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THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

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Executive Session #2

The Houston Police Department

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INTEGRATING INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS
THROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

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FOREWORD

This report represents the final product from the department's second Executive Session. This session addressed the difficult task of refocusing criminal investigations to accommodate the philosophy of Neighborhood-Oriented Policing. The information contained in this report draws upon the history of criminal investigations, including previous research that helps to illuminate our knowledge and understanding of progress made in developing more effective investigative techniques.

Unfortunately, when contrasted to literature on patrol operations, relatively little research has actually been done on criminal investigations. The paucity of available data also compounds the practitioner's quest for guidance to improve investigative operations, when it is discovered that results from this research frequently include inconsistent and contradictory findings. An analysis of traditional measures used to assess investigative productivity such as arrest, clearance, and conviction rates does not demonstrate a strong correlation between differences in the amount of training investigators receive, staffing levels, and the manner in which various departments organizationally configure their investigative functions. But close inspection of the literature consistently reveals the important function equally served by patrol officers and criminal investigators in solving crimes.

Building upon work completed during the department's first Executive Session that dealt almost exclusively with patrol operations, this report stands as a natural sequel to that initial effort. In looking at implications that can be collectively adduced from both sessions, it clearly indicates a mandate for management to develop ways to more closely integrate the

investigative process between patrol and investigative operations. In reviewing these reports, some readers may find irony in suggestions made to expand the roles and responsibilities of both patrol officers and criminal investigators in the investigation of crime, given the fiscal constraints that have place heavy burdens on shrinking resources. This call comes from within the ranks of the officers and investigators themselves, who realize that, if afforded an opportunity, they could do even more in investigating crime. Times of fiscal cutbacks provide a rare opportunity to test management abilities in the efficient utilization of resources. It must be remembered that both Executive Sessions were conducted to explore change in patrol and investigative operations, not when the local economy was experiencing prosperous expansion, but amid dire economic forecasts.

Sparked through open, if not at times heated, exchange of ideas and suggestions made during the second Executive Session by the session's membership and a host of distinguished outside speakers, this report presents a series of structural models designed to more effectively integrate investigative operations within the department. Aside from provoking thought in suggesting alternative organizational configurations to facilitate the investigation of crime, the models also incorporate additional functions that serve to more closely align department resources in response to community needs and expectations.

Given the dictates of the department's mission statement and values, Neighborhood-Oriented Policing is a management philosophy designed to guide our efforts in working with citizens to help prevent and control crime. In light of this philosophy, this report represents a bold initiative on the part of the session's membership to grapple with complex issues and time-hardened

assumptions in refocusing criminal investigations. The content of this report, not only exemplifies the professional character of the session's membership, but it conveys our commitment to work more closely with the public in making the city of Houston a safer and more enjoyable place to live.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lee P. Brown", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Lee P. Brown
Chief of Police

PREFACE

The Houston Police Department has experienced accelerated change in recent years. Considerable effort has been expended in updating policies and procedures to attain national accreditation. A state-of-the-art computer-aided dispatch system has recently been installed, and many individuals from across the country--indeed, around the world--have come to view this new technology. A semi-automated crime analysis system has been established that is capable of identifying citywide crime patterns on a daily basis, and, in working in conjunction with representatives from Harris County's Justice Information System, a computerized warrant system will be forthcoming shortly. Of no less significance, is the pioneering work being conducted in the development of an automated fingerprint system. Once fully operational, this system will, not only be able to instantaneously search a number of latent prints (it will also be to do this through booking terminals at the substations and command stations), but it will be integrated with an automated mug shot system than can store and retrieve visual imagery of facial characteristics.

While the department takes pride in helping advance technological innovations for policing, significant strides have not gone unnoticed in other areas. In 1983, for example, implementation of the Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) program provided a historical pivot in shifting the focus of patrol operations away from performing preventive patrol to more effective use of uncommitted time in conducting directed patrol activities and in increased informal contact between the police and the public. Evaluation of this program documented significant increases in job satisfaction among patrol officers, whose roles and responsibilities had actually been expanded. Patrol officers were given more latitude to conduct follow-up investigations for some

types of crimes, and, in using crime analysis information, they developed tactical action plans to interdict ongoing crime patterns. Favorable evaluation results also indicated increased flow of information between the patrol officers and decentralized investigative sergeants.

Before the D.A.R.T. program was implemented, a decision had already been made to decentralize some of the investigative functions, once the Westside Command Station began operations. Nothing was contained in the D.A.R.T. evaluation report to dissuade this notion, and some light was even shed on what types of investigative functions could be better served through decentralization. Admittedly, however, the primary focus of D.A.R.T. was centered on patrol operations; not the investigative function. The success achieved through D.A.R.T. in increasing interaction between the police and the public provided sufficient spark to think of ways various components of this program could be incrementally expanded throughout the entire city.

The vehicle for expansion came in the form of the department's first Executive Session. Chief Brown called for a "new style of policing" that was to be implemented at the Westside Command Station when that facility opened. In response to this call, the new style emanating out of the first Executive Session as dubbed Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP).

Unlike D.A.R.T., NOP was not destined to be a program. It was envisioned as a philosophy to guide police service delivery in response to community needs and expectations. The most efficient way for officers to ascertain citizen needs and expectations was through increased interaction with citizens, something that had been demonstrated in the D.A.R.T. program. To a large extent, therefore, D.A.R.T. provided the platform upon which NOP could be built. Understandably, initial construction was dedicated almost totally to revamping patrol operations. But it was soon realized, given the strong

interplay between the patrol and investigations functions, that investigative operations required immediate attention to help clarify the role of decentralized investigators within the context of NOP.

Chief Brown called for a second Executive Session to examine the issue. The only "given" going in was the decision regarding investigative decentralization. But the concept was nude. While some work had been done on determining what investigative divisions might be affected by decentralization, little, if any, consideration had been given to address the rationale underlying such decentralization, how both centralized and decentralized investigative roles would change under NOP, and what type of process would be established to facilitate decentralization. Moreover, consensus achieved during the first Executive Session had strongly suggested expanding the investigative responsibility of patrol officers, i.e., having them conduct more comprehensive preliminary and initial investigations resulting in "early case closures," thereby reducing the amount of time required to carefully process each case coming into high volume investigative divisions. How this was to be accomplished, however, had not been resolved.

Additionally, because of information provided during the second Executive Session by distinguished guests who were invited to make presentations based on their knowledge of criminal investigations, new functions were introduced that stood, for the most part, outside the traditional mainstream of criminal investigations. Thus, another issue surfaced. What types of organizational changes would need to be made within the Field Operations Command (FOC) and the Investigative Operations Command (IOC) to accommodate these functions if they were to be taken seriously? To further compound complexity, given separation of investigative responsibilities between the FOC and the IOC because of decentralization, how were these two investigative entities to be functionally

integrated? What mechanism would be used to monitor the quality of investigations in both the IOC and the FOC? And what means would be used in assigning cases for centralized vis-a-vis decentralized investigations?

Initially confronted by only a single issue, i.e., defining the role of centralized and decentralized investigators under NOP, the second Executive Session encountered other issues that seemed to multiply algebraically. While complete consensus was not achieved in resolving all the issues discussed during the second Executive Session, sufficient agreement was obtained to organize the information presented so that a final report could be prepared.

As an internal document prepared for the department, this report examines the issues raised during the second Executive Session. It draws upon the minutes from these meetings that captured many of the ideas and suggestions made by department personnel and outside speakers. The session's dialogue is balanced by the inclusion of pertinent research that complements NOP, in general, and enriches investigative insight, in particular. Perhaps most notable, is the work of Herman Goldstein on "problem-oriented policing" and John Eck's extensive research on solving crimes. Both of these individuals have been involved in working with the department, having made presentations during the department's first Executive Session.

Synthesizing the issues discussed during the second Executive Session proved to be much more difficult than analyzing the issues initially. While it was beyond the scope of this report to list recommendations calling for specific changes in investigative operations, several, less than subtle, proposals are presented that suggest substantive change in criminal investigations. These proposals are presented as models that can be used to organizationally reconfigure the Westside Command Station Operations Division and the IOC to accommodate investigative functions suggested during the second

Executive Session. Lacking any "time-tested" models to emulate, the models presented in this report were conceptualized from the ground up. In addition to the models themselves, a few new concepts are introduced along the way to better articulate the functional integration of investigative operations between the FOC and the IOC.

It is anticipated that these proposals will provoke detailed discussion of ways to enhance investigative operations. Hopefully, the result will be improved investigative efficiency. Understandably, changing traditional routines is not easy; indeed, it is a challenge. But each challenge the department encounters provides an opportunity for the resolution of problems that helps advance the department's mission.

The Houston Police Department is looked to more and more for innovations in policing. The work completed during the second Executive Session provides a different perspective of the investigations function in light of NOP. Hopefully, the issues addressed in this report will provide assurance for continued organizational development, bold and insightful leadership, and the development of more innovative management techniques to prevent and control crime.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is a direct result of invaluable contributions, intense discussions, and considerable debate by numerous people working within the Houston Police Department and those nationally recognized guest speakers who were gracious enough to devote their time and energy toward this endeavor.

Among those speakers were: Mr. Darrel Stephens, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum; Mr. Henry Rossman, Management Information Systems Consultant; Mr. Ronald Goldstock, Director of the New York State Organized Crime Commission, Mr. O. B. Revell, Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations; and Mr. Robert Wasserman, Research Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Their insight and contributions regarding the investigative function within municipal policing were extremely useful to the membership.

Appreciation is also extended to Mr. Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation, who was responsible for approving the financial support to conduct the Executive Session meetings.

This report could not have been written without the input from all of the members of the second Executive Session. Through their dedication and willingness to raise issues, challenge traditional notions, and offer innovative suggestions, contributions have been made in examining how investigative operations can be integrated within the department under the context of Neighborhood Oriented Policing.

Lastly, our sincere appreciation is extended to officer Steve Mann, Operations Support Division and officer Danny Brown, Training Division, for their diligent work in preparing the figures for this report; and, to officer Carolyn Denton, Field Operations Command Office, for her exemplary efforts in assisting the authors in the editing of this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Police Chief Lee P. Brown convened the first Executive Session in the history of the Houston Police Department on October 1, 1986. The purpose of this session was to develop a "new style of policing" for the Houston Police Department. This new style of policing is presently being implemented through personnel assigned to the recently constructed Westside Command Station, the first of four proposed police command stations to come on line in the city of Houston.

A final report produced from the first Executive Session labeled the new style of policing Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP). Following publication of this report, an implementation plan for the Westside Command Station was developed. The implementation plan called for establishing a training committee to facilitate the transition to NOP. But in response to questions that began to emerge regarding the role of investigative sergeants under NOP, Chief Brown initiated a second Executive Session during the summer of 1987.

The second Executive Session was initiated under joint sponsorship from the Police Foundation and the Houston Police Department. A cross-section of sworn and civilian personnel from throughout the department were requested to attend this session along with a representative from the community's Police Advisory Committee. Additionally, several individuals who have achieved prominence in the research community or were affiliated with government agencies, universities, and research institutions were invited to make presentations about topics currently pertinent to the investigative function.

From August through December, 1987, seven separate meetings were held to

assess the impact NOP would have on investigative operations. This report represents the final product from these meetings.

Neighborhood-Oriented Policing

Encompassing a broad spectrum of philosophical issues that embody moral prerogatives, Constitutional principles, and organizational tenets, NOP is a management philosophy that serves to more closely unite the police with the public. NOP seeks to integrate the desires and expectations of citizens with actions taken by the department to identify and address conditions that negatively impact the city's neighborhoods.

Central to operationalizing and thus converting this philosophy into action is increased interaction between the officers and citizens. Increased contact with citizens provides officers with the most fruitful means of establishing the type of rapport needed for officers and citizens to join one another in working together to prevent crime and thereby enhance the welfare of the city's neighborhoods.

But from a practical point of view, is the management tone set by NOP to more directly involve citizens in tailoring the department's service delivery unrealistic, given traditional influences that have shaped the scope of policing? To answer this question involves unraveling what is perhaps the most fundamental issue that has confronted policing since its conception; namely, the conflict in role expectations as to what the public expects the police to do. Does the public want police officers to concentrate on "crime fighting" thereby emphasizing the primary role of the police as law enforcement officers? Or does the public expect the officers to concentrate on maintaining order thereby placing more emphasis on the role of the police as "peace officers?"

In light of its philosophical underpinnings, NOP confronts the role issue head-on. NOP envisions the officers as becoming ex officio managers of the neighborhoods to which they are assigned. This "role" involves sufficient flexibility to invite a number of different roles to meet the needs of citizens in addressing conditions that negatively impact the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods. The role for officers under NOP is formed in response to citizen expectations regarding their perceptions of neighborhood problems and not from any unilateral, predefined conception of what the department thinks is the **primary** role for all officers. Being results-oriented, NOP places more emphasis on what is accomplished in servicing the city's neighborhoods than it does on any particular "style of policing," save for NOP, that engendered the results.

Given its "results-orientation," NOP draws heavily on the work of Herman Goldstein, who pioneered development of "Problem-Oriented Policing" in the late 1970s. Problem-oriented policing seeks to shift policing away from being almost totally reactive and "incident-driven" to developing strategies to solve persistent neighborhood problems.

Of course, it is recognized that implementing NOP will not be easy. Traditional routines are convenient and not easily discarded. But for NOP to work a radical departure from tradition is required that places more emphasis at the grass roots level of policing. NOP provides more discretion for officers in working with citizens to deal with neighborhood problems. NOP places considerable responsibility on the officers to prevent crime, holding them accountable for the types of crimes that can be prevented through individual initiatives in working with others. In addressing these responsibilities, NOP encourages "self-directed activities" to be performed in

lieu of the unproductive time that has traditionally been spent in conducting random patrol.

To translate vision into reality, much work is needed. The development of appropriate management support to sustain NOP is a vexing concern. The training implications to facilitate NOP implementation are mind boggling. And criteria needed to more meaningfully advance work performance must be developed.

While Chief Brown has already taken steps to address the training implications and performance evaluation, additional effort is required to more clearly articulate the role of criminal investigations within the context of NOP; the purpose for which the second Executive Session was held.

History of Criminal Investigations

The forerunners of modern day detectives were originally known as "thief-takers." Thief-takers emerged in Europe during the late 1600s or early 1700s, and some of the earlier, self-proclaimed thief-takers were engaged in illicit activities.

The actual use of thief-takers in criminal investigations began under the authority of a magistrate of London's Westminster Court around 1740. The term, thief-taker, was eventually rejected in favor of a new name, the "Bow Street Runners," given the name of the street on which the court was located. By 1780, a few the Bow Street Runners had emerged as the first group of salaried police officers to perform criminal investigations in plain clothes

The Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 formally abolished the Bow Street Runners, because the act extended the jurisdiction of the newly formed London Metropolitan Police to include the area formerly policed by the Bow Street Runners. In 1843, the London Metropolitan Police established their own

"Detective Department," which was decentralized three years later, placing detectives in each of the department's districts throughout London.

The first detectives began to appear in the United States around the mid-1800s, and, unlike their English counterparts, they were almost immediately absorbed into the political machinery of large cities. Following the turn of the century, the public's outcry to clean up corruption resulted in a "progressive movement" to reform local governments. Police reformers demanded closer supervision of detectives with better documentation to account for their activities.

Despite the influence the reform movement had on policing, the most significant impacts on the criminal investigations function have come from the scientific community and decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. The pioneering work of Bertillon (anthropometry), Malpigni, Perkinje, Herschel, Faulds, Vucetich, Henry, and Galton (dactylography), Locard (first to establish a crime lab), Lacassagne, Jeserich, Waite, Fisher, Gravelle, and Goddard (ballistics), Osborn (questioned documents) and many others, to numerous to mention, have provided invaluable insight in helping investigators to collect, process, preserve, and present physical evidence. These contributions have tended to place less reliance on obtaining informant information and more emphasis on searching for physical evidence.

Decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, particularly the "Warren Court," have also had a profound impact on the investigations process. Beginning in 1961, the Supreme Court began to focus on two key Constitutional issues; search and seizure and a defendant's right to counsel. As a result of Supreme Court rulings on these matters, the police have been required to develop new procedures in conducting interrogations, holding line-ups, and seizing physical

evidence.

Unlike most decisions rendered by the high court, results from research conducted on criminal investigations have not had an immediate impact on investigative operations. While it is perhaps tempting to attribute this nonresponsiveness to the detectives themselves, who are viewed by many as being the group most resistant to change in police agencies, it is more likely a function of the inconsistent findings produced by the research. In looking at the contributions made by detectives, for example, some studies indicate that crimes essentially "solve themselves," i.e., the solution of any particular property crime is a chance event, regardless of what actions are taken by detectives. Other studies suggest the opposite outcome, implying that the types of actions taken by detectives are instrumental in solving crimes.

Perhaps most noteworthy of studies conducted during the early 1970s was the pioneering work of researchers at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). This effort involved the development of "screening models" to predict the potential solution of cases assigned to criminal investigators based on various types of leads. Although results from this work were initially ignored by most investigators, they achieved national acclaim following a replication of the SRI burglary models that was conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).

But the notoriety achieved by the PERF replication during the latter part of the 1970s was dwarfed in comparison to that obtained from a study conducted during the mid-1970s by The Rand Corporation. Although methodologically suspect, results from Rand's study of criminal investigations rocked the investigative community. Based on analysis of data collected from over 150 police jurisdictions, the findings revealed that the work actually performed by

detectives stood in sharp contrast to the public's impression of criminal investigators as projected through the media. Rand found an almost complete lack of administrative control in managing the investigative function. Perhaps even more damaging were findings that indicated that differences among agencies in the amount of training, staffing, and individual workload had no appreciable effect on arrest and clearance rates. Moreover, differences among the agencies in how criminal investigations was organizationally structured could not be linked to any significant differences in arrest and clearance rates.

A response to remedy the investigative deficiencies outlined in both the Rand and SRI studies resulted in the development of a national program to more effectively manage criminal investigations. Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the program was called Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI). This program was designed to help law enforcement agencies manage the investigative function through following a series of structured procedures for processing cases. By 1977, five agencies had been selected to "field test" the program.

Although representatives from the agencies participating indicated that the program was successful, analysis of findings were less encouraging. But the field test produced a milestone for future development by revealing the types of support needed to sustain MCI.

While MCI appeared to have lost whatever momentum had been gained following the demise of LEAA, the prototype did provide a framework for organizing the types of investigative operations primarily involved in conducting follow-up investigations. It also suggested the importance of more closely coordinating investigative activities between the patrol and criminal investigations functions. And it recognized the significance of establishing

positive relations between the police and prosecutors to more effectively monitor court dispositions.

Building upon what had been learned from the 1970s, perhaps the most significant research on criminal investigations that has thus far come out of the 1980s was conducted by the PERF. This work sought to determine how much the preliminary and follow-up investigations contribute to the solution of robbery and burglary cases. While previous research dating back to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice had emphasized the importance of preliminary investigations in contributing to the solution of crimes, PERF's findings seemed to challenge other research that had questioned the importance of detectives in conducting follow-up investigations. The study concluded that preliminary investigations performed by patrol officers and follow-up investigations conducted by detectives were equally important in determining whether a crime would be cleared through arrest.

Since publication of PERF's findings, more recent research has tended to focus on issues important but more peripheral to mainstream investigations. These efforts include a review of ways used to select detectives and assess investigative performance along with a listing of things that can be done to improve quality investigations, e.g., work-load management, paperwork reduction, development of an Investigative Management Information System (IMIS), etc.

The most current research initiative dealing with criminal investigations was recently funded by the Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA). This initiative, just underway, seeks to incorporate elements of problem-oriented policing into the investigation of drug cases. Called "problem-oriented

investigations," several cities from various regions throughout the United States have been already been selected to participate in this effort.

While not considered research projects, other work is also underway that may have considerable potential for enhancing criminal investigations. Perhaps most notable are two efforts, national in scope, sponsored by two different federal agencies. The first is the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (SHOCAP) sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). As the name implies, this is a community-based program engaged in identifying and dealing with violent prone and habitual juvenile offenders. The second is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VI-CAP). VI-CAP is concerned with collecting information from police agencies around the country and then analyzing this data to determine the presence of any national crime pattern that would be very difficult for any particular police agency to identify.

The research and programmatic initiatives on criminal investigations have, in general, produced negative and oftentimes mixed results. If inconsistent findings are excluded, only two consistent findings remain. These involve expanding the role of patrol officers in the investigative process and implementing procedures to more effectively screen cases for assignment.

While the consistent findings clearly target programmatic implications for training and implementation of MCI, the inconsistent findings are also significant in providing latitude carte blanche to change traditional procedures. Staffing levels, methods used to select and assign investigators, criteria used to assess individual performance, types of information needed to facilitate the investigative process, organizational configuration, and investigative specialization and division of labor are examples of open issues

awaiting further exploration.

Refocusing Investigative Responsibilities

The department's mission statement conveys a commitment to deliver services that are consistent with Constitutional principles in enforcing the laws and preserving the peace. The department's value statements serve more specifically to align organizational resources in response to community needs and expectations. Foremost among these expectations is the desire expressed by most citizens to have the police work more closely with them to improve the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods.

While the department's mission statement and values provide more specificity in articulating the role of patrol officers within the context of NOP, they are less clear when the role of the criminal investigators is contemplated. With respect to the mission statement, for example, what are the investigators to do to improve the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods? In response to the department's value statements, what can the investigators do to reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods? What can they do to facilitate meaningful crime prevention initiatives? And, as presently structured, what can the IOC do to provide tactical and strategic responses to both neighborhood and citywide crime problems?

These questions raise issues that must be addressed by the IOC. The department's commitment to continue building command stations will eventually force decentralization of most of the investigative functions. Even before the Westside Command Station began operations, the IOC had begun to decentralize investigative operations in conjunction with the department's Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) program. This program provided valuable insight into the types of investigative functions compatible with the department's

orientation for continued decentralization. While most of the IOC's investigative functions still remain in a centralized traditional mode, impetus to implement NOP will surely accelerate the transition the IOC is currently experiencing.

Whereas NOP is, to a great extent, predicated on lengthy evolutionary development of changes in patrol operations, there is little to draw from, save for MCI, that attempts to bridge the investigative function with the community. But MCI was not designed as a community-based investigations program. MCI's link with the community was primarily administrative through providing victims with status updates on cases.

Given the NOP mandate emanating out of the department's first and second Executive Sessions to tailor service delivery in response to community needs and expectations, the IOC will be required to refocus investigative responsibilities. Changes must be instituted that, not only incorporate the components of MCI that were suggested during the mid-1970s, but facilitate new and more innovative approaches to prevent and control crime. This will require structural adjustments within the IOC to accommodate the types of investigative functions envisioned by NOP to closely align the police with the public.

Although administrative controls are needed to monitor investigative productivity and the quality of investigations, the type of structure needed to accommodate NOP must not stifle investigative ingenuity. Quite the contrary, investigators require considerable autonomy. Case loads and paperwork must be significantly reduced to allow individual investigators to be creative in solving crimes. In search of creative solutions, elements of problem-oriented policing that look for conditions that contribute to crime causation can be incorporated into the investigative process. Information systems must be

developed and be readily available to assist investigators in conducting investigations and in developing strategies to more effectively prevent and control crime. Case supervisors must identify and find ways to eliminate impediments that obstruct the investigative process. And budgetary priorities must be established to ensure that investigators are provided with proper equipment.

Assessing Organizational Structures to Accommodate Functions

NOP presents a paradox for criminal investigations. On the one hand, restructuring is called for to accommodate the types of investigative functions that were suggested by quest speakers during the second Executive Session. On the other hand, aside from thinking about alternative ways to incorporate new functions, little is known about how traditional functions should be organizationally configured. Previous research is not all that helpful. It does not indicate that one form of structure versus another makes much difference when comparisons among different organizational configurations are made based on arrest and clearance rates.

What is known is that the manner in which a group is organizationally configured can either facilitate or impede attaining the goals for which the group was formed, assuming, of course, that meaningful goals have been established at the outset. If, for example, a major objective of criminal investigations is to apprehend persons actively engaged in perpetrating similar types of crimes, then ways must be found to consolidate pertinent information that would facilitate the identification of potential suspects. While it may seem initially logical to organize a highly centralized investigative operations around legal and prosecutorial labels, such forms of organization may, in fact, impede the identification of individuals who continue to break

the law.

Similar care must be taken in assessing issues associated with decentralizing criminal investigations. Unlike patrol, the investigations function in many departments has continued to vacillate between centralized and decentralized modes of organization. This type of eclectic change provokes questions concerning management philosophy. What types of investigative functions are best suited to a centralized organization? And what type of crimes can be more effectively investigated under a decentralized structure?

The logic used in distinguishing these differences is similar to that used in the development of the department's crime analysis system that contains both centralized and decentralized components. The centralized component is "suspect-oriented." It is primarily concerned with identifying citywide crime patterns. As such, it is dependent on the decentralized components to provide the appropriate information. Likewise, the decentralized components are more concerned with crime problems peculiar to their areas. And they are dependent on centralized capabilities to distinguish between citywide patterns that cross through their jurisdictions and crimes that appear to be confined within the boundaries of their substations.

The difference in focus between centralized and decentralized investigations is designed to be complimentary. Logical distinctions in function encourage "facilitative reciprocity" between the FOC and the IOC through establishing different kinds of expertise to service each command's objectives. While facilitative reciprocity recognizes the autonomy of each command, it also recognized that each command is largely dependent on the actions taken by the other command. NOP's recognition of the interdependence between each command serves to functionally integrate the investigative process

thereby providing the most effective means to prevent and control crime.

Developing Management Models for Investigative Operations

Chief Brown's call for a "new style of policing" resulted in the department's first Executive Session that produced Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP). The department's commitment to establish a process to begin implementation of NOP following the first Executive Session coincided with a decision that had already been made to begin decentralizing criminal investigations once the Westside Command Station opened. A second Executive Session was called for to determine how investigative operations, both centralized and decentralized, would work in light of NOP.

As the membership began to deliberate this issue, other issues began to emerge. Stemming from the first Executive Session was an issue to expand investigative responsibilities for patrol officers. This involved having patrol officers conduct more comprehensive initial investigations resulting in "early case closures," thereby substantially reducing the amount of time required to screen cases for follow-up investigations. In conjunction with this issue, several of the distinguished guests that had been invited to make presentations during the second Executive Session had suggested incorporating new functions within criminal investigations. The means of accommodating these functions, however, was not specifically addressed, and it therefore remained an open issue.

Commensurate with discussion of proposed changes in functions was a need to more closely examine existing organizational structures. How was the Westside Command Station Operations Division to be organizationally configured to, not only accommodate decentralized investigators, but to facilitate the implementation of NOP in patrol operations? And how was the IOC to be

structurally altered to accommodate the new functions that had been suggested during the second Executive Session? Of tantamount importance, given the separation in investigative responsibilities between the FOC and the IOC following decentralization, what could be done to functionally integrate investigative operations between these two commands?

In addressing these and other issues, this report presents several management models that were developed to better articulate the types of organizational structures needed to support the proposed functions mentioned during the first and second Executive Sessions. The first model identifies responsibilities of criminal investigators assigned to the Westside Command Station. Because investigative responsibilities cannot be examined independently from the patrol responsibilities, the first model includes an extensive discussion of the patrol function in relationship to NOP. This model also introduces the designation of a crime prevention detail, established to facilitate integration between patrol and investigative personnel assigned to the Westside Command Station.

Highlighted within the discussion of this model is an acknowledgment that traditional organizational configurations of police departments are incapable of supporting NOP. Traditional policing has been described as "reactive" and "incident-driven." There appears to be an incessant concern with lowering response times, while, perhaps ironically, increasing the amount of time spent on random patrol. Arrest is seen as an end in itself, rather than one of several alternatives that could be used to deal with crime.

NOP, on the other hand, recognizes the importance of time spent in interacting with citizens to learn about their perceptions of neighborhood problems. NOP solicits citizen participation to work with the officers in

resolving neighborhood problems and confronting circumstances that could lead to neighborhood problems.

NOP also requires officers to be actively involved in the planning and implementation of tactical responses designed to prevent and control criminal activity. This will require officers to structure their uncommitted time to perform "self-directed" activities. The types of self-directed activities to be performed is dependent on what the officers learn in talking with neighborhood residents.

Since one of the more important underlying tenets of NOP is a commitment to the prevention of criminal activity, officers and investigators will attempt to elicit involvement by the citizenry to reduce their chances of becoming victimized. Both the officers and investigators, consequently, will be examining the relationship between the symptoms of a problem, the problem itself, and the behavior of the victim(s) in relationship to the problem.

It will be the responsibility of the Operations Support Detail to support patrol and investigative personnel by performing three primary functions: (1) a tactical crime analysis function, (2) a strategic analysis function, and (3) a planning and implementation function. Through these functions, the crime prevention detail will serve as a repository of information.

The process of decentralization will cause differences in responsibilities to exist between centralized and decentralized investigators. Centralized investigators will be responsible for conducting pattern or suspect specific citywide investigations; decentralized investigators will be responsible for neighborhood or area specific investigations. Both centralized and decentralized investigators will: develop a knowledge base about crime in their respective areas; liaison with analysts; assist in the planning and

implementation of strategies to resolve crime problems; conduct continuing investigations when appropriate; provide assistance to the officers when requested, and maintain quality control for their respective investigations. The investigators will also work with the citizens in promoting community education and prevention strategies.

Contained within the investigative chain-of-command at the Westside Command Station is the Investigative Response Team (IRT). The IRT is looked upon as a resource, capable of providing assistance in the resolution of neighborhood problems. To insure the proper utilization of the team's flexibility, the IRT will continue to be supervised by patrol sergeants. But, as proposed under this model, they will report to the investigative shift lieutenant, since a large majority of their work is of an investigative nature.

The second management model, perhaps a first in policing, configures structure around what is considered as a key ingredient of NOP; interaction between the police and the public. Thus, the structural relationships contained in the model are forged around an abstraction of neighborhoods. This serves to acknowledge NOP as a management philosophy in directing the department's service delivery in response to citizen needs and expectations.

Unique in character, the second model represents the formation of an organizational entity referred to as the Interactive Service Unit (ISU). Conceptually, the configuration of the ISU is based on a number of assumptions. First, interaction among the officers, investigators, and citizenry is crucial to the identification of neighborhood concerns. Second, officers and investigators must be mutually accountable for the control and prevention of crime within the neighborhoods. Third, the efficient management of service delivery is dependent upon the functional integration of

responsibilities. More importantly, functional integration connotes a commitment to working together, developing cooperative relationships. Guided by the premise of teamwork, officers and investigators are assigned to specific neighborhoods to work with the citizenry.

The ISU, consequently, represents a structural entity which has been functionally configured to promote the notion of teamwork. Organizationally, the ISU will require each neighborhood to be represented by a police officer, the officer's immediate supervisor (referred to as a unit supervisor), an investigative sergeant (who can be responsible for multiple neighborhoods simultaneously), and the citizens.

The number of neighborhoods encompassed by one ISU would be dependent upon the number of officers a unit supervisor could efficiently manage. For example, the size of a typical ISU would probably include one unit supervisor for every 10 officers. The 10 officers would be assigned to separate neighborhoods which may be encompassed within two beats (five neighborhoods to a beat). The number of investigative sergeants assigned to the ISU will be dependent upon the workload contained within those two beats or 10 neighborhoods. It is possible one, or possibly two investigators could be assigned to a unit.

The creation of the ISU is based upon the notion that responsiveness to citizen needs and expectations can be more efficiently managed within the department if patrol and investigative responsibilities are functionally integrated. To reiterate, this means investigators are dependent upon the officers' ability to conduct comprehensive initial investigations which may lead to early case closures resulting in more time being available for investigators to conduct other types of activities. It also means that patrol

officers are dependent upon any assistance they can secure from the investigators during the course of conducting their investigations. Functional integration also implies that investigators are dependent upon patrol officers and analysts (tactical crime and strategic) for information which will assist them in performing their expanded role of working within the neighborhoods to promote citizen involvement in the implementation of community education and crime prevention activities. Furthermore, centralized and decentralized investigators will be dependent upon each other's respective expertise. Collectively, the relationship between the citizens, officers, and investigators under NOP requires a different managerial approach from the one existing within the department today.

Not unlike numerous agencies across the country, the department's present management style is described, at best, as being reactionary in nature. There is little planning, coordination, or evaluation of efforts expended to accomplish specific short or long term results within the neighborhoods. Officers work independently of one another with little, if any, perceived decision making authority. Officers seldom have the opportunity to become involved in strategy development or response implementation as these activities are usually reserved for specialists (e.g., the IRT, narcotics officers, investigators, etc.). Interaction between the officers and their respective supervisor is minimal, usually initiated only on the basis of seeking clarification to a department policy or procedure; or in asking permission to perform an activity deemed to lie outside the officer's sphere of responsibility.

With the advent of the ISUs under NOP, management takes on a different connotation. For it is through the use of the ISUs the management process

becomes more efficient as evidenced by a commitment to: systematically collect, analyze, and distribute information from the citizenry and department personnel; allow officers and investigators to develop, implement, and assess short and long term neighborhood plans designed to address identified neighborhood problems; allocate resources in accordance with neighborhood priorities based upon perceived results; mutually share the responsibility and accountability for preventing and controlling crime among the members of the ISU; and place the citizens in a position of contributing to the betterment of their own neighborhoods.

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the ISU is that it represents a self-managing team of which the citizens are members. Characterized by the decentralization of authority, coupled with an expansion and integration of functional responsibilities, officers and investigators will experience more flexibility and discretion in determining how to work with the citizens to address their neighborhood needs and expectations. By working together and sharing responsibility within the confines of an ISU, the willingness to participate and develop a sense of ownership for one's work within the neighborhoods will grow significantly among the officers, investigators, and citizens.

If a predominance of investigative operations is to be decentralized in accordance with the Command Station concept; and, the investigative function is to be altered in response to NOP, how will these changes affect the responsibilities of the personnel assigned to the IOC? Furthermore, given the proposed functional changes for the IOC, how will that affect the organizational structure of the command? The third and final management model addresses these issues.

In keeping with the theme of this report, the revised structure of the IOC, depicted in Figure #6, is presented to highlight integration of investigative functions rather than display the traditional, hierarchically structured chain of command pieced together with lines and boxes. The proposed restructuring includes three bureaus: The Centralized Criminal Investigations Bureau (CCIB); The Special Investigations Bureau (SIB); and the Investigative Support Bureau (ISB). These bureaus surround the the administrative function served by the Command Office of the IOC. And while the new structure retains most of the investigative functions currently performed by the IOC several new functions, given the advent of NOP, are added.

An "administrative analysis" capability is established in the Command Office of the IOC to more effectively monitor the volume, status, and disposition of cases in relationship to MCI procedures used to document the administrative processing of cases. This function will also be able to capture data useful for analysis of investigative caseloads, thereby developing defensible documentation in the allocation of resources. The information generated from these types of activities should be systematized to insure access by personnel throughout the IOC and the FOC. The value of such a system, rarely, if at all, found in municipal police agencies, is twofold. First, it enhances managerial efficiency by relating information usage with operational outcomes. Second, it serves as a management tool designed to promote human resource development, while simultaneously accounting for the attainment of specific results.

Another feature of IOC's revised structure is the incorporation of problem solving task forces. Although excluded from the newly proposed ISB, because of the intracommand/department function served by this bureau, the creation of

problem solving task forces within the Command Office of the IOC, the CCIB, and the SIB, is designed to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information between the police and members of the community in grappling with persistent problems that continue to hamper investigative operations in dealing with citywide crime problems..

Focusing more closely on functions served by each bureau, the CCIB consists of six investigative divisions: Motor Vehicle Investigations; Burglary and Special Theft Investigations; Homicide and Major Assault Investigations; Robbery Investigations; Fraud, Forgery, and White collar Crime Investigations; and Sex Offense Investigations. Support for criminal investigators working on subsequent investigations is internally provided through tactical crime analysis, which is designed to facilitate the identification of citywide crime patterns and suggest possible suspects. In addition to conducting follow-up investigations, each division within the CCIB also includes a capacity for strategic analysis that is specifically oriented toward examining more effective ways of performing investigations, preparing cases for prosecution, and in exploring methods, if need be, with representatives from the community, in dealing with ongoing crime problems. Finally, given the repository of investigative expertise contained within each of these investigative specialities, each division is expected to provide technical assistance in the form of training to other department members, for example, and to help decentralized investigators in working on perplexing or unusual cases.

The SIB consists of two investigative divisions: Narcotics Investigations; and Vice Investigations. And as with their CCIB counterpart, each of these investigative divisions also incorporate components for strategic

analysis and technical assistance. Internal support generated to assist narcotics and vice investigators includes the ongoing performance of link analysis, given the more unique nature of drug and vice investigations in gathering and sorting out intelligence information on any number of individuals involved in drug trafficking and vice activities. The use of link analysis does not, however, exclude tactical crime analysis to identify crime patterns. But tactical crime analysis is not used to identify interactive networks among individuals engaged in perpetrating crimes. And it is weak in determining an individual's status within a group that displays characteristics of organized affiliation; something that narcotics and vice investigators are concerned about in trying to "make cases" and unravel complex social networks involved in the commission of crime.

The ISB includes four functional specialities: The Criminal Intelligence Unit; The Administrative Juvenile Unit; The Crime Scene Unit; and The Tactical Response Unit. These four separate functions are designed to provide intracommand support for the IOC and intercommand support throughout the department. The Criminal Intelligence Unit involves dignitary protective services, among other intelligence activities, for example, that track the movement and membership of motorcycle gangs involved in crime. The Administrative Juvenile Unit will provide liaison support for decentralized juvenile investigations with the juvenile court, protective services, and the county's probation department. The Crime Scene Unit will continue to provide needed expertise in processing crime scenes. And the Tactical Response will provide tactical support to investigative divisions within the IOC and to personnel in the FOC. Moreover, this unit will develop "career criminal" criteria in targeting career criminals. It will also provide direction in

locating and apprehending fugitives within the City of Houston.

Collectively, the three management models presented in the report provide a basis for understanding how functional responsibilities relate to the development of supporting organizational structures. As new functions emerge under NOP, there will be a need to reassess existing structures and, perhaps, realign or create alternative structures. Additionally, the models clarify relationships between the IOC and the FOC. While both of these commands are involved, to a great extent, in separate investigative activities, the investigative work in each command complements the work of the other command. Based on the notion of facilitative reciprocity, a concept very germane to NOP's management philosophy, centralized and decentralized investigators will come to depend on each others expertise, while simultaneously recognizing the independent nature of each others responsibilities.

Inherent within each of the models is a conceptual commitment to begin developing a management framework which will support institutionalizing the NOP philosophy within the department. Such a framework must be designed to allow for the efficient management of service delivery which under NOP is results oriented. And in the context of NOP results must be measured in association with developing the capacity to more efficiently manage organizational functions and available resources in working the public to both prevent and help control crime.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 1986, Police Chief Lee P. Brown convened the first Executive Session in the history of the Houston Police Department. Modeled after the Executive Sessions held at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, in which Chief Brown participates, the Executive Session is a management construct that provides a forum for individuals of different backgrounds and perspectives to focus on identifying issues needed to facilitate meaningful organizational change.

The purpose of this session was to allow participants an opportunity to generate questions and ideas to develop a new style of policing for the Houston Police Department to be initially implemented through personnel assigned to the recently constructed Westside Command Station, the first of four proposed police command stations to come on line in the City of Houston. (The three remaining Command Stations are scheduled to be operational by 1996). The underlying theme for developing a new style of policing is based on values expressed in the department's Plan of Action to more closely align the department's service delivery with community expectations.

A total of 28 classified personnel representing all ranks from within the department were selected to participate with Chief Brown in this session. A number of civilian resource personnel from the Field Operations Command (FOC), the Office of Planning and Research, and the Training Division were also asked to attend this session along with a citizen from the department's Police Advisory Committee. Finally, to round out the session's participants, several guest speakers who had achieved national and, in some instances, international

renown through publishing books and articles about policing were asked to present information during the session.

At the conclusion of six meetings that spanned three months, a final report was produced entitled: Developing A Policing Style For Neighborhood Oriented Policing. The report contained a number of issues, including the following:

- a discussion of the tenets of policing for the Houston Police Department as delineated in the department's Plan of Action;
- a definition of Neighborhood Oriented Policing;
- a discussion of role expectations for beat officers, district sergeants, and shift lieutenants under Neighborhood Oriented Policing;
- a discussion of lessons learned from the implementation of previous programs and other strategy considerations that contributed to the development of Neighborhood Oriented Policing;
- the presentation of a process model to be followed in developing Neighborhood Oriented Policing; and
- a discussion of the kinds of managerial support required to implement Neighborhood Oriented Policing.

Upon completion of the final report, it became necessary to develop an implementation plan that attempted to operationalize the concept of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP). The Westside Operations Planning Committee was therefore formed to elicit input and support from the personnel who would be assigned to the new facility. The committee was chaired by Captain J. W. Snelson and consisted of nine lieutenants, five sergeants, and 10 officers along with a compliment of support personnel, including persons skilled in training, evaluation, and community relations. Their responsibility included reviewing material that had been developed during the Executive Session to determine how NOP could be transformed into a series of concrete

tasks and activities performed by beat officers, district sergeants, and shift lieutenants to more closely unite the delivery of police services through the Westside Command Station with citizen needs and expectations.

Starting in January, 1987, the committee began to tackle this arduous task that was completed in eight weeks, culminating in the publication of a final report entitled: Operational Plan For The Westside Command Station. Numerous issues addressed by this committee are described in this report, including, for example, the following:

- the various types of duties and activities to be performed through NOP, together with meaningful criteria to assess the officers' performance;
- changes in traditional management styles needed to support NOP;
- training requirements anticipated to facilitate NOP activities;
- evaluation criteria needed to document NOP implementation;
- the identification of impediments that might hinder the implementation of NOP and suggested ways to overcome obstacles encountered; and
- commentary regarding the types of support needed to sustain and further develop NOP throughout the entire department.

Despite the completion of this report, many participants thought considerable work was still needed to be performed. Specific attention had to be directed toward converting the recommendations set forth within the implementation plan into day-to-day responsibilities which were supportive of the NOP concept, including specific guidelines for how the officers were to begin to identify and, in working with citizens, resolve neighborhood problems that contributed to improving the quality of life within the neighborhoods. Thus, a training committee was created to address this phase of the development

process.

The training committee members quickly realized the difficulty of their task. They were entrusted with the dual responsibility of, not only determining what changes would need to be made in redefining the traditional roles of the beat officers, district sergeants, and shift lieutenants under NOP, but with developing an orientation session for Westside personnel to convey the underlying rationale for the changes anticipated. It was therefore imperative that the orientation session(s) enlighten command station personnel on the evolutionary underpinnings that culminated in the development of NOP.

While the training committee was grappling with these issues during the summer of 1987, Chief Brown decided to hold another Executive Session to look more closely at the implications NOP would have for the Investigative Operations Command (IOC). Before the second Executive Session began, the Chief, wanting to sustain the organizational momentum that had emerged following the first Executive Session, initiated a series of one-day "retreats" designed to inform members of the department--sergeants and above but excluding the investigative sergeants--of proceedings from the first Executive Session that resulted in a commitment to develop and implement NOP.

Implicit in the department's decision made a number of years ago to decentralize various services including some of the investigative sergeants from the IOC to the FOC and the subsequent placement of investigative sergeants at the Westside Command Station once that facility was opened, immediate attention had to be focused on examining the responsibilities of investigative sergeants in conjunction with NOP. This provoked a barrage of questions. Were investigative sergeants expected to interact with the public outside the course of conducting investigations? What rationale would prompt such interaction,

and under what circumstance should it occur? What kinds of things could the investigative sergeants do that would contribute to improving the quality of neighborhood life? How would they interact with uniform personnel whose roles, following recommendations made during the first Executive Session, were to be expanded to include greater responsibility in conducting investigations? And how would the inevitable changes contained in NOP affect the investigative sergeants' relationships with centralized investigators, support personnel such as crime analysts, members of the Investigative Response Teams, and prosecutors, etc.? These were just a few of the more salient questions raised during the second Executive Session.

Therefore, from August, 1987, through December, 1987, under the joint sponsorship of the Police Foundation and the Houston Police Department a number of personnel were asked by Chief Brown to attend seven separate meetings to discuss the role of investigative sergeants within the context of NOP (See Appendix A, p. 288). This report represents the product emanating from those meetings as the membership strived to identify and discuss issues, ask questions, and seek consensus to begin the process of critically examining the investigative function in light of traditional influences, present procedures, and the impact of NOP's emerging managerial philosophy.

This report, consequently, will identify a number of issues presently confronting the FOC and IOC as attempts are made to more clearly define the roles and commensurate responsibilities of investigative sergeants, given the decentralization of the IOC. It will also include more specificity regarding the expanded investigative role of the neighborhood beat officers that was discussed during the first Executive Session. Building upon material presented during the second Executive Session by department personnel and distinguished

outside speakers, this report presents alternative ways to reconfigure present investigative structures to, hopefully, provoke serious inspection of the investigative function, resulting in ways to more efficiently organize and manage both centralized and decentralized investigative operations in reference to the NOP mandate.

The following chapter of this report introduces NOP as a management philosophy. It provides an account of the historical underpinnings for this philosophy in conjunction with detailed discussion of several issues that must be resolved if the required management support needed to sustain NOP can be developed. Next, the history of criminal investigations is presented in Chapter 3, including discussion of research on criminal investigations and, in line with the management theme set by NOP in Chapter 2, the implications this research has in suggesting ways to enhance investigative operations. Based upon the department's previous experience and the history of criminal investigations, Chapter 4 sets a transitional tone for refocusing investigative efforts in response to NOP tenets. Chapter 5 briefly addresses key issues regarding the rationale for investigative centralization, decentralization, specialization, and division of labor. Serious consideration must be given to these constructs if NOP is to become a mainstay in criminal investigations. Finally, several investigative models that describe different organizational configurations for the IOC and FOC are presented in Chapter 6 along with extended discussion of their functional implications.

CHAPTER 2

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING WITHIN THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) was defined in the department's first Executive Session as **an interactive process between the police and the public** to mutually identify and resolve neighborhood problems. Contained in this definition is a change in focus--a rather dramatic change in the traditional orientation the police have had toward the public. Abating traditional practices of formal separatism between the police and the public (i.e., "us" and "them"), NOP calls for the formation of a union, indeed a partnership between police officers and citizens to work together in the prevention and control of crime in the city's neighborhoods. The formation of this union, is however, dependent upon the internal development of more appropriate management systems to build and better utilize available resources in working with the public to promote neighborhood tranquility and ensure justice through equitable enforcement of municipal codes and state laws, while acknowledging allegiance for democratic axioms that espouse the dignity and individual rights of citizens that comprise the community.

In having recognized both the need and importance to modify traditional management thought regarding a new and different approach in providing service delivery, NOP has necessarily acquired an additional overtone as constituting a management philosophy. **As a management philosophy, NOP provides a conceptual framework to direct a multiplicity of organizational functions designed to improve the quality of life in the city of Houston.** As with any management

philosophy, NOP is "results-oriented." Explicit in focus, NOP seeks to integrate the desires and expectations of citizens with actions taken by the department to identify and address conditions that negatively impact the city's neighborhoods and, therefore, community life in general.

Realistically, citizens' perceptions of neighborhood problems may differ from those of the officers. And perceptions among citizens about neighborhood problems may differ--oftentimes quite strongly--even to the point of casting different neighborhood groups into adversarial roles. But the officers must be able to facilitate at least some semblance of consensus before a course of action to ameliorate the deleterious conditions that affect the quality of neighborhood life can be mutually developed. Of course, the mutual development of a course of action assumes that there is a strong enough commitment among a sufficient number of concerned citizens that they are willing to become involved in an interactive process with the officers to improve the neighborhoods. Simply stated, citizen apathy that detracts from initiatives to improve the quality of neighborhood life, although such apathy may be well-founded in years of frustration in not having obtained the types of public services desired, constitutes but yet another type of "neighborhood problem" that must be redressed by the officers before other types of problems can be addressed. Increased contact with citizens provides officers with the most fruitful means of reducing apathy and establishing the type of rapport needed for officers and citizens to join one another in working together to prevent crime and thereby enhance the general welfare of citizens that reside and work in the city's neighborhoods.

As Chief Brown has mentioned on several occasions, NOP is not a revolutionary change in policing but rather an evolutionary process for

changing policing. In anticipation of moving toward an alternative style of police service delivery a number of years ago, the Houston Police Department reconfigured its patrol beats, making them, for the most part, contiguous with the city's neighborhoods. Each of the city's 100 beats contains one or more neighborhoods. In constructing the new beats, neighborhood boundaries were only violated if natural or man-made barriers such as bayous, golf courses, railroad tracks, highways, school campuses, etc., impeded the officers from crossing through their beats in response to emergency situations.

The neighborhood focus of NOP is based on the gestalt premise that the whole of any entity is greater than the sum of its parts. A musical symphony that conveys a consonance of sound engendering emotional inspiration, for example, is more than a collection of discrete notes. Likewise, a living organism represents more than the complex chemical composition of iron, calcium, manganese, copper, etc., that serves to form muscle, bone, and neural matter. Through concentrating department efforts in each of the city's neighborhoods, an essence of community spirit can evolve that transcends the collective improvements made in each of the city's neighborhoods. This will hopefully serve to more closely unite citizens with one another and with the police and other members of city government that provide services to the public.

If NOP is perceived as a new and radically different approach to policing, one that stands in sharp contrast to "real police work," it must be mentioned that NOP is, in many respects, strongly akin to the "traditional thinking" of Sir Robert Peel, who was Secretary of the British Home Office and principal architect of the Metropolitan Police Act that was passed by Parliament in 1829. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this act created the first centralized police

authority for the City of London and it still stands the governing statute for the London Metropolitan Police. Peel promulgated his conception of the police as being inseparable from the public. He outlined his thoughts regarding the police function in a list of "principles of law enforcement," each of which had a strong community dimension. As reiterated by Radelet (1986), this list, although not totally inclusive given the thrust of this report, included the following:

- The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. . . .
- The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police . . . actions, behavior, and the ability of the police to secure and maintain public respect.
- The police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain public respect.
- The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity for the use of physical force and compulsion in achieving police objectives.
- The police seek and preserve public favor . . . by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to the law, . . . by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the society without regard to their race or social standing; by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humor; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
- The police should use physical force . . . only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, and warning is found to be insufficient to achieve police objectives; and the police should use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
- The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police [emphasis added]; the police are the only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of the community welfare.

- The police should . . . never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary by avenging individuals or the state, or authoritatively judging guilt or punishing the guilty.
- The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the evidence of police action in dealing with them.

As noted by Radelet (1986), Peel's convictions were not new for England. They were embedded in an English tradition for justice. According to this author:

In the Anglo-Saxon England of a thousand years ago, every able-bodied freeman was a police officer. Every male from fifteen to sixty maintained such arms as he could afford. When the hue and cry was raised, every man within earshot dropped whatever he was doing and joined in the pursuit of the transgressor. Not to do so was serious neglect of duty.

But it wasn't until the advent of Sir John Fielding's Bow Street Runners, also mentioned in the following chapter, that civilian volunteers became paid for their work as police officers, having gradually evolved from previous positions that included constables, peace officers, justices of the peace (who performed dual duties as both police officers and judges), and finally, watchman. According to Radelet (1986) the British are still of mind that ". . . a police officer is someone who is paid to do what it is a citizen's duty to do without pay."

The implications that can be drawn from this type of thinking are germane to NOP. While police officers are expected to work more closely with the public, the public, in turn, is expected to work more closely with the police officers. The management tone set by NOP involves a mutual and reciprocal relationship between the police and the public that is based on civic compliance to municipal ordinances and state statutes. If an individual is asked, "Who do you think controls most of your behavior," the answer this person will give will, hopefully, be, "Why, I do."

Fundamental to policing in a democratic society is the manifestation of self-control by ordinary citizens. The police are called upon to help control others who, for one reason or another, are unable or unwilling to control themselves. The prohibitions of law thus represent the range in behavior citizens in a democratic society are unwilling to tolerate. Through the political processes in state government, legislatures empower the police to enforce the law. State statutes and municipal codes embody the "edictal conscience" of the community as a whole. Strict observance of these codes and laws save, perhaps, for "special occasions" such as the New Year's Eve, the Fourth of July, and Halloween, when certain forms of aberrant behavior are more likely to be tolerated by the police, is essential for democracy to function effectively. Indeed, citizens must realize that they shoulder considerable responsibility in working with **their** police officers to improve **their** community.

As for the police officers themselves, they are the most visible representatives of the community. As such, they must be model citizens. Their behavior must be beyond reproach. **What** they do is critical in the formation of public opinion about the overall mission of the police and for the police officers themselves. Equally important is a concern for **how** they do their job, which will also be reflected in the confidence the public has in the police "to protect and serve." As noted by Claudine Wirths almost 30 years ago, ". . . the actions and attitudes of law enforcement people themselves probably constitute the greatest single cultural influence on public attitudes toward law enforcement" (Radelet, 1986). In analyzing survey results regarding the formation of public opinion about the police, Wirths was perplexed to find that **individuals that had never experienced any contact with the police had**

the most favorable attitude toward the police (Radelet, 1986); a finding that has surely disturbed many conscientious police administrators.

Managerially speaking, the amount of confidence citizens have in their police officers is directly and inextricably linked to the optimum level of effectiveness that can be achieved by a police agency. This is something both the police and the public must realize. Policing is--or should be--a two-way road. Lack of citizen confidence can spell lack of needed support. Citizens that lack confidence in the police are less likely to come forth as witnesses and cooperate with the police. They are also less likely to notify the police of suspicious circumstances or crimes in progress. And they may also be less likely to render aid and assistance when needed by the police. Unless police officers are able to gain, through their actions, the trust, respect, and confidence of the public, they are undermining their own efforts to service the needs of the community. It is simply unrealistic for police officers to expect community members to behave like model citizens if the officers themselves cannot display the types of desired behaviors they expect others to emulate. As noted by Radelet (1986):

Police are part of, not apart from, the communities they serve. In a democratic society, they are (ideally) a living expression, an embodiment, an implementing arm of democratic law. . . . For many people, police are the only contact that they may ever have with the legal system. If democratic law is to be credible and ethical to ordinary citizens, with standards of fairness, reasonableness, and human decency, it will be so to the extent that police behavior reflects such qualities.

NOP's philosophy echoes Radelet's concern for compassion and professional demeanor on the part of the officers in dealing with the public. But there is a more vexing concern. Is the focus of NOP requiring police officers to become much more involved with the public in working with them to improve community

life too idealistic for the department to achieve or, to put it more bluntly, is this approach, given traditional influences, totally unrealistic? The answer to this question may reside in unraveling what is perhaps the most fundamental issue that has confronted policing since its conception; the ostensibly inherent conflict in role expectations as to what the public expects the police to do. This dilemma is perhaps best distinguished in deliberating between what sets of terms to use when describing police officers. Are they to be described as law enforcement officers, or are they to be referred to as peace officers? Obviously, the answer to this question depends on their mission. But what is their mission? More precisely, what is their primary mission? Is it to concentrate on enforcing the laws or to maintain the peace, or is there an alternative mission that has yet to be articulated? Again, a return to history might be instructive.

In defense of proposing a centralized police authority for the City of London, Sir Robert Peel was quite clear on the basic mission he foresaw for the police. Peel envisioned the police as a civilian middle ground, according to Radelet (1986), ". . . to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force . . ." Peel's emphasis on prevention would appear to have suggested increased autonomy for police officers so they could become familiar with their areas. It would also seem to suggest self-discipline and self-direction on the part of police officers to become acquainted with citizens to find out what could be done to prevent crime and maintain peace. Preventing something from happening before it eventuates is, in general, much more demanding than reacting to an incident after it occurs. Unbeknownst to Peel was the significance the distinction between "crime prevention" and "crime suppression" would have in the future development

of police "management systems" to cope with crime in America.

While the British have apparently retained their primary policing emphasis on peace keeping and crime prevention, policing in America has shifted more and more away from this orientation, - tending now to emphasize the enforcement aspect of policing. The implications for this shift in emphasis are significant. Retention of a crime prevention and order maintenance focus would seem to keep the police in close contact with the public. Conversely, a strong enforcement orientation that positions the police to perform almost continual surveillance in looking for lawbreakers would appear to separate and, perhaps inadvertently, alienate the police from law-abiding citizens. Given the relatively recent movement toward community based policing in this country, this appears to be the case. In times past, the public worked more closely with the police in "police matters." While citizens in New England established town meetings to address community ills, their western counterparts joined the posse to help the sheriff track down outlaws.

What happened? What accounted for this shift in emphasis? Having initially modeled themselves after the Peelian prototype, why have most police departments in America relinquished their emphasis on crime prevention in favor of an enforcement orientation? In response to these questions, Radelet (1986) cites the work of an American social historian, Oscar Handlin, who said that the United States has, from the very beginning, been "a much more violent society than that of most European countries. Carrying arms and rounding up a posse were aspects of American history that are still glamorized in today's movies and television." But, as noted in the following chapter, police officers were not held accountable for the control of violent crime during the early stages of policing in America. Officers with the Boston Police

Department, for example, ". . . were not fully armed at public expense until 1884" (Radelet, 1986). What types of duties did they perform?

Again, Radelet (1986) cites Handlin in stating that ". . . early American police forces had 'undifferentiated functions.'" Continuing, he (Radelet, 1986) indicates that:

The police were public servants with duties pertaining to public health, clean streets, and all sorts of other odds and ends. . . Until after 1900, the most important aspects of police work as we see it today were not performed by the police. Various private agencies took care of apprehending crooks, while the police busied themselves with menial chores, thereby cultivating the public impression that a police officer was a rather backward character, a more or less friendly simpleton.

A gradual shift in emphasis regarding the primary role of the police from public servants to "watchmen" and then on to "crook catchers" began to emerge in American policing following the introduction of detectives around the mid-1800s. The "decents" conducted by Francis Tukey, Marshal of the Boston Police Department (referenced in the next chapter), involved the use of detectives to arrest prostitutes and gamblers. Unlike reacting to a citizen complaint, these types of activities allowed police officers (i.e., detectives) to initiate prosecutions on their own. Quoting James Q. Wilson, Radelet (1986) writes in his text that ". . . the use of the police to enforce unpopular laws governing the sale and use of liquor . . . led to the beginning of the popular confusion as to what the police do. . . . [the detective], and not his patrolman colleague, was the 'real' police officer doing 'real' police work."

The gradual emergence of this new, "enforcement-oriented" role was later reinforced by the bureaucratization of detectives, which introduced civil service procedures governing the selection, promotion, and transfer of detectives and provided them with paid salaries to replace their "customary

fees," toward and, shortly following, the turn of the century. But, according to Radelet (1986), it was not until Congressional passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the distillation and sale of alcohol and the period of The Great Depression of the 1930s, which, in quoting James Q. Wilson, ". . . focused public attention 'on the escapades of bank robbers and other desperadoes,'" that the prominence of the "order maintenance" function in American policing finally gave way to a "legalistic" orientation for strict law enforcement.

Of no small consequence in facilitating this transformation, was publication of the Wickersham Commission report in 1931. Based on dialogue contained in this document, the police were, henceforth, to be held more accountable, lacking "political interference," for controlling crime. In considering the consequences the Wickersham report has had on policing styles, Radelet (1986) states, "All 'superfluous' police services were questioned. These were not 'real police work.' The police were portrayed mainly as 'crook catchers'; both the police view of themselves and the public's view of them were adjusted accordingly, over a period of several ensuing decades."

But this new definition of policing failed to correspond with reality. Again, paraphrasing James Q. Wilson, Radelet (1986) remarks that:

The police knew that they were still handling family fights and troublesome teenagers. They also knew that they alone could not prevent crime. So they turned to manipulating crime records, to make things look better from the standpoint of public expectations. The 'good pinch' and the 'G Man' became symbols of 'real police work.' Rewards and incentives in the department--for example, promotion to detective--were geared to the crook-catching function.

Reality notwithstanding, police culture would change. Given the officers' perceptions of the public's expectations toward them, a cultural facade would

evolve that more "clearly" defined the role of the police as "crime fighters."

Despite changes in the public's perceptions regarding the primary mission of the police, there were other changes in communications technology and transportation that were destined to have a profound impact on police and community relations. Coincidental to the time frame of the Wickersham Commission, the latter days of Prohibition, and the beginning of The Great Depression, although not mentioned by Radelet but perhaps of equal significance, was the advent of the radio patrol car during the late 1920s and early 1930s that mobilized police officers. Placing "foot beat officers" in motorized vehicles tended to sever the close and informal contacts that had been established between the police and the public. The eventual demise of the corner call box with the installation of centralized dispatching capabilities soon replaced the interpersonal ties that had been established between the police and the public with infrequent and impersonal contacts only for the purpose of conducting "official business."

Another influence, perhaps of tantamount importance, was the end result of a police reform movement that started after the turn of the century but began to fade following a reassessment of police response to the widespread incivility of the 1960s. Initially, this movement sought to clean up corruption and wrest control of the police from the political influences of city hall. Although well intentioned, it eventually culminated in increased quasi-military bureaucratization of the police with centralized command and control structures. Given a hyperexaggerated sense of businesses and organizational efficiency, the "professional" police officer of the 1950s developed terse interactive skills in "communicating" with the public, perhaps best epitomized in the cliché, "Just the facts, mama."

Paradoxically, change, as in other lines of work, is constant in policing. The events that occurred following the turn of the century and up through the decade of the 1930s gradually transformed the major focus of policing from maintaining order to controlling crime. In having been preoccupied with World War II during the first part of the 1940s, a "cold war" with Russia following the end of the second world war, and a "police action" in Korea during the first half of the 1950s, the public seemed content with the crime fighting image of the police by the dawn of the 1960s. Of course, it is possible that the public was sufficiently distracted by the events of war during the previous two decades that they simply paid no mind to the police. On the other hand, they might have been irritated with the police but lacked ways to report their discontent. If accurate, however, this contentedness would be dramatically disrupted for many Americans during the decade of the 1960s. It would also be followed by some equally profound rethinking of the police function during the 1970s.

The advent of the 1970s, given the establishment of LEAA (now expired) and its research arm, NIJ (still in business), provided a profusion of monies for research and program development in policing. As a result, the pace of change in policing quickly accelerated. A section of the report from the department's first Executive Session examined some of the reasons for this change, including mention of the following:

This change was initially influenced by protest demonstrations against the government's military actions in Vietnam and the incivility that occurred across the country in the mid- to late 1960s. It was later perpetuated by a plethora of research findings regarding police operations that emanated out of the 1970s. The impetus for this research was directly linked to police actions in handling anti-war demonstrations, their attempts to control incivility, and a search for more effective methods to combat crime. Although the findings from this research

generated more questions than answers, it seriously challenged the veracity of time-hardened assumptions underlying management of the patrol, dispatch, and investigative functions.

Ironically, the questions that emerged regarding the "crime fighting" role of the police were perhaps prompted by television coverage that brought police confrontations into millions of American homes on an almost daily basis. As a result, the public's query for answers to explain civil strife and disobedience, not to mention a few overzealous reactions by the police in dealing with riots and anti-war demonstrations, was aroused.

While the initial response to the turbulence of the 1960s sparked "tough talk" and political rhetoric in "declaring a war on crime in the streets of America," by the early to mid-1970s questions regarding the role of the police were again topical for heated debate. To help fuel the fire were results from various commission reports, beginning in 1965 with President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, each lending some insight into civil disorder, campus unrest, and violence in America. The most recent commission, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, published its results in 1973 in a series of five volumes that dealt with: A National Strategy to Reduce Crime; Criminal Justice System; Police; Courts; and Community Crime Prevention. The report dealing with the police begins with consideration of the "role question," according to Radelet (1986), ". . . tying it directly to community relations." Radelet (1986) goes on to state that: "This commission emphasized the importance for every police agency of developing both short- and long-range goals and objectives, and of securing maximum input in this process from within the agency and from all community elements." While this has failed to materialize, the debate regarding the proper role for the police has continued.

Geared to the late 1960s, Radelet (1986) quotes James Q. Wilson regarding what Radelet believes to be "the classic statement" of the police role hang-up. Wilson says:

The simultaneous emergence of a popular concern for both crime and order does put in focus the choices that will have to be made in the next generation of police reforms. In effect, municipal police departments are two organizations in one, serving two related but not identical functions. The strategy appropriate for strengthening their ability to serve one role tends to weaken their ability to serve the other. Crime deterrence and law enforcement require, or are facilitated by, specialization, strong hierarchical authority, improved mobility and communications, clarity in legal codes and arrest procedures, close surveillance of the community, high standards of integrity, and the avoidance of entangling alliances with politicians. The maintenance of order, on the other hand, is aided by departmental procedures that include decentralization, neighborhood involvement, foot patrol, wide discretion, the provision of services, an absence of arrest quotas, and some tolerance for minor forms of favoritism and even corruption. . . .

There is no magic formula--no prepackaged "reform"--that can tell a community or a police chief how to organize a force to serve, with appropriate balance, these competing objectives. . . . One would like to think that since both points of view now have ardent advocates, the debate has at last been joined. But I suspect that the two sides are talking at, or past, each other, and not to each other, and thus the issue, far from being joined, is still lost in rhetoric.

Wilson's suspicion was correct. Since the time he published the article containing the above quote, almost 20 years has passed, and the debate has still not ended. Surely, the length of time this debate has taken is indicative of its importance. Perhaps the problem resides in the tendency of police departments to respond to complex issues unilaterally, feeling compelled to "take a stand." This hypothesis is not to suggest that unilateral positions per se are bad, because they constituted some type of menace to society; no, not at all. Understandably, a unilateral position regarding one issue or another may be in response to a department's perception of the public's

expectations; "Let's stop coddling crooks!" But also, without negating the enormous complexity involved in policing large communities that display differences in cultural, ethnic, racial, socioeconomic, occupational, and educational composition, unilateral responses to a problem or issue are frequently administratively convenient.

Take, for example, the issue of patrol deployment. Despite differences in work load by time-of-day and day-of-week, some departments still allocate the same number of officers to staff each shift and permit an equal number of officers to be off each day of the week. Similarly, what about the issue of span of control? While a fixed span of supervisory control is normally set for patrol in most departments, e.g., 12 to one, 10 to one, seven to one, five to one, etc., call volume and types of problems can vary quite dramatically from one area to another in large communities. Rigid procedures used to standardize span of control generally have a leveling effect on individual abilities and can therefore invite mediocrity among the ranks of supervisors. It also implies that the service needs of the public and neighborhood problems are distributed equally, when, in fact, they are not. Depending upon the nature and complexity of the problems to be addressed, a span of control of 15 to one may suffice in one area on a particular shift, while a span of control of three to one may be required in another area on the same or on a different shift.


The point being made is that the demographic divergence found in large cities defies categorical application of a single style of policing, unless, as envisioned by NOP, it is possible for officers assigned to the city's neighborhoods to become ex officio managers of the neighborhoods they police; a role that involves a multiplicity of functions, e.g., collecting and analyzing information, planning, persuading, directing, implementing, evaluating,

facilitating, coordinating, etc. Although from time to time, a particular role or orientation may be emphasized in response to a national or international event such as hosting the Olympics or a political convention or in response to an act of terrorism, but on a day-to-day basis in servicing the needs of the city's neighborhoods flexibility, not rigidity, is called for. Police agencies that fall prey to the ubiquitous inclination of trying to serve only one of many important functions, particularly in pluralistic communities, place themselves in the politically precarious position of attempting to accomplish the impossible. Through developing a grass roots process of close interaction between the officers and citizens at the neighborhood level, the department's method of establishing goals becomes directly linked to citizens' perceptions and expectations regarding localized needs, Figure #1 (p. 24). The goal setting process thereby becomes decentralized.

NOP therefore concedes what James Q. Wilson has known all along and what Radelet has been recommending for years. The various demands of the public must be accommodated by police officers working with citizens within the city's neighborhoods. And within these neighborhoods citizens' needs must be accommodated by the officers in servicing each call, in attending the meetings of civic groups, and in visiting with residents and business persons while not on call. This type of orientation must also include active participation by investigators, who also have a stake in the affairs of the city's neighborhoods. Given their extensive knowledge of crime, it must be put to better use in interdicting criminals, assisting victims, and in helping to develop crime prevention strategies to make the city's neighborhoods safer places to live.

Neighborhood Oriented Policing

Figure #1



Being results-oriented, NOP places more emphasis on what is accomplished in servicing the city's neighborhoods than it does on any particular "style of policing," save for NOP, that engendered the results. Perhaps this focus can help eliminate the role ambiguity that, according to Radelet (1986), "Every police recruit inherits . . . what he or she is expected to do and what the priorities are." In light of NOP, "the priorities," always of relative magnitude, are to be jointly established by citizens and their neighborhood police officers in working together to identify and resolve problems of mutual concern. Because of the potentially disparate perspectives on given issues found among neighborhood residents, no one style of policing can service most of the people most of the time.

Perhaps apparent by now, NOP draws heavily on the sagacity of Herman Goldstein's (1979) work in the theoretical development of "Problem-oriented Policing." This work has recently become much less theoretical and more practical for police departments, given support from NIJ to help operationalize this concept in Madison, Wisconsin; Newport News, Virginia; and, presently, several communities in Florida.

To understand Goldstein's line of reasoning, one must first understand the way most police departments operate. Typically, calls for service dominate patrol operations. The corollary of the call for service found in patrol is "the case" found in criminal investigations. While most detectives handle cases, most patrol officers handle calls for service. About one in five or more of the calls for service result in a patrol officer completing an offense report. When the offense report enters criminal investigations, it becomes part of the investigative caseload.

Goldstein characterizes much of police work as being "incident-driven."

According to Eck (et al., 1987), incident-driven policing has four characteristics, including the following:

First, it is reactive. Most of the work load of patrol officers and detectives consists of handling crimes that have already been committed, disturbances in progress, traffic violations, and the like. The exceptions--crime prevention and narcotics investigations, for example--make up but a small portion of police work.

Incident-driven police work relies on limited information, gathered mostly from victims, witnesses, and suspects. Only limited information is needed because the police objectives are limited: patrol officers and detectives are only trying to resolve the incident at hand.

The primary means of resolving incidents is to invoke the criminal justice process. Even when an officer manages to resolve an incident without arresting or citing anyone, it is often the threat of enforcing the law that is the key to resolution. Alternative means of resolution are seldom invoked.

Finally, incident-driven police departments use aggregate statistics to measure performance. The department is doing a good job when the city-wide crime rate is low, or the city-wide arrest rate is high. The best officers are those who make many arrests, or service many calls.

NOP incorporates the logic and merits of problem-oriented policing as an alternative to traditional policing methods. Problem-oriented policing is defined as ". . . a department-wide strategy aimed at solving persistent community problems. Police identify, analyze, and respond to the underlying circumstances that create incidents" (Eck, et al., 1987). According to Eck (et al., 1987), "The theory behind problem-oriented policing is simple." This theory is explained as follows:

Underlying conditions create problems. These conditions might include the characteristics of the people involved (offenders, potential victims, and others), the social setting in which these people interact, the physical environment, and the way the public deals with these conditions.

A problem created by these conditions may generate one or more incidents. These incidents, while stemming from a common source, may appear to be different. For example, social and physical conditions in a deteriorated apartment complex may generate burglaries, acts of vandalism, intimidation of pedestrians by rowdy teenagers, and other incidents. These incidents, some of which come to police attention, are symptoms of the problem. The incidents will continue so long as the problem that creates them persists.

By refocusing traditional management orientations, it is envisioned that NOP can incorporate the elements of the problem-oriented approach in combination with increased interaction and participation by the public in working with the police. This can eventually provide a form of customized policing in addressing problems perceived to be unique to individual neighborhoods. Getting citizens more directly involved in the problem-oriented approach with their neighborhood police officers will also make the mutually derived solutions to neighborhood problems more palatable for the citizens to accept. Again, the key for the successful implementation of NOP resides in recognition that NOP is a process. In turning traditional tables through NOP, citizens will soon begin to realize that they are actively involved in an interactive process with the police, i.e., they are a part of and, not apart from, the police in the identification and solution of neighborhood problems.

Of course, it is recognized that the transition from traditional methods of policing to NOP will, as a masterpiece of understatement, not be achieved without some difficulty. Although frustrating at times, traditional routines are convenient and not easily discarded. Rather than providing new direction, tradition at times can imprison change.

Of paramount importance in implementing NOP, is a managerial stance on the issue of random patrol; an activity that consumes a considerable amount of time. Based on extensive research (Kelling, et al., 1974), NOP views random

patrol as an inefficient use of time that could be put to more productive use. Because NOP's management philosophy is not predicated on achieving "random type results," random patrol as an end in itself is discouraged. This is thus the first, formal recognition by a municipal police department that after 14 years since publication of results from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, random patrol is a dying issue, at least in the Houston Police Department. Parenthetically, the demise of random patrol should also be accompanied by the demise of the label, "patrol officers."

While the randomness of random patrol occasionally produces a random result, random results will not suffice for NOP. As a management philosophy, NOP anticipates achieving "expected results" based upon the planning and ingenuity of the officers in working with one another and with citizens in identifying, analyzing, and solving neighborhood problems. Unlike an old cliché that runs rife in the military and in an unknown number of police agencies, "You don't get paid to think!," NOP expects strong analytical and cognitive skills to be displayed by the officers in managing the service needs of their neighborhoods. NOP places considerable responsibility on the officers to prevent crime in their neighborhoods, holding them accountable for the types of crimes that can be prevented through individual initiatives in working with other officers and the public. In addressing these responsibilities and the extensive amount of work to be done in the neighborhoods, "self-directed activities" on the part of the officers are to replace the frequently unproductive time that has traditionally been spent in performing random patrol. Self-directed activities are actions initiated by the officers to address citizen concerns about their neighborhoods. To a great extent, these actions are based on information collected from within the department (i.e.,

crime analysis and dispatch data) in conjunction with information collected from citizens and other neighborhood and district auspices such as schools, businesses, hospitals, and health care and welfare services.

Continuing to nitpick random patrol, managers must ask themselves whether the random routine of preventive patrol, having officers systematically unsystematically patrol (i.e., drive) around their beats, is boring for the officers. Informed managers know that boredom can produce a lot of things; most of them bad, e.g., accidents, complacency, overreacting in certain situations that can result in citizen complaints, more paperwork, etc. And the unpredictable danger that officers are occasionally exposed to does not appear to adequately compensate for the drudgery involved in performing routine acts. But just how many patrol officers are there that conscientiously, with monotonous regularity, perform random, preventive patrol--windows down, listening for the sound of gunshots or a woman's scream? Persons that know the answer to this question are also aware that the time committed to random patrol can be put to more meaningful use.

In having questioned conventional wisdom regarding any managerial niche for the continued use of random patrol, NOP provides an intellectual challenge, indeed an opportunity, for the officers to tackle tough and important issues, when time between calls becomes available. NOP recognizes the value of police officers as individuals. NOP understands that most police officers want more than just a job. They want to become involved. They want to participate in the decision-making process, including input in the formulation of policy and standard operating procedures. As such, NOP demands a managerial commitment to cultivate and support the officers' abilities to deal with problems.

Traditionally, lip service has been given to acknowledge the importance of the patrol function. Such cliches as "the backbone of police work" have been heard for decades. But then officers that "screw up" in other assignments are disciplined by being "sent back to patrol." It is therefore not surprising that many patrol officers see patrol as a "dumping ground" for persons that "can't cut it" in other, more desirable, types of work. According to Kelling (1988):

. . . patrol officers have been frustrated with their traditional role. Despite pieties that patrol has been the backbone of policing, every police executive has known that, at best, patrol has been what officers do until they become detectives or are promoted. . . . Getting "busted to patrol" has been a constant threat to police managers or detectives who fail to perform by some standard of judgement. (It is doubtful that failing patrol officers ever get threatened with being busted to the detective unit.) . . . Never mind that patrol officers have the most important mission in police departments: They handle the public's most pressing problems and must make complex decisions almost instantaneously. Moreover, they do this with little supervision or training. Despite this, police administrators treat patrol officers as if they did little to advance the organization's mission. The salaries of patrol officers also reflect their demeaned status. No wonder many officers have grown cynical and have turned to unions for leadership rather than to police executives. "Stupid management made unions," says Robert Kliesmet, the President of the International Union of Police Associations AFL-CIO.

Predating Kelling's comments by almost 11 years, Patrick V. Murphy (et al., 1977), former Commissioner of the New York City Police Department and past President of the Police Foundation, conveys the following observation regarding the importance of patrol officers:

What the police chief--behind his big oak desk in his private office, insulated from the outside world by hordes of officious aides and layers of bureaucracy--must do, by all means, is to focus the entire institutional effort around one job: that of the police officer closest to the communities [emphasis added]. Everything else should be secondary. It's a bosses' job only if we permit the bosses

to make it one, if we permit both the institutions of the police and the officers themselves to become alienated, literally and figuratively, from their primary role in society, which is to keep the peace and maintain order in a sophisticated, human, and Constitutional way. Policing should not be a bosses' job but rather a cop's job because it is my view that perhaps the American police officers in this last quarter of the twentieth century has the most important job around [emphasis added].

This change in focus may seem foreign to police officers. In having been repeatedly told what to do, the officers are not accustomed to being asked what they think needs to be done. With NOP, the officers will no longer have to "sneak around" to do the type of work they were looking for when they joined the department. If this new role, expanded and more abstract, is difficult for the officers to initially accept, it may be devastating for their superordinates. NOP envisions sergeants (i.e., traditionally, first-line supervisors) and shift lieutenants to also become managers; a role that stands in sharp contrast to functions traditionally performed in "event" or "incident-driven" policing.

NOP is not in search of the proverbial "quick fix" designed to cosmetically alter perceptions; rather, it is designed to institute meaningful change in the city's neighborhoods. Because it is not a program, it does not call for more specialization or "splitting" the patrol force into various groups with each group dedicated to serve either different or redundant functions. What NOP does call for is a genuine recognition of the complexity of the task at hand and the important function served by police officers in, not only handling an almost infinite variety of dispatched calls, but in facilitating work to solve community problems.

To accomplish this end, a sound management system will need to be developed to support NOP. Quasi-military management structures, usually much

more military than "quasi," will not support the fruition of NOP. In point of fact, traditional and bureaucratic "control-oriented" management systems predicated on an ability for quick reaction to one incident after another will impede, if not totally stymie, the development and implementation of NOP. A more progressive alternative is required that extends beyond participatory management and involves input from the citizenry in addressing community concerns for public safety. The alternative envisioned through NOP provides a rare opportunity for department members and community representatives to draft an acceptable framework for service delivery that aligns department resources in response to community expectations. Attempts to force the functions served by NOP into existing structures will not work. Structure must envelop function. Once a functional foundation has been laid, work can commence on the appropriate structure to support the function. A change in the way those little the boxes are configured in table of organization charts can be expected to make traditionally-oriented commanders nervous.

Team policing has been in and out of vogue for a number of years. It is closely akin to NOP in emphasizing crime prevention and close relations between the police and the public. Results from evaluations of team policing programs, of more than just passing interest to NOP, are not encouraging. In one study after another, implementation of these programs encountered formidable opposition. In drawing upon John Angell's experience with the Holyoke, Massachusetts, Police Department, Radelet (1986) indicates that the successful implementation of team policing ". . . requires substantial changes in management philosophy and in police training." Going further, Radelet (1986) cites David Anderson's assessment as to why team policing has not proliferated in American policing. According to Anderson:

The real issue is power. If police administrators are serious about giving captains and lieutenants full authority over a neighborhood, if they are serious about giving sergeants and patrol officers the right to participate in decision making, then they are talking about taking power away from some people and granting it to others. And that rarely happens without a battle in organizations like police departments.

While Chief Brown has served notice that NOP will be implemented -- "This isn't an experiment." -- he has also indicated that architectural work to develop this concept will begin from the bottom up. Because patrol officers are more familiar with their beats than anyone else, it logically follows that the process needed to facilitate implementation of NOP begins with the patrol officers themselves. Given the command staff's commitment and an abundance of talent throughout the department, it is anticipated that historical records of the department's effort to implement and institutionalize NOP will one day be recognized as the policing style for America, if not the free world.

Despite troubling concern for management development, what kinds of training will be needed to support NOP? Clearly, the training implications to facilitate NOP are mind boggling. There are two issues of immediate concern. The first addresses the issue of crime. Given the crime fighting emphasis that has evolved in policing since the 1930s, Radelet (1986) asks a pertinent question, ". . . why should police officers be trained as if most of their time were spent catching crooks, when most of their time is not spent catching crooks?" The following remarks made by Newman (1986) lend some credence to Radelet's question:

An ordinary patrol officer in a metropolitan police agency probably devotes no more than 10 to 15 percent of available time to activities directly related to criminal law enforcement. And even here, 'crime fighting' most often entails intervention in minor crime situations involving misdemeanors and public order

offenses. A patrol officer may experience long intervals of on-duty assignment between felony arrests, and many officers serve years without using side arms.

In attempting to separate myth from reality, NOP recognizes that the majority of an officer's time is not spent on "crime fighting." But, as mentioned elsewhere, policing large cities entails unpredictable danger. Concern for officer safety is a high priority, and officers must be prepared when confronted with combative situations. And even though less than 20 percent of an officer's time is directly engaged in criminal matters, it is vitally important for quality investigations to occur so that more time can be devoted to training officers in basic investigative skills including searching for and collecting evidence, canvassing neighborhoods to locate witnesses, interviewing witnesses, interrogating suspects, preserving physical evidence, writing reports, preparing photo spreads, conducting lineups, preparing cases for submission to prosecutors, etc. This is by no means to suggest that curriculum in recruit training be unnecessarily laden with courses on weaponry, self-defense, assault tactics, etc. But it does not negate the significance of having officers prepared to handle that one percent of all police calls that result in violent crimes and in conducting thorough investigations of crimes that pose no immediate danger to the officers.

The second training issue addresses problem solving. Because of Goldstein's influence on NOP, training will be needed to develop a variety of new skills to assist officers in communicating with the public, in learning to discern citizens' expectations, in public speaking, in collecting and analyzing data, in planning and developing implementation strategies--in short--in developing ways to work more closely with the public in solving neighborhood problems. Equally vital is the development of management training for the

officers, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. New roles will require increased responsibility in coordinating the efforts of the officers. The development of assessment techniques that allow district sergeants, shift lieutenants, captains, and deputy chiefs to monitor results achieved in the neighborhoods will be required. Most of the ground to be plowed is new. Unfortunately, very few models exist that can be emulated.

In anticipation of training requirements to support citywide implementation of NOP, Chief Brown has already established a department Training Task Force, headed by Assistant Chief T. G. Koby, Field Operations Command (FOC). The task force has already been divided into several subcommittees to explore considerations regarding the recruitment and selection of candidates, curriculum development for recruit and in-service training, the impact NOP will have on criminal investigations, management training, etc.

Moreover, the issue of performance evaluation has perplexed police administrators for years. Is it possible that the more significant accomplishments made by the officers on a day-to-day basis have gone unnoticed? Methods used to assess officer performance have traditionally relied on "bean counting" measures such as summing the number of tickets issued, calls handled, arrests made, reports taken, miles driven or, on the investigative side, massaging the statistical artifacts of the investigative process, i.e., clearances. As already mentioned, NOP is more concerned with results than it is with activities. This is not to deride the tasks performed by the department's employees. Meaningful performance measures are as important to the organization as they are to the employees. Thankfully, NIJ has provided the Houston Police Department with a grant to develop meaningful performance criteria to support the department's NOP initiative. This work is

presently being performed in conjunction with the Police Foundation.

NOP constitutes a bold endeavor to change direction in policing; to more closely unite the police with the public. The display of a united front, of officers working in unison with citizens and, equally important, with one another provides the most effective assurance to control crime, thereby enhancing the quality of life for all Houstonians. But this endeavor is as arduous as bold. It will require work and even more sacrifice. This is called for, given bleak budgetary forecasts, when disincentives to work hard seem to prevail. But it is just possible that this work and sacrifice will provide a legacy to policing that will inspire other law enforcement agencies to rethink their missions in light of community needs and expectations.

Unlike a sign hung outside police headquarters in a city in New England that displays the following remark, "This Isn't Burger King So You Can't Have It Your Way," NOP provides customized policing that caters to the individual needs of the city's neighborhoods. NOP does not require more equipment or additional resources. It requires a change in thinking about the essence of policing. This spirit is perhaps best exemplified by an observation made by Jerome Skolnick and captured by Radelet (1986) that states as follows:

The problem of police in a democratic society is not merely a matter of obtaining new police cars and more sophisticated equipment, or communication systems, or of recruiting men who have to their credit more years of education. **What is necessary is a significant alteration in the philosophy of police [emphasis added],** so that police 'professionalization' rests upon the values of a democratic legal polity, rather than merely on the notion of technical proficiency to serve the public order of the state.

In having discussed the philosophical underpinnings of NOP, the next chapter begins to focus more specifically on the ramifications NOP has for criminal investigations, beginning with a review of the history of criminal investigations.

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CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Introduction

Criminal investigation does not lend itself to precise definition because of the different types of investigative functions performed. Some forms of investigation are generated to "make cases" on individuals known to be implicated in illicit activities. These types of "instigative investigations" can be quite complex, spanning the globe and involving hundreds of individuals of different nationalities, or they may simply be initiated in response to a citizen complaint about a person alleged to be selling drugs next to a school playground.

Perhaps most common, particularly for municipal police agencies, are the types of follow-up investigations required to unravel a case in which the perpetrators are not known. These types of investigations generally involve a post facto inquiry, back in time, to reconstruct the circumstance, including actions or inactions, that contributed to the violation of one or more criminal statutes.

Modern day criminal investigation can involve coordinating the collection, analysis, preservation, and presentation of evidentiary information in criminal proceedings among a variety of police, forensic, and legal specialists. These specialists would most certainly include the criminal investigators themselves along with the prosecutors and a mix of polygraph examiners, fingerprint classifiers, voice identification examiners, individuals from criminalistics and ballistics, toxicologists, histologists, and serologists from the medical

examiner's office, expert witnesses, and possibly a graphologist (i.e., hand writing specialist). And a variety of techniques can be used to facilitate the acquisition of information and evidence needed for criminal prosecution. Techniques used may include link analysis to identify network constellations, tactical analysis to determine the temporal and geographic parameters of crime patterns, the use of sonar, radar, and elaborate types of electronic and physical (including aerial and marine) surveillance to monitor the movement of suspects or stalk the shipment of cargo, not to mention painstaking audit of bank records, tax returns, investment instruments, bills of lading, travel vouchers, and money transfers.

Aside from more exotic technological advances in electronic transmitters and receivers, artificial computer intelligence, and satellite photography, equipment used in the analysis of evidence has also become very sophisticated. A recent series of homicides in the Tampa area involved examination of carpet fibers (i.e., red lustrous and delustered trilobal fibers). The equipment used in this analysis consisted of a stereoscopic microscope, a comparison microscope, a polarized light microscope, a microspectrophotometer, a melting point apparatus, and an infrared spectrophotometer (Terry, et al., 1987). Even more astounding, "genetic fingerprinting," i.e., analysis of blood, skin, hair, saliva, and semen, to determine individual deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) patterns, was used to convict a man for raping a crippled, 43-year-old woman in Bristol, England (Law Enforcement News, December, 1987) and, even more recently (February, 1988), to convict a rapist in Orlando, Florida.

Thief-Takers and Runners

The present day application of scientific methods to assist the criminal

investigator in preparing cases for prosecution stands in sharp contrast to earlier practices used to identify, capture, and convict criminals. The forerunners of modern day detectives were initially known as "thief-takers." Their emergence during the late 1600s or early 1700s apparently resulted from a failure of uniformed police patrols to prevent crime. According to Weston (et al., 1970):

. . . police patrols did not remove the need or motivation for crime, and the ingenuity and stealth of many criminals allowed them to commit crimes despite police patrols. Unsolved crimes led to public indignation. Crimes in an apparent series were particularly demonstrative of the impotence of police and revealed the need for diligent inquiry by persons with special skills.

The inception of thief-taking in both England and France did not emerge without considerable difficulty. In France, for example, the percept "set a thief to catch a thief" literally describes a thief-taker, Eugene Francois Vidocq, who was hired by the Prefecture of Police in Paris during the early 1800s. Prevailing thought at that time suggested that crime could only be fought by former, reformed criminals (i.e., ex-convicts). Vidocq directed a group of ex-convicts to investigate crimes and arrest criminals. Despite some apparent successes, however, Vidocq and his squad were eventually disbanded. The other police officers could not accept the notion of using ex-convicts in positions of public trust (Weston, et al., 1970).

Before thief-takers became popular in England, citizens had always suspected thief-takers to be thieves, given the criminal proclivities of one, Jonathan Wild, a self-proclaimed "Thief-Taker General," who syndicated thievery in and about London during the first quarter of the 18th century. Wild was renowned for recovering property for a reward; "with no questions asked." But his operations were eventually disclosed, and he was hanged in 1725.

The legitimate use of thief-takers in criminal investigations began in London, not under the authority of the police, but under the authority of the Magistrate of Westminster Court, Thomas de Veil, around 1740. Before the advent of "Scotland Yard," de Veil, a former military officer, directed and supervised a small group of volunteer, nonuniformed homeowners to "take thieves." Once a reported crime had come to their attention, they would respond to the scene and begin an investigation.

Following de Veil's death in office in 1748, Henry Fielding (noted playwright and novelist) became Magistrate of Westminster Court. Sir Henry continued the use of homeowners as thief-takers. By 1752, he began aggregating data about criminals, and he published and circulated this information throughout London, inadvertently advancing the importance of a function now known as crime analysis.

Sir Henry resigned in 1754 for reasons of health and was succeeded by his blind half-brother, John. During the 25-year tenure of Sir John, the term, "thief-takers," was rejected in favor of a new name, "Bow Street Runners," because the public had begun to equate the business of apprehending criminals with the location of the court that was located on London's Bow Street. Moreover, the negative connotation of associating "thief-taking" with the unsavory likes of Jonathan Wild was not lost in the mind of the public.

At the time of Sir John's death in 1780, four of the Bow Street Runners had emerged as the first group of salaried police officers to perform criminal investigations in plain clothes. Weston (et al., 1970) notes:

The runners of Bow Street were allowed to function as private investigators. Banks and other business firms could hire any one of them. While such work was in addition to their assigned duties, several of the runners earned considerable sums each year to supplement their official income. Their work in Bow Street as criminal investigators provided these men with excellent sources of information

about thieves and highwaymen and contributed to their competence when serving as private investigators.

The Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 formally abolished the Bow Street Runners. This act extended the jurisdiction of the London Metropolitan Police, organized by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, to include the area formerly policed by the Bow Street Runners. This move was possibly motivated by a suspicion of collusion between some of the criminals and a few of the runners. This suspicion was grounded in sporadic, albeit minor, scandals that disclosed a cozy relationship between some of the highwaymen and thieves and a few of their "pursuers."

The introduction of plain clothes police officers was intended to conceal the identity of individuals as policemen. While it is not known when police officers first began to work in plain clothes, some of the Bow Street Runners who had been involved in criminal investigations wore plain clothes. Of course, early police attire was far from uniform. Police "uniforms" generally consisted of civilian dress that displayed some type of distinguishing badge.

The first plain clothes assignment made by the London Metropolitan Police occurred in 1833, and the results eventually embarrassed the department. A sergeant named William Popay was instructed to obtain information about a political group, the National Political Union, to determine if this group was conspiring against the government. But in his capacity as an undercover operative Popay became enthralled with the group's activities. He began to express revolutionary ideas, and he made inflammatory speeches. One day, however, his police identity was accidentally discovered by a member of the group he had "joined." When other group members learned of his true identity, they became enraged and informed the public what had happened. Public indignation with this type of police tactic provoked Parliament to ban further

use of plain clothes police officers as spies. As for Popay, he was censured for his conduct and dismissed from the force (Weston, et al., 1970).

The public's reaction to the "Popay incident" restricted the use of plain clothes assignments for several years in the London Metropolitan Police. But the practice was later readopted to combat an increase in robberies and burglaries.

Detectives

The English author, Charles Dickens, is credited with being the first person to coin the word, detective. Dickens used the word in a mystery novel entitled Bleak House. The major character in the book, an Inspector Bucket of Scotland Yard, always introduced himself to others as being "of the Detectives" or as being a "detective officer" (Weston, et al., 1970).

The creation of a "Detective Department" for the London Metropolitan Police began on an experimental basis with approval from the British Home Office on June 20, 1842. Initially staffed by two detective-inspectors and six detective-sergeants, this "Department" was charged with responsibility to gather information about crimes and criminals. The detective-sergeants were selected from the ranks of patrolmen, and they were given a slight salary increase (Weston, et al., 1970).

In 1846, the first commanding officer of the Scotland Yard detectives, Nicholas Pearce, was ordered to develop a "field force" of detectives from among the uniformed divisions. The detectives selected were to remain in their districts and to work with detectives from other uniform divisions and the central detective force. Thus, by 1846, Scotland Yard had decentralized their criminal investigations function.

In 1877, Scotland Yard's Criminal Investigation Division was shaken by a scandal involving three senior division detectives, who had received payoffs from a London gambling syndicate. The following year, after an intensive investigation of detective operations by the British Home Office, the detective force was reorganized and a new Criminal Investigation Department was created. Under this latest reorganization, each of the patrol divisions were allowed to retain a detective-inspector to investigate less serious crimes confined to their respective patrol areas.

Following the gambling scandal of 1877, the continuance of the department's detectives was again jeopardized in 1889 by a pattern of unsolved murders attributed to the notorious "Jack the Ripper," who fatally stabbed and slashed six women in a period of four months. According to Weston (et al., 1970):

. . . the viciousness of the attacks and the inability of the police to develop a single promising lead after the first few deaths led to terror throughout London. The killer was a nocturnal criminal, but despite nighttime patrols victim after victim was murdered. The public outcry centered on police failure to identify and apprehend the killer after investigating the first murder. As the murders continued and opened up additional opportunity for investigation, an angry public rejected a system of investigation keyed to informers as the middlemen of criminal investigation. The public, threatened by an apparently emotionally disturbed and sadistic killer, couldn't care less that this criminal was a loner and concealed his operations and, therefore, that the detectives had not been contacted by an informant and could not develop one. . . . Queen Victoria stated the general attitude and opinion of the public when she commented on the police impotence, 'Our detectives are not what they should be.'

The evolution of detectives as a legitimate part of police service encountered considerable difficulty in Europe. The emergence of detectives in America was not realized without also experiencing considerable difficulty, particularly, in relationship to the vagaries in governing practices found

among county, state, and municipal authorities.

The Evolution of Criminal Investigations in the United States

Because of the lack of uniform reporting procedures among law enforcement agencies until this century, it is difficult to estimate the extent of crime during colonial times (even today, victimization surveys suggest that the majority of serious crime [i.e., 65 percent] is not reported to the police). What is known is that there were incidences of robberies and burglaries (housebreakings). But, according to Weston (et al., 1970), serious professional crime did not appear until shortly after the turn of the 19th century, somewhere between 1810 and 1820, and the first instance of professional crime was counterfeiting. Investigative activity to address this problem was, for the most part, nonexistent.

The posting of rewards predates use of any formalized investigative intervention before the mid-1800s, whether the crime involved counterfeiting, arson, robbery, or burglary. For some types of crimes such as arson, murder, and aggravated assault, state and municipal monies were used to fund rewards, although individual victims could post their own rewards or solicit funds from family and friends if local assistance was not available (Weston, et al., 1970).

Similar to the origin of policing in England, policing during colonial times was done, according to Marchiafava (1977), by part-time "volunteers" selected to demonstrate civic duty (salaried, municipal police officers under one central authority first appeared in Philadelphia in 1833, although this department was disbanded three years later). Often inconvenienced, these part-time volunteers hired night watchmen to patrol the streets (citizens in

Boston had voted in 1712 to pay night watchmen "for their toil" [Swanson, et al., 1988]) to patrol the streets (Marchiafava, 1977). But because of their daily contacts with crime and criminals, many of the volunteer officers became adept at catching crooks. Not unlike their earlier English counterparts, some of these part-time volunteers made substantial sums of money in collecting reward money for their efforts.

Perhaps a forerunner to modern day "sting activities," the police once advertised use of reward money as an incentive to recover stolen property. This method, however, seemed to provide an incentive for thieves to steal more property and then return it for a fee, again, with "no questions asked." Once the police had decided to discontinue this practice, however, the thieves, ". . . finding they could no longer steal and bargain, were forced to sell the stolen property, and police supervision of pawnshops, secondhand dealers, junk shops, and known receivers of stolen goods produced results previously unknown--and at no cost to the owner of the property" (Weston, et al., 1970).

Following the appointment of Francis Tukey as Marshal of the Boston Police Department in 1846, this agency became the first department, at least in New England, to appoint police officers as detectives (it wasn't until 1857 that New York City appointed 20 patrol officers as detectives), because, according to Weston (et al., 1970), of their "knowledge of rogues and their schemes." Marshal Tukey used his detectives to perform "decents" in areas of Boston that catered to gambling and prostitution activities. In 1851, Tukey also introduced the concept of the "show-up" (line-up), which has since then been adopted by many police agencies throughout the world.

According to one student (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988):

American cities needed reliable detectives for several reasons. First, graft and corruption were common among America's big city police officers. Second, police

jurisdiction was limited. Third, there was little communication of information among departments in different cities. Thus, offenders often fled from one jurisdiction to another with impunity.

Ironically, it was not in the public sector but in the private sector that detectives achieved national notoriety following their inception into American policing during the mid-1800s. And even a cursory overview of the history of criminal investigations in America would be incomplete without mention of Allan Pinkerton, certainly one of, if not, the most famous detective in this country's history.

Pinkerton was appointed as Chicago's first detective in 1849 by Mayor Boone. Because of political interference, however, Pinkerton's stay with Chicago was short-lived. He formed a firm with a Chicago attorney named Edward Rucker. This firm, The Pinkerton Detective Agency, opened in Chicago in 1850 and eventually became highly diversified in the field of criminal investigations. Pinkerton and his detectives ". . . established themselves in the East by conducting extensive undercover work for management in labor disputes, in the West by hunting down train robbers, and across the country by catching thieves, forgers, kidnappers, and confidence men" (Weston, et al., 1970). One of Pinkerton's operatives was directly instrumental in infiltrating the notorious Molly Maguires in the coal regions of Pennsylvania that resulted in the hanging deaths of twenty convicted members of this group between 1877 and 1878. Pinkerton's "private eyes" (a sign over Pinkerton's headquarters in Chicago showed an open eye with the caption, "We Never Sleep") were also instrumental in running Butch Cassidy (Robert Parker) and the Sun Dance Kid (Harry Longabaugh) out of the country (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988). Finally, Pinkerton himself apparently thwarted an assassination attempt against President-elect Abraham Lincoln in 1861 by diverting the train Lincoln was

riding on back to Washington away from Baltimore, which Pinkerton's sources had indicated was the location where the assassination was to take place.

In summarizing Pinkerton's approach to criminal investigations, Weston (et al., 1970) states that:

Pinkerton believed honesty and integrity were good business. Soon the reputation of his agency and his agents surpassed that of most of the police forces of the nation. He refused the concept of commission or reward based on the results of investigation. His agency offered its services at a stated sum per day for each detective employed on a case plus minimal out-of-pocket expenses; and Pinkerton offered no guarantee of success. He did, however, advise his agents and his clients that any agent found to have taken a gift, reward, or bribe would be instantly dismissed. Pinkerton sold honest work and profited, because major business organizations in America found his work produced results in solving crimes and in tracking down criminals.

At the turn of this century, detectives enjoyed considerable autonomy. As Eck (1983) notes, "The political machines which ran the cities often ran the police departments. . . . Detectives not only mixed with the criminal element, but sometimes regulated criminal enterprise for the benefit of the local politicians--and themselves." Many detectives were therefore more sensitive to the needs of local politicians than they were to their own chiefs of police.

After repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933, ". . . many former bootleggers and other criminals turned to bank robbery and kidnapping" (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988). Given a wave of kidnappings that followed Prohibition, public indignation about the inability of local police to deal with this problem became manifest. The kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's 20-month-old infant son in 1932 was particularly devastating. Public arousal in response to this act culminated in congressional enactment of the "Lindbergh Law," a federal statute that was to be enforced by the Bureau of Investigation (renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 1935).

Federal agents soon became known as "G-men" and gained the confidence of the public. While local authorities initially resented the notion of concurrent jurisdiction in sharing investigative responsibility with government officials for certain types of crime, the relationship helped establish a national law enforcement network among officers from city, county, state, and federal jurisdictions for the exchange of information and technical assistance in solving crimes. Moreover, the reputation earned by federal agents during the 1920s and 1930s influenced many municipal police agencies to adopt more modern and progressive techniques in the investigation of crime (in 1931, the Wickersham Commission, although critical of lower courts, had admonished the police in the use of rubber hoses [the "third degree"] to facilitate confessions during interrogations).

Because of the public's outcry to clean up corruption and "kick the rascals out of city hall," the political power bases of some elected officials had begun to erode before the turn of the century. The Pendleton Act of 1883 had set a precedent in seeking to eliminate the ills of the "spoils system" for federal employees. Many states and local governments passed similar legislation over the next thirty years, establishing civil service systems designed to protect government employees from political influence. For example, civil service advocates were successful in eliminating the political spoils system in New York City in 1884 and in Chicago in 1885.

As muckraking intensified after the turn of the century in disclosing one scandal after another, the "progressive movement," as the reformation is referred to by historians, gained momentum. By the end of the "Roaring Twenties," civil service regulations were present in a majority of the nation's cities with populations of 100,000 or more (Marchiafava, 1977).

Electorial response in attempts to dismantle the political machines led to an increase in power for the police chiefs. The police chiefs placed as much distance as they could between themselves and city hall, while they sought to wrest control of the detectives away from elected officials. Police reformers demanded closer supervision of detectives with better documentation to account for their activities. Gradually, the orientation of detective activity began to shift away from concentrating on offenders to focusing attention on individual cases. As Eck (1983) notes:

Working offenders starts with knowing who is actively engaged in criminal activity on a regular basis and then attempting to gather sufficient evidence to arrest these people for committing a particular offense. Working cases starts with the report of a criminal offense and then attempting to establish the identity of the offenders in order to make arrests. Working cases permitted numerical productivity measures (e.g., clearance and arrest rates) to be used in order to exercise greater control over the members of the detective bureau. However, working cases also meant that detectives no longer could rely to the degree they had on the criminal element for information.

The offender-oriented programs that came out of the 1970s, i.e., the Kansas City (Missouri) Police Department's Location Oriented Surveillance (LOS) and Suspect Oriented Surveillance (SOS) programs and the Wilmington (Delaware) Police Department's Split-Force Project (a segment of which devoted attention to problematic offenders), along with a later emphasis on "career criminals" and the current attention given to the Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan Police Department's Repeat Offender Program (ROP) are now back in vogue and considered by many to be new and innovative approaches in addressing crime (Eck, 1983).

Scientific Contributions

The progressive movement to improve local government and, thereby, various aspects of police operations has had less direct impact in changing criminal

investigations in America than events and developments that occurred in other fields, namely, decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and scientific innovations.

If necessity is the mother of invention, it is understandable that most of the contributions made in the development of criminalistics originated in Europe. This development borrowed from a number of more established disciplines including geology, physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics.

The first major book to describe the application of scientific inquiry to criminal investigation was written by an Austrian, Hans Gross, in 1893. The book, System der Kriminalistik (Criminal Investigation), was translated into English in 1906 and still stands as the seminal work in criminalistics.

Gross advanced meticulous accuracy in working with physical evidence and exalted impeccable honesty in criminal investigations. According to Weston (et al., 1970):

His greatest contribution to the introduction of science in criminal investigation was the advocacy of a parallel system of inquiry based upon the crime scene. Gross disliked the existing concept of dependence upon an informant or a detective's knowledge of the underworld and became the leading exponent of crime reconstruction. He rejected the informer or undercover agent, . . . consistently expressing his belief that technical proof uncovered or developed by scientific methods far surpassed information or testimonial evidence.

The development of photography initially assisted the police in identifying criminals. But as crime and the number of criminals increased police record systems became overburdened. Clerks were no longer able to efficiently retrieve photographs from storage for comparative purposes, and the earlier problems that had predated photography in the identification of criminals returned.

Alphonse Bertillon, now credited with being the father of criminal

identification, began his career in policing in 1879 as a clerk in the identification division of the Prefecture of Police in Paris. Although Alphonse was the grandson of a well known naturalist and mathematician and the son of a distinguished French anthropologist, he experienced difficulty in school as a youngster (he was expelled for poor work) and later in the military, and he was dismissed from several jobs. The clerk's position he had with the Prefecture of Police, although considered to be menial work, was obtained through his father's "good connections" (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

It was also through his father that Alphonse became aware of Adolphe Quetelet's research that indicated that no two persons had identical measurements (Weston, et al., 1970). Alphonse Bertillon began to question procedures used in the identification division to identify criminals. The information contained in the cards used to describe criminals was so vague it was almost worthless (e.g., "stature: average . . . face: ordinary," etc.). He constructed a series of physical measurements of body parts such as the head, legs, ears, feet, arms, and torso. He ". . . concluded that if eleven physical measurements of a person were taken, the chances of finding another person with the same eleven measurements were 4,191,304 to 1" (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

Not surprisingly, given the bureaucratic mind-set, his initial proposals regarding "anthropometrical signalment" were rejected outright, and he became the target of jokes and ridicule. But in 1883, after permission had been granted to test his system, the system correctly identified a prisoner named Martin, who had tried to conceal his identity under the alias of Dupont. This event received worldwide attention, and Bertillon's system of anthropometry was soon adopted by almost all European countries (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

In 1888, Bertillon came up with yet another innovation he referred to as the portrait parle, the prototype of what is today known as the "mug shot." Not being portable, the anthropometrical system was largely confined to the identification division. It was simply not practical for officers, who had stopped individuals on the street for questioning, to take a series of body part measurements. In response to the officers' complaints, Bertillon ". . . supplemented available photographs with extensive categorization of the size and shape of the head, face, forehead, ears, eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin" (Weston, et al., 1970). Both the full face and profile photographs of a person were displayed on each card, and the card contained measurement information and details regarding facial characteristics. Bertillon is therefore also recognized as being the first person to create a system of visual identification from photographs.

Without discounting the significant contributions made by Bertillon, he was understandably defensive about his system. As dactylography (a system of classifying fingerprints) developed, Bertillon reluctantly added fingerprints to his portrait parle, ". . . at first only four from the left hand but later all ten fingerprints from both hands" (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

England was the first country to officially adopt fingerprinting as a means of criminal identification in 1900. But knowledge of fingerprints have a lengthy history. As indicated by Swanson, Jr. (et. al., 1988):

. . . in the first century, the Roman lawyer Quintilianus introduced a bloody fingerprint in a murder trial, successfully defending a child against the charge of murdering his father. Fingerprints also were used on contracts during China's T'ang Dynasty in the eighth century as well as on official papers in fourteenth century Persia and seventeenth century England.

Through time, many individuals are known to have contributed to the

development of fingerprinting and fingerprint classification. In 1684, an Englishman, Dr. Nehemiah Grew, called attention to the patterns of ridges and pores on the skin of hands and feet, an observation made two years later by Mercello Malpigni. In 1823, a professor at the University of Breslau, John Perkinje, developed a general method of classifying fingerprints based on nine types of fingerprint patterns. And in 1858 a British official named William Herschel, who was working in India, began to collect palm and fingerprints of individuals with whom he did business, anticipating that it would help keep agreements made between him and his associates. He continued this practice for almost 20 years and discovered that the fingerprint patterns never changed for the same individual. In the meantime, a Scottish physician, Henry Faulds, who was teaching physiology in a Tokyo hospital, had also been interested in fingerprints. In 1880, he lifted a "sooty print" that had been left on a whitewashed wall and was able to convince the police that the person they had in custody was not the thief (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

In having developed an interest in criminal identification and familiar with the work of Herschel, Sir Francis Galton, an English anthropologist who had published extensively in meteorology and eugenics, published the first definitive piece on dactylography in 1892 (Galton was unable to contact Faulds to obtain his work). The book was entitled Finger Prints, and it presented documentation on the uniqueness of fingerprints and outlined numerous principles of identification by fingerprints. And in Argentina just two years later Juan Vucetich published a book, Dactiloscopia Comparada, on the use of fingerprints to facilitate criminal identification. But it was Edward Henry, who had become Inspector General of Police of Nepal in India in 1891, that, in having studied Galton's work, developed a simple and reliable system for

classifying fingerprints that was eventually adopted in England in 1900. Henry published his work, Classification and Use of Finger Prints in 1901, the same year he advanced to the position of Assistant Police Commissioner of London, eventually rising to the post of Commissioner (Swanson, Jr., et al., 1988).

Even though Vucetich's book predated Henry's work by seven years, Henry's system was to become more widely used, although some experts still prefer Vucetich's method. Because of the number of individuals that contributed to the development of fingerprint classification, it is difficult to credit any one person with the most significant contribution.

A contemporary of Alphonse Bertillon, Dr. Edmond Locard, established a police laboratory in Lyons, France, in 1910. Locard encouraged applying methods used in the natural sciences to criminal investigations. He published an article in 1928 that dealt with "Dust and Its Analysis" and two years later produced another article that introduced the "concept of exchange" in describing the transfer of physical evidence. His interest ultimately resulted in publication of a seven-volume, three-thousand-page Traite de Criminalistique (Treatise on Criminalistics), which helped pioneer development of criminology as a science.

Not unlike the evolution of fingerprint identification, more than a few persons were responsible for advances made in bullet and firearms identification. Known today as ballistics, a term coined by U.S. Army Colonel Calvin Goddard, this discipline has been especially significant in criminal investigations in the United States, given the country's history with the use of firearms.

One of the last of the Bow Street Runners, Henry Goddard (it is unknown whether Calvin was a kin to Henry), was first to identify a murderer in 1835

based on the recovery of a bullet from the body of a victim. According to Swanson, Jr. (et al., 1988):

Goddard noticed that the bullet had a distinctive blemish on it, a slight gouge. At the home of one suspect, Goddard designed a bullet mold with a defect whose location corresponded exactly to the gouge on the bullet. The owner of the mold confessed to the crime when confronted with this evidence.

In 1889, Professor Lacassagne removed a bullet from a corpse in France. His examination of this projectile revealed seven grooves made on the bullet as the bullet passed through the barrel of a gun. He was given several different guns the police had taken from some suspects and asked to see if he could identify which gun might have fired the bullet. His examination indicated that one of the guns examined could have produced the seven grooves. As a result of this information, a man was convicted of the murder, although a number of guns manufactured at that time could have produced similar marks.

A German chemist, Paul Jeserich, was given a bullet taken from the body of a man murdered near Berlin in 1989. Swanson, Jr. (et al., 1988) notes that "After firing a test bullet from the defendant's revolver, Jeserich took microphotographs of the fatal and test bullets and on the basis of the agreement between both their respective normalities and abnormalities, testified that the defendant's revolver fired the fatal bullet, contributing materially to the conviction obtained." Also mentioned by these authors, Jeserich, "Unknowingly at the doorstep of scientific greatness, . . . did not pursue this discovery any further, choosing instead to return to his other interests."

Perhaps the most important single article written on firearms identification was published in 1913 by Professor Balthazard. The article shifted attention away from bullets to other aspects of firearms noting, for

example, differences among weapons in marks left on cartridges by firing pin mechanisms, breechblocks, extractors, and ejectors.

But Calvin Goddard, a physician who served in the army during World War I, is rightly remembered as most responsible for raising firearms identification to a science, although substantial credit is also due Charles E. Waite, John Fisher, and Phillip Gravelle. In 1923, Goddard and Waite adapted the comparison microscope to firearms identification in their New York ballistics laboratory. After Waite's death in 1926, Goddard served as a technical expert on firearms identification for almost a quarter century before his death in 1946 (Weston, et al., 1970).

Aside from those already mentioned, other individuals that made significant contributions to forensic medicine and criminalistics deserve at least parting attention. As noted by Swanson, Jr. (et al., 1988), this list would include the following individuals:

. . . in 1910 Albert Osborn (1858-1946) wrote Questioned Documents, still regarded as a definitive work. . . . Leone Lattes (1887-1954) developed a procedure in 1915 which permitted blood typing from a dried bloodstain, a key event in forensic serology. Although more an administrator and innovator than a criminalist, August Vollmer's (1876-1955) support helped John Larson produce the first workable polygraph in 1921, and Vollmer established America's first full forensic laboratory in Los Angeles in 1923. In 1935, Harry Soderman and John O'Connell coauthored Modern Criminal Investigation, the standard work for the field for decades, until the publication of Paul Kirk's Crime Investigation in 1953. A biochemist, educator, and criminalist, Kirk helped develop the careers of many criminalists.

The Supreme Court

Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court took a more active role between 1961 and 1967 in "interpreting" the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the provisions of the Bill of Rights to criminal

proceedings in the various states. Why did the Supreme Court initiate this activity when political rhetoric sought "law and order"--when rising crime rates were "going out of sight"--when the public's fear of crime was intense--when the police were under growing pressure to "do something" about crime? Well, according to Swanson, Jr. (et al., 1988):

. . . the Supreme Court's role in the due process revolution was a response to a vacuum created when the police themselves failed to provide necessary leadership. The era of strong social activism by special-interest groups was not yet at hand, and neither state courts nor legislatures had displayed any broad interest in reforming the criminal law. . . . The Court may even have felt obligated by the inaction of others. The high court did not move into this arena until after it had issued warnings which, to responsive and responsible leaders, would have been a mandate for reform. It thus became the Warren Court's lot to provide the reforms so genuinely needed but so unpopularly received.

Beginning in 1961, several key decisions that would be rendered by the Supreme Court focused on two areas: Search and seizure, i.e., *Mapp v. Ohio* (1961) and a defendant's right to counsel, i.e., *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963), *Escobedo v. Illinois* (1984), and *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966]. Collectively, these decisions have had a profound effect on the investigative process. Swanson, Jr. (et al., 1988) states ". . . that they greatly reduced the use of questionable and improper tactics, thereby creating the need for new procedures in interrogations, line-ups, and seizure of physical evidence."

Not unexpectedly, the initial reaction by the police was that they were being "handcuffed." They were convinced that these decisions would impair them from doing their job. Support was garnered from the public, many of whom were adamant about the Court's decisions, resulting in the display of billboards that called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Warren.

By the early to mid-1970s, however, many police administrators recognized these decisions would facilitate the development of a more professional

approach to the investigative process. This approach would necessarily rely on increased and almost continual training, the development of new policies and procedures, and establishing a closer working relationship with local prosecutors. Because of the cases that specifically dealt with protecting a defendant's Constitutional rights for the presence of counsel during custodial interrogation, increased attention was inadvertently focused on the collection of physical evidence, e.g., skin tissue, saliva, blood, semen, hair fibers, spent cartridges, cloth and carpet fibers, etc. A greater reliance on physical evidence vis-a-vis confessions needed to achieve a conviction also increased the importance of criminalistic analysis, thereby elevating the role of criminalistics in the investigative process.

Research in Criminal Investigations

Most of the research published in criminal investigations before the 1970s occurred, as already mentioned, in ancillary, more technical scientific fields. And most all of the research that addressed police operations during the 1970s was primarily devoted to the patrol and, to a lesser extent, dispatch functions. Therefore, relative to all the research done in police operations proper, little has been done in criminal investigations.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, initiated by President Johnson on July 23, 1965, contained findings from one of the first empirical studies of criminal investigations. The study was conducted by the Institute of Defense Analysis in conjunction with the Los Angeles Police Department.

Published in the Commission's Task Force Report: Science and Technology, the study's author, Herbert Isaacs, found that 25 percent of all crimes

reported to the police resulted "in arrests or other clearances" (Silver, 1968). Of those cases cleared, seventy percent were cleared by arrest, of which ninety percent were made by patrol officers, although one fourth of these arrests were based on leads provided by detectives who had conducted follow-up investigations. More than half of the arrests were made within eight hours of the crime, and two-thirds of the arrests were made within the first week of the crime. The author indicated that the most important factor in clearance is whether or not a suspect was named in the initial report. If the suspect was ". . . neither known to the victim nor arrested at the scene of the crime, the chances of ever arresting him are slim" (Silver, 1968).

In 1970, a study was conducted by the New York City Rand Institute that examined how arrests were made by officers from the New York City Police Department. The study's author, Peter Greenwood, found that a substantial amount of detectives' time was wasted on the investigation of cases that could not be solved. He therefore concluded that cases be selected for follow-up investigation based on the likelihood of possible solution (Eck, 1979).

In 1972, the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), in having received a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now called the National Institute of Justice [NIJ]), developed criteria from an analysis of burglary cases from six police agencies in Alameda County, California, to help predict whether or not a particular burglary case would have been solved if assigned. Once the model (i.e., the Burglary Decision Model) had been developed, the researchers drew a sample of approximately 500 burglary cases from four of the original six Alameda County police agencies to test their model. Results indicated that the model correctly predicted from 67 to 90 percent of the investigative outcomes (i.e., those that would have been

screened out by the model had a much lower arrest and clearance rate than those that would have been selected for assignment).

Paralleling information presented in the report prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (already mentioned), the SRI report demonstrated that if basic information on burglary cases was collected from the witness or victim within one hour of the time of the incident, the potential for successful case solution was increased by 50 percent. Moreover, if suspect information was reported to the police no more than eight hours after a burglary, the potential for successful case closure could have been as high as 95 percent (Greenberg, et al., 1979). According to Greenberg (et al., 1979):

. . . all criminal cases do not have an equal potential for solution; 'that a large number of cases essentially solve themselves' when particular investigative elements (i.e., solvability factors) are present; and that in the absence of these elements certain cases should be screened out of the investigative process. These conclusions lie in direct contrast to traditional investigative strategy which supports active investigation, to varying degrees, of almost all criminal cases.

Following publication of SRI's results in screening burglary cases, the model was tested by the Peoria (Illinois) Police Department and by the Minnesota Crime Control Planning Board in four Minnesota police departments. The model's accuracy rate in predicting investigative outcomes was found to be more than 90 percent in Peoria, and, for the Minnesota agencies, ranged from 91 to 93 percent (Eck, 1979).

In 1975, a similar model (i.e., the Robbery Investigation Decision Model) was developed by SRI staff to screen robbery cases for the Oakland (California) Police Department. Criteria used to review cases included 17 solvability factors, e.g., "suspect named," "suspect known," "auto color given," "auto

description given," "auto license given," "weapon used," "physical evidence collected," etc. Each of the solvability factors were quantified by having a predetermined numerical weight attached to the factor. If the suspect was known, for example, this factor was accorded a weight of 10. If the weapon was known, a weight of 1.8 was assigned to this factor. If the sum of all the numerical factors exceeded 10, the case was assigned for follow-up investigation, and if the sum of the factors was less than or equal to 10 (the "cutoff" point) the case was not assigned (i.e., any further investigation was suspended).

When tested in Oakland, this system correctly predicted the outcome of follow-up investigations in 90 percent of the robbery cases. According to Greenberg (et al., 1979), this achieved both of the objectives established for the research that included:

. . . to ease the burden of investigators reviewing a high volume of felony crime reports that have a low probability of successful clearance [and] . . . to determine the elements of information leading to offender identification and case solution by investigative personnel.

By far, the most ambitious effort to assess case screening procedures involved the Police Executive Research Forum's (Eck, 1979) research replication of the SRI Burglary Decision Model. Called the Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication (BIDMOR) project, this effort, initiated in 1978, involved 26 police agencies that were members of the Police Executive Research Forum. The project was designed to identify burglary cases for follow-up investigation that had the greatest probability of being solved. In so doing, it sought to test the performance of SRI's ". . . statistically weighted information model by testing whether the model could predict case outcomes correctly by comparing the model's predictions with actual burglary case investigation results" (Eck, 1979).

Results from analysis of 12,001 burglary reports (the burglary sample drawn from each participating agency ranged from 480 to 523 cases) indicated that the prototype developed by SRI, while not perfect, was very accurate in predicting the outcome of investigative effort 85 percent of the time.

According to the study's author (Eck, 1979), several implications can be adduced from the results of this work:

. . . it is the characteristics of burglary cases, not follow-up investigations, that determines the overall success or failure rate of burglary investigations. This finding means also that police management can use the screening device to select from the flood of burglary reports they receive those cases that have the best chance of being solved. The screening model provides police managers with a tested tool with which they can direct their investigators to be more productive, or, put another way, less wasteful of increasingly scarce police resources. Managers thus have a device by which they can control assignment of burglary investigations and impose a degree of order in an area--police investigations--where attempts at management traditionally have been the exception rather than the rule. Currently, investigators make case assignment decisions based on their intuition or experientially derived judgement. Collectively these individual decisions determine department practice in the absence of an established management policy. Individuals, rather than management, are making the important choices inherent in the investigative decision-making process, thus removing control of the process from management.

Between the time the SRI case screening model was initially tested on burglary cases and the 26 city test replication of that model was completed by the Police Executive Research Forum, another study of criminal investigations, much broader in scope, was implemented that achieved almost immediate national notoriety. The Rand Corporation's study (three volumes) of The Criminal Investigation Process (Greenwood, et al., 1975) sought to describe "investigative organization and practices" including, among other things, how detectives spent their time and how crimes were solved. Restricting its analysis to the crimes of homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, and

theft, the study collected survey information from 153 police jurisdictions (out of 300 solicited) in the United States from county and municipal law enforcement agencies that had 150 or more full-time employees or that served a jurisdiction whose 1970 population exceeded 100,000. Information obtained from survey responses was bolstered by a more detailed examination of data collected from more than 25 cities that had completed the surveys. And a "limited phone survey" was made of robbery and burglary victims in one of the cities in which on-site observations were made.

Based on analysis of data collected, the findings revealed that the work actually performed by detectives stood in sharp contrast to the media image of the working detective as a ". . . clever, imaginative, perseverant, streetwise cop who consorts with glamorous women and duels with crafty criminals trying to break a single case, which is ultimately solved by means of the investigator's deductive powers" (Greenwood, et al., 1975). Rand further cited an almost complete lack of administrative control in managing criminal investigations. As presented by Greenwood (et al., 1975) in the first volume (i.e., Summary and Policy Implications) of the study's three reports, Rand found that:

- . . . Differences in investigative training, staffing, workload, and procedures appear to have no appreciable effect on crime, arrest, or clearance rates.
- The method by which police investigators are organized (i.e., team policing, specialists vs generalists, patrolmen-investigators) cannot be related to variations in crime, arrest, and clearance rates.
- . . . Substantially more than half of all serious reported crimes receive no more than superficial attention from investigators.
- . . . an investigator's time is largely consumed in reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims on cases that experience shows will not be solved. For cases that are solved

(i.e., a suspect is identified), an investigator spends more time in post-clearance processing than he does in identifying the perpetrator.

- . . . The single most important determinant of whether or not a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately responding patrol officer. If information that uniquely identifies the perpetrator is not presented at the time the crime is reported, the perpetrator, by and large, will not be subsequently identified.
- . . . Of those cases that are ultimately cleared but in which the perpetrator is not identifiable at the time of the initial police incident report, almost all are cleared as a result of routine police procedures. . . . that is, they required no imaginative exercise of investigative experience and skills. . . . Investigative 'special action' made a perceptible difference in only three types of crimes: commercial burglary, robbery, and homicide. In these crimes, we found that roughly 10 percent of the cases were solved as the result of nonroutine initiatives taken by investigators.
- . . . Most police departments collect more physical evidence than can be productively processed. . . . allocating more resources to increasing the processing capabilities of the department can lead to more identifications than some other investigative actions.
- . . . Latent fingerprints rarely provide the only basis for identifying a suspect. . . . [i.e.,] fingerprint identification did not have a significant effect on overall arrest rates in any department.
- . . . In relatively few departments do investigators consistently and thoroughly document the key evidentiary facts that reasonably assure that the prosecutor can obtain a conviction on the most serious applicable charges.
- . . . Police failure to document a case investigation thoroughly may have contributed to a higher case dismissal rate and a weakening of the prosecutor's plea bargaining position [in one of the jurisdictions studied].
- . . . victims . . . desire to be notified officially as to whether or not the police have 'solved' their case. . . .
- . . . Investigative strike forces have a significant potential to increase arrest rates for a few difficult

target offenses, provided they remain concentrated on activities for which they are uniquely qualified; in practice, however, they are frequently diverted elsewhere.

Prefaced by the remark that ". . . the effectiveness of criminal investigation would not be unduly lessened if approximately half of the investigative effort were eliminated or shifted to more productive uses" (Greenwood, et al., 1975), Rand researchers suggested nine "proposed reforms" to improve investigative productivity. These reforms, taken verbatim from the first volume, include the following:

- Reduce follow-up investigation on all cases except those involving the most serious offenses.
- Assign generalist-investigators (who would handle the obvious leads in routine cases) to the local operations commander.
- Establish a Major Offenders Unit to investigate serious crimes.
- Assign serious-offense investigations to closely supervised teams, rather than to individual investigators.
- Strengthen evidence-processing capabilities.
- Increase the use of information processing systems in lieu of investigators.
- Employ strike forces selectively and judiciously.
- Place post-arrest (i.e., suspect in custody) investigations under the authority of the prosecutor.
- Initiate programs designed to impress on the citizen the crucial role he plays in crime solution.

In general, these results and proposed reforms infuriated detectives. A satire of the stereotypical role of the detective in light of the findings was presented on "The Barney Miller Show," a situational comedy series that was popular at that time. Aside from the initial shock, however, the results did

eventually provoke serious inspection of the traditional investigative process.

Parenthetically, while the Rand and SRI studies were being conducted, several police departments were beginning to experiment with various procedural strategies and management techniques to improve criminal investigations. These agencies included: Fremont, California; DeKalb County, Georgia; Cincinnati, Ohio; Rochester, New York; and Washington, D.C. According to Greenberg (et al., 1979), these departments shared a number of common concerns that reinforced recommendations forthcoming from the Rand and SRI studies, including the following:

- Increased patrol officer involvement in investigative functions;

- Increased patrol officer and detective cooperation;

- Utilization of some form of early case closure [procedures];
and

- Increased cooperation between the police and prosecutor.

Other studies explored "team policing," a concept first introduced in Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1946. The Police Foundation funded two research initiatives in Rochester, New York, and Cincinnati, Ohio, to examine the effects of decentralizing some of the investigative functions to small geographical areas within these cities. Detectives were assigned to "team areas," where they were assisted by patrol officers in conducting preliminary and follow-up investigations. The studies produced mixed results, including the following (Eck, 1983):

- Team areas (decentralized) made a greater percentage of arrests for larcenies, burglaries and robberies than non-team areas (centralized);

- Team areas showed a greater number of on-scene arrests and follow-up investigation arrests than non-team areas;

- Team investigators gathered more information during follow-up investigations and seemed to use this information

better than non-team investigators;

. . . . Team policing . . . produced a higher clearance by arrest rate than either a fully or partly centralized approach;

There were no differences between team and non-team areas in terms of the ability to obtain descriptions of suspects from witnesses during preliminary investigations; and

There were no differences between the team and non-team areas in terms of arrests that resulted in prosecutions.

A response to remedy the "investigative inefficiencies" outlined in the Rand and SRI reports resulted in the development of a national program to help law enforcement agencies more effectively manage criminal investigations. Sponsored by NIJ, work began in the summer of 1976 to design an 18-month "field test" to implement the program which was called Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI). By December, 1976, five police agencies had been selected to "test" the MCI model, although implementation didn't actually begin until the spring of 1977. The agencies selected represented the following cities: Birmingham, Alabama; Santa Monica, California; Montgomery County, Maryland; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Rochester, New York.

The investigative and post-investigative process, as outlined by MCI, consisted of four operational components. These included: 1) the initial investigation; 2) case screening; 3) managing ongoing, follow-up investigations; and 4) establishing good liaison with the district attorney's office. Dividing the investigative process up into a series of discrete steps was intended to improve each individual step thereby improving overall investigative productivity.

Although representatives from the agencies involved in the field test indicated the program was successful, analysis of findings were less encouraging. For example, only two of the five departments involved in this

project (i.e., Birmingham and Santa Monica) were able to reassign detectives to other areas within their departments, because of reduced caseloads created through implementing case screening procedures. According to Greenberg (et al., 1979):

The Birmingham Police Department reassigned 7 of 23 burglary and larceny investigators to an Anti-Fencing and Fugitive Squad which could not have been created had MCI not screened out 75 to 80 percent of reported burglaries and larcenies. In Santa Monica, the detective division reduced its original force of 35 investigators by ten; 5 were transferred to the Major Crimes Unit and another 5 were lost to attrition. This significant reduction in manpower is attributed to the suspension of 70 to 75 percent of the robbery, burglary and larceny (under \$3,000) cases as a result of the case screening process.

Additionally, other anticipated outcomes were found, for the most part, to be inconsistent among the departments examined. Greenberg (et al., 1979) reports:

the average time devoted to initial investigations increased (relative to average service time prior to MCI) in some sites and remained constant in others;

follow-up investigators tended to retrace the steps taken by initial investigators in some sites and not in others;

the total investigative caseload was reduced in all sites;

the average monthly caseloads of investigators were reduced in some sites and not in others; and

the percentage of cases closed by the first review date rose in some sites and not in others.

Finally, local evaluations at each site did not reveal any significant before and after differences in arrest, clearance, and conviction rates.

Overall, while the initial test of MCI failed to produce more than it promised it did provide a milestone for future development. Greenberg (et al., 1979) indicates that ". . . the implementation of MCI be viewed as an ongoing process, one that extends beyond this initial effort to the development of the

kinds of investigative functions and strategies that may have more direct implications for efficiency." Greenberg (et al., 1979) suggested several "conditions for success" in implementing MCI. These included:

Commitment from Top Management. The implementation of MCI . . . is dependent on a commitment from the administration to the goals of the program and a willingness to alter policy and procedure in response to the dictates of the program design. This commitment from the top must necessarily translate into the assignment of individuals to key staff positions who share a basically common view of the nature and degree of change required to have the authority to effect that change.

Training. MCI is a response to the evidence that many of the traditional assumptions underlying the roles of patrol officers, detectives and supervisory personnel have led to the development of inefficient investigative strategies. If the implementation of MCI is to offer any potential for improving the efficiency of the investigative process, police departments must be willing to examine these assumptions in a way that at least makes it possible for them to change. Training can provide the foundation for the redefinition of roles and operating assumptions.

Call Screening System. . . . it is clear that the time devoted to initial investigations is limited by the pressure to respond to calls for service. . . . [but] calls can be stacked and patrol unit responses can be scheduled so that larger blocks of uncommitted time can be made available. It will not be possible to expand the patrol role in the investigative process in many police departments unless a call prioritization system and a system of differential response strategies are incorporated into the MCI program design.

Data System and Analysis. . . . The development of a monitoring system is dependent on two basic elements. The first is the availability of a management information system . . . that generates the kind of data required to assess investigative performance . . . The second . . . is a policy analyst responsible for detecting problems revealed by the data and offering recommendations for policy change, since police management rarely has either the time or the skills to perform this function.

Cost Considerations. . . . program planning should include an assessment of the cost implications of training, a management information system, data analysts, technical consultants and travel to observe the operations of existing MCI programs.

During the fall of 1976, work also was initiated to design an MCI training program. This program was to be delivered at ten preselected "regional workshops" across the country. Also funded through the NIJ, these sessions were eventually expanded to include an additional ten "department specific" sites for agencies requiring technical assistance in implementing procedures to more effectively manage their criminal investigations. Altogether, the 20 training presentations began during the latter part of 1976 and continued through the last quarter of 1978.

During the spring of 1978, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) held a series of "briefings" to consider the possibility of expanding MCI to other cities. Discussions at these meetings addressed the scope and objectives of MCI, preliminary results of program accomplishments from the five pilot agencies already funded through the NIJ, and the development of evaluation criteria to be used in monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of a new MCI initiative.

By late winter of 1978, program guidelines had been completed for this new initiative and were included in an "incentive grant" program that was distributed nationally by LEAA in early 1979. During the spring of 1979, LEAA asked representatives from a technical assistance contractor, University Research Corporation (a firm that had been instrumental in the original design of the MCI prototype), to develop a training program for prospective recipients of grant awards. Once developed and approved by LEAA, the program was presented at a "preaward training conference" in August of 1979. Following the training, agencies interested in participating in the new MCI program had approximately 80 days to complete and submit proposals to LEAA for funding consideration. The following year 15 cities from across the country were

awarded grants to participate in this program. These grants included a 24-month timetable for program implementation.

Given the demise of LEAA in 1982, the full impact of LEAA's (including NIJ's) MCI program was never thoroughly evaluated, although an evaluation report was published by the Urban Institute in 1979 regarding the five MCI test sites originally funded through NIJ. Perhaps with the possible exception of some police departments in California and Florida, states that had adopted the programmatic components of another LEAA national initiative that evolved during the mid-1970s, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), the overall impetus generated by LEAA during the mid- to late 1970s to improve management of criminal investigations gradually succumbed to spotty and infrequent MCI implementations among law enforcement agencies.

Results published during the late 1970s about the "success" of MCI program implementations that appeared in the Urban Institute's evaluation report and a variety of other "prescriptive packages," "program implementation guides," and MCI "test site manuals" were, in general, ambiguous and inconclusive. In its generic form, MCI displayed a propensity to address broad generalities in suggesting ways to improve investigative efficiency rather than in providing substantive detail in suggesting exactly how particular functions were to be performed. In-depth thought had not addressed differences in investigative routines among the various types of investigations performed, e.g., burglary, theft, homicide, robbery, rape, motor vehicle theft, arson, aggravated assault, etc. And little, if any, consideration was given to the rationale used in differentiating criteria for case screening vis-a-vis case assignment; two separate functions. While some departments did experience positive results in implementing certain programmatic components, no single agency achieved

"complete success" with the MCI program.

In retrospect, the MCI prototype did provide a structural framework for organizing some of the investigative functions that had gone undocumented theretofore. By analytically dividing the overall investigative process into a series of discrete, logically interdependent functions, the MCI model (at least) suggested a more formal method to establish objectives and thus monitor investigative performance through accounting for the outcome and disposition of cases. In so doing, it suggested the importance of establishing positive relations between the police and the prosecutors to review changes in the filing of charges and in tracking cases through the courts.

Perhaps of tantamount importance to the model itself, efforts to implement MCI revealed the weight tradition carries in thwarting organizational change. An important component of MCI included expanding the responsibilities of patrol officers in the investigative process. This change from tradition required patrol officers to perform more comprehensive "initial investigations" (the term, "preliminary investigation," suggests another investigation will follow), i.e., to conduct neighborhood canvasses, detect and collect physical evidence, interview witnesses, interrogate suspects, etc. It also included latitude to seek "early case closures" through following leads obtained during the initial investigation that resulted in the apprehension of suspects or, in having exhausted all leads or in failing to obtain any meaningful evidence, to inform victims that further investigation was unlikely, rather than telling them that they would be contacted by a detective.

Little wonder that MCI appears to be "detective negative," as mentioned by one of the guest speakers at the second Executive Session. Aside from management initiatives to identify "performance anchors" and develop methods to

better account for detectives' time and activities, using solvability factors to screen "unsolvable" cases out from assignment together with expanding the role of patrol officers to perform some follow-up investigations tends to threaten detectives. Many detectives perceive that a loss of work traditionally performed only by them would mean fewer detectives needed to pursue criminal investigations. This rationale is not illogical. As previously mentioned, two of the five departments involved in the original MCI research cut their investigative strength. Perhaps it is not surprising that MCI has continued to struggle with piecemeal implementations. Detectives who are, in general, most resistant to change can not realistically be expected to enthusiastically embrace MCI and the required changes that go along with this concept.

Moving into the 1980s, the Police Executive Research Forum, beginning in 1980, initiated a two-year comprehensive study to determine how much the preliminary and follow-up investigations contribute to the solution of burglary and robbery cases. Questions posed by the researchers included (Eck, 1983): How much time is required to conduct a "typical" investigation?; What actions are performed during an investigation?; What information is obtained during an investigation?; What is the relative contributions of patrol officers and detectives in conducting an investigation?; What sources contribute information to the investigation and how frequently is information obtained from these sources?; and What actions taken or information gained by detectives contribute to the apprehension of suspects?

The crimes of burglary and robbery were selected for examination for several reasons. According to the study's author (Eck, 1983):

They are relatively common offenses . . . and are also considered to be serious crimes [as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting

procedures].

Burglary and robbery investigations consume a large amount of police resources.

. . . the offenders are seldom known to the victims . . . thereby making the investigations difficult. [and]

Comparisons of burglaries and robberies are useful, because the two crimes differ in one major respect--there is almost always some contact between the offender and the victim in robberies; this contact often results in information being gained about offenders that may lead to their capture. Burglary is typically a crime of stealth--offenders generally take great pains to avoid contact with the victim--and thus provide little information upon which to conduct an investigation.

The police agencies involved in the collection and analysis of data for this research included: the DeKalb County (Georgia) Department of Public Safety; the St. Petersburg (Florida) Police Department; and the Wichita (Kansas) Police Department. The study involved analysis of investigative information taken from more than 320 robberies and 3,360 burglaries in the three jurisdictions.

Findings from this effort revealed that robbery and burglary cases are generally investigated for no more than four hours, counting both the preliminary investigation done by patrol officers (which took approximately one hour to complete--it was slightly longer for robbery cases) and the follow-up investigation done by detectives. In 88 percent of the cases for both types of crime, the investigations consumed no more than three-days, although the three days were not taken consecutively, spanning 11 days before investigative activity was terminated. As the investigations continued, there was a shift in focus away from the victims to possible suspects, and the pattern of investigative action became less routine and increasingly unique (Eck, 1983).

Paraphrasing the study's author (Eck, 1983), patrol officers interviewed

crime victims in 90 percent of the cases, while they interviewed witnesses in less than 17 percent of the burglaries and in more than 44 percent of the robberies. The officers collected physical evidence in 10 percent of the cases, and they conducted neighborhood canvasses in less than 20 percent of the cases.

Almost half of the burglary cases were screened out for lack of leads immediately after the preliminary investigation. While all robbery cases were assigned for follow-up investigation, 75 percent of the robbery cases and the assigned burglary cases were suspended for lack of leads after just one day of investigation.

Investigators obtained most of their information from victims, primarily because they interviewed almost all of them. But a very small percentage of victims were able to provide fruitful information. Other sources of information that included witnesses, informants, other department members, and record searches, while used less often than victims, were collectively likely to produce more relevant information. Eck (1983) notes:

. . . in robbery cases in which detectives obtained the name of the suspect, the robbery victims provided that name in more than 40 percent of the cases. But the probability that a robbery victim could provide a suspect's name to a detective was little more than ten percent; the probability that an informant could provide the name was 30 percent. The probability that the name could be learned from informants or department records was over 50 percent. Witnesses and patrol officers were also more likely than victims to provide suspect names to detectives.

Analysis of the investigative process revealed that the preliminary investigation performed by patrol officers and follow-up investigation conducted by detectives were equally important in determining whether a crime would be cleared through arrest. Arrests were made in either the preliminary investigation or follow-up investigation in eight percent of the burglary cases

and in 18.8 percent of the robbery cases. Of course, decisions made to assign cases for follow-up investigations are heavily dependent upon information obtained during the preliminary investigation. "If few or no leads are developed, the case is likely to be screened out and never assigned for follow-up or, if assigned, the follow-up will be quickly suspended" (Eck, 1983).

Eck's work tends to challenge previous research that questioned the role of the detectives and the value of follow-up investigations. While previous research emphasized the importance of patrol officers in conducting preliminary investigations, the Forum's research of robbery and burglary cases concludes that ". . . both patrol officers and detectives contribute equally important work toward the solution of cases" (Eck, 1983).

A more recent study sponsored by NIJ (Cohen, et al., 1987) sought, not to assess the investigative process, but to identify methods used in the selection of detectives and in the evaluation of their performance. Using on-site interviews and observations in three locations together with telephone interviews, the study collected data from police agencies in the following cities (and one county): Boston, Massachusetts; Boulder, Colorado; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dade Metro Police, Dade County, Florida; Denver, Colorado; Fremont, California; Fort Collins, Colorado; Kansas City, Missouri; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New York City; Richmond, Virginia; Rochester, New York; San Diego, California; San Jose, California; and St. Petersburg, Florida.

Results from the study found little uniformity in the ways departments selected detectives (only one of the agencies used civil service procedures to govern the selection of detectives). The variation displayed among the departments in selecting detectives was captured in the development of four

"management styles," i.e., Unstructured, Semistructured, Structured, and Highly Structured (civil service).

Agencies characterized by unstructured detective selection "procedures" were found to ". . . have few, if any, written materials or rules about selecting detectives. The criteria for selection are undefined, discretionary, and subject to frequent change and interpretation" (Cohen, et al., 1987).

Departments displaying semistructured detective selection procedures were found to frequently define and formalize general steps for detective selection, e.g., a minimum of three years' experience as a police officer, one year of college, etc. These agencies included interviews and assessments in the selection process, and they checked previous performance, including, for example, awards, sick leave, and disciplinary actions, if any.

Departments characterized as having structured selection procedures for detectives specifically . . . "define in writing their rules, requirements, and procedures; they allow little discretion in the process" (Cohen, et al., 1987). Aside from checking on past performance, the process used by these departments may involve a series of "peer evaluations," "staff evaluations," and structured interviews.

Although most of the detective selection procedures were found to lie between the unstructured and highly structured models, agencies in which detective selection was controlled by civil service procedures represented the most rigid approach. According to the authors (Cohen, et al., 1987):

The entire selection process is highly structured with virtually no discretion. . . . the time and place of the civil service examination is announced, and openings . . . are read at roll call and posted for seven days. Qualifications include 3 years of service in the department, specified minimum service ratings, and accumulated points toward promotion. The candidate must then pass a written examination, which is weighted 90 percent and combined with the most recent service rating, worth 10 points. A maximum

of seven percentage points for seniority may be added to the total score. The Police Chief makes the final selection after reviewing the candidates' personal qualifications and competence.

The researchers also found a good deal of variability with the tenure of detectives. For some agencies, the investigative position was essentially a permanent appointment. At the other end of the spectrum, all detective assignments were temporary. In one department studied, a three-year rotation cycle for all detectives and the heads of investigative units and the chief of detectives was implemented through the department's policy of participatory management. The practice ". . . is highly popular even though it does limit the detectives' ability to gain specialized skills needed for certain types of investigations, such as those involving homicide or complex frauds" (Cohen, et al., 1987).

According to Cohen (et al., 1983):

One advantage of rotation is that it opens up the detective slot to large numbers of department employees. Potentially nearly all officers can eventually serve three years as detectives during their career in the police force. Another advantage is that the patrol force becomes sophisticated in its knowledge of investigative techniques, methods for carrying out good preliminary investigations, requirements for presenting cases to the prosecutor, and the importance of collecting and preserving crime-scene evidence.

In having compared several organizational differences and similarities among the departments examined, the authors (Cohen, et al., 1987) concluded that investigative performance can be improved through "upgrading and refining the selection process." They suggest that a meaningful detective selection process should include the following:

- two-years of college education (exposing potential investigators to young adults and abstract thinking and also demonstrates that they are motivated to achieve the assignment of detective);

- screening procedures to identify officers with positive employment histories (thereby screening out officers with disciplinary problems);
- testing for verbal and cognitive (i.e., inductive and deductive reasoning) skills;
- assessing candidate officers according to their rates of conviction instead of the number of arrests ("The conviction rate is a measure of an officer's awareness of responsibility for preparing cases against arrestees so they can be successfully prosecuted, and for not making unwarranted arrests.") In this sense it reflects the qualitative aspects of arrests; and
- peer assessments (peer nomination, ranking, and rating), peer reviews ("a thorough review and check of work output"), personal interviews, and assessment centers (a procedure that involves situational exercises, including, for example, leaderless group discussions, writing exercises, extemporaneous speaking, and role-playing where participants pose as subordinates, peers, and supervisors of the officers being evaluated).

The authors of this research realize that no single detective selection procedure will be applicable to all law enforcement agencies. But serious examination of present methods used to identify and select criminal investigators could result in changes that would improve investigative performance.

Perhaps the best method to increase the pool of quality candidates eligible for detective positions is for departments to recruit and select quality officers. Unpublished papers developed by Henry Rossman (1986, 1987), a guest speaker at the second Executive Session and the person most instrumental in stimulating Cohen's (et al., 1987) research, include mention of the disparity found among officers (both patrol officers assigned to patrol, on special assignments, engaged in undercover work, and detectives) in arrests that resulted in convictions. Quoting from the earlier "Super-Cop" research conducted by the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW), Rossman notes:

. . . some police officers demonstrated substantially more

skill than others in producing arrests that lead to conviction. A small fraction of the more than 10,000 officers studied who made arrests in these jurisdictions--12 percent--accounted for more than half of all the arrests that lead to conviction: 19 percent of all arresting officers studied in Los Angeles County accounted for half of the convictions there; 17 percent in Indianapolis; 14 percent in Salt Lake; 12 percent in Washington, D.C., and in Cobb County, Georgia; 12 percent in New Orleans; and only 8 percent in Manhattan.

Rossman's (1987) more recent research supports the earlier work by INSLAW; namely that what differentiated officers showing low investigative productivity from those demonstrating high investigative productivity was found in the background characteristics of the officers themselves, i.e., the ". . . things they brought with them to the police department." Rossman (1987) states that, "We were consistently told that the more productive officers were those who were internally motivated to do quality work." The implications of these findings are significant, given the fact that police departments, in general, can not realistically offer the types of incentives for high productivity that are found in many quarters of the private sector, e.g., bonuses, profit sharing, stock options, gifts, trips, etc.

In spite of limited incentives, Rossman (1987) found that there were things departments could do to improve the quality of investigations; the most notable being an emphasis by an agency's top managers that improving the quality of investigations be established as a high-priority goal! Others included: ". . . using measures of investigative quality in selection and assignment, innovative rotation systems, work-load management, paperwork reduction and improved report preparation, improved feedback from the prosecutor and the courts, and the transmission of the police management's commitment to quality investigation throughout the department" (Rossman, 1987).

While not considered research projects, other initiatives, national in

scope, have potential for enhancing local investigative efforts. These programs are the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (SHOCAP), sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VI-CAP), sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Although managed through the local police department, SHOCAP is a comprehensive community-based program that includes officials and representatives from the schools, the juvenile court, the business community, probation and corrections, the clergy, and various social welfare and human services (after care) agencies. Vitally dependent on crime analysis as an information and case management system, SHOCAP seeks to identify serious, violent prone, and habitual juvenile offenders. Research from this initiative, published in OJJDP's SHOCAP manuals and other materials, suggests that two percent of habitual juvenile offenders are responsible for as much as 40 percent of all juvenile crime and that 10 percent of this group commit approximately 75 percent of the total amount of juvenile crime. One SHOCAP study of 403 habitual juvenile delinquents found that these youths had each been arrested an average of 14 times, collectively accounting for 5,642 arrests. In addition, interviews with these youths indicated they had, on average, committed approximately 10 crimes for each arrest.

The initial success of this program has already been publicized through a major television network (an NBC "White Paper" news documentary), an article that appeared in "Readers Digest," and an hour-long program presented on public television through a Chicago television station (WGN). Also, in August of 1987, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill #2323, introduced by State Senator Ed Davis, former Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police

Department, that defined what legally constitutes serious and habitual delinquent behavior (e.g., five arrests in 12 months, including three felony charges, 10 arrests in two years, etc.). Similar bills, modeled after the California bill, are presently pending passage in Massachusetts and Florida. Further the California Youth Commission has recently been authorized to dedicate a correctional facility to house juveniles that have been adjudicated as serious habitual offenders ("SHOs").

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VI-CAP) program, located at the F.B.I.'s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime in Quantico, Virginia, originated from LEAA's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program that, as previously mentioned, began during the mid-1970s. In having provided technical assistance in a series of child murders in an area called the "Woodward Corridor" in Oakland, County, Michigan, in 1977, several crime analysts from ICAP cities developed a manual regarding multi-jurisdictional case investigations that was designed to pool and exchange investigative leads. It was later expanded to nationally link the crime analysis systems that had been established among ICAP agencies so information could be exchanged on certain types of "serial crimes," i.e., crimes in a series or a "crime pattern."

Initially, three of the ICAP cities sought to obtain additional funding to house and develop this capability: Colorado Springs, Colorado; Jacksonville, Florida; and Memphis, Tennessee. But given urging from the former Chief of Police of the Eugene (Oregon) Police Department (an ICAP implementation cite) and the program's national director, who was concerned about the uncertainty that tends to parallel a chief's tenure, the F.B.I. was approached to see if they might be interested in the concept, and they were receptive. Once

financial assistance had been received from the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) administered through NIJ and OJJDP for implementation, it was decided to call the concept VI-CAP and to locate the program in the F.B.I.'s Behavioral Science Unit at Quantico, where it is presently situated.

To date, several individuals have been hired as crime analysts along with former homicide detectives from municipal police departments to work with agents from the F.B.I. in staffing this function. Sections of VI-CAP reporting instrumentation was designed to collectively capture and consolidate information to identify serial crimes were independently developed by crime analysts, homicide detectives, medical examiners, and academicians. Agents from each of the F.B.I.'s 59 field offices have been schooled on the VI-CAP concept and have been trained to instruct local law enforcement authorities in their jurisdictions on how to develop and submit information for analysis. While results from this effort have failed to match initial expectations, the F.B.I. is continuing to expand their networking for exchange of information regarding state and national violent crime patterns.

Finally, a federal grant from the Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) has been recently approved to select four police agencies from different regions in the United States to initiate "problem-oriented" drug investigations. Building upon what has evolved from Goldstein's (1979) theoretical work regarding "Problem-Oriented Policing" and results from the Newport News (Virginia) Police Department's efforts to operationalize this concept in the delivery of patrol and investigative services, an alternative approach to traditional investigative practices may emerge. This new approach involves much greater use of information from community sources traditionally unavailable to police departments and the establishment of community linkages,

similar to SHOCAP, that more directly involves representatives from the community to identify conditions that favor the emergence of crime. It also includes latitude for citizens to become much more active in combatting the conditions that contribute to crime causation and crime proliferation.

Implications

Research on the criminal investigations function has, in general, produced negative and oftentimes mixed results that tend to generate more questions than answers. Although skimpy when compared to research that has been conducted on patrol operations, examination of this literature has consistently demonstrated two positive themes that were reinforced by presentations made during the second Executive Session by nationally prominent guest speakers. These themes address a concern for both improved **quality** and increased **productivity** in the investigative process and provide the most fundamental foundation from which future development can proceed. They include the following:

- expanding the role of patrol officers with commensurate responsibility to conduct comprehensive initial investigations, including prerogative to recommend early case closure that can dramatically reduce the amount of time investigators in some investigative divisions spend on "unsolvable" cases thereby allowing them to work cases with a higher probability for solution;
- implementing MCI to more effectively screen cases for assignment, set times for formal review of ongoing, follow-up investigations, and establish ways to obtain feedback from the prosecutors and courts to assess changes in charges filed and the final disposition of cases presented;

Interestingly enough, it is the paucity of consistent and definitive findings in research regarding criminal investigations that opens up exploration into many areas of the investigative function that have heretofore been either taken for granted or ignored altogether. While not consistently

demonstrated through previous research, a series of additional themes and issues regarding criminal investigations has been provoked as a result of the Houston Police Department's commitment, through two Executive Sessions, to examine traditional assumptions in light of the department's managerial philosophy regarding NOP.

Collectively, these themes and issues address a concern for making the investigative process more efficient. An efficient investigative system is effective (although the converse may not be true), and an effective investigative system enhances meaningful productivity--not just increased activity--while also seeking to enhance the quality of work produced through the investigative process. The notion of increased productivity is nude unless it is aligned to an efficient system designed to produce desired results. Although Noah Webster has failed to hone a precise distinction between the terms "effective" and "efficient," someone once said that to be effective is to "do the right thing," while to be efficient was to "do it right." Following this line of reasoning and in contemplating change to improve investigative performance, the strategic concept, given the above distinction, is that of efficiency. What types of things can be done to develop an efficient investigative system; one that will be effective in both enhancing investigative productivity and the quality of investigative output?

In response to this question, the following suggestions are made:

- establish a more comprehensive information management system that will not only address operational concerns in tracking and enhancing cases through linking some of the MCI components with crime and intelligence analysis data but will also facilitate expanding traditional roles of investigators to become more directly involved in victim assistance, problem solving, planning activities, and crime prevention initiatives thereby more closely integrating the investigative function with other elements within the department and also with the community at large;

- refine procedures used in the selection, promotion, and performance evaluation of investigators along with the development of new incentives to enhance job satisfaction and increase morale;
- create an investigative organizational configuration that supports the various types of investigations conducted based upon the notion of "facilitative reciprocity," a concept that acknowledges a certain degree of autonomy between the centralized and decentralized investigative functions but also recognizes the overall **mutual dependence** between these two entities when investigative efforts are perceived as being complimentary within the same system;
- develop policies and procedures to support the concept of facilitative reciprocity through functionally integrating the investigative work performed by patrol officers and criminal investigators;
- develop educational and training curriculum that supports effective methods used to investigate crimes; and
- recognize the vital role citizens have in solving crimes, explore and establish ways to work more closely with the community in **both the investigation and prevention** of crime.

Even when criminal investigations is correctly perceived as a process that places patrol officers and detectives on differing ends of the same continuum, there are, perhaps ironically, many conditions that influence the quality of investigations and increased investigative productivity that lie outside the direct control of the criminal investigators (both patrol officers and detectives) themselves. If, for example, the allocation of available patrol resources by time of day (i.e., shift) and day of week is not accurately calculated to deploy officers to handle dispatched calls for service and call prioritization procedures and field response codes have not been logically developed, then it is unrealistic to expect that officers overburdened with an inordinate amount of work will have sufficient time to conduct quality preliminary investigations. Recalling Eck's (1983) finding that patrol

officers and detectives contributed equally in solving burglary and robbery cases, conditions that impede patrol officers from conducting comprehensive initial investigations will adversely affect the quality of subsequent investigations. Because of the critical importance the preliminary investigation serves in the ultimate solution of most crime categories, emphasis to improve the quality of investigations must begin in patrol, if a negative domino effect on follow-up investigations is to be avoided.

But there are other conditions, some of which are not recognized in the literature, that impact the quality and increased productivity of criminal investigations. A supervisory span of control greater than 10 to one (or even five to one for some areas of the city, given call volume and a high rate of offense reporting) can hamper adequate supervisory review, i.e., "quality control," of offense reports. It can also complicate decisions regarding recommendations for early case closures and decisions to immediately follow up on some types of cases with "hot" leads. If adequate time is not afforded supervisors to attend to these details, some, perhaps many, "unsolvable" cases or cases that could have been cleared through arrest following completion of the initial investigation will be sent to an investigative division for processing. If several days go by before cases with "hot leads" are assigned for subsequent investigation, the suspects may have left town, greatly reducing the chances for solving these types of cases.

The amount of information collected in a department's offense report and the manner in which the information is formatted can also affect the quality of investigations. If solvability factors are listed for certain types of offenses, are they logically ordered? Do they help direct the officers in determining that a crime has occurred and in conducting an initial or

preliminary investigation? Is there provision for differentiating locations of where crimes occurred (if known) and where the offense report was taken, e.g., hospitals, etc.? Is information collected regarding suspect demeanor and victim vulnerability that could assist crime analysts in their efforts to enhance cases through providing additional investigative leads and in targeting crime prevention initiatives? Moreover, have the officers received proper training in conducting comprehensive initial investigations, including securing crime scenes, taking photographs, collecting and preserving physical evidence, interviewing witnesses, interrogating suspects, showing "photo spreads," etc.? Finally, have department policies been developed that clearly articulate the mix of investigative responsibilities, including, although not limited to, persons responsible for crime scenes, whether or not a centralized or decentralized detective should be called to the scene of the crime, under what conditions should evidence technicians be required to process scenes, and what procedures govern the chain of evidence?

Finally, reminded that the Rand study found that ". . . the most important factor in crime solution is the information provided by the victim to the responding police officer" (Greenwood, 1975), what accounts for a victim's failure to cooperate with the police? What contributes to citizen apathy? What perceptions do citizens have of the police, and where did they come from? Do citizens sense any civic responsibility, not only to cooperate with the police, but to get involved in working with the police to combat crime and the causes of crime. And why are many citizens reluctant to notify the police when they see a crime committed or are personally victimized? In response to this last question, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Silver, 1968) makes a sobering statement:

A Commission survey of the reasons citizens give for not reporting crimes to the police shows that the number one reason is the conviction that the police cannot do anything. If this impression of the ineffectiveness of the police is widely held by the public, there is every reason to believe that it is shared by criminals and would-be criminals.

Failure by citizens to fully cooperate with the police can stymie investigative efforts. Likewise, failure by citizens to fully cooperate with prosecutors can seriously undermine the potential for convictions. These questions and issues are raised to emphasize the point that crime control is a community responsibility. Civic duty must dictate a conscientious willingness on the part of the public to work with the police in the control of crime. Likewise, the responsibility to control crime cannot be bifurcated within the police department based on whether or not an individual is assigned to an investigative vis-a-vis patrol division.

This report recognizes that the complexities involved in investigating and prosecuting crimes cannot be overstated. But detailed discussion of conditions that lie outside the direct control of the criminal investigators themselves (e.g., differential police response [DPR] and resource allocation procedures, etc.), although, as previously mentioned, they are known to influence investigative efficiency, are beyond the scope of this report. In light of the history of criminal investigations and an assessment of research findings on this subject, broad latitude presently exists to examine and reexamine issues that can be directly impacted by internal changes within the patrol and criminal investigations functions. The remaining sections of this report will therefore concentrate on issues and proposed changes that surfaced during the second Executive Session to envelop criminal investigations within the management context of NOP.

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CHAPTER 4

REFOCUSING INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Closer public scrutiny of police operations combined with rapid social change have placed heretofore unknown pressures on the police to meet the competing demands of flexibility and yet, at the same time, maintain organizational consistency. Police agencies are better able to meet this challenge if they have a well thought out philosophy about policing that guides management efforts in meeting the service delivery needs of the public.

Over the past few years, the Houston Police Department has addressed this issue by developing, as its overriding philosophy, a commitment to manage its affairs and deliver its services in a manner that is responsive to neighborhood concerns. This commitment is clearly evident in the department's mission statement (Brown, 1987), which reads as follows:

The mission of the Houston Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in the City of Houston by working cooperatively with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment.

The challenge confronting the Houston Police Department is to ensure that all members accept their responsibility to conduct business in a manner consistent with the department's mission. To assist in this effort, the department has promulgated a set of 10 values. Collectively, these values constitute a set of organizational tenets that, not only govern the development of policies and procedures, but convey to the public a conviction on the part of the department to align organizational resources in response to community needs and expectations. Foremost among these expectations is the desire of

citizens to have the police work more closely with them to improve the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods.

Of the 10 values cited by Brown (1983), several provide specific guidance when considering the role of criminal investigation under NOP. These include the following:

The Police Department adheres to the fundamental principle that it must deliver its services in a manner that preserves and advances democratic values.

The Department is committed to delivering police services in a manner which will best reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods.

The Police Department believes that it has a responsibility to react to criminal behavior in a way that emphasizes prevention and that is marked by vigorous law enforcement.

The Department will collaboratively work with neighborhoods to understand the true nature of the neighborhood's crime problems and develop meaningful cooperative strategies which will best deal with those problems.

The Department is committed to managing its resources in the most effective manner possible.

While the mere articulation of these values and the mission statement are insufficient in determining the primary role investigators are to assume under NOP, they provide a conceptual foundation from which a query can begin. With respect to the mission statement, for example, what are the investigators to do in improving the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods? What can they do to help preserve the peace, reduce unjustified fears among citizens, and provide for a safer, community environment?

In response to the department's value statements, what can the investigators do to reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods? What can be done to facilitate meaningful crime prevention initiatives? And, as presently organized, what can the IOC offer in developing both tactical and

strategic responses to neighborhood and citywide crime problems?

It was anticipated that these types of questions would be answered during the second Executive Session. But the questions tended to generate more questions than answers. In search of a nexus between the department's mission statement, its values, and the IOC, it may prove instructive to first examine the manner in which the IOC is presently configured within the Houston Police Department.

The IOC is one of four commands within the department; the other three being the Field Operations Command, the Support Services Command, and the Professional Standards Command. Presently, the Investigative Operations Command consists of two bureaus: Special Investigations and Major Investigations. The Special Investigations Bureau consists of three divisions: Vice, Narcotics, and Juvenile. The Major Investigations Bureau consists of five divisions: Robbery, Burglary and Theft, Auto Theft, Special Thefts, and Homicide. The Criminal Intelligence Division reports directly to the IOC office.

Investigations are generally conducted on a centralized basis with citywide jurisdiction. But the question of decentralization has been a topic of concern within the department over the last six to seven years. The predominant reason for this concern rests in the development of the "command station" concept. The command station concept emerged from a study that began in 1980 to develop plans for the decentralization of the Houston Police Department. The principle goal of the study was to provide insight regarding the projected need for additional facilities through the year 2010. As noted in the study's final report (DeFoor, 1980):

The Command Station is the key to the success and effectiveness of the Houston Police Department's decentralization program. It is more than just a building.

It is tangible evidence of a concept; the symbol of our Department's commitment to provide effective, in-depth police services to the community, utilizing appropriate facilities located at places easily accessible to the community.

The concept of the Command Station was not envisioned to be just an oversized substation. It was anticipated to be a full-service police center for citizens needing assistance within the jurisdiction of a particular Command Station. Again, according to the 1980 report, under the Command Station configuration:

All functions necessary to provide complete police services to the Command area (defined as encompassing a population ranging from 250,000 to 300,000) will be sufficiently decentralized to the respective Command Station. All necessary resources will be provided to the Command Station's commanding officer for the effective deployment of police services to his area of responsibility. Crime control, continuity of operations, liaison with community members, communication and cooperation with other Command Station (personnel) and citywide operations, and the effective deployment of available manpower requires a high level of managerial authority (DeFoor, 1980).

Thus, basic police services would be decentralized throughout the city. With respect to the IOC, this translates to reassigning many of the investigative sergeants from their present divisions to the Field Operations Command, where they would be located along with uniform patrol personnel.

In 1983, under the auspices of the Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Program, the department experimented with decentralizing investigators. A total of 10 investigators were assigned to the Central Patrol Division to work in, what was then, District 16, one of 20 Master Districts. Their responsibility was limited to handling burglaries, robberies, thefts, and auto thefts. Jurisdictional responsibilities were confined to the district boundaries unless otherwise approved by supervisory personnel or from one the controlling centralized investigative divisions.

Although investigative sergeants had been temporarily assigned to work with uniform personnel, this marked the first time in the department's history that investigators were permanently reassigned and physically relocated to another command and facility. As a consequence, the centralized divisions were no longer responsible for handling the aforementioned investigations which occurred within District 16. According to the department's assessment of the DART Program (Oettmeier, 1985), the decentralization of detectives was successful from a "procedural viewpoint." Investigative sergeants were able to perform their job in working with patrol officers, crime analysts, and members of the supportive response team.

Difficulty did exist in setting up adequate channels of communication with the centralized divisions, but those problems centered more on questions of assigning cases rather than assisting each other when requested. Because of certain limitations noted in the assessment report, a determination of effectiveness, as it pertained to traditional measures (i.e., case clearances), were not considered to be reliable. Although case clearance statistics were reported, questions emerged regarding their validity. Despite these concerns, the strategy of decentralizing investigative sergeants was considered to be a success.

Up until 1987, no other permanent reassignments of investigative sergeants have been made. With the advent of the opening of the Westside Command Station facility, the IOC was confronted with having to again reassign investigative sergeants. A total of 28 investigative sergeants were assigned to the Westside Command Station. These investigators are responsible for investigating all criminal offenses within three of the city's 20 Master Districts (i.e., 18, 19, and 20) except for homicides, auto thefts, forgeries, pawn shop related

offenses, special thefts, robberies of federally insured institutions (i.e., FSLIC and FDIC), child abuse, and aggravated sexual abuse of a juvenile. In addition to the 28 investigative sergeants, the IOC authorized the transfer of 19 juvenile investigators to the Westside Command Station. Of this number, 13 were assigned to staff the intake function of juvenile detention at the command station, two were assigned juvenile investigative responsibilities in Districts 18, 19, and 20, one was assigned to the Westside Patrol Bureau's Investigative Response Team, and the remaining three open positions were eventually lost because of other personnel trade-offs and transfers.

With the exception of the Westside Command Station Operations Division and the IOC's Homicide Division, investigative sergeants are considered to be specialists within the Houston Police Department. Investigative sergeants assigned to the Robbery Division work only on robberies and those assigned to the Auto Theft Division only work on motor vehicle thefts. While the Homicide Division includes personnel to investigate sexual aggravated assaults, investigative sergeants assigned to a particular division work their cases independently from those assigned to other investigative divisions. Unless a particular case warrants collaboration (e.g., a homicide that started out as a robbery, a residential burglary that ended up involving a rape, etc.), the investigative sergeants work their own cases irrespective of geographical locations. This is not to suggest, that geographical constraints cannot be applied within each division. For example, a squad of burglary and theft investigators can be assigned to work only certain master districts. They would not, however, be responsible to work on robberies that occurred within the districts to which they were assigned.

In retrospect, the IOC, as with the FOC, is in a state of transition. On

the one hand, a large part of the IOC continues to operate in the traditional mode as described above. On the other hand, in the face of having to eventually decentralize its entire operation, particularly the high volume caseloads presently found in the Burglary and Theft Division and, to a lesser extent, the Robbery Division, questions are beginning to emerge regarding just how this will be done. Coupled with that concern is the need to determine how the investigative function will change in light of NOP, an issue compounded by fiscal constraints and a hiring freeze. Yet, in spite of any clear-cut direction for changing investigative operations, the IOC has begun to institute some nontraditional methods in thinking more abstractly about how to prevent crime.

Determining how the investigative function will change and assessing how the ensuing role modifications will relate to the department's mission statement and values is predicated, to a large degree, on understanding NOP as a management philosophy. As indicated in the report produced from the first Executive Session, Developing A Policing Style For Neighborhood Oriented Policing, the definition of NOP contains four primary components:

- 1) increased interaction between the police and the public;
- 2) mutual input between the police and the public regarding identification of neighborhood problems and concerns;
- 3) collaborative work between the police and the public to mutually resolve neighborhood problems; and,
- 4) mutual responsibility between the police and the public to provide the types of resources needed to address problems and concerns.

These components clearly suggest a change in the traditional role of both the citizens and the department as it pertains to the delivery of police services. For example, NOP must involve continuous planning participation,

program development, implementation, and evaluation, by both the officers assigned to the beats and the citizens living in their respective neighborhoods.

The role of the officer will be enhanced as a result of increased interaction with the citizens. Beat officers will be actively involved in the decision-making process regarding the identification and resolution of problems in their beats. Because of the officers' interaction with citizens, they will be in an excellent position to determine what additional resources, if any, could be obtained to address neighborhood problems and concerns. Since the beat officers should be most familiar with the citizens who work and reside within their beats, the officers, if given the appropriate support, are in an ideal position to implement programs, strategies, and other initiatives to improve the essence of neighborhood life.

Citizens must be willing to serve as catalysts in initiating efforts to improve conditions that enhance the quality of life for their families, friends, and fellow neighbors. Consequently, they must be willing to become "active partners" with the officers in the neighborhoods. Does this mean that citizens are expected to assist the officers in physically apprehending criminals? No, not at all. But citizens should cooperate in the exchange of information which could lead to the arrest of a person known to have committed a crime and inform officers about suspicious circumstances.

Citizens should also learn how to organize their respective neighborhoods to help themselves in preventing crime. The department's Community Services Division has prepared an a variety of materials to assist citizens in community organizing. This division has been instrumental in providing information to the Houstonians On Watch (HOW) programs and the Apartment Renters On Watch

(AROW) programs. Information provided by the Community Services Division contains phone numbers that can be used by citizens to contact other city departments, minimizing time consuming and unnecessary calls to the police.

Given the focus of NOP to more closely unite the police with the public in working together to improve the city's neighborhoods, thereby collectively bridging one neighborhood with another to form a common, community bond, how are investigative responsibilities to be refocused? Or, as presently structured, how does the investigative function fit into this new style of policing? Taken at face value, the unfortunate answers to these questions, given the IOC's present configuration based upon, to a large extent, traditional orientations, is that the IOC, as with the FOC, cannot substantively accommodate NOP without making some internal "adjustments" to accommodate some nontraditional investigative functions.

Whereas NOP is, to a great extent, predicated on lengthy evolutionary development of changes in patrol operations, e.g., moving more away from random to increased directed patrol, providing support to direct patrol activities with crime analysis information, providing better time management in handling calls through implementation of DPR procedures, constructing "beat profiles" to become better acquainted with neighborhood residents and the heads of civic groups, etc., there is little to draw from, save for MCI, that attempts to bridge the investigative function with the community. But MCI was not designed as a community-based investigative program. MCI's link with the community was primarily an administrative one; informing victims that their cases had been cleared through arrest or through "exceptional means" or telling them that further investigation on their cases had been suspended.

As previously mentioned, the most significant changes made in criminal

investigations since the turn of the century have come, not from inside, but from outside the mainstream of police investigations; scientific discoveries and innovations and decisions rendered by the courts. Now, because of the NOP mandate emanating out of the first Executive Session to provide a new style of policing for the citizens of Houston, investigative practitioners must again institute changes that, not only incorporate the components of MCI that were suggested during the mid- to late 1970s, but reconfigure investigative operations to facilitate the implementation of NOP, thereby providing new and more effective methods to prevent and control crime.

Given this new dimension of the investigative function for which a prototype has yet to be molded, NOP suggests a radical departure from traditional investigative practices. Predictably, based on time-hardened assumptions combined with the staunch reluctance for change generally found among detectives (alluded to by Henry Rossman in a meeting during the Second Executive Session), this departure may not be enthusiastically welcomed. Lacking a model to emulate in refocusing investigative efforts to achieve closer alignment with community groups and in establishing both tactical and strategic analysis support to help retard crime, changes proposed for the IOC can be expected to generate considerable anxiety. While most research on criminal investigations tends to elevate rather than reduce anxiety, the history of the function itself provides little comfort.

As indicated in the preceding chapter that provided brief mention of the history of criminal investigations, the emergence of detectives in Europe got off to a bad start. The ex-convict thief-takers of Paris were expelled from the Prefecture of Police, because they were rejected by the nonex-convict officers of that department who could not accept them to hold positions of

public trust. London's first thief-taker was eventually hanged for perpetrating thievery. The first officer of the London Metropolitan Police that was given a plainclothes assignment in 1833 was subsequently dismissed from the force for the actions he took in "investigating" an alleged political conspiracy. Is it any wonder that the formal establishment of the "Detective Department" for the London Metropolitan Police in 1842 began on an experimental basis? And "the experiment" was almost scrapped on several occasions, given a series of gambling scandals that rocked the department and the unsolved murders of "Jack the Ripper."

The American counterparts to European detectives got off to an equally shaky start. They were almost immediately absorbed into the political machinery of large cities, coming more under the direct control of oftentimes corrupt elected officials than their own chiefs of police, who were more likely than not to have been appointed by elected officials. Perhaps with the exception of Eck's (1983) work, descriptions of the traditional role of detectives, which many would argue remain surprisingly contemporaneous, have not been positive. Take, for example, the statement made by Sweeney (1977):

Historically, . . . detectives have enjoyed greater freedom and status than have their patrol counterparts. The popular media image pictures criminal investigators as combining dogged determination with brilliant inductive reasoning to successfully track down unknown culprits. Within police agencies this popular image has merged with largely outdated folklore about the ability of detectives to elicit information from informants and underworld contacts to create a privileged and often envied position for the detective. Status differences are often reinforced by higher pay, personal use of a police vehicle, and relatively unrestricted coming and going. Investigative work is believed by many to be an art form capable of being accomplished only by individuals with unique skills and abilities. The aura or mystique that surrounds the position has often permitted investigative activities to be cloaked

in secrecy. Detectives themselves often resent departmental attempts at oversight and, in most departments, their performance receives little real scrutiny. Rarely have detectives been held accountable for their time.

More recently, the following remarks were made by Greenberg (et al., 1979):

The job of a detective has long been seen as a glamorous one. . . . most police officers believe that the detective division is where the real police work is done. . . . promotion to the detective division brings with it substantial prestige and often an increase in pay. . . . The detective portrayed on television is a tenacious and cunning sleuth who frequently dedicates weeks to the tireless pursuit of a single criminal.

. . . . common perceptions of the detective division as the center of covert operations and the cultivation of informants has created a 'mystique' surrounding the detective role. One important consequence of this mystique is a high degree of autonomy, or freedom from supervision. . . . detectives rarely account for their time and often determine which cases they will investigate, how much time they will spend on a case, and when the investigation should be discontinued. In addition, detectives' files are generally considered proprietary and confidential, making them unavailable for supervisory review.

While these observations provide scathing criticism of the traditional role of detectives, as did some of the findings from Rand's study of criminal investigations, their veracity has been questioned (Eck, 1983). As processors of information, detectives do require a good deal of autonomous latitude in investigating crimes. They are expected to be insightful, imaginative, and creative in collecting evidence, in searching for clues, and in trying to determine the motives for crimes. But there should be, at minimum, some form of administrative structure that permits investigative managers to monitor the quality of investigations and investigative productivity that does not stifle individual ingenuity.

Although, as already mentioned, MCI is not new and can stand independently

of NOP, it does provide a more logical method of managing most types of investigative cases. In spite of some shortcomings mentioned in the previous chapter, MCI enables managers to more effectively organize the investigative function. Traditionally, detectives have been terribly overburdened with cases, having been assigned more cases than they can realistically investigate. The assignment of all incoming auto theft, burglary, and larceny cases is perceived by many detectives to be a "political numbers game" oriented toward appeasing the palates of elected officials and their constituents. This type of "investigative management" is totally inimical to achieving quality investigations and increasing productivity for convictable cases.

DPR strategies designed to prioritize and manage incoming calls for dispatch is analogous to the case screening component in MCI. Hyperbolically speaking, before the advent of DPR patrol officers had become "telephone slaves" in responding to one call after another in not having dispatch intake operators discriminate, through call screening techniques, emergency from nonemergency calls. Historically, this call-, event-, or incident-orientation in patrol is analogous to the "case-orientation" traditionally found in high-volume investigative divisions.

As noted by one of the guest speakers during the second Executive Session, Mr. Darrel Stephens, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum, MCI represents the "mainstream of criminal investigations today." Without negating this point, the managerial philosophy of NOP extends beyond MCI's administrative focus in processing and tracking cases to grappling with issues regarding the most efficacious organizational structures needed to support a multiplicity of investigative functions that integrates department resources with the expressed needs of the community.

Although the Houston Police Department has yet, or only partially, to implement MCI in the investigative divisions of the IOC, steps have been taken to begin examining some of the associated issues. In September of 1987, the Case Management Committee under the chairmanship of Assistant Chief T. G. Koby submitted its report to the Command Staff which focused on developing uniform procedures for managing cases within the department's Major Investigations Bureau. Specific objectives of the committee addressed developmental work in the following areas (Koby, 1987):

- a case screening process to separate work from nonwork cases and establish priority criteria for case assignments;

- procedures to facilitate management of ongoing investigations involving the establishment of review dates to assess investigative progress;

- methods to enhance the quality of work in the preparation of cases for submission to prosecutors; and

- procedures to track cases through the District Attorney's Office and the courts to determine the final disposition of cases.

A number of recommendations were contained in the report. These recommendations are presently being reviewed by members of the IOC to see how the various components of MCI can be accommodated in each of the investigative divisions within the Major Investigations Bureau.

Without negating the importance MCI can have in administering the investigative function, it does not stack up to NOP in significance. MCI is basic. It includes procedures for screening, assigning, monitoring, and tracking cases through the courts. If thoughtfully implemented, it can become an "efficiently reactive" method for processing and disposing of incoming cases. But MCI is only a partial, not a complete answer for the investigative

function. If anything, MCI would have a tendency to further lock investigators into traditional roles, thereby relieving them of responsibility for making contributions in other areas. Hence, MCI is not to be implemented as a "substitute" for NOP. As a management philosophy, NOP is more comprehensive, much broader, in scope. Because of the importance placed on planning and strategy development aimed at preventing crime and interdicting criminals, NOP begins to shift some emphasis away from the traditional and almost totally reactive business of investigating crimes to a more analytical approach on identifying conditions that contribute to crime causation.

This more abstract way of thinking about the investigations function incorporates Goldstein's work on problem solving, more specifically referred to as "problem-oriented investigations" in criminal investigations. But, as with MCI, NOP differs with Goldstein, perhaps more in emphasis than in substance, in several respects. First NOP emphasizes problem-oriented policing to be neighborhood based. While this inclination does not detract from "problem-oriented investigative" efforts in developing strategies to impact citywide crime problems, it devotes primary attention in first working to improve the conditions of individual neighborhoods that, collectively, contribute to citywide problems.

Second, NOP anticipates problem solving to be equally shared between the officers and the citizens. Getting the citizens involved in the problem-oriented approach will, hopefully, make the mutually derived solution to neighborhood problems more palatable for the citizens to accept.

Third, traditional, "control-oriented" organization structures will not facilitate NOP. If anything, this type of "management system" will impede, if

not completely rebuke, the implementation of NOP. While Goldstein has published extensively on this subject, the type of management structure needed to support the function sought has yet to be described in the literature. What the practitioner is left with is a concept, a program, or a different way of doing something without having been provided with the type of management structure needed to facilitate the function. While books abound on topics of police administration and ways to conduct criminal investigations, little has been written on managing police operations.

Finally, NOP sees intrinsic value in increased interaction between the police and the public as an end in itself. The thrust of NOP is to have the officers become closely associated with neighborhood inhabitants so both the officers and citizens can identify conditions that contribute to the emergence of neighborhood problems before they occur.

These differences do not diminish the importance of problem solving and Goldstein's significant contributions. Quite the contrary, it is expected that a considerable amount of the officers' self-directed activities will be spent in solving neighborhoods' problems. Where problem-oriented policing is obviously concerned with solving problems per se, NOP has, as its primary focus, the neighborhoods themselves. Getting to know the individuals that live and work in the city's neighborhoods will lead to more intense efforts to grapple with neighborhood problems. But NOP provides a more expanded perspective in addressing the needs and concerns of the public whether or not these needs and concerns are perceived as problems.

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CHAPTER 5

ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES TO ACCOMMODATE FUNCTIONS

Based on available evidence in what could be construed as a "case of irony," management of criminal investigations has been indicted by the research community. Although the literature informing investigative operations is small in a relative sense, it is rife with inconsistent and contradictory findings. According to Eck (1983), one school of thought i.e., Greenwood suggests that there is absolutely no relationship between what a detective does and the probability of a case being solved, because cases are solved by chance events which are beyond the control of detectives. Another school of thought i.e., Folk completely contradicts this contention suggesting that the actions taken by detectives are critical in contributing to the solution of crimes. This lack of agreement compounds confusion when questions emerge regarding the role of detectives and the development of appropriate management support to guide the investigative function, particularly in light of NOP.

As mentioned in the latter part of Chapter 3, only two findings are consistently produced when research results are analyzed. Extrapolating a bit beyond the literature, the first finding pertains to expanding the role of patrol officers in the investigative process by having them perform more comprehensive preliminary investigations for cases where a follow-up investigation will be made. It also includes having patrol officers perform the entire investigation for some types of crimes where officers have latitude to recommend "early case closure" thereby negating the need for any further

investigation by criminal investigators. The second finding pertains to adopting formal case screening procedures, recommended, as already noted under MCI, to more effectively identify and assign cases requiring a subsequent investigation. Little disagreement, if any, exists about the importance of having patrol officers conduct comprehensive and qualitative preliminary and initial investigations, a topic treated extensively in a section of the report produced from the first Executive Session entitled "Research Trends and Implications," although this has yet to happen in the FOC. But consensus is apparently evasive within the IOC, given the absence of MCI in its complete form, to institute effective and well-documented case screening and assignment procedures to more efficiently manage criminal investigations.

The focus of this chapter is not, however, to discuss issues addressed during the department's first Executive Session or to provide some hidden insight into MCI that was not considered by the department's Case Management Committee; the latter of which has already been mentioned. As indicated in the preceding chapter, it is to look at broader issues in relationship to how criminal investigations is to be organizationally structured under NOP to, not only address other investigative functions mentioned by guest speakers during the second Executive Session, but more fundamentally, to accommodate the department's mission statement and values.

In response to this issue, Eck (1983) indicates that ". . . little [is] known about how investigations **should** [emphasis added] be organized." Perhaps even more disturbing are his final remarks regarding "Organization of Investigations" after he had an opportunity to compare differences in results from among three agencies he studied in the early 1980s, i.e., the DeKalb County (Georgia) Department of Public Safety, the St. Petersburg (Florida)

Police Department, and the Wichita (Kansas) Police Department. In having noted inconsistent findings in the literature (i.e., the way the investigation function is organized "makes a difference" vis-a-vis "makes little difference"), Eck, after reviewing his own results, states the following:

Our study found little difference in arrest rates between the two agencies with traditionally organized investigative functions (DeKalb County and St. Petersburg) and the agency using a team policing approach (Wichita). Additionally, no difference in robbery arrest rates was found between the two agencies that assigned initial investigative responsibility to patrol officers (St. Petersburg and Wichita), and the agency that dispatched detectives to robbery crime scenes to conduct preliminary investigations (DeKalb County).

In having found the above results, Eck (1983) goes on to say that the evidence concerning investigative organization is ". . . far from conclusive." He further suggests that, "Research needs to be conducted concerning the relationship between various forms of police and investigative organization and the way in which information is gathered, the type of information gathered, the way in which it is used, and how this influences investigative outcomes."

While not denying the need for additional research, hopefully producing some consistent results, two implications can be drawn from Eck's conclusions. First, the implementation of NOP does not have the luxury of waiting until the last definitive word from the research community arrives regarding how the investigative function is to be organizationally configured. Second, because of this lack in definitive direction, police practitioners are provided with considerable liberty to conceptualize alternative models in structuring investigative operations to meet objectives sought by NOP.

Foremost among objectives is what most, if not all, investigative practitioners consider to be a major (or the major) objective for criminal investigations; namely, the identification and apprehension of persons who have

either broken the law or are about to break the law. NOP emphatically endorses this objective. But it also ponders the efficacy of traditional investigative structures designed to achieve the result, because the manner in which a group is organizationally configured can either facilitate or impede attaining the objective sought; the purpose for which the group was originally formed.

Drawing upon some hypothetical illustrations, it may prove insightful to examine how an organization's configuration can potentially impede it from achieving its objectives. For example, many states have now passed a Burglary of Motor Vehicle statute, because conviction of a burglary generally carries more severe punishment than does conviction for a larceny. In the event that a burglary of a motor vehicle is reported, the report will end up in the Burglary Division. If the person that broke into the vehicle was of mind to steal the car but was interrupted during the commission of the crime, it is unlikely that detectives in the Motor Vehicle Theft Division will ever see the report. Conversely, if the same person breaks into a car the next day and drives it to a remote location to remove the front seats, it is unlikely that detectives in the Burglary Division will see the report, which will end up in the Motor Vehicle Theft Division, because, in this particular state, movement of the car constitutes grounds for third degree auto theft. But the same person who unlawfully enters a car and then drives it away to only steal the car's seats or stereo components may also be actively engaged in stealing auto accessories from other vehicles, e.g., hub caps, bumpers, fog lights, etc., report information that ends up with detectives in the Theft Division. Is there a more efficient organizational configuration that can help correct this problem?

Similar questions can also be raised for other types of offenses. Do homicide detectives receive reports in which aggravated assaults ("unsuccessful

homicides") occurred? If an assault report was taken from a lady who was attacked by a man who ostensibly had intended to rape her in a laundromat, is a copy of this report sent to detectives that investigate sex crimes? And what is the logical organizational niche for the Pawn Shop Detail? Idealistically, where should it be located (to help facilitate achieving the organization's objective)?

A more perplexing series of questions revolves around the function of individuals and groups dedicated to combat narcotic trafficking. When speaking before public gatherings, police administrators are often asked what proportion of crimes are perpetrated by drug addicts? Half? Sixty percent? Or more? Do drug addicts commit only certain types of crimes, or do they commit almost any type of crime for money either to buy more drugs or as a result of some violent reaction to drugs they have consumed? In thinking about the relevance of these types of questions in relationship to organizational configuration--given the potential for exchange of valuable information regarding a multitude of various offenses and the names of possible suspects--should the Narcotics Division be located outside the mainstream of most investigative divisions, or strategically centered exactly in the middle of criminal investigations with direct informational ties to other investigative divisions and law enforcement agencies?

While it seems initially logical to organize the investigative function around crime labels, such forms of organization may, in fact, be dysfunctional to the overall mission of investigative operations. It is of interest to note that the department's Centralized Crime Analysis Section includes larceny pursesnatching in its automated robbery mode. In general, the only difference between a crime being reported as a "strong-armed robbery" (robbery,

nonaggravated robbery) rather than as a larceny pursesnatching is in the actions of the victim and not of the suspect. If the victim resists being relieved of her purse and is knocked to the ground, then the elements of a robbery are present. But if the same suspect runs up behind another victim and, without breaking stride, grabs a purse from an arm or shoulder (not using any force or threat of force to dislodge the purse) then it is appropriate for the responding officer to complete a theft report.

The automated crime analysis modes used in the Centralized Crime Analysis Section were primarily designed for tactical purposes, i.e., to expedite the identification of existing and emergent crime patterns so interdiction tactics can be implemented (there is a close parallel between the crime analysis objectives and objectives for criminal investigations). The rationale used in the development of these modes incorporates both deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductively, working from the general to the particular, all crimes are initially sorted into general categories, e.g., robberies, burglaries, etc. They are further examined by grouping various subcategories of crimes being analyzed, e.g., aggravated, commercial robberies, single family, residential burglaries, etc., and then studied to determine the commonality of modi operandi, if present. If one crime incident is matched to a "related case," the analyst then attempts to determine if other offense types fit the pattern. This is an inductive process, working now from the particular to the general, to determine the parameters of a crime pattern based upon interactive behavioral characteristics displayed in other crime incidents. The key in understanding the logic of the department's crime analysis system is in understanding how information is logically organized to facilitate the system's objective (recall the questions raised by Eck in determining the way

information is gathered and used to support investigative outcomes).

The logic involved in the department's decision to decentralize some portions of investigative operations, i.e., to reassign investigators to work out of substations or a command station, is more than just ancillary to issues earlier addressed in developing a work plan to establish the department's crime analysis system, which involves built-in, complementary centralized and decentralized components.

Unlike the patrol function, the investigations function has continued to vacillate between centralized and decentralized modes. At first, the detectives, at least in England and America, worked directly for the chief of police or, ostensibly for Pinkerton, the mayor. Before the turn of the century, the detectives were back out in the community, again in search of "rogues and rascals." But then, perhaps because of collusive practices in working too closely with the crooks, corruption surfaced and detectives were once again centralized. So back and forth and forth and back--it appears that the criminal investigations function has been looking for some solid organizational footing.

The decentralization of the patrol function, on the other hand, has seemed to more logically evolve in response to changing demographic conditions as shifts in population occurred from rural to urban areas during and immediately following World War II. As cities grew in population and their political jurisdictions expanded, decentralizing patrol operations through building substations was appealing for several reasons. It relieved the ever increasing congestion of officers and vehicles at central headquarters. The central facility could no longer accommodate parking requirements and the space needed to conduct roll calls. Before decentralization, more travel time was required

for the officers to reach their beats and commence patrolling following roll call at police headquarters. And placing the officers in closer proximity to the recipients of service delivery was perhaps perceived to have political and, therefore, strategic merit.

While advantages to decentralize patrol operations appear to be relatively clear-cut, such is not the case when the investigative function is examined. Unlike patrol, where responding to one call after another becomes almost routine throughout the entire city (and even across shifts), the investigative function displays considerably more variability. As mentioned at the outset of Chapter 3, some types of investigations are oriented toward "making cases" on persons "already known" to be heavily involved in criminal activities. Other forms of investigation involve reviewing information contained in the original offense report and then attempting to gather additional evidence that will lead to the identity and, hopefully, arrest of the offender.

In having decided to decentralize criminal investigations (which, as mentioned elsewhere, occurred to some extent in the department's D.A.R.T. program), some thought must be devoted to determining what types of investigative functions could or should be decentralized under the management philosophy of NOP. As indicated at the outset of this chapter, one of the key questions in this endeavor is in determining whether decentralization will impede or compliment efforts to more effectively manage criminal investigations. In other words, will investigative decentralization, given the traditional objective, hinder or facilitate the identity and arrest of offenders.

Rather than beginning by discussing the kinds of investigative functions that could be decentralized, perhaps it is best to start in considering what

kinds of investigative activity should not be decentralized. To this end, decentralizing types of investigative operations that, over time, painstakingly builds cases on specific individuals or groups of individuals involved in perpetrating crimes throughout the entire city makes little sense. This is not to say, in general, that these types of specialized groups primarily engaged in "instigative investigations" should be located completely outside the mainstream of most centralized investigative operations. The being made is that information obtained from informants, electronic and physical surveillances needs to be centrally pooled. Tight security of information must be maintained. Inadvertent leaks of information must be avoided. A careless remark by an officer uninformed about the extent of the overall investigation can irreparably damage the investigation, thus jeopardizing any hope for eventual prosecution. Funds expended for space rental, equipment, salaries and overtime, and "buy money" cannot be recouped.

The investigation of well-organized and well-planned crimes call for a well-organized and well-planned response. Not infrequently, investigations of this type will require coordination with state and federal authorities. Major investigations of auto theft rings, "chop shops," narcotic traffickers, extortion racketeers, large-scale gambling activities, pornography, and fencing networks suggest types of crimes that require a more centralized investigative orientation; but these types of investigative activities must develop some type of liaison, in general, with other types of centralized and also decentralized investigative operations so that pertinent information can be exchanged and to emphasize that all department members share a responsibility in combatting crime, regardless of rank or assignment.

Just because investigative specializations may differ in focus does not mean that other investigative functions are any less important. Deterring

young persons from using narcotics is perhaps more important than formalized efforts required to convict a community's drug kingpin. The community is potentially spared innumerable crimes perpetrated by young persons to support their habits, not to mention interpersonal consequences of family suffering, broken homes, loss of work, and countless medical, legal, and social costs. But there is perhaps a moral imperative in attempting to turn young persons away from drugs. The "Teens-Oriented Policing Seminar" (TOPS) concept initiated by Officer Clarence Douglas, Southwest Patrol Division, was designed to facilitate stronger rapport and respect between police officers and teenagers. This type of initiative can conceivably help many troubled youngsters so they can become responsible, indeed, contributing members of the community and, hence, society at large.

A centralized investigative approach is also warranted to address crime patterns that cross and crisscross areas that cut through more than one of the department's substation or bureau boundaries. The underlying rationale for a centralized focus, not dissimilar from that used in establishing a centralized/decentralized citywide crime analysis system, is to facilitate crime pattern recognition.

Except for the investigation of single, albeit heinous crimes that call for special expertise, centralized investigators should, in general, focus on citywide "patternable crimes," i.e., crimes in a series or "serial crimes" and the persons responsible for committing these offenses. Investigators engaged in these activities should be more cognizant of the types of crime that usually involve adult, mobile offenders. Centralized criminal investigators are envisioned under NOP to become experts on suspects and particular crime types. This type of expertise makes them invaluable as in-house consultants to assist, decentralized investigators in the investigation of particular crime types, in

the development of tactical response to interdict violent and habitual offenders, and in suggesting strategic response to prevent and control crime.

Whereas centralized investigators are perceived as becoming "suspect specialists" and "area generalists," the converse is true for decentralized investigators. NOP envisions decentralized investigators as becoming experts on their geographic areas (i.e., districts and beats) as a primary focus. This focus is designed to enhance knowledge about criminal activities in the city's neighborhoods. The neighborhoods therefore become the center of investigative attention. Types of crime that originate and end in particular neighborhoods, beats, and districts within the Westside Command Station Operations Division should be handled through decentralized investigative efforts. This would include, for example, a substantial proportion of residential burglaries, larcenies, and pursesnatchings along with street robberies, sexual assaults, vandalisms, and some murders (confined, for example, to local bars, residences, and cantinas), violent domestic assaults, and sexual offenses committed by exhibitionists. In short, crimes that do not display citywide patterning, although a pattern may be evident within the jurisdiction of the Westside Command Station Operations Division become the province for decentralized investigation.

Admittedly, the difference in focus between centralized and decentralized investigations is one of delicate balance. The decentralized perspective does not exclude decentralized investigators from obtaining intelligence information, i.e., information that associates suspect names with criminal activity, from informants, crime analysis, and centralized investigators, etc. And it does not exclude determining the identity of active criminals that reside within the Westside Command Station Operations Division's jurisdiction

but are known to perpetrate their crimes elsewhere. While it is possible that some centralized investigators may become very knowledgeable about certain parts of the city, because of the concentration of a citywide crime pattern in a particular area, it is also possible that some decentralized investigators might become specialized in specific types of offenses that seem only to occur in one or more districts in the city. But these delicate differences in perspective can also serve to strengthen the overall investigative process.

More than just theoretically significant, NOP anticipates that these differing perspectives will, from a practical and operational point of view, serve to complement one another. Specialized knowledge of a particular area within the city could at times be very valuable for a centralized investigator in trying to solve a particular case. Likewise, the knowledge of centralized investigators can become a type of "suspect bank" from which the decentralized investigators can, from time to time, "make withdrawals" to obtain intelligence information. In short, these differences encourage facilitative reciprocity between the FOC and the IOC through establishing different, although equal, kinds of expertise required to service each command's objectives. NOP therefore envisions that this logical distinction between the two commands will force functional integration between the IOC and the FOC, given their mutual dependence on the organizational efficiency of the other command. High quality preliminary investigations conducted by FOC personnel can facilitate more efficient follow-up investigations conducted by centralized investigators. And cases suspended through early case closure procedures can save valuable time in not having to process cases for assignment that, in all probability, would not be solved anyway. Conversely, subsequent investigations based on leads obtained from preliminary investigations have a higher

probability of being solved. Increased arrests can help reduce crime in the city's neighborhoods, making citizens feel more secure and enhancing their confidence in the police.

Functional integration that results from facilitative reciprocity also reduces "turf fights" between the two commands, because each command recognizes that its success is, to a large extent, dependent on the work performed by the other command. Time spent on building "control-oriented internal empires" is diminished when each command recognizes its mutual dependence on the other command. Given the intricate relationships involved in the investigative process, both commands must work in concert with one another. Failure to do so negatively impacts the ability of each command to achieve its own "organizational actualization." This not only hinders a particular command from achieving its goals, but it also hurts other commands, the entire department, and, perhaps most damaging, the community served.

In having discussed how different perspectives between centralized and decentralized investigative operations can complement one another in identifying individuals actively engaged in perpetrating crime, brief mention should also be made of other, perhaps less salient, investigative functions envisioned under NOP. Because of differences in expertise, NOP anticipates that investigative sergeants can become much more actively involved in the development of tactical procedures to interdict crime. These may include, for example, refining techniques used in decoy operations, stakeouts and "channeling" operations, electronic and physical surveillance, creative "stings," etc.

Additionally, effort could also be expended in thinking about strategic responses to crime. This might entail more abstract ways of thinking about a

community response in determining what could be done to prevent and control certain types of crime, similar to the department's previous initiative in combatting glue sniffing among some of the community's youth. Initial efforts might involve more in-depth analysis of generic crime types to isolate commonality of victim and perpetrator characteristics (e.g., age cohorts, sex, ethnicity, nationality, etc.), motives, relationships to other types of crime, etc. Aside from police responsibilities in orchestrating such initiatives, various community groups (e.g., the clergy, schools, medical and business communities, etc.) could be called upon to assist department efforts in program implementation.

Finally, a complete review of methods currently used to assist victims of crime could be examined. Hopefully, this work might provide insight into ways to better inform victims of what can be expected to happen after a crime occurs. This might include informing victims of the chances of making an arrest and what might follow if an arrest occurs. Victims should be apprised on the role of the prosecutors, tactics used by defense attorneys, plea bargaining, etc. Crime prevention information could also be provided to help individuals avoid becoming "repeat victims" along with the names of social welfare agencies that provide a host of services such as psychological counseling, medical help, and, in some instances, custodial protection for victims and their families.

Having now focused on ways to improve working relationships between the FOC and the IOC and in addressing additional investigative functions as perceived by NOP, what can be done within the commands to help the criminal investigators themselves? Unlike their patrol counterparts, can it be assumed that the investigative sergeants or their supervisors, for that matter, are

completely enamored with their jobs? As indicated in the Rand studies, are detectives overburdened with paperwork? How much of their time is actually spent in investigating cases? What type of caseload presently exists among the investigative divisions? Are investigative sergeants handling more than ten active cases at any one time? How many new cases are assigned each day? And how much time, on average, is spent on each case? Has reliable information been developed that would answer these questions?

And what about ways used to evaluate investigative efficiency? Are performance evaluations solely based on "bean counting" clearance rates? If so, how valid are the clearance data? According to Eck (1983), "Measures such as clearance, arrest, and conviction rates are useful in determining individual officer productivity, but only if one assumes that a single officer was the only investigator who contributed substantially to the outcome of the investigation. These types of measures place a premium on acting independently and **not sharing information** [emphasis added] with other officers." It must be remembered that clearance rates are the "statistical artifacts" of the investigative process. Many types of clearances are beyond the control of the investigators themselves. It is therefore unclear why so many police departments place such a heavy reliance on an administrative function.

Again, according to Eck (1983), productivity can only be measured in terms of goals and objectives. What types of goals and objectives have been established for investigative operations within the FOC and the IOC? What internal process is used within these commands to establish goals and objectives? As indicated in the previous chapter, do these goals and objectives conform to the department's mission statement and values? Are they designed to facilitate NOP?

Because of the important function served by the investigative sergeants and their immediate supervisors (i.e., the case managers), job enrichment must become a high management priority. The investigators need to have their caseloads reduced through implementation of more effective case screening and assignment procedures. Overburdened by unrealistic investigative caseloads mitigates against quality investigations. Unless caseloads can be substantially reduced, the experience, imagination, ingenuity, and creativity of individual investigators becomes stymied, resulting in an underutilization of personal expertise needed to adequately investigate crimes. A budgetary balance must be achieved, even during times of fiscal stress, that provides investigators with a sufficient number of vehicles to conduct their work in following up leads and in contacting victims and witnesses to secure additional information. To help offset a shortage of cars, proper communications equipment must also be obtained so investigators can expeditiously access crime analysis and on-line offense (OLO) report data. Investigators in some investigative divisions spend a considerable amount of time waiting to access a computer terminal to obtain needed information regarding vehicle information and criminal histories. It is difficult to imagine that investigative personnel will become enthusiastic about working more closely with citizens if they perceive their superordinates to be unenthusiastic in working for them.

It goes without saying that, given the tone of the second Executive Session, the IOC must become more directly involved in working in the city's neighborhoods. This will surely involve novel ways to include many of the city's residents in resource development, community education, community organization, and, possibly, community mobilization that may be, at times, required to assist investigative efforts to stop neighborhood and citywide

crime patterns.

How can this be done? What alternative types of organizational configurations will be required to accommodate new functions envisioned under NOP? How will traditional roles be affected? These questions are addressed in the final chapter of this report.

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CHAPTER 6

DEVELOPING MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

Overview

The criminal investigations function has shifted back and forth from centralized to decentralized and back to centralized modes of organization since the inception of the detectives in American policing. Following the turn of the century, detectives were, for the most part, organized on a decentralized basis (Eck, 1983). Under this configuration, detectives were considered to be generalists, responsible for a wide range of investigations within a specific area of the city. Although this configuration allowed detectives an opportunity to interact with the public as a means of cultivating information sources for their investigations, it was ultimately seen as a cause of corruption and an obstacle to the development of specialized investigative skills (Greenberg, et al., 1979). Because of these drawbacks, a trend had been apparent from the early 1900s up through the mid-1970s for police departments to develop more centralized investigative structures favoring development of increased specialization.

The predominance of this organizational arrangement is illustrated by Greenwood (1979) in Rand's survey of 152 police agencies, which found:


Of the (152) departments with geographic commands, 63 percent located all investigators at central headquarters; 22 percent had investigators operating primarily from the district stations; the remaining 15 percent placed a small portion of the investigators in the districts, while the majority remained at headquarters. (Additionally) . . . In the case of large agencies, the investigative function is subdivided according to units or divisions for homicides, robberies, burglaries, auto thefts and so forth. Even in small agencies, divisions are made according to crimes against property and crime against persons (pp. 15 - 16).

The organizational configuration of the Investigative Operations Command (IOC) within the Houston Police Department, as depicted in Figure #2 (p. 129), parallels Greenwood's findings. Despite the relative simplicity of such a basic organizational configuration, some agencies frequently vacillate between a centralized or decentralized organizational posture for investigative operations. According to one of the guest speakers, the Boston Police Department has "flip-flopped" back and forth between centralized and decentralized investigative configurations over 20 times in the last several years. Obviously, this begs the question: "Why?" Although there is probably no direct answer to such a question, this type of vacillation certainly provokes some concern regarding that department's managerial philosophy. Given the disruption based on the frequency, to say nothing of the magnitude, this type of organizational change entails for department members, one begins to question whether the repetitiveness of these changes is somehow tied on a need to be responsive to the public or a "knee jerk" reaction administratively designed to appease internal turmoil.

In an effort to avoid this type of situation, police organizations must adopt a managerial philosophy that clearly articulates the functions needed to serve the public in an efficient and responsive manner. By virtue of Chief Brown's call for a "new style of policing" during the first Executive Session, the Houston Police Department produced such a managerial philosophy that has come to be known as NOP. The department's commitment to establish a process to begin implementation of NOP following the first Executive Session coincided with a decision that had already been made to begin decentralizing criminal investigations once the Westside Command Station opened. A second Executive Session was called for to determine how investigative operations, both

Investigative Operations Command

Figure #2



centralized and decentralized, would work in light of NOP.

As the membership began to deliberate this issue, other issues began to emerge. Stemming from the first Executive Session was an issue to expand investigative responsibilities for patrol officers. This involved having patrol officers conduct more comprehensive initial investigations resulting in "early case closures," thereby substantially reducing the amount of time required to screen cases for follow-up investigations. In conjunction with this issue, several of the distinguished guests that had been invited to make presentations during the second Executive Session had suggested incorporating new functions within criminal investigations. The means of accommodating these functions, however, was not specifically addressed, and it therefore remained an open issue.

Commensurate with discussion of proposed changes in functions was a need to more closely examine existing organizational structures. How was the Westside Command Station Operations Division to be organizationally configured to, not only accommodate decentralized investigators, but to facilitate the implementation of NOP in patrol operations? And how was the IOC to be structurally altered to accommodate the new functions that had been suggested during the second Executive Session? Of tantamount importance, given the separation in investigative responsibilities between the FOC and the IOC following decentralization, what could be done to functionally integrate investigative operations between these two commands?

In addressing these and other issues, this chapter will present a series of three management models which have been configured on the basis of analyzing functional responsibilities and organizational configurations under NOP. The first model examines the scope of functional responsibilities for patrol and

decentralized investigative personnel assigned to the Command Station. Contained within this analysis is an in-depth description of the investigative and patrol functions to be integrated under NOP. The second model builds upon the first in that it describes how investigative and patrol responsibilities will be functionally integrated. Based on the need to redefine how patrol and investigative personnel will work together within the framework of NOP, the second management model offers as a new concept the formation of a new organizational entity known as the Interactive Service Unit (ISU). The ISU becomes the basis from which roles are redefined in terms of expansion and integration so as to enhance the department's ability to efficiently manage the delivery of services to the public. The third management model examines the organizational configuration of the IOC. Given the demands of NOP, coupled with the commitment to decentralize the investigative function, changes within the IOC are to be expected. This model, therefore, not only describes what those changes are, but of equal importance, describes how those changes will affect the relationship between and among centralized investigators, decentralized investigators, and patrol personnel. A final model is presented toward the end of this chapter that depicts the major theme of this report involving integrating the department's overall investigative operations through NOP. While this model displays functional responsibilities between centralized and decentralized criminal investigations within the FOC and IOC, it also focuses attention on the integrative aspects of investigative efforts between these two commands.

Collectively speaking, the proposed models imply that significant changes regarding the organizational configurations of the Westside Command Station Operations Division and the IOC may be in order. Centered upon the concept of

facilitative reciprocity, these models provide a framework from which an efficient management system can be designed to sustain NOP and enhance its evolutionary development. Unlike many of the historical precedents in policing, which were identified earlier within this report, the proposals within this chapter represent alternatives designed to improve the organization's capacity to efficiently manage the delivery of services to the neighborhoods throughout the city of Houston.

Much of the material contained in this chapter is new and may, therefore, be expected to generate some controversy. But the fact that members of this department will be debating this information should lead to the accumulation of additional knowledge. This, by itself, will serve to benefit the department as an institution as well as improve the relationships among police personnel and with the citizens whom they serve.

Model #1: Organizing Functional Responsibilities

In December, 1980, a report entitled: Study of Organizational and Facility Needs of the Houston Police Department Through the Year 2000, (DeFoor, 1980), was submitted to Police Chief B. K. Johnson. The purpose of this report was to devise a plan for the decentralization of basic police services provided by the Houston Police Department. The Command Station concept was envisioned as the key to successfully implementing the decentralization process. As a concept, the Command Station represented more than just a building. It was considered to be tangible evidence of the department's commitment to provide effective, in-depth police services to the community, utilizing appropriate facilities located at places easily accessible to the community (DeFoor, 1980).

The success of decentralization, however, was dependent on more than just constructing a number of Command Station facilities throughout the city. Of critical importance was recognizing how the process of decentralization would affect the delivery of police services. As noted within the report (DeFoor, 1980):

The most important recommendation resulting from this study is that the department must be reorganized functionally to meet the needs of our City over the next 20 years (p. ii).

The report went on to suggest that additional studies would be needed to examine how specific functional responsibilities would be altered by the process of decentralization. Of particular concern, was the impact the Command Station concept would have on patrol and investigative operations.

Although the patrol force was already decentralized throughout the city via the use of substations, it was clear the diverse needs of the citizens were rapidly exceeding the abilities of department personnel to adequately address

those needs under the present organizational configuration. The Command Station concept was seen as a means of alleviating these concerns. As indicated earlier in Chapter 4, personnel assigned to the Command Station were to be responsible for a multitude of services. How the department would address service issues such as controlling crime and liaising with citizens became the direct responsibility of the Field Deployment Techniques Task Force (herein referred to as the Task Force), which was created in February, 1981.

The members of the Task Force were requested to develop a workable and viable program to meet the needs of the department in delivering police services. They were also instructed to design a program around the concept of decentralization with an emphasis placed on the "team policing" concept (Collins, 1981). The efforts of Task Force members along with contributions made by The Metropolitan Organization (TMO) in working with the department to establish a more sensitive neighborhood based type of police service delivery system culminated in the creation of the Direct Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) project (for an account of activities that occurred between the department and representatives of TMO, reference an article by Chief Lee P. Brown on "Police-Community Power Sharing" that appears in a book by William A. Geller, 1985).

As noted in the first Executive Session report, the D.A.R.T. program served as the impetus for making a number of functional changes which affected the traditional responsibilities of police officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. Two significant changes brought about by the D.A.R.T. program had a direct bearing on the task before the membership of the second Executive Session. First, investigative personnel were actually transferred from the Investigative Operations Command and reassigned to the Field Operations Command in an attempt

to monitor the ensuing relationship that was to develop with patrol personnel. Second, functional responsibilities of patrol personnel were altered to allow police officers, community residents, and business personnel to work together through mutual participation in a number of community interaction strategies (Snelson, et al., 1987). It was from the successes of the D.A.R.T. strategies, coupled with other significant programmatical experiments (e.g. the Fear Reduction Program, Project Oasis, the Positive Interaction Program, etc.), that the members of the first Executive Session eventually created the Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) concept (Oettmeier, et al., 1987).

As indicated in Chapter 2, NOP is a management philosophy which seeks to guide and direct the delivery of police services. Determining how this will be accomplished is not an easy task. It has been suggested throughout this report, however, that the concept of facilitative reciprocity be used to describe the integration of functional responsibilities within the IOC and between the IOC and FOC under NOP. For purposes of clarification, this concept acknowledges a certain amount of autonomy will exist between the centralized and decentralized investigative functions. Facilitative reciprocity also recognizes that a degree of mutual dependency must exist between these two entities when investigative efforts are perceived as being complementary within the same system.

The first management model, consequently, serves to identify the functional responsibilities of investigative personnel assigned to the Westside Command Station. But, as has been referenced in each of the preceding chapters, the investigative function cannot be examined independently from the patrol function. Therefore, the description of the first management model includes an extensive discussion of patrol under the context of NOP. Incorporated within

this discussion is an acknowledgement of the need to legitimize a commitment to the crime prevention function.

In keeping with the philosophical underpinnings of NOP as expressed in Chapter 2, the crime prevention function serves many purposes; chief among them is the need to facilitate the integration of certain patrol and investigative responsibilities through the mutual sharing of information. It is through the process of utilizing a variety of different kinds of information, that patrol and investigative personnel will come to depend upon each other's assistance and expertise. The type of information needed and determining how it is to be used to unify operational commitments will be a major concern addressed within the discussion of this model.


Before beginning this discussion, however, as a means of administrative protocol, it is first necessary to indicate that the Command Station is assigned to the assistant chief of the Field Operations Command (FOC). Reporting to the assistant chief is a deputy chief who is physically assigned to the facility and is directly responsible for overseeing the administration of two divisions: the Westside Command Station Operations Division (WCSOD) and the Westside Command Station Administrative Division. Each of these divisions is commanded by a captain.

The first proposed management model is only concerned with the functional and organizational configuration issues of the WCSOD. Under the context of this model, the captain of the WCSOD is responsible for managing the activities of three basic functions: patrol, crime prevention, and investigations (See Figure #3, p. 137). It will be the captain's primary responsibility to manage the integration of these functions so services can be delivered within the neighborhoods in a responsive and efficient manner. To appreciate the

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING MODEL

Westside Organizational Configuration

Figure #3



magnitude of this responsibility, it becomes necessary to describe each of these functions in detail.

The Patrol Function

To best understand the patrol function under NOP, it is appropriate to first examine the traditional framework which guided the patrol function from the early to mid-1900s through the latter part of the 1970s. In referencing the material of George Kelling, a guest speaker of the first Executive Session, this time period was known as the "reform era" of policing. Spearheaded by various police leaders, including August Vollmer and O. W. Wilson, the impetus for the reform movement was based upon a number of forces, among them: police corruption and inefficiency, linkages to local political machinery, the Great Depression, and the urban reform movement. These forces changed the source of police legitimacy, police tactics and technology, police management, and the standards by which police were judged (Kelling, 1985).

In describing the operational characteristics of police agencies during the reform era, Kelling (1985) identifies several facets which are still quite prevalent in most police agencies during the 1980s:

Foot patrol was replaced by preventive patrol in automobiles and rapid response to calls for service. Determination of beat structure on the basis of neighborhoods was replaced by mathematical formulas developed on the basis of calls for service and reported crime. Police administration moved from decentralized police units closely linked to neighborhoods and local political units to centralized patterns incorporating "scientific" management characteristics of the Progressive Era: improved recruitment, supervision, training, management, record keeping, and methods of accountability. Informal means of judging police success were abandoned, and police impact on crime, measured by arrest statistics and the use of the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime Reports, became the primary means of judging individual police officers and police organizations. Police behavior that did not lead to arrests

was neither organizationally recognized nor rewarded. Police actions were rarely seen as ends in themselves but instead were viewed as means to "process persons" into the justice system (p. 296).

As a result of these changes, the police found themselves to be primarily focused on criminal apprehension. With the advent of the police car and radio, the police became mobilized but not without the consequences of being removed from interacting with citizens or being able to spend time in the neighborhoods other than having to respond to calls for service. The officers' responsibilities were generally structured around the enforcement of laws (Kelling, 1985).

Despite the support engendered by police chiefs during this time period, the reform era of policing was not without its problems. In particular, concerns began to surface regarding the administrative structure within police organizations which was supposed to enhance the efficiency of service delivery. According to Klockars (1985), the quasi-military administrative model of policing was organizationally primitive in that it suffered from two main defects:

First, it works, to the extent it works, largely by setting hundreds and sometimes thousands of rules and regulations covering everything from haircuts to shoeshines and punishing even trivial deviations from those rules and regulations severely. Unfortunately, the success of this type of administrative structure depends on the unwarranted assumption that policemen will not discover that the surest way to avoid doing anything wrong in such an organizational environment is to do as little as possible--out of sheer self defense.

The second feature of the quasi-military administrative model that undermines administrative aspirations has to do with the fact that in any agency whose major management tool is punishment, punishment must not only control malpractice but induce productivity. To encourage productivity in this way a department must set clear levels of expected performance and identify and punish those who fall short of these levels (pp. 312 - 313).

Whereas Klockars critiques the reform era in terms of the influence the administrative model had on the efficiency of police operations, Kelling focuses on what he perceives to be an overreaction by police leaders to remove police officers from a close association with the public. By doing this, according to Kelling (1985), a number of benefits available to the police were ignored, such as:

. . . community support for police, active communication between police and citizens, police awareness of local community standards, police familiarity with such local institutions as churches and welfare agencies, a sense of police participation in the community, the development of trust between the police and citizens that enabled informal solution of many problems, and a feeling of active police "presence" in a community (p. 305).

To take advantage of these shortfalls, Kelling (1985) suggests considerable experience will have to be gained in managing police relationships with the variety of institutional, corporate, political, neighborhood, and other interests that will escalate their demands on the police to keep pace with the new receptivity.

The patrol function of the 1990s and beyond, consequently, should heed these observations. As was indicated to members of the first Executive Session by a number of the guest speakers, the patrol function must be managed in such a manner that it capitalizes upon: (1) the strengths of its personnel; (2) the cooperation and participation by community residents; and (3) the availability of resources within the community and the department. To assist the police in this endeavor, Kelling (1985) suggests a number of activities be recognized and acted upon:

- The police should be perceived and perceive themselves as an integral part of a network of community problem-solving resources that includes other city agencies, private sector agencies, corporations, voluntary organizations, interest groups, and a host of others;

- Priority should be given in the allocation of police to those areas essential to city life: transportation hubs, small business areas, schools and recreation facilities, entertainment areas, and neighborhoods particularly threatened by disorder that could turn into serious crime;
- For the patrol (force) within a department, the most important goal should be to increase the quantity and improve the quality of police-citizen contacts;
- Officers at all levels must perceive themselves as resources through which neighborhoods and communities maintain social control;
- "Rapid response" to calls for service must be deemphasized because, without providing offsetting benefits in crime control, it imposes the costly requirement that a substantial part of the police force be held in reserve to be available;
- Emphasis must be given to gathering information from citizens and disseminating it beat to beat, watch to watch, and among patrol, special units, and detectives; and
- It should be recognized that current indicators of police success--crime levels and arrests--are of extremely limited value as measures of police performance. Other easily quantifiable measures are not available. Developing them will be a long and complex and essential task (pp. 306 - 307).

Each of these activities has been presented, in one form or another, to the members of the first and second Executive Sessions. Furthermore, each of these activities is characteristic of the NOP philosophy within the Houston Police Department. What remains to be accomplished at this juncture, is an examination of how the patrol function under NOP will affect the role responsibilities of the various patrol personnel.

Implicit within the scope of the officers' role under NOP is the need to develop a personal desire and willingness to be responsible for improving the quality of life within their assigned neighborhoods. If this is to occur, officers must be responsible and be held accountable for the performance of

activities designed to prevent and suppress crime. This means the officers must experience active participation in the development and implementation of crime prevention and interdiction strategies.

If the officers are not allowed to work with the citizens and other division personnel in this capacity, they will unilaterally reject the notion of being held directly responsible for the safety and welfare of the residents living and working within their neighborhoods. This is based upon the supposition that officers will feel their authority to act has been severely impaired. Without this authority, officers may feel helpless in being able to legitimately respond to citizen expectations and needs as they relate to criminogenic problems. To avoid this dilemma, time should be spent determining how officers can become involved in neighborhood crime prevention and control activities under NOP.

Police officers will certainly be expected to respond to calls for service. However, under the context of Differential Police Response (DPR) strategies (e.g., the use of a computer aided dispatch system, call prioritization procedures, response code classifications, queue code classifications, use of a Teleserve Unit, etc.), calls for service will be more efficiently managed. This will result in more time being available for the officers to perform other types of activities during their uncommitted time periods. Contrary to traditional policing assumptions, officers will not be expected to spend their uncommitted time performing random, preventive patrol.

As an alternative, the officers will be performing different types of directed activities. Some of these directed patrol activities will be tactically oriented by virtue of identifying crime problems within specific neighborhoods via tactical crime analyses. In addition to the law enforcement

activities, officers will also be expected to perform a wide range of other activities commonly referred to as order maintenance or peacekeeping responsibilities (Wilson, 1968). These activities are defined as handling drunk and disorderly incidents, resolving gang activities, handling the mentally ill, resolving street disturbances, disbanding threatening congregations of personnel on street corners and so forth. While these incidents may not necessarily represent violations of the law, left unattended, they may rapidly escalate into criminal activity.

Of even more importance to the role of the patrol officer under NOP, though, is a reliance on performing self-directed activities. This is an important concept within the framework of NOP; for the term self-directed implies a sense of control over one's destiny. Within the context of NOP, the responsibility of performing self-directed activities must be guided by the premise of identifying and resolving problems which are unique to any given neighborhood. No longer should officers expect to address neighborhood problems by adhering to the fundamental principles inherent within one particular role orientation such as law enforcement or order maintenance. As indicated in Chapter 2, the conflict of deciding which role is the most advantageous for a given department or for a city in general is a dead issue under NOP. The argument has been resolved by virtue of having officers fulfill role obligations on the basis of responding to the diverse demands placed upon them by neighborhood residents. Before initiating a response, however, officers must first have the flexibility during their tour of duty to interact with the citizenry for the purpose of identifying and responding to neighborhood service demands. Herein lies the importance of allowing officers to direct their own uncommitted time.

The crux of performing self-directed activities during one's uncommitted time begins with the process of interaction on behalf of the officers and the citizens. Whether it occurs via casual conversations in the citizen's front yard, during the course of handling a call, or in the performance of conducting a neighborhood needs assessment survey, officers will be attempting to identify specific concerns they feel responsible for addressing because of their commitment to establish and sustain a safe environment within the neighborhoods. Officers, consequently, will be expected to procure salient information regarding neighborhood crime and noncrime problems; they will be expected to analyze this information; develop responsive, practical, and realistic plans; organize and coordinate the allocation of resources; successfully implement those plans; and evaluate outcomes in terms of anticipated goal attainment.

It is anticipated that information will be exchanged resulting in the identification of particular crime and noncrime problems which will require a collaborative response on behalf of the police and the citizens. In essence, the officers will become "neighborhood managers," accountable to both the citizens within their neighborhoods and their respective district supervisors.

The concept of self-directed activities will also significantly affect the supervisors' role as the officers' responsibilities are expanded and eventually integrated with the investigative function. No longer will supervisors' primary responsibility be one of control. Control will be deemphasized in lieu of providing support to the officers as they attempt to address various neighborhood concerns. It is anticipated that by virtue of their interaction, officers will be expected to perform a wide range of activities within the neighborhood. Depending upon the nature of these activities, officers may seek

assistance from their supervisor in the form of: setting priorities; allocating resources; identifying performance indicators; and evaluating results. Supervisors will need to become efficient planners, organizers, and coordinators of services and resources in order to effectively support the activities of the officers.

In essence, the primary role of district sergeants will be one of management as opposed to supervision. As managers, district sergeants will be expected to manage the activities of their officers as well as the events occurring within their district. This will require the sergeants to become proficient in the allocation of resources as there will be competing service demands emanating from citizen requests within neighborhoods, beats, districts, and between shifts.

As a consequence, the demand for managerial efficiency will increase proportionately for patrol shift lieutenants. Whereas sergeants are responsible for activities within a singular district, the lieutenants will be responsible for the activities and events occurring within Master Districts 18, 19, and 20. It will be their responsibility to manage the allocation of resources in relation to community needs as identified by the sergeants, police officers, and citizens. The shift lieutenants will pay particular attention to ensuring the district sergeants are supporting and managing the activities of the patrol officers. Additionally, the lieutenants will be responsible for working with the various personnel in the development of long-term strategic responses to prevent and suppress criminal activity from occurring during their shift.

It suffices to state that the responsibilities of patrol personnel under NOP will be altered. Patrol personnel, however, must realize these changes

will not preclude them from the delivery of normal, daily responsibilities such as responding to calls for service, making arrests, enforcing traffic laws, and writing reports. Instead, the effects of NOP will be felt in the area of an officer's uncommitted time. This time will become more structured via the officers' performance of self-directed activities generated on the basis of interaction with neighborhood residents. This will have a direct effect on the functional responsibilities of other patrol and investigative personnel. The extent of these changes will be further described in the context of Interactive Service Unit presented later in this chapter.

The Operations Support Function

One of the underlying tenets of NOP is a commitment to the prevention of criminal activity. Among other things, as a managerial philosophy, NOP requires police administrators to reassess the appropriateness of structuring departmental policies, supervisory responsibilities, and service delivery activities under traditional police assumptions which have inherently been characterized as reactive in nature. Despite the mixed feelings of police administrators as to whether the police in general have been successful in this approach, a reactive approach to criminogenic behavior is not designed to address the causes of the various crime problems; it only addresses the symptoms. If significant improvements in police effectiveness are going to occur changes must be made. As noted in the report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1968), one of the first changes the police must recognize is knowing where to begin:

Despite the seriousness of the problem today and the increasing challenge in the years ahead, the central conclusion of the Commission is that a significant reduction in crime is possible if the following objectives are

vigorously pursued:

First, society must seek to prevent crime before it happens by assuring all Americans a stake in the benefits and responsibilities of American life, by strengthening law enforcement, and by reducing criminal opportunities . . . (p. 39).

Through NOP, the Houston Police Department is reexamining the traditional reactive policing approach and augmenting it with a commitment to work with the community in identifying and addressing the causes of neighborhood crime and noncrime problems. In working with the community in this capacity, it is the intent of the department to eventually change the behavioral patterns of the citizens in an effort to prevent them from becoming victimized.

Conceptually, the notion of crime prevention is not new to the police or the citizens. What has been open to debate is determining what method is most suitable for the police to use in promoting crime prevention activities. Initially, it was thought that crime prevention ought to be a significant aspect of the community relations function. However, this orientation has been obscured over the years as noted by Radelet (1986):

Yet, in perspective, we are reminded that the first institutes on police-community relations in the mid-1950s made crime prevention a primary objective. The prevalent concept of police-community relations that emerged in the ensuing years, especially the turbulent 1960s, obscured this initial objective. We were to get back to it in the 1970s, it is true, under different titles, almost as if something new and unique had been created (p. 397).

In the view of police experts, however, police community-relations (PCR) units, despite their primary objective, generally had low status and were seen as being peripheral to basic police operations and hence had little direct impact on an agency's relationship with racial minority group communities (U.S. Department of Justice, 1973). Moreover, according to Malcom (1975), many PCR

units or programs have been eliminated or downgraded as a result of the fiscal constraints of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Therefore, to be effective, the function of crime prevention must not be perceived as a "public relations" program or a primary responsibility of a PCR unit. Crime prevention must take on a different perspective; it should be the responsibility of the police and citizens alike. In the words of John Alderson, chief constable of Devon and Cornwall, when he spoke to an International Conference on Police Accountability in January of 1981, a "new ethic of policing" must be developed that is concerned mainly with the prevention of crime through "communal policing" directed against social disorganization leading to crime (Radelet, 1986). Furthermore, in quoting from Radelet (1986), Alderson indicates:

It seems, therefore, that in their own responsibilities for the prevention and containment of crime, the police operate at three levels. The primary level challenges their ability to harness the proactive forces in society, exemplified in social participation At the secondary level, they have to guard, to patrol, and to enforce the law . . . if the primary function is embedded in the communities, the secondary and enforcement role will be seen to be complementary to it. The common good is witnessed as being served. The tertiary role of the police may be said to be their investigative function which will, in turn, be enhanced by their success in the primary or social participation role . . . (p. 44).

Alderson's comments illustrate the essence of an operational schemata for NOP. Given what has previously been described regarding the patrol function, the task now at hand is describing how the elements of the crime prevention function facilitate the integration of patrol and investigative operations.

This model, consequently, proposes that a separate Operations Support Detail be established within the WCSOD. This detail would be under the direct supervision of a lieutenant who would report directly to the captain of the WCSOD. This detail will support operations within patrol and investigative

operations through the performance of three primary functions: (1) a tactical crime analysis function, (2) a strategic analysis function, and (3) a planning and implementation function. As a means of supporting the commitment to resolve neighborhood problems, functional responsibilities will focus on the preventive aspects of criminal activities, victim behavior, and police involvement within the neighborhood through their interaction with the citizens.

As a means of promoting the concept of facilitative reciprocity, this detail will force functional integration to occur between patrol and investigative personnel by developing and sustaining an information management system. As indicated in the latter part of Chapter 3, such a system is predicated upon the type of interaction occurring within the department and among the citizenry. Of utmost importance to this system is the contribution made by the citizens. According to Skogan (1986), this is because:

. . . citizens hold a virtual monopoly over the key item necessary to succeed in combating crime: information. Understanding how much and what kind of information is out there and organizing to gather and use it more effectively could be the key to making sufficient gains in real police productivity (p. 332).

Furthermore, Skogan (1986) contends that:

In their roles as victims and witnesses, citizens have a virtual monopoly over information about who did what, and this tight control extends over almost all Index and most non-Index crimes. Probably the most critical aspect of policing is how effectively the authorities gain access to this information, and much of what the police do and how they are organized reflect implicit theories about the best way of doing this (p. 334.).

In the context of Skogan's analysis, the proposed information system will be driven by two functions: tactical crime analysis and strategic analysis. Each of these functions sets forth as guidelines reasons for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating different types of information. Based on the efficiency of

this process, patrol and investigative personnel will be able to be more responsive in the prevention and control of criminal activity within the neighborhoods. An examination of each of these functions is in order to explain just exactly how this can occur.

The Tactical Crime Analysis Function

According to Bieck (1987), tactical crime analysis represents the most prevalent form of crime analysis. Furthermore, this type of analysis:

. . . consists of a set of techniques and procedures used to identify existing and emergent crime patterns and crime clusters, along with names of possible suspects involved in perpetrating such crimes (p. 1).

Tactical crime analysis is not the same as strategic analysis. Whereas tactical crime analysis leads to the implementation of tactical responses, strategic analysis is more comprehensive and leads to the development of long-term strategies to deal with problems. Tactical actions are interdiction oriented. They are generally designed to apprehend offenders when the safety of citizens is placed in peril. Tactical analysis does not lend itself to developing solutions to etiological questions surrounding crime.

This is not to suggest that the functions are incompatible. To the contrary, they complement one another. On the one hand, tactical crime analysis can provide information regarding the frequency of emerging and existing crime patterns or clusters. On the other hand, strategic analysis can provide information describing the conditions or factors that contribute and/or cause those patterns or clusters to exist.

For example, a crime analyst may discover that burglaries are prevalent within a particular neighborhood. Once this information is conveyed to the officer, steps can be taken to profile the neighborhood. This profile might

include having the officer conduct an assessment of defensible space criteria around victims' homes, or, performing a number of security surveys to assess the potential for becoming victimized. The information gleaned from the analysis can be used to not only direct the behavior of the citizens, but also to characterize the behavioral tendencies of the criminal. The value of this information is recognizing that criminals attempt to identify targets based upon certain types of criteria, such as the degree of risk or opportunity. If this criteria can be identified via strategic analyses, the ability to predict future targets may be enhanced thereby increasing the probability that interdiction responses will be more successful. Other examples abound, such as diminishing auto thefts by removing car keys and locking the doors, reducing burglaries by locking doors, securing windows, strategically planting shrubs around the home and so forth.

In comparing both analytical functions, however, if a decision had to be made regarding the importance of tactical crime analysis and strategic analysis, police administrators must be compelled, given the peril posed by violent ongoing crime patterns, to direct their resources to the development of tactical crime analysis. This is based upon the need to immediately identify and apprehend suspects who are presently endangering and harming the lives of the citizenry.

Tactical crime analysis techniques and procedures, therefore, will serve as the primary means of supporting patrol service delivery along with providing information about criminal activities to enhance criminal investigations within the WCSOD. The analysts must direct their attention to offenses that are more likely to originate and be confined within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Command Station. Additionally, the analysts will be expected to enter their

information into the crime analysis system in order to support the citywide crime analysis component.

The identification of emerging patterns and clusters will be useful to patrol personnel as it will guide the implementation of tactically-oriented, directed patrol activities. As evidenced from the D.A.R.T. program, the use of tactical action plans (TAPs) by the crime analysts represented the primary tool with which interdiction responses were initiated (Oettmeier, 1985). Under this proposed functional model, TAPs would continue to be produced by the tactical crime analysts. The nature of the TAP, whether it is designed to apprehend a suspect or is designed to collect evidence that leads to the eventual apprehension of a suspect(s), will determine who is responsible for implementation.

For example, if information which specifies the need to apprehend an armed robbery suspect is produced, the TAP would be forwarded via the crime prevention lieutenant to the appropriate patrol shift lieutenant. It would be the responsibility of the patrol lieutenant to pass the TAP on to the proper sergeant who would implement the TAP through the use of any number of interdiction responses performed by the patrol officers. Should the need arise, the sergeant could also enlist the support of investigative personnel or the Investigative Response Team. Upon completion of the assignment, the sergeant would be responsible for advising the lieutenant of the outcome; who, in turn, would report the information back to the crime prevention lieutenant.

If, however, the information from the crime analysts requires responses for the purpose of collecting evidence about the activities of a suspect, the TAP should be sent to the investigative shift lieutenant; again, via the crime prevention lieutenant. In these instances, covert operations (e.g.,

surveillances, decoy operations, stings) may need to be implemented in an effort to secure the proper evidence. Apprehension occurs only after the evidence has been determined to be sufficient by a prosecutor who acknowledges it as such by issuing a warrant for the suspect's arrest.

Herein lies a good example of how patrol and investigative personnel not only work together, but are dependent upon information support from the members of another functional unit. Another example of this interdependency occurs when tactical crime analysts assist the investigative sergeants in the process of case enhancement. The process of linking cases will result in a pool of information being collected and analyzed which may result in the identification of heretofore unknown but useful investigative leads. Hence, investigators will experience more opportunities to effectively utilize their time in the pursuit of investigative leads as opposed to searching for those leads; which would now become a shared responsibility of the tactical crime analysts.

Other specific duties to be performed by the analysts have been extracted from Bieck's (1985) report entitled: Crime Analysis Implementation Work Plan, and include the following:

- Circulation of Wanted Person(s) and other crime analysis bulletins received from the central Crime Analysis Section;
- Preparation of Tactical Action Plans (TAPs) based on information received from the central Crime Analysis Section;
- Preparation and distribution of crime analysis bulletins and TAPs based on information analyzed within the command station area;
- Preparation of . . . "neighborhood profile reports" that indicate crime trends and noncrime problems in each of the beats . . . (these reports could also be used to help structure deployment of citizens engaged in neighborhood watch programs to address certain types of crimes);

- Development of suspect, victim, and crime profiles to facilitate implementation of directed patrol activities (e.g., structured helicopter surveillance based on analysis of residential burglaries);
- Performance of vector analysis to assess mobility patterns of suspects engaged in criminal activities;
- Collection, analysis, and distribution of data obtained from Neighborhood Assessment Surveys performed by the patrol officers; and
- Developing a liaison capability with other law enforcement agencies and private or institutional security personnel within or surrounding the command station area to facilitate the collection and distribution of information regarding criminal activities (pp. 10 - 11).

The role of tactical crime analysis is obviously one of support. This type of support serves to functionally integrate patrol and investigative operations by focusing upon the implementation of interdiction responses. Thus, crime analysis must not be perceived as an end in itself, but rather a means to an end; that end being the control of crime through the utilization of information needed to efficiently manage patrol and investigative operations.

The Strategic Analysis Function

Whereas tactical crime analysis focuses upon determining whether two or more crimes comprise a pattern, strategic analysis seeks to identify factors that contribute to crime and noncrime problems. Strategic analysis is a natural by-product of the "problem oriented approach" to policing created by Goldstein in 1979, and discussed within Chapter 4 of this report. According to Eck (et al., 1987), the theory behind Goldstein's problem-oriented policing is relatively simple:

Underlying conditions create problems. These conditions might include the characteristics of the people involved (offenders, potential victims, and others), the social

setting in which these people interact, the physical environment, and the way the public deals with these conditions.

A problem created by these conditions may generate one or more incidents. These incidents, while stemming from a common source, may appear to be different. For example, social and physical conditions in a deteriorated apartment complex may generate burglaries, acts of vandalism, intimidation of pedestrians by rowdy teenagers, and other incidents. These incidents, some of which come to police attention, are symptoms of the problem. The incidents will continue so long as the problem that creates them persists (p. xvi).

In accordance with this description of problem oriented policing, the strategic analyst should be responsible for being the most knowledgeable person about the causes of crime and noncrime problems within the WCSOD. Unlike the investigative sergeants, who become traditionally knowledgeable about crime in their assigned areas by virtue of investigating crimes, the strategic analyst obtains expertise on the basis of interaction; interaction between and among patrol personnel, investigators, other analysts, and the citizens.

The purpose of the interaction is to develop an understanding as to **WHY PROBLEMS EXIST IN NEIGHBORHOODS**. Strategic analysts will attempt to identify conditions that contribute to and perpetuate crime. Conceptually, this is quite different from determining **what types of problems exist**, which is the primary responsibility of the tactical crime analysts. Strategic analysts will be interested in collecting and analyzing information which is traditionally not available within police departments. This type of information will provide insight regarding characteristics of problem causation existing within the neighborhoods. This type of information will certainly prove useful in the planning and implementation of tactical responses and crime prevention strategies; two activities strategic analysts should be involved in.

The function of strategic analysis will require the analysts to perform a number of unconventional, yet innovative and enlightening responsibilities. For example, strategic analysts will be responsible for:

1) Information Collection and Analysis

This would involve identifying, collecting, and analyzing information regarding the amount and type of reported and unreported crime existing within a given area. This could be accomplished in any number of ways, inclusive of:

A) Conducting neighborhood victimization studies.

Victimization studies provide insight about types of crime and the frequency of its occurrence; information that is not captured through routine reporting. More importantly, victimization studies offer the prospect of examining causation issues from the perspective of the victims rather than from the basis of suspect-oriented information. In keeping with the notion of perpetuating prevention through behavioral changes; it makes more sense to concentrate on behavior one has some semblance of control (i.e., the citizen) versus that of the suspect where one has no control until after the fact; and even then the amount of control is minimal. Victim-oriented information, consequently, can be generated on the bases of:

- 1) **Demography** - the identification of population characteristics where crimes were committed; such as: age, sex, ethnicity, density, proportion of age groups etc.;

- 2) **"Criminography"** - the analysis of crime characteristics in relationship to neighborhood typography; for example, identifying corridors or shopping strips where crime occurs, business locales, parking lots, local streets, yards, vacant lots, in one's home, a neighbor's home, apartments, etc.; and
- 3) **Victim Vulnerability** - the identification and analysis of information about individuals, such as their behavior at the time of the offense (e.g., drunk, "high on drugs"), their demeanor or attitude, who they were associating with (family, friends, strangers, casual acquaintances); what they were doing when victimized, what time of day/night it occurred, etc.

This type of information is useful not only in describing why crime problems exist, but it serves as a basis for performing a wide variety of crime prevention strategies; a responsibility which requires active citizen involvement.

Collecting this type of information is not a difficult task. The newly proposed offense report, for example, contains several provisions for the collection of this information. Additionally, patrol officers and investigators can discuss with the citizens these factors as a part of servicing a call or in the performance of conducting an investigation. This responsibility represents an opportunity for investigators to expand their involvement with neighborhood residents into the realm of crime prevention. (This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.)

Lastly, it provides a basis for community education about the problems associated with crime and noncrime activities from which prescriptive prevention strategies and responses can be discussed. Information concerning steps residents, business proprietors, or civic group members can follow to avoid being victimized can easily be passed on to citizens through civic group meetings, addressing professional business groups, or by using department initiatives (e.g., Positive Interaction Program, etc.).

Efforts could also be made to incorporate this type of information within school curriculums as a means of reinforcing citizen participation and cooperation with respect to crime prevention responsibilities and civic duties concerning the identification of criminal activity, reporting such activities to the police, and testifying when directly involved in such matters.

- B) Canvassing rehabilitation centers and hospitals to collect information which will provide comparisons of behavioral propensities for performing activities which create neighborhood crime and noncrime problems.

Generally, hospital personnel report incidents to the police for investigation when there is a belief an injury was the result of criminally related activities. Rehabilitation centers do not report such information primarily because of their commitment to confidentiality on behalf of the patient.

There is, however, a civic obligation on the part of

these organizations to share information with police personnel which will allow them to improve the safety and quality of neighborhood life. This does not mean police personnel should seek to acquire information for the purpose of conducting an investigation into the activities of these individuals.

The strategic analyst should be more interested in identifying the behavioral characteristics of the victim or conditions which contribute to the performance of certain types of criminogenic activities. These activities may be symptomatic of specific problems within a neighborhood that residents are concerned about; and, represent something they and the police can do something about.

C) **Interacting with school officials to determine the extent of criminal activity involving youth.**

Experiences from the School Task Force Program have demonstrated the value of working with school administrators in reducing the opportunities for juveniles to become involved in criminal activities. Based upon this type of interaction, strategies were devised to remove reasons responsible for enticing juvenile delinquent acts.

When this type of information is shared with juvenile authorities, both within and outside the department, a description of juvenile related criminal activity will begin to emerge. The characteristics of this activity will probably suggest different courses of action for the police

and the public to pursue (as has been demonstrated through a federal program known as the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program, sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).

- D) **Canvassing neighborhoods to assess the impact environmental design changes may have on the capacity to reduce opportunities for criminal activity while simultaneously enhancing the residents' sense of safety within the neighborhood.**

The notion of designing physical spaces to prevent crime was developed simultaneously, but separately, by architect Oscar Newman and sociologist C. Ray Jeffery in 1971. Through their research, it was determined that crimes such as burglaries, robberies, rapes, and vandalism (most all of which occur during the nighttime), are the product of desire, opportunity, and perceived risk. All three of these elements have a spacial dimension - privacy (Bennett, 1987).

With respect to privacy and the issue of crime, the citizen wants to be protected from the intrusion of a criminal and the criminal wants to be protected from observation by witnesses and police. The way spaces are defined determines whose purpose gets served. Spaces designed to limit access and open activities to public view suffer less crime. Spaces that are freely accessible and closed off from view invite it (Bennett, 1987).

Traditional crime prevention approaches such as security hardware, block watches and property markings are

doomed to fail without proper environmental design. According to Bennett (1987), target hardening and social interaction treat space as an afterthought. The point to be made is that target hardening and social interaction activities should be implemented in conjunction with environmental design considerations to foster effective crime control.

Strategic analysts, patrol officers and investigative sergeants should become knowledgeable about assessing neighborhoods in terms of spacial design to enhance natural surveillance and territoriality (defined as a feeling of ownership among residents). According to Bennett (1987), this can be accomplished by examining a number of issues within each of the following categories:

- 1) **Examine neighborhoods in terms of assessing the impact of image and isolation criteria.** This would include factors such as: the clustering of similar buildings, segregation of commercial and residential land uses; existence of vacant lots, access visibility of bus shelters or overpasses; etc.;
- 2) **Assess street blocks in terms of how public space is used and control of access to neighborhoods by outsiders.** Criteria could include: privatization of streets, adequate streetlighting, obstruction of pedestrian paths, etc.;
- 3) **Assess individual structures in terms of unobstructed surveillance and access control.** Criteria would include: accessibility to side yards, landscaping, height of walls or fences, existence of common halls or blind turns, garage door access to homes,

etc.; and

- 4) **Assess individual units within structures in terms of surveillance.** Criteria would include: orientation of rooms toward streets or public areas, ability to look through windows, breakability of material in windows, etc. (pp. 297 -298).

This type of information should be included in a comprehensive crime prevention program of which each officer, supervisor, and manager should be aware of. It becomes their responsibility to convey this information to the citizens. In time, citizens (and possibly police personnel) should be expected to be involved in working with building architects and engineers on construction projects affecting the safety of their neighborhoods.

These sources represent but a few of the opportunities for the strategic analyst to interact with different community entities in order to develop information about community problems. There are others, most notably, church groups which have a significant influence within the community. Thus, strategic analysts should collect information from a diverse number of community resources. This information should be analyzed and disseminated to stimulate involvement on behalf of the police and citizens to enhance neighborhood safety.

2) Information Dissemination and Feedback

Once the strategic analyst has analyzed the information and has determined its usefulness, it must be disseminated to the appropriate

line personnel. This should occur irrespective of whether or not the analyst expects to receive useful information in exchange.

These exchanges should occur with a number of outside agencies. For example, depending upon the nature of a particular type of problem, it may require liaising with private security personnel. The liaison should not necessarily be limited to discussing the deployment of operational strategies (which may be more appropriately handled by the tactical crime analysts). Instead, it could be used for the purpose of identifying problems which result in public and private law enforcement personnel working together toward specific resolutions. Or, the information may necessitate having private security personnel assess and respond to the problem independently.

The same rationale could be used in developing and sharing information with municipal law enforcement agencies (e.g., Bellaire, Pasadena, or West University), the Medical Center Police, or campus police (e.g., University of Houston, Texas Southern University, St. Thomas, etc.). Although the needs of these agencies will strongly reflect the priorities of their service recipients and the capacities of the agency to deliver services; one must not underestimate the value certain information has in identifying the conditions which contribute to the commission of criminal activity. It is this type of information which is of real value to the development of interagency relationships and the deployment of inter and intra-agency strategies.

The strategic analyst can also act as a liaison within the department. There may be times when decisions regarding criminal intelligence operations require the acquisition of information

possessed by the analyst that is different from the information developed by criminal intelligence personnel or that from crime analysts. Although the strategic analyst would not be actively involved in the implementation of strategies or the supervision of them, the quality of his knowledge would certainly be useful in helping decide which strategies lend themselves to the highest probability of success.

Internal liaising must include working with centralized investigators. Since the strategic analysts will be the most knowledgeable people about the causes of crime in given areas of Houston, it only makes sense for them to meet regularly with investigative personnel to discuss the implications their information has for the citywide operations. As is the case with criminals, factors of causation will not be constrained by geographic boundaries. Thus, certain types of information may lend itself to the identification of citywide problems which can be more effectively handled through the deployment of broader based strategies.

Strategic analysts should also interact with tactical crime analysts and personnel responsible for planning and implementing prevention strategies within the Operations Support Detail. Since the strategic analysts are expected to interact with a diverse mixture of personnel within the community, it is very probable that new strategies and programs will need to be developed to address special types of problems which may heretofore have been unknown to the police. By sharing this type of information within their own detail, comprehensive profiles of community problems and their causes can be

developed.

3) Technical Assistance

Lastly, strategic analysts should act as technical assistants to the citizens, patrol personnel, and investigative personnel. In a sense, the strategic analysts will be resource personnel to both the police and the citizens. With respect to being a resource to the citizens, the analyst must attend civic club meetings when possible. Of particular importance to the analyst in this endeavor would be the use of the Positive Interaction Program. The value of attending these meetings is in allowing the strategic analyst to support recommendations made by patrol and investigative personnel. This support is based upon the analyst's examination of neighborhood information. The meetings can also be used to prompt citizen recognition of neighborhood strengths; and, work to improve weaknesses that have a debilitating effect on the quality of neighborhood life.

The strategic analyst must act as a resource person to patrol personnel. When necessary, the analyst must attend roll call, or unit briefing sessions with the patrol officers, supervisors, and investigative personnel. The purpose of attending these sessions is to enlighten the officers as to what types of problems exist in areas they are unfamiliar with and to share information which may be useful to the officers when they decide what and how services can be efficiently delivered in their respective neighborhoods. It also provides an opportunity for the analyst to share with the officers different types of strategies being used to combat certain types of

problems occurring on other shifts, at other stations, or on a citywide basis. The officers, consequently, have an opportunity to reciprocate by describing actions they are taking to resolve certain problems within their neighborhoods. This type of exchange and the ensuing actions taken by the officers should make their job more attractive.

The strategic analyst should also be available upon request to assist the investigative shift lieutenant. As a technical advisor, information can be shared with the lieutenant which will expedite decisions regarding case assignments. Certain types of cases may be more appropriately handled by a particular investigative sergeant, or, a certain type of problem may lend itself to coordinating resource commitments with patrol personnel in order to resolve or displace the problem.

Additionally, the information provided to the lieutenant may prove valuable toward case enhancement. The type of information possessed by the analyst may lend itself to identifying leads in cases which, in turn, could result in linking similar cases and thereby expedite the investigative process and case closure.

The strategic analyst must be prepared to work with the investigative sergeant upon request. Information regarding the causes of problems may assist investigators in understanding more about the criminal's behavioral tendencies. If investigators can acquire more useful information about criminal behavior, the probability of predicting future behavior should increase. This, in turn, can heighten the success of interdiction strategies on behalf of the

investigators and patrol personnel.

Finally, the notion of having strategic analysts or civilian volunteers generate victim profiles may suggest an entirely different perspective for the investigative function. Based upon an understanding of the victims' behavior and their environment as extracted from investigative report information coupled with ensuing inquiries (e.g., interviews, surveys), investigators may be in a more practical position than patrol officers to influence citizen behavior within the neighborhoods. Rather than expose citizens to general principles of crime prevention, which often emanate from lectures delivered by Community Services Division personnel; the investigators could impart information which is directly related to the residents' or business proprietors' immediate needs and expectations. Such information would be based upon the assimilation of information by investigators from their experiences as it relates to the prevention of specific neighborhood crime and noncrime problems.

The Planning and Implementation Function

Whereas the tactical crime analysis and strategic analysis functions are designed to identify problems based on community interaction and information exchange; the planning and implementation function facilitates the process of changing behavior through the implementation of different crime prevention programs or strategies. With the advent of the Community Interaction Strategies (e.g., community contacts, attending neighborhood meetings, conducting crime prevention/security surveys, and liaising with in-house community relations officers) utilized within the D.A.R.T. program, an emphasis

on prevention has been growing within the FOC with each passing year.

This culminated in the decentralization of a large number of crime prevention responsibilities during 1986/87 which were traditionally performed by officers assigned to the department's Community Services Division. The decision to decentralize was based on the premise that these services could be delivered more efficiently and more responsively to the recipients if placed under the control of division captains. It was anticipated that officers assigned to a patrol division would be more readily apt to use these services if they were more accessible. Each division within FOC, consequently, assigned a certain number of officers to perform these activities. Although the services have been decentralized and properly administered, a concern still exists within the FOC as to how these responsibilities are perceived and utilized by the patrol officers.

Under the context of NOP, this concern can be more easily addressed. Officers and investigators alike are expected to share responsibility for improving the quality of life within the neighborhoods. This responsibility should involve more than administering reactive, tactically oriented responses. Attention should also be directed toward the administration of prevention strategies; strategies designed to reduce the opportunity for criminal activity to flourish. These strategies or programs can be developed for any number of reasons.

For example, in the course of performing their work, both officers and investigative sergeants will be exposed to neighborhood conditions which act as a catalyst for criminal activity. Rather than wait for something to happen (e.g., a burglary), steps must be taken to mobilize neighborhood residents to address those conditions before something criminogenic happens. In these

types of instances, the need to establish and maintain a Houstonian On Watch (HOW) program and an Apartment Renters On Watch (AROW) program is of considerable value. Moreover, such a program is much more meaningful to officers or investigators when they are being held accountable for the safety and welfare of neighborhood residents. For one thing, these types of programs are valuable for officers in that they represent tools which require community involvement and monitoring if the program is to be effective.

In order to administer these programs or strategies, crime prevention specialists must be available for the officers to interact with. As noted in the report entitled: Operational Plan For the Westside Command Station, (Snelson, et al., 1987), these specialists (or community liaison officers) will be responsible for a number of activities:

. . . will perform a number of responsibilities in addition to coordinating the involvement of the beat officers in certain functions. . . . (They) will primarily serve as a community contact officer with one of the responsibilities being the coordination of speaking requests. They will also serve as a station information and referral service for beat officers and the citizens. Additionally, (they) will assume responsibility of training and preparing beat officers to participate in actual programs and/or strategies (p. 51).

While all officers can not be expected to administer a HOW program by themselves, they can receive training in program administration in addition to being held responsible for monitoring its progression and acting as a catalyst for improvement when needed. The officers and investigators can also work together with the members of this detail to determine the appropriateness of program or strategy selection, along with delineating implementation and maintenance responsibilities

In addressing the scope of responsibilities encountered by personnel assigned to this function, there may be instances when certain types of

community problems arise which require new crime prevention programs or strategies to be developed. When this occurs, consideration may be given to assigning one or more persons to this function for the purpose of developing appropriate responses to alleviate or eliminate the problem(s). It would be unreasonable to assume this responsibility could be performed by any of the other members of the detail or those assigned to patrol, given the scope and magnitude of their present responsibilities (as described in this chapter). Furthermore, analytical skills possessed by crime and strategic analysts are not necessarily representative of the type of expertise needed to develop: community education programs; citizen networking strategies involving civic groups, business groups, or church groups; community organizing strategies; etc. However, this should not preclude analysts, patrol, or investigative personnel from providing assistance when so requested or desired.

In summary, the Operations Support Detail serves two purposes. First, it serves as a repository whereby information is: received from the citizens, officers, investigators, supervisors, and managers; analyzed; and disseminated back to the users for their specific purposes. In this capacity, the detail is acting like an "information switching center" or a "computer chip" capable of processing a large portion of information for expressly different reasons.

In a sense, NOP is driven in accordance with the efficient processing and utilization of this information. The information serves to guide and direct the activities of the police and citizens as they interact to suppress crime and noncrime problems within the neighborhoods. Through the utilization of this information functional integration is achieved within the division. The police and the citizens learn to work together because of their mutual willingness and desire to make the neighborhoods a safer place to live, work,

and play. For it is in response to the information processed by the Crime Prevention Detail that community problems are resolved or prevented.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this detail acknowledges the value of crime prevention as a fundamental tenet of policing. In keeping with Peel's first "principle of law enforcement" identified within Chapter 2, this detail places importance on the need for all police personnel to recognize crime prevention as an orientation designed to suppress criminal activity. As has been indicated in this chapter, this suggests a need for different functional and structural alignments to occur within the FOC and IOC to minimize the dependency patrol officers and investigators have on their reactive orientation which they have traditionally perceived as being the most successful means of combatting crime.

The Investigative Function

The process of decentralization within the department is best signified by the decision to assign portions of the investigative function to the FOC. Traditionally, the patrol and investigative functions were envisioned as semiautonomous entities within the department. Although officers and investigators worked together on occasional "warrant runs" or "special investigations" (e.g. sting operations); the basic day-to-day responsibilities called for little interaction, information sharing, or mutual strategy implementation. However, in lieu of decentralization and the introduction of the NOP concept, a number of issues are beginning to emerge within the investigative function which will alter the nature of this relationship.

First, because of the decision to decentralize, differences will exist regarding the responsibilities of centralized and decentralized investigators.

Centralized investigators, for example, will be responsible for conducting pattern or suspect specific citywide investigations; decentralized investigators will be responsible for neighborhood investigations (area specific). Centralized investigative sergeants, therefore, will be crime specialists and area generalists, while decentralized investigative sergeants will become crime generalists and area specialists. Centralized investigative sergeants will continue to remain experts for a single type of crime on a citywide basis whereas decentralized investigative sergeants will become experts for crime within their respective neighborhoods.

Second, despite these apparent differences, in actuality, the work of the centralized and decentralized investigators is reciprocal; there is a degree of mutual dependency in the performance of their work. Furthermore, under the auspices of NOP, integration must occur between the patrol and investigative functions. This will require a sharing of information between and among patrol officers and investigative sergeants. It will also require a commitment on behalf of patrol and investigative personnel to assume a sense of shared responsibility for the delivery of police services. Thus, procedures must be developed to help clarify the coordination of responsibilities between patrol personnel, centralized investigators, and decentralized investigators.

Third, in accordance with the comments of the second Executive Session membership, the concept of "functional oversight" should be considered when determining how coordination between centralized and decentralized investigative personnel is to be achieved. Quite succinctly, functional oversight has been defined as an activity whereby:

- 1) Investigative Operations Command division commanders will establish procedures and guidelines to ensure the proper coordination of particular types of criminal investigations; and,

- 2) Field Operations Command managers will ensure the investigative sergeants' compliance with these procedures and guidelines through the direct supervision of their activities.

Functional oversight should not be construed as a form of direct supervision, review, or even an inspections role on behalf of the centralized investigative personnel. It merely means that all investigative personnel, regardless of their place of assignment, will adhere to standardized investigative guidelines for each respective crime category as set forth by the centralized division commanders.

Despite its apparent simplicity, deciding what responsibilities and procedures are to be coordinated, who will be involved, how compliance and accountability will be maintained are but a few issues in need of attention. These issues and others will directly affect the responsibilities of all personnel assigned to the WCSOD as attempts are made to manage the investigative function under the context of NOP.

Therefore, steps will need to be taken to identify what procedures are actually needed. A determination must also be made to describe the relationship between these procedures and those set forth to guide the management of criminal investigations mentioned earlier in Chapter 3.

It is anticipated the responsibility of managing criminal investigations will primarily fall within the purview of the investigative shift lieutenant. This responsibility will encompass three basic tasks: case screening; case assignment; and case monitoring. The purpose of case screening is to reasonably determine which cases merit follow-up investigations based upon the high probability of solution. Factors such as the volume of cases and the existence of solvability factors will certainly affect these decisions.

Case assignment decisions are made in accordance with a number of different factors as indicated in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say, of those factors, case assignment decisions will certainly be affected by the number of investigations patrol officers can close; and, the number of cases warranting assignment to centralized investigators because of their association with citywide patterns of activity.

It will be the responsibility of each investigative shift lieutenant to monitor the progress of all cases handled by their respective decentralized investigators. Reporting procedures should be established in conjunction with regularly scheduled meetings between the investigators and the shift lieutenant.

The shift lieutenant must also be concerned about establishing procedures governing case preparation. Whatever decisions are made with respect to this responsibility, it must be coordinated with similar commitments made by centralized investigative personnel. This issue will be addressed later within this chapter.

The investigative shift lieutenant will also act as the liaison to members of the centralized divisions whenever a WCSOD case has been found to be a part of a citywide pattern. This will prevent confusion from occurring by reducing the number of people interacting with centralized investigative personnel. It will also provide for a more efficient transmission of information about a case(s) when a single contact person is used.

Reporting to the shift lieutenant will be the investigative sergeants assigned to the WCSOD. In determining the scope of their responsibilities under this organizational configuration, initial consideration should be given to assigning the investigators to districts. Since they will be "generalists"

in their own right; hypothetically, they represent a team charged with the responsibility of investigating criminal cases within a given area. Whether assigned to work cases against property or persons, it is quite possible for the investigative sergeants to be assigned to a specific beat(s) where they would serve as neighborhood crime coordinators. As a neighborhood crime coordinator, the investigative sergeants would be responsible for a number of basic responsibilities, inclusive of:

- 1) developing a knowledge base about crime thereby becoming an expert about crime within a given neighborhood(s);
- 2) liaising with crime analysts regarding the existence of crime problems and the frequency of their occurrence;
- 3) liaising with strategic analysts in order to learn more about the causes of crime problems as well as to discuss the development and implementation of potential strategies needed to resolve those problems;
- 4) assisting in the planning and implementation of strategies to resolve crime problems;
- 5) conducting continuing investigations which are area specific in nature;
- 6) providing assistance to the centralized investigators;
- 7) liaising with beat officers to assist them in conducting comprehensive initial investigations, limited follow-up investigations, or case closures when so requested; and,
- 8) maintaining quality control for all area specific investigations and reports within their sphere of responsibility.

The success of the investigative sergeants' efforts is largely dependent upon the quality of their relationship with the patrol officers. This is extremely important given the prospect of having patrol officers conduct more comprehensive initial investigations. It is anticipated officers will need to interact with the investigative sergeants should questions arise regarding any number of technical issues surrounding such investigations (e.g., interviewing

techniques, knowledge of legal statutes governing search and seizure techniques, collection of evidence, etc.). Having patrol officers conduct more comprehensive initial investigations also raises other interesting questions which ultimately must be addressed, such as:

- Do officers understand the differences between preliminary investigations, comprehensive initial investigations, and continuing investigations and how those differences affect their responsibilities at the scene of a crime;
- Who will be responsible for supervising the officers' investigation(s); for checking the quality of their investigations and their reports; and
- What type of managerial responsibilities will the investigative sergeants and the patrol sergeants be accountable for when officers conduct comprehensive initial investigations.

These questions and others should be answered prior to having the officers become involved in the investigative process.

In addition to being responsible for the activities of the investigative sergeants, the investigative shift lieutenant will also direct the affairs of the investigative response team members. Historically, the investigative response team concept emerged from the D.A.R.T. Program where it was first created as a part of the Supportive Response Section (Collins, 1981). The primary objective of the unit was to work with beat officers and to conduct special operations as needed. Since these problems usually required a special, tactically oriented response, the units were eventually referred to as tactical response teams. Because of their eventual success within the D.A.R.T. program (Oettmeier, 1985), a decision was made to allow each patrol division commander the opportunity to create their own team.

In capitalizing upon the success of the teams, members of the IOC opted to decentralize responsibilities encompassing "street narcotics" activities and

"street prostitution" activities. This recommendation was approved by the commanders of the FOC. The rationale for this decision was predicated upon the assumption the teams represented a more efficient use of resources in responding to these types of criminal activities. From the standpoint of the IOC, this decision allowed the members within the Vice and Narcotics Divisions to pursue what they perceived to be more important responsibilities.

As a result of this decision, the responsibilities of the team were standardized throughout the FOC, with the focal point being investigative vice and narcotics oriented activities. Hence, the teams became known as Investigative Response Teams (IRTs).

In an effort to assess the role of the IRTs under NOP, Deputy Chief T. W. Shane was asked to discuss the relationship between the IRTs and the investigative function. During the course of his presentation, Deputy Chief Shane identified several key issues concerning this relationship which are listed below:

- 1) Investigative sergeants should not be directly responsible for supervising the responsibilities of the IRTs;
- 2) To maximize operational efficiency, the IRTs should be supervised by patrol personnel;
- 3) Members of the IRTs should not be allowed to spend all of their time conducting long term investigations of any kind unless authorized to do so;
- 4) The IRTs should not be solely used as a specialized narcotics unit;
- 5) Rotation of members through the IRTs should be maximized as much as possible;
- 6) The stigma of being "elite officers" within the IRT must be addressed;
- 7) The flow of information between the members of the IRT and the beat officers, investigative sergeants, and crime analysts must be enhanced; and

- 8) The IRT members must envision themselves as a resource, flexible enough to provide assistance in the resolution of "any" neighborhood problem(s).

In order to capitalize upon the significance of these suggestions, it is being proposed the IRT be placed under the responsibility of the investigative shift lieutenant. Since the team consists of plainclothes police officers recruited from the patrol function, patrol sergeants should continue to serve as the members' immediate supervisors. Because of this unique arrangement (uniform sergeants reporting to an investigative lieutenant), there is a stronger likelihood that a balance will be attained regarding the amount of time spent supporting patrol and investigative operations.

It is anticipated patrol and investigative personnel will both request assistance from the IRT. This is primarily attributed to the functional responsibilities of the team which are: instigating cases, investigating cases, and performing a variety of tactical interdiction responses via the use of tactical action plans (TAPs). These functions are valuable to the patrol and investigative functions for three specific reasons.

First, the team serves as a valuable resource within the WCSOD in addition to patrol officers and investigative sergeants. The members can provide different types of services to the public because of their plainclothes capability. Second, as an added resource, the team provides flexibility in terms of service delivery. Team members can work with patrol officers in implementing tactical responses through the use of TAPs, they can assist investigators in suspect apprehensions through the performance of covert operations (e.g., surveillance, decoy, or sting operations), or they can instigate cases on their own behalf. Third, by virtue of their flexibility, the team can serve as a conduit for information exchange within the division.

As the members become involved in different types of activities, they will acquire unique information regarding the prevalence of criminal activity, suspect modus operandi, or unusual neighborhood conditions; all of which will be useful to the officers, investigators, the analysts, and citizenry as they work together within the neighborhoods.

In summary, the IRT represents a tool which can be used to address a variety of different problems within the neighborhoods. By virtue of its placement within the proposed organizational configuration, it will assist in the facilitation of functional integration between patrol and investigative operations. This in turn, will enhance the efficiency of the patrol officers and investigative sergeants as they work together in addressing neighborhood needs and expectations.

In retrospect, the proposed organizational model of the WCSOD implies that changes are in order which will simultaneously affect patrol and investigative functions. Although the investigative function within the department is in the process of being decentralized; this model does not mean significant functional changes, which are different from practices of the past, will automatically occur.

Traditionally, investigative and patrol functions have, and probably still do, represent independent sets of bifurcated responsibilities within a police organization. Furthermore, they are envisioned as being organizationally discrete entities consisting of members who do not perceive themselves as being integrated to any great extent. The mere act of decentralization, coupled with aligning investigative and patrol personnel within a singular division is not adequate in and of itself to overcome this problem.

Methods must be devised which seek to unite the functional responsibilities

of investigations and patrol through "forced integration" within the organizational configuration. This was alluded to by several of the guest speakers during the second executive session, but was never clearly articulated. The notion of forced integration suggests that organizational structures should be based upon the efficient utilization of operational and managerial functions, rather than administrative ends, to achieve outcomes. For example, operational and managerial decisions are often determined on the basis of administrative convenience. The administrative guidelines become the controlling factors, rather than facilitating ones. Instead of using administrative guidelines to achieve an end, they become ends in and of themselves; and, in most cases, subvert attempts to attain quality outcomes. Or stated more forcefully, they in fact, inhibit attaining the outcomes operational and managerial functions are designed to achieve.

In applying this logic to the WCSOD, the mere notion of decentralization, an administrative decision, does not necessarily mean integration of functions will occur. As stated earlier within this chapter, it is very easy to replicate traditional, bifurcated sets of responsibilities on a decentralized basis. On the one hand, you have people dedicated to the patrol function; while on the other hand, there are people dedicated to the investigative function. The functions, consequently, are not integrated. They are only "related" by the mere fact that an administrative edict requires preliminary investigations to be forwarded to investigative sergeants for closure. Other than that reason, patrol officers and investigators generally operate independently of each other.

The challenge before the executive session members, therefore, was to consider how this problem could best be addressed. In considering the issue of

function as it applied to investigations, the membership had to first examine the role of the patrol officer advocated under NOP. The membership was concerned about the scope of the officers' responsibilities. Was it possible the officers' responsibilities would possibly "infringe" upon the hallowed grounds of the investigative sergeants under the concept of NOP? The answer to that question was yes; the officers' role was going to expand into the arena of investigations. Yet, this was not the only change being advocated under NOP.

As suggested by many of the nationally renowned guest speakers appearing before the membership, changes should not just be limited to the expansion of the officer's responsibilities. Of greater importance was the emphasis being placed on the aspect of integration. Upon examining the issue of integration, the membership agreed that a blending of responsibilities could occur between the patrol officers and the investigative sergeants. This agreement was centered upon having the patrol officers conduct comprehensive initial investigations. Through the implementation of MCI procedures coupled with early case closure decisions emanating from the officers' comprehensive initial investigations, it would appear that case volume for the investigators would diminish considerably. Consequently, there would be no reason to believe that investigative sergeants could not become more actively involved in other types of activities. Thus, in expanding the patrol function via conducting comprehensive initial investigations, a reciprocal expansion of the investigative function is possible; which, under NOP, could lead to their becoming more actively involved within the neighborhoods.

Expanding functions, however, does not necessarily ensure that integration will occur. There are no assurances that patrol officers will come to depend upon the help of investigators; nor should one expect investigators to openly

embrace the notion of seeking assistance from patrol officers to perform responsibilities of a non-investigatory nature. To overcome this resistance, both investigative and patrol personnel alike must focus their attention on the citizenry. Under NOP, it is no longer a question of isolating responsibilities to achieve better control. Instead, attention should be placed on having personnel work together in an environment characterized by a willingness to share knowledge, experiences, and skills so that citizen needs and expectations can be more efficiently addressed. To accomplish this, there must be a unification of effort on behalf of the patrol officers and the investigative sergeants commensurate with a mutual expectation of shared accountability for the services rendered to the public.

If integration is to occur, a consensus must be reached as to how it can be accomplished. Tradition would suggest that a reorientation of this magnitude would require alterations to be made within the department's organizational structure in order to "force" the integration to occur. Theoretically speaking, unless there is a substantial catalyst (something akin to the establishment of a new organizational entity) which will force this unification or integration to occur on a daily basis; chances are the officers and investigators will revert back to their old habit of isolation legitimized through battles of "turf." To avoid committing organizational atrophy, consideration must be given to identifying a structural entity which would reinforce the notion of functional integration on behalf of patrol and investigative personnel. It is on this point in particular that the discussion of the second management model is focused within the next section of this chapter.

Model #2: Managing Functional Integration

The second management model, perhaps a first in policing, configures structure around what is considered as a key ingredient of NOP; interaction between the police and the public. Thus, the structural relationships contained in the model are forged around an abstraction of neighborhoods. This serves to acknowledge NOP as a management philosophy in directing the department's service delivery in response to citizen needs and expectations.

Unique in character, the second model represents the formation of an organizational entity referred to as the Interactive Service Unit (ISU). Conceptually, the configuration of the ISU is based on a number of assumptions. First, interaction among the officers, investigators, and citizenry is crucial to the identification of neighborhood concerns. Second, officers and investigators must be mutually accountable for the control and prevention of crime within the neighborhoods. Third, the efficient management of service delivery is dependent upon the functional integration of responsibilities. More importantly, functional integration connotes a commitment to working together, developing cooperative relationships. Guided by the premise of teamwork, officers and investigators are assigned to specific neighborhoods to work with the citizenry.

The ISU, consequently, represents a structural entity configured to promote the notion of teamwork. As an organizational framework to service the city's neighborhoods, the ISU will require each neighborhood to be represented by a police officer, the officer's immediate supervisor (referred to as a unit supervisor), an investigative sergeant (who can be responsible for multiple neighborhoods simultaneously), and concerned citizens that work and live in the

city's neighborhoods (Figure #4, p. 185).

Presently, little organization exists at the bottom level of the FOC to unify the officers and their supervisors in providing service to the neighborhoods. Sergeants are assigned to districts, and officers are assigned to beats within the districts. They are not assigned to a squad or team with a sense of mission to work with citizens in dealing with neighborhood problems

Once the officers complete roll call and leave the station, having inspected their vehicles, they are supposed to proceed directly to their beats. During their eight-hour tour of duty, they are supposed to conduct preventive patrol (or drive around) until interrupted to handle a call for service. Seldom do they meet with "their" district sergeant. Not infrequently, weeks can go by without an officer talking to a supervisor. In general, meetings between officers and district supervisors result from problems in handling calls or in the officers needing permission to perform a particular activity, e.g., tow a car, initiate a building search, etc.


Sergeants are not required to review and formally approve (usually through signing or initialing a report) reports completed by officers, which must surely handicap their abilities to complete performance evaluations and talk knowledgeably about crime problems within the districts. They are not expected to assist the officers in dealing with neighborhood problems. What presently exists is what observers of the police function have been writing about for years; namely a "reactive" and "incident-driven" way of policing; which is, parenthetically, administratively very convenient.

The creation of the ISU is based upon the notion that responsiveness to citizen needs and expectations can be more efficiently managed within the

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING MODEL

Interactive Service Unit

Figure #4



department if patrol and investigative responsibilities are functionally integrated. To reiterate, this means investigators are dependent upon the officers' ability to conduct comprehensive initial investigations which may lead to early case closures resulting in more time being available for investigators to conduct other types of activities. It also means that patrol officers are dependent upon any assistance they can secure from the investigators during the course of conducting their investigations. Functional integration also implies that investigators are dependent upon patrol officers and analysts (tactical crime and strategic) for information which will assist them in performing their expanded role of working within the neighborhoods to promote citizen involvement in the implementation of community education and crime prevention activities. Furthermore, centralized and decentralized investigators will be dependent upon each other's respective expertise. Collectively, the relationship between the citizens, officers, and investigators under NOP requires a different managerial approach from the one existing within the department today.

Not unlike numerous agencies across the country, the department's present management style is described, at best, as being reactionary in nature. There is little planning, coordination, or evaluation of efforts expended to accomplish specific short or long term results within the neighborhoods. Officers work independently of one another with little, if any, perceived decision making authority. Officers seldom have the opportunity to become involved in strategy development or response implementation as these activities are usually reserved for specialists (e.g., the IRT, narcotics officers, investigators, etc.). Interaction between the officers and their respective supervisor is minimal, usually initiated only on the basis of seeking

clarification to a department policy or procedure; or in asking permission to perform an activity deemed to lie outside the officer's sphere of responsibility.

With the advent of the ISUs under NOP, management takes on a different connotation. For it is through the use of the ISUs the management process becomes more efficient as evidenced by a commitment to: systematically collect, analyze, and distribute information from the citizenry and department personnel; allow officers and investigators to develop, implement, and assess short and long term neighborhood plans designed to address identified neighborhood problems; allocate resources in accordance with neighborhood priorities based upon perceived results; mutually share the responsibility and accountability for preventing and controlling crime among the members of the ISU; and place the citizens in a position of contributing to the betterment of their own neighborhoods.

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the ISU is that it represents a self-managing team of which the citizen are members. Characterized by the decentralization of authority, coupled with an expansion and integration of functional responsibilities, officers and investigators will experience more flexibility and discretion in determining how to work with the citizens to address their neighborhood needs and expectations. By working together and sharing responsibility within the confines of an ISU, the willingness to participate and develop a sense of ownership for one's work within the neighborhoods will grow significantly among the officers, investigators, and citizens.

To more clearly understand how the ISU concept would work in reality, an examination of the roles of each of the ISU members is in order.

The Role of the Police Officer and the Citizen in the ISU

Implied within the definition of NOP is recognition that police personnel may not know as much about neighborhood needs as they think they do. If the police are to be truly successful in responding to neighborhood needs and expectations, it is their responsibility to interact with the public to discover what those needs are. Furthermore, it is equally important for police personnel to interact amongst themselves. Purposeful interaction will result in the attainment of a consensus regarding service delivery expectations. Once consensus is achieved with the public and among the members of the ISU, efforts can be directed toward devising efficient service delivery mechanisms to address agreed upon needs and expectations.

Given this supposition, it is important beat officers understand that NOP requires an environment which is conducive to meaningful interactive exchanges occurring within the ISU and among neighborhood residents. The purpose of these exchanges is twofold: first, the information gleaned from these exchanges will provide the officers and investigators with additional insight beyond their own experiences as to what types of services need to be delivered within the neighborhoods; and second, service delivery strategies become more responsive to community needs by focusing on specific results which should lead to a more efficiently managed organization. Consideration, therefore, must be given toward identifying how the officers and citizens will exchange information which will help them formulate a set of reliable neighborhood priorities.

Foremost among the steps to be taken, is the recognition by citizens to become actively involved within their neighborhood. As indicated in Chapter 2, citizens must share a sense of civic responsibility toward their community,

which can best be exemplified by working to improve conditions within their own neighborhoods. It should not come as a surprise to citizens, therefore, that they must become actively involved in the process of identifying neighborhood needs, concerns, or problems. Obviously, this type of information can be a product of their own experiences or those of their friends and neighbors. But beyond the confines of immediate neighbors, how much do citizens really know about other neighborhood concerns that may affect the quality of their lives?

Thus, citizens should actively seek to form neighborhood civic associations or begin to attend civic club meetings and support the city's neighborhood based Positive Interaction Program (PIP). Civic meetings represent an environment which is conducive to exchanging a variety of information. Through these meetings, citizens should learn more about what they can do within their neighborhood, as well as learn about the types of services offered, how to access those services, and how to mobilize other types of resources (e.g., other governmental service agencies). In particular, when confronted with issues of safety, citizens should certainly attempt to contact the police.

Under the context of NOP, however, contacting the police should not be limited to just calling 911 whenever an officer(s) is needed. That service will always continue to exist. More importantly though, is taking advantage of these opportunities to meet with the officers to discuss neighborhood needs and concerns. There are a variety of ways these meetings can be conducted, for example: spending additional time with officers after completing a call for service; casual conversations in one's front yard or within one's business could occur upon noticing an officer driving through the neighborhood; attending neighborhood civic group meetings which officers will be attending;

inviting the officer to meet with a group of residents within a citizen's home; etc.

An additional indirect consideration would require citizens to select a few "contact" persons within their neighborhood. The citizens could channel their concerns to the contact person, who in turn has a daily schedule that is conducive to meeting with an officer. This type of arrangement may prove useful in lieu of the anticipated number of people who will be unable to meet with officers because of their work schedules.

There are a number of activities officers can perform to initiate the interactive process. With respect to the citizenry, officers should begin to access information through self-initiated citizen contacts, interviews with business proprietors, conducting neighborhood need assessments, security surveys, or attending home and apartment owners' association meetings, church meetings, etc. Both officers and citizens should be concerned about identifying crime and noncrime problems which impact the quality of life within their neighborhoods.

Officers should also be concerned about interacting with personnel within the ISU. This includes meeting with other officers within their own ISU and other ISUs on their shift or on other shifts. They should interact with the investigators, tactical crime analysts, and strategic analysts. Information can be gleaned from reviewing tactical crime analysis and strategic analysis bulletins; operational analysis reports; and computer aided dispatch reports. Lastly, officers should not hesitate to initiate discussion with their unit supervisors or their shift lieutenant about their experiences and expectations. Further discussions regarding the nature of these meetings is discussed in Snelson's (et al., 1987) report.

Collectively, this information would broaden the officers' understanding of their neighborhood. Officers may discover certain neighborhood residents have identified concerns that have been totally unnoticed by department personnel and vice versa. In either instance, efforts should be made to verify the reliability of the information. For example, if the officer was told about a burglary problem in a neighborhood for which the officer was unaware, the officer could meet with the crime analysis personnel to determine if they had detected this problem. Thus, verification becomes important because it causes beat officers to interact with other operational personnel as well as justify the eventual prioritization of neighborhood needs.

Generally, the officers' experience will be a primary factor in justifying how the neighborhood needs are prioritized. Other considerations may be dependant upon whether the need is of a criminal or noncriminal nature. Prioritization may also be dependent upon the officers' perception of resource availability given the size or type of problem. Another justification criteria would be the acknowledgement of impact considerations by the officers. The impact concerns would more clearly describe what might happen if neighborhood needs were not addressed.

At this juncture, the officers would begin to assess the need to commit resources. It may be that both short-term tactical responses or long-term strategic responses would require more resources than are available. However, the problems may also allow the officer to implement different types of strategies which do not require additional resources beyond those that are readily available.

The officers should also be expected to identify appropriate evaluation criteria which would coincide with the various courses of action they are

considering. By identifying performance criteria, the officers are more apt to be cognizant of the commitment they and the citizens need to make if they expect quality services to be delivered. Since the officers had substantial involvement in determining the criteria by which they will be held accountable, they have a vested interest in the success of their efforts.

This process of interacting with the public and other department personnel to acquire relevant information; verify its accuracy; prioritize neighborhood needs; assess resource availability; and identify performance criteria should become routinized among the beat officers. Based upon the magnitude of their findings, officers will be able to develop customized neighborhood plans. The value of such a plan would be to chart a course of action whereby the officers could identify what their intended accomplishments would be over a set period of time. As indicated previously, these accomplishments would reflect neighborhood expectations as identified by the officers and the citizenry.

Another element of the interactive process worthy of considerable attention is the type of relationship that exists between the beat officers and the investigators. Historically, officers within the Houston Police Department have conducted preliminary investigations; investigations which by their very nature require additional attention on behalf of investigative sergeants. Under the concept of NOP, however, the officers' role is to be expanded to incorporate more investigative flexibility. While some cases (e.g., a multiple homicide, a "gang" rape, etc.) will require the officers to perform a comprehensive preliminary investigation knowing a subsequent investigation will also be conducted by investigative sergeants, officers should be properly prepared to conduct comprehensive initial investigations for crimes in which the officers know that a follow-up investigation by investigative sergeants

will not be forthcoming, given the absence of available leads.

The primary distinction between initial and preliminary investigations lies in providing the officers an opportunity to bring a case to closure. This means officers must have the flexibility and authority to perform certain types of investigative responsibilities heretofore not considered to be within the scope of their responsibilities. These activities include, but are not limited to:

- 1) collecting, or if not readily available at the scene, seeking information through the interviews of victims and witnesses regarding the offense(s) in question;
- 2) overseeing the processing of the crime scene;
- 3) collecting or overseeing the collection of evidence;
- 4) identifying clues pertinent to the investigation and being allowed to pursue those clues in an effort to bring the case to closure; and
- 5) requesting assistance from other patrol officers, investigative personnel, crime scene units, etc., when necessary.

This does not mean officers will be able to bring all of their initial investigations to closure. Obviously, some investigations, due to issues of complexity, may be beyond the capacity of the officer to close. In these instances, the investigative work performed by the officer represents a portion of the investigative process; which under these circumstances would be appropriately referred to as a preliminary investigation.

The distinction from past practices, however, is that under this scenario, even though it is a preliminary investigation, the officer is now able to perform more tasks in conducting this portion of the investigation than had been previously allowed. This reduces the time spent by the investigative sergeant in having to perform the same tasks. Time can now be used more

efficiently in managing the caseload or in the performance of other service delivery activities.

By expanding the officers' role in this manner, investigative sergeants will be required to work more closely with the officers. Investigative sergeants should not consider these changes to be an infringement upon their sphere of expertise. To the contrary, they should begin to envision their role as being dependant upon the officers' role. As officers become more adept at efficiently closing out cases, investigators will be able to devote more time to other cases or responsibilities. This suggests the traditional role expectations regarding investigative responsibilities are subject to change under NOP. The ISU, consequently, becomes the vehicle which facilitates and supports these changes.

The Role of the Unit Supervisor in the ISU

The primary role of the unit supervisor is that of being a manager of personnel and activities. Of all the people working within the ISU, the unit supervisor is responsible for overseeing the activities of the unit. The unit supervisor should be the most knowledgeable person within the ISU about the status of neighborhood activities performed by officers and investigators. As the manager the ISU, this will require the unit supervisor to possess the ability to guide, direct, and support the members of the ISU. Although supervision is still considered to be one facet of the unit supervisor' job, it is not a predominant one. To the contrary, a unit supervisor should seek to support the patrol officers in the performance of their responsibilities. In this capacity, the unit supervisor should strive to develop and enrich the officers' job. One of the methods available to assist the unit supervisor in this endeavor is through active participation in the interactive process.

Participation in the interactive process requires the unit supervisor to perform a number of responsibilities which unite the members of the ISU. For example, some of the unit supervisor's major responsibilities mentioned within the report prepared by Snelson (et al., 1987) are summarized below:

- Meeting with the officers to discuss the type of problems which exist within their respective neighborhood, beats, and the district as a whole;
- Discussing with the officers the rationale used to prioritize problems and, when necessary, collectively decide appropriate responses based upon the seriousness of the problem(s) and the availability of resources within the department and from the neighborhood residents;
- Acting as a coordinator, not only with the officers, but on behalf of the other ISU members. There will be occasions when assistance may be needed from plainclothes officers, investigators, or analysts. It will be the unit supervisors' responsibility to coordinate the acquisition of this assistance;
- Assisting the officers in the development and implementation of various strategies and tactical responses when necessary. This responsibility may result from an officer recognizing a problem and its importance as a neighborhood priority, but needing assistance in developing an appropriate response to the problem;
- Implementing tactical action plans (TAPs) which will require directing and coordinating the efforts of patrol officers. Additionally, when TAPs are administered to investigative personnel, the unit supervisor may need to act as a liaison or coordinator in the allocation of personnel or other resources to assist the investigators in the implementation of their TAPs; and
- Meeting with the officers on a regular basis to discuss the status of activities occurring within their respective neighborhoods. These meetings would be dependant upon the frequency, quality, and outcomes generated from the meetings the officers have with the citizens (pp. 12 - 13).

As a result of performing these activities, unit supervisors should be able to create an operational plan for the ISU. Through the creation of this plan, the unit supervisor can more efficiently manage the affairs of the ISU. This

is possible by virtue of having the plan identify: what is to be done; how it is to be done; who is to be involved; what the resource commitment will be; and what the final results are expected to be. Naturally, as a part of the plan, there will be a provision which requires an accounting of what actually occurred along with commentary on the success of the efforts or the lessons learned from the failures. This type of plan will also serve as direct evidence of the unit supervisor's contribution to the FOC's overall management system under NOP.

The Role of the Patrol Shift Lieutenant in the ISU

Whereas the unit supervisor is responsible for managing the affairs of the ISU, the patrol shift lieutenant is responsible for managing the affairs of the shift. This includes, under this proposal, a commitment to supporting and coordinating the affairs of several ISUs working during a given shift.

As shift managers, the lieutenants are responsible for conveying to the division captain what is or will be occurring on their shifts within and between districts, beats, and neighborhoods. By meeting with their unit supervisors on a regular basis, the shift lieutenant can ascertain the compatibility of their supervisors' recommendations with their own thoughts or those of the captain. This is very important, given the possibility of there being other specific requests to use resources of limited availability.

In a similar fashion to that of the unit supervisors, the shift lieutenant must also recognize the need to coordinate a multitude of potentially different and similar requests. The scope of the shift lieutenant's responsibility, however, is even broader than those of the unit supervisors since they must oversee the administration of shift activities. This equates to having the shift lieutenant review the numerous recommendations emanating from the

different ISUs.

Such an examination may also include the need to reverify the quality of: information collected; the accuracy of the analysis; the availability of resources; and the compatibility of recommendations. It is possible certain types of problems entertained by different ISUs may be similar in nature and therefore necessitate a joint effort on behalf of two or more ISUs. This could result in a reprioritization of recommendations contained within the unit supervisor's plans.

The reprioritization could also be based on a number of other factors, such as: the nature, frequency, and severity of the problem(s) identified; the availability of resources; or due to other concerns expressed by the chief of police or members of city government. In other words, the patrol shift lieutenant may have to assume a very delicate responsibility of coordinating the needs of numerous personnel, all of whom may have legitimate concerns.

To assist the shift lieutenant in this endeavor, a shift plan should be developed. As noted earlier for unit supervisors, the creation of such a plan will help the shift lieutenants organize the competing demands, manage the implementation of the plans, and assess the effectiveness of the results. Once the shift lieutenant has formulated a shift plan, a meeting should be arranged with the WCSOD captain. The captain's responsibility is to approve or disapprove the plans brought forth by each of the shift lieutenants. The captain is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the merits of the recommendations from all of the shift plans. The same type of operational constraints which the shift lieutenants had to overcome in the development of their plans are of equally, if not greater concern, to the captain.

Upon approving the the shift lieutenant's plans or portions thereof, it is

imperative the captain be apprised of the progress made during the course of implementation. In order for the captain to assess the relative merits of the progress, an awareness of the evaluation criteria must be attained. Herein lies another important element within a given shift plan. As progress is reported back to the captain, comparisons of the ISU's performance must be made with the criteria (e.g., activities, strategies, or programs) contained within the shift plan. As the captain reviews the progress of each plan, a determination of the actual results can then be made. These findings can then be forwarded up through the chain-of-command via a management progress report to the the chief of police.

As was the case with the unit supervisors and their officers, the shift lieutenant should attempt to support the activities of their unit supervisors. Again, in referencing material contained within Snelson's (et al., 1987) report, the shift lieutenant should:

- conduct regular meetings with the unit supervisors to discuss neighborhood activities, ISU activities, or personal concerns as they pertain to the job at hand;
- continue to have "open door" access for unit supervisors should there be a need to discuss unexpected requests;
- evaluate the progress, success, and/or failure of the programs, strategies, or responses based upon the performance indicators supplied by the officers and unit supervisors; and
- strive to enrich the unit supervisor's job through: the utilization of competent performance evaluations; attending insightful, yet practical training sessions; or by extending to the unit supervisor, opportunities to acquire additional managerial responsibilities through mentoring or sponsorship activities.

Shift lieutenants must not relegate their responsibility to develop their immediate subordinates because of their perceived lack of time or opportunity. In time, the dedication and commitment made to enhancing the worth of the unit

supervisors will result in a more efficiently managed operation for all personnel within each ISU.

The Role of Investigative Sergeants in the ISU

Investigative sergeants must begin to reexamine the scope of their responsibilities if the prospect exists whereby police officers can effectively bring to closure a number of cases which have traditionally been handled by the investigators. When coupled with the efficient operation of a case management system, the question of how investigative sergeants will spend their available time becomes critical.

With respect to complementing the police officer's role, investigative sergeants must begin to think differently about how they will handle their workable cases. Hypothetically, since the pressure emanating from case volume will be significantly reduced as a result of allowing officers to close cases, and, through the implementation of MCI procedures; the investigative sergeants will have to also consider how they can efficiently utilize their uncommitted time.

An investigative sergeant's time can be spent in a number of ways. Initially, they should spend time collecting, analyzing, and processing information about a case. This would include consulting extraneous sources other than interviews from victims as previously mentioned by Eck (1983). The purpose for conducting this activity is to enhance the case through the acquisition of new information which would increase the probability of identifying and arresting the offender. And, in terms of NOP, this information may be extremely useful in constructing strategies designed to prevent these types of problems from reoccurring in the future.

In performing this task, the investigative sergeant can seek the assistance

of the patrol officer who conducted the initial investigation. There may be certain tasks the officer can perform which will also assist in the enhancement process (e.g., talking with crime analysts, strategic analysts, other officers, etc.). This should not preclude the investigative sergeant from talking directly with the tactical crime analysts or the strategic analysts. And, depending upon the nature of the problem, further assistance may be obtained from personnel assigned to the IOC divisions.

Secondly, once all possible information about a case(s) is collected and analyzed, the investigative sergeant may again seek assistance in the development of a plan of action. Primary sources of assistance could come from the neighborhood officers, the analysts, or other investigators from within the division or from the centralized divisions. If the investigative sergeant is of the opinion assistance need only come from the officers and investigators working within his assigned area, they can become adjunct members of an investigative team. This occurs quite naturally by virtue of the case being initially generated from a neighborhood within a particular beat and district.

Thirdly, if the planning process results in the investigative sergeant needing assistance from the officer(s) in the form of strategy implementation, consultation with the officer's unit supervisor becomes necessary. It will be the unit supervisor's responsibility to decide if the officer can participate based upon the effects that loss of time and manpower will have on the supervisor's ability to continue managing the overall activities of the unit. It should also be noted, the investigative sergeant has access to the investigative response team members. Seeking their assistance would require additional consultations to occur among the investigative sergeant, the team's sergeant(s), and the investigative shift lieutenant.

Lastly, despite whether the neighborhood officer is actively involved or not, the investigative sergeant should provide feedback to the officers regarding the status of the case. The officer should know if the case was closed via an arrest, if other suspects were involved, whether the case was prosecutable, and, if so, what the verdict and/or sentence was.

In extending the scope of an investigative sergeant's responsibilities even further, it is important to remember that a fundamental premise underlying the development of the ISU is recognizing that functional integration is dependent upon the issue of flexibility. Police officers and investigative sergeants alike are inextricably linked through the performance of comprehensive initial investigations performed by the officers. The scope of the investigative sergeant's role, however, must not be limited to just interacting with police officers or managing their own caseload activities. As a member of the ISU, investigative sergeants must become involved in other responsibilities that are designed to improve the quality of neighborhood life.

Under the concept of NOP, therefore, the role of the investigative sergeants must be expanded in other directions. For example, investigative sergeants should be involved in a number of self-directed activities, inclusive of but not limited to:

- 1) **interacting with the public, with operational support personnel, and information support personnel.**

The purpose of this interaction is to consult with:

- church groups, civic associations, business groups, and neighborhood residents, among others, to better understand their needs and concerns;
- victims to determine what type of assistance they may need;

- patrol personnel to acquire resources which may help them identify and arrest criminals;
- centralized investigative sergeants to coordinate activities or participate in citywide strategy implementation efforts;
- crime analysts to determine the type of and frequency of crime patterns and clusters as they relate to individual cases; and
- strategic analysts to obtain a more comprehensive understanding about the causes of problems which eventually contribute to the type of cases investigators must manage;

2) developing procedures to facilitate the process of functional integration.

This process includes performing the following responsibilities:

- identifying neighborhood crime and noncrime problems;
- initiating or assisting ISU members in the development of strategies designed to resolve those problems; and
- initiating or assisting in the coordination of administering, implementing, and evaluating strategies;

3) participating in the development and implementation of crime prevention strategies.

Because of the nature of an investigative sergeant's job, the ensuing experiences, knowledge, and expertise all help to formulate perceptions about preventive activities which are valuable to neighborhood residents and business proprietors;

4) participating with centralized investigative personnel in the development of standardized case management techniques.

Particular attention must be directed toward developing procedures governing case screening, case assignment, case monitoring, and case closure activities;

5) participating in the development of procedures governing the type of interaction among and between centralized

investigators, decentralized investigators, patrol officers, crime analysts, strategic analysts, unit supervisors, and various support personnel under NOP; and

- 6) contributing in the development of training criteria which will support the management of patrol operations, the management of criminal investigations, and the quality of interaction with the public.

In some respects, these dimensions of the investigative sergeant's role are as different as they are similar to the role of the unit supervisor. Whereas the investigative sergeant is primarily concerned with investigating cases, the unit supervisor must focus on managing the activities of the ISU. While the investigative sergeant may spend time on victim assistance activities, the unit supervisor will direct attention toward the development and implementation of tactical operations. Both should be concerned with crime prevention activities and training issues as they pertain to sustaining and enhancing the efforts of the ISU. And, both should be involved in the creation of policies and procedures which will govern how activities are to be performed within the ISU.

In retrospect, however, there is a common thread that permeates the responsibilities of both the unit supervisors and the investigative sergeants; that being one of management. Investigative sergeants must certainly be expected to manage their cases; however, they should also be expected to develop action plans which require them to manage personnel, activities, and information. Furthermore, the process of management requires investigative sergeants to coordinate the responsibilities of a variety of individuals. Toward this end, the investigative sergeants must not only work with the officers, but also work with the officer's unit supervisor; with other investigative sergeants, with crime analysts, and with strategic analysts. They must also confer with centralized investigative sergeants and with the citizens to whom they are responsible to. Not unlike the unit supervisor, in

this capacity the investigative sergeant becomes an active member of the command's management system by virtue of performing similar responsibilities designed to produce a different set of specific outcomes.

The Role of Investigative Lieutenants in the ISU

The Westside Command Station maintains jurisdictional responsibility for Master Districts 18, 19, and 20. An investigative lieutenant is assigned to each of these districts with 24 hour responsibility for managing on-going investigations conducted by the investigative sergeants, who, as previously mentioned, are also assigned by district and are even responsible for specific neighborhoods within each district.

The assignment of investigative lieutenants to districts (i.e., areas) represents a logical extension of NOP's philosophy regarding decentralized investigations to more actively increase investigative interactions with neighborhood beat officers, who are also assigned to specific neighborhoods within beats in each district, and equally important, with individuals and citizen groups, who work and reside in the neighborhoods contained within each district. Increased interaction among investigative personnel, ISU supervisors, neighborhood beat officers, and citizens accelerates the exchange of information regarding existing and emergent crime problems within district neighborhoods. Feedback from this exchange provides the investigative lieutenants with a broader perspective of citizen perceptions about neighborhood problems and whether or not their fear of becoming potential victims of crime is justified or exaggerated. Increased interaction also helps to bolster rapport between the police and the public, thereby facilitating a more personal style of police service delivery that can be custom tailored in

meeting the needs of citizens by having the police to work in concert with them to identify and mutually resolve neighborhood problems.

Managing criminal investigations at the district level involves a complete set of responsibilities for decentralized investigative lieutenants that, upon initial inspection, may appear to overwhelm their centralized peers who are generally unaccustomed to handling a multiplicity of diverse functions, being primarily confined to honing specialized expertise in dealing with specific crime types. Administratively, investigative lieutenants at the Westside Command Station must establish procedures to help process incoming cases. Traditionally contained under the rubric of MCI, these procedures involve developing criteria needed to screen cases for assignment (i.e., separate "work" from "nonwork" cases), establishing case assignment priorities and in contemplating alternative rationales for the actual assignment of cases (i.e., Is the scope of the investigation to be confined to certain geographic boundaries? Should the cases be given to one investigator or to a team of investigators and, if the latter alternative is accepted, who should comprise the team?, etc.), setting review dates to monitor ongoing investigations, preparing quality cases to be submitted for criminal prosecution, and, once these cases are submitted to prosecutors, tracking the cases through the district attorney's office and courts to determine the final disposition of each case.

While the development, implementation, and evaluation of these procedures are as important as they are fundamental to facilitate management of the investigative function, it must be clearly recognized that there is more to managing criminal investigations than adopting a set of procedures to administratively process cases; particularly in light of NOP. Under NOP,

investigative lieutenants are expected to take a more active role, than traditionally required, in meeting and working directly with citizens in trying to solve neighborhood crime problems, including the development of crime prevention strategies, and in refining methods to more effectively assist victims of crime.

Additionally, they must become acutely aware in recognizing changes to the physical nomenclature of their districts, changes that might negatively impact environmental design, thus inviting potentially deleterious consequences, albeit inadvertently, in attracting criminal perpetrators. Through establishing feedback networks among immediate subordinates, neighborhood beat officers, ISU supervisors, and citizens, they must be able to readily identify problems potentially caused, for example, because of inadequate lighting detected for a parking lot in a proposal to construct a new hospital facility. In being held partly accountable to identify conditions that might spawn crime, the investigative lieutenants must keep their hand on the pulse of their districts, continually monitoring their district's "physical condition."

Perhaps most challenging, the investigative lieutenants, in working closely with their patrol counterparts, are also expected to develop a team process that includes the neighborhood beat officers as part of the investigative team. It would be logically inimical to NOP to not hold neighborhood beat officers partly accountable for the commission of crimes in their neighborhoods. After all, the **quality of life** in each of the city's neighborhoods should be the focus of attention for each neighborhood beat officer. It would also be naive, stated most diplomatically, to assume that neighborhood beat officers would enthusiastically conduct both initial and preliminary investigations, not to mention some follow-up investigations,

knowing that their work and responsibility in relationship to crime was merely perfunctory; their role in relationship to crime being primarily defined as "report takers" and "mobile secretaries" (issues addressed during the department's first Executive Session). Without any sense of a neighborhood "territorial imperative," save for an "ecumenical imperative" to address citywide serial crimes, it is difficult to imagine that centralized investigators would or could share a similar sense of commitment in thwarting crime than that that could be achieved by officers held accountable to police specific neighborhood areas and, with a "NOP mandate" in hand, to, again, concentrate their efforts on preventing crime.

The structure of the ISU model demands an investigative team approach that includes the patrol shift lieutenants, ISU supervisors, and neighborhood beat officers along with investigative sergeants and investigative lieutenants. The national reputation for excellence that has been achieved by the department's Special Weapons and Tactical (S.W.A.T.) detail and the Hostage Negotiation Team, to single out just a few "specialty groups," strongly suggests that a team approach work best. The fact that these types of specialty groups are primarily only required to handle situations of special circumstance does not negate the application of a team approach for policing the city's neighborhoods. If the officers and their supervisors train as a team, with the supervisor assuming major responsibility as a "team leader" in training exercises, the behavior of individual team members is much more predictable across a diverse set of both stressful and mundane situations.

When it comes to training "patrol officers" assigned to the FOC, the training has been bifurcated, i.e., the officers are not trained to perform as a team with their supervisors -- their sergeants have been separated out of

the process and are not present -- because the role of sergeants has over time gradually evolved to be one that focuses not on developing the officers but on disciplining them. In short, they have come to be primarily recognized as disciplinarians. It is, therefore, not surprising that many, if not most, "patrol officers" tend to work independently (and they are more likely to get into trouble "independently"). Moreover, because of the department's 40-hour mandated in-service training, the officers are frequently more knowledgeable about handling certain types of situations than are their immediate supervisors. Collectively, bifurcated training that separates the sergeants from "their officers" and the disciplinarian role that has evolved for the sergeants results in the exact opposite outcome desired under NOP's management philosophy. By default, the sergeants are left out of the training process, which results in the alienation of sergeants mitigating, to a great extent, the emergence of leadership.

If closely examined, the ISU model suggests a host of training implications that focuses on integrating groups of individuals rather than providing solitary treatment of individual officers. The Westside investigative lieutenants, as with their patrol shift peers, will be required to address these issues if quality investigations are to be performed by the neighborhood beat officers. Investigative lieutenants and patrol shift lieutenants must begin to focus on team building within the ISU. And under NOP, the development of these teams are not intended to exclude citizen participation in exploring and implementing strategies designed to rectify problems that compromise neighborhood safety.

Finally, and in returning to that complex mix of responsibilities for investigative lieutenants at the Westside Command Station, investigative lieutenants will be required to coordinate resource support as delineated in

the ISU model. This will involve working closely with ISU supervisors and crime analysts to implement interdiction activities (i.e., Tactical Action Plans - "TAPs") designed to apprehend criminals involved in ongoing crime patterns manifest within particular districts of the Westside Command Station and crime patterns that cross district boundaries within the jurisdiction of the Westside Command Station. Coordination of support will also be required to involve representatives from the decentralized Community Services Division and the Tactical Response Team. In short, the responsibilities of decentralized investigative lieutenants at the Westside Command Station demand an ipso facto "hands on" role for these lieutenants to become managers of investigative operations at the district level.

The Role of Support Groups in the ISU

Contained within the ISU are two very important support groups. One group focuses upon supplying information to the members of the ISU, while the other group provides operational support.

The information support group consists of two distinct entities, crime analysis and strategic analysis. The responsibilities of the strategic analysts were discussed at length in the beginning of this chapter and, therefore, will not be repeated. It is suffice to state, however, strategic analysis focuses upon identifying conditions that cause or contribute to the deterioration of neighborhood safety. This differs from the function of crime analysis which is designed to identify clusters and patterns of criminal activity. Irrespective of these differences, it is important to realize the value of processing information as it relates to the responsibilities of each ISU member.

Mr. Rossman, one of the guest speakers during the second executive session, claims police agencies must pride themselves on collecting, processing, and transmitting a variety of different types of information. He suggests, however, that police agencies in general have had difficulty in carrying out this endeavor in an efficient manner. A number of departments struggle with the elementary concerns of determining how to gather and distribute relevant police information which is of fundamental importance (in terms of the second executive session) to the investigative sergeants. For example, in referencing John Eck's (1983) work with the Police Executive Research Forum, some departments fail to properly use existing information to resolve robbery and burglary cases.

Eck (1983) infers police personnel must not negate the value of managing information flow. In the police profession, managing information is considered to be a valuable responsibility, especially for investigators. Why then is this principle so important to the membership of this executive session? Primarily because the interactive process required under NOP will be generating a tremendous amount of information; information which will require efficient management and control. To effectively utilize this "additional information" to its fullest potential, officers and investigators alike must position themselves to evaluate the applicability of the information.

Crime analysis, according to Lt. R. E. Wizinsky, the director of the department's Crime Analysis Unit, provides a vehicle through which every member of the department can efficiently manage their own operations. In essence, the department's crime analysis system serves as a communication network for each line operative within the department. With respect to crime problems, crime analysis allows each person the opportunity to more clearly define problems,

verify the accuracy of information, assess solvability or case screening factors, and/or determine if crime and noncrime problems are localized within neighborhoods or are pervasive throughout the city of Houston.

In accordance with NOP, the crime analysis system will serve as the repository for information collected by beat officers and investigators. As the information is fed into the system, decisions can be made with respect to identifying problems, developing solutions, and appropriating resources to implement strategies. Crime analysis, consequently, becomes a management tool available for the beat officers and investigators to use during the course of their tours of duty.

The department has developed an elaborate centralized/decentralized crime analysis system which is capable of providing information in a number of different formats. For example, information can be used to:

- identify crime problems;
- identify crime clusters;
- identify crime patterns;
- assist in case enhancement;
- assist in case assignment;
- provide investigative leads;
- produce trend reports;
- assist in crime prevention efforts;
- provide assistance for tactical assignments; and
- identify criminal activity based upon suspect behavior.

Each officer and investigator can use the crime analysis system to help them determine their own neighborhood commitments, to set objectives, to prioritize their needs, guide and direct strategy development, or to enhance their problem solving, community organizing, or planning skills.

Crime analysis, therefore, is a management tool which allows all officers and investigators to be linked to the same system, yet maintain their own flexibility and individuality in the use of the system's capabilities.

The key to a successful crime analysis system is participation by all of the user groups. Participation is best defined under these circumstances as a two way exchange of information. Information must be fed into the system before it can be extracted and effectively used. Participants must strive to share their collective information, expertise, and experiences irrespective of their assignment to patrol or investigations. Through the use of crime analysis, beat officers and investigators become more proficient managers by focusing their efforts and resources on the problems they have identified or have been assigned to resolve.

The successful utilization of the crime analysis system within the ISU, therefore, is based on the capability of the various user groups to supply and analyze information in an effort to identify and resolve neighborhood and citywide crime and noncrime problems. The crime analysis system serves as a conduit linking the expertise of the user groups to pertinent information.

What the crime analysis unit does not represent is a separate entity, independently responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. This results in forcing analysts to be responsible for developing a rapport with user groups in order to increase an exchange of information between the unit and operational personnel.

To the contrary, the crime analysis function within the ISU, and the department as a whole, operates as an interactive system that aids in integrating operational efforts with identified problems through the efficient management of information. Beat officers, investigators, special squad officers, etc. have the capacity within this system to become managers. Furthermore, it becomes their responsibility to use the system to support their neighborhood needs and commitments.

A second support group lending assistance to ISU members is responsible for providing operational support. For example, should the unit be in need of specialized tactical support to help prevent, identify, or resolve specific crime or noncrime problems, assistance would come from any number of available sources. One such source would be the use of IRTs.

As mentioned previously, the IRTs can offer special knowledge, expertise, and skills to the officers and investigators as they attempt to resolve different types of problems requiring specialized tactical support. Tactical support can come in the form of implementing undercover strategies, working surveillance, participating in sting operations, assisting in the instigation of cases, and apprehending suspects to name just a few.

A second form of operational support can come in the form of assistance from members of the Community Services Division. In discussing the matter with Lt. C. B. Wiener, who is assigned to the division, their responsibilities entail:

providing staff guidance, assistance, and coordination for field divisions with regard to the crime prevention function within the department. The Community Services Division provides support services as the repository for equipment and materials; and, as the central source for program development, crime prevention training, and statistical storage and reporting.

Of considerable value to the ISU members, is the availability of standardized programs and lesson plans. This ensures the same information is shared with the public for a given program (e.g., rape prevention, home security surveys, etc.).

Another valuable contribution from the Community Services Division is their commitment to developing new programs. These programs are generally in response to specific citywide problems arising within the community. Based

upon in-depth research and development, these new programs are prepared, tested, and then taught to the field personnel. Examples of such programs include the recent development of a Pedestrian Safety Program, a Gun Safety Program (stemming from the highly visible accidental shooting incidents involving children in their homes), and a Commercial Crime Prevention Program which focuses on consumer theft and fraud practices.

The Community Services Division can also provide traditional types of support services. These types of services are generally relegated to "show and tell" activities involving the use of the: the Police Show Car, the Antique Police Show Car, the Crime Prevention Van, the Child Safety Van, the Seat Belt Convincer, and "Mac - the Robot." When educational needs are identified within the community, these types of tools are available for the ISU members to draw upon.

A third and final type of operational support can come from the Training Division. It is quite evident from the material contained within this report, attention will have to be devoted to teaching people how to perform new skills or old skills more proficiently. Perhaps what is of considerable importance, however, is the method used to provide this type of training.

Traditionally, the department's Training Division has focused on refining their ability to train individuals. While certain tasks and activities lend themselves to this approach, the concept of an ISU suggests another alternative may be more worthwhile. For example, maybe attention should be directed toward identifying how to train "units". If one expects the unit to be responsible for addressing neighborhood problems or delivering services, attempts should be made in teaching the unit how to efficiently perform these activities.

Furthermore, when it comes to training individuals, attention should be

directed toward providing them with the skills needed to effectively work within a unit. Each ISU member should know what they are expected to contribute, what others are expected to contribute, what the unit objectives are, and how these objectives will be attained. The underlying training premise is recognizing the need to focus on developing a consensus among the unit members. It is the prevalence of dissension regarding functional responsibilities that leads to confusion, performance deterioration, and eventually, poor service delivery to the public.

The value of the information and operational support personnel to the ISU is critical. Information becomes the lifeblood which helps guide and direct the type of activities performed by the ISU members. In those instances when special operational skills, knowledge, or expertise is needed, a wide variety of support personnel will be available to help. Together, these support personnel will help insure the efficient management of resources in addressing the service needs identified within the neighborhoods by the members of the ISU.

Offense Report Processing Within the ISU


Of considerable importance to the investigative function is the processing of all offense reports generated by members of the ISU. Without a doubt, the information contained within offense reports will have a considerable influence on the type of activities performed by the ISU members. To more clearly understand this influence, an examination of Figure #5 is appropriate in order to first identify the process.

Probably the most critical, yet debatable topic with respect to processing offense reports is the issue of quality control. If officers are given the

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING MODEL

Offense Report Processing

Figure #5



latitude to perform comprehensive initial investigations, with the hope of facilitating case closure, the importance of quality control becomes magnified. Presently, a separate group of officers performs this task within each patrol division throughout the FOC.

Under this particular model, however, the task of reviewing offense reports becomes the responsibility of the officer's unit supervisor. If officers are entrusted with the responsibility of case closure, it will require the availability and experience of the unit supervisor to determine if all of the requirements have been met to justify the officer's recommendations. Unlike conducting preliminary investigations where the purpose of quality control is to primarily check for information accuracy; case closure recommendations require procedural checks as they relate to interviewing, interrogation, evidence collection, scene processing, etc. Unit supervisors rather than officers (e.g., quality control officers or crime analysts) are in a better position to monitor and verify an officer's actions in each of these procedural areas.

Another reason for having unit supervisors quality control check offense reports is it will ultimately result in increased quality reports being written. If a unit supervisor is responsible for reviewing a report which could be assigned to a beat investigator, the possibility exists the investigator may need to liaison with the unit supervisor to contact the officer responsible for writing the report. The liaison may be prompted by a desire on behalf of the investigative sergeant to ask for the officer's assistance in clarifying the content of the report or for assistance in conducting a follow-up investigation.

In either instance, the unit supervisor does not want to be embarrassed by

allowing a poor report to be processed through the system. There is an element of pride and professionalism associated with producing quality work. If unit supervisors know their work, and that of their officers, are going to be reviewed and used by others, there is less likelihood shoddy work will be allowed to pass through the system. Hence, any mistakes found by the unit supervisor will surely be brought to the attention of the officer in question. The officer wanting to avoid additional confrontations with the unit supervisor or avoid personal embarrassment will attempt to improve upon the quality of his or her work.

And finally, by reviewing the officers' reports, the unit supervisor will be able to ascertain the level of criminal activity occurring within different areas. This will assist the unit supervisor in making managerial decisions regarding the allocation of resources to prevent and suppress this activity. It also places the unit supervisor in a position of facilitating integration between the officers and investigators. This is important when it comes to supporting teamwork and accounting for team results.

Another significant aspect associated with the processing of offense reports is the role of the crime analysts. Copies of all offense reports should be supplied to crime analysis personnel in order to allow them the opportunity to identify clusters and patterns of activity. The identification of these types of activity will result in the issuance of TAPs which will stimulate a response by patrol or investigative personnel.

The analyses may also result in the enhancement of a case. Since the primary objective of the crime analysis system is to identify clusters and patterns of crime and noncrime activity, it is hoped that cases can be linked together on the basis of the analyses. The more information one can obtain

about a criminal or the events and actions surrounding the offense, the higher the probability will be for apprehension. Of course, the final outcome is based on a number of factors, none of which may be of more importance than the actual assignment of the case.

Depending upon the extensiveness of the pattern, the investigative shift lieutenant may opt to assign the case to the decentralized investigators or be required to send the case to the IOC for assignment to the centralized investigators. Assuming the case is area specific, the investigative shift lieutenant has yet another option, that of assigning the case to a single investigator or a team of investigators.

The assignment of a case to a single investigative sergeant signifies a traditional approach to case assignment. The team approach, however, offers up an interesting alternative. As mentioned earlier, investigative sergeants assigned to a district could hypothetically represent a team. Collectively, the investigators would be held accountable for the investigations conducted within the district. When the lieutenant decides to actually assign a case, it would be assigned to a district team of investigators. The members of the team would decide who would work the case, how it would be handled, and be allowed to orchestrate regular meetings to discuss status updates of the cases and so forth. Members of the team would also be able to insure the continuity of an investigation(s) should a member be absent for an extended period of time. Rather than waiting for the lead investigator to return, other team members could continue working the case.

The use of investigative teams does not preclude any investigator from volunteering to work the case, nor does it mean that because of case enhancement efforts, the case will be assigned to "the wrong" investigator.

Furthermore, it does not prevent an investigator from seeking the assistance of a patrol officer(s) when necessary. An investigative sergeant can also seek the assistance from other investigators assigned within his district should the need arise. All investigators should strive to assist each other when necessary since they will collectively be held accountable for their overall performance within the district.

Investigative sergeants, therefore, must appreciate the value of teamwork as it relates to accountability for their actions. This is quite different from helping a fellow investigator, but not being held responsible for that investigator's end product. In this instance, all investigators are held accountable for the collective product within the district. Each of them has responsibility for the final outcomes.

If teamwork is to be efficient, it must be managed. The responsibility of the investigative sergeant in this context, therefore, more closely resembles the managerial responsibilities of the unit supervisor. The investigative sergeant becomes a manager of people and activities. The managerial responsibility for the investigative sergeant, consequently, exceeds the realm of just managing investigations. As is the case with the unit supervisor, the managerial contributions made by the investigative sergeant must support the management system within the command and ultimately the management processes utilized within the department as a whole.

In summary, the ISU represents a organizational entity which seeks to functionally integrate patrol and investigative responsibilities on a decentralized basis. Through the ISU concept, community residents have a definitive set of responsibilities designed to unite them with patrol and investigative personnel. Police services, consequently, will become more

responsive to the needs of the citizens. Consensus of purpose is attained as each member of the ISU better understands how responsibilities contribute to the attainment of specific results. This understanding will enhance managerial efficiency as resources will be allocated in accordance with customized plans to address specific neighborhood problems.

Given the commitment to integrate patrol and investigative responsibilities via the ISU, what, if any, impact will this have on the centralized investigators assigned to the IOC? If the responsibilities of the decentralized investigators are expected to change under NOP, is it safe to assume commensurate changes are in store for centralized investigators? Furthermore, given the prospect of altering the responsibilities of centralized investigators, what affect would these changes have on the organizational configuration of the IOC? The third and final management model addresses these and other issues.

Model #3: Reconfiguring Organizational Structure

If a predominance of the investigative function is to be decentralized in accordance with the Command Station concept and the investigative function is to be altered in response to NOP, how will these changes affect the responsibilities of the personnel assigned to the IOC? As was originally noted in DeFoor's (1980) report:

The main function of its (the Metro Operations Command) divisions is to handle all police matters which extend beyond the boundaries of any given Command Station, or are simply beyond the resources of the Station (p. 18).

The intent is clearly for the proposed Metro Operations Command to have citywide jurisdiction for a number of responsibilities, including, for example, major crimes, narcotics, criminal intelligence, helicopter operations, and special weapons and tactics operations. With the advent of the NOP concept, however, the functional responsibilities within the present day IOC must change from those proposed in the 1980 report.

It is no longer an issue of just determining how to reconfigure the proper placement of traditional responsibilities within the IOC. Under NOP, efforts must be made to identify functional areas of expansion for the investigators, both on a decentralized and centralized basis. There is also a concern for integration; the need for patrol and investigative operations to be supportive of each other. Together these concerns strongly suggest a need to rethink what investigative sergeants assigned to the IOC should be responsible for and then determine the most appropriate organizational configuration to support and facilitate the performance of those responsibilities.

As noted throughout this report, the decision to decentralize the

investigation of certain crimes was based on the premise that crimes peculiar to a given neighborhood can be more effectively investigated by decentralized personnel. In effect, decentralized investigators will become area specialists and crime generalists. Coupled with their investigative responsibilities, the decentralized investigators will also be responsible for a number of additional functions that were described in the previous section of this chapter.

Contrary to their decentralized counterparts, centralized investigators will become crime specialists and area generalists. Centralized investigators will be responsible for investigating cases that consist of citywide, patternable offenses and, for investigating homicides, forgeries, frauds, and motor vehicle thefts whether or not these crimes are serial in nature or are isolated events. Citywide patternable cases, by their very nature, represent the existence of a minimum of two cases which are related and, in the context of this department, exist within separate jurisdictional substation and command station boundaries. The relationship between the two cases is usually determined by identifying the interrelatedness of existing solvability factors or the modus operandi of the criminal(s). The cases generally lead the investigator to believe the same person(s) is responsible for committing the offenses in question.

Nonpatternable offenses are devoid of similarities in so far as suggesting one person(s) is responsible for the offenses. These types of offenses are considered to be isolated, discrete events. Although the same types of solvability factors may be known from one offense to the next (e.g., the name of the suspect is known, a license plate number is known, fingerprints were found at the scene, etc.), there is no guarantee the cases are related until further investigative work produces evidence to the contrary.

The decision to decentralize the investigation of certain crimes within this department was not based purely on the identification of patternable offenses. Homicides, for example, are in most instances isolated events involving persons who probably knew one another. Unless evidence exists to suggest a serial killer is at large, most homicides are generally independent events. Although the offense of murder may be more susceptible to decentralization; questions concerning the public's acceptance of such a move and the political ramifications of such a decision may be too much for the department to overcome. Traditional beliefs and perceptions are probably too firmly entrenched within the minds of the public to expect acceptance of decentralizing this offense. Hence, the division remains in tact more so for these reasons than because of arguments regarding the value of acquiring and sharing special information needed to investigate murder cases.

Motor vehicle investigations, on the other hand, represent a different concern. As indicated in Chapter 5, the complexity of this offense and the interrelatedness of events emanating from auto thefts strongly justifies keeping it centralized.

As each succeeding command station comes on-line, the IOC will be expected to divest itself of investigators through the process of decentralization. A significant portion of this report has been devoted to describing, under the context of NOP, the functional responsibilities and relationships of the decentralized investigators once they are assigned to the FOC. What about the responsibilities of the centralized investigators though; will they be expected to just conduct criminal investigations? The answer to that question is a resounding no. As stated earlier, because of the expertise they will acquire from investigating cases, they will develop an in-depth understanding of the

crime problems that exist or are about to emerge throughout the city. It logically follows, therefore, that centralized investigators should spend a considerable amount of time in thinking of ways to more effectively prevent crime.

This responsibility will encompass a number of tasks, among them being the need to: identify problems, initiate and facilitate the development of appropriate strategies, coordinate and participate in the implementation of responses, and assess results. In the performance of these tasks, centralized investigators will actively seek assistance from the citizens, decentralized investigators, crime analysts, strategic analysts, and, most of all, the neighborhood beat officers. The officers can help in three ways. First, they can conduct comprehensive initial investigations which will facilitate case resolution. Second, they can initiate early case closures which will reduce the volume of cases being sent to the investigators for handling. And third, upon request, they can assist the investigators in the performance of their problem solving responsibilities. When these three tasks are coupled with the efficient administration of standardized, divisional MCI procedures, investigators will be able to devote more time in addressing conditions that foster crime.

Since these basic functions will be performed by centralized investigators under the context of NOP, an organizational configuration for the IOC must be devised that will facilitate the performance of case investigations and problem solving, while simultaneously insuring operational integration is achieved with patrol and decentralized investigative personnel. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will be dedicated to discussing an alternative


configuration of the IOC's present organizational structure and functional alignments as depicted in Figure #6 (p. 227).

It should be noted at the outset, that this organizational configuration will not actually exist until the decentralization process has been completed. Complete decentralization will be dependent upon the time needed to complete the remaining three command stations, which, conservatively speaking, will take approximately five years.

An examination of Figure #6 reveals a number of proposed changes from the IOC's current organizational configuration depicted in Figure #2 (p. 129). The newly configured IOC will consist of three bureaus as opposed to the two bureaus it now has. The former Major Investigations Bureau has been retitled and will be known as the Centralized Criminal Investigations Bureau (CCIB). The Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) remains the same in title, but has been divested of the Juvenile Division. A new bureau has been created entitled the Investigative Support Bureau (ISB).

This configuration of the IOC has been designed to enhance the centralized investigators's ability to engage in problem solving without compromising quality "instigative" and subsequent investigations. Problem solving task forces will be created to establish an alliance between police and citizens aimed at addressing the needs of special types of problems. Tactical, link, and strategic analysis capabilities will be established to develop a better understanding of emerging crime patterns, to identify the expansiveness of a problem within or among communities, and to identify factors which contribute to the emergence of problems within the community. The ISB has been created to consolidate various support services within the command and to enhance the

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING



Reorganization of the
Investigative Operations
Command

Figure #6

efficient delivery of those services to units within the IOC, as well as to requesting units within the FOC. And finally an Administrative Analysis Detail is being proposed for the command office. This detail will be responsible for examining resource allocation procedures, conducting case workload analyses, and conducting productivity analyses within the IOC.

Collectively, these changes represent the department's commitment to reconfigure organizational structure in support of functions associated with operationalizing the concept of NOP within the IOC. In an effort to enhance the understanding of these proposals, each of them will be discussed separately.

The Investigative Operations Command Office

It is not the intent of this section to discuss the myriad of responsibilities assigned to the assistant chief of police of this command. As implied from the design of Figure #6, one of the assistant chief's primary responsibilities is to maintain open lines of communications with the bureau offices. This is essential if an efficient management system is to be established within the command. Management systems, however, are dependent upon an exchange and analysis of information flowing within, through, and out of the command. In an effort to capitalize on the utility of this information, the creation of an Administrative Analysis Detail to be assigned to the command office is being proposed.

The Administrative Analysis Detail

In order to best understand the significance of this detail, attention must

first be drawn to the concept of Managing Patrol Operations (MPO). In referencing the material contained within the first Executive Session report, the concept of MPO is predicated on the need to properly manage the allocation of existing resources and then insure the efficient utilization of those resources within the context of administering the patrol function (Oettmeier and Bieck, 1987). One of the tools available to assist patrol managers in this endeavor is a function known as operations analysis.

Operations analysis is a process designed to examine work demands over time. Work demands are best illustrated in terms of requests for service by time of day and day of week, reported crime activity, the proportion of "backup" unit dispatches, on-view officer activities, etc.. Regular monthly reports are also produced via the computer aided dispatch system to inform managers of changes in the frequency and type of officer generated activities existing within predefined areas along with an analysis of the citizen's demand for police service. These reports assist patrol managers in assessing the effectiveness of resource allocation procedures in relationship to the volume and dispersion of calls both temporally and geographically. Additionally, it will permit the analysis of "repeat calls" and assist in efforts to monitor dispatched work load and self-initiated activities (Bieck, 1985).

Historically, little attention has been paid to developing an operations analysis capability within investigative operations. Given today's current economic plight, coupled with proposed changes in functional responsibilities for investigators under NOP, this issue can no longer be ignored. The management of criminal investigations requires an analysis of the same types of operational criteria as it does for the management of the patrol function.

Although the work performed by investigators is largely attributed to the number of investigations conducted by the patrol officers this should not be seen as an obstacle to conducting a work demands analysis within the IOC.

Such an analysis goes beyond merely determining where the work is coming from in that it also recognizes the importance of understanding what the work load actually consists of as well as documenting how personnel are used to respond to and manage the incoming work. What makes this entire issue of resource allocation of particular interest, is conducting the analysis in light of implementing MCI procedures.

If one assumes the administration of MCI procedures will reduce the traditional investigative work load of certain types of crimes (e.g., high volume crimes like burglaries, larcenies, etc.), a concern arises as to determining how many investigators are needed to investigate the remaining cases, or to perform new, nontraditional responsibilities incurred through the expansion and integration of investigative sergeants' and lieutenants' roles.

Thus, to no one's surprise, the issue of manpower distribution becomes critical. Instead of positing a need for more resources because of decentralization or NOP initiatives, the challenge becomes one of efficiently managing the utilization of resources that are presently available. Furthermore, it is difficult to advance notions for greater resources when documentation is lacking regarding the present effective utility of investigative efforts. Therefore, if the implementation of MCI procedures results in a significant reduction in the number of cases decentralized and centralized investigators need to work, a couple of interesting options emerge. One, new responsibilities can be taken on by the investigators; or

two, the number of personnel committed to the investigative function can be reduced thereby allowing personnel to be redirected to other functions within the department.

Another significant responsibility of the Administrative Analysis Detail is productivity analysis. This responsibility should amount to more than just completing the department's Management Progress Reports (MPRs). Unfortunately, most MPRs within the department serve as nothing more than a mechanism for counting activities rather than associating accomplishments with objectives sought. Each command has gone to great pains to develop and implement their respective MPR but, outside the notion of relating activities to command objectives and department goals, there is little known about the effectiveness of the efforts expended to accomplish these ends. In other words, activities can be accounted for in terms dollars expended but, is the appropriate information being collected that describes the relationship among the activities performed, the problems addressed, and the results attained by virtue of performing activities? Herein lies one of the biggest differences between the traditional perspective associated with performing investigations and the perspective of NOP. Under NOP, results must represent a measurement of problems resolved and results achieved and not simply an accounting of the number of activities performed.

Productivity analysis, therefore, should go beyond describing the types of activities being performed by department personnel. It should focus on analyzing relationships between and among resources expended and efforts taken to identify problems and activities implemented to address these problems, whether resources were efficiently used, a recording of outcomes, and

recommendations for sustaining, enhancing, or discontinuing the strategies or programs implemented. The results of this analysis should be used to improve managerial decision-making at all levels within the IOC, especially the managerial decisions made by investigative sergeants.

Managerial decision-making can also be facilitated through the development of a comprehensive information management system mentioned earlier within this report. The purpose of this system is to act as a catalyst and a repository from which information can be collected, analyzed, and disseminated throughout the department. For example, information regarding repeat victims or multiple offenses committed by one suspect should not only be identified for patrol personnel, but it should be shared with investigative personnel. Additionally, time should be devoted to matching crime and intelligence analysis data with case information gleaned from the MCI data. The purpose of sharing this information is to relate cases or enhance cases which heretofore may go unnoticed. In the long run, this type of information exchange will help improve the likelihood of apprehending suspects.

The Administrative Analysis Detail, consequently, is designed to examine information generated within the IOC with respect to workload analysis, resource allocation (i.e., manpower distribution), and productivity analysis. This information should be systematized to insure access throughout the IOC. The value of such a system is twofold. First, it enhances managerial efficiency by relating information usage with operational outcomes. Second, it serves as a tool designed to promote human resource development, while simultaneously accounting for the allocation of resources.

The information system, by design, transcends the traditional notion of

using information just for the purpose of clearing cases. The information must also be used to identify and address factors that contributed to the generation of cases in the first place. Furthermore, the information will provide a basis for centralized and decentralized investigators to instill an obligation within the citizenry to become more knowledgeable about steps they can take to prevent crime and resolve problems within their neighborhoods.

Efficient utilization of department generated information is certainly an important component of any management system. However, another equally important component is citizen input into the problem resolution process. Citizens not only help to identify problems, but they can also take an active role in the formulation of plans and strategies designed to resolve troublesome community problems. It becomes the responsibility of the assistant chief to provide leadership and guidance in determining how this type of citizen participation can be effectively integrated within the investigative operation. One such method is through the creation of Problem Solving Task Forces discussed in more detail below.

Problem Solving Task Force(s)

Occasionally, there will be a need to convene a task force to address a particular type of citywide problem discovered by patrol and investigative personnel working in a centralized or decentralized capacity. Problems can also be identified by citizens and brought to the attention of the police. In either instance, the problem warrants the attention of a task force because of its relative complexity.

For example, if a number of thieves are stealing cars and either selling

the cars or parts of cars for narcotics, and then turning around and transporting and selling the narcotics to high school students, it may be necessary to bring all of the affected parties together to develop a plan of action to combat this problem. This would include members from the Motor Vehicle Investigations Division, Narcotics Investigation Division, the Tactical Response Unit, various analysts, and patrol personnel. The problem may necessitate having a member of the district attorney's office become a part of the task force. Furthermore, it is also conceivable that business proprietors, legislators, and school officials might be invited to participate in the deliberations.

Since the problem in this example adversely affects more than one division, coordinated responses become of primary importance. Rather than having three bureaus competing against one another for information and resources to address the problem, the task force serves to avoid this friction and potential waste of resources.

The primary purpose for convening a task force of this nature is to coordinate the development of strategies and implementation of responses. It is far too dangerous for members of any of the three affected bureaus to pursue the resolution of this problem independently. Only through the use of the task force can all of the information about the problem be brought to the table for open and honest discussion and analysis. Furthermore, agreement can be reached as to the assignment of authority and responsibility for different facets of a plan of action.

It should be pointed out, the task force lends itself more readily to involvement from the citizenry. Traditionally, there has been a tendency in

policing to relegate citizen participation to a passive role. However, in the upcoming years, especially under NOP, citizen participation will be expected to grow in stature. Even today, in cases involving the interdiction of stolen auto parts, members of the IOC are working with insurance companies to pressure them from purchasing used parts, with the State Comptroller's Office regarding possible sales tax violations, and with the Internal Revenue Service regarding possible tax fraud on the part of accessory shops. In the area of narcotics enforcement, efforts are now being made to work with landlords and property owners as one method of alleviating the crack house problem. This type of participation is expected to increase dramatically over the next several years as efforts to attack these types of problem intensifies.

The use of problem solving task forces should not be restricted from being used outside the context of the command office. As depicted within Figure #6, this idea can be incorporated within the CCIB and the SIB. This would occur in instances when a problem is confined to the responsibilities assigned to any one of these bureaus. Although the problem may be isolated to a division within a bureau, this does not mean membership cannot include personnel from other divisions, bureaus, commands, or the citizenry. Whoever possesses the needed expertise or experience should become a member of the task force.

No one should perceive the task force as a permanent assignment, nor should the task force be expected to justify its existence month after month. Once a plan has been developed, executed, and the results evaluated, task force members should be dismissed from this assignment.

The Centralized Criminal Investigations Bureau

Investigators assigned to the Centralized Criminal Investigations Bureau (CCIB) will be responsible for performing two major functions: 1) conducting criminal investigations and 2) problem solving. With respect to conducting criminal investigations, all citywide patternable offenses, regardless of type, will be handled by centralized personnel. This determination will be made by tactical analysts operating within the various patrol and investigative divisions. It will be the tactical analysts' responsibility to identify existing and emerging crime patterns and clusters based upon their analysis of suspect intelligence information contained within the preliminary and/or comprehensive initial investigations. As citywide patterns and clusters are identified, accountability for the investigation will be assigned to centralized personnel for handling.

Although a review of Figure #6 implies centralized investigative responsibilities are applicable to a number of criminal offenses, a variety of changes will occur as a result of the decentralization process. For example, of the offenses assigned to this bureau for investigation, the crimes of burglary (includes thefts and larcenies), major assaults (of a domestic nature), simple assaults, robberies (excluding federally insured institutions), and sex offenses have been decentralized. However, if any of these crimes are found to be a part of a citywide pattern or cluster, they will be investigated by centralized personnel.

The offenses of motor vehicle investigations (previously known as the Auto Theft Division, but changed to more accurately connote divisional responsibilities which include: heavy equipment thefts - previously assigned to the Special Thefts Division, and all other offenses inextricably linked

directly to motor vehicles.), commercial burglaries and special thefts (the Special Thefts Division will be consolidated with the Burglary and Theft Division to form a new division entitled Burglary and Special Thefts), homicides and major assaults (stranger initiated), robberies of federally insured institutions, and fraud, forgery, and white collar crime (which represents the formation of a new division) will remain centralized.

The decision justifying the decision to centralize motor vehicle investigations and fraud, forgery, and white collar crimes is based primarily on the need to centralize the information generated from these offenses. Motor vehicle related offenses are extremely complex to address because of the varying degrees of organization attributable to the different related aspects of these offenses alluded to earlier in Chapter 5. Since motor vehicle investigations are so diverse in nature, control of and accessibility to information which potentially links one form of motor vehicle theft to another is critical to the successful resolution of these crimes. The probability of utilizing this information to establish patterns that link these offenses is very high, thereby warranting the need for centralization. "Operation Flytrap," for instance, represents a classic example of a strategy used by auto theft personnel to capitalize on information that established a link between street thieves and shop operators.

Fraud and forgery crimes also require a need for centralized information access and control. Generally, these offenses do not occur in isolation. Forgery suspects have a tendency to operate throughout the city so as to avoid detection, especially after a retail institution realizes they have become victimized. Department stores, who represent one of the largest victims, will

inundate the division with forged checks in hopes that they can eventually recoup their losses. Information also comes in from patrol officers, who during the course of their tour of duty encounter victims of this offense, conduct their preliminary investigation, and submit their evidence to division personnel for follow-up work. The information generated from the investigations (from patrol officers or investigators) must be centralized to facilitate the identification of a pattern hopefully resulting in the arrest of the perpetrators.

The investigation of white collar crime has not been highly visible in municipal policing for a variety of reasons. Many, perhaps most departments simply lacked investigative expertise. Additionally, offenses that occurred in financial institutions were "handled internally," because management was reluctant to risk shaking investor confidence. Furthermore, complications in ascertaining exactly what state penal code, if any, was violated and what authority, i.e., federal, state, or local, had the appropriate jurisdiction to conduct such investigations oftentimes prevented any meaningful action from being taken. While many of these complications still exist, there are offenses that clearly constitute violations of the state penal code, e.g., embezzlement of funds by a bank employee, illegal sales of alcohol and narcotics, price-fixing by medical service practitioners, fraudulent securities transactions, etc. But even now police involvement in these types of cases is almost completely dependent upon requests by victims for assistance.

If called to investigate cases involving white collar crime, the police are expected to possess the necessary skills and expertise to investigate and solve these types of offenses. But, as of this writing, a clear-cut direction for

the evolution of white collar crime investigations has yet to emerge within the department. Once this eventuates, however, this expertise, being highly specialized and difficult to acquire, will most certainly remain centralized.

The acquisition and utilization of special expertise also represents an appropriate justification for centralizing the investigation of special thefts. Thefts involving museum pieces such as paintings and artifacts and thefts from automated teller machines, not to mention thefts of coin and stamp collections, personal art pieces, precious gems and expensive jewelry, require specialized knowledge about these crimes and individuals that perpetrate these types of offenses. Intelligence sources must be tapped to identify fences that specialize in handling unique property transactions. Decentralization of this function would severely hamper investigative efforts. As with so many of the other centralized investigations, information must be centrally pooled.

Commercial burglaries and robberies of federally insured institutions (FSLIC and FDIC) are also centralized in part because of the need to use specialized expertise. However, both of these offenses, which are relatively infrequent occurrences in Houston, are potentially patternable offenses and therefore meet the initial criteria for retaining centralized responsibility. This has led to the Robbery Division's use of the "Rogues Gallery" and Robbery Camera programs which have been very successful in increasing clearance rates and bringing national prominence to the division's efforts in combatting robberies.

Homicides and stranger initiated aggravated assault investigations will also remain centralized. The rationale for centralizing homicides was discussed previously in this chapter. However, it is significant to recognize

the ever present link between increased homicides and the narcotics problem within the city. Centralization of responsibilities for both crimes will allow a pooling of information and a sharing of expertise between personnel from different divisions, thereby strengthening the need for extensive collaboration from members of both divisions.

Homicides and stranger initiated aggravated assaults are also interrelated offenses in that aggravated assaults realistically represent unsuccessful homicides. Since the perpetrator is generally unknown, investigators are likely to pursue MOs that are similar to those of homicide suspects. This will also require investigators too work from the same information pool.

Irrespective of who is responsible for conducting criminal investigations, success is dependent upon the ability of patrol and investigative personnel to work together. The concept of facilitative reciprocity has been used to describe the integration of functional responsibilities between members of the IOC and FOC. Facilitative reciprocity is achieved by sharing expertise in terms of experience, knowledge, and information. Decentralized investigators, are area experts whereas centralized investigators are suspect and crime experts. Centralized investigators depend upon the decentralized investigator's knowledge of the area to assist them in identifying and addressing citywide patternable offenses. Likewise, decentralized investigators must rely upon the special skills and expertise centralized investigators have with regards to suspect behavior to help them solve their criminal cases.

Centralized investigators are also functionally dependent upon the

assistance they can receive from the patrol officers. As was the case with decentralized investigators, high quality comprehensive initial investigations from patrol officers can also facilitate more efficient follow-up investigations conducted by centralized investigators. Furthermore, cases eligible to be suspended through early case closure procedures will allow some centralized investigators to redirect their time toward other types of activities. These activities may include the implementation of interdiction strategies or responses. Again, this may necessitate dependency on behalf of the centralized investigators when seeking the availability and cooperation of patrol personnel to efficiently execute their plans.

The second major function assigned to the members of the CCIB is problem solving. Centralized investigators, by virtue of their suspect-oriented expertise, will be the most knowledgeable people in the department about the various crime problems within the city. Each division within the CCIB will possess the capability of identifying problems and developing action plans aimed at resolving those problems. The identification of problems, however, will require more than pattern or cluster identification by tactical analysts. Additional information must be generated by strategic analysts. To best understand this function, a comparison must be made between strategic analysis and tactical analysis.

Strategic Analysis Within the IOC

In drawing from Bieck's (1985) crime analysis workplan report, tactical crime analysis has primarily been concerned with discerning time and spacial characteristics of criminal events. This information was then displayed in

order to determine the existence of crime patterns or clusters. The identification of these patterns served as a basis for structuring uncommitted patrol time to suppress crime. Implied within these activities is the rationale that solutions to crime problems resided exclusively in the domain of police resources to impact crime.

According to Bieck (1985), inherent within the techniques used to perform tactical analysis is the linking together of individual incidents to identify crime patterns. This "incident orientation" tends to perpetuate a belief by the police that they are best suited to resolve these types of community problems. Consequently, there exists the possibility for the police to ignore alternative views from community representatives regarding constructive solutions to crime and noncrime problems.

It will be the responsibility of the strategic analysts to complement efforts already initiated within the department by encouraging citizens to be involved in the development of creative solutions to crime and noncrime problems. Again in drawing from the previous work of Bieck (1985) and the comments expressed by Mr. Robert Wasserman during one of the second Executive Session meetings, a strategic analysis function within the department can represent a mechanism to solicit input from private citizens and public officials in a "community problem analysis process."

Given the multiplicity and complexity of problems existing within a community, time must be spent developing conceptual models that provide more abstract insight into the analysis of problems vis-a-vis individual incidents. The conceptual development of these models is based upon Herman Goldstein's "problem-oriented approach to policing." As different types of problems are

identified, the process used to collect and analyze the information along with developing plans in response to the information varies from one types of problem to the next. For example, analytical diversity is illustrated in the questions raised within Bieck's (1985) workplan which are cited below:

- Drawing upon the department's initiative in addressing inhalant abuse, what can be done to impact other forms of drug abuse prevalent among youngsters?;
- What are the reasons for "repeat police calls" to the same locations, and what can be done to reduce these calls?;
- What can be done to reduce crime among the homeless (transient individuals) as victims and perpetrators in the city's Central Business District?;
- What are the sexual proclivities of sex offenders once they are released from prison or placed on probation?;
- What can be done to impact the continual handling of situations involving the mentally ill?;
- What is the incidence and nature of violence resulting from domestic and nondomestic disturbance calls, and what can be done to reduce this violence?;
- What accounts for the inordinate number of auto thefts in Houston each year vis-a-vis other jurisdictions in the State of Texas, and what can be done to reduce motor vehicle thefts?;
- What is the extent of criminal victimizations among illegal aliens and recent (legal) immigrants in Houston each year, and what can be done to impact criminal exploitation among these groups?; and
- In addition, to apprehending drunk drivers, what other alternatives exist to reduce the frequency of individuals driving while intoxicated? (pp. 8 - 9).

These questions address a wide range of community problems. Although many, many more problems can and should be identified, it is important to recognize the impact these problems have on patrol and investigative operations.

The organizational value of strategic analysis is that it facilitates functional integration of responsibilities between patrol and investigative personnel. Within the confines of the IOC, centralized investigators benefit by learning more about the causal conditions of criminal activity which lead to a more in-depth understanding of why suspects act the way they do. Knowing this, investigators may be able to develop more effective means of apprehending suspects.

Strategic analysts also benefit from interacting with centralized investigators. The analysts will receive information regarding the characteristics of a crime. This could include obtaining the investigator's opinions of underlying motives regarding a suspect's behavior. Additionally, the analysts should elicit information and suggestions from the investigators relative to strategy implementation. This will be extremely useful in working with the members of the Tactical Response Unit.

The scope of responsibilities performed by personnel assigned to the strategic analysis function will be diverse. Initially, consideration should be given toward:

1. working with tactical analysts to develop a citywide information management system based, in part, on the type of information needed to conduct strategic analyses discussed in detail earlier within this chapter;
2. developing a capacity to identify causes and conditions which contribute to the emergence of citywide **noncrime** problems;
3. developing a communications network within the city aimed at soliciting input from the educational community, legal profession, business community, clergy, and so forth for a number of reasons, inclusive of needing:

- to identify the causes of citywide crime problems;
 - to solicit cooperation in working together to address citywide problems; and
 - to share crime prevention information and solicit involvement in community-oriented prevention projects.
4. assist in the development of short and long-term plans regarding:
 - crime prevention strategies and
 - community education programs; and
 5. providing technical assistance in the development of strategies and tactical responses when so requested.

Of these responsibilities, developing a citywide information management system is crucial for a number of reasons. First, it requires the centralized and decentralized strategic analysts to meet regularly in addition to meeting with tactical analysts. The initial meetings should be devoted to identifying the objectives served by the information system. This will require decisions to be made regarding the types of information needed, how the information is to be collected, and how the information will be classified within the system. Some hypothetical guidelines were presented earlier in this chapter.

Secondly, the decentralized strategic analysts need to know what types of activities are being performed by the centralized strategic analysts. This will provide the decentralized analysts with an opportunity to support citywide actions by responding to specific needs of the centralized analysts. Much like the department's use of the tactical crime analysis system, the centralized strategic analysts will be dependent upon information generated by the

decentralized analysts.

A third reason for the development of this system is that it will serve as a basis for developing and implementing prevention strategies designed to address crime problems. Although the information within the system may be useful in the development of tactical responses, it is anticipated that a much greater relevance will exist in the area of developing and implementing prevention programs and other strategies.

In summary, the strategic analysis function provides an analytical support capability within the IOC and for the department as a whole via the establishment of a comprehensive information management system. This system must include a commitment to collect, analyze, and disseminate information regarding factors that contribute to the emergence of crime and noncrime problems. This type of information will serve as a basis from which citywide crime prevention strategies and tactical interdiction responses are developed.

The information generated from the centralized strategic analysts supports and is supported by the activities of decentralized personnel vis-a-vis the strategic analysts within the ISUs. Strategic analysts support the responsibilities of centralized investigators within the CCIB and SIB, as well as personnel assigned to the tactical response unit in the ISB, by availing information which may prove helpful in the performance of their respective duties. Of particular importance is the application of this information to the problem solving process. This represents another example of how functional integration will occur between and among investigative and patrol personnel under the context of NOP.

Problem Solving Responsibilities

Problem solving, consequently, is heavily dependent upon the skills of the strategic analysts to identify factors that contribute to the emergence of a problem within the community. But problem solving is not an isolated responsibility assigned to the strategic analysts. The centralized investigators are also accountable for performing a number of problem solving responsibilities. Among them is the need to:

- 1) Develop strategies, implement responses, and evaluate results as it relates to addressing crime problems within their respective divisions.
- 2) Provide technical assistance to decentralized investigative teams or individuals upon request. As crime specialists, centralized investigators must be capable of:
 - A) providing procedural assistance in the form of:
 - updates governing the investigation of certain types of crime, such as improved interrogation and interview techniques, more efficient methods of processing crime scenes to collect and preserve evidence, etc.;
 - improved procedures relative to case preparation; and
 - legal assistance, such as updates in case law involving the exclusionary rule, the Miranda warning, victim rights, etc..
 - B. sharing information about specific types of crimes and suspect behavior. Centralized investigators, by design, are to work suspect-oriented cases based on the identification of patternable offenses. Therefore, they will be more knowledgeable about suspects' modi operandi by crime type.

Examples of this activity are reflected in the command's commitment to work with the Hispanic community through the Chicano Squad, the Asian community through the Asian Squad, or in working through the Jamaican Task Force, which interacts with federal agencies in addressing drug related and violent crimes committed by individuals and groups from that country;

- C. providing training support. Because of the differences in knowledge, time must be spent providing on-the-job training or classroom training, particularly in those instances when the knowledge imparted may also be useful to patrol officers or the citizens;
3. Participate in the development of community crime prevention and education strategies which require involvement on behalf of the citizens. As crime specialists, centralized investigators will be very knowledgeable about the behavior patterns of victims as they relate to specific types of crimes. By working with the strategic analysts, the investigators will be able to advise citizens as to what they should and should not do in order to reduce the risk of becoming a victim. Hence, not only will the citizens become involved in changing their own behavior; but, equally as important, is the citizens' understanding of the relationship between their behavior and being victimized.

With respect to community education, citizens need to be apprised of the importance of good witness behavior, which includes noting the appearance of suspicious people within their neighborhoods and identifying factors (e.g., license plates, etc.) which could lead to the capture of escaping suspects. Other types of community education activities abound which could be used by patrol and investigative personnel; and

- 4) Performing victim assistance activities. These activities include, but are not limited to:
- A. advising citizens of any recourse worth pursuing as a result of being victimized (i.e., the Victim's Assistance Program);
 - B. advising citizens on the availability of appropriations for compensation based upon the damage incurred; who to contact, what initial steps need to be taken (i.e., Crime Victim's Compensation Act);

- C. explaining to citizens what can be anticipated procedurally within the criminal justice system; especially the courts. Citizens are entitled to know about the jury selection procedures, the importance of testifying, the stress associated with testifying; the process of appeals; etc.; and
- D. identifying human service referral agencies which can provide different types of assistance to citizens depending upon the nature of their victimization.

These responsibilities have a direct and indirect effect on the problem solving process. As a consequence of performing these tasks, centralized investigators will need to interact with their decentralized counterparts in the ISUs. If the centralized investigators are to develop an accurate picture of citywide crime problems, they must obtain pertinent community based information from the people who are most familiar with that particular portion of the city in question. Equally as important, is the notion of having centralized and decentralized investigators working together in the development and implementation of strategies that are unilaterally beneficial to citizens throughout the city. Through this reciprocal exchange of information, service delivery will become more responsive as the management of resources becomes more efficient throughout the department.

The Special Investigations Bureau

The Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) consists of two divisions: Vice and Narcotics. But considerable time was spent in deliberating whether to include Motor Vehicle Investigations in this bureau, because the logical distinction in separating functions between the CCIB and the SIB was primarily predicated on the extent to which crimes falling into each of these categories (including motor vehicle thefts) were, in a relative sense, more organized -- not necessarily apart of "organized crime" -- but displayed more ongoing organization involving other people. The commission of commercial robberies, residential burglaries, and sexual assaults, for example, are types of crimes that are more likely to be spontaneous and opportunistic, being committed by individuals or a few individuals rather than by persons affiliated, in one way or another, with organized groups, whether either loosely affiliated or individually dependent upon the success of the group as a whole. Of course, this is not to suggest that robbery, burglary, theft, fraud, forgery, and even sexual assaults are immune to organizational support, as evidenced by members of some motorcycle gangs. But narcotics and vice investigators are more likely than burglary and robbery investigators to spend more time in "making cases" through collecting intelligence information on individuals and groups of individuals alleged to be actively engaged in criminal activities; something many auto theft investigators would also like to do in concentrating on regional, national, and even international auto theft rings, if more time were available.

Finally, it was hypothesized that less "crime switching" would be found among individuals involved in narcotics trafficking, prostitution, gambling, child pornography, and the more commercialized aspects of vehicle thefts of

heavy equipment, pickup trucks and automobiles, and auto parts and accessories. But sufficient consensus did not surface among those engaged in these proceedings to alter the investigative niche traditionally found for auto theft investigations. In fairness to those who successfully sought to retain motor vehicle investigations in the CCIB, however, a strong argument was presented in analyzing the criminal behavior of individuals, many, if not most, of whom act independently in stealing and "stripping" cars and are not apparently bound to any organized network. In any event, the logic used in separating investigative functions will surely continue to be explored by those involved in examining organizational structures to support NOP functions.

Regardless of how intuitively cogent was the logic used to differentiate functional separation between the CCIB and the SIB, suffice it to say that the SIB is perhaps more involved than their CCIB counterpart in both instigating time consuming investigations and in performing subsequent, "complex investigations" that involve solving crimes that have, in most instances, involved more planning and organization on the part of the offenders. In short, drawing again from Goldstock's presentation, the more organized the crime -- the more organized must be the response to combat the crime.

Based on this premise, this bureau should primarily concentrate on gathering intelligence information that places individuals engaged in criminal activity into an "interactive network" that reveals a constellation of possible associates. Not long ago, for example, centralized crime analysts working with patrol officers from the Northeast Patrol Division discovered that upwards to 30 different individuals had sold auto parts and accessories (e.g., pickup tailgates, "T-tops," car seats, hubcaps, etc.) at an auto parts business adjacent to US Highway 59. Surprisingly, while this property had been sold

by individuals acting alone, all of these individuals, as disclosed through information obtained from physical surveillances, had driven the same car to the auto parts store, suggesting some link, however strong, of association among these individuals.

"Link analysis," a form of crime analysis that specifically seeks to identify members of a group (or gang) and their status in relationship to other group members can be used to help vice and narcotics investigators depict group affiliation networks and relationships. Expertise in performing this function has already been demonstrated by officers assigned to the IOC's Criminal Intelligence Division. Techniques used in link analysis are therefore readily transferrable to other divisions, given the skill that presently exists within the department.

The scope of the SIB's responsibilities in dealing with the manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs is staggering, without mentioning attempts to appease the moral consciousness of the community in trying to control gambling activities, pornography, and prostitution. Again, and more unlike most crimes investigated by the CCIB, the distribution of controlled substances and pornographic materials are, perhaps more often than not, likely to originate outside the City of Houston. Local bookies may also be tied in with nationally syndicated gambling operations. While the organizational linkages of street whores and pimps may be confined to the local community, "modeling studios," and escort service may have ties with national and even international organizational groups.

Because of the planning and organization required to perpetrate crimes locally that are linked to individuals and organizations that cross the country -- indeed, in some cases, span the globe -- it is incumbent upon

SIB investigators to work closely with officials from other agencies. With frequent regularity, this does, include sharing and exchanging intelligence information obtained locally with other department members and representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the US Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the state's Department of Public Safety (DPS), along with members from the Harris County's Sheriff's Department and law enforcement officers from other municipalities.

Aside from working closely with representatives from other law enforcement agencies, NOP's philosophy also dictates increased interaction with the public. Under the proposed reorganization of the IOC, provision is provided within the SIB to facilitate increased citizen interaction through participating in problem solving task forces. While, understandably, citizens will not be apprised of details regarding ongoing investigations and covert activities that could potentially compromise the integrity of these investigations, ideas and suggestions regarding more effective prevention strategies to discourage drug usage among youth, for example, would most certainly be welcomed. And any programs and strategies suggested for implementation to help curb crimes involving vice and narcotics should also articulate the citizens' responsibilities. What can they do to help the police do their job? And what types of support can the police provide to help citizens become more involved with the police in combatting crime?

Combatting drug abuse is a major department goal. Under the direction of Chief Lee P. Brown, a Comprehensive Narcotics Plan has been developed for implementation in 1989. Representatives from the SIB will be directly involved in implementing the various components of this plan along with providing

assistance to the recently created Mayor's Drug Abuse Task Force.

Narcotics Investigations

Not surprisingly, narcotics investigations display broad diversity. Investigative time is almost equally split in instigating cases and in conducting follow-up investigations based on complaints and anonymous tips. As already mentioned, narcotics investigators work closely with officials from a variety of federal agencies, and representatives from state and local authorities. Investigative activities include, but are not limited, to the following activities:

- Locating local labs involved in the manufacture of amphetamines and methamphetamines;
- Monitoring medical practitioners and pharmacists engaged in illegal "drug diversion" activities;
- Conducting surveillance at major metropolitan airports for drug traffickers;
- Working with representatives from Houston's Port Authority to monitor incoming shipments of drugs;
- Engaging in undercover, "street-level buys" throughout the city;
- Liaising with juvenile investigators and investigators from other investigative divisions about alleged suspects involved in drug-related crimes; and
- Working with officers from the US Customs Service in identifying and apprehending individuals involved in "money laundering" activities.

As with their CCIB divisional counterparts, in addition to instigating and investigating cases narcotics personnel are also expected to continue to provide technical assistance through training and the dissemination of

information to other department members under NOP. Furthermore, a strategic analysis capability is proposed for the Narcotics Division that will allow narcotics personnel to explore more abstract ways of thinking about how to prevent drug abuse and, equally important, arrest subjects engaged in drug trafficking. And this function does not exclude citizen participation in working with narcotics investigators in scoping out methods for more active and effective citizen involvement in curbing drug abuse.

Vice Investigations

Most vice investigations tend to be concentrated in four areas: (1) Gambling; (2) Prostitution; (3) Pornography; and (4) Liquor law violations.. Of course, investigative diversity within most of these areas can be quite broad. Gambling can run the gamut from clandestine bookmaking operations to back alley crap games, with investigation of "poker houses" falling somewhere in between. Prostitution can involve anything from interstate call girl services that cater to wealthy clients, at one extreme, to "street hookers" openly soliciting sex for "Johns" in several areas of the city. Enforcement of obscenity laws can be even more arduous; checking for pornographic materials in book stores and arcades in addition to trying to build cases on sex acts performed inside arcades. Although perhaps less diverse, continual monitoring of liquor law violations requires considerable time.

Similar to their peers in narcotics investigations, vice investigations includes providing technical assistance in the form of training and the dissemination of information about vice matters to other members of the department. Given the repository of investigative expertise that has been obtained in the Vice Division, neighborhood beat officers and investigative

sergeants outside the Vice Division are dependent on knowledge from vice investigators that may assist them in identifying and investigating infractions of vice laws.

Also containing a strategic analysis component within vice investigations, vice investigators are expected to contemplate more effective ways of both preventing and controlling vice activities. As with other investigative divisions, citizen participation should be encouraged at some point in time so that differing perspectives on "the problems" can surface for discussion. Ways in which citizen involvement can facilitate vice investigations should be explored. And suggestions in proposing new municipal ordinances to help thwart vice activities might prove productive.

The Investigative Support Bureau

Experience from the early command station planning sessions held in the late 1970s reaffirmed the belief that city services, especially those associated with the police department, have been escalating constantly since the mid 1970s. Even during the mid 1980s when Houston felt the brunt of the recession inflicted from the "oil patch debacle," demands for police service have grown. The department responded to this situation with an initial commitment to decentralization followed by the adoption and institutionalization of the NOP philosophy. Collectively, NOP and decentralization will cause changes to occur within the Houston Police Department. The most obvious changes mentioned within this report have been the creation of new functions, a redefinition of roles, and the emergence of expanded responsibilities, all of which requires a rethinking of how the status of daily operations will be affected.

It was clear from the material presented within the first Executive Session report that NOP would alter the traditional management practices used to guide and direct patrol operations. Because of these anticipated managerial changes, commitments are being made to develop a means of facilitating the performance of basic and innovative patrol practices. For example, changes in dispatch procedures represent one method of securing more uncommitted time for the officers to work in their neighborhoods to address crime and noncrime problems. As the officers spend more time working with the citizens, they will become more dependent on obtaining assistance from a variety of different sources. A couple of excellent examples involve the use of tactical crime analysts and members from the investigative response teams. These services are specifically designed to help the officers identify and address legitimate neighborhood crime problems such as narcotics, burglaries, robberies, etc.

As the philosophy of NOP continues to be assimilated by members of the IOC, they too will begin to harbor a similar need for various forms of operational support. Support services, consequently, should not be considered the exclusive domain of the patrol function. Under NOP, investigators will also be attempting to secure more uncommitted time to address neighborhood and citywide crime problems. Consequently, centralized investigators, just like the beat officers, will be in need of assistance from analysts and tactical response specialists to help them conduct their job in an efficient and successful manner. And given the unpredictability of increasing demands for service it will be difficult to anticipate how much and what kinds of support will be needed.

In an effort to establish a foundation for building this support within the

IOC, coupled with a need to also support decentralized investigators and patrol personnel within the FOC, a third bureau, the Investigative Support Bureau (ISB), has therefore been proposed as a part of the overall reorganization of the IOC as depicted in Figure #6. The purpose of the ISB is to provide specialized types of operational, technical, and informational support to personnel within the IOC as well as respond to requests from other commands within the department. This expertise will be available through the administration of four functional units: (1) The Tactical Response Units, (2) The Crime Scene Units, (3) The Administrative Juvenile Unit, and (4) The Criminal Intelligence Unit.

The tactical response function will focus on establishing a "targeted offender unit" in addition to specializing in the development and implementation of citywide interdiction tactics. Crime scene units will continue to process crime scenes and collect physical evidence, however, the scope of their expertise will be expanded to coincide with technological and scientific advancements being made in the forensic field. The administrative juvenile function will serve as a central repository from which certain responsibilities will be coordinated and performed for the entire department. The criminal intelligence unit will continue to perform a multitude of responsibilities designed to support various operations being performed throughout the department. These four functions will not only serve the needs of the IOC, but will also provide assistance to requests for service from various patrol divisions within the FOC. Each of these functions will now be discussed in more detail.

The Tactical Response Units

The primary reason for establishing this function is to acknowledge the need to create an organizational entity that is primarily entrusted with the responsibility to plan and implement tactical operations designed to interdict citywide criminal activity. Under the decentralization format, it would be unreasonable to expect patrol division personnel or decentralized investigative personnel to assume responsibility for this function. The tactical response units will have a dual set of responsibilities consisting of; 1) the identification and apprehension of targeted offenders and the planning; and 2) implementation of interdiction response tactics.

Before discussing each of these functions, there is a valuable point to be made with respect to how these operations should be managed. In drawing upon the contributions offered by Mr. Ronald Goldstock during one the second Executive Session meetings, tactically oriented functions require a strong commitment to the principle of organization. In the context of addressing organized crime, Goldstock structures his tactical operations in accordance with at least two concepts: (1) An "investigative planning" process; and (2) The utilization of team configurations.

Investigative planning, according to Goldstock, can best be compared to the development of a game plan used in sports whereby an assessment is made of the opposing team's strengths and weaknesses. As a result of this assessment, the goals of the plan become varied and complex. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop a logical, rational process which will ensure some semblance of reasonable success given the resources available to be expended. It is through the application of the planning process that Goldstock has

defined structure in relationship to function. Furthermore, Goldstock advances the value of structure one more step by enveloping the investigative planning process within the context of teams. Devoid of a specific leader per se, Goldstock's teams are conceived on the basis of skills needed. Depending upon the nature of a particular problem, team membership may consist of a lawyer, several analysts, accountants, investigators, etc., or any combination thereof; all of whom assume the collective accountability for producing intended results.

The point to be gleaned from Goldstock's presentation is in recognizing the value of developing a cogent, logical plan of action based upon sound organizational principles. As clearly evidenced from Goldstock's presentation and documented results, much can be said about the value of how one develops plans, utilizes existing resources, and assesses the effectiveness of the results. The significance of this advice cannot be underestimated as the department pursues its commitment to apprehend targeted offenders and implement tactical interdiction activities.

The Targeted Offender Function

The purpose of this function is to identify those suspects who are directly responsible for committing multiple offenses throughout the city, or because of the gravity of a particular offense, must be apprehended as quickly as possible to avoid similar incidents from reoccurring. Not unlike the theory of the Repeat Offender Program developed by the Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan Police Department, this function operates on the premise that a "significant bite" can be taken out of crime if one removes those who are most responsible for it.

The success of this type of effort is predicated on the support received from other department members including centralized and decentralized personnel in patrol and investigative operations. Nowhere is this support more evident than in the comprehensive initial investigations conducted by the officers, as this is how targeted offenders are initially identified, save perhaps, for fugitives, and eventually linked to other incidents by the strategic or tactical crime analysts. The implication of this activity is recognizing the need to develop and properly utilize an interactive information system, which must be a characteristic of the proposed information management system mentioned previously throughout this report.

Efforts must also be taken within the targeted offender detail to establish criteria for determining what constitutes a targeted offender. Standard operating procedures must be developed to guide and direct the detail's activities. This is extremely important given the citywide nature of this function. For example:

- What happens when a number of different cases (burglaries, robberies, larcenies, etc.) are being investigated by decentralized personnel and are found to be committed by one person working in the jurisdictional boundaries of a command station?;
- Because of the multiplicity of crimes committed by this one individual, who assumes control over the investigations?;
- What guidelines exist to manage the investigation of these types of cases?; and
- How will implementation of tactical responses be coordinated?

Obviously, members of this detail will be expected to coordinate their activities with patrol personnel on a decentralized basis, as well as with

personnel responsible for conducting citywide tactical interdiction responses.

Because of their special expertise, information gleaned from targeted offender activities will also be useful to the strategic and tactical crime analysts, as it will help them in the identification of events attributing to the commission of offenses and to the identification of emerging and existing crime patterns or clusters. Additionally, and of no less significance, information generated from these activities will also be helpful in the development of crime prevention strategies aimed specifically at reducing the opportunities for a particular type of crime to be repeatedly committed.

One such strategy available to members of this detail is the use of the Automated Warrant Program currently administered as a part of the department's crime analysis system. This program depends upon access to information from the Harris County Justice Information Management System (JIMS). Each day, as "noshows" are identified in the criminal courts for capital felony cases, felonies, and Class A and B misdemeanors, arrest warrants are issued and the suspects' names are entered into the JIMS. This information becomes available to the department through the crime analysis information network which is accessible to all investigative and patrol personnel. Each day the JIMS is updated by county personnel which in turn allows for a consistent update of information within the Houston Police Department. The potential value of this information to the targeted offender detail is boundless.

This information is also valuable to members of the Fugitive Detail. Since the department has vacillated on the organizational placement of the Fugitive Detail for the past several years, it is possible, given time, that a more logical relationship between the Targeted Offender Detail and the Fugitive

Detail will begin to gel. Presently, however, while their respective responsibilities are not in conflict with one another, a formal linkage has yet to be established. Only time will tell as to how similar they will become as the scope of their respective responsibilities expand.

Members of the Targeted Offender Detail will be expected to perform a variety of activities, including, but not limited to, assisting investigators in the investigation of cases, developing and implementing strategies, administering tactical responses, instigating cases, and performing liaising with patrol and investigative personnel to efficiently manage operational endeavors and coordinate the exchange of relevant information. Although the targeted offender function is considered to serve in a support capacity, it too is heavily dependent upon the support it receives from different personnel assigned throughout the department (e.g., information received from tactical crime analysts, strategic analysts, link analysts, etc.). If efforts are not made to efficiently use this assistance in the performance of their responsibilities, the detail will become nothing more than another independent organizational entity seeking to "justify" its existence within the department.

The Tactical Interdiction Function

The tactical interdiction function will require attention to be placed on two sets of related activities; the performance of covert operations and citywide pattern interception operations. Personnel assigned to this function will serve as interdiction coordinators. As interdiction coordinators, investigators will be primarily responsible for instigating cases on behalf of inquiries emanating from any of the divisions within the IOC or requests for

assistance from division personnel within the FOC. Activities associated with instigating cases would include, but not be limited to, conducting suspect and area surveillances, participating in decoy operations, administering sting operations, etc. The nature of these activities requires the development of specialize expertise to ensure efficient implementation. The acquisition of this expertise, however, should not preclude investigators assigned to other investigative divisions from being rotated through this detail as a means of job enrichment and broadening an individual's scope of specialized experience.

Citywide pattern interception activities are largely dependent upon the type of criminal activity being committed. Traditionally, these activities have included such things as the use of channeling techniques, physical stakeouts, active saturation patrol (more likely than not resulting in the displacement of offenders), electronic and physical surveillances, and cultivation of informant information. These activities will require people assigned to this function to be primarily dependent upon information from tactical crime analysts and investigative and patrol personnel and, secondarily, from community service representatives and citizens to help manage the design and implementation of these activities.

A classic example of the need for cooperation between personnel assigned to patrol and the citywide tactical interdiction function is in the use of Tactical Action Plans (TAPs). As crime patterns are identified, TAPs are issued by tactical crime analysts as a means of notifying appropriate personnel and facilitating their development and implementation of tactical responses to address the problems in question. Depending upon the nature of the crime problem identified within the TAP, personnel assigned to the citywide tactical

interdiction function may need additional resources, either personnel or equipment, to successfully administer the TAP. If a pattern is identified as existing within the jurisdictional boundaries of the command station and the TAP is assigned to investigative or patrol personnel, it will require a need to meet with members of the citywide tactical interdiction detail to discuss and explore alternative ways of addressing the problem. The same rationale applies if TAPs are assigned to personnel within the CCIB or the SIB.

Reiterating, the primary focus of this function is to interdict citywide crime patterns. This group will not be responsible for operating on a decentralized basis unless called upon in a support role (i.e., technical assistance). However, this does not prohibit their need to work with decentralized personnel when a pattern transcends the jurisdictional boundaries of a particular division.

Given the likelihood that this will occur, it is proposed that at least one member from each decentralized Investigative Response Team (IRT) be assigned to work in conjunction with the personnel assigned to this function. Because of their familiarity with decentralized operations, IRT members will be able to assist in coordinating the use of personnel and resources if and when the need arises. The IRT members will also develop an expertise that will be useful to their respective teams during the course of performing interdiction tactics within their respective division's jurisdictional boundaries. The IRT members will also serve as communication conduits to supplement and transmit information contained within the crime analysis information network.

In summary, the tactical response function provides different forms of tactical operation support services to centralized investigators, decentralized

investigators, and patrol officers, be it provided independently or in terms of supporting the ISU in a team context. The overall responsibility of this function is designed to efficiently utilize resources within centralized investigative operations, especially in those instances where investigative responsibility has not been decentralized (i.e., motor vehicle investigations, homicides, fraud, forgery, and white collar crime, etc.). Furthermore, it serves to integrate citywide tactical responses with decentralized patrol and investigative personnel, who may assist in the identification and apprehension of suspects responsible for initiating citywide crime patterns.

The Crime Scene Units

A critical component of the investigative process is recognizing the importance processing crime scenes and gathering physical evidence has on the eventual outcome of a criminal case. Traditionally, this responsibility was considered to be a significant aspect of an investigative sergeant's job. Over the years, an investigative sergeant's job had been defined in such a manner that it encompassed responsibility for all aspects of any criminal investigation. They were expected, consequently, to possess the expertise needed to efficiently collect and preserve evidence found at the scene of a crime. However, with the dramatic rise in criminal activity in Houston during the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the increased degree of sophistication associated with collecting and preserving evidence, a decision was made to specialize this aspect of the investigative process.

Crime Scene Units (CSUs) were created for that explicit purpose. The CSUs are staffed by highly trained and skilled officers who specialize in the

collection and processing of physical evidence at major crime scenes.

Presently, the department has a total of 16 officers assigned to the CSU function. There are six officers assigned to each shift for 24-hour coverage, seven days a week. A total of seven vans, highly equipped vans were purchased for the CSU officers to use. The primary responsibility of the CSU officers is to respond to every D.O.A. ("dead on arrival") call, this includes all murder cases. This does not preclude the units from responding to other major crime scenes. For example, the CSUs work robberies (e.g., individuals, businesses, banks, savings and loans, etc.), safe burglaries, all aggravated sexual offense cases, recovered stolen vehicles - if time permits, aggravated assaults, and any crime scene where their assistance may be needed. Irrespective of which type of crime scene a unit is summoned to process, the officers perform any one or all of the following responsibilities:

- 1) photographing and video taping;
- 2) collecting and recording all types of physical evidence, inclusive of, but not limited to;
 - serological evidence (e.g., blood, semen, other bodily fluids) and
 - trace evidence (e.g., minute pieces such as broken glass, carpet fibers, hair, soil samples, powder residues, etc.);
- 3) lifting fingerprints;
- 4) collecting and preserving evidence for submission to the chemical lab for processing;
- 5) taking scene measurements;
- 6) sketching scene diagrams;
- 7) conducting morgue investigations, inclusive of:
 - photographing wounds;

- charting wounds;
 - lifting fingerprints for elimination or identification purposes;
 - photographing the deceased for identification or elimination purposes;
 - collecting evidence from the body prior to the autopsy; and
 - collecting evidence found in conjunction with the autopsy;
- 8) training officers during in-service training sessions;
- 9) advising complainants on crime prevention issues by answering questions such as:
- What should I do next time?;
 - Whom do I call?;
 - How can I prevent this from occurring again?; and
 - What can the police department do to help me?; or how can I help the department?; and
- 10) providing community service assistance in the form of:
- helping hospitals identify accident victims or comatose victims;
 - training other municipal agency personnel or county law enforcement personnel; and
 - attending school seminars, making presentations, conducting tours of their vans, and demonstrating how their equipment operates.

Despite the reassignment to the IOC, the relationship between the CSU officers and patrol officers remains secure. Anytime assistance is needed by patrol officers at the scene of any crime (i.e., assaults, burglaries,

robberies, etc.), CSU officers will respond if time permits.

In the case of homicides, patrol officers will still continue to: respond to the calls; arrest the perpetrator(s), if present; identify and interview victims, witnesses, or complainants; isolate and secure the scene; and protect evidence while awaiting for the arrival of the CSU. Upon arrival, the CSU officers will take over responsibility for the scene, they will liaison with the responding patrol officers and work with the investigative sergeant assigned to the case. In those instances when investigative personnel are not summoned to the scene, the responding officers will make a preliminary report outlining the steps they have taken, as will the CSU officers.

There will be instances when CSU officers need assistance during the course of performing their responsibilities at a scene. For example, a recent sensational murder scene in Houston contained the bodies of five victims prompting the need for additional help from the department's latent fingerprint examiners who are assigned to the Identification Division.

A majority of the CSU officers' time over the past several years has been spent at the scenes of homicide, aggravated assault, and sexual assault cases. For this reason, the CSUs have been assigned directly to the Homicide Division. Although there is a need for the units to continue working in this capacity, there have been and will continue to be additional demands placed on these officers to work on other types of cases. As has been suggested throughout this report, if patrol officers are to assume more responsibility for conducting comprehensive initial investigations, what effect, if any, will this have on their relationship with CSU personnel? How will the process of decentralization affect the CSUs once all of the command station facilities

have been completed? Will the function be expanded in size and scope of responsibilities? These are just a few of many questions that cannot be answered now but must be addressed in the future.

Clearly, there will be a broad based need by patrol and investigative personnel for the support services provided by CSU personnel, both now, and in the immediate future. This will require having the CSUs occupy a position within the IOC's organizational configuration that will lend further credence to their status as support units for all entities within the department. Therefore, as proposed in Figure #6, the CSUs should be assigned to the ISB so that the function can be properly administered in accordance with other support services needed throughout the department.

The Administrative Juvenile Unit

The decision to decentralize has had a significant impact on the juvenile function within the Houston Police Department. Historically, all juvenile related matters, with the exception of homicides, have been handled by investigative personnel working within the Juvenile Division (see Figure #2, p. 129). With the birth of the command station concept, however, changes within the division were imminent. Foremost among those changes was the commitment to establish an intake center within each command station, decentralize the investigative component of the juvenile function, and maintain a centralized administrative component within the IOC.

The intake function includes a number of responsibilities, inclusive of but not limited to: receiving and processing incoming prisoners; handling prisoner property; creating/updating juvenile records for incoming prisoners;

interviewing prisoners and obtaining confessions in accordance with Title 3 of the Texas Family Code; fingerprinting certain juvenile offenders; handling the release and detention of prisoners; contacting parents/guardians; and handling walk-in complaints or phone requests. The nature of these services are such that they do not need to be performed at the central police complex. By assigning them to the command stations, parents and legal guardians will have the opportunity to conveniently conduct their business at a facility located more closely to their home.

The investigative component of the juvenile function will also be administered within the confines of the command stations. Both preliminary and follow-up investigations will be handled by decentralized investigative personnel. These investigations will encompass a number of crimes, such as: burglary, theft, criminal mischief, forgery, robbery, attempted murder, assault, etc. Included along with this activity will be responsibility for apprehending suspects involved in juvenile cases, serving orders for immediate custody, and adhering to Texas Youth Commission directives.

Conspicuously absent from the list of crimes targeted for decentralization were the offenses involving sexual and physical abuse of child. Initially, these offenses were to remain the responsibility of centralized investigators; however, an assessment of the characteristics of these crimes would suggest a need to reconsider this decision. Current data indicates an increase in the number of cases being assigned to centralized juvenile personnel for both offenses from 1987 to 1988. Concomitantly, there has been a drop in the percentage of cases cleared during the same time period. While there is much latitude for debate over what these basic trends suggest, one point remains

clear, the demand for service is increasing. This demand is placing additional pressure on the juvenile investigators.

To compensate for an increase in demand, more personnel are requested which contradicts the decentralization commitment. The command station, on the other hand, has better access to more manpower via the use of patrol officers to assist in conducting the investigations. It must be recognized though, that patrol officers also have a multitude of other responsibilities to perform.

Another more relevant point of contention, however, is acknowledging that sexual and physical child abuse cases represent "neighborhood crimes." In citing from a recent department document:

- in 42% of the sexual abuse cases nationwide, the suspect is a parent;
- in 22.8% of the sexual abuse cases nationwide, the suspect is a relative;
- this combined figure of 64.8% does not include "live in" boyfriends or girlfriends;
- in 81.9% of the physical abuse cases nationwide, the suspect is a parent;
- in 5.5% of the physical abuse cases nationwide, the suspect is a relative; and
- this combined figure of 87.4% does not include "live in" boyfriends or girlfriends.

Given the nature of the relationship between the victim and the suspect in these types of cases, it would seem to make more sense for neighborhood-based investigators to handle the investigation of these offenses.

Because of the close proximity between the officers, investigators, and the parties to the offense, a number of benefits can be derived by decentralizing these offenses. For example, obtaining records of injuries sustained from the

offense can be accomplished much more quickly, avoiding the typical delays of days, or even weeks. More efficient case assignment techniques will facilitate obtaining statements from the child and witness(es) before undue influence is exerted from the suspect(s), especially if the suspect is a family member. These techniques will also lead to reducing the trauma of having the child repeat their "story" an inordinate number of times. Lastly, the familiarity of staying at home or traveling to the command station versus traveling downtown, may have an appealing affect on the willingness of the parents and the child to cooperate with the police.

Invariably, the complete decentralization of the investigative component of the juvenile function (with the exception of homicides) will require the Juvenile Division to divest itself of investigators as each command station comes on-line. The only exception would occur when the central police complex is converted to a downtown command station serving the inner city's master patrol districts. This organizational adjustment would necessitate establishing an operational juvenile component similar in nature to those proposed within this section of the report. Divesting investigators becomes necessary under decentralization, otherwise each command station would assume additional responsibility without adequate manpower compensation, thereby exacerbating existing workloads. The remaining issue, therefore, is determining what will become of the traditional juvenile division.

As implied from its label, the juvenile component within the IOC will operate as a centralized administrative detail. Although each command station will maintain responsibility for the intake function and investigative function, the responsibility for liaising with protective custody personnel,

juvenile court personnel, and juvenile probation personnel will become the mainstay responsibility of the administrative unit. All correspondence and communication concerning these functions should be directed through this unit. It will be their responsibility to maintain all of the appropriate records governing these functions and disseminate appropriate information back to the concerned divisions. Furthermore, they will be expected to advise and direct decentralized personnel in accordance with particular questions or inquiries regarding follow-up work of any kind.

With respect to the responsibility for handling missing juvenile cases, the administrative unit should continue to be the central reporting point for victims and complainants. Information about the incident should be captured by members of this unit and disseminated to the appropriate search personnel should the situation escalate to that point. The responsibility for managing the search, however, may be better served if handled on a decentralized basis, given the familiarity command station personnel will have with their respective neighborhoods.

The administrative unit should also maintain responsibility for providing technical assistance to patrol and investigative personnel. Changes in case law may require a need for new department policies or procedures to be developed. Training will need to be modified to support administrative and operational changes affecting line performance. Members of the administrative unit should take the lead in assuming authority for these activities.

Needless to say, the juvenile function poses a number of perplexing challenges to traditional management practices used to guide and direct these activities within the department. While this section of the report serves only

to emphasize the importance of centralizing administrative and decentralizing investigative responsibilities, it indirectly suggests more time be spent assessing the implications NOP will have on the juvenile function as a whole.

The Criminal Intelligence Unit

The last component of the ISB is the criminal intelligence unit. This unit performs a multiplicity of functions, most of which focus on gathering intelligence information. The unit consist of four details: (1) A technical equipment detail; (2) An anti-terrorist/public disorder detail; (3) An organized crime detail; and (4) A research and analysis detail. Each of these details provides support services to divisions within the IOC, the FOC, and other local, state, county, and federal agencies.

The technical equipment detail is responsible for providing assistance in suspect surveillance activities. Most of their time is directed toward monitoring the actions of narcotic suspects or special theft suspects. This detail also video tapes raids for narcotics personnel and investigative response teams.

The anti-terrorist/public disorder detail is responsible for gathering intelligence information on domestic or terrorist groups known to be violent. They are also responsible for providing dignitary protection services to national and international dignitaries. Stemming from this responsibility is the task of liaising with foreign consulates located in Houston. Most of this assistance comes in the form of helping officials cope with bureaucratic "red tape" or clarifying local governmental policies and procedures.

In cases where bombs or explosive devices are discovered, this detail also

provides investigative assistance to the Bomb Squad. The members of this group will also assist in the investigation of threats directed toward any of the department's officers.

The organized crime detail is responsible for gathering intelligence information on known groups of criminals. These groups are either known to be organized or associated with organized crime groups. In the traditional sense, some of these groups would represent organized crime families. However, other groups, such as juvenile gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs have been garnering significant amounts of attention in the Houston area as of late. The overall focus of these gangs seems to be on narcotic activities. The information collected by this detail is used to assist personnel working on cases in other investigative divisions within the IOC. When appropriate, these officers also liaison with members of federal law enforcement agencies.

The research and analysis detail provides support services to department personnel as well as to other law enforcement agencies. In particular, they conduct public records searches on requests from other jurisdictions. Time is spent trying to identify people involved in active inter/intra community-based criminal investigations. Members of this detail are also cross-trained to provide assistance in any of the aforementioned details.

Because each of these four details provides a number of different types of support services to intra/interagency personnel, it is being proposed within Figure #6 that the criminal intelligence unit be assigned to the ISB. It is anticipated that the criminal intelligence unit will continue to provide a variety of support services in the upcoming years. Whereas the unit's major focus of attention today is in the area of narcotic enforcement, five years

from now, Houston may find itself contending with terroristic activities, or different forms of localized gang activities. In either instance, this unit has been organized to provide technical and informational assistance to patrol and investigative operations.

As the members of the department begin to strengthen their working relationship with the citizens of Houston under NOP, this type of assistance will become even more useful. By recognizing this unit's function as a support service, its placement within the organizational configuration of the IOC should be seen as a means of legitimizing that function. This can only be achieved by assigning the criminal intelligence unit to the ISB.

Conclusion

It has been stated throughout this report that NOP is a management philosophy, which provided a conceptual framework to guide and direct the multiplicity of organizational functions designed to improve the quality of life throughout the City of Houston. NOP seeks to integrate the desires and expectations of citizens with actions taken by the department to identify and address conditions that negatively impact the city and neighborhoods. The success of this endeavor will be based to a large extent upon the quality of interaction that occurs between the police and the citizens as well as within the department itself.


By virtue of the commitment to improve the quality of neighborhood life, the department is recognizing the necessity of preparing its personnel to be flexible in responding to the anticipated diversity of the citizens' needs and expectations as reflected within each of the city's different neighborhoods. NOP, consequently, requires a rethinking of roles, especially as it relates to the responsibilities of the citizens, patrol officers, investigators, supervisors, and managers.

The material contained within this chapter, therefore, discussed what those responsibilities were, how they were integrated, and what affect they had on the organizational configuration of the WCSOD and the IOC within the context of NOP. An important premise contained within these discussions was the need for centralized and decentralized investigative personnel to work together; to functionally integrate their responsibilities as they respond to the needs of the citizenry. The essence of the integration principle for the investigative function is illustrated within Figure #7 (p. 279).

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING MODEL

Integrating Investigative Operations

Figure #7



Initially, criminal offenses occurring within the City of Houston can be examined from two perspectives: the community or the neighborhoods. This distinction is made by crime analysts who determine if the offense is part of a pattern of similar or related offenses. All offenses related to a citywide pattern are handled by centralized investigators. Nonpatternable offenses are handled by decentralized investigators. (There are general exceptions to this distinction which were noted earlier in this chapter.) Irrespective of their assignment, all investigators rely on information within the crime analysis system for processing their respective cases. The independent nature of their functional responsibilities begins to emerge when one considers how the information is used by the investigators.

As demonstrated by the arrow emanating out from the neighborhoods on the right hand side of Figure #7, decentralized investigators are responsible for working offenses occurring within their assigned neighborhoods. As the volume of their work increases, they will develop area specific/suspect generalist degrees of expertise. While patrol officers will conduct most of the initial and preliminary investigations, the decentralized investigators will concentrate on performing follow-up investigations. This does not preclude them, however, from conducting initial investigations should it become necessary for them to do so.

Likewise, the arrow on the left hand side of Figure #7 indicates that centralized investigators will work citywide, pattern specific offenses (with certain exceptions as duly noted within this chapter). They will develop suspect specific/area generalist degrees of expertise. Most of their investigative work will focus on conducting follow-up investigations, with some time devoted to conducting initial investigations.

Functional differences between centralized and decentralized investigators begin to dissipate as the amount of interaction increases among the investigators. For example, interaction among investigators as they begin working on problem resolution strategies increases during the preparation and implementation of tactical interdiction strategies. Teams of investigators begin to emerge as tactical and strategic analysts work to provide investigators with information to help them plan their strategies. The type of strategy implemented may also require the use of special skills possessed by investigators working in the tactical response unit. Or, patrol officers may be needed to perform certain types of activities.

Similarly, the level of interaction between investigators and citizens will increase with the performance of a variety of victim assistance strategies. Under the philosophy of NOP, investigators will be expected to devote more time to performing crime prevention activities than has been expected under traditional, investigative operational philosophies. The success of their efforts will be heavily dependent upon the strategic analysis capability contained within the IOC. One cannot expect to alter the citizen's behavior without first understanding what precipitated their behavior. This requires strategic analysts to conduct in-depth assessments of the relationship between the types of crime/noncrime problems existing within the neighborhoods/community and their respective causative factors.

Effective interaction between investigators and the citizenry also depends on how well other important variables are addressed. Examples of these variables include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Increasing the amount of uncommitted time available for investigators to work with the citizens. This does not preclude investigators from properly advising the citizens about their actions and behavior while they are conducting their investigation. Instead, it suggests that as more time becomes available, investigators will be able to spend

additional time working with the citizens;

- Enhancing the willingness of the citizens to listen and respond to the advice of the investigators. NOP demands that citizens become actively involved in working with the police. This includes working with investigators as well as with patrol officers;
- Stimulating the investigator's desire to help citizens prevent and control crime and noncrime problems that exist within their neighborhoods;
- Utilizing the type of expertise possessed by the investigator. Investigators are not "jacks of all trades." They realize each possesses a certain degree of expertise about a problem or a technique. Depending upon the situation investigators should not be leery of calling on one another to provide assistance in working with citizens; and
- Improving the investigator's ability to efficiently manage the use of existing resources (e.g., patrol officers, other investigators, outside agency personnel, etc.) to assist them in working with the citizenry. Investigators should never underestimate the value patrol officers can bring to a neighborhood, especially when it comes to preventing and controlling crime.

These factors, if favorably addressed, will promote increased integration by strengthening the bond among and between investigators and the citizenry. Furthermore, the citizens in working with the police will take a giant step toward preventing, displacing, or eradicating crime and noncrime problems which negatively impact the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

Thus, the integration of investigative operations occurs on two fronts. The first front, as just described, is between investigators and citizens. The role and functional responsibilities of the investigators and how they interact with the citizens has been fully discussed within this chapter. Additionally, the functional responsibilities of the investigators depicted within Figure 37 are organizationally displayed in Figures #3 and #6.

Integration also occurs on a second front, that being among patrol and

investigative personnel. A fundamental premise contained within this chapter specified the importance of having patrol and investigative personnel work together; to functionally integrate their responsibilities as a means of addressing citizen needs more efficiently. Chapter six was replete with examples of how this will occur within the context of NOP.

Easily one of the most significant proposals offered within this chapter that describes how this form of integration is to occur, was the creation of the ISU (see Figure #4). As an organizational entity, the ISU is specifically designed to facilitate interaction among the police and with the citizens. In doing so, the ISU provides an environment whereby traditional practices emphasizing the importance of individual initiatives is relegated to a commitment to teamwork. Teamwork, within the context of NOP, places an emphasis on a shared commitment by all to accept responsibility for an area and be held accountable for the quality of services delivered to the citizens residing and working within those areas. The unique attribute of the ISU, however, is that it requires an altering of traditional functional relationships among and between patrol officers, investigators, and citizens.

It is through the concept of facilitative reciprocity that these relationships become more clearly defined. First, there is a sense of mutual dependency between the responsibilities of decentralized investigators and patrol personnel within the WCSOD regarding the performance of investigative and crime prevention activities. Second, mutual dependency also exists when patrol officers seek technical assistance from centralized and decentralized investigative personnel. Third, a similar form of dependency exists between decentralized and centralized investigators when they come to depend upon each other's expertise and thereby seek out technical assistance from one another.

Fourth, as proposed in model #3, there is a sense of mutual dependency within the IOC, in that members of the CCIB and the SIB are dependent upon each other's expertise when their problems converge (e.g., an addict who commits robberies); or, when they depend upon tactical, link, or strategic analysis work to be performed; or, when they solicit assistance from personnel working in the ISB (e.g., tactical interdiction function, targeted offender function).

And fifth, there is a recognition of the independency that exists between centralized and decentralized investigations under NOP. As noted in the discussion of Figure #7, the centralized investigative function must focus on the investigation of citywide crimes, the development of citywide strategies, and the implementation of citywide tactical interdiction responses. Conversely, decentralized investigators are responsible for conducting criminal investigations, developing strategies, and assisting in the implementation of tactical responses within their respective neighborhoods. In both instances, the success of the investigators will be dependent upon their willingness to work with each other, patrol personnel, and most importantly, the citizens to whom they are ultimately accountable.

The management models contained within this report represent alternative considerations to the traditional mindset concerning the definition and organization of patrol and investigative operations within the Houston Police Department. As alternatives, these management models provide a basis from which functional responsibilities are being redefined and integrated; resulting in new organizational configurations.

Inherent within each of the proposals is a conceptual commitment to begin building a management system which is not only feasible under the notion of decentralization, but is supported by the basic tenets of NOP. Foremost among

those tenets is the unification of effort between the police and the public to prevent crime from occurring within the neighborhoods and across the community. Success, however, will be tempered in accordance with the level of consensus regarding the viability of the proposed functional responsibilities and organizational reconfigurations illustrated within each of the management models. Only upon achieving complete consensus can steps be taken to begin the process of building a management system which is results oriented. And, within the context of NOP, results must be measured in association with developing the capacity to more efficiently manage available resources in working with the citizens to prevent and control crime.

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APPENDIX A

EXECUTIVE SESSION NO. 2

Defining The Role Of Investigative Sergeants Within The Context Of Neighborhood Oriented Policing

Panel Participants and Resource Personnel

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