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 \overline{T} T T C A S U T Y to the National Griminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

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Cover:

On January 12, 1987, an explosive device detonated between the front and rear seats of a Beechcraft aircraft while it was parked at the Osceola Municipal Airport, Osceola, Arkansas. ATF assistance was requested by the Osceola Police Department. ATF responded to the scene and conducted a crime scene search. A joint investigation by ATF, the Arkansas State Police, and the Osceola Police Department ensued. A preliminary investigation revealed that a destructive device consisting of suspected dynamite had been placed inside the aircraft. The explosion caused damages estimated at \$10,000 but no injuries.

On February 12, 1987, a second explosive device detonated inside the passenger compartment of another private aircraft at the Osceola airport. There were no deaths or injuries, but damages were estimated at \$15,000. The targeted airplane belonged to the Mayor of Osceola.

The Mayor was notified of the bombing of his aircraft this same day. As he was leaving his residence to go to the airport, he discovered an undetonated explosive device underneath his car. This device was recovered intact by the investigators.

The joint investigation of the explosives incidents continued. Crime scene investigations and traces of the explosives used have led investigators to the individual responsible for these incidents. Judicial action is pending.







The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 1987 Explosive Incidents Report NCJRS is dedicated

In Honor Of

JAN ~ 1990

Corporal David B. Pulling

ACQUISITIONS

of the

Delaware State Police

Corporal Pulling, a 6-year veteran, was killed on November 18, 1987, during a bomb technician training exercise at the FBI Hazardous Devices School located at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Hired by the Division of State Police in 1981, Pulling had been assigned to the Canine Unit, the Special Operations Response Team, and the Traffic Division before requesting permission and being selected to attend the Hazardous Devices School. The unfortunate loss of his life is a reminder to all of the everpresent dangers that threaten the safety of law enforcement officers as they combat the criminal misuse of explosives.

Message from the Director



The 1987 Explosive Incidents Report continues an ATF tradition of providing a comprehensive presentation of statistical data and narrative information on explosive incidents that occur in the United States. Our intent, as in the past, is to provide you, in a single document, the additional means for analyzing and combating the growth in the illegal and criminal uses of explosives.

Abortion clinic bombings, together with other criminal bombings and international terrorism, continue to heighten the public awareness of the threat posed by explosives. For this very reason, investigations of these incidents remain ATF's top priority. Through its Explosives Enforcement Program, ATF continues to direct and combine its resources with State and local law enforcement agencies in a manner that will have the greatest impact in stopping these acts of violence. In this regard, it is interesting to note the criminal profiles of those individuals who were apprehended for their illicit use of explosives. From the total number of defendants prosecuted, 26 percent had prior felony convictions; 39 percent had prior arrest records; 7 percent were armed at the time of the arrest; and 30 percent were involved in some form of drugrelated activity.

With the continuing availability of stolen explosives to the criminal element, the potential for their criminal misuse remains high. Criminal acts that involve the use of or the threat to use explosives against the private sector place a significant responsibility on law enforcement agencies. In view of this fact, ATF recognizes a need for the general public to be educated in and have a practical understanding of how to prepare for and react to criminal actions such as bombings and bomb threats. However, it is also recognized that law enforcement cannot address this problem alone. Responsibility must be accepted, to some degree, by everyone. Proper education, training, and preparation by the private sector can maximize personal safety and minimize property damage during a bombing incident. Toward this end, ATF will continue its diligent search through both governmental and private sources for new ideas and improved methods in evaluating and dealing with these criminal acts.

Another area of concern for law enforcement is the serious threat to public safety posed by the continued manufacture of explosives used in illegal destructive devices such as M-80's. The chemical nature of the explosives used in the manufacture of M-80's is highly sensitive. This sensitivity, coupled with the quantities of this type of manufactured explosive and the lack of quality control, generates a potential for disaster that can be devastating. The situation is aggravated further by the view held by the general public that these explosives are "firecrackers." This is a gross misconception that is fueled by the public's lack of understanding as to the dangers presented by M-80's. It is our job then, as law enforcement agencies, to address this issue and increase public awareness of the hazards posed by this type of device. In furtherance of this goal, ATF will continue to target the manufacturers, distributors, and sources operating in the illegal explosive device market to make the manufacture of these devices less profitable.

Cooperation among all elements of the law enforcement community is the key to the success of any effort against criminal activities. This concept has been the center of ATF's activities and is demonstrated in the ATF-developed programs that provide technical training and investigative assistance to both ATF special agents and State and local officers. Among these programs are:

NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (NRT). Organized geographically to cover the entire United States, the four NRT's are capable of responding to major explosive and arson incidents within 24 hours. Each team is composed of specialized investigators, explosive technicians, and a forensic chemist.

This specialized response concept is the only one of its kind offered by a Federal law enforcement agency. The NRT's purpose is twofold: First, the teams render timely assistance to State and local law enforcement agencies in their investigations of major arson and explosive incidents; and second, they augment the investigative resources of ATF field offices. The NRT's responded to 22 incidents in 1987 and have been mobilized 173 times since their inception in 1979. The NRT concept continues to be an invaluable tool to ATF and State and local law enforcement, as evidenced by the continued success of chosen activations. **STOLEN EXPLOSIVES AND RECOVERIES** (**PROJECT SEAR**). This computerized system, inaugurated in 1976, is the national clearinghouse for all information regarding thefts, losses, and recoveries of explosive materials.

ATF NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES TRACING CENTER. This center is the focal point for Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to initiate traces of criminally or illegally used explosives. Given the possession of proper identifying data, explosives can be traced from the manufacturer to the last retail sale by a licensed dealer.

EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS SYSTEM (EXIS). EXIS is an inherent function of ATF's Explosives Enforcement Program. Developed in 1975, EXIS is a computerized source of all pertinent information from every ATF explosives investigation. To date, there are 86,000 detailed records from 25,500 explosive incidents stored within the computer's memory. Its importance as an investigative tool is considerable for it provides investigators with readily accessible analyses of bombing incidents relative to their trends, patterns, bomb components, and modus operandi.

FORENSIC LABORATORY SUPPORT. ATF maintains a national laboratory system composed of a Headquarters laboratory in Rockville, Maryland, and field laboratories in Atlanta, Georgia, and San Francisco, California. These multi-discipline laboratories support both the Bureau's explosives and arson programs and hold the distinction of being the only Federal laboratory system accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. As well as providing the full range of traditional forensic analysis, the laboratories routinely examine intact and functioned explosive devices and explosive debris in order to identify device components and the nature of explosives used.

A notable achievement in forensic analysis was made this past year by the Headquarters laboratory. They developed a computer data base for use in the analysis of smokeless power. The chemists perform their analysis on powder used in an explosive device and then enter the data into the computer. What follows is a breakdown of the powder into a brand identification and the type of powder within the brand. The analysis applies to powder that is bought and sold commercially.

EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT. Complementing ATF's forensic analysis capabilities of explosive devices and debris is one of the Nation's foremost explosives technology sections. This branch supports the Bureau's explosives and arson enforcement programs by constructing facsimiles of bombs, rendering destructive device determinations for court purposes, and providing expert analysis of intact and functioned explosive/incendiary devices.

Any State or local law enforcement agency can access each of the programs described above through local ATF offices.

ADVANCED EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES SCHOOL. Initiated in 1982, this 2-week course of instruction in post-blast investigation was developed by ATF in conjunction with the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators. To date, a total of 649 State and local officers have been trained in 20 schools.

ATF is constantly alert to the changing needs of law enforcement. During 1987, ATF undertook a new initiative to more effectively address the increased threat posed by both arson and the illegal use of explosives.

BOMBING/ARSON PROFILING. During 1987, ATF participated in a program that trained law enforcement personnel in the art of criminal personality profiling. A profile can identify personality characteristics of known or unknown suspects. This identification is based upon a detailed crime analysis of any past case trends, past methods of operation of known/unknown criminal offenders, and the likelihood of any future occurrences. Its value as an investigative tool is proving to be very beneficial, and its success rate will contine to rise as more research is conducted on this new science. Related concepts of profiling can also be successfully applied to other investigative areas such as major case consultations, suspect interviewing techniques, search warrant preparations, proactive suggestions designed to encourage a suspect to confess, and the development of productional strategies.

ATF is fortunate to have the high caliber of assistance that is being provided by our conterparts at the State and local level. It is imperative that a cooperative environment remain constant, given the growing crime problem we all encounter. The threat posed by criminal or unregulated and irresponsible use of explosives will never be eliminated. However, ATF is totally committed to developing and sharing with all law enforcement agencies any advanced investigative procedures and technology toward this cause.

Atypen E. Higgin

Director

Table of Contents

			puge
Methodology	 	 	 3
Glossary of Terms	 	 	 3

PART I. EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS ANALYSIS

Technical Note	es 7
Table I.	Types of Explosive Incidents
Table II.	Explosive Incidents by Category by State 10
Table III.	Total Explosive Incidents by State
Figure I.	Bombing and Incendiary Incidents by State
Figure II.	Total Criminal Bombing Incidents14
Table IV.	Analysis of Bombing Incidents by Target as to Deaths, Injuries, and
	Property Damage
Table V.	Explosive Incidents by Motive Including Estimated Monetary Loss 16
Table VI.	Bombing Incidents by Target17
Table VII.	Types of Containers Used in Destructive Devices
Table VIII.	Types of Fillers Used in Destructive Devices
Figure III.	Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Commercial Targets. 19
Figure IV.	Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Residential Targets . 20
Figure V.	Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Vehicular Targets 21
Table IX.	Accidental Explosions by Type of Target
Fact Sheet-19	987

PART II. STOLEN EXPLOSIVES AND RECOVERIES

Technical Not	es	27
Table X.	Quantity of Explosives Stolen by Category 2	28
Figure VI.	Comparison of Categories of Explosives Stolen by Year as Percent of	
	10-Year Totals	29
Table XI.	Explosive Theft Incidents by State	30
Table XII.	Amount of Explosives Stolen by State	31
Table XIII.	Number of Blasting Caps Stolen by State	32
Table XIV.	Theft of Explosives as Reported by Licensees, Permittees, and Users 3	3
Figure VII.	Percentage Graph of Explosive Thefts as Reported by Licensees, Per-	
	mittees, and Users	13
Figure VIII.	Explosive Thefts and Recoveries by State	\$4
Table XV.	Quantity of Explosives Recovered by Category	15
Table XVI.	Incidents of Recovered Explosives Previously Reported Stolen 3	15
Figure IX.	Comparison of Categories of Explosives Recovered by Year as Percent	
	of 10-Year Totals	6
Table XVII.	Incidents of Explosive Recoveries by State	7
Table XVIII.	Pounds of Explosives Recovered by State by Year	8
Table XIX.	Number of Blasting Caps Recovered by State by Year	19
Fact Sheet—19	987	0
PART III. SI	GNIFICANT EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIONS-19874	13
PART IV. DI	RECTURY OF ATF OFFICES 5	6

WANTED FOR SERIAL BOMBINGS

On February 20, 1987, at 10:30 a.m., a bomb detonated in the parking lot of CAAMS, Inc., a computer sales and service company in Salt Lake City, Utah. A CAAMS employee arriving for work had observed the device, which was placed between two cars. He attempted to move it, causing the device to explode. The employee received fragmentation wounds and lacerations to his legs, hands, arms, throat, and face.

A witness at the scene had observed a white male place the device between two parked automobiles earlier that same day. This witness was able to furnish a description of the suspect, from which a composite drawing was prepared.

Due to the characteristics of this device, it has been linked to 11 prior bombings that have occurred throughout the United States. Since 1978, this bomber has constructed a series of destructive devices that have either been placed or mailed to the victims. One person has been killed and at least 20 injured in the 12 known bombings. On seven occasions, the devices were sent to or placed at university campuses. Other targets have included a commercial airliner bound for Washington, DC, from Chicago; a former airlines president; and an aircraft manufacturing plant.

The lone fatality occurred as a result of the 11th bombing, which took place on December 11, 1985. The owner of a computer rental store in Sacramento, California, was exiting his business when he observed a package on the ground. This package exploded when disturbed by the victim, killing him instantly.

The other bombing incidents occurred in Illinois, Tennessee, Utah, California, Washington, and Michigan.

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are working together to apprehend the criminal or criminals responsible. Participating agencies include the Postal Inspection Service, the FBI, ATF, the Salt Lake City Police Department, and the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department.

Many other police agencies have become involved in the case due to bombs detonating in their respective jurisdictions. These agencies include the University of California Police; the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority Police; the Virginia State Police; the Metropolitan Nashville, Tennessee, police; the Lake Forest, Illinois, police; the Vanderbilt University Police; the Auburn, Washington, police; the Ann Arbor, Michigan, police; the University of Illinois, Circle Campus Police; the Northwestern University Police; and others.



White Male 25-30 Years Old 5'10"--6' Tall 165 pounds Slender Build Blond Hair (reddish tint) Light Mustache Ruddy Complexion Wearing Blue Denim Jeans, Gray Hooded Sweatshirt Teardrop Sunglasses (smoked lenses)

The U.S. Postal Service has offered a reward of \$50,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any person or persons responsible for these serial bombings. In addition, the University of California at Berkeley is offering a reward of \$10,000 for information. Two of the bombings occurred at this university on July 2, 1982, and May 15, 1985. Information can be directed to the ATF office in your area. The telephone numbers appear in the back of this publication or in your local telephone directory. You may also call ATF Headquarters toll free, 24 hours a day at 1-800-424-9555. Agencies providing data incorporated in this report are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and United States Postal Service (USPS). The information presented is that which was reported to one of these agencies and should not be considered exhaustive of all explosive incidents which occurred in calendar year 1987. The data is considered highly representative and sufficient to permit valid chronological, geographical, and/or trend analysis. Categories appearing in this publication are those employed by ATF in its intra-agency tracking of explosive incidents. Prior to initiating any analysis utilizing information presented in this report, we suggest that the reader review the Glossary of Terms and the appropriate Technical Notes Section.

Data presented for the years 1978 through 1987 is that previously published in ATF's Explosive Incidents Reports for those years. To make those reports timely, cut-off dates, usually in March or April of the year following the calendar year in question, were established for data reporting purposes.

Normal "rounding-off" procedures have been employed. Any minor discrepancies between information presented in this report and that previously published may be the result of these "rounding-off" procedures.

Glossary of Terms

Accidental Explosion: Unplanned or premature detonation/ignition of explosive/incendiary material or a material possessing explosive properties. Activity leading to the detonation/ignition having no criminal intent. Primarily associated with legal, industrial or commercial activities.

Attempted Bombing/Attempted Incendiary Bombing: Incidents in which a device designed or purposefully contrived to detonate/ignite fails to function. Intent of activity was criminal in nature. Pertains to malfunctioning, recovered, and/or disarmed devices.

Blasting Agents: Any material or mixture of materials, consisting of fuel and oxidizer, intended for blasting purposes, not otherwise defined as an explosive (e.g., ammonium nitrate and fuel oil composition); provided that the resulting material or mixture of materials cannot be detonated by a number 8 test blasting cap when unconfined.

Blasting Cap/Detonator: Any device containing a detonating charge that is used for initiating detonation in an explosive. This term includes, but is not limited to, electrical and non-electrical blasting caps (either instantaneous or delayed) and detonating connectors.

Bombing/Detonation/Functioned Device: Any incident in which a device constructed with criminal intent and using high explosives, low explosives, or blasting agents explodes. These terms also refer to incidents where premature detonation occurs during preparation, transportation, or placement of a device so constructed.

Boosters: An explosive charge, usually of high strength and high detonation velocity, used to increase the efficiency of the initiation system of the main charge.

Dealer: Any person legally engaged in the business of explosive material distribution.

Delivery Method: The manner in which an explosive/incendiary device was transported/positioned at the site of an explosive incident (e.g., hand carried, mailed).

Detonating Cord: A flexible cord containing a center core of high explosives used to detonate other explosives with which it comes in contact.

Explosive: Any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term includes, but is not limited to, high explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, ignitor cord, and ignitors.

High Explosive: Explosive materials which can be caused to detonate by means of a blasting cap when unconfined (e.g., dynamite).

Low Explosive: Explosive materials which deflagrate rather than detonate (e.g., black powder, safety fuses, "special fireworks" as defined as Class B explosives).

Explosive Incident: Any explosives-involved situation impacting on ATF jurisdiction. This term encompasses bombings, incendiary bombings, attempted bombings, attempted incendiary bombings, stolen and recovered explosives, threats to U.S. Treasury facilities involving explosives, hoax devices, and accidental non-criminal explosions.

Extortion: The wrongful taking of a person's money or property through use of violence or intimidation. The elimination of competition or bettering of one's position through use or threat of violence.

Filler: Type of explosive/incendiary/chemical substance which in combination with a detonating/ ignitor system and container constitutes an improvised explosive device (e.g., dynamite, matchheads, gasoline).

Hoax Device: An inactive or "dummy" device designed and intended to appear as a bomb or explosive material.

Ignitor Cord: A small cord which burns progressively along its length with a short, hot external flame used to ignite safety fuses in the execution of multiple shot patterns.

Improvised Explosive Devise: A homemade device consisting of an explosive/incendiary and firing components necessary to initiate the device. Similar in nature to a grenade, mine, or bomb.

Incendiary Bombing/Functioned Incendiary: Any criminally motivated bombing incident in which an incendiary/chemical device which induces burning is used (e.g., Molotov cocktail).

Insurance Fraud: The purposeful destruction or damaging of property with the intent of collecting insurance monies for same.

Labor Related: Acts related to strikes, job actions, lockouts, etc., perpetrated by management, organized labor, or others to increase one side's bartering leverage over another.

Manufacturer: Any entity legally engaged in the business of making explosives for distribution or personal use.

Other: Subcategory of a general category reserved to reflect all reported incidents of the general category that do not conform to one of the other subcategories enumerated in a specific analysis. Unless otherwise specified, the subcategory "other" will not contain data of a general nature (e.g., bombing incidents) for which categorical information (e.g., type of container) was either listed as "unknown" or "not reported."

Permittee: Any person possessing a federally issued permit authorizing acquisition and interstate transport of explosives for personal use.

Primer: A unit, package, or cartridge of explosives used to initiate other explosives or blasting agents.

Property Damage: The monetary loss resulting from explosive/incendiary incidents. In that estimates of property damage are generally reported during the initial stages of an investigation, these estimates may not reflect in totality all property damage that occurred. Property damage in this report has on various charts and figures been presented in \$10,000, \$100,000, and \$1,000,000 increments. Please note the appropriate footnotes and/or Technical Notes section to determine increments used.

Protest: This motive category includes any expression of objection, disapproval, or dissent manifested through the use of explosive/incendiary devices. Political and terrorist type incidents are also included in this category.

Recovered Explosives: Any seized, abandoned, or purchased (undercover) explosive material taken into custody by ATF or other law enforcement agencies.

Safety Fuse: A flexible cord containing an internal burning medium by which fire or flame is conveyed at a uniform rate from point of ignition to point of use, usually a detonator.

Targets: The following categories are mutually exclusive.

Commercial: Any structure whose principal purpose is to facilitate the generation of revenues in the private industry sector. This category does not include airports or those industries involved with furnishing temporary or permanent housing. Included in this category are factories, banks, office buildings, bars, theaters, and restaurants.

Federal Government: This category does not include information regarding education or law enforcement targets.

Law Enforcement: This category includes all law enforcement facilities, vehicles, and personnel regardless of State, local, or Federal affiliation.

Military: This category includes Reserve and National Guard type facilities, vehicles, and personnel, but does not include ROTC facilities located at a college or university.

Residential: Any structure whose principal purpose is to house individuals on a permanent or temporary basis. This category includes private residences, hotels, motels, and apartments.

State/Local Government: This category does not include information regarding education or law enforcement targets.

Vehicles: This category includes all forms of transport either private or commercial in nature (e.g., tractor-trailers, automobiles, buses, trains, boats). This category does not include aircraft, law enforcement or military vehicles.

Users: Individuals who acquire and use explosives in the same State for legitimate purposes through legal means.

Part I EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS ANALYSIS





One of 18 unregistered explosive devices recovered by agents during an undercover investigation. The suspect was later sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.



The results of an accidental explosion at a legal fireworks factory in Jaffrey, New Hampshire. The removal and attempted disposal of hazardous component chemicals used in the legal fireworks manufacturing process prompted the explosion. The initial explosion caused a fire, and a series of subsequent explosions and fires caused damages to surrounding buildings and vehicles that contained explosive materials. A factory employee who had been involved in the disposal process suffered severe burns to 85 percent of his body.

Technical Notes

The information provided in this section was derived from statistics reported to and/or contributed by ATF, FBI, and USPS field offices. The categories used are those employed internally by ATF to track and record explosive incidents. If further explanation of categories is desired, please consult the Glossary of Terms in this report.

Table II—Explosive Incidents by Category by State 1978–1987

The categories Bombings and Incendiary include both functioned and attempted bombing and incendiary bombing incidents respectively.

The category of Other includes incidents previously categorized as Accidental-Noncriminal, Hoax Device, Threats—U.S. Treasury Facilities, Stolen Explosives, and Recovered Explosives.

Table III—Total Explosive Incidents by State1978–1987

Ranking of States as to the number of explosive incidents by year was determined through the following process (example follows):

- 1. The number of non-repetitive totals of explosive incidents for a given year was ascertained.
- 2. That number established by step 1 above was the rank assigned to the State(s) having the lowest number of explosive incidents reported in the given year.
- 3. Successively descending ranks were then assigned to States having successively ascending totals. This inverse ranking procedure continued until that State(s) having the highest number of explosive incidents in the given year was assigned ranking number 1.
- 4. States exhibiting tied totals in a given year were assigned the same rank as was determined appropriate through the foregoing process.
- 5. This process was independently replicated for each year 1978 through 1987.

EXAMPLE

T	Э	
		-

State	Nur	nber e	of Ex	plos	ive I	ncide	ents	Ass	signed F	lank
A				6					7	
В				12					. 3	
C.				11					4	
Ď				9					5	
E				0					8	
F				6					7	
G				13					2	
Ĥ				9					5	
I				15					1	
J				8					6	
7				-						

Figure I-Bombing and Incendiary Incidents by State

Data in this figure reflect only incidents in which bombs or incendiary bombs functioned. The letter B denotes Bombings. The letter I denotes Incendiary Bombings. The number appearing first reflects incidents occurring in 1987. The number appearing after the slash mark (/) reflects the average number of incidents per year computed from data for 1978–1987 inclusive and rounded to the nearest integer.

 Table V—Explosive Incidents by Motive Including

 Estimated Monetary Loss

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosive incidents where devices functioned and motive was determined and reported. The motive categories, further explained in the Glossary of Terms, are those employed by ATF for internal tracking. The number of explosive incidents where motive was unreported or undetermined is presented by year in the last row of the table.

The Grand Total is a summation of all reported explosive incidents for which motive was reported.

Percentages presented in columns under the headings 1978–1987 reflect the number of explosive incidents by type (Bombing or Incendiary Bombing) by motive, compared to total explosive incidents by type only for the given year, for which motive was reported. The Unreported or Undetermined category does not include accidental-noncriminal explosive incidents.

Data under 10-Year Total reflect the number of explosive incidents by motive regardless of type for the period 1978–1987. Percentages in this column reflect the number of explosive incidents of a given motive over the 10 years 1978–1987 compared to the total number of explosive incidents where motive was reported for the same period.

Estimated property damage is entered in rounded \$10,000 increments.

Table VI–Bombing Incidents by Target

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosive incidents (functioned bombings and incendiary bombings) where the nature of the target was also reported. Attempted bombing and attempted incendiary bombing data are not included for the years 1981-1987. This manner of reporting will be continued in the future. Data for years 1978-1980 include attempted bombings and incendiary bombings. Ranking was determined in a like manner as that elaborated upon under the discussion of Table III-Total Explosive Incidents by State.

Please note that in 11 instances in the table yearly rankings reflect two consecutive numbers (e.g., 5–6, 9–10). This was necessitated by the previously used ranking system where tied ranks for a given year were assigned independent consecutive ranks in no particular order. For example, in 1984 there were eight reported explosive incidents for the target Government State/Local and the target Military. Given this circumstance, one target was assigned the rank of 9 and the other tied target was assigned the rank 10. This ranking procedure did not lend itself for use with the ranking system employed in this report.

The category Other is a catch-all category reflecting explosive incidents where target was reported but where the nature of target was not compatible with those target categories employed by ATF. No ranking was given the category Other. Totals reflect all explosive incidents in which the nature of target was reported. The category Other does not include accidental-noncriminal explosive incident data.

Table VII-Types of Containers Used in Destructive Devices

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosive incidents (functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary bombings) where the type of container was also reported.

Table VIII—Types of Fillers Used in Destructive Devices

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosive incidents (functioned bombings and incendiary bombings) where the type of filler was also reported.

In 1978, neither Photoflash Powder and Fireworks filler nor Matchhead filler was carried as a separate category. Between 1978 and 1980, C—4 was not carried as a separate filler category.

Figure III—Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Commercial Targets

The reporting of motive, filler, container, and firing system for any explosive incident is independent of one another. For a given incident, all, any, or none of the categories of motive, filler, etc., may have been determined and reported. Therefore, any analysis such as Motive by Filler by Container by Ignitor is not warranted.

Data presented were extracted from incidents of both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary bombings. Information presented concerns only the three most frequently identified motives, fillers, and containers. Commercial targets, for the purpose of this analysis only, include all targets previously reported as commercial plus banks, utilities, and airports.

Figure IV—Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Residential Targets

Reference above discussion regarding like analysis of commercial targets; Figure III.

Figure V—Analysis of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Vehicular Targets

Reference above discussion regarding like analysis of commercial targets; Figure III.

Vehicular targets, for the purpose of this analysis only, include all targets previously reported on as vehicles plus police vehicles and aircraft.

Table IX-Accidental Explosions by Type of Target

The category Other includes all incidents in which the site of an accidental explosion was reported and that site was other than categories utilized by ATF. Property loss is presented in increments of \$10,000.





Stolen explosives purchased during undercover investigation in Little Rock, Arkansas.

			· · ·					1. 1. A.			10–Year
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Totals
Type of Incident	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %	No. %GT
Bombing	963 30	901 29	922 32	805 34	597 34	575 34	648 35	720 32	842 35	816 37	7,789 33%
Attempted Bombing	287 9	179 6	163 6	152 7	127 7	131 8	144 8	169 8	167 7	157 7	1,676 7%
Incendiary Bombing	446 14	346 11	368 13	329 14	235 13	164 10	155 9	151 7	204 8	169 8	2,567 11%
Attempted Incendiary	71 2	44 1	68 2	99 4	41 2	40 2	34 2	63 3	58 2	45 2	563 2%
Stolen Explosives	362 11	335 11	349 12	243 10	201 11	208 12	212 12	219 10	170 7	122 5	2,421 10%
Recovered Explosives	987 30	1,167 38	908 32	637 27	503 28	499 30	566 31	828 37	879 36	740 33	7,714 33%
Threat to Treasury Facility	22 1	35 1	22 1	24 1	10 1	9 —	7 —	10 —	8 —	10	153 1%
Hoax Devices	47 1	26 1	11	12 —	8 1	15 1	10 1	17 1	75 3	127 6	348 1%
Accidental-Noncriminal	71 2	60 2	64 2	37 2	40 2	49 3	52 3	51 2	31 2	42 2	497 2%
Total	3,256	3,093	2,875	2,338	1,762	1,690	1,828	2,226	2,432	2,228	23,728
	2			2			1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 -	· · · ·			
Percent of Grand Total	14%	13%	12%	10%	7%	7%	8%	9%	10%	9%	
Reported Killed	68	54	91	75	56	71	47	104	64	57	
			1								687
Percent of 10-Year Total	10%	8%	13%	11%	8%	10%	7%	15%	9%	8%	
Reported Injured	707	328	483	262	221	400	288	477	373	384	
				the second second							3,923
Percent of 10-Year Total	18%	8%	12%	7%	6%	10%	7%	12%	9%	10%	
Reported Property Damage ¹	\$27.5	\$16.0	\$31.2	\$105.6	\$12.3	\$34.3	\$74.9	\$26.5	\$29.3	\$45.6	
							-	· · · ·	and the second	1	\$403.2
Percent of 10-Year Total	7%	4%	8%	26%	3%	9%	18%	7%	7%	11%	

Table I.-Types of Explosive Incidents 1978-1987

[Reported Deaths, Injuries, and Damage]

¹Property damage reported in million-dollar increments.

BOMBINGS¹

INCENDIARY²

OTHER³ 19____

					19_		1.1											19	·							
	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	TOTAL	- [78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	TOTAL	78	79	8
AL	21	9	13	11	9	11	15	9	13	11	122		20	9	7	5	4	2	4	2	3	4	60	60	50	4
ĀK	. 9	4	4	- 0	3	3	0	1	6	3	33		3	0	0	2	. 1	- 1	2	0	0	0	9	9	5	
ĀZ	14	9	27	16	24	11	17	10	10	16	154	[18	5	20	4	6	2	0	0	1	3	59	1	7	1
ĀR	11	7	5	7	9	2	10	9	5	9	74	ſ	1	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	11	22	29	2
CA	161	133	162	124	106	61	99	124	154	183	1,307	ŀ	132	132	105	149	58	23	31	33	38	31	732	77	35	6
	37	20	28	27	11	17	22	30	57	-31	280	ſ	22	16	25	40	34	22	17	31	38	15	260	-51	. 29	2
CT	16	9	7	13	4	. 7.	6	7	9	9	87	1	9	1	5	2	0	-3	2	0	4	3	29	e	19	1
DE	0	1	2	2	1	0	2	5	3	0	16	Ī	0	0	· 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		3 4	
DC	10	2	7	2	2	8	6	6	- 2	.0	45	Ī	3	0	1	2	0	2	3	1	2	2	16	2	4	
FL	23	36	25	27	25	28	27	29	60	77	357	ſ	9	18	17	8	4	3	9	2	10	10	90	32	18	1
GA	14	17	17	15	20	14	16	17	8	13	151	Ī	13	6	5	6	3	7	5	4	4	5	58	49	76	3
ні	0	-3	8	1	13	0	3	3	1	4	36	Ī	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	- 0	5		6	
ĪD	6	- 6	15	8	4	4	7	5	11	2	68	Ī	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	10) 10	
п	74	85	97	102	62	76	49	65	72	69	751	Ī	16	16	19	16	7	9	6	11	23	14	137	5	76	7
 IN	25	24	16	12	10	13	12	15	15	17	159	ſ	6	4	15	2	8	2	1	2	3	1	44	2	24	1
 IA	4	8	11	8	0	6	4	2	4	1	48	Ī	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	1	. 8	1
KS	6	4	10	10	3	4	11	19	11	19	97	Ī	1	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	10	22	2 11	1
<u>кү</u>	90	29	27	32	31	21	18	25	13	9	295	· · [9	7	12	8	8	6	5	9	5	4	73	10	142	11
LA	6	10	4	4	9	3	6	9	10	4	65	-	3	0	2	0	0	1	7	4	11	2	30	29	21	2
ME	1	0	0	2	1	1	3	6	2	4	20	Ī	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	4		3 3	
MD	25	19	28	24	11	16	39	18	17	18	215	Ī	15	8	14	- 33	7	4	7	9	10	6	113	1	/ 8	1
MA	18	19	15	13	13	14	9	9	12	6	128	Ì	27	7	4	2	3	2	0	1	4	6	56	18	3 14	1
MI	29	31	29	28	21	19	23	20	26	37	263		5	5	4	7	4	5	5	0	7	7	49	24	14	1
 MN	12	21	23	23	6	4	11	8	8	13	129		0	5	1	5	3	1	1	0	0	6	22		3 20	1
MS	5	6	4	5	5	1	7	5	9	3	50		3	3	1	2	3	4	5	2	3	0	26	1:	3 26	2
мо	32	38	41	34	17	13	13	15	10	20	233		26	23	15	8	4	-1	2	2	6	4	91	38	69	4
MT	1	10	2	7	3	1	1	1	5	10	41	ŀ	1	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	0	8		2	1
				1. [*]	E _ 1		1 7	1 7	1 .	1					1	U		_		1.1.1	l i	1		T .	1	1

78	79	80	_ 81	82	_83	84	85	86	_ 87	TOTAL	TOTAL
60	50	48	37	22	20	26	30	16	20	329	511
9	5	3	5	1	4	7	2	4	5	45	87
17	- 7	19	11	11	13	13	15	10	12	128	341
22	29	26	21	9	18	13	20	31	_ 23	212	297
77	35	68	49	32	45	52	84	126	165	733	2,772
-51	29	22	14	12	6	10	24	41	22	231	771
6	19	10	13	7	16	11	8	14	5	109	225
8	4	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	2	20	37
2	4	4	2	4	3	4	8	7	9	47	108
32	18	18	27	17	22	37	24	39	31	265	712
49	76	35	31	20	8	18	27	24	32	320	529
4	6	4	3	4	0	- 3	3	5	2	34	75
10	10	5	3	9	-9	4	5	7	11	73	146
57	76	70	26	32	20	24	48	71	55	479	1,367
21	24	19	9	14	20	12	27	13	_20	179	382
11	8	7	8	. 3	. 3	7	7	3	3	60	116
22	11	16	15	_14	15	21	19	31	_ 19	183	290
101	142	114	82	62	62	31	79	46	33	752	1,120
29	21	23	26	9	15	12	15	24	17	191	286
3	3	2	1	0	0	3	5	3	2	22	46
17	8	13	9	7	10	4	9	22	12	111	439
18	14	14	. 11	12	8	21	15	8	12	133	317
24	14	11	12	17	14	21	23	27	33	196	508
8	20	10	4	2	3	3	6	6	13	75	226
13	26	23	20	11	12	20	6	9	9	149	225
38	69	42	27	33	20	28	34	47	20	358	682
1	2	11	16	18	. 8	3	3	1	2	65	114

															c <u>.</u>						_									-				
NE	3	6	4	4	3	6	1	10	4	3	44	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	8	3	11	3	6	1	2	5	3	1	43	90
NV	3	5	19	. 6	8	9	20	8	11	8	97	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	. 0	1	2	8	8	10	18	13	6	12	11	7	16	19	120	225
NH	1	1	0	1	3	2	2	7	3	2	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	0	5	2	1	8	7	5	33	55
NJ	31	29	29	15	17	19	10	9	16	22	197	10	4	6	6	2	7	0	5	4	1	45	23	28	32	22	12	23	14	23	23	14	214	456
NM	11	12	9	18	7	7	10	26	12	12	124	0	1	11	3	2	1	9	8	6	3	44	23	15	15	13	4	6	20	13	14	16	139	307
NY	115	54	57	52	71	56	55	57	77	48	642	35	11	11	12	8	9	6	12	9	7	120	42	45	28	24	13	24	44	35	34	31	320	1,082
NC	19	18	22	8	10	20	14	12	11	12	146	3	4	3	2	1	0	3	4	0	3	23	64	94	60	45	32	37	35	46	24	25	462	631
ND	1	3	2	5	3	0	0	1	4	1	20	0	0	0	0	. 1	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	15	6	0	2	3	1	1	2	3	34	57
ОН	83	71	50	45	30	26	36	40	49	44	474	29	27	43	33	28	33	22	16	13	16	260	56	80	51	28	26	28	16	34	34	37	390	1,124
ок	9	21	10	11	12	11	17	_16	33	22	162	11	3	2	6	0	4	2	0	5	3	36	50	51	17	25	42	22	16	31	43	24	321	519
OR	23	20	14	15	10	9	8	5	2	9	115	5	3	1	5	0	1	0	4	0	1	20	31	9	16	4	12	11	12	12	2	7	116	251
<u>PA</u>	38	14	34	14	_17	23	11	23	28	25	227	8	0	4	2	9	2	2	6	5	5	43	56	47	55	26	25	38	34	53	50	35	419	689
<u>RI</u>	4	3	4	1	4	3	4	2	1	5	31	2	0	1	· 0	3	0	0	0	1	_1	8	3	0	1	3	0	3	0	8	1	3	22	61
<u>SC</u>	6	9	14	10	5	12	5	4	_10	5	80	2	6	5	2	4	2	1	0	3	0	25	42	56	21	16	13	17	13	12	8	12	210	315
$\underline{SD}\ldots$	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	6	15	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	- 0-	4	5	9	5	2	2	1	0	2	4	5	0	30	50
<u>TN</u>	32	55	31	32	20	26	35	21	_36	16	304	11	5	20	26	38	7	6	7	5	3_	128	61	55	50	30	_37	39	39	-51	30	_33	425	857
TX	49	34	43	19	18	35	37	74	44	53	406	22	30	30	4	4	17	12	19	8	13	159	78	113	83	68	52	56	88	108	1.32	112	890	1,455
<u>UT</u>	19	9	11	15	6	13	6	8	12	7	106	7	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	. 2	1	16	19	12	_36	19	17	21	11	14	9	11	169	291
VT	2	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	3	1	12	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	1	4	4	1	0	1	<u> </u>	5	1	_ 7,	24	40
<u>VA</u>	38	49	19	20	12	7	17	26	45	30	263	8	2	6	8	2	1	3	4	14	11	59	62	59	62	34	20	22	29	38	30	20	376	698
WA	21	32	27	44	12	35	35	27	11	32	276	2	2	2	4	2	5	4	4	3	4	32	27	36	43	34	12	10	10	35	20	15	242	550
<u>WV</u>	17	24	21	7	2	1	2	19	8	1	102	6	9	7	3	1	_2	3	1	2	1	35	82	114	74	30	14	11	19	17	24	10	395	532
WI	21	18	12	15	_12	6	17	- 9	4	10	124	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	2	8	13	14	7	14	6	9	11	_11	4	6	95	227
WY	6	0	6	6	4	5	3	_ 2	2	2	36	1	0	2	0	2	_1	0	1	2	1	10	14	18	22	14	19	10	10	4	4	2	117	163
Guam .	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	O	0	0	2	10	11
Puerto Rico	47	27	18	33	15	17	9	8	28	9	211	6	2	0	3	7	3	0	5	4	0	30	3	2	1	3	2	0	0	0	3	2	16	257
Virgin Is	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	6
TOTAL	1.250	1.079	1.085	957	724	706	792	889	1.009	973	9,464	517	390	436	428	276	204	189	214	262	214	3.130	1.489	1.624	1.354	953	762	780	847	1.123	1.161	1.041	11.134	23,728

¹Bombings include both actual and attempted. ²Incendiary includes both actual and attempted. ³Other includes Accidental, Hoax, Threat, Stolen, and Recovered Explosives.

GRAND TOTAL

Table III.—Total Explosive Incidents By State 1978–1987

YEARLY	19	78	19'	79	19	80	19	81	1)82	19	83	19	84	19	85	19	86	19	987	10-YI	EAR
TOTAL/RANK	#	R	#	R	#	R	#	R	Ħ	R	#	R	#	R	#	R	#	R	#	R	TOTAL	RANK
AL	101	12	68	13	68	15	53	13	35	14	33	17	45	13	41	19	32	21	35	20	511	18
<u>AK</u>	21	32	9	33	7	40	7	34	5	33	8	32	9	29	3	41	10	31	- 8	33	87	41
<u>AZ</u>	49	25	21	27	66	17	31	22	41	13	26	21	30	18	25	25	21	27	31	22	341	23
<u>AR</u>	- 34	29	38	20	34	27	29	24	18	24	20	24	23	21	29	23	36	18	36	19	297	27
<u>CA</u>	370	1	300	1	335	1	322	1	196	1	129	1	182	1	241	1	318	1	379	1	2,772	1
<u>CO</u>	110	7	65	14	75	_13	81	8	57	7	45	12	49	11	85	7	136	4	68	8	771	8
<u>CT</u>	31	30	29	24	22	33	28	25	11	28	26	21	19	24	15	29	27	24	17	28	225	34
<u>DE</u>	8	41	5	36	3	43	2	39	3	34	0	38	3	- 33	6	38	4	36	3	38	37	49
<u>DC</u>	15	36	6	35	12	38	6	35	6	32	13	29	13	27	15	29	11	30	11	30	108	39
<u>FL</u>	64	17	72	10	60	18	62	11	46	10	53	9	73	7	_55	13	109	6	118	4	712	9
<u>GA</u>	76	15	99	8	57	19	52	14	43	11	29	20	39	15	48	15	36	18	. 50	12	529	16
<u>HI</u>	4	42	10	32	13	37	4	37	17	35	0	38	6	31	8	36	7	33	6	- 35	75	42
<u>ID</u>	18	34	18	29	-20	34	11	33	13	.27	13	29	11	28	11	33	18	28	13	28	146	36
<u>IL</u>	147	6	177	3	186	2	144	2	101	2	105	3	79	5	124	3	166	3	138	3	1,367	3
<u>IN</u>	52	28	52	16	50		_23	29	32	16	35	15	25	20	44	17	31	22	38	17	382	22
<u>IA</u>	17	35	19	28	19	35	<u>· 17</u>	32	3	34	9	31	11	28	9	35	7	33	5	36	116	37
<u>KS</u>	29	31	17	30	28	32	27	26	17	25	21	_23	32	17	38	_20	43	17	38	17	290	29
<u>KY</u>	200	2	178	2	153	4	122	3	101	2	. 89	4	54	8	113	4	64	12	46	14	1,120	5
LA	38	27	31	23	29	31	30	23	18	24	19	25	25	20	28	24	45	16	23	25	286	30
<u>ME</u>	4	42	3	38	3	43	3	38	2	35	1	37	7	30	12	32	5	35	6	35	46	47
<u>MD</u>	57	21	35	21	55	20	66	10	25	20	30	19	50	10	36	22	49	15	36	19	439	21
<u>MA</u>	63	18	_40	19	33	28	_26	27	28	18	24	22	30	18	25	25	24	25	24	24	317	24
<u>MI</u>	58	20	50	17	44	23	47	15	42	12	38	13	49	11	43	18	60	14	77	7	508	19
<u>MN</u>	20	<u> 33</u>	46	18	34	27	32	21	11		-8	32	15	26	14	30	14	29	31	22	225	34
<u>MS</u>	21	32	35	21	28	32	27	26	19	23	17	26	32	17	13		21	27	12	29	225	34
<u>MO</u>	96	13	130	4	98	8	69	9	54	8	34	16		14	51	14	63	13	44	15	682	12
<u>MT</u>	3	43	14	31	13	37	23	29	22	22	12	30	4	32	4	40		33	12	29	114	38
<u>NE</u>	12	37	9	33	16	36	7	34	10	29	7	33	3	33	15	29	7	33	4	37	90	40
<u>NV</u>	11	38	17	30	37	25	21	30	14	26	21	23	32	17	15	29	28	23	- 29	23	225	34
<u>NH</u>	2	44	4	37	1	44		40	8	30	4	35	3	33	15	29	10	<u>31</u>	7	34	55	45
<u>NJ</u>	64	17	61	15	67	16	43	16	31	17	49	11	24	22	37	21	43	<u> </u>	37	18	456	20
<u>NM</u>	34	29	28	25	35	26	34	20	13	27	14	28	39	15	47	16	32	21	32	21	308	26
<u>NY</u>	192	3	110	- 7	96	9	88	6	92	4	89	.4	105	3	104	5	120	5	86	6	1,082	6
<u>NC</u>	86	14	116	5	85	12	-55	12	43	11	57	8	52	9	62	12	35	19	40	16	631	13
<u>ND</u>	2	44	18	29	8		5 D	36	6	32	3	36	<u> </u>	35	2	42	6	34	6	35	57	44
<u>OH</u>	168	4	178	2	144	5	106	4	84	5	87	- 0	74	6	90	6	96	1	97	5	1,124	4
<u>OK</u>	70	16	75	9	29	31	42	17	54	8	37	14	35	16	47	16	81	10	49	13	519	17
<u>OR</u>	59	19	32	22	31	29	24	28	22		21	23	20	23	21	27		<u>30</u> 0	17	28	251	32
<u>PA</u>	102	<u>11</u>	61	10	93	10	42	17	<u>- 51</u>	9	63	24	41	12	82	8	00	9 9	60	9	689	11
<u>RI</u>	9	40		38	8	41	- 4	37	1	<u> 00</u>	0	10	<u>4</u>	32	10	00	01	<u>37</u>	9	<u>32</u>	01	43
<u>BU</u>	10	24	71	11	<u>40</u>	<u>24</u> 40	- 28	20	44	44 95	- 21	10	19	- 24	10	20	<u>41</u> 5	21	10	20	515	20
<u>5D</u>	10	39	115	34	101	43 7	- D	30	4	<u>00</u>	70	30	2	34	0	- 29	0	<u>- 00</u> - 1 1	10	31	057	40
<u>TIN</u>	140	10	177	0	101	(00	0	90 274	<u> </u>	109	0 9	107	4 0	19	9	11	11	170	11	1455	
	149	0C	00	00	100	 	91	0 00	<u>//4</u> 04	0	100		101	<u>4</u>	201	96	104	4 00	10	2	1,400	2
$\frac{\mathbf{U}\mathbf{I}}{\mathbf{v}\mathbf{m}}$	40	20 	23	20	<u>41</u>	22	0	20		21	37	14	11	<u>40</u>	22	20	<u>20</u> 4	20	19	20	291	28
<u>V1</u>	100	44	0	00	07	44	2	11	<u> </u>	- 00	1	- 37 - 10	3	30	(3/	4 00	06	.9	32	40	40
<u>VA</u>	100	<u> </u>	70	10	01	11	02		04	10	50	10	49	11	60	10	-09 	<u> </u>	51	10	550	10
	105	4	147	14	102	_14 	02	10	40	- 19 - 19		10	943 04	00	27	-11	04 01	20	10	20	590	14
<u>vv v</u>	109	<u>8</u>	141	 იი	TUZ	0 95	40 91	00 70	11 10	40	14	20 07	24	10	07	21	04 0	40 90	12	29	00Z	00
WV	00 01	<u>40</u> 00	10	44 90	00 12	00	00	44 91	0E	44 90	10	41 97	40	04 TA	41	21	0	9 <u>0</u> 00	ب 10	-41 92	169	
<u>пі</u> Спам	41	04	10	29 95	1	00 A A	_ <u>⊿</u> ∪ ∧	10	40 ^	20 20	- T0	20	10	21		-01 AA	<u> </u>	04 20	່ ບ ດ	20	11	50
PITERTO RICO	4 50	<u>44</u> 00	0 91	-00 -00	10	44 95	20	+1 10	0 94	01	0 90	00	0	00	12	91	<u>ע</u> 25	10	11	20	11 957	21
VIRCIN IS	00	44 15	01 1	20	ТД	00 AE	09	11	44 A	41 92	0	24	2	23	10	10	00 A	20	11	10	201 C	51
ΤΟΤΑΙ	20	- <u>+</u> U	3.0	03	0 00	40 75	<u> </u>	±⊥ 38	 1 '	762	1 6	300	1 0	28		- <u>+</u> 0 26		32	<u> </u>	+U 228	0 00 7	28
	₩ ,4		0,0		ب واستر	na di C	ں, ہے	50	ونادري	્યત્વ	,L		್ರಾಂಗ್ರ	·	<u>مر س</u>			- 	کر ہے۔			



¹Actual (Functioned) Bombings and Incendiary Bombings.



Figure II Total Criminal Bombing Incidents 1978-1987

Table IV.—Analysis Of I	Bombing Incidents By Target As To	Deaths, Injuries, and
	Property Damage 1978–1987	

	Į				Ki	lled	19_				1 a a					Ini	ured	19				·	1			Fro	pertv	Dam	age1	19			ĺ
Target	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	Total	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	Total	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	Total
Residential	7	- 7	15	13	9	9	3	22	18	10	113	57	43	52	25	32	34	58	70	69	54	494	29.8	2.6	7.6	8.2	15.1	12.4	11.4	5.7	9.0	6.9	108.7
Commercial	6	4	3	8	2	13		4	13	2	55	46	24	37	60	8	30	20	41	54	16	336	87.8	29.3	51.7	102.7	12.2	71.9	30.5	37.2	142.0	44.0	609.3
Vehicles	7	10	13	10	7	4	1	9	5	6	72	25	28	35	22	16	14	21	25	28	30	244	21.2	14.5	14.3	4.4	7.2	4.9	8.2	12.6	11.0	8.7	107.0
Education	_	1	-	. —	-	_		-	1	_	2	5	26	35	5	16	1	14	10	95	10	217	5.3	3.0	24.5	.4	2.4	.5	.6	20.5	2.0	.4	59.6
Mail Boxes	_	-	·	_	_			-	—		· · · ·	2	-	1			2	2	1	1	1	10	-	.1			. –	-		_	-		.1
Open Areas	2	_	5	8	3	2	4	1	5	6	36	13	43	24	31	17	35	23	22	11	36	255	_	.1	.5	.1	.1	_	.2	_	_	.2	1.2
Utilities	_	-						1	_	_		2		-	- -		1	2	1	1	-	7	17.3	.5	13.8	41.0	5.7	.4	9.1	3.0	1.0	1.4	93.2
Law Enforcement	·	1		_	_	_	_	_	_	-	1		4		2	2	1	5	3	1	9	27	.7	.9	8.3	.7	.3	.4	1.0	.2		10.6	23.1
Government State/Local	1	-		1		1		1		1	3	4	1		4	1		1	5	1	15	32	.7	1.2	.6	1,1	1.1	.1	.3	.1	1.0	10.3	16.5
Government Federal			·	-	_	_	_		_	_	_	1	· _	1	1	2	1	1	2	7	_	16	.1	.2	.2	.1	-	2.9	_	.2		.2	3.9
Banks		_			_	-		l.		_		-	1	2	-	1	3		-	1	_	7	5	.3	2.1	2.9	.6	6.9	· _		2.0	1.6	16.9
Military	—	1			-		<u> </u>	_		_	1	1	1	_	-	2	1	2	1	2	_	10		.2	· · _	.1	.1	1.4	7.5				9.3
Airports/Aircraft	-	_	_	1	1	-	_	_		_	2	-	4	2	·	15		·	2	_	<u> </u>	23	_		1.2	495.0	.1			8.1	5.0	.2	509.6
Other ²	·	1	5	-	_	3	1	1	1	4	16	279	24	28	11	4	11	17	10	12	11	407	8.7	3.6	9.4	4.7	27.8	4.0	3.0	4.1	7.0	.7	73.0
Totals	23	25	41	41	22	31	9	37	43	29	301	435	198	217	161	116	134	166	193	283	182	2.085	172.1	56.5	134.2	661.4	72.7	105.8	71.8	91.7	180.0	85.2	1,631.4

¹Property damage estimates presented in rounded increments of \$100,000. ²Other category does not include accidental-noncriminal explosive incidents.

		19	78	19	79	19	80	19	81	19	82	19	83	19	84	19	85	19	86	19	87	10-Y Subt	'ear otals	10- Year
Motive Yearly Number	er=No. nt=%	- <u>-</u>				· .												· .		·	-	·	· _	Total % Grand
Loss=	\$	В	I _	В	I	В	Ι	В	I	В	¹ I	B	Ι	B	Ι	В	I	В	I	B	I	В	· I	Total\$
Vandalism	No.	106	19	169	23	174	34	124	29	92	16	119	11	131	13	151	13	224	24	311	20	1,601	202	1,803
	%	28,9	12.2	38.0	15.0	41.0	18.4	36.9	21.0	32.9	15.1	40.8	10.7	38.7	14.9	42.3	17.8	51.6	21,4	60.5	20.6			36.1
	\$	11.9	2.1	5.8	.5	59.0	242.0	6.4	.6	7.3	23.2	7.0	.3 -	55.7	.1	9.2	6.2	.8	2.2	47.1	19.8	210.2	297.0	507.2
Revenge	No,	105	67	147	95	147	117	95	81	103	71	95	51	106	51	111	46	125	56	123	53	1,157	688	1,845
	%	28.7	42.9	33.0	62.1	34.7	63.2	28.3	58.7	36.8	66.9	32.5	50.0	31.4	58.6	31.1	63.0	28.8	50.0	23.9	54.6			36.9
	\$	57.8	13.3	28.5	17.2	47.2	9.9	40.1	14.6	64.0	43.9	32.1	22.6	41.1	51.0	23.7	15.4	9.3	3.4	21.8	76.3	365.6	267.6	633.2
Protest	No.	30	26	41	7	38	10	40	8	28	7	18	12	31	17	15	3	24	5	17	7	282	102	384
	%	8.2	16.7	9.2	4.6	8.9	5.4	11.9	5.8	10.0	6.6	6.2	11.8	9.2	19.5	4.2	4.1	5.5	4.5	3.3	7.2			7.7
	\$	111.7	12.6	63.9	7.9	67.1	2.2	5368.7	1.1	57.6	1.3	68.8	3.5	160.5	27.3	66.5	7.5	4.3	.2	1.6	5.6	5,970.7	69.2	6,039.9
Extortion	No.	19	2	33	2	23	4	32	2	23	1	23	4	15	1.	18	1	20	4	17	2	223	23	246
	%	5.2	1.3	7.4	1.3	5.4	2.2	9.5	1.4	8.2	.9	7.9	3.9	4.4	1.2	5.0	1.4	4.6	3.6	3.3	2.1			4.9
	\$	26.7		17.7	.8	309.9	.3	37.9		229.7	-	40.4	.2	7.2	1.0	40.3	.1	9.7	.8	25.9	47.5	745.4	50.7	-796.1
Labor Related	No.	87	30	38	21	18	10	21	15	10	8	17	18	31	1	39	8	14	12	18	8	293	131	424
-	%	23.8	19.2	8.5	13.7	4.3	5.4	6.2	10.9	3,6	7.6	5.8	17.6	9.2	1.2	11.0	11.0	3.2	10.7	3.5	8.2			8.5
1	\$	275.9	58.7	64.6	.3	115.6	4.6	22.9	6.4	2.7	.1	92.9	7.9	50.3	<u> </u>	117.3	8.0	5.0	3.1	3.6	7.3	750.8	96.4	847.2
Insurance Fraud	No.	7	9	5	4	6	- 8	8	2	5	3	8	2	6	3	6	ĺĺ	5.	7	1	5	57	44	101
	%	1.9	5.8	1.1	2.6	1.4	4.3	2.4	1.4	1.8	2.9	2.7	2.0	1.8	3.4	1.7	1.4	1.2	6.2	.2	5.2			2.1
	\$	35.7	1.4	24.2	11.5	31.2	17.1	114.0	4.5	24.4	3.7	109.0	125.0	10.8	2.7	30.8	1.0	5.5	3.8		65.0	385.6	235.7	621.3
Homicide/Suicide	No.	12	3	12	1	18	2	16	1	19		12	4	18	1	17	1	22	4	27	2	173	19	192
	%	3.3	1.9	2.7	.7	4.3	1.1	4.8	7	6.7		4.1	4.0	5.3	1.2	4.8	.1.4	5.1	3.6	5.3	2.1			3.8
	\$	6.3	-	3.6	2.0	11.0	3.0	33.5		56.2		12.3	11.5	6.8	<u> </u>	14.8	_	.8		100.3	.1	245.6	16.6	262.2
Yearly Total	No.	866	156	445	159	424	185	336	138	280	106	292	102	338	87	357	73	434	112	514	97	3,786	1,209	4,995
	\$	526.0	88.1	208.3	40.2	641.0	279.1	5623.5	27.2	441.9	72.2	362.5	171.0	332,4	82.1	302.6	38.2	35.4	13.5	200.3	221.6	8,673.9	1,033.2	9,707.1
Unreported ⁴ or	No.	597	290	456	193	498	183	469	191	317	129	283	62	310	68	363	78	408	92	459	117	4,160	1,403	5,563
Undetermined	\$	904.9	202.1	305.4	11.8	352.2	71.2	742.3	220.6	147.7	65.7	506.0	19.4	249.7	54.3	319.7	257.0	118.1	14.1	114.7	317.0	3,760.7	1,233.2	4,993.9

Table V.-Explosive Incidents By Motive Including Estimated Monetary Loss 1978-1988

[B—Bombing I—Incendiary]

'Estimated property damage presented in \$10,000 increments.

²Grand Total reflects total for all incidents in which a motive was reported.

³Yearly percent is by category (i.e., bombing data considered independently of incendiary data for a given year).

*Category does not include damage resulting from accidental-noncriminal explosions.

Table VI.-Bombing¹ Incidents by Target 1978-1987

TARGET										·	10-3	ZEAR
YEARLY TOTAL/RANK	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
Residential	355	327	371	303	209	159	207	223	304	232	2,690	24
	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1.	1		
Commercial	458	317	313		200	173	196	189	194	200	2,484	22
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	1_	2	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	2		
Vehicles	330	254	321	184	170		154	188	208	188	2,151	19
	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3		
Education			106	65	49	32	49	53	63	59	717	6
·····	4	4	4	5	4	6	4	4	5	6	1	
Mail Boxes	79	100	101	55	27	37	44	36		77	630	6
	5	5	5	6	6	5	5–6	6	4	5		
Open Areas	65	66				47	44		51	94	597	5
	7	6	6	4	5	4	5-6	5	6	4		
Utilities	69		40		$\frac{13}{-}$	20	20				289	3
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6	7	7	7	10	7	7	9	7	7		
Law Enforcement	34	29	14		15		$\frac{12}{}$		10		183	2
	8	8	11	9	8–9	9	8	8	10	10		<u> </u>
Gov't.—State/Local					16	9	8				160	1
<u> </u>	11	10-11	8	8	7		9-10	10	9	8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Gov't.—Federal	27				15 ——	14	4			<u> </u>	168	1
	9	9	9	12	8–9	10	11-12	7	7	9		
Banks	$\frac{21}{}$			15	9	19	4	7	14	7	127	1
	10	10-11	10	10-11	11	8	11-12	11	8	11		
Military	4		8	3	<u> </u>	7	8		6	4	57	—
	12	12	12	13	12	12	9–10	12	11	12		
Airports/Aircraft		4	3	15		· ·		3	4	2	40	
	12	13	13	10-11	13			13	12	13		
Other (No Rank Given)	186	147	107	89	63	50	53	59	67	53	874	8
Total	1 767	1 469	1 521	1 1 34	832	730	803	871	085	985	1 11 167 G	rand Total

¹Includes all functioned bombs and incendiary devices; does not include attempts for years 1981-87. Does include attempts for years 1978-1980. Table does not include accidental-noncriminal explosive incidents.

		-					1		· · · ·				1									
	197	8	197	9	198	0	198	1	198	2	198	3	198	4	198	5	198	6	198	7	10-YI	EAR
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	% GT
Pipe	473	37	423	38	427	35	352	33	325	38	297	44	355	46	431	45	541	54	543	52	4,167	42%
Bottle	407	32	376	33	414	33	460	44	278	33	209	31	186	24	226	24	265	26	235	23	3,056	31%
Dynamite Sticks	199	16	187	17	161	13	112	11	58	7	55	8	43	6	44	5	40	4	37	4	936	9%
Cans	66	5	38	3	50	4	33	3	39	5	22	3	27	- 3	41	4	43	4	37	4	396	4%
Boxes-Metal/Cardboard.	69	5	25	2	29	2	35	3	34	4	26	4	39	5	57	6	27	3	26	2	367	3%
Other	68	5	73	7	154	13	64	6	112	13	70	10	124	16	152	16	93	9	158	15	1,068	11%
Total ¹	1,28	2	1,12	2	1,23	5	1,05	6	84	16	67	9	77	4	951	Ľ	1,00	9	1,03	6	9,990	
Number of Incidents Where Not Reported	48	5	. 34	8	28	6	32	9	18	54	23	1	20	7	15	2	26	62	15	1	Grand (G'	Total F)
Imatel weflecte and the see in a	: Janka						tad Da				inter Train		41. 1. 4. 4.	1								

Table VII.—Types Of Containers Used In Destructive Devices 1978-1987

'Total reflects only those incidents where container was reported. Percentage computed using this total.

Table VIII.-Types Of Fillers Used in Destructive Devices 1978-1987

1	197	8	197	9	198	0	198	1	198	2	198	3	198	4	198	5	198	6	198	7	10-YI	EAR
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	% GT												
Flammable Liquid	468	36	358	31	423	37	331	36	287	35	196	29	174	23	224	25	265	26	227	25	2,953	31%
Black Powder	171	13	180	16	163	14	129	14	146	18	101	15	213	28	204	23	268	26	229	25	1,804	19%
Dynamite	251	19	215	19	197	17	168	18	121	15	100	15	94	12	76	9	78	7	56	6	1,356	14%
Smokeless Powder	157	12	144	13	152	13	125	14	110	14	123	18	111	14	146	17	163	16	178	20	1,409	15%
Photoflash Powder and Fireworks	3		99	9	71	6	64	7	53	6	77	11	91	12	93	11	110	10	91	10	749	8%
Military Explosive ²	54	4	82	7	58	5	43	4	49	6	31	5	43	6	54	6	51	5	49	5	514	5%
Matchheads	3		22	2	28	2	19	2	14	22	- 8	1	10	1	14	2	12	1	18	2	145	1%
Chemical	7	1	12	1	13	1	5	1	7	1	6	1	15	2	23	3	38	4	35	4	161	2%
Blasting Agent	8	1	3	-	6	1	5	1	2	-	9	1	3	· _	8	1	18	2	9	1	71	1%
C-4	3		3		3		6	1	1	-	. 8	1	3	·	5	1	5	1	- 3		31	-
Other	176	14	22	2	42	4	26	3	21	3	23	3	14	2	31	3	21	2	12	1	388	4%
Total ¹	1,29	2	1,13	7	1,15	3	92	1	81	1	682		771		878	3	1,02	9	907	7	9,581	
Number of Incidents Where Not Reported	47	'5	33	3	36	8	46	4	18	9	22	8	21	0	22	5	24	2	28	0	Grand (G	Total F)

'Total reflects only those incidents where type filler was reported. Percentage computed using this total.

²Other than C-4. ³Not reported in that year.



A quantity of explosive primers similar to this one was stolen from a transport truck in Hummeltown, Pennsylvania.

Figure III Analysis ¹of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Commercial ²Targets



Total Number of Explosive Incidents Analyzed-242

¹¹Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis. ²¹Commercial targets, for the purpose of this analysis, include all targets previously reported as commercial plus banks, utilities, and airports.

Figure IV Analysis ^yof Explosive Incidents Directed Against Residential ^wTargets



Total Number of Explosive Incidents Analyzed-331

¹Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis. ²/Residential targets, as defined in the Glossary of Terms, include all residences including apartments, hotels, and motels.

Figure V Analysis ¹of Explosive Incidents Directed Against Vehicular ²Targets



Total Number of Explosive Incidents Analyzed-247

¹Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis. ²Vehicular targets, for the purpose of this analysis, include all targets previously reported on as vehicular plus police vehicles and aircraft.

		1070	1050	1 1000	1001	1000	1000	1004	1005	1000	1007	
Commercial	Total	1978	1979	<u>7/90</u>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	10tal 250
Commercial	Killed	28	40	94	97	18	28	20	50	17	18	263
	Injured	43	91	160	65	53	20	50	158	57	187	1 094
	Property Loss	314.0	642.2	1 393 5	3 802 5	306.3	211	3 1 2 4 5	692.7	1 037 0	3 356 3	\$16 848 7
		014.0	044.4	1,000.0	0,002.0	000.0	2,110.1	0,124.0	002.1	1,001.0	0,000.0	φ10,040.1
Vehicles	Total	6	9	6	3	4	4	. 2	9	1. 1	5	49
	Killed		19	3	4	2	3		1	0	3	37
	Injured	155	63	2	10	7	5		13	2	3	260
	Property Loss	5.0	175.6		50.5	1.8	.9	3.8	190.1		6.0	\$ 433.7
							.					
Residential	Total	16	8	8	9	8	3	6	11	4	3	76
	Killed	10	1	4	—	4	1	4	6	0	0	30
	Injured	16	8	5	17	12	15	14	34	- 3	4	128
	Property Loss	13.8	14.5	2.0	37.9	116.8	140.0	62.2	331.4	10.2	.1	\$ 728.9
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				1	-						
Education	« Total	1	4	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	4	18
	Killed	_	1	1	2	_	-		-	-	2	6
	Injured	1	2	33	2		1	18	4	1	6	68
	Property Loss		57.0	300.0		25.0	· _ ·	1.0	_	20.0	300.0	\$ 703.0
· · · · · ·	-											
Utilities	Total	4	4	1		1	1	_	-		1	12
	Killed	3	<u> </u>			4	1			_		8
· · ·	Injured	27		7		6						40
	Property Loss	150.0	140.0	· · · ·								\$ 290.0
0								<u> </u>		-		
Open Areas	Total	4	3	8	2	2	1	7	5	3	1	36
	Killed		2	2		-	2	1		1	1	9
	Injured	5	2	1	4	2	LT	11	75	18		
	Property Loss								500.0			\$ 500.0
Gov't State	Tocal Total	1	4			4	2	1			2	7.1
UUV L-DIALC	Killod	1	<u> </u>		<u></u>	1	1	<u> </u>			1	11
	Triured		10			<u> </u>					1	<u>ງ</u>
	Property Loss	25.0	19		50		50.0				50.0	40 ¢ 120.0
		20.0			5.0		50.0				50.0	φ 130.0
Military	Total			7		1	3	1		. 2	1	9
	Killed	_	_	3		1	4			- 3	3	14
		_		1		15	29	_		7		52
	Property Loss								· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· · · · ·	
			1. A. A.									
Other ¹	Total	10	5	9	1	-5	_	1	2	2	1	36
	Killed	4	2	3	1	4	-	1	1	-	_	16
	Injured	24	5	51		10	_	20	_	2	1	113
	Property Loss	517.0	7.5	80.0	50.0	50.0		3,581.2	16.5	40.0		\$ 4,342.2
1		- C						1. 1. A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.				
Yearly	Total	71	60	64	37	40	49	52	-51	31	42	497
	Killed	45	29	50	34	34	40	38	67	21	28	386
	Injured	272	130	266	101	105	266	122	284	90	202	1,838
	Property Loss	1.024.8	1,036.8	1,775.5	3,945.9	499.9	2,370.6	6.772.7	1.730.7	1,107.2	3,712.4	\$23,976.5

Table IX.—Accidental Explosions By Type Of Target 1978-1987

¹Other includes all incidents in which target was reported and was other than those listed above.

Property loss presented in increments of \$10,000.

Fact Sheet-1984/85/86/87

Illegal Fireworks Accidents

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Explosions	4	5	5	5
Killed	0	9	11	1
Injured	6	10	26	8
Property Damage	\$100,000	\$20,000	\$10,268,000	\$151,000
Legal Fireworks Accidents				
Explosions	7	7	ана (1997) Алана (19 1)	6
Killed	2	22	ō	2
Injured	9	43	ŏ	31
Property Damage	\$879,500	\$707,100	\$400,000	\$11,000
Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Explosive Incidents				
			1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	
Bombings	2	8	9	11
Killed	0	0	4	1
Injured	2	1	1	11
Property Damage	\$7,500	\$292,300	\$35,500	\$82,000
Pounds of explosives stolen	725	41	0	0
Pounds of explosives recovered	68	500	249	336
Blasting caps stolen	1,000	63	0	0
Blasting caps recovered	2	110		15
Feet of safety fuse/detonating cord stolen	14,000	0	0	0
Feet of safety fuse/detonating cord recovered	1,000	1,250	0	965
Grenades recovered	0	31	12	9
Incidents Involving Military Explosives and/or Components				
Bombings	56	65	62	58
Killed	0	0	3	7
Injured	20	39	12	30
Property Damage	\$1,115,005	\$81,400	\$146,850	\$56,850
Radio Remotely Controlled-Bombing Incidents	16	16	11	15
Number of Bombing Incidents Where Home Computer Bulletin Boards Were Used to Obtain Instructions in Making	1000 - 1000 1000 - 1000 - 1000 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000			
Bombs	0	5	0	1



ATF's explosives investigation truck. The Coast Guard is capable of transporting these vehicles and ATF special agents to remote or distant scenes of major bombings and arsons.



On April 18, 1987, a juvenile from Lenexa, Kansas, committed suicide by wiring a large quantity of dynamite to a car battery. A suicide note was left with the victim's girlfriend. ATF assisted the Lenexa and Overland Park Police Departments in determining the source of the explosives. Through interviews and by tracing an undetonated stick of dynamite found at the scene, a suspect was developed. Further investigation revealed that the suspect, who uses an alias, was the boyfriend of the victim's mother. When his true identity was revealed, it was determined that the suspect is a fugitive with armed robbery offenses in Florida. This person remains at large.





Only the twisted railroad tracks remain outside the packing building of the Independent Explosive Plant in Suscon, Pennsylvania. The building was destroyed in an accidental explosion on December 15, 1987.

Technical Notes

The information provided in this section was derived from statistics reported to and/or contributed by ATF field offices. The categories used are those employed internally by ATF to track and record stolen and recovered explosives.

Table X-Quantity of Explosives Stolen by Category

Publications of the Explosive Incidents Report for the years 1978 through 1987 included a category entitled Other in this table. This category has been deleted for those years in this 10-year format. Also deleted from this table was the category Potassium Chlorate/Photoflash Powder. Note that those thefts that would have fit either of these categories in 1987 have not been reported in this table. In that the amounts of explosives involved under the category of Other were small in comparison to yearly totals, it is believed their deletion will have little effect on the overall validity of the data presented for comparative purposes.

Figure VI--Comparison of Categories of Explosives Stolen by Year as Percent of 10-Year Totals

Percentage computations presented in this figure were obtained by dividing individual year totals by 10-year totals for specific categories.

Abbreviations of HE for high explosive, LE for low explosive, and BA for blasting agent were used. The category HE + LE + BA therefore reflects information regarding thefts of all explosives (whose unit of measure was the pound).

Table XI-Explosive Theft Incidents by State

For an explanation of the procedures used in ranking of States, Modal Rank, please reference Technical Notes, Section I, Table III.

Table XII-Amount of Explosives Stolen by State

Percentages entered under columns headed 1978 through 1987 reflect the number of pounds of explosives (high explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents) stolen in a given year for a given government entity as a percent of all such explosives stolen for that year.

Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole 1% and percentages of less than .5 were indicated by a dash (-).

Percentages listed under the heading "10–Year" reflect the total number of pounds of explosives stolen for the period 1978 through 1987 for a given government entity as a percent of all such explosives stolen for that period.

Table XIII-Number of Blasting Caps Stolen by State

For an explanation of percentage computations in this table, consult Table XII directly above.

Table XIV—Theft of Explosives as Reported by Licensees, Permittees, and Users

Data presented in this table include information from 1978 to present.

Figure VII—Percentage Graph of Explosive Thefts as Reported by Licensees, Permittees, and Users

These graphs depict data presented in Table XIV for the year 1987 and an average year computed using data presented for the years 1978 to 1987 inclusive.

Figure VIII-Explosive Thefts and Recoveries by State

In this figure, the letter "T" denotes thefts and the letter "R" denotes recoveries.

The number appearing first reflects the number of 1987 incidents and the number appearing after the slash mark (/) reflects the number of incidents for an average year computed using data from 1978 through 1987. Rounding was employed to the nearest whole integer in averaging.

Table XV-- Quantity of Explosives Recovered by Category

Recoveries include all explosives reported as taken into law enforcement custody either through seizure, abandonment, or purchase as evidence.

In previous publications of the Explosive Incidents Report for 1978 through 1984, categories of Other, Potassium Chlorate, and Photoflash Powder were included. Those categories have been deleted in this report. Those incidents that would have been included in these categories for 1987 have not been reported in this table.

Table XVI-Incidents of Recovered ExplosivesPreviously Reported Stolen

This table reflects recovery of explosives verified through corroborating evidence as having been previously reported stolen.

Explosives reported as recovered in a given year are not necessarily explosives reported stolen during that same year.

Figure IX-Comparison of Categories of Explosives Recovered by Year as Percent of 10-Year Totals

As in Table XV, the categories of Other, Potassium Chlorate, and Photoflash Powder previously reported in Explosive Incidents Reports for the years 1978 through 1984 have been deleted from the instant figure.

Percentage calculations were obtained by the same process as elaborated upon under Figure VI above.

Table XVII—Incidents of Explosive Recoveries by State

The discussion entered for Table XI above is applicable for this table except that the data in the instant table reflect recoveries as opposed to thefts.

Table XVIII—Pounds of Explosives Recovered by State by Year

The discussion entered for Table XII above is applicable for this table except that the data in the instant table reflect recoveries as opposed to thefts.

Table XIX—Number of Blasting Caps Recovered by State by Year

For an explanation of percentage computations in this table, consult discussion under Table XII above.

Table X.-Quantity Of Explosives Stolen By Category 1978-1987

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	10-YEAR TOTAL
Dynamite	44,316	33,886	107,453	21,317	29,267	25,588	28,468	24,013	24,945	8,372	347,625
TNT C-4 Military	140	1,455	172	20	1,871	75	135	235	2	1	4,106
Primer	4,333	545	2,681	1,461	474	821	2,171	562	1,676	1,304	16,028
Boosters	9,528	447	1,851	494	243	1,331	1,017	491	788	696	16,886
Yearly Total	58,317	36,333	112,157	23,292	31,855	27,815	31,791	25,301	27,411	10,373	384,645

High Explosives—In Pounds

Low Explosives—In Pounds

Black Powder	379	2,446	772	325	558	1,034	418	428	170	150	6,680
Smokeless Powder	163	6	307	973	73	47		87	115	0	1,771
Yearly Total	542	2,452	1,079	1,298	631	1,081	418	515	285	150	8,451

Blasting Agents-In Pounds

42,172	65,457	51,168	24,036	31,476	4,975	35,891	7,132	8,210	4,705	275,222

Detonating	Cord/Ignitor	Cord/Safety	Fuse-	-In	Feet
Donnaning	Corarentor	oorabarooy	I UDO	***	1,000

		1		1	1				1	1
113,510	141,628	148,117	80,356	56,047	85,813	106,537	85,066	127,588	47,450	992,112
				Blastir	ng Caps-	–By Cour	nt			
66,614	47,918	87,644	33,990	42,466	26,455	33,136	46,352	31,497	33,112	449,184
······································			· · · ·		1					
				Grei	nades—E	By Count				
*	1.822	90	40	_	191	93	1	35	10	2,282

Note: The category of Other, as reflected in statistics for the years 1978 through 1983, has been deleted in compilation of this table as well as the category Potassium Chlorate/Photoflash Powder. *Pertinent data regarding the theft of grenades were not recorded independently for the year 1978.

Figure VI

Comparison of Categories of Explosives Stolen by Year as Percent of 10-Year Totals 1978-1987



Table XI.-Explosive Theft Incidents by State 1978-1987

VEARLY	10	78	10	70.	10	80	19	81	19	82	19	83	19	81	19	85	19	84	19	87	10.Y	EAR
TOTAL/BANK	No		No	R	No	R	No	R	No	R	No.	R	No	R	No	R	No	R	No	R	TOTAL	RANK
	14	g	11	7	9	10	11	6	7	77	6	7	6	6	4	8	9	11	6	6	76	9
<u>ки</u>	<u>73</u>	17	1	19	•// Q	18	9	15		173	<u> </u>	12	3	0		11		19	0		17	34
AR	0	11	4	10	5	14		10		10		10	1	11			-	10	0		20	0.0
<u>AZ</u>	8	12	0	10	0	14	3	14	1	13	0	0	1	11	4	0	4	11	3	9	30	44
<u>AR</u>	0	14	.0	10	3	10	2	15	2	12	4	9	3	9	4	8	0	8	1	-0	43	20
<u>CA</u>	17	6	8	8	18	5	14	3	6	8	10	5	11	4	11	4	14	3	4	8	113	4
<u>CO</u>	16	7	7	9	6	13_	7	10	3	11	2	11	6	6	4	8	6	8	0	_	57	16
<u>CT</u>	2	18	8	8	4	15_	3	14	-	14	4	9	-	12		12	2	11	1	11	24	29
<u>DE</u>	_	20		16		19		17	1	13		13		12		12		13	0	-	1	44
<u>DC</u>		20		16	_	19	_	17		14	_	13	_	12	-	12	-	13	0		0	45
FL	9	11	7	9	2	17	3	14	4	10	5	8	5	7	3	9	3	10	1	11	42	21
GA	7	13	8	8	8	11	5	12	5	9	2	11	5	7	4	8	—	13	5	7	49	19
HI	1	19	1	16	1	18	-	17	1	14		13	1	11	_	12	1	12	1	11	5	41
ID	4	16	6	10	2	17	2	15	5	9	6	7	3	9	3	.9	1	12	4	8	36	23
п	12	10	7	9	6	13	5	12	13	3	2	11	9	5	3	9	7	7	3	9	67	13
IN	5	15	6	10	6	13	2	15	2	12	2	11	3	9	4	8		13	2	10	32	26
ΤΔ	3	17	2	14	2	17	2	15	1	13	_	13	3	9	1	11	2	11	1	11	17	34
WS	6	14	2	14	6	19	6	11		19	4	4	a	5	6	6	6	8	-	8	51	18
<u>TU</u>	07	1	17	74	0	10	95	1	20	-14	97	1	10	0	977	1	0	1	10	1	01	10
<u>NI</u>	41	10	11		43 11	1	20	1	20	10	41	1	10	- 4	01		04	10	10	<u> </u>	50	177
<u>LA</u>	12	10	-1	9	1	12	11	0	4	10	<u> </u>	8		11	3	9		13	3	9	- 53	- 17
<u>ME</u>	2	18	.1	15	1	18		17	-	14		13	2	10	1		1	12	0		8	38
<u>MD</u>	6	14	. —	16	<u>_</u> 6	14	1	16	2	12		13	1	11	2	10	2	11	0		19	32
<u>MA</u>	1	19	1	15	1	18	2	15	1	13		13	1	11		12	<u>s</u>	13	0		7	39
<u>MI</u>	2	18	3	13	1	18_	1	16	4	10		13		12	1:	11	1	12	1	11	14	36
<u>MN</u>	2	18	4	12	4	15	2	15	2	12	2	11	<u> </u>	12	1	11	2	11	1	11	20	31
<u>MS</u>	2	18	2	14	7	12	5	12	2	12	1	12	2	10	4	8	1	12	1	11	27	28
<u>MO</u>	7	13	12	6	12	9	5	12	12	4	6	7	12	3	11	4	9	5	5	7	91	8
<u>MT</u>		20		16	8	11	12	5	3	11	5	8	3	9	1	11	1	12	0	<u> </u>	33	25
<u>NE</u>	3	17	2	14		19	· 	17	1	13		13	1	11		12	—	18	0		7	39
NV	1	19	5	11	6	13	3	14	1	13	-5	8		12	-	12		13	1	11	22	30
NH		20	1	15	?	19		17	2	12	1	12		12	2	10	1	12	1	11	.8	38
NJ	2	18	8	8	3	16	4	13	3.	11	3	10	3	9		12	2	11	1	11	29	27
NM	8	12	6	10	6	13	2	15	3	11	_	13	3	9	3	9	3	10	0	:	34	24
NY	7	13	3	13	4	15	1	16	3	11	5	8	6	6	2	10	1	12	2	10	34	24
NC	7	13	8	8	9	10	7	10	5	9	4	9	9	5	14	2	3	10	2	10	68	12
ND	7	19	3	13	1	18		17	1	19	1	12		12	·	12	1	12	1	11	9	37
OH	14	8	14	4	Я	11	5	12	5	9	10	5	3	9	3	9	3	10	1	11	66	14
ОК	18	9	14	4	7	12	3	14	12	4	6	7	4	8	5	7	7	7	3	9	74	10
OR	7	18	3	13	4	15	1	16	2	12	7	6	4	8	2	10	1	12	1.	11	32	26
<u>-</u> ΡΔ	91	3	19	2	19	4	13	4	10	5	14	3	12	3	12	3	6	8	9	3	135	3
BI	1	10	10	16	10	10	1	16	-10	14		19		10	1	11		19	0		3	42
<u>sc</u>	0	18		14	q	10	9	15		14	9	11	-	10	0	10		12			15	35
<u>הסט</u>	4	10	- 4	15	<u> </u>	10	<u></u>	17		10	- 2	10	1 2	10	- 4-	10		10			<u> </u>	40
	10	13 . E	177	10	10	10		11	1	10	10	10	6	10	11	12	- 1	14	0		100	<u>40</u>
<u>IN</u>	19	0	11	1	07	0	10	9	1.5	1	10	+ 0		1	14	÷ +	10	0	0	- <u>+</u>	109	
<u>IX</u>	22	2	33	10	21	4	17		15	- 2	10		21		14		10	2	11	4	194	
<u>UT</u>	<u> </u>	13	3	13	12	9	9	8	9	<u>ь</u>	6	10	6	6	6	0	<u>× 1</u>	12	1	<u> </u>	60	15
<u>VT</u>		20	3	13	3	10	-	17		14		13	-	12		12	1	13	3	9	9	37
<u>VA</u>	14	8	14	4	15	1	10	7	3	11	5	8	13	2	11	4	11	4	3	9	99	6
<u>WA</u>	9	11	13	5	17	6	8	9	<u> </u>	12	4	9	4	8	7	5	5	9	2	10	/1	
<u>wv</u>	20	4	17	3	23	3	10	7	4	10	3	10	5	7	6	6	7	7	2	10	97	7
<u>WI</u>	4	16		16	3	16	4	13		14		13	2	10	3	9		13	2	10	18	33
<u>WY</u>	4	16	6	10	9	10	4	13	9	6	6	7	3	9	1	11	<u> </u>	13	1	11	43	20
<u>Guam</u>		20	5	11		19	_	17		14		13		12		12		13	1	11	6	40
Puerto Rico	1	19	<u> </u>	16	1	18		17		14	<u> </u>	13		12		12		13	0		2	43
Virgin Is		20		16		19		17		14	<u> </u>	13		12	1	11	2	11	0		3	42
Totals	36	52	33	15	34	19	24	13	20)1	20)8	2	12	21	19	17	70	12	22	2,4	21

YEARLY	1978	3	1979)	1980)	1981	L	1982	?	1983	}	198	4	1985		1986	1	987		10-YE	AR
TOTAL/PERCENT	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	6 N	ò. (%	TOTAL	% GT
AL	18,511	18	55,052	53	338	1	1,760	4	4,123	6	693	2	1,352	2	150	<u> </u>	135 -		704	4	82,817	12
AK	101	-	. 98	1	374	1	603	1	Ī	-		ļ	1.219	2	950	3			- -	<u>.</u>	3,345	
AZ	201	-	319		953	1	350	1	7		1,753	5	E	<u>,</u>	925	3				-	4,513	
AR	1,913	2	2,908	3	41	1	104	_	85	-	2,151	6	91	_	593	2	1,587	4	244	1	9,717	1
СА	8,127	8	885	1	5,082	3	1,067	2	224		1,370	4	250	_	501	2	1,647	4	50	_	19,203	3
CO	6,359	6	349	—	283	-	581	1	120	_	16	-	580	1	287	1	238 -	- 1	- -	_	8,813	1
СТ	102	Į,	432	-		1	5	-	_	-	1,525	5	-	_	· <u>·</u>		200 -	- 1	-	_	2,264	_
DE	_			_	_				_		30	-	_	_	_	_			. .	_	30	
DC			_	1		1		_	-	-	_	-			·	_				_	0	_
FL	4.387	4	681	1	51		1,435	3	1.058	2	814	2	26		1.836	6	2,750	8 2.	2501	15	15.288	2
GA	32	-	1,504	1	242		283	1	772	1	455	1	33,993	50	651	2			354	6	38,786	6
HI		-	-		550	I			_			-			_		1.	_		_	551	
ID	2.668	3	2.540	2	150		50	1	45		80		311	_	82	_	30 -		400	3	6.356	1
Ш	757	1	1.577	2	700		556	1	4.343	7	11	-	2.751	4	58		4 199 1	2 2.	0831	14	17.035	2
IN	696	1	689	1	438		118	_	150	Ì	23		786	1	697	2			53 -	_	3.650	
ΙΑ	245		64	_	71		1.450	3	8			_	962	1	75	_	400	1	150	1	3.425	
KS	1 651	2	150		2.102	1	400	1	50		302	. 1	2 307	3	1.816	6	211		613	4	9,602	1
КҮ	1 850	2	6 790	7	41 405	25	20.796	43	24 930	39	6,393	19	2 302	1 3	6 239	19	2 674	7	743	4	114 122	17
Γ.Α	1 998	2	580		400		1 246	3	179	00	564	2	2,001	Ľ	158		2,011		0		5 118	1
ME	1,000	1	194	_	00		1,210		1.14			-	350	١,	75					_	601	
MD.	55		307	_			90		406	1	78	_			18	_			d.	_	1 068	
MA			5	_	160		100			-			190			_					385	
MT			50	_	100		100	H	2 4 60			_	120		199		689	9	0	-	9 961	
MN	50		59	_	991			_	<u>2,700</u> 50			_			180	1	410	1	150		1 994	
MS	169		1 020	1	201	Ţ	694	-	900	•		_	55		1 0 9 9	6	410	*	150		7 990	1
MO	1 014	- 0	1,020	2 1	2,000	<u></u>	995	1	2 075	E	970	1	1 614	5	1,000	<u> </u>	004	5 (251	2	1,440	- 1
MT	1,314	4	1,010	4	10,000	0	200	-	1.005	. U n	270	- <u></u>	1,019		1,200	. **			101	4	6 091	1
MII	150	-	- 07	_	4,400	<u> </u>	200	_	1,000	4		1	100				20		-1		0,021	
NTV7	100			-	1 507			_	000		969		100			_				-	9,090	
NTU	U	1		-	1,007	7	07	_	100	1	202					-	0.700		0	-	2,030	
INTI	110		150	-			454	-	400	4	- 000	4	1 975	6	201	1	2,100		- 0	-	4,104	
INJ	112		100		100	-	404		40	-		1	2,010	4	110	_	1 005	<u>.</u>	- 0-	-	2,330	
LN1VL	1,700	4	400	=	1,009		4,170	9	1,001	4			101	1	110		1,000	0			10,911	1
NO	292		440	j.	320		14	-	60) 000	1	342	1			19		- 6		252	Z	3,322	
ND	400		438	-	049	_	1,300	J		l	210	<u>.</u>		-1	1,040	G	595	2	22 -	-	0,298	. Д е
<u>ND</u>			940	-	150		-	_		Ŧ	100	_		-	100				-10		1,170	1
от	0,070	1	780	1	21,913	10	640		311	-	133		42		100	_	690		300	의	32,189	0
OR	3,274	<u>ა</u>	1,181	- 1	140		175	2	4,240	1	1,331	4	56 7 7 00	-	1,218	4	904	4 7	49		13,380	2
DA	2,521	2	1 050	-	4,2/2	3	150	_	100		1,905	0		11	100	_	20 -			井	17,202	3
Γ <u>Α</u>	2,192	_2	1,350		1,900	1	1,411	3	2,811	4	1,617	5	(89	1	488	2	411	1 4	197	3	13,472	2
<u>R1</u>	100			-	-	-	300	_1							5	_			-0-	=	405	
<u>50</u>			30	-	-	-	'/4	_	-	-	40	-	50		1,014	3			4	-	1,287	
<u>SU</u>		-	123					_	500	<u> </u>			725	1		_			-10	_	1,348	
<u>I'N</u>	5,998	6	5,390	5	3,207	2	1,356	3	-565	1	6,629	20	594	1	320	1	1,090	3 1,9	3771	3	27,126	4
<u>1X</u>	11,990	12	2,198	2	1,307	1	2,187	4	6,9%	<u>11</u>	998	3	3,571	5	3,264	10	3,9561	1 :	315	2	36,758	6
<u>UT</u>	4,000	4	·	_	1,018	1	512	_1	. 101		322	1	42	-	370	-1	.800	2	0	-	7,165	1
VT	<u></u>		155	=	440	-		_	1			-		-		-		1,	365	9	1,960	<u> </u>
VA	1,134	1	2,118	2	2,555	2	551	1	. 46	-	486	1	530	1	1,023	3	982	2	155	1	9,580	1
WA	1,650	2	2,745	3	5,839	4	301	1	1	-	658	2	200	-	2,672	8	2,017	6	25	1	16,208	2
WV	5,790	6	1,340	1	44,043	27	1,205	2	398	1	801	2	700	1	1,513	5	2,812	8 4	150	3	59,052	9
WI	100	-		_	1,900	1	374	1		-		_	224		197	1			107	1	2,902	, <u> </u>
WY	57	_	5,800	6	576		340	_1	1,155	2	487	_1	(50	-	5	-			0-	_	8,470	1
Guam			672	1		_	<u> </u>	-		-		-					<u> </u>		0-	_	672	
Puerto Rico	707	31 I	-	_	ନ୍ତ୍ର	1	_								1	_1		S	· /	_1	805	·

Table XII.—Amount of Explosives Stolen by State 1978–1987 (Total in Pounds of H.E. + L.E. + BA Stolen)

669,408 Grand Total (GT)

1,168

1,680 4

0

15,228

101,217 104,247 164,504 48,917

64,112 33,873 **68,100** 32,948 36,262

Virgin Is

Totals

Table XIII.-Number of Blasting Caps Stolen By State 1978-1987

YEARLY	1978	3	1979	1	1980		1981		1982	2.	1983		1984	L.	1985	;	1986		1987	-	10-YEA	AR
TOTAL/PERCENT	No.	R.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	1%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	æ	No. 9	6	TOTAL	% GT
AL	6,751	10	5,272	11	505	1	849	2	2,887	7	606	2	709	2	149	<u> </u>	1,049	3	808	2	19,585	4
AK		1	789	2	-	-		_	1		_	_	96		_				0 -	<u></u>	885	-
AZ	1,120	2	431	1	332	-	20	-	ŀ	_	1,121	4			33	_	44		322	1	3,423	1
AR	10		2,217	4	1,746	2	372	1	-	_	15		815	2	390	1	8		1,126	3	6,699	1
CA	1,093	2	1,100	2	1,708	2	901	3	200	_	365	1	979	3	1,060	2	1.894	6	330	1	9,630	2
C0	3.065	5	900	2	1,425	2	700	2		_	430	2	148		· _		1,098	3	0 -	-	7,761	2
CT	164		2,507	5	4,449	5	20	_	-		250	1			·	_	174		100 -	_	7,664	2
DE		-					-			-		- 1			· _ ·	_	1		0 -	_	0	Ţ
DC	·		· · ·	1	-						i i	_				_			0 -	_	0	
FL	3.863	6	626	1	_		_ ·		381	1	145	1	325	1	80	_	462	1	0 -		5.882	1
GA	1.601	2	1.284	3	781	1			250	1		_	390	1		_	÷		0 -		4,306	1
HI		-	_	_			-	_	-	_		-			372	1			0 -	_	372	-
ID			1.100	2		1	250	1	544	ī	431	2	3		100	_	100	1	13.315 4	0	15.843	3
IL	508	1	100	_	47	1	50		3.335	9	50		1.648	5	_	_			- 0	_	5,738	1
<u>IN</u>	934	1	198		530	1	2.067	7	855	2	25		169	ī	263	1	_		64 -	_	5.105	1
ΤΑ	979	t i	_	_	50		100		_		_		436	1			1 282	4	165 -		3.012	_
KS	1.480	2	_ :		30		894	3	907	2	213	1	1.087	3	1.211	3	811	1	204	1	6.337	1
KY	10.371	16	3.908	8	12.069	14	6.854	20	7.516	18	5.899	22	2 4 5 4	7	12,942	28	6.326	20 1	0.124 3		78,463	17
Ι.Δ	261		270	1	186		597	2	58		150	1			7		0,010		0 -	1	1 529	
ME	1 092	0		-											125	<u> </u>	_		0-		1 217	······································
MD	490				456	,			1 996	2		· · ·	40		22		245		0		2 488	
<u>Μ</u> Δ	740				100		··	_	880	9						_	440				2,400	
MI			- 40					_	2 996	5							9 600	9	2		1 890	1
MN	0		1 000	-	43		795	- 2	14	U	62			F	15	_	2,000	Ť		+	1,868	
MC	-	-	1,005	- 24	904 204		67	-4	20	-	0	_	50		11 990				0	-	11 075	
MO	176	-	9 596	-	0.094	- C	910	1	20 2 250	-	470	- 0	0.175	7	0 101	40		5	20	╧┼╴	19 550	9
<u>MU</u>	1/0		2,020	0	2,000 700	0	012 451	1	2,002	0	4/9	4	4,171	<u>,</u>	2,121	0	120	4	- 00-	-	1 906	<u> </u>
MIT		H		-	130	1	401	L	-		100	T	4							-+-	1,050	
<u>NE</u>		-	20							-		-		-		-				-	0.020	
NV	300		908	4	494	1	979	3		-	200					-				-	2,939	
<u>NI</u>	00		=	-		ł		-		Ē		_	1 100			-					9.910	
NJ	00		010	1	100	-		_	040		1,000	4	1,100	4	· · · · · ·	=				-	3,219	
	7,395		24	_	3,031	3	50		390			-	2,000	0		-	. 510	1		-	13,276	<u>J</u>
<u>NY</u>	2,284	0	100	_	419			-		-	001	1	1 000			-			- 1 -	-	3,304	
<u>NG</u>	292		100	_	1,158	4	1,427	4	329		721	3	1,900	0	1,881	4	200	-	321	4	8,279	2
ND	100		217	_	-	=		-	14	1	30	1		╞═		-	1		- 0	╪	362	
<u>OH</u>	2,324	ö	526	1	2,6/4	2	1,361	4	350		2,941	11		-	99	-	40		238	4	10,558	2
<u>OK</u>	1,370	Z	1,100	2	715	1	1,148	3	2,144	0	948	4	/0	F	232	1	412	1	185 -	-	8,390	2
<u>OR</u>	590		452	1	2,220	5		-	19		693	3	140	-	200	1			400	1	4,720	
PA	•2,811	4	1,282	3	1,049	1	2,110	6	0,824	14	1,962	7	3;217	10	2,930	6	879	3		-	22,064	5
<u>RI</u>		H		-		1	524	<u> 2</u>		-		_	<u> </u>	-	13	_	-		<u> </u>	-	537	
<u>SC</u>	48		550		833	-	3	-		-	200	Ł				-				- -	1,634	
<u>SD</u>	150						_		400				1,000	<u>_3</u>	. —	-			- 0	-	1,550	
<u>TN</u>	2,403	4	870	2	1,025	1	712	2	3,466	8	2,440	9	26	=	2,534	5	2,086	6	675	2	16,287	3
<u>TX</u>	4,078	6	7,772	16	1,560	2	501	1	1,974	5	2,288	9	3,322	10	1,539	3	1,689	5	2,018	6	26,741	6
<u>UT</u>	1,165	2	2,595	5	3,207	4	1,059	3	112	-	226	1	188	1	160	<u> </u>	100	-	60 -	-	8,872	2
<u>VT</u>	—	-	450	-1	74	H		-		-		_		-					- 0	-	524	
<u>VA</u>	2,097	3	3,056	6	20,150	23	5,911	17	2,604	6	1,011	4	6,166	19	2,676	6	3,426	11	1,530	5	48,627	11
<u>WA</u>	1,200		52	_	1,294	1	538	2			350	_1	975	3	1,900	4	4,924	16	50 -	-	11,283	5
<u>WV</u>	1,544	2	2,939	6	19,419	22	2,178	6	681		527	2	640	2	2,053	4	709	2	575	2	31,265	- 7
<u>WI</u>	2,172	3	<u> </u>	-		-	100	-		<u> </u>		_		ļ		-			450	1	2,722	
<u>WY</u>	13	1-			29	-	160		134		300	1				<u> </u>			- 0	= -	636	<u> </u>
<u>Guam</u>	<u> </u>		18		-	-		-		<u> -</u>		_		<u> </u>				-		-	37	
Puerto Rico	488	1	·	-	1	-				<u> </u>				<u> </u>	· <u> </u>	<u> </u>	-		0 -	-	489	
Virgin Is		1-	i <u>,</u> ,	=		-	_	_		1-				1-	140	<u> </u>	125	-	- 0	-	265	
Totals	66.61	4	47.91	8	87.66	4	33,99	0	42.46	6	26.45	5	33.13	6	46.25	5	31.497		33.112		449.10	07

Grand Total (GT)

			a de la composición d		1	A Constant of the second se
Year		Manufacturer	Dealer	Permittee	User	Total
1078	#	31	29	72	230	369
1310	%	8.6%	8.0%	19.9%	63.5%	002
1070	#	28	30	70	207	225
1919	%	8.4%	8.9%	20.9%	61.8%	
1090	#	32	38	71	208	340
1.500	%	9.2%	10.9%	20.3%	59.6%	0+0
1001	#	29	19	65	130	049
1901	%	11.9%	7.8%	26.8%	53.5%	240
1089	#	13	30	52	106	901
1902	%	6.5%	14.9%	25.9%	52.7%	
1099	#	24	24	58	102	909
1900	%	11.5%	11.5%	28%	49%	
108/	#	9	23	67	113	010
1904	%	4.2%	10.9%	31.6%	53.3%	
1085	#	12	27	49	131	910
1900	%	5.5%	12.3%	22.4%	59.8%	- 219
1096	#	7	16	51	96	170
1900	%	4%	9%	30%	57%	- 170
1097	#	6	16	34	66	100
1901	%	5%	13%	28%	54%	
	Total	191	252	589	1,389	9 491 Gra
% (Frand Total	8%	10%	24%	58%	- 2,421 Tot

Table XIV.—Theft Of Explosives As Reported By Licensees, Permittees, and Users 1978–1987

Figure VII

Percentage Graph of Explosive Thefts As Reported By Licensees, Permittees, And Users 1978-1987





Table XV.-Quantity Of Explosives Recovered By Category 1978-1987

							1				
					-			1 I			10-YEAR
<u> </u>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	TOTAL
Dynamite	41,008	30,975	87,653	24,546	22,574	20,755	9,962	22,536	16,635	14,226	290,870
TNT C-4 Military	783	5,333	288	502	2,661	143	304	329	424	285	11,052
Primer	344	138	268	47	124	170	247	339	148	1,004	2,829
Boosters	362	2,897	2,425	377	604	298	87	1,179	200	171	8,600
Yearly Total	42,497	39,343	90,634	25,472	25,963	21,366	10,600	24,383	17,407	15,686	313,351
		у. — ⁴			Low Ex	plosives-	–In Pou	nds			
Black Powder	723	2,856	433	19	41	363	319	1,044	261	588	6,647
Smokeless Powder	1,361	7,546	45	114	6	49	312	162	625	414	10,634
Yearly Total	2,084	10,402	478	133	47	412	631	1,206	886	1,002	17,281
					Blasting	Agents	—In Pou	nds			
	23,623	33,335	27,744	12,822	16,046	319	3,065	3,793	1,603	4,147	126,497
		- 	D	etonating	Cord/Ig	nitor Co	rd/Safety	r Fuse—In	n Feet		
	101,117	148,850	120,561	48,375	82,887	57,492	79,306	87,820	111,033	31,311	868,752
					Blastin	ig Caps-	-By Cou	nt			
	44,456	29,222	37,670	11,386	16,000	15,053	12,061	29,571	17,017	15,619	228,055
					Gren	iades—B	y Count				
	*	566	136	96	138	49	402	314	295	299	2,295
			· /								

High Explosives-In Pounds

*Pertinent data regarding the theft of grenades were not recorded independently for the year 1978.

Note: The category of Other, as reflected in statistics for the years 1978 through 1984, has been deleted from this table as well as the category Potassium Chlorate/Photoflash Powder. Those recoveries that would have filled these categories for 1985 and 1987 are not reported in this table.

Table XVI.—Incidents of Recovered Explosives Previously ReportedStolen1 1979–1987

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Total
Number of Incidents	121	123	90	66	49	69	103	88	53	762
Pounds of Explosives	11,813	92,961	11,142	15,133	5,994	6,867	15,125	9,411	8,060	176,506
Blasting Caps	12,778	10,416	5,835	7,345	4,404	6,015	22,479	11,716	3,210	84,198
Feet of Safety Fuse and Detonating Cord .	35,000	37,264	13,970	29,785	22,267	17,833	49,378	45,488	7,208	258,193

¹Recovered explosives may have been reported stolen in years other than recovered.

Figure IX

Comparison of Categories of Explosives Recovered by Year as Percent of 10-Year Totals 1978-1987



	Table XVI	L	Ine	cid	en	ts	OT	Ex	cpl	$\mathbf{0S1}$	ve	K	eco	DVE	erie	es i	by	St	ate	5 13	97	8-18	57
	YEARLY TOTAL/RANK	19 No.	78 R	19 No.	79 R	19 No.	80 R	19 No.	81 R	19 No.	82 R	19 No.	83 R	19 No.	84 R	19 No.	85 R	19 No.	86 R	198 No.	37 R	10–Y TOTAL	EAR RANK
AL.		. 43	7	33	11	36	7	26	5	15	9	13	10	20	7	25	11	14	20	13	14	238	12
AK	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	. 4	30		31	·	28	3	24	-	23	4	18	3	20	-	31	4	25	3	22	21	42
AZ.	<u></u>	. 9	25	1	30	12	18	8	19	9	14	8	15	11	14	9	22	6	24	8	19	81	30
AR	<u></u>	. 11	23	21	15	20	14	17	12	7	16	13	10	10	15	14	18	24	11	16	11	153	20
CA	••• <u>••••</u> ••	. 44	6	23	13	42	5	30	4	21	6	31	3	39	2	67	2	91	2	108	1	496	3
CO		. 24	14	22	14	16	16	7	20	9	14	4	18	4	19	19	15	31	8	15	12	151	21
<u>CT.</u>	<u></u>	. 2	32	11	22	6	23	9	18	7	16	10	13	9	16	6	25	12	21	3	22	75	32
DE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 7	27	4	28		28		27	1	22		22	1	22	1	30	1	28	2	23	17	43
DC	*******		34	_2	29		28	_	27		23	1	21		23	3	28	4	25	2	23	12	46
FL.	<u></u>	. 19	17	8	25	12	18	24	7	13	10	18	6	31	4	18	16	33	6	24	6	200	15
GA	<u></u>	. 38	9	67	5	22	12	25	6	12	11	6	17	11	14	22	13	22	13	25	5	250	9
<u>HI .</u>		. 3	31	6	26	3	25	2	25	3	20		22	2	21	3	28	3	26	1	24	26	40
<u>ID</u> .	••••••••••	. 6	28	4	28	3	25		27	4	19	3	19		23	2	29	6	24	6	20	34	37
<u>IL</u> .	<u></u>	. 42	8	63	6	60	2	18	11	18	8	16	8	13	12	45	3	55	3	38	3	368	5
<u>IN</u> .	<u></u>	. 14	21	15	18	11	19	5	22	11	ï2	16	8	7	18	23	12	12	12	16	11	130	22
<u>IA</u> .	<u></u>	. 7	27	6	26	5	24	6	21	1	22	2	20	4	19	5	26	1	28	2	23	39	36
KS.	<u></u>	. 14	21	9	24	10	20	8	19	12	11	11	12	12	13	12	19	23	12	11	16	122	24
<u>KY</u>	<u></u>	. 67	1	121	1	82	1	53	1	40	1	34	2	16	10	39	4	26	10	20	9	498	2
LA.	<u></u>	. 14	21	11	22	16	16	14	14	4	19	10	13	11	14	11	20	20	14	14	13	125	23
ME	<u></u>	. 1	33	2	29	1	27	1	26	_	23	<u> </u>	22	1	22	4	27	2	27	2	23	14	45
MD	<u></u>	. 10	24	8	25	8	22	8	19	5	18	10	13	1	22	5	26	18	16	11	16	84	29
MA	••••	14	21	9	24	11	19	4	23	9	14	4	18	18	8	15	17	7	23	- 8	19	99	26
<u>MI .</u>	····	. 20	16	10	23	9	21	10	17	_11_	12	11	12	16	10	21	14	23	12	29	4	160	18
MN	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 4	30	14	19	5	24	2	25	1	23	_1	21	3	20	4	27	4	25	8	19	45	35
MS	<u></u>	. 8	26	19	17	14	17	14	14	8	15	11	12	17	9	1	30	6	24	4	21	102	25
MO	<u></u>	. 27	12	50	8	27	9	20	9	21	6	12	11	16	10	23	12	36	5	15	12	247	10
MT	<u></u>	. 1	33	2	29	3	25	4	23	12	11	3	19	~	23	2	29		29	2	23	29	39
<u>NE</u>	<u></u>	. 5	29	1	30	9	21	2	25	3	20	1	21	1	22	5	26	3	26	0		30	38
<u>NV</u>	<u></u>	7	27	5	27	11	19	9_	18	4	19	7	16	11	14	7	24	16	18	15	12	92	28
<u>NH</u>	<u></u>		34	2	29	1	27		27	2	21	1	21	1	22	6	25	6	24	4	21	23	41
NJ.	<u></u>	16	19	19	17	26	10	16	13	9	14	13	10	11	14	21	14	17	17	12	15	160	18
NM NW	•••••••	15	20	. 9	24	9	21	10	17	1	22	6	17	17	9	9	22	10	22	13	14	99	26
NY	<u>••••••••••••••••••</u>	20	13	20	16	16	16	8	19	5	18	12	11	34	3	25	11	30	9	21	8	196	16
	<u></u>	00	04	10	- J - 01	48	4	30	3	20	4	28	4	24	00	31	- 7	20	14	20	9	375	4
	<u></u>		32	12	21	0 41	24 Č		21	10	24	2	20	1	22	1	30		23	1	24	23	41
	<u></u>	24	10	09 95	10	41	0	22	0	4.9	- <i>1</i>	14	9	1	10	28	14	20	10	10	10	217	14
<u>OR</u>	<u></u>	09	11	- 	10	10	10	24	0	40		10	10	11	14	<u>41</u>	14	36	1	10	10	<u>441</u>	14
PA	<u></u>	97	12	24	120	39	30	12	16	19	10	17	7	15	11	36	6	30	20	22	20	997	19
RI	·····	21	32	27	31	1	97	1	26	10	79	-11	20	10	29	7	24	- 55	78	22		17	13
SC .	······································	38	9	50	8	17	15	13	15	13	10	14	<u>4</u> 0	11	14	10	21 91	- 7	20	10	17	183	17
$\frac{20}{\text{SD}}$	····	8	26	4	28	2	26	2	25		23		22	2.2	23	4	27	9	26	0		23	41
<u>~d</u> . TN	······································	37	10	33	11	32	10 19	22	8	23		22	5	29	5	37	5	19	15	21	8	275	
TX		47		77	4	50	3	49	2	33	2	36	1	63	1	85	1	104	1	90	2	634	1
UT		12	22	8	25	21	13	7	20	8	15	12	11	4	19	6	25	6	24	9	18	93	21
VT.	****	1	33	1	30	1	27	1	26		23	1	21		23	5	17	1	28	4	21	15	44
VA		46	5	40	9	42	5	19	10	15	9	13	10	10	15	26	10	16	18	16	11	243	11
WA		17	18	22	14	24	11	25	6	10	13	6	17	4	19	27	9	14	20	10	17	159	19
wv		61	2	90	2	50	3	19	10	10	13	8	15	13	12	11	20	15	19	8	19	285	6
WI.	<u></u>	9	25	13	20	3	25	10	17	6	17	9	14	8.	17	8	23	4	25	4	21	74	33
			Terra and the second second				and the second second			and the second				Tester Concerns					March 1977				

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Table XVIII.—Pounds Of Explosives RecoveredBy State By Year 1978–1987 (HE + LE + BA)

YEARLY	197	8	1979	 }	1980		1981		1982		1983	 }	1984	. 1	1985		1986		1987		10-YE	AR
TOTAL/PERCENT	No.	1%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	Ħ	No.	%	No.	Ħ	No.	%	No:	%	No.	%	TOTAL	% GT
<u>AL</u>	2,681	4	372	_	607	1	931	2	195	Ŧ	717	3	2,071	12	167	-	46	-	2,691	13	10,478	2
<u>AK</u>	8	8—				_	4	_		-	27	_	4	_	—	_	754	3	2	_	799	
AZ	187	<u>' -</u>		_	905	1	497	1	478	1	257	1	156	1	1,126	4	112	1	188	1	3,906	1
<u>AR</u>	847	1	815	1	755	1	527	1	87		2,751	12	345	2	853	3	201		1,159	5	8,340	2
CA	5,721	. 8	651	1	3,615	3	1,232	3	309	1	1,200	5	358	2	174	-	694	3	1,038	5	14,992	3
CO	529	1	1,512	2	1,793	2	81	—	36		33	-	305	2	66		119	-	54	_	4,528	1
<u>CT</u>	- 2	<u> </u>	284	_	2	_	72	_	179	ł	34	_	540	3	16	-	802	3	159		2,090	
DE	2,196	5 3	14	_		_	·	—	30	-	<u> </u>			-	4				0	_	2,244	
DC		-	13				<u> </u>		<u>, </u> — С	1							-	-	0	_	13	
FL	1,672	2	651	1	63		2,967	8	381	1	409	2	129	1	1,278	4	1,162	5	3,192	15	11,904	2
GA	2,435	3	549	1	705	1	3,127	8	266	1	95	_	158	1	569	2		1	201	1	8,425	2
<u>HI</u>	1		_	-		_	-		2					_	11	_		-	0	-	14	_
ID	355	<u> </u>	1,764	2	91	-		_	160		50	_	-	4	10	-	11	-	579	3	3,020	1
<u>IL</u>	-307	<u>/ </u>	2,598	3	1,024	1	2,280	6	2,238	5	2,647	12	54	<u></u>	1,278	4	570	2	279	1	13,275	3
IN	290) 	1,124	1	518		11	—	309	i	8	_	11	<u> </u>	584	2	199		206	1	3,260	1
IA	232	<u> </u>	351	-	6	_	1,596	4		-	26	-	13	4	9	_			330	2	2,563	
KS	3,720	5	314		70	_	162	_	277	1	1,529	7	722	4	310	1	1,463	6	173	1	8,740	2
КҮ	5,019	7	5,393	6	18,464	15	2,786	7	10,343	25	607	3	3,106	19	5,738	19	910	4	1,918	9	54,278	11
LA	820	1	103	-	726	1	930	2	113	1	162	1	140	1	201	1	265	1	232	1	3,692	1
ME	<u> </u>	-	25	_	_	_	2	_	l	1	1	1	125	1	76	1	9	_	0	—	237	·
MD	6,298	8 8	29	_	49		502	1	30	1	7	1	I	1	l	1	50		169	1	7,134	2
MA	355		69		14		8	_	683	2	199	. 1	- 333	2	5	1	139		1	_	1,806	
MI	176	;	18	_	112	_	295	1	2,668	6	168	1	68		222	1	758	3	59	-	4,544	1
MN	53		138		142		I	_	-	-	20	-	5		52	_	8	_	485	2	903	
MS	215	; —	275	_	417	_	318	1	742	2	112	1	491	3	- 1	:	258	1	52		2,881	
MO	1,176	2	5,047	6	632	1	325	1	3,027	7	212	1	594	-4	637	2	552	2	201	1	12,403	3
MT	944	1	47	-	500	_	26	_	722	2	61	_				-	1	_	3	_	2,303	
NE	259)	200	_	124		-		505	1	2	-	1	1	168		8		0	_	1,266	
NV	262		81		1,905	2	415	1	18	1	307	1	87	1	203	1	207		211	1	3,696	1
NH			2	_			·			1	12	_	-		3	_	19		200	1	236	
NJ	44		176		78		2		81		46	-	891	5	48	-	8	-	37	_	1,351	
NM	696	1	1,099	1	529		1,113	3	300	1	188	1	79	-	9	-	142	2	2,559	12	6,714	1
NY	601	1	437	1	285		67	_	725	2	351	2	632	4	165	. <u>.</u>	72		296	1	3,631	1
NC	1,134	2	1,467	2	886	1	2,640	- 7	556	1	352	2	587	4	1,083	4	322	1	345	2	9,372	2
ND			1,184	1	355		1		1	1	370	2	4	-	2	1			0		1,916	
ОН	7,145	10	3,670	4	21,941	18	249	1	412	1	138	1	28		1,935	6	613	2	198	1	36,329	8
OK	1,948	3	9,134	11	1,228	1	89	_	4,318	10	1,284	6	153	1	248	1	1,396	6	502	2	20,295	4
OR	945	1	36	_	2,315	2	9	_	628	1	825	4	220	1	837	3	2		6	_	5,823	1
PA	3,450	5	622	1	44,092	37	914	2	1,344	3	1,719	8	87	1	889	3	1,931	8	208	1	55,256	12
RI	100		· ·	-	_		300	1		ļ	5	_	_	ł	5	. •	-	_	23	_	433	
SC	1,055	1	593	1	258		124	-	123		274	1	773	5	806	3	121	-	18		4,145	1
SD	- 20		296	_	10		4	_	2-1	1	-	-	-	1	71	1	9		0	_	410	-
TN	· 794	1	1,502	2	1,982	1	959	2	1,110	3	739	3	1,179	7	2,456	8	3,032	13	827	4	13,980	3
ΤΧ	7,975	10	4,143	5	2,834	2	11,514	30	4,377	10	2,414	11	980	6	4,202	14	3,075	13	1,537	7	42,451	9
UT	682	1	240	_	983	1	208	1	542	1	142	1	159	1	161	-	160		382	2	3,659	1
VT		_	150	_	27	_	1		1		1				855	3		1	50	-	1,088	
VA	658	1	1,795	2	895	1	282	1	2,161	5	403	2	472	3	1,037	3	24	_	63	_	7,790	2
WA	. 258	 	1,846	2	3,518	3	277	1	287	1	142	1	900	2	503	2	1,722	7	204	1	9,052	2
wv	10,833	14	32,512	39	3,969	3	471	1	193		1,225	5	253	2	1,715	6	880	4	301	1	52,352	11
WI	127		34	_	423		254	1	7		10	_		-	138	<u></u>	8		52	_	1,053	
WY	152		773	1	127		436	1	1,268	3	1	_	63	46	2		16	-	0	_	2,838	· _ [
Guam	196		47					_			_	_			_				0	_	243	
Puerto Rico				_	A0		_	_			_	_				_	1		0		1	_
Virgin Is			·	<u> </u>			_			2	_		-		_	_			0	_	0	
Totals	74.9	36	84,19	5	119.36	9	39,00	7	42.23	1	22,28	1	16.61	6	30.92	8	23.17	0	21,39	0	474,1	52

Grand Total

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 10-YEAR No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 10-YEAR YEARLY TOTAL/PERCENT

Table	XIXNumber	Of Blasting	Caps]	Recovered	By	State
	\mathbf{I}	By Year 1978	3-1987			

AL	1.798	4	144	1	224	1	1.188	10	417	3	39	_	1.365	11	74		183	1	1.038	7	6.470	3
AK	71		· _	-			34	_			1	_	3		_	_	4	1	5		118	· · ·
AZ	156				3.892	10	418	4	267	2	_	_	150	1	44	_	12	1	6	_	4,945	2
AR	17		2.132	7	393	1	128	1	10		484	3	4		94		83		255	2	3.600	2
	2 243	5	371	1	1 945	3	127	1	309	9	582	4	267	2	196	1.	1 014	6	177		6.531	3
<u>CO</u>	1 590		1 179	4	1 977	5	7		75		23		40		142	-	2,022	-	281	2	5 258	2
<u></u> CT	1,000		2 261	- R	2,011	1	92	. 1	6		23				34		397	9	18		3 114	1
<u>סו</u>	759	9	4,401	- 0	200	1		1	0		20		159	1	- 01	-	161	P	10		1 077	
DC	100	4	10	=		-		-				-	100	1		-	101		0	ᅴ	1,017	
<u>DU</u>	0.007		001		100		055			-	115	1	400	-	190	_	<u></u>	I	50	-	4 010	-
<u>FL</u>	4,041	0	201	1	109		200	2	<u></u>	Ξ,	110	1	100	0	129		409	9	02	_	9,605	- 4
<u>GA</u>	1,090	4	080	-2	210	<u> </u>	307	- 3	<u> </u>	-	<u> </u>	-	102	1			420	4	0/4	-4	3,000	
<u>HI</u>		-		-		-		-	1	-		-	0	╞═					<u> </u>	_	1 1 1 1	
<u>ID</u>	30		12	-	1,437	4		-	20		17	-		–		-	223	1	10	ᅴ	1,747	
<u>IL</u>	660	1	756	3	122	-	163	1	1/1	1	263	2	110	1	290	1	18	Π.	13		2,580	
<u>IIN</u>	743	2	142	1	273	<u> </u>		-	183	1	105	1	10		946	3	239	<u> </u>	50	_	2,751	
<u>IA</u>			1		11	-	401	4					10	-	201	1			1,282	8	2,149	
<u>KS</u>	2,483	6	4	-	52		210	2	38		117	1	214		787	3	1.60	1	30	_	4,095	2
<u>KY</u>	1,253	3	4,719	16	1,879	<u>b</u>	2,042	18	1,666	10	5,260	35	1,890	16	2,255	8	/41	4	1,721	11	23,426	10
LA	2,533	6	14	_	170		519	5	3		96	1	47	-		_	30	-	7	_	3,419	
<u>ME</u>	29	-		_		1	1	-	-	-			—	-	125	_	3	-	0	-	158	
<u>MD</u>	154	-	66	-	20	1	4		2	-	3	-		-			228	1	1	_	478	
<u>MA</u>	38	-	18	-	5	-	42	_	1,117	7	_308	_2	1	-	16	-			19	-	1,564	
<u>M1</u>	54	-	44		14	-	443	4	744	5	2	-		-	63	-	2,634	15	42	_	4,040	2
<u>MN</u>	3			-	131	Н		-		-	35	-	15)	50	-		-17	13	_	247	
<u>MS</u>	7	-	92	-	154	F	196	2	114	1	50		90	1	1	-	111	-	4	_	819	<u> </u>
<u>MO</u>	457	1	1,509	5	1,658	4	244	2	151	1	103	_1	896	17	2,049	7	736	4	83	1	7,886	3
<u>MT</u>		-	200	1		1	100	_1	12	-	37	-		-		_		_	3		352	
<u>NE</u>			871	3	b	1		-	<u> </u>	F	2	_	6		10	_		I	0	-	895	<u> </u>
<u>NV</u>	356	1	391	1	791	2	6	_			<u> </u>		137	1	32	-	683	4	37	_	2,446	
<u>NH</u>		-	-			1		-	-	-		-				_	8	-	400	3	408	
NJ	1 015		285	1	652	2	39	-	<u>1</u> 1		12	-	192		15	-	101	I	3	_	1,266	1
	1,040	4	2,072	1	1,204	0	104				0	-	204	2	100	_	101		100	-0	0,208	3
<u>NY</u>	3,073	4	50	_	438	-		_	2/1	2	9	_	273	2	168	1	38		13	-	4,393	2
ND	080	1	1,884	1	412	1		-0	049	3	211	1	10	0	2,403	8	3/	-	99	<u> </u>	7,471	3
<u>ND</u>	1.007	_	210	1	1 010	1			4	-	20		18	-				_	110	-	260	
<u>OZ</u>	1,207	0	1 4774	2	1,019	0	141	-1	60	10	1010	10	150	0	100		50		110	1	4,009	- 4
<u>OR</u>	000	4	1,474	Э	(0 0.041	17	217	- 2	2,123	10	1,910	10	102	1	15	1	<u>00</u> 0		0/	1	7 094	0
<u>ΟΛ</u> Dλ	201	1	- 49 91 4		0,241	1	20		1 1 4 0	1	1 10	0	103		10 9 911	1.1	2 207		100		1,004 9 001	
<u>FA</u> pi	50	4	514	1	000	4	504 504	0	1,140	<u> </u>	1,100	0	04	1	0,011	11	0/2/	<u>ə</u>	102	1	0,001	<u>4</u>
<u>44</u>	00					-	044	0			200	-		F	10	-	10		U 90	커	9 650	
<u>SD</u>	201	4	143	3	1-	A I	11		0/		320	2	<u></u>	⊨	50		10		- 39	-	401	
	020	4			0 000		201	-		1	- 179		1 105		11 564		967		5 004	20	92 002	10
TN	6 4 6 0	15	000	- 2	3,290	3	541	0 5	100 5 (10	1 94	110	 	1,190	10	0 500	<u>ა</u> ფ	1 967	4	1 1 9 0 4	7	40,990	10
1 <u>A</u>	0,402	10	970	0	1,000	* 7	10	-0	0,410	04	004	0	1,514	10	2,000	9	1,001	0	2,130	-1	2 9 9 6 9	10
<u>UI</u> VT	104		1		4,100	_1	19	-	<u></u>	ļ	-040	4	100	1		_	1	_	100	1	3,004	4
<u>V1</u>		-			405	-	110	-			109	- 1	167	-		-	110	-	199	-1	200	<u> </u>
<u>WA</u>	100	<u> </u>	040	<u></u>	900 001	7	119	1	114	1	100	1	107	1	1 020	1	5 959	94	44		4,949	
	100	10	9 590	1	001	4	000		110	<u> </u>	1 990	10	200	1	1,049	J	100	04	120		10 020	
<u><u>vv</u> v</u>	9,007	110	4,039	а	1,117	্র	90	1	207	1	1,009	12	300	3	107	_	T9A		70A	1	10,932	0
<u>WI</u> WV	2,212						1		. <u> </u>		40	_	100	F.	107				520	4	4,140	<u> </u>
<u>WI</u>	28		280		10		87		60	<u>т</u>	4		100	<u> </u>			24		10	-	1 170	
Puorto Rico	1,109	3								Ť						_			19	-	1,110	
<u>ruerto Mco</u>	<u> </u>					-								F		-			0	-	0 0 0	
Totala					07.07		11 00	_	18.00	~	15.05	-		1 <u></u>		1	17.01		15 01		000.01	55
Totals	1 44,40	0	49,22	4	01,01	U	11,00	0	10,00	v	10,00	<u>o</u>	14,00	<u>u _</u>	49,07	T	TINT	1	10,01	5	620,00	<u>10</u>

Grand Total

Fact Sheet-1984/85/86/87

- 1. Number of explosive traces conducted by ATF during 1987-648
- 2. Methods of entry employed in explosive thefts

		198	84	198	35	198	36	19	87
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Α.	Locks cut & pried	68	32	66	30	72	42	27	22
В.	Doors pried & blown open	10	5	20	9	7	4	11	9
С.	Keys used	14	7	20	9	13	8	11	9
D.	Entry through wall	9	4	6	3	7	4	5	4
E.	Entry through roof	3		4	2	1	1	3	2
F.	Entry through windows & vents	5	2	5	2	3	2	2	2
G.	Entry through floor	1	<u> </u>	2	.1	0	- <u></u>	0	0
H.	"Inside" help	1		1		0		4	3
I.	Other/Unknown	101	48	95	43	67	39	59	48
	TOTALS	21	2	21	9	17	0	12	2



Pipe bomb found near Kalamazoo, Michigan, during a search of motorcycle saddlebags. The suspect was charged in a 9-count indictment with posessing pipe bombs, machine guns, and silencers, and threatening a witness.

Part III SIGNIFICANT EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIONS 1987



_{എനി}ാ റ സ



The results of a February 2, 1987, vehicle bombing that proved fatal to a Texarkana, Texas, business executive.





Significant Explosives Investigations 1987



In January 1987, a former U.S. Army Special Forces major was sentenced in San Antonio, Texas, to 10 years in prison and fined \$15,000 for transferring unregistered explosive devices. These charges resulted from his making bombs that were sold to ATF undercover agents. The undercover agents, posing as Mexican terrorists, negotiated with the retired major for the purchase of 18 explosive devices. The undercover scheme centered on the major's willingness to sell explosives to Mexican nationals who had ties with terrorist organizations. On May 24, 1986, he was arrested when he delivered the bombs to the agents. His wife, and co-conspirator, was also arrested as was a third accomplice, another former Green Beret.

The former major had a 20-year military career in which he taught bomb disposal techniques to Latin American police, fought as a mercenary in South Africa, participated in a Special Forces combat team in Vietnam, and fought leftist guerrillas in Equador.

The two other defendants were each sentenced to 5 years' probation and assessed a \$5,000 fine for conspiracy to possess, manufacture, and transfer an unregistered explosive device.



On May 31, 1987, the home of a Federal firearms dealer and known mental patient from Jennings, Missouri, was searched by ATF, a U.S. army explosive ordnance disposal unit, and the St. Louis County and Jennings police. The search was initiated when investigators received information that the suspect had an undetermined amount of explosives in his house. During this search, several rooms were found to be booby-trapped with potential destructive devices, none of which contained any explosive materials. The search resulted in the seizure of 25 hand grenades, a pipe bomb, and a quantity of explosive powder. Two unregistered machine guns, a large quantity of ammunition, and other numerous firearms were also seized.

The suspect, who had been released from a mental facility the same day as the search, was arrested when he returned to his residence. He revealed to investigators that he had previously test-detonated several of the explosive devices. The suspect further stated that he had intended to kill his ex-wife and then himself.

The suspect was immediately recommitted to a mental facility. He currently remains at the institution to await formal action by State and Federal prosecutors.



On December 5, 1987, an explosive device detonated at a residential trailer in Reno, Nevada, causing severe injuries to the legs of the victim and \$4,000 in damages to the trailer. The two other occupants of the residence were not injured. The device, which had been placed by the entrance to the trailer, exploded when the victim opened the door. A joint investigation into the incident was initiated by ATF and the Reno Police and Fire Departments.

Information was developed during the investigation that identified a prime suspect in the bombing. The information revealed that the suspect, a close associate of the Branded Few Chapter of the Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, had access to a quantity of explosives. Further investigation resulted in a consent search of the suspect's vehicle. Three blasting caps were recovered. The leg wires of the blasting caps were similar to those found at the scene of the blast. The investigators were also able to obtain a confession from the suspect's accomplice who stated that he had assisted in placing the bomb next to the victim's door. This bomb was rigged to detonate when the door opened.

As a result of the developed leads and other corroborative evidence based on laboratory analysis, both the primary suspect and his accomplice were indicted in State court for attempted murder and destruction of a building by explosives. On December 9, 1987, the suspects were arrested by ATF and the Reno Police Department. Both individuals

were held in lieu of \$100,000 bond.

The primary suspect and his accomplice were sentenced in April of 1988. The accomplice was originally sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, but his sentence was suspended. This resulted in his being placed on 5 years' probation for using explosives to destroy property. The suspension of the accomplice's sentence was due to his cooperation with law enforcement and his minimal participation in the bombing.

The primary suspect was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment at the Nevada State Prison for attempted murder with a deadly weapon.



On September 2, 1987, an electrician installing computer lines in the Comanche County Courthouse, Lawton, Oklahoma, discovered a brown briefcase in the suspended ceiling near a district judge's chambers. A Comanche County deputy removed the briefcase and transported it to a safe area. The Lawton Police Department Bomb Squad was then called in to render safe a device that had been found inside the briefcase. ATF's assistance was requested, whereupon the recovered evidence from the device was forwarded to the ATF lab for latent fingerprint examination.

On this same date, ATF developed a witness who had overheard a subject state that he was going to blow up the courthouse because he was angry about a domestic proceeding. ATF confronted the subject who stated that the comment which had been overheard was only a joke. The subject later submitted to a polygraph examination administered by the Lawton Police Department. The subject tested deceptive but denied any involvement in the incident. A consent search was also conducted at his residence, and this proved negative.

This investigation continues.

On February 27, 1987, two Portsmouth, Ohio, men were indicted by a grand jury in Scioto County, Ohio, for explosives violations. These indictments stemmed from an investigation conducted by ATF and the Portsmouth Police Department. The investigation was initiated when two juveniles found four pipe bombs at a dump site in Portsmouth. The bombs, which were hidden inside a tire, were in a six-pack beer carton inside a paper bag. The juveniles brought the devices home and called the Portsmouth Police Department. The police responded with the local explosive ordnance disposal unit who detonated one device and



rendered the other three safe. ATF assisted in the investigation by attempting to learn who made the bombs. A price tag found on one of the end caps of a device was traced to a local building supply store. Two suspects were developed, and an interview with one resulted in a statement implicating the other as well as himself. It was learned that the suspects had purchased the components and manufactured the devices but were interrupted at the dump site while detonating the pipe bombs.

Both defendants pled guilty to misdemeanors. One was sentenced to 1 years' probation, and the other received a jail sentence of 30 days and was fined \$250.

On September 17, 1987, a Virginia man's sentence was reduced from 60 years to 15 years in Federal prison following the results of his psychiatric evaluation. This sentence was the result of a verdict that found the defendant guilty on 9 counts of a 10-count indictment for possessing and manufacturing an unregistered device and for illegally intercepting a wire communication.

The investigation was initiated by ATF and the Richmond Police Department on October 13, 1986, after a Virginia State probation officer was injured when a bomb detonated in his automobile. The victim suffered a bruised leg and impaired hearing as a result of the explosion. Property damage was estimated at \$500.

A bomb scene search was conducted, and it was discovered that two pipe bombs had been placed under the seat of the car. The larger of the two devices failed to detonate and was recovered intact.

The ATF laboratory examined the recovered evidence and discovered latent fingerprints. Further investigation developed a suspect. A fingerprint comparison between that of the suspect and the latent print conclusively identified him as the bomber. The suspect had targeted the victim because of his involvement with the suspect's estranged wife.

In March 1988, two members of the Renegades Motorcycle Gang in Virginia Beach, Virginia, were sentenced in U.S. District Court, Norfolk, Virginia. The sentencing was the result of guilty pleas to part of a 153-count indictment handed down by a Federal grand jury on August 11, 1987. The indictment also charged 14 other members and associates of the Renegades with various Federal violations. These charges were the result of a 3¹/₂-year investigation conducted by ATF, the FBI, DEA, the Norfolk police, and the Virginia State Police. The investigation was initiated on March 20, 1984, when an explosion and fire destroyed a building in Norfolk, Virginia, that housed a drug addiction clinic and three other businesses. The total amount in damages as a result of the explosion and fire exceeded \$728,000. The investigation determined that the explosion was caused by a Thermite grenade which had been placed in the facility.

Further investigation revealed that the bombing was



ordered by the president of the Virginia Beach Chapter of the Renegades and that the motive was to destroy a "dirty" urine sample submitted by him to his Federal parole officer.

The 14 additional defendants have entered guilty pleas and also await sentencing.



On June 15, 1987, an explosion occurred at a fireworks distribution plant in Enid, Oklahoma. One employee was injured, and property damage was estimated at \$117,000. The explosion was investigated by ATF, the Oklahoma Fire Marshal's Office, the Enid Fire Department, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. It was determined that as the injured employee inspected a fuse, he smelled smoke and saw a spark in a magazine just prior to the blast. He attempted to escape when he was hit by fragmentation. The cause of the explosion was ruled accidental.



On January 29, 1987, ATF undercover agents, posing as criminals, purchased 175 sticks of dynamite and 150 electric blasting caps from an individual in Little Rock, Arkansas. This investigation was initiated when information was received by ATF that several individuals were dealing in stolen dynamite. During the course of the investigation, several similar undercover contacts and purchases were made that enabled the agents to learn the identity of all of the subjects. In addition, the agents determined that the dynamite was stolen from several locations in Arkansas. Five individuals were subsequently arrested and convicted. They were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 2½ to 4 years.

On November 9, 1987, a Denville, New Jersey, man was severely injured while manufacturing a pipe bomb in the basement of his residence. A search of his residence resulted in the seizure of another pipe bomb, two incendiary devices, timing devices, and other explosive materials.

While awaiting surgery, the bomb manufacturer stated that there was another device located in his family's summer home in Manchester, New Jersey. A search of that location resulted in the recovery of two incendiary devices. This investigation was conducted by ATF, the Denville and Manchester Police Departments, and the Morris County Prosecutor and Sheriff's Offices.

On May 14, 1987, a Reno, Nevada, student was convicted after a jury trial for violating Federal explosives laws. This was the second conviction in an investigation that began in October 1986 when ATF received information that another Reno, Nevada, student was selling stolen explosives. During the investigation, an ATF undercover agent, posing as a narcotics dealer, met this individual on several occasions and purchased approximately 100 pounds



of dynamite. The undercover agent, in his dealings with the student, was able to learn how the theft was accomplished. The agent also discovered that the explosives were stolen in Colorado and then transported to Reno, Nevada.

After arresting the student, ATF recovered the remaining stolen dynamite and a large quantity of blasting caps. The total amount stolen was in excess of 100 sticks of high explosives and almost 400 blasting caps. The first defendant was sentenced to 3 years' probation, and the other defendant awaits sentencing.



On January 14, 1987, five individuals were arrested by ATF and the Naval Investigative Service for a 1985 burglary of a railway car near the Concord Naval Weapons Station in California. Eight artillery shells were stolen in this burglary. The investigation revealed that the five suspects removed the filler from the shells and with this filler manufactured eight pipe bombs which were intended for use in a bank robbery.

All five defendants pled guilty to conspiracy and theft of Government property and were sentenced to serve 5 years in prison.

On December 18, 1987, a North Huntington, Pennsylvania, man was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and fined \$75,000 for violating Federal explosives and postal laws. The defendant's sentencing culminated a joint ATF and U.S. Postal Inspection investigation into a bombing, a bombing attempt, and several related mailings that contained threats of physical and destructive violence.

The investigation was initiated by the U.S. Postal Inspection on March 23, 1985, when a package exploded at a post office. Several weeks later, a letter was received by the local television station. The letter threatened the lives of three individuals and targeted a local coal company and the school district with violence.

On March 14, 1986, an explosive device was discovered at the local high school. ATF entered the investigation at this time, whereupon the two investigative agencies discussed the likelihood of the two explosive incidents being related. Ten days after the device's recovery, the local newspaper received a postcard referencing the two explosive incidents and threatening the coal company for a second time.

Based on handprint comparisons, bomb similarities, and circumstantial evidence, the investigators were able to determine the identity of the perpetrator. The motive behind his actions was his opposition to the conversion of a wooded area into a soccer field. His targets and intended targets were individuals or businesses who, in one way or another, were associated with the land's conversion.

In April 1987, a Fairmont, West Virginia, man was arrested by ATF and the Fairmont Police Department. The defendant had harassed, for more than 2 years, various family members of an old girlfriend through a series of assaults and bombings.

The investigation was initiated on July 10, 1985, when ATF and the Fairmont police responded to the scene where a county prosecutor had been injured by an exploding bomb. The bomb had been placed beneath the undercarriage of the prosecutor's vehicle. The explosion resulted in the victim sustaining injuries to his lower legs, but the vehicle protected him from potentially fatal injuries. This same prosecutor had previously attempted to convict the defendant for his attempted murder of a relative of the targeted family. The case was brought to court twice, but both trials ended in a hung jury and were dismissed.

The second bombing incident occurred on September 5, 1986, when the mother-in-law of the intended murder victim observed that a package had been left on the porch of her residence. When she lifted the package, it exploded. The victim received extensive injuries, but because of the failure of the main charge to explode, her life was spared.

The defendant, described as a violent and undisciplined individual, was developed as a suspect through interviews with his fellow employees and through the results of laboratory analysis of evidence recovered at the bomb scenes. The investigators discovered that all of the components found in the bombs, with the exception of the blasting caps, were readily available to the defendant through his work as a maintenance man at a headlamp manufacturing plant.

Further investigation revealed that an anonymous letter received by the West Virginia State Police in regards to the investigation had been typed on a typewriter from the manufacturing plant. An examination of a ribbon from one of the typewriters disclosed that the characters found in the text of the letter were identical to those found on the ribbon. The anonymous letter, which indicated that another bomb was being assembled by a relative of the targeted family, was intended to divert attention away from the suspect.

The suspect was subsequently arrested. On the day of his arrest, a search warrant was also executed. Seized from the defendant's residence were components that matched those used in the two bombs. Tools used in the manufacture of the devices were also seized. These same tools were later forensically matched to toolmarks found on the components of the bombs.

The defendant was later charged and arraigned in State court. He was placed under a \$600,000 cash and surety bond and currently remains confined in the county jail to await trial.

On March 9, 1987, a Louisville, Kentucky, man was sentenced to 18 months in prison for possessing and manufacturing pipe bombs and damaging a vehicle by means of an explosive.

This investigation was initiated on August 19, 1986, when two plastic pipe bombs were detonated in a parking lot in Louisville, Kentucky. One device was placed under a parked automobile. Investigating officers of the Louisville Police Department were advised by neighbors that other explosions had previously occurred and that a particular resident was observed going into his apartment after each explosion. Officers observed what appeared to be small craters and fragments of detonated bombs in the backyard of the suspect's residence. In addition, a search through garbage that was set out for collection revealed portions of a detonated plastic pipe bomb.

On August 28, 1986, ATF agents and Louisville police officers executed a search warrant on the suspect's residence. This search resulted in the seizure of six completed pipe bombs, portions of a PVC pipe, end caps, and a quantity of smokeless powder.

On January 10, 1987, a man from Monroe, Wisconsin, detonated a pipe bomb in Green County, Wisconsin. A subsequent investigation by ATF, the Monroe Police Department, and the Dane County Sheriff's Office enabled the officers to obtain a search warrant for the residence of the subject. During this search, six additional pipe bombs were seized. The defendant was charged and convicted in Federal court for Federal explosives violations and sentenced to 2 years' probation.

On June 22, 1987, ATF agents from Austin, Texas, executed a Federal search warrant at a residence near Elgin, Texas. As a result of this search, more than 800 pounds of stolen explosives were recovered. The investigation revealed that these explosives were stolen in 1984 from a construction company. Further investigation led to the identification of three suspects and the recovery of 728 blasting caps. Prosecution is pending against the three suspects. On March 2, 1987, a 23-year-old man was killed in Austin, Texas, while assembling an illegal pipe bomb. The explosion also destroyed the victim's apartment and damaged several other units.

An investigation by ATF and the Austin Police Department revealed that the victim was duped by his uncle into manufacturing the device. His uncle was also his business partner in a security systems firm. It is believed that the victim, who had an electronics background, was attempting to patent a new security system. Further investigation revealed that the victim's uncle was involved in unscrupulous business practices and may have tried to intimidate business associates; however, no charges have yet been filed.

On March 19, 1987, five defendants were indicted by a Federal grand jury in Houston, Texas, for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the bombing of Graham Central Station, a nightclub in Bryan, Texas. These indictments marked the end of an investigation that lasted more than 2 years. The investigation was conducted by ATF and other Federal, State, and local agencies. The bombing, which occurred in October of 1984, caused an estimated loss of approximately \$1 million. Initially, four defendants pled guilty and agreed to testify against the remaining defendant who was described as the architect of the conspiracy. Testimony at a jury trial in July 1987 revealed that the motive for the bombing was to eliminate the business competition of the principal defendant, an owner of several nightclubs. He was subsequently convicted on July 16,1987, sentenced to serve 20 years in prison, fined \$20,000, and ordered to pay \$216,000 in restitution. The defendant was also sentenced to 5 years of probation. The other defendants received sentences ranging from probation to 5 years in prison.



On August 3, 1987, ATF initiated an investigation on a Colorado man who was allegedly manufacturing and selling destructive devices. An ATF undercover agent was introduced to the subject. The agent purchased five bombs consisting of CO2 canisters filled with pyrodex powder and initiated by a time fuse. During the undercover meeting, the subject stated that he had thrown one of these devices through the window of his ex-wife's residence. Probable cause was soon established that enabled ATF to obtain a Federal search warrant for the subject's residence. Several additional destructive devices and other explosive materials were seized upon execution of the search warrant. The subject was then arrested and later pled guilty to selling the destructive devices. He was sentenced to serve 10 years in Federal prison.

On February 11, 1987, the brother of a reputed organized crime figure in Chicago was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment and 5 years' probation for manufacturing, possessing, and transferring an unregistered destructive device. While imposing the sentence, the judge referred to the defendant as a "bomber-assassin." The investigation, which lasted for more than a year, was conducted by ATF and the Metropolitan Sanitary District Police Department in Stickney, Illinois. This investigation was initiated after the suspect repeatedly requested that a police officer assist him in building explosive devices for use in destroying income properties. Through a series of monitored conversations, the investigators were able to illicit details that helped to identify the expected destructive capacities of the bombs as well as the intended targets of the bombs. The suspect's intentions were to blow up and burn a pornographic bookstore and then murder its owner by placing another device in his vehicle.

On October 4, 1987, undercover agents delivered an inert remote control car bomb and a live remote control explosive/ incendiary device to the suspect, who was then arrested. It is believed that the defendant purchased the bombs at the request of his brother who wanted to eliminate his competition in the pornography business.

On July 30, 1987, a convicted felon and alleged associate member of organized crime was arrested on an ATF warrant by the Illinois State Police. The subject had been stopped by the police for traffic violations. A subsequent computer check revealed the outstanding arrest warrant that stemmed from an indictment issued on February 20, 1987, in Hammond, Indiana. A search of the subject's vehicle was then conducted, which resulted in the seizure of over 1 kilo of cocaine and several hundred hits of speed.

The indictment charged the subject with possession and transfer of explosives with the intent to kill or intimidate. The indictment was the result of a lengthy ATF undercover investigation that was initiated when information was developed about the subject having access to several cases of stolen explosives. Three cases of dynamite and a quantity of blasting caps were purchased from the subject during the investigation.

Following his arrest, the subject was held on \$750,000 bond for the cocaine found in his car. Federal prosecution on the explosives violation is pending.



On April 4, 1987, an electrically-initiated pipe bomb detonated inside an automobile driven by a Clay Center, Ohio, woman. The victim, who suffered severe burns over 80 percent of her body, died approximately 12 hours after the explosion. Before her death, she gave statements to authorities that implicated her estranged husband, an elected official in Ohio, as a suspect in the bombing. A crime scene search was conducted by ATF, the Toledo-Lucas County Arson Response Team, and the Lake Township Police Department. Through investigative leads, a search warrant was obtained for the residence of the victim's husband. Items were seized that were consistent with the components of the device. As a result of the search warrant, numerous interviews, and recovered evidence, the suspect was indicted with a death penalty specification and subsequently arrested for aggravated murder.

The defendant initially entered a not guilty plea; however, after reviewing the evidence obtained by ATF, he attempted to change his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. After several psychological evaluations, it was determined that the defendant did not meet the statutory requirements for this plea.

Further court proceedings are pending at this time.



Following an intense, 6-month investigation, a father and son from Ft. Worth, Texas, were indicted and arrester on charges of mail fraud, conspiracy, and violations of Federal explosives laws. In August 1987, the son was found quilty of causing the largest explosion in the history of Ft. Worth, Texas. This explosion, which occurred on December 7, 1986, resulted in an estimated \$2.6 million in damages. The damages to one-quarter of a city block included the total destruction of six businesses as well as extensive damage to scores of others several blocks away. The initial investigation indicated that the firery eruption was caused by an accidental explosion of natural gas. However, upon further examination, Ft. Worth's Arson and Bomb Squad discovered that a natural gas line and a fire extinguishing system of a restaurant destroyed in the blast had been disconnected.

ATF was then called to assist in the investigation. Special agents of ATF determined that the father and son had financed the restaurant through an insurance settlement resulting from a fire in their home. Arson was suspected in this fire and in another incident that destroyed an automobile. The investigation further revealed that their restaurant business was failing and that both the father and son planned to burn the establishment and recover money from a fire insurance policy.

It was learned that the son had disconnected the natural gas line and fire extinguishing equipment for a grill. He then placed an unknown ignition device inside the restaurant.

The son was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment and 5 years' probation for his involvement in the explosion. The father, who was granted a severance after the indictment, currently awaits trial.

In February 5, 1987, an investigation was initiated by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division and ATF relative to the theft and illegal sale of military explosives by army personnel in Killeen, Texas.

During the course of the investigation, undercover agents identified two individuals as major illegal traffickers in stolen military explosives, one of whom was on active duty status. The agents purchased from these individuals various components and devices such as TNT, explosive simulators, dynamite, Claymore mines, and plastic explosives. In addition to the explosive materials, the investigators recovered approximately \$6,000 in other stolen government property.

On March 10, 1987, the primary suspect, a civilian, was indicted on 12 counts for the possession and transfer of illegal destructive devices and for the theft of government property. The suspect fled the area following his indictment, but he was subsequently arrested in his hometown in Vermont. The military suspect, indicted on the same charges, was arrested by the military authorities. The two individuals were later tried and convicted. The civilian was sentenced to 8 years' probation, and the military defendant was sentenced to 10 years' military imprisonment.

On January 20, 1987, a pipe bomb detonated outside the Nance County Courthouse, Fullerton, Nebraska, causing \$2,000 in property damage to the building and a police vehicle. There were no injuries.

The investigation, which was conducted by ATF, the Nebraska State Patrol, and the Nance County Sheriff's Office, led to the identification of two suspects. Two search warrants were obtained and executed at businesses owned by the suspects, who were cousins. Sections of pipe, end caps, welding materials, and ingredients used in the manufacture of explosives were seized. One of the suspects later confessed to his part in the bombing, whereupon he implicated his cousin as the prime suspect. The investigation revealed that the prime suspect was scheduled to appear in Nance County Court on the day of the bombing for sentencing on a narcotics violation. It was further revealed that this suspect had previously attempted to intimidate witnesses in his narcotics case.

On January 21, 1987, the two suspects were arrested and later pled guilty. One suspect was sentenced in State court to a term of probation. The principal suspect pled guilty in Federal court to explosives violations. He was sentenced to serve 7 years in prison and ordered to make restitution.



On April 14, 1987, a man on trial for distributing LSD detonated a bomb at the Howard County Courthouse in Kokomo, Indiana. The bomb, which was concealed inside a briefcase, caused an explosion that killed the defendant and seriously injured six others, including the sheriff, three police officers, the defendant's defense attorney, and a bystander. The bombing caused an estimated \$1 million in damages to the building.

It is believed that the defendant's intention was to detonate the bomb inside the courtroom during the trial in order to kill himself and a witness. However, he was escorted to the sheriff's office to have his briefcase searched, at which time he detonated the device. The bomb, which consisted of three pieces of metal pipe filled with black powder, was wired from a battery to a switch on the outside of the briefcase.

The defendant had prior arrests for drug offenses as well as for possession of stolen property and reckless endangerment. He was also a suspect in a house bombing that occurred in 1983.

In July 1987, three bombings occurred in Honolulu, Hawaii, that were at first thought to be unrelated. However, through an investigation conducted by ATF and the Honolulu Police Department, a suspect was identified and linked to the bombings.

The first incident occurred in Honolulu on July 8, 1987, when a bomb exploded under a vehicle. The vehicle was damaged along with another that was parked nearby. No injuries were sustained in the explosion. A preliminary analysis of some of the recovered evidence revealed metal pipe fragments and the presence of gasoline.

On July 24, 1987, a pipe bomb exploded in a storage room of a major hotel in Honolulu. There were no injuries as a result of the explosion, and the resultant damage was limited to the storage room. The bomb detonated just as a phone call was received by the hotel switchboard. The caller identified himself and claimed that a bomb would explode. The hotel was called several more times the same day with additional threats, but no other devices were found when the hotel was evacuated. The remains of the bomb were forwarded to the ATF laboratory in Treasure Island, San Francisco, for examination.

On July 29, 1987, a third pipe bomb exploded under a vehicle that was parked at a local shopping center. Several vehicles were damaged, but there were no injuries. Prior to the explosion, three telephone calls were placed to the local television station. The caller, having the same identity as before, stated that a bomb would detonate. Again, evidence was recovered at the scene and forwarded to the laboratory.

At this point, the investigators discussed the possibility of the three bombings being related. An examination of the recovered evidence supported this theory by revealing the similarities between the explosive filler used in the bombs.

Based upon a voice identification from the bomb threats, a suspect was taken into custody on August 4, 1987, and questioned about the bombings. On August 5, 1987, search warrants were executed on the suspect's vehicle and residence. A vial of suspected explosives with fuse was recovered and submitted to the ATF laboratory for analysis. At this point, the laboratory was able to link the three bombings to the suspect, who was subsequently ordered held on bond. Further judicial action is pending.



On August 3, 1987, a member of a local union in Tacoma, Washington, was arrested for Federal explosives violations. This investigation, which was conducted by ATF, a U.S. Army explosives ordnance disposal unit, and the Pierce County Sheriff's Office, involved undercover negotiations between law enforcement officers and the suspect who intended to bomb several grain-loading facilities.

During the 3-month investigation, the suspect described,

in detail, which facilities he wanted to have destroyed, how and with what the devices were to be constructed, and where the devices were to be placed. It is believed his anticipated actions were in response to a proposed wage cut by the Continental Grain Company, with whom his union was in the process of negotiating a labor contract.

At the time of his arrest, the suspect was attempting to purchase blasting caps, 30 pounds of C-4 military explosives, and 700 feet of DET cord from an ATF undercover agent. The execution of a search warrant at his residence followed the arrest, and it resulted in the seizure of explosive-related material. The defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to serve 3 years in prison. A union official stressed that the union had nothing to do with these actions.



On March 4, 1987, a Hewlett Packard employee from Spokane, Washington, received first- and second-degree burns over 15 percent of her body when she opened a parcel that exploded in her vehicle. This parcel was delivered to the victim via United Parcel Service. The explosive device consisted of 5 pounds of smokeless powder, 6 pints of gasoline, bird shot, and broken glass. A micro-switch was attached to the lid of the parcel to initiate the device. Most of the device remained intact after the explosion. This was due to the failure of the gasoline to ignite. An investigation was soon initiated by ATF and the Spokane City-County Bomb Squad.

Their investigation revealed that a fellow employee of the victim was a prime suspect in the incident. Through interviews with the victim, it was disclosed that the suspect had tried to develop a romantic relationship with the victim. When she failed to respond to his efforts, the suspect felt rejected and began to harass the victim with notes and telephone calls. These attempts to get her attention proved unsuccessful, so the suspect tried to poison the victim by contaminating her drinking water at work. It was after this attempt failed that the suspect constructed and mailed a bomb to the victim. Further investigation traced several components of the detonated device to the suspect.

The subject subsequently pled guilty in Federal court to manufacturing, transferring, and possessing a destructive device. He was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison for these charges. The defendant was also charged in State court with first-degree attempted murder. His sentencing for this charge is pending, but it is expected that this sentence will be concurrent to that issued in Federal court.

On January 4, 1988, three members of the Renegades Motorcycle Club entered guilty pleas in Norfolk, Virginia, Federal District Court. These three pleas bring it to a total of 16 defendants who have entered pleas in a case involving conspiracy to possess a destructive device, arson, conspiracy to commit arson, RICO, RICO conspiracy, possession and distribution of narcotics, illegal use of a communications facility, and false statements to a Federal agency.

A United States attorney for the Eastern Judicial District of Virginia stated that the case originated when the Virginia State Police discovered a large number of weapons in the western part of the State. Among those weapons found were explosives, hand grenades, TNT, a grenade launcher, and an M-16 machine gun.

Through the joint investigative efforts of the Virginia State Police, ATF, DEA, FBI, Norfolk Police Department, Naval Investigative Service, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Western Judicial District of Virginia, an indictment, charging these 16 people with 153 counts in violation of various sections of Federal law, was returned on September 30, 1987.

All 16 defendants have received prison sentences. These sentences range from a minimum of 6 years to a maximum of 35 years for three of the defendants.

The United States attorney stated that additional indictments are expected. The case remains under active investigation.

On February 2, 1987, a Texarkana, Texas, business executive was killed and his 9-year-old daughter injured when a bomb exploded in his automobile. The executive's wife,



who was a witness to the explosion, suffered minor burns when she attempted to help her family. ATF responded to the scene and was assisted by the FBI, the Texas and Louisiana State Police, and the local police department of Texarkana.

The investigators determined that the bomb had been placed under the victim's vehicle only a short time before the explosion. The investigation also disclosed that the victim had been chairman of the board at the bank in Texarkana and was one of several individuals under investigation by the FBI for participating in a \$100 million bank fraud scheme.

At the present time, no arrests have been made; however, after hundreds of interviews and other investigative techniques, two possible suspects have been developed. The investigation is continuing.

Forbidden Explosives

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has been conducting investigations into the illegal distribution of M-80 explosive devices almost since the passage of the explosives laws in 1970.

During the 10-year period from 1978-1987, ATF statistics revealed a total of 623 investigations involving 41 explosions, 50 fatalities, and 107 injuries as a result of illegal M-80 factories. In addition, property damage was estimated in excess of \$18.5 million. ATF's National Response Team was activated on seven of those occasions where explosions occurred.

In 1984, ATF initiated an Illegal Explosives Interdiction Project, which was designed to monitor investigations concerning the illegal distribution of M-80's. By the time of the project's inception, it became increasingly clear that the scope of the investigations ATF was conducting went far beyond street sales of M-80's; the scope expanded all the way to the factories which were producing these devices and to the suppliers of raw materials for the devices.

Despite ATF's successes in the interdiction of illegal explosive device manufacture, many law enforcement personnel still look upon M-80's as "firecrackers." This is a gross misconception. M-80's are classified as explosive devices.

ATF's experience has shown that a raid upon an illegal explosive device factory can be one of the most dangerous operations in which a law enforcement officer can participate. An officer should approach an investigation of this sort with as much awareness as possible of the M-80 manufacturing process and the hazards caused by the careless storage of chemicals and explosive mixtures at these plants. Armed with this knowledge, an officer will be able to conduct one of these investigations safely and successfully.

Toward this end, ATF recently published the Special Agent Guide to Investigating M-80 and Similar Explosive Devices. The purpose of this handbook is to enable ATF special agents to execute a safe and thorough search of an illegal explosive device (M-80) factory and to conduct a successful investigation of the factory. The handbook guides the investigator through such items as ATF's investigative jurisdiction and seizure authority relative to M-80's and similar devices. In addition, this manual discusses investigative techniques, the M-80 manufacturing process, and the safe handling of explosive materials. Contact your local ATF office for additional information.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over M-80's and similar devices is the responsibility of the following agencies:

- 1. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
- 2. The Department of Transportation, Office of Hazardous Materials Regulation (DOT).
- 3. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).

ATF is empowered by 18 U.S.C. chapter 40 with the responsibility for licensing the manufacturer, distributor, and user of explosives and explosive materials. By law, anyone who engages in the business of manufacturing such devices must possess a valid license to assemble explosive powder. The manufacturer or distributor of such devices who fails to secure such a license is in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 842(a) (1).

Chapter 49, CFR, section 117.86 requires that all ex-

plosive materials be submitted to DOT for examination and classification before they can be transported in commerce. Analysis is done by a private agency, the Bureau of Explosives. Because M-80's and similar devices have never been submitted for such analysis, they are considered forbidden explosives under 49 CFR section 173.51. As such, their transportation in interstate commerce is illegal.

CPSC has jurisdiction over hazardous substances in accordance with Title 15, U.S.C., chapter 30. Section 1261(f) (1) (a) of this statute defines a hazardous substance as follows:

"Any substance or mixture of substances which (I) is toxic; (II) is corrosive; (III) is an irritant; (IV) is a strong sensitizer; (V) is flammable or combustible; or (VI) generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or other means, if such substances or mixture of substances may cause substantial personal injury or substantial illness during, or as a proximate result of, any customary or reasonably foreseeable handling...."

Furthermore, 16 CFR section 1500.17(a) (3) declares that the following are banned as hazardous substances:

"Fireworks devices intended to produce audible effects (including but not limited to cherry bombs, M-80 salutes, etc.) if the audible effect is produced by a charge of more than 2 grains of pyrotechnic composition...."

Definitions

The Department of Transportation (DOT), Office of Hazardous Materials Regulation is the Government agency responsible for the examination, classification, and approval of explosive materials. All such materials submitted to DOT are subject to analysis by the Bureau of Explosives, Bureau of Mines, or other contract agency. Materials approved by the Bureau of Explosives are assigned a classification by DOT.

Class C Fireworks.

Class C fireworks are also called common fireworks. They are designed for use by the general public and include firecrackers and salutes with casings that do not exceed 1½ inches in length and ¼ inch in diameter. Their pyrotechnic composition does not exceed 2 grains. Class C fireworks are not regulated by ATF. However, anyone who manufactures the explosive materials used in Class C fireworks must obtain a license from ATF. (See 27 CFR section 55.41(a).)

Special Fireworks.

Special fireworks are classified by ATF as low explosives. Special fireworks which are included within the definition of Class B explosives are designed to produce visible or audible pyrotechnic effects. Their pyrotechnic composition is greater than 2 grains of explosive charge. Federal law places the following restrictions on the use and sale of special fireworks:

- 1. Anyone who acquires, transports, ships, or receives, in interstate or foreign commerce, any special fireworks for his personal use must obtain a user permit. (See 27 CFR section 55.41 (a).)
- 2. Anyone who manufactures black powder or any explosive material used in special fireworks, as well as anyone who imports or deals in special fireworks, must obtain a license from ATF. (See 27 CFR section 55.41 (a).)

52

M-80's, M-100's, Cherry Bombs, and Other Similar Devices.

These items have never been submitted to the Bureau of Explosives for approval; therefore, they are classified as forbidden explosives by DOT. As such, they are considered by ATF to be explosive devices. These devices are not Class B explosives or special fireworks and are not to be referred to as such.







Illegal fireworks factory seized in Mesquite, Texas.









ATF's Arson Response

While arson is basically a State and local enforcement responsibility, the national magnitude of the problem has exceeded the capabilities of any one agency to effectively respond to the full range of arson crimes occurring within its jurisdictional area. ATF, in promoting the Federal role in this critical program, has spearheaded the drive to coordinate enforcement efforts among Federal, State, and local sectors.

In 1977, ATF began to work arsons with the formation of the first arson task force in Philadelphia. At that time, arsons were investigated under the Explosives Control Act of 1970 utilizing the "fuel air mixture" theory. Section 844(j) of Title 18, United States Code, defined an explosive, in part, as a chemical compound containing any oxidizing and combustible units that would explode when ignited. In order to sustain a conviction, it was necessary to prove that an explosion occurred from the utilization of an accelerant and that the oxidation of fumes from the accelerant was sufficient when mixed with air in the building to cause an explosion. Federal courts varied on the acceptance of this theory, which presented an obstacle that had to be overcome in every investigation. On October 12, 1982, the Anti-Arson Act of 1982 was signed into law. This act amended certain sections of the Explosives Control Act with the insertion of language that specifically covered malicious damage or threats to damage by use of *fire* as well as explosives. The passage of this legislation was designed to enhance efforts at the Federal level to impact upon the national crime of arson.

The growing number of arson incidents nationwide and the complex nature of such crimes preclude any one agency from effectively addressing the problem. One of the most successful weapons ATF has found to address arson crimes is the pooling of ATF and State and local talents and resources in task forces to attack arson in areas experiencing major problems.

Each task force is unique in configuration, reflecting such contributing factors as varying environments, manpower allocations, and management techniques. ATF currently has 16 formal task forces in operation at the following locations: Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Seattle, San Francisco, St. Paul, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh.

FISCAL YEAR	INCIDENT INVESTIGATED	PERSONS KILLED	PERSONS INJURED	PROPERTY DAMAGE	DOLLARS SAVED	CASE REPORTS SUBMITTED/DEF. RECOMMENDED
1979	634	47	286	143.0 MIL	UNK	123/111
1980	653	34	80	154.5 MIL	54.0 MIL	176/303
1981	451	25	115	199.5 MIL	27.0 MIL	112/286
1982	352	40	106	154.2 MIL	37.0 MIL	101/195
1983	550	58	178	232.6 MIL	30.0 MIL	110/247
1984	561	34	200	238.7 MIL	43.2 MIL	136/314
1985	553	55	218	871.6 MIL	77.3 MIL	180/410
1986	507	47	190	254.8 MIL	31.7 MIL	193/538
1987	511	141	375	368.6 MIL	24.6 MIL	166/382
1988 (6 mos.)	250	29	56	188.7 MIL	10.3 MIL	61/132
TOTALS	5022	510	1804	2.8 BIL	335.1 MIL	1358/2918
(9.5 YR. AVG.)	528	53	190	295.3 MIL	35.3 MIL	143/307

ATF Arson Statistics

The typical arson task force is comprised of three to five ATF special agents and at least two arson investigators from police and/or fire service agencies. Local officers contribute cause and origin expertise, while all member agencies provide additional field investigative talents and assist in other support areas. Specific arson crimes are targeted for investigation by the task force, concentrating on major incidents that involve profit-motivated schemes. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the local prosecutor are included from the outset and are available to the task force during each step of the investigation.

A valuable part of the task force is the ATF auditor. The auditors are attached to ATF's Office of Compliance Operations. In the past, the auditors were primarily utilized to collect forthcoming revenue from the alcohol and tobacco industries. As ATF's arson program has grown, the auditors have responded to make the support of arson investigation their top priority.

There are currently 25 ATF field auditors located at Compliance Operations offices across the country. Projections include increasing the number of auditors by 5 positions to meet future arson-related demands.

ATF's investigative scope is limited not only by manpower and resources but also by jurisdictional limits. Congress inserted language in the Explosives Control Act which required that the target property be involved in interstate commerce.

The primary thrust of ATF's arson investigations is directed toward those incidents involving industrial or commercial activities where the suspected perpetrators are members or associates of organized crime or white collar criminals and associates.

Statistically, ATF investigates only a comparitively small number of the total number of arsons that occur each year in the United States. While statistics on the total of incendiary and suspicious fires are not yet available for 1987, in 1986, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported 111,000 fires of suspicious and incendiary origin that caused \$1.6 billion in damages. (See chart.) By comparison, in 1987, ATF initiated 511 investigations into arson fires that killed 141 persons and injured 375. The average amount of damage in each investigation opened by ATF is in excess of \$500,000.

Training has always been a critical element of ATF's arson program. A variety of training is available in the following areas:

Advanced Arson-for-Profit for State and Local Officers -This 2-week course is offered three times annually at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Glynco, Georgia. It is open to sworn police and fire personnel and offers training in such areas as arson scene investigation, financial investigative techniques and motive, and other courses designed to aid the investigator in perfecting arsonfor-profit cases. Since its inception in 1982, 618 State and local investigators have been trained in this program.

Arson-for-Profit for State Prosecutors - This 1-week course was developed in 1986 and was designed to instruct State and local prosecutors in the prosecution of arson-for-profit cases, which are largely based on circumstantial evidence. Guest lecturers are brought in from across the country to instruct in such topics as search and seizure, fire investigation, and trial tactics. Originally, this school was funded through a Federal grant, so there was no charge for this seminar. However, future seminars will be administered through the Office of State and Local Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and a fee will be charged.

Arson-for-Profit for Insurance Claim Supervisors - This school is presented once annually and is one week in duration. It is designed for insurance company claim supervisors and instructs them on the intricacies of investigating an arson-for-profit crime. This school, which is held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, is funded entirely by the tuition charged each student.

Student selection for the various training programs are made based upon recommendations submitted by the special agent in charge (SAC) of each district office. (See enclosed list for names and addresses of district offices and the respective SAC's.)

In addition to training, ATF's arson effort has aided the insurance industry in a substantial monetary way. Between October 1, 1980, and the present time, an amount in excess of \$325 million has been saved by the insurance industry. The money has been saved in the sense that in the absence of effective law enforcement efforts, the insurance industry could potentially have payed out that amount for arson-related crimes, thus creating a greater burden upon the premium-paying general public and the Nation's economy as a whole.

Forensic Laboratory Support - The ATF laboratory system provides invaluable assistance in meeting the Bureau's responsibilities in arson enforcement. Laboratories located in Rockville, Maryland, Atlanta, Georgia, and San Francisco, California, process evidence submitted by ATF special agents and State and local law enforcement and fire service agencies.

The ATF Forensic Science Branch also provides training to State and local crime laboratory chemists. The week-long training course is conducted at the ATF National Laboratory in Rockville, Maryland. To date, 300 chemists in 22 classes have been trained in the most current laboratory techniques for the detection and identification of accelerants collected from arson debris.

Canine Arson Detection - Vapor detection instruments for the detection of accelerants, explosives, and narcotics have been in use for some time, with varying degrees of effectiveness. However, experience demonstrates that for speed and efficiency, the olfactory abilities of a canine far surpass that of an instrument. In explosives detection situations where life is at stake, technicians place their confidence in a dog's ability rather than with an instrument.

ATF subsequently initiated a program in cooperation with the Connecticut State Police to train a canine to identify areas where diluted accelerants have been used. This will provide arson investigators with a tool that may prove invaluable in the crime scene investigation. The training methodology employs the "food reward system," which is based on Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflex. Long-range goals include training assistance and certification of accelerant detection canines for use by State and local agencies. For further information, contact Trooper First Class Doug Lancelot, Connecticut State Police, 294 Colony Street, Meriden, Connecticut 06450. He can be reached by telephone at (203) 238-6026.



Directory of ATF Headquarters

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Associate Director, Law Enforcement Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Chief, Explosives Division Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226 (202) 566-7159 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Special Agent in Charge Explosives Enforcement Branch Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226 (202) 566-7395



Directory of ATF District Offices

All addresses given below should be preceded by:

Special Agent in Charge Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

State	Address		
Alabama	2121 8th Avenue North Room 725 Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 731-1205	Georgia	101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 406 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 331-6526
Alaska	Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue	пажан	915 Second Avenue Seattle WA 98174
a di serie di serie Serie di serie di seri Serie di serie di ser	Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442-4485		(206) 442-4485
Arizona	P.O. Box 1991, Main Office Los Angeles, CA 90053-1991 (213) 894-4812	Idaho	Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442-4485
Arkansas Counties of Mississippi and Crittenden	215 Centerview Drive Suite 215 Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 736-5412	Illinois Northern and Central	Midwest Plaza North, Suite 300 2115 Butterfield Road Oak Brook, IL 60521-1364 (312) 620-7824
All other counties	Hale Boggs Federal Building Room 330 500 Camp Street New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 589-2350	Southern	U.S. Customs House 1114 Market Street Room 611 St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 425-5560
California Southern	P.O. Box 1991, Main Office Los Angeles, CA 90053-1991 (213) 894-4812	Indiana Northwest Counties	Midwest Plaza North, Suite 300 2115 Butterfield Road Oak Brook, IL 60521 (312) 620-7824
Northern and Central	221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 974-98589	All other counties	510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KY 40202
Colorado	221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105		(502) 582-5211
Connecticut	(415) 974-9589 Boston Federal Office Bldg.	Iowa	811 Grand Avenue, Room 106 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 374-7188
	Boston, MA 02222-1081 (617) 565-7040	Kansas	811 Grand Avenue, Room 106 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 374-7188
Delaware	U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597-7266	Kentucky Counties of Campbell, Kenton and	Plaza South One, Room 300 7251 Engle Road Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 (216) 522-7210
District of Columbia	701 West Broad Street Room 206 Falls Church, VA 22046 (703) 285-2543	Boone All other counties	510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KX 40202
Florida	8420 NW. 52nd Street Suite 120 Miami, FL 33166 (305) 536-4368		(502) 582-5211

Louisiana	Hale Boggs Federal Building Room 330 500 Camp Street New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 589-2350	Southern	U.S. Customs House Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597.7266
Maine	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222 (617) 565-7040	New Mexico Northern and Central	1114 Commerce Street, Room 718 Dallas, TX 75242 (214) 767-2250
Maryland	701 West Broad Street, Room 206 Falls Church, VA 22046 (703) 285-2543	Southern	16630 Imperial Valley Drive Suite 263 Houston, TX 77060
Massachusetts	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222-1081 (617) 565-7040	New York	(713) 229-3511 90 Church Street Room 1016 New York NY 10008
Michigan	231 W. Lafayette 533 Federal Building	North	(212) 264-4658 222 South Church Street
	Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 226-4830	Carolina	Suite 404 Charlotte, NC 28202 (704) 371-6125
Minnesota	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101 (612) 290-3092	North Dakota	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101
Mississippi	2121 8th Avenue North Room 725	Ohio	(012) 290-3092
	Birmingham, AL 35203 (205) 731-1205	Counties immediate to Tristate	510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KY 40202
Missouri Eastern	1114 Market Street, Room 611 St. Louis, MO 63101	Area	(502) 582-5211 Plaza South One Boom 300
Western	(314) 425-5560 811 Grand Avenue, Room 106	counties	7251 Engle Road Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 (216) 522-7210
	Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 374-7188	Oklahoma	1114 Commerce Street, Room 718 Dallas, TX 75242
Montana	Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (2020) 449 4495	Oregon	(214) 767-2250 Federal Building, Room 806
Nebraska	(206) 442-4485 811 Grand Avenue, Room 106 Kansas City, MO 64106		915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442-4485
Nevada	(816) 374-7188 221 Main Street, Suite 1250	Pennsylvania	U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philodolphia PA 19106
	San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 974-9589	Dhada Taland	(215) 597-7266
New Hampshire	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222-1081 (617) 565-7040	Knode Island	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222-1081 (617) 565-7040
New Jersey Northern	90 Church Street Room 1016 New York, NY 10008	South Carolina	222 South Church Street Suite 404 Charlotte, NC 28202 (704) 371-6125
	(212) 264-4658	South Dakota	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101 (612) 290-3092

Tennessee	215 Centerview Drive Suite 215-A Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 736-5412		Washington	Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442-4485
Texas Northern	1114 Commerce Street Room 718 Dallas, TX 75242 (214) 767-2250		West Virginia Northwest Panhandle area	U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597-7266
Southern	16630 Imperial Valley Drive Suite 263 Houston, TX 77060 (713) 229-3511		All other counties	510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 582-5211
Utah	221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 974-9589	2	Wisconsin	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101 (612) 290-3092
Vermont	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222-1081 (617) 565-7040		Wyoming	Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442-4485
Virginia	701 West Broad Street, Room 206 Falls Church, VA 22046 (703) 285-2543			(400) 114 1100

ATF Explosives/Arson Training—Fiscal Year 1989

ATF, in conjunction with the National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training, offers training in advanced explosives investigative techniques and advanced arson-for-profit investigation. Briefly presented below are qualifications for attendance, costs, and program outlines of these schools. On the following page is a registration request, suitable for duplication, that may be used in application for either of these schools. If applying for both courses, use separate registration requests. Please note that upon receipt of an application by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, a card informing the applicant of such will be mailed. This card does not constitute scheduling. When selected, a letter of confirmation will be forwarded to the applicant approximately 45 days in advance of the scheduled school.

Advanced Explosives Investigative Techniques Training Program

Qualifications for Attendance: Enrollment is limited to public safety officials involved and experienced in the investigation of bombings and related explosive incidents (police and fire investigators).

Estimated Cost for Fiscal Year 1989: \$450. This fee covers room, board, materials, and supplies. Attendees are responsible for their own transportation expenses to FLETC. Fees will be collected on the first day of class.

Program Outline: The 2-week program of instruction was developed in conjunction with the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) and is presented in the classroom and through practical exercises. The subject areas covered include pre-planning, team concept and individual duties, initial and final explosive scene evaluations, processing the crime scene, technical resources available to the investigator, information management, roles of the prosecutor and expert witness, informants and undercover techniques, and the pathologist's role in bombing investigations.

Proposed Schedule—Fiscal Year 1989: 10/16/88 through 10/28/88, 3/12/89 through 3/24/89, and 7/9/89 through 7/21/89.

Advanced Arson-for-Profit Investigative Training Program

Qualifications for Attendance: Applicants must be full-time law enforcement and/or fire service personnel whose workload is primarily focused upon the investigation/management of arson-related crimes. Each applicant should be familiar with cause and origin determination.

Estimated Cost for Fiscal Year 1989: \$413. This fee covers room, board, materials, and supplies. Attendees are responsible for their own transportation expenses to FLETC. Fees will be collected on the first day of class. Program Outline: This 2-week program of instruction is presented in the classroom and through practical exercises. The subject areas covered include the arson task force concept, analytical techniques, visual investigative aids, financial investigative techniques and motives, kinesic interviewing, report writing, electronic surveillance techniques, real estate and insurance investigative techniques, laboratory capabilities, and utilization of the expert witness.

Proposes Schedule—Fiscal Year 1989: 10/24/88 through 11/04/88, 1/23/89 through 2/3/89, and 6/12/89 through 6/23/89.

National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Glynco, Georgia



REGISTRATION REQUEST

Preferred Program Date(s) **Program** Title Applicant's Name SSN Sex Duty Telephone No. Department/Agency Address/Agency City, State, Zip Code Applicant's Rank/Title Length of Time in Total Years' Experience **Present Assignment** Name and Title of Authorizing Official Date Signature FEE: _____ per student

Program costs include tuition, meals, lodging, and course materials. Fees will be collected on the first day of class, and may be paid by cash, check or money order. Make checks payable to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

CONFIRMATION: A confirmation letter with full details on housing, transportation, and schedules will be provided upon acceptance to the program.

Questions may be directed:

Assistant Director Office of State/Local Training Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Building 262 Glynco, Georgia 31524 912-267-2345