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THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIENCE 1968-1988

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Office of Criminal Justice Coordination
Sidney J. Barthelemy, Mayor

Stuart P. Carroll, Executive Director
Linda Marye, Principal Researcher
December, 1988

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ACQUISITIONS

PREFACE

For twenty years the federal government has waged a "war" on crime through the creation of agencies to conduct research and evaluation, advise on policy, modify federal laws and procedures, and provide funds through grant-in-aid programs to state and local units of government for the purpose of law enforcement and criminal justice system improvement. New Orleans "enlisted" in that war as an ally in the late 1960's and has been a consistent comrade in arms for the past two decades. This report documents the development of the criminal justice grant process in New Orleans, describes the utilization of grant funds during the twenty year period, and as a history, it is hoped that it will guide those in the future concerning the utility of grants in determining and supporting criminal justice system policy.

There are many agencies and individuals who have contributed greatly to the success of grants in New Orleans. Four mayors have encouraged, supported and realized the potential grants offered for improvements in the system. Mayors Schiro, Landrieu, Morial, and Barthelemy were all consistent leaders in grant funding development and without their support and involvement the program would have failed in New Orleans. The City Council over the entire period supported the programs and backed that support by providing required matching funds when necessary and funding

projects way beyond their grant periods. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination has been blessed by both being consistently supported by all mayors and from the talent and continuity of a highly professional staff. Almost seventy professional level employees developed hundreds of programs and employees trained through this office are now in place at all levels of government and the private sector. Much credit is due my predecessors, Frank Vacarella and Frank Serpas, for their vision and pragmatic approach to grants which in large measure helped us avoid the pitfalls of other major cities. Encouragement, guidance, and a touchstone in Washington has been continuously provided by Mark Cunniff, Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Justice Planners.

Typically, the relationships between New Orleans and the State Planning Unit and the Regional Planning Units could be characterized at the very least, as adversarial, typically because of nationwide and historical tension between states and their largest cities. It is to the credit of the Executive Directors of the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice that Louisiana has not followed the footsteps of other states and has provided a fair and open opportunity for New Orleans to participate in state block grant programs. Wingate White, Elmer Litchfield, and Mike Renatza have all supported and encouraged the City of New Orleans in its determination of local priorities and projects.

New Orleans was also fortunate to have had only a single jurisdiction for a working environment. Even more fortunate has

been the consistency of the system actors in their support for the grant program. In the distribution process, early "pie cutting" met a quick demise through both accommodation and understanding from a "systems" perspective. The "Class of '74" came into office at just the time the grants program was maturing and the members of that class provided leadership and foresight which bore no relationship to the "turf battles" of other cities. Principal among those leaders are Sheriff Charles Foti, District Attorney Harry Connick, Clerk of Court Edwin Lombard, and Coroner Frank Minyard. Without a doubt support from the Police Department is critical. We have been fortunate to have had police executives who both saw the possibilities of the federal grant program and resisted temptations to abuse it. Chiefs Giarrusso, Parsons, Henry Morris and Warren Woodfork provided the necessary leadership and support for the success of the program.


Hundreds of citizens have provided countless hours of time in assisting to define problems, offer solutions, and work for their implementation. The quality of their work is evidenced by the fact that reports issued by the citizen committees did not go unused but provided a framework for future initiatives. It is not possible to credit all of these unselfish citizens, but the leadership provided by Donald Mintz especially during the 1985 Street Crimes Committee deliberations should be mentioned. Mr. Mintz not only led this committee in a model fashion, but also provided hours toward the implementation of their recommendations. His tireless efforts and support greatly encouraged and excited the staff and provided a rejuvenating effect.

Too often it is easy to exaggerate both the amount of grants and their value to the criminal justice system especially in terms of crime control. To put the amount in perspective, it should be remembered that barely 5% of the total amount of expenditures for criminal and juvenile justice operations came from grant funds. These funds were never enough nor were they intended to be enough to even approximate the costs of justice. The value of the programs and projects funded through grant sources were by far characterized as system improvement rather than crime control. In many cases they have provided the foundation upon which concrete improvements can be made in crime control or they have provided the opportunity for experimentation to see which approaches work best.

Linda Marye, the principal author of this report, has to be commended for both her thoroughness and understanding. She was not here during the formative years and through interviews and old records reconstructed accurately the history of this agency's grant involvement. This was done in an atmosphere characterized by old and many times retired records and documents. Her results have not given us a listing, but rather a document for future planners and coordinators describing background and major initiatives.

As New Orleans moves into 1989 the criminal justice system faces new problems and new challenges. Not the least of these challenges is to adopt an adequate consistent funding base for its operations. Grant funds will not fill this void but should provide, in the future,

the same opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and special projects which have characterized two decades of service.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'S. Carroll', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Stuart Carroll, Executive Director

Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice

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I

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

INTRODUCTION

During the early 1960's when President Lyndon Johnson declared a federal political and bureaucratic "War on Crime", New Orleans enlisted. After completing a rough "basic training" period, New Orleans received its CJCC stripes and emerged, during the following years, as a national model for planning change and improvements in the criminal/juvenile justice systems and allocating federal crime control grant funds. While the war on crime continues at the local level, federal involvement, vis-a-vis funding, has diminished radically. During federal fiscal year 1973, for example, New Orleans was appropriated approximately \$5.3 million for local projects, exclusive of prison construction. The source of these funds was almost entirely the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). In federal fiscal year 1988, New Orleans was appropriated approximately \$600,000. The primary sources for these funds were the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP), Victim Services (CVA), and the grandson of LEAA, the Office of Justice Assistance (OJA).

The potential effect of federal funds on crime reduction generally was exaggerated. Even in the most fiscally generous years of the federal initiative, barely 5% of the total expenditures in the criminal justice system came from grant funds. While the federal dollars appropriated to win the war on crime are the most tangible

evidence of federal involvement, other, more subtle, positive effects have been long lasting. The institutionalization of planning and coordination of efforts, the establishment of standards and goals, innovative research, and technological improvements have modernized a cumbersome system and made it more responsive and more efficient in completing its responsibilities.

Since the demise of the major federal initiatives, the experiences of the effort have been reviewed many times with the results of the reviews generally critical in terms of the cumulative national effort. Rather than reviewing the entire federal experience with crime control grant activity, this report describes federal crime control grant activity in New Orleans from 1968 through 1988 and concentrates on the utility of the funds locally. The experience in New Orleans was extremely positive both in terms of receipt and allocation of grant funds. Political pressure, both internal and external, was absent in the distribution process and the stability of the staff and leadership of the Office of Criminal Justice aided greatly in developing a rational model for planning and allocating grant funds. External factors, basically guidelines and distribution formulas, had the effect of diminishing local prerogatives in planning. During the period 1968-1988 staff turnover was minimal, thereby creating a group of professionals who, because of their cumulative experience, were thoroughly aware of the system in which they worked. Leadership in the office, although an appointive position of the Mayor, was not a highly visible political position. During the four mayors serving in the history of the office, the

position did not turn over as the result of a transition in administrations. Having only three directors over the twenty year period undoubtedly added to stability, continuity, and credibility with the elected officials in the criminal justice system.

This report reviews the history of law enforcement, criminal, and juvenile justice grants in New Orleans during the twenty-year period. At the time of the demise of LEAA, the grants division of the office was all but abolished. However, developments since 1985 have required that the grants operation be re-instituted as a result of the OJA, Crime Victims, Drug Abuse and other grant initiatives. Currently, the office is administering approximately \$3 million in federal grant funds involving about 50 operating grants.

While the federal "War on Crime" did not end in a victory, it did establish perspectives and attitudes which foster cooperation among agencies, a willingness to try new innovative methods and technologies, and a rational model for planning change. The importance of the dollars cannot be underestimated, their real contribution was to provide the resources for agencies to experiment and help in making a basically reactive system both effective and efficient.

II

THE WAR ON CRIME: FEDERAL RESPONSE

The emphasis on and institutionalization of criminal justice planning and coordination are byproducts of the nationwide concern over crime in the 1960's. In those years of rapid social change, the baby boom generation achieved adolescence and young adulthood, the country became more urban, protests against the Vietnam War were often violent and political assassinations and racial conflicts were at their peak. President Lyndon Johnson declared a "War on Crime" in 1965 to bring law and order back to the country.

In his first message to the Congress, Johnson announced the establishment of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice to investigate crime and make recommendations for its control. The Law Enforcement Assistance Act passed easily and was the first federal grant program "designed solely for the purpose of bolstering state and local crime reduction responsibilities." (Safe Streets Reconsidered: The Block Grant Experience 1968-1975, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, p. 10) Seven million dollars was appropriated to begin the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA). This modest amount was appropriated primarily because of reservations among congressmen concerned with avoiding federal control over local law enforcement.

Two components of the criminal justice system, police and courts, opposed the measure because they wanted more equipment, men and prisons -- not research and innovative programs. Corrections alone supported the act hoping that it would provide funding for community based programs.

Under the act, War on Crime allocations never exceeded \$7.5 million in a single year. The act merely established the idea of using federal seed money to supplement local and state efforts.

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968

By 1967 the nation had seen two more cities in riot, Newark and Detroit, and the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. That year the President proposed the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act. The Congress debated the act for one year before finally passing it in 1968. Debate waged primarily over the issue of direct federalism versus block grants. President Johnson's original bill proposed allocating money directly to local governments in categorical grants, bypassing the states altogether. Supporters of this view felt that the states were "unconcerned, unable, and unwilling to become involved in local law enforcement activities". (Safe Streets Reconsidered, p. 13) Opponents feared a national police force under the control of the Attorney General. The opponents won.

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as it was finally passed, was the first major legislation to incorporate the block grant to the states approach from the beginning. The act

established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) under the administration of a troika within the Justice Department. State planning agencies (SPA's) were established, funded up to 90% by federal grants. The SPA's were to be designated by the governors and to develop comprehensive state-wide criminal justice plans. Forty percent of planning funds were to be available to local jurisdictions (Part B). Eighty five percent of action funds were allocated to states on the basis of population as block grants. Local governments were to receive 75% of these action funds (Part C). The remaining 15% were to be used at the discretion of LEAA (Part D). Federally funded grants for research, demonstration and training programs were administered by a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. One hundred million dollars was authorized for federal fiscal year 1969 and \$300 million for FY 1970.

Because reauthorization hearings in 1970 revealed that almost 80% of all action grants were being used for police programs, Part E grants were established, from \$100 million in 1971 to \$250 million in 1973, for corrections.

As originally written, states were divided into Regional Planning Units (RPU's). Each community supposedly had representation on the RPU that submitted its plan to the SPA for inclusion in the state-wide comprehensive plan. In 1970 much criticism of the RPU's was voiced. They merely contributed to the already prolific red tape, and it was felt:

The source of the concern was rooted in the belief, particularly in large cities, that 1) regions for criminal justice planning were created without the consent and sometimes despite the opposition from local governments; 2) regional staffs were state agents and not representatives of local government, thus helping to thwart the expression of local needs in state level plans; 3) large cities had different anti-crime problems and their plans and proposals should not be subjected to the veto power of suburban coalitions that often dominated regional supervisory boards; and 4) some RPUs were financed by the 40% share of planning funds intended for local plan development, leaving no monies to support city and county planning for criminal justice. (Safe Streets Reconsidered, p. 19)

An amendment was passed in 1970 that authorized funding units of local government having populations of 250,000 or more. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils (CJCC's), established to receive these funds, were to improve coordination of local criminal justice agencies. A CJCC was defined as "any body so designated which serves a unit of general local government, or any combination of such units within a state, with a population of 250,000 or more; and which has responsibility for assuring improved planning and for coordination of local criminal justice agencies within its jurisdiction." (The Coordinating Council, Gordon Raley, U.S. Conference of Mayors, p. 3) The CJCC amendment was a victory for large cities because it recognized their need for local planning.

Although not part of the block grant program, it was during this period that the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) was

established. It provided funds primarily for in-service college level training and was used for the most part by police officers. Funds ranging from a low of \$7 million a year to \$40 million provided educational opportunities for over one and one half million students. In Louisiana alone fifteen colleges and universities participated.

Crime Control Act of 1973

Under President Nixon, LEAA underwent a slight modification. To his administration, the large number of categorical grants that grew out of the Great Society seemed an intrusion of federal control over the state and local governments. He proposed a "New Federalism" that was to cut to a minimum federal control over grants it made to localities. This "Special Revenue Sharing" affected LEAA only peripherally since it was already established to administer block grants instead of categorical grants.

In general, the Crime Control Act of 1973 eliminated the troika system of administration of LEAA and removed some of the emphasis on law enforcement, emphasizing instead criminal rehabilitation, the prevention of juvenile delinquency, and the coordination of all system components. Match restrictions were made more lenient and limitations were put on the time SPA's and LEAA could take to approve the required annual local plans for cities with over 250,000 population. Evaluation and monitoring of projects were strengthened. Appropriations for 1974 and 1975 totaled \$1 billion each year and \$1.25 billion was approved for 1976.

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Juvenile justice has historically been marked by a confusion between protection of the juvenile--children as victims, and punishment of the juvenile--children as criminals. The federal funding of delinquency prevention has repeated this same confusion. In the first juvenile delinquency programs, overlapping responsibility among agencies for delinquency prevention was remarkable. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was first earmarked to administer the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968. Delays in appointing an agency head, underspending of funds, and the duplication of HEW efforts by four different agencies, including LEAA, led to a reappraisal of the placement of juvenile delinquency programs under HEW. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 placed the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) under LEAA and approved a \$350 million authorization for three years. It did away with the separation between delinquency prevention and juvenile justice and joined both together in one program.

Crime Control Act of 1976

The first seven years of LEAA witnessed the gradual redefinition of an agency. Beginning as a broad block grant program that emphasized law enforcement, restrictions were gradually introduced through categorization that included corrections, crime control and juvenile delinquency. This cycle seems to be mirrored by other block

and categorical programs. They begin by allowing broad discretion to recipients and over time become more restrictive. A 1975 comment by Joseph Califano presaged the downfall of LEAA:

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 recognized the urgency of the national crime problem as a matter that threatens the peace, the security and general welfare of its citizens, and made it the declared policy of the Congress to assist state and local government in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance.

Yet, year after year since 1968, crime has continued its persistent rise. The Safe Streets Act has been funded at 50 percent or less of its programmed level, and the American public has been presented with a series of preposterous assurances that there is a cheap and easy way to eliminate street crime. The rhetorical commitments of the President proposing this legislation and Congress enacting it were magnificent but they have the timber of hollow echoes against the reality of performance. They provide good reason for Americans to believe that our national security is at stake as we face our domestic problems. They also provide ample justification for Americans to conclude that the President and the Congress do not mean what they say. The President and the Congress have repeatedly refused to act in accordance with their own rhetorical and legislative commitments. (Safe Streets Reconsidered, p. 28)

The Crime Control Act of 1976 was passed under President Ford in response to continued criticism of LEAA programs. LEAA was criticized first for having too much red tape and bureaucratic delay and second for ignoring the needs of metropolitan areas. With this in mind the mini-block grant system was instituted. Under this procedure units of local governments with populations over 250,000 could submit annual plans to the SPA for inclusion in the state's comprehensive

plan. In that plan would be all the applications for proposed projects for one year to be approved by the state and LEAA en masse. The SPA's had to approve such funds as long as they conformed with LEAA guidelines and the state plan. Included in mini-block were action grants (Part C) corrections grants (Part E) and juvenile grants (JJDP). Local CJCC's were authorized to do their own monitoring and evaluation with Part C funds.

Several programs were emphasized over others by granting authority to fund them out of each state's Part C funds: eg. court related projects, crimes against the elderly, drug offender programs, career criminal programs, STING operations, and neighborhood watch programs. In addition to grant programs the Public Safety Officers Benefit Act of 1976 was passed and was designed to compensate law enforcement officer's survivors as a result of death in the line of duty.

Justice System Improvement Act of 1979

With the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 passed under President Carter, the continuing criticism of LEAA had its effect. Although LEAA was reauthorized under the act, funds for its continued operation were not allocated and, in effect, it was abolished.

Debate over LEAA became heated in 1977. As the Carter Administration saw them, the defects in LEAA were as follows (Letter from Carter to Congress, July 10, 1978):

For the past 10 years, federal efforts to control crime through LEAA have been uncoordinated and ineffective. In providing financial assistance to State and local governments, the LEAA program has never been as

efficient or effective as originally intended. A complex bureaucratic structure has enveloped the Federal effort, involving State and local law enforcement officials in excessive regulation, complexity, and mountains of red tape--rather than providing them with needed financial and technical assistance. Compliance with procedural guidelines has often overshadowed substantive accomplishments. Further, Federal research and statistics programs have not provided the types of information needed for sound management decisions by those involved in controlling crime and improving our justice system.

One of the major criticisms continued to be that after almost 10 years of operation, crime rates had not been reduced.

As the act read, LEAA was to be reorganized. LEAA, a National Institute of Justice (research and development). and the Bureau of Justice Statistics were all placed under an Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Development (OJARS) under the Attorney General. For several years, funds for OJARS were held up and the existence of LEAA was pending. Eventually, however, appropriations for the latter two functions were approved along with those for JJDP programs, but the formula block grants under LEAA were not.

With the disappearance of LEAA monies, many local and state criminal justice planning agencies could no longer function. Most that remained operational did so under a much reduced staff after obtaining state or local funding.

Justice Assistance Act of 1984

The 1984 act passed under President Reagan reestablished a federal means for funding state and local law enforcement programs by

establishing in the Office of Justice Programs a Bureau of Justice Assistance (OJA). This act did away with some of the features of mini-block that urban areas applauded and put the SPA's once more in control of the funding. Block grants were made to the states to assist state and local governments in funding programs with high degrees of success. "The regulations provide significant discretion to the states to determine priorities and to carry out their administrative responsibilities. They assure minimum Federal intrusiveness and red tape, while preserving standards of accountability for public funds." (Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 104, May 30, 1985) Each state was to make a simplified two year application and to make subgrants to state and local agencies. The federal match was reduced from 90% to 50%.

Eighteen eligible programs were established: 1) neighborhood watch programs, 2) STING operations, 3) anti-arson programs, 4) programs to stop white collar and organized crime and political corruption, 5) programs to expedite cases against serious criminals, 6) witness and juror assistance programs, 7) alternative programs to jail, 8) programs for drug offenders, 9) programs to alleviate prison and jail overcrowding, 10) management and technical assistance, 11) prison industry programs, 12) informational and management information systems, 13) discretionary programs, 14) specially authorized programs to reduce crime, 15) programs for serious juvenile offenders, 16) programs to stop crimes against the elderly, 17) technical assistance to rural areas, and 18) ICAP programs. Most of the 18 program areas contain descriptions of key program elements that must be present in approved applications.

The new act was a curious hybrid between block and categorical grants. In one way it disburses blocks of money to the states but only for use in very specifically defined ways. There were no separate allocations for urban areas and no right of review to the federal government if the state disapproved a city's application.

Other recent major program initiatives related to federal funding have been assistance to victims of crime and enforcement activities directed toward illegal drugs. In 1984 the Victims of Crime Act was passed which allocates money to be used for programs to repay victims for some of the costs incurred as a result of a crime and to provide services to victims by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. The 1986 and later 1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Programs provided a mechanism for the distribution of badly needed dollars to the local level primarily for the purposes of drug enforcement and prosecution.

Summary of Federal Assistance Efforts in Criminal Justice

Some of the historical problems with federal efforts to assist in crime reduction can be summarized as follows:

- 1) The program changed constantly as Congress and the President responded to special interest groups: eight amendments to the act in seventeen years were made thereby reducing consistency and the value of long range plans and purposes.

- 2) Domination by the states of the planning and allocation process caused serious problems between staffs and local units of government. Studies show that 62% of funds spent for criminal justice purposes are

expended by city and county governments while states are responsible for only 25%.

3) The extensive paperwork required resulted in most planning units spending so much of their time developing comprehensive planning documents, which were little more than grant applications, that they had little left for efforts at real improvement of the criminal justice system.

4) The view among some decision makers that federal spending should be reflected in measurable decreases in crime rates was not achievable.

While the accomplishments of the federal effort are fewer, they may be more telling:

1) The creation of a new discipline and approach, Criminal Justice Planning, that encompasses all components of the system and had never before been recognized as a legitimate field for research and development.

2) An increasing sophistication about crime indicating that:

In the short run, improved law enforcement and strengthened crime suppression activities may have limited impact upon the crime problem. At best, long term remedies will only be approached through concerted efforts to develop a sound economy, provide jobs and educational opportunities, ameliorate social inequities and reduce the opportunity to commit a crime--and the need to commit a crime. Many of the actions which must be taken to impact upon the crime problem are not related to the criminal justice system... The Congressional interest in the quality of law, order, and justice in America should be more positively focused on increasing the capability of the system to be efficient and humane, and not demand, as quid pro quo, a reduction in crime for every dollar. (State of the States on Crime and Justice, A Report of the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, 1976, pp 21-23.)

3) The ability of local governmental units and criminal justice agencies to innovate and make both management and technological changes was enhanced as a result of the funds even though federal expenditures never exceeded 5% of the amount of funds annually spent on the criminal justice system.

III

THE BATTLE BEGINS:

STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING UNITS

The state planning agency for Louisiana, the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice (LCLE), was formed in 1968 as a response to the first Omnibus Crime Control Act. It did not achieve statutory authority until July 24, 1972, when it was established by Executive Order No. 8. That order was amended in 1973. (See appendix, Ex. Order 30.) Commission members were appointed by the governor and represented all functions of the justice system, state law enforcement agencies and, "representation that offers reasonable geographical and urban-rural balance and regard for the incidence of crime and the distribution and concentration of law enforcement services in the State." The Commission was staffed by the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (SLEPA). When LEAA funding was lost, LCLE continued to operate but at a much reduced level.

Establishment of Formula

As the system was originally set up, there was no established procedure as to how the SPA's determined the allocation of funds within the state. The local planning units in Louisiana could not be sure of how much money or what proportion of the state funds they would receive from year to year. It was very difficult to plan

under such circumstances. New Orleans pushed for some rational way to divide the state LEAA funds. The formula decided on in 1973 was based on four things: population, the local crime rate versus the state crime rate, the number of law enforcement personnel, and the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) reported crime. Based on a recalculation of the formula from year to year, New Orleans usually received 20% to 25% of the state share.

When LEAA funding was not renewed, several other less visible services were cut as well. One of these was the Louisiana Criminal Justice Information Service (LCJIS), which had compiled UCR information for the state. There was now no source of information for the state crime rate and many of the smaller parishes simply stopped collecting information on theirs as well. LCLE decided to freeze the percentages at the level they were. This meant that New Orleans continued to receive approximately 21% of whatever funds were available. That percentage is still in effect today.

METLEC

The development of the New Orleans Criminal Justice Coordinating Council has been dependent to a great degree on the history of federal assistance to law enforcement as outlined previously. The original planning unit for New Orleans, however, was a regional one. Metropolitan Law Enforcement Planning and Action Committee (METLEC) was originally set up in 1968 by SLEPA, the state planning agency for Louisiana, and was composed of Orleans Parish and nine surrounding parishes. Since the original focus of LEAA was on law enforcement,

METLEC was made up solely of representatives of police departments and sheriffs offices in these ten parishes. The New Orleans Superintendent of Police appointed one of his staff as representative to METLEC. As a result, no one in the city administration knew much about the new LEAA program. Because of the lack of coordination, 1) the police representative was unable to involve other system components, 2) what information was compiled for METLEC was not forwarded to the city administration, and 3) none of the other parishes had any understanding or sympathy with the problems of New Orleans. Our needs were not reflected in the annual plans and with only two out of twenty votes, we had no power within the committee. Further there was no means of recourse to LEAA for communities who were overlooked.

Statewide, funds were allocated to Regional Planning Units (RPU's) or to Local Planning Units (LPU's) for ultimate disbursement to specific agencies. Until the early 1980's New Orleans CJCC was the only LPU statewide. Jefferson Parish broke from METLEC to become the second. All other RPU's contain several parishes and many competing jurisdictions.

State Grant In Aid

The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 which seemed to reauthorize LEAA, although funds for its continuance were not appropriated, called for state matching funds. The Louisiana Legislature was persuaded to provide this match, \$2.5 million, in preparation for the time when LEAA would be refunded. When the first

year passed and the funds were not needed, because LEAA's status was still pending, the Legislature decided to establish a State Grant in Aid (SGIA) program to use the monies.

In July 1981, Governor Treen signed an appropriation measure allocating the money to be distributed to local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The LCLE was designated to develop the distribution formula and guidelines for its use. The same formula was kept as had been used for distribution of federal funds. The bulk of the money, \$2 million, was to be distributed to local councils for action programs and the rest for basic training and support of state agencies such as district attorneys and sheriffs. New Orleans received 21% of the action funds. Restrictions excluded funding for most vehicles and equipment, administration, and evaluation costs. Block and basic training funds were available for all local criminal justice agencies and distributed by the local planning units.

The same thing happened the next year when the necessity for a state match for LEAA was still in doubt. By the third year the demise of LEAA was settled but the funds had become so popular, because of the relative lack of bureaucratic red tape involved with them, that the SGIA program was continued another year. (SGIA required no annual plans, elaborate applications or evaluations.) Each year since that time, the program has been refunded but at a steadily decreasing level as the state's budgetary crisis has intensified. Act 562 of the 1986 Legislative Session made permanent the State Grant in Aid Program by creating a self-generated fund through fees added to court costs. This fund primarily provides dollars for reimbursement to locals for

Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) programs, in-service training, and some small equipment purchases. Basic training academies receive a stipend of \$400 per POST certified graduate. This has been a positive and popular program especially with local law enforcement agencies. Although the funds are not massive (approximately \$400,000 per year), they fulfill a valuable purpose and provide important supplements to local agencies.

IV

INTO THE TRENCHES:

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

Just as most other large cities discovered, New Orleans found that its needs could not be addressed through the RPU design. In 1970, the Safe Streets Act was amended to include, "The establishment of a Criminal Justice Council for any unit of general local government or any combination of such units within the state having a population of two hundred and fifty thousand or more, to assure improved planning and coordination of all law enforcement activities." Now local CJCC's were eligible for three sources of funding: Part B Planning Grants, Part C Action Grants and Part D Discretionary Grants. Along with 33 of the 55 largest cities, New Orleans broke away from the regional planning unit and formed its own Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

New York CJCC

The nation's first CJCC was established in New York in 1967 by an executive order of the mayor. The mayor was strongly involved, heading both the 74 member council and the executive committee. The executive committee of the New York CJCC served as a planning board to receive federal funds from LEAA and other agencies. The council had

representatives from city council, various city and criminal justice agencies, unions, community groups, and private citizens.

New Orleans CJCC

New Orleans's Chief Administrative Office had a department of federal programs that took an interest in the LEAA procedures. When they saw how powerless New Orleans was as part of METLEC, they invited the U.S. Conference of Mayors here to perform a study of the situation. The U.S. Conference of Mayors suggested that New Orleans form a coordinating council with statutory authority.

Using the New York CJCC as a model and guided by assistance of the Council of Mayors, the New Orleans CJCC was established on December 31, 1970, by local ordinance No.4449 (See appendix). The SLEPA resisted New Orleans' breaking away from METLEC but when LEAA supported the move by saying none of the state plan would be recognized without New Orleans being a separate planning unit, they were forced to yield. In July of 1971 the CJCC was authorized by the state as a separate region with jurisdiction for Orleans Parish.

The CJCC was originally staffed and funded by LEAA discretionary funds to develop the first comprehensive criminal justice plan for Orleans Parish. The Mayor served as chairman of the council and the staff was located administratively within the Mayor's Office. Members of the CJCC were appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.

Ordinance 4449 states the CJCC's functions as:

1. To confer with appropriate City, State, Federal, and private agencies concerned with the administration of criminal justice for the purpose of improving crime control programs and policies;
2. To confer with appropriate City, State, Federal, and private agencies for the purpose of securing funds for the support of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, and for initiating programs of crime control and criminal justice reform, and, on behalf of the City, to accept and enter into contracts subject to approval of the New Orleans City Council, for grants of Federal, State or other funds to the City for such purposes;
3. To advise the criminal justice agencies on improved policies and programs;
4. To conduct research, operate programs, and conduct studies of crime control and criminal justice; and to contract subject to the approval of the New Orleans City Council, with other public or private agencies and engage consultants for such research programs and studies;
5. To prepare and publish such reports and sponsor such conferences as is deemed appropriate;
6. To encourage joint activities among the separate criminal justice agencies and to represent the overall interest and needs of the criminal justice system;
7. To collect statistics and information relative to the criminal justice agencies.

Only one of the seven functions, the second, seemed to deal directly with federal grants.

Council Organization

The first CJCC in New Orleans began meeting in January, 1971. It had 33 members: The Mayor, five judges, the Sheriff, the Police Superintendent and two deputy chiefs, the City Attorney,

the Chief Assistant District Attorney, three City Councilmen, the Superintendent of the School Board, heads of three city agencies, the Chief Administrative Officer of the city, six heads of private agencies and five private citizens.

There was also an advisory committee of 30 that could not vote. These were representatives of system components that, because of their line responsibility, could contribute special expertise to the activities of the council. Usually they influenced decisions by issuing reports with a series of recommendations.

The original CJCC was divided into five task forces each assisted by one member of the staff. The five task force problem areas were: drug abuse, rehabilitation, law enforcement, judicial process, and juvenile delinquency. After ten months, that body issued a comprehensive criminal justice plan of over 400 pages for New Orleans that was comprised of the report and recommendation from each task force with a detailed analysis of the system.

By 1973 the council had grown to 40 and the advisory committee had disappeared as the staff became more expert. In 1975 an executive committee was drawn from the whole council who were allowed to make decisions on grants. As action was needed on more grants, the full council of thirty or forty became too unwieldy. Their work was more efficiently done by the smaller executive committee of approximately 20. Gradually the full council ceased to meet and the executive committee took its place.

With the loss of federal funds there was seldom reason for even the executive committee to meet for grant purposes. The SGIA procedures, however, still required the vote of a local body so the

council did meet at least annually to approve applications. The staff of the CJCC became known as the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination; the director, as the Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice; and the staff turned to the Mayor more for decision making.

We are currently in a new phase of council development. The old CJCC is now called the Criminal Justice Council with only 20 members, 15 of them private citizens. A criticism of the former structure was that the private citizens' input was diminished in a group of so many powerful elected officials. Since the components of the system now had a greater sophistication about planning and increased power from their knowledge, the staff, city administration and City Council felt that broader representation was needed. The current 20 member council has eight members appointed by the Mayor and seven appointed by the City Council. Members are to be representative of the community at large. Five criminal justice officials are specifically named to the council and are the Superintendent of Police, the District Attorney, the Criminal Sheriff, a Criminal District Court Judge, and a Juvenile Court Judge. It is hoped that such a structure can more easily gain the support of city government when support is needed on such things as additional appropriations for criminal justice or changes in city ordinances. (See Ord. 10578, appendix.)

Staff Organization

The director of the office has traditionally been appointed to an unclassified position by the Mayor with his or her staff being classified civil service appointees. The 1971 CJCC was funded

entirely by a discretionary grant and the staff numbered nine including the director. There was an assistant director, a chief planner and a police, a court, and a corrections planner. The rest of the staff were clerical personnel.

At the end of the discretionary grant, Part B block funds began to pay for the office administration. In 1973, the staff had grown to 14 with the addition of a grants administrator and accountants. In 1975 two large discretionary grants added to the staff and Part C funds were also available. The staff was at its peak size of 21. One of the grants was called the Youth Assistance Committee (YAC). It was funded by HEW funds and set up a coordinating council for juveniles. The grant lasted for three or four years and brought on a juvenile delinquency planner and supervisor.

The other major grant was the two year Target Area Program. This was a small version of several \$10 million grants called the Impact Cities. New Orleans received \$3 million and the CJCC was the administrator of a group of thirteen programs to concentrate on juvenile crime, drug abuse and rehabilitation. To administer, monitor and evaluate this effort two project managers and an evaluation division made up of a supervisor and two evaluators were added to the staff.

In 1977 the staff shrank to fourteen but retained its four divisions: planning, grants administration, juvenile planning, and evaluation. By this time disenchantment with the idea of planning specialties such as police, court, and corrections set in. If a planner worked over a long period of time with one component, he or she risked becoming coopted by that component and unable to contribute

to the overall system view. Many of the planners were in fact hired by the components of the system they represented.

The Youth Assistance Committee was also discontinued. It was found that the larger CJCC had lost its tendency to neglect the juvenile area and a separate body was no long needed to concentrate on it. The juvenile specialists were absorbed into the regular staff.

The loss of federal funding entailed major revisions in the staff. There was a transition period of a year or two as leftover federal money was spent. At the end of that time the staff of the CJCC was funded entirely by the city budget. Over the years we had built up a good relationship with the Mayor and City Council. We had set up programs that the council wanted, such as the truancy program. We had developed a large constituency in the community through programs that aided different private and public agencies. The Mayor also had found it to his advantage to have someone on his staff concerned with the potentially politically volatile area of crime.

The need for staff specialization vanished. Before it had been the planners' job to write annual plans describing problem areas which were to be addressed through grant funds. This requirement disappeared. Many of the system components had hired their own planners, many former CJCC personnel, and incorporated planning as part of their normal operations. Existing grant programs deemphasized evaluation primarily because of costs. With fewer grants to oversee, grants administration could be done by one person.

The emphasis in the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination evolved from a planning and grants agency to a source of information,

a mediator and coordinator of system components, and a facilitator for programs that involved the cooperation of more than one agency.

Each staff member became responsible for certain projects and worked under the supervision of the director and assistants. Current staff numbers eight: a director, deputy director, assistant director, four management analysts, and one clerical position.

Advantages of CJCC Design

The New Orleans CJCC seems to have been better designed than many to be concerned in matters not limited to LEAA. First of all, it had no other planning units sharing its jurisdiction because New Orleans and the parish are coterminous and not part of any multi-parish unit. It was found that, "planning units in other planning systems (part of a multiple planning unit) are forced to spend considerably more time arguing with other planning entities about role and function." (Survey of Local Criminal Justice Planning, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, June 1973, pg. 36)

We also fairly early on began receiving our funds from the SPA on a formula basis and thus were freed from spending all our time in grantsmanship activities. "LPU's (Local Planning Units) that do not receive a formula allocation from their SPA must take valuable time away from agency assistance activities and grant review activities in order to insure that their grant requests are not turned down by the SPA." (Survey of Local CJ Planning, p. 22)

In fact, the only disadvantage found with the type of organization New Orleans criminal justice planning incorporated is the heavy dependence on the Mayor. As a part of the Mayor's Office, the ability of our office to work in the extremely political arena of criminal justice and its elected officials is determined by how much authority in that arena the Mayor is willing or able to give the council.

(Criminal Justice Planning--Five Alternative Structures for Cities, Nancy Loving and John McKay, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1976).

Nongrant Functions

The early CJCC was authorized to delve into matters requiring coordination that had nothing to do with federal grants. The council and its staff developed an expertise in criminal justice affairs that allowed it to act in an advisory capacity to city officials. A policy memorandum dated November 11, 1971, requests all city departments to contact the director to inform him of any "activities, proposals, meetings, programs, projects, proposed legislation, adoption and/or revision of criminal justice policies and procedures which transcend intra-agency jurisdictional lines and impact related criminal justice agencies or the City of New Orleans." (see appendix)

A later policy memorandum dated July 18, 1983, gives the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination more authority to act for the improvement of the system. (see appendix). It states that the office shall be informed of relevant activities by city agencies (police, fire, emergency medicine, and city attorney) and will review and

forward recommendations about all legislative and budgetary matters. In contrast, it merely requests parochial and other criminal/juvenile justice boards, agencies and commissions (sheriff, district attorney, courts) to contact the agency head on relevant matters.

Some of the nongrant activities of the office have required close contact with community leaders. As a branch of the Mayor's Office we have responded to public outcries about crime by setting up and staffing citizen groups to study crime problems. The Citizen Committee Against Crime operated for one year in 1979 and the 1985 Criminal Justice Task Force on Violent Street Crime operated for three months. In addition, in 1988 the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination (OCJC) provided the staff for the District Attorney's Commission on Illegal Drug Activity.

Other nongrant activities have involved the coordination of projects involving several system components. Our office wrote a report in 1979 outlining the need for an Arson Squad made up of members of the police and fire departments, and an Arson Task Force, of police, fire, district attorney, city administration, and insurance representatives, to combat arson. We have received only minimal funding to purchase equipment and training for squad members. Other needs have been met by the city budget and donations from private industry.

A similar effort involved the 911 Emergency Telephone System. In 1980 a report was written outlining the need for one telephone number that could be used for fire, police, and medical emergencies. A 911 Coordinating Committee was formed of representatives of the public sector and the telephone company, a dedicated tax was passed, and the

Orleans Parish Communication District was formed, staffed by members of our office.

With our support the Municipal Court Probation Office was begun with a small grant and permanently funded from an increase in fines at Municipal Court.

All of our nongrant related efforts have not been so successful. In the mid 1970's we developed a plan by which all criminal justice agencies would be on the same computer system called an Offender Based Transaction System. A contract was prepared and at the final moment withdrawn by a newly elected mayor. As a result, each component has its own computer system which sometimes breaks down and is not compatible with any other computer system. There is much needless redundancy and the management information needed for an overall look at the system is not available.

Before the new parish prison was built and we were under court order to improve the old one, the office recommended Operation Swap. The police department and sheriff's office were to trade facilities with the police getting Old Parish Prison for city offenders and the sheriff getting the House of Detention and Central Lock Up for state offenders. No action was taken on the recommendation at the time, although the Sheriff currently has control of all parish incarceration facilities: House of Detention, Central Lock Up, Old Parish Prison, Community Correctional Center, and satellites.

There can be little doubt that our original ability to allocate grant funds enabled us to develop a nonadversarial relationship with

all criminal justice agencies. If we saw a need in an area, we could also find money to help correct that need. Because we attempted to maintain a rational, fair approach to the allocation of funds, no one agency felt overlooked.

That situation is different now. With less money as an incentive, change is harder. Now improvements must be fought out in political battles over an already stressed city budget.

V

HEARTS AND MINDS:

ESTABLISHING LOCAL GOALS

EARLY ALLOCATION AND PLANNING

In the next section some of the major programmatic grants funded in the New Orleans area will be described. Before discussing particular grants, however, the local process for determining which agency's programs would be funded will be reviewed.

Local Allocation

An important fact to remember is that local planning units have never had total freedom to spend their funds in whatever areas they wished. Planning and fund allocation is both an idealistic and pragmatic process. At times there were federal mandates that a certain percentage of local Part C action funds be put into a certain area, and, less frequently, the mandates were made by the state. Such mandates were based on studies of nationwide or statewide problems and might or might not reflect local concerns. For example, a consistent phasis at the federal level has been the removal of juveniles from adult jails. Money continues to be allocated for programs to this end, and yet New Orleans has not had juveniles in adult jails for some time.

The two major areas that have been emphasized in this manner are juvenile and correctional programs. Juvenile programs were

traditionally to receive about 15% of Part C funds and correctional programs, 20%. The intent of these mandates was that programming in these areas be increased and not merely maintained by the special use of JJDP and Part E funding. At times the mandates extended to other functional areas depending on what was considered problematic at the time.

On the federal level, the mandated minimum funding percentages were defined for the state as a whole. New Orleans, as the largest LPU in the state, was thus under considerable pressure to conform to the mandate. Because Part E monies were allocated at the discretion of the state, an additional bargaining point was added. For example, if a federally mandated percentage for Part C corrections was 20% and New Orleans' plan would have put the total state spending over that figure and thus forced other percentages to be below mandated levels, a proposal might be made to reprogram those funds into Part E programs, which were generally capital programs.

Fitting programs into mandated levels was further complicated by on-going programs. If a program showed promise based on monitoring and annual evaluations, it was generally funded for three years at a decreasing level. The first year, the federal share was 90%; the second year, 75%; and the third year, 60%. At that time the program was expected to have secured permanent funding.

Very few programs received funding for longer than three years, and those that did usually went from discretionary to Part C action funds and were maintained in that manner for six years. This policy was made by the council itself.

The eventual result of these controls was that at times the CJCC was forced into funding programs it did not want to fund, and prevented from funding others it did. Over a long period of time, all problem areas would probably have been addressed, but over the relatively brief period discussed here, they were not. Criminal justice agencies themselves found the mandated percentages hard to understand and it was a cause of friction on the council, especially when some of the grants given to local agencies were very large. As time passed, however, and the grant amounts decreased, the agencies found it easier to accommodate themselves to one another's needs.

Under mini-block and State Grant in Aid programs, the requirements were not nearly so formal. Informally, however, the council has chosen to try to divide money fairly evenly among police, courts, and corrections with an additional amount going to private non-profit agencies.

The allocation of Part C monies for 1976 is presented below to give an example of one year's distribution:

1976 Distribution

Systems	4.6%
Police	20.5%
Juvenile Delinquency	17.9%
Corrections	25.0%
Courts	17.5%
Defense	0
Prosecution	13.2%

In more recent years the allocation of local funds has diminished the amount of in-fighting among agencies for dollars. Several elements have worked together to achieve a relatively smooth, congenial process. Fund allocation management is conducted through the Grant Advisory Committee of the Criminal Justice Council (CJC). This group reviews staff recommendations regarding all categories of funds. The very nature of the categorical grants (i.e., Drug, Victim, Juvenile) severely limits both the types of programs which can be funded and the type of agencies which are eligible recipients. Broad responsibility has been given to the Executive Director for allocation of some categories of funds such as Act 562 and training because of the erratic nature of their receipt. A report to the CJC is made yearly and ratification takes place. If a dispute were to arise the CJC would mediate.

Planning

An important part in the allocation of local funds was played by the planning division. Until 1978 an annual Criminal Justice Plan for the City of New Orleans was prepared which described the system, identified and prioritized needs, recommended programs and presented a multiyear forecast of results. The submission of this yearly report was a requirement for receiving LEAA funds. Ongoing statistical data were collected from criminal justice agencies and criminal justice officials were interviewed to assess needs in the system. In fact, the publication of the annual plan was found to be so useful that it has been continued though the requirement for it has ceased. We

currently report annual crime and workload statistics for each component of the system and describe changes in operations.

Planners are involved more directly in the grant process by working with agencies to design new programs. They assist in developing the initial application, the submission and review of the application and implementation of the program following local and state approval. In fact, at one time the review and implementation process was quite lengthy, even on the local level. In appendices 7 and 8 are two tables from the annual plan for 1974 that explained to prospective grantees current procedures.

Before discussing several major grants, it would be helpful to have in mind a picture of what the criminal justice system in New Orleans was like before an attempt was made at overall planning. The original 1971 criminal justice plan is particularly illuminating because it identifies problems that were dealt with later, and some that were not. It thus offer a sort of baseline description.

In 1970 there were 1400 commissioned police officers and 200 civilians making 43,913 arrests. In 1987 there were 1350 commissioned police officers and 279 civilians making 41,732 arrests. Then there were 27 assistant district attorneys, and 25 assistant city attorneys. There are now 71 assistant district attorneys and 12 assistant city attorneys. The police communication system was four channel VHF and it might take a police officer in the field ten or fifteen minutes to make an inquiry about a vehicle or suspect. The police department also controlled the House of Detention and Central Lock Up. The communication system is now eight channel UHF and the Sheriff controls all parish incarceration facilities.

In 1970 two of the biggest problem areas were the courts and corrections. The Criminal District Court had a totally manual record keeping system. Each of the ten courts was totally managed by its judge. There was no overall administrator and little coordination between sections. The duties of magistrate judge (who handles bail decisions) were rotated among the ten sections of court. The court had no program for indigent defense, or free legal representation for the poor. Currently, the record system is automated, a judicial administrator oversees all court sections, magistrate court is a separate section, and we have an office of indigent defense.

As is the case today, little could be determined about the lower courts. "Statistics on the activities of the Municipal and Traffic Courts are limited, due largely to shortages of personnel and equipment." (CJC plan, 1971, pg. 60)

Another needy area was corrections. In 1971 there were 21 probation officers for Orleans Parish, and 97 untrained prison officers overseeing 1163 prisoners daily. Today we have 45 probation officers and 750 trained prison guards overseeing an average of 2821 prisoners daily. Then there was a minimal rehabilitation department at the prison with two staff paid for through the prison commissary. There was no probation department for Municipal Court. The only parish prison was what is now called the Old Parish Prison and was built in 1929 to house 450 inmates. Conditions there were deplorable. Quoting from the 1971 plan (CJC plan, 1971. pg. 197), "Incarceration in Parish Prison as it presently exists is inhumane and degrading. Men are crowded together in cells and tiers originally built to accommodate less than one-half the present number. There is no proper

classification or separation of offenders according to the nature of the offense or mental condition of the offender. (Exception is racial segregation.) Because of the inadequate facilities, murderers, rapists, drug addicts, misdemeanors, multiple offenders, first offenders, mental incompetents, etc. are detained in the same cell while awaiting trial. Sanitation is almost non-existent in regard to both the inmates and the prison. Rats and roaches run rampant, showers and toilet facilities are filthy and allow no privacy."

These then were the conditions the CJCC hoped to address.

VI

FULL METAL JACKET: SELECTED GRANT INITIATIVES

This section reviews some of the major initiatives undertaken through the use of grant funds in New Orleans. In the following chapter those grant initiatives which had as a specific emphasis the juvenile justice system will be reviewed.

Prior to the description of specific projects and programs there needs to be an explanation of the broader aspects of grant funds both in terms of general impact and aggregate funds. Grant funds were used in New Orleans primarily to stimulate modernization of the criminal justice system and to encourage the implementation of new and innovative programs. While some of these initiatives would have occurred without the impetus of the grants, the funds hastened that development and in many cases made experimentation both fiscally and politically possible. While New Orleans was successful in having the vast majority of its programs assimilated into the normal operations of the criminal justice system, not all programs were successful. This is certainly an expected result of attempts at experimentation. Those programs which did fail, were not successful for a variety of reasons. Flaws in the planning process, operational difficulties, political or organizational opposition and the inability to secure a permanent funding source are the most common reasons. A subjective assessment

of the programs initiated by grant funds reveals that less than twenty percent fall into the failure category. In fact, because of personnel changes, changes in programs, changes in name, and modifications to program operation, the relationship of currently existing programs to grants has become dim. In recent years, because of fiscal problems in the city, some programs have ceased to exist. This was not a result of their previous grant heritage but because the city was forced to emphasize basic services.

While an attempt was made to develop a complete data base for all criminal justice system grants funded in New Orleans, some inevitably were overlooked. Records retirement and loss, faded memories and record keeping vagaries probably diminish somewhat the total used in this report. Excluded totally are major capital improvement funds, LEEP payments directly to students, and grant funds that were directly awarded, primarily to private agencies. Also excluded were the numerous test site programs and national research projects in which New Orleans participated. While the cumulative dollar total of these exclusions is substantial (possibly even equaling the amounts relevant to this study) their exclusion does not diminish the intent of this report which is to review the effects of grant funds on the system.

Overview

As can be seen in Table VI.1 approximately \$34 million in grant funds were awarded to New Orleans during 1968-1988. The vast majority of the funds originated with the U.S. Department of Justice (primarily LEAA). Other sources such as OJJDP and DOT allowed for special

emphasis programs in the juvenile justice system and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).

Table VI.1

Criminal Justice Grant Funds by Source
1968-1988
(Rounded)

Source	Amount	%age
Department of Justice	\$27,000,000	79
Omnibus Drug	2,400,000	7
State of Louisiana	2,000,000	6
Office of Juvenile Justice	1,500,000	5
Dept. of Transportation	500,000	1
Crime Victim Assistance	375,000	1
Health, Education, Welfare	125,000	<1
	\$34,000,000	100%

Grant funds were not awarded with regularity during the study period as can be seen in Table VI.2. The primary reasons for the large variation by year were shifting emphases in the U.S. Congress, changes in the federal administration, distribution formula variations, and success in attracting large discretionary grants. For example, the massive increase in 1973 was due to the awarding of the Target Area Program, and the demise of LEAA can be illustrated by the sharp decline in funds by 1981.

The distribution of grant funds was always problematic in that a mandated percentage distribution was often imposed by the funding source (See Chapter V) and there were never enough funds to adequately and equitably address all priorities within each major component. What flexibility in the distribution process existed after deducting mandated amounts became the province of the CJCC. When

Table VI.2
Grant Funds by Fiscal Year
(Rounded)

Year	Amount
1968	--
1969	\$ 61,000
1970	740,000
1971	2,014,000
1972	4,900,000
1973	5,248,000
1974	2,752,000
1975	2,253,000
1976	2,946,000
1977	1,364,000
1978	1,878,000
1979	1,872,000
1980	1,260,000
1981	298,000
1982	896,000
1983	921,000
1984	560,000
1985	286,000
1986	685,000
1987	2,739,000
1988	<u>591,000</u>
TOTAL	\$34,000,000

establishing priorities, the CJCC decided where the available dollars would be applied. These priorities shifted yearly as new problems arose and old ones were addressed. Table VI.3 illustrates, by gross category, how funds were distributed during 1968--1988. By far, the leading recipient is Corrections with 34% of the funds. It was during this period that the national emphasis was on the correctional system with a 30% distribution mandated to it during several years. Even without the mandated percentage, it is likely that a percentage of this size would have resulted because of the severe local problems with the correctional system.

The CJCC's emphasis on Juvenile Justice can be clearly seen with 14% of all available funds dedicated to that category. Their total amount is four times the amount received through specially dedicated funds. Although modest, Training is a consistent priority of the CJCC and efforts resulted in amounts allocated to this general category each year. Training funds are used by system personnel and private nonprofit practitioners alike. As agency training funds diminish, these funds become more sought after.

Approximately 5% of our local funds are dedicated to Planning, Evaluation, Research, and Administration. These funds provided for continuity in the planning process, lowered or eliminated the cost of grants administration by grant recipients and provided for the data and research which resulted in successful grant applications and nongrant initiatives. The Other category consists of joint projects involving several components, such as DWI, and major programs outside the normal system such as Treatment Alternatives for Street Crimes.

Table VI.3

Funds Distribution by Major Category
(Rounded)

Function	Amount	%age
Corrections	\$11,500,000	34
Enforcement	6,240,000	18
Juvenile Justice	4,800,000	14
Prosecution	2,800,000	8
Courts	2,700,000	8
Planning, Eval., Research, Admin.	1,660,000	5
Training	1,300,000	4
Other	3,000,000	9
	\$34,000,000	100%

As would be expected, the formal criminal/juvenile justice system has been the major beneficiary of grant funds. The CJCC has, however, a policy of supporting community organizations and private nonprofit agencies especially in the juvenile justice system. Reflective of that, 13% of all grant funds received have been subgranted to agencies not in the formal system. This 13% does not include benefits from training, research and evaluation.

One aspect of grant funding nationally which received a great deal of attention during the life of LEAA was the amount of funds being utilized for the purchase of hardware and equipment not related to a program. Much attention was diverted to the acquisition, primarily by police departments, of guns, ammunition, cars and other enforcement paraphernalia. Although this was probably a result of the events leading to the establishment of the federal effort, it was clearly not the intent after several revisions of the original act. Indeed, one of the first grants received in New Orleans was \$100,000 for Riot Control Training and Equipment. Both the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and the CJCC made serious efforts to preclude the use of funds in this manner and were successful.

Examination of equipment-only grants is problematic. Many programs included equipment purchases which were necessary and proper for operation of the programs. Some grants included only an equipment line item but were actually programs in themselves or were in support of an existing program. A review of the grants in New Orleans revealed few, if any, grants in the guns and bullets category. However, in an effort to illustrate some distinction in funds spent, Table VI.4 uses four broad categories. The vast majority of New Orleans

grants were spent for programs (67%). A program for this purpose is defined as a grant in which less than 50% of the funds were spent on equipment, and which the major emphasis was the purchase of services or hiring of personnel. The Other category includes grants related to training, administration, evaluation, research, and planning. Construction/Renovation includes costs associated with physical improvements. Major costs in this category include improvements to Parish Prison, Juvenile Detention Center, and group homes. The Equipment category includes those grants in which 50% or more of the budget was spent on equipment. This category includes expenditures for the automation of many criminal justice agencies, communications equipment, crime lab and microfilming. While the dollar amount of equipment grants is higher during the LEAA years, the volume of these types of grants increased dramatically during the period 1982-1985 with the advent of the State-Grant-In-Aid (Act 562) program. In a time of diminishing resources, the funds, although modest, became essential for agencies whose equipment was in desperate need of repair or replacement.

Table VI.4

Grant Expenditures by Type
(Rounded)

Category	Amount	%age
Programs	\$23,000,000	67
Equipment	5,000,000	16
Construction/Renovation	3,000,000	9
Other	3,000,000	9

\$34,000,000 100%

In an effort to review the long term effects of grant involvement, programmatic initiatives were examined to determine which initiatives are still a major part of the criminal justice system. Implicit in accepting a grant is the anticipation that, if proven successful, the project will receive continued funding from non-grant sources thus becoming institutionalized. The matrix in Table VI.5 illustrates the results of that review.

Table VI.5

Program Institutionalization		
Category	Number	%age
Exist today in original form	35	44
Exist today in modified form	18	22
Existed but not in place today	12	15
Never funded beyond grant	15	19
Total	80	100%
Institutionalized	65	81
Not institutionalized	15	19
Exist today	53	66
Do not exist today	27	34

In constructing this table, programmatic initiatives were used rather than individual grants. Grants for one-time equipment purchases, research, evaluation and other similar uses were excluded. In most cases, more than one grant was involved in the initiatives. Eighty clearly identifiable initiatives were identified using this process. The exclusion of other types of grant funded projects is

not intended to reflect negatively on these projects. Indeed, many, particularly in training, were extremely valuable to the system.

Programs reviewed were classified into four categories.

1. Programs which exist today in basically their original form.
2. Programs which ceased to exist after conclusion of grant funding.
3. Programs which exist today but either in an altered or modified form or in an agency different from the original grant recipient.
4. Programs which met the criteria for #2 or #3 but which were subsequently discontinued because of reasons external to the operation of the program.

A review of the program initiatives revealed that 44% are still in place today in basically their original form. An additional 22% are still in place in a modified version. Those initiatives which were initially institutionalized and which subsequently succumbed to external factors, such as general budget reductions, accounted for 15%. Nineteen percent of the initiatives were never institutionalized. A close examination of these suggests that a few were politically unacceptable, several others were believed to be too expensive, some were found not to be needed and the balance either were not operationally successful or were flawed in the planning process. The fact that 81% of the initiatives were funded and operated exclusive of grant support indicates a high level of satisfaction by policy makers

with the programs, a strong commitment by the community to support successful programs, and, in some cases, the ability of program supporters to develop an influential constituency. In any event, the residual effects of initial grant funding were felt and continue to be felt in the community long after the last grant dollar was spent.

The balance of this chapter will selectively review some of the specific and some major grant initiatives in the criminal justice system during 1968-1988. In the next chapter this process will be repeated for the juvenile justice system. Both small and large dollar amounts will be represented, thus illustrating that the size of the grant is not necessarily positively related to its importance. This description is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather as an example of the scope of initiative inclusion.

Enforcement

New Orleans Police Department

Beginning in 1970 one of the first uses of LEAA funding was to completely upgrade the Police Department's communication system. Over \$1 million purchased mobile radios and other sophisticated equipment to convert the system from VHF to UHF. This eliminated so-called "dead areas" in the city in which a patrol officer might wait as much as fifteen minutes to complete a communication with headquarters.

An additional aid to the patrol officer was the purchase of the MOTION computer system. This system allows an officer pursuing

a suspect or vehicle to immediately ascertain the past record of the individual or whether the car has been reported as stolen, thus providing the officer with necessary information about how to handle the situation. In addition, the computer helps aggregate crime data for planning and reporting functions. A total of more than \$300,000 in federal and state funds has been spent on the police computer system since 1976.

Another major innovation made with federal funds was the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). This program consisted not so much of personnel or equipment as the use of a new management philosophy. As a concept it described a step-by-step decision making process for directing police operations. The five components were data collection, data analysis, planning, service delivery, and feedback. For central coordination the Crime Analysis Unit was begun. Information was used systematically to direct field units. The goal was increasing the number and quality of arrests, clearances, and prosecutions emphasizing the serious habitual offender. The immediate results of the program were modified data collection, a new field report form, management training, better crime analysis information, crime scene cameras and the making of short and long term plans for further development. The Crime Analysis Unit is still functioning and the report form is still in use. The program operated for three years with more than \$600,000 in federal funds.

In addition several operations dealing with specific crimes were funded such as a STING project (antirobbery and burglary), a family violence program, commercial vice and civil disorder projects, and drug enforcement. In all since 1969, about \$1,000,000 has been granted for

programs investigating specific crimes. Finally, over \$100,000 has been used to develop and upgrade the Police Crime Lab.

New Orleans Fire Department

Although the Fire Department is not usually thought of as a law enforcement body, they were the recipient of a number of small grants, over \$40,000 since 1980, to improve the city's antiarson effort. Most of the improvements made did not require funding. For example, an Arson Task Force of volunteers representing criminal justice agencies, insurance companies, and private citizens was set up, and the Police and Fire departments each assigned investigators to an Arson Squad. However, federal and state funds did purchase computers and equipment to improve the apprehension of arsonists.

Prosecution

District Attorney

The most heavily supported grant program in the area of prosecution was the District Attorney's Career Criminal Bureau. Over \$1 million was put into the program beginning in 1974. Like features of ICAP, it was an attempt to single out serious repeat offenders for special treatment. The Career Criminal Bureau provided for vertical prosecution of such criminals by having only one prosecutor assigned to the case from magistrate hearings to pardon or parole hearings. It set up a screening system to select habitual criminals whether or not

the current crime was serious. The funds purchased personnel, equipment, expense money for witnesses, expert testimony, and extradition expenses. Although the Career Criminal Bureau was cut from the D.A.'s budget when his funds became scarce, the concept is still used in the screening of cases.

The D.A. bought a computer system with almost \$200,000 in federal and state funds. Known as the District Attorney's Record Tracking System (DARTS) it provides immediate information on the status of a case.

The D.A. has also operated some programs offering nonprosecutorial services that have been discontinued due to budget cuts. A diversionary program operated for juveniles and adults that offered restitution and counseling in lieu of prosecution. Also tried at one time were a victim witness program, an economic crime unit, and even a release on recognizance program. From 1972 to 1983, over \$600,000 in grant funds were obtained for such programs. More recently the District Attorney has received a grant to establish a special prosecution unit for drug cases. Over \$400,000 is being used to promote these cases utilizing the Career Criminal model.

Orleans Indigent Defender Program

To conform with Supreme Court rulings, New Orleans established an office in the Criminal District Court to provide free legal counsel to the poor. The Orleans Indigent Defender Program (OIDP) services Criminal District, Traffic, Municipal, and Juvenile Courts. The OIDP

was first begun with LEAA funds in 1971. Although it got off to a rocky start, the office continues to operate, presently funded by court fines and fees. They handle about 80% of the cases going through Criminal District Court.

Besides the initial start up costs, grants have been made to them from time to time to keep them on a parity with the D.A. They have purchased a library, computer, and equipment. In addition, New Orleans was one of the few places to fund a Specialized Trial Bureau to protect the rights of those habitual offenders going through the D.A.'s Career Criminal Bureau and a similar process for drug related arrestees. Since 1971, \$1,000,000 has gone into the support of the ODP.

Adjudication

Criminal District Court

Some of the most wide-ranging changes were made in the organization of Criminal District Court. With over \$100,000 in grant funds the Office of the Judicial Administrator was created to handle details of managing the court and to oversee the matters that affected the court as a whole. That office oversaw, for example, specialized court management studies to set up a Magistrate Court and a Central Jury Pool. Both of these projects were paid for in their beginnings with federal funds. Instead of rotating the job of magistrate judge among all ten court judges, one magistrate was elected to serve full

time with a number of commissioners serving outside of regular hours. This alone reduced the time a person might spend in jail before trial and was accomplished with more than \$230,000 in federal funds. The Central Jury Pool replaced the ten separate jury pools with one common pool reducing the number of jurors who had to be on hand for selection. It cost only \$15,815 in federal funds.

Automation was introduced, records were put on microfilm and microfiche, and the Clerk's Office was reorganized. This total updating of the information system was supported by almost \$500,000 in grant funds. All of these programs exist today greatly increasing the efficiency of the Criminal District Court. Criminal District Court has recently received a grant of about \$700,000 to create two additional court sections to speed the processing of drug-related cases.

Municipal Court and Probation

In the lower courts, grants have not been as effective or as widely used as in the higher courts. A federal grant did help to establish the Municipal Court Probation Department and smaller grants have provided it with equipment and computers.

A voucher system whereby victims of family violence can receive shelter in certain hotels when established centers are full, and certain capital improvements have been made with grant funds.

Corrections

Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office

Perhaps the major benefit of federal funds in the New Orleans area has been the construction of the new parish prison, called the Community Correctional Center (CCC), and the renovation of the Old Parish Prison. In all since 1971, over \$7 million has been granted for capital improvements. The Old Parish Prison is now used for unsentenced inmates. The CCC with a maximum capacity of 944 was designed to accommodate the delivery of services to sentenced inmates.

Over the years grant funds have provided for the testing of a number of inmate service concepts. The first of these, a rehabilitation program, began in 1969 in response to a federal court order calling for more humane incarceration in Orleans Parish. It had four components: classification, group counseling, work release, and education. Although it did not reduce recidivism it did reduce in-prison crime. That unit has been partially funded in a number of ways since its beginning with a total expenditure of over \$1 million, and still exists as the umbrella unit for other service programs. Other grants have included a restitution program (\$737,294), a work release/pre-release program (\$95,000), a substance dependency center (\$555,039), a crisis clinic (\$43,000), and a release on recognizance program called CINTAP (\$556,287). The Sheriff currently operates the only ROR program in the parish.

Over \$60,000 in State Grant in Aid funds also purchased a computer system for the Sheriff that tracks inmates once they have been incarcerated. It also prepares capiases and subpoenas for trials and is, thus, the closest thing Orleans Parish has to a computer system linking different criminal justice components.

Community Service Center

In the early 1970's over \$150,000 in grant funds provided for the establishment of the Community Service Center, a nonprofit corporation serving released convicts returning to Orleans Parish. The center is still operating today to help excriminals reintegrate into society.

Coordinated Efforts

Many of the grant-funded projects and programs involved more than one component of the criminal justice system. The success or failure of the projects involved the cooperation and coordination of many, if not all, agencies. A few examples of these more comprehensive approaches follow:

Comprehensive DWI Enforcement

The Driving While Intoxicated Enforcement program was directed at reducing the number of arrests, property loss, injury, and death resulting from persons driving while under the influence of alcohol

and drugs. Through the establishment of a local task force composed of all relevant parties including the police, sheriff, city attorney, traffic court judges, and concerned citizen groups, much effort went into establishing local priorities and developing a communication mechanism for sometimes competing agencies. A comprehensive analysis of the problems resulted but little else.

The failure of this project cannot be attributed directly to one agency or actor but must be shared by all. While all concerned agreed that the problem was serious and in need of attention, there was little agreement on the approaches to take. This lack of consensus resulted in no consistent initiative being supported by all concerned.

Problems of role, responsibility, and goals between the funding agency and the local agencies resulted in more energy and attention being paid to turf problems and the minutiae of grants management than to the ultimate goals of the program. The litigious approach to all enforcement efforts by the private bar resulted in suspension of activities until those issues could be litigated, often years after the fact. The inability of concerned citizen groups to develop support and become active greatly diminished the accountability aspects of the program. DWI enforcement continued in spite of these problems but this effort can take no pride in its accomplishments. Of the more than \$400,000 directed to this effort, most went for on-street enforcement.

Comprehensive Drug Enforcement

In late 1985 , prior to the passage of the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse

Law, agencies in the criminal justice system began to meet on an ad hoc basis to explore strategies to combat the drug problem in New Orleans. Past experience had taught us that we must start early in both defining the problem and the coordinated strategy with which all could agree. This process was successful. As a result of a clear understanding of what needed to be accomplished, the role definition of each agency involved, and the lack of disagreement over fund distribution, an approach was developed that could be supported by all agencies. After announcement of fund availability, agencies were supportive of one another's attempts at grant funding because it was clear that the efforts of one agency would not be successful without all of the pieces of the strategy being in place.

To date, we have been successful in implementing this plan almost in its entirety. The Police Department received funds for a major enforcement effort and substantial improvements to its crime lab. The District Attorney received funds for the operation of a specialized drug prosecution unit. The judiciary received funds for the establishment of two additional sections of court to handle the expected large influx of cases resulting from the Police and District Attorney's efforts. The Indigent Defender Office received funds so that additional staff could be hired to defend those cases filed.

Training funds were successfully applied for as well as research funds. The Parish Prison became a test site for the Drug Use Forecasting Program. The first piece of the strategy yet to be realized is the addition of bed space in Parish Prison to accommodate the efforts of the other components. Although this project has only operated a few months, over 1,000 arrests have been made. It is

anticipated that substantial results will occur. Over \$2,000,000 has already been committed for this effort.

Target Area Crime Specifics Program

The Target Area Crime Specifics Program was the most significant grant funded program for the criminal justice system in New Orleans during the past twenty years, both from the standpoint of total dollars and potential long-term benefits to the system. In the early 1970;s, LEAA created the High Impact Anti-Crime Program which was their flagship effort to reduce crime in eight major cities. Each city chosen received \$20 million to be spent over a three year period on programs designed to dramatically reduce crime rates, primarily stranger to stranger crimes and burglary. New Orleans was not one of the cities chosen.

However, through a combination of previous grant experience, the seriousness of the problems in New Orleans, and political clout from Louisiana's congressional delegation, New Orleans was awarded a \$3 million discretionary grant for a "mini impact" program which was called Target Area Crime Specifics. The term "Target Area" related to the planning process and not to a geographical location. Not only was the amount different, but also the goals. Target Area, which consisted of a multi-faceted approach to crime reduction, especially targeted juvenile crime and drug-related crime.

There were thirteen components of the program with 88% of the funds allocated to action projects and 12% for administration and

evaluation. Table VI.6 displays the individual projects comprising the program.

Table VI.6

Target Area Components

Project	Funds	Subgrantees
Community Based Residential Facility	\$300,600	Welfare Department
Court Diversion	81,000	District Attorney
Drug Detoxification	85,000	Sheriff
Drug Enforcement	204,000	Police
Street Lighting	63,000	Utilities
Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement	428,000	Police
Manpower Deployment	19,000	Police
Public Housing Security	415,200	Police
Prisoner Rehabilitation	555,300	Sheriff
Volunteer Probation	62,500	Juvenile Ct.
Youth Service Bureau	415,300	Welfare Dept.
Administration	144,300	CJCC
Evaluation	226,300	CJCC

Under Target Area, 36% of the funds were awarded to the Police Department, 26% to juvenile agencies, 21% to the Sheriffs' Office, 12% for administration and evaluation and 5% for other agencies.

While most of the individual projects were successfully evaluated as to their specific goals and operations, no direct overall reduction in crime can be attributed to the effort. Intuitively, project outcomes can be associated with crime reduction but not empirically. This is discussed in the final chapter.

In addition to individual project success, other useful benefits derived from this program. Coordination of efforts among agencies, a directed, focused planning process, the systematic evaluation of projects and the realization that some projects are more correctly categorized as system improvement rather than crime reduction, to name

several, are some of those benefits. Probably the most significant benefits related to the planning process. Lessons were learned about direct involvement of operating agencies in the planning process and about the establishment of clear, relevant and achievable goals. This program composed the adolescent period for local planning and for expectation of grant results, and helped to mature those processes into a method which has proved itself successful in the following years. Naivete and idealism diminished somewhat and pragmatism in the planning and allocation process emerged.

A summary of the major points learned may be instructive in understanding the overall value of the Target Area experience. This "experiment" set the direction and future course of grant funded activities in the criminal justice system.

1. Establishing the Community Based Residential Facility or Dreyfous House on the campus of Milne Boys Home was our first incursion into the realm of group homes for juveniles. While the project itself was doomed to failure because of neighborhood resistance, the lessons learned from the experience and the research involved in determining need was instrumental in later planning and grant activities which assisted in establishing a group home network in New Orleans, not through government sponsorship, but rather through the private non-profit service provider agencies.

2. The Court Diversion Project operated by the District Attorney was one of the most successful projects funded under Target Area. It combined a pretrial diversion from prosecution effort for adults with a pretrial release program. The success of this program eventually resulted in its expansion to include juveniles. The project was

continued for many years without grant funds until statewide economic situations caused the closing of many special programs.

3. The Drug Detoxification Program for Parish Prison illustrated the difficulty in operating an essentially medical program in a penal environment. Access to prisoners, security, costs, and lack of long term positive benefits led to the abandonment of this project. It did, however, document the need for detoxification services which in later years have been handled more efficiently and appropriately by medical personnel.

4. The Drug Enforcement Component is one of the few Target Area Programs which had a direct and dramatic effect on the criminal environment in New Orleans. It was responsible for assisting the police and District Attorney in using new and innovative methods of investigation and technology in drying up the heroin supply on our city streets. The effects of this project were both immediate and long lasting. This success encouraged continued use of grant funds for narcotics enforcement.

5. The Street Lighting Program is a good example of an experiment which didn't work. Flaws in the planning process and an overambitious view of the results of this attempt led to its failure. No other attempts with grant funds have been instituted for any similar projects.

6. Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement had the effect of both system change in the Police Department and an actual reduction in the number of youths being arrested. The primary benefits of this program have led to better and more sophisticated investigative techniques for officers in the Juvenile Division. The success of this effort

resulted in additional grant funds being allocated to juvenile enforcement.

7. The Manpower Deployment Project, although not considered a success, did prepare the Police Department in terms of attitude and perspective for the future development of proactive patrol, special unit deployment, and crime analysis. Police enthusiasm with the possibilities this project represented resulted in other substantial grants for PEP, ICAP, and other innovative police management programs which today are now part of the normal operations of the department.

8. Prisoner rehabilitation was basically unheard of prior to the funding of the Prisoner Rehabilitation Project under Target Area. With the support of the Sheriff, this project has not only become a major component of the local prison system, it has also spawned many and varied projects for prisoners.

9. Volunteer Probation was a successful attempt to enlarge the capacity of the Juvenile Probation Department through the use of volunteers to reduce the large case loads of Probation Officers and allow them to spend more productive time with their most serious cases. While the program was successful in achieving its goals, the greatest benefits may have been techniques of volunteer utilization including recruitment, retention, and a more realistic appreciation of the types of cases they could handle effectively. The success of this project led to increased funding for other volunteer programs.

10. Public Housing Security represented an effort to provide specialized police services in areas of the city traditionally under served. This multi-racial, specially trained unit operated in high

density public housing projects which on one hand were viewed as havens for criminals, and on the other hand were the most victimized areas of the city. The unit achieved both police and citizen support and was continued for many years until manpower reductions in the Police Department caused the elimination of several specialized units.

11. The Youth Services Bureau was the city's first major attempt to systematically confront juvenile delinquency prevention with high risk youth. Three centers were established in public housing neighborhoods which provided a multitude of services for youth at risk and many of those who had already penetrated the juvenile justice system. This project was continued and expanded at the expiration of grant funding and the results stimulated grant fund allocation to private groups for similar purposes in other areas of the city and directly stimulated the development of truancy centers.

12. Funds expended on administration and evaluation not only served the purposes of efficiency and accountability but established an approach to planning, grants management, monitoring and the utilization of evaluation results which persists to this time. This is true both of this agency and the operating departments who have, over the years, developed substantial planning and evaluative capabilities in-house. The processes and approaches developed during this period have as much relevance today to non-grant funded projects as to grant funded ones.

VII

DIRECTED STRIKES:

SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON JUVENILE

The juvenile justice system has both formal and informal components. In the formal system are such agencies as the Police Department, the District Attorney's Office, Juvenile Court, the Welfare Department and, in some instances, the school system. Among informal components are those agencies traditionally designated as private-not-for-profit service providers which interact with the formal system in terms of resource provision. Primarily these informal components support the group home network for delinquent youths and a variety of juvenile delinquency prevention efforts. A complete description of the juvenile justice system can be found in Juvenile Justice in New Orleans, Brown and Ashcraft, (OCJC: 1985) with a fuller explication of some grant related initiatives.

Both the formal and informal systems have been grant recipients through this office. Early on it was determined that both of these systems have important and useful roles in reducing delinquency and that each system depended on the other for support. In addition to all funds dedicated to juvenile justice (primarily OJJDP), this office has made a special effort to include juvenile related projects in a variety of funding categories where allowable by federal law and state guidelines. This special emphasis on juvenile matters can be

easily illustrated by referring to previous tables which show that although only 5% of the funds distributed by this office were specifically earmarked by juvenile justice projects, 14% of the total funds distributed went to juvenile projects.

This section briefly reviews some of the major initiatives in juvenile justice during the period 1968-1988 which were grant related. The consistency of emphasis on juvenile justice has greatly increased both the development and continuity of juvenile services in New Orleans.

New Orleans Police Department

One of the Target Area grants going to the police department was called the Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component. It operated for six years with discretionary and block funding totaling almost \$700,000 and brought modern investigative techniques to the juvenile division. A special squad of four investigators, a lieutenant, and a sergeant concentrated on property crimes, escapees from the state detention facility, and serving old warrants. They created fingerprint, photographic, and geographic files of juveniles thereby doing away with the necessity for dragnet operations. Resulting in higher clearance rates for robbery and burglary, the techniques and files developed are still in use today.

More recently, the NOPD was awarded funds to develop a geo-based investigative system which is responsive both to the philosophy that youths tend to commit offenses in close proximity to their homes and to the goal of better clearing offenses believed to be committed by

"career" juvenile offenders.

Juvenile Court

Another component of the formal system, Juvenile Court, received substantial grant funds for use in developing an efficient management information system. Other funds provided a wider range of dispositional alternatives for the judges.

The Volunteer Probation Program was a Target Area program impacting juveniles. It was originally intended that the volunteers would counsel low risk juveniles; however, it was learned that the volunteers could replace intake screeners and resource workers who planned and chaperoned recreational events. The performance of these services freed the probation officers to spend more time with their clients. Arrest recidivism was reduced. The Probation Department now comes under the authority of the state of Louisiana, rather than the Juvenile Court, and the program is still operating.

Another program that has operated as an alternative to incarceration is the Juvenile Restitution Program. It provides direct monetary restitution to victims and indirect restitution in the form of community service. Originally grant funds subsidized the juvenile's employment and repaid victims. After grant funding ceased, the program could no longer provide subsidized employment. Currently they coordinate restitution payments and place juveniles in unsubsidized jobs. This project by providing an alternative to incarceration assists in alleviating severe overcrowding at juvenile correctional institutions.

City Welfare Department

The City Welfare Department is also part of the formal system because it operates the pre-trial detention facility for juveniles in the parish. That facility called the Youth Study Center (YSC), was supported by an LEAA grant to provide pre-trial detention and clinical evaluation of youth for psychiatric disturbance or retardation. The Youth Study Center has been further supported by grants amounting to over \$400,000 to expand their diagnostic services and to make capital improvements. It is still in operation today.

Another federal grant in 1980 established a home detention program called Community Attention. The program screens juveniles detained at the YSC to determine which ones can stay at home until their trial under intense supervision. The relatively inexpensive program was institutionalized by the YSC after funding ceased and is still in use today.

A final City Welfare Department program that is still functioning is called Youth Services Bureau. In the mid-1970's the program began operating in three housing projects. Including consulting psychologists, parent effectiveness training, tutoring and recreational and cultural activities, it combines a complex system of counseling and referral. Initial evaluations showed an overall decline in arrest incidents for youth involved.

District Attorney's Office

Based on the success of the adult Diversion from Prosecution Program, a juvenile component was established. Even though the program was operated efficiently and effectively, it was discontinued because the number of youth eligible could not justify the costs. Currently the District Attorney's Office in conjunction with the NOPD is operating a "career" juvenile offender program which provides special prosecution for multiple offending youths.

Orleans Parish School Board

The final component of the formal system discussed is the Orleans Parish School Board. To reduce truancy and criminality in youth, Student Action Centers were opened for two central city schools with federal funds and support from the City Council. Students from those schools who were found truant were referred to the Student Action Center and given counseling, tutoring, and other services in an attempt to return them to the regular classroom. The program resulted in a reduction in arrests and absenteeism from school. This program has been expanded and is jointly funded by the city and the School Board.

Informal System

In the informal system, the emphasis of this office has been to establish a number of group homes as an alternative to secure

incarceration and to develop and support the network of private service providers to prevent delinquency.

Group Homes

The group homes provided an additional dispositional alternative for Juvenile Court judges. The Volunteers of America opened three group homes for recidivist juveniles in the early 1970's which were built and supported with LEAA funds. All three are still operating. Youth Alternatives, Inc. operates a number of group homes for runaways and referrals from court that were begun with the help of federal funds. The approach of our office was to "seed" the development and to provide funds subsequently for special initiatives and training. The primary financial support for these group homes comes from state per diem payments.

Delinquency Prevention

The network of private service providers has included St. Mark's Community Center, Kingsley House, Big Brothers and Big Sisters, and the Associated Catholic Charities, among many others.

St. Mark's, a mission of the Methodist Church, has been one of the organizations most consistently supported. Since 1974, over \$250,000 has been appropriated for a variety of programs there. A grant first established Treme Street Academy (TSA), which is an alternative school for junior high school students. It is designed for those who are unwilling or unable to participate in a regular school setting.

Almost 45% of the students are self referrals and at least 50% usually have arrest records. Grants also funded a Pre-Vocational Guidance Program to develop vocational skills in the TSA youth and at one time funded Big Sisters when it was a part of St. Marks. St. Marks with Tremé Street Academy are still in operation today.

Both Big Brothers and Big Sisters programs were funded in the late 1970's. They were given money to hire staff to supervise additional matches. Each program matches a child in trouble with carefully screened adults of the same sex to give extra support in a troubled time.

Outward Bound is a program funded recently by JJDP and operated by the Associated Catholic Charities that provides counseling, recreation and field trips to needy youth. Most referrals are sent from the school or Juvenile Court.

Another program begun by the Archdiocese in the mid 1970's and augmented with grant funds was S.O.S. or the Save Ourselves Club. It helped Irish Channel young men from 15 to 21 who had an arrest record. The club gave individual, group and career counseling, tutorial services and recreational therapy. It is still in existence today.

The Kingsley House Anchor Outreach Program was begun to develop a model for a neighborhood delinquency prevention program. Irish Channel youth became members if they had been arrested for delinquent behavior. Like St. Mark's, Kingsley House has become a neighborhood hub for prevention projects and has hosted a wide variety of projects over the years. Currently it is involved with the NOPD in a crime prevention program which utilizes both the Explorer Scout model and an elderly escort service provided by youth.

Training and Resources

In addition to specific projects, grant funds have been especially useful in providing both formal and informal components with opportunities for specialized and upgrade training and for resource materials. Counting into the hundreds, these small grants provide badly needed resources which have traditionally not been readily accessible to juvenile justice agencies. In order to streamline the provision of training funds and to increase the cost effectiveness of resource provision, the OCJC developed a Resource Center. The Resource Center acts as both a clearinghouse for and provider of materials and supplies. Using loan, gratis, and low cost procedures, both formal and informal components can take advantage of a multitude of services simply, easily, and without incurring administrative or acquisition costs.

VIII

THE BATTLE CONTINUES:

SUMMARY

The War on Crime declared by the federal government twenty years ago has not been won. The battles for safe streets and improved quality of life for all citizens continue daily in the streets of America. This report has documented the process and product resulting from the federal "ammunition" provided for this war in New Orleans. While the goal of winning the war by providing insufficient ammunition, barely 5% of the total spent by local government for that purpose, is unrealistic, the targeted use of the funds in New Orleans has yielded several direct and indirect benefits.

Dollar Influx

During the past twenty years well over \$34,000,000 has been distributed to local criminal/juvenile justice agencies, related agencies, and private-not-for-profit groups in New Orleans. While these funds are small compared to overall expenditures, they were needed and, in most cases, wisely used. Many of the programs instituted during the 1970's may not have been done at all, or done at a later time. For the current generation of criminal justice professionals these improvements to the system are taken for granted today. Computerization of police records, on-line booking, jail

construction, group homes for juveniles, the Jury Pool, and Magistrate Court are some examples. While these improvements did not drastically reduce crime in the community, they did improve the ability of the criminal justice agencies to carry out their individual missions.

Innovation and Experimentation

In local government budgeting processes, the allocation of funds for new and innovative programs or programs of an experimental nature rarely takes place. Local governments allocate scarce funds for specifically mandated functions and there is great competition for any funds remaining. Legislative bodies only reluctantly seek out new or experimental projects since they need to be sure that funds are being used wisely, appropriately, and effectively. Federal dollars have helped criminal justice agencies try innovative methods without the negative aspects of failed experimentation. The process of clearly defining needs, program planning, and agency commitment has resulted in 80% of innovative programs being continued in New Orleans once grant funds were exhausted. Youth Services Bureaus, Truancy Centers, the Career Criminal Program, the Restitution Program, and many others are examples of where decision makers took risks in order to establish new methods for their agencies. Not all innovative or experimental programs have worked. But, from their lack of success, lessons were learned concerning other, improved initiatives.

Management Perspectives

Many initiatives during the past twenty years in New Orleans have been concerned with improving the quality of management in criminal/juvenile justice agencies. These initiatives not only resulted in tangible benefits for the agencies involved but also, and possibly more importantly, improved the attitudes, processes and perspectives of managers. These approaches, often referred to as "modernization," have occurred in environments often resistant to change. The development of computerized records systems, crime analysis techniques, investigative techniques such as MCI, major improvements in the handling of local prisoners, manpower deployment, specialized training, improvements in clerk's offices, and professional management in courts have all aided in professionalizing the criminal/juvenile justice system in New Orleans. Of all the initiatives, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program probably had the most impact both because of its comprehensiveness and the number of people it touched.

Direct Crime Control

The vast majority of programs funded did not directly impact day to day street crime. While it may have been the intent of the federal government to quickly impact crime rates with the infusion of dollars, that did not happen, nor was it likely to happen given the organizational environments of most criminal/juvenile justice agencies in the early 1970's. Groundwork had to be laid to help the

agencies use funds wisely and effectively. Perhaps many criticisms of the early LEAA program were premature knee-jerk reactions from agencies when confronted with spending massive amounts of money in a very short time. Indeed, most funds in the early years primarily were used for bells and whistles, guns and bullets. Whereas New Orleans spent very little of its funds on the hardware of enforcement, those initiatives into direct street crime control were successful. Through properly equipping, training, and providing necessary overtime funds, the New Orleans approach to direct crime control was through the use of special units. The sex crimes unit, narcotics unit, anti-burglary unit, numerous sting operations both for property and drugs, proactive task forces, specialized juvenile enforcement, the Urban Squad, and other similar efforts resulted in retarding specific crimes for short periods in specific locations. Experience gained through the use of these methods has been continually used throughout the years. While many of the other programmatic initiatives had assisted the criminal/juvenile justice system in reacting to crime, these proactive initiatives were aimed at directly preventing or stopping crime.

Soft Prevention

Substantial funds over the past twenty years have been allocated to what can generically be called crime prevention. These are the traditional approaches with the intent of either diverting an individual or group from criminal behavior or providing citizens with self-protection skills. Programs such as the Youth Services Bureaus,

Big Sisters, Big Brothers, Outward Bound, vocational skills programs, numerous church and agency affiliated youth clubs emphasize both the importance placed on prevention at an early age and the variety that these programs can take. Self-protection approaches such as Neighborhood Watch, Operation I.D., Elderly Escort, Rape Prevention, and many others offered citizens and groups the opportunity to contribute to their own and others' safety.

Significant limitations on funding criteria have undoubtedly diminished the effectiveness of these types of efforts. In most cases an "at risk" criteria had to be met, or with individual juveniles, some penetration of the system must have occurred. In this respect many of the crime prevention projects can be thought of as secondary. More general approaches, not related to a specific event or target group rarely, if ever, happened. This had the effect of diminishing the cost effectiveness of the dollars allocated. Especially in the early years, the emphasis was on new development rather than utilizing through expansion or modification, existing community initiatives. The lack of federal grant dollars over the years has caused this approach to be revisited and revised.

Victim Orientation

One criticism of the early program initiatives was that funds were disproportionately directed to apprehending criminals and then developing programs for them. It was felt by some that, for example, youth who do not engage in criminal behavior were not being offered the same opportunities for self-improvement programs as youth who had

criminal histories. Likewise, witnesses to and victims of crime were treated worse than the perpetrators. Although never the primary intent of federal funding, some changes were made in eligible program areas to allow for local initiatives for victims. Eventually, a special category of grant funds became available specifically for services directed toward victims and other funds were earmarked for use in witness programs. In New Orleans, this more positive approach resulted in program initiatives designed especially for victims of rape, domestic abuse, and child abuse.

Planning and Coordination

With twenty years experience, not only the local planning office, but also, and probably more importantly, the individual agencies in the criminal/juvenile justice system have developed planning and research capabilities which not only improve their grant related initiatives but also their normal operations. The emphasis on evaluation during the 1970's assisted individual agencies in more critically reviewing their operations wanting to know the effect of operations or changes to operations within their department. Aspects of coordination and facilitation by the Office of Criminal Justice have no doubt been enhanced as a result of the stewardship role over grant funds. The ability to place dollars behind suggestions for improvements or new initiatives led, at least initially, to agencies in the criminal/juvenile justice system depending on the OCJC for agency coordination, facilitation of projects, program suggestions,

funding development, and mediation of inter-agency disputes. This dependence has persisted despite the decline in funds available.

Training and Professional Development

Of all the programs and projects funded, those related to training and professional development have undoubtedly touched more employees of the criminal/juvenile justice system and other related agency personnel than any other. Literally thousands of system employees have had training opportunities provided through the use of grant funds. Unfortunately, as agency operating budgets have diminished over the years, training has been systematically cut. Many agencies depend solely upon grant provided opportunities for all of their training needs. Training opportunities provided have ranged from conferences and seminars, to workshops, to specialized hands on applications, and to in-service programs. The provision of these funds has been a consistent approach in grant fund allocation over the past twenty years.

While the availability of grant funds for crime control and criminal justice have not had the effect of "curing" the crime problem in New Orleans, they have improved both the system's ability to react, to provide for technological improvements, better management systems, and substantial prevention efforts. Would these things have happened without grant funds? Perhaps. But, perhaps not as soon and not without the evaluation of the efforts which has improved both efficiency and effectiveness. A major shortcoming of any analysis of the grant programs lies in the inability to demonstrate a positive

cause and effect relationship between the level of grant funds and the amount of crime in the community. It is naive to believe that the influx of relatively few dollars spread out over two decades can alter significantly the number of crimes in a community when compared to the multitude of variables which cause crime to exist. Where targeted, specific approaches to enforcement were used, the value of their work can be demonstrated. But, that cannot be generalized to the entire extent of the problem. Much needs to be done, and through judicious and innovative use of available grant funds, improvements can still be made.

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APPENDIX 1
SELECTED GRANT LISTING
1968-1988

This listing, although not all inclusive, gives some indication of both the variety of programs funded and the agencies which received funds. The programs and projects listed, in most cases, received more than one, usually several individual grants. Except in rare instances, grant funds provided partial support for only three years. Programs and projects similar to these comprised 67% of the total grant funds allocated through this office.

SELECTED GRANTS & AGENCIES
1968-1988

PROGRAM	SPONSOR
Abused Children Tracking System	Juvenile Court
ADAPT	Sheriff's Office
Advocates for Juvenile Justice	Advocates for Juvenile Justice, Inc
Anchor Outreach	Associated Catholic Charities
Anti Robbery/Burglary Project	Police Department
Appellate Process Support	District Attorney
Arson Squad	Fire Department
At Home Detention/Supervised Release	Welfare Department
Battered Women's Program	YWCA
Battered Women's Shelter	Crescent House
Bench Referral Book	Criminal District Court
Big Brothers	Big Brothers
Big Sisters	Big Sisters
Career Awareness	Public Schools
Career Criminal Bureau	St. Mark's Community Center
Central Drug Registry	District Attorney
Child Abuse Program	Health Department
CINTAP	YWCA
City Code Revision	Sheriff's Office
Close Up Partners	City Attorney
Commerical Vice Unit	Sheriff's Office
Communications Modernization	Police Department
Community Attention Program	Police Department
Community Based Residential Facility	Welfare Department
Community Crime Prevention	Welfare Department
Community Relations Improvement	Police Department
Community Services Center	Police Department
Comprehensive Adjudication of Drug	Community Services Center
Arrestees	Criminal District Court
Consumer Fraud Unit	District Attorney
Cooking & Baking Program	Sheriff's Office
Correctional Design & Utilization Study	Sheriff's Office
Court Appointed Special Advocate	CASA
Crime Lab	Police Department
Crime Prevention Unit	Police Department
Crime Scene Investigation	Police Department
Criminal District Court Computer	Criminal District Court
Crisis Clinic	Sheriff's Office
Crisis Intervention	Police Department
Drug Detoxification	Health Department
Drug Enforcement Component	Sheriff's Office
DWI Comprehensive Program	Police Department
Emergency Shelter Care	CJCC
EMIT System & Computerization	Municipal Court
	Coroner's Office

SELECTED GRANTS & AGENCIES
1968-1988

PROGRAM	SPONSOR
Greenhouse	Youth Alternatives, Inc.
Group Home Development	Volunteers of America
Indigent Defender Program	Youth Alternatives, Inc.
Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program	Indigent Defender
Judicial Administrator	Police Department
Judo Club	Criminal District Court
Jury Pool	Police Department
Juvenile Career Criminal	Criminal District Court
Juvenile Central Intake & Tracking	District Attorney
Juvenile Correctional Design & Utilization	Sheriff's Office
Juvenile Court Automation	Welfare Department
Juvenile Court Surveillance System	Juvenile Court
Juvenile Crime Prevention	Juvenile Court
Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component	Kingsley House
Juvenile Detention Reimbursement	St. Luke's Community Center
Juvenile ICAP	Police Department
Juvenile Post Adjudication Services	Juvenile Court
Juvenile Restitution	Police Department
Juvenile Treatment Program	Sheriff's Office
Law Education	Juvenile Court
Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition	Welfare Department
Magistrate Court Section	Public Schools
Manpower Deployment System	Police Department
Minority Recruitment Program	Criminal District Court
MOTION and other Computer Systems	Police Department
Narcotics Intensification Project	Police Department
Narcotics Prosecution Program	Police Department
On-Line Booking	District Attorney
Operation I.D.	Police Department
Organized Crime Investigations Unit	Police Department
Outward Bound	Police Department
Parent Effectiveness Training	Associated Catholic Charities
Police Legal Advisor	St. Mark's Community Center
Pre Release/Work Release	Police Department
Pretrial Diversion	Sheriff's Office
Prison Construction/Renovation	District Attorney
Prisoner Rehabilitation	Sheriff's Office
Probation Automation	Sheriff's Office
Prosecution Management System	Municipal Court Probation
Public Housing Security	City Attorney
Rape Crisis Center	Police Department
	YWCA

SELECTED GRANTS & AGENCIES
1968-1988

PROGRAM	SPONSOR
Records Automation	Clerk of Criminal Court
Release on Recognizance	Sheriff's Office
Restitution Program	ROR, Inc.
Riot and Civil Disorder Planning	Sheriff's Office
Riot Control Equipment & Training	Police Department
Save Our Selves Club	Police Department
Scared Straight	Associated Catholic Charities
Self Defense Program	Juvenile Court
Sex Crimes Unit	Police Department
Spanish Language Component	District Attorney
Special Events Equipment	Police Department
Specialized Trial Bureau	Police Department
Sting Operations	Indigent Defender
Street Lighting	Police Department
Substance Abuse Prevention	Utilities Department
	Sheriff's Office
	St. Mark's Community Center
Summer Youth Jobs	Urban League
	Associated Catholic Charities
Taxis on Patrol	Recreation Department
Training Support	Utilities Department
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime	Municipal Training Academy
Treme Street Academy	TASC
Truancy Program	St. Mark's Community Center
Victim Assistance	Public Schools
Victim/Witness Program	Sheriff's Office
Vocational Training	Police Department
Volunteer Probation	Public Schools
World's Fair Preparation-Enforcement	Juvenile Court
World's Fair Preparation-Shelter	Police Department
Youth Assistance Committee	Kingsley House
Youth Services Bureau	CJCC
Youth Study Center Diagnostic Center	Welfare Department
	Welfare Department

APPENDIX 2

STATE OF LOUISIANA
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 30

Acting pursuant to the authority of Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, vested in me as Governor, I do hereby issue the following proclamation and Executive Order:

WHEREAS, Congress of the United States has declared that crime is essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by state and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively; and

WHEREAS, it is the declared policy of Congress to assist state and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement and criminal justice at every level with national assistance; and

WHEREAS, Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as amended provides federal financial assistance to states and units of local government to combat crime and delinquency; and

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 8, dated July 24, 1972, created the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, established its staff and defined its functions; and

WHEREAS, additional guidance is deemed necessary to adhere to prescribed conditions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as amended in order to maintain eligibility for federal

financial assistance and assure State and local initiative in developing and coordinating comprehensive planning activities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Edwin Edwards, Governor of the State of Louisiana, do hereby expand the previously designated functions of the Commission and direct compliance with the specific guidance provided in the following sections:

I. Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Criminal Justice

A. Functions

1. To bring together those persons most familiar with problems of law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice, including the disposition and treatment of persons convicted of crime, for the purpose of studying and encouraging the adoption of methods by which law enforcement can be made more effective and justice administered more efficiently and fairly to the end that citizens may be more fully protected.
2. To stimulate, promote and organize citizen participation in the improvements and extension of law enforcement, corrections, rehabilitation and the work of the courts.
3. To recommend improvements which need to be made in the recruitment and training of law enforcement officers and other law enforcement personnel.
4. To recommend methods by which cooperation may be furthered between Federal, State and Local law enforcement officials.
5. To assist in planning coordinated programs throughout the State in areas of the police, the courts and corrections.

6. To encourage public understanding of the responsibilities and problems of law officers and law enforcement agencies and the development of greater public support for their efforts.
7. To aid in publicizing and promoting those practices in the treatment of criminal offenders which will do most to prevent a return to criminal activity.
8. To carry out objectives of Public Law 90-351, as amended, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and other federal programs.
9. To approve proposals of State and Local agencies for programs to be financed with the aid of funds from the State, Local and Federal government funds.

B. Composition

The Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice shall consist of such professional and lay persons appointed by the Governor as may have a vital concern with law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice. Appointments shall be made in accordance with the following guidelines which have been prescribed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration:

1. Representation of State law enforcement agencies;
2. Representation of units of general local government by elected policy-making or executive officials;
3. Representation of law enforcement officials or administrators from local units of government;
4. Representation of each major law enforcement function-- police, corrections, court systems and juvenile justice systems--plus, where appropriate, representation identified with the Act's special emphasis areas, i.e., organized crime and riots and civil disorders;

5. Representation of public (governmental) agencies in the State maintaining programs to reduce and control crime, whether or not functioning primarily as law enforcement agencies;
6. Representation of community or citizen interests;
7. Representation that offers reasonable geographical and urban-rural balance and regard for the incidence of crime and the distribution and concentration of law enforcement services in the State; and
8. Representation, as between State law enforcement agencies on the one hand and local units of government and local law enforcement agencies on the other, that approximates proportionate representation of State and local interests.

C. Officers

1. Chairman - The Chairman shall be a Commission member and appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Governor. He shall be the chief executive officer of the Commission.
2. Vice Chairman - The Vice Chairman shall be a Commission member and be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Governor. Upon written direction from the Chairman, the Vice Chairman shall function as the chief executive officer of the Commission.

D. Meetings

1. Regular Meetings - Regular meetings of the Commission shall be held monthly. The date, time and place of such meetings will be determined by Commission vote. The Chairman may reschedule any regular meeting by written notice within a reasonable time prior to scheduled meeting date. The time and place of all such meetings, scheduled or rescheduled, shall be given the Commission members at least five days prior to the meeting date.

2. Special Meetings - Special meetings of the Commission may be called by the Chairman or, when requested in writing by a majority of Commission members when holding office, the Chairman shall call a special meeting. An agenda together with a notice of the time and place of any such special meeting must be provided the Commission members at least three days prior thereto. Only matters contained in the agenda shall be voted at any special meeting.
3. Quorum - In order to legally transact business, fifteen Commission members must be present at the initial roll call at the commencement of any regular or special meeting and they shall constitute a quorum. The Chairman, if a quorum is not present at the scheduled time of the meeting, may continue a roll call for a time not to exceed one hour after which, if a quorum is not then present, the meeting shall be adjourned. After a quorum is announced, Commission business may be transacted by the _____ members remaining provided, however, that no vote may be taken unless at least fifteen members are present.
4. Passage of Motions - After a quorum is announced, a majority of those voting (defined as those who cast "yes" or "no" votes) on a motion shall be sufficient to pass and make it the official act of the Commission.
5. Roll Call - The members' roll shall be called upon all propositions. The Chairman shall have the right

to call for a vote by leave to adopt the previous roll call vote unless there is an objection by one member. The minutes shall reflect the results of each roll call.

5. Secretary - The Administrative Secretary to the Executive Director shall serve as the Secretary to the Commission. In that capacity he or she shall
1) provide that a stenographic transcript of Commission meetings is kept, 2) draft minutes for the approval of the Commission, 3) provide for the public notice of regular, rescheduled and special Commission meetings and 4) perform such other tasks as the Chairman designates. The Secretary shall forward the minutes of a meeting to Commission members prior to the next Commission meeting, at which time they shall be submitted to the Commission for approval.
7. Public Notice - It is the policy of the Commission that all meetings shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public. No meeting shall be held on a legal holiday. Public notice of all meetings shall be given as follows:
 - a. The Commission shall give public notice of each regular meeting 72 hours prior to the meeting and shall state the date, time and place of such meetings. Public notice of any special meeting, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 24 hours before such meeting. However, this requirement of public notice of

reconvened meetings does not apply to any case where the meeting is to be reconvened within 24 hours nor to any case where announcement of the time and place of the reconvened meeting was made at the original meeting and there is no change in the agenda.

- b. The Commission shall supply copies of the notice of its regular meetings, and of the notice of any special, rescheduled or reconvened meeting, to local newspapers of general circulation. Public notice shall also be given by posting a copy of the notice at the office of the Commission.

8. Participation in Meetings -

- a. Proxies - Proxies to vote shall not be permitted. A Commission member must be physically present to record his or her vote and to present a motion or motions.
- b. Discussion - Non-Commission members may address the Commission and participate in its meetings at the discretion of the Chairman.

E. Committees

The Chairman shall appoint such committees as he shall deem necessary or advisable, and shall designate the Chairman and Vice Chairman of such committees.

II. State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (SLEPA)

A. Functions

The functions of the staff of the Commission shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

- 1. Preparation, development and revision of comprehensive plans based on an evaluation of law enforcement problems within the State.

2. Definition, development and correlation of action programs under such plans;
3. Establishment of priorities for law enforcement improvement in the State;
4. Providing information to prospective aid recipients on procedures for grant application;
5. Encouraging grant proposals from local units of government for law enforcement planning and improvement efforts;
6. Encouraging project proposals from State law enforcement agencies;
7. Evaluation of local applications for aid and awarding of funds to local units of government;
8. Monitoring progress and expenditures under grants to State law enforcement agencies, local units of government, and other recipients of LEAA grant funds;
9. Encouraging regional, local and metropolitan area planning efforts, action projects and cooperative arrangements;
10. Coordination of the State's law enforcement plan with other federally-supported programs relating to or having an impact on law enforcement;
11. Oversight and evaluation of the total State effort in plan implementation and law enforcement improvement;
12. Provide technical assistance and services for programs and projects contemplated by the State plan and by units of general local government;

13. Collecting statistics and other data relevant to law enforcement in the State as required by the Administration.

B. Composition

The staff of the Commission shall consist of necessary professional, administrative, and clerical personnel to accomplish required planning and plan implementation for each of the major law enforcement components, administration of the State subgrant program to local units of government, and for all other planning agency responsibilities.

1. Executive Director - The Executive Director shall be the chief executive officer of the Commission staff. He shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Governor. He shall take all necessary action and devote his full time to assist the Commission in performing its duties and fulfilling its responsibilities, including staff recruitment, training and direction. The Executive Director will exercise administrative supervision over the District Program Directors who will be responsible to him for the accomplishment of all tasks assigned to the law enforcement planning district agencies by the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency, including the preparation of district plans and the preparation of projects in the respective law enforcement planning districts. The Executive Director shall have final authority on matters pertaining to the employment, termination of employment, and wages paid to professional staff members of the law enforcement planning district agencies with the exception of the Orleans Parish Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

2. Staff Members - Staff members of the SLEPA shall be subject to the supervision of the Executive Director and will perform duties as requested or directed by him.

III. Law Enforcement Planning Districts

The below listed law enforcement planning districts are hereby established and will be comprised of the following parish(es):

Orleans Law Enforcement Planning District - Orleans Parish;

Capital Law Enforcement Planning District - Ascension,

East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston,

Pointe Coupee, St. Helena, Tangipahoa, Washington, West

Feliciana, and West Baton Rouge Parishes;

Metropolitan Law Enforcement Planning District - Assumption,

Jefferson, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles,

St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Tammany, and Terrebonne

Parishes;

Evangeline Law Enforcement Planning District - Acadia,

Evangeline, Iberia, Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary,

and Vermilion Parishes;

Southwest Law Enforcement Planning District - Allen, Beaure-

gard, Calcasieu, Cameron, and Jefferson Davis Parishes;

Kisatchie-Delta Law Enforcement Planning District - Avoyelles,

Catahoula, Concordia, Grant, LaSalle, Rapides, Winn, and

Vernon Parishes;

Northwest Law Enforcement Planning District - Bienville,

Bossier, Caddo, Claiborne, DeSoto, Lincoln, Natchitoches,

Red River, Sabine, and Webster Parishes;

Northeast Law Enforcement Planning District - Caldwell,
Franklin, Jackson, Madison, Morehouse, Ouachita, Tensas,
Richland, Union, East Carroll, and West Carroll Parishes.

IV. Law Enforcement Planning District Agencies

A. Delineation

The following planning agencies are hereby designated as
the law enforcement planning agency for the district
indicated:

Orleans Parish Criminal Justice Coordinating Council -

Orleans Law Enforcement Planning District;

Capital District Law Enforcement Planning Council, Inc. -

Capital Law Enforcement Planning District;

The Metropolitan District Law Enforcement Planning and
Action Commission, Inc. -

Metropolitan Law Enforcement Planning District;

Evangeline Law Enforcement Council, Inc. -

Evangeline Law Enforcement Planning District;

Southwest District Law Enforcement Planning Council, Inc. -

Southwest Law Enforcement Planning District;

Kisatchie - Delta Economic Development District Council, Inc. -

Kisatchie - Delta Law Enforcement Planning District;

Coordinating and Development Council of Northwest

Louisiana -

Northwest Law Enforcement Planning District;

North Delta Regional Planning and Development District, Inc. -

Northeast Law Enforcement Planning District.

B. Functions

Functions of the law enforcement district planning agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Preparation, development and revision of comprehensive district law enforcement plans based on an evaluation of law enforcement problems within the law enforcement planning district;
2. Definition, development and correlation of action programs under such plans;
3. Providing information to prospective recipients on procedures for grant application;
4. Encouraging grant proposals from local units of government for law enforcement planning and improvement efforts;
5. Evaluation of grant applications for aid in awarding of funds to local units of government;
6. Monitoring progress and expenditures under grants to local recipients of LEAA grant funds;
7. Encouraging regional, local and metropolitan area planning efforts, action projects and cooperative arrangements;
8. Provide technical assistance and services for programs and projects contemplated by the comprehensive district law enforcement plan and by units of general local government;
9. Collecting statistics and other data relative to law enforcement within the law enforcement planning district as requested by the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency.

C. Composition

The law enforcement planning district agency staff shall consist of a District Program Director and such other administrative and clerical personnel whose services are required on a fulltime basis in the accomplishment of law enforcement planning and administrative functions.

V. Law Enforcement Planning District Advisory Councils

A. Purpose and Functions

Law enforcement planning district advisory councils shall perform functions similar to those prescribed for the Commission in planning, developing, coordinating, and administering criminal justice improvement programs within their respective law enforcement planning districts. The law enforcement planning district advisory councils shall:


1. Review, approve and submit the comprehensive district law enforcement plan in accordance with district problems, needs, and goals, and with the format, schedule, description, and other specifics as the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency may require.
2. Identify criminal justice problems and needs in the district and encourage, support and assist with programs and projects proposed by appropriate public entities toward resolving such problems and needs.
3. Inform the SLEPA promptly and completely on all matters in the district affecting and/or affected by the SLEPA and its mission and advise the SLEPA in such matters.

4. Inform public and private entities in the district affecting and/or affected by the SLEPA in any instance promptly and completely of the SLEPA's mission, policies and action and advise such entities in criminal justice matters.
5. Administer and monitor progress and/or changes in district projects on the basis of guidelines developed by the SLEPA.
6. Make recommendations to the Executive Director of the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency on matters relating to the employment, termination of employment, and wages paid to professional staff members of the law enforcement planning district agency.
7. Review and accept the district budget from the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency. Assume responsibility to administer the district budget in conformity with State and federal requirements.
8. Form task forces or committees to assist in planning, analysis, policy and goal recommendations, and such other functions as the SLEPA deems necessary; appoint the chairmen and assure the satisfactory performance of each of the committees or task forces.
9. Establish bylaws in compliance with the Articles of Incorporation specifically dealing with membership, including composition, method and duration of appointment; task force or special committee appointment, structure and composition.
10. Perform other functions in accordance with State and federal policy.


B. Composition

The composition of the law enforcement planning district advisory councils shall incorporate the representative character elements prescribed for the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice in Section I, B., above, with the following modifications:


1. Representation by elective or appointive policy making officials must include at least one representative of the largest city and county in the region and of any unit of government of more than 100,000 population within the district (This need not be the senior official himself, but may be someone named by him as his representative.)
2. Those representative character requirements concerning State agency representation or State/local balance are not deemed applicable to law enforcement planning districts, although locally-based State officials (e.g., State judges within the district, directors of local branches of State correctional departments, etc.) may be considered appropriate candidates and can often make a valuable contribution to comprehensive planning at the regional/local level.
3. Those units of government which have the major share of law enforcement responsibilities within the law enforcement planning district, in terms of their population, their contribution to the total amount of crime within the district, their budget for law enforcement, or other factors, shall have fair and adequate representation.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand officially and caused to be
affixed the Great Seal of the State of
Louisiana, at the Capitol, in the City of
Baton Rouge, on this the 20th day of
February, 1973, A.D.


EDWIN EDWARDS
GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

A T T E S T:


WADE O. MARTIN, JR.
Secretary of State

APPENDIX 3

ORDINANCE

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

CITY HALL December 23, 1970

CALENDAR NO. 4839

NO. 4449 MAYOR COUNCIL SERIES
BY: CIACCIO, LAMBERT, & SAPIR
COUNCILMAN MOREAU/ (BY REQUEST)

AN ORDINANCE to establish the Criminal
Justice Coordinating Council.

WHEREAS, there are numerous public and
private agencies involved in the City's criminal
justice system;

WHEREAS, there is a need to coordinate
the efforts of these separate agencies;

WHEREAS, the President's Crime Commission
in 1967 recommended that every City have a
single coordinating agency for the coordination
of crime control activities;

WHEREAS, the Federal Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act requires that local criminal
justice agencies develop coordinated plans
and programs;

WHEREAS, the Justice Department and the State
of Louisiana's Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Commission has awarded a grant to the City
of New Orleans to establish such a Criminal
Justice Coordinating Council; now, therefore

1. SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY
2. OF NEW ORLEANS HEREBY ORDAINS, That there

3. is hereby established in the Office
4. of the Mayor, a Criminal Justice Co-
5. ordinating Council, which shall co-
6. ordinate crime control and criminal
7. justice activities for the City.

1. SECTION 2. That the Mayor shall
2. serve as Chairman of the Criminal
3. Justice Coordinating Council and
4. shall designate such other officers
5. as he deems appropriate, by and with the confirmation and
approval of the City Council.

1. SECTION 3. That the Mayor shall
2. appoint a Director of the Criminal
3. Justice Coordinating Council, who
4. shall serve at the pleasure of the
5. Mayor. Other members of the staff shall be appointed in the
classified service of City Civil Service.

1. SECTION 4. That the duties of
2. the Director shall include but not be
3. limited to the following:
4. (a) to confer with appropriate City,
5. State, Federal, and private agencies
6. concerned with the administration of
7. criminal justice for the purpose of
8. improving crime control programs and
9. policies;
10. (b) to confer with appropriate City,
11. State, Federal and private agencies for
12. the purpose of securing funds for the
13. support of the Criminal Justice Co-
14. ordinating Council, and for initiating

15. programs of crime control and criminal
16. justice reform, and, on behalf of the
17. City, to accept, and enter into con-
18. tracts subject to approval of New
19. Orleans City Council, for grants of
20. Federal, State or other funds to the
21. City for such purposes;
22. (c) to advise the criminal justice
23. agencies on improved policies and
24. programs;
25. (d) to conduct research, operate pro-
26. grams, and conduct studies of crime
27. control and criminal justice; and to
28. contract, subject to the approval of
29. the New Orleans City Council, with other
30. public or private agencies and engage
31. consultants for such research programs
32. and studies;
33. (e) to prepare and publish such reports
34. and sponsor such conferences as he deems
35. appropriate;
36. (f) to encourage joint activities among
37. the separate criminal justice agencies
38. and to represent the overall interest
39. and needs of the criminal justice system;
40. (g) to advise the Model Cities Director
41. and the local Model Cities Committees in
42. the coordination and implementation of
43. Crime Control and criminal justice pro-
44. grams in the Model Cities areas;

45. (h) to collect statistics and information
46. relative to the criminal justice agencies.
1. SECTION 5. That the membership of
2. the Council shall be as follows:
3. (a) The membership of the Criminal Justice
4. Coordinating Council shall include repre-
5. sentatives from all public agencies sub-
6. stantially involved in the criminal
7. justice system; the two Councilmen-at-Large,
8. and one district councilman to be selected
9. by the New Orleans City Council.
10. (b) The Mayor shall appoint the members
11. of the Criminal Justice Coordinating
12. Council to serve for a one year term, by the with the con-
13. firmation and approval of the City Council,
14. except those members of the City Council
15. who shall serve for their current term
16. of office. The terms of the members first
17. appointed, other than the City Councilmen,
18. shall expire in May 1971 and then, if
19. desired by the Mayor, to be reappointed
20. for one year each May of the succeeding
21. year.
22. (c) The Criminal Justice Coordinating
23. Council shall have no less than approxi-
24. mately twenty members and no more than
25. approximately thirty members.
26. (d) Approximately five members shall be
27. private citizens.
28. (e) The members of the Council shall
29. serve without compensation.

1. SECTION 6. That the Mayor shall ap-
to be confirmed by the City Council
2. point an Executive Committee/of not more
3. than ten members, three being councilmanic
4. appointments as mentioned in Section 5,
5. and the balance being selected from the
6. general membership of the Coordinating
7. Council which shall act on behalf of the
8. Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.
9. The Mayor shall serve as Chairman of
10. the Executive Committee.

1. SECTION 7: That the Executive
2. Committee: (a) is hereby designated to
3. act as the coordinating agency for the
4. City under the provisions of the Omnibus
5. Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and
6. (b) shall have the power to review and
7. approve all applications on behalf of
8. the City for Federal, State, and local
9. crime control and criminal justice funds.

1. SECTION 8. That all City agencies
2. shall furnish the Director with such
3. reports and information as he may deem
4. necessary to carry out the functions
5. and purposes of his office.

1. SECTION 9. That the Director shall
the City Council,
2. submit an annual report to the Mayor/and
3. members of the Criminal Justice Coordinating
4. Council.

1. SECTION 10. That this Ordinance be
2. effective immediately.

ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS DEC 30 1970

JOSEPH V. DI ROSA

PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL

Delivered to the Mayor on DEC 30 1970

Approved: DEC 31 1970
~~Disapproved:~~

MOON LANDRIEU

MAYOR

Returned by the Mayor

on DEC 31 1970 at 9:30 A.M.

MARY LOUISE MOON

ASST. CLERK OF COUNCIL

APPENDIX 4

ORDINANCE
(AS AMENDED)
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

CITY HALL: MAY 23, 1985

CALENDAR NO. 12,590

NO. 10578 MAYOR COUNCIL SERIES

BY: COUNCILMEN GIARRUSSO, BABOVICH, BARTHELEMY, BOISSIERE, EARLY,
SINGLETON AND WAGNER

An Ordinance to establish the New Orleans Criminal Justice Council; to repeal Ordinance No. 4449 M.C.S.; to repeal all conflicting Ordinances and to otherwise provide with respect thereto.

WHEREAS, there are numerous public and private agencies involved in the City Criminal Justice System; and

WHEREAS, there is a need to coordinate the efforts of these separate agencies; and

WHEREAS, the Criminal Justice Task Force on Violent Street Crime has recommended a successor to the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council with a full range of input from criminal and juvenile justice agencies, the Mayor, the City Council and the Public; and

WHEREAS, the creation of a New Orleans Criminal Justice Council is recommended to advise the Mayor and the City Council regarding crime control and to coordinate the activities of the criminal and juvenile justice agencies; now therefore

1. SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
2. HEREBY ORDAINS, That there is hereby established the New
3. Orleans Criminal Justice Council which shall advise the
4. Mayor and the City Council on policy matters regarding
5. crime control and criminal justice activities, and coordinate
6. the administration of criminal and juvenile justice for the
7. City.

1. SECTION 2. The Mayor shall have eight appointments
2. and those appointments shall be private citizens. Each
3. District Councilman and each Councilman at Large shall
4. have one appointment each and those appointments shall be
5. private citizens. Members shall serve at the pleasure of
6. their appointing authority. Individuals occupying the
7. following positions shall be members during their term of
8. office: Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department,
9. the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, the Orleans Parish
10. District Attorney, one Criminal District Court Judge to be
11. appointed by the Criminal District Court Judges en banc,
12. and one Juvenile Court Judge to be appointed by the Juvenile
13. Court Judges en banc. Appointments and replacements of
14. nominations by the Mayor and City Council shall be confirmed
15. and approved by Resolution of the City Council. The members
16. of the Commission shall serve without compensation.

1. SECTION 3. The Criminal Justice Council shall elect
2. from its membership a chairman and a vice chairman. Each
3. member is conferred one vote and the use of proxies is
4. prohibited. All meetings shall be public unless called
5. into executive session under the provisions of LSA RS 42:4.1
6. et seq. The Chairman may appoint such ad hoc committees
7. and study groups as are deemed necessary for the conduct of
8. the Criminal Justice Council's business. Members of such
9. committees may be non-Criminal Justice Council members and
10. will be considered as ex-officio members during their
11. tenure.

1. SECTION. 4. Staff and administrative support shall
2. be provided by the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination.

1. SECTION 5. The functions of the New Orleans Criminal
2. Justice Council shall include but not limited to the
3. following:

4. a. to advise the Mayor and the City Council
5. on matters relating to the New Orleans
6. Criminal/Juvenile Justice Systems.
7. b. to advise Criminal/Juvenile Justice
8. Agencies on improved policies,
9. procedures and programs.
10. c. to encourage joint activities among the
11. separate Criminal/Juvenile Justice
12. Agencies and to represent the overall
13. interests and needs of the Criminal/
14. Juvenile Justice System.
15. d. to conduct research.
16. e. to investigate specific problems
17. relating to the Criminal/Juvenile
18. Justice System on request of the Mayor
19. and City Council.
20. f. to establish a Technical Working Group
21. to be composed of mid level management
22. personnel within the Criminal/Juvenile
23. Justice Systems to specifically deal
24. with inter-agency problems and
25. coordination at the operational level.
26. g. to prepare and publish reports and
27. sponsor conferences.
28. h. to suggest legislation
29. i. to recommend appropriations, resource
30. allocations, and revenue generation
31. methods for the Criminal/Juvenile
32. Justice System. (based on the
33. identification of needs and
34. priorities).
35. j. to act as the reviewing and advisory
36. body for Criminal/Juvenile Justice
37. grants, if appropriate.

1. SECTION 6. All Criminal/Juvenile Agencies and other
2. City agencies shall furnish the Criminal Justice Council
3. with such reports and information deemed necessary to
4. carry out the functions and purpose of the Criminal
5. Justice Council.

1. SECTION 7. The Criminal Justice Council shall submit
2. an annual report to the Mayor and the City Council.

1. SECTION 8. Ordinance No. 4449 M.C.S., as amended, is
2. hereby repealed in its entirety.

1. SECTION 9. All Ordinances or parts of Ordinances in
2. conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
1. SECTION 10. If any provisions of this Ordinance or
2. the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
3. held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
4. or applications of the Ordinance which can be given effect
5. without the invalid provision or application, and to this
6. end the provisions of this Ordinance are severable.

ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS JUNE 6, 1985

SIDNEY J. BARTHELEMY
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

Delivered to the Mayor on JUNE 7, 1985

Approved:
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ JUNE 13, 1985

ERNEST N. MORIAL
MAYOR

Returned by the Mayor on JUNE 13, 1985 at 10:20 A.M.

LEATRICE S. SIEGEL
CLERK OF COUNCIL

THE FOLLOWING IS VERIFIED
AS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY

Leatrice S. Siegel
LEATRICE S. SIEGEL, Council Clerk

NOV 11 1971

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICEPOLICY MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1971

TO: All Departments, Boards, Agencies and Commissions

FROM: Bernard B. Levy, Chief Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: Office of Criminal Justice Coordination

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this memorandum is to establish a procedure for inter-agency ~~criminal justice coordination~~. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination was established by Councilmanic Ordinance 4449 M.C.S., and is located administratively in the Office of the Mayor.

2. FUNCTIONS.

The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination functions as a vehicle for facilitating coordination of crime control and criminal justice activities for the City of New Orleans. This function is executed by, but not limited to, the following activities:

- a. Conferences with appropriate City, State, Federal, and private agencies concerned with the administration of criminal justice for the purpose of improving crime control programs and policies;
- b. Conferences with appropriate City, State, Federal, and private agencies for the purpose of securing funds for the support of crime control and criminal justice reform programs among criminal justice agencies;
- c. Advising the criminal justice agencies on improved policies and programs;
- d. Conducting research, operating programs, and conducting studies of crime control and criminal justice; and contracting, subject to the approval of the New Orleans City Council, with other public or private agencies and engaging consultants for such research programs and studies;
- e. Preparing and publishing criminal justice reports and sponsoring conferences as appropriate; and
- f. Encouraging joint activities among the separate criminal

November 11, 1971

justice agencies, and representing the overall interest and needs of the criminal justice system.


3. PROCEDURE.

a. You are, therefore, requested to contact the Director of the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination on extensions 635 and 636 to inform him of any activities, proposals, meetings, programs, projects, proposed legislation, adoption and/or revision of criminal justice policies and procedures which transcend intra-agency jurisdictional lines and impact related criminal justice agencies of the City of New Orleans.

b. Observance of the policy herein set forth will result in effective consideration of individual proposals.

4. INQUIRIES.

Any questions concerning the intent of this memorandum should be addressed to the Director of the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination.



Bernard B. Levy
Chief Administrative Officer

BBL/DCA:cl

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICEPOLICY MEMORANDUM

July 18, 1983

TO: All Departments, Boards, Agencies and Commissions

FROM: Reynard J. Rochon, Chief Administrative Officer

SUBJECT: Office of Criminal Justice Coordination

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this memorandum is to restate the function of the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination, revise the procedure for inter-agency criminal justice coordination, and clarify the name of the office. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination was established in 1971 and is administratively located in the Office of the Mayor, Division of Intergovernmental Relations. Effective with this memorandum, the agency previously known as the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council is officially designated as the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination.

2. FUNCTIONS.

The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination serves the dual role as the vehicle for facilitating coordination of crime control and criminal/juvenile justice activities for the City of New Orleans. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination shall advise the Mayor and the Chief Administrative Officer on the status of and problems in the criminal/juvenile justice system and shall make recommendations for modifications and solutions.

Staff functions of the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination are executed by, but not limited to the following activities:

- a. Develop and monitor the implementation of the overall criminal and juvenile justice policies for the City of New Orleans;
- b. advise the Mayor, the Chief Administrative Officer, and criminal and juvenile justice agencies on matters of criminal and juvenile justice;
- c. provide staff support for the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, its Executive Committee and other ad hoc committees as determined by the Mayor;
- d. confer with appropriate city, state, federal and private agencies concerned with the administration of criminal and juvenile justice for the purpose of improving crime control programs and policies;

- e. confer with the appropriate city, state, federal & private agencies for the purpose of securing funds for the support of crime control and criminal justice reform programs among criminal and juvenile justice agencies;
- f. conduct research, studies, and evaluations of crime control and criminal justice agencies, including but not limited to operations organization and budget; and contracting, subject to the approval of the New Orleans City Council, with other public or private agencies and engaging consultants for such research programs and studies;
- g. prepare and publish reports, studies and public information and sponsor conferences as appropriate;
- h. encourage and coordinate joint activities among the separate criminal and juvenile justice agencies; and represent the overall interest and needs of the criminal and juvenile justice systems through participation on appropriate task forces, committees, boards and commissions;
- i. mediate disputes among criminal and juvenile justice agencies, and provide a forum for the resolution of conflicts;
- j. administer and implement special projects and operate programs;
- k. administer, monitor, and operate state, federal and private agency grant programs;
- l. collect statistics and information relative to the criminal and juvenile justice agencies, and maintain a system data base;
- m. prepare and review legislation relative to criminal and juvenile justice;
- n. prepare systems analyses, productivity analyses, and other special studies as directed by the Mayor and Chief Administrative Officer; and
- o. provide technical assistance to public and private agencies and identify training opportunities.


3. PROCEDURE.

- a. The Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice shall be informed of any activities, proposals, meetings, programs, projects, proposed legislation, adoption and/or revision of criminal or juvenile justice policies and procedures by City agencies. The Office of Criminal Justice Coordination will review and forward to the Mayor and CAO recommendations relative to all legislation and budgetary matters affecting the criminal and juvenile justice agencies.

- b. Parochial and other criminal/juvenile justice agencies, boards, commissions, etc. are requested to contact the Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice regarding activities, proposals, meetings, programs, projects, proposed legislation, adoption and/or revisions of criminal/juvenile justice policies and procedures which transcend intra-agency jurisdictional lines and impact related criminal/juvenile justice agencies or the City of New Orleans.
- c. All criminal/juvenile justice agencies are expected to cooperate with the Office of Criminal Justice Coordination relative to requests for descriptive and statistical information. The Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice shall develop mechanisms and procedures for the collection of such information.

4. INQUIRIES.


Any questions concerning the intent of this memorandum should be addressed to the Mayor's Assistant for Criminal Justice.




Reynard J. Rochon
Chief Administrative Officer

RJR:VJPjr:ch


LEAA PROGRAM FUNDS




APPENDIX 8 CJCC GRANT PROCESS: A - THE REVIEW STATUS



CJCC GRANT PROCESS: B - THE IMPLEMENTATION STATUS



Criminal Justice Grants by Fiscal Year, 1968-1988




<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount</u>
1968	
1969	61,000
1970	740,000
1971	2,014,000
1972	4,900,000
1973	5,248,000 (1)
1974	2,752,000
1975	2,253,000
1976	2,946,000
1977	1,364,000
1978	1,878,000
1979	1,872,000
1980	1,260,000 (2)
1981	298,000 (3)
1982	896,000
1983	921,000
1984	560,000
1985	286,000
1986	685,000
1987	2,739,000 (4)
1988	591,000

- (1) includes Target Area
 (2) last year LEAA
 (3) State Grant in Aid Begins
 (4) Omnibus Drug Program

Appendix 9

Uniform Crime Report Data New Orleans, 1968-1988



Source, Crime in the U.S. Part I
Crimes Reported to Police Only.

Year Reported Crime

1968	33,533
1969	35,812
1970	43,918
1971	43,978
1972	37,367
1973	35,199
1974	38,877
1975	39,802
1976	37,681
1977	39,897
1978	45,826
1979	52,477
1980	53,587
1981	52,159
1982	48,052
1983	44,523
1984	46,987
1985	48,732
1986	56,889
1987	51,001
1988	

Appendix 10

APPENDIX 11

Office Reports 1966--1985

DATE	TITLE
71/09	CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER STUDY
72/01	CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1972 OPERATION SHAP
72/11	COURTS TASK FORCE DRUG ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM TASK FORCE REPORT JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT PRE-TRIAL DETENTION: A STUDY OF TIME AND EFFECT IN ORLEANS CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT REHABILITATION TASK FORCE REPORT
73/01	CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1973 TARGET AREA CRIME SPECIFICS PLAN
73/09	REVIEW OF ORLEANS PARISH COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION
74/01	YOUTH ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE ANNUAL PLAN 1974
74/07	CRIME ANALYSIS 1974 TARGET AREA EVALUATION
74/08	CJCC PROGRAM DIRECTORY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1974 INFORMATION ON THE MAGISTRATE COMMISSIONER SYSTEM MANAGEMENT STUDY OF AN INDIGENT DEFENDER PROGRAM-NEW ORLEANS
74/12	SYSTEMATIC JUVENILE ENFORCEMENT: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES ON JUVENILE ENFORCEMENT
75/04	A STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL DESIGN AND UTILIZATION IN NEW ORLEANS 1975/2000 ANCHOR OUTREACH: AN EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROGRAM CRIME ANALYSIS 1975 CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1975
75/05	SAVE OURSELVES: AN EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROGRAM
75/07	CRIME REDUCTION THROUGH INCREASED ILLUMINATION: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF HIGH INTENSITY STREET LIGHTING
75/08	VOLUNTEERS IN JUVENILE PROBATION: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW ORLEANS DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
75/10	JUVENILE JUSTICE NEW ORLEANS CORRECTIONAL DESIGN AND UTILIZATION 1975/2000 ST. MARK'S YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION
76/01	FACT AND FICTION OF AN URBAN SOCIAL PROBLEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DRUG AND NON-DRUG USERS ARRESTED IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, 1974
76/03	AN EVALUATION OF THE REHABILITATION UNIT OF THE PARISH PRISON: PRE-LIMINARY REPORT

DATE	TITLE
	TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES TO STREET CRIME: FINAL REPORT
76/05	CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1976
	PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION MECHANISMS: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AND DIVERSION FROM PROSECUTION PROGRAM IN ORLEANS PARISH
76/06	A CASE HISTORY OF THE FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION EXPERIENCE IN NEW ORLEANS 1974-1976
	YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE SERVICE DELIVERY AND PROJECT IMPACT FOR THE NEW ORLEANS DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
76/07	EVALUATING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS: TWO CASE STUDIES (DRUG TREATMENT IN A PARISH PRISON AND A COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL FACILITY)
76/09	IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES AND INCREASED MAN HOURS: A FINAL TARGET AREA IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COMPONENT
76/10	NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL COURTS FACILITIES
76/11	A STUDY OF THE ORLEANS PARISH PRISON FEMALE INMATE POPULATION JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT: SIX MONTH REPORT ST. MARK'S COMMUNITY CENTER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
	YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU IMPACT: FINAL TARGET AREA EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SERVICE DELIVERY AND REFERRAL MECHANISM FOR YOUTH
76/12	YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT 3/76-9/76
76/78	VICTIMS OF CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: THE NEED FOR A STATE VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM PART I AND II
77/01	APPELLATE PROCESS SUPPORT PROJECT: ELEVEN MONTH ASSESSMENT
	THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVALUATION OF REHABILITATION AT THE ORLEANS PARISH PRISON
	TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES TO STREET CRIME (TASC); FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
77/02	BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROCEDURES AND THE EMERGING RULE OF LAW
77/03	YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU: ONE YEAR EVALUATION REPORT
77/04	THE LIMITS OF LIGHTING IN THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIMENT IN CRIME REDUCTION
77/05	CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1977 SPECIALIZED TRIAL BUREAU: INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT TASC EVALUATION REPORT VOL II THE MENTALLY RETARDED JUVENILE DELINQUENT AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
77/06	VOLUNTEER UTILIZATION IN JUVENILE COURT: FINAL TARGET AREA IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM
77/07	THE STUDY OF FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NOPD NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE SECTION CONSIDERING EXPENDITURES INCURRED DUE TO OVERTIME PAYMENTS
	YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU: STATUS REPORT EVALUATION SUPPLEMENT
77/08	A STUDY OF SELECTED CASES TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE

DATE

TITLE

DEPARTMENT DRUG ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT ON CONVICTION RATES

AN EVALUATION OF EDUCATION SERVICES AT THE ORLEANS PARISH PRISON

77/09 ORLEANS PARISH PRISON OFFICERS' TRAINING PROGRAM: INTERIM REPORT

THE SPECIALIZED DRUG ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT: FINAL TARGET AREA EVALUATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIMENT

77/10 CAREER CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT: INTERIM EVALUATION

77/11 COMMUNITY MULTI-PURPOSE CENTER ACCEPTABILITY: A STUDY OF A MINORITY NEIGHBORHOOD'S ATTITUDES

77/12 DEFENSE SUPPORT MECHANISMS FOR THE CAREER CRIMINAL BUREAU: SPECIALIZED TRIAL BUREAU

GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY: VICTIM COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES/INJURIES CAUSED BY PERSONS COMMITTED TO COMMUNITY BASED TREATMENT FACILITIES

PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS IN THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THE CASE OF ORLEANS PARISH

78/01 SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS

78/03 ORLEANS PARISH PRISON OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM: FIRST YEAR IMPACT EVALUATION

PRELIMINARY ARSON REPORT

YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU: SECOND YEAR EVALUATION REPORT

78/04 CAREER CRIMINAL FINAL

78/05 ORLEANS PARISH PRISON RESTITUTION SHELTER/DIAGNOSTIC UNIT: PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT

78/07 CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN 1978

78/09 VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA GROUP HOMES

78/10 CAREER CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

ORLEANS PARISH PRISON CRIMINAL SHERIFFS RESTITUTION SHELTER AND DIAGNOSTIC UNIT: PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT

78/12 STUDENT ACTION CENTER: PROCESS EVALUATION

THE SPATIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: PATTERNS OF CERTAIN CRIMES AND THEIR OCCURRENCE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC AREAS

79/01 ST. MARKS PRE-VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE CENTER: PROCESS EVALUATION

79/03 AN ASSESSMENT OF ARSON IN NEW ORLEANS

TRENE STREET ACADEMY: IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT ON THE ST.MARK'S COMMUNITY CENTER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

DATE	TITLE
79/06	JUVENILE ADVOCATES: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT ON ADVOCATES FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
	OFFENDERS WHO PAY THEIR WAY: THE PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT ON THE ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL SHERIFF'S RESTITUTION SHELTER/DIAGNOSTIC UNIT
	ORLEANS PARISH PRISON REHABILITATION PROGRAM: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
	THREE JUVENILE GROUP HOMES: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT ON VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA GROUP HOME DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
	YOUTH STUDY CENTER: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
79/07	PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE STUDENT ACTION CENTER
79/08	BIG SISTERS OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS: A PROCESS EVALUATION
	CAREER CRIMINAL BUREAU: A PROCESS EVALUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE, APPELLATE, AND INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT GRANTS
	EVALUATION REPORT ON THE ORLEANS CRIMINAL SHERIFF'S COOKING AND BAKING PROGRAM
79/09	AN EVALUATION OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL BUREAU IN NEW ORLEANS: PROCESSING TIME, DISPOSITIONS, AND SENTENCING-MAY, 1975-JUNE, 1977
79/10	INTEGRATED CRIMINAL APPREHENSION PROGRAM: NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (PHASE II EVALUATION REPORT)
	VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AT ST. MARK'S COMMUNITY CENTER: THE PRE-VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE PROGRAM
	VOCATIONAL EDUCATION IN ORLEANS PARISH PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CAREER AWARENESS PROGRAM
79/11	AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS MUNICIPAL COURT
	CITIZENS' COMMITTEE AGAINST CRIME FINAL REPORT
	CITIZENS' COMMITTEE AGAINST CRIME FINAL REPORT SUMMARY, 1979
79/12	A CLOSEDOUT REPORT ON THE ORLEANS PARISH JUVENILE AWARENESS PROGRAM
	BIG BROTHERS OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS: A PROCESS EVALUATION
80/01	911 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SYSTEM: CONSIDERATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW ORLEANS
80/02	JUVENILE RESTITUTION: A PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT ON THE ORLEANS PARISH JUVENILE COURT JUVENILE RESTITUTION PROJECT
80/04	FINAL IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ORLEANS PARISH PRISON OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
80/06	CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: A RESOURCE BOOK
	LATINO YOUTH: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

DATE	TITLE
	PROGRAMS
	RESTITUTION FOR ADULT MALES: A PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL SHERIFF'S RESTITUTION SHELTER/DIAGNOSTIC UNIT PROGRAM
80/09	BIG SISTERS OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS: A PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION OF A VOLUNTEER PROGRAM
80/10	A DESCRIPTIVE REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD'S TRUANCY PROGRAM
80/11	PRIVATE SECURITY IN NEW ORLEANS: A PRESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT
80/12	A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE, EMERGENCY SERVICES, PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
	COMPUTERIZATION: THE MODERN APPROACH TO DATA GATHERING IN THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM OF ORLEANS PARISH, LOUISIANA
	FINAL EVALUATION OF THE ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD'S STUDENT ACTION CENTER
	PART II CRIMES: AN ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL OFFENSES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN NEW ORLEANS
81/03	BIG BROTHERS OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS: A PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION
	CLERK OF COURT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE HISTORY OF A REORGANIZATION
81/04	CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: THE SYSTEM RESPONSE
81/05	RESTITUTION FOR JUVENILES: A FINAL EVALUATION REPORT ON THE ORLEANS PARISH JUVENILE COURT JUVENILE RESTITUTION PROJECT
81/05	CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: A RESOURCE BOOK 1980 UPDATE
	THE PRE-VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE PROGRAM AT ST. MARK'S COMMUNITY CENTER: A FINAL EVALUATION
81/07	CJCC TEMPORARY SUB-COMMITTEE REPORT ON PART II OFFENSES
81/09	PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS IN THE MISDEMEANANT JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT RESPONSE
	THE ARSON REDUCTION PROGRAM: A FINAL EVALUATION
81/10	ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL SHERIFF'S SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCY CENTER: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
81/12	AN EVALUATION OF THE ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL SHERIFF'S PRE-RELEASE/WORK RELEASE PROGRAM FOR WOMEN
	ARSON: CONTROLLING THE CRIME THAT DESTROYS
	BIG SISTERS OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS: A FINAL IMPACT EVALUATION

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TITLE

THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE TRAINING PROGRAM IN THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT

82/08 AN EVALUATION THE THE JUVENILE DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THE ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

82/09 911 SAVES LIVES

82/11 A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO NEW ORLEANS CITY, TRAFFIC, AND MUNICIPAL COURTS
CRIME IN NEW ORLEANS: UPDATE 1981

THE INTEGRATED CRIMINAL APPREHENSION PROGRAM IN NEW ORLEANS: AN EVALUATIVE CASE HISTORY

82/12 ORLEANS PARISH JUVENILE COURT PROTECTIVE CARE MONITORING PROGRAM:
AN EVALUATION

THE COMMUNITY ATTENTION PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION

THE JUVENILE TREATMENT PROGRAM: A PROCESS EVALUATION

83/02 LOWER COURT INTERVENTIONS

83/06 A SYSTEMIC VIEW OF JAIL POPULATION FACTORS IN ORLEANS PARISH: AN INITIAL DESCRIPTION

AN EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE DIVERSION PROGRAM IN THE ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE: A PRELIMINARY IMPACT EVALUATION

PARKING AND TOWING TICKETS
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84/04 FOR A SAFER VISIT

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PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT--DWI IN
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WELCOME TO NEW ORLEANS

84/06 ARSON INVESTIGATION IN NEW ORLEANS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COORDINATED EFFORT

THE NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 1983

84/08 E-911 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
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84/09 CHILD ABUSE IN DAY CARE CENTERS

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85/06	THE NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1984
85/10	JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW ORLEANS
86/03	OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATION ANNUAL REPORT 1985
86/06	THE NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1985
87/02	WELCOME TO NEW ORLEANS
87/03	OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATION ANNUAL REPORT 1986
87/09	PUBLIC SAFETY IN NEW ORLEANS: A CITIZENS GUIDE
87/11	THE NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM 1986
88/02	BASIC JUSTICE IN NEW ORLEANS: COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION
88/03	PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COUNCIL RESOLUTION: R87-237
88/08	9-1-1 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER
88/09	THE NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM 1987

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1. CJCC - Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
2. LEAA - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
3. SPA - State Planning Agency
4. SLEPA - State Law Enforcement Planning Agency (Used in reference to LCLE and in numbering of forms employed in the LEAA program in Louisiana.)
5. LCLE - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the Louisiana State Law Enforcement Planning Agency as defined under the Act.
6. Match/Local Funds - The amount of subgrantee cash required by LEAA.
7. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP Act) - Public Law 93-415 enacted by the Congress to provide a comprehensive, coordinated approach to developing and implementing effective methods and programs of preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency and improving the quality of juvenile justice throughout the nation.
8. Discretionary Grants - The Discretionary Grant program is another major category of LEAA funding available to prospective subgrantees. Discretionary grants are those special emphasis grants awarded to local units of governments or state agencies directly from LEAA (Washington) and is not part of the Block Grants available to the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement for distribution to local agencies. LEAA use discretionary grants to research, develop, test, and evaluate programs and techniques designed to reduce crime and delinquency and also to assist state and local governments in attaining the highest standards of management for crime reduction.
9. Act - Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (p.l. 90-351, 82 stat. 197) as amended by the Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Crime Control Act of 1973..
10. Over-Match - The amount of subgrantee cash applied to the project over the required percentage.
11. State Buy-In - State Buy-In funds are appropriated to reimburse units of local government for a portion of the match required on part C subgrantees. The state buys into local projects on a project-by-project basis at a rate of one-half of the required match.

12. Preadward Costs - Project costs incurred prior to the award of the subgrant. The need for the preaward cost provision must be indicated in the application.
13. Prior Approval - Written authorization from LCLE for an expenditure or activity granted prior to the time the activity, commitment or expenditure occurs.
14. Project Funds - Both federal funds awarded under Title I of the Act by LCLE and matching funds expended by the subgrantee or others in the form of cash.
15. Title I - That portion of the Act which authorizes programs for federal financial assistance.
16. Hard Cash Match - New money appropriated in the aggregate by the local agency or unit of government.
17. Planning Process - A series of interrelated planning activities through which problems are defined, goals are selected, future possibilities are examined, courses of action are developed and programs designed; projects are implemented and the results of plan implementation are monitored and evaluated.
18. Planning, Crime-Oriented - planning which has two objectives: (1) eliminating the causes of crime by attacking underlying conditions that promote crime and by applying intervention techniques to criminal careers; and (2) improve control of criminal activity by reducing the opportunities to commit crime and by increasing the risk of apprehension.
19. Block Grants - Block action funds are divided into these categories- part C, JJDP and part E funds. Part C funds are those awarded to fund programs and projects intended to implement comprehensive crime reduction and criminal justice improvement. Part E funds are reserved for corrections programs and facilities. JJDP funds are for use in juvenile justice and delinquency prevention.
20. First Year Award - Projects will be eligible for 90% federal funds with the provision of at least 10% cash match. Construction projects require 50% cash match.
21. Second Year Award - These projects will only be eligible for a maximum of 75% of their first year's federal fund award. A minimum of 10% cash match must be provided. Construction projects require 50% cash match.
22. Third Year Award - Projects in this category will only be eligible for a maximum of 60% of their first year's federal fund award. A minimum of 10% cash match must be provided. Again construction projects require 50% cash match.

23. Monitoring - Involves describing planned project results and comparing these planned results with actual project achievements. Monitoring will provide current information on project performance (resources expended, activities implemented and objectives achieved), comparing project performance with some activities as standard of expected performance to determine to what extent objectives are met.
24. Mini-Block - The Mini-Block allows local units of general government or combinations thereof having a population of at least 250,000 to submit annual plans (for inclusion in the annual State Comprehensive Enforcement plan) containing proposed projects utilizing LEAA funds for approval in block form by the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement. The Units of local government, upon approval by LCLE, then administers these mini-block projects with minimum supervision after the original approval of the grant by the full Commission.
25. Impact Evaluation - Assesses the project's ability to impact or affect a problem or situation. This is reflected in a project's ability to achieve the goals specified in the grant.
26. Process Evaluation - Assesses the project's ability to become operational on an administrative level. This is reflected in the attainment of the grant stated objective.