

**COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS FOR POLICE  
SERVICES IN THE YEAR 1997**

by

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Command College Class V  
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## COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS FOR POLICE

### SERVICES IN THE YEAR 1997

BY LT. ROGER A CLARK

#### ABSTRACT

Officials and concerned citizens alike are frequently frustrated in their attempts to determine how well police agencies serve the community because few agencies do anything to obtain the data necessary to make accurate assessments.

In this study, the unique global, economic and ethnic conditions that are shaping California's communities are examined and forecast. The State is irrevocably moving into a new age, swept along by global, national, and regional currents which are shaping our future. California already has large regions of "minority-majority" ethnic groups, and by 2010, California will have *no* ethnic majority. Expectations for police services will change accordingly.

A survey was sent to all 408 police agencies in California to determine what methods, if any, were employed to monitor community expectations and needs for police services. 326 agencies (80%) responded to the survey. The survey indicates that methods used vary according to agency *size* and *type*. Police departments are more actively involved in determining community expectations than are County Sheriffs'. Additionally, *medium* (25-99 personnel), and *large* (100-499 personnel), departments are more active in this area than *small* (1-25 personnel), and *major* (over 499 personnel), departments. A sampling of successful methods used by various California departments is also included in this study.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Police administrators are frequently frustrated in their attempts to determine how well police agencies serve the community because few agencies do anything to obtain the data necessary to make accurate assessments. Except in rare cases, a comprehensive view of the effectiveness and desirability of basic police services, or the need for a different mix of law enforcement services is not available. The appropriate data is either not collected at all, or improper data is used as a check on whether law enforcement operations are providing what the community really wants and needs.

Additionally, communities in the past were forced to accept the information coming from their police agencies as to what was needed to service the community. This is no longer true today. There is a wide range of independent information for the community to consider before giving their support to their local agencies. This trend combines with the special needs of specific ethnic groups who are becoming more politically active and expressive of their expectations for police services. Many experts feel that we are quickly approaching a state wide certification for police departments.

In this study, the unique global, economic and ethnic conditions that are shaping California's communities are examined and forecast. We are irrevocably moving into a new age, swept along by global, national, state, and regional currents which are shaping our future. California already has large regions of "minority-majority" ethnic groups, and by 2010, California will have no ethnic majority. Expectations for police services will change accordingly.

A survey was sent to all 408 police agencies in California to determine what methods, if any, were employed to monitor community expectations and needs for police services. 80% responded to the survey. The survey indicates that methods used vary according to agency size and type. Police agencies are more involved than are County Sheriffs'. Additionally, medium (25-99 personnel), and large (100-499 personnel), departments are more active in this area than small (1-25 personnel), and major (over 499 personnel), departments. A sampling of successful methods used by various departments is also included in this study.



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## PREFACE

I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the P.O.S.T. Center for Executive Development, whose vision and grit is creating a new and brighter future for the communities of California.

We have learned in the POST Command College that the future is not beyond our control. It is being "shaped (today) by the ways in which people conceive of its possibilities, potentials and implications" (Hank Koehn, January 10, 1986). In other words, our future coexists with the present and just as the present was shaped by the past, our future can be strategically shaped today to create a better world. All that is needed are the vision and the tools.

Since attending the Command College my attitudes about the future and my reactions to it have changed dramatically. I don't think that I will ever again read a newspaper, listen to the news nor even drive down a city street without thinking in terms of what it could mean to our future.

But more importantly, the Command College has given me the tools with which to *create* a better future.

This study uses some of those techniques in examining community expectations for police services over the next decade.

**SECTION ONE**  
**INTRODUCTION**



## INTRODUCTION

*"The power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior."--Sir Robert Peel*

Police administrators are often frustrated when they attempt to determine how well their agencies meet the needs and expectations of the community because comparatively few agencies in California do anything to obtain the data necessary to make accurate assessments. Except in rare cases, a comprehensive view of the effectiveness and desirability of basic police services is simply not available. The appropriate data is either not collected at all, or improper data is used as a check on whether law enforcement operations are providing what the community really needs and wants. Since most complaints of poor service, or the need for a different mix of law enforcement services, seldom come to the attention of city or county officials, a large percentage of police administrators are forced to operate with a blind eye to this aspect of police operations (Hatry, et al. 1977: 3).

Additionally, in a time when law enforcement administrators take great pride in increased operational efficiency, state of the art communications systems, and perfected analysis of the crime rates, the existing research in the field indicates that the public see things differently. In the surveys in which people were asked *why* they liked the police, they said nothing about technology or statistics. Instead they focused on *friendliness, helpfulness, and concern for others* (O'Boyle, 1987; Duke 1986).

Many police departments have expended large sums of money for new equipment in the never ending cycle to increase effectiveness and efficiency. Yet the dichotomy is that the very acquisition of improved technology can often become a major factor in further isolating the police from the community. Taking the time to listen to problems, going the extra mile to help those who could not care for themselves,

and showing a genuine concern for the community, are age old issues and have *nothing* to do with high-technology. Inspector Chris Braiden, Ministry of the Solicitor General (Canada), and noted critic of police-community isolation, expressed his concern on the issue of technology verses community expectations as follows:

"Some (of our) police cars are now equipped with computer terminals. But computers are irritable animals; they must be kept cool so the cars must have air-conditioning. For the air conditioning to work properly, the windows must be rolled up. Now in police jargon, 'in service' means to be in a car, close to the radio and computer. It is considered good to be 'in service'. 'Out of service' means one is away from the car, radio and computer perhaps casually chatting with a bunch of snotty-nosed kids bent on mischief. 'Out of service' is bad. So we have now come full circle; technology contact has become *primary* and people contact *secondary*" (Braiden, 1986: 14).

In order to understand our present condition and the prospects for the future, I felt that it would be well to take a brief look at our beginnings. In this regard I quote the nine *principles of policing* of Sir Robert Peel who, as Home Secretary, formed the Metropolitan London Police, in 1829 (Braiden, 1986: 5):

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and by severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing

of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing the observance of laws.

4. To recognize always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.

5. To seek and to preserve public favor, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of police and without regard to the justice or injustices of the substance of individual laws; by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing; by ready offering of sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.

6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order; and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen, in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8. To recognize always the need for strict adherence to police executive functions, and to refrain from seeming to usurp the powers of judiciary or avenging individuals or the state, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.

9. To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

It is interesting that six of the nine principals (70%) specifically stress the need for public co-operation and approval. Sir Robert wrote of "public approval", "public respect", "co-operation of the public", "public favor", "individual service and friendship to all members of the public", "community welfare and existence" and the "ready offering of sacrifice in protecting and preserving life." These are truly lofty, noble, and worthy ideals for all police administrators to remember--as true today as they were one hundred and sixty years ago. Yet many of our own modern-day mission statements frequently omit many of these objectives.

Several years ago, while assigned as a Watch Commander at one of our patrol stations, I had the occasion to take a telephone call from a victim of a car theft who lived in an adjoining city which had their own police agency. When I learned that the victim lived outside our normal jurisdiction, I advised him to call his local police department. "I have already done that," he replied. "They told me to come into the station and that they would take a report at the counter." I advised him that this was unfortunately true for many agencies because of a lack of resources to field enough cars to take various classifications of reports such as auto thefts, malicious mischief, petty thefts, minor automobile accidents, etc. I then assured him that the report would be processed once he arrived at his police department with the registration information and signed the theft report (CHP 180). "But you don't understand," he lamented, "I have no way to *get* to the police department--*my car has been stolen!*"

"Load-shedding of service calls" are current buzz words in many administrative circles. These are service calls where people might just need a bit of help or information and are placed lowest on the totem pole. Many metropolitan departments simply "wipe the slate" at the start of a new day with the result that the caller *never* gets contacted regarding his problem. These calls are "shed" so that officers are free for the "big catch". The end result is that we spend 40-60% of our patrol time doing nothing because the "big catches" do not come that often (Cable, 1987).

Some administrators who have studied the problem suggest that many agencies just might be "load-shedding" ourselves out of work. I have no doubt as to how the afore-mentioned auto theft victim feels each time he pays his city taxes. A study by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) estimated that in 1980, \$22 billion was spent on private security versus \$14 billion on public law enforcement. We know that the gap widens every year as neighborhoods and businesses turn to private security firms to meet their security needs (O'Boyle, 1987; Kirtley, 1987).

In the past, citizens were forced to accept their police department's point of view on what was best for the community. Primarily because the department itself was the sole source of information. It was a convenient package, with both the data and the interpretation coming from the same source. This is no longer true today. We have entered into a society that is awash with information on every aspect of government, with numerous experts willing to express their opinions. We must consider that there is now a wide range of independent information that the community will frequently consider before giving their support to any issue (Naisbitt, 1984: 1-33). Many feel that the time is coming when police departments will be required to undergo some kind of certification similar to hospitals and other regulated agencies (Kamm, 1987).

The recent national news coverage of the low clearance rates for homicide cases among the San Francisco and Santa Ana Police Departments illustrate this trend. Another powerful example of community scrutiny and rejection was the 1987 Los Angeles City special tax election for increased police deployment in the central parts of the city. Much to the surprise of elected officials, wide spread resentment developed at the prospect of being singled out to pay an additional special police tax. The issue was so seriously misjudged by the Los Angeles City Council that the staff of one Councilman was fired just prior to the election, and the entire City Council withdrew their support for the measure.

The ease that individuals and groups can obtain information, and network with one another on issues of mutual interest, is a very important fact of life in California that police managers would do well to remember. This trend combines with the special needs of specific ethnic groups who are becoming more politically active and expressive of their expectations for police services. The new "information age" has greatly facilitated access to data on almost every aspect of police operations to any interested group. All that is required is an inexpensive home computer and telephone modem to have direct access to a widely expanding number of data banks and interested individuals (Naisbitt, 1984: 1-33).

Another very important aspect of life in California is the sweeping social and economic changes that are occurring in our communities. With a unique global geographical, economic and ethnic position, California has become like a nation unto herself. California's economy is the ninth strongest in the world when compared to other nations of the globe. The state is also an integral part of the Pacific Rim family of nations, which includes China--the sleeping giant that will be fully awake in the 21st century. Our state wide population also has large regions of "minority-majority" ethnic groups, and California will shortly become a state with *no* ethnic majority.

We are irrevocably moving into a new age, swept along by global, national, state, and regional currents which are shaping our future. These social-economic conditions will have a direct and pervasive influence upon community expectations for police services. We will therefore first examine our position in the world and the social-economic trends that are shaping our communities before addressing methods of meeting the challenges of the future.

**SECTION TWO**  
**THE PRESENT STATE**

## THE WORLD

In just twelve short years, Mankind will enter the 21st Century. As we approach the threshold of the new millennia, we find that the future culture of California is being shaped as the result of Global social, technological, environmental, economic and political change. As we hurl through the universe, we truly have become a "Spaceship Earth". Nations and peoples have become inseparably linked, and can no longer remain islands unto themselves. This has never been more true for California than it is today. Along with the rest of the world, California will continue to evolve as the product of world-wide trends and the interplay of these forces upon our society.

History has taught us that there are "transnational" trends that unfold despite the individual actions of the governments and peoples most affected. In the past these broad trends have contributed to the rise and fall of civilizations. Now that nations have become more aware of their economic, environmental, and technological dependencies, there is a greater willingness to become involved with each other's problems. However, these trends will continue to shape world-wide events in the decade ahead. The entire globe will be affected as nations of the Earth respond to them (Stange, 1986). Let's look at some facts about our world, our nation, and our state:

### World Population

Over the next ten years the population of the World will rise at an annual growth rate of 1.7%, with an overall increase in the total population from slightly over 5 billion to approximately 6.2 billion people. Developing countries will add 828 million people--more than



three times the current population of the United States (Sanchez, 1987).

Three out of every four persons in the world live in one of the less developed nations of the world. The composite growth rate in these nations is expected to be four times higher (2.0%) than among developed nations. However, there are many large segments growing at a much faster rate. One of them, Mexico, shares a common border with the United States. The six nations (accounting for 10% of the world's total population) with the highest growth rates are:

#### **WORLD'S HIGHEST GROWTH RATES**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Growth Rate</b>	<b>Population Millions (1985)</b>
Nigeria	3.4%	95.1
Pakistan	3.1%	96.2
Venezuela	3.0%	17.4
Egypt	2.8%	46.8
Bangladesh	2.8	102.3
Mexico	2.6%	79.1

Figure 1 (Stange, 1986)

In contrast with the 2.0% growth rate of the less developed nations, the composite growth rate among the developed nations (the remaining 25% of the world's population) will only average .5%, with many of our European allies experiencing an actual reduction in their respective populations.

The challenges and demands created by such a huge increase in global population in only one decade can not be fully understood in today's world. Yet we know that this population increase will significantly influence the world's economy, emigration patterns, and the global politics between nations.

### World Resources and Food Supplies

The increasing demands upon world-wide resources and food supplies by such large portions of the population in the less developed nations will directly influence life in the industrialized nations of the world. For example, many parts of the less developed world must depend upon imported food. In many of these countries improvements in agriculture barely keep pace with increases in their populations. Additionally, in many nations that do export some food, nutrition is not adequate even when crop conditions are good. The specter of world-wide hunger continues to influence events in much of the world (Stange, 1986).

The prospects for world hunger over the next decade would be much worse if conditions in China, which holds one-fifth of the world's people, were such that she could not provide sufficient food supplies and nutrition to her population.

We know historically that the underfed regions of the world are the ones that are ripe for revolution, war, and massive emigration. The political and economic instability of these developing countries will cause millions to look beyond their own borders in search of a place to pursue their hopes and will influence the position and role of the United States in the world. America will continue to remain a primary destination for years to come. Additionally, similar population pressures exist in Mexico, the sixth fastest growing nation in the world, and are a special concern to the United States and California (Casanova, 1980).

## World Ecology

The depletion of raw materials, inadequate water supplies, and dangerous urban and industrial wastes are among civilization's oldest problems and they are growing worse. We are living in a time when waste from nations have a direct effect upon the entire globe. Scientists are becoming more alarmed at the prospect of a "green house effect" caused by the increased burning of fossil fuels throughout the world. Such an effect would lead to higher global temperatures which would significantly change weather patterns, and possibly cause the flooding of many cities in the world through a partial melting of the ice caps. Acid rain has already become a bitter issue within nations as well as between them (Stange, 1986). The European community of nations has experienced the devastating effects of an unconfined nuclear reactor accident in the U.S.S.R. and India has suffered losses from a chemical plant disaster.

While wealthy nations are starting to impose internal environmental restrictions, most less developed countries, in their rush to industrialize their economies, do little to preserve the environment. Yet all nations of the globe are affected by a disturbing decline in the world-wide quality of water and air, as well as changes in weather patterns. Most experts agree, however, that control of the global environment would require a level of cooperation between nations that is not likely to occur within the next decade (Currie, 1987).

## The World-Wide Spread of Technology

Throughout history there has been a steady transfer of technology from the advanced to the less advanced countries. As this occurs, advantages based on superior skills are narrowed and lost to other nations. Additionally, the advantages based on producing the best, the most, or the cheapest are not permanent with any country. Just as

Europe lost its lead in steel and textiles to the United States during the last century, the United States is now losing its lead in electronics to Japan. Similarly, Japan has lost its one time lead in textiles and shipbuilding. As the spread of technology continues, the United States may possibly lose more of its share of the world market for manufactured and high technology goods (Stange, 1986).

Very recently China, with her vast population, has opened her doors to new technology and the world economy. Some of China's growth in world markets for manufactured goods will come at the expense of other emerging countries who presently hold a share of the market. Many countries have difficulty adjusting to world markets. Additionally, the expected substantial elevation of technology within China's consumer and industrial sectors will add greatly to the worldwide demand for natural resources.

The continued diffusion of agricultural and medical technologies into the Third World can improve human conditions in those nations. Additionally, the spread of manufacturing technologies combined with international investments and low cost labor can raise the standard of living, expand the technical, managerial, and entrepreneurial classes and thus provide a basis for stable societies.

However, new technology can sometimes come at a high price, both within individual nations and to the world. For example, although the actual production of such weapons is not known, we do know that the capability to produce nuclear weapons has been developed by several third world nations. Also, the migration of displaced farmers, into the cities in a vain search for jobs (a major problem in Mexico) is a direct result of the introduction of new agricultural technologies in developing nations (Casanova, 1980).

## The World Economy

Marshall McLuhan said: "There are no passengers on spaceship Earth. We are all crew." This has never been more true than in the development of the world's economy. The economic interdependence of nations and the influence that the economic health of one nation has on others is a fact of life. Author John Naisbitt, in his book, Megatrends, has identified the shift from a national to a world economy as one of the ten major new directions transforming America.

Economic experts predict that while there will be no major economic or political alignments in the next decade, there will be general international cooperation in honoring debts and limiting protectionism (a more detailed overview of the existing world economy and projections for the future is covered in appendix 1). The overall view is optimistic for the next decade (Stange, 1986).

In this regard, California is in a unique geographical and economic position. The American economic axis has already moved from the Atlantic Rim to the Pacific Rim as United States trade continues to expand with nations within the Pacific Basin. The vast majority of trade with this region of the world will pass through California ports. Additionally, the early development of high technology combines with California's strong industrial base, and continues to make her a primary trading partner to the Pacific Rim nations.

## THE UNITED STATES

*"No one can predict the future with anything like scientific precision; we do not pretend to have a crystal ball. But we can observe a number of important trends that will have a profound effect on our chances for security or insecurity, violence or social peace, social alienation or cooperation and productivity. Among them are trends in economic opportunity and equality; in the nature and distribution of work; in the pressures on American families; and the composition of our population." --Elliot Currie.*

America has already achieved the very dubious distinction as the leader in criminal violence among the world's industrial societies. History has taught us that the deep and pervasive problems at the roots of these trends in our society cannot be resolved in a single decade (NIJ, 1987). There are no quick fixes in changing the attitudes, values and beliefs in a population of 242 million people. The solutions will require national policies that will involve future American generations. Police Administrators must realize that our unenviable record will continue--and perhaps worsen--over the next decade, and reflect accordingly upon the quality of American life.

### United States Population (1980 Census)




Figure 2 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986)

226 million people were counted in the 1980 United States Census. The population on January 1, 1987 was estimated at 242.1 million--a 6.9% increase or 15.5 million people. Experts estimate that the U.S. population will grow to 252 million by 1990 and 275 million by 2000. At the current fertility rate, the population of the United States will stabilize at a figure close to 300 million approximately in the year 2030.

U.S. Population Growth and Projections, 1970-2000




Figure 3 (Sanchez, 1987)

#### Growth Due to Birthrate:

Growth of the nation is mostly attributed to the natural increases of the population which accounts for about 85% of the growth. The remainder is accounted for by immigration. Nationally the picture reveals a much larger birthrate for minorities than for whites. The 1980 fertility rate (nationally) was 1.7 for Whites, 2.4 for Blacks, 2.8 for Hispanics, and 2.7 for Asians. A declining birthrate among whites especially in urban areas contributes heavily to the changing ethnic compositions of major metropolitan areas.

However, there is much more to the story regarding our population than mere continued growth of existing ethnic groups. As will be seen in the following sections, there are demographic trends that have their roots in world-wide events that will greatly change America by the year 2000.

#### Growth Due to Immigration:

Immigration also plays an important role (15%) in our overall population growth. For the past 20 years, Asia, and Latin Countries have been the source of most immigrants to the United States. In the 1970's, 4.5 million foreign-born immigrants settled in the United States, one of the largest foreign-born increases in U.S. History (Stange, 1986).

The demand from Europe to enter the United States has lessened. Northern and Western Europe's immigration is now at a declining and slower pace compared to what it was just two decades ago. This is not so for many of the developing Third World peoples, particularly those from Latin America and Asia, who are seeking entry into the United States in increasingly large numbers.

Latin American and Asian immigrants accounted for 78% of the 1980 foreign-born population who immigrated to the United States. The pace continues at a much higher rate than it did a decade ago and is quickened by the attraction of certain U.S. Cities with well established ethnic communities established some years ago by their fellow countryman. These metropolitan areas have become "settlement centers" for immigrants who naturally settle in these cities and dramatically alter the existing ethnic balance in a short period of time.



### Demographic Trends

In addition to the overall trends in our population growth, the increases of immigrants, and declining birth rates among white populations, other glaring demographic realities present themselves to our communities.

#### Growth of the U.S. Minority Population:

Perhaps the most dramatic change in the population of the United States--fueled by both natural births as well as immigration--is our continuing growth in racial and ethnic diversity. Today, of the nation's 242 million people, 52 million (21%) are minorities. By 1990, 25% of our population will be minority. This will rise to 30 % by the year 2000. In California, the public elementary school system is already comprised of a "minority-majority" and will soon be through the entire K-12 system. By the end of the century, 53 major U.S. cities are predicted to have "minority-majority" populations. Five major cities have already crossed the line. They are New York, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland.

## GROWING MINORITY POPULATIONS

### CENSUS BUREAU FIGURES FOR SELECTED CITIES

CITY	YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION (MILLIONS)	MINORITY POPULATION (MILLIONS)	% OF TOTAL POPULATION
NEW YORK	1970	7.9	2.8	36%
	1980	7.1	3.4	48%
	1985	7.4	4.0	54%
BALTIMORE	1970	0.9	0.4	48%
	1980	0.8	0.4	57%
	1985	0.7	0.4	61%
CHICAGO	1970	3.4	1.4	41%
	1980	3.0	1.7	57%
	1985	3.1	1.9	61%
DETROIT	1970	1.5	0.7	46%
	1980	1.2	0.8	67%
	1985	1.1	0.8	72%
CLEVELAND	1970	0.8	0.3	40%
	1980	0.6	0.3	48%
	1985	0.5	0.3	59%

Figure 4 (Currie, 1987)

### Aging Population:

The median age of the U.S. population is increasing. In 1970, the median age was **27.9** years. By 1984, the median age rose to **31.3** years. For the year 2000, the projection is a median age of **36** years.

**Median Age of the United States Population  
(1970-1984)**




Figure 5 (Sanchez, 1987)

Life expectancy rose from 67.1 years for males and 74.7 years for females in 1970 to 71.0 years for males and 78.3 years for females in 1983. The number of persons 85 and older in the United States has tripled during the past 25 years. Additionally, the number of people 65 years and older reached 28 million in 1984 and will increase by almost 8 million to 35.9 million in 2000.

**U.S. POPULATION BY AGE, 1910-2050**  
(Millions)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>17 &amp; UNDER</u>	<u>18-64</u>	<u>65 &amp; OVER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1910	35.1	53.5	4.0	92.6
1980	63.7	138.3	25.7	227.7
1990	66.1	155.2	31.5	252.8
2000	68.4	168.4	35.9	272.6
2030	65.9	174.3	64.6	304.8
2050	64.9	177.2	67.4	309.5

Figure 6 (Stange, 1986)

Current demographic trends suggest that as the elderly population continues to grow, the burden of supporting their social security and pensions will likely rest on the "at risk" youth of today. How well this arrangement will work out in view of the changing nature of work in America is yet to be seen.

**Ratio of workers (age 18-65) to retired (age 66 and older):**

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
1980	19 retired for each 100 workers.
2000	21 retired for each 100 workers
2030	37 retired for each 100 workers

Figure 7 (Stange, 1986)

**Shifts in the Job Market:**

The nation's employment and occupational structure is undergoing a major shift--we are moving more to a service economy and away from a manufacturing economy. In fact, it is estimated that well over a third of the jobs by the year 2000 will be different from what we see in the

job market today. Given the rapidity of technological innovation, these jobs will be newly invented! Frightening to many, because it means less predictability of occupational destinations for our youth. It also means that segments of the labor force will have to be well-equipped and prepared to change jobs with some frequency.

Actual and Projected Employment by Industry Group,  
for the U.S., 1959, 1984, 1995




Figure 8 (Sanchez, 1987)

Our last massive change in the world of work was the transformation of agriculture from an employer of millions of Americans (especially poor Americans) to one that today employs only 3% of the labor force. That transformation threw millions of rural Americans into our urban-industrial economy (it is going on today in Mexico), and it took decades to absorb them (Casanova, 1980).

There is much debate over just how much of "smokestack" America has been lost. Some argue that America is going through a rapid "deindustrialization". Others believe that only a few traditional industries have been declining, and that overall the share of the manufacturing in America will remain stable for decades. But few deny that the prospects for employment in these industries have dimmed--whether or not the industries themselves survive or even prosper. The best estimate is that manufacturing will remain strong, but the percent of workers involved in manufacturing will decline from 18% today to only 10% in the next 25 years (Sanchez, 1987).

Behind this shift lies a fundamental change in America's economic position in the wider world. The United States has been facing increasing international competition in the past ten years--a trend that can only accelerate in the remaining years of the 20th century. Especially in view of the growing economic power of some of the newly industrializing countries with lower-paid workers (Naisbitt, 1984: 53-79).

Sharper international competition will also lead to continued changes in the labor market at home. More use of automation in place of human labor, transferring of jobs to low-wage countries overseas, more attempts to cut wages in jobs that remain, more training and adaptability required for the American worker (the multi-career worker, more education), etc. The projections for the American job market over the next decade are as follows:

**JOB SECTOR:****PROJECTED GROWTH  
1986-1997 (%)**

<u>Agriculture</u>	0%
<u>Industry(overall)</u>	18%
Mining	0%
Construction	4%
Manufacturing	4%
High-tec	6%
Transportation, Communications, & Public Utilities.	5%
<u>Service (Overall)</u>	82%
Wholesale & Retail Trades.	24%
Eating & Drinking Establishments	7%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate	7%
Services	44%
Business Services	17%
Health Services	11%
Government	7%

Figure 9 (Sanchez, 1987)

Some observers point to the economy's recent record as evidence that the outlook for jobs is bright. Especially in the emerging "service economy". Three stubborn problems cloud this hope:

1. A greater percentage of jobs in the new "service economy" are poor paying compared to jobs in the industrial economy. Between 1963-1973, 20% of the jobs paid poverty-level wages. This contrasts with 50% for jobs offered between 1979-1985, and creates serious problems for workers attempting to support families, and for young people entering the job market. The trend is best illustrated by listing the top ten job opportunities through the next decade:

# **TOP TEN OCUPATIONS, ANNUAL GROWTH 1987--2000**

OCCUPATION:	PROJECTED GROWTH (%)
1. Cashier	3.6%
2. Registered nurses	2.8%
3. Janitors & cleaners	2.8%
4. Truck drivers	2.7%
5. Food service	2.7%
6. Wholesale trade sales	2.3%
7. Nursing aids, & orderlies	2.2%
8. Retail sales	2.2%
9. Accountants & auditors	1.9%
10. Elementary School teachers.	1.9%

Figure 10 (Sanchez, 1987)

2. The high-level jobs in the new economy will require more skills and education than the urban poor possess and will likely contribute to the growing mismatch between jobs and the people in the cities. For example, between 1970 and 1984, New York City *gained* almost a quarter of a million jobs requiring come college, but *lost* almost 500,000 jobs that required less than a high school diploma. The result is what some have called the "dual city"--a city increasingly split between those with skills and education that qualify them for good jobs and those who do not.

## **JOB PROSPECTS FOR HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS THREE MAJOR U.S. CITIES 1970-1984**

CITY:	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL REQUIRED (LOSS):	SOME COLLEGE REQUIRED (GAIN):
NEW YORK	-492,000	+239,000
PHILADELPHIA	-172,000	+39,000
BALTIMORE	-73,000	+15,000

Figure 11 (Currie, 1987)



3. Some economists have also looked to the growth of "high-tec" industries to provide more job opportunities in the future. However, high-tec industries will represent only a small fraction of current jobs in America over the next decade (see figure 9). Despite faster growth in this industry than in other sectors, High-tec will only provide 10-16% of the new jobs created over the next decade (Bulkeley, 1986).

#### Women in the work force:

Women continue to enter the U. S. labor force in increasing numbers. This trend is expected to continue through the next decade. The following chart illustrates that an increasing percent of women will become workers through the year 2000:

% IN AGE CATEGORY THAT PARTICIPATE IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE				
MEN	AGE: 16-24	AGE: 25-44	AGE: 45-64	AGE: 65+
1950	79.6%	97.1%	92.0%	45.8%
1980	74.4%	95.3%	82.0%	19.0%
2000	70.1%	94.0%	82.0%	18.0%
<b>WOMEN</b>				
1950	44.0%	36.4%	33.2%	9.7%
1980	61.8%	65.5%	50.7%	8.1%
2000	67.0%	77.5%	62.5%	10.2%

Figure 12 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986)

One of the continuing demographic trends impacting our future is the increasing numbers of mothers with young children who are leaving home and joining the work force:

### Mothers of Children Under Six Years In the Labor Force




Figure 13 (Sanchez, 1987)

The Census Bureau reports that in 1986, 50% of all mothers in the United States with a child under the age of six years was part of the U.S. Labor force.

It is estimated that of the 3.6 million children who began their formal schooling in 1986, 25% to 33% are "Latchkey" children with no one to greet them when they come home from school.

Additionally, the statistics do not change by much among children in married-couple households compared to single parent households. Among children of working mothers in married-couple households with children 5 to 13 years of age, 3.5% had no adult supervision for their children before school, and 13% had no adult supervision for their children after school. Of single-parent households with working mothers, 5.9% had no adult supervision for their children before school, and 14.9% had no adult supervision for their children after school (Sanchez, 1987).

## Growing Economic Inequality:

By every measure we have, the United States in the year 2000 will be a more unequal society than it is today. This growing inequality will probably bring many negative consequences for the quality of American life; from increased risks of disease and infant mortality and escalating homelessness to increased threats to family stability. And it will certainly increase the risks of crime and violence in our communities.

Increased poverty breeds bitterness and resentment in individuals and families, which frequently leads to poor parenting, child abuse, and domestic violence. The increased incidence of alcoholism, and drug abuse in poverty areas also put children and youth at higher risk of delinquency and crime. Additionally, poverty sharply limits access to a quality education, or training which perpetuates new generations of impoverished and ill-prepared families.

The last several years have brought a wider spread of inequality than at any time since the end of WW II. The most dramatic expression of this trend is the rising rate of poverty among America's children. The chance of living in a family below the poverty line, for a child under 18, has risen 26% since 1979. This trend is particularly troubling because it is striking at younger families with children. Low-income families with young children saw their income drop by more than 25% on average from 1973 to 1984. Approximately 25% of American children under age six are poor; 40% are poor if they are Hispanic, and nearly 50% are poor if they are Black (Currie, 1987).

For many children, especially if they are Black or Hispanic, there is an increasing chance that they will remain in poverty for much of their childhood and perhaps into adulthood. For most families who experience it, poverty is a temporary state they will occupy only briefly. But a Black child born into a poor family can expect to remain in poverty for an average of 10 years. It is the minority children of this

sharply rising American poverty who will arrive at the high-crime teenage and young adult years by the turn of the century.

**Poverty Rates by Race and Ethnic Group, 1985**  
(Percents)

United States	White	Hispanic	Black
All Persons	11.4%	29.0%	31.3%
Families with children under 18 yrs of age	15.9%	39.9%	43.4%

Figure 14 (Sanchez, 1987)

The poverty trends also reflect a growing gap in the earnings of many lower-income workers and ethnic groups who are family heads and who work full-time, year-around, yet do not earn enough money to pull their families out of poverty levels without assistance. In short, one of the most alarming trends in the United States today is that a growing proportion of Americans cannot make an adequate living.

**U.S. Poverty Rates 1979-1985**

(Percents)

United States	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Persons	13.0	14.0	15.0	15.3	14.4	14.0
Families	11.5	12.5	13.6	13.8	11.6	11.4
Children:						
under 18	17.9	19.5	21.3	21.7	21.0	20.5
6-17 yrs.	16.8	18.4	20.3	20.2	19.7	19.5
0-5 yrs.	20.3	22.0	23.3	24.6	23.4	23.2

- \* Poverty rates (overall) in the U.S. are 14%
- \* Poverty rate for children 6-17 years is 19.5%
- \* Poverty rate for children 0-5 years is 23.2%

Figure 15 (Sanchez, 1987)

Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, many Americans are doing better--enjoying rising earning, increased discretionary income, and growing power to consume goods and services, leading to what many demographers call the growing separation between the "haves" and the "have-nots". In the 1950s observers called it "social dynamite" (Currie, 1987).

## CALIFORNIA

*"We may as well get used to change, because of one thing we can be sure: Life in our society and in our world is on the move. All the world changes. We may not always like change, but change is the norm."-- Dr. Angel A. Sanchez, Los Angeles County Office of Education.*

### California. Population Growth and Projections, 1970-2000:




Figure 16 (Ca. State Census Data Center, 1986)

The population of California in 1940 was only 6.9 million people. In the ensuing 20 years (1960 Census), the population more than

doubled to 15.9 million people. By the time of the 1980 Census, the State had grown to 23.7 million and passed 25 million in 1986. By the year 2000 the state will have once more doubled its 1960 population to a total of 31.8 million persons. However, the single most important factor to note about California's population as we enter the next century is that we are entering an new age of *cultural and linguistic diversity*.

In 1960, only 8.5% of California's population was foreign born. Things began to change dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. In the last 25 years our population has undergone a revolution of diversity in language and culture. Some time around the year 2010, California will become the second state in the union (after Hawaii) where *no* ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population. Additionally, the demographic shifts are not uniform throughout the state, but are occurring in different regions of the state and among different ethnic groups.

### Californias Aging Population




Figure 17 (Heim, 1986)

A comparison of the two population pyramids reflects not only the projected overall increase of approximately 8 million persons from 1980 to 2000, but also shows the general ageing (similar to the general U. S population) of our population: However, the trend toward an older population is just the beginning of the story for California, and is best illustrated by a more detailed break down of the 2000 population pyramid according to ethnic group:




Figure 18 (Heim, 1986)

We can clearly see that while there will be a general trend of steady growth of California's population, this trend is not universal for all ethnic groups. Some racial and ethnic minorities are growing, and will continue to grow, at a rate much faster than the general population of the state. The white, non-minority population will shrink as a proportion of the whole.

Some age groups will grow while others will shrink in size, with the net result that the median age of our population, along with the rest of the nation, will increase from about 30 years in 1980 to 36 years in 2000. Additionally, while the population of the state as a whole will increase smoothly to the end of the century, more of us will live in cities, with some counties and regions such as Riverside, San Bernardino, Sacramento and San Diego growing at a rate much faster than the average (SAG, 1986).

The following charts demonstrate the racial/ethnic components of that growth in California from 1970 to 2000 (the percentages for each group are shown on the right):

**POPULATION BY RACE/ETHNICITY  
(MILLIONS)**

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>ASIAN &amp; OTHER</b>	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>HISPANIC</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL (100%)</b>
<b>1970</b>	<b>0.6 (03%)</b>	<b>1.4 (07%)</b>	<b>2.4 (12%)</b>	<b>15.6 (78%)</b>	<b>20.0</b>
<b>1980</b>	<b>1.6 (07%)</b>	<b>1.8 (08%)</b>	<b>4.6 (19%)</b>	<b>15.8 (66%)</b>	<b>23.8</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>2.7 (10%)</b>	<b>2.2 (08%)</b>	<b>6.5 (23%)</b>	<b>16.6 (59%)</b>	<b>28.0</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>3.7 (12%)</b>	<b>2.5 (08%)</b>	<b>8.4 (27%)</b>	<b>16.8 (54%)</b>	<b>31.4</b>

Figure 19 (Helm, 1986)



**POPULATION MIX FOR  
CALIFORNIA, 1970-2000  
(by Percent)**




Figure 20 (Heim, 1986)

While the state's total population will grow by 33% from 1970 to 2000 over the white population will grow only 10.6% and the Black population will grow about 25%. At the same time the Hispanic and Asian populations will each double. Asian Californians have replaced Black Californians as the third largest group (Heim, 1986). As a portion of California's population, the white group will decline from

66% of the population in 1980 to 54% of the total at the turn of the century (Ca. State Census Data Center, 1986). Remember also that the majority of whites will be in the age group *older* than 35 years, while the majority of all other ethnic groups are *younger* than 30 years of age.

### OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO

It is impossible to discuss the demographic trends in California without briefly covering some of the major trends in Mexico because the two have become so inseparably linked. California absorbs 25% of all legal immigration (including Latin American), and at least 50% of all illegal immigration to the United States (SAG, 1986); the majority of which comes from Mexico. The United States has become a reluctant employer for millions of Mexican adults.

Additionally, the United States absorbs 75% of Mexico's exports; the majority of which flows through California. Mexico is so closely dependent upon the U.S. economically that a recession in the U.S., or even a decline in our economic growth, would have dramatic consequences in Mexico (Moffett, 1987).

With a higher per capita income of any Latin American country (see Appendix 1, page 4), Mexico might be mistaken for a developed nation. Yet because the benefits of economic growth have been so inequitably distributed, Mexico exhibits some of the sharpest indexes of underdevelopment. Nearly half of the population subsists at the margin of nutrition or below it; nearly half of her enormous population of children have no schooling; and the disparity in income between the richest and the poorest approaches 40 times. It is easy to see why life in the United States would be considered so desirable (Casanova, 1980).

**POPULATION PYRAMID**  
**Mexico**  
**70,000,000**  
**1980 (Census)**




Figure 21 (Casanova, 1980)

The population pyramid of Mexico demonstrates part of the reason for the growth of Hispanic immigration to California. Where California's pyramids tapers to its base, Mexico's spreads out. The median age of the population of Mexico is only 15 years--less than half that of California. At the current rate of growth, the population of Mexico will increase from 70 million in 1980 to 132 million people by 2000. Put another way, the population of Mexico--which equaled 30% of the United States population in 1980--will equal 47% of our population by 2000. This growth cannot help but assure continued northward pressure for migration across our southern border (Casanova, 1980).

**Socio-economic Characteristics:**

**Educational Trends:**

We know that the opportunities for success in the labor force over the next decade will depend more upon education than ever before. High school students and college graduates will be facing choices of careers

which are both highly verbal and technology-dependent in our increasingly information-based economy.

Additionally, a greater percentage of available jobs will require an education beyond high school. It is also probable that minorities will find that they will be competing among each other for employment, and may still be at a severe academic disadvantage when competing with whites for higher education or entry-level jobs. A look at the existing trends among college degrees earned by whites (63% of our population) illustrates the point:

**DEGREES EARNED BY WHITES-1983**  
**(% of all Degrees)**

Associate Degree	72.6%
Bachelor's Degree	79.7%
Master's Degree	84.0%
Doctorate Degree	89.5%
First Professional Degree	84.0%

Figure 22 (Gold, 1985)

As can be seen, Whites were over represented as a proportion of all degrees earned, taking home 72% of the AA degrees, 80% of the Bachelors, 84% of the Master's, 90% of the Doctorates, and 84% of the First Professional degrees. In contrast, Hispanics and blacks earn only half their proportion of AA degrees and much less of a proportion of the Bachelors degrees.

We know that by the year 2000, the population under 30 years of age will be decidedly less than half white, and that Hispanics will greatly outnumber any other subgroup. Among of the most disturbing trends

among the Hispanic and black minority groups in the state are the school drop-out rates for both groups.

In a state-wide study of high school students taken between 1979 and 1981, it was found that Hispanics who were enrolled in the ninth grade in 1979 had lost over 14% of their class by the fall of 1981. The Hispanic class of 10th graders in 1979 had lost almost 29% by the fall of grade 12, and the graduating class of June 1981 had 31% fewer Hispanics than it did in the fall of the 11th grade. The data for Blacks showed similar patterns of attrition.

A recent national report on Hispanic High school students also confirmed these statistics: 45% of Hispanics students that enter High School never finish, 40% leaving before reaching the 10th grade. By comparison, about 17% of white students drop out prior to completing High School. Unless these trends are reversed, we will see about 100,000 high school dropouts per year, and that will mean about 1.2 million more young adults in 2000 who lack the minimum requirements of a high school diploma (Gold, 1985).

If the existing educational trends among California's ethnic groups continue, the possibilities for major social problems become more real. Large numbers of elderly (the majority of them white) in the year 2000 and beyond, will be counting on social security and a thriving economy to ensure a comfortable retirement--all paid for by an increasingly under-educated *minority* work force.

#### Poverty Rates in California:

The national trends regarding poverty among the Hispanic and black ethnic groups has already been discussed in some detail. They are all generally true for California as well, including the poverty rates for children, which is slightly higher for California when compared with the nation (22.5% vs. 20%). This is one of the great paradoxes of the

state, which continues to fare much better economically than the rest of the United States. This trend points to the pervasive poverty rates among minorities who are also producing the majority of the children in California.

#### Poverty Rates of Children Under 18, 1979-1985




Figure 23 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987)

A steady upward increase of single-parent families has been evident in California over the last twenty years. Single parent families among whites increased from 8.6% to 17.6%; for Blacks 26.4% to 49.8%; Hispanics, 12.2% to 19.5%, and for Asians, 8% to 15.8%. One in five children are currently in a single-parent family situation, and the chances of a student in California graduating with the same parents as he or she had when entering kindergarten are only 40%.

## LOS ANGELES COUNTY


### General Population:

As might be expected, Los Angeles County is giving all of California a glimpse of the future:

Current Population (January 1, 1986)	8.1 Million
Largest Ethnic Group: White	47.3%
Increase since 1980 Census	600,000
Projected Population by 2000	9.7 Million

Los Angeles County is growing faster with more kinds of people from more places than any other area of the United States. According to the latest report of the Los Angeles County Department of Regional Planning, the population of the county reached 8.1 million as of January 1, 1986. This is an increase in population of 600,000 just since the 1980 Census--an 8% increase which is equivalent to a city the size of Columbus, Ohio, moving into the county. The county growth from January 1985 to January 1986 alone was 120,000 persons.

Total Population Trends  
Los Angeles County, 1920-1980



If ever there was a time when Los Angeles County (33% of California's total population) was sociologically stable and predictable, it has long since passed. The key word in describing the county is *change*. It has been changing, it is changing, and will continue to change well into the next century.

While the white ethnic group continues to age and drop out of the child-bearing ages, the Hispanic community, with a *median age of 22 years*, produced 70% of the total net natural increase in Los Angeles County over the past five years. Less than *one-half of one percent* of the increase was due to whites. Vital records for the Hispanic population show that for every one death, ten live births occur (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987). The following chart illustrates the increasing growth in the county's Hispanic, and Asian populations and the projected decline in the white population:




Figure 25 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987)



Today's racial and ethnic configuration in the county is:

Whites	47.3%
Hispanics	30.5%
Blacks	12.2%
Asians	8.5%
All Others	1.5%

Figure 26 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987)

As can be seen, the county's ethnic mix is considerably different than that of the state. The most striking fact is that the county, with an overall population larger than all but nine states of the Union, has *already* crossed the line of having no ethnic majority--something the state will not do until approximately 2010. This is one aspect of the situation in Los Angeles County that should always be considered when evaluating demographic trends in California. Except for Asians, Los Angeles County, the new Ellis Island of America, will continue to host a greater percentage of ethnic mix than any other region of the state (Sanchez, 1987).

Perhaps the best indicator of population trends for the future is found in school enrollments. The "baby boomlet" Los Angeles County is now experiencing is not a uniform natural growth from each ethnic group. It is based on an influx of diverse ethnic immigrants, mixed with a prolific minority population base, bringing a totally new set of changes with it.

With 25% of the nation's immigrants settling in California, and nearly 60% of these people coming to Los Angeles County, the influence on school enrollments is dramatic. For example, in 1986-1987, 75% of the children in grades k-4 *are minority*. Clearly the Los Angeles of the future will not look the same as the Los Angeles of today. Enrollment over last year (1986) *increased* by 28,000 students, with a *decline* of 1.2 % (15,700) white students (SAG, 1986). In this regard the Los

Angeles County statistics for the 1.31 million students enrolled for the 1986-1987 school year are quite striking:

**COUNTY SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS VS. COUNTY POPULATION  
(by Percent)**

GROUP:	SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS:	COUNTY POPULATION:
Whites	29.9%	47.3%
Hispanics	45.8%	30.5%
Blacks	14.1%	12.2%
Asians	10.2%	8.5%
Current enrollment (1986-1987)		1.31 Million

Figure 27 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987)

**SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS  
CALIFORNIA VS. LOS ANGELES COUNTY**

**White and Minority Enrollment Trends—California:**




Figure 28 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987)

### White and Minority Enrollment Trends--Los Angeles:




Figure 29 (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987).

### Language Problems:

Over 90 Languages are spoken in Los Angeles County. However, more than 80% of the population with limited ability to speak English are Spanish. Clearly Spanish will be a necessary consideration for effective communication with the community. There will also be large localized areas of Vietnamese, Cantonese, Pilipino, Mandarin, Korean, Japanese, Farsi, and Cambodian speaking groups (L.A. Co. Office of Education, 1987).

### Government Work Force Diversity:

While there is no ethnic majority represented among the total county work force, there are differences between the ethnic mix in the

population and the mix among county employees. Additionally, various departments within the county family differ greatly in the composition of their respective work forces. Several large departments still have predominantly white workers with a significant number of years of time in civil service, who also fill the majority of their supervisory, management and command positions. The overall county ethnic mix is as follows:

**L.A. COUNTY WORK FORCE VS. COUNTY POPULATION  
(by Percent)**

	Number of County Employees:	County Population:
	<b>66,000</b>	<b>8.1 Million</b>
White	<b>41%</b>	<b>47.3%</b>
Hispanic	<b>18%</b>	<b>30.5%</b>
Black	<b>30%</b>	<b>12.2%</b>
Asian	<b>7%</b>	<b>8.5%</b>

Figure 30 (Merina, 1987)

The above chart illustrates the unequal success that the County has had in recruiting qualified Hispanic personnel to fill its ranks. Consider, for example, the fact that 30% of the current county work force is black while they represent only 12% of the population--a circumstance that could easily create friction between the Hispanic and black communities. We must realize that ethnic groups naturally begin to feel disenfranchised if they do not have a fair stake in their government. Additionally, the lack of balance is easy exploited by persons interested in disrupting harmonious racial relations (Shaffer, 1987).

One of the most critical aspects of this situation is the relationship between the ethnic configuration of the community and that of our

Law Enforcement Agencies. In general, the ethnic composition of law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County *do not* resemble the communities that they serve. For Example, only **23%** of the sworn officers in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department are minority employees (see Appendix 2). Other departments have similar ratios. However, these results do not reflect the recruitment efforts of the Sheriff's Department--considerable effort has been spent on recruitment among minority groups. While I am optimistic over how well we will do in our County as the population continues to evolve, we must realize that without a semblance of ethnic balance, community relations problems will develop in the future (Merina, 1987).

**SECTION THREE**

**SURVEY OF  
CALIFORNIA AGENCIES**

## AGENCY SURVEY

In order to learn exactly what methods, if any, Law Enforcement Agencies throughout California are currently using to determine community expectations for their services, a survey was developed and sent to all Police and Sheriff's Departments throughout the State.

Prior to the actual development of the survey, a literature search and an informal inquiry among a sampling of representative law enforcement agencies was conducted in order to obtain a general idea of what is currently being done in this area. It was found that the methods used to determine community expectations for police services generally fell into two broad categories: (1) the *traditional* methods used by most agencies to monitor agency performance, and (2) the *pro-active* methods used by a few innovative agencies to obtain information from individuals or groups within the community.

The literature search and informal inquiry also identified several likely probabilities regarding the outcome of the formal survey, which facilitated the elimination of superfluous questions in the formal questionnaire and kept the design of the final form as simple as possible. The survey and the related methodology were developed with the assistance of NGT member, Dr. Ward J. Jenssen, Ph.D., a Marketing & Management Consultant. A list of eleven questions was eventually developed to cover the issues. The final draft of the survey form was reviewed and approved by the other members of my NGT group.

The survey was divided into two major parts: (1) a letter of introduction from POST, soliciting the cooperation of the concerned agency to assist with the survey, and (2) the survey form itself (see appendix 5). A self-addressed and stamped return envelope was also included.

A specific strategy was developed which was designed to promote the highest possible participation in the survey. The strategy used to insure a high response was as follows:

- \* The survey was designed to be as simple and uncomplicated as possible--something that could be easily filled out in a few minutes and quickly placed in the return mail.
- \* The questions were kept short and to the point. The shortest questions were two words in length, and the longest was seven. Common terms were also used to facilitate understanding of the issues.
- \* The survey was deliberately designed to create the impression of anonymity. There was nothing visible on the survey to indicate that the recipient could identify the respondent. Even the return address on the envelope was stamped with the address of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. However, an unobtrusive code was placed on each return envelope that identified the responding agency, and thus provided the key for sorting the respondents by category (see appendix 5). It is interesting to note that despite this precaution, 25 of the total 326 respondents included business cards, and/or other information which identified their agency.



\* The survey deliberately included the three common *traditional* methods that were expected to generate a high response in order to facilitate participation with the survey and eliminate the feeling that "something" should be checked off or the respondent might look bad.

#### AGENCY RESPONSE

There are 408 police agencies in California. Each one was sent a survey form and asked to participate in the survey. A total of 326 (80%) responded. This is an exceptionally high level of response compared to other surveys of this type (Babbie, 1979).




Figure 31

Among the 326 respondents, the percentage of Police and Sheriff's Departments was almost exactly the same: 279 out of 350 (79.7%) Police Departments responded and 47 out of 58 (81.0%) Sheriff's Departments responded.




Figure 32

In order to identify the dynamics within each agency, they were grouped into four categories according to size: (1) Small Agencies (1-24 personnel), (2) Medium Agencies (25-99 personnel), (3) Large Agencies (100-499 personnel) and, (4) Major agencies (over 499 personnel). Although there is no accepted "official" terminology for agency size in the literature, a classification according to size for the purposes of this study were logical for two main reasons: (1) Most police administrators interviewed agreed that operational procedures, e.g., deployment policies, specialization of personnel, administrative

load, relationships with the chief, etc. all change somewhat according to agency size and, (2) the number of agencies in each category forms a logical distribution curve. The participation in the survey by agency size is as follows:

Category	# of Personnel	# of Agencies in California	# of Agencies that responded
Small	1---24	129	90
Medium	25---99	164	135
Large	99--499	94	80
Major	499+	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>
	Total	408	326

Figure 33

The percent of participation in the survey by agency size is as follows:




Figure 34




Figure 35

The above charts indicate that as agencies increased in size, the rate of participation increased from a low of 69.9% among small agencies to a high of 100% among major agencies. The improved rate of participation in relation to agency size was expected because most larger agencies have formalized their correspondence procedures and have personnel specifically assigned to process their mail. However, even the lowest (69.9%) participation rate is considered to be an exceptional sampling in this type of survey.

### SURVEY QUESTIONS

The survey was physically laid out on a single sheet of paper with a paragraph asking for the input of the Chief or Sheriff on eleven questions. A check off box was provided for each question (see appendix 5):

Question #1. *Monitoring the Crime rate.* This is a *traditional* method used by most police administrators to determine effectiveness of the agency. While it is safely assumed that every community desires the lowest possible crime rate, this method does nothing to determine community needs, fears or desires for police services.

Question #2. *Monitoring citizen complaints.* This is another *traditional* method used by departments to monitor citizen satisfaction with the agency. Preliminary studies indicated that a well defined protocol for dealing with citizen complaints has evolved over the years as a standard operating procedure throughout California. However, complaints are mostly generated as a result of officer contact with either a victim or suspect. Therefore this method does not reach a large cross section of the community.

Question #3. *Input from officers in the field.* This question was designed to capture any methods used by agencies to obtain and internalize the experiences and observations of their field personnel. While this method comes close to a *pro-active* approach to the issue, it must also be classified as *traditional* because it is restricted to the officer's contacts in the community. It does not actively seek input from the total range of those in the community.

Question #4. *Follow-up interview(s) by Patrol Supervisor (Patrol Survey).* This question captures a rising *pro-active* trend first identified in the informal study. Many agencies have implemented a formalized assessment by a supervisor of work done by line personnel. The most common names given to this procedure are "Quality Audit" and "Patrol Audit". Additionally, most agencies also include some sort of expression of a desire to provide the best possible service to the community. Although

this method deals basically with crime victims, it demonstrates an important transitional first step towards a *client centered* approach to service, and will be discussed in further detail later in this report.

Question #5. *Community meetings*. This question was designed to determine the extent of community involvement at any level, including City Council meetings, Neighborhood Watch, Chamber of Commerce meetings, Service Clubs, etc. Since the method requires active contact and involvement with segments of the community, it is categorized as a *pro-active* method.

Questions #6-#9 refer to various methods of surveying the community and are all considered a *pro-active* approach to establishing community expectations:

Question #6. *Mail Survey*. Any type of survey taken through the U.S. Mail.

Question #7. *Telephone Survey*. Any type of survey conducted by telephone.

Question #8. *Shopping Mall Survey*. Any type of survey conducted at shopping centers. Shopping Malls have evolved as a nationally recognized sampling point by researchers and surveys are frequently taken at these locations as a basic survey procedure.

Question #9. *Neighborhood Survey*. Any type of survey taken door-to-door in all or any part of a neighborhood.

Question #10. *Other (Please briefly specify)*. This question was designed to capture any unique method(s) that might be used. 105 agencies responded to this question . Many repeated their

involvement in community meetings which was covered by question #5. However, there was a wide range of interesting information offered in this response (see appendix 4).

Question #11. *None of the Above.* This question was designed to identify agencies that have no specific method of obtaining information from their clientele. A surprising 2% of those surveyed checked this box.

## SURVEY RESULTS

The purpose of the survey was to determine what methods were currently being used among Law Enforcement Agencies throughout California to determine community expectations for police services. The following charts illustrate the *frequency of use* of each method expressed in percentage points.:




Figure 36

The pattern of Police Agencies vs. Sheriff Departments is as follows:

### POLICE DEPARTMENTS




Figure 37

### SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENTS




Figure 38



The pattern of use according to Agency size is as follows:

### SMALL AGENCIES (1-24 PERSONNEL)




Figure 39

### MEDIUM AGENCIES (25-99 PERSONNEL)




Figure 40

## LARGE AGENCIES (100-499 PERSONNEL)




Figure 41

## MAJOR AGENCIES (OVER 499 PERSONNEL)




Figure 42

The following chart compares the frequency of usage among all other categories:

**FREQUENCY OF METHOD USAGE**  
**(EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGE)**

	CRIME RATE	CITIZEN COMPLAINTS	INPUT FROM EMPLOYEES.	PATROL AUDIT	COMMUNITY MEETINGS	U.S. MAIL SURVEY	TELEPHONE SURVEY	SHOPPING MALL SURVEY	NEIGHBORHOOD SURVEY	OTHER METHODS	NONE
TOTAL RESPONSE	86	87	86	33	70	19	9	2	18	32	2
	BREAKDOWN BY AGENCY TYPE: POLICE VS. SHERIFF										
POLICE DEPARTMENTS	89	91	87	34	72	20	9	1	20	35	1
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENTS	72	72	77	26	64	13	6	6	11	21	4
	BREAKDOWN BY AGENCY SIZE										
SMALL AGENCIES	80	81	86	29	56	8	1	1	16	23	4
MEDIUM AGENCIES	87	89	90	37	70	23	7	2	20	36	1
LARGE AGENCIES	90	93	81	31	82	26	19	0	20	36	0
MAJOR AGENCIES	90	85	71	24	86	19	10	5	10	33	0

Figure 43

Several interesting trends are evident:

- \* Police Agencies use these methods with greater frequency as compared to Sheriff's Departments. Sheriff's Departments exceeded frequency of use over Police Agencies in only one category: Shopping Mall Surveys (question #8).


\* Small Agencies have the lowest rate of usage, and never exceeded larger agencies in any category. They also had the highest response to the statement that "nothing" was being done in this area (question 11).

\* The survey produced several surprising ties when the frequency of method usage was tabulated (see page 57): The rate of use in *Monitoring the Crime Rate* tied at 90% between Large and Major Agencies. The use of the *Neighborhood Survey* tied at 20% between Medium and Large Agencies. The use of *Other Methods* tied at 36% between Medium and Large Agencies.

\* Large Agencies reported the highest rate of usage in 6 of the 11 categories listed on the survey form (*Monitoring the Crime Rate*, *Citizen Complaints*, *U.S. Mail Survey*, *Telephone Survey*, *Neighborhood Survey*, and *Other Methods*). Medium Agencies were highest or tied in 4 categories (*Input from Employees*, *Patrol Audit*, *Neighborhood Survey*, and *Other Methods*). Major Agencies were highest or tied in 3 categories (*Monitoring the Crime Rate*, *Community Meetings*, *Shopping Mall Survey*, and *Other Methods*).

\* The greatest variance in the overall study occurs in Small Agencies when compared to all other agencies. The NGT group expressed the opinion that this is probably not as bad as it might look at first glance. The populations in small communities are traditionally close to one another, and accurate feedback from the community is more easily obtained through informal methods in small communities than in larger ones.

**SECTION FOUR**  
**FORECASTING THE FUTURE**



**Figure 44 (Courtesy of Jack H. Moffett, LASD, Retired)**

## INTRODUCTION

We see depicted in the cartoon on page 59 an extension of many of the demands on today's law enforcement officer--high-technology, space age communications, improved weaponry, protective devices, computerization, increased complexity of laws, and armored police vehicles. Is this what police work is coming to, or can we create a better future? This section will examine the possibilities.

On June 9, 1987, the first meeting with a group of thirteen volunteers was held to begin a process of evaluating community expectations for police services in the next ten years (1987-1997), and met monthly through November 10, 1987. As the study evolved, they followed the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) of: (1) identifying trends, (2) forecasting events, (3) evaluating the interaction between trends and events and (4) developing alternative strategies for creating the best possible future.

The group represented a broad cross-section of educators, consultants, planners, and businessmen, who all participated in the project with great enthusiasm and interest. Additionally, despite their diverse backgrounds, they demonstrated amazingly low levels of uncertainty and disagreement of the issues involved. The members of the group are listed in Appendix 6.

## TRENDS

During the first meeting held on June 9th, the group was briefed on social, technological, economic, environmental, and political events as discussed in section two of this study. Thirty-four trends were identified and discussed as important to the issue of community expectations for police services. The group then reached a consensus

on the top five trends most likely to influence community expectations for police services over the next decade:

### **Trends List**

#### **Top Five:**

1. *The growing economic split between the "haves" and "have nots".* This trend has roots deeply imbedded in economic and educational conditions in California. Hispanics, (who represent the majority of California families with children), and blacks are rapidly becoming an "underclass" group. 50% of Hispanic and black children do not graduate from high school, and only a slight percent obtain college degrees. These factors insure the continuing uneven distribution of wealth in California along ethnic lines.

2. *Ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system.* The NGT group felt that pressure is building for all elements of the criminal justice system to come to grips with our continuing tide of criminal activity. However, in order to accomplish such a task, there must be a more effective coordination and integration of all segments of the system (Police, Courts, Custody, Probation, etc.) in their response to crime in California. Additionally, the supporting elements (data banks, scientific services, communications, etc.) are fragmented and lack standardization. The group felt strongly that this trend will most likely result in a major overhaul of our existing criminal justice system in the next decade.

3. *Breakdown of the citizen attitudes towards conforming to the law.* The Group felt that the existing crime wave would not diminish, despite the overall reductions in crime that normally occur as the population grows older. This is primarily due to the large numbers of



disadvantaged minority youth entering their crime prone years over the next decade. The group also pointed to a growing generalized disrespect for law and order throughout all segments of the population, fueled partly from trend number two (Ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system.).

4. *Ethnic and demographic changes in California and Los Angeles County.* The group expressed the opinion that the current ethnic and demographic changes occurring in the population will become a major factor in shaping the nature of community expectations for services. The recruitment of bilingual personnel is already becoming an imperative, and minorities are increasingly sensitive to their ratios of employment within police agencies.

5. *Ineffective termination of early (first offenders and juveniles) criminal behavior.* Since a large share of the crime rate is the result of juvenile activity, the group identified the continuing ineffective handling of juvenile offenders as a major trend to be considered. Our general inability to cope with this issue in the past has spawned the explosive growth of organized (street gangs) as well as individual juvenile crime.

**Other Trends Considered:**

6. The continuing increase in the American crime rate.
7. The aging population.
8. The mini baby boom.
9. The spread of gun control laws.
10. The negative influences of environmental changes.
11. Increased terrorism.
12. The developing caste system in America.

13. Increased transience, both national and State wide.
14. The increased urban growth in California.
15. The increases in population.
16. The reduction of social programs.
17. The increased burdens of health costs.
18. The continuing reductions of government budgets.
19. The increased movement to self protection.
20. Privatization of police services.
21. The increased use and ownership of weapons.
22. The increased use of computers.
23. The increase in street people.
24. Changes in drug culture.
25. The increase of high tech crimes.
26. Decreased support of public education.
27. Decreased economic opportunities.
28. An increase in poor police attitudes to duties.
29. New laws restricting the ability of the police to serve.
30. The information age.
31. Increased sophistication of criminal activity.
32. Increased white collar crime.
33. Decline of the family.
34. Increased costs of Law Enforcement.

### **Trend Evaluation:**

In order to assess the role these trends will play in the future of California over the next ten years, the NGT members were asked to evaluate the top five trends and assign the numerical value of "100" as an expression of the *present* influence each has on community expectations for police services in Los Angeles County. With that benchmark in mind (100), they were next asked numerically express a value for the *past* strength of each trend (five years ago), and a numerical value relative to the *future* strength of each trend (ten years from today).

The bold numbers in each column of the following evaluation table expresses the consensus of the group, and the the small numbers in the same square indicate the highest and lowest values assigned to each trend during the NGT process. For example, the consensus of the group on trend one five years ago was 81% of its present day strength. However, one member of the group gave it a value of 85% (highest value expressed), and another gave it a value of 60% (lowest value expressed).

The NGT group was also asked to express what each trend "should be" verses what it "will be" relative to their projections into the future. As can be seen, the group expressed the general wish for a less turbulent 1997 after their in depth evaluation of the issues. The following table lists their consensus:

# TREND EVALUATION

TREND STATEMENT		LEVEL OF THE TREND (Ratio: Today = 100)			
		5 Years Ago	Today	"Will be" in 10 Years	"Should be" in 10 Years
1	Economic Split Between the "HAVES" and "HAVE NOTS"	85 81 60	100	220 183 150	400 171 100
2	Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System	100 74 40	100	200 170 120	200 130 100
3	Breakdown of Attitudes Towards Conforming to the Law	90 67 20	100	150 135 125	190 135 95
4	Ethnic and Demographic Changes in Los Angeles County	80 59 50	100	300 201 160	200 163 110
5	Ineffective Termination of Early Criminal Behavior	85 74 60	100	205 165 130	200 134 90

Figure 45

As a point of clarification, it would be well to briefly summarize the findings listed on the the Trend Evaluation table and graph each:

Trend one, the economic split between the "haves" and "have nots", increased by 19% over the last five years and will increase by 83% over the next ten years.




Figure 46

Trend two, *ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System*, increased by **26%** over the last five years and will increase by **70%** over the next ten years.




Figure 47

Trend three, *breakdown of attitudes towards conforming to the law*, increased by **33%** over the last five years and will increase by **35%** over the next ten years.




Figure 48

Trend four, *ethnic and demographic changes in Los Angeles County*, increased by 41% over the last five years and will increase by 101% over the next ten years.




Figure 49

Trend five, *Ineffective termination of early criminal behavior*, increased by 26% over the last five years and will increase by 65% over the next ten years.




Figure 50

It is interesting to note that all of the five trends selected by the NGT group have historically strong growth patterns (between 19% to 41%) over the past five years, and that they consider them to continue into the future at the same, or increasing, intensity. Trend four, *The ethnic and demographic changes in Los Angeles County*, was identified as the most dynamic of the five with a projected 101% growth over the next ten years.

## EVENTS

Events are defined as single key occurrences that could alter the course of trends. At their next meeting on July 14, 1987 the NGT group met to discuss important future events that, should they occur, would make a significant impact upon community expectations for police services over the next ten years. Twenty possible events were identified, and five events were selected for inclusion in this study. The events discussed are as follows:

### Events List

#### Top Five:

1. *The California Jail and prison population reaches the saturation point, with no let up in the number of criminals being sentenced. A forced mass release of inmates occurs.* The saturation of several county jail systems has already occurred in California, with occasional court ordered releases of some inmates. State officials know that without significant changes, the State penal system will eventually reach the saturation point. Expanding the existing penal system is an expensive and unpopular alternative and will not keep pace with current trends. Prisons are unpopular on two counts; they drain funds for social programs and, are not wanted in the community. The group

anticipates that this event will spark a significant state wide public reaction when it occurs.

2. *Major economic recession or depression drains the ability to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System, and swells the ranks of citizens living in poverty.* California's world wide economic ties, and linkage to the Pacific Rim nations is discussed in section two of this study. Any refusal by the Third World to honor debts, or the loss of the edge that California enjoys in high technology would have dramatic effects upon our economy. Section two also outlines the pervasive poverty among many families with children in California. The group predicted that there will at least be an economic recession during the next decade which will have its greatest impact on California's growing "underclass".

3. *Major increase in the crime rate with the resultant impact on patterns of living and attitudes towards the police.* The group tied this event to the growing ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system (trend #2). They predicted that at some point in time, the crime rate would make a quantum leap with resultant changes in public attitudes and lifestyle.

4. *A critical shortage of regularly paid, full-time police officers develops throughout California (much the same as the current teacher shortage).* A study of the teacher shortage in California illustrates the likelihood of this event. It is increasingly difficult to recruit qualified personnel to meet the need. This overall shortage will combine with critical shortages in bilingual and Hispanic personnel.

5. *Dominance of ethnic groups in the political process changes the political structure in California.* Political pressure to service the existing population detracts from the older, retired minorities. Demographers have stated that in the past, the transition of political power from an old ethnic majority to a new ethnic group can take as



long as ten years. However, the NGT group felt that our information age had set the stage is set for a much quicker transition. They predict sweeping changes on the political scene during the next decade, with some conflict between older whites and the needs of younger Hispanics. The problems will be further enhanced because the economic wealth of the state will reside with the minority "overclass" long after the political balance has shifted.

**Other Events Considered:**

6. Economic upswing greatly improves the economic health of Governments, and the overall wealth of communities.
7. Ground swell backlash of public opinion against elements of the Criminal Justice System (those perceived as ineffective).
8. Effective reduction in illegal immigration.
9. An overhaul of the juvenile justice system (legislative changes and funding) that creates more accountability for families, and the offender, and which impacts the rate of juvenile crime.
10. Legislative changes in all aspects of family accountability (absent fathers, family liability and responsibility, etc.).
11. Cities throughout the State experience a wave of major civil disorders, many of which cause death and wholesale destruction of property.
12. A major unusual event, such as a toxic spill, nuclear accident, earthquake, tidal wave, etc., occurs and numerous lives are lost due to the lack of police manpower.
13. The United States experiences major acts of Terrorism. Because of its rich ethnic mix, California becomes a hotbed of terrorist activity.
14. Political and intellectual conservatism become popular in the U.S. and California.
15. Four day work week is instituted in California.

16. New breakthroughs in technology eliminate or greatly reduce the manpower needs of police agencies.
17. Criminal use of high technology creates a major shift in Law Enforcement deployment and techniques.
18. Street gangs and organized crime greatly expand their influence and control.
19. Death factor for Law Enforcement increases greatly. Many are killed and/or injured.
20. A national wave of public support for the police greatly increases the status of Law Enforcement as a profession.

#### **Event Evaluation:**

As an assessment of the impact the key events will play in the future, the NGT group was asked to evaluate the top five in regard to their relative probability of occurrence, and their net impact upon both the issue area, and law enforcement generally. This was done in five steps:

1. The year that the probability of the event occurring exceeded zero percent was forecast. The consensus is indicated in bold print in the first column of the following table. The high and low estimates are also included in small print within the same square.
2. The likelihood of the event occurring within the next *five years* was addressed and is expressed as the percentage posted in the second column of the table. The high and low estimates are also included in small print within the same square.
3. The likelihood of the event occurring within the next *ten years* was also determined and is expressed as the percentage posted in the second column of the table, with

the high and low estimates included in small print within the same square.

4. The group consensus of the net impact that the event would have upon community expectations for police services is expressed as a number on a scale between plus or minus ten, and posted in the fourth column of the table. The high and low estimates are also included in small print within the same square.

5. The net impact that the event would have upon Law Enforcement generally is similarly expressed as a number between plus or minus ten and posted in the last column, including the high and low estimates in small print.

The following table lists the consensus evaluation of the selected events:

### EVENT EVALUATION

EVENT STATEMENT		PROBABILITY			NET IMPACT ON THE ISSUE AREA (-10 TO +10)	NET IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCE- MENT (-10 TO +10)
		Year that Probability First Exceeds Zero	By 1992 (0 - 100)	By 1997 (0 - 100)		
1	Saturation of Jails and Prisons	89	100	100	-5	-7
		1988	81%	82%	- 6	- 8
		87	50	50	-8	-10
2	Economic Recession or Depressions	90	80	100	-4	0
		1989	31%	44%	- 8	- 2
		87	5	5	-10	-5
3	Major Increase in Crime	91	80	75	-5	+5
		1988	54%	52%	- 7	- 4
		87	25	20	-10	-9
4	Shortage of Qualified Law Enforcement Personnel	97	90	100	+5	-7
		1989	57%	61%	- 4	- 8
		87	30	30	-9	-10
5	Dominance of Ethnic Groups in the Political Process	93	100	100	+5	0
		1989	55%	80%	+1	- 2
		87	20	70	-5	-4

Figure 51

As with the trend analysis, each event lends itself to an individual graph and brief summary:

Event one, *saturation of jails and prisons*, is an event likely to occur in the near future. The curve of probability rises quickly from the year 1988 to an 82% forecast by 1992. However, the curve increases by only 1% in the next five years.




Figure 52

Event two, *economic recession or depression*, is an event less likely to occur than any of the other top five events. The curve of probability starts at 1989 to an 31% forecast by 1992. The curve increases by only 13% to 1997.




Figure 53

Event three, a *major increase in crime*, is forecast to occur with a 54% probability between 1988 and 1992. If the event does not occur by that time, the group forecast that the probability was reduced by 2% in the next five years.




Figure 54

Event four, a *shortage of qualified law enforcement personnel*, was projected at 57% between 1989 and 1992, and increases by 4% by 1997.




Figure 55

Event five, the dominance of ethnic groups in the political process, is an event very likely to occur within the next ten years. The curve of probability rises from the year 1989 to an 55% forecast by 1992. The curve increases sharply by 25% in the next five years.




Figure 56

### CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

Using the previous trends and events analysis as guides, the NGT group examined what impact, if any, the occurrence of a specific event would have upon the other events and trends. The process, known as *Cross-Impact Evaluation*, is a technique that attaches a numerical value expressing the relationship between trends and events. It should also be noted that while every numerical change was calculated in the final results for the futures forecast, the group felt that events which influenced a change above 15% should be considered as significant. The results of their analysis are briefly summarized as follows (ref. figure 57, page 78):

#### **Event One: Saturation of Jails and Prisons--82% Probability**

The NGT group forecast that when the *saturation of jails and prisons* (event one) occurs, it has a direct impact upon the probability of one other event and also directly influences three out of five trends. The probability of occurrence for a *major increase in crime*, event number three, is increased by **21%**. Trend number two, *the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System*, trend number three, *attitudes towards Law Enforcement*, and trend number five, *termination of early criminal behavior*, are increased **46%**, **39%** and **30%** respectively. As can be seen on line one of figure 57, the impact study of event number one indicates little or no changes upon the remaining three events or remaining two trends.

#### **Event Two: Economic Recession or Depression--44% Probability**

The NGT group forecast that when event number two, an *economic recession or depression*, occurs it has an important impact upon the probability of two other events and also directly influences four out of five trends. The probability of occurrence for *saturation of jails and prisons* (event one), is increased by **31%**, and a *major increase in crime*, (event three), is increased by **49%**. Trends number one, *the economic split between the "haves" and the "have nots"*, number two, *the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System*, number three, *attitudes towards Law Enforcement*, and number five, *ineffective termination of early criminal behavior*, are increased **36%**, **44%**, **60%** and **22%** respectively. As can be seen on line two of figure 57, the impact study of event number two indicates little or no changes upon the remaining two events or trend number four.

### **Event Three: Major Increase in Crime--52% Probability**

The NGT group forecast that when a *major increase in crime* (event three) occurs, it has a direct impact upon the probability of one other event and also directly influences three out of five trends. The probability of occurrence for a *saturation of jails and prisons* (event one), is increased by 61%. Trend number two, *the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System*, trend number three, *attitudes towards Law Enforcement*, and trend number five, *ineffective termination of early criminal behavior*, are increased 35%, 50% and 22% respectively. Line three of figure 57 of the impact study indicates little or no changes upon the remaining three events or remaining two trends.

### **Event Four: Shortage of Qualified Law Enforcement Personnel--61% Probability**

The NGT group forecast that when the *shortage of qualified law enforcement personnel* (event four) occurs, it has a direct impact upon the probability of one other event and also directly influences three out of five trends. The probability of occurrence for a *major increase in crime*, (event three) is increased by 48%.. Trends number two, *the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System*, number three, *attitudes towards Law Enforcement*, and number five, *the ineffective termination of early criminal behavior* are increased 34%, 51% and 22% respectively. As can be seen on line four of figure 57, the impact study of event number four indicates little or no changes upon the remaining three events or two trends.

### **Event Five: Dominance of Ethnic Groups--80% Probability**

The NGT group forecast that when *the dominance of ethnic groups* (event five) occurs, it will have a direct impact upon all of the remaining events and three out of the five trends. The probability of



occurrence for a saturation of jails and prisons (event one), is increased by 27%, a economic recession or depression (event two) is increased by 19%, a major increase in crime, (event three) is increased by 47%, and a shortage of qualified law enforcement personnel (event four), is increased by 23%.

Trend number one, the economic split between the "haves" and the "have nots", is decreased by -15%. This means that the occurrence of event five will help close the gap between the "underclass" and the "overclass" groups. Trends number three, attitudes towards law enforcement, and number five, the ineffectiveness of the Criminal Justice System, are increased 47%, and 19% respectively. As can be seen on line five of figure 57, there are little or no changes upon the remaining two trends.


### CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

Suppose that this event ↓	With this proba- bility ↓	Actually occurred..... How would the probability of the events shown below be affected?									
		EVENTS					TRENDS				
		Saturation Of Jails & Prisons	Economic Recession Or Depression	Major Increase In Crime	Shortage Of Qualified L/E Personnel	Dominance Of Ethnic Groups	Economic Split	Ineffective- ness Of CJ System	Breakdown Of Attitudes Towards Law Enforcement	Ethnic & Demographic Changes	Ineffectiveness Of Early Cri- minal Behavior
1	82%	X	0	21	7	0	3	46	39	6	30
2	44%	31	X	49	-6	-1	36	44	60	12	22
3	52%	61	13	X	9	0	-8	35	50	2	22
4	61%	14	14	48	X	1	-13	34	51	-1	22
5	80%	27	19	47	23	X	-15	2	47	0	19

figure 57

Through the process of the cross impact evaluation a final value expressing the *probability of occurrence* was established for all five events and a final value expressing the *degree of influence on the future* was assigned to each of the five trends. The following charts illustrate the original values assigned to each trend and event and the final values assigned to each after the cross-impact evaluation process:

### Original Values:



### Final Results:







Figure 58


## Original Values:

## Final Results:


EVENT #3 - MAJOR INCREASE IN CRIME




EVENT #3 - MAJOR INCREASE IN CRIME




EVENT #4 - SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL



EVENT #4 - SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL



EVENT #5 - DOMINANCE OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN POLITICAL PROCESS



EVENT #5 - DOMINANCE OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN POLITICAL PROCESS







Figure 59

## Original Values:



## Final Results:







Figure 60

## Original Values:



## Final Results:






Figure 61

## **HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS**

The final step in the forecasting process is the creation of hypothetical scenarios from the data generated by the cross-impact analysis. As can be seen by the above charts, the interplay between trends and events will usually enhance or diminish the probability of their occurrence. We are now ready to develop three possible futures; one in which all events with a 30% probability of occurring are included, one for events with a 50% probability and lastly, one which will include events with a 60% probability:

### **SEQUENCE OF EVENTS**

#### **30% PROBABILITY (FIRST FORECAST):**

<b>YEAR:</b>	<b>EVENT:</b>
--------------	---------------

- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| <b>1988.75</b> | 1. The California Jail and prison population reaches the saturation point, with no let up in the number of criminals being sentenced. A forced release of inmates occurs. |
| <b>1989.00</b> | 3. Major increase in the crime rate with the resultant impact on patterns of living and attitudes towards the police.   |
| <b>1989.75</b> | 4. A critical shortage of regularly paid, full-time police officers develops throughout California (much the same as the current teacher shortage).                       |

**1990.25** 5. Dominance of ethnic groups in the political process changes the political structure in California. Political pressure to service the existing population detracts from the older, retired minorities.

**1990.25** 2. Major economic recession or depression drains the ability to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System, and swells the ranks of citizens living in poverty.

Tuesday, May 27, 1997. The words glared back at Chief Jenson as he sat down in front of his PC, ready to start the new day. His mind was awash with details: a scheduled meeting with the citizen action committee later that evening; a note from the president of that committee, indicating that they had received the quarterly P.O.S.T. Certification Report, and wished to discuss it at their meeting; the end of the fiscal year was approaching, and the budget was tight; the Hispanic Coalition was breathing down his neck regarding plans for a new jail: they wanted a new school; and the Senior Citizens Council was up-at-arms because the Hispanic Coalition proposed dipping into the State retirement funds to finance the school. The majority of the wealth in the state belonged to those over 65; they also had less political power of any of the groups.

Chief Jenson glanced at the clock. It read 8:45 a.m. He had been sitting in front of his PC for ten minutes. Ten minutes! It felt like ten hours! How could a decade pass so quickly, and ten minutes drag on forever? He reached inside his desk drawer for his bottle of aspirin. Acetaminophen and Ibuprofen aside, he liked aspirin. It upset his stomach something awful, but at least he felt that it was working. Maybe if he put his head back and closed his eyes, the throbbing pain

at the top of his head, and the one at the base of his neck which were traveling toward intersection, would cease.

As he often did in times of stress, he let his mind wander to the past. Things could be worse, Jenson, he told himself. He remembered the Crisis of '89 when the California jail and prison system populations had reached such a saturation point that officials were forced to release inmates because there was no room for them. Courts continued to sentence them without let-up. Every time a jail or prison was scheduled to be built, a general public out-cry arose. Nobody wanted a prison or jail in their neighborhood. He chuckled slightly when he remembered the outcome: everyone got one. Just like the days of Dodge City. Every town had their own community jail. We took a step forward by taking a step backward, he mused. Now the community was more actively-involved in the jail system, since they contained members of their own community. A Citizens for Community Safety group had formed, and they were the watchdogs of the system. They helped correlate and develop work programs and inmate rehabilitation projects. They also lobbied for stiffer jail sentences where needed. All in all, it had been rather successful.

The Chief was starting to feel a little better.

He recalled how prior to the community jail system, it was very unpopular being a police officer. People were fed up with the crime rate, they were fed up with the courts, they objected to the release of the inmates, they were tired of bars on their windows and expensive security measures in order to insure the safety of their families and businesses.

A burning pain had begun to sear the inside of the Chief's stomach. Ahhh, the aspirin must be starting to work, he thought.



There were still some problems: he was having a terrible time recruiting police officers. Of course, so was every other city in California. Especially difficult were the members of the Hispanic community. Good, qualified, bilingual applicants were hard-to-find. Hispanic women were at a real premium too. Most still stayed home with their children, or took less skilled jobs.

He laughed when he thought about the Hispanic situation. Here he was, a man raised in the prairies of America. Good Norwegian immigrant stock. He thought of his family's traditions, the fact that most of his family had retained some knowledge of the Norwegian language while integrating into the system. Lefse and lutefisk seemed light years away from where he sat today. He had to take an adult school Spanish language course in order to deal more intelligently with members of his community. Most of them spoke English, but some did not. And it was this basic understanding of the Spanish language that had helped him to bridge the ethnic gap. Little had he known that he would need that knowledge on a more personal level. Some of his children had married members of the Hispanic community, and his grand children were being raised bilingually. It was one thing not to understand the majority of the population, and quite another not to understand the affectionate greeting of one's own grandchild!

As he pondered the major changes in his life, he caught sight of a steadily-moving figure passing by his window. Old Fernando Alvarez was on his way to the corner drug store to buy his morning paper and to chat. Fernando had been a fixture in the town for years. He had labored in the fields of Northern California in his youth. Increased age and a move to Southern California had caused him to switch to gardening. It was hard to remember a day when Fernando's battered, late-model pick-up truck hadn't passed his office, loaded down with lawn mower, rakes, and other tools of his trade. As he watched the somewhat stooped man making his way down the street, Chief Jenson

continued to reflect on how times had changed. Fernando was nearly 75 years old now and The Change had come too late to affect his lifestyle very much. But Fernando's grandson, Steven Gutierrez, was the Regional Planner for Mishimoto, the largest bank in town, a respected member of the community, and politically active in the Hispanic Coalition.

The buzz of his inter-office phone caused the Chief to jump. It was his secretary, Nancy Tsi, reminding him that he had to make sure his calendar for the second week of June was clear. The State Association of Chiefs of Police Region Three was meeting to discuss a proposed change in the Data Bank system they were all tied to. They were also going to discuss topics of common interest such as the community jails, feed-back from the Chamber of Commerce survey of police services within the community, and the latest recommendations from the Security Systems Corporation, a private company which maintained their jails for them.

He felt a slight twinge beginning to grow between his eyes, and retirement flitted briefly through his conscious mind. Then the bitter reminder of the major economic depression in 1992 caused him to dispel all thoughts of beach front houses and motor homes. Everyone had been affected by that crash. There had been great difficulty trying to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System. It was very unpopular to ask for new facilities, while a good portion of the citizens found themselves living in poverty. It had gotten a little better, though the division between the "haves" and the "have-nots" had risen slightly but steadily.

Be thankful, Jenson, he told himself. You may not travel anywhere farther than Region Three meetings, but you've got a paycheck. And Thank God your children and their families are all right. They've had to tighten their belts and do without some things, but haven't we all? At least they weren't among the growing number of "street people" in

the city. Every day you could see them with their meager belongings packed in old, ramshackle cars. Little children, tired-eyed and dirty, playing by day in parks, and huddled together in the back seat of the family car at night. And they were the lucky ones! One woman, in particular, her face tanned and leathery by constant exposure to the sun and elements, hair unkempt, clothing shabby, spent her days walking the streets of the community pushing a shopping cart laden with her personal belongings and whatever she had gleaned from the trash bins that day.

A glance at the clock brought the Chief back to the reality of a pending staff meeting at ten o'clock. He quickly keyed into the P.O.S.T. Data Bank to see what the Certification Report said.

## SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

### 50% PROBABILITY (SECOND FORECAST):

YEAR:	EVENT:
-------	--------

- |         |   |
|---------|---|
| 1990.50 | 1. The California Jail and prison population reaches the saturation point, with no let up in the number of criminals being sentenced. A forced release of inmates occurs. |
| 1991.50 | 4. A critical shortage of regularly paid, full-time police officers develops throughout California (much the same as the current teacher shortage).                       |

**1991.50** 3. Major increase in the crime rate with the resultant impact on patterns of living and attitudes towards the police.

**1991.75** 5. Dominance of ethnic groups in the political process changes the political structure in California. Political pressure to service the existing population detracts from the older, retired minorities.

**D.N.O.\*** 2. Major economic recession or depression drains the ability to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System, and swells the ranks of citizens living in poverty.

\* Does not occur in the range of 50% probability.

Lieutenant Byers of the Central Division stuck his head in the office doorway and asked,

"Want to get some lunch, Bill?"

Captain William Hennessey, the recipient of the invitation, said,

"Sure Ron, I was just starting to think about getting a bite to eat. That sounds fine".

The two colleagues walked out to the Division parking lot and proceeded to drive into the heart of the city.

"What do you feel like having? Italian? Mexican? Chinese?"

"Well, Ron, Chinese sounds pretty good. Besides, I hear it's less fattening." Both men laughed at this display of male vanity. Bill Hennessey was a member of the Old Generation of policemen. One of the traditional "Irish Cops", he was active in the Catholic Church, did a lot of networking with the Council of Churches, and was not the type of person one would think of as worried about his weight.

"Boy, look at this place, Bill. You'd never know it was an American city. It looks more like Hong Kong." There had been a sudden influx of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong of late, mostly due to the pending Communist take-over of the colony at the turn-of-the-century. Government foreign policy was such that anyone wanting to immigrate was allowed to enter the country.

The two policemen were momentarily stuck in the middle of the congestion of people and cars that had become a common characteristic of the city. Had they been alone, it would have been a major irritant. Today, however, it offered them an opportunity to discuss departmental problems.

"Look at this traffic, Ron. What are we going to do? These people are so difficult to reach. They're clannish, they don't pay any attention to zoning laws, or parking laws, and the businessmen in this district are going nuts trying to cope with them."

"Well Bill, you know most of these businessmen are putting the blame for the increase in crime, directly on these immigrants".

"They've always done that Ron. If it weren't the Chinese, it would be the blacks, or the Hispanics. They've always had to have a scapegoat. But in some respects, they're right...at least partially. These Chinese kids have "Westernized" to the point where they're organizing into gangs just like the blacks and the Hispanics have done. Some information came across my desk from one of our undercover

operations that there's a Red Dragon Gang operating in this area. They're into the drug scene, the terrorism, the whole bit. Remember that big recession everyone was predicting? And how uptight it had everyone? Well, the way this area looks, it might as well have happened. You certainly can't tell the difference. But we're going to have to do something to get to the root of this problem because the citizens are starting to get hot. These people have bars on their windows, just like THEY were the criminals. They don't go out at night because it's just not safe. And what's more, the Chinese in this community aren't very happy about the whole situation either. At least the ones we can get to talk to us, aren't. I don't know, Ron, I just don't know."

"I've had sort of a thought while you've been talking, Bill. You remember those surveys we did a couple of years ago? You remember, to determine the community's reactions to certain things? Their satisfaction and whatnot. Well, wouldn't the same thing work for these people? What if we surveyed the community again. This time we'll go door-to-door and maybe we can pull in some Oriental officers from some of the other divisions to canvass the neighborhood, so the people will be more receptive. If they knew we cared, maybe they'd open up. And we'll do the shopping mall survey again too. Maybe we can determine our glaring weak spots."

"That might work Ron. I've been after the brass to let me yank some extra personnel from other divisions for a long time. Oriental cops are kind of hard to find. That's another area I've been trying to work on: recruitment in this community. I've been working on a plan to start an Explorer program to try and recruit directly from the neighborhoods. You know, get the young people interested. We've got to start somewhere. I can see where the Asians are going to be a strong political force in this city. I see it more and more everyday. That Hispanic City Councilman hasn't got a very long tenure ahead of him, I'm sure of that."

## SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

### 60% PROBABILITY (THIRD FORECAST):

**YEAR:      EVENT:**

- 1990.00**    1. The California Jail and prison population reaches the saturation point, with no let up in the number of criminals being sentenced. A forced release of inmates occurs.
- 1992.75**    5. Dominance of ethnic groups in the political process changes the political structure in California. Political pressure to service the existing population detracts from the older, retired minorities.
- 1993.00**    4. A critical shortage of regularly paid, full-time police officers develops throughout California (much the same as the current teacher shortage).
- D.N.O.**      3. Major increase in the crime rate with the resultant impact on patterns of living and attitudes towards the police.
- D.N.O.\***    2. Major economic recession or depression drains the ability to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System, and swells the ranks of citizens living in poverty.

\* Does not occur in the range of 60% probability.

The sharp jangle of the telephone awoke Sunny Hills Police Chief John Richardson from a sound sleep. His wife, Valerie, slept through the onslaught as though drugged. Why was it that a woman who spent over twenty years listening for the sounds of her children in the night, could sleep through the ringing of the telephone?

Chief Richardson balanced the receiver under his chin and muttered a drowsy,

"Hello?"

The caller was Terence Crosby, President of Chemco Incorporated, one of the big industries to locate in Sunny Hills. Sunny Hills was referred to by some as "Cardiac Acres" and had even been dubbed "Pacemaker Place" by some of the surrounding communities because of the high proportion of retired people living there. In fact, it was due to these predominantly white, retired, professional people that Sunny Hills had it's beginning. They had tired of paying taxes for schools they didn't use, and so to insure their status quo, they had organized and formed their own city, complete with police department.

John Richardson, a retired police captain from Los Angeles, recognized the Chief's position as a good opportunity and came out of retirement to take over the office.

Terence Crosby was a casual friend of Richardson's. They often played golf together, and attended the same Rotary meetings. Not many people in the city had the Chief's unlisted telephone number.

Crosby greeted the Chief with a tirade of angry complaints. After complaining about those "other people" who were moving into Sunny Hills, and raging on about not being able to understand the proprietors of the local businesses anymore, he finally came to the heart of the



problem. His wife, Eleanor, had called the station asking for some information about traffic control during their church bazaar. Eleanor felt the officer who took the call was unnecessarily abrupt, and it also had taken several rings before the phone was answered.

"What are we paying you for? What are we paying our police force for? They were probably playing cards or watching T.V. and just let the phone ring until they couldn't stand it anymore! I'm sick of it! This used to be a nice place! Now a bunch of foreigners have moved in, the downtown shopping area sounds like a Chinese marketplace, and now we're going to be surrounded by murderers!"

Richardson asked Crosby when Eleanor had placed her call. Upon learning the time and the date, he realized that she had called at approximately the same time as the multi-car pile up on the Interstate. The officer had probably been upset and flustered, and a lady inquiring about her church bazaar seemed rather unimportant.

He assured Crosby that he'd look into the matter personally, and added the information he had about the accident. That seemed to calm Crosby down somewhat. At least enough so that he hung up.

As his adrenaline was going full-bore, Richardson propped himself up on one elbow and thought about the call. When sleep did not return, he swung his legs over the side of the bed, and went into the kitchen. Sometimes warm milk helped. He poured some in a pan and put it on the stove. They had a microwave, but for some reason it was an alien being to John Richardson. Everything he tried to heat either turned out lukewarm or scalding hot. The old reliable methods always seemed to prove best.

As he looked out the window to the city lights below, he reflected that there was a lot of unrest in the little community. He felt some personal unrest himself. Not the type that Crosby had purged himself of, no, his was more the feeling that he was the last living dinosaur that had come to life in the age of high-tech. And just like he had trouble adjusting to new-fangled appliances, so he had some trouble adjusting to new-fangled laws, and new-fangled attitudes.

Fifteen or twenty years ago, he could have hung up on Terence. Years ago, they kicked down doors and took names and the public be-damned. Police business was *police business*.. The minorities stayed out of the way; they knew their place and acted accordingly. Now all these people had so many demands. The whole place was changing.

California Governor Jacob Nelson had been ousted after one term of office. His successor was an Hispanic woman named Dolores Gutierrez. Their former State Assemblyman had lost to his opponent, Ricardo Sanchez. Every day the newspaper reflected community unrest over dominance of ethnic groups in the political process, spending of tax dollars for penal expansion, and the Hispanic population were pushing for new schools for their children...the very thing the founders of Sunny Hills had sought to escape. To make matters worse, the government was doing an environmental impact study for a new state prison not five miles from the city borders of Sunny Hills. Assemblyman Sanchez appeared deaf to the pleas for assistance from the retired community, due in large part to the fact that they were no longer politically potent.

Richardson walked over to the stove and discovered that in his preoccupation, he had forgotten to turn it on.

"Oh Geez", he muttered. He cast a suspicious glance at the shiny, black glass microwave on the counter beside the stove. Raising his cup in a mock salute to the city, he said,

"Oh what the heck! I might get lucky!"

As he waited for the microwave to finish its cycle and beep, he jotted a note to himself on the telephone pad: "Remind Sergeant Jane Price to include Mr. Crosby's complaint in the electronic mail, to all supervisors."

**SECTION FIVE**  
**STRATEGIC PLAN**

## STRATEGIC PLAN

This strategic plan will provide the basis for preparing law enforcement agencies to establish: (1) methods of learning about their respective community needs and expectations and, (2) methods of making law enforcement agencies more responsive to their communities

### Situation:

Thus far, we have established two central points to the issue of community expectations for police services over the next decade:

1. California communities are *changing*. The demographic trends that we have previously discussed will impact every aspect of the way that we live and work in California, and will greatly influence the delivery of police services in the next decade. Successful law enforcement administrators will be those who adapt to these changes and who prepare their agencies to respond to new community needs as they evolve.

2. With few exceptions, the majority of California law enforcement agencies have not developed *proactive* methods of identifying community needs or expectations for police services. Most agencies simply track the crime rate, develop protocols to respond to citizen complaints and are otherwise *reactive* in their approach to the issue. Among most agencies, the absence of citizen complaints combined with a respectable crime rate is today's "bottom line".

### Capability/Resources Analysis

In order to be able to respond to community expectations they must first be understood, and, once understood, both administrative and

line personnel must be receptive to any new procedures that may evolve to meet the new needs. We must realize that as the new "service economy" evolves in America, a new emphasis on *excellence* will cut through both public and private organizations. After all, when the *product* is service, the *quality* of that service becomes synonymous with *friendliness*, *helpfulness* and *concern*.

This has already been true with successful companies in the private sector for some time. Corporations with a high level of sensitivity to the customer dominate their respective industries (Kneale, 1986; Peters, 1982: 103; Reynolds, 1987). Police departments are no different (Duke, 1986; Kamm, 1987). Are we ready? The NGT group examined the question from two perspectives: (1) internal capability analysis and, (2) external influences.

#### **Internal Assessment:**

The following two pages report their general assessment of the internal strengths and weaknesses common to law enforcement agencies throughout California.

The first form (page 92), is a general assessment of our present capabilities towards meeting community expectations and needs. As can be seen, the general assessment is positive with only one area, *technology*, identified as a weakness. When questioned further regarding this response, the group identified a lack of technical skill associated with polling elements of the community, taking surveys, evaluating responses, etc.

The second form (page 93), focused on the adaptability of agencies throughout California, to make any changes necessary to effectively deal with the issue. Two areas were identified as weaknesses: (1) the general lack of adaptability in the power structure to adapt to change and, (2) the strong tendency for most police agencies to keep the status quo.

## CAPABILITY ANALYSIS - RATING ONE

### STRATEGIC NEED AREA:

### COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICES BY THE YEAR 2000

#### Instructions:

Evaluate each item, as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good, not bad.
- IV Problems here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action.

Category:	I	II	III	IV	V
Manpower	—	—	X	—	—
Technology	—	—	—	X	—
Equipment	—	—	X	—	—
Facility	—	—	X	—	—
Money	—	—	X	—	—
Calls for Service	—	—	X	—	—
Supplies	—	—	X	—	—
Management Skills	—	X	—	—	—
P.O. Skills	—	X	—	—	—
Supervisory Skills	—	X	—	—	—
Training	—	X	—	—	—
Attitudes	—	X	—	—	—
Image	—	X	—	—	—
Council Support	—	X	—	—	—
City Mgr. Support	—	X	—	—	—
Specialties	—	X	—	—	—
Mgt. Flexibility	—	X	—	—	—
Sworn/non-sworn Ratio	—	—	X	—	—
Pay Scale	—	—	X	—	—
Benefits	—	—	X	—	—
Turnover	—	—	X	—	—
Community Support	—	—	X	—	—
Complaints Rec'd	—	—	X	—	—
Enforcement Index	—	X	—	—	—
Traffic Index	—	X	—	—	—
Sick Leave Rates	—	—	X	—	—
Morale	—	X	—	—	—

Figure 62

# CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

## RATING TWO

STRATEGIC NEED AREA:

COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICES BY THE YEAR 2000

Instructions:

Evaluate each item for your agency as to what type of activity it encourages:

- |     |            |                         |
|-----|------------|-------------------------|
| I   | Custodial  | Rejects Change          |
| II  | Production | Adapts to Minor Changes |
| III | Marketing  | Seeks Familiar Change   |
| IV  | Strategic  | Seeks Related Change    |
| V   | Flexible   | Seeks Novel Change      |

Category:	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Mentality Personality	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—
Skills/Talents	—	—	—	<u>X</u>	—
Knowledge/Education	—	—	—	<u>X</u>	—
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—
Rewards/Incentives	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—
Power Structure	—	<u>X</u>	—	—	—
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure	—	<u>X</u>	—	—	—
Resources	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—
Middle Management	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—
Line Personnel	—	—	<u>X</u>	—	—

Figure 63



## **Summary of the Internal Strategic Assessment:**

### **Strengths:**

Management Skills  
Police Officer Skills  
Supervisory Skills  
Training  
Attitudes  
Image  
City Council Support  
City Manager Support  
Specialties  
Management Flexibility  
Enforcement Index  
Traffic Index  
Morale  
Top Managers:  
Skills/Talents  
Knowledge/Education

### **Weaknesses:**

Technology  
Organizational Climate:  
(Power Structure)  
Organization Competence:  
(Structure)

### **External Assessment:**

The NGT group next turned their attention to individuals or groups that have a stake or interest in meeting community expectations over the next decade (stakeholders), as well as any who could block or thwart efforts in this area (snaildarters). The following thirteen groups were identified as critical to any future implementation plan. A brief assessment by the NGT group of their basic position is included for each one.

### **Stakeholders & Snaildarters**

1. *Law Enforcement:* Could easily resist any changes in deployment policies or increased demands on line personnel. Lack the technology to monitor community expectations, and may feel that changes are unnecessary.

2. *Police Unions/Associations:* Will resist any loss of jobs, and/or income by members, and any action that would diminish dues, power and status. Old timers in unions will be white and new comers will be other ethnic groups. Separate unions along ethnic lines (like Miami P.D.) is likely.
3. *Government (Elected):* Will want the highest level of service for the least cost. Will favor any program that maximizes service to the community, and helps keep them in office.
4. *Government (Civil Service):* Could resist interaction with other ethnic groups in the community, as well as co-workers.
5. *City/County Commissions:* Will provide one of the best sources of information regarding community needs. Could become obstructive and uncooperative if not carefully staffed.
6. *General Population:* Increasing resistance to taxes and increases in department size, yet wants and demands increased service. Will view programs as necessary to maximize levels of service. May resent service or redeployment policies that favor other ethnic groups.
7. *White Ethnic Groups:* Will try to maintain the status quo as long as possible and will resent and resist any program that caters to other ethnic groups at their expense..
8. *Hispanic Ethnic Groups:* Will expect/need increased levels of service as they grow in numbers and political power. Demands for Hispanic officers and bilingual personnel will increase. Friction with blacks could increase as Hispanics make demands on affirmative action programs.
9. *Asian Groups:* Will also require increased levels of service as the ethnic groups grow. However, the problem is somewhat more complex because of the great differences in culture and language

between Asian ethnic groups. Increased street gang and organized crime activity.

10. *Black Groups*: Will suffer the most from ethnic shifts in the population because of their "underclass" status. Tension over competition for social services, affirmative action programs, jobs in government and changes in the community. Continued street gang activity probable.

11. *Business*: Will resist any changes that may impact the business district.

12. *Organized Labor*: Will not be representative of new ethnic majorities and will resist changes that shift political power to others. Will most likely compete with other ethnic organizations.

13. *Media*: Will play an increasingly important role in shaping public opinion. May exacerbate problems when friction between ethnic groups becomes evident. May also push for new civil rights legislation that could impact police operations.

#### Summary of the External Strategic Assessment:




Figure 64

As indicated by the above chart, the NGT group gave a strongly favorable assessment for a successful program of determining community expectations for police services. They were confident that *eleven* of the thirteen assumptions were important to the issue and *would respond as predicted*, and were uncertain about only two: one of which (Organized Labor) was not considered to be important to the issue.

However the other, *Police Unions* (or organizations) was considered to be vital to meeting community expectations during the next decade. Appendix 3, The Dark Side of the Force, illustrates the critical linkage between any successful police operation and employee labor organizations. The NGT group strongly recommend that ethnic fragmentation of police employee organizations be avoided, and when it does occur, administrators take immediate steps to heal the rift.

#### **Policy :**

As part of our overall consideration of policies helpful to the transition of police agencies in this area, I would like to share two interesting examples:

"Los Angeles police policy recognizes only one class of citizenship--first class citizenship. Any incident of police action which deviates from this policy is met with swift and certain *discipline*.

"A police department's community relations program begins with training, a firm human relations policy, and strong disciplinary machinery to enforce it...

"For those who question whether that degree of discipline is possible, I have an example. I am thinking of a certain Los Angeles police officer who walks a foot beat in the old

section of the city. The street is a racial melting pot. I know the officer personally; he is one of the 'old school', recruited long before psychiatric examinations were instituted. If there is a maximum number of racial and religious prejudices that one mind can hold, I am certain he represents it. This officer has been exposed to the complete range of human relations training...Of, course, he doesn't believe a word of it.

"This may surprise you--the officer's eight hour duty tour is characterized by tolerance, applied human relations, and equitable treatment of all persons. Both his division commander and myself have watched his work closely, a little wary that his deep-seated convictions might win out over discipline in moments of stress.

"This has not happened during the five years he has patrolled this highly critical district. We are very near the opinion that his intolerance has become the victim of enforced order--habit has won out over belief.

"*Discipline*, enforced compliance with police policy, is a key which is available to every police administrator. If it works in Los Angeles, it will work elsewhere. The entire community relations program is at stake on every officer in the field. It is here that the police department proves itself, or is found wanting."--Chief Parker, LAPD, 1954.

After considerable discussion, the NGT group concluded that they were in total agreement with Chief Parker's vision of individual officer responsibility. However, the type of discipline that worked in the 1950's is no longer a viable tool for today's police administrator.

Police agencies are unique organizations where many of the most critical decisions are made by line officers rather than executives.

Decisions which often occur as "snap" responses to life or death situations. In view of this fact, there are obvious advantages in fostering strong value systems in the police personnel at every opportunity, and personnel always perform best when they share a commitment for excellence with the administration. Consider the following expression of this ideal--it is one of the closest modern day mission statements to Sir Robert Peel that I have seen:

"We constitute an organization whose very existence is justified solely on the basis of community service. Our mission must be clearly expressed to both members of the department and to the community. The mission must be continually reexamined and updated in the context of the community served...

"Our broad philosophy must embrace a wholehearted determination to protect and support the doctrine of individual rights while providing for the security of persons and property in the community...

"People are the community's most valuable asset...The community has demonstrated its demand for a *well-trained cooperative, responsive, humanistic and professional* police department. The Department, therefore, has a continuing obligation to demonstrate to the community that it is *worthy* of such trust and to provide the type of police service expected."--Concord Police Department Manual, 1987.

**SECTION SIX**  
**IMPLEMENTATION**  
**(THINGS THAT WORK)**

## IMPLEMENTATION SUGGESTIONS

This section of the study includes a variety of successful methods used by other agencies to monitor and meet community expectations for police services. They are recommend to the reader as "things that work".

### Hiring Policies:

Several recent studies in the area of ethnic values point to the fact that *different ethnic groups have different value systems* (Walker, 1983; Carter, 1986). Hiring policies that put the agency in balance with the community have more than just "cosmetic" value to the organization--they are basic to the delivery of services.

In this regard I will quote Donald B. Walker, Kent State University, from his report on Black Values and the Black Community. " The findings tend to support the argument that blacks ought to be recruited into law enforcement because *they possess values in common with the black population* and this has the potential to improve the quality of law enforcement within our core cities." Other studies indicate that this is also true for Hispanics and Asians.

### Postal Surveys:

Postal surveys are inexpensive and, if carefully constructed, they can be a valuable resource to police administrators. They are most effective when sent to a limited clientele (such as recent victims of a specific crime), and are kept brief. additionally, since there is no opportunity to clarify issues, the questions must be kept as simple as possible. The following two examples illustrate the point. Both are single sheet documents with easily understood questions that can




require only a few minutes of time. The first questionnaire was used by a Los Angeles City Police Department Detective Commander to determine quality of detective services. The other, used by the New Zealand Police, checked on the quality of called for service:

### LAPD SURVEY

**LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**DARYL F. GATES**  
Chief of Police



**TOM BRADLEY**  
Mayor

P. O. Box 38158  
Los Angeles, Calif. 90038  
Telephone:  
(213) -  
Rel: 1-

Date \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Dear \_\_\_\_\_,

The Los Angeles Police Department is always concerned with the service it provides. You were recently the victim of a crime. A radio car responded to handle the call, and at a later date, you were contacted by a detective to complete the investigation.

You are one of a small number of citizens that I am personally contacting regarding the quality of our service. Would you please take a few moments and give me your opinion, using the attached evaluation scale.

Taking a few moments will help me to keep our service at the highest possible level. A business reply envelope is attached for your convenience. Postage will be paid for by the city.

We will appreciate you providing your name and address; however, this is optional. What I want most is your opinion.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,

**E. T. HOCKING, Lieutenant**  
Commanding Officer  
Hollywood Detective Division

ENC:

AN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY—AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER

Figure 65

## Quality of Service Evaluation

E—Excellent

G—Good

F—Fair

P—Poor

Quality of responding officer(s)' service \_\_\_\_\_

Responding officers' attitude \_\_\_\_\_

Responding officers' courtesy \_\_\_\_\_

Quality of follow-up detectives' service \_\_\_\_\_

Responding detectives' attitude \_\_\_\_\_

Responding detectives' courtesy \_\_\_\_\_

Responding detectives' knowledge \_\_\_\_\_

Additional Comments and/or Suggestions: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Name and address is optional.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_


City: \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 66

## New Zealand Survey

Please consider three aspects of the recent occasion in which you telephoned the Police — the telephone call, the promptness of the Police attendance, and the manner in which the problem was dealt with. Answer each question.

1. Did you use the 111 line? Yes/No
2. Was your call answered promptly? Yes/No
3. Did you feel confident that the problem was being understood? Yes/No
4. Did you feel confident that the proper attention would be given? Yes/No
5. How satisfied are you with the way your call was received?  
(Use the scale below to indicate)



- 
6. Taking into account any arrangement you made by telephone, was the Police attendance punctual? Yes/No
  7. If no, was an explanation given? Yes/No
  8. Would a faster response have made any difference to the outcome? Yes/No
  9. If Yes, state briefly why? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. How satisfied are you with the time which the Police took to attend?  
(Again use the scale below to indicate)



Figure 67

11. Did you feel confident that the Police attending were capable of dealing with the situation? Yes/No
12. Did the Police attending handle the problem to your satisfaction? Yes/No
13. If not, why not? (State briefly any shortcomings)

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---

---

- 
14. Sex: Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_
15. Age: Under 20 \_\_\_\_\_, 20-29 \_\_\_\_\_, 30-39 \_\_\_\_\_, 40-49 \_\_\_\_\_, 50-59 \_\_\_\_\_, 60 or over \_\_\_\_\_
16. Which category best describes your present situation?
- (a) Student
  - (b) Homemaker
  - (c) Employed
  - (d) Unemployed
  - (e) Retired
  - (f) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
17. If employed, which category best describes your present occupation?
- (a) Manual work
  - (b) Skilled tradesperson/artisan
  - (c) Clerical
  - (d) Salesperson
  - (e) Professional/executive
  - (f) Scientific/technical
  - (g) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 67 continued

### Los Angeles County Sheriff's Post Card Survey

The Los Angeles County Sheriff (Lakewood Station) has a post card survey personally delivered by responding deputies to persons who had called for service. The card expresses the desire to provide the best service possible and asks for the opinion of the caller on three issues: (1) Officer attitude, (2) officer performance and, (3) asks for comments. Both sides of the card are illustrated on page 105.



**Sheriff's Department**

The Sheriff's Department is concerned with providing competent and courteous law enforcement to the citizens we serve. To help us evaluate the quality of our service, we would appreciate your comments and suggestions:

On \_\_\_\_\_ Deputy \_\_\_\_\_ was assigned to your request for service regarding: \_\_\_\_\_

( ) Burglary                      ( ) Vandalism                      ( ) Other \_\_\_\_\_  
( ) Theft                              ( ) Disturbance

( ) Theft                      ( ) Disturbance

Was the Deputy:    ( ) Courteous            ( ) Indifferent            ( ) Rude  
                          ( ) Other

( ) Other

Would you rate the Deputy's performance as: ( ) Excellent ( ) Good

( ) Fair ( ) Poor ( ) Other \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

[illegible]

PLACE  
STAMP  
HERE

Captain Elmer Omohundro  
Lakewood Sheriff's Department  
5130 North Clark Avenue  
Lakewood, California 90712

Figure 68

## Counter Surveys

Several departments sent me examples of simple survey forms left on the counter for walk-in traffic to fill out while they are waiting to conduct other business. The form used by the City of Fountain Valley (all government services) is as follows:

### VALUED CITIZEN:

PLEASE HELP US. YOU'RE OUR REASON FOR BEING HERE. Service to you is our business! We would like to know how you feel about the quality of service you've received. Please help us to continually improve by taking a moment to complete our survey.

Your opinion is valued at the City of Fountain Valley.

Date of service \_\_\_\_\_

Department(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Employee's name (if known) \_\_\_\_\_

Please rate the following: (circle response)

	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	AVERAGE	POOR	NOT ACCEPTABLE
1. Greeted by smiles and in a courteous and timely manner:	5	4	3	2	1
2. Employee's attitude towards you: (Enthusiastic, concerned, helpful?)	5	4	3	2	1
3. Employee's willingness to answer questions:	5	4	3	2	1
4. Information given was accurate, timely and complete:	5	4	3	2	1
5. If employee didn't know required information, were you referred to someone who could help you?	5	4	3	2	1
6. Quality of service you received:	5	4	3	2	1
7. Overall satisfaction with our City services:	5	4	3	2	1
8. Additional comments and/or suggestions:	_____				
	_____				
	_____				

Your name (optional) \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_ City \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose of contact with the City: Obtain information/service \_\_\_\_\_  
 Obtain permit \_\_\_\_\_ Type \_\_\_\_\_  
 Complaint \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_

THANK YOU!  
 CITY MANAGER  
 CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY

Figure 69

## Quality of Service Evaluations

Perhaps the most impressive of all surveys to the public is the "Quality of Service Evaluation" also known as the "Patrol Audit". This is a formal review by a supervisor on all aspects of a specific call for service. Several departments have established formal procedures for a certain number of audits per employee per month. The procedure is most effective because of the personal contact required and the investment in time necessary to do an through audit. A copy of the form used by Los Angeles Police Department is as follows:

### QUALITY OF SERVICE EVALUATION

TYPE OF SERVICE AUDITED _____		
DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT _____	AUDIT DATE/TIME _____	
NAME OF OFFICER(S)/ASSIGNMENT _____		
LOCATION _____	I.H. # _____	(if available)
PERSON CONTACTED: NAME _____	PHONE _____	
ADDRESS _____		
RESPONSE TIME:	CALL RECEIVED (ACKD/ENRT/ATSC)	CLEARED
DFAR	_____	_____
INCIDENT HIST. (if available)	_____	_____
	TOTAL TIME	_____

### OPINIONS OF PERSON CONTACTED

	<u>SATISFIED</u>		<u>NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>	
	<u>VERY</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT</u>		<u>VERY</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT</u>
QUALITY OF SERVICE	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
RESPONSE TO CALL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OFFICER'S DEMEANOR (Concern)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OFFICER'S APPEARANCE	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OFFICER'S INTERVIEW AND INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
CITIZEN'S REMARKS	_____				

### AUDITING SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>		<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
WAS A POLICE REPORT REQUIRED?	_____	_____	TAKEN?	_____	_____
WAS A VICTIM'S MEMO REQUIRED?	_____	_____	GIVEN?	_____	_____
WERE PRINTS REQUIRED?	_____	_____	TAKEN?	_____	_____
WERE PHOTOS REQUIRED?	_____	_____	TAKEN?	_____	_____
WAS A BUSINESS CARD REQUIRED?	_____	_____	ISSUED?	_____	_____

THOROUGHNESS/ACCURACY OF REPORTS \_\_\_\_\_

EVIDENCE PROPERLY OBTAINED AND DISPOSED \_\_\_\_\_

SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ SERIAL # \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ SERIAL # \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

AUDITING SUPERVISOR \_\_\_\_\_ SERIAL # \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

AUDIT CHECK LIST

\_\_\_\_\_ REVIEW AND ATTACH RELATED REPORTS

\_\_\_\_\_ REVIEW AND ATTACH DFAR

\_\_\_\_\_ REVIEW AND ATTACH I.H.  
(if available)

\_\_\_\_\_ REVIEW WITH CONCERNED OFFICERS

\_\_\_\_\_ AUDIT IS OF OFFICER(S) ASSIGNED TO REPORTING SUPERVISOR

WATCH COMMANDER'S COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

REVIEWING WATCH COMMANDER \_\_\_\_\_ SERIAL # \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 71 (back side)



### **Personal Contact Surveys**

The final process to be illustrated in this section is a sample of a personal contact survey. This survey is the most expensive and time consuming. However, it gives the most data. The survey can be taken at almost any location such as: Shopping Malls, neighborhoods, Businesses, Churches, Special events, etc. The great advantage to this type of survey is that the personal contact provides clarification for any misunderstanding. Additionally, the form is filled out on the spot.

The survey illustrated on the following three pages (110-112) was taken by specially trained Law Enforcement Explorer Scouts at the Cerritos Shopping Mall, in the City of Cerritos, California.

Do you live in the City of Cerritos?

YES

NO

☐  
☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONE

1. Compared to most Southern California communities, how would you rate the fire department protection you get in Cerritos?

The fire department protection I get in Cerritos is:

Much better than most other So. Calif. communities  
A little better than most other So. Calif. communities  
About the same as most other So. Calif. communities  
Not quite as good as most other So. Calif. communities  
Not nearly as good as most other So. Calif. communities

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

2. Do you feel that the fire department protection you get in Cerritos now is better than it was 2 or 3 years ago, or not as good as it was 2 or 3 years ago?

The fire department protection I get in Cerritos now is:

Better than it was 2 or 3 years ago  
About the same as it was 2 or 3 years ago  
Not as good as it was 2 or 3 years ago  
I didn't live in Cerritos 2 or 3 years ago

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

3. Compared to most Southern California communities, how would you rate the police or sheriff's protection you get in Cerritos?

The police or sheriff's protection I get in Cerritos is:

Much better than most other So. Calif. communities  
A little better than most other So. Calif. communities  
About the same as most other So. Calif. communities  
Not quite as good as most other So. Calif. communities  
Not nearly as good as most other So. Calif. communities

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

4. Do you feel that the police or sheriff's protection you get in Cerritos now is better than it was 2 or 3 years ago, or not as good as it was 2 or 3 years ago?

The police or sheriff's protection in Cerritos now is:

Better than it was 2 or 3 years ago  
About the same as it was 2 or 3 years ago  
Not as good as it was 2 or 3 years ago  
I didn't live in Cerritos 2 or 3 years ago

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

5. Please check whatever words describe your feelings about the police or sheriff's departments serving Cerritos.

CHECK AS MANY AS YOU WISH

Modern ☐  
Unfriendly ☐  
Well trained ☐  
Have old equipment ☐  
Respond quickly ☐  
Incompetent ☐  
Well organized ☐  
Too small ☐

Poorly trained ☐  
Competent ☐  
Badly organized ☐  
Friendly ☐  
Not modern ☐  
Have good equipment ☐  
Respond too slowly ☐  
Too big ☐

About the right size ☐

6. Which one law enforcement agency do you think could provide Cerritos with the best protection?

Artesia-Cerritos Police Department ☐  
Cerritos Police Department ☐  
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ☐  
Los Angeles Police Department ☐  
Orange County Sheriff's Department ☐  
(Other) Write in your choice: \_\_\_\_\_ ☐  
No opinion ☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

7. Who provides Cerritos with law enforcement protection now?

Artesia-Cerritos Police Department ☐  
Cerritos Police Department ☐  
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ☐  
Los Angeles Police Department ☐  
Orange County Sheriff's Department ☐  
(Other) Who? \_\_\_\_\_ ☐  
I'm not sure ☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

8. Would you say that your law enforcement officers are doing?

An excellent job ☐  
A good job ☐  
A fair job ☐  
A poor job ☐  
No opinion ☐

PLEASE CHECK  
ONLY ONE

9. Have you personally, ever had any direct contact - for any reason - with police or sheriff's personnel in Cerritos?

YES

☐

NO

☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONE

9a. If you checked "YES", approximately when was the most recent time you personally had this direct contact?

Within the last year

☐

Within 1 - 2 years ago

☐

Over 2 years ago

☐

PLEASE CHECK  
ONLY ONE

10. What is your approximate age?

Under 20

☐

20 - 29

☐

30 - 39

☐

40 - 49

☐

50 - 59

☐

60 or over

☐

PLEASE  
CHECK  
ONLY  
ONE

11. What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

11a. Occupation of husband or wife? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Male

☐

Female

☐

PLEASE CHECK ONE

Interviewer # \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION SEVEN**  
**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the research and our analysis, the following conclusions and recommendations are offered:

### Conclusions:

A positive public perception of Law Enforcement is more often the result of individual officer attitudes and demeanor (friendliness, helpfulness and concern) than in efficiency, communications, and lower crime rates. Agencies lose community support when they cut services or otherwise ignore community expectations. The explosive growth of private security agencies is symptomatic of this problem (pages 1-6).

Based upon demographic research, the nation's employment and occupational structure is undergoing a major shift from a manufacturing to a service economy. A greater percentage of jobs in the service economy are poor paying compared to jobs in the industrial economy. Between 1963-1973, 20% of jobs paid poverty-level wages. This contrasts with 50% for jobs offered between 1979-1985, and creates serious problems for workers attempting to support families, and for young people entering the job market (page 22).

The high-level jobs in the new economy will require more skills and education than the urban poor possess and will likely contribute to the growing mismatch between jobs and the people in the cities (page 23).

The United States in the year 2000 will be a more unequal society than it is today. This growing inequality will probably bring many negative consequences for the quality of American life, including increased rates of crime and violence in our communities (page 26).

By the year 2000, the population under 30 years of age in California will be decidedly less than half white, and Hispanics will greatly outnumber any other subgroup. Among the most disturbing trends among Hispanic and black minority groups in the state are the school drop-out rates for both groups. If the existing educational trends among California's ethnic groups continue, the possibilities for major social problems become more real (pages 35-36).

A survey was developed to determine what methods were currently being used among Law Enforcement Agencies throughout California to determine community expectations for police services. Approximately 80% of the 408 police agencies in the state responded with the following results (page 45-57):

1. Most agencies are *passive* in their methods to determine community needs. A very small percentage of the total response indicated any type of *proactive* methods were used.
2. Police Departments survey for community expectations more frequently than do Sheriff Departments.
3. Small agencies (1-24 personnel) have the lowest rate of usage.
4. Large agencies (100-499 personnel) reported the highest rate of usage.

Over a five month period, a group of thirteen volunteers made up of educators, consultants, planners and businessmen met monthly to explore community expectations for police services over the next ten years (1987-1997). The group used the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) to: (1) identify trends, (2) forecast events, (3) evaluate the interaction between trends and events and (4) develop alternative strategies for creating the best possible future.

The group identified thirty-four trends most likely to influence community expectations for police services over the next decade. The group's consensus on the top five trends are as follows (page 60):

1. *The growing economic split between the "haves" and "have nots".* This trend has roots deeply imbedded in economic and educational conditions in California. Hispanics, (who represent the majority of California families with children), and blacks are rapidly becoming an "underclass" group. 50% of Hispanic and black children do not graduate from high school, and only a slight percent obtain college degrees. These factors insure the continuing uneven distribution of wealth in California along ethnic lines.

2. *Ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system.* The NGT group felt that pressure is building for all elements of the criminal justice system to come to grips with our continuing tide of criminal activity. However, in order to accomplish such a task, there must be a more effective coordination and integration of all segments of the system (Police, Courts, Custody, Probation, etc.) in their response to crime in California. Additionally, the supporting



elements (data banks, scientific services, communications, etc.) are fragmented and lack standardization. The group felt strongly that this trend will most likely result in a major overhaul of our existing criminal justice system in the next decade.

3. *Breakdown of the citizen attitudes towards conforming to the law.* The Group felt that the existing crime wave would not diminish, despite the overall reductions in crime that normally occur as the population grows older. This is primarily due to the large numbers of disadvantaged minority youth entering their crime prone years over the next decade. The group also pointed to a growing generalized disrespect for law and order throughout all segments of the population, fueled partly from trend number two (ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system).

4. *Ethnic and demographic changes in California and Los Angeles County.* The group expressed the opinion that the current ethnic and demographic changes occurring in the population will become a major factor in shaping the nature of community expectations for services. The recruitment of bilingual personnel is already becoming an imperative, and minorities are increasingly sensitive to their ratios of employment within police agencies.

5. *Ineffective termination of early (first offenders and juveniles) criminal behavior.* Since a large share of the crime rate is the result of juvenile activity, the group identified the continuing ineffective handling of juvenile offenders as a major trend to be considered. Our general

inability to cope with this issue in the past has spawned the explosive growth of organized (street gangs) as well as individual juvenile crime.

The group also identified twenty possible events that, should they occur, would make a significant impact upon community expectations for police services over the next ten years. The top five events are as follows (page 68):

1. *The California Jail and prison population reaches the saturation point, with no let up in the number of criminals being sentenced. A forced mass release of inmates occurs.* The saturation of several county jail systems has already occurred in California, with occasional court ordered releases of some inmates. State officials know that without significant changes, the State penal system will eventually reach the saturation point. Expanding the existing penal system is an expensive and unpopular alternative and will not keep pace with current trends. Prisons are unpopular on two counts; they drain funds for social programs and, are not wanted in the community. The group anticipates that this event will spark a significant state wide public reaction when it occurs.

2. *Major economic recession or depression drains the ability to fund the needs of the Criminal Justice System, and swells the ranks of citizens living in poverty.* California's world wide economic ties, and linkage to the Pacific Rim nations is discussed in section two of this study. Any refusal by the Third World to honor debts, or the loss of the edge that California enjoys in high technology would have dramatic effects upon our economy.

Section two also outlines the pervasive poverty among many families with children in California. The group predicted that there will at least be an economic recession during the next decade which will have its greatest impact on California's growing "underclass".

3. *Major increase in the crime rate with the resultant impact on patterns of living and attitudes towards the police.* The group tied this event to the growing ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system (trend #2). They predicted that at some point in time, the crime rate would make a quantum leap with resultant changes in public attitudes and lifestyle.

4. *A critical shortage of regularly paid, full-time police officers develops throughout California (much the same as the current teacher shortage).* A study of the teacher shortage in California illustrates the likelihood of this event. It is increasingly difficult to recruit qualified personnel to meet the need. This overall shortage will combine with critical shortages in bilingual and Hispanic personnel.

5. *Dominance of ethnic groups in the political process changes the political structure in California.* Political pressure to service the existing population detracts from the older, retired minorities. Demographers have stated that in the past, the transition of political power from an old ethnic majority to a new ethnic group can take as long as ten years. However, the NGT group felt that our information age had set the stage is set for a much quicker transition. They predict sweeping changes on the political

scene during the next decade, with some conflict between older whites and the needs of younger Hispanics. The problems will be further enhanced because the economic wealth of the state will reside with the minority "overclass" long after the political balance has shifted.

The group also created hypothetical scenarios from the data generated by the cross-impact analysis. Three possible futures were developed in section four of this paper (page 83).

#### **Recommendations:**

Law enforcement agencies in the state, with the possible exception of the very smallest, should strongly consider improving some of the proactive methods discussed in section six of this paper. These methods and survey techniques will greatly assist agencies in identifying local community needs and expectations for their services. Additionally, further study is required in the development of better and more effective methods of surveying the community.

In view of the dramatic demographic changes occurring throughout California, police administrators must study new methods to recruit members of the community that they service. The ethnic changes in our community will require changes in the delivery of police services. Different ethnic groups have different value systems and they will be reflected in their expectations for police services. More study is required in this area.

As the new "service economy" continues to emphasize *quality and excellence*, demands for more personal attention by the police will grow in the community. Officers must somehow develop a more caring and concerned attitude at a time when delivery systems are isolating the police from the community. This issue strikes directly at the development of an organizational culture devoted to excellence. We must learn how to become more skilled in changing the *values, attitudes and beliefs* of police personnel. New methods of training and supervision that focus on excellence must be developed for the new generation of police officer.

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**APPENDIX ONE**  
**THE WORLD ECONOMY**

## THE WORLD ECONOMY

### Critical Assumptions

#### International Structure:

1. Nation-state system, ineffective world government, weak international law.
2. U.S. and U.S.S.R. continue as the only superpowers.
3. No wars between major powers.
4. Wars between Third World nations.
  - \* Insurgencies, revolutions, and terrorism by Third World nations.
  - \* Limited superpower involvement.

#### Relations Between Trading Nations:

1. No change in major economic and political alignments.
2. Limited movement toward international law.
3. Possibly more ( but not severe) protectionism.
4. New worldwide trade agreements unlikely.
  - \* Some new regional and bilateral agreements possible.

#### Policies of the United States:

1. National security: less U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension.
2. Civilian spending priorities.
  - \* Continued Social Security and "Safety Net" programs.
  - \* Growth in civilian programs.

3. Deficits reduced

- \* Timetable altered in the event of a recession.
- \* Spending cuts to postpone and curtail military and civilian programs.
- \* Additional taxes--energy tax possible and added corporate taxes probable.

U.S. and World Economy:

1. International debt/banking problems resolved through cooperation.
2. Mild Economic slow down possible.
  - \* Magnified by deficit cutting in U.S.
3. No deep recession or depression.

North America:

As shown on the following chart, the populations of the United States and Canada continue to enjoy the highest per capita income of any other nations listed. The problem of international debt is being solved without a crisis in the international banking system, and the economy remains strong despite the October stock market crash. It is assumed that the United States will move toward a balanced Federal budget which will require some cuts in Federal spending and some new taxes.

The economy of California will continue to improve at a faster rate than other states in the nation because it will serve as the gateway to the Pacific Rim, and will continue to experience demographic shifts in its population over the next decade.

### NORTH AMERICA

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita 1985	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
		(Thousand U.S. \$)	During 1985	Annual Projected For 1986-1996
United States	240.0	16.6	2.3	2.7
Canada	25.4	13.0	4.9	2.8

### Western Europe:

The problems that will slow economic growth in Western Europe during the next decade include lavish (by American standards) unemployment benefits, social attitudes that discourage job mobility and the reentry of displaced workers, and barriers to starting service-sector enterprises like those that have provided many new jobs in the United States. As Western Europe competes for economic ascendancy with the United States, the European Community will continue to be divided internally on fundamental matters such as budgets, agricultural policy, unemployment benefits and production quotas. The American economic axis has already moved from the Atlantic Rim to the Pacific Rim as United States trade continues to expand with nations within the Pacific Basin.

**WESTERN EUROPE**

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita 1985 (Thousand U.S. \$)	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
			During 1985	Annual Projected For 1986-1996
West				
Germany	61.3	10.2	2.5	2.4
Italy	57.2	6.2	2.4	2.4
U.K.	56.5	8.0	3.7	2.0
France	55.1	9.3	1.3	2.4
Spain	39.0	4.4	1.9	2.

**Latin America:**

Latin America is emerging from a long recession. The drastic austerity programs have been successful in the sense that there has been no wave of defaults. The banking systems in the lending nations have survived and the economic growth among the borrowing nations, with the exception of Argentina, has gone from a negative growth to a positive rate. While the emergency is not over, it is expected that Latin America will continue to recover over the next decade.

The debt problem aside, the region faces problems of rapid population growth, runaway urban expansion, and the loss of democratic governments. Nevertheless most of Latin America is rich in natural resources and has a per capita GNP relatively high compared to most of the Third World. Current rates of growth and future forecasts are generally greater than rates of population growth

Mexico

Mexico, our immediate neighbor to the south, faces a range of political and economic problems which have been made worse by the fall in oil prices. However, Mexico continues to enjoy a per capita GNP that is high relative to most of Latin America (see chart).

Since 1938 Mexico has experienced an inflation-discounted economic growth rate of never less than 5% per year. Mexico had begun its protectionist policy after World War II, and for 30 years that policy helped to create the so-called Mexican Miracle--a period of economic growth unrivaled in the developing world.

The cumulative growth of her production in this period generated a nearly hundredfold increase in industrial output per capita, in spite of a more than 100% increase in population. But by the 1970s, many long-protected Mexican industries had grown fat, lazy and inefficient. The turning point was the 1985-86 collapse of oil prices, which sapped Mexico's major source of foreign exchange and forced the country to emphasize manufactured exports.

The new policies have forced an improvement in quality and have brought boom times to manufactures who have learned to compete. Motor-vehicle exports to the U.S. increased 185% in the first half of 1987 to \$543 million. Exports of engines, electrical equipment and cement also surged. Overall manufactured exports in the first nine months jumped 45% to \$7.12 billion.



With a per capita income of \$2,200, Mexico might be mistaken for a developed nation. Yet because the benefits of economic growth have been so inequitably distributed, Mexico exhibits some of the sharpest indexes of underdevelopment. Nearly half of the population subsists at the margin of nutrition or below it; nearly half of its children have no schooling; the disparity in income between the richest and the poorest approaches 40 times.

The bitter irony for Mexican industrialists is that Mexico continues to be at the mercy of forces beyond their control despite their Herculean efforts to become competitive in international markets. After six painful years since the collapse of oil prices, Mexico's prospects are still uncertain.

#### LATIN AMERICA

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita 1985 (Thousand U.S. \$)	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
			<u>During</u> 1985	<u>Annual Projected</u> For 1986-1996
Brazil	135.8	1.6	7.0	5.1
Mexico	79.1	2.2	4.4	3.4
Argentina	30.5	1.7	-4.3	3.2
Colombia	28.9	1.1	2.2	3.7
Peru	19.7	0.7	2.6	3.6
Venezuela	17.4	2.7	0.3	2.4
Chile	12.1	1.4	1.2	4.2

**Pacific Basin and China:**

The Pacific Basin holds great potential for substantial progress over the next decade. Of course, California is in a key geographical position as trade continues to expand between the United States and nations within the Pacific Basin. In a very real sense, California will become a "nation state" as the two economies become more integrated over the next decade.

Regional problems are the drop in oil prices which has slowed growth in Indonesia, political instability in the Philippines (the only country in the region with negative growth in 1985), and Japan's difficulty in maintaining its lead in modern plants and productivity. Additionally China's actions are critical to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

However, the economic changes in China hold great promise as fully one fifth of the earth's population become integrated in a world-wide economy. The prospects for California and the United States are enormous.

**PACIFIC BASIN & CHINA**

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita 1985	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
		(Thousand U.S. \$)	During 1985	Annual Projected For 1986-1996
China	1,047.0	0.4	8.0	5.5
Indonesia	162.3	0.5	2.8	3.7
Japan	120.6	10.8	4.4	3.6
Philippines	54.9	0.7	-3.6	2.4
Thailand	51.8	0.8	4.3	5.5
Korea	41.3	2.0	4.8	6.1
Taiwan	19.3	2.9	4.9	5.7
Australia	15.7	9.8	4.1	2.9
Malaysia	15.6	2.1	4.5	5.8
Singapore	2.6	7.0	0.2	5.0

**Indian Subcontinent:**

Over the years nations of the Indian Subcontinent have marched to their own economic drummer, and have ironically benefited from being poor credit risks in past years. Since they could not encumber themselves as heavily as other Third World Nations, the prospects for the three major nations in the region for the next ten years are better than for other less developed nations. As trade increases with the United States, California will enjoy the unique benefits created by her geography.

## INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita 1985 (Thousand U.S. \$)	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
			<u>During</u> 1985	<u>Annual Projected</u> For 1986-1996
India	760.9	0.3	5.0	5.0
Bangladesh	102.3	---	---	---
Pakistan	96.2	0.3	6.1	5.4

Middle East and Arab Africa:

In the Middle East and the Arab States of North Africa, the threat of war is high. War is ongoing in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Ethiopia and reliable economic data is not available. The table points to the fact that Middle Eastern wealth is highly concentrated. Most of the countries of the region are poor, and there are now booming economies comparable to Brazil or China.

Because California has large populations from nations within the region, the risk of hostilities boiling over into California exists as a real possibility.

**MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB AFRICA**

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
		1985 (Thousand U.S. \$)	During 1985	Annual Projected For 1986-1996
Turkey	49.4	1.0	4.7	3.8
Egypt	46.8	1.0	0.9	2.9
Iran	44.7	4.2	---	---
Ethiopia	36.4	0.1	---	---
Morocco	23.5	0.5	4.7	2.5
Algeria	21.9	2.3	-0.5	1.5
Iraq	15.7	3.8	---	---
Afghanistan	13.5	---	---	---
Saudi Arabia	11.2	8.9	-4.5	3.7
Syria	10.4	1.3	---	---
Israel	4.3	5.7	2.7	---

**Africa, South of the Sahara:**

There are severe political and economic problems in this region of the globe. Most of the countries rank among the poorest of the world. In most cases the economies are forecast to grow no faster than their respective populations.

## AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Nation	Population 1985 (Millions)	Per Capita	<u>% Rate of Change in Economy</u>	
		1985 (Thousand U.S. \$)	During 1985	Annual Projected For 1986-1996
Nigeria	95.1	0.6	2.3	3.5
Zaire	33.2	---	---	---
South Africa	32.4	1.7	---	---
Tanzania	21.7	0.2	2.0	3.1
Kenya	20.3	0.3	3.6	3.6

**APPENDIX TWO**

**AN ETHNIC STUDY OF THE**

**LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S**

**DEPARTMENT**

## INTRODUCTION

The following material was presented to a seminar on *Demographics Affecting Law Enforcement* which was held on May 29, 1986, by the Peace Officers' Association of Los Angeles County (P.O.A.). The source of the data was the result of research of files held by the Personnel Bureau of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Department, and from interviews with Mr. Walter Wilson, the Department's Affirmative Action Coordinator.

While the following statistics indicate that the Sheriff's Department is not currently in ethnic balance with the general county population, it should be noted that this is a problem common to all departments. No law enforcement agency in Los Angeles County is hiring in ethnic ratios equal to the 1986 census estimates, and this condition will become even more exasperated as we move towards the projected population ratios for the year 2000.

As the county population continues to evolve, we have already experienced some community relations problems as a result of our ethnic imbalance. We must realize that groups can begin to feel disenfranchised if they do not have a stake in the power structure. Additionally the lack of balance is easily exploited by those who seek to disrupt harmonious racial relations (Shaffer, 1987; Merina, 1987).

During my interviews with Mr. Wilson and our recruitment, background, and personnel people, I discovered a real frustration in not being more successful in their efforts to balance the existing ethnic ratios. The current ratios are not indicative of either past or present efforts. There continues to be a considerable effort being spent on recruitment of minority ethnic groups.



## ETHNIC STUDY OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENT

There are no "quick fixes" when dealing with ethnic issues. The problems related to hiring practices designed to balance law enforcement agencies are more complex than most people think. Each ethnic group has unique "culture patterns" that resist integration into either the County or Departments' work forces. Therefore, ethnic diversity (or the lack of it) is a long term issue and must be dealt with in terms of *years* rather than months.

The experience of the Miami Police Department in this area is a classic example of moving too quickly without proper regard to "culture patterns" within various ethnic groups (Dorschner, 1987). These patterns must be considered in any recruitment/employment program designed to bring an agency into ethnic balance. Four major cultural patterns which illustrate the point and which are supported by this study are:

1. The Hispanic culture has dramatically limited the employment of Hispanic women among law enforcement agencies. As a result, very few Hispanic women respond to our recruitment efforts and apply for employment as either sworn or civilian employees. In our agency they are only **12.9%** of our civilian work force, and **1.4%** of our sworn employees.

The cultural forces among Hispanics will continue this trend for some time--or at least until they become more culturally involved in Law Enforcement and accept the notion of working women. This is a major cultural force to be reckoned with and overcome if more Hispanic women are to be hired.

2. The strength of women in the black culture is in stark contrast to the underemployment of Hispanic women. 33% of our black sworn employees are woman, and they outnumber black civilian men by 300%. In contrast with black male applicants, our recruitment people report that black women rarely fail an employment interview. This employment trend is not unique to law enforcement agencies--the Wall Street Journal recently reported that of the black college graduates between the ages of 25 and 54 there are 770,00 black women compared to 633,00 men. In the professions the ratio gets even more lopsided. Among the country's black MBA's 60% are women.

3. One of the most obvious anomalies in the county work force is that despite the large percentage of Hispanics in the county population, a *greater* number of blacks are employed than are Hispanics. Of the four ethnic groups employed by the county, as well as the department, Hispanics are the most underemployed. In view of the rapid future growth of Hispanics, this situation can only worsen as time goes on, and could lead to conflict between black and Hispanic affirmative action demands.

4. Employment in law enforcement is not acceptable among most Asian ethnic groups who raise their children to enter other professions. The feelings against becoming a police officer run deep and usually take generations to overcome.

5. Despite past efforts to the contrary, the overwhelming majority of our eligible applicants to become sworn officers continues to be white males. This is partly due to the tremendous school drop-out rates (50% state-wide) of the

Hispanic and black ethnic groups. The background problems such as drug usage, that seem to occur more frequently in lower economic neighborhoods are also a contributing factor.

Since it takes at least five years to qualify for promotion to Sergeant, a natural consequence of this trend is that our supervisory and management pipeline will also continue to be white male. The ethnic balance at the higher ranks can lag as much as 15 years.

The statistics for the Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Department are as follows:

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
SWORN & CIVILIAN  
(8,546)**

66.4%
13.8%
16.7%
3.0%

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
SWORN ONLY (6,342)**

76.9%
12.3%
9.2%
1.6%

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
CIVILIAN ONLY (2,204)**

White	47.3%	36.8%
Hispanic	30.5%	17.5%
Black	12.2%	38.3%
Asian	8.5%	7.2%

The following set of charts outlines our ratio on men to women employees:

**Sworn and Civilian (8,546)**

Men	74.5%
Women	25.5%

**Sworn Only (6,342)**

Men	88.9%
Women	11.2%

**Civilian Only (2,204)**

Men	33.3%
Women	66.7%

The following set of charts outlines our ethnic balance according to rank:

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
DEPUTY SHERIFF  
(4,670)**

73.6%
14.0%
10.4%
2.0%

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
DEPUTY IV (337)**

78.4%
8.6%
12.0%
1.0%

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
SERGEANT (826)**

89.1%
5.5%
5.0%
0.4%

**L.A. COUNTY GENERAL  
POPULATION:**

White	47.3%
Hispanic	30.5%
Black	12.2%
Asian	8.5%

**L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF  
LT. & ABOVE (325)**

92.2%
4.3%
3.4%
0.1%

**DEPARTMENT RECAP:  
TOTAL SWORN (6,342)**

	WHITE		HISPANIC		BLACK		ASAIN		TOTAL:	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%:
MEN:	4,417	69.7%	685	10.8%	431	06.8%	95	01.5%	5,632	88.8%
WOMEN:	457	07.2%	95	01.5%	152	02.4%	6	00.1%	710	11.2%
TOTAL:	4,874	76.9	780	12.3%	583	09.2%	101	01.6%	6,342	100%

**DEPARTMENT RECAP:  
TOTAL SWORN & CIVILIAN (8,546)**


	WHITE		HISPANIC		BLACK		ASAIN		TOTAL:	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%:
MEN:	4,755	55.6%	789	09.2%	648	07.6%	170	02.0%	6,366	74.5%
WOMEN:	916	10.7%	391	04.6%	782	09.2%	90	01.1%	2,180	25.5%
TOTAL:	5,671	66.4	1,180	13.8%	1,430	16.7%	260	03.0%	8,546	100%

**APPENDIX THREE**

**THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORCE**

**(A STUDY OF THE MIAMI POLICE)**



# TROPIC



**The  
Breakdown**  
What went wrong  
with the  
Miami  
Police?



Shake-ups, breakups,  
larcenies, drug  
running, murder.  
What has happened  
inside the  
Miami Police  
Department  
is a crime



# THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORCE

BY JOHN DORSCHNER

**T**he real problem, the one that really rankles Miami cops, is when they knock on doors, and people peer through a window and see the cop from Miami P.D. in his regulation blue uniform, with his regulation silver badge, his regulation black belt, his regulation Smith and Wesson, with the regulation yellow-and-blue city insignia circling the green palm tree — they see all that, and they ... don't ... open ... the ... door.

This has happened to officers Rene Landa and Rudolfo Hierro and Luis Diazlay, and to a lot of other Miami cops.

Residents peer through the windows and ask: "What do you want?"

They hesitate even when they have just called to report a burglary in their house or a disturbance in the neighborhood. They make the call, and then when the cop shows up, they start thinking, well, this person looks like a cop, and acts like a cop, but is he a cop? And even if he is a cop, how do I know he's an honest cop? How do I know he's not a burglar?

The officers hate this, of course. They became cops because they wanted people to admire them, to sigh thankfully when they arrive on a scene, sirens blaring, lights flashing — and now they face the closed, chained, dead-bolted door, as if they were burglars.

But what really hurts, the thing that makes it hard to be a Miami police officer these days, is that the wildest, most unkind suspicions are not completely unfounded. It has come to this.

## The Division

**W**hat a mess Miami P.D. is in. The FBI has launched a broad investigation, suspecting pervasive corruption, subpoenaing the records of 25 officers. Miami cops

have been charged with murder, with shooting up a doper's house, with conspiring to sell police radios and badges, with big-time dope dealing. The elite Special Investigation Section opens its safe and finds \$150,000 missing. In the back of the police compound, a simple bicycle padlock is clipped and several hundred pounds of marijuana are reported missing.

Miami P.D. trembles with tension and uncertainty. There have been three chiefs in a little more than three years: One was fired at 2:47 a.m. following a frenzied night of conspiracy and accusations. Another was asked to retire. The current chief, Clarence Dickson, believes that the marijuana theft may have been carried out by rivals inside the department in an attempt to get him fired. There have been persistent rumors that Dickson is about to resign or be shuffled aside in favor of a new deputy administrator.

How bad is it? Consider this memo: "Paranoia and suspicion has run rampant throughout the Police Department and City Hall, to the extent that free verbal expression cannot be exchanged without fear that the halls, telephones, desks, walls and office of everyone who is part of the decision-making process is illegally bugged."


That memo wasn't written by some cowering functionary with a gripe or a grudge.

Its author was the chief himself, Clarence Dickson.

Talk to the cops — colonels and lieutenants and sergeants and just plain cops on the beat — and they paint a portrait of a department confused, chaotic, demoralized, driven by rumor and leaks and fear.

The publicity on the corruption and on the tumultuous politics has been widespread and seemingly unending. There has been plenty of comment on the sad state of the police department, but barely a word on how it got that way. How did one of Miami's most essential institutions suffer such a disastrous breakdown?


There is no shortage of insiders willing to offer their version of the real reasons for the



extended nightmare of a police force going wrong. Still, the discussion has not gone public for a good reason: It is dangerous stuff. It is about ethnic tension, racial distrust.

Listen to the cops and you hear disillusioned Anglos, suspicious blacks and defensive Hispanics. Their perspectives are so different that it seems as if they are describing three departments, not one.

The black and Hispanic organizations now have separate but equal bulletin boards outside the first-floor locker rooms. Some Hispanic officers complain that the FBI investigation is really a vendetta against Hispanics, perhaps initiated by angry Anglo or black officers — 18 of the 25 officers named in the subpoenas are Hispanics. Bitter Anglos race to the telephone to call the news media any time there is the slightest embarrassment within the



JOHN DORSCHNER is a Tropic staff writer. His most recent story for the magazine was about cigarette smoking.

department. (Indeed, news organizations were tipped off about a stripper performing at the station while the event was still going on, before the chief's office knew about it.)

Miami has undergone a more dramatic ethnic transformation in the last two decades than any other American city. With it has come a tidal wave of crime and racial unrest. From the beginning, the Miami police have been in the middle of it. Cops' jobs have been complicated, made more dangerous. The temptations for corruption have poured in with the suitcases full of cash. Two devastating riots in the last 10 years were touched off when white police officers killed blacks under suspicious circumstances.

The city, in its struggling and imperfect way, has attempted to respond to the pressures. At the heart of the response is an affirmative action program, brought about by a federal consent decree, that has revolutionized the police department. Within a two-year stretch, the Miami Police Department went from being a bastion of Anglo males to a force that is 60 percent minorities.

And here is the really awful possibility, the charge too inflammatory to easily make part of public debate: that in the remaking of the Miami Police Department lie the seeds of its destruction. But even if you have not seen that in the newspapers, it is precisely what many police officers are thinking.

Paul Oboz, an Anglo colonel who recently retired: "I attribute our descent from superiority to affirmative action."

Sgt. J.J. Williams, head of the black officers association: "It's not that the consent decree has created a problem. It's the people fighting against the consent decree, that's what's wrong."

Sgt. Sebastian Aguirre, leader of the Hispanic Officers Association: "This isn't the '60s. It's the '80s. And we're building the department for the year 2000. If you can't make the change, get out."

It would be painful for any institution as pressurized as a police department in a large, high-crime city to absorb such dissension and change. And it would be even harder if the change had been rushed and mishandled, creating a poisonous atmosphere that forces good cops out and rewards cronyism and incompetence — an atmosphere that breeds corruption.

Or has this unprecedented remaking of an urban police department — the ideal of reformers of the previous decade — in fact succeeded remarkably, with serious but inevitable growing pains? Are the problems due more to lingering bigotry and covetous politicians eager to build personal fiefdoms?

These are difficult and sensitive questions, not often raised because even to raise them can seem racist. But the questions are there, permeating the police department.

As one colonel says, "We are a divided police department because we are a divided city."

## The Sergeant

**I**t was 7:30 a.m., and he was hunched over a bagel and a cup of coffee in a rear booth of Berney's

Restaurant. He had just finished a 10-hour midnight shift, and his eyes had that hooded, exhausted look that put him out of step with a crowd of workers revving up for the start of their day.

This is Sgt. Ed Westpy, a bald man with a solid jaw and dark, heavy eyebrows that give him a look of authority: the perfect look for a cop.

Ken Harms, a former chief, will tell you: "The Ed Westpys represent the supervisory backbone of the police department." There are a lot of people like Westpy in the department, angry middle-echelon Anglos who were trapped when the rules changed in midcareer. Most don't want their names used.

the Liberty City riots. Westpy was not happy with the result: "They got quantity and they didn't get quality. ... If you had to go out and hire 100 white Anglos tomorrow, and you had to pick the first 100 of them off the street, I'd hate to think what kind of quality you'd get. And that's what happened."

His supervisors, he said, complained about the written reports of the new recruits. The brass wanted him to smooth out the language before turning the reports in. Westpy shook his head at the idea. "What do they expect? You're hiring people who can't read and write. I mean, I always thought my spelling was bad, but to see these guys. The higher-ups complain, and I say, 'I can't teach English.' ..."

At first, Westpy said, he swallowed hard and went on. He understood the goal, he understood why it might be necessary to sacrifice some aptitude in language skills to recruit a Miami police force that better reflected Miami: "That's hard to take at first, but you can live with it."

*"They hired us to be one color. Blue. But as soon as you get out of the police academy, you're different."*

*— Black officer Walter Byars*

Westpy is different.

"I'm a little difficult," Westpy warns, puffing on a Winston Light. "I speak what's on my mind, and I don't pull any punches."

He started the department's SWAT team and the marine patrol unit, but as Westpy tells it, when Chief Harms was fired in January 1984, some people in the hierarchy were concerned because he and Harms were fishing buddies. He was considered a Harms man, a loyalist to the old administration. Suddenly he found himself working midnight shifts. After 18 years on the force, he couldn't sink any lower.

"I used to put 50, 60 hours a week in my first 17 years. ... But when you just get jerked around, you say, 'Hey, wait a minute. What am I doing here?'"

"I'm tired, as simple as that. You get kicked in the teeth enough. ... I am going to do my job, no more, no less."

Westpy has seen some astounding changes since he came down from the North to join the department in 1969. Back then the Police Benevolent Association was still white-only, and he refused to join until it became integrated. "I have my prejudices, same as anyone else," Westpy says. "But if any job ever existed where the color of a man's skin shouldn't matter, this is it."

Then came the hiring frenzy of the early '80s, following Mariel and

But then, he says, it became clear that the affirmative action wasn't going to stop at recruitment. The new officers left vertical streaks as they leapfrogged over the old guard — men who had come in at about the same time as Westpy and slowly worked their way up to lieutenant and captain. Overnight, sergeants became majors. "What's that tell all the hard-working lieutenants and captains?"

Since Westpy was put on midnights, he has been offered better assignments, but he's turned them down. On midnights, without the brass around, cops can do their work with a minimum of interference. "I've got seven people working for me on midnights. Three of them are black. We all get along very well. I wouldn't trade any of them."

But his loyalty does not extend to the people at the top. He has some good words to say about Chief Dickson, but of the others he says, "There's some there who I seriously doubt if they can do a policeman's job on the street."

## The Frenzy

**M**iami police scandals have come one after another, each one generally reported as if it had sprung full-blown from nowhere. What seems puzzling and chaotic in

freeze-frame makes a sense in the context of the turbulence of recent history. The problem with Miami police, those who know will tell you, is Miami.

Until 1960, Miami was small and Southern. Police officers were white males. They were dedicated guys, most of them, military vets who fell naturally into law enforcement. They worked hard; they played by the rules; they took the tests for promotion, and if they were bright enough, they could expect regular promotions over the years: sergeant to lieutenant, to captain. Being a cop provided a good, stable life, and the cops liked it that way.

In the '50s, Hispanics were virtually nonexistent in the city and on the force. There were black cops but the department was segregated. Blacks were classified as "patrolmen," a step lower than "officers." They could not attend the police academy; they had no chance for promotion. And the PBA, which was the union bargaining agent, was limited to white males.

Slowly, the department integrated. In the mid-'60s, blacks and whites were teamed in patrol cars. In 1971, black officers sued for membership in the PBA. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld their request. Another lawsuit alleged that blacks had been unfairly denied promotions. The courts agreed. Several blacks were promoted.

But what about Hispanics? In the '70s, Cubans were becoming a majority of the city's residents, and the police didn't seem to be adjusting. In 1974, Mayor Maurice Ferre pointedly illustrated the problem to 100 spectators by calling the police complaint desk and shouting, "¡Emergencia! ¡Emergencia!"

The cop responded: "Speak in English."

The U.S. Justice Department began demanding an "affirmative action" program by threatening to cut off all federal funds unless 56 percent of all new cops be from minority groups. Another condition: All new hires would have to be City of Miami residents. This restriction, it was felt, would force the police department to reflect the demographics of the city.

Without much debate, the affirmative action program was agreed upon by city and feds in 1977. At the time, it didn't seem to mean much because the cops were doing little hiring anyway. And in fact, little changed. Two years later, a newspaper editorial decried the fact that the police force was only 9.6 Hispanic in a city where Hispanics had become the majority.

In the fall of 1979, the city commission had a Latin majority for the first time. Mayor Ferre announced that "it's simply not acceptable" that the police force be such an Anglo bastion. He proposed hiring not 56 percent minorities, but 80 percent.

Again, the proposal aroused little debate: It seemed both sensible and

academic, since the police department was doing little hiring.

Then came 1980: the flood of new immigrants from Mariel, some of whom were career criminals, followed by the Liberty City riots.

The city was torn and trembling. Crime rates were soaring. Everyone was demanding more cops, and many were frankly tired of Anglo cops. The riots, after all, had been sparked by the acquittal of five white Metro police officers who had been accused of beating to death a black insurance executive. Getting more minority police officers seemed not only a way to fight crime but also a way to reduce the roiling anger of the city's minorities.

So it was that a hiring frenzy began. At the time, it seemed the best possible solution: more cops, more minorities. Things could only get better, or so it seemed.

City personnel officials insisted then, and continue to insist today, that they never lowered standards in the new hiring crunch, but, in retrospect, many observers think that it was this rush for new officers, not affirmative action itself, that was to lead to the department's future problems.

Geoffrey Alpert, head of the criminal justice program at the University of Miami, said recently that there was "absolutely" a connection between the mass hiring and the department's current problems: "We're seeing the consequences of that indiscriminate hiring."

Desperate for new officers, police recruiters found a very small pool of talent within the Miami city limits. In effect, the department was being forced to choose not just from minority groups, but from a particularly small sampling of minority groups — lower-income, less-educated people who were found in the core city. If recruiters could have concentrated on more affluent areas outside the city, such as Coral City or Richmond Heights for blacks, Kendall or West Dade for Hispanics, say recruiters, they might have been able to find better applicants.

Just as bad, from the veteran police officers' view, the personnel people had taken over the testing of applicants. The theory was that the Anglo police officers were prejudiced against minorities, so it would be better for unbiased outsiders to do the testing. The new tests combined the scores of the educational and psychological parts of the exam. The theory was that if someone wasn't equipped psychologically to be a cop (overly aggressive, too timid), the test would weed him out. But in practice, it meant that an applicant who scored low on the educational portion and high on the psychological could still make it onto the police force.

With dismay, police officials learned that recruits were going through the academy with reading levels as low as the fifth or sixth

grade. The city had to initiate remedial reading and writing classes for police officers — classes that are still going on.

Within two years, the force went from 650 officers to 1,050, an unprecedented increase. The department was beginning to reflect the ethnic-racial makeup of the city. Many veteran Anglo officers, seeing little chance for promotion, were quitting. Those Anglos who remained — including the bulk of middle-echelon management, the sergeants and lieutenants and captains — became "disillusioned and discouraged," in the words of ex-chief Harms.

Today, two out of five Miami cops are Hispanic. Almost one in five is black. Women make up 11 percent of the force. And the once-dominant Anglo male now makes up only one-third of the force.

(By contrast, when the Metro-Dade police force started its own massive recruitment drive to redress ethnic imbalance in the early '80s, it sought only the best minority applicants possible, wherever it could find them; it even sent a recruiter to Puerto Rico. The entire hiring operation was carried out without the same sense of urgency; today, one-third of the Metro force is minorities.)

In the early '80s, Miami was hiring at such a fast rate that there wasn't time to train recruits properly. More than affirmative action, more than the hiring limitations many veteran officers believe, it was this lack of training that was to cause problems. It was "a miracle," Chief Dickson said recently, that this frenzied hiring did not lead to "total catastrophe."

Young officers out of the academy only six months became field training officers for rookies. The results were disastrous: In December 1982, Officer Luis Alvarez, hired just the year before and already the subject of five citizen complaints, was showing a rookie through an Overtown video arcade when he ended up shooting Nevell Johnson Jr., age 20. The shooting sparked disturbances that lasted several days, and created a rift between Hispanics and blacks, both in the community and in the police department.

When Officer Alvarez was put on trial for manslaughter, Hispanic officers contributed money for his defense, sat behind him in the courtroom, and even planned a motorcade on his behalf to City Hall before they were warned that it might spark another race riot.

George Adams, then a sergeant and a leader in the black officers group, was offended: "You don't rub it in the face of the black community by standing up for Alvarez like that. That's insensitive. They're saying, 'We're a group of Alvarezes, and the same thing could happen again tomorrow.'"

Blacks versus whites, Hispanics versus blacks, Anglos versus everybody. The city commission was

changing, and the pressures were mounting. This new mixture of politics and law enforcement did not make a healthy concoction.

When Chief Harms found that Sgt. Sebastian Aguirre was going with other Hispanic officers to talk to commissioners at Dinner Key about more promotions for Hispanics, the chief accused Aguirre of trying to get him fired. The chief then turned the tables, firing Aguirre, who had to initiate a lawsuit in order to get his job back.

Chief Harms was trapped between warring factions: promoting far more minorities than the old Anglo officers wanted, but not enough to placate Howard Gary, the black city manager. Harms, struggling to survive, was getting into power politics. In January 1984, he lost. During a frenzied night of intrigue and paranoia, Gary ended up firing Harms in a late-night phone call.

The new chief was Herbert Breslow, a steady and taciturn cop. Breslow quickly followed the city manager's suggestion by doubling the number of top brass, including more Hispanics, blacks and a woman in the top echelon. For the first time, the force had an integrated hierarchy that came close to mirroring the community. Some civic leaders praised the promotions, but within the police department, attitudes were decidedly mixed.

The problem was who among the minorities were getting the promotions. Seven officers were leapfrogged from sergeant to major, bypassing a large group of lieutenants and captains. Many of these leapfroggers were politically connected: Jack Sullivan, an Anglo who was a former head of the predominantly white Fraternal Order of Police; Mary Stair, an organizer of the women's officer group; George Adams, a leader in the black benevolent association. These three leaped ahead of minority officers who were higher ranked but apparently lacked the political connections.

Former Miami police colonel Richard Witt, now Hollywood's chief of police, says the leapfrog promotions sent "a message loud and clear. The message: 'If you are going to advance your career, you can study, work hard, do well on the tests, or you can become political, standing up for your group, so your group will stand up for you when it comes time for promotions.'"

Racial-ethnic strife, in other words, had become institutionalized in the department. A cop had to stand firm with his group, opposing the appeals of the other groups, or he (or she) would have a rough time getting promoted.

Many of the rank-and-file — blacks, Hispanics and women, as



well as Anglo males — thought the promotions were so cynically political that some lost faith in their ability to climb on merit alone.

Officer Rene Landa, a young Hispanic: "Why did they pick the heads of the organizations? Because they assumed that if the leaders of these organizations were happy, then everybody would be happy. But how are the men supposed to feel when they see all these lieutenants and captains passed over?"

Chief Breslow lasted barely a year before being squeezed out by City Hall. On Jan. 9, 1985, a press conference was called to announce the appointment of Clarence Dickson to the post of police chief. Dickson, the first black to hold the title, stood up and immediately displayed the insecurity that went with the job of being Miami's No. 1 cop: "Even if I'm not here next week," he said, "I reached the top."

Dickson's first act was to promote an Anglo and a Puerto Rican to assistant chief posts, and to retain a Cuban as an assistant. He said he was doing so to promote harmony in Miami. He might as well have added ... in the Miami Police Department.

## The Game

**P**ig Bowl IV: The annual football game between Miami cops and Metro cops.

A beige Mercedes limo delivers two of the fabulous BeeGees, and a helicopter plops down in the middle of the football field with the fabulous Don Johnson (dressed in no-earth-tone lime-and-white), but for the cognoscente, the truly interesting action is taking place on the sidelines.

Over on the Metro side are the "Deputy Dawgs," a good-old-boy cracker kind of name, fitting a department that is still two-thirds Anglo. Pacing behind the Dawgs' bench is Ray Bedal, a squat detective from the Organized Crime Bureau, who's dressed as a perfect "Boss Hawg," in white suit and white cowboy hat, just like the character on the old *Dukes of Hazzard* show. In case one misses the team's country leaning, ol' Boss is being trailed by a young lady in cowboy hat and fringed mini-dress.

But what's most interesting about the Metro side of the field is what's missing: politicians. None of the Metro commissioners are mingling with the team, none are obvious in the stands.

Now, look over at the Miami police side. This team has a nice neutral name, the Force, fitting for a multiethnic, multiracial department. Here the politicians are obvious, and it is here the knowledgeable ones in the stands are watching carefully, much the way observers in Moscow look at the positioning of the top pols on the Red Square podium.

To the right of the bench, Mayor Xavier Suarez roams in a blue Force jersey and designer jeans, chatting with Chief Clarence Dickson, who's wearing an off-white cowboy hat with his Force jersey and designer jeans.

Farther down the bench, City Manager Cesar Odio is chatting with Michael Mahoney, an assistant chief whom Dickson recently forced into

retirement. The rumor mill has it that Dickson had feared Mahoney was trying to sabotage him and get his job. And here he is, back for the game.

"What is he doing here?" several whisper in the stands. Is Cesar Odio smiling at him to be polite? Or does this mean something bad for Dickson, who is staying over on the right-hand side of the bench, 20 yards from Mahoney. And why is nobody talking to Col. Guillermo Zamora, directly behind the bench? Is it because Zamora has fallen out of political favor, or is it because he's supposedly one of the FBI's top targets?

Meanwhile, up in the stands, old J.L. Plummer is holding court. Here's the city commissioner who loves being an amateur cop, patrolling with the cops at night, and who's sitting up there with him? None other than Col. Walter Martinez. What's that supposed to mean? Martinez is one of the names on the FBI list, too, but he's also said to be very close to the city manager, and now if he's close to Plummer as well ...

The knowledgeable spectators in the stands are watching all this, because they know how much politics influences the Miami Police

## The Mood

**H**ow does all of this turmoil and discontent on the police force affect the Miami citizen? Is it making the city a more dangerous place to live? The crime stats, which rise and fall with no clear pattern, prove little. George Kirkham, a criminologist at Florida State, says, "Crime is an independent kind of thing. It's going to go up and down, regardless of what the police department does. Unemployment, poverty — all sorts of variables affect crime."

A more complicated question is how cops behave in a demoralized force with uncertain leadership such as Miami's. Here we are dealing with speculation, really, because most officers work alone in patrol cars, their hour-by-hour activities unsupervised by anyone.

Leonard Territo, criminologist at the University of South Florida: "It's no different than any other employee who's unhappy with his work. ... For instance, a patrolman decides not to take action. Most times, when he decides not to do something, he

*Literacy is one casualty of the hiring frenzy. Mistakes in police reports are legend, such as the time an officer on a traffic accident wrote about "squid marks."*

Department, and to them the political choreography on the sidelines becomes much more important than the game.

"We do feel there is too much politics," Sgt. Williams of the black officers group will explain later. "It's hard to tell who's running the police department when you have that pressure from City Hall."

On this, at least, the different factions of cops agree: There's too much interference from the City Hall at Dinner Key, and too many police officers who try to play politics.

"That's true," says Sgt. Sebastian Aguirre. "There should be only one politician in the department — the chief."

But in fact, there are many politicians, and word spreads quickly through the department when, say, an ambitious captain has breakfast at a Denny's with civic leaders from northeast Miami. So-and-so was seen at a Kiwanis Club meeting with Commissioner such-and-such. Col. X knows a contractor who's a big contributor to Commissioner Y. And so it goes. Rumors abound that even low-ranking officers have frequent contact with city commissioners. "And then," says Franklin Foote, a psychologist at the Urban Studies Institute, which has been hired by the police department as a consultant, "you have your middle-echelon saying, 'Well, I better be careful when I supervise him, because he might complain to a commissioner.'"

probably won't be discovered."

Ken Nelson, head of Miami's FOP: "If they observe a violation, they're going to do something about it. That's an inner instinct. But let's say nothing is happening, and so if they're feeling down, maybe the officer is patrolling over on Biscayne Boulevard, where he's not going to see anything, rather than on Third Avenue and 13th Street, in Overtown, where a lot more crime takes place. In other words, he's not out aggressively looking for things."

Another sergeant, who doesn't want to be identified: "The anticipated level of service is not as high as it should be. You get the idea, 'Don't make waves, don't do things that could make trouble.' So you go park the car somewhere. You answer the call, but you don't do anything else. The extra patrol, the extra investigation doesn't get done." The officer doesn't check on the hardware store that has been frequently burglarized, or doesn't scare the crack dealers off their typical corner. If he's in a foul mood, adds the sergeant, "he's also more likely to write traffic tickets. 'The s--- slows downhill.'"

Dick Witt, the ex-colonel: "There's a tendency to go through the motions. 'I'll go up one street and down another. Don't look for things, very brief on reports. You don't go back through alleys. You don't beat the bushes. These guys on the corner — you figure you won't check them out. There's whores on the boulevard, so what?"

## The Gripe

**"P**erhaps," the attorney announced, standing at the podium in the semi-circular federal courtroom, "the greatest ally in this case has been history."

Robert Klausner, attorney for the Fraternal Order of Police, was speaking in the courtroom of James W. Kehoe, U.S. district judge. He was offering up facts and figures to show how far the Miami Police Department had come since the 1977 consent decree, the instrument for affirmative action through hiring and rapid promotion of minorities.

Behind him sat an earnest young man: Ken Nelson, the current FOP president. Back in 1981, when he had expressed interest in becoming a Miami cop — as he explained later — "they told me not to apply, I wouldn't make it, because I was a white Anglo male."

Now, he was spearheading the union's fight to get the consent decree abolished.

The battle had begun a year ago, when FOP conducted a vote of all Miami police officers. The majority voted to ask the federal court to set aside the decree. Some officers cried foul. They claimed the ballot had been confusing, that a yes vote meant an officer was saying no to the decree.

A second vote was held, but the result was the same: 307-20 against the decree.

The vote baffled those who had predicted it would be defeated along ethnic lines since two-thirds of the department are minorities. But when you talk to the rank and file, you find the distaste for the consent decree is quite simple. Many young Hispanics and women, as well as white non-Latin males, are fed up with the Byzantine promotion practices.

The rather astounding truth is, nobody in the department — including the chief — really understands who gets promoted and why.

Everyone knows that the highest scores don't always get promoted. Everybody knows that from a list of 40 candidates for sergeant, No. 1 (often an Anglo male) may get pick-plus, say, No. 11 (Hispanic male), No. 19 (a black) and No. 29 (a female). That is an accepted part of affirmative action, the leapfrogging of minorities over higher-scoring Anglo males.

But what confuses virtually everybody in the department is how these minorities are selected, a crucial point in a department where the minorities are actually the majority.

Women are considered a minority group for purposes of affirmative action, but on a recent sergeant's exam, one white female officer was shocked to learn that a minority male who scored lower than she was promoted, and she wasn't. "How did they decide?" the officer asked. No one could tell her.

Likewise, sometimes a Hispanic who ranks, say, 22, is promoted, and a Hispanic who ranked 15 is not. What the rationale in that?

"We don't like jumping numbers," says Officer Rene Landa. "It's unfair." Chief Dickson laments the number-jumping and says he is trying to control it. But, he says, he has little

control over promotion. As strange and misguided as it seems, that's the system.

"The police department does not have enough play in how that system works," he says. The city's personnel department, he says, sends him a list of eight candidates for an opening: the top five scores on the test, plus three minority scores. He doesn't know how the minorities are selected, but he has to select one of the eight, basing his decisions "on an affirmative action goal I have to meet each year."

To the troops, that doesn't sound like much of an explanation, and that's why many of them would like to go to a system in which the highest scores get the promotions. Period. That's true even of many young Hispanics who could expect to be favored by the consent decree.

"It should be based on qualifications," says Officer Jose Bao. "That's it. If you're good, you're good."

## The Outsiders

**T**he Overtown "mini-station" is a glass-windowed storefront in a small mall. Only a half-mile from the main police station, it was opened after Officer Alvarez killed Nevell Johnson in 1982. It is staffed predominantly with black officers, who have acquired a very noticeable "us versus them" attitude toward the rest of the force.

A report had come in that a short guy with a multicolored cap and dreadlocks was selling crack on 12th Street. The officers were waiting for their sergeant to go make the bust. Until he came, they talked, boasting about their mini-station. It was a matter of pride to them that residents will tell them things (and show them stolen property) after refusing to cooperate with cops from the main station.

But as far as the department overall was concerned, the officers didn't quite trust it. The chief, they said, may be black, but the system is still white.

Said Officer C.T. Jones to the white journalist: "You look at 'Anglos' and 'Hispanics.' We are looking at white men. They can change their name, they can change their accent. I still know what I'm looking at."

Jones may as well have added, "... the oppressors."

Jones has been with the department for 16 years. Walter Byars and Michael Bryant are younger; both were hired after 1980. And both feel that the department is still a tough place for blacks.

Bryant: "Our integrity is constantly challenged, and we feel we're always being suspected."

Byars: "They hired us to be one color. Blue. But as soon as you get out of the police academy, you're different." Byars felt he had been given reprimands and had been "set up" by white supervisors because he was black. He said that when he was a rookie, he called up the station and said he couldn't make his scheduled court appearance because his wife was in the hospital. The guy took the message and hung up. "I did it three times," says Byars, "and I was up for

suspension."

It turned out he should have called the court liaison office, too. He had been taught that in the academy, but he had been taught a lot of things in the academy, he said, and he couldn't be expected to remember everything. A sympathetic veteran, he believed, would have helped him out by reminding him to call the liaison office.

His conclusion: "We don't have enough black officers training black officers."

That's one reason why they are angered by the attempts of the FOP to do away with the consent decree.

"We have a lot of catching up to do," said Byars. "How can you make up in 10 years what's been going on for 100 years?"

Under Chief Dickson, Byars added, "things have improved 70, 80 percent. Now I feel I have a voice in things. ... But you know what scares me: How long is this going to last?"

All three said they believed that the missing marijuana and the stolen \$150,000 were not the acts of common crooks.

"These latest episodes," said Jones, "have been to embarrass the chief. It's a conspiracy. It was made to look like they were doing it for the pot, but they were embarrassing the chief."

Byars looked back at a large photo of Chief Dickson that was hanging from the rear wall. Underneath was a caption, more plaintive than commanding:

"Support our chief."

## The Chief

**S**ome of the older Anglo officers will grumble about Clarence Dickson, about his not really understanding the department, about his not being a firm enough commander, but most people have much more neutral feelings about Miami's first black police chief. They say he's a nice guy.

Geoffrey Alpert, director of the criminal justice program at the University of Miami, puts it this way: "I don't know anyone who dislikes Clarence Dickson. He's a nice person."

That statement, like most statements about Dickson, seems to beg for an ellipsis, an indication that there is a sentence left unsaid, a "but ..."

Talk to rank-and-file cops in the department — Anglo, black and Hispanic — and most will say that the problems with the department aren't really his fault. But Dickson is the man at the top, and these days he acts like a besieged man.

So many negative things have happened — the missing \$150,000, the missing marijuana, the looming FBI investigation — that he responds sternly to any problem. When a stripper was sneaked into the building for an officer's birthday celebration, it might have been worth a simple reprimand, but when the media learned of the incident, Dickson felt compelled to call for a full-blown Internal Review investigation, as he did again a few days later when a sergeant on the midnight shift was discovered in a van in the parking lot with a secretary.

Dickson's once jaunty individualism has disappeared, his broad-brimmed

cowboy hat replaced by a no-nonsense chief's-style hat with gold braid on the brim. The sartorial change occurred shortly after the marijuana was reported missing. When told that many young black officers believe the theft was created to embarrass him, he says: "I've thought the same thing. Let me put it this way, whoever did it wasn't trying to endear themselves to me." Taking the pot, he says, was more than a theft. "It violated the department. It assaulted the department."

There have been persistent rumors — into the middle of February, as this is being written — that Dickson may be retiring soon, fleeing while a "deputy administrator" is brought in by the city manager, allegedly to help the chief out.

Several weeks ago, a journalist asked Dickson whether he was contemplating retirement. "Almost anyone in my shoes," he said slowly, "would look back at what's happened and wake up one morning and say, 'Who needs this?' That has crossed my mind. ... But that's just a reactive response that provides some temporary relief. ... That's why they wrote that song, *Take This Job And Shove It*, I guess. Everybody likes that song, too, but everybody don't do it."

This is a nondenial denial, as it were, and publicly he says he welcomes the new deputy. "Originally, I think the word was out that this person was going to be the interim chief. Or the heir apparent. ... I don't know what lies behind the green door. In somebody's mind, that may be what the whole thing is about. But, ah, you know, I am dealing with, with honorable men, and with, uh, people who I trust. I know that is not the manager's intent. If it was, he would have told me."

## The Bad Example

**I**n a conference room, a half-dozen young Hispanic police officers gathered to talk about being Hispanic and police officers at a time when they are seeing a considerable number of their colleagues being arrested.


They do not like it, they say, not at all. They are especially angry about the seven so-called Miami River Cops, who have faced charges of dope-dealing and murder.

"It gives the perception," said Rene Landa, "that all of us are dirty."

"You can't deny," said officer Luis Diazlay, "that the seven River Cops are Hispanic. But don't forget that the two lead investigators on the case were Latinos."

All of them were tired of the negative publicity that the department has been receiving, and two said they are worried that embittered higher-ups in the department are trying to destroy the chief by leaking any negative information to the media. "Someone in control," said Landa, "wants the administration to look like dirt."

Continued





several others, agrees with Ibrahim that the system of reprimands — the department's efforts to come to grips with the problems brought on by rapid hiring and advancement of less experienced officers — angered these young cops. Garcia, especially, was angry about one complaint against him, brought by a suspended Beach cop, who primly accused him of using a 12-letter word. "He always brought that up," said Sgt. Blanco. "Can you believe it? That's what he kept saying."

Other cops, however, think it was lack of supervision that caused problems. In their trials, testimony has revealed that while on duty they would often frequent a couple of bars where dopers hung out, or meet doper contacts in parking lots. At least one cop, according to testimony, used to have sexual intercourse with women in the back seat of his patrol car. And one cop was said to have gone to the station on his day off and borrowed a police car and a police radio to carry out one rip-off.

George Adams, a black retired major: "We have a responsibility to supervise, and when you have supervisors who don't do that, then you run into problems. We depend on Anglo males for most of that supervision. If they feel disenfranchised, they don't care. So they let the officers on the street run amok."

Sgt. Aguirre, head of the Hispanic officers group, says that some of River Cops' supervisors were Hispanic, not

Anglo, but he agrees: "Overall, I would have to place some of the blame on the supervisors. If you supervise a person right, you can't do half the s--- those River Cops did, or were alleged to have done."

One ominous note: Testimony at the River Cops trial revealed that, on one rip-off, there were 11 uniformed cops. Only seven were on trial.

### The Miranda Rites

**D**uring the mass hiring, one of the cops doing background investigations — checking the pasts of applicants to see if they were qualified to be police officers — was named Joaquin "Jack" Miranda. During an undercover drug investigation called "Operation Snow White," Miranda was seen associating with persons who were ultimately arrested on drug charges.

When detectives questioned Miranda about his connections with the alleged dopers, he refused to answer questions. On Jan. 15, 1983, he was fired.

Dick Witt, a colonel with the Miami police before he became chief of the Hollywood force, says that investigators, appalled by the idea that one of the department's gatekeepers may have been a bad cop, went over Miranda's background files. "We uncovered at least six," he says, in which Miranda seemed to have omitted negative information about an applicant that should have been in the

file, including information about previous drug usage. Worse, Miranda appeared to be a "gung-ho cop," and often did background checks to help out his associates — checks to which the associate, not Miranda, signed his name. "I o' we had no idea," says Witt, "what he could have been up to. . . . What we have here is a bunch of time bombs ticking."

Ken Harrison, who worked with Witt during that time and is now a colonel in charge of internal security, says he recalls that Miranda had indeed omitted information from files, but that he doesn't remember the missing facts to have been all that important. "To the best of my recollection," he says, "no one was hired who should not have been hired."

Col. Harrison says he can't check Miranda's internal security file to see exactly what the investigation showed: The file is among those taken by the FBI as part of its probe into corruption.

### Reading and Righting

**W**hether the mass hiring of the early '80s has planted the seeds of corruption in Miami's police is still debatable. But the general degradation of police reading and writing skills is not. Consider Basic Law Enforcement class 106, which went through the police academy last fall. Of 29 students from Miami P.D., 16 flunked the course in Report Writing. All those who flunked

must go through the remedial course. (Sally Gross-Farina, a administrator at the academy, says that Metro, by contrast, will have only four or five in a class fail Report Writing.)

Mistakes in live field reports are legend. Captain Ivo Alvarez recalls a young officer who reported that a victim had been "bitten on the head," when the person had been beaten. A judge recalls pondering over a report in which the officer said he had "dried fried" a weapon. He meant, "dry fired." Another cop recalls a traffic accident in which one of the cars left "squid marks." An assistant state attorney was asked to prosecute a case of "attempted murder."

Such mistakes can be humorous, unless the case ends up before a jury in court. Call up three circuit court judges, and all three will say (upon the condition that their names not be used) that Miami cops are inferior to Metro cops in quality of their reports and their testimony on the witness stand.

Judge one: "The quality of cases is poor and very often the police officer is bright enough to know they're poor, and so they gild the lily on the witness stand." Such tactics, he said, often turn off both judge and jury. The reason for Miami P.D.'s problems, according to the judge: "When you take people based on ethnic or racial background, rather than skill, let's face it, hiring standards have been lowered."

Continued on 10

## FORCE

The news that the 3½-month River Cops trial had ended with no verdict was a bitter shock to all of these young cops.

"All of us wanted a verdict," said Diazlay. "I was really upset."

Several others nodded. No verdict meant a new trial, and a new trial meant more headlines about corrupt Hispanic cops — a kind of publicity they would rather have behind them. The group shuddered at the idea that acquitted River Cops might someday come back to work.

"They would be completely ostracized," said Landa.

### The River Cops

**T**hough 75 Miami police officers have been arrested since 1980, it is the seven who have been dubbed "the Miami River Cops" who have been the focus of attention. They have been charged with big-time dope dealing, and three of them were charged with murder, which was altered to "violating the civil rights" of the dead victims when

the case was moved to federal court.

They have become a central issue to the problems of the department: Were they "bad apples" who were mistakenly hired during the rush to integrate the department at any cost? Were they good guys led astray by the temptations of drug-saturated Miami? Did the department somehow screw up in handling them? Typically, in trying to point to where the mistakes were made, the blame is distributed according to factions.

Let's look at the evidence. All of the River Cops were young and Hispanic, hired during the early '80s.

According to two sources familiar with the River Cops investigation, speaking on condition they not be identified, one of the River Cops, Roman Rodriguez, had admitted on his application form that he had used cocaine and marijuana during high school. That alone would not have disqualified him. But more ominously, Rodriguez had been fired from a previous job at Florida Power & Light — a job he held for only three months — accused of falsifying meter reports. This rather amazing information appears to have been completely overlooked.

The River Cops, however, weren't exactly dummies. In reading comprehension tests given after they were hired, Roman Rodriguez was shown to be quite bright, reading at the level of a college freshman. Two others, Armando Estrada and Ricardo Aleman, were reading at high-school level, which is respectable for a police recruit. At least one, however, had lower grades: Osvaldo Coello was reading at an eighth-grade level.

A former Miami High student who went to school with Coello and Armando Garcia said they were "dedicated, pretty good guys," clean-cut jock types who didn't do drugs. The former classmate, who didn't want to be named, never would have envisioned that either would be charged with a crime. "I really blame the system," he says.

"They give these guys something like 14 or 16 weeks of training, and then they put them out there where they can make twice their salary just by turning their head the other way."

Once on the police force, the River Cops' reputations varied. Rudy Arias was thought by several of his supervisors to be a great officer, and he had been named an "officer of the month."

Several of the seven gravitated to the midnight shift. Maj. Anibal E. Ibrahim, commander of the midnight shift during some of the period the River Cops were there: "They were very productive at one point. I don't think they were hired in error. Very assertive, very aggressive."

Too aggressive, it turned out. Armando Garcia, for one, amassed a series of complaints from citizens about his tough behavior. Garcia, says Maj. Ibrahim, was a particular problem. "His outlook was basically primitive." He had "no tact," and people complained that he could be "rude, discourteous, offensive."

Over time, says Ibrahim, he saw that "these individuals had changed a lot. . . . They had values they lost, for one reason or another."

Ibrahim blamed the change on an Anglo supervisor's philosophy of maintaining ultra-firm discipline by handing out reprimands for the smallest of infractions. "The philosophy existing in that section was very damaging to young officers. . . . I think a lot of their self-pride and self-esteem was lost."

Sgt. Eddie Blanco, who supervised one of the River Cops and knew



## FORCE

Continued from page 15

Judge two says that he thinks the main reason that Miami cops seem to be inferior witnesses is that many of them lack the experience of Metro's men. "Metro has, without a doubt, a lot more experienced officers."

Judge three: "Affirmative action killed them, without a doubt. They have an awful lot of officers who don't pay attention in court, who don't show up." One example: in a first-degree murder case, a cop came into court on his day off in sneakers, jeans and a T-shirt. He didn't even have his case file. He recited a few thoughts from memory, then stepped down. The judge has also seen cops forget to bring the murder weapon to court, saying they would have to go back to the station to get the weapon. "That happens a lot also."

### The Payoff

**N**ow that we have seen the opinions and the evidence, the question remains, what happened to Miami P.D.? How does all of this fit together? How does the

corruption connect with the affirmative action programs, the turmoil, the racial-ethnic tensions, the political interference, the abrupt departure of two chiefs and the tenuous existence of a third?

It was the totality of this instability, some observers feel, this lack of firm control over right-and-wrong, that has led to the department's problems.

Listen to Larry Sherman, a professor of criminology at the University of Maryland and author of two books on police corruption, who believes that all the turmoil at Miami P.D. is linked:

"It fits together in a very coherent way. Faced with the enormous temptation that you have with the drug traffic in Miami, the only way that a police department can withstand that is to have a very strong organization, with very clear values and procedures to control everything. . . . But just at the time when the drug trade and the temptation was substantially increasing, you saw a total revolution within the department. . . . The politicians became involved in a rather chaotic way. . . . The values were changing, and no one was sure to what, and

Continued on page 22

## FORCE

Continued from page 20

then there was so much cynicism among the police that no one knew who would be in control the next day, and so you had an atmosphere where corruption would flourish."

Dedicated cops, of course, will tell you that there is no excuse for corruption, that you shouldn't be able to blame it on hiring practices, or lack of education, or poor supervision. Thou shalt not be a crook. Period.

Sgt. Aguirre puts it this way: "If you have a problem with the system, you change the system. You don't go around and start ripping people off."

Which is the way that cops are trained to think, for good reason. No one wants a cop who makes little psycho-socio-economic excuses for crime.

Still, it may not be that simple.

Dick Witt, the former colonel who left to become chief of the Hollywood police: "Put yourself in place of a young police officer. He reads at a fifth-grade level. Hard work and merit mean nothing in promotion. All the messages are: There's no reward for being a good guy."

These may be the words of an embittered Anglo — one does not hear blacks and Hispanics talking like this, and several cops point out that the arrested Hispanics, such as the River Cops, actually had the most to gain from the new affirmative action programs. As Leonard Territo, the criminology professor at the University of South Florida, says: "A guy doesn't get a promotion and start stealing money from the property room — it doesn't work that way."

However, George Kirkham, the FSU criminologist, says that the constant gut-churning changes in the department can create "a pervasive demoralizing in the department, which can lead to not caring about doing good police work, and it's a short step from not giving service to the public to not caring about the public to, for those who are prone to it, saying, 'What the hell, I'm going to do some sort of taking.'"

### The Future

**W**ith all its problems, this much can be said for the Miami Police Department: In Dade County, we have gone more than four years without a police-inspired riot. That would be a bizarre measure of success in most cities, but in Miami it can be considered

something of a triumph. These days, when a cluster of Miami P.D. squad cars gather at a crime scene, it's almost a certainty that some of the officers will be black. The chance of an all-white group of cops chasing a black man in a black neighborhood, ala McDuffie, is virtually nil.

Many cops praise Chief Dickson for getting rid of some of the top-heavy administration, and cutting back on the amount of paper work that was choking the lower levels, though one does occasionally still see such bureaucratic horrors as a 20-page departmental memo sent by a major to recommend a five-page Readers Digest article on how to make your house safe from burglars.

Both City Manager Cesar Odio and Mayor Xavier Suarez concede that there has been too much political interference in the past, but they believe the police department is on the upswing.

"Morale in the department couldn't be much lower than it was," says the mayor. "And it's been getting better. The department has had a succession of catastrophic occurrences. They were overwhelmed by Mariel and then the riots and demonstrations, and then all the new police officers and the consent decree."

Within both the police department and City Hall, there are strong tendencies toward changing the hiring and promotion systems.

The Urban Studies Advisory Committee, a group made up of outside consultants and police officials, has issued a report asking for improved hiring practices. The committee requested that the city's personnel management people, who administer the pre-hiring tests, no longer merge academic and psychological scores into one uncertain number, but instead "identify individuals who possess above average intellectual and academic skills."

Indeed, a survey by city personnel people has shown that applicants from within the city score considerably lower on the application tests than do other applicants. Because of that, the city recently did something it hadn't done since the consent decree was signed a decade ago: It began looking for the best applicants statewide. Recruiting teams have been sent to Tallahassee and Daytona Beach, particularly seeking qualified black males at Florida A&M University and Bethune Cookman.

And the city is moving the controversy over promotions. City Manager Odio is saying that, because of the widespread dissatisfaction, he would like to find a new system that "makes sense to everybody and would include promotions for minorities." He says he has three assistants trying to come up with a plan, but it seems unlikely they will develop anything that could mollify everyone.

Despite the positive signs, there are some new negatives. Within the department, it seems that the lines of battle have shifted. During the recent court hearings on the consent decree, there was a notable absence: No attorney from the Hispanic Officers Association was present. The traditionally Anglo FOP was on one side, the black group's attorney on the other, but the Hispanics were sitting it out, which in effect meant support for the FOP. As Officer Jones said at the Overtown mini-station, the battle within the police department seems to be returning to a struggle between blacks and whites.

The other problem, says Chief Dickson — the real problem — may well be political. In the past four years, there have been four city managers. "Each of people," says the chief, "strong and capable city managers and they left their impact on the police department, like all city managers do. And each time one came in, they struck a staggering blow to the police department, and by the time we recovered from that staggering blow, another powerful manager came in to strike a staggering blow to us, and then another. [Chiefs] Harms, Braslow, Dickson — all recipients of staggering blows. And also sending a tremor throughout the department, which reached all the way down to the police officers on the street."

"We've . . . been trying to deal with this trauma, and trying to steady the organization, and I hope we don't get dealt a staggering blow in the near future, just when we began to get our feet on the ground. . . ."

**APPENDIX FOUR**  
**SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT**  
**AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA**  
**(SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS)**

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## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General

## COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING

1501 ALHAMBRA BOULEVARD  
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95816-7083

## GENERAL INFORMATION

(916) 739-5328

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE

(916) 739-3864

## BUREAUS

Administrative Services

(916) 739-5354

Center for Executive

Development

(916) 739-2093

Compliance and Certificates

(916) 739-5377

Information Services

(916) 739-5340

Management Counseling

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Standards and Evaluation

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Training Program Services

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(916) 739-5391

Reimbursements

(916) 739-5367

Resource Library

(916) 739-5353



## To Whom It May Concern:

This is to introduce Lieutenant Roger A. Clark who is conducting a law enforcement Independent Study Project. He is a member of the Command College, a program for future law enforcement leaders sponsored by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). Independent study is an integral part of the program and is a requirement for graduation.

Assistance provided toward the study project will benefit law enforcement in general. The final product produced by each member of the Command College will be made available through POST.

If you have any questions, you may contact me at (916) 739-5336. This letter of introduction expires on December 15, 1987.

Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Doug Thomas'.

DOUG THOMAS

Senior Consultant

Center for Executive Development

August 13, 1987

Dear Chief, (or Sheriff),


In order to complete my studies for the P.O.S.T. Command College, I am seeking data on any methods you may use within your Department to monitor community expectations for your police services. I would appreciate your input on the following question:

Method(s) used by your agency to assess community expectations for your police services: Please check. ✓

- ☐ Monitoring the crime rate.
- ☐ Monitoring citizen complaints.
- ☐ Input from officers in the field.
- ☐ Follow-up interview(s) by Patrol Supervisor (Patrol Survey).
- ☐ Community meetings.
- ☐ Mail Survey.
- ☐ Telephone Survey.
- ☐ Shopping Mall Survey.
- ☐ Neighborhood Survey.
- ☐ Other (Please briefly specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ None of the above.

A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,



Lieutenant Roger Clark  
P.O.S.T. Command College, Class V  
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department  
Reserve Forces Bureau  
11515 South Colima Road  
Whittier, California 90604  
(213) 946-7875

**"OTHER" LISTING**

Question # 10 ,Other (Please briefly specify), was designed to capture any unique method(s) used to determine community expectations for police services. 105 agencies of the total 326 respondents answered this question. However, many repeated their involvement in community meetings which was already covered in question # 5. The following list reflects the unique methods used that were not covered by other questions in the survey:

SURVEY #:	RESPONSE:
#2	We tape record samples of the calls for service.
#4	We attend other City Departments, & City Council meetings (expressed 2 other times).
#9	We have a Police Commission.
#11	Our City Council lets us know,(expressed 14 other times).
#23	City Council conducts a Bi-annual Review of the Department.
#34	We survey our U.S. Mail.
#56	Direct citizen contact.
#58	We have a Community Awareness Team.
#60	Input from Business and Civic Organizations.
#66	Neighborhood walk-through on each shift.
#68	Input from Probation, Courts, Schools, Newspaper & City Council.
#69	Our Citizen Survey Form is posted at each facility.
#82	Contact with Community Response people from Ethnic groups.
#97	Media survey (expressed 2 other times).

- #111 We have a Crime Prevention Unit.
- #116 Our Survey form is located on lobby counter (expressed 2 other times).
- #126 Direct contact by the Chief (expressed 3 other times).
- #143 Open door policy.
- #150 Police Booster Club.
- #153 Committee/Commission System.
- #154 Political Grapevine.
- #156 Partnership with schools.
- #157 Special Elections.
- #163 Information from other City Departments.
- #171 Ride-a-long program, Civilian Volunteers, & Citizen's Crime Prevention Committee.
- #175 Letters to the Editor.
- #178 Community News Letter--The Civic Soapbox.
- #185 Letters to the Editor,& letters of appreciation to the Department.
- #188 Random sample of call for service & monitoring performance.
- #194 Letters to the Editor & City Council.
- #197 Other City Employees and City Council.
- #201 Citizen's Crime Prevention Association.
- #208 Citizen's Crime Prevention Team.
- #215 Front Counter Survey.
- #221 Mc Gruff Program.
- #232 Volunteer Programs.

- #237 Feedback from city newsletter.
- #240 Citizen's Committee.
- #256 Chamber of Commerce does routine surveys of city services.
- #273 Chamber of Commerce meets with Chief.
- #291 We track response times.
- #325 Annual in house communications seminars with all personnel.
- #347 Feedback through normal daily contact.
- #350 Senior Citizens, Women & Children Personal Safety Programs.
- #352 Direct contact with community.
- #354 Community services officer.
- #362 Local press, & social functions.
- #375 Volunteer groups, Reserves, Explorer Scouts & Families.
- #384 Citizen advisory board, (expressed 2 other times).
- #390 County Government Feedback.

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Adelanto Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Alameda County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1		1							1	
Alameda Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Albany Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Alhambra Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Alpine County Sheriff's Dept.	G											1
Alturas Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Amador County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Anaheim Police Dept.	C	1		1		1						
Anderson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Angels Camp Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Antioch Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Arcadia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Arcata Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Arroyo Grande Police Dept.	G	1	1			1	1					
Arvin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Atherton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Atwater Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1			1		
Azusa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1							1	
Bakersfield Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	
Baldwin Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
BART Police Dept.	D	1	1									
Bear Valley Springs Police Dept.	G		1	1		1					1	
Beaumont Police Dept.	G	1	1		1						1	
Bell Gardens Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Belmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Belvedere Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Benicia Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Berkeley Police Dept.	C					1	1	1		1		
Beverly Hills Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Blythe Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Brea Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Brentwood Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Brisbane Police Dept.	G											1
Burbank Police Dept.	C	1	1									
Burlingame Police Dept.	E											1
Butte County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Calaveras County Sheriff's Dept.	E										1	
Calxico Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
California City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Campbell Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Capitola Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Carlsbad Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Carmel Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Carpinteria Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Ceres Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	
Chico Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Chino Police Dept.	E	1	1			1	1	1		1	1	
Chowchilla Police Dept.	G	1		1	1	1					1	



AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Chula Vista Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Claremont Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Clayton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Clearlake Police Dept.	F		1	1		1					1	
Cloverdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Clovis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Coachella Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Coalinga Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Colfax Police Dept.	G			1		1						
Colma Police Dept.	G	1				1				1		
Colton Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Colusa County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1		1	1							
Colusa Police Dept.	G			1	1	1					1	
Compton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Concord Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Contra Costa County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1		1						
Corcoran Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1					
Coronado Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Cotati Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Covina Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Cypress Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Davis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1	1	
Del Norte County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	
Delano Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Desert Hot Spgs. Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Dinuba Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Dixon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Dorris Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Dos Palos Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Downey Police Dept.	D	1	1	1								
Dunsmuir Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
East Bay Reg. Pk. District	E	1	1	1								
El Cajon Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
El Cerrito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1				1	
El Dorado County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1			1						
El Monte Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
El Segundo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Escalon Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Escondido Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Eureka Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Exeter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Fairfax Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Fairfield Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
Ferndale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Folsom Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Fontana Police Dept.	D	1	1	1							1	
Fontana Police Dept.	G	1	1			1	1	1				
Fontana Police Dept.	G	1	1			1				1		
Foster City Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Fountain Valley Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Fremont Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Fresno County Sheriff's Dept.	B		1	1		1		1				
Fresno Police Dept.	B	1	1			1					1	
Fullerton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Galt Police Dept.	G						1		1			
Garden Grove Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1			1				
Gardena Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Gilroy Police Dept.	E	1	1				1					
Glendale Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1					1		
Glendora Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Glenn County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Gonzales Police Dept.	G	1		1						1		
Gridley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Grover City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Guadalupe Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Gustine Police Dept.	G											1
Hall Moon Bay Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Hanford Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1		1				
Hawthorne Police Dept.	D	1	1			1						
Hayward Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Hercules Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Hermosa Beach Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Hillsborough Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Hollister Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Holtville Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Hughson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Humboldt County Sheriff's Dept.	D		1	1		1	1					
Huntington Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1					
Huntington Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Imperial Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Imperial County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Imperial Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Indio Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Inglewood Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Inyo County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Ione Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Irvine Police Dept.	D	1	1			1					1	
Irwindale Police Dept.	G		1	1	1						1	
Isteton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Jackson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Kensington Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Kerman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Kern County Sheriff's Dept.	B		1	1	1							
King City Police Dept.	G	1		1		1						
Kings County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Kingsburg Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
L.A. City Housing Authority	E	1		1		1					1	
La Habra Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
La Mesa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
La Palma Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1	1				
La Verne Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Lakeport Police Dept.	G											1
Lassen County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Lemoore Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Lindsay Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Livermore Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Livingston Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Lodi Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					
Lompoc Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1				1	
Long Beach Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
Los Alamitos Police Dept.	F		1	1			1			1		
Los Altos Police Dept.	F										1	
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1		1	1						
Los Angeles Police Dept.	A	1	1		1	1						
Los Banos Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Los Gatos Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					
Manhattan Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1		1			
Manteca Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Martinez Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Marysville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
Maywood Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
McFarland Police Dept.	G										1	
Mendocino County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Mendota Police Dept.	G	1	1		1							
Menlo Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Merced Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Millbrae Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Modesto Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1		1			1	
Modoc County Sheriff's Dept.	G		1	1								
Mono County Sheriff's Dept.	F										1	
Monrovia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Montclair Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Montebello Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Monterey County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1				1		
Monterey Park Police Dept.	D	1	1			1	1				1	
Monterey Police Dept.	E		1	1		1	1			1		
Morgan Hill Police Dept.	F		1			1	1					
Morro Bay Police Dept.	G		1	1	1	1	1				1	
Mount Shasta Police Dept.	G											
Mountain View Police Dept.	D						1					
Napa County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Napa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
National City Police Dept.	E	1		1							1	
Needles Police Dept.	G	1	1									
New City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1					1		
New County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1									
Newark Police Dept.	E		1	1	1						1	

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Newman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Newport Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Novato Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Oakdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Oakland Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Oceanside Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Ontario Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Orange County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1					
Oxnard Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Pacific Grove Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Pacifica Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Palm Springs Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Palo Alto Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1		
Palos Verdes Estates Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Pasadena Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Paso Robles Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Patterson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Perris Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Petaluma Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Piedmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Pinole Police Dept.	F										1	
Pismo Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Placentia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Placer County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1									
Pleasant Hill Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Pleasanton Police Dept.	E		1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Plumas County Sheriff's Dept.	E											1
Pomona Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Port Hueneme Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Porterville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Red Bluff Police Dept.	F		1	1							1	
Redding Police Dept.	D		1	1	1	1		1			1	
Redondo Beach Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Redwood City Police Dept.	D	1	1	1						1		
Reedley Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1			1	1	
Rialto Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Richmond Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Rio Dell Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Riverside County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1			1	1						
Riverside Police Dept.	C	1	1			1					1	
Rocklin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Rohnert Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Roseville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1						1		
Ross Police Dept.	G			1							1	
Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1				1						
Sacramento Police Dept.	B	1	1	1		1					1	
Salinas Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
San Anselmo Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
San Benito County Sheriff's Dept.	G			1								

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1	1	1					1	
San Bernardino Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1						
San Bruno Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
San Clemente Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1						1	
San Diego County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	
San Diego Police Dept.	A	1	1			1						
San Francisco County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1						
San Francisco Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
San Jacinto Police Dept.	F	1	1			1					1	
San Joaquin County Sheriff's Dept.	C											
San Jose Police Dept.	A	1	1	1							1	
San Juan Bautista Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
San Leandro Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1						
San Luis Obispo Police Dept.	E			1	1	1						
San Marino Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
San Mateo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
San Pablo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
San Rafael Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Sand City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Santa Ana Police Dept.	B	1		1		1				1		
Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Santa Barbara Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1	1			1	
Santa Clara County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1								
Santa Clara Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1		1				
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1		1		1					1	
Santa Cruz Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Santa Maria Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Santa Monica Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Santa Paula Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Santa Rosa Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Sausalito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	
Scotts Valley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Seal Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Seaside Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Sebastopol Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Selma Police Dept.	F	1	1			1						
Shafter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Shasta County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	
Sierra Madre Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Simi Valley Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Siskiyou County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1								
Soledad Police Dept.	G	1	1	1			1			1		
Sonoma County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1						
Sonoma Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Sonoma Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
South Gate Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1							
South Pasadena Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1					
South San Francisco Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1				

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Stanislaus County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Stanton Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	
Suisun Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Sunnyvale Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1				1	
Susanville Police Dept.	G		1	1								
Sutter County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1								
Sutter Creek Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Taft Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Tehachapi Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Tehama County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tiburon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Torrance Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Tracy Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Tulare County Sheriff's Dept.	C			1		1						
Tulare Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tustin Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	
Ukiah Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Union City Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Upland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1			1		
Vacaville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
Vallejo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Ventura County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1		1						
Ventura Police Dept.	D	1	1		1		1					
Vernon Police Dept.	E			1		1						
Visalia Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
Walnut Creek Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
Watsonville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
West Covina Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1		1		
Whittier Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Willows Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Winters Police Dept.	G		1	1		1					1	
Woodland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1								
Yuba County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1		1	1	1						
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>328</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>PERCENTAGES</b>		<b>85.89%</b>	<b>87.42%</b>	<b>85.56%</b>	<b>32.52%</b>	<b>69.84%</b>	<b>19.02%</b>	<b>8.55%</b>	<b>1.53%</b>	<b>18.10%</b>	<b>32.62%</b>	<b>1.84%</b>

[illegible]

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Tehama County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tulare County Sheriff's Dept.	C			1		1						
Ventura County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1		1						
Yuba County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1		1	1	1						
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>PERCENTAGES</b>		<b>72.34%</b>	<b>72.34%</b>	<b>76.60%</b>	<b>25.53%</b>	<b>63.83%</b>	<b>12.77%</b>	<b>6.38%</b>	<b>6.38%</b>	<b>10.64%</b>	<b>21.28%</b>	<b>4.26%</b>



AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Adelanto Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Alameda Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Albany Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Alhambra Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Alturas Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Anaheim Police Dept.	C	1		1		1						
Anderson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Angels Camp Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Antioch Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Arcadia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Arcata Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Arroyo Grande Police Dept.	G	1	1			1	1					
Arvin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Atherton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Atwater Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1			1		
Azusa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1							1	
Bakersfield Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	
Baldwin Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
BART Police Dept.	D	1	1									
Bear Valley Springs Police Dept.	G		1	1		1					1	
Beaumont Police Dept.	G	1	1		1						1	
Bell Gardens Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Belmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Belvedere Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Benicia Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Berkeley Police Dept.	C					1	1	1		1		
Beverly Hills Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Blythe Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Brea Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Brentwood Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Brisbane Police Dept.	G											1
Burbank Police Dept.	C	1	1									
Burlingame Police Dept.	E											1
Callexico Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
California City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Campbell Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Capitola Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Carlsbad Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Carmel Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Carpinteria Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Ceres Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	
Chico Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Chino Police Dept.	E	1	1			1	1	1		1	1	
Chowchilla Police Dept.	G	1		1	1	1					1	
Chula Vista Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Claremont Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Clayton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Cle Elum Police Dept.	F		1	1		1					1	
Cle Elum Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Clovis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Coachella Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Coalinga Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Collax Police Dept.	G			1		1						
Colma Police Dept.	G	1				1				1		
Colton Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Colusa Police Dept.	G			1	1	1					1	
Compton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Concord Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Corcoran Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1					
Coronado Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Cotati Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Covina Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Cypress Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Davis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1	1	
Delano Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Desert Hot Sprngs. Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Dinuba Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Dixon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Dorris Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Dos Palos Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Downey Police Dept.	D	1	1	1								
Dunsmuir Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
East Bay Reg. Pk. District	E	1	1	1								
El Cajon Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
El Cerrito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1				1	
El Monte Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
El Segundo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Escalon Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Escondido Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Eureka Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Exeter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Fairfax Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Fairfield Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
Femdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Folsom Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Fontana Police Dept.	D	1	1	1							1	
Fort Jones Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1	1				
Fortuna Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1		
Foster City Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Fountain Valley Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Fremont Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Fresno Police Dept.	B	1	1			1					1	
Fullerton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Galt Police Dept.	G						1		1			
Garden Grove Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1			1				
Gardena Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Gilroy Police Dept.	E	1	1				1					
Glendale Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1					1		

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Glendora Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Gonzales Police Dept.	G	1		1						1		
Gridley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Grover City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Guadalupe Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Gustline Police Dept.	G											1
Half Moon Bay Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Hanford Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1		1				
Hawthorne Police Dept.	D	1	1			1						
Hayward Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Hercules Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Hermosa Beach Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Hillsborough Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Hollister Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Holtville Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Hughson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Huntington Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1					
Huntington Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Imperial Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Imperial Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Indio Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Inglewood Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Ione Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Irvine Police Dept.	D	1	1			1					1	
Irwindale Police Dept.	G		1	1	1						1	
Isleton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Jackson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Kensington Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Kerman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
King City Police Dept.	G	1		1		1						
Kingsburg Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
L.A. City Housing Authority	E	1		1		1					1	
La Habra Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
La Mesa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
La Palma Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1	1				
La Verne Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Lakeport Police Dept.	G											1
Lemoore Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Lindsay Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Livermore Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Livingston Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Lodi Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					
Lompoc Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1				1	
Long Beach Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
Los Alamitos Police Dept.	F		1	1			1			1		
Los Altos Police Dept.	F										1	
Los Angeles Police Dept.	A	1	1		1	1						
Los Angeles Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Los Angeles Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Manhattan Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1		1			
Manteca Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Martinez Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Marysville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
Maywood Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
McFarland Police Dept.	G										1	
Mendocino County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Mendota Police Dept.	G	1	1		1							
Menlo Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Merced Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Millbrae Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Modesto Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1		1			1	
Monrovia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Montclair Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Montebello Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Monterey Park Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Monterey Police Dept.	E		1	1		1	1			1		
Morgan Hill Police Dept.	F		1			1	1					
Morro Bay Police Dept.	G		1	1	1	1	1				1	
Mount Shasta Police Dept.	G											
Mountain View Police Dept.	D						1					
Napa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
National City Police Dept.	E	1		1							1	
Needles Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Nevada City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1					1		
Newark Police Dept.	E		1	1	1						1	
Newman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Newport Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Novato Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Oakdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Oakland Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Oceanside Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Ontario Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Oxnard Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Pacific Grove Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Pacificia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Palm Springs Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Palo Alto Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1		
Palo Verde Estates Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Pasadena Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Paso Robles Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Patterson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Perris Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Petaluma Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Piedmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Pinole Police Dept.	F										1	
Pismo Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Placencia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Pleasant Hill Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Pleasanton Police Dept.	E		1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Pomona Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Port Hueneme Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Porterville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Red Bluff Police Dept.	F		1	1							1	
Redding Police Dept.	D		1	1	1	1		1			1	
Redondo Beach Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Redwood City Police Dept.	D	1	1	1						1		
Reedley Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1			1	1	
Rialto Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Richmond Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Rio Dell Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Riverside Police Dept.	C	1	1			1					1	
Rocklin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Rohnert Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Roseville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1						1		
Ross Police Dept.	G			1							1	
Sacramento Police Dept.	B	1	1	1		1					1	
Salinas Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
San Anselmo Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
San Bernardino Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1						
San Bruno Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
San Clemente Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1						1	
San Diego Police Dept.	A	1	1			1						
San Francisco County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1						
San Francisco Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
San Jacinto Police Dept.	F	1	1			1					1	
San Jose Police Dept.	A	1	1	1							1	
San Juan Bautista Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
San Leandro Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
San Luis Obispo Police Dept.	E			1	1	1						
San Marino Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
San Mateo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
San Pablo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
San Rafael Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Sand City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Santa Ana Police Dept.	B	1		1		1				1		
Santa Barbara Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1	1			1	
Santa Clara Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1		1				
Santa Cruz Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Santa Maria Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Santa Monica Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Santa Paula Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Santa Rosa Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Sausalito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	
Scotts Valley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Seal Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Seaside Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Sequoia Police Dept.	G	1	1		1	1						

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Selma Police Dept.	F	1	1			1						
Shafter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Sierra Madre Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Simi Valley Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Soledad Police Dept.	G	1	1	1			1			1		
Sonoma Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Sonora Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
South Gate Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1						1	
South Pasadena Police Dept.	F	1	1		1		1					
South San Francisco Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1				
Stanton Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	
Suisun Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Sunnyvale Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1				1	
Susanville Police Dept.	G		1	1								
Sutter Creek Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Taft Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Tehachapi Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Tiburon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Torrance Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Tracy Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Tulare Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tustin Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	
Ukiah Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Union City Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Upland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1			1		
Vacaville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
Vallejo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Ventura Police Dept.	D	1	1		1		1					
Vernon Police Dept.	E			1		1						
Visalia Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
Walnut Creek Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
Watsonville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
West Covina Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1		1		
Whittier Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Willows Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Winters Police Dept.	G		1	1		1					1	
Woodland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1								
GRAND TOTAL	279	248	253	244	95	200	87	28	3	55	97	4
PERCENTAGES		88.89%	90.68%	87.46%	34.05%	71.68%	20.43%	9.32%	1.08%	19.71%	34.77%	1.43%

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Alameda County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Contra Costa County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1		1						
Fresno County Sheriff's Dept.	B		1	1		1		1				
Fresno Police Dept.	B	1	1			1					1	
Kern County Sheriff's Dept.	B		1	1	1							
Long Beach Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1		1	1						
Los Angeles Police Dept.	A	1	1		1	1						
Oakland Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Orange County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1					
Riverside County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1			1	1						
Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1				1						
Sacramento Police Dept.	B	1	1	1		1					1	
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1	1	1					1	
San Diego County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	
San Diego Police Dept.	A	1	1			1						
San Francisco Police Dept.	A	1	1	1		1						
San Jose Police Dept.	A	1	1	1							1	
Santa Ana Police Dept.	B	1		1		1				1		
Santa Clara County Sheriff's Dept.	A	1	1	1								
Ventura County Sheriff's Dept.	B	1	1	1		1						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>90.48%</b>	<b>85.71%</b>	<b>71.43%</b>	<b>23.81%</b>	<b>85.71%</b>	<b>19.05%</b>	<b>9.52%</b>	<b>4.76%</b>	<b>9.52%</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>



AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Alameda Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Alhambra Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Anaheim Police Dept.	C	1		1		1						
Bakersfield Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	
BART Police Dept.	D	1	1									
Berkeley Police Dept.	C					1	1	1		1		
Beverly Hills Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Burbank Police Dept.	C	1	1									
Butte County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Chula Vista Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Compton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Concord Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Downey Police Dept.	D	1	1	1								
El Cajon Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
El Dorado County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1			1						
El Monte Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
Escondido Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Fairfield Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1				1		
Fontana Police Dept.	D	1	1	1							1	
Fremont Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Fullerton Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Garden Grove Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1			1				
Gardena Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Glendale Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1					1		
Hawthorne Police Dept.	D	1	1			1						
Hayward Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Humboldt County Sheriff's Dept.	D		1	1		1	1					
Huntington Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1					
Imperial County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Inglewood Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Irvine Police Dept.	D	1	1			1					1	
Kings County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Mendocino County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						
Modesto Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1		1			1	
Montebello Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Monterey County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1				1		
Monterey Park Police Dept.	D	1	1			1	1				1	
Mountain View Police Dept.	D						1					
Nevada County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1								
Newport Beach Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						



AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Oceanside Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Ontario Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Oxnard Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Palm Springs Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1					
Palo Alto Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1		
Pasadena Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Placer County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1									
Pomona Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1					1	
Redding Police Dept.	D		1	1	1	1		1			1	
Redondo Beach Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Redwood City Police Dept.	D	1	1	1						1		
Richmond Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Riverside Police Dept.	C	1	1			1					1	
Salinas Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
San Bernardino Police Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1						
San Francisco County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1						
San Leandro Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	C		1	1		1						
San Mateo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Santa Barbara Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1	1	1			1	
Santa Clara Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1		1				
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1		1		1					1	
Santa Monica Police Dept.	C	1	1	1		1				1		
Santa Rosa Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Shasta County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	
Simi Valley Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1					1	
Sonoma County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1	1	1						
South Gate Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1						1	
South San Francisco Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1				
Stanislaus County Sheriff's Dept.	C	1	1	1		1						
Sunnyvale Police Dept.	C	1	1			1	1				1	
Sutter County Sheriff's Dept.	D	1	1	1								
Torrance Police Dept.	C	1	1		1	1						
Tulare County Sheriff's Dept.	C			1		1						
Vallejo Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1						
Ventura Police Dept.	D	1	1		1		1					
Visalia Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
West Covina Police Dept.	D	1	1	1	1	1		1		1		
Whittier Police Dept.	D	1	1	1		1						

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
TOTAL	80	72	75	65	25	66	21	15	0	16	29	0
PERCENTAGE		90.00%	93.75%	81.25%	31.25%	82.50%	26.25%	18.75%	0.00%	20.00%	36.25%	0.00%

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Albany Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Amador County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Antioch Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Arcadia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Arcata Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Atwater Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1			1		
Azusa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1							1	
Baldwin Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Bell Gardens Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Bell Police Dept.	E											
Belmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Benicia Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Blythe Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Brea Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Burlingame Police Dept.	E											1
Calaveras County Sheriff's Dept.	E										1	
Calverico Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Campbell Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Capitola Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Carlsbad Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Carmel Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Carplinteria Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Ceres Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	
Chico Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Chino Police Dept.	E	1	1			1	1	1		1	1	
Claremont Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Clearlake Police Dept.	F		1	1		1					1	
Clovis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Coachella Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1						
Colton Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Colusa County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1		1	1							
Coronado Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Covina Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Cypress Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Davis Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1	1	
Del Norte County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	
Defano Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
East Bay Reg. Pk. District	E	1	1	1								
El Cerrito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1				1	
El Segundo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Eureka Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Folsom Police Dept.	F			1		1						
Foster City Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Fountain Valley Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1				1	
Gilroy Police Dept.	E	1	1				1					
Glendora Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Glenn County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Hanford Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1		1				
Hermosa Beach Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Hillsborough Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Huntington Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Indio Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1			1	
Inyo County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
L.A. City Housing Authority	E	1		1		1					1	
La Habra Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
La Mesa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
La Palma Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1		1	1				
La Verne Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Lassen County Sheriff's Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Lindsay Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Livermore Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Lodi Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					
Lompoc Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1				1	
Los Alamitos Police Dept.	F		1	1			1			1		
Los Altos Police Dept.	F										1	
Los Banos Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Los Gatos Police Dept.	E	1	1	1			1					
Manhattan Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1		1			
Manitoba Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Martinez Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Marysville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
Maywood Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1					1	
Menlo Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1					
Merced Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Millbrae Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Mono County Sheriff's Dept.	F										1	
Monrovia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Montclair Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1		1				1	
Monterey Police Dept.	E		1	1		1	1			1		
Morgan Hill Police Dept.	F		1			1	1					

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Napa County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Napa Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
National City Police Dept.	E	1		1							1	
Newark Police Dept.	E		1	1	1						1	
Novato Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Pacific Grove Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Pacifica Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Palos Verdes Estates Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Paso Robles Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Perris Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Petaluma Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Piedmont Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Pinole Police Dept.	F										1	
Placentia Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
Pleasant Hill Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1					1	
Pleasanton Police Dept.	E		1	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Plumas County Sheriff's Dept.	E											1
Port Hueneme Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Porterville Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Red Bluff Police Dept.	F		1	1							1	
Reedley Police Dept.	F	1	1	1			1			1	1	
Rialto Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Rohnert Park Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Roseville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1						1		
San Bruno Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
San Clemente Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1						1	
San Jacinto Police Dept.	F	1	1			1					1	
San Luis Obispo Police Dept.	E			1	1	1						
San Marino Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
San Pablo Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1				1		
San Rafael Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Santa Cruz Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1						
Santa Maria Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Santa Paula Police Dept.	F	1	1	1								
Sausalito Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	
Seal Beach Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Seaside Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Selma Police Dept.	F	1	1			1						
Siskiyou County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1								
South Pasadena Police Dept.	F	1	1		1		1					

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Stanton Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	
Suisun Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Tehama County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tracy Police Dept.	F	1	1	1	1							
Tulare Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1						
Tustin Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	
Ukiah Police Dept.	F	1	1	1		1						
Union City Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Upland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1	1			1		
Vacaville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1							
Vernon Police Dept.	E			1		1						
Walnut Creek Police Dept.	E	1	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	
Watsonville Police Dept.	E	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Woodland Police Dept.	E	1	1	1								
Yuba County Sheriff's Dept.	E	1		1	1	1						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>86.67%</b>	<b>88.89%</b>	<b>90.37%</b>	<b>37.04%</b>	<b>70.37%</b>	<b>22.96%</b>	<b>7.41%</b>	<b>2.22%</b>	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>36.30%</b>	<b>1.48%</b>

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Adelanto Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Alpine County Sheriff's Dept.	G											1
Alturas Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Anderson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Angels Camp Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Arroyo Grande Police Dept.	G	1	1			1	1					
Arvin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Atherton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Bear Valley Springs Police Dept.	G		1	1		1					1	
Beaumont Police Dept.	G	1	1		1						1	
Belvedere Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Brentwood Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Brisbane Police Dept.	G											1
California City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Chowchilla Police Dept.	G	1		1	1	1					1	
Clayton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Cloverdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Coalinga Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1			1		
Colfax Police Dept.	G			1		1						
Colma Police Dept.	G	1				1				1		
Colusa Police Dept.	G			1	1	1					1	
Corcoran Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1					
Cotati Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Desert Hot Spngs. Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Dinuba Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Dixon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Dorris Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Dos Palos Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Dunsmuir Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Escalon Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
Exeter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Fairfax Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Ferndale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Fort Jones Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1	1	1				
Fortuna Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1		
Galt Police Dept.	G						1		1			
Gonzales Police Dept.	G	1		1						1		
Gridley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Grover City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Guadalupe Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	

AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Gustine Police Dept.	G											1
Half Moon Bay Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Hercules Police Dept.	G	1		1		1				1		
Hollister Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Holtville Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Hughson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1							
Imperial Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Imperial Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Ione Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Irwindale Police Dept.	G		1	1	1						1	
Isleton Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1		
Jackson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Kensington Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1				1	1	
Kerman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
King City Police Dept.	G	1		1		1						
Kingsburg Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Lakeport Police Dept.	G											1
Lemoore Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Livingston Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
McFarland Police Dept.	G										1	
Mendota Police Dept.	G	1			1							
Modoc County Sheriff's Dept.	G		1	1								
Morro Bay Police Dept.	G		1	1	1	1	1				1	
Needles Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Nevada City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1					1		
Newman Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Oakdale Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1					1	
Patterson Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Pismo Beach Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Rio Del Police Dept.	G	1	1									
Rocklin Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Ross Police Dept.	G			1							1	
San Anselmo Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
San Benito County Sheriff's Dept.	G			1								
San Juan Bautista Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Sand City Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Scotts Valley Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1					1	
Sebastopol Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Shafter Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Starra Madre Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						



AGENCY	PERSONNEL	CRIME RATE	CIT. COMP.	INPUT	PATROL	COM. MTGS.	MAIL	PHONE	MALL	NEIGHBORHOOD	OTHER	NONE
Soledad Police Dept.	G	1	1	1			1			1		
Sonoma Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Sonora Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1				1	1	
Susanville Police Dept.	G		1	1								
Sutter Creek Police Dept.	G	1	1	1							1	
Tall Police Dept.	G	1	1	1		1						
Tehachapi Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Tiburon Police Dept.	G	1	1	1								
Willows Police Dept.	G	1	1	1	1	1						
Winters Police Dept.	G		1	1		1						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>PERCENTAGE</b>		<b>80.00%</b>	<b>81.11%</b>	<b>85.56%</b>	<b>28.89%</b>	<b>55.56%</b>	<b>7.78%</b>	<b>1.11%</b>	<b>1.11%</b>	<b>15.56%</b>	<b>23.33%</b>	<b>4.44%</b>

**APPENDIX FIVE**


**CHAPTER SIX FROM: HOW EFFECTIVE ARE**

**YOUR COMMUNITY SERVICES?**

**(CRIME CONTROL)**

# HOW EFFECTIVE ARE YOUR COMMUNITY SERVICES? Procedures for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Municipal Services

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# Chapter 6

## Crime Control

This chapter focuses on the role of police in crime prevention and deterrence and, for those crimes not prevented, on apprehension of offenders. Measures for corrections, prosecution, and adjudication functions are not included except to the extent that they are reflected implicitly in the suggested measures.

Crime control is a police responsibility, but it is influenced by other local government agencies, including those responsible for street lighting, narcotics treatment, recreation, and, in the long run, city planning, housing programs, and job development programs, as well as corrections and the courts. Crime control is also influenced by factors largely not under local government control, such as the community's population characteristics.

Many police activities such as traffic control and emergency medical aid do not involve crimes and are not treated in this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

### Crime Control Objectives

For purposes of developing a set of effectiveness measures, the overall police objective in crime control is assumed to be the following:

**To promote the safety of the community and a feeling of security among the citizens, primarily through the deterrence/prevention of crime and the apprehension of offenders, providing service in a fair, honest, prompt, and courteous manner to the satisfaction of the citizens.**

1. Traffic control measures are included in Chapter 8.

### Principal Measures and Measurement Procedures

The following principal measurement procedures are suggested as possibilities for annual tracking. The specific measures are listed in Exhibit 6-1.

1. A regular "victimization" survey of representative samples of citizens and businesses should be considered, perhaps annually. This would correct for the current inadequacy of information on the total incidence of crime due to the reliance on data pertaining to *reported* crimes.<sup>2</sup> Victimization surveys will yield estimates of the number of unreported crimes in various major categories. These can help show whether changes in the reported crime rates result from changes in the degree of reporting or represent true changes in actual rates of crime. The survey can also identify locations and characteristics of those parts of the population most victimized to help police develop better crime prevention programs. Because it is hard to obtain fully accurate information from respondents, these data should be regarded as imprecise estimates. They will be valuable primarily for making comparisons over time and among various groups within the community. The same survey can be used to obtain other information as discussed below.

2. The term "reported crime data" is used in this chapter when referring to the number of criminal incidents reported to a police department. Some studies prefer the term "recorded crime data," since police may not always report all incidents that are reported to them.

*Exhibit 6-1*  
**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR CRIME CONTROL SERVICES**

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE:** To promote the safety of the community and a feeling of security among the citizens, primarily through the deterrence/prevention of crime and the apprehension of offenders, providing service in a fair, honest, prompt, and courteous manner to the satisfaction of the citizens.

OBJECTIVE	QUALITY CHARACTERISTIC (OR SERVICE ASPECT)	SPECIFIC MEASURE	PRIME DATA SOURCES
Prevention of Crime	Reported crime rates	1. Number of reported crimes per 1,000 population, total and by type of crime.	Incident reports
	Victimization rates	2. Number of reported plus nonreported crimes per 1,000 households (or residents or businesses), by type of crime.	General citizen survey
	Different households and businesses victimized	3. Percentage of (a) households, (b) businesses victimized.	General citizen survey, business survey
	Physical casualties	4. Number and rate of persons (a) physically injured, (b) killed in course of crimes or nontraffic, crime-related police work.	Incident reports
	Property loss	5. Dollar property loss from crimes per 1,000 population (or, for businesses, per \$1,000 sales).	Incident reports
	Patrol effectiveness	6. Number of crimes observable from the street per 1,000 population.	Incident reports
	Inspection effectiveness	7. Number of crimes per 1,000 businesses in relation to time since last crime prevention inspection.	Incident reports, inspection records
	Peacekeeping in domestic quarrels and other localized disturbances	8. Percentage of domestic quarrels and other disturbance calls with no arrest and no second call within "x" hours.	Dispatch records, incident reports
Apprehension of Offenders	Crimes "solved" at least in part	9. Percentage of reported crimes cleared, by type of crime and whether cleared by arrest or by "exception."	Incident reports
	Completeness of apprehension	10. Percentage of known "person-crimes" cleared, by type of crime. <sup>1</sup>	Incident reports, arrest reports
	Quality/effectiveness of arrest	11. Percentage of adult arrests that survive preliminary court hearing (or state attorney's investigation) and percentage dropped for police-related reasons, by type of crime.	Arrest and court records
		12. Percentage of adult arrests resulting in conviction or treatment (a) on at least one charge, (b) on highest initial charge, by type of crime.	Arrest and court records
	Speed of apprehension	13. Percentage of cases cleared in less than "x" days (with "x" selected for each crime category).	Incident report, arrest reports
	Stolen property recovery	14. Percentage of stolen property that is subsequently recovered: (a) vehicles; (b) vehicle value; (c) other property value.	Incident reports, arrest or special property records
Responsiveness of Police	Response time	15. Percentage of emergency or high-priority calls responded to within "x" minutes and percentage of nonemergency calls responded to within "y" minutes.	Dispatch records
	Perceived responsiveness	16. Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses that feel police come fast enough when called.	General citizen survey, business survey, and complainant survey
Feeling of Security	Citizen perception	17. Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesspersons who feel safe (or unsafe) walking in their neighborhoods at night.	Citizen survey, business survey
Honesty, <sup>2</sup> Fairness, Courtesy (and general satisfaction)	Fairness	18. Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses that feel police are generally fair in dealing with them.	General citizen survey, business survey, and complainant survey
	Courtesy	19. Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses who feel police are generally courteous in dealing with them.	General citizen survey, business survey, and complainant survey

(Exhibit continued on next page)

## Exhibit 6-1 continued

OBJECTIVE	QUALITY CHARACTERISTIC (OR SERVICE ASPECT)	SPECIFIC MEASURE	PRIME DATA SOURCES
	Police behavior	20. Number of reported incidents or complaints of police misbehavior, and the number resulting in judgment against the government or employee (by type of complaint (civil charge, criminal charge, other service complaints), per 100 police.	Police and mayor's office records
	Citizen satisfaction with police handling of miscellaneous incidents	21. Percentage of persons requesting assistance for other than serious crimes who are satisfied (or dissatisfied) with police handling of their problems, categorized by reason for dissatisfaction, and by type of call.	Complainant survey
	Citizen satisfaction with overall performance	22. Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses rating police performance as excellent or good (or fair or poor), by reason for satisfaction (or dissatisfaction).	General citizen survey, business survey, and complainant survey
VICE, DRUGS, AND SIMILAR OFFENSES <sup>3</sup>			
Apprehension	Level and focus of arrest activity	23. Number of arrests for vice- and drug-related crimes, by type of crime (e.g., prostitution, gambling, narcotics possession, narcotics sales, etc.) and type of drug, and by "big fish" or "little fish," if possible.	Booking records
	Quality of arrests	— Measures 11 and 12.	Arrest and court records
Citizen Satisfaction	Citizen perception of seriousness of problem	24. Percentage of citizens who feel that (a) pornography, (b) prostitution, (c) gambling, (d) soft drug usage, (e) hard drug usage, or (f) sale of drugs is a major problem in their neighborhood or community.	General citizen survey
Apprehension	Illegal materials seized	25. Quantity and street value of illicit drugs seized.	Police property records
	Availability of drugs	26. Retail and wholesale prices for illicit drugs, by type and quality.	Vice squad intelligence data

1. One person committing four crimes or four persons committing one crime would be four "person-crimes." When the number of offenders involved in a crime is unknown, as may frequently happen with such crimes as burglary, "one" criminal can be assumed for this statistic (or the historical average number of offenders for that type of crime could be used).

2. A satisfactory approach to measuring the degree of corruption, malfeasance, or negligence is lacking. Data on the number of complaints received by the city on these problems should be examined, particularly when their number increases substantially.

3. These offenses have special measurement difficulties, so measures for them have been grouped separately.

2. Current apprehension measures such as clearance rates and number of arrests appear to have major deficiencies, so the use of some form of the measure "percentage of arrests that survive preliminary court hearing" is suggested. This will provide an important check on the quality of arrests. Moreover, if the reasons for dropping arrests are identified and tallied, the "number of arrests dropped, by reason for being dropped," would provide additional useful information to police and courts. These new measures require procedures for obtaining data from the court or prosecution offices. Initial tests indicate that such procedures are feasible, but methods and definitions must be carefully developed.

A related improvement is to count the "percentage of 'person-crimes' committed that are cleared," so that if more than one suspect is identified, credit would be given when (or withheld until) the other suspects are brought to justice.

Better yet, but more complicated, would be a measure of the "percentage of 'person-crimes' committed leading to an arrest that survives a preliminary hearing."

3. The citizen survey that collects victimization data can also be used to obtain representative citizens' perceptions of the adequacy of various aspects of police service including feelings about security in their neighborhoods and about the speed of response, courtesy, and fairness of their police. In addition, a survey by telephone or mail (if properly followed up) of persons who have requested help would enable the government to assess its performance on calls that are for nonserious requests for assistance—the great majority of all calls.

4. Some small but potentially helpful modifications can be made of current, reported crime statistics.

These include providing crime rates separately for businesses and for residences, considering transient as well as residential populations in determining crime rates, and identifying rates for those crimes usually susceptible to police deterrence (such as crimes visible from the street). Many problems accompany the introduction of such changes, but the long-run cost should be small.

## Individual Measures and Data Collection Procedures

Exhibit 6-1 presents a set of effectiveness measures for consideration by local jurisdictions.<sup>3</sup> These measures, and the procedures for collecting necessary data, are discussed in this section under four major headings:

- Measures of crime prevention (1-8);
- Measures of apprehension success (9-14);
- Measures of police responsiveness and citizen satisfaction (15-22); and
- Measures of performance on vice, drugs, and similar offenses (23-27).

### Measures of "Crime Prevention" (Measures 1-8)

#### *Measure 1. Number of reported crimes per 1,000 population, total and by type of crime.*

This is the standard crime measure, but many variations are possible. The following should be considered by local communities for use in addition to the standard procedures required for FBI crime reporting:

1. Aggregate crime rates might be reported using three different groupings of crimes: (1) FBI "index" crimes, (2) FBI "Part I" crimes, and (3) a locally defined group of all crimes considered serious.<sup>4</sup> The first two groupings will generate crime rates that permit inter-city comparisons. The last grouping, tailored to local judgments, might include (a) all Part I crimes: the seven index crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) plus negligent manslaughter, and (b) those Part II crimes with di-

3. References such as those listed in the selected bibliography are worth consulting in developing measures of police effectiveness and productivity.

4. Local governments might also wish to consider groupings of violent crimes, crimes against property, and other crimes with direct victims.

rect, unwilling victims: arson, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism, child neglect or abuse, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, stolen property trafficking, and other related crimes. The local grouping might exclude the following: Part II sex offenses, narcotics possession, gambling, non-violent offenses against the family, liquor law violations, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, runaways, loitering, and so forth.<sup>5</sup> The additional crime categorization would not require any additional data collection, but it does require another tabulation of data.

2. To the extent feasible, crime rates should be refined to reflect offenses against various populations at risk. Included in crime totals are offenses against businesses and against nonresidents (such as commuters) located in the city at the time of the offense. Thus, crime rates based on residential population (that is, crimes per 1,000 population) can be somewhat misleading. For example, the crime rate will be inflated artificially in those jurisdictions, or portions of a jurisdiction, that have proportionately more businesses or more employees and shoppers commuting from outside.<sup>6</sup> To reduce the problem of defining and measuring comparable groups of crimes and populations at risk, the following separate crime rates might be calculated:

- "The number of reported crimes against residents (or residences) per 1,000 residents (or residential units), defined to include all crimes against the person when the person is a resident and all property crimes involving residential property." Property crimes against businesses owned by residents could be counted here and in the next measure (the double counting that would result from some incidents<sup>7</sup> is not necessarily bad here). Resi-

5. St. Petersburg, Florida, adopted the following three-part division for aggregate reporting of its crime rates: (1) all Part I crimes, (2) the Part II crimes suggested for inclusion above, and (3) all other nonvice crimes. Vice crimes (including narcotics-related offenses) are reported separately as an indicator of department activities in that field.

6. We examined a sample of 100 Part I crimes in one city for January 1974. It showed that eighteen were against businesses and seven against nonresidents. Thus the overall crime rate as usually computed was one-third higher than the actual rate of crimes against residents (as residents). Some of the businesses may have been owned by residents, however.

7. An assault against a resident that occurs within a business would be counted as against resident. If a store was robbed, the crime would be counted as against both business and resident if the owner is a resident. Note that for crimes against the person, each person victimized constitutes a separate crime by FBI definitions, so that mixtures of residents and nonresidents involved in those crimes need not involve double counting.

dential population estimates between censuses are often available from the local planning department.

- "The number of crimes against businesses per 1,000 businesses or the number of crimes against businesses per 1,000 employees." The latter version would reflect the increased population at risk presented by larger establishments and reduce the problem of defining a single business. An estimate of the number of businesses is often available from the license department, the treasurer's office, or one of the government's offices responsible for inspections, such as for fire and safety conditions. The measurement data might be categorized by type of business (banks, motels, and the like).
- "The rate of crimes per 1,000 equivalent daily population," with "equivalent daily population" defined as the total number of residents and nonresidents in the city on an average day. The "equivalent daily population" is likely to change with the season for communities with large visitor populations or with seasonally varying employment, and averages would need to be computed for annual figures. The chamber of commerce often has estimates of visitor populations, but since these may represent rough guesses, they should be investigated before use. In particular, they often cover only visitors staying in hotels or motels. Better estimates of "average daily population" might be developed by some centralized local agency such as the planning department, inasmuch as they will be useful to many agencies (for example, police, fire, transportation).

3. Report crime rates by age, race, sex, and neighborhood of victims (for nonbusiness crimes) and by general type of business and neighborhood (for business crimes). This practice will identify more clearly those groups with the most severe problems and may provide clues as to the direction needed for prevention procedures.

**Special Validity Considerations.** One major problem with the use of reported crime rates is that many crimes are unreported. According to the 1973-74 general citizen surveys in St. Petersburg and Nashville, unreported crimes in those cities represented 40 to 50 percent of total crimes. Surveys by the federal government have shown a range from 33

to 66 percent.<sup>8</sup> Measures 2 and 3, which include estimates of underreporting, are included to counteract this problem.

Another important problem with measures of reported crimes concerns the differences that develop among police officers or from year to year in the application of definitions for various crimes.<sup>9</sup> To cut down on differences in defining crimes, a government can provide officer-training programs that emphasize the importance of accurate records and clarify confusing categories, conduct regular supervisory review of incident reports, establish clearer departmental policies (when the law affords discretionary choice), and have an independent agency periodically check the accuracy of tabulations of a sample of incidents.

*Measure 2: Number of reported plus unreported crimes per 1,000 households (or residents, or businesses), by type of crime.*

Underreporting causes at least two major problems. First, it may mislead officials and the public about the total magnitude of crimes. Second, when a government undertakes activities that lead to increased crime reporting by citizens, the higher reported crime figures that result are likely to be misinterpreted as an increase in crime.

The degree of underreporting varies considerably by type of crime.<sup>10</sup> It may also vary as citizens gain or lose confidence in the police, and as they are encouraged to report, or dissuaded from reporting, crimes.

**Data Collection.** Obtaining reliable estimates of unreported as well as reported crimes is more easily said than done. An approach that appears feasible for many governments is to survey periodically a random sample of households and businesses to provide estimates of the number and percentage of

8. See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Criminal Victimization Surveys in Thirteen American Cities" (Washington, D.C., June 1975).

9. For example, practices may differ with regard to recording crimes involving youths, especially the lesser crimes.

10. Evidence from federal and local victimization surveys indicates that underreporting is particularly large for incidents involving little or no loss or harm, such as attempted forcible entry, attempted robbery without incident, and attempted assaults without weapon. However, rape and other assaults also appear to have unreported rates of over 50 percent. Detailed findings of completed federal victimization surveys are contained in U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Criminal Victimization Surveys, Crimes and Victims: A Report of the Dayton/San Jose Pilot Survey of Victimization* (Washington, D.C., June 1974), and *Criminal Victimization Surveys in the Nation's Five Largest Cities* (Washington, D.C., April 1975).



households (or individuals) and businesses which have been the victims of unreported crimes.<sup>11</sup>

The U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has developed victimization survey questionnaires for use by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in a number of cities. These surveys ask detailed questions about many types of crimes to aid the memory of the respondents and to avoid relying on citizens' knowledge of the legal definition of each type of crime.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, few local governments are able to afford the lengthy interviews and large sample size of the LEAA surveys (about 10,000 households contacted per city) at all, much less for annual collection. Such surveys could easily cost \$250,000 or more.

The victimization survey proposed here poses fewer questions, employs smaller samples (500 to 1,000 households), and probably uses procedures less sophisticated than those of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It is drawn up in such a way that it could easily be part of a survey that covers other government services as well as crime control. The smaller sample size reduces the accuracy of the estimates, but the results are still useful.

This more limited approach to household surveys was used (and as of this writing is still being used) by St. Petersburg, Nashville, Palo Alto, and other cities. The victimization questions tested in Nashville are numbers 31 to 36 in Appendix 1. A similar set of questions was used in St. Petersburg.<sup>13</sup> Other governments may want to use these questions as a starting point for developing their own surveys. The questions generally follow the wording of the LEAA questions but inquire about fewer categories of crime and obtain fewer details about each crime. Interviewers administering questions on victimization must be trained to understand thoroughly the definitions of the categories of crimes included in the wording of the questions (such as when assault is "serious" or "not serious"). For example, see Question 34 in Appendix 1. Moreover, care must be taken to match survey questions with the categories of reported crimes already in use in the jurisdiction if

victimization information yielded by the survey is to be compared with crime rates reported by the police.

Businesses as well as households can be surveyed to discover the extent of their unreported victimization. The Census Bureau questioned commercial establishments as part of the LEAA victimization survey. For annual data collection by local governments, however, it is recommended, as with the household survey, that a few victimization questions be included on a general citizen survey along with questions on other government services. A survey of businesses is discussed in Chapter 15; an illustrative, but untested, questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. Questions 14 to 18 illustrate questions that might be used to estimate the number and percentage of unreported criminal acts against businesses.

The estimate of the total number of reported plus unreported crimes can be calculated in several ways; three are outlined here:

1. Estimate the total residential victimization rate by multiplying the per capita (or per household) victimization rate calculated from the survey by the total population of the jurisdiction. The number of commercial crimes could be estimated similarly from the business survey. (Less satisfactorily, business crimes could be estimated from police records, though this would omit unreported business crimes from the overall total.) This calculation will not include an estimate of victimizations of transients, who are not covered in the residential surveys. If the number of reported incidents involving transients is determined from police records, this could be added.
2. Estimate the amount of unreported residential incidents (and commercial incidents, if the survey of businesses is used) by multiplying the per capita (or per household) nonreported crime rates obtained from the survey by the total population. Add this to the number of crimes reported in police records. The resulting estimate will include no estimate of the underreporting of crimes involving transients (because, as noted above, these incidents are not covered by the residential surveys), but will include reported crimes involving transient victims.
3. Multiply the ratio of unreported-to-reported residential incidents, as obtained from the survey, by the number of crimes reported from police records to estimate the number of unreported incidents. Add this number to the number of crimes reported in police records. This method assumes that the nonreporting rate will be roughly the same for transients as for residents.

11. Another approach that has been suggested is to use insurance data on crimes with property loss or injuries to estimate total crime trends. However, this presents other validation problems such as lack of insurance for the poor (who are often heavily victimized), underreporting of even insured losses to the insurance companies themselves, and the lack of full information on nonproperty crimes, plus the difficulty of obtaining data from insurance companies.

12. A layman might call a burglary a robbery, for example.

13. See Questions 26 to 33 of the St. Petersburg questionnaire in "Measuring the Effectiveness of Basic Municipal Services: Initial Report" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute/ICMA, February 1974).

We have no evidence to suggest which approach will prove most accurate. Regardless of which approach is selected, the procedures should be used consistently to permit meaningful comparisons from one time period to another.

Finally, tallies of the reasons for nonreporting are desirable. This information—such as frequent mention of "fear or retaliation"—should provide the jurisdiction with clues as to necessary corrective action. Question 31c in Appendix 1 illustrates how such data might be collected.

*Special Validity Considerations.* The potential problems in the sample survey approach are discussed in full in Chapter 14, but one particular concern for this measure is the ability of respondents to recall accurately their victimization experiences.<sup>14</sup> The questions used in our city tests, such as those shown in Appendix 1, ask about a twelve-month period. Alternatively, respondents could be asked about shorter periods and the resulting data used to project annual amounts of nonreporting. Another problem concerns the validity of responses in cases in which one person in a household (or business) may be asked to recall crimes committed against anyone in the household.<sup>15</sup> Those efforts that have been undertaken to check on the validity of crime victimization responses suggest that surveys have problems but yield data accurate enough for gross monitoring.<sup>16</sup>

It is our judgment that, with proper survey procedures, estimating the total crime rate is likely to

14. The memory problem has two major components. On the one hand, respondents may forget incidents; on the other hand, they may include incidents that occurred prior to the period they are being asked about. Little evidence exists on the size of either of these problems and their net effect. The primary research on this to date of which we are aware is a study by LEAA in 1970 in Santa Clara County, California. See U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *San Jose Methods Test of Known Crime Victims* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Division, June 1972). It reported a 74-percent recall rate when the inquiry was for "the past 12 months" and concluded that "a reference period of 12 months is not worse than one of 6 months for simply assessing whether a crime occurred." LEAA has been using twelve-month recall periods for victimization surveys of twenty-six large central cities, but six months for its national "panel" survey.

15. This problem can be eliminated by a local government if the more expensive survey procedures are used in which each member of the household is interviewed—perhaps including school-age children. The Bureau of the Census in its victimization surveys interviews all persons fourteen years or older in the surveyed households.

16. For a recent examination of the accuracy of victimization surveys see Alfred J. Tuchfarber and William R. Klecka, *Random Digit Dialing: Lowering the Cost of Victimization Surveys* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, December 1976). Previous references on this issue, such as LEAA's tests in San Jose and Dayton, are listed in the selected bibliography.

be a more accurate guide to a community's overall progress than merely relying on reported crime data.<sup>17</sup> With the use of the less detailed and less expensive procedures, however, estimates of the number of unreported crimes for a given type of offense are likely to be imprecise because of the occasional difficulty of determining the proper category of crime for a given incident. Thus, these abbreviated victimization surveys are not likely to collect enough detailed information on each crime to estimate reliably the crime rate by type of crime.

If the same survey questions are used from year to year, the survey should help indicate relative changes in the magnitude of the crime rate as well as possible changes in the degree of underreporting over time.

*Measure 3: Percentage of (a) households, (b) businesses victimized.*

Victimization measures are usually calculated as shown in Measure 2: the total number of crimes divided by the total population (or number of households). A potentially useful variation is Measure 3, which indicates the size of the victim population. The total number of crimes divided by the number of households is *not* equivalent to this measure, since many households are victims of more than one crime. For example, in the 1973 St. Petersburg survey, 31 percent of the respondent households indicated they had experienced at least one crime, but a division of the total number of crime incidents by the total number of households responding yielded 67 percent. The corresponding figures in the 1974 Nashville survey were 33 percent and 62 percent.<sup>18</sup> This measure is particularly useful as a rough indicator of possible inequities in the provision of crime-prevention services; it can be helpful for the police to know if a small number of households and businesses are experiencing a disproportionate share of the crimes. If characteristics of the frequently victimized households and businesses can be identified, local authorities may be able to use such information in redesigning and re-targeting crime prevention programs.

*Data Collection.* The number of households and businesses victimized at least once would be esti-

17. See Roger B. Parks, "Complementary Measures of Police Performance: Citizen Appraisals and Police-Generated Data," *Studies in Political Theory and Policy Analysis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Department of Political Science, 1973), pp. 24 ff., for a review of studies supporting this view.

18. The 1974 Nashville survey found that 39 percent of the households which indicated that they had been victimized at least once had also been victimized more than once.

mated from general citizen surveys, using the same questions as those used for Measure 2. The "number victimized more than once" can also be obtained.

**Special Validity Considerations.** This measure may prove more generally reliable than Measure 2 (estimated total crime rate) because it is easier for a respondent to remember whether there were any crimes at all than to remember the exact number of crimes for a given period.

**Measure 4:** *Number and rate of persons (a) physically injured, (b) killed in the course of crimes or nontraffic, crime-related police work.*

In statistics relating to fire protection, fire-related casualties are routinely reported, but the situation in crime statistics is different. Except for the deaths by murder and manslaughter, statistics on other citizen injuries or deaths related to crime are rarely compiled.

There are problems in defining what constitutes an injury. It can be argued, for example, that all crimes—or at least all crimes against the person and most robberies—cause some degree of psychological, if not physical, injury. For this measure it is suggested that only those physical injuries requiring medical attention be included. (This will have the added benefit of allowing comparability with fire and traffic accident injuries, for which similar definitions are used.)

Although tempting, it is inappropriate to estimate this measure by summing the number of "crimes against persons." Many jurisdictions make no distinction between assaults that result in injury and those that do not. For example, aggravated assault may be an attack resulting in serious injury or a threat with a gun that is not fired. Also, injuries associated with crimes such as robbery and injuries to bystanders, whether caused by offenders or police, often do not result in separate formal charges for assaults.

Data can be grouped by the following categories:

- By role of person injured (victim of crime, bystander, suspect, or police);
- By cause of injury (actions of suspect, police, bystander, or victim; or accident associated with the crime—for example, a fall); or
- By severity of injury (death, injury that required hospitalization, other injury likely to require medical attention).

To obtain these data a display format for this

information such as the following might be added to the incident report:

	TO VICTIM	TO POLICE	TO SUSPECTS	TO BYSTANDER/ OTHERS	CAUSE
Number of Injuries					
Number of Deaths					

**Special Validity Considerations.** This measure has not been tested in this project. Because it represents mainly a reformulation and summary of existing data, often reported in narrative form on incident reports, it probably presents no special validation problems—except for the definition of injuries, which is a longstanding problem in traffic and fire statistics.

**Measure 5:** *Dollar property loss from crimes per 1,000 population (or, for businesses, per \$1,000 sales).*

Minimizing property loss is another basic objective in crime prevention. The amount of total property loss depends on the average loss per crime as well as on the number of crimes. Prevention education, inspections, and other police activities may help cut the "take" per crime whether or not they reduce the number of crimes.

**Data Collection.** Procedures for data collection must be standardized. Property losses for each crime should be established according to (a) victim estimates or (b) a periodically updated catalog of prices for new and used products of the kinds most frequently stolen, supplemented by victims' estimates. Insurance company estimates of the value of stolen articles can sometimes be used, but not all property is insured, and an insurance company may not follow a full-value reimbursement policy.<sup>19</sup>

To facilitate comparisons over time, summary statistics on losses should be presented in dollars adjusted for price-level changes as well as in current dollars.

Distinguishing between losses of residents, businesses, and nonresidents can be useful to demonstrate the relative magnitude of the problem within each group. Per capita losses to residents

19. See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook* (Washington, D.C., January 1974), pp. 52-55, for additional suggestions on valuation of stolen property.

might be compared to per capita tax dollars spent on police. For businesses, the dollar loss per \$1,000 sales might be compared to the local taxes per \$1,000 that go to police protection.

*Special Validity Considerations.* Validity problems can arise from having nonstandardized procedures for estimating the value of property loss, from losses that are unreported or incorrectly reported, and, for comparisons over time, from not adjusting for price changes.

Victimization surveys could be used to improve the data on losses relating to unreported crimes, but this information is likely to be less reliable than the data on the number of unreported crimes because the respondent has to recall even more specific information, that is, the value of the property lost.<sup>20</sup> Also, crimes involving high property loss are less likely to go unreported than are those with low loss; one reason often cited by respondents for not reporting crimes is that they were too unimportant.<sup>21</sup>

*Measure 6: Number of crimes observable from the street per 1,000 population.*

This measure provides information on the types of crime most likely to be prevented by police patrol units. Crimes on the streets and alleys, or visible from them, should be more easily deterred by the presence of patrol units than most other crimes.

The effectiveness of patrol in deterrence has been the subject of much debate.<sup>22</sup> Widespread use of the street crime measure might throw useful light on this debate.

*Data Collection.* Standardized departmental guidelines defining the circumstances that characterize a visible crime would need to be developed. Outdoor crimes would obviously be included, but the

20. See Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *San Jose Methods Test*, p. 16, for a comparison of losses per crime from incident reports and victimization surveys. Which is the more accurate data source is not clear.

21. For example, in the 1974 Nashville survey, 41 percent of the reasons given for nonreporting were that the respondents "didn't think it was important enough." (The second largest reason given was that they "didn't think it would do any good"—21 percent.) For the 1973 St. Petersburg study the corresponding figures were 31 percent and 29 percent.

22. See, for example, George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown, *The Kansas City Preventive Experiment: A Summary Report* and George L. Kelling et al., *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Technical Report* (both Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974). For critiques of the study see the June 1975 issue of *Police Chief*. Other experiments involving police saturation patrols have shown reductions in some crime rates, at least in the short run, while also at the same time they suggest that crimes were perhaps being shifted to neighborhoods outside the saturated areas.

definition of visible crimes should probably also embrace such an offense as illegal entry, when the evidence of entry (for example, a broken window) would have been visible from the street.

*Special Validity Considerations.* A check of incident reports in St. Petersburg and Nashville showed that the distinction between outdoor and indoor crimes was already being made in those cities, and those occurring outdoors could be easily tallied. For most indoor crimes, however, visibility from the street could *not* be inferred from the reports. A workable set of definitions and procedures for collecting reliable data remains to be tested. Meanwhile, merely distinguishing indoor and outdoor crime probably is worthwhile and may indicate at least to some degree the effectiveness of patrol.

*Measure 7: Number of reported crimes per 1,000 businesses in relation to time since last crime prevention inspection.*

Some jurisdictions inspect commercial premises to determine their safety and to suggest improved precautions against crime. In a few communities, these inspections are performed by public safety agents who simultaneously inspect for crime and fire hazards. The effectiveness of the inspections can be assessed partially by comparing the crime rate in inspected properties to the crime rate in similar properties that have not been inspected. Inspection of all properties of a given risk class would preclude comparison of inspected and uninspected properties, but it might still be possible to see whether recently inspected properties have substantially lower crime rates than properties that have not been inspected for some time.<sup>23</sup>

*Special Validity Considerations.* These procedures have not been tested, but analogous measures of the influence of inspection on fire rates have been tested.<sup>24</sup> The procedures are probably feasible, but they involve considerable effort and might be more appropriate for occasional special studies than annual use. Also, groups of properties at similar risk must be compared. When only a limited police inspection effort is possible, it is likely to be directed toward properties of highest risk, and these cannot be compared directly with properties of lower risk.

23. Some local governments may also want to measure the extent to which compliance has occurred within a ninety-day period following an inspection in which a deficiency was identified.

24. See John R. Hall, Jr., "Measuring the Effectiveness of Fire Inspections" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, March 1976). Working Paper.

**Measure 8:** *Percentage of domestic quarrels and other disturbance calls with no arrest and no second call within "x" hours.*

Domestic quarrels, quarrels among acquaintances, and the like are often precursors of serious crimes. They have received growing attention from the police because they often result in violence, sometimes with injuries to the officers responding. How well police defuse such situations is a key aspect of police effectiveness in deterrence. No other measure directly addresses this police activity.

This measure makes the assumption that, in many cases, police are able to defuse the situations which prompt these types of calls—without the need to make an arrest and in such a way as to prevent second calls for at least a certain period of time. This period (the value of "x" in the measure) might be the duration of a tour of duty, twenty-four hours, or perhaps even a week—the selection is here left to local judgment.

There will, of course, be occasions when an arrest is appropriate on the first call. On other occasions, a police officer may, exercising reasonable judgment, avoid making an arrest on the initial call, but circumstances beyond his control could prompt a second call. To the extent that such uncontrollable circumstances are prevalent, this measure is likely to be less meaningful. If the percentage of such situations remains fairly stable from year to year, the changes in the values for the measure would probably still be meaningful to track success in handling calls that represent situations in which deterrence of violence was possible.

The National Commission on Productivity's Advisory Group on Productivity in Law Enforcement suggested a somewhat simpler variation of this measure: "percentage of noisy disturbance calls for which no further attention is required for the remainder of the patrol tour."<sup>25</sup>

**Data Collection.** Special procedures would be needed to keep track of "family quarrel situations reported to the police." Each dispatcher might log such calls; the frequency of calls to the same address would subsequently be tallied. Records of the initial calls would also have to be checked to determine if arrests had been made. Calls discovered on arrival of police officers to involve felonies (thus making arrest more likely) should be grouped separately.

**Special Validity Considerations.** These procedures have not been tested, but several police chiefs

25. See U.S. National Commission on Productivity, *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services*, (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 28.

have suggested that this category of calls merits close examination. Until satisfactory testing has been done and the meaningfulness of the resulting data examined, this measure should be considered experimental.

### Measures of Apprehension Success (Measures 9-14)

**Measure 9:** *Percentage of reported crimes cleared, by type of crime and whether cleared by arrest or by "exception."*

This measure is the clearance rate, the traditional measure of apprehension effectiveness. This is the percentage of crimes for which at least one suspect has been arrested and charged, or for which an "exceptional clearance" has been made.<sup>26</sup> The number of exceptional clearances should be presented separately. Exceptional clearances may constitute a substantial proportion of total clearances, and they present special measurement problems, including the following: (1) the degree to which police attempt to get already apprehended criminals to admit to other crimes may change over time; (2) difficulties in definitions of exceptional clearance can make for inconsistent application; and (3) the number of exceptional clearances reported by the suspects will vary with their willingness and capability to confess to other crimes.

As is normally done, clearance rates should be presented for each crime category, so that performance on each type of crime can be assessed. Clearance rates on Part II crimes with victims (such as kidnapping) should receive similar treatment.

Clearance rates vary considerably among types of crimes.<sup>27</sup> Consideration of clearance rates by individual crime categories will permit officials to determine if an improvement or degradation in the overall clearance rate was due to a change in the crime mix. For example, if an unusually large number of "hard to solve" crimes are committed in a given year, a decrease in the overall clearance rate might result even though all clearance rates for individual crime categories increased. Case "difficulty" within crime categories ideally should also be

26. "Exceptional clearances," as defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting System, include cases where an arrestee confesses to other crimes, the accused dies, the victim refuses to cooperate in the prosecution, the suspect is transferred to another jurisdiction to face other charges, and so forth. See the complete definition in U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook*.

27. For example, the nationwide clearance rate for aggravated assault with guns was 63 percent in 1974 versus 18 percent for burglary involving forcible entry. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States Uniform Reports 1974* (Washington, D.C., November 1975).

considered. Incidents might be classified for any given crime category by the quality of evidence available to the immediately responding police officer.<sup>28</sup>

Unfortunately, as has already been mentioned, clearance rates as currently defined have major validity problems, and the measure provides only a very crude indication of success in "solving" crimes. This is discussed below.

**Data Collection.** Clearances are reported monthly by type of crime, in most jurisdictions, as part of the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting System. The major problem in data collection is to assure that the FBI definitions are consistently used, especially those for exceptional clearances.

A local government should consider tallying clearances for each particular unit accomplishing clearances, including "assists" (cases in which one unit helps another). If this is done, care must be taken to establish fair ground rules for "assists" to avoid misuse of the data and promotion of unhealthy rivalries.<sup>29</sup> Clearances can also be categorized by how they were made. Some suggested categories are "response to a call of a crime in progress," "preventive patrol," "follow-up investigation by patrol," "follow-up investigation by detectives," and so forth.

**Special Validity Considerations.** Using clearance rates as indicators of "solution" success poses some major problems:

1. As noted earlier, the validity of an exceptional clearance is sometimes questionable; for instance, arrestees may admit to multiple crimes in exchange for leniency, because they know they are unlikely to be prosecuted for them in the absence of evidence other than their confessions. As has been noted, definitions of exceptional clearances are complex and not always strictly adhered to.

2. Another problem is that clearances as defined by the UCR reflect only the first arrest on a case and give no credit to subsequent arrests. A crime is considered cleared when only one offender is arrested—even when multiple offenders were known to have participated in it. A department that

apprehends only one of the offenders involved in a crime thus would have as high a clearance rate as one that arrested all offenders involved in a similar crime. Measure 10 has been included to address this particular problem.

3. A major problem with clearance rates is that the "clearance" is usually counted even if the arrest does not pass preliminary court hearing (regardless of the reason for its being dropped). Most jurisdictions apparently have little systematic feedback from the court system to the police concerning disposition of arrests. A clearance is not removed from the total if the suspect is released. Thus, the clearance rates do not necessarily indicate the percentage of offenders who are successfully brought to justice or even the percentage of crimes that have been "solved." Measures 11 and 12 have been included to address this problem.

4. Usually the clearance rate is computed as the number of clearances in a year, quarter, or month divided by the number of crimes in the same period. Because some time elapses between crime and arrest, some clearances in a given year will relate to crimes committed in the previous year, and some clearances for crimes in the current year will not show up until the next year. If elapsed time is generally short or if crime and clearance rates are constant, this practice presents little problem. If the lag is considerable and crime clearance rates vary, clearance rates computed the usual way will be somewhat different from the actual clearance rates. Local governments should estimate the distribution of times required to clear various types of crimes (see Measure 13) to determine the severity of this problem for their jurisdictions for various types of crimes. This problem is likely to be considerably less consequential than the previous ones.

*Measure 10: Percentage of "person-crimes" cleared, by type of crime.*

As noted under Measure 9, the commonly used apprehension measure, the clearance rate, counts a crime as cleared after the first arrest on a case. The extent to which *all* offenders are apprehended can be reflected better by a new measure, the percentage of "person-crimes" cleared. Although this measure may seem strange at first, it is really more natural than the commonly used "clearance" definition.

A "person-crime" is defined as one person committing one crime. One person committing four crimes or four persons committing one crime would each mean four person-crimes have been committed. Each time a person is arrested for a crime or charged with an additional crime, one person-crime would be counted as cleared. Exceptional clearances of

28. Procedures for such categorizations were not attempted in the work reported here. However, there are forthcoming studies that may provide a sound basis for such classifications. David J. Farmer, "Fact versus Fact: A Selective View of Police Research in the United States," *The Police Journal*, April 1976, p. 112.

29. The Sunnyvale, California "ICAM" System records the effectiveness of various units and activities (e.g., fingerprinting) as they contribute to arrests (and therefore clearances). See Sunnyvale, California, Public Safety Department, *Investigation Control and Management System*, by Charles T. Crabtree, 1973.



person-crimes would be handled the same as for FBI crime clearances.<sup>30</sup>

**Data Collection.** The known number of offenders is usually already recorded on incident reports. An additional space on the incident report form for the estimated number of offenders would expedite tallies. The total count would be compared to the total number of arrests and exceptional clearances for the reporting period. A trial of this procedure for a sample of 100 cases in one city revealed no significant data collection problems. It was found, however, that when a case is subsequently classified as "unfounded," it is necessary to look up the number of person-crimes in the case file to determine how many to subtract from the total number of person-crimes. As information becomes available to indicate that more (or fewer) persons were involved than previously estimated, the tallies ideally should be revised.

**Special Validity Considerations.** The chief difficulty is the accuracy of the information on how many offenders were involved in individual crimes. The data are likely to be most accurate for crimes against the person (because the number of offenders is more likely to be known) as distinguished, for example, from burglaries. When the number of offenders is not known, "one" offender (or the historical average number of offenders per crime in the jurisdiction) might be assumed.

Even with this limitation, this measure appears to be more accurate in reflecting apprehension success than the traditional clearance rates. Its importance depends on whether there are a significant number of crimes known to involve multiple offenders.<sup>31</sup>

**Measure 11: Percentage of adult arrests that survive preliminary court hearing (or state attorney's investigation) and percentage**

30. For purposes of this measure, a "crime" should probably be defined by the FBI definition of an incident, rather than as each offense that may take place during an incident. For example, one person committing four offenses during the same incident would count as only one person-crime and not four.

31. In a sample of 100 Part I crimes in Nashville in January 1974, thirteen were "against the person" and seventeen offenders were involved. Thus there were 31 percent more person-crimes than crimes for this type of offense. Assuming one offender for each of the other crimes would lead to a count of 104 person-crimes, or 4 percent over the number of crimes. However, this sample is too small for generalizations. A government could make estimates of the number of offenders for various categories of crimes, using samples of cases that it believed had been fully solved—and use these estimates rather than "one" for crimes for which no evidence was available as to the number of offenders.

*dropped for police-related reasons, by type of crime.*

Many arrests never lead to conviction and others fail to survive even the preliminary court hearing. Thus, arrest and clearance rates may considerably overstate apprehension effectiveness.<sup>32</sup> In addition, an ineffectual arrest may waste much police, prosecution, and judicial time before it is dropped from the system. Also, arrests are restrictions of personal liberty. Without some measure of the quality of arrests, there may be a perverse incentive for officers to make questionable arrests in order to increase arrest totals (which are sometimes improperly used by themselves as productivity indicators) or to achieve a presumed deterrent or fear-inducing effect.

A suggested approach to measuring the effectiveness of arrests is to determine the percentage that pass judicial screening or screening by a state attorney's office.<sup>33</sup> The quality of police performance probably has more influence on whether a case passes screening than it does on the final court disposition, although the latter is also of importance (see Measure 12).

Because of the newness and potential importance of this measure, special effort was made to test the procedures, and a relatively large amount of detail is provided in the discussion of this measure.

For many jurisdictions, the judicial screening that can be used as the test for this measure is the preliminary hearing in a court of limited jurisdic-

32. The potential magnitude of this problem is indicated by the findings from our initial tests of the procedure for obtaining these data. In each of the samples, a significant number of arrests did not survive the initial screening. In one city, a sample of sixty consecutive Part I arrests in 1972 found that 48 percent passed the preliminary hearing. A second sample of fifty-two consecutive Part I arrests in 1973 found 38 percent passing preliminary hearing. A sample of 870 misdemeanor arrests in one month in 1974 was also examined. It showed that 21 percent resulted in a guilty verdict; however, 49 percent of the cases resulted in dispositions we classified as "ambiguous." That is to say, for example, the defendant paid a fine, court costs, or forfeited a bond but was not found guilty. In a second city, a sample of seventy-six consecutive felony arrests in 1974 showed that 68 percent passed the state attorney's hearing and another 12 percent were certified for trial as a misdemeanor, for a total of 80 percent receiving further prosecution. Of a sample of twenty-three consecutive misdemeanor arrests, 61 percent passed state attorney's hearings. Note that the results of these two jurisdictions are not directly comparable because the nature of their hearings and tests applied and the composition of the sample of cases were somewhat different.

33. Another approach, suggested by Nashville, is to measure the percentage of arrest reports that are judged of acceptable quality by a panel of two attorneys. Both the quality of the report itself and the quality of the arrest as described by the report are considered. See John F. Schnelle et al., "Evaluation of the Quality of Police Arrests by District Attorney Ratings," *The Police Chief*, January 1977.

tion.<sup>34</sup> "Preliminary" hearings are usually the second hearing in the process of an arrest. The first is usually an advisory hearing held within twenty-four hours after arrest, depending on the state, to set bail or appoint a public defender if necessary. Usually the advisory hearing is not a sufficient test of probable cause, although in some states (such as Tennessee) there is an attempt to make at least a brief screening of the case. Cases not surviving the advisory hearing obviously would not be counted as passing a preliminary hearing.

The preliminary hearing usually includes a presentation of evidence before a judge. Prosecution and defense are present. The basic test of the arrest at the hearing is whether a crime probably took place as charged, and whether there is "probable cause" to assume that the person arrested was one of the offenders. The arrestee may not be "bound over" if the evidence seems insufficient, if legal procedures in making the arrest and preparing the case were not properly followed, or if police and other key witnesses do not appear. Cases also may be dropped because of crowded court dockets and many other reasons having no bearing on police effectiveness.

The measure should be subdivided to indicate the "percentage of arrests dropped for police-related reasons." This would better reflect the police role, and it would also help provide feedback to the police on specific areas for improvement. The overall measure, however, is still of interest (1) because it is less dependent than the subdivided version on value judgments and (2) because it is meaningful as a measure of apprehension effectiveness in relation to the criminal justice system of which the police comprise but one component.

The District of Columbia's police department started using an analogous measure in 1972, namely, "the percentage of arrests that are 'no-papered,' categorized by reason for 'no-papering'" (that is, the case did not pass initial screening by the U.S. Attorney's Office; D.C. has no preliminary court hearing). Police-related reasons included:

... any deficiency in preparation or procedures, attributable to (their) personnel, which is primarily responsible for the unsatisfactory

disposition of the case. Included for each are . . . improper recovery of evidence, evidence mishandled, unintelligible reports, (improper) search and seizure, and similar matters which by appropriate training and instruction ought to be correctable.<sup>35</sup>

This process of reviewing "no-papered" cases was considered responsible for a subsequent reduction in the number of such cases.

Jurisdictions with no preliminary hearings (such as in the state of Florida) sometimes substitute investigations by the state attorney's office which perform a similar function, with one important difference: The prosecution's investigation purposely considers the likelihood of successful prosecution, and not just the likelihood that a crime took place and that probable cause existed for making the arrest. Thus, cases may be dropped that would have survived a preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, the "percentage that pass the state attorney's hearing," and the "percentage that do not pass for police-related reasons" seem satisfactory arrest effectiveness measures.

Measurement data for felony arrests should be separated from misdemeanor arrest data. Misdemeanor arrests are often processed differently from felonies. Preliminary hearings usually are not held when the defendants waive their rights to jury trials. Instead, cases proceed directly to trial by a judge. The arrest effectiveness measure for misdemeanors, therefore, might be "the percentage that pass a preliminary hearing (or state attorney's investigation) or that are found 'guilty' at trial, or that are turned over to another court for further prosecution." This is a somewhat stricter test than that for felonies because a trial requires tighter standards of proof than does a hearing. It seems desirable also to provide arrest "survival" rates by the major category of offenses for both felonies and misdemeanors in order to direct attention to specific categories with low survival rates.<sup>36</sup>

"Survival" of an arrest should be defined as continued legal processing of at least one charge. Up to

34. This measure was also recommended by the 1973 National Commission on Productivity's Advisory Group on Productivity in Law Enforcement. See *Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Productivity, 1973), and the earlier Urban Institute report for the National Commission on Productivity, *The Challenge of Productivity Diversity: Improving Local Government Productivity Measurement and Evaluation, Part III: Measuring Police-Crime Control Productivity* (National Technical Information Service, June 1972).

35. See Geoffrey Alprin, "D.C.'s Case Review Section Studies: The 'No-Paper' Phenomenon," *The Police Chief*, April 1973, p. 39. Note that other governments may choose to define "police-related" reasons more broadly to include cases dropped because witnesses were not willing to testify.

36. It may also be useful to distinguish survival rates for arrests made (a) by an officer who either observes a crime in progress or who otherwise responds to a crime call; (b) after a warrant has been issued at the request of the police or prosecution; (c) in response to a warrant obtained by a citizen. In one sample of arrests, we found striking differences among these categories in percentages of arrests surviving hearings.



this point we have referred loosely to preliminary hearings for arrests. Actually, hearings are held for specific charges and not for arrests. One individual may be arrested on several charges which may be heard either at the same time or at separate hearings. Several individuals may be arrested for the same crime and the charges against them heard simultaneously or separately. The main intent of the proposed measure is to determine whether individuals are arrested needlessly. Thus, attention should focus on the percentage of arrests for which at least one charge survives preliminary hearing. If any one charge survives, the arrest could be considered of satisfactory quality.

Juvenile arrests will probably need to be excluded from the measure. In most jurisdictions, juvenile arrests are handled both separately and differently from adult arrests for most noncapital offenses. Based on preliminary investigations in St. Petersburg and Nashville, which have quite different laws and procedures for processing arrests, it would appear that a sound measure of the quality of juvenile arrests cannot be obtained from existing procedures. The processing of a juvenile arrest often focuses on what is best for the juvenile rather than on the validity of the charges. In one jurisdiction examined, the preliminary processing and decision for a juvenile arrest are made by social workers rather than the courts. These case reviewers are not likely to welcome the task of evaluating the quality of police arrests, and they are not trained to make such judgments. Also, juvenile records are held in much greater confidence than adult arrest records—a fact that could make both initial data collection and subsequent audits more difficult. This exclusion of juvenile arrests leaves a major gap in the effectiveness measures.

Does the suggested measure really reflect the quality of the arrest? Only in part. It reflects both the quality of the arrest itself *and* the follow-up processing of the arrest and associated investigation for additional evidence and witnesses. It is conceivable that the arrest itself might have been made on insufficient grounds even though subsequent investigation turned up supporting evidence. The measure also does not reflect "quality" aspects such as whether the amount of force used was appropriate or whether the officer was courteous; nor does it reflect arrests that were not made when they should have been. Conversely, arrests for good cause may be disposed of improperly by prosecution or courts. Despite these difficulties in reflecting purely police effects, this measure should represent the effectiveness of apprehensions more accurately than do clearance

rates, and give insights into how to improve arrest procedures and processing.

**Data Collection.** The principal data collection problem is to establish a procedure for police to receive regularly, or have access to, court disposition data. As a regular procedure, few police departments obtain information on the disposition of arrests, although individual police officers on individual cases of interest may follow them closely. It may well be that police departments will find disposition information valuable not only for providing data for Measures 11 and 12 but also for other purposes.

Data on dispositions of preliminary hearings and state attorney's investigations are usually available in a centralized source, either a court docket book or a computer file. When different courts handle different types of cases, two or more sources may be needed. The number of arrests corresponding to the dispositions for a particular time period can be obtained from either arrest records or booking entries—or from the court records themselves, if the number of arrests dropped out prior to preliminary hearing is very small.

Some of the major procedural findings from the tests undertaken in two cities are presented below.

1. Each jurisdiction will need to develop definitions and ground rules for classifying specific arrest dispositions to determine if each type of disposition should be counted as one that successfully survived the preliminary court prosecution test or one that did not.<sup>37</sup> Such definitions and ground rules need to be adhered to so that the measurement findings will be fully comparable from one time period to another.

2. In general, the number of arrests made is not equivalent to the number of preliminary hearing dispositions, because cases may be dropped before the hearing for a variety of reasons. Each government should make at least an initial examination to see if a significant number of cases are being dropped prior to the hearing. If not, court (or prosecution office) disposition data can be used to obtain the number of arrests as well as to obtain disposition data.<sup>38</sup> If there are a significant number of arrests dropped before the preliminary hearing, the jurisdiction should use the arrest records or booking re-

37. For example, we categorized those misdemeanor arrests with guilty dispositions as "successful" arrests; those involving dismissal by the judge, withdrawal by prosecution, or a verdict of not guilty as "unsuccessful" arrests; those involving forfeit of bond, not-guilty plea coupled with paid fine, dismissal on (court) costs, capias warrant, or referral to another jurisdiction as "ambiguous" arrests.

38. To be precise, the measure would be the percentage of cases heard (arrests) that survive the hearing.

ports for calculating the number of arrests. In a sample of 112 arrest reports in one city, 3 were found to result in no bookings and 2 others could not be traced to a disposition (a total of 5 percent of the arrests). Of 79 felony arrests in a second city, 1 suspect escaped, 3 had charges dropped, and 1 case could not be tracked—6 percent of the arrests. The effect of dropouts on the measure thus was quite small. If these rates for dropouts prior to court disposition are representative, they can be ignored, and the added work of tallying arrest records or number of bookings can be avoided.

3. Similarly, jurisdictions probably can ignore the lapse between the time of arrest and the preliminary hearing. In the cases sampled in two cities, the lapse was small (on the order of one to seven days for the vast majority of the cases). Thus, the number of arrests surviving court test in a period (year, quarter, or even month) could be divided by the number of arrests booked in that period; or the number surviving could be divided by the number of cases heard, with both figures coming from the court disposition. It is recommended, however, that each government initially check the time lag to ascertain if there are many cases involving significant delays, and if so, whether they are uniformly distributed.

4. Care must be taken (a) to avoid recording each charge as a separate arrest and (b) to see whether each arrest resulted in at least one charge that survived the hearing. Even if data are recorded manually and the charges are not recorded consecutively, it seems feasible to attempt to relate charges to an arrest.

5. Felony arrests are frequently downgraded to misdemeanors either before or during preliminary hearings. In our sample of felony arrests in one test city, 11 percent were downgraded to misdemeanors. Care should be taken that these arrests are neither unintentionally recorded twice (once as felonies, once as misdemeanors) nor completely neglected. A charge reduced to a misdemeanor may be recorded as one type of disposition of a felony arrest; alternatively, the arrest may be considered a misdemeanor arrest that was incorrectly labeled. In the latter case, it would be counted with misdemeanors, and subtracted from felonies. It is advisable to choose one approach and stay with it.

6. A major data collection problem involves persuading the courts or the state attorney's office to agree to specify reasons for dropping cases so that the percentage of arrests dropped for each major reason can be measured. It is often difficult to determine if the reason was "police related." Also, it may be embarrassing to admit that cases are dropped for

reasons such as crowded court calendars. Perhaps the best way to resolve this problem is to have representatives of the attorneys, judges, and police attempt to reach a consensus on how to classify reasons for dropping cases. This will probably not be accomplished easily. As mentioned earlier, it has been done in the District of Columbia. The key is to separate categories that involve a significant element of police responsibility from those over which the police have little or no control.

*Special Validity Considerations.* The principal problems are as follows: First, parts of the criminal justice system other than police also have a role in the outcome for this measure—thus, this measure covers somewhat more than police apprehension effectiveness. And second, there are numerous troublesome data collection details, such as developing and adhering to category definitions, that can cause the data collected to be inaccurate. Thus, periodic, independent checking of the tallies seems particularly advisable for this measure.

Yet this measure appears to have some significant validity advantages over traditional "solution" measures such as clearance rates. If a jurisdiction finds that a significant percentage of arrests do not survive the preliminary hearing, as was the case in the two test cities, the validity of clearance rates as indicators of satisfactorily solving crimes would be in considerable question.

*Measure 12: Percentage of adult arrests resulting in conviction (or treatment) (a) on at least one charge, (b) on the highest initial charge, by type of crime.*

The ultimate test of the effectiveness of an arrest and its associated police work is whether the arrest leads to conviction or treatment of those arrested.<sup>39</sup> The percentage of arrests leading to conviction or treatment more closely reflects the ultimate effectiveness of the arrest than does the previous measure ("percentage of arrests passing preliminary hearings")—but it also involves to a greater extent the work of the prosecutor's office and court system and to a somewhat lesser extent the role of the

39. This is not to say that it is in the best interest of society to convict every person arrested (some of those arrested inevitably will be innocent), and some arrests that the police officer knows to be on shaky evidence nevertheless can have a beneficial effect on guilty parties in discouraging future criminal activity. Nor do we mean to imply that conviction and subsequent disposition in corrections are always correct and effective. However, ideally only the guilty would be arrested, and all those arrested would be convicted (or at least be provided treatment in lieu of conviction).

police. An arrest may stand the test of probable cause, which is adequate for preliminary hearing, but the evidence may not be strong enough to withstand the test of reasonable doubt at trial. The courts, prosecution, judge, and jury all have a major say in whether an arrest results in a conviction. Given the same evidence and quality of police work, different judges and juries may arrive at different conclusions.

Nevertheless, the quality of evidence obtained by the police, the proper legal handling of the arrested person, the competence of the police in giving court testimony, police lab work, and other factors are all important contributions to the likelihood of conviction and should be considered part of apprehension effectiveness.

Conviction may be for the original charge, a lower charge, or, less frequently, a higher charge. Sometimes a reduced charge results from plea bargaining. The strength of the case prepared by the police (and later the prosecutor's office) probably influences the extent of plea bargaining, but many other factors are also involved that are not controllable by the police (such as court workload or failure of prosecution witnesses to appear). Various forms of the measure may be used, including the "percentage of arrests resulting in conviction for some charge," the "percentage resulting in conviction for the highest original charge," and "the percentage of charges that result in conviction." Each of these might be computed as successively more stringent tests of arrest effectiveness. Changes in these quantities provide somewhat ambiguous information on police effectiveness, but they should be interpreted as signals of possible problems or evidence of success in improving arrest and investigation procedures.

Conviction rates should be reported separately for adult felonies and misdemeanors and by specific type of crime, for the same reasons as noted in the previous measure.

In some situations the outcome of a trial may not actually be a finding of guilt but will imply strong evidence of guilt. For example, in 4 percent of the misdemeanor cases we examined in one month in one city, not-guilty pleas were accepted and fines imposed. Such disposition may be made when a judge or jury feels it is warranted to expedite the case or to protect the record of the person arrested. When such dispositions occur, the measure should probably be computed with such outcomes distinguished separately. Whether these outcomes should be counted with the "guilty" outcomes for assessing quality of arrest is a judgment that each jurisdiction will need to make.

**Data Collection.** Prosecuting attorney's offices and courts often compile statistics for their own use on the percentage of cases resulting in various dispositions. These data may not be fed back to the police, may include results for several local jurisdictions using the same court mixed together, and are rarely categorized according to percentage of arrests resulting in each disposition. As with the preceding measure, the largest data problem is to establish regular reporting of court data to the police, or to get the prosecutor or courts to make the necessary computations. As states develop reliable offender-based transaction information systems, the data collection problems may be alleviated considerably.

A significant number of arrests may drop out of prosecution subsequent to the preliminary hearing but before the trial. This may result from 'not pressing' or any of the number of legal options that, in essence, put the case into limbo from which it may be recalled at a later time. Thus it is not possible to obtain the overall percentage of arrests resulting in conviction by simply multiplying the "percentage of those cases that were tried that resulted in conviction or treatment" by the "percentage of arrestees that passed preliminary hearing."

The key technical data collection problem results from long delays between felony arrests and trial, which make it difficult to link arrests to dispositions. Unlike the preliminary hearings, these delays may run into many months for felonies (although an increasing number of states are passing "speedy trial" legislation that requires trial within a fixed period after arrest). Usually misdemeanors are disposed of more rapidly, because the preliminary hearing is often waived and the case goes directly to trial before a judge.

To develop an approximate measure that partially circumvents this problem, the percentage of arrests resulting in conviction might be computed using the convictions for the current time period divided by the arrests for some earlier period. For example, if felony trials usually take place between three and six months after arrest, then the convictions in one quarter might be divided by the arrests from the quarter ending three months earlier. Though there will still be some "edge effects," the resulting statistic may be a more reliable indicator than using convictions and arrests for the same month (or than just considering arrests regardless of their outcome). The reliability will depend on how sharply the arrest rate is changing, whether it varies from season to season, how the times between arrest and trial are distributed, and whether the measure is computed annually or more frequently.

*Measure 13: Percentage of cases cleared in less than "x" days (with "x" selected separately for each crime category).*

Prompt justice is a goal of our society, not just on ethical grounds, but also for the practical reason that as the time lessens between crime and apprehension, the offender learns his "lesson" more immediately and has less chance to commit additional crimes. Speedy apprehension also improves the chances of finding witnesses with reliable memories. In the absence of professional standards, the value of "x" would be a locally chosen target. Different targets should be considered for different kinds of crimes.

The time to apprehend is not a function of police activity alone. Local laws may have built-in delays for obtaining warrants, or delays may be caused by prosecutors' investigations. Hence, local constraints should be considered in interpreting the data.

The measure could be expressed either as (a) percentages of all reported incidents, or (b) percentages of cleared crimes only. The former seems to provide a more comprehensive perspective.<sup>40</sup>

*Data Collection.* This measure requires linking the date of each arrest and clearance to the date of the crime. When both are recorded on the same form, as is the case in some jurisdictions, the computation is easy—even easier if the incident report data is computerized. When arrests are not recorded on incident reports, the manual linking of arrest to crime must be done to record a clearance anyway, and the apprehension time could be computed at that time.

A test of computing apprehension times, based on a sample of forty-five Part I crimes in one city, showed that the procedure, using existing records, seemed feasible, although it was slightly cumbersome.<sup>41</sup> Explicitly recording the dates of the crime and apprehension, and/or calculating apprehension times by computer would simplify the procedure.

*Measure 14: Percentage of stolen property that is subsequently recovered: (a) vehicles, (b)*

*vehicle value, and (c) other property value.*

Part of the apprehension objective is recovery of stolen property, to help reduce losses from crime.<sup>42</sup> Since property may be recovered without apprehension of the offenders and vice versa, both need to be measured for a full picture of apprehension effectiveness.

Because search and recovery methods involving stolen vehicles are quite different from those relating to most other stolen property—and the recovery rates are often quite different—we suggest that vehicle recovery be measured separately from the recovery of other property. Police attempt to recover all stolen vehicles regardless of value, so the "percentage of vehicles recovered" might be reported rather than, or in addition to, the "percentage of vehicle value recovered." This statistic also is likely to be more reliable than the percentage of dollars recovered because of the inherent problems in valuation.

Because stolen vehicles are often returned damaged, the value of recovered cars preferably should be assessed as the "value when stolen" reduced by the "estimated cost of damages." Year-to-year comparisons should be made in terms of dollars adjusted for changes in price levels.<sup>43</sup>

*Data Collection.* Many departments already keep records of the number and percentage of vehicles recovered. Issues relating to collecting data on property dollar losses were discussed under Measure 5. Total value of recovered property of all types is also sometimes reported, though it is not usually stated as a percentage of property stolen. Damages to recovered property, especially vehicles, are often noted on reports but seldom deducted from value when stolen.

Value of stolen property may be either exaggerated or underplayed at the time of loss because of insurance claims or estimation errors or other reasons. Even if the absolute loss and absolute recovery value are inflated or deflated, however, using the same values for recovery as were listed for the loss will improve the accuracy of the "percentage recovered." This matching of values is somewhat easier to do for autos, expensive jewelry, and other types of readily identifiable property than for other stolen

40. We considered another variation, "average number of days until an arrest is made," but found it less satisfactory. It has these problems: (a) It is not clear how many days should be included for crimes for which an arrest is never made, and (b) some crimes will be cleared after long periods of time, and, although perhaps reflecting great police persistence, might distort the statistic.

41. U.S. National Commission on Productivity, *The Challenge of Productivity Diversity*, p. A-10. The test also showed that for the sample, the distribution of apprehension times was extremely skewed: the median time to clear was one day; the average was thirty-nine days. This indicates the likelihood that most arrests that are made will occur soon after the crime.

42. Large indirect losses may include doctor's bills for victims, repair of damaged goods, and reduced economic activity through fear of crime.

43. Some communities may want to measure not only the amount of property recovered but also the amount that is actually returned to the victim.

items. To improve consistency in valuations, book values for new and used items should be used to estimate values for recovered property for which the value was not listed at the time of loss. Police do not now usually record estimates of the value of recovered property, so instituting such record keeping may be the greatest change required to implement this measure. Nevertheless, this measure uses existing data for the most part, and the added cost of collection should be low.

Procedures for computing the net property recovered—value at time stolen less damages found upon recovery—were not tested by us.

*Special Validity Issues.* Property recovered in one period may be from crimes in earlier periods. Similarly, when the measure is computed, "property recovered in one's own jurisdiction from crimes committed in others" may not offset "property recovered in other jurisdictions from crimes in one's own." Instead of going to great lengths to adjust for special calculation problems—as when an important fencing operation is broken or when one jurisdiction is a particularly good dumping ground for stolen cars—it should suffice simply to note any large recoveries from previous periods or other jurisdictions. If these problems involve significant dollar values and cannot be corrected for, the measure would be of limited value as a gauge of the jurisdiction's police performance on property recovery.

#### Measures of Police Responsiveness and Citizen Satisfaction (Measures 15-22)

*Measure 15: Percentage of emergency or high-priority calls responded to within "x" minutes and percentage of non-emergency calls responded to within "y" minutes.*

Promptness in responding to calls for assistance is a direct service objective as well as a factor contributing to prevention and apprehension effectiveness. Citizens generally want local government to respond quickly to calls for service; this particularly applies to police services—and not just to crime calls. The value of reducing response times is by no means fully clear but for emergency calls there is much professional opinion, supported by some evidence, that for at least the first few minutes, quicker response time is associated with higher clearance rates.<sup>44</sup> Response time may be defined as the "time

from receipt of a call by the police to the time the first unit arrives at the scene."<sup>45</sup>

Response times should be reported separately for calls of different priorities as follows: "emergency calls," used particularly for crimes in progress, critical medical problems, and need for immediate assistance by police officers; and "low priority" calls such as those to investigate crimes that occurred some time ago or calls for trivial complaints. (An intermediate category might also be used: "high priority" calls, such as for crimes that just occurred.) The bulk of calls are likely to be in the "low priority" class, but responsiveness to them should not be ignored, since they are likely to be important to those requesting the assistance. Values for "x" and "y," for example, might be three minutes for emergency calls and twenty minutes for nonemergency calls. Such values would be locally established.<sup>46</sup>

In addition to measuring the percentage of calls responded to in less than "x" minutes, the mean, median, and range of response times are also useful indicators of response time.<sup>47</sup> The mean (or average) response time should not be used alone because it can be quite misleading; a few extremely long response times can sharply affect the average.

*Data Collection.* The time when a call is received and the time when police are dispatched are recorded by many police departments, frequently on a punched card run through a time clock in the dispatch (communications) office. Somewhat less frequently, the time of arrival at the scene, radioed in by the officers responding, may be recorded. Some jurisdictions do not collect this information because they want to avoid (1) delaying the start of "service" at the scene or (2) clogging the air waves. As communication systems improve, however, more departments are collecting this information, because it is vital for monitoring operations and designing patrol sectors.

45. It would be preferable to note the "time from the moment the phone starts ringing to the time service is 'applied' at the scene" (which may be several minutes after arrival of the police unit at a multistory building and in other situations). Few governments, however, are likely to consider this additional information worth the added effort it involves. Jurisdictions that should consider this refinement are those in which telephone lines to the department's emergency number are frequently overloaded, or those that have many calls from high-rise office or apartment buildings in which particular offices or apartments are hard to locate.

46. Recently, some police departments have begun trial of procedures in which certain kinds of nonemergency calls are responded to by telephone rather than in person. In such cases, the meaning of "response time" may need to be redefined.

47. The cumulative frequency distribution for response times should probably also be examined. It would show the percentage of calls responded to in less than "x" minutes for various values of "x" and not just for the single value used in the measure.

44. See, for example, "Task Force Report, Science and Technology: A Report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice," 1967, U.S. Government Printing Office, and Deborah K. Bertram and Alexander Vargo, "Response Time Analysis Study: Preliminary Findings on Robbery in Kansas City," *The Police Chief*, May 1976.

Because the computation of response times has been used on a regular basis by many police departments, further testing was not undertaken in this project.

*Special Validity Issues.* The accuracy of response time data depends on the diligence with which the dispatcher's office and the officers in the field report promptly and accurately. An appropriate definition for response time should be established and adhered to. To the extent that arrival times are called in prior to the officers' actual arrival at the scene, the data will not reflect the full intent of the measure.

*Measure 16: Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses who feel police come fast enough when called.*

Citizen perceptions of the adequacy of response times is another aspect of the results of police services. Citizen satisfaction with the service rendered is likely to be a major service objective, and perceived speed of police response to citizens' calls is likely to be a prime component determining that satisfaction. It can be argued that the more "objective" measure, Measure 15, is superior for measuring promptness of response and, thus, that Measure 16 is secondary. However, if citizen satisfaction is considered a principal issue in nonemergency calls, this measure assumes greater importance.

Citizen perceptions of response time should be reported separately for those who have called for assistance (or at least been present when someone else has called) and for the general public—in order to distinguish firsthand experience from other types.

*Data Collection.* Perceptions of response times of citizens who have called for service can probably best be obtained by using a survey of a scientifically drawn sample of those who called for service. A similar approach is to include questions on perceived speed of response as part of a municipality's general citizen survey dealing with police issues only or with various government services.

The general citizen survey has the disadvantage that only a portion of the respondents will have had firsthand contact with police during the period of interest; for example, 39 percent of the respondents to the 1974 Nashville survey and 35 percent of the respondents to the 1973 St. Petersburg survey reported having had contact with the police over the previous twelve months. (These figures include persons stopped by police for traffic violations.)

No test of a survey of only those who had requested police services was undertaken in this ef-

fort. (Such a survey is discussed in more detail under Measure 21.) Nor was a question on police response time included in the Nashville citizen survey (see Appendix 1). But relevant questions for this measure were included in the tests of the multiple-service, general citizen survey in St. Petersburg using the question "Would you rate the speed in responding to calls of the St. Petersburg Police: Excellent, Good, Fair, or Poor?" Such a question could be used in a survey of those who had called for service as well as in a general citizen survey. With a general citizen survey, a question such as Number 30 in Appendix 1 would be appropriate to permit distinguishing the responses of those who had had direct contact with police from the responses of those who had not. A similar question for surveys of businesses is noted in Appendix 2, Question 20.

The general citizen survey has one advantage over surveys of only those who have called for services: not all calls for service result in an incident report. Thus, the general citizen survey may include some of these callers. This survey procedure is discussed at greater length in Chapter 14.

The survey of callers ("complainant survey") is discussed in more detail under Measure 21.

*Measure 17: Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesspersons feeling safe (or unsafe) walking in their neighborhoods at night.*

An important police objective is to help establish and maintain an atmosphere of security for residents, the business community, and visitors.

Apparent risk and true risk are not necessarily the same. It seems desirable to measure the perceptions of citizens as well as actual crime rates.

Feelings of security will not necessarily change when true risks change. For example, the reporting of crime in the mass media and the actions of civic leaders can affect citizens' perceptions. The importance of providing data for various major citizen groups, in addition to jurisdictionwide totals, is well illustrated by this measure. Feeling of security seems to vary considerably by age groups, sex, and race.<sup>48</sup>

*Data Collection.* Data on citizens' feeling of security can be obtained using general citizen surveys

48. For example, the percentage of both white and nonwhite females not feeling safe at night was 20 percentage points higher than for males in the 1973 St. Petersburg survey and in both the 1974 and 1975 Nashville citizen surveys. The elderly also had significantly high percentages not feeling safe—over 50 percent in all three surveys. Thus, jurisdictionwide percentages can hide significant variations among major citizen groups.



and surveys of businesses. This can be the same survey usable for obtaining data on other measures.

Question 28 of Appendix 1 might be used for residents. Questions regarding areas of the city into which the citizen would like to go but does not for fear of crime (Questions 29 and 29a of Appendix 1) can help measure the atmosphere of security and also suggest specific areas of the community where the problems are worst. An illustrative question that might be used for businesses is presented in Appendix 2 (Question 11).<sup>49</sup>

*Measure 18: Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses that feel police are generally fair in dealing with them.*

*Measure 19: Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses rating police as generally courteous in dealing with them.*

The fairness and courtesy with which police services are delivered are of concern to citizens and businesspersons. While response time, clearance rates, and the like can be measured best by more objective data, fairness and courtesy seem to be measured best by obtaining direct citizen feedback on them.

Fairness has several aspects, including evenhandedness in dealing with different clientele groups and individuals, respect for civil rights, use of reasonable force in apprehension, and neither overzealousness nor underenforcement of the law. Each of these aspects may be separately addressed, but considering them as a group—at least at first—appears likely to suffice. If problems develop, supplemental questions could be added to the same or later surveys. An alternative measure is "the number of complaints reported regarding police fairness," but the probable lack of reporting of complaints makes it difficult to know how representative the available figures are.

Courtesy is related to fairness, but, as noted above, one can be fair but not courteous and vice versa. Whether citizens can distinguish between these two qualities remains open to question (as noted below). It may be sufficient to include only one or the other measure, but at present both are recommended.

49. A question of the respondent's feeling of security during the day might be considered as an additional measure. Fear during the day would be an even stronger signal of lack of a feeling of security. Question 11 of Appendix 2 illustrates such a question, for businesses.

**Data Collection.** The general citizen survey can be used to obtain data on citizen perceptions of fairness and courtesy. Examples of questions that have been used are presented in Appendix 1 (Questions 38 and 39). On both the 1973 St. Petersburg and 1974 Nashville surveys responses to these two questions were very similar; still, we are not confident that respondents can distinguish between the attributes of fairness and courtesy as defined in the questions used. If a government wishes to obtain information on these attributes, it is recommended that brief definitions of the two terms be provided to the respondents. Questions regarding the number and possibly the nature of contacts with the police should also be included so that perceptions of persons who have had firsthand experience can be reported separately from the general public's perceptions.<sup>50</sup> (See Question 30 of Appendix 1.)

As discussed under Measure 16 and later under Measure 21, an alternate data collection procedure (untested in this effort) is to survey a sample of those who have called the police department for service (rather than the general public).

Illustrative questions on fairness and courtesy applicable to surveys of businesses are presented in Appendix 2 (Questions 21 and 22).

*Measure 20: Number of reported incidents or complaints of police misbehavior, and the number resulting in judgment against the government employee, by type of complaint (civil charge, criminal charge, other service complaints).*

Honesty is a difficult quality to address. The number of citizens likely to have firsthand information regarding police honesty is far smaller than the

50. Using the 1973 St. Petersburg survey, we compared the responses of those who indicated that they had had at least one direct contact in the past twelve months with the St. Petersburg police with the responses of those who reported having had no contacts. We did this for the questions that asked for an overall rating of the police and for a rating of their fairness. On neither question was there substantial difference between the ratings. For the overall rating, of those who provided a rating, 75 percent of those with prior contacts gave a rating of either excellent or good, as compared to 80 percent for those without prior contact. On fairness, 85 percent of those with prior contacts and 82 percent of those without prior contacts in the past twelve months gave a rating of "fair" rather than "not fair" or "varies." These suggest that it may not be necessary to distinguish those with contacts from those without for the purposes of these questions. However, the limited evidence presented here is far from conclusive, and intuitively it appears likely that at least under some circumstances there would be significant differences. As would be expected, the number of "don't knows" was considerably higher for those with no prior contact (21 percent versus 5 percent on the overall rating question and 23 percent versus 8 percent for the fairness question).

number likely to be informed on other aspects of police service qualities. It is also questionable whether respondents with firsthand information will be candid about police honesty because of the sensitivity of the issue and potential criminal liability. Questions on police honesty can be included in general citizen surveys, but they seem intrinsically less reliable for use in measures of honesty than do questions on fairness and courtesy.

No satisfactory approach to measuring corruption, malfeasance, and negligence was identified in this project. Yet some, even very crude, measure should be used to indicate the seriousness of the community's concern about this issue, such as the "number of reported incidents or complaints of police misbehavior." Both "the total number of complaints" and "the total number of complaints that have not been invalidated" (as by police internal investigation) probably should be included.

*Data Collection.* Data on complaints are already routinely collected in some cities.

*Special Validity Considerations.* As indicated earlier, this measure is far from satisfactory. Clearly, not all incidents will be reported. Incidents invalidated by police internal investigations and police review boards will be subject to question by outsiders. More complaints are likely to be made during periods when police misbehavior receives much publicity than during periods when the level of honesty is no better (and possibly even worse) but when there is little attention to the issue. At best this measure can be considered a very crude indicator.

*Measure 21: Percentage of persons requesting assistance for other than serious crimes who are satisfied (or dissatisfied) with police handling of their problems, categorized by reason for dissatisfaction and by type of call.*

Most calls for service in most jurisdictions do not involve serious crimes.<sup>51</sup> Yet, except for Measure 8, which focuses on domestic quarrels, and Measures 15, 16, 18, and 19, which deal with particular aspects of service quality (speed, fairness, and courtesy), most previous measures have tended to focus on matters related to serious crime. This

51. For example, of 73,000 calls for service (other than for traffic accidents) received by the St. Petersburg police in 1970, almost 45,000 were for complaints about animals, noise, other disturbances, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, trespassing, and a host of other miscellaneous problems.

measure attempts to provide an indication of overall satisfaction with police services received by those who called for help on nonserious crime matters.

Separate measures could be used for each type of minor complaint. For example, in some communities stray dogs may be a major problem, and measures dealing with the number of animal bites from dogs on the loose might be desired. However, the large number of different types of miscellaneous complaints appears to preclude a separate measure tailored to each, at least for regular measurement.

The approach suggested here is to consider together all miscellaneous calls for service, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the police in handling them on the basis of the satisfaction of those making the calls. In other words, did the police, in the opinion of citizens who called for assistance, help remedy the situation for which they were called or otherwise effectively supply the service desired, or refer the caller to the appropriate agency if the matter was outside police jurisdiction?

*Data Collection.* A survey of a scientifically drawn sample of those calling, as discussed under Measure 16, can be used to obtain caller satisfaction levels. Data for Measures 16, 18, and 19 would be obtained at the same time. Reasons for any reported dissatisfaction, such as delays in responding or discourtesy, would be requested. This would help identify how to improve service and give some indication of the validity and seriousness of the reported problem. Results could be tallied separately for calls responded to in person or by telephone only, to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the two modes.

The general citizen survey represents another potential procedure for data collection. But the small samples involved for a general citizen survey (500 to 1,000 households) would yield even smaller samples of complainants, and it is not recommended for this measure. As noted earlier, about 35 percent of respondents to the 1974 Nashville survey and 39 percent in the 1973 St. Petersburg survey reported having had contacts with the police (these included contacts on traffic matters). The citizen survey may be adequate to obtain a general idea of overall complainant satisfaction, but is probably inadequate for reporting results by type of call.

A survey of persons who had requested services (complainants) could be made using either (a) a sample of complainants (if properly drawn to avoid biases), probably surveyed by telephone; or (b) all complainants, reached with a short questionnaire sent by mail. Note that no such survey was tested in



this project; a local government would need to develop and test the procedures.<sup>52</sup>

The complainant survey could be based on a sample drawn from incident reports chosen at random. Although incident reports are not usually separated by type of crime, the percentage of miscellaneous calls for service or calls for minor crimes is large enough that a random sample could be drawn from the total set, and those not fitting into this miscellaneous category rejected.

Ten minutes are probably enough to obtain the data necessary from each person interviewed. Since the survey would involve only complainants who had called the police department, addresses for a mail survey or phone numbers for a telephone survey will usually be available from the original incident reports. Naturally, the success of this procedure depends on the availability of correct addresses or telephone numbers for at least most of the persons who have called the police department; otherwise, the sample of responses may be biased. Therefore it may be necessary to have department personnel exercise more care in recording callers' names, addresses, and telephone numbers than they are currently required to do.

A mail survey will be less expensive than a telephone survey but its relatively low response rates may cause considerable question as to the representativeness of the responses.<sup>53</sup> Response rates can be increased by second and even third mailings or perhaps by the use of telephone interviews for nonrespondents.

The telephone survey, if done by an outside professional survey firm, is likely to cost \$10 per interview (1975 prices). The out-of-pocket expense can be reduced considerably by the use of government personnel for the interviewing. However, to avoid influencing respondents who might fear retaliation for any unfavorable responses, interviewers should not come from within the police department; similarly,

52. Some police departments have surveyed citizens who have called for services. The sheriff's department of Yuba County, California (population 45,000) used a ten-question survey of persons who called and received service. It included questions on adequacy of response time, fairness, friendliness, concern, courtesy, helpfulness, and overall satisfactoriness of the response. The police department of Albion, Michigan (population 12,500) reported on its use in L. R. Disser and Roland M. Kissinger, "Inspection: A Management Tool," *The Police Chief*, August 1975. For a survey mailed to a sample of persons who had been victims, witnesses, arrestees, or traffic violators, it noted a 46 percent return rate to a mail questionnaire (with no follow-ups apparently attempted).

53. In St. Petersburg, a police department mail survey on another subject to a small sample of all citizens obtained a 50-percent response. Because of the question of representativeness, the resulting information could be used only as a rough indicator for the whole city.

if a mail survey is used, questionnaires should not be mailed back to the police department.

For either type of survey, professional and technical assistance should be used to minimize possibilities of bias.

*Measure 22: Percentage of (a) citizens, (b) businesses rating police performance as excellent or good (or fair or poor) by reason for satisfaction (or dissatisfaction).*

An overall measure of citizen satisfaction with police services is desirable to provide insight into the composite perception of the citizens about police services.

*Data Collection.* The general population survey (for household responses) and survey of businesses (for business responses) appear to be the primary sources of data. As for other perception questions, citizen ratings should be reported separately for those with firsthand contact with the police, by type of contact, as opposed to those from citizens with no contact during the period covered by the survey.<sup>54</sup> Categories for "types of contact" could include callers for assistance, witnesses, persons stopped for traffic violations, and persons stopped for other reasons by the police.

As for previous measures reflecting citizen perceptions, a general multiservice citizen survey and, for citizens who have called for assistance, the complainant survey (see Measure 21) can be used to obtain the data. A question such as Number 41 of Appendix 1 could be used for residents; for businesses, Question 23 of Appendix 2.

#### **Measures of Performance on Vice, Drugs, and Similar Offenses (Measures 23-26)**

Measuring police effectiveness in controlling crimes against public morals and crimes relating to drugs (the so-called "victimless" crimes) poses special difficulties. The objectives of the laws concerning vice crimes are ill-defined and continually changing with public attitudes. Also, most vice crimes are not reported to the police, and there are no data on the incidence of such offenses equivalent to reported crime data. (Incidents are counted when arrests are made.) Thus even the approximate total incidence of such events is seldom known and we know of no

54. See note 50 above for some findings of the differences in responses for those who have had at least one contact with the local police over the past twelve months as contrasted with the responses of those who have not had any contacts. These findings indicate that there may be a surprising similarity in perceptions between these two groups.

appropriate procedure for obtaining such information.

Measures 23 through 26 in Exhibit 6-1 should be considered as a group. Together they may help provide an overall indication of effectiveness in controlling vice crimes, although, with the possible exception of the quality/effectiveness of arrest measure, they are not satisfactory if taken individually. This is a specialized area of crime control, and because no special testing was undertaken on these measures during our project, they are not discussed further in this book.

## Summary of Suggested Additions to Incident Reports

Some additions to the information generally collected on incident reports have been suggested in the previous sections. These additions are summarized below; the need for them is cited in the discussion of the individual measures.

1. *Type of victim:* Resident,<sup>55</sup> nonresident, business, or other (for example, institutions).—For Measure 1.
2. *Number of casualties, by cause:* Number of injuries or deaths to (a) crime victims, (b) bystanders, (c) suspects, and (d) police associated with the particular crime. It would also be useful to indicate whether the casualty was inflicted by (a) crime victims, (b) bystanders, (c) suspects, (d) police, or (e) accidents not caused directly by a person, such as a fall.—For Measure 4.
3. *Type of location:* Outdoors, by type of place (such as public street, alley, park, transit vehicle, transit stop), or indoors by type of place (high-rise, single family or multifamily houses, store, school, and the like).—For Measure 6.
4. *Visibility to patrol:* Whether the crime occurred in a place that could be seen by routine car or foot patrol. It may be stated as "yes," "probably yes," "probably not," or "no."—For Measure 6.
5. *Number of offenders:* The probable number of participants in the crime.—For Measure 10.
6. *Disposition of arrests* (from court or state attorney's records).—For Measures 11 and 12.
7. *Response-time information:* The time each call for assistance is received and the time the first police unit arrived at the scene.—For Measure 15.

55. A resident may be defined as someone residing in the jurisdiction more than "x" months per year, with "x" a locally defined standard.

## Costs and Staffing Requirements

The principal additional costs for use of the procedures discussed in this chapter are for the following:

1. General citizen survey, to obtain data on household victimization, feeling of security, and citizen attitudes to such aspects of police performance as speed of response, fairness, and courteousness (for Measures 2, 3, 16 to 19, 22, and 24).
2. A survey of businesses to obtain the same data as in (1) but from the business community's perspective (for Measures 2, 3, 16 to 19, and 22).
3. Data from the courts or prosecutor's office on disposition of arrests (for Measures 11 and 12).
4. A survey of persons who have called for assistance to obtain their perceptions as to the helpfulness, speed of response, fairness, and courteousness of the service (for Measures 16, 18, 19, 21, and 22).

### General Citizen Survey

Costs are likely to run \$10 to \$15 (1976 prices) per interview (for about a ten- to fifteen-minute interview). The lower estimate would tend to be for surveys by telephone; the higher one for at-home interviews. For annual samples of 300 (small jurisdictions) to 1,000 households (large jurisdictions), this would mean \$3,000 to \$15,000. These costs can be much higher if more detailed, elaborate, and larger surveys are undertaken. If these crime questions are included as part of a multiservice survey, the costs (as in St. Petersburg and Nashville) can be spread over a number of government services. The general citizen survey is further discussed in Chapter 14.

### Survey of Businesses

Few direct cost data for business surveys are available. Business respondents may be more difficult to reach and interview by telephone or in person. With proper groundwork in obtaining the business community's cooperation, however (see Chapter 15), a mail survey might achieve a reasonably high business response rate, so the cost could be lower than that for the general population survey. Without such groundwork, the costs would probably be about the same.

### Survey of Persons Who Have Called for Service

A telephone or mail survey, if adequately followed up to obtain a reasonable response rate and if undertaken by current government personnel (perhaps those from the government's "service and informa-

tion" office), could require little out-of-pocket expense. The length of the interview should be held to a maximum of five to ten minutes. An annual sample of 100 to 500 callers would probably cost well under \$10 per interview, even if done by an outside organization.

#### **Disposition-of-Arrest Data**

Costs will depend on the number of different courts, the number of cases, and the extent to which police and court cases are computerized and linked to a common data base. In our tests in two cities, a junior city employee required two or three days to record manually data on preliminary hearing dispositions from court docket books for 900 cases for Measure

11. The additional cost should be lower for Measure 12—concerning final disposition—because the basic arrest information will already have been collected for Measure 11 and court dispositions are usually tabulated by courts or prosecutors' offices.

#### **Analysis Costs**

Although basic tabulations are included in these estimates, the time and costs for analyzing the data are not. Analysis is an important step after the data have been collected. In many jurisdictions, analysis capability already exists. Governments without such capability should consider acquiring it; analysis of effectiveness measurement data would be but one activity for a full-time analyst.

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