential for more effective police agency involvement. A paradox of American crime control is that many local governments are profoundly concerned about violent crimes like homicide, but simultaneously, they exhibit little effective willingness to take the steps that are available to them.

The first section of this paper discusses the nature of an urban homicide policy. Comments are offered on selected characteristics of such policies, and an index of homicide control is proposed. The second section suggests the need for greater awareness of the possibilities for more effective police intervention in controlling homicide problems. The comments and conclusions offered in this paper follow a review of the criminal justice literature on homicide and a limited examination of homicide practices in two U.S. local governments. One of the governments is a large community we refer to as Piccadilly; the other is middle-sized with more than 200,000 people, and we call it Bakerloo.

INDEX OF HOMICIDE POLICY

An index of homicide policy can be identified for local governments. Undoubtedly a variety of criteria could be used in developing different types of such an index. The one proposed here makes use of three scales: programmatic scope, personnel scope, and technical scope. Three levels can be identified for each of the three scales: these are labeled A for the optimal policy in that area, B for a developing or improved policy, and C for an undeveloped or traditional policy. Finer divisions are possible, but the three-fold scale serves the purpose of indicating where local officials stand in program performance; and there are difficulties in measuring closer distinctions.

Localities can evaluate their homicide-control programs by using the proposed index of homicide policy. For example, a local government rated as AAA on this system would be categorized as having an optimal homicide policy. Less than AAA would be suboptimal, and less than B would be undeveloped or traditional on that scale.

The index of homicide policy can be depicted as follows:

		SCOPE		
		Programmatic	Personnel	Technical
LEVEL	Optimal	A	A	A
	Developing	B	B	B
	Undeveloped	C	C	C

BACKGROUND

Two preliminary questions should be addressed. First, why in this discussion of homicide control is emphasis being placed on policy rather than services? Second, what is the basis for the proposed index?

The reason why emphasis is placed on policy rather than services is that, for too long, police agencies have suffered from viewing their output in nonsystems terms. As evidenced by the character of their evaluation systems (such as the structure of the Uniform Crime Reports), police agencies have been overly concerned with responding to "a" homicide, "a" rape, and "a" burglary. This perspective has been increasingly recognized in recent years following Herman Goldstein's work on problem-focused policing (1979). The issue also was extensively discussed in publications by David Farmer (1981, 1984).

There is need, then, to define output in a broader framework than is possible by focusing only on responses to individual crimes and individual situations. Such a framework fits with the view of some public choice economists that governmental output should be seen as explicit and implicit policy. In Albert Breton's words, "the true outputs of governments are policies" (1978). He gives the example of police protection. As the policy objective of policing, he defines protection as "the probability that one's person and/or one's property will not be attacked by criminals in such a way that when this probability increases the amount of police protection supplied increases and, when the probability falls, it decreases" (1978). Specifying police output solely in terms of crime is mistaken; nevertheless, Breton's point about "output as policy" is well taken.

The index proposed here has been developed following a review of the relevant literature and conversations with police officials. But, one would be hard pressed to defend a claim that others would inevitably be driven to develop the same index by reviewing the same literature and conducting the same on-site visits. For that reason, we are content that the index should be described as (to the extent that the term has meaning) *a priori*.

The relevant literature for this purpose falls into two major categories. The first is the criminal justice literature relating to homicide, where particular attention was paid to 358 items on homicide produced by a search of the criminal justice literature conducted through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. The second includes general literature about both systems and administrative theory. And the two study sites are Piccadilly and Bakerloo.

The homicide literature has a large component directing attention to the variety of behaviors included under the idea of "homicide." The extent and flavor of this literature is suggested later in this paper. Significant literature also exists on the correlates or causes of murder. For instance, the correlates of gun ownership (McClain, 1984; Kleck, 1984), unemployment levels (Cantor & Land, 1985), and the impact of mass media (Phillips, 1983) have been widely discussed. Like the print media in Bakerloo, as another example, there is literature that would support a correlation of homicide

problems with the existence of an underclass and with the absence of effective handgun-control legislation. There are implications in much of this literature for the societal and police responses to the homicide problem(s). Other publications more directly address the question of what should be done about homicide (for example, Regnery, 1985, on the overhauling of the juvenile justice system). Our paper is in the latter vein, and it focuses on the community's response to the homicide problem. For this focus, it has been necessary to go beyond the literature on homicide itself, because the homicide problem is as much a bureaucratic as a societal difficulty. The literature of administrative theory bears on homicide control as well as on the administration of public enterprises.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEX

Programmatic scope refers to the breadth of the homicide control program. At the minimal level (C), a police agency's homicide control program consists mainly of attempting to solve whatever murders occur in its jurisdiction. Its murder control policy—the policy implied by the nature of its program—is essentially reactive. All police agencies, of course, undertake some form of murder prevention. All agencies in the U.S. that have preventive patrol include murder prevention in that general activity, but not all this activity is focused exclusively on murder. In a sense, too, the mere existence of a police officer, even if nothing is done, is preventative. But, beyond this nonspecific and unfocused activity, the C-level police agencies undertake no other significant murder-prevention activity.

In terms of programmatic scope, a police agency at the B level has a policy that includes a significant amount of homicide-prevention. The agency is not only concerned with investigating homicides (a reactive function) but also invests significant resources in activities specifically intended to prevent homicides (a proactive function). Following research on domestic violence (Sherman & Berk, 1983), it is becoming more and more widely recognized that some homicides are preventable. For instance, a Minneapolis analysis of domestic assaults reported, in its study, that 19 percent of the men arrested for simple assault against women (usually their current or former husbands or boyfriends) perpetrated another assault within six months, while the percentages rose for men ordered off the premises (33 percent) and for those merely told to behave (37 percent). That research has made the point that appropriate police intervention may stop an escalating level of violence in a series of domestic incidents that come to the attention of the police. A recommendation coming from the research is that, as a step to prevent homicides, police agencies should make arrests in appropriate domestic incidents so that potential murderers can be referred for treatment.

A policy of making arrests in domestic violence situations by itself, however, does not define an agency as at the B level. Equally unwarranted is the assumption that combating domestic violence is the sum total of homicide prevention. On the contrary, a sound program encompasses a wider range of homicide types, and it has both short- and long-term goals. An example of a long-term goal is for police to provide leadership to architects and local officials in the order-maintenance aspects of downtown revitalization. In other words, an agency at the B level is making a serious investment of resources in a recognizable homicide prevention program, which includes some problem definition, more than one specific coping activity, and some feedback on effectiveness.

Problem definition in homicide control involves recognizing that "a homicide is not necessarily a homicide is not necessarily a homicide." As the literature makes abundantly clear and as every police officer knows, there is a large variety of homicides. Unfortunately the legal basis used by police agencies in counting criminal activity, while useful for some purposes, artificially lumps together disparate activities under the single heading of "homicide." Examples of different homicides include serial and spree murders, organized crime murders, domestic murders, murders of psychoanalysts by their patients, drug-related murders, sex-related murders, and others. The legal basis used in statistical systems, such as the Uniform Crime Reports, also results in distinctions between criminal activities that are not of a police, even if they are of a legal, utility. Many aggravated assaults, for example, are failed homicides, and some homicides are species of aggravated assaults.

How homicides should be categorized admits to no single answer. One possible breakdown as an improvement over lumping together all acts legally considered to be homicide is to use dimensions relating to the character of the murderer, the victim, the act, and the effects. On each of these dimensions, further divisions could be shown, such as age or race categories for murderers and victims. But no such single system would be completely satisfactory. A classification system should be selected to suit the purpose for which the system is to be used. For example, some in Bakerloo believe that most of their murders are connected with the underclass and availability of handguns. In that case, the numbers of murders falling under both these headings should be part of the primary classification.

The resources for analysis of homicide categories are now abundant. The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, for example, now maintains post-1978 information on the specifics of all homicides reported. Thus, a significant homicide-prevention program could not be conducted without some analysis of the particular local problem, and it could not be done without more than one coping activity and without some system for assessing the effectiveness of activities undertaken.

The variety and complexity of incidents included under the heading of "homicide" should be emphasized. It would be an important part of problem definition to make use of this variety in the particular local situation. The homicide literature is replete with discussions of the various types of murders: homicide-suicides (Fishbain, Rao & Aldrich, 1985); young females who kill (Russell, 1985); alcohol-related violence (Holcomb & Adams, 1985); drunk drivers who kill (Russell & MacDonald, 1980); battered women who murder (Kuhl, 1982); police and citizen killings of criminal suspects (Griswold & Massey, 1985); organized and disorganized murders (Ressler & Burgess, 1985); parricide (Mones, 1985); black-on-black homicides (Rose, 1984); adolescent murders (Haizlep, Corder & Ball, 1984); police homicides by misidentity (Vasquez, 1985); rape murders (Ressler, Burgess & Douglas, 1985); murders of clinicians (Annis, McClaren & Baker, 1984); serial murders (Egger, 1984); youth homicide (Zimring, 1984); nursing home homicide (Schudson, Onellion & Hochstedler, 1984); corporations as criminals (Hochstedler, 1984); cop-killings (Little, 1984); elderly murderers (Wilbanks & Murphy, 1984); murderers who are mental patients (Channabasavanna, Sharma & Reddy, 1983); drug-related murders (Heffernan, Martin & Romano, 1982); physician murders (Eckert, 1982); mass murderers (Hugli, 1982); fatalities by arsonists (Mercilliot, 1981); lust murderers (Hazelwood & Douglas, 1980); and more. And, of course, there is the large amount of literature devoted to murderers who use guns (for example, Cook, 1981).

Programmatic scope at level A would be recognized in police agencies approaching homicide and other crime problems on a problem-focused rather than an incident-oriented basis. Incident-oriented policing, the traditional approach, responds to incidents qua incidents. Consider any tenderloin area "X" in any local jurisdiction: the police may respond to a homicide, then to a mugging, to a robbery, to a case of prostitution. But the various incidents—the homicide, mugging, robbery, solicitation—are really no more than symptoms of the larger problem "that is area X." They are the legal categories that capture the incidents resulting from this larger problem. Problem-focused policing, on the other hand, will specify in practical terms the precise shape and character of the basic problem. It will then examine the alternatives for coping and shape a police and community strategy that is more than merely reactive to incidents. A homicide-control program with no strategy about handguns, as another example, can hardly be considered problem-focused. The programmatic scope of a homicide policy and program conceived within a problem-focused framework is clearly broader than the traditional activities at the B and C levels. A satisfactory problem-focused approach to homicide control would inevitably include not only a program to solve homicides but a program to prevent homicides.

Personnel scope refers to the character of the personnel involved in the homicide control program. At the minimal (C) level, police agencies with a detective unit typically leave homicide investigation to specialists.

Agencies that are suboptimal (say, with five or ten officers only) may well have no specialists at all; however, we are referring here to agencies large enough to have specialist detective units.

In the traditional police agency, the detective has significantly greater status than the patrol officer. In Piccadilly, for example, officers are eager to earn the "gold shield"; patrol officers are described as "in the bag." The relationship between detective and patrol bureaus has remained a nagging management problem for police chiefs for years. This problem has a deleterious effect on investigative work, because information from patrol officers is useful. The function of the patrol officer includes responding to the initial call (including those for homicides) and conducting the preliminary investigation. In the traditional police agency, this investigation is usually repeated by the detectives when they take over from the responding patrol officers. Subsequent relations between patrol officers and detectives in the traditional agency are essentially one-way streets: information goes to the detectives, no feedback goes back to the patrol, and credit for the arrest goes to the detectives. Homicide policy at the C level, then, is essentially a matter for specialist police officers only. The problem in this C-level arrangement is underscored by recalling the Rand study of the criminal investigation process (Chaiken, Greenwood & Petersilia, 1976). The study pointed out that most crimes are solved using the information provided by the responding patrol officer.

Personnel scope at the B level widens the traditional relationship of the C level in two respects. The first is that better working relationships, whether by exhortation, procedural improvements, or organizational adjustments, are achieved between specialist and generalist officers. The second respect is that the specialist officer utilizes competent intradepartmental analytic capability. In this respect, both the managers of the investigative function and the detectives are assisted by programmatic and operational analysis, often conducted by some sort of planning and research unit (under whatever title). The key, however, is that at the B level the analytical capability is more than in name only, usually entailing the need for civilian specialists. Homicide control is far too important to be left entirely to police officers; typically additional skills are necessary. (In passing, there is a parallel between the B level under personnel scope and the B level under programmatic scope. It would hardly be possible to have an effective homicide-prevention program without the involvement of nonspecialist police officers and without specialist planning capability.)

Personnel scope at the A level opens even further to extra-departmental personnel. Effective crime control requires a community response, for entirely by itself, the police agency is impotent at crime control. The level of order in a community is a function of the action not only of the police but also of a number of governmental, private, voluntary and other organizations and individuals. Elsewhere, a method has been offered for securing the involvement of these other agencies, under the leadership of the police agency, to develop effective crime control programs (Farmer, 1984). Clearly, some

aspects of homicide work must always remain internal to a police agency; operational matters concerning an investigation are an example. But the possibility of involving extra-departmental individuals and groups in activities, like developing a program of homicide prevention, is no less clear. And we are referring to genuine involvement. Many attempts at extra-departmental involvements, such as some neighborhood watch programs, are no more than token activities.

Technical scope refers to the technical capacity of the police agency to carry out the homicide control program. At the C level, the technical capacity again is traditional. It is true that many detectives in larger jurisdictions are street-wise, and it is also true that no other quality seems as important for successful homicide control. But the distribution of "street smarts" among individual detectives can be uneven, sometimes even lacking. In addition the technical capacity in many detective bureaus is often incredibly deficient, especially in the management of larger cases. The nature of technical competence at the traditional level is perhaps reflected in the relatively small part that forensics plays in the resolution of most major crimes (Peterson, 1974).

The technical capacity at the B level is higher. Investigators at this level are formally trained in the specialist detective work that they undertake. This was not the case in New York City, for example, until 1973. Until then, New York homicide investigators, considered the most experienced homicide investigators in the world, had no formal training in homicide investigation.

Partly as a result of this training, investigators at the B level bring resources to their work not used at the traditional C level. Forensics is one example; psychology, management skills, and computer support are others. In terms of preventive activity, the agency has the managerial skills to conceive and develop an adequate preventive program, tapping specialist skills such as those of the psychologist, the sociologist, and the data-processing specialist.

The technical capacity of the police agency at the A level occurs when the agency expends considerable creativity in homicide control. It is an agency capable of management through a system of natural and systematic experimentation, such as that proposed for public agencies by Alice Rivlin (1971). It is significantly interested in research and new approaches. It is capable of working with other agencies and individuals in the community in developing effective crime and homicide control. "Police managers in the new form of police agency . . . would be creative information gatherers and analysts of order-enhancement programs and techniques. What works—when, where, how, and why? What does not work—when, where, how, and why? Police agencies have done such a creditable public relations job of projecting the appearance of knowledge and competence concerning crime control that it may be shocking to some, nourished on the capability of literary and television police, to recognize that the cupboard is almost empty. Outside a relatively narrow spectrum, not much has been firmly established about what works and what does not work in on-the-street policing" (Farmer, 1984). The A-level homicide policy has the capacity to address this need.

SITE VISITS

How, then, would selected U.S. localities rate on this index? Our site visits at Piccadilly and Bakerloo partly illustrate use of the index. Bakerloo considers its homicide problem significant; it recently realized one of the highest rates of homicide in the nation. Piccadilly is a city with one of the highest absolute numbers of homicides in the nation and the world. We have rated Bakerloo as CCC and Piccadilly as CCB. Let us look at the activities of homicide control at these two sites in terms of programmatic scope, personnel scope, and technical scope.

Concerning programmatic scope, we have rated both jurisdictions at the C level because of their lack of homicide prevention activities. The police personnel interviewed at both sites appeared convinced that homicides are not preventable and that no successful prevention programs exist. Both sets of respondents report having tried domestic violence programs but have no faith in their effectiveness. Bakerloo initiated a program at the beginning of 1986 but discontinued it in August 1986, regarding it as a failure. Piccadilly has an order that defines the law and the steps police officers are to take to conform to the law, with a prescription to stay at the scene until they are assured that no further violence is likely to occur. Domestic violence (one area where homicide is said to be preventable) in both cities is left in the hands of generally trained police officers.

In terms of their capacity for problem definition, it may seem harsh to categorize both departments at the C level. The statistical reports on homicide assembled in Bakerloo are less detailed but more recent than those produced in Piccadilly. The Bakerloo Police Department conducts an analysis of the characteristics of the perpetrators, the victims, the circumstances, and the motivation. For instance, it analyzes data in terms of type of perpetrator, type of victim, time and place of the offense, weapon used, and (if known) motivation. The Piccadilly analysis uses finer breakdowns, including data by type of location (vacant building, open area, transit, commercial, public building, and residence); victim-perpetrator relationship (spouse or common law, boyfriend-girlfriend, other family friend-acquaintance, stranger, and unknown); weapon (shotgun-rifle, handgun, cutting instrument, physical force, blunt instrument, and other); and situation (burglary, robbery, sexual crime, drug-related, other criminal act, dispute, and unknown). Piccadilly also produces data for police supervisors to use, on a reactive basis, in the planning of work schedules—showing incidents by time of day, day of week, month of year, as well as general location—categorizing crimes by whether or not they would have been visible to a patrol officer if one had happened by. Almost half (47.5 percent) of the 1985 homicides were identified as visible (and therefore potentially preventable) by patrol officers.

Perhaps because of the detail involved, some of the Piccadilly data are not up to date. The Crime Analysis Unit reported that it hoped to have all the 1983 data available by the end of 1986. Both jurisdictions gather

data to understand their problems better and to assure proper responsive action. But only limited use is made of these data for planning for preventive purposes.

It should be noted that determining whether a particular agency has a homicide prevention program is somewhat arbitrary. This can be illustrated by looking at the case of Piccadilly. That locality has established a large task force of some 30 detectives to address the "epidemic of crack"; it is hard to see how this will not involve preventive aspects when one of the areas of the jurisdiction has experienced a 63 percent increase in homicides linked to the incidence of crack. The chief of detectives pointed out to us that Piccadilly's program of keeping career criminals off the streets must have some effect on the homicide rate, although correlations are far from clear. It appears that where precinct level officials are unaware of homicide prevention activities, such activities may exist more in name than fact.

Concerning personnel scope, we rated both local governments at the C level. Again, this may seem a trifle harsh, but fair, in the case of Piccadilly. Piccadilly has made attempts, organizationally and otherwise, to improve working relations between detectives and patrol officers; and perhaps the problems of scale in that department can account for the difficulty. Detectives in Piccadilly, while under a central command, are decentralized to precincts or areas and to special task forces. But neither police department seems to use its patrol officers in any significant way in homicide investigation, beyond general patrol work, even though change would be advisable. Officials in neither jurisdiction seemed convinced that alternatives exist. For example, a significant use of task forces of detectives and patrol officers does not occur. As for extra-departmental resources, both urban areas contain several law enforcement organizations functioning within their jurisdictions and they cooperate with these organizations, but their extra-departmental coordination is limited to that.

Concerning technical scope, we have rated Bakerloo at the C level and Piccadilly at the B level. Homicide detectives in both jurisdictions are usually selected based on established records of success in other types of investigations. Their training is chiefly on-the-job, although they may attend formal training schools when available and when workloads permit. Piccadilly, however, does provide its homicide detectives with specialist, homicide investigative training. The relative volume of homicides in that locality also is educative for its detectives.

In considering technical scope, we asked about the use of forensic science, data processing, and psychological profiling. Homicide detectives were reported to value forensic science and used forensic specialists to search for physical evidence at all homicide scenes. (One difficulty, however, was noted in Piccadilly. Forensic specialists are not normally called to assault scenes. If the victim later dies as a result of the injuries from the assault, there is little or no forensic evidence to support the assailant's prosecution.) Within the limits of the time available during our on-site visits, however, it was not possible to pursue the question of the character and the extent of this use of forensic capability.

Piccadilly has made significant use of data-processing capability in the management of exceptionally large investigations, and this use has been of landmark importance. Otherwise, with the exception of checking such items as criminal records, data processing is not routinely used by homicide detectives in either Piccadilly or Bakerloo—not even for management purposes. Both departments do make some use of the FBI's psychological profiling capability, although according to our respondents, this procedure works only for special cases such as serial murders. Piccadilly makes more use of behavioral science specialists, but this use is not extensive. In neither jurisdiction is use made of behavioral or social scientists for preventive purposes.

The basic methods of investigating homicides in both Bakerloo and Piccadilly are reported to have changed little during the past two decades. Investigators will ask the FBI to do psychological profiling if they suspect that a serial murderer is operating, and they may depend a little more on forensic evidence and less on confessions. But officials interviewed during the site visits made no claims about changing their basic methods, nor can they see a need to change them in the foreseeable future. The only change that was reported is in the number of investigators. In Piccadilly, respondents pointed out that changes in policy have little effect on operations, although there has been concern about the degree of detective specialization. Bakerloo has experienced stable leadership, but the addition of detectives to handle the growing number of homicides is reported to be the only substantial change.

Nationally, a number of homicide managers and detectives are well informed on management issues, many are sophisticated in their craft, and a few have written journal articles. More than one has written a quality book on homicide investigation, and some have participated in research studies. But natural and systematic experimentation in the management of homicide prevention and control programs has never been a serious possibility in either Piccadilly or Bakerloo.

The homicide environment differs between the two jurisdictions. The number of homicides peaked in Piccadilly in 1981 and decreased each year to 1985, although the rate rose in the first half of 1986, owing, it is believed, to drug-related activity. The response has been to organize a detective task force focusing on the small area where the drug problem is mainly located. The locality has experienced some homicides that have excited considerable public discussion and reaction, and the reporting (at the anecdotal rather than the policy level) of sensational crimes is a staple in the media in this jurisdiction no less than in others. The locality does have a continuing crime commission with a capable staff.

Bakerloo has experienced wide public concern about its per-capita homicide rate and about its increasing volume of murder, and this increasing rate continued during the first half of 1986. The media have kept the public aware of the problem through newspaper articles and television coverage. The police seem to be blamed only when a crime is not solved promptly. Some council members voice mild criticism of the police department and its management, but little is said of the way homicides are handled. Bakerloo City Council recently

formed a one-shot Citizen Crime Commission, which hastily studied and prepared a good report on the crime problem. But the report has had little impact on the crime problem at this writing.

Overall, then, there is much opportunity for improving homicide-control policies and programs in both Bakerloo and Piccadilly. On the basis of observations made in other local governments, we suspect that this opportunity exists for many other communities.

THE STUMBLING BLOCK

Why do local governments find it difficult to do what clearly can be done to reduce the incidence of homicide? We will suggest here, as we suggested in our site visits to Piccadilly and Bakerloo, that a principal impediment is the lack of an AAA police agency vision. Neither the politicians nor the police seem to have a valid sense of the possibilities. They are like the characters in Edwin Abbott's classic *Flatland*. They live in their own world of two-dimensional space, and they do not conceive that there might be more dimensions. Piccadilly and Bakerloo could have a homicide control policy with more dimensions.

Those who want to improve their community's homicide control or any other policy may find it useful to focus on the forces that encourage and the forces that discourage change. This view is neither controversial nor new. A number of techniques are available in facilitating a systematic analysis of such forces. One well known example is force field analysis, which came from the work of Kurt Lewin and has long been discussed in public administration texts.

In analyzing the situations in Piccadilly and Bakerloo, we attempted to use a modification of force field analysis. Our approach involved four steps. The first was to identify the major actors in the management of the locality's homicide control policy. While these varied between sites, both localities included a number of officials from within the police agency, the politicians and political entities, and the community organizations and interest groups. In general, then, management officials from within the police agency would include the police chief, the chief of detectives, and the head of the patrol officers' (or other) association. The politicians would include the mayor or chairman of the board of supervisors and council factions. The community groups would include the print media, the electronic media, and interest groups.

The second step was to estimate the significance of a particular actor in securing the change in question. A police agency isolated from political control, for example, would leave the police chief with more influence than the mayor or board chairman.

The third step was to estimate the costs and benefits to the respective actors of making the indicated change. An assumption is that each actor is entirely self-interested, concerned with optimizing his or her own career prospects. So, for example, the costs to the police chief may include loss of political support from subordinates by changing practices, loss of political support from politicians receiving complaints from police officers' spouses, the time required to learn the new practice, and so on. Benefits may include increased community support because of better crime statistics.

The fourth step was to identify alternative strategies for changing the cost-benefit equations.

The four-step method was valid, but more significant at that point was the absence of the vision of an AAA police agency. Therefore, we have emphasized the need for increasing understanding of the characteristics of an AAA agency—how police agencies should be developed to a level where they are capable of giving the required leadership.

A major impediment limiting the prospects for change—in Piccadilly, Bakerloo, and many other local governments, seems to be the narrow and traditional view of the role of the police agency in crime control. It is a narrow view also held by many politicians, the public, and the police themselves. It is not a view that holds the police agency responsible for effective policy formulation, policy leadership, and policy administration; rather, it is content to see the police agency on the periphery of real crime control.

A new form of police agency, which would be central to crime control and, therefore, homicide control, has been recently described in detail (Farmer, 1984). In terms of policy formulation, it would be an agency with the capacity for developing, in genuine partnership with other local public and private agencies, workable priorities, policies, and programs for achieving higher levels of order, law, and justice. In terms of policy leadership, it would be a police agency that has the capacity for mobilizing and leading agencies and individuals to achieve order enhancement, with emphasis not only on working on its own but also through other organizations. In terms of policy administration, it would be a police agency that is creative, capable of using research results and new perspectives. In sum, it would be a police agency that is more than reactive; it would be one that provides leadership in the community.

While we do not suggest that the traditional police agency does no planning, does not work in conjunction with others, and lacks creativity, we do suggest the need for a quantum upgrading of capacity in these areas. The essential point of this discussion is that the police agency, in our view, must develop so that it can give the community truly professional and substantial leadership. If Bakerloo sees its murder problem as being connected primarily with its underclass and handguns, Bakerloo should be able to turn to its police agency for leadership in developing, in concert with other relevant local institutions, a workable plan for coping. It should not have to accept that its police agency is incapable of going beyond traditional police approaches. It should not have to accept that its police agency is essentially peripheral to the main sociological issues.

Bakerloo and Piccadilly and other local governments concerned with controlling murder more effectively need a police agency that is working toward the AAA level. They need a police agency capable of seeing the extra dimensions that are possible. And this need surely places a burden on criminal justices and administrators to articulate their view of the nature of such an agency. The police agency—in Bakerloo, Piccadilly, and elsewhere—should be at the center, and not the periphery, of all aspects of a local government's homicide control policy.

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