Management Strategies for Combatting Prison Gang Violence

Part I. Combatting Prison Gang Violence: Some Management Options
Part II. Combatting Violent Inmate Organizations at the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla: A Case Study

Camille Graham Camp
George M. Camp
Criminal Justice Insitute
South Salem, New York

April 26, 1988

Grant # 85-IJ-CX-0049
Final Report

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If the strategies for combatting prison gang violence contained in this report are found helpful to the corrections community, it will be due in large part to the contributions of corrections staff in the prison systems that were studied. The agencies that participated in the study were the California Department of Corrections, the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the Washington Department of Corrections. The particular prisons that were studied were:

California:	Folsom Prison San Quentin Prison
Illinois:	Pontiac Correctional Center Stateville Correctional Center
Washington:	Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla

In California, those who contributed significantly included Dan McCarthy, former director of the Department of Corrections; Deputy Director Robert Deninger, Institutions Division; Richard Krupp, Information Systems Coordinator; Tony Newland, Court Services; Assistant Director Lou Dentici, Law Enforcement Liaison; Don Hill, Prison Gang Office; Warden Otis Thurmond, Chino; Deputy Director Gregory Harding, Evaluation and Compliance Division; Bob Spindler, Chief, Management Analysis and Evaluation Branch; Assistant Counsel Ken Hughes, Department of Corrections; Gordon Underwood, Institutions Division; Terry Yearwood, Director of Classification; Bill Friederick, former Senior Special Agent; Warden Bob Borg, Folsom Prison; Chief Deputy Warden Bob Briggs, Folsom Prison; Deputy Warden Wally Smith, New Folsom Prison; Deputy Warden Steve Camra, San Quentin Prison; Captain Louis Echeverria, San Quentin Prison; Program Administrator Rose Garcia, San Quentin Prison; Brian Taugher, Deputy Attorney General; Steve Shutte, Assistant Auditor General; Art Letter, Senior Legislative Consultant; and Donald Specter, Director of the Prison Law Office.

In Illinois, we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Michael P. Lane, Director of the Department of Corrections, for providing us with the opportunity to explore gang management issues within Illinois institutions. He and his staff expedited our entry into the system and spent a considerable amount of time responding to our questions and providing us with reports and documentation of practices. In additon to Mike Lane's contributions, Deputy Director Leo Meyer, Adult Institutions; Assistant Deputy Director George Welborn, Adult Institutions; Operations Assistant Fred Spada; Management Information Director Nola Joyce; Chief of Intergovernmental Relations, Melissa Sutler; Lynette Jones; Training Academy Supervisor Terry Neathery; and former Assistant Counsel Debra Anderson all gave generously of themselves to this effort.

At Stateville, Warden Michael O'Leary and his staff were extremely helpful in allowing us access to the entire institution and to responding to our questions and requests. Of great assistance were Assistant Warden for Operations Tony Godinez, Assistant Warden for Programs Tom Roth, Unit Supeintendent Ron Fleming, former Unit Superintendent Travis Wheaton, Unit Superintendent Tom Morris, and Gang Coordinator Tom McWilliams gave us the benefit of their many years of experience in managing prison gangs.

At Pontiac, Warden James Chrans assisted us by sharing his experiences and by providing us access to the entire institution, his staff, and records. Among those on his staff to whom we are particularly indebted are Unit Superintendent Dan Kelly and Unit Superintendent Robert Taylor, who was brutually murdered by gang members in the fall of 1987. His tragic death dramatically and unfortunately illustrates the level of violence prison gangs generate.

We also acknowledge the contributions made by Michael Mahoney, Executive Director of the John Howard Association and State Representatives Kent Slater and John Culberton.

At the Washington Department of Corrections, we were assisted primarilly by Secretary Amos Reed; Director of Prisons, Kip Kautzky; and Deputy Director of Prisons, James Spaulding. They offered much insight into past and present management strategies, based on their intimate experience with those events.

At Walla Walla, Superintendent Larry Kincheloe spent nearly a week of his time with us, making sure that every request was honored, suggesting additional avenues for exploration, and offering insight into the events that had transpired at Walla Walla. His staff were equally as helpful. Many more members than we are able to acknowledge here were extraoridnarilly patient and helpful to us in piecing together historical events and managment strategies. Among those individuals were Wayne Helgeson, Associate Superintendent; Tana Wood, Associate Superintendent; Robin Moses, Unit Manager Supervisor; Mike Kropf, Unit Manager; Dick Morgan, Unit Manager; Larry Hines, Recreation Director; Sergeant Jim Hartford, Intelligence Unit; Sergeant Stevenson, Prison Industries; and Sergeant Tom Paul.

Four other individuals gave generously and helped to clarify past events at Walla Walla. They are Robert Rhay, Walla Superintendent from 1957 to 1977; Gene Struthers, State Legislator representing the Walla Walla area from 1977 to 1984; Tom McCoy, a writer for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and author of *Concrete Mama,* an account of Walla Walla during the 1970's; and

Professor Steven Rubin of Whitman College, who has observed and assessed the prison over a number of years.

We also want to express our appreciation to John Conrad, who offered us advise and encouragemnt throughout the course of the work and who was especially helpful in his comments on earlier drafts of our work. His knowledge of correctional institutions, prisons gangs, and the Claifornia and Washington prison systems were invaluable.

The National Institute of Justice provided the funds to make this study possible. We acknowldege that support and thank Director Chips Stewart for NIJ's confidence in us. Throughout the course of the project at NIJ we were guided by Anne Schmidt, who served not only as our monitor, but also provided insightful comment and sound advice on how best to pull the materials together. We appreciated her encouragement and guidance throughout the venture, as well as her input into the presentation of this final document.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Significance of the Prison Gang Problem

Prison gangs have emerged as a major disruptive force within a large number of correctional systems. Where gangs exist, they are responsible for a substantial amount of prison violence. Finding ways to control gangs and to reduce the level of violence they generate has proven to be a very difficult task.

In a national study of prison gangs, their presence has been reported in 32 state prison systems and the federal prison system.[1] More than 100 gangs have been identified and reported to have nearly 13,000 members. In 1986, correctional agencies reported experiencing an average of 361 assaults against inmates and 254 against staff.[2] While gang members account for only a small percentage of all state and federal inmates, prison administrators attribute 50 percent or more of their problems with inmates to gangs. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that a significant number of inmate homicides and reported assaults are directly related to the presence of prison gangs.

This report presents the issues raised in the course of seeking solutions to the problem of gang violence, and discusses options available to administrators, along with the practical consequences of selecting them. It is based primarily on first hand observations and analyses of the experiences of three state correctional agencies and how they have responded to prison gangs over a number of years.

Agency Need for Gang Violence Management Strategies

Prior prison gang research revealed the extent to which prison gangs are becoming an increasingly significant problem for prison systems that have not had to deal with them until recently. More than half of the jurisdictions reporting the presence of prison gangs in 1985 indicated that they had appeared in their institutions since 1980. Further research and study of the problem has revealed frustration in dealing with the problems created by the gangs and stopping their activities.

Probably the breadth and depth of the problem are best exemplified in California, where the Department of Corrections continues to grapple with the violence generated by prison gangs. It

---

[1]George M. Camp, and Camille Graham Camp, *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature, and Impact on Prisons*, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1985.
[2]George M. Camp and Camille Graham Camp, *The Corrections Yearbook*, Criminal Justice Institute: South Salem, New York, 1987.

has risen to a level of concern where one of the Department's major goals is "management control of inmate violence through the establishment of standardized gang management/administrative segregation practices and the analysis of alternatives to better manage the violent inmate and parolee." (Violence in California Prisons: Report of the Task Force on Violence, Special Housing, and Gang Management, Department of Corrections, Sacramento, California, November, 1986.)

The magnitude of the problem facing prison managers across the country was described in that same report in terms of the extent to which gangs are responsible for violence and criminal activities in every jurisdiction in which gangs are present. The extent of that violence and criminal activity in Texas has been documented in terms of the large number of inmate murders in the mid-1980's that were attributed to gang activities. In 1984, twenty-five inmates were murdered; in 1985, twenty seven were killed.[3] The degree to which gangs escalate the level of violence was made tragically apparent in Illinois, where a senior prison manager was murdered by gang members at Pontiac in late 1987.

Goal: Find Management Options for Administrators

The research is directed at meeting three major objectives:

- To formulate the issues that arise in the control of prison gangs and the violence they generate.
- To present a series of strategy options from which correctional administrators might choose to address these issues.
- To explore the possible consequences of initiating various options under various circumstances.

---

[3]Accounts and analysis of the levels of violence in Texas prisons are reported in Sheldon Ekland-Olson. "Crowding, Social Control and Prison Violence: Evidence from the Post Ruiz Years in Texas," Unpublished document, 1985, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, S. D. Barrick, and L.E. Cohen, "Prison Overcrowding and Disciplinary Problems: An Analysis of the Texas Prison System", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol 19, No. 2, 1983, pp. 163-176, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, "Judicial Decisions and the Social Order of Prison Violence: Evidence from the Post Ruiz Years in Texas," Department of Sociology, University of Texas, 1985, "Inside America's Toughest Prison", Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1986, Steve J. Martin and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, *Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling Down*, (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1987)

- To convey a detailed case study of one prison's experience (the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla) in dealing with gang violence and a brief overview of the experiences of the California and Illinois Departments of Correction.

The study does not test the direct relationship between the application of certain strategies and specific changes in the level of institutional violence that may be attributed to those strategies.

Case Study Approach To Gaining Management Options

To shed light on prison gang issues, strategies, options, and the likely consequences of these options, the work was approached as a series of case studies, the results of which would be synthesized into a final report, incorporating and relating the findings from each agency and institution into a single framework. As such, an historical perspective was sought to determine the changes in levels of violence, the degree and intensity of gang activity, the ways in which administrators viewed gangs, the strategies employed over time and circumstance, and the outcomes that resulted. Recognizing that it was difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely why those results occurred, it was judged to be more appropriate to determine what occurred, including what management strategies and tactics appeared to be most helpful in controlling gang violence.

Three state correctional systems - California, Illinois, and Washington - were selected for detailed exploration and assessment of management strategies to control prison gangs and reduce the level of violence. Five prisons - Folsom and San Quentin (California), Pontiac and Stateville (Illinois), and Walla Walla (Washington) were chosen for study. Each had (1) experienced prison gangs for twenty years or more, (2) employed a variety of strategies over that period of time, (3) reported fluctuating violence levels that had been attributed to the presence of gangs, (4) achieved some successes and acknowledged some failures in their attempts to reduce prison violence, and (5) were willing to open their agency records and reports, their institutions, and their staff to study.

While the chosen institutions shared some characteristics, experiences, and strategies, they were also unique. Each one offered a variety of important differences that contributed to the applicability of the management strategies and options for prison administrators in a variety of different settings across the country.

Walla Walla experienced its first real exposure to gangs and gang violence in the early 1970's. The gangs, which emerged from institutionally approved clubs and organizations, precipitated severe disruption of normal institutional activity and significant amounts of violence. Ethnic and racially

oriented groups, along with motorcycle gangs whose members had been bikers prior to coming to prison and who continued to maintain close ties with bikers outside the prison, formed elements of the key gangs. The institution eventually was successful in bringing the gangs under control, preventing their spread to other facilities, and sustaining those achievements for several years (up to the present time), as well as reducing violence levels. Violence levels reached their peak in the mid-1970's, diminished significantly beginning in 1980, and have remained relatively low through the 1980's.

At San Quentin and Folsom, as well as in the rest of the California prison system, prison gangs have long been a major factor in prison management. The gangs appear to have been born in prison, rather than being a creation or carry-over from gang, or gang-like, organizations on the "street". When prison gang members were eventually released, community-based ties were solidified or expanded from the contacts gang members had made in prison. California's experience is unique in the sheer magnitude of the problem, the number of gang members, the viciousness of inter-gang rivalries, and the level of violence directed at both inmates and staff. For more than twenty years Department officials have been wrestling with ways to control gang violence.

Illinois has lived with more prison gangs and young members over a longer period of time than other correctional systems. The gangs owe their origins to the social, political and environmental fabric of the greater Chicago area that feeds the Illinois prisons a large percentage of their inmates. In the two institutions that were studied it is estimated that 90 percent of the inmates are either members or affiliates of an active gang. The number of inmates officially identified as active gang members is significantly lower. There can be no question however, that gang activity is a way of life for inmates confined at Pontiac and Stateville, just as it was prior to admission and just as it is likely to be following release from prison.[4]

These three systems and the five institutions studied employ a rich variety of approaches applicable to the management of prison gangs. A more detailed description of each correctional system's experience with prison gangs is included in the "Case Study Synopses."

[4]The origins and evolution of Illinois prison gangs have been traced and discussed by Jacobs (1977), Camp and Camp (1985), and the by James B. Jacobs in Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, by Illinois Department of Corrections.

Presentation of Strategy Options and a Case Analysis

The results are presented in two parts. The first presents management strategies organized around a series of issues that bear most directly on controlling prison gang violence. Particular issues were chosen to frame the strategies because they seemed to be most relevant to the experiences of the three correctional agencies. Strategies and tactics are presented within the following list of issues.

Agency Policy Concerning Prison Gangs
Initiatives of the Director of a Prison System with Gangs
The Development and Use of Prison Gang Intelligence
Classification as a Tool to Combat Gangs
Program Considerations for Gang-Infested Prisons
Using Housing Arrangements to Combat Gangs
Training Staff Concerning Prison Gangs
Discipline Related to Prison Gangs
The Policing of Contraband and Prison Gangs
Inmate Management Principles Related to Gangs
Responses to Critical Gang Situations
Lawsuits Related to Prison Gangs

At the end of Part I, three case study synopses describe the experiences of the California, Illinois, and Washington correctional systems with prison gangs.

Part II isolates and explores the range of management strategies and their consequences at the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla. The original intent of the study was to prepare a series of in-depth case studies of the gang management experiences of several correctional agencies. The first site examined was Walla Walla, from which resulted an in-depth written account involving considerably more time and effort than had been foreseen. While there was sufficient project time remaining to examine California's and Illinois' experiences, there was not enough time to prepare individual in-depth written accounts of each. The more relevant factor, however, in the decision to include the Walla Walla case study rests in the learning experiences themselves. More so than in California and Illinois, Washington experienced extreme lows and highs in gang management. Different management strategies were applied with varying results from the time just prior to the disruptive inmate groups' presence, through their ascendency, their violent and stormy periods of disruption, their decline, and their eventual disappearance. While the

experience is unique to Walla Walla during that particular period of time, it offers the opportunity to view a completed circle - one that includes a complete range of experience with disruptive inmate groups.

The strategies, options, and suggestions offered here are recognized as not being applicable universally, nor are they claimed to be the only ways to address prison gang violence. Every correctional agency and prison is unique. Time and circumstances have produced a variety of situations, no two of which are identical. It is hoped that the results will be useful to administrators who are coping with prison gangs and that they will be able to take full advantage of the experiences of the agencies and institutions examined in this study. It is also hoped that the options here will stimulate thought and discussion leading to the development of strategies which might be more appropriate to their specific situations.

PART I

Combatting Prison Gang Violence:

Some Management Options

Agency Policy Concerning Prison Gangs

The Prison Gang Challenge to Correctional Management

The advent of gangs within United States prisons during the 1970's and 1980's has presented an unprecedented challenge to corrections management. Under the best of conditions running a prison raises some thorny issues and conflicting choices for administrators. Higher security facilities present particularly difficult management dilemmas. Finding the proper balance between the often conflicting goals of the community at large, numerous institutional objectives, and a variety of inmate needs is far from an easy task. When those factors are in a state of flux, the dilemma for administrators can became serious in what may seem like no time at all. Add to these complex management issues the sudden development of organized and disruptive groups of inmates, and the management situation can reach crisis proportions.

Only a cursory review of social developments during the last several decades is required to understand the context in which the prison gang challenge has appeared. The extent and rapidity of social change over the last 20 years has been well documented. Societal developments that have had the most important effects on corrections include the civil rights movement, increasing civil disobedience during and after the Vietnam war, the formation of political activist groups and subcultural groups on society's margin, rises in crime rates, media "hype" of serious crimes, and the heightened emphasis on "law and order" with its accompanying "lock them up" mandate.

The impact of social change on prisons has also been well documented. Most obvious is the dramatic and continuing increase in the number of individuals being sent to prisons, and the resulting degree to which more prisons are operating under crowded circumstances. For example, from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1987, state and federal prison populations increased by 23.0 percent from 424,959 to 522,744. During the same period of time prison capacity increased by 19.7 percent from 376,009 to 450,004. The difference between capacity and prisoners was such that prisons were operating at 113.0 percent of capacity in 1984 and at 116.2 percent of capacity in 1987. Thus, while new bed space was being added, it was not increasing at as fast a rate as was the prisoner population. The characteristics and backgrounds of individuals sent to prison have changed dramatically to include large numbers from the drug culture, as well as large numbers of felons who lived in antisocial subcultures in the community. The federal courts have defended an

expanding range of individual inmate rights, sending a clear message to prisoner populations that the traditionally coercive prison environment can be changed into one in which inmates can influence management. Past methods of managing prisons have not continued to be appropriate under these new circumstances. Changes in management policies and procedures to accommodate the new prison environment have often been slow and arduous - a game of "catch up".

Within this context, groups of prison inmates in at least 33 jurisdictions have organized, usually along racial lines, to share and protect common values.[5] They support their organizations by way of criminal activities, and enforce their wills with violence. In these systems, disruption and rising violence levels have developed without any apparent connection with managerial performance. Prison managers are wrestling not only with a new and different environment, but also with gangs that do not respond to inmate management policies which have been successful in many other prison environments.

Developing a policy to respond to the challenge that prison gangs offer is not a simple undertaking. A number of questions arise.

- Is membership in one of these groups to be considered criminal?
- If membership is to be considered criminal, what is the appropriate punishment in the prison context?
- If membership is not criminal, is it condoned?
- Should the attitude toward gang inmates differ from the attitude toward non-gang inmates?
- Should the prison community be policed differently than an outside community with regard to gang membership?
- Should management communicate with gangs?
- What is the appropriate means of combatting gang violence?
- What liabilities are involved in an approach to combatting gangs?

The answers to these and perhaps other questions about what correctional managers believe is the appropriate posture toward the prison gang problem become the rationale for a prison gang policy and its accompanying strategies and practices. The goal is to develop a policy that results in institutional stability and individual safety.

---

[5]George M. and Camille Graham Camp, *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons*, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1985

Current Agency Prison Gang Policy Development

Prison gang management policy has developed in response to the gangs that emerged from these societal forces and conditions, challenging the existing institutional equilibrium. The policies that are currently in effect in gang-infested systems have evolved from years of gang experience and are not in written policy form. In all of the systems studied, there have been positions toward the gangs that have failed and even aggravated the problem. There have also been successes - some temporary and some long-term. Some policies are currently being re-evaluated in light of new developments. There is no current policy that will work for every system that encounters a gang problem.

Current policies in gang-infested prison systems represent contrasting points of view as well as contrasting experiences with various types of prison gangs. The reader should take into consideration that these descriptions are of the "purest" philosophies and have rarely, if ever, been implemented in this form. In addition, the varying circumstances of different prison systems should be taken into account when evaluating the positions, and especially in applying the positions to a given system where policy issues about prison gangs are being formulated.

Behavioral Basis For Gang Policy. One school of thought proposes that gang membership in and of itself is not sufficient to warrant official sanction. As long as individual gang members do not violate the rules of institutional conduct they may participate in activities available to other inmates and move about the institution as do other inmates. Grouping, associating, identifying with one's peers is considered a phenomenon of institutional life, and "ganging" is viewed as an outgrowth of that pattern as well as a continuation of ties formed prior to becoming a prison inmate. Behavior. then, is the critical factor in deciding how to respond to gang members. Membership in a subculture or group, even if its members are thought to engage in illegal or rule-breaking acts, is not sufficient justification to warrant action against that member, unless the individual member has broken a specific rule or law.

A policy based primarily on gang behavior as a criterion for action is likely to define gang behavior in terms of signifying, possessing gang literature and paraphernalia, recruiting members, intimidating in the name of the gang, and a variety of other crimes that are gang-related, but violations under any circumstance. Sanctions are set for gang behavior, and are enforced. This

policy does not provide for segregation as a wholesale strategy for combatting gang activity, but does not preclude segregation of an inmate who becomes a threat to institutional security because of gang-related crimes. Such a policy emphasizes intelligence on gang operations and activities, policing of contraband, strict monitoring and resistance of gang manipulations in housing and program assignments, and prompt and sure discipline for rule violations.

Membership Basis for Gang Policy. The second point of view approaches the presence of prison gangs on the basis that any unsanctioned group represents a threat and a challenge to the administration. Even if the gang has not violated an institutional rule, the fact that it is "organized" is sufficient to conclude that it is "anti-administration". Membership or association with gang members is a violation of institutional rules. The threat is increased when these groups confront staff and inmates publicly and violently. The fact that the gang, promotes such tactics is enough to make an inmate's membership, association, or support of the gang's values and actions a violation of institutional rules.

A policy based on gang membership as the criterion for action is likely to state that unauthorized covert organizations will not be tolerated in the prison and that any inmate identified as a gang member will be segregated from the general population. This policy requires provision for enough segregation cells to house all inmates identified as gang members, and a plan for how segregation units containing large numbers of gang members are to be operated, including contingency plans for gang warfare within the units. Strategies emphasize screening for gang members upon admission and in the general population, and detail official criteria for establishing identification.

The Evolving Nature of Prison Gang Policies. While these two views represent the major policy positions, they are not the only possible policies. Over time, administrators have incorporated experiences gained from applying their policies in a variety of circumstances. Thus, it is not at all inappropriate for policy to change over time and for elements of both schools of thought to be present simultaneously within the same agency. As a result, policies evolve to better meet future challenges.

Initiatives of the Director of a Prison System With Gangs

Correctional administrators work in a public arena where all of their decisions and activities are observed and frequently second-guessed by a public with a variety of interests and viewpoints. The directors of gang-infested prison systems have to face the public at large, the people responsible for their appointment, agency staff, and the inmates concerning their policies and strategies for combatting prison gangs. Given that the director is a strong and capable leader, the major issues involved in formulating and implementing those policies and strategies are:

- understanding what the dynamics of the prison gangs are in the total system;
- making a philosophical decision about the agency's posture toward gangs and disseminating that policy;
- planning particular strategies in keeping with policy that will be used to combat the gang(s); and
- following through with resources and support for those responsible for implementing that policy.

Establishing Prison Gang Policy and Strategy. Becoming aware of the presence of prison gangs in the correctional agency is not a basis for laying strategy to combat them. An assessment of the nature and extent of the problem is an essential first step to achieving viable gang control management practices. Discussing the issues with subordinates, jurisdictional authority, and key legislators, as well as heads of other correctional agencies who have faced similar gang problems is a good beginning. A series of work sessions from a variety of agency functional areas and at a variety of levels should be conducted. When agreement has been reached on the policy, it should be reduced to writing, reviewed by others including legal counsel, and rewritten as necessary. The policy should be broad enough to address both deterrent measures as well as incentive programs to control gang behavior. The following are some steps involved in such planning.

- Gather information from heads of institutions, from violence reports, and from whatever intelligence is available about the number and names of gangs that may be in operation, their size, structure, recruitment practices, and problems they have caused, as well as strategies that have been employed to control them.

- Analyze the effects that the gangs have had on institutional operations, non-gang inmates, and staff, as well as the degree of success or failure of attempts to combat them.

- Select the best qualified staff to develop the strategies and plan their execution. Include line staff in the planning process to foster ownership of the strategies within the planning group and throughout the agency.

- Plan for all conceivable eventualities. Include, for example, the circumstances under which deadly force is to be used as well as when, where, and how gang leaders will be transferred.

- Involve staff training personnel in the planning process so that strategies will quickly become incorporated into and disseminated at training programs and plans may be developed regarding the best method of communicating this information.

- When more than one institution is involved, compare the gang situations in each institution, as well as the effectiveness of the differing strategies used in each to combat the gangs.

- Consider the impact gangs have or may have in the future on institutions other than those in which they are currently operating and asses the likelihood of their spreading to other institutions in the agency.

Taking the Policy Public. Determining how to communicate to the public the agency's position on gangs takes into account the nature of the problem presented by gangs. To what degree ought the agency acknowledge the presence of a gang that thrives on notoriety, disruption, and violence? More importantly, will recognition of a gang problem be misconstrued by the public as the inability of the agency to control its prisoners and strengthen prestige in gang membership among other inmates? In deciding how to communicate the policy, several issues should be addressed.

- Publicly acknowledging the gangs' presence and their disruptive acts sets the record straight, but unless a plan is offered for eliminating or controlling the gangs, it places the administrator in the position of having to explain why such violence and disruption are not being controlled and eliminated. Such criticisms may become harsh and persist over long periods of time, and may eventually lead to the replacement of the current administrator in favor of another who will be expected to "get things back under control."

- Disavowing the presence of gangs creates the impression that the administration is in charge and is dealing effectively with isolated incidents of violence. Since such organized groups or gangs are prohibited, they therefore do not exist. Were they to appear, they

would be quickly dispersed and eliminated. This approach carries with it the liability that if the real extent and nature of the problem is revealed, the agency and those espousing the policy are subject to severe criticism and loss of credibility.

- Appreciating the difference between acknowledgement and recognition of prison gangs permits the administrator to draw a clear distinction between denying their presence and bestowing them status. Making the distinction clear to the public affords the administrator greater credibility while lending no credence to the gang, and allows for statements indicating vigorous intent to eliminate the gang. It is the preferred option.

- Stating publicly the agency's position on prison gangs does not involve outlining any strategy details. A short, clear statement of the position and the fact that initiatives are being taken to deal with the problem is sufficient.

Communicating Gang Policy Within the Agency. How the agency communicates its gang policy influences the degree to which that strategy is likely to be successful. The policy may be precisely what the agency needs to address prison gang violence, but unless staff understand it and adopt it, it may never be implemented fully. Several considerations are worth bearing in mind when communicating the policy.

- Written communication of the policy to staff in a variety of formats reinforces its importance. The document may be written as a new, separate, and distinct policy statement; it also may be incorporated into existing agency policy statements regarding discipline, security, and the authorization of inmate activities and organizations.

- Spoken communication may be used to supplement the written policy. It provides opportunities to answer staff questions, to amplify on specific points, and to gain feedback for further reassessment of the policy. Oral communication of the policy, if used exclusively, makes it difficult for those who might take exception to the agency's practices to challenge it; however,it also increases the likelihood of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and inconsistent application of the policy.

- Dissemination of the policy statement should be as official as possible. It may be helpful to conduct meetings with staff to discuss the policy and respond to their questions. To ensure that everyone in the organization, new and old, knows and understands the policy thoroughly, it should be incorporated into all levels of staff training, both preservice and inservice.

Monitoring Policy Implementation. Gang management policy requires planned implementation and close monitoring. Implementation requires a team effort, and its success depends largely on the breadth and duration of the effort. While the director cannot do it alone, he/she must be able to monitor closely its progress so that appropriate changes can be made in a timely manner. Considerations important to this process are briefly stated here.

- Directors must be careful not to usurp or compromise the warden's power in the eyes of staff and inmates. Any loss of power or conflict between the warden and his/her superiors may be quickly perceived by the gangs as an opportunity to drive a wedge between staff and weaken the warden's position and ability to control gang activity. If the warden of the prison does not agree with the policy and its strategies, the problem must be resolved before implementation, even if it means replacing the warden.

- Placing the right person in charge of the gang-infested institution is crucial to gaining staff support for the job ahead. The skills required of an administrator whose task is to retake such a prison are not necessarily the same skills needed in a person whose job is to solidify those gains. Retaking an institution from gang control is not only a lengthy and dangerous process; it is also extremely fatiguing physically and psychologically on staff.

- Staff in key policy implementation positions should have the necessary correctional management experience, hold values in tune with those of the agency director, and support the goals and objectives of the organization. Good prison management under the best of circumstances depends on mutual support and understanding. A unified team approach is essential.

- Criteria must be established for evaluating the effectiveness of strategies, and a regular reporting system should be put in place to monitor progress.

Providing Support for the Policy. Providing the necessary resources to implement the prison gang policy and encouraging and supporting staff in their efforts are important aspects of the director's role. The gang policy will make apparent the need for resources currently unavailable to the agency. The responsibility for acquiring those resources is the director's. Existing resources may be re-allocated based on a reordering of priorities and additional resources

gained from other sources. Support of agency gang policy from criminal justice agencies, budget authorities, and legislative decision makers is also critical to its success. Listed here are some methods and approaches for gaining these resources and support.

- Re-allocate agency funds toward
  - purchasing necessary equipment (computer, for example),
  - hiring additional staff to identify and track gang members and their activities, and
  - instituting travel and training programs in gang awareness and tactics.

- Seek legislation providing harsher penalties for those caught committing acts that frequently involve gang members e.g. possession of weapons and other contraband items.

- Promote partnerships and cooperative efforts with law enforcement investigative units, prosecutors, and the courts to expedite the criminal justice processing of gang members charged with criminal acts.

- Engage the media in efforts to make the public aware of the war being waged at great risk to staff and others to eliminate prison gangs and to make a safe environment for staff and inmates.

- Contact other correctional agencies and form partnerships with them to share gang information and strategies that have proven successful in combatting gangs.

The Development and Use of Intelligence

In a gang-infested prison, organized covert criminal activity affects large numbers of inmates. Much of that activity involves crimes against persons, including murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and buggery. As custodian of this population, the prison administrator's is responsible for finding out why, when, where, and how such planned criminal acts occur and taking action to prevent, stop, or at the very least, uncover them. Trial-and-error intelligence tactics are much too weak to uncover gang activity. For example, reviewing movement sheets daily and trying to

remember if certain incoming or outgoing inmates are members of a particular gang is an inexact approach at best and a dangerous method that could easily fail to prevent a homicide or gang warfare and even riot.

Jurisdictions that suffer from gang problems agree that the development and use of gang intelligence is critical in any comprehensive strategy to combat gang activity and crime.[6] The degree of sophistication deemed necessary for an intelligence system, the amount of manpower and equipment allocated for the effort, and the parameters within which the system operates will vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The issues that arise from these variations are presented with some suggested options for consideration.

Protection of Gang Intelligence from Discovery. The purpose of developing organized intelligence specifically addressing gangs and gang members is defeated if information becomes public and therefore vulnerable to disclosure to inmates. Gathering and organizing intelligence on prison gangs must take into account jurisdictional statutes on "freedom of information." It may be advisable to have legislation passed that protects gang intelligence from public information access before developing systematic gang intelligence. Policies that affect sharing of information should be carefully worded to prevent inmates from gaining access to gang intelligence on the basis of existing correctional policy. When the press is involved, explanation of the security problems that intelligence sharing would cause will be honored in most cases.

Intelligence Systems. The collection of gang and gang member intelligence is needed in a form that is usable. Gang member identification information as well as gang description and transaction information should be accessible to the staff who will be working within the agency's intelligence strategy. The information is best stored in a system that lends itself to retrieval in the form needed by the users of the information. It is advisable to consider the following issues when designing a gang intelligence system.

- A gang intelligence system may be designed by an information management specialist to serve agency-wide needs or institution specific needs or both. In agencies where inmates are transferred from institution to institution, or where gang activity occurs inter-institutionally, the agency-wide system may be preferable.

---

[6]George M. and Camille Graham Camp, *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons*, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1985

- Existing systems for storing gang information vary among jurisdictions from memory recall by existing staff to highly sophisticated computerized systems. Organized intelligence is difficult to achieve when information is kept in one's head. It can be developed on a paper system, but an automated system will probably serve the user more efficiently. A computerized system will require an investment in equipment and manpower, except in agencies where current management information systems (with terminals at each institution) can accommodate the additional service. In small systems or institutions, or in agencies where it is not wise to store sensitive information in a larger, and more widely accessible MIS system, a separate computer (perhaps a personal computer or a network of personal computers) may be indicated. In varying stages of sophistication, Washington State, California, and Illinois are now using computerized programs to organize gang member information.

- A gang intelligence system best serves everyone when data is entered on a regular and ongoing basis, keeping data current. When a computer network system is used, a terminal at each institution facilitates such data entry. On a pilot basis, th e Information Systems Coordinator of the California Department of Corrections has been experimenting with a gang information network with terminals at several of its gang-infested institutions.

- The complexity of information in an intelligence repository will vary with the needs perceived by the users. Elements of gang information can be planned to cover as many uses as are needed. If the need is perceived to be keeping a list of gang members by name, location, and affiliation, use will obviously be limited to tracking where gang members and gang clusters are located in the prison. If, however, the need is perceived to be keeping information that enables one to follow gang organization and activity, information will include more items, such as:

  - home address (that sometimes will indicate street gang affiliation),
  - monikers,
  - tattoos,
  - liaisons,
  - status in the organization,
  - role in the organization,
  - number of "hits" (assaults and homicides performed for the organization),
  - types of weapons used for "hits",
  - criminal history related to drugs, prostitution, strong-arming etc. that might indicate how the organization will use the member,
  - types and numbers of disciplinaries that are gang-related,
  - amount of inmate pay,
  - commissary purchases by date and item.

Both California and Illinois keep a variety of data fields, and California is experimenting with a program that will provide them with all of the above capabilities.

Even more sophisticated systems can include data sets based not only on individual inmate data, but also on chronology of gang events, gang-related assaults with information on both assailant and victim, gang-related lockdowns and surrounding events, gang-related disciplinaries, program and housing assignments related to gang affiliation, etc. so that events and persons and gang activity can be studied in terms of patterns and trends. Such intelligence educates the administrator on how the gang operates--not just who is involved in which organization doing what.

Some of the relationships and trends that can be tracked include:

- relationship between gang affiliation and rate of inmate pay; (Comparisons can be made with total population rates.)

- rate of commissary sales (especially food and cigarettes) to gang members before major events such as gang conflicts, homicides etc.; (Sudden increases may indicate preparation for lockdowns after "taking care of business", and could be indicators to administrators that they should be prepared for an upcoming violent episode.)

- relationship between gang membership and program assignment (which may show when a particular gang is monopolizing a certain work area or program assignment and which may alert the administrator to an organizational objective and motivation as well as the kinds of problems that may occur as other organizations are forced out of that area);

- relationship between gang membership and housing assignments (which may show a gang developing an organizational neighborhood, or perhaps a cluster close to an enemy that is scheduled to be eliminated);

- relationship between drug confiscations and gang affiliation, which may indicate that an organization 's members are using drugs if the amount is small, or that a stash is for sale by a particular gang; (Drug information will have to be maintained for a considerably long period of time in order to show definite trends.)

- relationship between weapons and weapon types with gang affiliation may indicate what weapons are preferred by which organizations and the sources of those weapons.

Note that as the need to use broader intelligence expands, the number of gang information entries expands; it may be necessary to revise some reporting forms and route such documents to the staff responsible for gang data entry.

- Computer networking is a time-saver for intelligence staff who are sending or receiving gang members to or from another institution. With a single command, all of the information on a particular gang member can be instantly transferred into another institution's gang intelligence system as a part of the transfer procedure.

- When particular institutions have information needs peculiar to their circumstances and situations, an institution-specific screen can be devised to provide entry of their special bits of information along with programming to provide for processing that information into usable formats.

- An intelligence system may be used to integrate and analyze information and perhaps revise strategies to control gang violence regularly. When the intelligence system is complex enough to allow it, the administrator may consider entering information on violent and gang-related events into pre-planned programs so that patterns as well as relationships can be reviewed routinely and regularly. For example, rates of different types of violence with particular types of weapons occurring at particular locations and times, when known, can indicate to the administrator what needs to be done to intervene in planned criminal acts.

- Information that may bear on gang activity serves best when it is accessible for study not only by research experts but also by administrators and other gang strategy staff. The information can be programmed so that even local intelligence officers can readily enter commands that will allow the information to be processed and presented in useful formats. Unless this feature is present, intelligence officers that are not computer-educated may avoid a system that could otherwise be invaluable to them. Although no such system was found fully functioning in any of the systems studied, plans and/or initial steps for such systems exist in Illinois, California and Washington State.

- Regular meetings among intelligence officers and administrators both within the institution and among institutions in the agency can be a valuable means of sharing and analyzing information and developing and revising strategies and tactics for interfering in gang activity.

Identification of Gang Members. It is advantageous to detect an inmate's gang involvement as early as possible, preferably at reception. An identification process can be instituted to identify gang membership not only at reception, but also at any time during an inmate's time served.

Knowing that an inmate is a member of a particular gang early in his/her sentence enables the administrator to watch for associations that may develop, to make sense of inmate requests and behaviors that may be gang-related, and to prevent violence and other gang crime that might otherwise have occurred in the context of the inmate's association in the gang. On the other hand, labelling an inmate as a gang member for the purpose of singling him/her out for special deprivation or punishment in the absence of observed criminal or maladaptive behavior may become the subject of a prisoner rights issue. Identification must be for intelligence gathering purposes, and based on sound demonstrative criteria. Some strategy considerations are offered for consideration.

- Identification can be achieved by means of a screening device that may be part of the general intake form and/or preferably a separate document entirely. This should provide for self-admission, observable signs (such as gang-associated tattoos, insignia, clothing, or jewelry), verbal but documented communications from staff or law enforcement, or written indications on documents found in belongings, on pre-sentence reports, police reports, prior prison records, or other official criminal justice reports. Some jurisdictions require two or more types of documentation for an official gang member identification unless self-admission is present (e.g. California and Illinois). Some say that paper documentation is not sufficient to establish membership, and some warn that if there is not enough evidence, even though the verifier is sure of membership, a disclaimer should be included in the identification document.

- Staff training should include instruction on how to identify gang members. Such training information and instructions are in effect in California and Illinois.

- Once identification is established, the information can be communicated to those staff who "need to know" gang affiliation, which may include intelligence officers, intelligence coordinators, housing officers, gang awareness committee members, and classification officers, and/or to the intelligence system that is in place to deal with gang information and which automatically informs appropriate staff. This should be outlined in a protocol detailing the use of information. A rather advanced Gang Awareness component is present in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Lawful Intelligence Methods. Methods of gaining gang intelligence should be lawful and in keeping with good correctional practice. However, many methods have inherent within them issues and concerns. Some of these are discussed.

- Informants should be used with care, and the practice of paying informants can prove dangerous. There is a big difference between a "snitch" who is looking for favors and a responsible prisoner who is interested in living in a violence-free environment.

- Telephone taps to monitor gang members' conversations may be used only when the practice is legally permissible and procedures delineated in written policy documents. The practice is normally based on gang affiliation and consequent overriding security consideration.

- Cells may contain valuable information. Jurisdictions have found that they can learn a great deal if cells are searched carefully, thoroughly and frequently, paying attention to suspicious mail, pictures, literature, colors, insignia, "hit" lists, debtors lists, dues lists, etc. Bits of information are plentiful in this area, and oftentimes may be pieced together to produce significant information.

- "Roll overs," or inmates who repudiate gang membership, almost always appeal to the administration for protection from the organization that may not be very happy about the circumstances under which they left. These inmates are usually quite willing to discuss gang operations, identify assailants, drug dealers, extortionists, etc. since they have an "axe to grind" with their former colleagues. They can be valuable sources of information. California has found it beneficial to require a thorough debriefing with "roll overs" before they go to protective custody and before the gang ID can be removed. Be wary, however, of motives and the possibility of false or misleading information. If the issue is an important one, a polygraph may prove useful.

- Visitors provide another potential information source. Attention may need to be given to visitors' dress, colors, addresses, and cross-visiting between inmates. Thorough shakedowns of visitors may prove necessary, especially of those suspected of carrying messages, drugs, money, "hit" lists, etc. Suspicious persons may prompt background checks, including criminal records.

- Inmate account deposits and withdrawals may be connected to extortion, drug sales. Special attention may be given to transfers from one inmate's account to another, as well as transfers of money (perhaps gained from drug deals) from prison accounts to bank accounts on the streets. Visitors may also be conduits for the transfer of funds to community bank accounts. Money orders sent to prisoner accounts may be checked against addresses of the family members of inmates who may be paying protection money to a gang. Automated systems make these checks much easier.

- It may be desirable to train intelligence officers in evidentiary requirements so that intelligence may be used in criminal prosecutions. California and Illinois have experienced problems with the quality of evidence to be used in court, and both are seeking assistance from local law enforcement authorities in improving investigative techniques.

External Sources of Intelligence. Internal intelligence systems can be augmented with information gained from sources external to the prison system. In systems where prison gangs were spawned as street gangs in large metropolitan areas, it is especially important to develop relationships with municipal authorities so that information can be shared when gang members come into the prison and when they return to the community. Other agencies in the jurisdiction are valuable sources of information on mutual clients and have been cooperative in some states in establishing an initiative against gang operations. Neighboring jurisdictions who have gang problems, who have incarcerated mutual clients, and who are willing to share information that may add to an understanding of gang operations are often willing to enter into a partnership (task force) and meet regularly or on an "as needed" basis to discuss trends and transactions that can help in problem solving within the prison system and in the community. Some considerations include:

- External partnerships are most productive when the objectives of the partnership(s) are clear and when there is a procedure that is followed to share particular kinds of information on a regular basis. Some relationships tend to be sporadic and gossipy in nature without a great deal of direction. Oftentimes serious sharing occurs after some act of violence has occurred about which one or more parties may have had some information and "would have helped out if they had only realized that it had meant something so serious." If the relationship is meant to be only a liaison that comes into play after events occur, it should be acknowledged as such. However, if the relationship is meant to be productive and germane to the intelligence system, then it must be defined that way by all participants and structured accordingly.

- Intelligence may also be available from local police departments, parole offices, local and state courts, federal law enforcement (Marshals, DEA officers) or correctional personnel in the area. Concentrating on the geographical areas where gang activity is more prevalent may be helpful. Youth agencies in jurisdictions where gangs are prevalent are almost always rich in information gained from wards and sending agencies.

- Interstate task forces have been successful in sharing information in the west, southwest, and Midwest. Regional task forces can benefit from intercepting interstate communication between gangs, as well as having the benefit of information on a gang member from another state where the inmate has served a sentence. Parole officers are often recipients of information about prison gang operations in their own states as well as surrounding states. Commitments between states to share regularly certain types of information assure better information. Telephone follow up is essential, considering geographic distance and time gaps between meetings.
- Occasionally intelligence can be gained and shared when the Interstate Compact is used to relieve a state of a particularly powerful gang leader. Follow up on such inmates can be fruitful as well.

Intelligence Staff. The amount of manpower necessary to operate a comprehensive gang intelligence system is dependent upon the system that is used, the amount of data that is kept, and the extent to which it is automated. There are arguments for and against central coordination by a gang intelligence unit. The organizational structure of the unit and the selection of its leader are important points for consideration.

- When the intelligence system is not fully automated and when the administrator of the system opts to keep system-wide intelligence on gangs, it is essential to have a specific focus for system-wide intelligence. If only one person is assigned the responsibility, intelligence may consist of little more that a list of who is in what gang at what status in which institution. With a few more staff, information can be gleaned from the institutions on a systematic basis, and certain records (e.g. assault reports and other critical incidents) can be reviewed to detect patterns of gang violence. A staff of three or more in a system can coordinate their data gathering efforts with the institution staff to assure that the collection is not burdensome and that the result is of maximum utility. They can also schedule times to brief institutions on methods of collecting more information for use at the local level, sit in on local institutional gang information meetings, and give regular training to incoming officers as each new class of officers is trained.

- When the agency opts for a fully automated system, much information is shared electronically and regularly, eliminating the need for many phone calls and institutional visits by the gang intelligence facilitator at the central office level. That person is then able to spend more time looking at trends that can be used by the entire system, assist intelligence gatherers in the institutions in developing more sophisticated databases, and become more engaged in development of strategy to proactively combat the gang activity. Additional personnel can then conduct both pre-service and in-service training full time.

Planned Use of Intelligence. Information systems do little good unless there is a plan that will ensure that the information is used for problem solving.

- In addition to the availability of data by means of the system on an informal "as needed and requested" basis, regular meetings between the institution's operations staff who are using the data and the institution's intelligence gatherers and analyzers are helpful in keeping a dialogue going between the user and the provider of information. The two groups feed one another. During these meetings information needs and additional uses of the information can be discussed, as well as the probability that a particular strategy will be effective.

- Regular if infrequent meetings between sister institutions in the system including the same types of staff as above can give rise to more and better brainstorming that may result in improvement in strategies to control gang violence system-wide.

- A regularly provided security-controlled printout that shows system-wide trends in gang involvement and activity can be valuable to selected staff and will be part of the process to ensure that the information is getting back to those who need it.

- Intelligence should be gathered in such a manner so that it can be admissible in court in the event that it is needed as evidence in the prosecution of a prisoner for a crime.

Classification as a Tool to Combat Gangs

Classification is a powerful prison management tool which can help in combatting prison gangs if the classification instrument is tailored to prevent gang members from manipulating their way into privileged status and if the classification system is enforced strictly.

Tailoring Classification Systems to Thwart Gangs. Revisions in the classification instrument may be necessary to prevent gang members from attaining preferred positions that permit recruitment, enhance prestige, and facilitate the running of rackets. It is necessary to stay constantly alert for the loopholes in the system that allow gang members to subvert its purpose. Care should be taken, however, not to insert criteria that exceed department policy and that violate due process requirements when excluding gang members from inmate activities.

Monitoring Classification Application. Regular monitoring of how the classification system is being used relative to gang members will ensure that gang members are being classified and treated according to departmental policy. The following methods have proven helpful to managers.

- Frequent and thorough review of all placements in restricted settings.
- Monitoring classification of gang member transfers to ensure that inappropriate mixings are avoided and that all member locations are known and tracked.
- Monitoring of releases from administrative segregation or protective custody to avoid unwanted encounters among gang members and between gang members and non-gang members.
- Monitoring gang members held in segregation at the central office level to ensure review at the highest levels.

Processing Gang Members at Reception. Reception processing of gang members and potential members represents the first point at which sound gang management practices may begin. If all inmates move through intake as swiftly as possible, gang members will be denied the opportunity to recruit new inmates and/or disrupt institutional activities. It is during this important

stage of the imprisonment process that the institution should make best use of its opportunity to convey the message that gang affiliation is detrimental to an inmate's well-being during incarceration. At the same time, it is important to avoid unnecessary and unwarranted labelling of gang members by conferring a special status to them through unnecessarily lengthy and unique processing routines.

Carefully interviewing inmates and reviewing their case histories, as well as following up on facts that suggest that the incoming inmate has been gang-affiliated in the past, can be valuable in establishing identification and determining gang roles prior to placement in an institution.

Placement in High Security Institutions. Classification practices must take into account that gang members and gangs are more likely to show up in higher security institutions where inmates are serving lengthy sentences for violent crimes. As a means of diffusing the concentration of gang members in these institutions, the classification system must contain incentives to make positive behavior attractive to those who might wish to move away from the gang ("roll over") and perhaps transferred to other prisons.
Opportunities for assigning weaker gang affiliates in other than high security facilities should be considered as a means of dispersing selected gang members and reducing gang solidarity. The classification system should provide for such movement.

Program Considerations for Prisons with Gangs

When prison gangs abuse prison programs and activities, the knee-jerk reaction is to close them down. Idleness, however, is likely to work against institutional objectives and should be avoided. Programs and activities in an institution with prison gangs must be planned carefully and supervised meticulously. Program design should provide incentives more attractive than the gang's reward structure (for example, opportunities for earlier release from prison).

Importance of Adequate Supervision. Participation in well supervised institutional programs limits the gang's time and ability to successfully engage in corrupting these programs to their own ends. Without constant staff monitoring, the gangs may begin to decide who will participate, what it will cost for an inmate to participate, and what activities will actually occur "behind the scenes." As a result, a legitimate program continues to run as if it were still under the staff's direction, while in fact it has been subverted and is being dominated by the gang.

To ensure that programs do not fall under the influence of the gang, administrators have taken several steps. In some systems, membership or affiliation is sufficient justification to deny participation in programs offered to the general population. Other administrators are willing to allow participation unless the gang member's behavior is found to be disruptive to the program. If gang members are allowed to participate, concentrations of individual gangs on particular assignments for the purpose of running rackets must be avoided. Careful assignment decisions are as important as close monitoring of activities and supervision of inmates.

Purposeful Programming. The assignment of inmates to programs should regulate and control activity, as well as offer institutionally sanctioned alternatives to gang behavior. Filling time or "making work" has a tendency to degenerate quickly into unstructured situations where the gang makes the time and activity work in their favor and against the institution. If the institution's goals are not being met by gang members' program participation, then it may be time to terminate their program participation.

Programs should also be incentives to deter other inmates from turning to gangs for rewards and services. Otherwise, the gang will fill the void by offering its own set of "programs" which will appear more attractive.

Closing Programs. If there is insufficient staff to provide maximum supervision, a program or activity may be a liability and may have to be closed. Even the most worthwhile programs may have to be halted if they can not be administrated effectively. When adequate numbers of staff become available, they can be re-instituted.

Using Housing Arrangements to Combat Gangs

Inmates, including gang members, spend much of their time in housing areas. Significant amounts of gang "business" transpire there, including the sale of drugs, prostitution, strong-arming, assault, and homicide. Strategies for managing these housing units involve a variety of important considerations. They may include designing and/or renovating areas to enhance supervision and control; providing a variety of housing; allocating sufficient numbers of trained and experienced staff; and being prepared for attempts by gang members to manipulate the system and intimidate unit staff.

Design and Control. While the costs of renovation may preclude significant changes in older institutions, it nevertheless should be kept in mind that the design of the housing unit may have value in deterring and controlling gangs. Since prison gangs may gain strength in direct proportion to the amount of physical space they can control, it is imperative that staff control the housing space. Designing it for maximum staff observation and supervision will help ensure the strong presence of the administration and diminish gang influence. Cell block renovations were completed at Walla Walla which converted large open inside cell blocks into ones in which inmate movement was restricted by physical barriers and staff's freedom of movement and observation of inmates increased by creating separate screened-off passage ways. Additional lighting was installed and air-conditioning added.

The appropriate use of well designed housing units may not only deter gang violence but also reinforce constructive behavior. Clearly defined design differences between restrictive housing units and more open units may deter gang activities and encourage more acceptable behavior. To the extent that the prison environment and especially the housing units may be made to appear less forbidding and institutional, interactions with staff may be less combative.

Size. Just as smaller institutions may be preferable for controlling gangs, smaller housing units may likewise be desirable. Smaller units provide more options for housing assignments, reduce gang member contacts, and improve staff's ability to supervise and monitor inmate activity. The gang's influence is diminished and staff's effectiveness is enhanced through improved staff-inmate ratios. Even in housing units without gang members, smaller units reduce the likelihood of gang infiltration and may help to lessen the need for protective custody housing. Smaller housing units are now in operation at New Folsom and are an integral part of all new maximum security housing

in California. Contact between gang members is limited and staff observation is enhanced. Both California and Washington report a reduction in the rate of inmates requesting protective custody and attribute this decline to the use of these smaller, high security, easier to manage housing units.

Many agencies operate older and larger institutions that contain large cell blocks in which they house both gang members and non-gang members. To the extent possible, gang management may be easier if the units are divided into smaller components. Flooring over multi-tiered cell blocks and/or inserting vertical barriers to shorten the length of these cell blocks may be appropriate.

Creating smaller units may not be easily accomplished, but if achieved, may assist staff control of the gang and its activities. Some alternatives that might be worth exploring include:

- Spread general population gang members throughout existing housing units to reduce the amount of direct contact gang members have with one another. When the members are dispersed, communication between members of the same gang may become somewhat more difficult and time consuming, although it may not be impossible. Additionally, staff may have more opportunities to intercept messages.

- Include members of all gangs in all housing units. Integration reduces the likelihood of housing units being labelled as one particular gang's "turf" and, as already mentioned, also makes communications within the gang more difficult.

Single Cells. Within the housing unit, single cells or rooms may be preferable to multiple occupancy cells or dormitories. They limit the movement of inmates within the housing unit, and may be just as important as controlling movement into and out of the unit. To the extent that inmate movement is decreased and supervision increased, individual gang members may be prohibited from acting together as a gang.

In addition, the use of "closed cell-fronts" may reduce the likelihood of gang member assaults on staff through the bars of open-front cells and reduces the chance of the cell being fire-bombed. Officers are particularly vulnerable when passing along narrow walkways by open-front cells. When locked in their cells, inmates are also vulnerable to fire bomb attacks and other forms of assault. Closed front cells permit staff observation but may serve to protect the occupant and staff from assault.

While single-cell housing may be preferable for managing gang members, all general population gang members need not be confined to their cells all of the time. Some form of small dayroom space may be desirable, providing it is observed and supervised by staff.

Special Housing Units. Special housing units (administrative segregation, special detention, special treatment units, etc.) play a major role in managing gang violence. Experience has demonstrated that the availability of such housing units does not necessarily solve the problem, but their absence hinders management's ability to gain and maintain control. Having too few segregation cells may inhibit separation and isolation strategies, while having too many may lead to their excessive and unwarranted use. The number required is difficult to specify since each situation is different and varies over time. The extent to which they are needed depends largely on the agency's gang policy. If lockup is not a key element, lockup units may be kept to a minimum. Walla Walla administrators point to the importance of their Intensive Management Unit (IMU) in controlling the behavior of more violent inmates and in deterring others from violent behavior. The 150-bed IMU, located just outside the main institution, was opened in 1982 and incorporates state-of-the-art design features. California officials report similar successes since the small special management units have opened at New Folsom.

Managing and Staffing Housing Units. Control of the unit is maintained by the physical presence of staff. Where possible, the design should incorporate unimpeded staff observation and an ability to vary the amount of direct contact and supervision. While direct contact and interaction with gang members may vary in degree, constant supervision is usually necessary.
The finest physical design and classification system will not control gang violence if staff does not manage the unit properly. Key to success is how officers conduct themselves and carry out unit procedures. Some important points to bear in mind are:

- Unit management staffing arrangements may effectively increase accountability and discovery of gang plans and activities. Unit management, as it has come to be termed, involves placing decision making responsibility with the staff that work most closely and directly with the inmate and increasing the amount of contact between those staff and inmates by placing them in closer proximity for longer periods of time. Staff may perceive subtle behavioral and attitudinal changes and act on that information to prevent violent incidents. Unit management creates a more stable, less transient staff in the housing area. To some degree stability may offset a lack of longevity and experience.

- Whatever the management structure of the unit, it is necessary to assign adequate numbers of staff and to assign more experienced officers to these areas. The judgment acquired from years of handling prison situations equips them to deal with gang members and issues that are likely to arise.

- Housing unit rules should be enforced fairly and professionally, with deviations reported and corrected immediately. Close monitoring of staff's enforcement of the rules should ensure that exceptions are not made and the security of the unit is not compromised. Gang members will exert pressure on staff to bend, but staff must counter the pressure with persistent and consistent enforcement of the rules. Small deviations may seem inconsequential at the time, but can lead to larger ones.

In some instances, both subtle and "not so subtle" threats may be made against staff and their families if rules are not bent or broken to further gang objectives. Such pressure and intimidation must be reported immediately and action taken appropriately. The following are forms of manipulation and intimidation by gang members that require close attention by housing unit staff.

- Seemingly routine requests for housing unit changes or cell changes within a particular housing unit can be part of a gang's maneuvering for position to conduct gang business. Such requests bear close scrutiny for possible gang schemes.

- Charging non-gang members a fee for living in their own cell establishes gang control and produces income for the gang. This rental payment may be paid in goods (money or its equivalent) or in services (sexual favors, running drugs, etc.). Obviously if the gang is acting as a landlord, the gang, not the staff, controls the "turf". Even a trained, observant officer, if not constantly alert, can miss these transactions. Staff at both San Quentin and Walla Walla acknowledged that this practice had occurred in their institutions and that it was still a problem at San Quentin, although not as great a problem as it had been. At Walla Walla the practice had been pervasive, but in recent years it all but disappeared with the increase in staff monitoring and controls.

- Items routinely supplied by the institution to all inmates may also become commodities controlled by the gang unless staff strictly monitors their distribution and use. Bedding and towels, as well as cleaning supplies and cell fixtures are

items that have frequently fallen under the gang's sphere of control and that must be kept under tight control by staff to avoid this practice in the future.

- Pressure not to strictly enforce rules frequently may arise when gang members communicate a willingness to help staff "keep the peace" in return for some consideration, such as overlooking minor abuses of personal property regulations or passing over their cells during contraband searches.

The form of supervision employed by staff in the unit will be determined by policy, physical design, and inmate behavior. The two major choices for staff include (1) direct supervision (direct contact with inmates) and (2) indirect supervision (remote contact). Each has been found effective with gang control under different circumstances.

- Direct supervision of gang members, as well as non-gang members, provides immediate access to all inmates and areas of the unit. It clearly demonstrates staff's ability to monitor and exercise its prerogative to run the unit on its terms.

- Indirect supervision offers less exposure of staff to potential assault since face-to-face contact with inmates is reduced and electronic surveillance technologies are frequently employed. In general population units where the physical design is supportive of such supervision, it may be less costly to staff the unit. On the other hand, indirect supervision may run counter to more important correctional management objectives involving issues as to who is really in charge. The gang occupies the space only when staff is absent, and staff only occupy it when the inmates are locked in their cells or are absent from the unit. As a result, a situation may be created in which the unit "belongs" to the gang, because the staff do not normally enter when the inmates are out of their cells. When staff is present in the unit with the inmates, even in small numbers, they make a clear statement to the gang that staff controls and manages them, not the reverse.

- Special security/control housing units warrant special forms of supervision and contact. Direct contact and supervision work well in combination with the appropriate use of physical restraints on gang members when they are not confined to their cells, and when they are managed in very limited numbers. Staff and inmate safety is ensured while maintaining a direct physical staff presence within the unit.

Staff Training Concerning Prison Gangs

Thorough training is essential for any new officer, but specialized training on gangs and responses to gang behavior is critical for the new officer entering a gang-infested prison. Officers in any prison can be tricked, intimidated, bribed, threatened, and even assaulted by a few troublemaking inmates, but the likelihood of confronting those problems in a prison where gangs exist and operate is greater. Administrators agree that new officers should know what a prison gang is, how it operates, what constitutes gang behavior, what gang behavior to expect, and how to respond to it. Issues arise around how much training should be given, how often, and of what the training should consist.

Extent of Staff Training on Gangs. There are many topics to cover in pre-service training, and the administrator must decide how much time and effort (investment) should be devoted to talking about gangs. Some are concerned that emphasis on such instruction will give officers a false and overblown idea of the problem and even scare them away from a situation where gangs are present. Some systems have gangs that are active in only one or two of the system's institutions, and not all officers will be working at those prisons; therefore, gang training may not be viewed as appropriate for officers assigned to prisons without gangs. Several options are worth consideration.

- Early in pre-service training, trainers may acknowledge that gangs are a problem in the agency and present a short module describing the gangs and their operation. Thereafter during the regular training, gang behavior or gang insignia, etc. can be addressed as it arises (as in discipline, contraband search, etc.). Large blocks of time are not required exclusively for gang orientation and training.

- Devoting an entire day, or even two, to gang training can demonstrate to the pre-service officer that the subject is of great importance, and can heighten the officer's awareness of what to observe and what will be expected of his/her performance concerning gangs.

- A short descriptive module on gangs may be incorporated into pre-service training, reserving the discussion of strategies for control and instruction on responses to gang behavior for the first weeks of service when behavior can be observed in the cell blocks. On-the-job training may also include classes where discussion and instruction can put more emphasis on the gang problem in the prison where the new officer works, and how officers are expected to approach it.

- In addition to any pre-service or early on-the-job training that is provided, on-going and regular in-service training should include instruction and briefing on pertinent new information about gangs and their operations as well as new strategies and/or procedures for combatting gang activity. Training in new procedures and new strategies for combatting gang activity should always be provided before implementation, with special emphasis given to any aspect that will affect how the officer does his/her job.

Pre-Service Training Emphasis on Gang Dynamics and Appropriate Responses to Gang Activity. Few gang-infested prison systems have special pre-service or in-service training on prison gangs. When such training modules are present, they consist of descriptive material about the general history and nature of prison gangs and about the particular gangs in that system. Symbols, colors, organizational structure, numbers of members, rules of membership, major criminal activities, and means of internal discipline are discussed. Additional information on what the officer will see that will alert him/her of particular gang moves or transactions, as well as what the officer is expected to do with such observations would make the training more practical. Specific training on the enforcement of any regulation that prohibits display of gang insignia, signs, etc. and possession of gang literature (which is a very small percentage of gang activity) will enhance the usefulness of the discipline system in combatting gang activities.

Some say that the subtleties of gang behavior cannot be taught in a classroom, and stress that there is no substitute for considerable daily experience with the prisoner population. Others say that preparation for managing oneself in the gang-infested environment is essential, and should be an important part of officer training. The latter group feels that awareness of the indicators of gang activities is crucial to knowing what is going on in the organization and suggests the use of training modules such as one that would explain, for example, what the officer can look for that will indicate that a "hit" or gang confrontation is about to occur, what kind of code language is used to connote gang interaction, what manipulations to expect when a gang is trying to monopolize a section of a cell block or a program assignment, what indicates that a gang member is high in the organization, etc. Awareness of these indicators may prove crucial to knowing what is going on in the organization. In Illinois, for example, a broken hand indicates a "violation" which means that a member has been disciplined for stealing. In California a stabbing consisting of three to four punctures is a message to the inmate to "Get off the line," or, loosely translated, "Check in to protective custody or we will finish you off."

Additional elements of such gang training might include:

- The philosophy of the agency as it relates to gangs, the posture of the agency toward gangs, and the policies that are in effect in order to combat gang activity and its accompanying crime and violence.

- Information about the history and nature of prison gangs in general and about the particular gangs in the agency. (Symbols, colors, organizational type, numbers of members, rules of membership, major criminal activities, and means of internal discipline should be included.)

- A training module that explains both the dynamics and nuances of the prison gang way of life, produced by seasoned cell block officers, classification officers, and unit managers who work in cell blocks where gang members are housed. (One of these staff members might also participate in pre-service training to give new officers a preview of what kinds of gang behaviors they may see when they begin working in the cell blocks.)

In-Service Training Emphasis on Refining Skills. One cannot assume that more experienced officers are skilled in recognizing gang behaviors and indicators of organizational changes and events. Ongoing training can extend knowledge of gang behaviors, raise awareness of indicators that may be overlooked and provide information about behaviors that may have been added to the gang's repertoire. Refining skills of officers who daily come into contact with gang members may involve some of the following subjects.

- Training in what constitutes gang activity and what does not for the purposes of reporting. Often officers are unsure and hesitate to write disciplinary reports. If the report writing is in keeping with evidentiary requirements, it can also contribute to a policy to vigorously prosecute gang-related violence.

- Training regarding identification of gang members. If officers are to be responsible for contributing to the identification process, they must be trained in what evidence can be used to establish a positive identification. Regular cell searches and inmate shakedowns can lead to identification if officers know what constitutes evidence.

- Teaching the appropriate attitude that staff should demonstrate toward inmates who are gang members. There is a fine line between letting a gang member know that their membership in the gang and their gang activity is not a secret, and giving the message to

the inmate that the affiliation and activity is condoned. Role playing is one of the techniques that might be used to help officers learn how to convey to inmates that they are alert to the situation that it is not condoned, and that if a rule violation or crime is committed, disciplinary action and/or prosecution will result.

Discipline Related to Prison Gangs

Administrators of gang-infested prisons have wrestled with disciplinary issues relative to gang affiliation. Does gang affiliation warrant punishment, or must a rule infraction be committed? What is the significance of gang signification as a disciplinary offense? Should gang-relatedness be used as an aggravating factor in discipline?

When Gang Membership Is Punished. Some administrators believe that the consequences of gang membership (e.g. jeopoardizing of parole, placement in segregation, denial of programs, etc.) should be so great that there would be little incentive for participating in gang activity. Others argue that discipline should be meted out only for infractions of rules and regulations. They advocate making a rule against gang activity (manifested through gang symbols and signs, possession of gang literature, and gang-related violations) that carries sanctions, but do not support punishing an inmate because information has established gang membership.

Where gang membership is punishable, administrators normally set aside higher security areas where members are housed if they are known to engage in gang activity and/or have a *bona fide* identification as a gang member. This policy works best in prisons where such security housing is available and where the gang member numbers are small enough to be accommodated. This practice has met with some negative consequences in California, where officials note problems such as the development of a gang stronghold, use of the area as a base for business conducted with "small-timers", in the general population and difficulty in reintegrating "roll overs" if and when they return to the general population.

Gang membership can be made to cause grave consequences other than close-ended segregation.

- Privileges can be limited.
- Certain programs (metal industries, for example) can include criteria for participation that would rule out gang members.
- Visitation for gang members can be restricted to non-contact visiting.
- Surveillance of known gang members can be heightened.
- Advancement in classification can be ruled out.
- All of these measures can have a detrimental effect on parole possibilities.

The liability with the use of such measures is that they may generate lawsuits against the administration, claiming that the inmate has the right to access all of the above regardless of his/her affiliation and must be afforded due process when they are denied. Another problem may arise with regard to identification procedures and the basis upon which an inmate may be labelled a gang member. Heightened surveillance may also be construed as harassment. Finally, when the majority of the population is gang-affiliated, it may be difficult and extremely expensive to enforce such a policy.

When Gang Membership Is Not Punished. Some administrators argue that punishment should not be based solely on gang affiliation. They approach discipline of gang members in the prison similar to the way law enforcement approaches gang members on the streets. They point out that many inmates were gang members in the community before they were incarcerated, and that society does not punish a person for having been identified as having a certain affiliation unless he/she commits a crime.

They discourage prison gang affiliations and recruitment, and have written disciplinary policies that prohibit indicators of gang affiliation such as gang-related jewelry, insignia, clothing, hand signs, literature, and other objects and behavior. They also prohibit actively recruiting non-gang members to become members of a gang. Punishment is meted out for such activities.

Administrators who do not punish gang membership *per se* make it clear to both staff and inmates the ground rules for punishing gang activity. They develop sophisticated intelligence and policing

systems and practice vigorous prosecution of gang violence and other gang crime. A few pertinent issues warrant discussion.

- When the policy is not to segregate inmates based on their gang affiliation, the administrator must be careful to distinguish between this policy and his/her position that "ganging" is not condoned and will meet with severe consequences. It must be clear that, while it is not an infraction to be a member it is an infraction to engage in any gang behavior. The distinction to be made is that behavior, not one's affiliation or identification, is subject to punishment.

- Since gang members are allowed to remain in the general population, a gang-infested system that punishes gang behavior rather than affiliation will emphasize intelligence-gathering and policing to prevent gang crime and violence. If the policing is not keen, prompt and sure, inmates may conclude that ganging is condoned.

- Vigorous prosecution of gang members who are caught committing a felony is especially important when gang members are allowed to live in the general population. Such a practice requires working relationships with prosecutors' offices, complete crime reports, and flawless handling of evidence and witnesses.

Rules Against Signifying Gang Affiliation. Administrators generally agree that signifying gang affiliation must not be condoned and must be discouraged; however, there is little knowledge or agreement about the effects of disallowing gang members to signify their gang membership. Does less signifying mean less gang activity and less recruitment? Or does it mean that approximately the same level of activity continues, but is conducted underground? In California, where identification as a gang member can have severe consequences, officials have noticed that gang tattoos are fewer in number, but gang membership and activity seems not to have decreased. In Illinois, where there is a sanction for signifying, signifying has decreased somewhat, but gang recruitment and activity seems to continue. Sanctions do reduce flagrant signifying and do give an outsider the impression (which may be false) that the administrator has done away with gang activity. Policing of gang signifying is symbolic of the administration's disapproval of the activity. However, gang activity can persist whether or not the signifying is sanctioned. Both in California, where signifying affiliation can produce identification as a gang member and consequent segregation, and in Illinois, where gang signifying is sanctioned, gang insignia and colors can still be observed in the cell houses. Following are some issues involved in policing the signifying of gang affiliation.

- The administrator may choose to punish signifying gang affiliation by writing a rule setting the sanction at a appropriate to the agency's gang policy. The rule and sanction should be written carefully to prevent liability, and advice of attorneys is a must.

- The administrator may issue a regulation that prohibits gang symbols and objects from personal and cell property, and provides for confiscation of it during routine inspections and shakedowns.

- Policing of gang symbols may require as much effort as the administration is willing to spend. It may be inappropriate to police at the expense of other priorities such as weapons detection, investigation of potential assaults or other serious infractions, as well as gathering intelligence on rackets, gang plans etc. Policing of gang symbols is an ongoing chore that is never really completed, and can become ambiguous and "nit-picking" when it involves hand signs, color of personal objects, and jewelry that can signify something other than one's affiliation. Once active policing of symbols is established, laxness during periods when other duties take priority can be perceived as condoning gangs. Even when this is not true, the perception should be avoided as much as possible.

Gang Relatedness as an Aggravating Circumstance. Administrators of gang-infested prisons have considered making "gang-relatedness" an aggravating circumstance in the processing of disciplinary reports. Some questions that arise are 1) whether there is liability in labelling a person's behavior as gang-related for the purpose of punishment and 2) how to handle the ambiguity involved in a decision the officer has to make about whether or not the perpetrator of an incident committed the act as part of gang activity.

- With the advice of counsel and approval of governing bodies, a provision can be written that will allow "gang-relatedness" to be considered an aggravating circumstance in meting out the punishment for an infraction, and will also allow considerably heavier sanctions. When that authorization is received, disciplinary rules may be revised to include the heavier sanctions.

- If "gang-relatedness" is considered an aggravating circumstance in sanctioning inmate rule violations, it may be advisable to include in the disciplinary procedures criteria for determining "gang-relatedness" so that there is minimal guesswork involved and therefore less likelihood of arbitrariness and liability.

The Policing of Contraband and Prison Gangs

The policing of contraband, one of the most difficult inmate management problems in corrections today, is complicated in a gang-infested prison by the fact that a prison gang's most valued commodities are weapons, drugs and money. In addition, gang symbols must be policed as contraband, notwithstanding that they contribute to the identification of inmates as gang members, and that they persist and recur in housing areas as a demonstration of gang pride. Gaining control of weapons, drugs and money is essential to any plan to combat gang activity. Adequate policing of contraband in gang-infested prisons usually entails vigorous contraband initiatives including intelligence gathering, development of search skills, investment of resources, and systematically and persistently applied procedures.

Systematic, Persistent Policing. Elimination of contraband may be a gargantuan task in a prison where gangs abound, requiring the best and most vigorously enforced policies and procedures.

- Both random and routine searches of inmates' persons, property, housing, and all of the areas where inmates reside or move within the prison are likely to be more effective when conducted according to a checklist of procedures to ensure that any contraband that exists will be found. When intelligence information leads to the search of inmates believed to be carriers or holders of contraband for gangs, such searches should be vigorous and persistent, and when there is cause, additional searches should be scheduled so that a "bust" is likely to occur.

- Technological advances in contraband detection may assist searching. Equipment is expensive, but many administrators feel that they are so helpful that they can hardly afford not to use them. Metal detectors, x-ray equipment, and even sound sensors that detect knife sharpening on concrete floors are among the available devices that may have the potential to reduce human error and to reduce or possibly eliminate contraband entry and movement within the prison.

- Squads of officers highly trained in contraband search may be assigned full time to contraband policing. Intelligence related to possible locations of contraband could be provided to them routinely to enhance their effectiveness. They could be made aware of the habits of particular gangs with regard to contraband preferences. (For example, the Latin Disciples of Illinois are reputed to prefer knives with large blades, presumably because of the predominantly small physical stature of the members and the consequent need to have a vicious-appearing weapon.)

  Shakedown squads may be most efficient when they hit cell blocks by surprise and spend a minimum amount of time in a particular block, unless the whole block is locked down for shakedown. Cell searches may become lax when the work becomes repetitious or when squads work blocks too many hours at a time. Schedules might be adjusted to have the squads search cells, then program areas, then conduct canine searches, then support areas, then cells, etc., keeping the work varied while preserving the randomness of the searches. The use of random numbers with numerical listings of calls and areas may be helpful in scheduling searches.

- Property control may facilitate search for contraband. A balance is sought between humanitarian concerns that inmates have enough property to provide constructive use of private time and moderate comfort, and permitting staff the ability to search all items quickly and thoroughly. A written regulation detailing what items are allowed in a cell may be followed carefully and without exception, leaving little room for argument when cells are searched for contraband and excess property is removed. Obviously, the smaller the amount of property allowed, the easier it is to search for contraband.

- In a gang-infested prison where the greatest commodity is drugs, contraband violations should be treated as serious infractions, particularly in the Visiting Room. In some jurisdictions, visitors who attempt to introduce drugs can be denied further visits for varying periods of time according to the seriousness of the violation, or visits can be suspended indefinitely or even permanently in most jurisdictions. When the prison is gang-infested, the art of introducing contraband into the prison by way of visits may become a very sophisticated one, and intelligence may need to be vigorous and constant. Where inmates (and sometimes their visitors) are known gang members and drug traffickers, provisions may be made in the rules for non-contact visits on the basis of a security consideration when there is cause to believe that contraband may be passed.

- Swift prosecution of violators of contraband laws may deter contraband smuggling, especially when the penalty is severe and when convictions are numerous. Successful prosecutions may depend on staff well-trained in preservation of evidence, report writing, and proper handling of witness requirements, as well as full cooperation by the governing jurisdiction. Some institutions have part-time use of local criminal investigators to aid in developing cases on contraband and other gang-related crimes.

Elimination of Weapons. The disciplinary tools of prison gangs are weapons. They are used to punish thieves, non-producers, "holdouts", and "double dealers"; they are also used to make non-gang members submit to the gang's wishes; and they are used as a last resort to attack members of rival gangs when turf issues over drug, prostitution, and protection rackets arise, or when there are philosophical differences. Weapons are also indicators of power. Policing a large prison to keep it free of weapons while inmate organizations are producing weapons from every conceivable material is no small task. It requires a sound strategy, careful planning, thoughtful intelligence-gathering, and meticulous application of institutional procedures. Particular issues to be considered are discussed briefly here.

- Some administrators are now questioning the advisability of housing metal industries in maximum security prisons because of the difficulty in keeping contraband metal out of the prison. Even with strict supervision and heavy search procedures when inmates leave the industrial yard, metal may be smuggled into the prison. Metal detectors may help when they are sensitive enough to pick up even small pieces of metal that can be fashioned into "shanks" (homemade knives) or parts of "shanks". Their utility may be limited unless they are accompanied by strict procedures with regard to shoes and other personal items which are sometimes handed to the searching officer to avoid setting off the alarm and may not be searched thoroughly enough to detect metal hidden in them before returning them to the inmate. Hand held metal friskers can help with this problem. Issuing shoes that have no metal shanks and requiring their exclusive use in the industrial yard may also help.

- Administrators agree that it is preferable to establish and maintain a policy that deters weapon introduction and concealment rather than conducting massive searches to remove accumulated weapons from the institution. Both deterrence and clean up are essential. Metal detectors may be placed at strategic positions throughout the institution to catch inmates smuggling weapons. Mobile metal detectors may be used to surprise weapon carriers who rely on a patterned use of metal detection. X-ray of packages mailed and/or brought by visitors, strict search procedures for incoming trucks, truck drivers (who may

have gang affiliations on the street), and equipment may also help. Keeping intelligence on sources of metal, means of production, likely hiding places for "shanks", as well as smuggling methods, will aid staff in staying ahead of weapon production and concealment.

- A few gangs specialize in explosives. It goes without saying that it is valuable to know if a gang is trying to develop a cache of bombs. Most of these devices are not highly sophisticated. A typical one might be made of match heads wrapped with string from bedding and fused. More sophisticated ones involve highly flammable substances that cause a bigger explosion, such as battery acid, lighter fluids, gasoline, paint thinners (smuggled from maintenance, vocational or industrial shops). A few highly sophisticated devices have electronically timed triggering mechanisms and some have made use of an institution's electrical wiring systems.

Cracking Down on Drugs. For gangs, drugs may serve as rewards to those who perform well for the organization (unless drug use is prohibited by gang code), as a symbol of the gang's power within the prisoner population ("macho" image), but most importantly as a valuable, saleable commodity within the prison. Drug sales produce large sums of money that benefit not only the gang's image but its financial condition. Drug sales produce revenues that are funnelled into bank accounts on the street. Often gangs inside the prison collude with their counterparts on the streets. Drug turf is a common reason for ensuing wars between gangs. Administrators in gang-infested systems know that intervening in the gang's major income source, the drug business, may cripple the organization, and they have developed some creative means of combatting the entry of drugs into the prison, some of which are discussed here.

- Urinalysis is an effective means of detecting drug users, although gang members are usually more interested in sales than use. Still, there are many gang member users; and non-gang members who are caught with "dirty" urine are more likely to give information on sources than those who are not caught. Administrators also say that refusal of testing is a good indicator that the inmate is using drugs and may be either a pusher or a source of information. One administrator recommends that refusal of urinalysis be treated the same on disciplinary reports as "dirty" urine if the urine test is to serve as a deterrent to those who want to keep clean records and shorten their sentences.

- Non-contact visits should be conducted for prisoners who have a history of heavy drug use and especially for prisoners who have been found guilty of receiving smuggled drugs into the prison.

- Canines trained to detect drugs are increasingly used in conjunction with housing and visitor shakedowns. Illinois routinely uses canines in cell block shakedowns. Some jurisdictions use canines (not attack dogs) at visitors' vehicle entrances. When dogs are used in areas where the general public is present, much care has to be taken to warn people that the procedure is used and to explain that the dogs are trained not to attack as part of their work.

- When there is reason to believe that drug deals are being made, most jurisdictions allow monitoring telephone conversations and mail for information that may lead to the arrest of persons trying to drop or smuggle drugs into the institution. Applicable statutes and court orders govern the use of this method.

- Officers should be trained thoroughly in how to search for and detect drugs (as well as alcohol, which is also saleable) hidden in incoming personal property and infrequently used hiding places in the institution.

Control of Money Transactions. U.S. currency is contraband in many correctional institutions. Gangs are not usually found with a stash of "green and coin" in the institution; instead, they manage their money with more subtle accounting methods that are difficult to detect and uncover. Some administrators do not concentrate on this type of contraband or criminal transaction simply because it seems a fruitless task and is almost impossible to prove in a court. Others feel that breaking the money transaction system is key to breaking the gang.

Transfers of money between inmates should always be monitored and under many conditions prohibited. Prohibiting it means that more transactions will have to be made through barter, but for drug sales it necessitates two additional transactions - one to a street contact and another back to the institutional accounting system. Where transfers are allowed between inmate accounts, it is easy to investigate who is buying from whom or who is paying extortion to whom. Patterns are easier to trace. On the other hand, the administration will find it difficult to intervene, having no more proof of wrongdoing than a money transfer, while making it easier for the gang to do business. Where transfers are not allowed between accounts, inmates have to send money to family or friends or ask them for money, and have the family or friend in turn send the money (usually money orders per prison policy) to the account of the inmate who is to be paid.

When the gang is sophisticated enough to have a bank account on the street, inmates will send their extortion payment or purchase payments for drugs or prostitution to persons on the street who then deposit the money in the street bank account and then inform the inmate seller that the payment has

been made. Needless to say, this system can also be discovered by a sophisticated intelligence system, but making a case that a crime has been committed is still difficult. The main value is the intelligence about the method that allows the institution to impede and even cut off lines of transaction. Knowing the method also helps staff to be alert to situations where there may be a possibility of a bust or gaining even more information if they can locate and access information about the street account. Criminal money transactions are valuable intelligence items.

A sound intelligence system may eventually break the internal accounting system and find the accounting list of debits and credits usually kept in the belongings of the gang member who handles the organization's finances. If that document is found, often accounts can be matched with incoming money orders and outgoing checks from inmate accounts.

Policing of Gang Symbols. There are a number of reasons for suppressing and confiscating gang symbols, signs, literature and other signifiers:

- to defame gang affiliation;
- to learn from literature the gang's organization, plans, operations;
- and to impede or slow down gang transactions.

In a gang-infested prison where inmate identity is with gang affiliation and where "signifying" one's membership is part of the gang code, it may be impossible to have the prison completely devoid of any gang symbols at any given time. Some have said that a prison where gang colors or insignia can be found is out of control and in the hands of the gangs. Others advise that policing has to be done, but it can quickly become a full-time job and a distraction from the more important gang control efforts that prevent violence, gang murders, prostitution, strong-arming, drug sales, etc. Gang insignia policing should not be an end in itself, but nonetheless has to be an on-going concern and activity. There are several strategy options that should be considered.

- Administrators may make gang-signifying a violation that carries any or all of three consequences:

  (1) Documented membership may be entered into the inmate's record which will be seen by the paroling authority;

  (2) A sanction that fits in with the disciplinary procedure may be imposed ; and

(3) Membership may be considered an aggravating factor in future disciplinaries where the charge can be connected to gang activity. Caution: Colors, items, and signs may not be clear-cut gangs symbols and are normally present among a combination of identification factors. (See Identification of Gang Members, p. 21??)

- The administrator may choose merely to confiscate the material and remove privileges for a prescribed time.

- In prisons where gangs have painted their cells in gang colors, the administrator may consider scheduling a re-painting of the blocks in uniform colors. It is not advisable to immediately paint any cell that looks like it represents a gang and summarily to write a disciplinary report on the cell occupant. Doing so takes additional time and may cause unnecessary disruption in the housing unit. The signifying may have been done by a former occupant. It is preferable to do a comprehensive paint job, followed by strict policing and repainting as necessary.

Inmate Management Principles In Gang-Infested Prisons

The front-line combat of prison gangs by a prison's administration occurs where there is interaction between staff and inmates - in the cell houses, the dining hall, the program, and work areas. The quality of staff's management of inmates determines whether gang strategies succeed or fail. Inmate management issues include administrative posture and line staff attitude toward gang members, special tactics for attacking gang dynamics, and communications with gang members.

Posture Toward Gangs - No Recognition and No Deference. The tone set by prison operators in regard to the presence of gangs and gang members in the institution sets the stage for the success or failure of the institution's attempts to combat gang activity. Administrators of gang-infested prisons generally agree that gangs are not to be given any notoriety within the system or with the public, and that they are not to be combatted by any strategy that acknowledges or defers to gang leaders, gang structure, or gang values and beliefs.

Taking the posture that gangs are not to be recognized (given credence), does not mean that administration or staff must ignore their existence and pretend to inmates and to the public that they do not exist. It is desirable to communicate to the public and to the prisoner population that the administration is aware of the gangs' existence without dramatizing or making villainous heroes of them. Along with the acknowledgement of the problem should go a clear communication of resolve to do everything possible to eliminate their criminal activities and rule-breaking.

Refraining from condoning, recognizing, or bargaining with gangs, as these administrators are suggesting, means:

- refusing to make any kind of deal with a gang leader or member (such as overlooking an infraction in return for information);
- never speaking through gang leaders to their memberships (as in "You tell your people..."); and
- never giving any possible appearance of doing either (such as holding private conferences).

Bargaining with gang leaders amounts to power brokering and participating in gang business. Stopping an established practice of bargaining may result in the gangs' concluding that they have been betrayed, followed by confrontation with the staff. Certainly they will disavow previous agreements to "keep things quiet." They are also likely to protest that staff has unfairly "changed the rules in the middle of the game", and that the organizations have done nothing to deserve being shut out. The inappropriateness of this approach for reducing violence or as a management tactic was most dramatically revealed at Walla Walla where past practices of dealing with gang leaders bought only brief periods of calm. The problems were never really resolved through these transactions and eventually led to a series of stormy and bloody confrontations between inmates and staff.

From discussions with administrators, it appears that institutional staff members project to the prisoner population more confidence and an attitude more appropriate toward gang members under specific circumstances:

- when they know that there is a oneness of purpose from the top down and when they know that they will be supported and will not be undercut when they enforce the rules and follow the agreed upon strategies and tactics for combatting gang activity;

- when the administration pays attention to staffing to assure that well-trained, stable, and seasoned staff as opposed to new officers who are not sure of themselves are placed in prisons where gang problems exist; and

- when there are adequate levels of staff present in the areas where inmates are present. (Minimum levels can be set if necessary. Note that there is no evidence that more staff is required in gang-infested prisons than in other non-infested prisons with the same numbers of high security inmates and same physical plant layout.)

Staff can demonstrate that they will not be intimidated by gang behavior or gang numbers by searching and policing vigorously and by taking prompt action against violators of rules and regulations. Pressures will nonetheless be placed on staff, but a persistent adherence to procedure and vigorous staff effort have the best chances for success and will breed confidence.

Supervisory Interaction With Inmates. Observing and communicating with inmates in a prison that is gang-infested is to be accomplished carefully and efficiently. Pointers that may be useful include:

- Watch for indicators of major transactions and violent events. Administrators cite examples such as hoarding of canteen and other preparations for lockdown, unusual huddles, extreme quiet and extreme noise, rise in weapon confiscations, increase in requests for protection and/or transfers, unusual disciplinaries, fewer inmates going to meals and programs, more sick call and "lay-ins", parades and chants by gangs, increase in classification hearing requests, and increase in requests for personal interviews.

- Investigate all suspicions of gang activity and plans. Don't take a chance by dismissing information. Problems can develop and fester.

- Communicate methodically with other staff to compare notes on suspected gang transactions. Don't dismiss any one's observations, but don't be alarmed at every suspicion. Gear up for trouble only when there is sound evidence and general consensus.

- Orient new inmates to negative consequences of gang membership if they are not already affiliated. Take time to discuss the problems and risks, and provide some guidance as to how an inmate can handle situations to avoid recruitment and extortion.

- Never give in to inmate threats over any issue, small or large.

- Monitor relationships and changes in relationships. Frequently query communicative inmates. Communicate information to other staff. Keep confidences, especially when the informant's information can put him/her in jeopardy.

Special tactics. Coping with inmates in a gang-infested prison requires special tactics in addition to vigorous policing. Administrators have to perform a balancing act so that they deter and incapacitate rule violators and law breakers without violating any of their own rules nor any inmate rights. Staff must catch them at their game without playing their game. Some administrators have found the following strategies to be effective.

- Gangs operate based on the consistency/predictability of staff behavior and procedures. Almost any new policy or institutional change disrupts gang plans and throws gangs off guard at least temporarily. For example, a reduction in the items permissible in a cell, or an increase in the number of jobs in an industry can have a great impact on a gang's operation. It is advantageous to plan changes that not only improve operations but also upset gang dependency on the status quo. On the other hand, sudden and dramatic change almost always triggers some kind of abrupt reaction, frequently gang violence, as a balance of power is re-negotiated within the gang structure. Anti-gang strategists should be aware of the phenomenon and plan to head off any violent reaction. (For example, plan a lockdown/shakedown coincidental with a change to be implemented so that security will be tighter during adjustment.) It is vital to keep abreast of changes in the gangs' power structures, dynamics, issues, enemies, especially during adjustments to change. Events such as homicide or serious assault do not occur by accident and usually the victim knew he was in danger. It is the administration's business to find out what is planned and to prevent such violence.

- The structure of the organization may be used to undercut it. When the gang control strategist knows the structure of the gang, he/she can take action to cripple operations by removing key people in the organization from the situations in which they play their roles, or by arranging events to intervene in transactions. Administrators have the power to create obstacles such as (1) reassigning certain members away from positions needed to conduct a racket; (2) re-scheduling events where there is suspicion that opportunities exist for criminal transactions; (3) holding surprise shakedowns of the suspected keepers of weapons, goods etc.; and (4) reshuffling housing assignments.

- When intervening in a gang's power structure, it may be advantageous to remove more than the top leader, thereby avoiding an immediate struggle for leadership. If enough of the top structure is removed, members will have no apparent leader to whom they can immediately turn. The remaining "soldiers"/"brothers" will become confused and directionless, giving the administration valuable time to cripple the organization further and to encourage members to "roll over" and to become involved in constructive behavior. Catching gang members when they are weak from lack of leadership will make them more dependent on staff than the gang. If the administration simply removes the leaders without working with the remaining members, staff may witness violent struggles as remaining members compete for leadership and try to develop stronger ties within the gang by committing acts that bring recognition and prestige.

- Staff should avoid gang infiltration into any inmate assignments that offer a strategic advantage for getting information or items valuable to the gang, especially "clerk" positions. Even the appearance of gang members' having important or prized jobs can be detrimental to administrative goals. Gang members make it their business (and are assigned by gang leaders) to manipulate themselves into such positions.

- Finding out what causes gang members to defect, and creating situations that will encourage them to "roll over" may give administrators opportunities to motivate inmates toward constructive activity. Staff may want to consider as alternatives:

    1. Making gang members aware that intelligence is kept on them and that the consequences of remaining in the gang are costly;
    2. Finding out what is important to inmates and offering it to them legitimately; and/or
    3. Writing and enforcing policies that make gang membership unattractive.

- Correspondence between inmates other than what is legally required may be prohibited. (There is supporting case law for such a policy in Missouri and Texas.)

- Strictly regulated inmate access to the media can prevent the possibility of gang leaders "grandstanding," or taking their case to the public.The inmate organizations at Walla Walla were permitted uninhibited access to the media and used them to press their demands for increased authority within the prison and attempted to undercut prison administrators by appealing publicly to both their department officials and elected state leaders.

- A gang member's request for a change in assignment in housing or programs should arouse suspicion. Such requests should be investigated for dynamics and motivation, and

for the effect the change would have on the gang's operation. (Illinois has extensive experience in tracking and controlling gang clustering and positioning.)

- Administrators agree that it is wise never to allow inmate clubs or organizations to meet privately, and never to abdicate control of any room or area to an organization. (Washington State's experience provides insight into the consequences of granting physical "turf" to inmates. Current policy does not allow it.)

- Feeding and programming inmates in small numbers reduces the amount of contact that large groups allow and thereby reduces opportunities for gang transactions.

- Lockdowns control or slow down gang transactions, but a lockdown should not be called (other than for emergencies and cool-off time) unless concrete changes that improve institutional control are planned during the lockdown time, for example, new procedures, housing reassignments, re-scheduling, program reassignments etc.. Most administrators agree that protracted lockdowns are not generally effective. (Walla Walla frequently employed lockdowns for brief periods of time following major disruptions of ongoing institutional operations. However, long-term positive results from lockdowns were not realized until a lengthy lockdown was imposed, during which time substantial changes were made in operational procedures and to the physical environment Once the institution returned to normal operations, the inmates found that it was not going to be "business as usual." Staff had made use of the lockdown opportunity to significantly alter the rules of the game and strengthen its hand.)

- Separating and isolating gang leaders within the system of institutions interrupts communication and can serve to fragment and cripple a gang operation. Enough distance must be maintained between actors to ensure that there are no transactions. It should be kept in mind that inter-institutional transfers can cause the spread of gang organization, and the receiving administrator should be apprised of incoming gang members and their roles in their organizations. (Illinois has experienced some success with transfer of gang members, but it should be noted that such transfers are carefully orchestrated in conjunction with way of gang intelligence coordination.)

- The polygraph may be useful in determining the credibility and sincerity of "roll overs". They are more willing to give information when they are in the process of denying the gang. Thorough debriefing can produce valuable information. Details should be checked and verified information used to advantage. (California has gathered valuable intelligence by way of debriefing and polygraph examinations.)

Responses to Critical Gang Situations

The potential for gang violence and major disruptions cannot be minimized. Prompt and effective response measures will be required. Plans and preparations must be made in advance of the call for an actual response, including the use of staff.

Response Capability Preparations. Institutional riot and disturbance control plans should take into account that violence is more likely to occur between rival gangs than directed against staff. Staff will be concerned with (1) stopping further attacks between gang members and other non-gang members that might be caught up in the incident, (2) safeguarding institutional property, and (3) ensuring the safety of staff involved in bringing the incident under control. In the event of gang warfare, several preparations should not be overlooked:

- Provision for identifying and separating gangs on a temporary basis. A gang intelligence unit (not inmates) can assist with identification, and plans for housing separation can be made in conjunction with institutional contingency planning.

- Methods for settling disputes that avoid negotiations with gang leaders. Intelligence in hand, administrators may address all inmates equally, giving directives and expectations, and announcing the consequences of further outbreaks of violence. When institution-wide issues are the subject of gang rebellion and controversy, the issue may be discussed with inmates but not in terms of the gang's interest in it.

- Plans for determining when it is safe to resume contact between rival gang members in the general population. Intelligence methods can be utilized to determine when internal gang conflicts have been resolved.

An institution's willingness to use force to control potential incidents can be used as a deterrent to gang violence if that willingness is properly communicated to gang members and non-gang members alike. Some administrators signal a show of force to the inmates by doubling coverage on easily observed posts and on armed posts covering the yard and other institution areas. Some administrators also use armed posts overlooking cell blocks, dining halls, auditoriums, and other congregate areas to deter incidents.

Special Training and Preparations. A few gangs have adopted paramilitary tactics and intimidating postures. Unless deterred, they will go into formation on the prison yard and begin marching and chanting. Staff can not assume that these and other combat tactics have not been perfected and will not be used by the gang against them and other inmates. Consequently, staff should not only be physically well-conditioned but well-versed in techniques to counter and overcome any such training by the gangs.

Preparations for responding to gang violence may also require use of specific types of munitions suitable for dispersing groups, protecting property, and isolating specific areas of the institution. In all jurisdictions studied during this project, such preparations were complete.

Defusing Critical Situations. Reasoning with gang members who are on the verge of creating a critical situation can be a valuable tactic as long as care is taken to avoid creating an even larger problem than the current one. Experience gained from confronting gang issues and critical incidents with a dialogue of reason has demonstrated that a willingness to stand one's ground and not give in to gang demands is the preferred response to such situations. Such discussions cannot be held behind closed doors with gang leaders. Any discussions should either be public or should be announced to the entire population and staff. If, during a crisis situation, discussions are held with inmates who happen to be gang members, care should be taken to avoid even the appearance of bargaining with gang leaders. Talking down an incident should not include giving into gang demands.

Lawsuits That Arise in Combatting Gang Violence

In two of the jurisdictions studied, there were ongoing class action lawsuits challenging the policies of the corrections agencies with regard to gangs. The legal challenges have arisen in conjunction with the general approaches used. In California, gang members charged that they were treated unjustly by being segregated without due process upon being identified as having a gang affiliation, but without having committed a violation. In systems where gang membership identification is not the basis for segregation, and particularly in Illinois, the charge by non-gang members is that the agency is allowing gangs to operate unbridled, thereby subjecting non-gang inmates to predatory and assaultive behavior. In other systems, inmates challenge having their mail "flagged" (set aside and reviewed for gang information before delivery) and having other privileges restricted due to suspicion of gang communications. (See *Ruiz v. Estelle*, Texas and *Saffly v. Turner,* Missouri.)

Using Segregation to Combat Gangs Within Constitutional and Accepted Standards. In systems where identified gang members have been locked up in administrative segregation, the issue for the administrator is whether or not due process is followed and whether or not services and programs similar to those provided to inmates in the general population are provided to gang members who are on administrative segregation status.

A couple of options within constitutional requirements are available to the administrator who chooses segregation of gang members as a strategy. The first is to lock up an inmate identified as a gang member after heavy surveillance and after he/she commits an infraction. A hearing can then be held to determine whether or not the gang member's behavior warrants administrative segregation status. Such a practice should be written carefully, followed meticulously, and documented thoroughly. A regular review process can also be an efficient means of determining when the inmate is ready for return to the general population. The second option is to target only gang leaders and key gang players for heavy surveillance and segregation, following due process. Of the two practices, the first would seem to entail less liability since it involves less intensive selection and labelling.

Administrators must be cautioned that following either of the two options will require expensive investments in "super" maximum security housing and its accompanying hardware, as well as the development of a means to provide special services and programs in the lock up area, all of which are expensive and staff intensive. When special services and programs are introduced, the administrator will want to beware of the attractiveness of the lifestyle to some inmates who will do .

what is necessary to fit the criteria for living there. Both California and Washington have extensive experience in using these options in the face of class action litigation, and are valuable sources of information and advice concerning the expense involved as well as the disadvantages and advantages of practicing the segregation strategy.

In systems where gang members are treated no differently than others unless they commit a violation, the administration must protect non-gang inmates from predatory harm inflicted by gang members. Administrators of such systems are expected to miss nothing and to practice security to perfection. Any incident of harm may become cause for litigation. Several issues require consistent, intensive attention.

- The question of how good a job is being done to protect non-gang inmates from the detrimental effects of living in cell houses where gang members are attempting to operate should be raised regularly and plans reviewed and modified to enhance and improve procedures and circumstances that will assure security to non-gang inmates.

- The success of operating a heterogeneous population (gang mixed with non-gang) depends on vigorous policing and prompt, sure discipline. Follow-up procedures are essential on a continual and persistent basis. Care should be given to document thoroughly all policing, including contraband, drugs, searches, prosecutions, and disciplinary reports to offset claims that policing and prevention are not being practiced.

- Administrative Segregation is appropriate for repeat gang offenders who are posing a constant threat to others, especially gang leaders who can be caught. Be alert, however, of "throwaway soldiers" (gang "hangers-on" who run errands and commit criminal acts for gang members in return for their own protection) who are "set up" to take the consequences, including administrative segregation, while the real gang bosses continue to run free, directing more and more criminal activity.

Achieving a Totally Constitutional Set of Strategies. Is there an approach that neither deprives a prisoner from regular privileges without due process nor fails to protect a prisoner from harm by predatory prisoners? Is there a means of achieving a balance between the two general means of combatting gangs that will reduce legal liability?

Administrators are tending to combine the attractive aspects of both major strategies so that ganging inmates cannot run free and non-gang inmates will not be harmed by gang members. It is a difficult balance to achieve. Combining strategies from opposing philosophical positions point up

conflicts and inconsistencies at the policy stage of such a revision. For example, a policy that provides for vigorously policing the prison community to eliminate gang activity without segregating identified gang members seems inconsistent with a policy that states that an inmate who engages repeatedly in gang activity will be administratively segregated. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that criminal behavior is the important and consistent variable. Segregation based on identification as a gang member is an entirely different matter from segregating inmates whose behavior presents a threat to institutional security.

In the last analysis, administrators of gang-infested prisons cannot responsibly make decisions based on what the litigators are likely to do. If the administrator operates the prison according to accepted correctional and constitutional standards, doing what has to be done to control the gangs, what the litigators do should not be feared.

PART II

Combatting Violent Inmate Organizations at the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla

A Case Study

Some Historical Perspective

Built in 1886 as a territorial prison, Washington State Penitentiary (Walla Walla) evolved much like its counterparts throughout the United States. It opened at the end of the abusive contract prison labor system of the 19th century, and grew steadily as inmate numbers increased during the early 1900's. It was operated as a state-managed system geared toward custody and housing of inmates, with limited activity and industry. Correctional professionals as we know them today were virtually nonexistent, and what went on inside Walla Walla depended largely on the superintendent. The Penitentiary added buildings as it grew, but for decades remained the state's only correctional institution.

Like many other states, Washington State Penitentiary's Walla Walla location was remote from the seat of government, reinforcing its autonomy and decreasing its exposure to the public. From time to time there were outbreaks of violence when the inmate subculture exercised its solidarity against rigid and repressive practices. Over a period of years internal and external investigations were ordered to expose issues and bring about improvements; but broad changes in philosophy or management practices did not occur.

By 1940 there were groups of concerned citizens and a few experienced prison managers in the country who recognized the need for a standardized system of correctional management. In Washington State, this trend was evidenced by the Osborne Association's recommendations for professional classification and management, issued in 1942, and by the selection in 1941 of Richard McGee, a professional correctional administrator from New York City, as Director of Institutions. McGee supervised all superintendents of state institutions, including the Superintendent of Walla Walla. He had a positive effect on the system until he left Washington in 1944, and if his tenure had lasted longer, his impact might have endured.

The wave of violence that swept the country in the early 1950's did not leave Walla Walla unscathed. In February of 1953, a homemade pipe bomb was used to kill the prison's business manager. In September of that same year, inmates rioted, destroying a cell block and burning the license plate factory to the ground. By 1954, more than 1800 inmates were housed in Walla Walla. In the summer of the following year, a riot occurred in which officers were taken hostage and then released after 27 hours of negotiations. Officials promised some changes, the most significant of which was the replacement of Superintendent Lawrence Delmore.

Inmate Management Strategies
Before the Violent Inmate Groups Appeared

In 1957 Bobby Rhay, a Walla Walla native and prison employee since the end of World War II, was appointed Superintendent. He would remain in the prison's top post for twenty years. The Superintendent reported to the Director of Institutions who, from 1959 until 1966, was Garrett Heyns, a treatment-oriented albeit a traditional correctional administrator, who did not appear to press the Superintendent, and was sympathetic to staff problems. During Heyns' tenure, Superintendent Rhay functioned with relative autonomy. The methods of inmate management during this period are important to note because they were in effect just prior to the development of violent inmate groups.

There was no open conflict between Rhay and Heyns, but there were differences of opinion about how inmates should be treated. During this time Heyns and the supervisor of mental health institutions, Dr. William Conte, were developing a rehabilitation oriented philosophy of administration for the Department of Institutions. Nonetheless Rhay practiced a conservative, traditional corrections philosophy without interference from Heyns. For a number of years, this approach kept the prison on a even keel.

Rhay emphasized custody and security, not at all atypical of wardens of that period. A high value was placed on the warden's image as a strong and fearless personality who could mete out punishment as well as mercy. Inside the institution designated inmates called "con bosses" operated the lever boxes to lock and unlock cells, and exercised considerable control over other inmates. Housing assignments were handled by the inmates according to beds available and the willingness of existing occupants to rent space in their cells. The traditional convict code of doing one's own time, keeping convict matters to oneself, and showing respect to the "man" was in effect. The administration relied upon older, more influential convicts to keep the younger ones in line. Poor living conditions and increasing numbers of prisoners were accommodated. Potential racial confrontations were avoided by housing inmates of different races in different cell houses. Inmate problems were managed by taking them up with leaders in the population who then addressed the issues in the population their own way, quietly. Staff discipline of rule breakers was harsh. Inmate management hinged upon a strong superintendent, the convict code, and the inmate social structure. Inmate management practices at Walla Walla were similar to those of many other maximum security prisons in the country during the fifties and sixties. They did not, however, keep pace with the national and state trends of the late sixties that helped to create a new and more

complex inmate culture. The national events and movements of the late sixties and early seventies that affected prisons and especially inmate management included the following.

- The development of a drug culture produced an influx of inmates who were steeped in the "hippie" philosophy of passive resistance and preoccupation with getting illegal drugs.
- Questioning and resisting authority (civil disobedience) became prevalent among youths following the Vietnam years.
- Black nationalism and the civil rights movement produced tension among the races.
- Prisoners rights suits produced court intervention into prison administration, bringing into question the practices that had been accepted for years.
- Corrections moved toward treatment of criminal behavior via the medical model, using a variety of rehabilitation experiments.

These changes prompted many correctional administrators to examine the implications for prison management and plan accordingly. At Walla Walla, the Rhay administration was not fully prepared for the impact these forces would have when they were embraced by a new governor and some of his key appointees. A new treatment-oriented Director of Institutions, Dr. William Conte, a psychiatrist and former administrator of Mental Health, would shape the impact of these forces on Walla Walla. He and Heyns had developed a plan earlier for a new rehabilitation model at the Washington State Penitentiary. Conte's plan was based on two assumptions:

- Both mental health patients and prisoners can be managed effectively using similar methods; and
- A democratic government can be successful in a prison whose structure is autocratic and coercive by nature.

The plan was to create a healthy, non-prison-like atmosphere and to prevent violence by fostering in inmates a positive self concept. If inmates could exercise some control over their environment, it was thought that they would become productive and positive, and life in the prison would be peaceful. This idea was a popular penological paradigm for the correctional reformers of this period. Confronted with a fundamental shift in the basis for inmate management at Walla Walla, Rhay expressed concern and reservation. Conte sent him to see the concept in action in Danish prisons, hoping to convince him that the changes would be beneficial at Walla Walla. Rhay was impressed, but still uneasy. The prisons he saw in Europe were nothing like the ones he knew in Washington. When Rhay returned, Conte met with superintendents and other institutional staff to communicate his goals. The record shows that in a short time, Rhay began publicly to embrace the new approach.

Rhay did not, however, initiate changes immediately. In 1971, a serious racial incident occurred. The inmates formed a Race Relations Committee to resolve their differences. Encouraged by that demonstration of positive inmate behavior, he permitted the inmates to draft a constitution. Fourteen drafts were written before the administration agreed to the provisions. The resulting establishment of the Resident Government Council (RGC) produced a significant shift in the balance of power within the institution. An elected inmate body now had a voice in institutional decision-making.

The new self-government structure did not lend itself to Rhay's management style. In the past he had dealt with factions separately, with no group involved in another's transactions with him. He had been able to keep inmate groups off balance by granting and denying each group's requests according to his exclusive knowledge of all of the groups' agreements with him. This management style was insufficient to address the new approach which, to be successful, would require a sound implementation strategy and plan. There was no plan, little staff ownership of the concept, no phasing of change, and no monitoring of its impact. Instead, management under new circumstances would evolve with a direction and momentum of its own. It was in this context that disruptive inmate organizations developed at Walla Walla.

Specific practices in place by 1972 that facilitated the transformation of inmate organizations into prison gangs can be identified.

- Members of the Resident Government Council (RGC), ostensibly representatives from particular housing areas, were fact the leaders of ethnic and self-interest groups who had clustered in those housing areas. The RGC gave the organizations status, authority, and means for manipulating the administration and facilitating gang activities. They exploited it fully.

- Inmates were allowed to organize ethnic and special interest groups with few limitations. Any group that wanted to organize, whether to play chess or to repair motorcycles, could do so in the name of a constructive activity. Members of groups normally shared common ethnicity or lifestyle, and developed leadership within those contexts. Since housing was self-assigned, organizations/clubs tended to stake out their own housing areas. In addition, each organization/club had a "clubhouse", a physical space in the prison set aside for their exclusive use, and decorated in keeping with their interests. For the most part, "clubhouses" were off-limits to staff, so they were rarely entered or searched by staff. They became havens for contraband and illicit activities (drugs, prostitution, weapons manufacture, etc.).

- Inmate groups were allowed to go into business and set up corporations. Each organization had its own businesses, and they were, for the most part, criminal. One organization dealt in the distribution of drugs; one repaired and sold motorcycles; one enforced extortion payments and obedience from the rest of the organizations; and yet another handled contract killings. The balance in the prison economy was maintained by the organizations, and when one club exceeded its boundaries, the reaction frequently was violence. Similarly, when the administration intruded on a club's "turf", officers were often hurt.

- Organization leaders dictated who would live in which cells and frequently charged other inmates rent for the use of a cell. This "real estate business" was the inmates' self-styled method of classification. When a new inmate arrived, he was instructed to go into the cell blocks and look for a cell. According to his race and other characteristics important in the prison environment (and important to the organizations), he would be accepted into a block, onto a tier, and into a cell for a rental price paid to the inmate who owned the cell. From all accounts most inmates rented or bought a cell. Some paid with homosexual favors. These activities fit well into a prison gang's mode of operation.

- Most inmate organizations had their own bank accounts, into which funds derived both legitimately and illegitimately were placed. (Institution policy permitted them access to such accounts, which were generally not monitored.)

- The RGC had an influential voice in the discipline of fellow inmates. Discipline meted out by the staff was not taken seriously. For example, an inmate locked up on a given night might be released from isolation by the next day when an organization leader (RGC member) pressed the administration. Organization leaders preferred and demanded that they be allowed to discipline their own , and they did, frequently with violence. Vices and steel knuckles in the Bike Shop were often used to punish apprehended wrongdoers. In turn, inmate leaders attempted to hold the prison administrators hostage, saying that they could "keep the lid on" only if the administration made whatever concession they were demanding at the time.

- The RGC had direct access to the Superintendent, the media, and government officials. Inmate representatives from the organizations presented issues directly to government and department officials in Olympia (the state capitol) to gain their organizational ends.

- The Council had a voice in everything, including, during some periods, decisions about custody reductions and furloughs. They gave permission for specific inmates to be out of their cells and in their "clubhouses" late at night after lockup and count. They voted on the advisability of new administrative policy and regularly questioned existing policies, demanding changes in those they did not like.

- There was no well formulated and effective response to the RGC's initiatives. The RGC related selectively to the authority figures from whom they thought the most could be gained on the particular issue at hand. Consequently, it was not uncommon for supervisors to unwittingly overrule their subordinates. Miscommunications and bad feelings between staff resulted. Conflict became most apparent when the inmates appealed a Rhay decision to Conte, or merely passed over Rhay, going directly to Conte.

In summary, the RGC and the inmates in general had a large sphere of influence within the institution, access to outside influencers of public opinion, and freedom to expand legitimate and illegitimate activities. While the inmates' influence increased, Rhay's authority diminished, and staff morale suffered. Reclaiming control would be difficult.

Disruptive Inmate Organizations at Walla Walla

As the administration's control over the RGC weakened, the inmate organizations became stronger. Seven organizations garnered enough strength either individually or in combination with one another to exert significant influence on the operation and activities of Walla Walla. The two most powerful gangs were the Bikers and the Lifers. The basis for their power was drugs and money. They vied for power on the prison yard, and when one group would fall from favor with the administration because of their actions, the other would rise to "clean up." Power switched back and forth between these two groups throughout the gang period (1973-1979) at Walla Walla. The gangs that evolved during the 1970's are described briefly to give an overview of their nature and organization.

Lifers with Hope (Lifers) Of the more than four hundred lifers enrolled in the Lifers Club, only about 100 were active and only a handful of leaders used the clubhouse located on the second floor of a former dormitory. Eligibility for Lifers membership overlapped with other groups, especially

the Bikers, i.e. a Biker might be serving a life sentence and therefore be eligible for membership in either group. Lifers developed power during the early and middle 1970's that reached its peak when Kenny Agtuca, a powerful and violent inmate leader, was its president. *De facto* head of the Inmate Council, he carried more power than any inmate at Walla Walla. He and a few others in the Lifers Club created Lifers Park, a grassy, ornate area between Seven and Eight Wings where they held parties and conducted business, including drug and sex concessions. Other illegal activities were protection, extortion, loansharking, debt collection and real estate transactions, as well as instruction in locksmithing, weapons manufacturing and martial arts techniques. They fronted their business with legitimate sales of candy and ice cream to other inmates.

Washington State Penitentiary Motorcycle Association (Bikers) An amalgam of about 200 inmates who were members of a variety of street motorcycle gangs formed this organization. The center of their activities was a large clubhouse, the Bike Shop. The shop was equipped with tools, gasoline, cutting torches, grinding equipment, power saws, and drills that were used for working on motorcycles and for other less constructive purposes. The Bikers provided the muscle in the gang structure and frequently served as the enforcers for both gang leaders and the administration. In spite of the Bikers' clout with the inmates and the administration, they were not as shrewd as the Lifers. During the organization's heyday, they took over the Big Yard to test their bikes and show their colors every Friday afternoon . They also held banquets annually, when as many as 240 male and female "bikers" and 40 motorcycles were allowed into the Big Yard where 12-hour feasts were enjoyed. Motorcycles were driven around the perimeter of the yard and tents were pitched to provide privacy for inmate activities.

Black Prisoner Forum Unlimited (BPFU) An organization of about 350 black prisoners, the BPFU was a large group, but not as well organized or disciplined as the Bikers, nor as violent. Their clubhouse, stark in appearance, was located in what had been the prison library. The group was plagued with divisiveness, probably because the street-oriented Blacks and the Muslims had different values and styles. The BPFU had a strong voice on the Inmate Council, and were key operators in the Race Relations Committee (RRC).

United Chicanos There were approximately seventy Hispanics at Walla Walla during the peak of disruptive inmate organizations who were eligible for membership in the Chicano Club; thirty-five were active members. Their clubhouse, known as Chicano Cultural Studies Center, was decorated with murals of Mexican heroes. An inmate who had been a member of the Mexican Mafia in several prisons in California was the organization's most outspoken leader. The Chicano Club had friendly relationships with the Bikers, but for drug transactions, they aligned themselves with the

Lifers, for whom they made "hits" and from whom they gained more institutional power and greater access to heroin than their small numbers would have otherwise allowed.

Brotherhood of American Indians The Indian Club held up its native religion as its guiding purpose and, through litigation, was successful in securing the right to build and use a sweat lodge on institutional grounds. The clubhouse for their forty to fifty members was located on the third floor of the Admissions Wing. They painted its walls with likenesses of great Indian leaders and had medicine men admitted inside the walls to hold pow wows and teach them about the Great Spirit. They caused less trouble than many of the other groups. When alliances were needed, they joined with the Bikers and Lifers as enforcers.

Men Against Sexism (MAS) A small group of about a dozen gay prisoners formed this organization under the leadership of a member of the George Jackson Brigade that had bombed the offices of the Department of Corrections in Olympia. They established the club as a gay rights group to protect homosexuals from the "wolves" that tried to take advantage of them. They ran a tailor shop, ostensibly to mend and alter clothes, in their small second-story office in the Admissions Wing. Their most significant act of violence was their attempt to help the George Jackson Brigade engineer a mass escape by distracting the administration during an annual MAS banquet.

Felons United for Self-Endeavor (FUSE) In late 1977 and early 1978, this organization emerged in an attempt to consolidate all of the inmate organizations. Inmates from all groups could be members, i.e. one could belong to the Bikers and still belong to FUSE. The group established inmate businesses as a means for operating criminal rackets. They also set up community service projects that provided license for them to leave the prison for activities such as apple-picking, clam-digging, and shopping. Among their criminal activities were strong-arming, prostitution, and selling drug-laced snow-cones.

Inmate Management Strategies During the Inmate Organizations' Rise to Power

The inmate self-government approach to prison management attracted national attention and publicity as an experiment that apparently was working. In an attempt to determine its effectiveness and future course, Conte, prior to his resignation in mid-1971, called in a panel of

experts to evaluate self-government at Walla Walla. The panel, headed by Richard McGee, Director of Corrections in California, did not recommend that the project be discontinued, but did express concern that institutional good order and security be ensured, and warned against short-circuiting staff.[1]

By 1972, powerful organizations and groups of inmates that controlled the RGC had gained firm strongholds inside the prison. In the process, internal power struggles between them developed, which the organization leaders blamed on Rhay's "divide and conquer" tactics. The Blacks (Black Prisoners Forum United) issued a "Black Manifesto" and staged a three-day boycott, making demands that were eventually supported by the population. As a result, concessions were made not only to blacks but to all inmates, among which was the right to negotiate with state officials in Olympia.

In November of 1972, the RGC resigned in a power play. The administration bargained with the council, making concessions to avoid the resignations. Confounding the problems inside the institution were two tragic incidents that had occurred in the community when inmates who had been allowed outside the prison committed two murders.

At the state level in 1973, a new Division of Adult Corrections was established within the Department of Social and Health Services, and a new central office management team was created. Milton Burdman, from the California Department of Corrections, was recruited as Deputy Secretary of DSHS and California prison superintendent, L. N. Patterson, was hired temporarily to reorganize adult corrections. Nine months later, Harold Bradley, also of California, was brought in as Director of the Division of Corrections.

Burdman and Bradley supported some of the implemented reforms, but thought that the experiment at Walla Walla had gone too far. They wanted to pull in the reins without precipitating an explosion in the population. By now the inmate clubs were enjoying flourishing businesses, federally funded rehabilitative programs, and lavish banquets attended by friends and supporters from the community.

In June, 1974, the inmate leaders had become confident enough to make eleven demands of the administration and, after a struggle with the superintendent over the role of the RGC, they called a work stoppage. Rhay locked the prison down, ignored the RGC, and negotiated a settlement

[1]As part of a reorganization of state government in early 1971, the Department of Institutions, which Conte directed, was merged into the newly created Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). Conte became the new agency's Deputy Director, responsible for correctional and mental health institutions. He appointed the panel prior to his resignation, although its report was completed after his departure.

directly with club leaders. By December, 1974 , Rhay decided to meet with the RGC about their demands. While he was negotiating with the RGC, another group of inmates invaded two floors of the hospital, taking thirteen hostages, after which inmates in one of the large cell blocks rioted. The night of the riot Bradley confronted the RGC and told them that this was the end of self-government. Rhay officially ended the RGC four months later.

Apparently little thought had been given to the consequences of this change. Plans for getting the institution back under control had not been formulated. When the RGC was abolished, none of the inmate privileges were removed. The newly named Resident Council (stripped of the word "Government") was no more than an advisory council. The structure of RGC was gone, but the disruptive inmate organizations remained intact. "What was RGC's loss may, however, have been the club system's gain, particularly the Bikers'."[2] Without the semblance of legitimacy maintained by the RGC, there was no longer a link between the administration and the disruptive inmate organizations. The inmate clubs/organizations had all of the characteristics of prison gangs, that is, close-knit and disruptive groups of inmates organized around common affiliation for the purposes of mutual caretaking, solidarity, and profit-making criminal activity.[3] These organizations conducted criminal activity that oftentimes involved violence. The staff began to feel even more helpless. The turn of events appeared to them to be an abdication of the administration's authority to the inmate organization leaders. The clubs preyed on one another. With increasing inmate access to street drug traffic, drugs became the commodity of power and status, and the means of exchange for goods and services.

The administration had not foreseen the consequences of disbanding the RGC without addressing the inmate organizations. The superintendent continued to rely on his natural management style. The Bikers were enlisted as his allies to help keep peace. Negotiations and lockdowns were used to deal with confrontations such as stabbings and work stoppages. The inmate organizations were allowed to continue as long as they refrained from direct physical confrontation with staff. Matters were aggravated as inmate idleness increased in direct proportion to the rising numbers of prisoners at Walla Walla.

Bradley recognized the seriousness of the problem. Resolving the dilemma would not be easy. Crowding and idleness would make the job even more difficult. A general strategy that began to evolve at the Department level was to improve overall institutional conditions, systematize institutional procedures and carefully tighten security.

---

[2](Charles Stastny and Gabrielle Tyrnauer, *Who Rules the Joint?* D.C. Heath & Company, Lexington, 1982, p. 99.
[3](George M Camp and Camille G. Camp, *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature, and Impact on Prisons.* U.S. Government Printing Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 1.

Meanwhile, the level of violence intensified. In 1975, five inmates were murdered. These killings were related to (1) the flow of drugs in the prison and (2) the intense club rivalry over "racket turf" and ethnic prejudices. Rhay continued to negotiate with organization leaders and locked down the institution after outbreaks of violence and threats of strikes. Meanwhile, staff/inmate relationships and staff loyalty to the prison suffered. In 1976, there was a 70 percent turnover of staff. In January, 1977, Dixy Lee Ray became Governor. Three months later, a streak of violence and disruption rocked the prison. Three fingers of a officer's hand were blown off by a booby-trapped cigarette lighter. Staff responded by searching for similar contraband in segregation housing. During these shakedowns, officers were accused of beating and macing inmates. Inmates from the Resident Council were permitted into segregation to talk with the inmates who had allegedly been mistreated. On April 10, Easter Sunday, the inmates threatened to strike within 30 days, after which 300 inmates looted the inmate canteen and set fire to the chapel.

Rhay responded with a lockdown that lasted forty-six days. More shakedowns were conducted. The Resident Council then circumvented Rhay and went straight to the Governor with their allegations. The Governor appointed a five-member blue ribbon commission to investigate the charges. The chairman of that committee was the new Department of Social and Health Services Director, Harlan P. McNutt. The committee's recommendations resulted in the removal of a deputy superintendent whom the inmates had charged with oppressive behavior. Various other recommendations called for improvements, but did not result in far-reaching consequences for inmates or staff. When Rhay took the inmates off lockdown, he refused to talk with members of the Resident Council, meeting instead with the leaders of the inmate organizations. One month later, Bradley reassigned Rhay to the central office.

A Failed Attempt: Management Strategies Employed to Control Disruptive Inmate Organizations at Their Peak

Governor Ray attempted to regain control by appointing Douglas Vinzant as Superintendent. Formerly a Methodist minister, he had been superintendent of a prison in Massachusetts for a short while. For the last three years he had worked in Olympia, developing a plan to reduce prisons to manageable size (miniprison concept), and directed the Juvenile Bureau. Shortly after he was appointed, Governor Ray removed Bradley and Burdman, and named Vinzant to replace Bradley. Vinzant would hold the positions of both Director and Superintendent for almost a year. This

move was intended as a rejection of the liberal ideas of the recent past and a return to an emphasis on security.[4]

At legislative subcommittee hearings a month after he took office, employees expressed concern over the administration's direction. They felt that they had been given empty promises and little support in the past, and now had no input into new policies. Inmates appeared cautiously optimistic, but complained about a lack of programs. They pointed out that their clubs had provided most of the rehabilitation within the walls and that the club leaders had provided security for many of the inmates.

Vinzant perceived the problems at Walla Walla and attempted to solve them by addressing crowding, idleness, and inmate-staff relations in that order of priority. Resolving these issues was expected to reduce violence. Negotiating with inmate organization leaders was not to be tolerated. What actually occurred can be listed in summary.

1. Idleness was reduced by increasing jobs in industries and the numbers of inmates who could attend school, but the two-thirds of the population remained idle.
2. Expansion of inmate club businesses was encouraged to reduce idleness, but control over them was not established. Consequently, the power of the groups increased and, eventually, officers were not even allowed to enter the clubhouses.
3. Negotiations with inmates were conducted despite Vinzant's pronouncements to the contrary. Staff interpreted these acts as permissive.
4. Legislators did not support the miniprison concept.
5. Nicholas Genakos, a strict disciplinarian from Massachusetts, was hired as Assistant Superintendent and later promoted to Superintendent.

By September, 1977, Vinzant had reduced the number of inmates in segregation, improved dental and medical services, and reduced idleness slightly by assigning inmates to maintain the physical plant. Skin searches of visitors decreased, family visiting was permitted on the Big Yard, five minority staff were hired, and the parole board promised to see inmates in person for their hearings. An admissions unit for new inmates was established, metal detectors were located at control points, and an inside tower was erected to provide greater observation and security. In December, 1977, he proposed renovations of the existing facility, including conversion of the former women's prison to a temporary mental health unit, conversion of a minimum-security

[4]It is not clear as to why she chose Vinzant, other than his stand against negotiating with inmates and his determination to deal with the critical issues of overcrowding and idleness.

building to a medium-security compound, and construction of a 54-bed intensive management unit. His capital improvement requests were not adopted.

A great deal of his attention was focused on combatting idleness. He sought federal funds to expand prison industries and to subsidize inmate operated businesses. The Bikers repaired and customized motorcycles; prison artists accepted commissions for wood and stone carvings; and the newly created inmate organization FUSE (Felons United for Self-Endeavor) launched a public relations campaign to garner support for its proposal to allow inmates to work in the Yakima orchards. By the spring of 1978, the number of inmates in prison industries had doubled, and school enrollment had tripled. Still, significant numbers of inmates remained idle.

On the surface the prison seemed calm. For the first eleven months of Vinzant's administration there were no murders. Reasons for the calm are suggested by both staff and inmates. Publicly, Vinzant championed the managerial application of "subtle controls" and providing programs in which inmates had a personal interest. Staff who worked at Walla Walla during this period of time almost unanimously agree that he had some good ideas, that he planted the seeds for needed changes, but that his methods of dealing with staff and inmates were his eventual undoing. Violence was curbed by promising favored treatment for certain inmates. For example, if inmates refrained from resorting to disruptive and violent acts, they might be offered furloughs, work release assignments, or reductions in their minimum sentences. On the other hand, if they did not cooperate, he retaliated. One rather dramatic example of such a response occurred when the president of the Lifers Club and two of his "enforcers" crossed Vinzant. In retaliation, he called them to his office and fired a shotgun through a trash can and into the conference room walls to get their attention. As one interviewed inmate put it, "He did whatever he had to do to keep the lid on." In fact, much of his power seems to have derived from his ability to make deals with the facility's most powerful clubs.

In general, inmates enjoyed great license under Vinzant. Visiting was permitted all day, every day. Members of inmate organizations were permitted to go on trips outside the prison to develop business contacts. One inmate reported that during a trip to buy seafood for a prison banquet, the inmates went clam digging on an island in Puget Sound with their officer escort. Clubs continued to hold annual banquets in the prison. In June, 1978, the Bikers Club entertained 240 invited bikers who brought 40 motorcycles into the prison yard. He thought the Bikers were a stabilizing influence on other inmates, that the clubs reduced violence and taught inmates useful job skills. He also appointed twelve of the prison's toughest and most respected inmates to the Race Relations Committee. The committee's purpose was to intervene in arguments, persuading angry inmates to fight with fists rather than knives.

On May 23, 1978, Governor Ray toured the facility. Vinzant turned her over to some of the inmate leaders to conduct the tour. On that same day an inmate was fatally stabbed in an incident unrelated to the tour. On June 19, another inmate was stabbed to death in the auditorium restroom. On July 2, an escape attempt by five inmates (members of the George Jackson Brigade) was aborted, and a shakedown of their cells revealed pipe bombs, a pistol, knives, and ammunition. The escape attempt was timed to coincide with the annual banquet of the Men Against Sexism, to which these inmates also belonged.

In August, an inmate-made pipe bomb exploded in the hands of an officer who was trying to dismantle it, killing him and injuring two other officers. This incident ignited the prison's highly charged atmosphere. The lines were now clearly drawn between staff and inmates. Vinzant could not recover from the damage. Governor Ray's newly appointed Secretary of DSHS, Gerald Thompson, disclaimed Vinzant's administration as more of the same liberalism that had caused the earlier deterioration of the prison, and removed him and Genakos.

Management Strategies and Tactics Used to Retake the Prison from Violent Inmate Groups

A clear mandate came from Olympia. Tighten security and take back the prison. Thompson developed a two-year program for the retaking. He chose Jim Spalding, who had come up through the officer ranks at Walla Walla. Spalding's plan was first to shift the staff's combative posture with the inmates to a professional one by emphasizing staff training. After nearly ten years of demoralization, regaining staff confidence would be difficult. They were skeptical of any new superintendent, even one who had "paid his dues." Union opposition to any management posture other than one that emphasized tight inmate controls was strong. However, training and orientation to his professional approach proceeded while he developed his plan to methodically and deliberately bring the inmates under control. As implementation of the controls began, inmate privileges were withdrawn. The new procedures were not well received by the organizations, and they were incensed when he quietly transferred some of their top leaders to another institution. A series of violent acts ensued. In May, ten hostages were taken but quickly released. In June, turf disputes between Indian and Chicano organizations resulted in the murder of an Indian inmate by a Chicano. The Indians assaulted several Chicanos in retaliation. Young Correctional Officer William Cross was fatally stabbed while attempting to intervene between the two groups. This

event triggered open conflict between staff and inmates. The ensuing power struggle would overshadow most of Spalding's efforts for the next year. The chain of events that followed demonstrates the retaliatory cycle.

1. Spalding put the institution on lockdown (which would last four months) to prevent further violence.
2. He then decided to shake down the institution for weapons. Officers were bitter about the death of Officer Cross. During the shake down, a group of officers who called themselves the Cross Revenge Squad locked Eight Wing inmates in a storage closet while they made a shambles of their personal property.
3. Inmates retaliated with a riot in Eight Wing.
4. About the same time, a consultant team from the American Correctional Association (ACA) was called in to assess the troubled prison situation and to make recommendations.
5. Inmates from Eight Wing were put out on the big recreation yard to eat, sleep and exercise. The rest of the institution was locked down. This situation lasted for six weeks. During this time:

    - Forty-two officers walked out in protest of hazardous working conditions;
    - Inmates filed a conditions of confinement class action suit (*Hoptowit v. Ray).* Judge Jack Tanner would later declare Walla Walla unconstitutional and order the state to formulate a plan to achieve constitutionality.)
    - In August, ACA issued its report of findings and recommendations (major recommendations were to reclaim the institution, and to disband clubs and clubhouses).
    - Time during the recreation yard lockdown was used to remove weapons throughout the institution, to establish a philosophy and plan for operating the prison, to make physical changes in keeping with tightened security (e.g. paving over grassy areas containing weapons caches and dividing the institution into quadrants for more control of movement).[5]

The inmates who had been confined to the yard were returned to their repaired cell block. When the lockdown ended, the institution would be run with greater controls over inmate movement and improved security procedures. Initially the officers resisted taking the institution off lockdown, but eventually accepted the inevitability of a return to regular operations, albeit substantially

[5]In fact, they had planned many of the physical changes, including security ones, early in Spalding's administration with the help of a Seattle architect. The situation provided the opportunity to implement some of them.

modified. In the past, when inmates had come off lockdown, they had returned to the same procedures and privileges that were in effect prior to the lockdown. Under Spalding, the rules and the environment had been changed to help cement the staff's control of the prison.

When the court's order in *Hoptowit v. Ray* was announced, Spalding responded to the conclusions of unconstitutional conditions with a statement that it was the inmate organizations that were the crux of the problem, particularly those individual members who routinely resorted to violence. The Inmate Advisory Council's chairman spoke out against Spalding's statements. Shortly thereafter, the Council chairman tried to intervene in a fray between officers and inmates over an inmate's removal from the visiting room. Because of his interference, the inmate chairman was locked up. The inmate organization/gang leaders threatened a disturbance if the chairman was not released, but Spalding refused. A number of small fires were set and windows broken. One week later, the inmate leaders held a press conference to press their demands, and the following day a strike was called. Spalding immediately locked down the prison. Five days later he resumed normal institutional operations with no further incidents. This series of events represented the last significant challenge to the administration's authority and marked the end of the gang leaders' influence over prison turf.

Spalding's management methods had made progress toward gaining control of the institution, but not without taking a toll on him and many other staff members. While he was credited with regaining control of the institution, he also accepted responsibility for the price that was paid. Violence and disruption began to abate, but the gains needed to be solidified and the institution stabilized.

Management Strategies and Tactics Employed to Stabilize the Prison After Retaking It from the Violent Groups

John Spellman was inaugurated Governor in January, 1981. Improvements resulting from the court order were already being realized by spring. The plans to renovate and upgrade the physical plant were put into effect. The institution would be divided into four major sections, or quadrants, as they were named, in order to restrict and control inmate movement and separate gang leaders as required. Governor Spellman's agenda for Walla Walla included resolving the consequences of the *Hoptowit* case, developing a smooth operation, and professionalizing corrections in

Washington. After a reorganization of state government removed the Division of Corrections from the DSHS umbrella agency and made it an independent Department of Corrections reporting directly to the Governor, he hired an experienced corrections professional, Amos Reed, to head it. This organizational structure gave the corrections chief direct access to the governor and more support for accomplishing agency objectives.

Reed promoted Spalding to Deputy Director in Olympia where he could still play a major role, but where he would not be in the direct line of fire at the prison. Robert Kastama was originally chosen as superintendent of Walla Walla, but as it turned out the conditions required an administrator with more institutional experience than his background allowed and so Reed turned to Lawrence Kincheloe, Walla Walla' assistant superintendent, to bring the required operational experience and provide necessary institutional administrative skills.

Reed's strategy was to lay professional claim to management's unrelenting right to administer the institution. In doing so the Reed-Kincheloe team effected a number of changes:

1. A policy was adopted not merely to respond, but to prevent incidents of violence and injustice.
2. The *(Hoptowit)* decision was managed so that court ordered improvements would fit into the administration's plans to stabilize the institution and maintain control without outbreaks of violence.
3. Physical improvements were carried forward (that were already on their way via Spalding and the *Hoptowit* decision) upgrading housing, security, and operations.
4. Internal security procedures were adopted to provide maximum control over inmate movement.
5. An objective inmate classification process was implemented for assigning inmates to housing units, programs, security levels, and institutions.
6. Property control procedures were established to make cell shakedowns easier and to improve accountability.
7. Communications between staff and inmates were improved through the use of closed-circuit television to inform inmates with current and accurate information, reducing the likelihood of rumor and overreaction.
8. Visiting procedures were modified to reduce the ease with which drugs and weapons might be introduced and to improve supervision in the visiting room.
9. Procedures were developed for transferring extremely disruptive inmates to other jurisdictions.

10. The inmate organizations were halted and the few that were later authorized had no voice in the administration of the institution and were under direct staff control and supervision.
11. Staff training was increased and emphasized.

Kincheloe stressed staff involvement in the systematic implementation of policy and procedures. As new state institutions were constructed or acquired, the crowding at Walla Walla was relieved, making it easier to manage. Interstate transfers were made to reduce the influence of emerging inmate leaders, to ease institutional tension, and to prevent violence from erupting. Funds for massive physical improvements to Walla Walla were approved and undertaken. Not only were the resources becoming available to implement and solidify the gains, but support from the Department level reinforced Walla Walla officials' commitment to maintaining a safe and secure institution.

Walla Walla Today

Amos Reed retired in early 1987. After a nationwide search for a replacement, Chase Riveland was appointed Secretary of the Department that spring. Prior to his appointment, he had served as Director of Corrections in Colorado.

Larry Kincheloe continues to serve as Superintendent of Walla Walla. There are approximately 1,400 prisoners in all units - 675 inside the walls, 544 in the Medium Unit, 96 in the Minimum unit, and 86 in the 96-bed maximum security Intensive Management Unit. Walla Walla has not faced the recent prisoner population pressures that many other institutions have, and has closed one of its large cell blocks for renovation.[6]

The institution has continued to operate without disturbances and lockdowns. Although there was one inmate homicide in 1987, it was not gang-related.[7] In fact, nothing similar to the disruptive inmate organizations of the 1970's exists today. While there are several Walla Walla Bikers and

---

[6]Washington is the only state correctional system that is experiencing a decline in its inmate population. Officials attribute the decline to a change in sentencing statutes, which shortened time served for a substantial number of prisoners. Rleases have increased sharply, while commitments have remained fairly constant.

[7]This has been the only homicide at Walla since January, 1981.

prison gang members from other jurisdictions, no prison gang activity is reported. Based on recent drug trafficking arrests of California street gang members in the Seattle area, it is anticipated that the Department and soon Walla Walla will have these gang members to manage.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
CASE STUDY SYNOPSES

California Department of Corrections

Prisons visited and studied: San Quentin State Prison
Folsom State Prison

San Quentin opened in 1852, followed by Folsom in 1880 as California's second state prison. Both are large, walled, maximum security prisons containing large, multi-tiered cell blocks. Historically, inmates in need of the highest levels of security have been confined at both institutions. Since 1987, however, the character of the inmate population in both facilities has changed markedly. The opening of a new maximum security prison in Tehachapi and the more recent opening of "New" Folsom, adjacent to the older facility, has permitted the Department to place those inmates in need of closer supervision in the newer maximum security institutions and has reduced the classification levels at both Folsom and San Quentin.

During most of the period that the institutions were studied they each held approximately 3,000 inmates. Most of California's prison gang members and those associated with the gangs were housed at one of these two facilities, either in restricted confinement units or in general population units depending on time and circumstance. Other gang members were confined at Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI) or Soledad.

The development of prison gangs within California prisons has been traced by a number of researchers. Generally, that reconstruction points to the earliest development of the gangs at DVI in the mid-1950's when a small number of Chicano inmates representing a number of East Los Angeles street gangs banded together to form the Mexican Mafia (EME) gang. As the disruptive activities of the individual members became known to prison officials, they were transferred to the higher security facilities at Folsom, San Quentin, and Soledad.

The EME continued to recruit among southern California Chicanos and to take advantage of the unorganized northern California Chicanos, some of whom formed their own gang and assume the name, La Neustra Familia. From the early 1960's to the present these two gangs have warred with each other for control of rackets within the high security prisons. Whether for reasons of self-protection and preservation or because of a desire to share in the profits and prestige enjoyed by

gang membership, both black and white inmates formed their own formal organizations in the early 1970's, aligning themselves with the existing gangs - the Black Guerilla Family (BGF) with the NF and the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) with the EME.

When violence between gangs escalated over racial issues, "turf", sales of drugs, and other prison rackets, the Department moved to separate the gangs by locking up the leaders of the four gangs in segregation units at the four major institutions - San Quentin, Folsom, Soledad, and DVI. The number of inmate murders had climbed from eleven in 1970, to nineteen in 1971, and thirty-four in 1972. The number of officers killed by inmates rose from just two for the seventeen years prior to 1970 to eleven from 1970 through 1972.

While the level of violence subsided temporarily as a result of the lockup policy, recruitment of members increased and the gang leaders were able to continue to run their organizations from the segregation units. As gang members were eventually released to the community at the expiration of their sentences, some of them served as conduits for drug trafficking back into the prison and for carrying out murders in the community that were directed by gang leaders still in prison.

More recent Department efforts to control the influence of the gangs and the violence generated by them has included the use of lockup units for all inmates who staff have verified as members of one of the prison gangs. (This policy exempts members of the CRIPS and Bloods, because by agency definition they are not prison gangs.) As the number of inmates within the system has increased and the number of verified gang members has increased, new high security facilities have been constructed and many of these gang members have been transferred to them for management control purposes. Staffing has increased, particularly at San Quentin and Folsom, inmate movement has been limited, and the use of physical restraints while moving gang members has increased.

Since the early 1980's, inmates who have been members of violent Los Angeles street gangs have come into the system in large numbers. Many of them have served early periods of confinement as juveniles in Youth Authority institutions. California officials have not labelled these inmates as prison gang members because these gangs were spawned on the streets. In reality, they have all the characteristics of two large black prison gangs with strong community ties. They are the Bloods and the CRIPS.

The Department has attempted to control and reduce the violence generated by the gangs using a series of management practices that in the past had worked well for them and prison administrators in other states. However, because the nature of the problem was new and different from those

faced in earlier situations, the end result was not as successful as anticipated. Locking up the leaders, effecting out-of-state transfers, and placing identified members in security units did not reduce significantly the gangs' influence nor eliminate the violence generated by them both in the general population and lockup units. What did occur was that the dramatic and constant increase in the overall number of prisoners in the Department of Corrections had a significantly positive impact on the Department's ability to manage the gangs. Prisoner crowding initially contributed to a variety of management problems, including controlling the gangs, but eventually led to a massive prison construction program that enabled the creation of several new maximum security institutions that provide new gang management opportunities. These new institutions are large in total size, but contain small high security housing units for the control of disruptive and violent inmates, including gang members.

Current policy initiatives reflect the reality of prison gangs and, while there is little likelihood they will be eliminated, violence can be reduced. Identifying more and more inmates as gang members and placing them in lockup units has severely reduced the number of cells available for this purpose. The lack of segregation cell space and court challenges to this practice has motivated the Department to construct new high security facilities to study methods for reducing gang violence, and to develop procedures for encouraging gang members to renounce their former gang ties and "roll-over". Intensive debriefings are used in combination with polygraph testing to verify information and confirm the sincerity of the gang member's convictions.

The Department anticipates that the effect of current initiatives will be that gang-related violence can be reduced as these new institutions come on line. Further, the Department is placing additional emphasis on the creation and maintenance of incentives for positive institutional behavior. Much of that incentive was thought to have been lost when fixed length sentences replaced the indeterminate sentences that had motivated inmates to strive for good conduct records and thereby earn parole. Officials are now considering awarding good time to produce positive behavior. Incentives for refraining from negative acts include loss of good time, more vigorous criminal prosecution for crimes by prisoners, greater use of technologies to reduce introduction of drugs through visiting areas, strengthening controls over inmate funds, more drug testing of inmates, stricter restrictions for inmates confined in segregation units, and making gang membership an aggravating factor when sanctions are applied to inmates for rule violations. Other strategies include improving communications between staff and inmates, adding more line staff, and increasing staff training on prison gang issues.

Illinois Department of Corrections

Prisons visited and studied: Pontiac Correctional Center
Stateville Correctional Center

Prison gangs existed in Illinois as early as the 1920's, when small, predominantly white gangs operated in the overcrowded and idle prisons. Many of their crimes were similar to those practiced today, and included intimidation, extortion, homosexual prostitution, and other illegal businesses. Riots and killings were numerous.

Illinois' prison gangs of today are not the offspring of the gangs of the 20's and 30's. Current gangs are products of the primarily black and Hispanic street gangs that grew up in Chicago in the 1950's and 1960's. As the gangs became larger and more powerful, they produced more and more crime in the streets. The largest of the gangs was the Blackstone Rangers (who have evolved into the El Rukns). Under the guise of social improvement for Chicago street youth, they gained government funds that they used instead to support organized criminal activities. Other gangs, including the Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and Disciples vied for power and turf in the narcotics, prostitution, and extortion businesses. A crackdown on gangs by the Chicago Police in 1969 resulted in arrest and convictions that sent gang members and their powerful leaders in large numbers into the Illinois prisons for lengthy sentences. Gang crimes were not discontinued, but transported wholesale into the Illinois prisons.

The largest numbers of gang members were sent to Stateville, and Pontiac received many as well. During the early 1970's, the gangs gained a stronghold in the prisons and have been a power to contend with ever since. Extortion, intimidation, drugs, gambling, strong-arm robbery, and homosexual prostitution have been the means of making money for the the organizations. Violence has centered around enforcement of threats, discipline of members, and gang rivalry over turf. Gangs infiltrate strategic job assignments, bribe weak officers, and abuse visitation, programs and commissaries to gain privileges, assistance, money and drugs.

In the 1970's, prison officials gave recognition to gangs as organizations and tried to work with them to maintain control. Leaders were depended upon to keep order and in return they received special privileges and prestige. The result was increased gang power and control as well as gang rivalries and violence. This approach is cited by officials as the major mistake that has exacerbated gang problems. For a short period of time the Department tried segregating all active gang

members in one prison, but ran into more problems than ever, as well as court intervention that prohibited the practice. Transferring gangsters to other jurisdictions also proved problematic.

By the mid 1970's, the Department of Corrections took a new position, refusing to recognize the gangs or their leaders and declaring that no administrative decisions would be made as a result of negotiation with inmates identifying themselves as representatives of gangs. While the new policy was a step in the right direction, the accompanying strategies and tactics for combatting gang activity were gradual developments. Stricter standards were established for the prisons. Plans were made for implementation of new policies and for establishing accountability throughout the system.

Meanwhile, the gangs continued to do business. The last straw was a riotous party held by the gangs at Stateville in 1979. The Department moved in to retake Stateville, where gangs had gained undeniable control. During the Big Shakedown, leaders were transferred to federal custody, others were locked in segregation, co-opted officers were identified and fired, and prosecutions were started. The process of rebuilding the prison under new management was slow and difficult. Officials instituted unit management for greater accountability, built more secure facilities and renovated or demolished antiquated ones, employed vigorous intelligence, policing, and contraband procedures, and came into compliance with accepted national correctional management standards. What had been accomplished at Stateville was duplicated at Pontiac, along with remedies to many of Pontiac's own set of peculiar problems. There are still gang problems, and occasionally there are outbursts of violence that are almost always gang-related.[1]

The major gangs in Illinois prisons today are the Black Gangster Disciples, the Black Disciples, the Latin Disciples, the El Rukns, Mickey Cobras, Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and Northsiders. There are also splinter groups within some of these major organizations. Gangs are most prevalent in the Stateville, Pontiac, and Menard institutions.

The Department takes the position toward these gangs that, while they are aware that gangs exist in the Illinois prisons, no official recognition will ever be given to them and no negotiations will be held with them. Current strategies are in keeping with that position. Pre-service training of new officers includes instruction on prison gangs. Inmate misbehavior is policed and dealt with on a case-by-case basis, rather than as part of a group, with special focus on contraband control and drug control. Emphasis is placed on keeping a good rapport with all inmates, gaining as much information on gang activity as possible, and being alert to gang behavior and responding appropriately to it. Housing and job assignments are carefully controlled. Gang leaders from the

second layer of the organization are removed from the areas where they are operating and sent to other facilities. Felonies, and especially gang-related felonies, are being prosecuted.

An intelligence system is being developed to provide operators with more and better information on gang members and their operations. One person on the state level and a staff person designated in each institution coordinate the sharing of information. Monthly meetings are held in affected institutions. Computerization of gang information is in an early stage of development. There has been a great deal of success at giving and receiving information with the Chicago Police Department. Attempts are being made to share information about gang activities and gang members by establishing a dialogue with other jurisdictions as well.

Washington Department of Corrections

Prison visited and studied: State Penitentiary at Walla Walla

Washington State's experience with prison gangs occurred in its original penal institution, Washington State Penitentiary (WSP), built in 1887 at Walla Walla. Not unlike many old maximum security prisons, WSP has persevered through periods of crowding and violence, and has been called upon many times to respond to social and political changes.

A combination of factors was present when prison gangs developed in WSP in the early 1970's. The rise in the drug culture, civil disobedience as a result of the Vietnam War, black nationalism and the civil rights movement, increasing prisoner numbers, changes in political power, changes in the state corrections systems, and rehabilitative prison reforms converged on the Washington State corrections system and Washington State Penitentiary in particular. Among the reforms imposed on the prison was the establishment of a Resident Government Council composed of inmates elected by the prisoner population to participate in decisions as to how the prison would be run. Unprecedented latitude was given to the prisoner population. Work was no longer obligatory, increasing numbers of furloughs were allowed, inmate organizations were allowed to run businesses and set up bank accounts. Organizations occupied physical space that was off limits to staff. Violence began to rise as inmates handled their problems among themselves.

The organizations became powerful groups (prison gangs). They included the Black Prisoners Forum Unlimited, the United Chicanos, the Brotherhood of American Indians, the Lifers with

Hope, and the Washington State Prison Motorcycle Association (Bikers). There were a dozen other hobby or special interest groups as well. The clubs competed for dominance among themselves and with the elected Resident Government Council.

Problems that resulted from the gangs gaining power in the institution included criminal "real estate businesses" whereby inmates bought, sold, and rented cell spaces; large scale drug smuggling and concessions, with bags of narcotics being the unit of exchange; violence of all types; sexual abuses such as rape, sodomy, and prostitution; abuse or mishandling of inmate organization funds; and illegal acquisition, handling, and selling of "hot" bike parts and finished bikes.

Serious incidents at WSP during the prison gang years were unprecedented. In the fall of 1973, there were two inmate murders, a number of stabbings, an assault on a correctional officer, and the bombing of an officer's station. In 1974, three fatal inmate stabbings were reported, one each in June, July, and September. In October of 1974 an inmate injured three officers in the control room, and sixteen maximum security inmates escaped. In December of 1974 a dental assistant and a nurse were stabbed and thirteen hostages were taken. In June of 1975, two inmates were killed, touching off an incident in Olympia in which a group that called itself the George Jackson Brigade bombed a state correctional office. Fifty-five escapes took place in 1976. In April of 1977 the prison store was looted and the chapel was set afire. In 1978, an inmate was stabbed to death in the prison auditorium rest room, more inmates escaped, and a pipe bomb killed one officer and injured two others.

Staff was resistant and unsteady throughout the years of gang domination. Shortly after the reforms gave more power privileges to the inmates, some officers, counselors, and administrative staff resigned. More officers resigned as the situation worsened. The union spoke out against the activities of the groups and the administration's failure to control the groups on many occasions. Keeping a full complement of staff became impossible, and the turnover rate skyrocketed. Inexperienced staff were afraid of the inmates' power and the groups took advantage of their fears by intimidating staff. In 1977, the union called its first strike, and again threatened a walkout in 1979. Before control was restored, staff actually became violent with the groups.

WSP administration did in fact made many attempts to control the prison and the inmate organizations. After each incident there was a lockdown, and some lockdowns lasted in excess of a month. The lockdown mechanism, in and of itself, did little to control the gangs and gang violence. Meetings were held with presidents of the organizations to work out disagreements and to call truces. Threats were made to the inmates if peace was not established, but very few were carried through. Negotiations stalled further gang violence for short periods of time, but the

ground given up during negotiations eventually led to more gang control and more violence. In an effort to deal with idleness in the prison and thereby distract the groups from criminal activity, programs for constructive activity and rewards for good conduct were established, and many of them were abused or converted into conduits for drug smuggling and illegal business. Physical security was enhanced at sites in the prison where violence was likely to occur, but illegal activities and violence then shifted to other areas. Finally, there was a state of war between staff and inmates, and assaults occurred regularly for almost a year. A class action suit was brought by the inmates on conditions of confinement, and the federal court intervened with a new set of reforms.

It was not until the administration called a time out, a four-month lockdown during which a plan was devised for retaking the institution, that any significant improvement was realized at WSP. Weapons and other contraband were removed throughout the prison. Power and privileges were taken from the groups and staff was instructed to enforce all rules with full support. Drastic physical changes were made to control movement and remove access to contraband. Security and shakedown procedures were stepped up. A plan was developed to upgrade security throughout the prison, to renovate buildings and yards in need of repair and re-design, and to add to the physical plant to relieve crowding. When the inmates came off lockdown, there were a few more spurts of violence, and leaders were shipped out to other prisons in the system. The worst was over.

After the prison was reclaimed, a more comprehensive plan for the prison was developed that included changes in the classification system, changes in the use of the physical plant, more upgrading of security procedures and equipment, hiring and training of new staff, and a variety of improvements to move the institution toward correctional professionalism. Violence levels have been reduced drastically. Inmate organizations still exist, but under tight controls and constant scrutiny.

APPENDIX B
WALLA WALLA CASE STUDY REFERENCE INFORMATION

Appendix B.1. Methodology

Case Study Approach

To assess the effects of management strategies on reducing the level of violence at the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, a case study approach was used. Historical data was gathered from institutional and public records, observations of the institution and its operation,and interviews of individuals who were present when prior events occurred.
Preparations

Survey tools were developed for gathering information while on site. Structured formats were devised for interviews with individuals familiar with the institution in a number of roles and capacities. Lists of documents to be requested and persons to be interviewed were prepared. A schedule covering each day's anticipated activities was reviewed with officials in Washington. Approval of plans was given by NIJ.

On-site Activities

The institutional visit was conducted April 14 - 17, 1986, and interviews at the central office in Olympia were conducted on April 18. All areas inside the Penitentiary and the Intensive Management (IMU) Unit were visited. The Medium Security Unit, which is adjacent to the institution was visited, but not in its entirety. The Minimum Security Unit was not toured. Time was taken to talk with staff and inmates, to observe the design changes that had taken place over the last fifteen years and to watch the current institutional operation. Of particular interest were security methods and inmate programs. Records and documents were collected and reviewed daily to assist in preparing questions for exploration on the following day.

The first interview was with the Superintendent who shared what he knew about past and current efforts to curb violence at Walla Walla. He assisted in scheduling appointments with staff who were likely to have information about specific events and institutional practices over the last twenty years. Staff interviewed over the four-day period included line correctional officers, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and Assistant Superintendents. Unit supervisors and officers, industry supervisors, recreation supervisors, intelligence and investigation personnel,grievance coordinators, protective custody unit staff, and food service staff were interviewed and encouraged to suggest the names of others who might have information.

In addition to staff, seven inmates who had been at Walla Walla either continuously or intermittently over the last fifteen or more years.were selected by the Superintendent for interviews.

A third group of persons no longer at Walla Walla were identified as valuable sources and several interviewed. They were Bobby Rhay, Warden of Walla Walla from 1955 to 1977; Gene Struthers, state legislator from Walla Walla from 1977 to 1985; Tom McCoy, the author of *Concrete Mama*, an account of the prison from 1977-1978; and Steven Rubin, a professor from Whitman College in Walla Walla .

Finally, at the Central Office in Olympia, Washington, the Deputy Director of Institution and formerly the Superintendent at Walla from 1978 - 1981, James Spalding, was interviewed, as well as the current Secretary of the Department, Amos Reed, who had been in charge since 1981.

Analysis and Preparation of Interim Report

Data was put into chronological order, with major events, circumstances, strategies and results. An historical account of the Walla Walla gang violence was constructed. The major disruptive inmate organizations that played major roles in the violence were described. A case study document was organized and written. Strategies used at Walla and their results were analyzed and arranged for use in the management strategies document.

Appendix B.2. Walla Walla Superintendents (1957-1988)

1957 - 1977	Bobby Rhay
1977 - 1978	Douglas Vinzant
1978	Nicolas Genakos
1978 - 1981	James Spalding
1981 - 1982	Robert Kastama
1982 - present	Lawrence Kincheloe

Appendix B.3. Persons Responsible for State Corrections (1959-1988)

1959 - 1966	Garrett Heyns	Director, Department of Institutions
1966 - 1970	Richard Conte	Director, Department of Institutions
1970 - 1971	Richard Conte	Deputy Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services
1971 - 1973	Gerald Thomas	Assistant Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services
1973	L.N. Patterson	Reorganization Director, Division of Corrections
1974 - 1977	Harold Bradley	Director, Division of Corrections
1977 - 1978	Douglas Vinzant	Director, Division of Corrections
1978 - 1980	Robert Tropp	Director, Division of Corrections
1981 - 1987	Amos Reed	Secretary, Department of Corrections
1987 - present	Chase Riveland	Secretary, Department of Corrections

Appendix B.4. Agency Staff Interviewed

Central Office

Amos Reed, Secretary,

James Spalding, Deputy Director, Division of Institutions

Walla Walla

Larry Kincheloe, Superintendent

Wayne Helgeson, Associate Superintendent

Tana Wood, Associate Superintendent

Robin Moses, Unit Manager Supervisor

Mike Kropf, Unit Manager

Dick Morgan, Unit Manager

Larry Hines, Recreation Director

Sergeant Jim Hartford, Intelligence Unit

Sergeant Stevenson, Prison Industries

Sergeant Tom Paul

Appendix B.5. Walla Walla Inmates Interviewed

Seven inmates who had been at Walla Walla since the late 1960's were interviewed.

Appendix B.6. Interviews Conducted with Other Individuals

Robert Rhay, Walla Superintendent (1957-1977)

Gene Struthers, State Legislator from Walla Walla (1977-1984)

Tom McCoy, Writer, Seattle Post-Intelligencer and author of *Concrete Mama*

Steven Rubin, Professor, Whitman College, Walla Walla

BIBLIOGRAPHY

_____. *A Comprehensive Review of Management Practices at Folsom State Prison -- Report Summary.* Report by the Auditor General of California, P-529, Vol. 1, March, 1986.

_____. *A Comprehensive Review of Management Practices at Folsom State Prison.* Report by the Auditor General of California, P-529, Vol. 2, March, 1986.

_____. *A Report of Conditions at Washington State Penitentiary.*, American Correctional Association, College Park: July 8, 1979.

_____. *A Review of Management Practices at Folsom State Prison, The Deuel Vocational Institution, and the California Institution for Men.* Report by the Auditor General of California, P-529.3, April 1986.

_____. *A Review of the Department of Corrections' Program Management and Construction Management Contracts.* Report by the Auditor General of California, P-569, January, 1987.

_____. "Attica - The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica.", New York: Bantam Books 1972

Ball-Rokeach, S.J. "Values and Violence - A Test of the Subculture of Violence Thesis." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 38, No. 6, December 1973, pg 736-749.

Barak-Glantz, I.L. "The Anatomy of Another Prison Riot." *Prison Violence in America.* Ed. M. Braswell, S. Dillingham, R. Montgomery, Jr., Anderson Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1985, pg 47-71.

Bidna, H. "Effects of Increased Security on Prison Violence", *Journal of Criminal Justice*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring, 1975, pg. 33-45.

Braswell, Michael, Dillingham, Steven, and Reid, Jr., Montgomery. (ed.) Prison Violence in America. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1985

Burt, M.R. "Measuring Prison Results - Ways to Monitor and Evaluate Corrections Performance." U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June, 1981.

_____. *California - Task Force to Study Violence - Report and Recommendations*, National Institute of Justice, May, 1974.

Calvin, M. 1980 "New Mexico Prison Riot", *Social Problems*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 1982, pg. 449-463.

Camp, George M. and Camp, Camille G. *The Corrections Yearbook*, Criminal Justice Institute, South Salem, New York, 1981-1987.

Camp, George M. and Camp, Camille Graham. *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Carriere, C.C. "Dilemma of Individual Violence in Prisons." Document, *New England Journal on Prison Law*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer, 1980, pg. 195-230.

Cloward, Richard A. "Social Control in Prison," *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, Ed. Richard A. Cloward, Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grosser, Richard McCleary, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham M. Sykes and Sheldon Messinger, New York: Social Science Research Council 78-110, 1960.

_____. *Comparative Assessment of Strategies to Manage Prison Gang Populations and Gang Related Violence.* Research Report, Vol. 1-8, EMT Associates, December, 1985.

Conrad, J.P. "Who's in Charge? Control of Gang Violence in California Prisons.", California Department of Corrections, National Institute of Justice

Crist, R. W. "Reducing Violence Through Management." American Correctional Association - Proceedings August 16-20, 1981, Ed. Julie N. Tucker, 1982, pp. 151-154.

Davis, J.R. "Street Gangs." - *Youth, Biker, and Prison Groups*, Kendall Hunt Publications: Dubuqe, Iowa, 1982.

Davis, J.R. *Terrorists -Youth, Biker and Prison Violence.* Grossmont Press: San Diego, California, 1978

Denenberg, R.V. "Profile/Washington," *Corrections Magazine*, November/December/ 1974, pp. 31-52.

_____. *Dangerous Motorcycle Gangs.* United States Marshals Service, Enforcement Operations Division, June, 1982.

Dinitz, Simon.and Beto, George. "In Fear of Each Other", *Sociological Focus*, V. 16, N. 3, August, 1983, pp. 155-167.

Dorin, D.D. and Johnson, R. "Violence and Survival in Prison - The Case of George Jackson", *Violent Crime - Historical and Contemporary Issues, 1977*, by James A. Inciardi and Anne E. Pottierger. Sage Publications, Inc.: Beverly Hills, California, 1978.

_____. *Due Process: A Study of the Inmate Disciplinary System.* California Department of Corrections, Management Analysis and Evaluation Branch, October, 1986.

Ekland-Olson, Sheldon "Crowding, Social Control and Prison Violence: Evidence from the Post-Ruiz Years in Texas." Unpublished document, 1985.

Ekland-Olson, Sheldon "Deviance, Social Control and Social Networks," *Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control*, Ed. S. Spitzer and R. Simon, JAI Press 271-299, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1982.

Ekland-Olson, S., Barrick, S.D., and Cohen, L.E. "Prison Overcrowding and Disciplinary Problems: An Analysis of the Texas Prison System." *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.* Vol. 19, No. 2, 1983,.pp. 163-176.

Elli, Frank. *The Riot.* New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1966.

Ellis, D. "Crowding and Prison Violence - Integration of Research and Theory." *Criminal Justice and Behavior.* Vol. 11, No. 3, September, 1984, pg. 177-308, .

Enomoto, J.J. "Prison Planning Problem in California", Correctional Facilities Planning, 1979, by M. Robert Montilla and Nora Harlow, Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington Books, 1979.

Farrington, D.P. and C.P. Nuttal. "Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence and Recidivism." *Journal of Criminal Justice.* Vol. 8, No. 4, 1980, pp. 221-231.

_____. "Federal, District of Columbia, And States Future Prison And Correctional Institution Populations And Capacities." By the U.S. General Accounting Office. Report To The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senate. Washington, D.C., February, 1984.

Finn, P. "Judicial Responses to Prison Crowding." *Judicature.* Vol 67, No. 7, February, 1984.

Flynn, E.E. "From Conflict Theory to Conflict Resolution - Controlling Collective Violence in Prisons", *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May/June, 1980, pp. 745-776.

Fuller, D.A., Orsagh, T., Raber, D. *Violence and Victimization Within the North Carolina Prison* System, National Institute of Justice, 1976.

Gaes, G.G. and McGuire, W.J. "Prison Violence - The Contribution of Crowding Versus Other Determinants of Prison Assault Rates." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*. Vol. 22, No. 1, 1985, pg. 41-65.

_____. *Gang Violence in California's Penal Institutions - Public Hearing of the California Senate Subcommittee on Civil Disorder, March 28, 1974*, National Institute of Justice, 1974.

Gottfredson, S.D. and Taylor, R.B. "The Correctional Crisis: Prison Populations and Public Policy." U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June, 1983.

Graham, Gordon. *The One-Eyed Man is King*.

Harris, M.K. "Reducing Prison Crowding: An Overview of Options." National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Washington, D.C., July, 1981.

Hoptowit et al. v. Ray. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, October 10, 1979.

Hoptowit et al. v. Ray. Judgment Order, June 23, 1980.

_____. *Inmate Classification System Study*. Policy Report, California Department of Corrections, Management Analysis and Evaluation Branch, May, 1985.

_____. *Inmate Classification System Study: Final Report*, California Department of Corrections, January, 1986.

Irwin, J. *Prisons in Turmoil*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980.

Jacobs, James.B. "Street Gangs Behind Bars", *Social Problems*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1974, pp. 395-409.

Jacobs, James.B. Stateville: *The Penitentiary in Mass Society*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977.

Jacobs, James B. "The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts," *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, Ed. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Vol. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kahn, B. "Prison Gangs in the Community - A Briefing Document for the Board of Corrections", National Institute of Justice, 1978

Kaufman, G. "The National Prison Overcrowding Project: Policy Analysis and Politics, A New Approach." Center for Effective Public Policy, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Krajik, K. and Gettinger S. "Overcrowded Time - Why Prisons Are So Crowded and What Can Be Done." The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, New York, 1982.

Lombardo, L.X. "Stress, Change, and Collective Violence in Prison." *Pains of Imprisonment*. Ed. Robert Johnson and Hans Toch, 1982, pp. 77-93.

Lonergan, T.F. "Jail and Prison Gangs", Interagency Workshop - Annual, 14th, pp. 1979, 31-36.

Mahan, S. "An 'Orgy of Brutality' at Attica and the 'Killing Ground' at Santa Fe: A Comparison of Prison Riots." *Prison Violence in America*. Ed. M. Braswell, S. Dillingham, R. Montgomery, Jr., Anderson Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1985, pp. 78-87.

Marcus, A.M. "Violence in Prison." *Prison, Society and the Future a Workshop* - Proceedings. Part 2, 1977.

Mattick, H.W. *Prosaic Sources of Prison Violence*, World Correctional Service Center, Chicago.

McCain, G., Cox V. and Paulus P.B. "The Effect of Prison Crowding on Inmate Behavior." Final report to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Grant 78-NI-AX-0019, 1980.

McCoy, John. *Concrete Mama.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981.

Moore, J.W. *Homeboys - Gangs, Drugs, and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles,* Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1978

Nacci, P.L., H.E. Teitelbaum and J. Prather. "Violence in Federal Prisons: The Effect of Population Density on Misconduct." Research Office, U.S. Bureau of Prisons., 1977.

_____. "Organized Crime in California - Annual Report to the California Legislature, 1978 - Part 2.", National Institute of Justice, 1979.

Porter, B. "California Prison Gangs - The Price of Control", *Corrections Magazine,* Vol. 8, No. 6, pg 6019, December, 1982.

_____. *Preventing the Placement of Potentially Violent Juveniles and Adults in Minimum Security Correctional Facilities.* Report by the Auditor General of California, P-642, February, 1987.

_____. *Prison Gangs in the Community: A Briefing Document for the Board of Corrections.* County of Sonoma Board of Corrections, June 14, 1978.

Quay, H.C. *Managing Adult Inmates: Classification for Housing and Program Assignments.* American Correctional Association, College Park, Maryland, 1984.

Quinsey, Vernon L. *Reducing Inmate Violence.* Psychological Services Division, Offender Programs Branch, Correctional Service of Canada, 1982

Ramsey, Bruce and Gettinger, Stephen. "Washington State Seeks a Return to Normalcy." *Corrections Magazine,* (June, 1981), pp. 33-37.

_____. *State Task Force on Youth Gang Violence.* California Council on Criminal Justice, Final Report, January, 1986.

Stastny, Charles and Tyrnauer, Gabrielle. *Who Rules the Joint?* Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982

Sykes, Gresham. *The Society of Captives.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1958.

Tyrnauer, Gabrielle. "What Went Wrong at Walla Walla", *Corrections Magazine,* June, 1981, pp. 37-41.

_____. *Violence in California Prisons.* Report of the Task Force on Violence, Special Housing, and Gang Management, State of California Department of Corrections, November, 1986.