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ANALYSIS OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

A Report to

The State of Arizona Office of the Auditor General

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Robert A. Buchanan

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

James Austin, Ph.D. Paul Litsky August 7, 1985

Mr. William Thomson
Director, Performance Audit Division
The State of Arizona
Office of the Auditor General
111 West Monroe, Suite 600
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ROBERT A. BUCHANAN
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Dear Mr. Thomson:

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM/A.G.

CONTRACT #0477

Enclosed, please find five copies of the above-referenced audit that has been prepared in accordance with Auditor General Contract Number 0477. An additional unbound copy has also been enclosed, should your agency determine that additional copies are warranted.

On behalf of Correctional Services Group, Inc., and its subcontractor, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and NCCD staff, Dr. James Austin and Paul Litsky, I want to formally acknowledge the cooperation and assistance afforded by Auditor General staff throughout the course of this study. I would also personally like to thank your staff member Cindy Whitaker for the information she provided both at the outset of the study and over the full course of the audit. As a consultant who has worked with a substantial number of state agency staff over the past decade, I found her interest in the area of offender classification and her diligence toward better understanding classification as practiced by the Arizona Department of Corrections to be refreshing and worth of "a strong pat on the back."

Correctional Services Group also wishes to thank the many staff and officials from the Department of Corrections for their time, interest, and contributions toward study findings. They demonstrated a continued willingness to share information and concerns, even though their classification system was being assessed, ofttimes critically, by an outside group. It is hoped that this audit and the Auditor General's report, which will be submitted later this year to the Arizona Legislature, will serve as the catalyst for additional improvements in the state's correctional system.

Please contact me should there be any questions pertaining to the findings and recommendations included in this report. Again, on behalf of Correctional Services Group, I wish to thank the Auditor General and his staff for the opportunity to serve the State of Arizona.

Sincerely,

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

Robert A. Buchanan Group President

Group President

Enclosures

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a result of the general public's and state legislature's concerns with the operation of the Arizona Department of Corrections, the Auditor General was directed to conduct a performance audit of the Department. A preliminary assessment determined that the Department's classification system appeared to be ineffective with respect to security assessment. In response to this perception, Correctional Services Group, Inc., was retained by the Auditor General to evaluate whether the Department is properly classifying inmates and to develop projections of inmates who could be eligible for early release programs, as well as make recommendations for immediate and long-term steps to alleviate subjectivity and misclassification within the system.

In order to determine the extent of misclassification, the Federal Prison System (FPS) Custody Determination Instrument was used to simulate the conditions under which a sample of the Arizona DOC stock population would be classified. The results of this simulation indicated that the Department does tend to overclassify inmates at initial classification. This is particularly the case for medium custody, where almost 59% of the inmate population is assigned following assessment at the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center; this compares to approximately 21% using the FPS model. However, for maximum custody there is moderate underclassification since approximately 26% of the sample was initially assessed as maximum custody in contrast to more than 30% based on the FPS approach. The Department assigned only an estimated 13% to minimum custody versus the 47% suggested by the federal system.

The apparent reasons for the high number of medium custody assignments include the Department's present custody classification criteria, which are essentially controlled by length of confinement at initial classification, and the large number of medium custody housing units that the agency must fill.

At reclassification, comparisons between the Department's and FPS's classification approaches are much more similar in that the Department reduced its medium custody population to 45% and increased the minimum custody portion to almost 36% versus 17% and 51%, respectively, for the FPS approach. Maximum custody, however, is more divergent since the Department classified less than 18% of its population in that level compared to almost 31% using the federal system.

These findings result in two inevitable conclusions: additional inmate housing is required at both ends of the custody scale and an objective classification system is warranted.

These findings have two important ramifications on bed space requirements. First, additional maximum security housing is required. Using the FPS simulation, an estimated 1,410 high security beds are now needed. These could be either new construction or upgrades of some of the higher security, medium custody facilities. At the other end of the custody continuum, an additional

1,300 minimum custody beds could be occupied without substantially endangering the welfare of the public. However, the maximum security beds are much more urgently needed, given the serious security and safety issues that have resulted and will continue to occur when space is unavailable to adequately control the Department's maximum custody inmate population.

An objective classification system is needed to minimize discretion while maximizing the best use of the Department's scarce inmate beds. This system, which would incorporate the concepts of public and institutional risk, would have the following advantages:

- Improvement in uniformity and consistency of offender classification decisions;
- Improvement in the documentation of classification decisions;
- Increased ability to determine the predictiveness and significance of factors used in determining security and custody;
- Ability to adapt to changing laws, policies, and offender populations;
- Maintenance of a system that is responsive to individual inmate characteristics and needs;
- Objective rating of facility program and security capabilities and resources; and
- Ability to serve as a management and planning mechanism.

The report also includes a number of recommendations to improve the overall classification system. These are grouped into the following categories: classification system decision-making; classification information needs; initial classification issues; institutional classification issues; central office classification issues; and special management inmate issues.

The final component of this study was devoted to assessing the percentage of inmates who could be released early from confinement with a low risk of becoming rearrested. The findings demonstrated, using the Selective Incapacitation Model developed by NCCD, that slightly more than 9% of the inmate population could be released early with only a minimal chance of being rearrested in the first year, while over 6%, if released early, would quite likely be rearrested during the same timeframe.

I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND FOR AUDIT

Arizona represents one of the fastest growing prison systems in the country. It has been growing at over 13% per year over the past five years as a result of general state-wide population growth, harsher sentencing legislation and conservative parole release policies which simultaneously increase both prison admissions and length of time served.

These conditions have led to overcrowding within the system and a perceived need to better allocate the agency's resources—the purview of a classification system. The existing classification system, however, is seen, at best, as ineffectual in resolving these problems and, at worst, as contributing to them.

Initial classification in the Arizona correctional system has been accomplished historically through a classification committee comprised of both program and security staff. Once inmates complete a two- to three-week diagnostic period, the classification committee reviews each new admission and describes which institution the inmate should be assigned to and at what security level. Statistics for 1984 indicate that over 77% of all new admissions were classified at medium security or higher.

This concentration of prisoners in the higher security levels, via the present subjective approach, has substantial ramifications on Department physical plant, staffing, program, and financial resources. The possible placement of some prisoners in higher security levels than warranted by their degree of risk, often termed overclassification, can and does result in a number of negative consequences including misuse or waste of agency resources, overcrowding, excessive supervision, denial of access to agency privileges; violates the rule of "least restrictive" security placement; and, in its extreme, can result in excessive and needless confinement.

Underclassification, on the other hand, describes those instances where inmates are improperly placed in lower security levels than their risk would indicate. While underclassification does not waste Departmental resources, it can lead to escapes, serious disciplinary infractions, suicide, violence, and erroneous community placement decisions. While overclassification brings minimal, if any, public outcry, underclassification which results in any of the previously cited consequences can trigger substantial media attention, high accountability, anxiety among staff and inmates and. in the event of an extremely serious incident, intervention by the Legislature and other government officials generally at the prodding of the citizenry.

OVERVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION IN ARIZONA

The first known recorded history of offender classification in Arizona was in 1975 when a law suit was filed in federal court (Harris vs. Cardwell, et al) alleging that the State of Arizona violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by providing a system of corrections (the totality thereof) which was cruel and unusual. The result of that law suit ended in a stipulated order against the State of Arizona, Department of Corrections and as a result, a number of requirements were demanded by the Federal Courts.

One of the elements of that settlement was that the Arizona Department of Corrections had to provide for a classification system that met all the requirements of the Constitution plus all applicable federal laws as required by the Court. One of those provisions included due process and what was referred to at that time as an objective classification system. the settlement, policies and procedures had to be developed which were presented to the Court for approval. In response, a contract was entered into with Psychological Resources, Inc., for a diagnostic, testing, classification system which at that time was considered to be objective. This classification system employs a number of paper-pencil tests including, but not limited to, the 16PF, the Culture Fair IQ, and the Wide Range Achievement This was never intended to serve as the Department's classification system, but rather as an information tool to provide psychological and personality data on each inmate. The data in turn was to be used as a guide in determining an inmate's housing assignment and supervision level but not his or her overall security status, e.g., maximum, medium, etc.

Simultaneous with the introduction of Psychological Resources' system (also known as the Eber System after its developer), the Department began to significantly expand with the addition of the Perryville Prison, Tucson and Ft. Grant/Douglas complexes and a myriad of smaller facilities. No longer was the classification task one of simply determining what unit an inmate should be assigned to at the Arizona State Prison complex at Florence, but rather what facility, security level, and when available, program the inmate should be placed in.

While the agency had a difficult time maintaining compliance with the classification system requirements set forth in Harris vs. Cardwell it was able to do so as a result of ambiguous language concerning offender classification and assignment. The classification system was, in reality, a non-system in that it varied in substance and form from institution to institution based upon the philosophy, management, style, and maintenance needs of the facility administration. Differences ranged from composition of classification teams to criteria involved in security determination to degree of inmate participation in the classification process.

In 1977, a new central office-based classification system was introduced to increased consistency in classification decision-making by being responsible for all inter-unit and interinstitutional transfers. However, this system, due to the lack of a definitive objective, classification model, has often resulted in inmates being assigned according to either the "laws of supply and demand" or the relationship of the central classification office to select institutional staff. While the latter situation has been reduced in recent years, primarily due to the increased professionalism of central office classification personnel, the serious overcrowding situation has continued to strain an already overtaxed system, particularly, according to Department staff, in shortages of maximum security beds. The resultant situation has been one where classification criteria tend to be relaxed or overridden to facilitate the downward security movement of prisoners to fill available lower security beds.

The most recent attack on the Department's classification system was initiated by the National Prison Project when it brought a class action suit on behalf of inmates assigned to the Department's Administrative Segregation Unit in Cell Block Six at the Arizona State Prison Complex (Black vs. Ricketts). This suit alleged that the Department's method of classifying inmates to administrative segregation, within the unit, and the system used for classification for release, violated the Constitutional rights of the inmate class. As a result of this litigation, the Department entered into a consent decree which has structured the administrative segregation classification process.

As stated previously, the Arizona Department of Corrections, similar to other state correctional systems, is experiencing a serious problem with prison overcrowding and the resultant problems brought about by insufficient bedspace, staff, equipment and supplies. Coupled with these problems is the perception among many staff and other state officials that the present classification system is inadequate to meet the needs of a correctional system that is having its resources taxed to the limit daily.

One response to the overcrowding situation nationally has been the development of objective classification systems such as those introduced by the Federal Prison System (FPS), the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), and such states as California, Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania. Principal objectives of all of these classification approaches as well as those developed by some 25 other state correctional agencies, are the placement of inmates in the least restrictive security status commensurate with their objectively measured degree of risk while also matching both the security and program needs of the inmate with the agency's resources. These dual objectives serve not only to minimize unduly the restrictions placed upon the majority of the inmate population, but also promote the effective utilization of scarce beds. They do so by assigning inmates to the proper housing based upon criteria which have been found to be correlated with an inmate's

potential risk to the general public, staff, other inmates, and himself/her-self.

In Arizona, movement toward an objective classification approach began with a task force developed approximately two years ago from which a document was prepared relative to a proposal to acquire funds to develop an objective classification system. Dissatisfaction with the Eber pencil and paper tests classification model now used on a limited basis by the agency lead to a second task force approximately one year ago which included all the Inmate Managers in the Department of Corrections which developed goals and objectives designed to address two issues: risk and needs assessment as well as a replacement for the existing psychological assessment (Eber). In addition to these efforts, a number of staff representing areas within the DOC including Community Services, Adult Services, Adult Institutions and the Management Information System visited a number of programs in various states including Wisconsin, Washington, Florida, Iowa, and Minnesota. Finally, the development and implementation of the Department's Management Information System included components of the risk and needs assessment and classification models developed by the States of Florida and Wisconsin.

DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Custody determination in the present Arizona DOC classification system is generally determined at initial classification by the length of anticipated stay for each inmate and then during reclassification by the inmate's adjustment to confinement. The Department employs five custody levels in labelling inmates relative to their custody needs. These include:<1>

- Segregation Custody;<2>
- Maximum Custody;
- Medium Custody;
- Minimum Custody; and
- Institutional Trusty/Community Custody.

While there are indeed five custody levels (six if Institutional Trusty Custody and Community Custody are treated separately), three are considered to be minimum custody or less and grouped into that category. The one custody category missing when Arizona's system is compared to other state systems is close custody, the level normally positioned between maximum and medium custody.

<1> The criteria for these custody levels are included in the Appendix to this report.

<2> Segregation Custody is a special custody level which is not dependent on length of sentence.

In addition to anticipated length of stay, the Department uses the following criteria to determine general inmate custody:

- Escape history;
- Dangerous and repetitive offenses;
- Detainers:
- Psychological adjustment; and
- Disciplinary history.

Criteria for determining assignment to administrative segregation are somewhat more explicit being divided into two categories; criteria that require assignment to administrative segregation and criteria that may cause assignment to that status.

Classification to protective segregation can be a function of a staff member believing the inmate's life is in jeopardy (involuntary segregation), or by self-request when the inmate personally believes his/her safety to be threatened.

The present classification system also includes policy and procedures for the maintenance of certification of inmates for parole eligibility and application of earned release credits. It was determined prior to commencing this audit that this component of the classification system would not be evaluated.

OBJECTIVES OF THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AUDIT

Correctional Services Group, Inc., conducted this analysis of the Arizona DOC classification system with the following identified as the principal objectives.

- Extent to which present Department classification system meets the definition of an objective classification approach.
- Percentage of Arizona Department of Corrections prisoners that are either over- or underclassified.
- Current and potential impacts on agency facility and staffing requirements and security and custody considerations.
- Potential system changes which could be brought about to reduce any documented misclassification.
- Percentage of inmates that could be made available with the introduction of an early release program.

II. CLASSIFICATION AUDIT APPROACH

The audit of the Arizona classification system was conducted using a variety of techniques which were dependent upon the various components being assessed. Each of these techniques is discussed in depth in the appropriate section of this report.

The effectiveness of the policies and procedures of the classification system were evaluated employing the classification principles promulgated by the National Institute of Corrections. The 14 principles are included below:

- There must be a clear definition of goals and objectives of the total correctional system;
- There must be detailed written procedures and policies governing the classification process;
- The classification process must provide for the collection of complete, high-quality, verified, standardized data;
- Measurement and testing instruments used in the classification decision-making process must be valid, reliable, and objective;
- There must be explicit policy statements structuring and checking the discretionary decision-making powers of classification team staff;
- There must be provision for screening and further evaluating prisoners who are management problems and those who have special needs.
- There must be provisions to match offenders with programs; these provisions must be consistent with risk classification needs;
- There must be provisions to classify each prisoner at the least restrictive custody level;
- There must be provision to involve the prisoner in the classification process;
- There must be provisions for systematic, periodic reclassification hearings;
- The classification process must be efficient and economically sound;
- There must be provisions to continuously evaluate and improve the classification process;

- Classification procedures must be consistent with Constitutional requisites; and
- There must be an opportunity to gain input from administration and line staff when undertaking development of a classification system.

In addition to the NIC principles, standards pertaining to classification developed by the American Correctional Association were used to assess the adequacy of the Arizona classification system. These include:

- 2-4339 There is a written plan for inmate classification which specifies the objectives of the classification system, details the methods for achieving the objectives, and provides a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to determine whether the objectives are being met. The plan is reviewed at least annually and updated if necessary.
- 2-4400 There are classification policies with detailed procedures for implementing them; these policies are made available to all staff involved with classification, and reviewed at least annually and updated if necessary.
- 2-4401 The system for classifying inmates specifies the level of custodial control required and requires a regular review of each classification.
- 2-4402 Youths charged with offenses which would not be crimes if committed by adults and adjudicated delinquent offenders do not reside in the institution.
- 2-4403 The written plan for inmate classification provides for maximum involvement of representatives of relevant institutional programs and the inmate concerned in classification reviews.
- 2-4404 The written plan for inmate classification specifies that the program status review of each inmate occurs at least every 12 months.
- 2-4405 The written plan for inmate classification specifies criteria and procedures for determining and changing the program status of an inmate; the plan includes at least one level of appeal.
- 2-4406 Written policy and procedure require that unless precluded for security or other substantial reasons, all inmates appear at their classification hearing and are given notice 48 hours prior to these hearings; such notice may be waived by the inmate, in writing.

- 2-4407 Written policy and procedure specify the conditions under which an inmate can initiate a review of progress and program status.
- 2-4408 Written policy and procedure provide for identification of special needs inmates.
- 2-4409 The written plan for inmate classification specifies that, prior to a parole hearing, preparole material is made available to the paroling authority including a current and complete history of the inmate's activities in the institution and a proposed parole plan.
- 2-4410 The institution or parent agency solicits and uses preinstitutional assessment information regarding the inmate's progress and adjustment.

In comparing the adequacy of the present classification approach to these principles and the ACA standards, the following techniques were employed:

Interviews with Department Personnel: a series of interviews were conducted with agency personnel at the following locations and institutions:

- Central Office Classification in Phoenix;
- Alhambra Reception and Classification Unit;
- Arizona State Prison;
- Arizona Correctional Training Center-Perryville; and
- Arizona Correctional Training Center-Tucson.

Review of Current Classification Policies, Procedures, and Forms: the Arizona DOC promulgates its rules and regulations for classification in the agency's Internal Management Policy and Procedure Manual. Procedures specific to classification include the following:

- DOC Policy No. 440 Inmate Custody Criteria<1>
- DOC Policy No. 439 Inmate Parole Eligibility Classification System 07/21/79 and After
- DOC Policy No. 438 Inmate Parole Eligibility Classification System 10/01/78 to 07/21/79
- DOC Management Order 85-09 Administrative Segregation
- DOC Rules Initial Custody Assignment Criteria, Reclassification, Furloughs, Temporary Removal, Temporary Release, Parole Eligibility Classification
- DOC Policy Maintenance of Adult Offender Records (Supercedes No. 239)

In addition to the above, Department memorandums pertaining to institutional placement and institutional classification guidelines were reviewed. These provide classification staff direction in determining inmate institutional assignment.

Observation of Classification Committee Hearings: prior to this audit, CSG had the opportunity to observe classification committee hearings at ASP as part of the consultant's role in the recently completed <u>Black</u> vs. <u>Ricketts</u> litigation. The purpose of these on-site observations were to assess the role of the inmate in the classification process, to determine the number and type of staff involved in institutional classification proceedings and to evaluate the extent to which written policies and procedures are followed during reclassification proceedings.

Review of Facility Physical Plants: the final data collection activity conducted during the project was a brief review of the physical plants at the institutions listed previously. This review was conducted to provide consultant staff with a general knowledge of the security capabilities of each unit relative to the assigned custody level of inmates housed at the unit. It was understood that the security audit, conducted simultaneous with the classification analysis, would provide a much more comprehensive assessment of the perimeter and internal security capabilities of each institution.

Analysis of Misclassification: the extent of misclassification by the Department was conducted through simulation of the classification model employed by the Federal Prison System (FPS). This model was selected as a result of its previously being validated by the FPS and in several other comparable evaluation studies as well as being accepted by the courts as a valid tool in assessing over- and underclassification. CSG staff anticipated that four major products would likely result from this analysis:

- Whether Arizona's current classification system is placing excessive numbers of inmates into inappropriate security levels;
- The principal reasons (factors) for high numbers of inmates being improperly classified;
- Whether a new classification model would place immediate and longterm demands upon the Department to plan, implement and monitor a dramatically different security and custody determination model; and
- What future construction and operational plans should be focused on by state policy makers in light of existing and anticipated inmate security requirements.

Early Release Analysis: the final component of the audit was an analysis of what percentage of inmates could be considered for early release without undue risk to the citizenry of Arizona. Similar to the assessment of misclassification, a simulation was conducted using the NCCD Selective Incapacitation Model developed by the Council during its recent evaluation of the Illinois Early Release Program. The objective of this evaluation was to sort a sample of Arizona inmates according to actual probabilities of rearrest.

III. ANALYSIS OF CLASSIFICATION FINDINGS

ARIZONA CLASSIFICATION STUDY METHODOLOGY

Sampling Procedure

A random sample of 350 male inmates was selected for inclusion into the study. The sample was selected in the following manner: starting from a random number, each 20th inmate file was selected from the Arizona Department of Corrections central office record room. If the offender was on parole or was a female, the next file was chosen. Given a base population of approximately 8,000 and a sample of 350, random error for males is 5% at the 95% confidence level.

A stratified random sample of 50 females was selected out of a stock population of approximately 400. From a list of all female inmates, 25 were chosen at random from each of the two female facilities. Random error for females would likely be higher than for males. Thus, any inferences made relative to female population classification on the basis of this sample should be made with some caution. Proper analysis of the classification of females would require further data collection and analysis beyond the scope of this study.

Data necessary for the classification analysis were coded onto the Arizona Classification Data Sheet (see Appendix A) according to rules established in the codebook (Appendix B). The AIMS system was used to augment data located in the inmate jackets when necessary. An SAS package was employed to analyze the data.

Federal Prison System Simultation

The Federal Prison System (FPS) classification model was simulated twice: first employing the maximum expiration date and second using the minimum eligible parol date. Employing the maximum expiration date results in more conservative assumptions about classification in that persons with longer projected lengths of stay are considered more of a risk for committing institutional misbehavior.

The Federal Prison System classification instrument incorporates two sections (see Exhibit A). Section A is used to determine initial security level, while Section B determines whether an inmate should be considered for a custody increase or decrease based on institutional behavior.

Exhibit A

Federal Prison System Classification Instrument

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Section A

- 1. Type of Detainer: scored 0,1,3,5,7 based on severity of most serious detainer. Greatest = 7; high = 5; moderate = 3; low moderate and low = 1; none = 0. If the coder knew of a detainer, but did not know the charge, item was given a score of 3.
- 2. Severity of current offense: scored 1,3,5,7 based on severity of
 most serious offense. Greatest = 7; high = 5; moderate = 3; low moderate = 1; lowest = 1.
- 3. Projected length of incarceration: scored 0,1,3,5 based on maximum expiration date minus the sentence begins date for the maximum expiration date model, or minimum eligible parole date minus the sentence begins date for the MEPD model.
- 4. Type of prior commitments: scored 0,1,3. If prior adult prison terms is 1 or greater, and most serious prior offense is greatest or higher than item is scored as 3. If prior adult prison term is 1 or greater and most serious prior offense is moderate or low than item is scored as 1. Otherwise, item is scored 0.
- 5. History of escapes or attempts: scored 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7. If escape record is coded 1 to 4 (escape from minimum security institution or jail, juvenile escape, or absconder) this is considered a "minor" escape and is scored 1, 2, or 3 based on the date of escape (date of most recent escape or attempt). If no date is present, item is scored as 3. If escape record is coded 5 to 8 (escape from secure jail, medium, or maximum security institution) this is considered a "serious" escape and is scored 4, 5, 6, or 7 based on the date of the escape. If no date is present, item is scored as 7. If no escape, items scored as 0.
- 6. History of violence: scored 0,3,7. If assaultive record is coded 1 to 3 (single incident) item is scored as 3. If assaultive record is coded 4 to 7 (history of violence), item is scored as 7. Otherwise, item is scored 0.

The total points on items 1 through 6 are used to determine initial security level:

- 0 6 points Security Level 1
- 7 9 points Security Level 2
- 10 13 points Security Level 3
- 14 22 points Security Level 4
- 23 29 points Security Level 5
- 30 36 points Security Level 6

Section B

- 1. Percentage of time served: scored 3,4,5,6. Time served was calculated as the date the form was coded minus the sentence begin date. Total time was calculated as maximum expiration date minus the sentence begin date (or minimum parole eligibility date minus sentence begins date for MEPD model). Percentage time served is time served divided by total time.
- 2. Involvement with drugs and alcohol: scored 2,3,4. If alcohol use is coded 0, 1, or 2, then alcohol is scored 4. If alcohol use is coded 3, 4, 8, or 9, then alcohol is scored 3. Otherwise, alcohol is scored 2. If drug type is coded 0 or 1 then drug is scored 4. If drug is coded 2 or 3, then drug is scored 3. Otherwise drug is scored as 2. Involvement with drugs and alcohol is the sum of drug and alcohol score divided by 2.
- 3. Mental/psychological stability: scored 2 or 4. If no unfavorable reports in inmate jacket, item is scored 4. If any unfavorable reports are present, item is scored as 2.
- 4. Type of most serious disciplinary report: scored 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Coders listed the most serious disciplinary reports on the code sheet. Greatest severity (scored 1) include: weapon possession, assault on correctional officer, serious assault, and escape. High severity (scored 2) include: threatening behavior, fighting. Moderate severity (scored 3) include: disobeying orders, stealing, contraband, stealing, contraband, sex acts, lying. Low severity (scored 4) include: not at count and other minor behaviors. Item is scored 5 if no violations occurred.
- 5. Frequency of disciplinary reports: scored 0, 1,2,3. Coders were asked to count the number of disciplinary reports in the inmate jackets. 10 or more scored 0, 6 to 9 scored 1, 2 to 5 scored 2, 0 or 1 scored 3.
- 6. Responsibility inmate has demonstrated: scored 0,2,4. Coders evaluated program performance based on ratings in inmate jackets. If most ratings were "good" or "excellent" then item is scored as 4. If most ratings were "average" then item is scored as 2. If most ratings were "poor" or "very poor," then item was scored as 0.
- 7. Family/community ties: scored 3 or 4.

Inmate jackets contained listings of the location of relatives and friends. If immediate relatives lived in the immediate area, item was scored as 4, average or good. If most relatives lived outside state, item was scored 3, none, or minimal.

The total score from Section B was then used to determine whether the initial custody designation should be adjusted up or down.

One of the caveats in conducting this classification analysis, as would be the case in any such analysis, is the inability to directly correlate the security levels of the Federal Prison System instrument with those of the Department. As just stated, the FPS model incorporates six security levels (see below) which range in general terms from community custody (SL-1) to "super-maximum" (SL-6, United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois) (see Appendix). The Department, however, formally uses only five levels (administrative segregation, maximum, medium, minimum, trusty) which are also described in the Appendix. The problem in matching the levels of two systems is to insure that one is not comparing "apples to oranges" but rather minimum security inmates with minimum security inmates and so on. For purposes of this analysis, the following correlations were employed:

Federal Prison System Model	Arizona System
SL-1 SL-2	Trusty Minimum Security
SL-3	Medium
SL-4<1> SL-5	Maximum
SL-6	Administrative Segregation

The table and graph on the following two pages depict the comparison of Department and FPS custody scores at initial classification for the sample group.

The results of the classification analysis suggest that there presently does exist some misclassification, according to the FPS instrument, in the Arizona Department of Corrections. This is particularly evident at initial classification where the majority of inmates (86.73%) are assigned to medium security or higher while only 13.27% receive an initial minimum security placement.


<1> SL-4 in the FPS is equivalent to Close Security/Custody in most state correctional systems. However, since the Arizona classification system does not incorporate such a status, it was made equivalent to maximum security.

COMPARISON OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

Males/Initial Classification (N = 339)

Security Level	Existing Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate Classification Distribution	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Maximum Out Date	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Minimum Parole Date
1 2	45 (13.27%) Combined in Total for Level 1	111 (32.74%) 51 (15.04%)	116 (34.22%) 49 (14.45%)
3	198 (58.41%)	72 (21.24%)	80 (23.60%)
4 5	88 (25.96%) Combined in Total for Level 4	97 (28.61%) 6 (1.77%)	87 (25.66%) 5 (1.47%)
6	8 (2.36%)	2 (0.59%)	2 (0.59%)

FPS vs ARIZONA DOC CLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS INITIAL SECURITY ASSIGNMENT/MALES



This high number appears to be the result of the Department's dependence at initial classification on length of sentence as being the principal factor driving the initial security assignment. The FPS instrument, using the same sample, indicated that approximately 48 (47.78%) could initially be assigned to reduced security (SL-1, SL-2) without substantially endangering the safety and welfare of the public, staff, and/or other inmates. This is a difference between the two systems of approximately 34%.

The results for reclassification (refer to the following table and graph), on the other hand, indicate that misclassification is not so apparent once an inmate has been assigned to a correctional facility and staff have the opportunity to assess his or her behavior while confined. At reclassification, the Department assigned almost 36% (35.69%) to a minimum security status while the FPS instrument assigned 51% (51.32%) or a difference now of only 16%. The substantial increase in the number of minimum security inmates at reclassification now appears to be based more on institutional adjustment than sentence length giving classification staff the flexibility of markedly decreasing the security of inmates who manifest a positive disciplinary adjustment. This capability is not only desireable, but necessary given the paucity of high security beds relative to medium and minimum security bed space.

For purposes of this evaluation and consistent with both the definitions of the FPS and Arizona DOC, security level SL-3 on the FPS instrument, as stated earlier, is approximately equivalent to medium security in Arizona. At initial classification, the Department assigned 58.41% to this status while the FPS instrument assigned only 21.24% or a difference of over 37%.

At reclassification, the Department assigned 45.43% of the same sample to medium security while the FPS model considered only 16.52% to be worthy of this security status. However, even though there is still a substantial difference between the two approaches it has narrowed by over 8% from initial classification.

With respect to maximum security, there is an apparent reversal when compared to the medium security differences. The Department assigned 25.96% of the sample to maximum. However, unlike the medium security scenario, the FPS system designated over 30% (30.38%) to maximum and at reclassification almost an identical number, 30.97% as compared to only 17.70% for the Department. It would appear that there is substantial underclassification relative to this security category which has been a long-held position by the agency given the minimal number of high security beds.


COMPARISON OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

$\frac{\text{Males/Reclassification}}{(N = 339)}$

Security Level	Existing Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate Classification Distribution	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Maximum Out Date	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Minimum Parole Date	Federal Prison System Security Level Distribution
1 2	121 (35.69%) <a>Combined in Total for Level 1	126 (37.16%) 48 (14.16%)	135 (39.82%) 43 (12.68%)	30.8% 13.2%
3 ¹ · · · 3 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	154 (45.43%)	56 (16.52%)	69 (20.35%)	17.9%
4 5	60 (17.70%) Combined in Total for Level 4	76 (22.42%) 29 (8.55%)	65 (19.17%) 24 (7.08%)	20.8% 4.8%
6	4 (1.18%)	4 (1.18%)	3 (0.88%)	0.9%

<a> Includes Trusties

FPS vs ARIZONA DOC CLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS RECLASSIFICATION SECURITY ASSIGNMENT/MALES



The final level analyzed was administrative seggation. Due to the small numbers in the cell for this category, it is difficult to derive any substantive conclusions. However, what is interesting is that while the Department placed 2.36% of the inmate initial classification sample compared to only 0.59% for the FPS, the numbers were identical at reclassification, 1.18% for both systems.

For females the findings were somewhat comparable in the analyses for initial and reclassification (refer to the following two tables). At initial classification, the results for females indicated that the FPS assigned almost 60% (59.15%) to minimum security as compared to only 22.45% actual assignments to that level for the Department. However, at reclassification the Department increased the percentage to 51.02% in contrast with 65.31% for the FPS model.

With respect to medium security, the numbers were almost equal for both initial and reclassification for females. At initial, the numbers were 26.53% for the Department versus 22.45% for the FPS and for reclassification, 20.41% as opposed to 14.29%. For maximum security, the numbers were comparable to those derived for minimum security, 51.02% for the Department and only 16.33% for the FPS model. However, at reclassification there was a decided shift downward for the Department, 51.02% down to 22.45% while the numbers increased slightly for the FPS approach, 16.33% up to 20.40%. The Department makes little use of administrative segregation at initial classification which the FPS instrument assigned only 1 inmate from the sample. In contrast, at reclassification, the Department assigned over 6% (6.12%) of the sample to this status.

These findings clearly demonstrate again that the Department's classification system is able to discriminate much more dramatically at reclassification than at initial classification which is unlike the FPS approach which distributes the population approximately the same at both classification decision points.

The audit was interested not only in the <u>amount</u> of misclassification, but also its <u>extent</u>. That is, it is not enough to know how many inmates are misclassified, but how serious the misclassification is relative to their actual custody assignment. For example, most correctional agencies would consider a large number of inmates assigned to minimum custody who in reality belong in medium custody to be misclassified, but that this finding would be not nearly as serious a situation had the same group belonged in maximum custody. The resultant threat to the safety and welfare of the public, staff, and other inmates for the latter situation would be much more serious than in the case where inmates were underclassified by only level.

In an attempt to identify the extent or degree of misclassification, a computer run was conducted comparing the present classification assignment of

COMPARISON OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

$\frac{\text{Females/Initial Classification}}{(N = 49)}$

Security Level	Existing Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate Classification Distribution	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Maximum Out Date	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Minimum Parole Date
1 2	11 (22.45%) Combined in Total for Level 1	19 (38.78%) 10 (20.41%)	19 (38.78%) 11 (22.45%)
3	13 (26.53%)	11 (22.45%)	10 (20.40%)
4 5	25 (51.02%) Combined in Total for Level 4	7 (14.29%) 1 (2.04%)	7 (14.29%) 1 (2.04%)
6	0 (0.00%)	1 (2.04%)	1 (2.04%)

COMPARISON OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

$\frac{\text{Females/Reclassification}}{(N = 49)}$

Existing Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate Classification Security Level Distribution	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Maximum Out Date	Federal Prison System Inmate Classification Distribution Using Minimum Parole Date
25 (51.02%) Combined in Total for Level 1	23 (46.94%) 9 (18.37%)	23 (49.94%) 11 (22.45%)
3 10 (20.41%)	7 (14.29%)	5 (10.20%)
4 11 (22.45%) 5 Combined in Total for Level 4	6 (12.24%) 4 (8.16%)	6 (12.24%) 4 (8.16%)
6 3 (6.12%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)

the Department sample with the current custody assignment as derived by the FPS instrument:

Security				Segregation		
Level	Trusty	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Medium</u>	Maximum	Unit	<u>Total</u>
1	3 0.88 4.65 42.86	62 18.29 96.57 54.39	56 16.32 90.31 36.36	5 2.47 8.47 8.34	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	126 31.17
2	1 0.29 14.29	16 4.72 14.04	26 7.67 16.88	4 1.18 6.67	1 0.29 25.00	48 16.52
3	2 0.59 3.57 28.57	16 4.72 28.57 14.04	25 7.67 46.43 16.88	11 3.24 19.64 18.33	1 0.29 1.79 25.00	56 16.52
4	1 0.29 1.32 14.29	18 5.31 23.68 15.79	34 10.03 44.74 22.08	23 6.78 30.26 38.33	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	76 22.42
5	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	2 0.59 6.90 1.75	12 3.54 41.38 7.79	13 3.83 44.83 21.67	2 0.59 6.90 50.00	29 8.55
6	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	4 1.18 100.00 6.67	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	4 1.18
Total	7 2.06	114 33.63	154 45.43	60 17.70	4 1.18	339 100.00

Legend: Frequency

Percent

Row Percentage

Column Percentage

An analysis of this table shows the following two significant results:

Nine inmates that the FPS system placed in minimum custody (SL-1/SL-2) were assigned to maximum by the Department; and

 Twenty-one inmates in the sample that the FPS system assigned to maximum custody (SL-4/SL-5) were placed in minimum custody or lower by the Department.

Finally, an important feature of any objective classification system is to be able to correlate its recommendations with actual behavior on the part of the inmate population. The easiest factor to demonstrate such correlation, if it exists, is disciplinary behavior.

Computer runs were conducted for Most Serious Disciplinary Violation and Magnitude of Custody Increases assuming that high security inmates should evidence the most serious disciplinary history and also the greatest number of custody changes.

Disciplinary	Securit	Security Level					
<u>Violation</u>	SL-1	<u>SL-2</u>	<u>SL-3</u>	<u>SL-4</u>	<u>SL-5</u>	<u>SL-6</u>	
None	51.1%	51.7%	34.6%	20.2%	57.1%	0.0%	
Low	9.8	5.0	9.9	8.7	0.0	0.0	
Moderate	29.3	35.0	28.4	33.7	14.3	33.3	
High	3.0	3.3	13.6	17.3	0.0	33.3	
Greatest	6.8	5.0	13.6	20.2	28.6	33.3	
N =	133	60	81	104	7	3	

Code: Low - Miscellaneous minor violations such as failure to keep cell clean, etc.

Moderate - Disobey orders, not at work, contraband, lying, sex, stealing, etc.

High - Threatening behavior, fighting, property destruction, etc.
 Greatest - Weapon possession, assault on correctional officer, serious assault, riot, escape, etc.

The above table shows, for the FPS simulation, that there is indeed a strong correlation between the seriousness of the violation and the inmate's custody level. For example, only 9.8% of the sample group rated as SL-1 had a "High" or "Greatest" violation in contrast with 37.5% of the group adjudged to be SL-4 for the same violation categories. Similarly, over 60% (60.9%) of the SL-1 group had a "None" or "Low" violation history as compared to only 28.9% for the SL-4 contingent.

Disciplinary	Securit	Security Level				
Violation	SL-1	<u>SL-2</u>	<u>SL-3</u>	<u>SL-4</u>	<u>SL-5</u>	SL-6
Yes	21.8%	26.2%	40.2%	40.4%	42.9%	66.7%
No	78.2	73.8	59.8	59.6	57.1	33.9
N =	133	60	81	104	7	3

The results of custody or security grade increase are depicted above. These results point out quite dramatically that only about one-fifth (21.8%) of the SL-1 group and one-quarter (26.2%) of the SL-2 group had their custody increased at least once during their confinement as compared to over two-fifths (40.4%) and (42.9%) respectively for the SL-4 and SL-5 groups.

Finally, an analysis was conducted to summarize the mean and median disciplinary socres for the sample population. The results are presented below:

Security Level	<u>Mean</u>	Median	N
SL-1	3.50	0	133
SL-2	2.08	0	60
SL-3	5.24	2	82
SL-4	7.29	4	104
SL-5	5.43	0	7
SL-6	11.33	11	3

Again, the findings demonstrate quite vividly that inmates in the lower security level have far fewer disciplinary violations than those in the higher security levels $(\overline{X} \text{ SL-1} = 3.50 \text{ versus } \overline{X} \text{ SL-6} = 11.33)$.

ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE FINDINGS FOR FPS SECURITY AND CUSTODY CRITERIA

The FPS custody determination system, as stated earlier in this report, consists of two major sections. The first is designed to determine an inmate's security level (institutional placement) while the second was developed to assess an inmate's custody level (type and amount of supervision).

Security Criteria

The scores of the sample population appear on the following pages. Six factors are employed to assess an inmate's security needs. They include:

- Type of Detainer;
- History of Escape;
- Severity of Commitment Offense;
- Projected Length of Incarceration;
- Type of Prior Commitments; and
- History of Violence.

Type of Detainer

The findings show that approximately 79% have no detainers pending while almost 12% (11.95%) have a moderate or high detainer. These findings are comparable to national statistics.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0 (None)	271	271	79.009	79.009
1 (Low)	31	302	9.038	88.047
3 (Modera	ite) 32	334	9.329	97.376
7 (High)	9	343	2.624	100.000

History of Escape

The second security factor assessed for the sample is History of Escape. Here the Arizona sample appears to have a high escape rate when compared with other states as almost 22% have some type of escape history and almost 4% an escape/attempted escape from a secure facility. The high number of escapes from low security environments is probably a function of the substantial number of minimum security beds operated by the Department which facilitate walkaways.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency		Cumulative Percent
ESCAPE/ATTEMPT FROM JU	VENILE FACILITY	OR MINIMUM	SECURITY	
None	268	268	78.134	78.134
15 Years Ago	8	276	2.332	80.466
5 to 10 Years Ago	6	282	1.749	82.216
Less Than 5 Years Ago	39	321	11.370	93.586
ESCAPE/ATTEMPT	FROM SECURE PR	ISON OR JAII		
15 Years Ago	3	324	0.875	
5 to 10 Years Ago	3	327	0.875	
3 to 5 Years Ago	3	330	0.875	
Less Than 5 Years Ago	13	343	3.790	

Severity of Commitment Offense

Severity of Commitment Offense is the third factor on the security component of the FPS model. Again, the Arizona sample appears to be more serious with respect to present offense than most other states. Almost 80% of the stock population had a moderate or more serious offense and almost 40% the Greatest on the FPS scale, e.g., murder, rape, armed robbery, etc.

Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0 (Low) 14	14	4.082	4.082
1 (Low/Mod) 56	70	16.327	20.408
3 (Moderate) 117	187	34,111	54.519
5 (High) 20	207	5.831	60.350
7 (Greatest) 136	343	39.650	100.00

Projected Length of Incarceration

The fourth factor in assessing security is Projected Length of Incarceration which is the principal driving factor in the Department's classification system. Over 50% (52.47%) were anticipated to be confined for more than 5 years with almost 36% (35.86%) expected to be incarcerated for more than 7 years. Again, these findings exceed most other state's inmate populations which is apparently a product of Arizona's relatively harsh sentencing laws and the parole eligibility regulations controlled by the Department.

Length Incarceration	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0 - 12 Mos.	28	28	8.163	8.163
13 - 59 Mos.	135	163	39.359	47.522
60 - 83 Mos.	57	220	16.618	64.140
84 or More	123	343	35.860	100.000

Type of Prior Commitments

The next factor that is considered in determining the security level for each inmate is the type of prior commitments. A review of the findings indicates that just over one-half of the sample group (45.8%) have a minor or serious type of prior commitment. Of that group, just slightly less than 15% have prior commitments for serious offenses which include: murder, rape, armed robbery, etc. Surprisingly, these findings are in the opposite direction of the previous findings, where the Arizona prison population appears to exceed a representative national group relative to criteria that are important in terms of determining security status. That is, the Arizona population, at least the sample, does not appear to have a serious history of prior commitment behavior as indicated by the less than 15% having a past serious prior commitment background. In part, this could be a result of inmate's self report being one of the primary sources of information for prior commitment data. Inmates would obviously, at least in most occasions, tend to negate or minimize the number of prior times they have been confined, particularly when they are aware that the classification staff do not have direct access to such information.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
None	185	185	54.252	54.252
Minor	107	292	31.378	85.630
Serious	49	341	14.370	100.000

History of Violence

History of violence is the sixth and final factor used to determine security level. A review of the results shows that just slightly less than 36% have at least one or more documented incidents of violent behavior for which they have been arrested and, in most instances, confined. What is important from the findings is that approximately 12% have a history of violence. This suggests that they would be, for the most part, difficult to manage offenders and that they would continue to be an operational and

management problem from a violence perspective once confined in the Arizona prison system.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
None	220	220	64.140	64.140
Single Incident	82	302	23.907	88.047
History	41	343	11.953	100.000

Custody Criteria

In assessing an inmate's custody needs, the following criteria are considered:

- Percentage of time served;
- Drug alcohol use;
- Mental stability;
- Seriousness of disciplinary reports;
- Frequency of disciplinary reports;
- Family/community ties; and
- Responsibility

Percentage of Time Served

Concerning percentage of time served, almost one-third (30.90%) had completed between 0 and 25% of their sentence. However, over 88% had completed between 26 and 75% of their sentence, suggesting that the bulk of the sample and hence the Arizona inmate population, was in the mid-point relative to percentage of time served. Less than 3% had completed between 91 and 100% of their confinement suggesting, at least for the percentage of time served factor, that there are few inmates nearing the end of their sentence that could be considered eligible for minimum security or community corrections assignment.

		Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0 -	25%	106	106	30.904	30.904
26 -	75%	196	302	57.143	88.047
76 -	90%	33	335	9.621	97.668
91 -	100%	. 8	343	2.332	100.000

Drug/Alcohol Use

Similar to most correctional populations, the Arizona sample demonstrates that the majority of inmates that are confined have a serious, or at least moderate problem, with drugs and/or alcohol. Over 59% of the sample reported having at least a moderate problem with substance abuse, while 12% have a chronic problem and 27% have a chronic or serious problem.

<u> </u>	requency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
2.0 (Chronic)	42	42	12.245	12.245
2.5	52	94	15.160	27.405
3.0	109	203	31.778	59.184
3.5	42	245	12.245	71.429
4.0 (None)	98	343	28.571	100.000

Mental Stability

Mental stability is the next criteria on the custody determination portion of the FPS instrument. Almost 58% of the sample population have a documented report of a referral to a psychiatrist or psychologist, or confinement in a mental institution. These findings indicate quite strongly that relative to psychological stability, the majority of the Arizona correctional population evidences a problem which must be taken into consideration when determining the amount and type of supervision that an inmate should have while confined.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No In- favorable Reports	145	145	42.274	42.274
Any Reports	198	343	57.726	100.000

Seriousness of Disciplinary Reports

The next area to be considered in terms of determining custody is the seriousness of disciplinary reports. The results show that approximately 34% of the sample have what are known as "Greatest" or "High" disciplinary reports. These findings likewise suggest that over a third of the sample is

likely to be disruptive while incarcerated and to be somewhat of a management problem.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Greatest	41	41	11.953	11.953
High	34	75	9.913	21.866
Moderate	112	187	32.653	54.519
Low Moderate	29	216	8.455	62.974
None	127	343	37.026	100.000

Frequency of Disciplinary Reports

The frequency of disciplinary reports is the fifth criteria in terms of determining custody level. Similar to the findings for seriousness of disciplinary reports, there is a strong indication that a large segment of the Arizona correctional population will be subject to repeated violations of agency rules and regulations. Almost one-half (49.90%) of the sample population have documented violations, occurring at least twice while over one-quarter of the sample population (25.90%) have an excess of six disciplinary violations since being confined.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent	
10 Plus	54	54	15.743	15.743	
6 - 9	35	89	10.204	25.948	
2 - 5	82	171	23.907	49.854	
0 - 1	172	343	50.146	100.000	

Family/Community Ties

Family/community ties is also an important consideration relative to custody determination. It is believed that those inmates that have strong family ties will be more cooperative and more positively consistent in their behavior while confined. The results demonstrate that the sample population is almost evenly split with respect to this criteria, some 51% having minimal family ties and the remaining 49% having either good or average family ties.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Minimal	175	175	51.020	51.020	
Average/Good	168	343	48.980	100.000	

Responsibility Shown by Inmate

The final criteria considered in terms of custody determination is the responsibility the inmate has shown while confined. This is generally a product of work record, involvement in institutional programs, and overall cooperativeness with correctional personnel. The results are somewhat surprising in that only an estimated 3% have been rated poor by institutional classification personnel while over 37% have an average rating. that these results appear somewhat surprising is that given the previously documented history of serious disciplinary violations in combination with the frequency of violations, one would have thought that the overall rated responsibility demonstrated by the inmate population would have been much However, it is possible that the findings pertaining to disciplinary history, while considered inferior to a national sample, may be in the perspective of Arizona officials, quite satisfactory. One has to examine the overall experience of the staff providing a responsibility assessment relative to the environment in which they work in interpreting the results on this factor.

	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Poor	10	10	2.915	2.915	
Average	119	129	34.694	37.609	
Good	214	343	62.391	100.000	

CONSTRUCTION AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS

Misclassification, particularly overclassification, can have dramatic impacts on the costs of constructing new correctional facilities and/or renovating existing institutions. It can also result in substantial and needless operational expenditures for excess staff that are unjustified given the objective custody needs of the inmate population.

This section of the audit concentrates on the number of beds that would be required if the results of the FPS simulation were taken at face value, that is, if the percentage of inmates by custody level as determined by the FPS model were translated directly into security bed requirements.

The following numbers represent the approximate spread of beds for male inmates by security level in the Arizona correctional system.<1>

	Number	Percent
Administrative Segregation	180	2.38
Maximum Security	932<2>	12.30
Medium	3,717	49.16
Minimum	2,512<3>	33.22
Community Corrections	220	2.91
	7,561<4>	100.00

The following table indicates the <u>percentage</u> of beds available now by security level in comparison with the recommendations of the Department's and Federal Prison System's classification approaches.

BED SPACE CAPACITY VERSUS CLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS (Reclassification)

Custody Level	Present Available Bedspace Capacity by Security Level	Department Security Distribution	FPS Security <u>Distribution</u>
Community Corrections- Minimum	36.13%	35.69%	51.32%
Medium	49.16	45.43	16.52
Maximum	12.30	17.70	30.97
Administrative Segregation	2.38	1.18	1.18

<1> This rating is provided by the Department and does not necessarily agree with results of the recent security audit.

<2> Includes special use housing such as protective custody and control unit.

<3> Includes 250 beds DWI.

<4> Excludes female housing and most special use housing.

The table below depicts the <u>number</u> of beds available now by security level in comparison with those recommended by the Department's and Federal Prison System's classification approach.

INMATE BED SPACE REQUIREMENTS

	Current Housing Availability	Department Classification System	FPS Classification Model	
Administrative Segregation	180	89<1>	89<1>	
Maximum Security	932	1,338	2,342	
Medium Security	3,717	3,435	1,250	
Minimum Security	2,512	2,699	3,880	
Community Corrections	220	Included Above	Included Above	
	7,561	7,561	7,561	

From a bed space perspective, the results, using the FPS instrument, suggest that the Department is in substantial need of beds at both ends of the security continuum and lesser need of beds at the security mid-range where currently almost one-half of all bed space is available. The most significant shortfall is in maximum security housing where over an 18% increase is indicated or a total of 1,410 beds. The second security area that is lacking regarding bed space is for minimum security where an additional 15% beds are required or 1,180 beds in all. At the other end of the continuum is medium security where the FPS instrument suggests that only an estimated 1,250 beds are required for male inmates, in contrast with the 3,717 that now are in operation, or a difference of 2,467 beds.

The Department's own classification system implies that an additional 406 maximum security beds are now needed, that minimum security bed space is generally in line with that security category's housing availablity, shortage of 33 beds, and that a surplus of 282 beds exist in medium security. It is apparent that the high correlation with the Department current bed space distribution and the recommendations of its own classification system are a result of the agency's need to fill available beds sometimes with limited capability to effectively match an inmate's needs with the Department's resources.

The one finding that is suspect is the implication that only 89 beds are needed for administrative segregation. Due to the sample size (350) and small <1> Underestimate anticipated due to small sample.

number of inmates in administrative segregation (less than 2% of the total inmate population), little or no confidence should be afforded this finding.

In assessing the fiscal repercussions of the application of an objective classification approach, the following estimates have been provided to assess the cost of construction and/or renovating existing prisoner housing. These figures are based on national correctional facility construction cost averages as provided by the National Institute of Corrections Information Center.

Maximum Security - \$85,000 Medium Security - \$45,000 Minimum Security - \$27,000

Based upon the figures and results depicted above, the following cost estimates are derived.<1>

Type of Bed By Custody Level	Department Classification System/Estimated Costs	FPS Classification System/Estimated Costs		
Administrative Segregation	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		
Maximum	\$ 34.5 Million	\$119.8 Million		
Medium	No Beds Needed	No Beds Needed		
Community Corrections- Minimum <a>	\$ 5.0 Million	\$ 36.9 Million		

<a> It is anticipated that these costs would be negated or minimized by the conversion of existing non-correctional housing into correctional beds or the reduction of surplus medium security beds to minimum security.

As can be seen from the above table, the majority of costs for new construction would be expended for maximum security beds ranging from the million resulting from the estimate using the Department's classification to almost \$120 million should the FPS system, recommendations be followed. These costs could be reduced should the Department upgrade existing medium security beds by enhancing perimeter and internal security. It is not expected that much funding would be necessary for minimum security beds as they could be, as noted in the footnote to the table, either converted from non-correctional housing or existing medium security beds could be downgraded without any capital investment.

The estimates do not preclude the possibility of upgrading existing facilities to enhance their security capabilities which would substantially reduce overall construction costs.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF AN OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Correctional Services Group recommends, based upon its analysis of the Arizona DOC classification system, that a new objective approach to inmate classification should be developed and implemented within the next 12 months. The objectives of this new system as well as a work plan for its development, implementation and evaluation follow.

Objectives of a New Classification Model

- Development of classification policies and procedures amenable to standardization;
- Development of specific criteria for housing assignment, custody designation, special needs identification, etc.;
- Development of a structured classification instrument which can be used by Department personnel for purposes of institutional assignment, security and custody designation, and program placement. This system should have the following properties:
 - Capable of being validated,
 - 2. Capable of working with a minimal amount of valid, timely, and accurate information,
 - 3. Able to adapt to changing needs of the Department and the inmate while incorporating changes in the laws and standards,
 - 4. Capable of being used as a management planning tool to assess short- and long-range bed space, staff, security, and program needs; and
- Establishment of a feedback and monitoring system to regularly evaluate the outcomes of classification decisions and the decisionmaking process.

Correctional Services Group believes that an in-depth evaluation of the classification system must be conducted to develop a more objective classification process that incorporates the concepts of public and institutional risk.

With respect to the development of an objective classification system for the Arizona DOC, a minimum of ten tasks will require completion. These alude the following:

Task 1 - Analysis of the Classification System Goals and Objectives

This will be the first task of the project as the objectives defined by the Department's executive staff will provide the foundation for the evaluation of the present classification system.

- 1. Existing system objectives: the present system objectives will be identified through an analysis of agency directives, supplemented by input from Department personnel.
- 2. Proposed system objectives: once the existing classification system objectives have been identified and expressed in written form, they will be compared to the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (ACA) standards governing classification and a set of objectives for classification developed by NIC. Based upon this comparison, a draft listing of objectives will be prepared for the proposed classification system. This list will form the basis for a questionnaire which will be administered to the Department's executive staff. The questionnaire will elicit additions and modifications to the list of objectives. Results of the questionnaire will be analyzed and a final draft of the proposed system objectives will be disseminated again to the Department's executive staff for rank ordering according to their perceived priority.
- 3. <u>Mission statement</u>: the product of this subtask will be a formal, comprehensive statement of the proposed mission, including the goals and objectives, of the Department's classification system, which have been somewhat compromised as a result of recent overcrowding.

Task 2 - Assessment of the Existing Arizona DOC Classification Policies and Procedures

The components of the Department's classification system that will receive the most attention during this task include:

- Initial Classification Procedures (Reception Process);
- Reclassification Procedures (Institutional); and
- Central Office Classification Procedures.
- 1. <u>Document review</u>: this subtask will involve a thorough examination of all available information that describes the operation of the Department's classification system. This information should specifically include:
 - Agency-defined goals and objectives of the classification system;

- Agency policies and procedures governing or impacting classification, e.g., administrative directives, memoranda, manuals, interoffice communications, etc.; and
- Arizona statutes supporting classification policies and/or procedures.
- 2. <u>Procedural observation</u>: the Classification Board will be observed to document the procedures followed, team composition, criteria used in classification decision-making, reporting requirements, etc. In addition, Central Office staffings will be observed to determine the procedures they follow when conducting administrative reviews of institutional classification recommendations.

Project staff will also "walk-through" the entire reception and classification process as part of this subtask.

- 3. <u>Staff perceptions</u>: a small number of staff and a sample of inmates from the Department will be interviewed to determine: discrepancies between written policy and procedures and actual practice; out-moded, unworkable or otherwise unsuitable policies and/or procedures; etc.
- 4. Revised classification policies/procedures draft: the final subtask of this task will be the preparation of a draft set of classification policies and procedures that are responsive to the needs of the Department while consistent with national standards, applicable case law, and contemporary trends. This draft will be further modified by the results of the subsequent tasks.

Task 3 - Review of Information and Informational Sources

This task is integral to the development of a comprehensive inmate classification system. As the offender proceeds through the criminal justice system, progressively more information is gathered concerning the individual, his behavior and potential influences on his behavior. Typically, information already gathered as the offender moves from one agency to another is gathered. Each agency then adds other information, consistent with its goals, responsibilities, programs, and procedures.

In general, corrections institutions at the federal, state, and local levels collect a vast amount of information concerning inmates, their characteristics, crime and behavior while incarcerated and what happens to them during confinement (e.g., institutional and program assignments). Unfortunately, all of this information is only infrequently gathered and is not given widespread distribution.

A classification system cannot be effective without the timely provision of reliable information. For example, several of the sentencing courts in Arizona do not provide the Department with sufficient background information. As a result, many inmates may be improperly classified upon initial assessment only to be later reclassified when the necessary information becomes available.

This task will seek to identify those agencies which impact the classification system, in terms of information provision and other ways, and to provide recommendations as to how the relationships with these agencies can be improved.

- 1. <u>Management of offender information</u>: this subtask will involve a thorough evaluation of the following areas:
 - Management of information collected at admission including offense data provided by the committing agency;
 - Collection, storage and management of information necessary for initial classification; and
 - Management of information used in institutional reclassification.
- 2. <u>Information availability</u>: an important aspect of this effort will be to not only identify the nature of information available during the 14 to 21 day reception process, but also when it becomes available and how accurate it is.
- 3. <u>Individual treatment programs</u>: the viability and effectiveness of individual treatment programming will be evaluated during this subtask.
- 4. <u>Classification for release</u>: examined during this subtask will be information needed by agency staff for release decision-making purposes.
- 5. Relevance of information: this important subtask will be an integral part of the entire evaluation process. It will involve a review of the various types of data, e.g., criminological, social, medical, used during initial classification deliberations and subsequently during reclassification activities.

Task 4 - Analysis of Classification Assessment and Testing Instruments

This fourth major task will involve a thorough review of the various testing instruments employed by classification staff in determining custody, program and placement assignments. These will include any screening protocol

such as DARAP or test batteries administered either during the reception classification process or later during confinement.

- 1. <u>Utilization/acceptance of instruments</u>: information as to the usefulness of tests and assessment methods used during reception and diagnosis and during later confinement and staff acceptance of such instruments and methods will be assessed. Institutional staff will be asked to rate the utility of tests and assessment methods used during later confinement.
- 2. <u>Validity/objectivity/legality of instruments</u>: contemporary literature concerning the use of diagnostic tests for offender populations in Arizona will be reviewed as will case law concerning the legality of using test/assessment results to make classification decisions.
- 3. Revised testing approach: criteria will be developed from this review with which to systematically evaluate each test employed in the Department's classification process. Tests and/or assessment methods that do not facilitate classification decision-making will be identified in this manner and their elimination recommended.

Task 5 - Evaluation of Discretion Exercised by Department Classification Staff

1. <u>Guidelines for use of discretion</u>: Task 2, the assessment of classification policies and procedures, will have identified both formal (written) and informal (common knowledge) guidelines for staff to follow in exercising their individual or group discretion.

In addition, policies and/or procedures for employing aggravating and mitigating factors in classification decision-making will be examined.

- 2. <u>Management and supervision of discretion by administration</u>: The primary focus of this subtask will be to identify the role of administrative staff review in the classification process, particularly as it relates to the monitoring of classification decisions made both at reception and during confinement.
- 3. <u>Training and supervision of classification personnel</u>: an overriding concern of a public service agency such as the Department is the training of professional staff.

Professional personnel in corrections have historically received minimal training pertaining to their specialty as it relates to correctional operations. in particular, classification personnel rarely receive formal preservice or inservice training in risk assessment, testing, classification counseling, interviewing techniques, etc.

Task 6 - Review of Classification Procedures for Special Management Inmates

Prisoners who are management problems and require special considerations in programming and institutional assignment fall into one or more of the following categories:

- Those who require protection and separation because they may be in danger from other inmates;
- Those who, by reason of their institutional behavior, require particularly close supervision; and
- Those who have special needs such as medical problems, mental illness or retardation, learning disability, etc.

This task will involve a thorough review of the procedures employed to identify, treat, program, monitor and house such inmates and an assessment of the numbers of such inmates within the Department.

- 1. Classification of protective custody inmates: this subtask will involve a review of the procedures and criteria used both by initial and institutional staff to identify inmates in need of protective custody and the housing assignments available within the Department that are capable of providing adequate protection. Procedures for removing an inmate from protective custody housing, voluntarily or involuntarily, will be examined, as will methods and timeframes for periodic review of the inmate's protective custody status. Programming provided to protective custody inmates will also be compared to that afforded general population inmates.
- 2. <u>Classification of inmates with behavioral problems</u>: this subtask will involve an assessment of the criteria and practices Department staff employ to determine which inmates exhibit violent or dangerous behavior or are potentially violent or dangerous and the steps taken to segregate these inmates from the general population while affording them programming aimed at reducing their violent, dangerous behavior.
- 3. Classification of inmates with special needs: the extent to which the Department provides for a thorough assessment of new admissions to identify special needs inmates will be examined. Special programs and housing assignments used for these inmates will be examined as will the criteria for special program placement and the procedures for providing a special needs inmate the services he needs.

Task 7 - Analysis of Procedures for Matching Offender Needs With Agency Resources

This task will include a review of the procedures the Department employs in identifying and matching inmate security/custody and program needs with resources of the Department.

1. <u>Catalog of available Department programs</u>: existing descriptions of Department programs will be collected, updated and supplemental information added, if necessary, to form a summary of Department resources.

Program elements that will be given particular attention during this subtask include:

- Number of inmates/programs;
- Criteria for participation;
- Criteria for program removal;
- Number and qualifications of staff;
- Classification actions attendent to program participation; and
- Program objectives.
- 2. <u>Matching inmate programmatic needs with available programs</u>: Procedures for matching inmates' needs with Department resources will be analyzed. Of particular attention will be the success of the Department in meeting inmate needs while at the same time not compromising the custody/security needs of the agency.

The above two subtasks must be completed prior to considering the implementation of a model such as the Correctional Classification Profile (CCP). The CCP was developed by CSG in 1980 as a means for systematically matching inmate security requirements with agency resources. A diagram of the model as it normally appears is included below:

F 20 F 2 B	Medical Needs	Public Risk Needs	Institutional Risk Needs	Mental Health Needs	Educational Needs	Vocational Needs	Work Skills	Drugs and Alcohol Needs
2	М	P	I	МН	E	٧	W	D
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	. 4
0 0000	, ,	3	3	3	3	.3	3	3
97.0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

The basic fundamentals of the CCP include:

- It represents all factors/criteria that the agency should employ in assigning an inmate.
- All factors incorporate a five level rating system.
- Factors associated with facility assignment are placed in priority either from left to right or top to bottom on the profile.
- Institutional capabilities are rated employing the same format.
- Ideally, all ratings should decrease during inmate's confinement.

The CCP has a number of advantages which include:

- Simultaneously objectifies and quantifies decision-making to improve population management.
- Is easily trainable for all levels of staff.
- Establishes priorities as demands on the correctional system change.
- Provides guidelines for inmate placement both within system and institution.
- Identifies needed resources.
- Provides objective data for new facility and program design.
- Promotes improved security and custody.
- Enhances monitoring of inmate progress and effectiveness of initial decision-making.
- Provides format for evaluating program effectiveness.
- Allows for "best fit" of inmate's needs with available resources.
- No math/computation is required.
- Requires assessment of <u>each</u> factor in making assignment decision.
- Permits ranking of each factor to be altered based upon changing agency resources.

- Provides documented, objective justification to legislature and public of the needs of the system as well as rationale for inmate assignment.
- Increases validity and reliability of assignment decision-making.

Task 8 - Review of Classification Security/Custody Decision-Making

This task will be one of the most important, if not the most important, tasks conducted during the project as it will assist the agency in the development of a more comprehensive approach to assessing an inmate's security and custody needs.

1. Assessment of public risk/institutional risk model: Department staff are interested in implementing a classification system which is responsive to the protection of the public and the management of inmates within the confines of a correctional facility. At the same time, the Department wishes to classify inmates for the least restrictive confinement assignment by minimizing staff subjective discretion while maximizing their professional classification skills. To accomplish these objectives, a model emphasizing two security concepts is being considered. The first of these concepts is Public Risk or the likelihood an inmate will escape and should escape be successful, the amount and type of threat the inmate would be to the general public. The second concept is Institutional Risk or the extent to which the inmate is a management problem within the facility, the type of supervision that is warranted to management his or her behavior.

A review of the applicability of this model's utility in Arizona will form the basis for the performance of the remaining subtasks within this task and for the development of the objective classification instrument.

2. <u>Criteria/factors used to determine public and institutional risk assignments</u>: the first area to be examined in this subtask is that of the minimal amount of information necessary for successful security/custody decision-making. For example, the Federal Prison Systems previously used over 40 criteria to determine an inmate's initial institutional and custody assignment. However, after a two-year project involving its Western Region, six criteria were identified as being excellent predictors for custody determination.

This examination will include the identification of the criteria Department personnel consider important in determining security/custody assignments (Public/Institutional Risk). Custodial and program staff will be surveyed to determine the elements (institutional adjustment, prior criminal history, length of sentence, etc.) that they use in making program level assignments. Upon completion of this task, the results will be statistically

analyzed to determine the relative importance of each factor in determining an inmate's initial security level and housing assignment.

- 3. <u>Definition of security/custody levels</u>: while the Department has adopted custody definitions, it will be important to evaluate the extent to which staff are consistent in their application of these definitions; whether each definition is interpreted in the same manner by all staff members, etc. In addition, it will be important to clearly define the security and custody capabilities of each of the Department's housing alternatives.
- 4. Pilot-testing of new classification model: using the new model, a security/custody analysis will be conducted of a sample of Department of Corrections inmates, determine whether inmates in the Arizona correctional system are being properly classified relative to security risk and custody considerations in relationship to the new objective format. In performing this analysis, the objective instrument will be applied to the information contained within each inmate's file. A sample of 500 is anticipated.
- 5. Training of classification personnel in new model use: prior to formal implementation, all staff involved with initial, institutional, and central office classification responsibilities will receive two to three days training in the actual use of the new classification approach. It is anticipated that such training will concentrate on the strengths and weaknesses of the model, criteria interpretation, when to use overrides, and at what level they can be approved, and review of facility security and program capabilities. All administrative and supervisory personnel receive a minimum of one day's training pertaining to the new model with emphasis on how the model interrelates with their area of responsibility.
- 6. Monitoring of classification decisions: the use of the new model will be monitored for six months following implementation to determine those situations or conditions it may experience difficulty in arriving at an accurate estimation of inmate security and custody needs. The number and type of overrides will also be assessed to determine one, the magnitude of overrides by classification and administrative personnel, two, what actions could have been taken in lieu of an override and finally, what direction the overrides are taking with respect to security/custody increases and decreases. An interater reliability study will also be conducted to examine whether classification staff systematically employ the new instrument or whether there exists substantial deviation in their scoring and interpretation of results.
- 7. Development of new model evaluation format: the new classification approach will only be useful to the Department if it indeed does a more effective job of assigning inmates to the most appropriate security levels, custody approaches, programs and services. Therefore, an evaluation model will be developed to assess the impact and effectiveness of the model one year after introduction. This evaluation model will include two major components; Time-Series Analysis to assess what changes, if any, the model has brought

about relative to serious incidents, escapes, etc., and Item Validation to identify what factor or factors are driving the model in terms of security/custody determination.

Task 9 - Review of Procedures Used to Update the System

This task will involve the analysis of the extent to which the classification system is adaptable to the changing needs of the Department and offenders while considering changes in laws and standards relating to classification.

Specific areas that will be examined include:

- The capacity of the system to adjust to changing Department needs and resources;
- The ability of the system to adjust to offender needs; and
- The responsiveness of the classification system to emerging knowledge such as new laws and professional advances.

V. CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CLASSIFICATION DECISION-MAKING

Recommendation 1: An objective classification approach should be developed incorporating the concepts of public and institutional risk.

<u>Findings</u>: As reported earlier in this report, the present Arizona classification system is primarily subjective in nature, being driven by length of sentence and institutional adjustment. The subjectivity inherent in this approach has resulted in considerable overclassification at initial classification and moderate over- and underclassification during reclassification proceedings.

Rationale: An objective classification approach would not only minimize staff's discretion, resulting in improved classification outcomes, but also reduce the likelihood of litigation, result in higher numbers of prisoners being placed in less restrictive custody settings, and facilitate both staff and inmate understanding of the classification system. While discretion cannot and should not be completely eliminated, an objective classification approach would serve to designate boundaries within which classification decisions can be made, thus eliminating too broad discretionary power for objective classification approach, individuals. An in which classification processes, rules, policies, findings, and reasons are open to scrutiny, can further serve to check discretion.

Implementation Plan: A detailed implementation plan is included along with a development plan earlier in this report.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 2: The new classification system should incorporate a minimum of five security/custody levels. This number would be increased if the current institutional trusty and community trusty security levels are retained by the agency.

<u>Findings</u>: The present Arizona Department of Corrections classification system, while including five security/custody levels, does not include the equivalent of close custody, which is found in most jurisdictions. This results in the situation where there is a substantial difference in the security and custody needs between inmates designated as maximum custody versus those determined to be medium custody.

Rationale: The development of five security/custody levels based on a numerical system would serve to eliminate the confusion that surrounds the present classification statuses designated as medium, maximum, etc. A system based upon a one-to-five scale, with appropriate definitions associated with each level, would provide a common definition for each security/custody level throughout the agency.

Implementation Plan: The new security/custody definitions and corresponding one-through-five custody scale would be developed in concert with the objective classification approach.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 3: The new objective classification approach should serve as a management and planning tool to assist the agency in responding to overcrowding.

<u>Firstings</u>: The present classification system does not always serve to identify the best match of inmates and security beds. In addition, it must be overridden on a continual basis to move inmates downward through the various institutions to free up beds for higher security prisoners. Further, the present classification approach does not permit the Department to incorporate the security and programmatic needs of the prisoner populations in any long-range planning.

Rationale: The development of an objective classification approach which in turn provides objective security, programmatic and support services data on the offender population would permit the Department to not only develop a standardized data base for short-term and long-term correctional system planning, but would also serve to provide objective data for developing annual budgets. Unlike the present system, which does not permit the collection or retention of objective information, the new system would provide for structured information from which management personnel would be able to delineate the needs of the agency not only for the following fiscal year but for five- and ten-year periods into the future. Population projections could then be done which would determine both the number and type of prisoners likely to be confined through the year 1990 and 1995.

Implementation. The implementation of such a management approach using an objective classification system would be incorporated in the development and implementation of the proposed objective classification approach. The actual use of such an approach as a management and planning tool would be installed once the new classification approach had been validated, approximately 12 to 18 months after implementation. This would not preclude,

however, the collection of data from the AIMS system, which would be used for subsequent planning purposes in the interim.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 4: The objective classification system should be validated within 12 to 18 months after implementation.

<u>Findings</u>: The present classification approach has not been validated since its implementation in the late 1970's and through recent revisions over the past several years. The present report is the first attempt at validation of the existing system since its introduction.

Rationale: The new classification approach should be validated within a year to 18 months after its introduction so as to determine its effectiveness and impact. All too often, correctional agencies develop and introduce classification approaches without ever determining whether they actually achieve the stated goals and objectives for which they were developed. The validation of the new classification approach should include both a time series analysis of classification data as well as item validation to determine which factor or factors are most important in determining inmate security and custody requirements.

Implementation Plan: The actual validation study should be carried out independent from the Department of Corrections. An outside consultant firm should be retained by the Department and given approximately six months to 12 months to complete the validation study. A detailed validation plan should be developed by the consultant firm, approved by the Department, and completed utilizing a standard and nationally accepted statistical analysis methodology.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 5: The Department should objectively classify each institution/unit in terms of their security and program capabilities.

Findings: There had not been an objective analysis of the security and custody capabilities of each institution up unto the Henderson and Gerard Study conducted early in 1985 and, more recently, the security audit performed by N.R. Cox and Associates. The findings of both of these studies should be strongly considered in assigning an objective security and custody rating to each institution. In addition, a programmatic analysis should be made of each facility to determine on an objective basis, preferably on a

scale of one to five, the educational, vocational training, medical, mental health, treatment, and related program resources available at each.

Rationale: By assigning an objective security and program capabilities score to each institution Department classification staff should be able to better match offender needs with agency resources. In addition, the use of an objective approach to both classify inmates and institutions should facilitate the automation of classification data for both the initial classification and reclassification processes.

Implementation. The objective rating of each unit/institution should occur simultaneous with the development of the objective classification system. As the majority of work pertaining to assessing the security capabilities of each institution has been completed, efforts should then be concentrated on assessing the program and support services resources available at each facility.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 6: Specific classification system goals and objectives should be developed and prioritized and clearly described and made available to all staff and inmates.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the only specific goals and objectives pertaining to the classification system are those developed by the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center staff. This unit has developed six major goals as well as nine related objectives pertaining to the role of the Alhambra Center in the overall Department classification process. Recently, the Department has also developed a preliminary set of goals and objectives for the remaining components of the classification system. These goals and objectives, as stated earlier, should be prioritized and available to not only all agency personnel but the entire inmate population.

Rationale: Prior to attempting to design a new classification process, the Department of Corrections must be very clear as to not only the goals and objectives of this new classification approach but also its own goals and objectives related to the function, purpose, and priorities of the system. These goals and objectives must be realistic, attainable, and understandable to both staff and inmates. Within these goals, an objective classification approach can be developed to sort those prisoners whose identified needs fall within the agency's objectives. Only after conceptualizing the goals of the classification system can a rational classification process be developed and produced. At a minimum, these goals and objectives should include the following provisions:

- Minimize risk to the public;
- Minimize risk to other inmates and institutional staff;
- Minimize breaches of security;
- Minimize risk to the operation of the system;
- Minimize litigation;
- Maximize fairness;
- Maximize the objective and quantitative nature of all classification criteria; and
- Maximize inmate understanding of the classification system and facilitate inmate participation in program decisions.

At a minimum, policies and procedures should be developed which include such classification issues as:

- Initial inmate classification and reclassification;
- Instructions regarding the makeup of classification committees, units, and teams, and the full responsibilities of each;
- Definitions of various committees' responsibilities for security, custody, employment, and program assignment;
- Instructions concerning potential changes in an inmate's program;
- Procedures related to inmate transfer from one program to another and one institution to another;
- Content of the classification interview; and
- Method of documenting classification decisions.

<u>Implementation</u>. The goals and objectives of the total classification system should be developed and implemented in concert with the proposed objective approach to assessing inmate security and custody needs.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 7: All classification staff should receive a minimum of 40 hours pre-service training and subsequent 40 hours inservice training each year.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the only training provided classification personnel is intermittent training delivered by Central Classification Office staff. This training is generally brought about as a result of a need to become familiar with new policies and procedures and is not specific to the overall classification system.

Rationale: All classification staff should receive a thorough orientation as to the goals and objectives of the classification system, the use of the various classification instruments, the role of the various testing protocol in classification decision-making, the use of classification data in determining security/custody and unit assignments, and the role of

classification as a planning and management tool. In addition, each classification staff member should engage in 40 hours in-service training each year. This training should concentrate on new policies and procedures pertaining to classification, updates on the security and program capabilities of each unit/institution, and any new classification concepts and ideas emerging both nationally and in Arizona that should be shared with personnel on a yearly basis.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: The pre-service and in-service classification training program should be developed jointly by Central Office and institutional classification personnel. This training program should include comprehensive trainers' and trainees' manuals which references not only the current classification system but is also capable of being routinely updated to reflect any new concepts that may surface.

Priority: 1

CLASSIFICATION INFORMATION NEEDS

Recommendation 8: The objective classification process should provide for the collection of complete, valid, high-quality, and standardized data.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the Department receives at initial intake presentence investigation (PSI) reports on approximately 85 percent of all new prisoners. In addition, an estimated 50 percent of Summary Intake Forms includes data based upon inmate self-report. Fortunately, only a small percentage of this information pertains to such important classification criteria as prior commitments, prior offense history, prior escape history, and previous institutional adjustment.

Rationale: An objective classification system must have valid, timely, and reliable data available in order to make both an initial classification recommendation as well as later during reclassification proceedings. In order to do so, the classification system must define the data needed and the format in which it is to be collected and analyzed. High-quality, standardized data is essential in forming a valid, statistical base for classification decision-making and for correlation of prediction and need factors. Such complete and verified data should permit an equitable determination of an inmate's security and custody needs based on particular factors for individual cases; similar decisions among individual classification analysts on approximately comparable cases; and quantitative analysis of trends in classification decision-making throughout the Department for individual units or the agency as a whole.

The National Institute of Corrections has found that the quantity and quality of inmate data available to classification staff when the classification decisions must be made are frequently less than adequate, and sometimes entirely unusable. The Institute has also found that very often agencies do not have guidelines for collection, maintenance, and use of offender data. Without specific and objective guidelines, classification staff are not likely to prepare reports sufficiently comprehensive and reliable to be used in an empirically valid statistical analysis.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: The procedures for the collection, use, and validation of offender data should be developed and introduced simultaneously with the development and implementation of the proposed objective classification approach.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 9: All classification information pertinent to housing assignment, security, and program assessment should be automated.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the Department's automated information management system (AIMS) is now in the process of being updated relative to a variety of types of offender information. However, all information relating to an inmate's unit assignment, security and custody status, as well as program and support service needs, should be automated and readily available to all classification personnel.

Rationale: Classification staff require accessible and accurate information on all inmates in order to make valid and reliable classification decisions both at intake and for institutional classification purposes.

The automation of an objective classification system would have a number of important advantages for the Department. Given this assumption, it is recommended that the AIMS system be capable of the following:

- Identifying in advance inmates eligible for security reduction and interinstitutional/interunit transfer;
- Identifying gang members and providing non-confidential information for classification decision-making;
- Providing system-wide information relative to institutional program offerings;
- Documenting reason(s) why inmates are transferred or are subject to a security/custody change; and

 Providing data for inmate population projections by security and custody level.

Implementation Plan: The automation of all offender classification data should occur simultaneous with the implementation of the objective classification system. This process should occur in conjunction and in coordination with records office personnel, central office, Alhambra, and institutional classification staff, as well as personnel responsible for the operation of AIMS.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 10: The present AIMS system should be validated as soon as possible.

<u>Findings</u>: According to Department of Corrections personnel, the AIMS system is only approximately 75 percent complete and has yet not been validated. As a result, staff continually refer to manual inmate record files rather than the automated data base. Such a continued practice is not only time-consuming but ineffective, given the potential of the AIMS system.

Rationale: The use of an automated data system by both records office and classification staff is not only practical and effective in terms of day-to-day classification proceedings, but also is a viable information source in terms of data required for facility planning, program and staffing analyses.

Implementation Plan: The implementation plan for the validation of the AIMS system should be consistent with the introduction of classification data.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 11: Identical classification information that is available to institutional staff should be readily accessible to Central Office classification personnel.

Findings: At present, the majority of records in the central office are from three months to six months behind in terms of important data needed to make classification decisions about unit assignment and security status for the Arizona Department of Corrections' inmate population. Most of the data are those regarding disciplinary actions that have not been forwarded on a timely basis to the Central Office by institutional records office and classification staff.

Rationale: The central office classification staff cannot make valid decisions without information that reflects the most up-to-date status of each inmate. Without having both Central Office and institutional classification files agree, inappropriate security and institutional assignment decisions will continue to be made.

The implementation of this recommendation should Implementation Plan: begin immediately. Specifically, the Department would be required to ensure that all information generated for each inmate be forwarded to the Central classification office within 72 hours after it was generated by institution. Records office personnel should then insert this information into the file within five working days after receipt. This would mean that the time lag for inclusion of institutional disciplinary and related data for each inmate for inclusion in Central Office files would range between four and eight days rather than the three- to six-month timeframe that now exists. This may mean that additional Central Office records personnel will be warranted. However, the cost of these additional staff would seem to be more than made up for in the accurate classification decision-making that Central Office personnel would be able to provide. In addition, efficient central office decision-making would enable beds to be made available on a more expedient basis, thus, in part, ameliorating the overcrowding situation.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 12: Up-to-date disciplinary information should be transferred simultaneously with the inmate from unit to unit, particularly when the inmate is transferred for disciplinary reasons.

Findings: Department staff at all institutions reported to the consultant team there are many instances where inmate disciplinary reports are not transferred at the same time as the inmate. This is particularly a problem when the inmate is transferred as a result of serious disciplinary action taken by the transferring unit. This occasionally results in a situation where the inmate is received at a new unit where he is often misclassified and/or mishoused.

Rationale: The current situation that precludes a standardized procedure for the transfer of disciplinary data should be resolved as soon as possible. Only with verified and timely information for each inmate can the classification staff of the receiving unit be in a position to effectively classify the inmate relative to his security, custody, and housing needs. If staff are fortunate, the inmate will be misclassified without resultant negative behavior. However, insufficient disciplinary information can lead to the inmate engaging in the same type of violations for which he was

transferred. This could result in an escape, violence against staff or another inmate, or instigation of a riot or major disturbance.

Implementation Plan: It would appear that this recommendation could be implemented within 30 days with the development and dissemination of a policy and related procedures requiring that disciplinary data be transferred with the inmate. At no time should disciplinary data be delayed longer than 24 hours following the transfer of the individual, and this would be only when extreme circumstances prohibited the immediate generation of a disciplinary report.

Priority: 2

INITIAL CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

Recommendation 13: The present facility housing the reception and initial classification process should be replaced with a 300- to 350- single cell occupancy facility.

Findings: The present Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center is an extremely inadequate facility for the reception and initial classification of inmates assigned to the Arizona Department of Corrections. It is inadequate not only in terms of security, both perimeter and internal, but also in terms of housing, in that the majority of cells are multiple occupancy and difficult to supervise, offices are minimal and too small, sufficient program and support services space is unavailable, and the rated capacity is insufficient to adequately manage the continual admissions from the local jurisdictions.

Rationale: The Alhambra physical plant is one of the most deficient facilities the consultant team has toured in developing and/or evaluating classification systems in 20 other states. The only desirable feature of the Alhambra facility is its centralized location in Phoenix, making it accessible to community resources and other departmental correctional facilities. Otherwise, it should be replaced within the next two to three years by a 300 to 350-bed facility which would provide sufficient space for housing, offices, programs, and support services. The planning, design, and construction of such a facility would permit the Department to carry out the initial classification process on a systematic basis, without having to transfer some individuals before the mandated classification and diagnostic workup have been completed. It would also permit inmates to be classified for effective assignment within the facility, minimizing the varied and numerous management and operational problems created by the present physical plant.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: The Department should set about within the next three to six months developing a prearchitectural program that would delineate the type and amount of space that would be required for a new reception

center. This prearchitectural program should include not only an architectural statement of space requirements but also a functional management plan depicting how the facility would operate, particularly with the introduction of a new objective classification system. It is anticipated, at a cost of \$75,000 a bed, that such a facility would cost in the range of 22 to 27 million dollars, depending upon the eventual agreed-upon size, configuration, and accourrements. The present Alhambra facility could then be converted for low-medium and/or minimum security housing. Preferably the latter as minimum security housing appears to be lacking for males admitted from the Phoenix area.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 14: All newly received inmates should be classified for housing at Alhambra, dependent upon their immediate public and institutional risk concerns.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, inmates received at Alhambra are housed on a random basis generally independent of their security and custody concerns.

Rationale: The random assignment of inmates to cells at Alhambra would not be as acute had this facility the capability to separate inmates via single-cell housing. However, given the multiple occupancy housing that now exists, the mixing of individuals during the initial classification process without considered attention to their public and institutional risk needs appears to "water down" their classification proceedings while exposing staff and inmates to a number of security problems. It should be noted, however, that those inmates that appear to adjust to the Alhambra unit are elevated to a higher status after several weeks. This higher status includes a number of privileges that are not available to either newly received inmates or inmates that have manifested a difficult time adjusting to confinement at the Center.

Implementation Plan: The above recommendation could be incorporated by the Department within 30 to 60 days after reception of this report. The development of a policy and related procedures for the initial housing classification of newly received inmates at the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center would be the primary requirement.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 15: Additional clerical personnel are required to enable classification staff to concentrate on classification functions.

Findings: At present, there is only one clerical staff member available for initial classification staff at Alhambra. This staff member devotes most of her time performing secretarial functions for the administrator of the unit. As a result, classification staff members, Correctional Program Officers, are required to personally complete most if not all typing functions. Typing of necessary classification reports during the initial classification can entail two to three hours a day of each CPO's time.

Rationale: It is incredulous that classification staff, most of which are pay grade 18, must spend between 25 and 35 percent of their day typing reports. It would appear to be a much more effective use of their time to have them concentrate on initial classification functions and employ clerical personnel at a much lower pay grade who will be responsible for typing, filing, and other clerical responsibilities.

Implementation Plan: Between three to five clerk typists should be hired within the next 90 to 120 days. This would require the Department announcing the positions, recruiting qualified individuals, and selecting appropriate personnel to fill each of the clerk typist positions. While the cost of these additional personnel would range between \$40,000 and \$60,000, it is anticipated that these costs would be offset by the additional time the classification staff would have to concentrate on assessing the needs of newly received prisoners. This would also mean that, in the long run, the need for additional initial classification staff would be minimized.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 16: Correctional career plans should be developed for all interested inmates.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the Department does not prepare correctional career plans for any inmates assigned to the Arizona Department of Corrections. The primary reason it is not done is the overcrowding situation, which negates the housing of individuals at units, depending upon their program and support service requirements. Housing assignment, as is stated throughout this report, is generally a function of bed space availability, with little regard devoted to the programmatic and service needs of the inmate population.

Rationale: With in excess of 1,200 new beds coming on-line within the next 12 months, the introduction of an objective classification system, and the Department's recent improvements in managing the inmate population, it is believed that institutional career plans can be developed for a large number of interested inmates. There would be advantages for both the inmate population and the Department. The advantages for the inmate would be that they have an understanding that the programs that they either require or are

interested in would be available on a scheduled basis. This would serve to promote improved behavior on behalf of the inmate population while at the same time providing the foundation for a realistic set of program objectives for each inmate to achieve.

The advantages for the Department would be that they would be able to concentrate programs and services at designated institution, depending upon the security and programmatic requirements of inmates involved in a career program system. It would also enable the Department to better plan and budget its resources. Career plans should be developed during the initial classification process and monitored over the inmate's confinement by central classification personnel.

Implementation Plan: It would probably require at least 12 months for the Department to develop a career program plan system for the agency. This would require Department staff identifying current institutional program and service capabilities and matching these with the needs of interested inmates.

Priority: 3

Recommendation 17: Pre-sentence investigation reports and jail records should be available for the classification of all newly received inmates.

<u>Findings</u>: As stated earlier, pre-sentence investigation reports are received for 85 percent or less of the inmate population. Jail records are received for much fewer inmates, agency staff reporting that less than 25 percent of all inmates received at Alhambra having jail adjustment information forwarded by the local jurisdictions.

Rationale: The information from pre-sentence investigation reports and jail records is essential for initial classification staff to prepare valid and reliable assessments of the security and program requirements of new inmates. Without such information, serious mistakes can be made relative to the unit and security assignment of inmates from Alhambra.

Implementation Plan: The Department, working in close association with Arizona's county detention systems and the various circuit courts, should develop a system whereby pre-sentence investigation reports and jail records are forwarded to the Department for each inmate at the time of transfer. This would necessitate either the passage of a statute requiring such a procedure or establishing an agreement between the local jurisdictions, the circuit courts, and the Department of Corrections regarding how and when pre-sentence

investigation and jail record reports will be forwarded to the Department for initial classification purposes.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 18: Caseloads should be assigned to initial classification staff on an equal basis.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, caseloads are assigned to correctional program officers, dependent upon the last digit of the newly received inmate. While this in itself would appear to be an equitable basis for caseload assignment, the Department's procedure for using a continuously assigned number for each inmate often results in a situation where a large number of newly received inmates who have previously been committed to the Department due to the "luck of the draw" are assigned to just a few CPO's.

Rationale: The assignment of temporary numbers to all newly received inmates would appear to resolve the current disparity in terms of caseload assignments. These temporary numbers would be used only by Alhambra staff for purposes of caseload assignment to ensure that the assignment process is fair and equitable.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: It would appear that this process could be implemented at initial classification immediately with minimal changes required in policy and procedures.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 19: Initial classification staff should become familiar with the security and programmatic capabilities of each institution/unit.

<u>Findings</u>: Many staff at the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center are unfamiliar with the specific security, program, and support service capabilities of each facility/unit operated by the Department. Several staff noted that they have not had the opportunity to physically view each institution nor become familiar with the education, vocational training, medical, mental health, treatment, and related programs and resources available at each unit.

Rationale: Initial classification staff cannot make effective decisions concerning the institutional placement of inmates without having personal information regarding the resources available at each institution/unit. By having such information available, either via on-site tours of each unit or

prepared documents identifying institutional resources, staff are in a much better position to appropriately assign inmates to Department facilities.

Implementation Plan: The implementation of this recommendation could be completed within 90 to 120 days. It would involve the development of a training program for initial classification personnel which would describe the resources at each facility. It would also involve the arrangement of on-site inspections of each institution/unit by the same staff.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 20: The Department of Corrections should control and schedule inmate intake from the counties.

Findings: At present, the Department of Corrections is for the most part left to the whims of the counties regarding the transfer of inmates from the local jurisdictions to the agency. This is primarily prompted by counties wanting to transfer inmates shortly after their sentencing. For several of the larger jurisdiction, court orders preclude their maintaining prisoners in the county jails for periods of longer than 10 days following their adjudication.

Rationale: The current situation that forces the Department to accept prisoners into the system on a random basis contributes to the crisis-oriented posture of the agency. The pressure to move inmates through the reception and classification process to make room for incoming commitments and to avoid overcrowding at Alhambra is counterproductive to the principles of a productive classification system. Classification counselors need adequate gather information about inmates upon which to base time classification decisions. Placing control over intake by the Department would facilitate a more orderly and efficient reception and classification process beneficial to inmates and staff alike. This process should include the identification of transfers from local jurisdictions on a priority basis with offenders who have major medical/psychological problems for whom local resources are not available being a top priority on through to state prisoners who have physically been assigned to a county jail for some period of time being a lower priority.

Implementation Plan: In order to implement this recommendation, it would appear that a new statute would require being prepared, giving the Department the authority to control and schedule intake.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 21: Computer terminals should be available for all Correctional Program Officers.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, as is consistent throughout the agency, classification staff primarily depend upon manually retrieved data to assist them in their classification decision-making. Alhambra administrative staff report that in the past several years they have budgeted for computer terminals for each of their Correctional Program Officers to improve the initial classification process, but that "at the last moment," funding for these terminals has been eliminated.

Rationale: The provision of computer terminals for initial classification staff would greatly enhance their ability to assess the security and program needs of each newly received inmate. It would do so by minimizing the time that they are now involved in manual record checks while also providing expanded information that could be called up on an immediate basis.

Implementation Plan: Implementing this recommendation would require funding for approximately 12 to 15 CRT's for the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center. Cost would be estimated at between \$25,000 to \$35,000.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 21: The present DARAP system should be continued as a source to provide basic screening information for initial classification purposes.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, the Department uses what is known as the Diagnostic and Risk Assessment Profile (DARAP) system, which is a computerized testing system administered to each newly received inmate. The testing includes psychological, scholastic, vocational, and substance abuse testing. Specific risk factors are highlighted in the compiled report, including violent tendencies, suicidal traits, and/or escape risks.

Rationale: At present, the DARAP system is one of the few objective classification tools employed by the Department. While this system cannot be considered in itself a document from which security and program decisions should be derived, it should continue to be used as a diagnostic tool for initial classification personnel in assessing security and program needs of offenders in association with the objective classification instrument that will be developed in late 1985.

<u>Implementation Pian</u>: None.

Priority Number: 2

INSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

Recommendation 23: There is a need for consistent internal classification policies and procedures between the various institutions/units.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, each of the various institutions and units utilizes its own procedures relative to institutional classification that are for the most part based upon departmental policies and procedures. However, they have been tailored to the specific security and staffing capabilities of the facility as well as the pressures exerted by the local community.

Rationale: While there is indeed an obvious need to modify Departmental classification policies and procedures on the local level to adapt to the philosophy and management of the institution administration as well as the politics of the local community, these modifications should be, as much as possible, standardized and consistent with internal classification policies and procedures promulgated by other correctional institutions. Too much diversion between the units results in an inconsistent application of Departmental regulations, which in turn lead to inappropriate classification decisions, litigation, and at the extreme, serious consequences such as escape, assault, and institutional destruction and take-over attempts.

Implementation Plan: Within 90 to 120 days a task force should be developed by the Department that will bring together all existing internal classification policies and procedures employed by the various units and attempt to standardize them to the greatest extent possible.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 24: Additional lock-up space is required at all facilities.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, less than 125 beds are available for lock-up at the Department's various institutions. This has resulted in a situation where inmates must wait sometimes up to six months in general population prior to assignment to lock-up for disciplinary reasons. In some instances, the time-frame has been so long so as to completely preclude the assignment of the inmate to disciplinary detention.

Rationale: The lack of adequate lock-up space severely impedes the effective operation of the classification system by maintaining inmates in the general population who should be, for at least a short period of time, assigned to disciplinary detention. This situation in turn tends to delay the transfer of prisoners to other institutions who are waiting "their turn" in lock-up. Lock-up space should be made available at all facilities as special

purpose housing. A minimum of five percent of all confinement space should be assigned for lock-up purposes at each unit and not counted in normal operational space by the agency.

Implementation Plan: The introduction of additional lock-up space will require the Department to either modify existing beds for disciplinary detention purposes or construct new beds at existing facilities. New facilities planned by the agency should incorporate the five percent standard recommended above.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 25: Reclassification of prisoners should be conducted on a structured schedule depending on the inmate's length of stay.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, all inmates are reclassified every 90 days. While this schedule is in itself desirable for many inmates in the Arizona prison population, it does tend to result in a considerable amount of staff time and additional paperwork.

Rationale: The following reclassification guidelines are recommended:

- Review/reclassification within two weeks following the prisoner's transfer from another institution within the agency;
- Review every three months for prisoners serving terms of 18 months or less;
- Review every six months for prisoners serving terms of 18 months to five years; and
- Six-month review for prisoners serving terms of five years or more, with three-month reviews during the last year of incarceration.

<u>Implementation</u>. Implementation of this recommendation would require the Department to issue a new policy and procedure regarding timeframes for reclassification reviews. This could be done within 90 to 120 days after formal approval of this report.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 26: Non-confidential information pertaining to gang affiliation should be included in inmate record files.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, there is little information in inmate files pertaining to those inmates who are affiliated with gangs, their affiliation within the gang, how long they have been involved with the gang, and what problems they are likely to cause the agency as a result of their gang membership. This has primarily been a function of the Department's Intelligence and Investigation Unit wishing to maintain this information on a confidential basis within their unit.

Rationale: Classification staff are not able to make effective classification decisions without completely understanding all the information that is pertinent to assigning an inmate to a facility and security status. often, investigative unit staff override a classification decision made by either initial or institutional classification staff based upon knowledge of an individual's affiliation with a specific gang. Generally, this information could be made available to classification staff so that they would be able to include that it in their deliberations relative to making an appropriate unit It is understood that there is certain information and security decision. that must be kept confidential and precluded from placement in the inmate's file. This would include those situations where the inmate is an informant for the Department, where the inmate's gang affiliation is unknown by other members of the inmate population, where the inmate is a gang leader and departmental staff desire to keep that status unknown by other staff within the agency, and when the inmate has discontinued his gang affiliation yet investigative unit staff desire to continue other inmates believing that the gang affiliation still exists.

Implementation Plan: This recommendation should be implemented within 90 days after this report is received. The implementation procedures would include bringing together central office and I and I Unit staff to determine what types of information can be included in inmate files without harming the confidentiality needed by I and I in order to function properly.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 27: Sufficient clerical personnel are required to assist in classification functions.

<u>Findings</u>: The majority of institutions visited by the consultant team reported that the lack of sufficient clerical personnel severely inhibit their abilities to generate classification and disciplinary reports on a timely basis. This in part is the reason that disciplinary information is not transferred at the time of an inmate transfer and why central office files remain out of date.

<u>Rationale</u>: Additional clerical personnel are needed to ensure that the findings and recommendations prepared by institutional classification personnel are prepared in document form, filed in the proper location, and readily accessible for classification decision-making.

Implementation Plan: The Department should appoint a task force to review the clerical staff requirements for classification at each institution. This task force should identify not only how many staff are needed, but what skills are required and the timeframe that will be necessary for the recruitment, selection, employment, and training of sufficient clerical personnel.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 28: Institutional classification personnel should be responsible for classification activities only on the institutional level.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, there is a desire and interest on behalf of institutional classification personnel to become involved in classification decisions regarding the interinstitutional transfer of inmates. This interest is shared by a large number of institutional staff who believe, as a result of their daily contact with the individual, they are in a better position than central office classification personnel to know the inmate and what types of behaviors they are likely to effectuate in another correctional environment.

Rationale: Institutional/unit classification staff, while having developed a personal relationship with most inmates and understanding how they have adjusted within their own institution, are not always in a position to understand how the inmate will adjust at another unit or institution. In addition, these same institutional classification personnel are not aware of systemwide issues, bed space availability at other facilities, or the ramifications of transferring inmates into those communities that will not tolerate certain types of offenders.

Implementation Plan: None.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 29: Additional classification staff appear to be warranted.

<u>Findings</u>: While it was not the intent of this audit to analyze staffing requirements throughout the agency for institutional classification decision-making, it became apparent to the consultant team through on-site reviews that

additional classification staff do appear to be needed. This is particularly the case at the Arizona State Prison Complex, Perryville, and Tucson.

Rationale: Without sufficient classification staff, the work load of available personnel becomes such that staff do not have sufficient time to review the information requirements for each inmate, often leading to inappropriate security and housing assignments.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: Similar to the recommendation that the Department develop a task force to identify clerical personnel requirements, this same task force should also be requested to examine the need for additional classification staff across the agency.

Priority: 2

CENTRAL OFFICE CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

Recommendation 30: Central Office classification should be elevated to the bureau level.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, central office classification staff and the manager of the office answer directly to the administrator of offender administration. This situation has resulted in central office classification being treated with somewhat less importance than its role in the agency would assume.

Rationale: Promoting the central office classification unit to the bureau level would not only eliminate considerable "red tape," but also demonstrate throughout the agency the importance of classification as a management and planning tool. In addition, central classification has minimal involvement in offender services which is its present location in the Department's central office organizational structure. In addition, since central classification is the cornerstone of the Department's classification system, this action would denote this level of responsibility. In raising the central office classification unit to the bureau level, several other actions should take place:

- The central office classification manager should be elevated to a bureau level position responsible directly to the administrator of institutional services;
- Classification staff should be elevated to pay grade 19 to reflect their authority over the classification process and to provide a promotional incentive for institutional classification staff;

Although somewhat unrelated to enhancement, the title of central office staff should be changed from classification and parole supervisor to classification supervisor or analyst to more actually reflect their actual duties.

Implementation Plan: Consistent with the development and implementation of an objective classification approach, the central office classification enhancement should occur simultaneously to reflect both the role of central office classification and the importance of the objective classification instrument.

Priority: 2

Recommendation 31: Sufficient central office classification personnel should be employed to effectively carry out the responsibilities of this office.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, there are three correctional classification and parole supervisors and one acting manager for the central classification unit as opposed to a budgeted four Correctional Classification and Parole Supervisors and one full-time Manager.

Rationale: A minimum of one Correctional Classification Supervisor should be available for every 1,500 inmates. This would provide, given the average daily population which is somewhat in excess of 8,000 prisoners, that at least five, and possibly six, Correctional Classification Supervisors should be employed in addition to one full-time manager. This staffing level would provide central office sufficient personnel to:

- Direct and supervise the agency's overall classification process;
- Establish procedures for inter-institutional transfer, including review by central office staff and an appeal procedure and administrative review of difficult cases;
- Establish procedures for central office monitoring and evaluation of classification process to ensure it is operating according to policy;
- Establish procedures for consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in decision-making;
- Initiate policy pertaining to classification, inmate programs and treatment, casework, including a comprehensive classification manual; and

 Assist in the selection, training, and supervision of initial and institutional classification staff and other classification staff members.

It would also provide sufficient staff to review and approve all parole classification changes, review classification decisions for due process, review and approve all compasionate leave and furloughs; and screen and coordinate all inmates used in Department construction projects.

Implementation Plan: Implementation of this recommendation would require the Department employing at least one and possibly two Correctional Classification Supervisors and developing a policy that there will be an established ratio of central office classification staff to the overall inmate population.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 32: Central office classification staff should take the lead in promoting improved understanding and relationships with facility classification personnel.

Findings: As is the case in most state correctional systems, there is a substantial amount of disagreement and understanding between central office and institution classification personnel. Institutional classification personnel, on the one hand, believe that central office assumes too much authority in reviewing and approving inter-institutional transfers as well as providing recommendations for increases or decreases in inmate custody. Central office classification personnel believe that their role is not sufficiently established and that they should assume more authority in approving inmate unit assignment and custody changes.

Rationale: Central office staff, because of their position in the agency, and their knowledge of system-wide classification issues, should be given the authority and responsibility to promote improved understanding of their function with institutional classification personnel. This would require central office staff regularly visiting each institution and reviewing not only Departmental policy and procedures pertaining to classification, but also reviewing individual classification actions, particularly those that institutional staff have disagreed with. Central office staff should also provide the majority of in-service training for institutional classification personnel, concentrating on the role of classification as a management and planning tool, the role of the central office unit in classification decision-making, and the authority that institutional classification personnel have pertaining to housing unit and custody recommendations.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: This recommendation should be implemented immediately, following the Director providing central office unit classification personnel with a policy statement and supporting resources enabling them to visit institutions and units on a periodic basis to review and discuss the basis for classification decisions they have made.

Priority: 2

SPECIAL MANAGEMENT CLASSIFICATION ISSUES

Recommendation 33: Protective custody inmates should be classified using a two-tiered system and should be dispersed throughout the system consistent with their security needs.

<u>Findings</u>: At present, all protective custody inmates are assigned to the central unit at the Arizona State Prison. This not only serves to misuse of valuable high security beds for a large number of prisoners who do not warrant the security of the central unit, but also subjects these same prisoners to a variety of problems such as loss of privileges, threats of the general population, and increase in custody that are commensurate with transfer to ASP.

Rationale: The Department should consider dispersing protective custody inmates into correctional facilities commensurate with their security and custody needs. The continued confinement of low security PC inmates at ASP is a misuse of severely needed high security beds. At a minimum, protective custody units should be established at Perryville and Tucson.

Similar to other correctional systems, the Arizona DOC has experienced a difficult problem in keeping the PC population to a manageable size. alternatives exist which CSG staff believe could ameliorate this problem. first is the introduction of a two-tiered PC program. The first level would be reserved for those inmates who staff involuntarily place in protection and those inmates who request protective custody for a documented, legitimate These inmates would be entitled to all of the rights and privileges reason. of the general population, including housing. The second level would be designated for those inmates who do not appear to have a legitimate reason to be housed in protective custody yet whose request cannot be denied due to the liability the Department would experience should the inmate be assaulted. Level two would provide inmates mandatory rights but would keep privileges such as television viewing, contact visits, personal clothing, to a minimum while maintaining a spartan environment. The goal of this second level would be to make the inmate uncomfortable to the point where he or she would either request return to general population or provide information which would substantiate his or her need for protective custody confinement.

<u>Implementation Plan</u>: Implementation of this recommendation would require the Department to develop policy and procedure supporting a two-tiered protective custody system as well as providing sufficient bedspace throughout the agency for the confinement of protective custody prisoners in institutions that provide security and custody commensurate with their degree of risk.

Priority: 1

Recommendation 34: Provisions should be made for a policy that defines the classification, housing, and management of disruptive mentally ill inmates.

Findings: Mentally ill inmates who are disruptive to the normal operation of the Department's institutions are confined in a variety of housing locations that are not readily accessible to the treatment that their psychological problems require. For example, there are approximately 25 to 30 mentally ill inmates who are disruptive to institutional operations housed in the central unit as ASP. While many of these inmates are not amenable to treatment, either through lack of motivation or because they have been treated previously without success, the Department does need to provide a housing environment that will permit these inmates to be managed without the remaining general population being entirely disrupted by their extreme behaviors.

The continued confinement of mentally ill disruptive inmates Rationale: in general population will not only result in these inmates being subject to both verbal and physical assault by members of the general population, but will also serve to continue their mental deterioration while incarcerated. Procedures should be developed to identify these offenders and the type of mental problem they are experiencing. Once identified, they should be segregated and either through the development of a new facility designed and staffed to deal with this segment of the inmate population or a wing of an existing structure, modified for their housing. Programming then should be developed to treat both the acute and chronic psychological manifested by this group. It is anticipated that many, if not the majority of this population, will vigorously reject any psychological treatment. However, this should be expected given the composition of this group. In any event, security and treatment staff should react to the individual as someone who is mentally disturbed and not as an inmate who is a chronic and intentional disciplinary problem.

Implementation Plan: The Department should begin immediately, within 60 to 90 days, to draft a policy on the management and treatment of mentally ill, disruptive inmates.

Priority: 1

VI. EARLY RELEASE ANALYSIS

The Selective Incapacitation Model developed by NCCD was used to determine what percentage of Arizona inmates could be released early with minimal risk of new crime and subsequent re-arrest (see next page). This model was originally developed by NCCD for assessment of the Illinois Early Release Program. It incorporates the following factors:

- Offense Seriousness
- Prior Arrests
- Prior Juvenile Commitment
- Prior Imprisonment (Jail/Prison)
- History of Disciplinary Grade Demotion
- Age at Release
- Prior Parole Violation
- Weapon Used in Offense
- History of Heroin/Barbituate Abuse
- Security Level at Release

The results of the early release component of the study suggest that there are a number of inmates who would be released from confinement 60, 90, 120, and possibly 180 days prior to their legal release date either via parole or expiration of sentence.

Category of Risk<1>	Range (Points)	Percentage
Low Low	0 - 5	9.14
Low	6 - 10	25.70
Moderate	11 - 14	29.20
High	15 - 20	29.50
High High	21 Plus	6.50

These results indicate that almost 10% (9.14%) of the Arizona inmate population could be released early with extremely minimal threat to the safety and welfare of the general public and that almost one-forth (25.7%) could leave the prison early with only minimal likelihood of further criminal activity. On the other hand, almost one third (29.2%) would be considered to be somewhat of a risk, another estimated one-third (29.5%) a substantial threat and less than 7% (6.5%) almost certain to recidivate shortly after release.

<1> Likely_arrest rates within 1 year of release:

Low Low	3 to	5%
Low	20 to	25%
Moderate	45 to	50%
High	65 to	70%
High High	85 to	90%

NCCD SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION MODEL

Offense Seriousness

Age at Release

Prior Arrests

$$0 - 3 = 0$$

 $4 - 4 = 1$
 $7 - 11 = 2$
 $12 + = 3$

Prior Parole Violation

Prior Juvenile Commitment

No =
$$0$$

Yes - 3

Weapon Used in Offense

Prior Imprisonment (Jail or Prison)

History of Disciplinary Grade Demotion

3 = 3

Security Level at Release

History of Heroin/Barbituate Abuse

With respect to risk of early release in comparison with the custody level of the inmate sample population, the following results emerged:

Risk Level	Community	<u>Minimum</u>	Medium	<u>Maximum</u>	Segregation Unit	<u>Total</u>
Low Low	1	17	12	1	0	
	0.29	5.01	3.54	0.29	0.00	31
	3.23	54.84	38.71	3.23	0.00	9.14
	14.29	14.91	7.79	1.67	0.00	
Low	3	29	47	8	0	
	0.88	8.55	13.86	2.36	0.00	87
	3.45	33.33	54.02	9.20	0.00	25.66
	42.86	25.44	30.52	13.33	0.00	
Moderate	3	33	44	17	2	
	0.88	9.73	12.98	5.01	0.59	99
	3.03	33.33	44.44	17.17	2.02	29.20
	42.86	28.95	28.57	28.33	50.00	
High	0	30	44	25	1	
	0.00	8.85	12.98	7.37	0.29	100
	0.00	30.00	44.00	25.00	1.00	29.50
	0.00	26.32	28.57	41.67	25.00	
High High	0 .	5	7	9	1	
	0.00	1.47	2.06	2.65	0.29	. 22
	0.00	22.73	31.82	40.91	4.55	6.49
	0.00	4.39	4.55	15.00	25.00	
Total	7	114	154	60	4	339
	2.06	33.63	45.43	17.70	1.18	100.00

These results suggest that from the Low Low group (9.14%) that over 96% were from custody level medium or less, that for the Low group (25.66%) the percentage was just over 90% and for the moderate group (29.20%) the percentage was slightly over 80%. However, for the High group (29.50%) the figure from the sample that were from medium custody or less was 74% and for the High group (6.49%) the figure was less than 45%. The message is clear given these findings. There is a significantly high correlation between an inmate's custody status and the risk they will present if afforded an early release. Inmates with low custody statuses will more than likely not be arrested during their first year after release while those assigned to higher custody status are likely candidates for rearrest.

Section 4 Page 2 5100.2 October 7, 1982

FACILITY SECURITY LEVEL CRITERIA

LEVEL OF SECURITY

					,
1	2	3	4	5	6
None	One Fence, or Building Facade	Double Fence	Double Fence or Single & Other	Double Fence or Wall	Double Fence or Wall
None or Not Manned	May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs.	May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs.	May have Towers Man- ned Full or Part-Time	Manned 24 Hours and/or	Manned 24 Hours
No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ОИ	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Open	Open to Medium	Medium	Secure	Secure	Secure
Single & Multiple Dorms	Single & Multiple Dorms	Single & Multiple Dorms	Single & Multiple Dorms	Single & Multiple Dorms	All Single Rooms
Low	Low	Low to Medium	Low to Medium	Low to High	High
	None or Not Manned No No Open Single & Multiple Dorms	None One Fence, or Building Facade None or May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. No No No Open Open to Medium Single & Multiple Dorms Single & Multiple Dorms	None One Fence, or Building Fence None or Not Manned Not Manned Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. No No No Yes Open Open Open Open Open Single & Multiple Dorms Low Low Low Double Fence Pence May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. Single Less than 24 hrs. Single & Multiple Dorms Low Low to	None One Fence, or Building Facade None or Building Facade None or Single & Other May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. No No Yes Yes No Open Open to Medium Single & Multiple Dorms Double Fence or Single & Fence or Single & May have Towers Manned Less than 24 hrs. May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. Yes Yes Single & Multiple Dorms Dorms Double Fence or Single & May have Towers Manned Less than 24 hrs. May have Towers Manned Full or Part-Time May have Towers Manned Full or Part-Time Single & Yes Ves Low Low to Low to Low to	None One Fence, or Building Fence Fence Fence or Single & Other None or Not Manned None or Not Manned May have Towers but Manned Less than 24 hrs. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Double Fence or Single & Other May have Towers Manned 24 Hours Anned Less than 24 hrs. Yes Yes Yes Open Open to Medium Secure Single & Multiple Dorms Double Fence or Single & Single & Multiple Dorms Double Fence or Single & Single & Multiple Dorms May have Towers Manned 24 Hours Part-Time and/or Yes Yes Yes Yes Low Low to Low to Low to Low to

ADDC 3.	ONA CLASSIFICATION Data Sheet Identifying Data: Today's Date: 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 Last Name	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 4. Initial 22
5. Birthdate:	Diagnostic Worksheet: 6. 7. Sex: 1=Male Ethnic Status: 2=Female 29 30
8. Marital Status:	9. Probations Status: 32
10. Most Serious Offense:	33 34
11. Most Serious Detainer:	35 36
12. Weapon Used: 1-none, 2-firearm, 313. Total Felo	37 30
Convictions 39 40 41	
Arrests 43 44 45	
14. Prior Adult Prison Terms: 47 4	15. Prior Juvenile Commitments 49 50
16. Escape Record 51	17. Assaultive Record 52
18. Sex Offense Record 53	19. Highest Grade Attended 54 55
20. Employment Record 56	21. Income 57
22. Alcohol Use 58	23. Drug Type 59
ĪĪ	I. Time Computation Form:
24. Sentence Begins Date month 60 61	day year 62 63 64 65
25. Max. Exp. Date 66 67	68 69 70 71
26. Minimum Parole Eligibility 72 73	74 75 76 77
	IV. PSI Data:
27. Prior Parole Violations 78 79	28. Prior Jail Commitments 80 81
29. Most Serious Prior Offense	82 83
	30. Date: day year 30. B4 85 86 87 88 89

	Y. Institutional Factors:	
31.	. Initial Classification 90 32. Current Classification 91	
33.	. Current Location	
34.	. Has there been a disciplinary grade demotion? 94	
35.	. Total number of violation reports: 95 96	
36.	. Most serious violation	
37.	. Program Participation: 1=poor, 2=average, 3=good 99	
38.	. Mental Health: 1=any unfavorable reports, 2=no unfavorable reports 100	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
39.	. Family Ties/Community Ties: 1=minimal, 2=average/good 101	
	VI. Prior Institutionalization:	
40.	. List most recent escape or attempt:	
		02
	41. Date: month day year 103 104 105 106 107 108	_ 1
41.	List most recent instituional violence:	_]
		09
	Date: month day <u>year</u>	

110 111 112 113 114 115

ARIZONA CLASSIFICATION
CODEBOOK

Summary of coding rules:

- Always use pencil. You can correct your mistakes.
- Write legibly. Others will have to read your codesheets.
- Follow the directions in the codebook.
- Enter all dates in the form of: Month 01-12 where 01 is January and 12 is December,

 Day 01-31

 Year: last two digits of year
- If data item is not available, leave box(s) blank.
- If you have any questions, please call: Paul Litsky or James Austin (415) 956-5651

Ite	<u>m</u>	Description
I.	Identifying Data	All data available on inmate jacket.
1.	Last Name	Starting in left box, code inmate's last name
2.	First initial	Code inmate's first initial
3.	ADOC#	Code the Arizona Department of Corrections number
4.	Today's Date	Code the date the form was coded.
II.	Diagnostic Workshe	et All data in this section of the codesheet is easily accessible on the diagnostic worksheet, located near the bottom of "side 2". If the diagnostic worksheet is not present, much of the data can be taken from other pieces of information in the file (See for example the presentence investigation (PSI) report or court intake). Code each item as if it were located on the diagnostic worksheet.
5.	Birthdate	Enter month, day and year of birth
6.	Sex	Enter 1 for males and 2 for females
7.	Ethnic	Enter number 1-9 as on worksheet
8.	Marital Status	Enter number 1-6 as on worksheet
9.	Probation status	Enter number 0-5 as on worksheet
10.	Most serious () ** offense	Write out the most serious offense in the space provided. Find the offense on Appendix I, Severity of Offense Scale. Code the two digit number associated with the offense. NOTE: Code any "attempt" as if it were the real thing. If you cannot find the offense listed, or you have a question about how it should be coded, leave the two digit code blank.

11. Most serious
 detainer

This item is usually found on the summary admissions report. Also check the PSI. Code item the same as the most serious offense.

<u>Item</u>		Description
12.	Weapon used	Code l=none, 2=firearm, 3=knife, 4=other (i.e. fists, baseball bat, etc.). A description of the offense can be found on the Summary Admissions Report and also on the PSI. There should be enough description to provide you with the information for this item.
13.	Convictions/ arrests	These items are found in the lower right corner of the diagnostic worksheet. Enter the numbers as they appear for total convictions, felony convictions, total arrests, and felony arrests. If data is not present or diagnostic worksheet is absent, refer to the PSI.
14.	Prior adult prison terms	This information is located at the top of page two of the diagnostic worksheet. Sum both Arizona and other jurisdictions.
15.	Prior Juvenile commitments	This information is located at the bottom of the same page. Again enter the sum of Arizona and commitments in other states.
16.	Escape record	Enter number 0-8 as on worksheet.
17.	Assaultive record	Enter number 0-7 as on worksheet.
18.	Sex offense record	Enter number 0-4 as on worksheet.
19.	Highest grade	Enter number from top of page three of diagnostic worksheet. If inmate has achieved a high school diploma or GED, enter 12. For junior college degree enter 14. For college degree enter 16. For post graduate, enter 18.
20.	Employment record	Enter number 1-8 as on worksheet.
21.	Income '	Enter number 0-9 as on worksheet.
22.	Alchol use	Enter number 0-9 as on worksheet.
23.	Drug type	Enter number 0-9 as on worksheet. NOTE: A sample diagnostic worksheet is included as Appendix II.

Item

Description

III. Time Computation

Time computation can be gathered from the time computation form located in "side 3".

24. Sentence Begins date

Listed as "Sentence Begins" or "SBD/New working date".

25. Max. Exp. Date

Listed in box on left, this is the maximum expiration date.

26. Minimum Parole eligibility

Listed on right side of page.

NOTE: If a time computation form is missing, please note this on the codesheet. Code the sentence begins date as the earliest date of admission (use date of offense if nothing else is available). Maximum expiration date is the sentence (i.e. 7 years, add 7 years to the sentence begins date. This method does not account for good time acrued, so we need to know you used information other than the time computation form.

IV. PSI Data

Some of the prior record information we need is not located on the diagnostic worksheet. You must refer to the PSI (presentence investigation).

27. Prior Parole violations

Enter the total number of prior (not current commitment) parole violations.

28. Prior Jail commitments

Enter the total number of prior jail commitments. A jail commitment takes place when a person is sentenced, and that sentence includes a jail (not prison) term. This is different than a person being held in jail prior to trial.

29. Most serious prior offense

If no prior offenses, code 00. Use the severity of offense scale (Appendix I) to determine the offense with the highest severity. Be sure to write in the offense.

30. Most severe prior offense date

Enter the date of the most severe prior offense.

V. Institutional Factors

This section includes information about the current institutional behavior. Disreguard any information from previous incarcerations.

Item		Description
31.	Initial Classif- ication	This item is found on the supplemental admissions form. Code as follows: l=community custody
		2=minimum 3=medium
		4=maximum 5=segregation unit
32.	Current Cllassif- ication	Look through the file for the latest (closest to present) inmate status change or institution classification report.
		Using available information in the file, code the current inmate custody level using the same categories as in item 31.
33.	Current location	Write out the inmate's current location Codes will be developed.
	Has there been a disciplinary grade demotion?	Based on inmate classification reports and status change reviews, determine whether inmate's classification or grade has been demoted.
35.	Total number of violation reports	Count the number of violation reports that result in disciplinary hearings.
36.	Most serious violation	Write out the most serious violation. codes to be developed.
37.	Program partici- pation	Review the "resident monthly work/training/ education/treatment evaluation" reports. If most are circled 1 or 2 (unaccptable or poor) code 1=poor. If most are coded 2 (average) code 2=average. If most are coded 4 or 5 (good, excellent), code 3=good.
38.	Mental Health	Review the "counseling/psychological services" forms. Code l=any unfavorable reports 2=no unfavorable reports
39.	Family ties/ community ties	In reviewing the inmates current incarceration, determine whether inmate has l=minimal ties or 2=average, good ties.
40.	Prior institution escape or attempt	List the most recent escape attempt, its date and a brief description. Only if in a

previous incarceration.

List the most recent instance of institutional violence and a brief description and date.

only if in a previous incarceration.

Prior institution

violence

41.

AT ZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECT INS

INITIAL CLASSIFICATION

Name:	<u> </u>		ADOC #
(Last) AKA: NMNE	(First)	(MI)	Race: <u>M/A</u> Age: 32
Marital Status S/	NGJE No. Dep. OO	SS #	, — · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
New; Parole Viola	ELO COMMIMENT- cor, Mandatory, Discretiona Probation Revocation; Oth	ry, Work Furlough,	EINCATION (V- Temporary, Returnees; and/
Crime(s)	2 PRIERS	Sentence(s)	CC CS S.B.D.
	-RY Zun DEG- NIDIR C14	, .	<u></u>
. = '	No/NR C/L		183 ×
3)		3) 4)	
5)		5)	<u> </u>
6)		6)	
7)		7)	
PHX, 3/71 Poss HE Litz 1 Proly Vial PA	d: 6/67 CTA, 1-2 YES AS EROIN PHX 3YRS. BRCh, 7/7, XX 5-3 YES ASP. 5/76 BUR YES. 9,105-5 YES, ASP	1 POSS DANGEROUS	DRUGS PHX SYRS PROB SP. PIXX, 4/78 PETTY
	: 6/67 GTA 1-2 425. parelien 2	lis, 3/69 PETTO THEF	T2-3 NAS ASP-11/71 (1-2
Pach Viel 5-8 ya. ASP	5/76 BURILIRY 3-4 you, 115	P 4/78 PETRITHEFT	-who even 4 yes-4 Mos - Syr
Escapes: 1d66 Coun		70 (000/ JAI) 1/71 ((CUILTY TAIL 9/71 /000 DINK V-2
Detainer: Yes	G A 2	Claimed Educa	
Explanation:		— Culture Fair	
	: GENECALLY UNEMPLOYED		
THIE he has be		T Arith.	Sal No
Vocational Trade o	r School: //ONE		1/2
Religious Backgrou	nd/Interest: (4)	Recreational	Interest: Nothing
Medical Comments:	Full DuTy 6-24-	-31	(V-)
Prior Psychiatric	History: KONF	Psych	Referral <u>No</u>
			(Dace)

ALH-54

white/Central Office -- canary/Institutional File -- pink/Reception Center -- goldenrod/C. P. C

DIAGNOST	TIC INTAKE WORKSHEET	- 12-31
. b(•
Inmate #	Name	•
Committing Court MARICONA		For Keypunchers Only
City of Residence PM x , A ->		DCT 3 Type E
Birthdate OG 22 Age	sex M	F Court City
M M O D Y Y ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP	MARITAL STATUS	MILITARY STATUS
1 White \(\sime\) Native U.S.	1 Single	Never in Military
2 Black 2 Naturalized	2 Common-Law (Yr)	1 Honorable Discharge
Mex. Amer. 3 Resident Alien	3 Married	3 General Discharge
4 Indian 4 Foreign National	4 Separated	4 Undesirable Discharge
5 Oriental	5 Divorced	5 Bad Conduct Discharge
5 Mex-Nat.	6 Widowed	6 Dishonorable Discharge
9 Other		9 Currently in Military
DELLOSOUS DOSESSENCE Probletion Re	יו צייני	
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE Explication RC	OFFENSE (Start with Mos	t Severe)
1 Protestant Crime	Date of Offense	Date of Arrest Sentence
∑2 Catholic1	M M D D Y Y	M M D D Y Y·
3 Orthodox 1A11 Bury	12 22 80	/김 김길 왕이 _ to
4 LOS/Mormon		6879
_5 Jewish (PR)2 Volt	9 13 80	9 18 80 (c3)
6 Islam, Muslim		
7 Buddhist, Toaism, Etc. 3		to
8 Unitarian, Banai		
9 Other 4	- 	tt
Ø None		•
		
6		to
		/\
ss # S1210 UC \$121210	CRIMINAL HIST Total	Felonies Redución
SIO # (DPS) A Z D	Convictions 23	<u>(5 </u>
F.S.I. #	Arrests 40	015
PPOBATION STATUS Ø No Probation Record	AKA (Aliases)	
. I Prior (Terminated) Probation Term		AXA
Z Committed as Probation Revocation		No No
3 Committeed for New Offense While on Probation	**************************************	1 Yes
. Rec'd. Concurrent or Consecutive Prob. Term		
S Committed as Condition of Probation		Warrents
CO-DEFENDENTS	For Keypunchers O	Only
		0 NO / Marie
	Crime Partners	l Yes
Page	<u> </u>	Form #DOC/RPPSE A-37
Els		6-24-81

Inmate #	Name
PRIOR PRISON TERMS	TYPE OF LAST PELEAGE
In Arizona ASP-67-68,68-71,71-75,76-77, 77-86	For Keypunching Use 1 Released to Ariz.Ceca
Other Jurisdictions	OCT 5 E2 Paroled
blace	3 Mandacory Release
ESCAPE RECORD	4 Expiration of Sentenc
0 No record of escape attempt of flight	Prior Az 9 Escape
l Juvenile escape record	Prior Total Ø No Frior Term
2 Absconded from adult probation or parole	1.11/
Escape from minimum security Jail	$\left(\frac{44}{111}\right)$
4 Escape from minimum security institution	Monchs in Prison (Total Prior Served)
5 Escape from secure jail facility	ASSAULTIVE RECORD
6 Escape from medium security institution	∠X № No record of violence
7 Escape from maximum security institution	l Single incident of physical violence
8 Escape from prisonsecurity level unknown	2 Single incidentweapon involved
an agresses areas	3 Single incidentagainst criminal justice
SEX-OFFENSE RECORD	officer/employee
Records contain no reference to sex offenses	4 History of physical violence
l Unofficial reference made to sex offense	5 History of violenceincluding use of deadly
(in presentence report or diagnostic interview)	weapon
2 Arrested or charged in court with a sex offense	6 History of violenceattack against criminal
(but not convicted on that charge)	justice officer/employee
3 Convicted on one occasion of a sex offense	7 History of violenceincluding both deadly
4 Multiple convictions (distinct terms) for	weapon against officer (and attack against
sex offenses	criminal justice officer/employee
PRIOR PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT	JUVEHILE RECORD
Quentient counseling (only)	Compilements to the Colon
2 Short term (60 days or less) institutional treatment	Commitments in Az:
J One major institutional stay (over 60 days)	Commitments other assess.
— 4 Two or more major institutional stays	Commitments other states: $[O,C]$
NEXT OF KIN: Levera . ()	7. Total $[O(7)]$
Last Name Airst	10041
	Age at 1st Arrest
RELATIONSHIP	OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IN INSTITUTIONS
	Parent in Correctional Institution
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Sibling in Correctional Institution
	Offspring in Correctional Institution
	Offspring in other institution (residential Facility)
	Sibling in other institution
The second secon	Parentin other institution
	Spouse in institution
8 Unrelaced individual (friend)	
$lacksymbol{arPsi}$ lia af Chilaren $lacksymbol{arDelta}{arDelta}$	

• •	FAMILY AGEN JUPPORT	BEHEFIT ELIGIBILITY
O Hone		None
	y receiving ADC during incarceration1	G.I. BillNo benefits used
	e receiving services from D.E.S2	G.I. BillBenefits partially used
	y receiving service from Mental Health Division3	G.I. BillAll benefits used
	4	Social Security
langth of Oor	. in Az. at time of Offense Yrs 312 Mos. C 8 _ B	Unknown
Length of Kes	. III Az. at time of offense 173 (EMPLOYMENT RECORD
tidah Kasada de	For Keypunch Use	Full time stable (same employer for
High Wrade At	Lendeu 77 (A	last 2 years)
	necose 2	
	DEGREE 2	Full time year (same employer for last
Ø None		full year out of last 2}
	r Vocational Certificate (No High School Diploma)3	Full time, erractic; usually full time
	hool (4 Year Graduation)	employment, less than a yr. with one em:
7	hool GED4	Employment usually seasonal or intermit:
-	hool + Trade/Vocational Diploma5	Part time employment or odd jobs only
5 Junior	College (AA)6	Student
6 College	(BA, BS) × 7	Generally unemployed
7 Profess	ionalGraduate (LLB, MSH, CPA, MD, Etc.)	Retired or Disabled
8 Post-Gr	aduate-Academic (MA, MS, PhD)	
& Unknown		For Keypunch Use
	(1) and	
PRINCIPAL OCC	SUPATION: 1000	
INCOME (Last	year before arrest) ALCHOL USE	
	Assistance 0 No alcohol offense, not state	ed use of alcohol
02 5	- 2,999 1 No alcohol offense, stated s	light or occasional use of alconol
3 \$3,000	- 4,999 2 No alcohol offenses, stated	average of medium use of alcohol
4 \$5,000	- 6,499 3 Record of alcohol offense, s	
5 \$6,500	- 8,499 4 No alcohol offense, stated h	
6 \$3,500	- 9,999 5 Record of alcohol offense, a	
- 7 S10,000		
8 \$15,000		dmitted alcoholic (unreformed)
9 \$25,000		, claims to be reformed alconolic .
E Unknown		
E CHANGA		
Ø Hone (n	<u>OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL</u> not member of labor force)	Dalie TAGE
		use of illegal drugs :
2 Manager		
3 Clerica		gens/Ampnetamines/Barbiturates (pills)
	: Workers (excluding domestics) 3 1 + 2	and the same and the same and same and same same same same same same same same
		Cocaine (hard staff)
		Cocaine (hard stuff)
		
	led labor (including Farm Workers) 6 2 ± 4	
- Sales	7 1 + 2 + 4	
9 Nomesti	cs 9 Admics us	e of illegal drugstype not specified

WIAGhostic WorkSneet

it Inknown

MARCOTICS USE

لا مر	No known use				
\nearrow 1	Known use prior to commitment .				
2	Use known to continue in Department of Corrections facility				
3	No known use, but arrested on narcotic law violation				
4	First known use in Department of Corrections facility				
5	Prior useknown to continue after release				
6	First known use in Department of Corrections facilitycontinued after release				
7	First known use after initial release on this commitment				
	PHYSICAL PROBLEMS				
	No major physical problems				
· -	2 Sight problems (corrective glasses required)				
	3 Hearing disability				
-	4 Missing or defective limbs				
_	5 Weak or injured back				
	6 Respiratory difficulties (asthmas, hay fever, etc.)				
	7 Chronic condition requiring regular medication				
-	8 Chronic condition requiring close supervision by a physician				
	For Keypunch Use				
	REMEDIAL REQUIREMENTS				
	Ø None				
	1. Dental work required				
	;:2 Orthopedic problem				
	9 Other temporary medical problem				
	, y other temporary medical problem				
. [
	Keypunch DCT 6 E Beta IQ				
ـــا	the state of the s				

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

TIME COMPUTATION FORM - NEW CODE

KANE .		BY X W	1
SENTENCE	2 urs	SENT. BEGINS DATE	,
OFFENSE Str 1811	nn Dnd Min CP-		
Adjustment/New Y	orking Date NO/12	Class	t
//	Sentence Begins	. ON OF	TOTAL
(+)//	Escape Time/Loss of Screet Time Ecc.	1251 81 10,27	183 4,2,6
:: '	New Working Date	127184 412	4,84 2,27,0
12,22,80		124,84	
			-/ /
(+)// <i>_</i> _	Maximum Sentence .	///	_///
12122192	Flat Maximum Date	//	_//
(-) 6/	Deduct 6 mos. MR if appl.		
1.122192	Flat Max. Minus MR Time	· (
(a) 10 /10 /	Rel Cr Earned to Date	///	-/ //-
1 12 191	Tent. Rel. Date	///	_///_
(-) 5 124 184	Last Date on Class I	/ / = /	1 6,29,6
217817	Flut Time to Comp. Sent.	, _ , _ ,	,
· <u> </u>	• by 3 or ①		
8/12/91	Tent. Rel. Date	CRAND TOTAL	: \//
(1) 91/91 al	Rel Cr to be Exemed Tatal	Credits Hurned	
11.123,89	Final Proj. Ret. Date	12912 Time Spent	on Class I (Grand Total)
(-) <u>61 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _</u>	Add to superis us root	2 / 10 / 10	
4153140	Max. Fxp. Date	01 10 1 0 . by 2 or 6	<i>)</i>
PROOF (STANIAR	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	/ / Total Cred:	ts Harned
· 1/23/20	Final Proj. Max. Exp.		
(a) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \	_ Sent. Regins Dute	PAROLE ELICI	BILLIN
4-11-11-	_ Flat Time Served	12,22,80	Sentence Segins Date
(i) -121 10-1 -,-	_ Rel Cr Earned	(3)	Months to Serve
(·) <u>9</u> / <u>7</u> /_/_	_ Rel Cr to be Eurned		
23/30/10	Maximum Sentence/2-410	4122189	Minimum Parole Eligibility
PROOF (P.V	- · //		
/	Date Rel. on Par./or		Maximum Expiration
(-)//	- Prior to Escape _ Sont. Bogins Oute	12123127	Mindatory Release (If have served one (1) flat year)
	_ Flut Time Served Prior to Rel.	REASON FOR COMPU	TATION
	Max. Rel. Date	Initial	
(-) /	Onte Ret. (PV/Escapee)	Change in Senten	ee.
	_ Flat Time to Serve After Ret.		
	Flat Time Served Prior to Rel.	Change in fime C	21 5-21/11
	Flat Time Served After Ret.	Other <u> </u>	
(·)//	Total Flat Time	Date of Computation:	10 7-30-84
· (·)///	_ Rel Cr Carmed	OISTRIBUTION:	\mathcal{A}
(.)//	Rel Cr to be Served		
(.)///	Parole Time Not Taken	white, Master Record; Pink, fr	stitution file; Yellow, Inmate
//	Maximum Sentence		

Appendix V

Severity of Offense Scale

Greatest

- 01 Aircraft hijacking
- 02 Assault-serious injury, risk of death or disfigurement
- 03 Escape-closed institutions
- 04 Espionage
- 05 Explosives detonation-potential risk of injury
- 06 Homicide, willful
- 07 Kidnapping
- 08 Mann Act-force
- 09 Robbery-multiple, weapon used or threat
- 10 Sex Act rape
- 11 Attempted Murder
- 12 Murder-2nd degree

High

- 21 Arson
- 22 Drugs-over \$100,000--use DEA list if \$ value not in PSI
- 23 Explosives-possession, transportation
- 24 Extortion
- 25 Manslaughter
- 26 Robbery, other (i.e., demand note)
- 27 Mailing threatening communications

Moderate

- 40 Breaking & Entering-bank, post office, etc.
- 41 Bribe public official--offer/accept
- 42 Contempt of court
- 43 Counterfeiting-over \$20,000--manufacturing, passing, possessing
- 44 Drugs--between \$5,000 and \$100,000
- 45 Escape-open institution or program--includes bail jumping
- 46 Firearms Act violation-any
- 47 Mann Act-no force or Sex Molestation-no injury
- 48 Property Offense-includes burglary, embezzlement, forgery, fraud, interstate transportation, larcency, theft--over \$100,000
- 49 Smuggling Alien(s)
- 50 Theft Motor Vehicle
- 51 Perjury
- 52 Interfering with police officer
- 53 Family neglect
- 54 Burglary

Low Moderate

- 61 Alcohol Law violation
- 62 Assault, simple-no injury
- 63 Counterfeiting--\$1,000 to \$100,000
- 64 Drugs-under \$5,000
- 65 Parole violation, technical-with poor parole adjustment
- 66 Property offenses--\$1,000 to \$100,000
- 67 Soliciting for Sexual Activity

Lowest

- 80 Bankruptcy
- 81 Counterfeiting--under \$1,000
- 82 Drugs, own use
- 83 Immigration Act violation
- 84 Income Tax violation
- 85 Parole Violation, technical-with good parole adjustment
- 86 Property offenses--under \$1,000
- 87 Probation violation
- 88 Disorderly conduct
- 89 Trespassing
- 90 Hit and run
- 91 Contributing to delinquency of minor
- 92 Reckless driving
- 93 Resisting Arrest
- 94 Incorrigible

99 - Unknown charge

PRESENT INMATE STATUS

- 1. Arizona State Prison (ASP)
- 2. Arizona Correctional Training Center-Tucson (ACTC-T)
- 3. Arizona Correctional Training Center-Perryville (ACTC-P)
- 4. Arizona Center for Women (ACW)
- 5. Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center (ARTC)
- 6. Fort Grant Training Center (FGTC)
- Safford Conservation Center (SCC)
- 8. Cochise Correctional Training Center (CCTC)
- 9. Southern Arizona Correctional Release Center (SACRC)
- Tucson Adult Parole (TAP)
- 11. Community Corrections Center
- 20. Escape
- 21. Work Furlough

MOST SERIOUS VIOLATION

0.	None		5
1.	Disobey Order	[Moderate]	3
2.	Not Showing Up for Work	[Moderate]	3
3.	Stealing	[Moderate]	3
4.	Contraband	[Moderate]	3
5.	Weapon Possession	[Greatest]	1
6.	Lying	[Moderate]	3
7.	Threatening Behavior	[High]	2
8.	Not at Count	[Low]	4
9.	Miscellaneous Minor	[Low]	4
10.	Fighting	[High]	2
11.	Assault on C.O.	[Greatest]	1
12.	Sex Act	[Moderate]	3,
13.	Property Distruction	[High]	2
14.	Serious Assault	[Greatest]	1
15.	Riot	[Greatest]	1
20.	Escape	[Greatest]	1

Section 8 Page 1 5100.2 December 1, 1982

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Prison System

Security Designation

1 13/11			2. REGIONAL OFF	K I. (ODI:	3. SPO CODE	
VOZIH-DAV-VLAR				- 788 - 788 - 78		
SECTIONA	il Einer			APHIC DATA	S 2021	
LAST	FIRST		INITIAL		I-DAY-YEAR	<u> </u>
3 SEX M * MALE F * FUMALE	1. RACE W = WHITE B = BLACK	A = ASIAN 1 = INDIAN (AMER.I		THNIG H * HISPANIC TROUP O = NONHISPANIC	
" LEGAL RESIDENCE	СПУ			STATE	ZIP CC)DE
Registrical and	IONITORING ASSIGNMENT individuals or group or	Y = YES N = NO	SEPARATE			
SEPANATEE			SEPARATE			
SENTFACE LIMITATIONS	0 = NONE 1 = MISDEMEANOR	7 = JU' 3 = YC	VENILE	4 = STUDY 5 = SPLIT S	6 = NARA	
CONSIDERATIONS	0 = NONE 1 = MEDICAL 3 = PSYCHIATRIC	3 = AGGRESS	IVE SEXUAL BEH TO GOVT. OFFICE	AVIOR	6 = HIGH SEV. DRUG 7 = DEPORTABLE ALIEN 8 = RICO OR CCE	
Tudiciak Recommendation	Y = YES N = NOT APPLICABLE	NOITUTITEN		. PF	ROGRAM	
: . OFFENSE		·		12. SENTENCE LENGTH		
INVAF.				14 USM OFFIC	E	
SI CTION B			SECURITY	SCORING		
TYPE OF DETAINER	0 = NONE 1 = LOWEST:LOW MODE	RATE	3 = MODERA 5 = HIGH	TE	7 = GREATEST	
2 SEVERITY OF CURRENT OFFENSE	0 = LOWEST 1 = LOW MODERATE		3 = MODERA 5 = HIGH	TE	7 = GREATEST	1
L XPECTED LINGTH OF INCARLIBATION	0 = 0-12 MONTHS		3 = 60-83 MO 5 = 84 PLUS 1		MONTHS.	
TYPE OF PRIOR COMMITMENTS	0 * NONE 1 = MINOR		3 = SERIOUS			
	NON	= >15 YEA	RS 10-15 YEA			
OR ATTEMPTS	S MINOR 0 SERIOUS 0	4	. 5	. 2		
HISTORYOF	MINOR 0	>15 YEA	RS 10-15 YEA	RS 5-10 Y		
VIOLENCE 7 SUBTUTAL	SERIOUS 0 TOTAL OF ITEMS 1 THE	4 IOUGH 6	5	. 6	7	
PRECOMMITMENT	0 = NOT APPLICABLE					
STATUS SECURITY	3 - OWN RECOGNIZANO	E	6 × V	OLUNTARY SI	JRRENDER	-
ואומו	SUBTRACT ITEM B FROM IT					
IN SECURITY LEVEL	1 = 04 POINTS 2 = 7.4 POINTS	3 = 10-13 POINT	5	5 = 33-39 POIN 6 = 30-36 POIN	₹TS	
	I. IS THERE ANY MEDICAL RE	ASON THAT WOU	LD PRECLUDE DE	SIGNATING A (TAMP? Y = YES N = NO	
T COMMENTS						
				•	•	
SECTION C			REGIONAL O	FFICE ACTION		•
INTE	<u> </u>	1, RFG NO.			3. INMATE SEC. LEVEL	T
MO-DAYAR I L INSTITUTION DISHAMID	INSTITUTION	CODI:	LUEL		OR DESIGNATION OR DESIGNATION OF THE STATE O	
REASON	0 = NOT APPLICABLE 1 = JUDICIAL RECOM 2 = ACIE 3 = RELEASE RESIDENCE			9 = 12 10 = V	DD. CONSIDERATIONS AROLE HEARING DEUNTARY SURRENDER HIER INFO (DOCUMENT)	