


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ANNOTATION:
EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS IN USING THE SAMPLE SURVEY AS A MEANS OF ESTIMATING KIND AND AMOUNT OF CRIME ARE PRESENTED.

ABSTRACT:
THE MAJOR THEMES OF THE RESEARCH REPORTS ARE - 1) HOW TO MEASURE AND REPORT THE AMOUNT OF CRIME IN A CITY OR IN THE UNITED STATES, 2) CITIZEN-POLICE TRANSACTIONS, AND 3) PERCEPTIONS THAT THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC HAVE ABOUT THE CRIME PROBLEM. THE PURPOSE OF THE REPORT IS TO EXPLORE NEW WAYS OF MEASURING CRIME AND OF AUDITING CURRENT STATISTICS ON CRIME, BY DISCUSSING FOUR MAJOR TYPES OF PROBLEMS - 1) PROBLEMS OF SAMPLING AND GAINING ACCESS TO RESPONDENTS 2) PROBLEMS IN INTERVIEWING AND DETERMINING VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF RESPONDENT REPORTING 3) PROBLEMS IN ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF VICTIMIZATION AND COMPARABILITY OF THESE ESTIMATES WITH POLICE STATISTICS AND 4) PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETING THE KIND AND AMOUNT OF CRIME FROM SAMPLE SURVEY ESTIMATES.

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FINAL REPORT: AN OVERVIEW /
OF PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH
ON CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

Final Report under Grant 006
Office of Law Enforcement Assistance
U. S. Department of Justice

Albert J. Reiss, Jr.
University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, Michigan
January 20, 1967

INTRODUCTION

This report makes no attempt to summarize the findings that are made in the separate reports that were prepared for the study. Each of the separate reports are to be considered as an appendix to this report. Rather this report focuses on the kinds of problems that arise in connection with this research and some recommendations for further research that may be of value to LEA in their grants program.

In an important sense, each of the separate reports in any series, e.g., Crime Statistics or Survey of Crime Against Residents, addresses itself to a common set of questions. There are certain common themes that underlie many of the reports, however. One of the major themes that runs through any number of the reports is that of how one should measure and report the amount of crime in a city or in the United States. Attention should be drawn to the fact that quite a number of the reports address themselves to this question. The main contributions of these reports to this question are: (1) an attempt to estimate by means of the sample survey the gross rate and volume of offenses for selected police districts in two cities and comparison of these estimates with those from official police statistics; (2) an attempt to estimate by means of the sample survey the gross rate of volume of offenses against businesses and organizations in selected police districts in three cities; (3) an attempt to demonstrate different bases and ways of constructing indexes of crime reflected in the computation of standardized rates of crime for race, sex and age groups for

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two cities (Seattle and New Orleans), the computation of probabilities of victimization by race and sex of victim and offender and by place of occurrence of the offense, and the computation of victim rates per se; (4) an attempt to demonstrate ways of auditing official police statistics through the use of other police statistics. A main conclusion emerges from these separate studies: any single index or even one or two indexes cannot report the kind of information about crime in the society that either the police organization or the public will find useful for policy, planning, and organizational purposes. To take but one example, a burglary of a household should undoubtedly be computed as a rate for households or dwelling units rather than for residents as is now the case. Similarly, burglary of establishments other than households should use the number of establishments as the base.

A second major theme that runs through these reports is that of citizen-police transactions. An attempt is made to provide data and some analysis of how the citizens and police relate particularly in terms of the legality of means that are used by the police and the human relations demands of the resident population. Thus one will find information on these aspects in a number of reports. The observation studies tell us how the police and citizens relate to one another in the dispatched, on view and citizen field mobilization settings. The survey of residents tells us how the citizen evaluates the way that the police handled his complaint, and of the reasons for calling or not calling the police. The survey of police officers provides information on their attitudes toward the public.

A third major theme that runs through these reports is perceptions that the police and the public have about the crime problem. Particular attention is given to how they perceive the crime problem as affecting them in their daily lives and for police officers, of how it affects them in their work.

In addition to the reports sent with previous quarterly reports, copies of the following reports are submitted with this report to provide a complete set of all reports prepared in connection with the study:

Crime Statistics Series:

"Probability of Victimization for Major Crimes Against the Person By Race and Sex Status of Victims and Offenders," Crime Statistics Series #6.

"Premises Where Victimization Occurs in Major Crimes Against the Person, By Race and Sex of Victims and Offenders," Crime Statistics Series #7.

"Race-Sex-Age Specific Rates for Selected Offenses in New Orleans and Seattle," Crime Statistics Series #8.

Business and Organizations Survey:

"Insurance Problems of Businesses and Organizations in High Crime Rate Areas," Business and Organizations Survey #4.

"Problems and Practices for Protection Against Crime Among Businesses and Organizations," Business and Organizations Survey #5.

"Crimes Against Public and Quasi-Public Organizations in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D. C.," Business and Organizations Survey Report #6.

"The Evaluations and Images of Owners and Managers of Businesses and Organizations Toward the Police and Police Service," Business and Organizations Survey Report #8. (Note mislabeled #8, actually #7, the last in this series.)

Police Observation Studies:

"Police-Suspect Transactions in Field Settings According to the Race and Social Class Status of Suspects," Police Observation Study Report #6.

"Police and Citizen Behavior in Routine Field Encounters: Some Comparisons According to the Race and Social Class Status of Citizens," Police Observation Study #7.

"Transactions With Suspects in On-View Police Work," Police Observation Study #8.

Police Officer Survey:

"Police Officer Attitudes Toward Their Work and Job," Police Sample Survey Report #1.

"Police Officer Attitudes Toward Their Work and Job," Police Sample Survey Supplement to Report #1.

Resident and Victim Surveys:

"The Perceptions and Recollections About Crime of Residents in Boston and Chicago," Survey of Crime Against Residents Survey #1.

"Estimates of Gross Rate and Volume of Offenses for Police Districts in Boston and Chicago," Survey of Crime Against Residents Survey #2.

ESTIMATING VICTIMIZATION FROM CRIMES

One of the major problems to which this study was addressed is that of how to assess victimization from crime so that a valid and reliable description of the kind and amount of crime in American Society could be made. The major way today that victimization is estimated is in terms of the volume of crime known to the police. Several indexes of crime can be constructed from these statistics of crimes known to the police. There are numerous published criticisms of crime statistics, many of which deal with technical aspects of current measures of crime. It was not the purpose of this project simply to reexamine these current measures and criticisms of them but rather to explore alternative ways of measuring crime and of auditing current statistics on crime.

Most current statistics on victimization from crimes derive from police agencies. The police agency, in turn, derives any statistic primarily from reports of citizens to the police. This latter fact is often ignored. For the most part, the citizen rather than the police officer, is the originator of information that a crime has been committed. Only a small amount of reporting on victimization derives from on view police work.

The mobilization of the police by the citizen is primarily a voluntary act depending upon the willingness of the citizen to call the police. There are many factors that affect the willingness of citizens to call the police. Some of these lie in the degree of confidence that the citizen places in the police. Others lie in how motivated the citizen is to report crimes to the police apart from any confidence he may place in them, as,

for example, motivation through possible benefits that may accrue to the citizen from an insurance claim. Still others lie in the pressures that may be placed upon citizens by others to call or withhold calling the police.

There also are factors within the organization of the police department that may affect the accuracy and validity of police statistics. Much depends upon how professionally organized a police department is and whether it has a professional orientation toward the development of valid and reliable statistics. Much also depends upon what kind of investment the department has in reporting to the public what it knows about crimes coming to its attention. Thus there may be department investments in "killing crime" by downgrading particular kinds of offenses, or correlatively in upgrading them if one seeks gain from a higher crime rate. Furthermore, lack of professionalization of the patrol may lead to failure by officers to report crimes that come to their attention, or even to engage in false reporting. All of these factors internal to a police department may affect the kind of statistics we currently have on crimes.

Any attempt to evaluate the success of programs for reducing crime depends upon the accurate assessment of the volume of crime and of particular kinds of crime. Since some of these program assessments must be made of police work and organization itself, it seems important and worthwhile to have methods of determining the nature and rates of crime independent of factors that affect police reports of crime.

Validation of Police Statistics through Organizational Statistics

One way that it is possible to validate police department statistics is to compare the description of the crime problem in police statistics with that obtained from statistics gathered by other organizations. In our major metropolitan areas there are any number of organizations that regularly gather statistics that either directly or indirectly measure crime in a jurisdiction. Any changes in amount of crime apparent in these statistics should be consistent with changes in police statistics for those kinds of crime.

Several such statistics were examined in Crime Statistics Series, Report #1. These included insurance claims and rates, statistics from electric protection services; business statistics on specific kinds of crimes, statistics from quasi-public and public organizations, and loss claims from tax deductions. Chicago was used as a case study for purposes of validation. During 1965, the Chicago Police Department reported a substantial decline in offenses known to the police. Although all index crimes showed a decrease in 1965 as compared with 1964, the most substantial decrease was in the category of larceny over \$50. Information obtained from insurance companies in the Chicago area provide some validation of this declining rate. The report analyzes reasons why the statistics are not as useful as they might be, pointing out that closer cooperation between police and insurance agencies might make them a more valuable source of validation. Similarly, it was shown that data from ADT subscribers in the Chicago area and from crime

losses for one department store were consistent with the data from the police department.

Briefly then it could be shown that one can provide some external validation of changes in official police statistics. But the main problem with these forms of validation is that they do not provide a means of estimating the amount of crime. The sample survey appears the most likely way to determine the amount of crime.

The exploratory work done on external sources of validation suggests however that further research in this area would be quite profitable. It would seem worthwhile for LEA to support some further research in this area since it is not a very costly form of validation. More generally, LEA should consider the problem of audits of police department statistics.

The sample survey was used as the major means in the study for estimating the nature and amount of crime. Two main types of sample surveys of victims were undertaken. The first sampled businesses and organizations as victims of crime; the second sampled residents of high crime Negro and white areas. Businesses and organizations were sampled in four precincts of Washington, D.C., two in Boston, and two in Chicago. This survey of businesses and organizations was designed and executed entirely by this project. The resident surveys were conducted in the same two precincts in Boston and in Chicago. The resident survey itself was designed in conjunction with a similar survey for Washington, D.C. under the direction of Dr. Albert Biderman of the Bureau of Social Science Research. Identical survey

instruments were used in Boston, Chicago, and Precinct 13 of Washington, D.C. The instrument for estimating the kind and amount of crime was identical for all precincts, however. The estimates for Boston and Chicago are presented in "Survey of Crime Against Residents," Report #2 appended to this report. No effort is made to summarize that information here except to say that on the whole the volume of crime obtained from the sample survey is higher than that obtained from police department statistics for the same district. This report rather focuses on problems in the design and execution of such surveys and in making estimates from them.

Major Problems in Sample Survey Estimation of Crime

We shall discuss four major types of problems in using the sample survey as a means of estimating the kind and amount of crime: (1) problems of sampling and gaining access to respondents; (2) problems in interviewing and of the validity and reliability of respondent reporting; (3) problems in estimating the incidence of victimization and comparability of these estimates with police statistics; (4) problems of interpreting the kind and amount of crime from sample survey estimates. Each problem will usually be discussed separately for the resident survey and the business and organizations survey.

1. Problems of sampling and gaining access to respondents.

Any sampling problem begins with defining a universe that is to be sampled. For these studies we recognized two distinct universes, one of resident citizens and one of businesses and

organizations located within the city whether or not the owner, manager, or workers were resident in the city. For each of these universes, however, an appropriate sampling frame is required, i.e., some way of defining the units that are to be sampled. It turned out to be difficult to secure economical sampling frames for both the resident and the business and organizations samples.

For residents, we decided upon a household sample, since potentially either the entire household is victimized by a crime as in a burglary of a residence, or one or more of its members are victims as persons, whether or not they are victimized within the dwelling unit. Nonetheless there are problems of whom is to be selected as the respondent to provide the information and what kind of information can be gained for other members of the household. Because of problems of reliability and validity of reporting on victim experiences for members of the household other than oneself and also the difficulty of interviewing young persons--problems discussed below--only respondents 18 years of age and over were considered eligible for selection within households. We chose to randomize the selection of these persons, since failure to do so would seriously bias the reporting of certain kinds of crime, as for example crimes against males if largely women are selected as respondents.

The randomization of the selection of the respondent, however, meant that the average cost per interview is higher since it necessitates call-backs to locate and secure the cooperation

of the respondent that is randomly selected within a household. It seems quite clear, however, that when one compares the respondent selection for the NORC interviews of the national sample and those done by the method selected for this study, that the latter method despite its higher average cost provides a more valid description of crimes against the person.

Selection of households in terms of a specific sampling frame poses problems of cost. To reduce costs, we did not wish to resort to an area probability sample, particularly since we had good reason to avoid high clustering of areas on the assumption that crime is not uniformly spread across even small areas of a city. Only in Chicago did we select an area probability sample and the listing required for that sample substantially increased costs. Perhaps we should have borne the cost of an area probability sample in the other cities as well since neither the polling lists in Boston nor the Real Property Inventory in Washington, D.C. were as complete a sampling frame as we originally anticipated.

The selection of businesses and organizations likewise posed serious problems since given the dispersion of organizations in an area, an area probability sample is quite costly. For that reason we chose to select business and organizations through the use of other sampling frames. In Boston and Chicago, the Police Department lists of businesses and organizations in an area were used. We checked the completeness of these listings through supplemental sampling procedures, but this also added to the cost. In Washington, D.C. the Real

Property Inventory likewise lacked completeness. All in all, samples of businesses and organizations are probably better done with an area probability sample and future studies should utilize such a sampling frame.

Selection of respondents within businesses and organizations poses some problems as well. We chose to interview the owner, if he could be interviewed within the city, and if not, the manager. Unfortunately managers are not always able to provide information, particularly on such matters as insurance claims. Furthermore in larger businesses and organizations, the manager or owner may be unaware of criminal incidents where the police are called since other employees may do so at any time. Given the fact that almost none of these organizations has procedures for reporting them to management or of keeping track of their occurrence, we undoubtedly lost information by selecting only owners or managers as respondents.

Having selected a household or a business or organization, there are very real problems in gaining access to respondents to secure the required information. On the whole, the problem of access was not great for gaining access to businesses and organizations; they are after all "open for business". The problem of gaining access to the respondent also was not great, though there were some problems in gaining cooperation from some owners or managers. On the whole, however, the loss of respondents through failure to gain access or cooperation from an owner or manager is small as compared with that for gaining access to residents of households.

For any sample survey of residents, there is some loss due to the fact that some respondents never can be located for an interview, even when someone has been contacted in the household. There always are some refusals to cooperate as well. In general we know that it is harder to gain access to high than low income dwelling units. Having gained access, it is somewhat harder to locate the respondent desired from a very low income than from a very high income respondent. Both of these problems were apparent in our surveys of residents, but they pose somewhat more serious problems for a study that attempts to estimate crime in high and low income areas.

In both Chicago and Washington, D.C. we had a fairly large number of respondents that are located in buildings with resident managers who function to control access to the tenants. While we could address letters to respondents, we could not locate them by phone if the manager denied such information or if he refused to allow the interviewer to ring the bell of the respondent. Our nonresponse rate is much higher for such buildings in both cities, leading to some difficulty in estimating crime for high income respondents.

Again, while we did not have particular difficulty in getting access to buildings in low income areas, there were very real problems in finding respondents at home for interview. This substantially increased our call-back rate in these areas. Since a substantial proportion of all of our respondents resided in low income high crime rate areas, we had a higher average interview cost than is typical of the sample survey of

a cross-section of the population. For these reasons, it also took a longer time to complete the survey in an area. These problems in sampling and locating respondents suggest that local sample surveys of crime will be somewhat more costly than is generally true of sample surveys.

2. Problems in interviewing and of the validity and reliability of respondent reporting.

2a. Selecting the respondent for interview.

Early pre-tests disclosed that any respondent selected provides reasonably complete information for crimes against the household and for those where the respondent personally was a victim. Respondents nonetheless are not very reliable reporters for crimes against other members of the household. We were able to assess this by interviewing independently several members of a household. In gathering information then, we focused on selecting respondents at random within the household so that we would be sure to gain valid and reliable information for every type of respondent in a household.

We further found that young respondents are relatively uninformed about offenses against the household or against other members of the household. For that reason, we decided not to interview anyone in the household who was under 18 years of age. This means that we cannot reliably estimate offenses against such persons, though such offenses are included in official police statistics as crimes known to the police.

For businesses and organizations, we recognized that offenses against employees that occur in places of business may be underestimated because we interviewed only the owner or manager. There may be serious underreporting in some instances. This may be true, for example, of theft from employees by others at work, of assaults on employees, or even of robbery. Thus our procedure does not permit us to estimate very reliably crimes that occur within a place of business or other organization but rather focus on those that occur against the business or organization or against employees acting as agents of that establishment.

2b. Salience of crime to respondents.

Before pretesting ways of securing information on crime or victim experiences, we had assumed that being a victim of a crime is a very salient experience to a person. Although we assumed that this would be somewhat more likely where the person experienced victimization through actual contact with an offender than where only his property was involved, we were surprised through these studies to learn what low salience crime appears to have for a substantial majority of the population.

Several things became apparent through pretesting and doing the studies. One is that respondents need considerable time to think about and remember all of their crime experiences. This may stretch over days or weeks as a time interval of recollection. Without such an opportunity, a respondent tends to focus on the most recent events. We therefore recognized that we should focus our study on estimates for the most recent periods of

time rather than to attempt any long term estimation. This suggests that no single sample survey can provide data on trends in crime; rather one must rely on repeated surveys of a population over time to estimate changes in kinds and amount of crime.

A separate study was undertaken of citizens who called the police and where an observer reported on the interaction that took place between the police and the citizens. A sample of these observed incidents of police-citizen interaction was selected and several months later an interview taken with the person who was known to have reported a victim experience to the police in the presence of an observer. To our surprise over 20 per cent of these citizens failed to report that observed report of a victim experience to the interviewer when the same schedule was used to secure crime experiences as was used with the cross-section sample. This study raises some important questions that require further research. Why is it that citizens fail to report experiences where they called the police even when no more than three or four months has elapsed since that experience? Though they reported in many cases other crime events against them where they did not call the police, why did they fail to report the specific one where it was known they made a report to the police? LEA should consider supporting further research on this kind of problem since it should contribute to further understanding on what are the factors that lead to citizen reporting and to the images they form of the police. It also should aid us in further

determination of the value of the sample survey as a means of crime reporting.

For businesses and organizations, we observed a similar tendency to focus on recent events. We are unable to determine at this point how much underreporting there may be due to salience of the event. Further study of the reliability and validity of management reporting should be made. Checks with insurance companies on claims followed by interviews with business owners or managers might aid us in determining the degree to which they recall and report on crimes against them. Similarly, follow up should be made where it is known that they reported particular crimes to the police to learn whether they systematically report such crimes in a sample survey about crimes against businesses and organizations.

2c. Effects of questioning about victim experience on the respondent.

Apart from the fact that citizens or businessmen have problems in recalling experiences with crime or crimes against their household or place of business, the nature of the interview itself may pose real problems in gaining the information.

It is commonly assumed that respondents experience great difficulty in reporting certain kinds of very personal victim experiences. It is commonly assumed, for example, that women will be reluctant to talk about their experiences in rape situations or that any victim experience that involves a deviant status for the victim will not be reported. Our study does not

provide sufficient information on this point. We are reasonably assured that experiences women have as rape victims are reported without great reluctance on the part of the respondent, particularly the low income respondent, since we secure more such reports than one would estimate from police statistics, reports that on face validity are bona fide. We are far less assured that deviants or upper income respondents report their victim experiences, however. The reason this is the case for deviants is that we lacked information on the deviant status of the person reporting on a crime. Thus we do not know whether the respondent was a victim because of his deviance. It is possible that we get an accurate picture of the victim experience apart from the deviant status, but we do not know this is the case.

The fact that we cannot answer this question means that further research should be undertaken in this area to assess the extent to which the sample survey can secure such information. One way to do such studies is to select from police department files cases where known deviants have reported victim experiences to the police and follow these with a sample survey interview. While we did follow a few such cases in our victim sample, there were far too few such cases to make an adequate assessment of the reliability of their reporting.

A second important problem in this area is how the structure of the interview affects respondent reporting. Our early pre-testing provided convincing demonstration that any technique based on asking the respondent whether they had a particular kind of victim experience followed by questioning about that

experience produced a "ceiling effect" on the number of victim experiences for a respondent. It soon became clear that a respondent controls the number of experiences he or she had on the basis of what they consider a sufficient amount of time they have given the interviewer. We also learned that if we asked the respondent whether this kind of crime occurred against them or any other member of the household that they soon produced a similar control of information about crime against themselves and other household members.

Since our primary goal was to estimate the kind and amount of crime to overcome these defects in structuring the interview, we developed a schedule that first secured all of the information for the respondent as a victim. After gaining information on all his victim experiences, we then took a separate victim experience schedule for each reported experience. This procedure yielded a considerably higher number of average experiences per respondent. It should be clear then that the quality of the estimate secured from the sample survey depends very much upon how one secures the information on experience. Any technique for securing the information that prolongs getting the information on the respondent will lead to considerable underreporting of victim experiences.

2d. Reliability and validity of reporting.

Despite our attempts to secure information on all victim experiences during a recent time interval, we are convinced that the more serious problem is underreporting rather than overreporting. All examinations of the data for overreporting

suggest that respondents generally report events that they regard as crimes. While some of these experiences might not be defined as crimes from a legal or police point of view, this problem can be handled by classification. The reports themselves do not appear to involve fabrication on the part of the respondent, but rather a difference in conception of what constitutes a crime against them.

Underreporting constitutes a problem however. Mention has been made of the fact that we learned respondents do not report experiences that we know through our observation studies they reported to the police, even when these were recent experiences. Police departments do not report a similar problem on follow-up through detective investigation, though that does not mean the problem does not arise in police work since no study has been made of this problem in police departments. Sometimes police detectives may report such experiences as failure to locate the victim; in other cases they may be cloaked as an "unfounded" report of a crime. In any event, it suggests that further work on this problem seems necessary both by doing studies internal to police departments where detective follow-up is used to secure such information or by the further development of audit procedures not unlike those undertaken by the Bureau of Government in St. Louis and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. Such audit procedures might be further developed to include not only inquiry about the particular crime that reported to the police that is being audited, but questions about other crimes this citizen may have experienced and did not report to

the police. Thus the audit and sample survey features might be combined in a single study. Indeed, it would be interesting to undertake some methodological work on reporting where the official auspices and status of the interviewer were varied, e.g., a uniformed police officer, a plain clothes detective, a government official, and an independent survey professional interviewer might be used as interviewers singly or in pairs.

For businesses and organizations, there are some special problems in securing information on all crimes against the business or organization. Mention has already been made of some of these problems. In particular, the failure of most businesses and organizations to develop a crime accounting scheme poses real problem for getting valid and reliable information. For example, the fact that most businesses and organizations do not keep adequate personnel records means that it is difficult to determine how many employees they may have discharged for employee theft. There is good reason to believe our estimates of employee theft cannot be precise without such records. Or, to take another example, the fact that most businesses and organizations do not have an inventory control means that it is almost impossible to secure more than an informed guess about their losses due to employee and customer theft. In such cases we could not in any event estimate the number of offenses, but we could get another kind of estimate, the cost of crime to the business or organization.

Similarly, the absence of any kind of organization procedure for monitoring citizen contacts with the police leaves the

citizen without an accounting system. Elsewhere we proposed a civic accounting system where the police officer receipts on every citizen contact. Such a system would make it more likely that both police statistics and citizen reporting to interviewers would be more reliable, at least where citizens do have contact with the police.

Finally, there are some difficult questions about the bona fide quality of the event itself. We discussed this problem somewhat above with respect to overreporting. Police departments have an organizational procedure for handling this problem, usually defined as follow-up through detective investigation. When in their judgement the facts do not warrant the complaint, the complaint is unfounded, either by the detective or by some superior officer or unit that actually makes the decision about "unfounding".

The study was not designed to follow-up the report of victim events for which the police were not notified. It could be argued that many of these would be unfounded on detective investigation. We believe that internal evidence suggests that for the most part these are bona fide victim experiences. Furthermore, in actually estimating the incidence of crime based on reporting from citizens, we applied an unfounding rate for the department. Yet the unfounding rate itself is not broken down adequately by type of incident and there may be differentials by type of crime that are not taken into account.

What is needed therefore, is additional research where the sample survey would be conducted in conjunction with a police

department. A sample of crimes that the citizen reports occurred but were not reported to the police could be selected and subject to detective investigation as to their bona fide status. If properly designed, such a study could tell us a great deal about the validity of citizen reporting of experiences that they do not report to the police. Indeed, some sample survey interviews if done by detectives with specific attention to their criteria for unfounding reports might be a useful way for determining the validity of the information. In any case such studies need to be considered even though they involve difficult questions of citizen rights and cooperation.

3. Estimating incidence of victimization.

3a. Choice of a victimization rate.

The proportion of persons who have been victims of a crime varies among areas of a city. And, indeed, to a degree the proportion of persons who have been victims varies somewhat independently of the crime rate itself since the crime rate depends upon a rate of multiple victimization. We found, for example, that the per cent of persons victimized from July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966 in all four precincts was 33 per cent but this varied from a high of 39 per cent in Roxbury and 32 per cent in Dorchester of Boston to 30 per cent in Fillmore and 26 per cent in Town Hall, Chicago. While Roxbury had the highest gross offense rate of .49 for this period followed by .32 for Dorchester, the gross rate was the same for both Chicago precincts, .26.

There are a number of ways of estimating victimization then. One can compute, as above, the proportion of persons with one or more victim experiences in a given period of time. This proportion will always be below a victim experience rate--here called a victimization rate--since it does not take into account multiple victimization. Both rates are of some interest since it is possible that high crime rate areas are characterized more by multiple victimization than they are by number of victims. Put another way, high crime rate areas are both multiple offender and multiple victim areas. Such a finding seems of some importance in that it poses problems for the multiple victim. We find this to be true both for businesses and organizations and for residents. In any crime prevention program, more research and attention needs to be directed to the multiple victim as well as to the multiple offender.

The period of time for which the victimization rate is to be calculated is also important. We know that memory affects the reliability of reporting victim experiences. We also know that there is some seasonal variation in the crime rate. Thus we would not expect the same amount of crime to be reported for each quarter of the year, particularly for kinds of crime. It is not an easy matter therefore to determine how much of the difference in reporting for a given quarter of the year is due to seasonal variation in crime and how much to memory factors. In any case, there is a sharp decrement in reports of victim experiences over time so that clearly memory is an important factor in periods as recent as two years.

For purposes of comparison with police department data, it was decided to take a one year period for calculating victim experience rates. However, since recency of event appears to affect reporting, we chose the most recent year period as the period for which data were to be used to estimate victimization rates. This was the period of July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966. This report period is not identical with the police department annual report period which generally is a calendar year. Nonetheless both logically relate to a year's period of time.

3b. Problems of selecting a base population or universe for estimates.

Rates of victimization for persons generally are computed for the resident population of an area. Unfortunately there are no good estimates of the population resident in the police precincts in 1966 for which data were gathered. The best estimates of current population readily available are those that can be made from the area probability sample such as the one in Chicago, or by using the 1960 census data for a police district. Both of these estimates of current population present problems. Population movement since the 1960 census may render the count fairly unreliable as an estimate of current population, particularly for areas as small as a police precinct. The estimate from the sample itself is subject to sampling variability and at best permits a range of estimates. This means that whenever the sample survey is used as a means of determining victimization rates, there is a problem of whether one has reliable estimates

of the current population which is used as a base for the rate. Estimation of current population is not a major problem for national surveys since there are reliable estimates of the U. S. population. Some state and local areas provide such estimates as well, but they are rarely provided for the kinds of areas such as a police precinct. Our resident victimization rates in this study are based on population counts from the 1960 census. We have no way of knowing how unreliable these estimates are, though the count falls within the estimates we have made from our sampling procedure. In any future use of the survey, more attention should be given to the problem of obtaining reliable estimates of the population in an area if the goal is a reasonably precise estimate. The problem does not appear to be a serious one in this study since the goal was not so much the precision of the estimate but the gross comparison of differences in rates obtained from police statistics as compared with the sample survey. Furthermore both the police and the sample survey rates were calculated for the same population base, so both have in common this imprecision in estimate.

The same problem exists for the estimates for businesses and organizations. The Census of Business provides counts of businesses and some organizations in areas; however such counts present the same problems as population counts. It is difficult therefore to know the level of precision of estimate we may attach to these victimization estimates. Furthermore, since police departments generally do not provide tabulations of crimes against businesses or organizations separately, it was

virtually impossible to calculate a rate for the police statistics. A separate study might well be made showing police departments the ease with which such calculations can be made and their advantages as a form of official statistic.

Some of the crime that occurs in an area is against persons who are transient in the area. These will be reported as crimes known to the police in that area and in the calculation of an offense rate will be included as offenses against the base resident population. The inclusion of offenses against transients in the area while reflecting crime that occurs in the area distorts the estimation of crime against residents of the area. At the same time, if one includes from the resident survey crimes against the residents that occur elsewhere, one has distorted the description of crime that occurs within the area. Insofar as possible then, the survey procedure should exclude all crimes that occur to residents outside the area. At the same time, the resident survey failing to provide information on crimes against transients in the area will not be comparable with police statistics that include them. Lacking a way of removing crimes against transients from the police statistics, the police statistics will not be strictly comparable with those from the resident survey.

We were unable to secure for Boston and Chicago any reliable estimates of the transient population in our study areas and at the same time we were unable to eliminate the transients from the police statistics. Thus the two sets of data are not strictly comparable in this respect. Parenthetically, it should

be said that it seems worthwhile for police departments to report separately the crimes against residents and nonresidents if the object is to calculate a victim risk rate.

3c. Estimation of frequency of occurrence.

There is evidence that respondents do not provide a complete account of all of their victim experiences. As indicated earlier, we know this from following up experiences reported to the police, some of which victims failed to report on later interview. We also have reasons to believe that there are recall difficulties and problems of motivating the respondents to continue to report information on their experiences. All of this suggests that our estimates will be minimal rather than maximal estimates. In short, our current survey instruments while making substantial inroads into dealing with what is called the "dark figure" problem in estimating crime, i.e., how much crime goes unreported or does not appear in official police statistics do not provide maximal estimates. Further work is necessary both with the survey instrument and through other means if we are to approach an estimate of the actual amount of crime that occurs in an area over a given period of time.

3d. Comparability of victimization rates with offenses or crimes known to the police.

It has already been noted that there are several senses in which one may speak of a victimization rate. One way to regard such a rate is as a statement of the probability that a person or a household or dwelling unit will be victimized by a crime.

Some attempt was made to calculate such victimization probabilities utilizing data from the Data Systems Division of the Chicago Police Department. They are included as appendixes, Crime Statistics Series, Reports #6 and 7. These reports were based however on all major crimes against persons known to the police where a suspect was identified. Probabilities were calculated for all major offenses against persons for a population of a given race and age. It should be clear that this probability almost always will differ from the probability that any person will be a victim of such offenses one, two, three or more times.

There are a number of ways that data from surveys on victim experiences are not comparable with metropolitan police department data on offenses known to the police. The major sources of non-comparability are as follows:

(a) Survey data are reports on persons as victims; police data are based on reports of offenses. An offense may have more than one victim. For example, a robbery offense may involve several people in a business establishment as victims. For police department statistics there could be a report of one or more offenders arrested in this robbery but only one offense. While their reports also will include information on the number of persons who were robbed, each person robbed is not reported as a separate offense. Yet if we were to conduct a survey, each of the victims would report they were robbed.

There likewise are differences because of the fact that some kinds of offenses do not have persons who are immediately identifiable as a victim. This may be the case for certain types

of offenses where the public more generally is defined as the victim. For example, a person might be charged with disorderly conduct in public, but no one other than the police officer who makes the arrest would be present. Or, there may be offenses of a collusive nature where it would be difficult to define a victim since the alleged victim does not regard himself as victimized. This would be true, for example, of an illegal sale of alcohol. Though such offenses occur and it may be possible in many cases to identify the offender, it is not even in all cases possible to define a victim beyond that of disturbing public order or offending standards of public decency, or beyond that of attributing a legal status to a person that automatically defines the person as legally victimized. In any case, reports of such offenses will not usually be obtained through a survey procedure.

For still other offenses, as when the offense is against property, it may be difficult to determine who is victimized. If articles are stolen from the household, shall one consider all members as victimized, or only those whose particular property seems to be involved? Shall only the owner of the automobile that is stolen or all members of his family be considered the victims of an automobile theft? For purposes of the survey we arbitrarily considered all such offenses against property as victimizing all adult members of the household; yet it should be apparent that there is an arbitrary quality to that decision.

(b) Offense data are reported for place of occurrence of the offense while victim data are reported by the residence of the victim. Thus in any sample survey one has offenses reported that occurred outside the police district where a person resides. Correlatively, police data include nonresidents who were victims of offenses in the precinct. This problem has been noted above.

(c) As previously noted, police statistics presumably result from some procedures of investigation of the bona fide status of the victim or complainants report about the crime, or they result from the report of a police officer's who viewed the crime.

Generally detective investigation forms the basis of determining whether certain crimes represent bona fide complaints. Police departments attempt to eliminate false reports or claims that a crime has occurred. There is no similar way in the survey procedure itself of determining the bona fide nature of the complaint though presumably such reports of victim experiences that were or were not reported to the police could be investigated. Other means for handling this problem are discussed below.

(d) Police statistics include offenses against non-residents, businesses and organizations, and public order while a survey of residents will not generally bring out such offenses.

Sometimes a person who owns a business thinks of himself as having been victimized in the offense and will report it in a survey.

3e. Rendering victim and offense data comparable.

Given the differences between survey and offense data it was necessary to render them as comparable as possible to effect comparisons between them. The calculations involved are presented in Table 1 of Report #2, Survey of Crime Against Residents. Very briefly, the major steps in rendering the data comparable were: (1) eliminating all respondent reports of victimization outside the neighborhood; (2) adjustment of victim totals to take account of offenses that were attributed to the entire household rather than to the respondent, using a factor of the number of persons 18 years old or over in the household in the entire sample since a separate calculation for one precinct based on the actual computation for each household yielded almost no difference in the adjusted rate; (3) reduction of the number of offenses that might be baseless or unfounded by applying the police department rate of unfounding; (4) elimination of the offenses that respondent says were not reported to the police so that only offenses reported to the police are included.

In this procedure, no account was taken of other factors that might affect the comparability of the statistics, e.g., the length of time that the resident was in the area or of offenses that may have occurred against persons who moved from the area during the past year. Since the rate of in- and out-movement did not appear to be unusually high for our areas, this may not seriously affect the statistics. It should be apparent that any survey for any area always will have difficulty obtaining data on out-movers, though adjustments could be made

for those who moved into the district by length of time in the district.

We were unable to adjust the police data for any of the Boston or Chicago precincts, though that would have been desirable. Among the sources of noncomparability that lie within the police data are these: (1) the inclusion of offenses where there is no clear victim other than the public or where there is mutual victimization; (2) the inclusion of offenses against business establishments and other organizations; (3) the inclusion of offenses against persons under 18 years of age. Failure to eliminate these offenses means that the police figures are higher than they would be if rendered comparable with those for the survey. Hence our comparisons result in more conservative estimates for the sample survey.

4. Problems of interpreting survey and police data comparisons.

From the foregoing it should be clear that there are problems in deriving survey data and in rendering them comparable with police data. These problems prevent precise estimates for either set of data. It is obvious that we do not have maximum estimates of victims from the survey data and that we include a greater range of offenses in the police than in the survey data when we convert victim data to offense data.

Recognizing these problems, we have attempted to effect comparability of survey with police data such that the survey data underestimate offenses. By not adjusting the police data for offenses not included in the survey data, we likewise have

erred on the side of conservative estimates for the survey data. Therefore conclusions about differences between data from police statistics and those from the survey are based on procedures that give the "benefit of doubt" to the police statistics.

Nonetheless, we are left with the problem that while we find a higher crime rate using survey than police data, we are unable to estimate just how much more crime there is in the society than is shown from police statistics. We have good reason to believe that it is more than our difference calculations show; just how much more remains unascertained.

Finally, we are left with the problem that we are unable to determine what the differences might be were we to be assured that police data were based on all complaints to the police and all crimes viewed by them whether or not there was a complainant. The survey procedure in the nature of the case will always be a poor way of obtaining information on crimes against the public where there is no obvious citizen victim. Police data always will underestimate where the citizen is unwilling to mobilize the police or the police officer is motivated for some reason not to make an official report. In any case, the two organizational ways of gathering information probably never shall provide mutually inclusive kinds of data; they can only provide comparable estimates for offenses where there are victims who potentially could mobilize the police.

5. Value of the survey method.

Despite the shortcoming in the survey estimates in the work done under this grant, it should be apparent that the survey

method provides one of the most important and promising ways for estimating the amount of crime in the society. At the present time, given both the relationship of the citizenry to the police and the organization of police information about crimes, the survey method provides a better estimate of the amount of crime in the society.

Many of the problems in gathering, analyzing and utilizing the survey data discussed above can be dealt with by further research. LEA might well consider further research in this area, recognizing, however, that it is fairly costly research because of special problems in gathering and analyzing the information.

POLICE OBSERVATION STUDIES

The police observation studies were designed to obtain information on the transactions that occurred between the citizen and the police officer. The reports submitted to LEA discuss various aspects of the citizen-officer relationship. Among the major reports are those dealing with the human relations aspects of police-citizen transactions, the extent to which the citizen is dealt with by legal means (Miranda, stop and frisk, etc.), and the effect of the race and class status of citizens on officer behavior.

The observational studies seem to be a very important way for obtaining this kind of information. For example, our survey of police officers indicates a high degree of race prejudice among the officers. This is confirmed in reports by observers of their conversations with officers. Yet the observational studies show that for the most part the officers do not respond with prejudice toward persons of the other race. In short, there is much support for the rather common finding that attitudes do not generally carry over into behavior if there are official organizational sanctions against being prejudiced toward persons--as there were in all the police departments we carried on observational studies--or if the situation is regarded as routine and bureaucratically defined.

No attempt is made here to summarize again the results from these observational studies since they are included among the reports submitted to LEA. Rather, we shall focus on some of the problems that arise in connection with this kind of study.

1. Problems with the observers.

Given the fact that an observer spent at least one watch a day six days a week for five or six weeks, he runs the risk of being coopted by the police culture and his relationships with individual police officers. It becomes difficult for the observer to maintain objectivity as these relationships arise. We have evidence that this happened to some degree to all of our observers. Despite their starting point in terms of attitudes toward the police, all observers could be considered as moving more "pro-police" during the period of observation. While it does not necessarily follow that this hampered the quality of their reporting, we know that in some cases it did. We know this to be true because some observers reported that other observers from time to time withheld information because they were afraid that it might make an individual officer or the department "look bad". Just how much this affected the quality of the data, it is difficult to say. From analyses made comparing data collected during the first and last weeks of the survey, the differences generally are not sufficiently large to attribute them to withholding or distortion of information.

It is clear from this observation study that one can train observers to gather this kind of information and obtain far more information on police-citizen transactions than most persons might be willing to grant. Yet it also should be clear that further work on the observational process itself is necessary to insure even more valid and reliable reporting and observation.

2. Problems with securing kinds of data in the observational process.

The observational studies were designed to secure information on police-citizen transactions that occurred in dispatched (run), on view, or citizen field mobilization settings. The schedules designed to secure this information deal for the most part with legal and human relations aspects of these transactions. The study was not designed to systematically collect data on other aspects of police work nor on police behavior apart from these transactions. Yet the fact that observers were with police officers during an entire shift or watch meant that they observed much other behavior on the part of the officers. In some sections of their report, observers were given the opportunity to report on other aspects of the observation that the observer felt was germane to the general purposes of the study. In some cases, the observers simply reported other material as a matter of providing information on a police-citizen transaction. In this way we acquired some information on a whole variety of matters that occur in the life of police officers. There are reports of reactions to department orders, to particular superior officers that were not specifically solicited as information about the command relationship, of how the officer spent his time when he was not on call, and so on. As a consequence of this reporting even though neither the sampling procedure nor the schedule sought this information systematically, we obtained information on what may be called deviant activity by police officers. The major kinds of such deviant activity

included the undue use of force, the breaking or circumvention of department rules, and engaging in conduct that might be defined as against the law, as well as of department rules.

Such information always poses a problem to the investigator. It posed special problems for this study that require careful consideration in terms of future LEA support for studies of this kind. It should be borne in mind that in undertaking the studies certain guarantees were made to each department and within each department to individual officers. These were guarantees of anonymity. The university based investigator who is a member of a professional organization with a code of ethics that compels guarantees of anonymity is in no position to do otherwise. Ordinarily such codes permit the sharing of information for scientific or training purposes provided that guarantees of confidentiality are met. The investigator is relieved of such guarantees only when consent from persons is obtained to disclose the information and when he has guarantees of confidentiality. Throughout these observation studies, we thought that we had both such guarantees.

While the studies were still in the field it became apparent that information was being obtained for which the studies had not been designed. This was discussed with members of the National Crime Commission staff under the usual assumptions about professional norms of confidentiality. In retrospect, this probably was a mistaken view, since there are real questions about the level of confidentiality of information that can be respected by any public agency, though there

clearly are procedures related to confidentiality of information in government agencies.

In any case, it was clear that the observation study could in no sense provide valid and reliable estimates other than those for which it was designed to secure the information systematically and in a systematic form of reporting. The principal investigator therefore expressed considerable reluctance to develop any kind of systematic formulation of data for which the study was not designed, particularly in the form of estimates, since both the quality and quantity of unevaluated data can make it misleading. Mr. Vorenburg of the National Crime Commission pressed for some formulation in these terms. Several reports were prepared on the assumption that these would simply "sensitize" members of the professional staff to the kinds of problems in this area. They were specifically not to be regarded as scientific in any sense of that word. They could not even approximate that model since the studies were not designed to secure data of that kind. Furthermore, considerable coder judgement had to be exercised in making any use of them at all.

Unfortunately for all concerned, these reports became the subject of considerable controversy between the principal investigator and members of the Commission staff. They remain so. Both on grounds of confidentiality and of the degree of confidence one can place in the data, they cannot serve as anything more than information to sensitize to the nature of the problem.

The preparation of data for scientific purposes and their public use poses many problems, problems that are apparent with these data. Research through grants to universities where the principal investigators are bound by codes of ethics pose problems but in the long-run such guarantees are necessary to insure the integrity of the scientific investigative of social processes. Where the goals and purposes of the granting agency or the ultimate consumer and those of the investigators may clearly be at cross-purposes, the granting agency may well have to give careful consideration to whether it can live with the scientific and professional traditions of the university based project.

Previously the principal investigator had undertaken observational studies in police departments through research grants. No such problems arose in these studies. The relationship with the staff of the National Crime Commission on the other hand was a particularly unsatisfactory one for the principal investigator so that he would never consider this form of relationship again. Quite clearly, this is not an isolated case of dissatisfaction as studies in education and other areas of government inquiry affirm. The relationship between scientific inquiry and sponsoring agents always is complicated. It is particularly complicated in the social sciences where knowledge may be more "socially dangerous" and the goals of sponsors may lie beyond scientific knowledge.

The help and cooperation of the police departments in the observational studies deserves special mention. Without a doubt observational studies of the police could not be undertaken

without the full support of the command system. In all of the police departments in this study there was almost without exception full support from the command system at every level. The police chiefs after having been given guarantees of anonymity and assurances that any information that might identify their department was subject to their review, gave carte blanche to the investigation.

There has been all too little social science research in police organizations, largely owing to the fact that police boards and chiefs have traditionally been skeptical of its value and of guarantees of anonymity. More recently police departments have been willing to open their departments to social science research believing that such guarantees can be met. To violate such understandings undoubtedly would set back social science investigation in police departments at a time that it is just beginning.

POLICE OFFICER SURVEY

The survey of police officers was based on a probability sample of police officers for each of the precincts studied in Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D. C. Twenty-eight officers were randomly selected for each precinct on the expectation that there would be a few refusals or some difficulty in locating a few men for interview because of furloughs, second jobs, or because their place of residence was outside the city. We were able to meet our original plan of 25 interviews per precinct so that in all 202 interviews were obtained with police officers.

There were relatively few difficulties in obtaining what appear to be valid and reliable interviews with the police officers. In three of the eight precincts, there was some initial resistance on the part of some officers due largely to suspicion that the interviewer might be attempting to gain data for the departmental command in their city. In each case, after discussions with other officers that had been interviewed or reassurances from the local commander, cooperation was secured. In some cases, officers asked that the interview be done at the station or at a separate location (in one case at a public library). Most interviews however were conducted in the home of the police officer with no one else present at the time of the interview.

There is considerable internal evidence in the interview that the officer spoke with considerable frankness during the interview, if his opinions on crime, the law, and minority

persons are considered. There is no evidence that most officers gave the expected socially desired responses to many of the questions. This survey demonstrates that it is possible to gather considerable data about the police officers beliefs, attitudes, and orientations toward his work and his assignment. We found that women interviewers were able to obtain about the same kinds of data as were men interviewers, though the latter secured more responses in the vernacular.

Overall, the response rate to the police officer survey is well above that normally secured in sample surveys. No doubt this is partly due to the fact that the study itself was regarded favorably, following as it did upon the observation study which the police officers had viewed with favor. No doubt, too, the fact that the entire command supported all phases of the study contributed to its success. Again the success of this study demonstrates the advisability of doing this kind of research with the full cooperation of the police department.

POLICE CONTACT OR VICTIM SURVEY

The police observation study produced a large volume of police-citizen contacts. There were 5,339 run, on-view, and citizen field situations observed for the study; 81 per cent of these dispatched or run situations. Each of the three cities contributed about one-third of the total observed run situations: 34 per cent are from Boston, 31 per cent from Chicago, and 35 per cent are from Washington, D.C. In each city at least one-half of the observation was in a predominantly Negro residential area.

Many runs do not involve citizen transaction or interaction situations. Though a citizen calls the police to the situation to which the police are dispatched, they may not be present when the police arrive. In over 30 per cent of the run situations no citizens was present when the police arrived. About two-thirds of all dispatches nonetheless involve the processing of persons either as complainants or as offenders or suspects. In only 23 per cent is there an offender or suspect present so that in almost 50 per cent of the situations the police deal only with a complainant or a citizen requesting some form of police service.

The police contact (victim) survey was designed to check upon the reliability of information obtained on victim experiences in the resident survey and to obtain information upon the observer reported reactions of citizens that could be compared with the way that the citizen reports his behavior and reactions about contact with the police in the later interview. Such a study was deemed particularly worthwhile from the

standpoint of checking upon the reliability and validity of reporting in the sample survey of residents.

A sample of citizens who were complainants in dispatched or run situations therefore was drawn for interview in the police contact (victim) survey. An analysis of variance design was used to draw this sample. First, all complaints were classified into the following Part I classes of the UCR classification system: assaults and attempts; auto theft; burglaries and attempts; larceny over \$50; rape and attempts; robbery and attempts. All other complaints were classified into three types of calls for service: Part II crimes, disturbances; juvenile disturbances and vandalism. A random sample was drawn from each of these classes so as to produce 10 interviews in each class other than for Part II crimes where 20 completed interviews were sought. Actually, for some police precincts there were fewer than 10 complainants available for interview, particularly when address information for the complainant was complete. There were fewer than 10 rape cases in all precincts and of robberies in most precincts. A few precincts also had fewer than 10 aggravated assaults.

In drawing the sample we were faced with a number of problems of having sufficient identifying information that would permit follow-up interviews with a complainant. We were forced to drop a substantial number of complaint situations because there was insufficient information to permit a follow-up interview. The main reason for this was that we lacked adequate name and address information for the complainant or victim. If one

examines why this information was insufficient, it can be explained on the basis of the police handling of the incident and the requirements of the observation situation. No observer was permitted to act in the role of interviewer in the police-citizen contact situation. Thus if the officer failed to secure certain information, or for some reason found it unnecessary to obtain the information on name and address, the observer was not in a position to get the information. There are a number of reasons why the officer not infrequently failed to get proper name and address information. Where citizens were for any reason away from the place of residence when in the role of complainant and the officer decided not to treat it as a formal complaint, the information generally was lacking. There are many situations in which the citizen is away from home when acting as a complainant--in a business establishment, on the street, at an emergency center of a hospital, etc. Although the rules and regulations of a department may require such information, the officer does not necessarily obtain and process it. Hence, though we knew almost everything that went on in the situation and the observer could report on such things as the race, sex, approximate age, and an estimate of his socioeconomic status, together with a report of what went on in the contact situation, we lacked the crucial information on name and address for follow-up. Thus while we could analyze the information for the observation study, we lacked the crucial information to do a follow-up interview with the complainant (victim).

For cases where a report was filed with the police department we were able to check name and address information of the respondents selected against the reports the police officer filed with the department. This was particularly possible in Chicago. Yet even here problems arose. For Part I crimes, the address information was usually very accurate since a follow-up had been made through detective investigation; however for miscellaneous incidents we had only the information from the radio dispatch cards, information that often is not complete, e.g., a complainant did not give his or her name, or the address information did not include the apartment within an address. Police officers when they arrive at the scene attempt to locate the complainant in such situations and often do because the complainant is waiting for the police. Yet none of these situations prevail on follow-up interview. While an attempt was made to eliminate all such cases from the sample, we failed to eliminate a substantial proportion of such cases as our subsequent attempts to locate the complainant disclosed. In part this was due to inadequate or incorrect information available to the observer and at times the police officer as well at the time of the police-citizen contact situation. For example, the officer and the observer assumed that the citizen lived at the address where the complaint was taken but actually it was that of a neighbor or friend, or of some place where the complainant had gone to make a call. This posed enormous problems of trying to locate the particular respondent on follow-up interview because without being able to indicate that this was a follow-up of a previous contact with the

police (required by the design of the study), suspicion was aroused if attempts were made to locate the particular person for interview.

We sought a "blind" interview with the complainant in order to check upon the reliability and validity of the sample survey. That is, the complainant was approached just as they had been in the resident survey, since we wished to know whether the particular incident would be reported without prompting on the part of the interviewer (a test of recall, etc.) and we also wanted to see how the situation might be distorted in that kind of survey situation. It can be seen then that the structure of the follow-up posed problems in locating the respondent if precise information on who was to be interviewed was not available. Over-all we were unable to locate almost one-half of the respondents in the original sample due to the following factors: (1) inadequate information on the name and address of the complainant; (2) refusal to be interviewed when the complainant was located; (3) unable to locate the respondent after five repeated call-backs though it was known that the respondent was at that address. Normally one would expect from 15 to 20 per cent of the respondents to be noninterview cases because of nonsample address, failure to locate on repeated contact, and refusal to be interviewed.

The rate we obtained obviously is considerably higher than that. Particular attention is called to the fact that our refusal rate is higher than that we normally would expect. This requires further investigation since it suggests that either

some victims or persons from the class level from which victims are disproportionally drawn may be more likely to refuse an interview when contacted. We are inclined to believe that it is the highly transient, "problem involved" family member or person who refused or is unavailable on repeated contact for interview. Nonetheless further investigation of this matter seems important. The only way that further investigation seems possible is through a cooperative study with a police department where the resources of detective investigation are utilized in follow-up, though some further work could be done by dropping the "blind" features of the design whenever a respondent could not be located or refused an interview to see whether cooperation could be secured under those circumstances.

The data from the victim survey then do not permit us to assess as reliably the reliability and validity of information from the resident survey as we had hoped. Nonetheless, they do permit us to assess some of the problems that are encountered. Thus we found that almost 20 per cent of those actually interviewed when reporting on the incident said they did not call the police (even though we know they did call the police)! Their reasons for not calling the police seem to be similar to those we found on the sample survey of residents. Yet we are left with a puzzle of just why they should say they did not call the police when they report most other information on the incident and there are no obvious reasons why they should want to disguise this fact.

Quite obviously, here is an area where further research is very necessary if the sample survey of victims is to be a means of monitoring the amount of crime in the society. It also seems important for other reasons related to the whole question of police-citizen relations. LEA might well consider further research in this area. Such research need not begin with a sample of cases drawn from police files. How valid and reliable is the information secured by the police officer in his role as policeman as contrasted with the kind of information secured when someone in the role of professional interviewer secures the information. One may have here a kind of Rashomon problem. What is the truth? This requires a design where the information can be checked independently of both roles of police officer and of professional interviewer.

END