

POLICE AND FIRE CONSOLIDATION:

WHAT IS CONCEPT VIABILITY IN URBAN CALIFORNIA BY 1999?

BY

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PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

What will be the future of police-fire consolidation in urban California by 1999?

PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A plan for California law enforcement, in general, and the City of Torrance, in particular.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Identification of a transition management structure to facilitate the consolidation of separate police and fire functions.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

Extent of police-fire consolidation. A review of literature reports on: the historical perspectives of police-fire consolidation; organizational designs; extent of consolidation in California; and other related literature findings.

Forecasting the future in urban areas by 1999: Through specific research methodology, trends and events that could influence the future of police-fire consolidation in California's urban areas over the next decade are identified. A Conventional Delphi Group of 18 professionals from varied backgrounds (law enforcement, fire service, city government, education, and the public) identified five most impacting trends and five most probable events. The identified trends include: (1) concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness; (2) public demands for service response and programs; (3) interest in "local control" and resistance to change; (4) managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency; and (5) specialization of public safety. The identified events include: (1) major local earthquake in urban area; (2) civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay; (3) prolonged major civil disorder; (4) major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government; and (5) major taxpayer revolt. Literature research and analysis of these trends and events result in the development of three possible future scenarios. One of these scenarios is selected for purposes of strategic planning which follows in Part Two.

PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Strategic plan development. The City of Torrance is identified as the sample urban populace for study, with strategic planning considerations focusing on the police and fire departments. Analysis of the environment within which the issue, the future of police and fire consolidation, may exist includes: (1) environmental threats/opportunities; (2) organizational strengths/weaknesses; (3) identification of individuals/groups of importance; and (4) plotting of individual/group assumptions. Mission statements are presented and five alternative strategies for consolidation are identified. Through the modified policy delphi process, the recommended strategic plan is presented and and implementation plan is discussed.

Implementation Plan. The implementation plan discussion includes: (1) administration and logistics of the plan; (2) type of planning system for consideration in implementation process; (3) suggestions for gaining necessary support to ensure change can be accomplished; and (4) identification of negotiable and non-negotiable issues regarding the plan. Those who are considered most important regarding the implementation process are: (1) police chief; (2) fire chief; (3) police officers' association; (4) firefighters' association; (5) city manager; and (6) the city council.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Establishment of a public safety consolidation plan.

Implementation of change requires commitment and planning during the transition period. Identification of the "critical mass", key individuals/groups whose active commitment is necessary to provide the energy for change to occur, results in a recommended management structure. Description and listing of technologies and methods to support the plan are followed by study conclusions and recommendations.

PREFACE

Why have some California municipalities elected to consolidate police and fire services, while the majority continued to provide these essential public safety services in the traditional way - separate police and fire departments? Answering this question will help us to better understand the past; however, it is the intent of this study to focus on the future.

Managing the future is essential if public managers are to respond effectively to the increasing complexities of urban living. Enormous social changes have occurred over the relatively recent past, and public safety leaders of today must be prepared to respond to the police and fire service demands of tomorrow.

With this in mind, the following question is asked: Will the concept of police and fire consolidation have a future in tomorrow's urban environment? In an effort to evaluate consolidation from a futures perspective, this study analyzes predictable trends, potential events, and other data viewed as relative to the consolidation issue and California's future. The study covers a future time period of ten years, 1989 to 1999. Certain assumptions are made regarding the data elements and a recommended plan of consolidation is developed.

The study is intended to generate discussion among law enforcement leaders regarding the issue.

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PART ONE -- A FUTURES STUDY

WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF POLICE-FIRE CONSOLIDATION
IN URBAN CALIFORNIA BY 1999?

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter reports on a review of literature concerning consolidation of police and fire services. The topics to be considered in this chapter are the historical perspectives of police-fire consolidation, organizational designs, extent of consolidation in California, and other related literature.

The section on historical perspectives outlines the growth of police and fire consolidation throughout the world. The section on organizational designs reviews the degrees to which public safety services are consolidated in the United States. Finally, the section on the extent of consolidation in California highlights the concept as it exists in California.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

By the 1960s, more than 73 cities--44 in the United States and some 29 in Canada--were operating under a police-fire consolidation system of one form or another. The largest city with a fully integrated police-fire system was Dearborn, Michigan, with a population of 112,007. One-half of all cities were under 14,332 in population. The average size was 24,168 in the United States and 18,100 in Canada. Thus, up to the late 1960s, consolidation was confined to small and medium-sized cities and communities.1

A study completed in the late 1960s sampled ten percent of the 3,613 police departments listed in a publication prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.² Every tenth police department received a questionnaire, and responses were received from 262 departments. Tabulations of the questionnaires resulted in the identification of 62 municipalities with some type of unified public safety service. The municipalities were then combined with others identified through a literature search, bringing the total number of consolidated departments in the United States to 129, as of the late 1960s.

According to More, 16 United States and Canadian cities had abandoned the consolidation concept by 1970.³ Table 1 lists these cities alphabetically.

TABLE 1

Cities Abandoning Police-Fire Consolidation as of 1970

MUNICIPALITIES	STATE OR PROVINCE
Buena Park	California
Chico	California
Fremont	California
Hawthorne	California
Hollywood	Florida
Lincoln	Nebraska
Melvindale	Michigan
Monterey Park	California
Oregon City	Oregon
St. Jerome	Quebec
Sanger	California
San Marino	California
Sherbrooke	Quebec
Taft	California
Waukegan	Illinois
West Miami	Florida

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS

The types of consolidation in the United States can be expressed in five distinct categories: "full consolidation"; "partial consolidation"; "selected area consolidation"; "functional consolidation"; and "nominal consolidation".

Full Consolidated Services. "Full consolidated services" describes a single, unified force in which the police and fire services have been combined into a Department of Public Safety. All officers perform both functions and have usually been identified as "Public Safety Officers". Full consolidated public safety services are coordinated by a single administrator. This individual is responsible for all police and fire functions and establishes policy and its implementation within an organization that includes a division between line and staff.

The organizational structure emphasizes a clearly defined chain-of-command in order to ensure a positive response to either police or fire incidents. It is essential that there be a concise designation of authority and responsibility.

The theory of full consolidation requires that the number of stand-by personnel at the fire stations be kept to a minimum and that additional manpower be placed on patrol. Not only do patrolling officers handle the regular patrol activities, but they also handle those duties involving fire prevention. Public safety officers, therefore, conduct fire inspections, enforce traffic and criminal laws, and respond to public calls for assistance.

All patrol vehicles carry firefighting equipment and are able to respond to fire emergencies. The patrol unit is, in many instances, the first unit on the scene of a fire situation since it is already in the field.

Partial Consolidation. "Partial Consolidation" defines departments in which the positive identity of the fire and police services are retained and a special patrol created to perform combined police-fire duties. Officers assigned to the special patrol unit are usually designated as "Public Safety Officers".

In contrast to the previously discussed aspects of full consolidated services, the partially consolidated services have retained separate staffs and separate police and fire departments to perform personnel, training, records, communications, budget, and fire inspection.

The division of police and fire organizational structures is maintained; however, public safety officers trained in both police and fire duties augment the patrol force and perform regular patrol duties. These same officers also respond to fire alarms and conduct fire inspections.

The supplemental force of public safety officers is assigned to intensify patrol activities. Again, public safety officers are able to respond quickly from the field to both police and fire emergencies. The units are equipped with essential firefighting gear.

Partial consolidation has been used by many communities as an intermediate step to a complete consolidation system. This is done primarily to lessen community and labor opposition. Under this system, current police and fire personnel continue to function in their respective job assignments and duties. As additional personnel are hired, they are assigned duties involving both police and fire functions.

Selected Area Consolidation. "Selected area consolidation" describes a circumstance in which the two services function separately except for the creation of specifically trained police-firefighters assigned to combined duties in a special geographical area.

There are not many known municipalities in the United States who fall under selected area consolidation. Two known cities are Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and Spartanburg, South Carolina. Each of these cities developed selected area consolidation programs after encountering the necessity of providing police and fire services to newly annexed areas.

Each city maintains a separate police and fire department with a chief administrator for each service. Both departments have their own staff and organizational structure, with the exception of fire-police patrols. Supervision of the special unit varies. In one instance, the fire-police squads are under the direct supervision

of the district's senior fire officer, whether the officers are on patrol or fighting fires. In the second example, the specially-trained officers are supervised by the police department when on patrol and by the fire department when engaged in fire-suppression activities.

Those officers assigned to patrol in specified areas respond to all fires, as well as enforce various laws. They are trained in both fire and police duties.

Functional Consolidation. "Functional consolidation" is a type of consolidation in which separate police and fire services are retained, but one or more duties normally performed by one department have been assigned to members of the other department. This category contains the largest number of communities that have any type of consolidated services.

Police and fire services organizational structures remain separate and traditional.

The theory of functional consolidation is that the number of stand-by personnel in the fire department should be kept to a minimum. Those fire personnel with the greatest amount of non-productive, or non-scheduled, time are assigned tasks normally performed by police personnel. Some of these tasks are fingerprinting prisoners and civilians, manning the complaint desk, dispatching police and fire units, filing and maintaining reports, bicycle licensing, and photographing prisoners.

The number of fire duties performed by police officers are not proportionate and include such functions as dispatching fire units, conducting residential and industrial fire inspections, and extinguishing small fires.

Nominal Consolidation. A term that describes a public safety department in which separate police and fire services have been placed under the direction of a safety director is "nominal consolidation". Each service reserves its individual identity, both operationally and administratively.

Under nominal consolidation, both police and fire services are unified into one agency, usually termed the "Department of Public Safety." One administrator, the "Director of Public Safety," has supervisory authority and responsibility over both service functions.

The purpose of having one chief administrator, rather than a police chief and a fire chief, seems to be for administrative expediency rather than an attempt to merge the two protective services.

CONSOLIDATION IN CALIFORNIA

Five California municipalities were known to be operating under some form of police-fire consolidation by the late 1960s. These five municipalities were Foster City, LaPalma, Salinas, Sunnyvale, and Upland. Several changes have occurred within the California public-safety environment since then.

Cities that have adopted or studied consolidation as of 1989.

A list of California cities believed to be operating under one of the types of consolidation was made available through the POST Library. Telephone contact was made with each police agency to determine its present consolidation status. As a result of this research process, additional agencies were identified and contacted. Table 2 indicates that, as of March, 1989, thirteen cities and one university have adopted consolidation in California.

TABLE 2

California Agencies with Some Type of Consolidation as of 1989

COMMUNITY	POPULATION	TYPE
Alhambra	73,000	Functional/Nominal Consolidation
Coronado	25,000	Functional Consolidation
Cal State University San Luis Obispo	---	Nominal Consolidation
Fairfield	70,000	Functional/Nominal Consolidation
Foster City	28,000	Functional Consolidation
Hermosa Beach	19,000	Nominal Consolidation
Lindsay	8,000	Nominal Consolidation
Marina	28,000	Full Consolidation
Milpitas	44,000	Nominal Consolidation
Pacifica	40,000	Functional/Nominal Consolidation
Rohnert Park	31,000	Full Consolidation
Ross	3,000	Nominal Consolidation
Sunnyvale	110,000	Full Consolidation
West Covina	93,000	Nominal Consolidation

Cities that have abandoned consolidation. Some California municipalities, which once functioned under a type of consolidation, abandoned it in favor of separate police and fire departments. The following cities were identified through the aforementioned telephone survey and available literature.

* Brisbane	* LaPalma	* San Marino
* Buena Park	* Manhattan Beach	* Sanger
* Chico	* Monterey Park	* Taft
* Fremont	* Pasadena	* Upland
* Hawthorne	* Salinas	* Visalia

Example of successful full consolidation in California.

Sunnyvale established a Department of Public Safety on June 6, 1950. At that time, Sunnyvale was a small community with a population of 9,290. It now has an estimated population of 110,000. The city is now described as a medium-sized urban/industrial center.⁴

Prior to June 6, 1950, the city was served by a volunteer fire department and a sixteen-man police department. Today, the total Department of Public Safety personnel numbers 207.

As the city grew, the need for a regularly constituted full-time fire service became evident. City administrators conducted an in-depth study of organizational structures relating to public-safety services. Two alternatives were considered:

1. Whether to create a separate fire department;
2. Whether to consolidate the police and fire functions and utilize one force to provide the community with a comprehensive approach to its safety requirements.

After studies were completed, the decision to establish a Department of Public Safety was made. This decision was based on the premise that a single department would avoid costly.

duplication of effort, would be more flexible administratively, and, in fact, would be more responsive to the community's safety needs and would achieve desired economics in manpower without experiencing a reduction in services.

Currently, the department is organizationally divided into three major divisions--patrol, fire, and support services. The Patrol Division is responsible for patrol, detectives, traffic, parking, and related functions. The Fire Division supervises all fire-fighting activities, fire prevention, fire training, and special-services activities. The Support Services Division is directed by the Assistant Chief and is responsible for the supervision of records, communications, personnel, training, and other related staff activities.

The basic principle of the public safety concept is that personnel are trained to provide both police and fire services. Sunnyvale has developed this principle through a system where all personnel, except for a few with highly specialized skills, are reassigned from police to fire duties, or vice versa, every one to three years. In addition to this assignment rotation, persons assigned to police patrol respond to fire emergencies when required. This allows the Public Safety Department to assign fewer personnel to the fire stations, while still permitting shift response and an adequate force at the scene of a fire emergency. Since statistics

show that only a small percentage of a firefighter's time is actually spent responding to emergencies, this staffing policy allows police patrol to supplement fire companies only when needed. Off-duty officers also respond to serious fire emergencies.

Since training is the key to the consolidation concept, intensive training is provided to all personnel in fire and police skills. Recruits (called Public Safety Officers in Training) must successfully complete both a police and fire academy before being appointed as sworn Public Safety Officers.

Since the cost of providing service is increasing each year, one of the chief advantages of the Sunnyvale Public Safety concept is that it allows a high level of service to be delivered at a relatively low cost. Personnel costs account for the largest portion of the public-safety expenditures (86% of the total costs for the 1984 - 1985 fiscal year), and the ability of Sunnyvale to provide services with fewer people illustrates cost savings.

A departmental study by Sunnyvale compared fire- and police-staffing levels for twelve nearby communities, broken down by total police personnel, total police-sworn personnel, total fire personnel, and total fire uniformed personnel. In order to establish comparable figures for Sunnyvale, support-services personnel were divided equally between police and fire activities. Sunnyvale showed an average of 40 percent

lower staffing per population than all the other cities. To show that lower staffing is possible while still maintaining a high level of service, 90 percent of all Sunnyvale police and fire emergencies are responded to within five minutes because of two identified factors--the flexibility of trained officers responding to both police and fire emergencies, and the modern communications and information network which aids in the efficient use of personnel resources.⁵

Example of attempted, but failed, full consolidation due to planning process. In November of 1978, a committee of ten city-staff members began a study in the City of Manhattan Beach, California. This committee was formed for the purpose of making a study and a report on the coordination of city resources for better utilization of the fire-prevention and suppression activities. It was to determine if workers in the city, other than firefighters, could be utilized on fire suppression activities, and whether such utilization could make possible a reduction in fire department personnel. In essence, was the integration of police and fire services feasible?

Committee members reviewed the operations of Sunnyvale's Department of Public Safety Service and studied literature on consolidation. The committee realized that the comparability of Manhattan Beach and any program that it borrowed from other cities must be measured in terms of population, type and size of geography, and composition of the city in terms of business, industry, residential, and financial sovereignty.⁶

Manhattan Beach is a small urban area city with a high density of residential structures and an estimated population of 36,000. The fiscal operations of the city have relied heavily on the property-tax base; however, with the passage of Proposition 13 (Property Tax Initiative), the city immediately experienced financial problems. Since public-safety personnel accounted for the largest part of the city's budget, (84% for the 1978 - 1979 fiscal budget), consolidation of these services received the attention. By consolidating the police and fire services, city administrators hoped to reduce the total number of safety personnel and experience a substantial cost reduction.⁶

As a result of the committee's study, the following recommendations were made:

1. That the police and fire services be merged into a Department of Public Safety.
2. That the merging of the two services be done over a ten-year period.
3. That there be one administrator responsible for both services, rather than an independent police chief and fire chief.
4. That the number of police-sworn personnel be increased.
5. That all new recruits be trained in both police and fire activities and be classified as public-safety officers.

6. That the number of fire personnel be decreased.
7. That a fire cadet program be developed. This program to be similar to police reserves, and volunteers to be trained in firefighting techniques.
8. That fire personnel be given ancillary work. Such duties could include bicycle licensing, handling the issuance of business and animal licensing, and repairing water and parking meters.
9. That a "Blue Ribbon" Citizens Committee be appointed to study ways of cutting costs in providing public-safety services.
10. That the consolidation process begin July 1, 1979.6

On July 1, 1979, the City Council approved the recommendation, and the consolidation of police and fire services into a Department of Public Safety was implemented. City officials projected savings of \$750,000 in the first five years of operation.

The recommended "Blue Ribbon" Citizens Committee spent several months studying the subject of police-fire consolidation with the ultimate goal of discovering more cost-effective methods of providing public safety in the City of Manhattan

Beach. Written information was received from various sources-- newspapers, professional publications, city administrators, and private corporations.

In order to better understand the functions of both departments, the Committee toured and inspected each facility. Each member of the Committee spent considerable time observing each department in a daily routine of riding on police, fire, and paramedic calls. Some of the Committee members observed the fire-training class in a fire situation at the training facility and during actual training in Manhattan Beach.

The Committee's primary directive was striving for cost-effectiveness. In striving for more cost-effective methods, the Committee did not lose sight of the fact that a particular level of service must be provided. Cost-effectiveness was not found to be purely a matter of "saving money". The objective was to obtain the full spectrum of services needed for public safety and security in the most efficient manner. With these objectives in mind, the Committee's conclusions reflect its judgement that the community would be better served by retaining a bifurcated system with modifications, rather than implementing drastic cost-saving measures.

Based upon these observations, the written communications received, and verbal testimony presented, the Committee arrived at the following conclusions:

1. Both police and fire departments need their own chiefs--not a Director of Public Safety.

2. Fire and police department consolidation will not work in Manhattan Beach under current constraints.
3. Ancillary duties of the fire department can be expanded, but only at the expense of current ancillary activities.
4. The unusually high rate of personnel turnover in both departments should be investigated.
5. Minimum acceptable staffing levels of both departments should be established by management.
6. Consolidation of services and facilities should be explored on a regional basis.
7. A type of volunteer program (paid call) should be studied to supplement the professional firefighters.⁶

The Committee presented its findings and recommendations to the Manhattan Beach City Council on January 2, 1989. As a result of this study, the concept of police and fire consolidation was immediately abandoned.

Of interest is the fact that the citizens of Manhattan Beach were not surveyed regarding their attitudes toward consolidation of these two services.

Example of full consolidation effort that was terminated through the political process. Incorporated on January 27, 1953, Buena Park, California had a population of approximately 9,000.

By 1960, the population increased to 62,000, and is now over 100,000. The city consists mainly of residential dwellings and light industrial areas.

At the time the city incorporated, it created a completely consolidated public-safety department with a complement of 20 officers assisted by a volunteer fire department that had been organized prior to the time of incorporation. All of the full-time personnel were identified as public-safety officers and were expected to carry out both police and fire duties.

In 1956, 16 of the 44 volunteer firefighters resigned en mass and charged the public-safety department with inefficiency. The volunteer firefighters initiated and circulated a petition to force the city council to place a measure on the ballot that would permit the local citizens to determine, by vote, whether or not they wished to retain consolidated public-safety services.

The volunteer firefighters were successful in their efforts. During the election, held November of 1956, the referendum to abolish the public-safety department was overwhelmingly approved by the electorate of the city.⁷

Conventional Bases of Resistance to Consolidation. Resistance to consolidation has come from several professional organizations, including the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), the

National Fire Protective Association (NFPA), and the American Insurance Association (AIA). Opposition has also come from firefighters and local fire unions and associations, police officers and police unions and associations, and the citizens who fear a reduction in services and safety.

More firefighters oppose consolidation than do police officers, primarily because consolidation affects the work schedule of firefighters more than police officers. The 24-hour work day for firefighters is usually abolished. Not surprisingly, cities which seek to merge police and firefighting services almost always confront intense union opposition.

Conventional arguments against integration include:

1. Public safety officers leave the city unprotected against crime while they are fighting fires.
2. Consolidation tends to break up the team concept of fire service operations.
3. In a well-run fire department, firefighters do not have non-productive time. When they are not fighting fires, they are engaged in other activities such as fire prevention and inspections, building inspections, care of apparatus and equipment, care of stations, training, and other efforts aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness.

4. Apparatus must always be ready and manned by a sufficient number of personnel for immediate and effective action. This cannot be achieved when firefighters are out performing police duties.
5. At the time of an alarm, public-safety officers may be far from the location of the fire. Delays in the arrival of manpower and equipment could result in serious damage and loss of life.
6. One person cannot perform two very distinct jobs. The duties and responsibilities of each service are highly specialized and diversified, requiring different types of individuals and different types of schooling and training.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has reported on the review of literature regarding the history and extent of police and fire consolidation efforts. While consolidation has not received wide-spread acceptance in California, 13 cities and one university have been identified as currently operating under a type of police-fire consolidation. Fifteen other California cities, which once operated under the consolidation concept, have since abandoned it.

The next chapter describes the manner in which futures data for the current study were gathered and analyzed in examining the issue of police-fire consolidation over the coming decade.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the futures research methodology used in the current study. Additionally, this chapter focuses on forecasting what the future might be like over the next decade relative to the issue of police and fire consolidation in urban California areas.

Forecasting involves the identification of those trends and events that could influence the future of a particular issue. In this instance, such forecasting is a prediction of what could happen to either influence or hinder the implementation of police-fire consolidation. In forecasting trends and events relative to the "consolidation" issue, the literature research process is insufficient.

FORECASTING RELATIVE TRENDS AND EVENTS

To identify trends and events for a futures analysis, professionals from law enforcement and fire service were brought together in a Nominal Group Technique Setting (NGT). The group consisted of eight individuals with diverse backgrounds and expertise in the two key public-safety professions (police and fire). After an instructional session regarding the issue of police-fire consolidation, the group members were asked to generate a list of trends and a list of events that had implications to the

consolidation issue. The resulting lists of trends (Appendix I) and events (Appendix II) were to be further analyzed, evaluated, and rated through the Modified Conventional Delphi Process.

REDUCTION TO KEY TRENDS AND EVENTS

The Conventional Delphi Process was selected to distill the trends and events down to a manageable number of five, to evaluate these trends and events individually and relative to each other, and to forecast probabilities and levels. It was selected over the NGT process because of the nature of the issue (police-fire consolidation) and a desire to obtain contributions from experts of varied backgrounds (law enforcement, fire service, city government, education, and the public). In addition, logistical concerns were minimized since this process is entirely done by mail and instrument.

There was also some concern on the writer's part that the issue of police-fire consolidation may be too controversial for a meaningful, yet controlled, discussion in a NGT setting, primarily because of scheduling and time constraints imposed regarding the NGT process.

Identification of individuals who would provide a wide range of experience, expertise, ideas, and opinions on the the issue resulted in selection of 18 individuals for the Modified Conventional Delphi Group.

- * Four urban California chiefs of police.
- * Four urban California fire chiefs.
- * Four urban homeowner association presidents.
- * Two urban California mayors.
- * A superintendent of an urban California school district.
- * A director of an urban California chamber of commerce.
- * Two independent insurance brokers.

Members of the Delphi group were mailed lists of the 21 relative trends and the 20 relative events. Using a rating scale of zero to ten, the members were asked to rate each trend and each event relative to its ability to influence or discourage acceptance of the police-fire consolidation concept by 1999. A rating of ten indicates a belief that the trend or event would have a substantial effect on the consolidation issue, while a zero would indicate a lack of importance.

A trend was defined as a continuing movement or occurrence. An event was defined as a one-time happening that, as yet, has not occurred. Trends and events can be classified into the following categories:

- | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| * social | * economical | * political |
| * technical | * environmental | |

After a second round, Delphi results were averaged. From this data, the highest average trends were identified. There

were five trends with an average of seven or higher. These were selected as the key trends for further analysis.

The data from the event rating process showed four events with an average rating of seven or higher. There were three with an average of six. Within this group, one was very near the seven range, at 6.8, while the next closest event was at 6.34. The four events within the seven or higher range and the event with an average of 6.8 were selected as key events for further analysis.

Key Trends. The five trends that seem of greatest significance for consolidation of police and fire services are:

1. Managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency.
2. Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness.
3. Public demands for service response and programs.
4. Specialization of public safety.
5. Interest in "local control" and resistance to change.

Key Events. The five events chosen as having greatest significance for the issue's future are:

1. Major local earthquake in urban area.
2. Civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay.

3. Major change in sales-tax allocation in favor of state government.
4. Major taxpayer revolt.
5. Prolonged major civil disorder.

EVALUATION OF TRENDS AND EVENTS

Evaluation of Trends. After this distillation process, the Delphi group evaluated the five trends and forecast their levels ten years in the future. Each was asked to forecast what the trend level was "five years ago," "will be" in ten years, and "should be" in ten years. The reference level was established as today, equaling 100. Results are summarized in Table 3.

The group members were directed to keep the issue of consolidation in mind in this forecast evaluation process. Regarding the terminology "will be," the group was instructed to equate "will be" with the idea that there will not be intervening events over the next ten years; therefore, they were asked to project what the trend level will be in ten years if it continues, as they now view it. Regarding "should be," members were instructed to project the trend level considering both positive and negative intervening events over the next ten years.

All returned data were collated and the median derived for each category, shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Median Results of Trend Analysis

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF TREND			
	WAS 5 YRS AGO	TODAY	WILL BE IN 10 YRS	SHOULD BE IN 10 YRS
1. Managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency	75	100	150	200
2. Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness	70	100	125	162
3. Public demands for service response and programs	90	100	150	150
4. Specialization of public safety	75	100	120	120
5. Interest in "local control" and resistance to change	98	100	105	100

The two trends with the highest projected "will be" levels, 150, are "managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency" and "public demands for service response and programs." Next, are "concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness," 125; "specialization of public safety," 120; "interest in 'local control' and resistance to change," 105. These "will be" levels refer to where the trend level is projected to be in ten years with no intervening events, of a positive or negative nature, acting upon the trend.

The results indicate that "managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency," 200, and "concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness," 162, should have the highest level of significance in ten years. In descending order, comes: "public demands for service response and programs," 150; "specialization of public safety," 120; and interest in 'local control' and resistance to change," 100. Again, "should be" refers to where the Delphi group felt the trend should be in ten years based on intervening factors, of a positive or negative nature, acting upon the trend.

Individual key trend forecasting results are shown on the following figures:




Figure 1: Trend of "Managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency"




Figure 2: Trend of "Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness"




Figure 3: Trend of "Public demands for service response and programs"




Figure 4: Trend of "Specialization of public safety"




Figure 5: Trend of "Interest in 'local control' and resistance to change"

Evaluation of Events. The Delphi group was asked to forecast event probabilities of occurrence using the following criteria:

1. The year that the probability of the event occurring first exceeds zero.
2. The probability of the event occurring by 1994 (five years from now).
3. The probability of the event occurring by 1999 (ten years from now).

The group was also asked to estimate the positive or negative impact of each event's occurrence by using a scale of minus ten to plus ten. A minus ten would be the most negative affect and a plus ten, the most positive. The following areas were estimated:

1. The positive or negative impact of the event on the issue.
2. The positive or negative impact of the event on law enforcement.
6. The positive or negative impact of the event on fire service.

Net-impact-column estimates require that each group member numerically estimate their perception regarding the impact of each event on the issue of consolidation and on each service, law enforcement and fire. This perception is the result of individual backgrounds and experience.

TABLE 4

Results of Event Analysis

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY			NET IMPACT ON ISSUE OF CONSOLID.	NET IMPACT ON LAW ENF PROFES.	NET IMPACT ON FIRE PROFES.
	YEAR PROB FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO	BY 1994	BY 1999			
Major local earthquake in urban area	1989	50%	80%	+8	+8	+10
Civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay	1991	20%	70%	+7	+2	+ 2
Major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government	1991	50%	50%	+5	+1	+ 1
Major taxpayer revolt	1992	27%	50%	+9	+3	+ 3
Prolonged major civil disorder	1993	10%	50%	+5	+5	+ 2

The results shown in Table 4 indicate that the Delphi group believes that all of the events have a probability of occurring by 1999. In fact, their projections allow for the occurrence of all events by 1993. By 1994, there is a 50% probability of a "major local earthquake in urban area" or a "major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government." The remaining events and their probability factors are: "major taxpayer revolt," 27%; "civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay," 20%; and "prolonged major civil disorder," 10%.

When projecting event probabilities to the year 1999, all of the events have a 50% or higher probability of occurring. Two events, "major local earthquake in urban area" and "civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay," have probabilities of 80% and 70%, respectively. The remaining three events, "major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government," "major taxpayer revolt," and "prolonged major civil disorder," have a projected occurrence probability of exactly 50%.

The following figures present the event analysis data for each key event:




Figure 6: Probabilities of "Major earthquake disaster in urban area"




Figure 7: Probabilities of "Civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay"

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


Figure 8: Probabilities of "Major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government"

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


Figure 9: Probabilities of "Major taxpayer revolt"

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


Figure 10: Probabilities of "Prolonged major civil disorder"

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

The Analysis Method. The Delphi group estimated what the change in probability would be for each key event relative to the occurrence of a particular event. In other words, if event one occurred, the probabilities of the occurrence of events two, three, four, and five may increase, may decrease, or may not change.

Likewise, the occurrence of each key event may increase, may decrease, or may have no effect upon the projected probability levels of the five key trends.

Whether an event is an "actor" event or a "reactor" event is also determined by this cross-impact analysis process. Actor events are determined by totaling the number of event and trend probability changes entered in each square (positive or negative impact) across each row of the matrix, Table 5. Reactor events are determined by adding the number of changes entered down each column. Actor events should be considered as targets for policy action, while reactor events are buffeted by the occurrence or non-occurrence of the actor events.

Events which were found to impact most on other events and trends were: "major taxpayer revolt" and "prolonged major civil disorder." The event found to react more than the other events was "civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay."

TABLE 5

Results of Cross-Impact Analysis

		EVENTS					TRENDS					ACTORS
		Major Local Earthquake in Urban Area	Civil Judgement in Excess of Local Government's Ability to Pay	Prolonged Major Civil Disorder	Major Change in Sales Tax Allocation in Favor of State Government	Major Taxpayer Revolt	CONCERN for Civil Disaster Planning & Emergency Preparedness	Public Demands for Service Response and Programs	Interest in "Local Control" and Resistance to Change	Managerial Concern for Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency	Specialization of Public Safety	
EVENTS		E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	T-1	T-2	T-3	T-4	T-5	
Major Local Earthquake Disaster	E-1	X	+18	+23			+100	+60		+30		5
Civil Judgement in Excess of Local Government's Ability to Pay	E-2		X			+10		- 5		+33		3
Prolonged Major Civil Disorder	E-3		+18	X		+10	+ 50	+50		+ 5	+22	6
Major Change in Sales Tax Allocation in Favor of State Government	E-4		+20		X	+17			+25	+25		4
Major Taxpayers Revolt	E-5		+15	+ 8	-5	X	- 10		+25	+28	- 5	7
	REACTORS		4	2	1	3	3	3	4	5	2	

Results of Cross-Impact Analysis. If a major earthquake occurs in an urban area, public safety services will be stretched beyond their limits. This will have far-reaching effects upon the government. Civil liability issues will materialize, focusing on the very real potential of the rendering of a civil judgement against the local agency that it is incapable of paying. With codified "Comprehensive Emergency Operating Plans," government response to the exacerbating public-service demands should be more controlled.

However, the probability of prolonged civil disaster is substantial, calling for the maximization of personnel resources. This will require effective and efficient use of people and equipment.

Fiscal bankruptcy brought on by the rendering of a civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay will increase the probability of a response from the taxpaying public. They will most likely seek legislative relief action to further limit local government's liability. Understanding the financial woes of the local government, public demands for service and programs will decrease only slightly. This will require increased effectiveness and efficiency to provide nearly the same level of service with a dramatic drop in financial resources.

The specific type of prolonged civil disorder will dictate what "special" public safety service efforts will need to be increased (or employed) in local government's effort to quell or neutralize it. An increased interest in civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness is expected, regardless of the nature or type of disaster. Public fear levels are expected to rise resulting in rather substantial increases in service level demands and programs. Public safety's response to these increased demands, along with their dynamic operational efforts to restore order, will increase the probability of a civil judgement being rendered

against the local government in excess of its ability to pay. This, in turn, could prompt a taxpayer movement for increased federal revenue support.

With the cost of government continuing to rise, coupled with a diminishing revenue base, a shift regarding the allocation of sales-tax revenues from local and county levels to the state level is seen as an attack on local control. The probability of a taxpayer revolt to re-establish local control and re-allocation of sales tax revenues to local governments jumps to the 67% level. Since such an event would dramatically lower local revenue resources, managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency will most likely increase since public service demands are not expected to decrease. With less revenue available, the potential of a civil judgement in excess of local government's ability to pay increases to the alarming probability of 90%.

A major taxpayer revolt to limit government's ability to increase the tax base is seen as a desire for increasing local control. Surprisingly, there is little effect on the probability of a change regarding sales-tax allocation. Efforts to limit governmental revenue resources, as was the case with Proposition 13 (Property Tax Initiative), is seen as increasing the probability of the occurrence of a civil judgment against a local government which is in excess of its ability to pay, up to 85%. With less financial resources

available, yet the same public demands for service and programs, managerial concerns for improved effectiveness and efficiency are expected to increase by 28%.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified key trends and key events through forecasting. These trends and events were analyzed relative to specific criteria and their inter-relationships were examined.

The future, relative to the issue of police and fire consolidation, was projected to the year 1999, using research methodologies.

The next chapter will build upon both the literature research and futures research by presenting three possible future scenarios.

CHAPTER III

FUTURES SCENARIOS

The three styles of scenario writings to be used in this study are:

- * Exploratory (most likely)
- * Normative (can be)
- * Hypothetical

The Exploratory Scenario supposes that there are no unforeseeable intervening events or policies that will change a future once it is on course. It is a "surprise-free" scenario.

The Normative Scenario describes how the future "can be" by establishment and implementation of policies that will impact on the future. The achievable future can be either "desired and attainable" or "feared, but possible."

The Hypothetical Scenario is one that is written in such a way that the scenario writer consciously produces an alternative path of development (or outcome) by manipulating elements of the data base, but does so in an impartial "what if" spirit.

The following scenarios ask three questions:

SCENARIO I -- What if nothing is done to change the course of the future?

SCENARIO II -- What can the future be if policies are introduced to influence it?

SCENARIO III -- What can the future be if alternative paths of development are introduced?

SCENARIO I

The year is 1999 and California is the most populated state in the nation. Immigrants from around the world continue to seek residency and settle in urban areas. Southern California has the largest concentrated number of Mexican, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Nationals outside of their native countries. The financial status of the state is sound. This is primarily the result of economic growth, since there has been a continued public outcry against tax increases over the past two decades. An attempt to legislate a change in local sales-tax revenue-allocation formulas, in 1994, only added fuel to a continuing taxpayer revolution.

Crime levels are at all-time highs throughout the nation. Californians living in urban areas continue to demand greater effectiveness and efficiency from their public-safety agencies. A new model of management, where concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency is paramount, became the rage among experts in the discipline just in time to prepare those entering today's management arena. This state of affairs, and the incredible technological advancements made in the past ten years, have caused serious strain in police organizations, while having little effect upon the fire-service organizations.

The special skills needed to effectively control increasingly sophisticated crime patterns make it difficult to find entry level police officers. While the education level of the recruitment pool has increased somewhat, the competition among public agencies and the private sector is at an all-time high.

Civil law suits against police officers have reached an uneasy level and are making recruitment of law enforcement applicants difficult. Urban governmental entities teeter-totter between financial solvency and bankruptcy on a seemingly daily basis, even though the state budget is strong. Many believe that, when the eight-plus earthquake occurs, local governments within the disaster area will find themselves unable to pay off any and all civil judgements.

Moreover, the cultural differences and influences associated with the tremendous growth of immigrants within California urban centers require specialized training of existing law enforcement officers, causing more and more of them to seek early retirement or a career change.

Presently, there is legislation pending in Sacramento mandating that local agencies unable to provide a minimum public safety service level contract with county government for law enforcement and fire services or find alternative methods, as for example, police and fire consolidation.

Politicians, government officials, and law enforcement leaders are asking themselves, "Why are we not prepared to deal with today's environment?"

SCENARIO II

The year is 1994, and immigrants from around the world continue to settle in the urban areas within California. These residents have brought with them the cultures and moral beliefs of their native countries. In most of these countries particularly the Asian and Central American nations, law enforcement is not highly regarded. This fear and mistrust of the California law enforcement community has had a tremendous negative impact upon law enforcement recruitment efforts, particularly within communities with growing resident and business owner populations of Mexican, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Nationals. Without ethnic representation among the law enforcement ranks, interpersonal relationships among these groups and law enforcement simply continues to grow more distant. This, in turn, has opened the way for the establishment and rooting of "ethnic-specific" organized crime groups. This crime element is very difficult to control since communication channels are almost non-existent for two reasons--mistrust of police and lack of cultural understanding by police officers. Inability to attract police candidates from these ethnic populations has only exacerbated interpersonal relations.

Add to this problem the fact that the general recruitment population of acceptable law enforcement candidates has been shrinking over the past decade, and it becomes apparent that something has to be done both to meet law enforcement personnel needs and attract candidates from these ethnic populations.

Financial limitations, beginning with Proposition 13 in 1978 through the use of the initiative process, did not go away as the 1990s materialized. There have been continued efforts by the electorate to limit government's ability to increase revenues through taxation, and limit government spending levels. While government has been limited regarding financial resources over this period, the private sector continues to flourish. Without a landmark court decision, or legislation, putting an end to the "public civil liability treasure chest," most local municipalities are simply not expected to be able to remain financially solvent through 1999.

The private sector continues to offer tremendous career choices to the young entry-level population. Throughout the State, law enforcement agencies are finding it difficult to compete with the private sector. Rather than viewing law enforcement as a challenging and desirable career, perceptions are:

1. That there is more money to be made in the private sector.

2. That law enforcement is a thankless job, due to the declining respect of authority within our society.
3. Being a police officer is the most dangerous job in California (and the nation).
4. Anyone can be a police officer, but "high tech" is the wave of the future and the place to be.

The cultural differences and influences associated with the tremendous growth of immigrants within California require specialized training for law enforcement officers. When POST mandates extensive training programs designed to sensitize police officers to these cultural and ethnic differences in 1995, many law enforcement officers are expected not to be able to cope with this mandate. It is anticipated that they will begin to seek early retirements or career changes. Efforts to fill vacancies will be complicated by the ever-increasing recruitment wars. With supply unable to keep up with demand, government entities have begun to "war" among themselves for that rare commodity--the law enforcement recruit. Those agencies able to pay the higher, attractive salaries and benefits are able to meet their minimum recruitment needs. Others have finally been forced to accept the fact that, if they are to continue providing adequate public safety at the local level, something

has to be done. Many municipalities have elected to consolidate various police and fire administrative functions.

Functional consolidation is becoming widely accepted in urban areas. Better coordination of police and fire operations has been realized. In addition, there is a sense among government officials and bureaucrats that improved organizational effectiveness and efficiency have resulted. Even though service costs have not significantly lowered, functional consolidation is seen as a step in the right direction considering the future ahead.

SCENARIO III

The early 1990s were years of much concern for government entities. All levels of government were experiencing budget cutbacks due to legislative controls limiting resources and placing restrictions on spending levels. Faced with serious financial problems, government officials became serious in their continuing effort to improve government's ability to provide police and fire services more effectively and efficiently. Many local cities, especially those in the metropolitan environment began to be concerned about their continued ability to provide services at all. They began to fear losing local control to county government, which would be very difficult to accept. Being strained on the one hand by serious financial limitations and, on the other, by increasing public demands for service

response and programs, these municipalities began to actually study and consider the concept of police and fire consolidation.

In late 1991, the League of California Cities unsuccessfully attempted to stop legislation aimed at giving the state a larger share of sales tax revenues. Passage of this legislation began to suffocate local governments. This generated a taxpayer revolution that was to be felt throughout the rest of the decade. By 1992, the sales tax legislation had been recinded and local sales tax revenues returned to the prior allocation formula. Throughout the decade, taxpayer revolts, through the initiative process, were common. Most of these successful efforts placed additional limitations on all levels of government. Public managers became concerned and sought programs that would improve government effectiveness and efficiency.

By 1993, municipalities were beginning to consolidate police-fire services. Labor union resistance was strong; however, the financial picture was gloomy enough to overcome this opposition. Most municipalities, turning to the consolidation concept, were located in metropolitan areas. With violent crime and drug abuse at epidemic levels, these entities saw the additional benefit of putting more police officers on patrol through consolidation.

In 1990, there had been a move nationally to de-criminalize ddrug use. Arguments for such a move seemed to be winning until

the summer of 1994. Urban rioting, primarily fostered by street gangs financed by drug money, left no urban community untouched. Cities who had consolidated public-safety services quickly realized the benefits of having both police and fire personnel trained and certified as police officers. Those that had not yet consolidated moved to implement the concept.

As 1995 began, social unrest lingered, continuing to strain municipal budget reserves. Civil litigation, which had been gradually increasing over the past 15 years, began to skyrocket as a result of public safety enforcement action during these tumultuous times. While judgement awards seemed to be progressively increasing, it was the frequency and number of awards that brought passage of the Civil Reform Act of 1996. Had this legislation not been implemented, it was believed that most urban governments would have become insolvent. This legislation increased the difficulty of bringing a lawsuit against government and greatly restricted judgement awards.

Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness continued to grow through the 1980s and 1990s. When a major portion of the Long Beach-South Bay Area was hit with a 7.4 earthquake on September 18, 1997, all the planning possible would not have been sufficient. However, response efforts were rated as very good regarding police and fire services. The fact that the affected municipalities

had consolidated police and fire services is listed as the primary reason for the coordinated and effective response.

As the twenty-first century approaches, California's experience over the past ten years is seen as a bellwether to the rest of the nation. While a majority of states are not concerned about an earthquake disaster, each one does have disaster concerns unique to itself. Many municipalities are asking the question, "Can consolidation of police and fire services make a difference?"

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter III has presented three futures scenarios based on trends and events while considering the study issue. In addition, other artificial factors which, when projected into the future, may or may not have an impact upon police-fire consolidation were also considered. In anticipating the future, it seems important for public safety managers to consider trends and events that could impact upon a particular issue of concern.

Scenario II was selected for purposes of strategic planning, which will follow in Part Two. Strategic planning will build upon the futures research in Part One.

PART TWO -- STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT, IN GENERAL
AND THE CITY OF TORRANCE, IN PARTICULAR

CHAPTER IV

SITUATION AUDIT

Police-fire consolidation has not found wide acceptance among California urban municipalities, as we look back in history. While it is impossible to predict with certainty what the future will be, projections are valuable and can be developed through the employment of specific futures methodologies.

Part Two of this study will use specific methodologies in the development of a strategic plan relative to the issue of police-fire consolidation in California urban areas. During this development phase, the information, data, and insights of Part One (A Futures Study) will provide a view of the future environment within which the issue, consolidation of police and fire services, may exist.

As with any study of this kind, the need to identify a sample population for analysis and employment of methodological processes is necessary. The City of Torrance Police and Fire Departments will be the focus sample population throughout the remainder of this study.

Employment of the WOTS UP (Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, and Strengths) analysis process will allow for the assessment of the environment as well as the internal capabilities of the focus population.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT - WOTS UP

Today, as ever, California urban areas face a future in which their destinies are not fully subject to their own control. Changes in the environment (social, technological, economical, environmental, and political) in which they operate will continue to have profound effects upon the quality and types of police and fire services they are able to provide their respective communities in the future. Although predicting the consequences of these environmental trends and events with certainty is impossible, exposing the nature and potential consequences (in terms of threats and opportunities) of them seems vital if any attempt to keep the future in focus is to be made.

Opportunities. Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness is a trend that has focused primarily on the potential of an earthquake disaster in most California urban areas. However, other disaster possibilities are gaining interest. These are landslides, droughts, commercial aircraft accidents, windstorms, floods, and hazardous material spills. In general terms, effective disaster response requires sufficient allocation of resources and funds and the establishment of priorities for their use. This, in turn, may require governmental officials, particularly at the local level, to exercise unusual control over police and fire services.

The key to police and fire organizational effectiveness and disaster response, or any other emergency, is simply to accelerate and reinforce existing practiced governmental plans, operations, and functions. Therefore, an emergency is not the time to introduce a new or unfamiliar apparatus, or concept, for coordination and control. The public looks to established political authorities to act quickly and effectively in an emergency. Consolidation of police and fire services could establish the desired and necessary coordinated effort of these public services, thereby maximizing emergency response and effectiveness.

Public demands for service response and programs have been rather static over the past five years. Over the next ten years, projections indicate that this trend will increase by one-half. Increasing fear of violent crime among urban dwellers, changing demographic make-up of urban populations, traffic congestion and related incidents, and increasing drug-related crime are some catalytic agents.

Meeting these demands in an urban society will require managerial awareness and concern for improving operational effectiveness and efficiency of police and fire services. With financial resources shrinking due to legislative controls (Jarvis and Gann Initiatives) and law enforcement recruitment becoming more and more problematic, meeting these public demands with available resources may be difficult for urban areas.

Consolidation could be seen as an opportunity to increase police patrol operations without substantially increasing personnel costs, thereby responding to these increasing public response demands and programs within available financial resources.

Interest in "local control" could work for consolidation. Most California local governments have been dogmatic in their approach to the "local control" doctrine. There is a clearer sense of community needs at this level of government. People seem to want a say in how they are governed and what services they are provided, especially when it comes to public safety. This public desire is not expected to lessen over the next ten years. With no change expected and considering such a strong position presently, the "local control" aspect is seen as an opportunity. Urban areas can be expected to hold onto control of police and fire services, even in the face of adversity and difficult times.

Managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency is not a new trend. Slow in development, the trend level is expected to greatly increase in future years. In fact, the projection is that it will double by 1999.

Most institutions--whether public or private, profit making or non-profit making--have been around for quite a while. This is true of many California urban areas.

They have traditions and inbred ways of doing things. The bureaucrats who have grown up in them find it hard to change and break old habit patterns.

While change may be slow to come, the important thing is that it appears that it is coming. This trend is seen as an opportunity regarding the study issue. Most consolidations are inspired by the fact that, except in the few largest cities, firefighters spend less than five percent of their time fighting fires. Consolidation is seen as a way of more efficiently assigning firefighters during the other 95% of their on-duty time.

Threats. Without the materialization of very difficult and adverse times, local government's level of resistance to change is not expected to decrease over the next ten years. Most California urban areas are caught up in, and comfortable with, the tradition of separate police and fire departments. Tradition, and resistance to changing it, is seen as a threat to consolidation.

Job specialization within police and fire organizations continues to occur. Technological advancements over the past decade have tremendously influenced and improved police and fire operational effectiveness and efficiency, crime scene investigation, crime analysis, tactical operations, records management, telecommunications, fire warning systems,

and fire control equipment. While technological advancements have improved both police and fire community service response, technology has also increased specialization. This trend may move at an accelerated rate in the future of law enforcement with profound effects. For example, "Genetic Fingerprinting" (DNA marking) is expected to revolutionize forensic investigation. Other examples are laser illumination that can detect microscopic particles in fibers or lift otherwise invisible fingerprints; automated fingerprint identification that can search thousands of files and find a match within minutes; more sophisticated listening and tracking devices that can expand the range and quality of surveillance; artificial intelligence systems that can trace links among the organized crime labyrinth, and high-tech "less lethal weapons" that can give police an option below the use of deadly force.¹⁴ In addition, increasing legal mandates (i.e., hazardous spill response) join with technological factors to increase the complexities of both disciplines. Specialization, as a trend, is seen as a threat to the consolidation issue.

INTERNAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT - WOTS UP

Two rating forms were used to obtain data for analysis regarding the resource capabilities and change adaptability of the Torrance Police and Fire Departments. These forms

were distributed to ten members of each department for completion. Every effort was made to randomly select surveyees from all ranks within each organization.

Tables 6 and 7 reflect the percentage breakdown of responses from police and fire personnel by category regarding combined departmental resource capabilities and adaptability to change.

TABLE 6

Averaged Responses from Police and Fire Surveys

Capability Analysis - Resources

INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluate each item as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than average. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good. Not bad.
- IV Problem here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action.

CATEGORY	I	II	III	IV	V
MANPOWER		73%	22%	5%	
TECHNOLOGY		70%	25%	5%	
EQUIPMENT		80%	15%	5%	
FACILITY	28%	32%	30%	10%	
MONEY		58%	37%	5%	
CALLS FOR SERVICE		20%	75%	5%	
SUPPLIES		51%	44%	5%	
MANAGEMENT SKILLS	10%	56%	29%	5%	
POLICE OFFICER SKILLS		100%			
SUPERVISORY SKILLS	5%	32%	51%	12%	
TRAINING	12%	58%	20%	10%	
ATTITUDES		54%	36%	10%	
IMAGE		20%	80%		

TABLE 6 (Continued)

CATEGORY	I	II	III	IV	V
COUNCIL SUPPORT	5%	42%	35%	18%	
CITY MANAGER SUPPORT		5%	70%	25%	
SPECIALITIES		45%	50%	5%	
MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY	5%	25%	50%	20%	
SWORN/NON-SWORN RATIO		27%	51%	22%	
PAY SCALE		50%	35%	15%	
BENEFITS	10%	50%	40%		
TURNOVER	15%	32%	48%		5%
COMMUNITY SUPPORT	12%	70%	18%		
COMPLAINTS RECEIVED	10%	45%	40%	5%	
ENFORCEMENT INDEX		43%	57%		
TRAFFIC INDEX		28%	72%		
SICK LEAVE RATES		15%	65%	20%	
MORALE		55%	32%	13%	

TABLE 7

Averaged Responses from Police and Fire Surveys

Capability Analysis - Acceptability to Change

INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluate each item as to what type of activity it encourages:

I	Custodial	-	Rejects Change
II	Production	-	Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	-	Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	-	Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	-	Seeks Novel Change

CATEGORY	I	II	III	IV	V
<u>TOP MANAGERS</u>					
MENTALITY - PERSONALITY	10%	48%	22%	20%	
SKILLS - TALENTS		44%	19%	37%	
KNOWLEDGE - EDUCATION		22%	37%	27%	14%
<u>ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE</u>					
CULTURE - NORMS	7%	51%	37%	5%	
REWARDS - INCENTIVES	7%	32%	32%	14%	15%
POWER STRUCTURE	27%	44%	14%	15%	
<u>ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETENCE</u>					
STRUCTURE	12%	49%	17%	17%	5%
RESOURCES	5%	17%	50%	28%	
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT		34%	16%	34%	16%
LINE PERSONNEL	5%	26%	44%	15%	10%

Strengths. While extensive management experience exists within both safety departments, formal education is more prevalent in the police department among management and administrative staffs. Both departments continue to find strong support from the community, as well as from elected officials and city administrators. Torrance is recognized as a quality city with highly skilled and motivated police and fire personnel. Today, these factors all work against incorporation of the study issue (consolidation).

Both departments have "average" to "above average" resource factors, as indicated in Table 6. Both departments operate in accordance with the latest technological and managerial standards. Both have state-of-the-art communication systems and presently operate and maintain separate dispatching centers. Efforts are underway to obtain additional frequency spectra which, if successful, will result in the purchase of new radio communication equipment, thereby upgrading the entire city's communication system. The police department has had a computerized Records Management System (RMS) since 1982 and added a Computer Assisted Dispatch System (CAD) in 1985. To date, fire department computerization has been restricted to a small number of personal computers which recently became operational. Regarding both departments, efforts are presently underway to hire an independent consultant to conduct a comprehensive study of police and fire computerized information needs for the next ten years. It is anticipated

that this study will result in the development, purchase, and implementation of a comprehensive and integrated public safety computer system.

Improved computer and communication systems are expected to have tremendous potential effects upon public safety operations in Torrance. Both efforts will most likely improve the effectiveness and efficiency of each department. Incorporation of consolidation during this time of technological change may be considered an opportunity which comes but once in a municipality's lifetime.

Weaknesses. The police facility is only seven years old and was built with the department's need projected to the year 2000. The fire administration facility is 34 years old and discussions regarding studying the feasibility of a new fire administration facility have recently begun. The police facility is not large enough to accommodate fire administration, and adjacent land to bring the two operations physically together is not available. This is not seen as beneficial to the issue under study.

Change and innovation occur slowly in the current environment, as indicated in Table 7. It appears that a climate of relative comfort has been established within the public safety environment, lessening entrepreneurship and risk taking. Forecast planning (i.e., five-year goal, ten-year goal) is not often pursued. Any plan to consider the

issue of consolidation would possibly be met with disinterest. This is seen as a threat to the concept of police and fire consolidation.

RELATIVE STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION

Individuals and/or groups that can have an impact upon the issue, or are affected by it, are considered stakeholders. A stakeholder that may have an unexpected impact on the issue is referred to as a "snaildarter". Using the brainstorming technique, an NGT group, consisting of eight police and fire professionals, generated a list (Appendix III) of stakeholders relative to the study issue.

KEY STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS

After further discussion, the NGT group distilled the relative stakeholder list to those that, in their opinion, are the most important. Among this list, they identified the snaildarter. The key stakeholders are:

1. chief of police
2. fire chief
3. homeowner associations
4. public employee associations
5. California taxpayers
6. insurance companies
(SNAILDARTER)
7. safety employees
8. elected public officials
9. city administrators
10. city residents

The NGT group was asked to develop key stakeholder assumptions regarding the issue of police and fire consolidation. These assumptions could be either of a positive or negative nature.

Key Stakeholder Assumptions. The chief of police can be expected to respond according to the type or extent of consolidation under consideration. If consolidation is seen as a threat to authority or a loss of control, the chief can be expected to resist. Additional civil liability, as the result of consolidation, will also bring resistance. Support can be expected if consolidation results in improved law enforcement effectiveness and efficiency while maintaining maximum traditional organization design.

The fire chief is most likely going to view any type of consolidation as a threat to his position, authority, and department. Most consolidation efforts will be viewed as taking from the fire organization in favor of law enforcement.

It is assumed that homeowner associations will resist consolidation if they perceive a lessening of either police or fire response, or increased costs. They will be more supportive of a design that would result in increased services.

Public employee associations include all designated and certified municipal employee groups. Police and fire associations are expected to resist consolidation efforts

seeing it as a threat to their political power bases. They will also be concerned about which association gains and which loses membership as a result of consolidation. Both will view cross-training as inconsistent with providing the very best, in terms of police and fire services. Police will be concerned about officer safety issues and fire about the break-up of the "team concept" to fire fighting.

Other municipal employee groups can be expected to support police and fire personnel. These groups will also be concerned with the establishment of a "super" public safety association, which will over-shadow them even more so, in negotiation efforts.

California taxpayers who are primarily concerned with tax issues may see consolidation as a threat to tradition (separate police and fire departments). It is assumed that, even though their particular communities are not looking at consolidation, they will see it as a potential tax liability that may spread throughout California.

Insurance companies' response to consolidation is uncertain. If they see it as increasing their profits, they are likely to support it; however, if they perceive the outcome to be detrimental to their reputation, they could come out against it. If they project increased fire rates and municipal liabilities and make that known to the public, they could threaten acceptance of consolidation.

Safety employees are seen as being emotionally reactive and less perceptive of the consolidation concept. It is assumed that this group will view consolidation as a threat to:

- * professional identity
- * the quality of career environment
- * career advancement
- * individual safety
- * benefits (change to eight-hour work day for firefighters)

Elected public officials, it is assumed, will react to both public response and to the influence of special interest groups. While they will support consolidation if they are convinced that it will improve public safety effectiveness, efficiency, and response levels, they will probably resist if other less controversial options are available. It is assumed they will be influenced by any cost-cutting benefits of consolidation.

The state fire marshal's office will be concerned that consolidation will lessen the quality and quantity of fire training in favor of law enforcement. It is also assumed that this governing body will see consolidation as a threat, seeing an increased need for state involvement in fire prevention and inspectional processes at the local level.

City administrators will be protective of their individual departments. It is assumed that they will resist any consolidation effort that would involve them

or would strengthen police and/or fire department efforts relative to the budget process. These other departments usually feel the pinch upon their budgets more so than either police or fire organizations.

The city manager may view consolidation as a threat to meet-and-confer processes. Too much ~~power~~ to any one employee association will not be desirable to city governmental operations.

City residents make up the totality of individuals living within the municipality and, as such, have much influence. The tradition of separate police and fire departments is desired when quality of service is good. It can be assumed that consolidation, even with increased effectiveness and efficiency, will find heavy resistance if it means changing tradition. Residents will be concerned with a lessening of police and fire quality and response, even if it results in more police patrol units.

STRATEGIC ASSUMPTION SURFACING TECHNIQUE

In an effort to plot and better understand each stakeholder relative to the issue of consolidation, the NGT group used the Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (S.A.S.T.). The degree of importance of each stakeholder was plotted, Table 8, as was their degree of certainty

regarding the assumptions made. Table 8 gives a picture of just how much attention and effort should be directed toward a particular stakeholder.

TABLE 8

S.A.S.T. Placement of Stakeholders

	MOST CERTAIN		Employee Associations *
			* Safety Employees
		Fire Chief *	
		* *	
LEAST IMPORTANT	*	Police Chief	MOST IMPORTANT
	State Fire Marshal	* City Administrators	
		Homeowner Associations *	
		* City Residents	
*	California Taxpayers		*
* Insurance Companies (Snaildarter)	LEAST CERTAIN		Elected Public Officials

Focusing on those stakeholders who are evaluated as being "most important" and whose assumptions are "most certain" is a key element in strategic policy definition and transition planning. More attention should be given to employee associations, safety employees, chief of police, fire chief, and city administrators. It is important to note that the assumptions and S.A.S.T. placement of the

stakeholders are in themselves without certainty. Therefore, it is essential that even the stakeholders with "less certainty," but perceived as "important," also be points of focus. These include homeowner associations, city residents, and elected public officials.

SUMMARY

Chapter IV has presented an analysis of the environment situation (WOTS UP); assessed organization capabilities and resources; and identified and mapped (S.A.S.T.) stakeholders according to assumptions and importance.

In the next chapter, two mission statements will be developed--the first mission at the "macro" level and the second at the "micro" level.

CHAPTER V

MISSION

Defining an organization's purpose, and establishing standards for evaluating its progress, is the intent of mission statement development.

This chapter will present mission statements at two levels, "macro" and "micro." The "macro" statement is intended to define the basic mission of the organization, while the "micro" statement should express the organization's mission in relation to the study issue of police and fire consolidation.

Since the study issue is not law enforcement specific, two "macro" statements are presented - one regarding the police organization and another regarding the fire organization. The "micro" mission statement is presented relative to the consolidation issue.

MACRO MISSION STATEMENTS

Police Organization Mission. The mission of the police organization is to enforce the penal provisions of the city charter, city ordinances, and state and federal laws for the purpose of protecting persons and property and the preservation of peace within the community.

The objectives of the police organization are:

- * to field an adequate number of patrol units to effectively respond to and control any probable

policing situation, while insuring the safety of the public and the officers involved.

- * to maintain consistent and vigilant police visibility.
- * to investigate known crime incidents so as to identify, apprehend, and gain convictions of criminal offenders.

Fire Organization Mission. The mission of the fire organization is the protection of life and property from fires, explosions, hazardous conditions, and natural disasters occurring within the community.

The objectives of the fire organization are:

- * to train a ready force of firefighters, sufficiently equipped to immediately respond to emergency needs.
- * to ensure maximum levels of protection from fires, hazardous conditions, and their effects upon citizens' person and property.
- * to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute arsonists.
- * to provide temporary emergency paramedical care for life threatening or traumatic injuries.
- * to respond and handle hazardous chemical spills and concerns within the community.

MICRO MISSION STATEMENT

The "micro" mission is:

- * to answer the public safety service needs of the community.
- * to promote a positive business climate by maximizing the probability of deterring or apprehending criminals.
- * to provide the citizens with fast, courteous, and professional public safety services.
- * to create a climate for positive community relation programs.
- * to constantly review public safety operations to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and coordination in the most cost-effective manner.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Defining the organization's mission, as it exists relative to the study issue, allows for a clearer understanding of purpose and provides standards for evaluating the organization's progress.

Chapter VI analyzes alternative strategies, recommends a plan of action, identifies the support needed, and determines the most appropriate planning system vis-a-vis the consolidation issue.

CHAPTER VI

EXECUTION

This chapter will identify alternative strategies to carry the City of Torrance into the future relative to the issue of police-fire consolidation. Alternative strategy analysis will result in the recommendation of a strategic plan and implementation plan.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT

Each member of the NGT group was asked to develop a strategic plan specific to the study issue, the City of Torrance, and the future. From this Modified Policy Delphi process, five consolidation strategies were developed.

Strategy One. Establish a Public Safety Department (patrol division, fire division, staff services division) through establishment of a public safety officer classification (cross-trained in police and fire disciplines). Public safety officers assigned to fire duties work 24-hour shifts, while public safety officers assigned to police and support work eight hour shifts. Periodic rotation of public safety officers through fire and police discipline is mandatory.

Strategy Two. Combine police and fire functions under the leadership of a Director of Public Safety (creation of

three functional divisions: police operations, fire operations, and administrative services). Police and fire disciplines remain separate.

Strategy Three. Integration of police, fire and civil disaster preparedness through establishment of a Public Safety Information System (computerized records systems, radio communications, and administrative support).

Strategy Four. Establish a Community and Prevention Services Division (develop and administer fire and crime prevention/education programs, coordinate the public relations process, plan for civil defense, investigate and approve (or deny) permit applications, examine land use and building designs, and coordinate various inspectional and enforcement activities).

Strategy Five. Establish a fire-police patrol operating out of each fire station (two-man teams from the fire company patrol their own fire district). Duties include surveillance of parks, public buildings, vacant houses, and business/industrial sites with the purpose of preventing vandalism, malicious mischief, and other property crimes.

RATING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

Each member of the NGT group was asked to rate each of the five alternative strategies regarding two dimensions--feasibility and desirability. The Policy Delphi Rating Sheet was the instrument used and the results are presented in Table 9.

TABLE 9

Alternative Strategy Composite Scores

Feasibility/Desirability

ALTERNATIVE					NGT COMPOSITE SCORE
<u>ALTERNATIVE 1</u>					
FEASIBILITY	DF	PF	PI	DI	11
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
DESIRABILITY	VD	D	U	VU	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
<u>ALTERNATIVE 2</u>					
FEASIBILITY	DF	PF	PI	DI	22
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
DESIRABILITY	VD	D	U	VU	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
<u>ALTERNATIVE 3</u>					
FEASIBILITY	DF	PF	PI	DI	38
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
DESIRABILITY	VD	D	U	VU	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
<u>ALTERNATIVE 4</u>					
FEASIBILITY	DF	PF	PI	DI	34
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
DESIRABILITY	VD	D	U	VU	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
<u>ALTERNATIVE 5</u>					
FEASIBILITY	DF	PF	PI	DI	17
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
DESIRABILITY	VD	D	U	VU	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

Feasibility

DF - Definitely Feasible
 PF - Possibly Feasible
 PI - Possibly Infeasible
 DI - Definitely Infeasible

Desirability

VD - Very Desirable
 D - Desirable
 U - Undesirable
 VU - Very Undesirable

STRATEGY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION

Strategy selection involves analysis of all data presented as well as the feasibility and desirability of implementing a particular alternative strategy.

Alternative strategies three and four were both rated as desirable and feasible by the NGT group. The strategy with the most polarized scoring results was alternative five. Individual scores ranged from zero to six, indicating that the NGT group viewed it as "possibly feasible," yet "undesirable."

These three alternatives will be analyzed regarding the "pros and cons" associated with each of them. An analysis of these dimensions is valuable in the final selection and recommendation process.

Pros and Cons of Alternative Three. Integration of police, fire, and civil disaster preparedness through establishment of a Public Safety Information System has the following associated positive and negative characteristics:

1. Would have a positive impact upon all five "key trends".
2. Would increase police and fire interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.
3. Maximizes use of equipment and facilities, while possibly cutting personnel costs.
4. The development and implementation of this system would require substantial capital outlay for computer hardware and software.

Pros and Cons of Alternative Four. Establishment of a Community and Prevention Services Division has the following associated positive and negative characteristics:

1. Could result in better delivery of these services to the public based on increased coordination of effort.
2. Would move both public safety departments to a new and desired level of sophistication that may serve as a model for further consolidation development.
3. With police and fire personnel brought together to do same job, a pay parity conflict could materialize.
4. Conflict among police and fire priorities could result.

Pros and Cons of Alternative Five. Establishment of a fire-patrol operating out of each fire station has the following associated positive and negative characteristics:

1. Such a deployment scheme should significantly reduce the targeted crime classifications.
2. More productive use of fire personnel; therefore, more cost effective.
3. High start-up equipment and training costs.
4. Can expect extreme resistance from all local level stakeholders.

Strategy Recommendation. Alternative Four is selected as a strategic police-fire consolidation plan for the City of Torrance. Assessment of external environmental factors

surveyed, internal strengths and weaknesses of police and fire organizations, and identified stakeholder positions indicate that this alternative strategy will:

1. Meet with the most favorable stakeholder responses.
2. Result in improved public safety effectiveness and efficiency.
3. Have the least start-up costs associated with it.
4. Impact positively upon civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness.
5. Answer to increasing public demands for service response and programs.
6. Not affect desire for "local control" and will probably receive least opposition as the result of the change.
7. Allow for specialization in a more cost effective manner.

While Alternative Three is also a desirable plan, it can be expected to result in more controversy than Alternative Four. Implementation of Alternative Three would seemingly be a logical step in consolidation efforts should the selected plan find positive critical analysis after its implementation.

Alternative Five, which was the most polarized alternative strategy, would be the most difficult to obtain the necessary "buy-in" from the identified stakeholder population.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The programs and activities recommended for consolidation within a Community and Prevention Services Division (fire and crime prevention/education programs; public/community relations; civil defense planning/coordination; permit/license review; land/building use/design review; and various inspection and enforcement activities) are presently being performed by police and fire units dispersed throughout both organizations. Because of the number of operational units involved, this plan will need the administrative support of both the chief of police and the fire chief. In addition, a climate of trust between these two chief executives is essential for implementation of the plan. With their united understanding and cooperation, the support necessary from the city manager will need to be obtained.

Direction to police and fire administrative staffs will come from both chiefs. They, in turn, will need to sell the concept to respective departmental staff and personnel. Early in the process, both public safety association representatives will need to be brought into the information, education, and selling aspects of implementation. Without support for the plan from administration and represented employee organizations, implementation will be most difficult.

In addition, support of those stakeholders who are not directly or administratively affected will need to be obtained.

The most effective approach to this effort is by staff reporting and open public information meetings.

Obtaining intra- and inter-department support for the plan will enhance obtaining necessary support from city council members.

Logistically, timing is not critical to implementation, since the work elements are presently being performed adequately. Initial efforts in pursuit of implementation will involve extensive staff analysis and comprehensive reporting for chief executive and administrative "buy-in".

As soon as this is obtained, "meet and confer" should begin with affected employee associations. Selection of a task force should be the next step. This task force should consist of representatives from a cross-section of police and fire personnel and city management. Sufficient freedom, time, and office/staff support to conduct a thorough analysis of the plan will be necessary.

Ample time should be afforded the task force; however, it would seem appropriate to limit the length of their study to six months.

While this study is proceeding, administrative efforts to obtain support from non-directly involved stakeholders will occur. Additionally, sharing of process, intent, and progress with city management staff and city council members will occur during this timeframe.

Upon completion of the task force study, continuing "meet and confer" sessions will be necessary to obtain a negotiated implementation plan and timetable.

PLANNING SYSTEM

Selection of an implementation planning system that is both appropriate and relevant was accomplished by analyzing the predictability and turbulence of the future. To accomplish this, the key trends were plotted on a "Planning Mode Chart" which is designed to measure trend predictability and turbulence. Table 10 shows the results of this process.

TABLE 10

Planning Mode Chart

<u>FUTURE PREDICTABILITY</u>					
Recurring	(3)	OPERATIONS TACTICAL PLANNING			PERIODIC PLANNING
Forecast by Extrapolation	(5) (1)	(2)	(4)		
Predictable Threats/ Opportunities	ISSUE PLANNING				SIGNAL SURPRISE PLANNING
Partially Predictable					
Unpredictable	NO CHANGE	FEW OCCASIONAL CHANGES	CHANGES ON A REGULAR BASIS	MANY CHANGES	CONTINUOUS CHANGE
<u>TURBULENCE/NUMBER OF CHANGES</u>					

- (1) Concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness.
- (2) Public demands for service response and programs.
- (3) Interest in "local control" and resistance to change.
- (4) Managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency.
- (5) Specialization of public safety.

The planning system most appropriate for accomplishing the recommended consolidation plan is "Operations-Tactical Planning." This planning system allows for zeroing in on the plan for completion of a comprehensive analysis without concern for "crisis intervention." It is also the best plan to employ when time restrictions are not of concern.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter VI has analyzed strategic plan alternatives, resulting in the recommendation of a consolidation plan for implementation.

The plan selected is expected to find the least environmental and stakeholder resistance, and should serve as a model for further consolidation consideration.

With the "Execution Phase" completed, Chapter VII will identify a transition management structure to facilitate the implementation of the selected consolidation plan.

CHAPTER VII
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The recommended police-fire consolidation strategic plan will be a dramatic change operationally within both Torrance public safety departments. The plan recommends the blending of specific work elements into one divisional unit. Presently, these work elements are being adequately performed and are meeting the needs of the city. However, consolidating these units would improve efficiency of administration and coordination of support functions within both police and fire organizations.

Organizational change necessitates implementation of the negotiation process. Established stakeholder perceptions and beliefs can dramatically affect the success or failure of plan implementation. Stakeholder "buy-in" is supported by establishing a clear understanding of the need for and benefits of the proposed consolidation plan. Identification of the negotiable and non-negotiable issues regarding the plan will help in positioning and negotiation strategy.

STRATEGIC PLAN--NEGOTIABLE ISSUES

1. Organizational placement of the Community and Prevention Services Division within either police or fire department. Which department becomes the lead agency regarding the

administration of this newly-created division would not affect the functionality of the plan.

2. Exact unit design and staffing levels are negotiable.

Whether to decrease existing personnel levels (current dispersed work effort staff levels) upon consolidation or increase civilianization should have little effect on the functionality of the plan.

3. Issues regarding training needs (type and extent) of personnel assigned to the new division is negotiable and can be studied after implementation.

4. Where the new divisional unit is physically located is seen as a negotiable issue. Whether the operation is located within existing police or fire facilities or an off-site location is viewed as having little effect on the functionality of the plan.

5. Timetable of plan implementation is negotiable. There does not exist a critical need to expedite consolidation; therefore, implementation scheduling is extremely flexible.

6. Pay/benefit issues regarding those employee classifications impacted by the consolidation plan.

STRATEGIC PLAN--NON-NEGOTIABLE ISSUES

1. Clearly defined supervisory chain-of-command.
2. Anything less than consolidation of the work elements identified in the plan.
3. Staff selection must result in most competent and capable personnel being assigned.
Dumping of poor performers by assignment to the unit must not be allowed.
4. Lead administrative agency responsibility for disciplinary matters. Whichever department is administratively responsible for new division, it must have authority over supervision and disciplinary matters.

STAKEHOLDERS POINTS OF NEGOTIATION

In Chapter IV, the NGT group used the S.A.S.T. to plot the degree of stakeholder assumptions relative to certainty and importance. The five stakeholders identified as most important and most certain were: the police chief, the fire chief, the police officers association, the fire fighters association, and the city administrators. The city council was seen as important; however, the certainty of their assumptions was not as certain.

The following key stakeholders will be considered regarding the negotiating process:

1. Torrance Chief of Police
2. Torrance Fire Chief
3. Torrance Police Officers' Association
4. Torrance Fire Fighters' Association
5. Torrance City Manager
6. Torrance City Council

Chief of Police Points of Negotiation. The chief of police will be willing to give on:

1. Consolidation of the work elements delineated in the plan.
2. Decreasing the total number of allocated personnel as the result of consolidation.
3. Civilianization of new division where appropriate.
4. Physical placement of unit.

He will not be willing to give on:

1. Primary administrative responsibility not resting with the police department.
2. A lessening quality of assigned personnel to the unit.
3. Review and critical evaluation of plan after first year of operation.
4. Administrative and disciplinary authority over unit.

Fire Chief Points of Negotiation. The fire chief will be willing to give on:

1. Consolidation of work elements delineated in the plan.
2. Decreasing the total number of allocated personnel as the result of consolidation of the functions.
3. Civilianization of new division where appropriate.
4. Physical placement of unit.
5. Disciplinary authority of police-sworn personnel.

He will not be willing to give on:

1. Primary administrative responsibility not resting with the fire department.
2. A lessening quality of assigned personnel to the unit.
3. Review and critical evaluation of plan after first year of operation.
4. Administrative authority over unit.

Torrance Police Officers Association Points of Negotiation.

T.P.O.A. will be willing to give on:

1. Need for improving coordination of work elements delineated in the plan.
2. Negotiation of scheduling policies and staffing level of new divisional unit.
3. Selection process of personnel assigned to unit.

4. Which department has administrative and operational responsibility of unit.

T.P.O.A. will not be willing to give on:

1. Cuts in staffing level that would decrease total sworn police officer positions (including supervisory ranks).
2. Sworn police supervisory responsibility of sworn police officers.
3. Relinquishment of disciplinary responsibility and authority to fire administration.

Torrance Fire Fighters Association Points of Negotiation.

T.F.F.A. will be willing to give on:

1. Need for improving coordination of work elements delineated in the plan.
2. Negotiation of scheduling policies and staffing level of new divisional unit.
3. Selection process of personnel assigned to unit.
4. Which department has administrative and operational responsibility of unit.

T.F.F.A. will not be willing to give on:

1. Cuts in staffing level that would decrease total sworn fire fighter positions (including supervisory ranks and civilian positions).
2. Supervision of association members (which include both sworn and non-sworn employees) by fire supervision.

City Manager Points of Negotiation. The city manager will be willing to give on the same points as presented under police and fire chiefs' points.

He will not be willing to give on:

1. Lack of input by his office in policy development and priority setting of new division.
2. Relinquishment of disciplinary responsibility by either department to the other.

City Council Points of Negotiation. The city council will be willing to give on:

1. Acceptance of a negotiated implementation of the plan between the other five stakeholders.

The council will not be willing to give on:

1. Increasing public safety budgeted strength (sworn or non-sworn) to implement plan.

NEGOTIATION STRATEGY

Initially, the negotiation effort will aim at obtaining "buy-in" from the three managing stakeholders (chief of police, fire chief, and city manager) regarding the benefits of the plan. This group of stakeholders must be influenced and sold on the plan concept before negotiating with the other stakeholder groups. Without their individual and collective support of the plan, it is seen as having little chance of gaining stakeholder and city-wide support.

These three administrators are viewed as being responsive to rational data. Therefore, the negotiation effort would involve a two-fold approach. First, negotiations would work for these three "opposers' needs" regarding information and understanding. This would involve the gathering of facts and figures relative to the plan and development of a clearly, concisely, and accurately written staff report. A graphic presentation of the plan must be conveyed in a way that will draw further inquiry and interest.

Next, a strategy of working for the self-esteem of these stakeholders will be employed. This strategy will work to convince them that the implementation of the plan is in the best interests of the city at large and will reflect favorably upon them individually. The importance of mutual cooperation needs to be continually recognized and efforts taken to maintain win-win relationships throughout this stage of the negotiation process.

Both public safety associations (Torrance Police Officers Association and Torrance Fire Fighters Association) will primarily be concerned with wages, hours, and working conditions, or trading benefits for non-benefit issues. These two stakeholders are well organized and active. Individually, they are considered very politically influential forces; collectively, even more so. Maintaining open and friendly channels of communication is extremely

important in the negotiation process. Keeping the association leadership informed of the administration's philosophy and position regarding the consolidation plan while developing full conceptual understanding is important. The participation strategy will help bring these stakeholders into the decision-making evaluation process. By involving various groups among these public safety units, their input will be received while, at the same time, exposing them to the advantages of the consolidation plan.

The city council is the final approving body in the negotiation process. Council will need to sanction and approve any meet-and-confer negotiations between management and the public safety associations. It is important to start with the strategy of working for the "opposers' needs" to know and understand. As with management stakeholder negotiations, clear, concise, and accurate staff reporting must be presented to council members. Thoroughly informed regarding the plan, the council will be more open for discussion of the trade-offs for "buy-in" between management and the public safety associations.

Every effort directed towards informing and educating council members will need to be tempered with the convincing fact that implementation of the plan will not lessen, but will improve, police and fire efficiency, effectiveness,

and coordination. In addition, the strategy will be to work for approval of the plan on a one-year evaluation period, with the long range goal of permanent adoption.

Maintaining a win-win environment throughout the approval and final acceptance process must never be ignored.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This plan is a dramatic change from current operational practices and processes. Particular attention must be given to clarity of facts regarding all of the stakeholders. Each must understand what the plan involves and what it means regarding the future. The negotiation process must be open, cooperative, and accommodating. All of the key stakeholders are critical to the approval of the plan. Each in their own way need to win during the process. Of particular importance is the need to demonstrate alliance between public safety administrators and associations while negotiating with the city council.

There is room for compromise and accommodation during negotiations with all key stakeholders, allowing for the avoidance of a no-win environment.

With the "Executive Phase" completed, the transition management phase (Part Three) will consider the "critical mass" in the development of process for production of the selected future scenario.

PART THREE -- TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

IDENTIFICATION OF A TRANSITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE TO FACILITATE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE AND FIRE FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICAL MASS ANALYSIS

This chapter will work to develop a transition management plan for the establishment of a Public Safety Community and Prevention Services Division (develop and administer fire and crime prevention/education programs, coordinate the public relations process, plan for civil defense, investigate and approve (or deny) permit applications, examine land use and building designs, and coordinate various inspections and enforcement activities). Contained within this transition management plan will be:

1. The identification of the key players ("critical mass") that are relevant to the success of the strategic plan and assignment of assumptions regarding them.
2. A description of the recommended management structure to manage the plan.
3. Description and listing of technologies and methods to support plan implementation.

IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL MASS

The same individuals and groups identified during the plan implementation process (Part Two, Chapter IV) are considered key players in the transition process. Therefore, the "critical mass" (active commitment is necessary to provide the energy for the changes to occur) is identified as the chief of police; the fire chief; the police association; the firefighter association; the city manager; and the city council.

The NGT group was asked to assess positions of the key stakeholders relative to the issue. Table 11 reports the current level of commitment each of the "critical mass" members are assumed to hold regarding the plan to consolidate police and fire functions. The desired commitment of each member is also indicated. Moving members from their current position to the desired position is considered necessary if the plan is to succeed.

TABLE 11

Commitment Planning Chart

CRITICAL MASS	POSITION ON THE ISSUE			
	BLOCK IT	LET IT HAPPEN	HELP IT HAPPEN	MAKE IT HAPPEN
POLICE CHIEF	O - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	X
FIRE CHIEF	O - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	X
POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION	O - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	X
FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION	O - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	X
CITY MANAGER		O - - - - -	- - - - -	X
CITY COUNCIL		⊗		

O = Current Position
X - Desired Position

Commitment Assumption Analysis. Without the support of both public safety chiefs, this plan is seen as having little chance of success. This plan is a significant change and presumably would be viewed by both executives as a threat to their authority and possibly a loss of operational control. Their present level of commitment is categorized as "would block it". Therefore, an effort to move both chiefs from a "block it" to a "help it happen" position regarding the strategic plan is rather critical.

Both chiefs are responsive to rational data; however, gaining support of respective department command-level personnel will work to enhance their receptiveness to a change concept of this magnitude. Therefore, the use of "problem finding" as a neutral mechanism to identify and clarify the issue will help to obtain command staff support and understanding. Given the climate regarding civil defense planning and community program development, it is believed that sufficient data exists to gain this administrative support and executive "buy-in" regarding the proposed strategic plan.

Next, the support of both public safety employee associations must be developed. It is unlikely that this plan will succeed even with support of both chiefs if the safety associations do not "help it happen." Without input into the implementation process, both groups would most likely attempt to "block the issue." They are formidable political forces and could significantly impact individual city council member attitudes.

The change as proposed in the plan will require "meet and confer" between city management and public safety association representatives. Therefore, the approval of the plan (or elements of it) is necessary before implementation. Even if "meet and confer" were not required, it would still be necessary to involve both groups in the final plan development and implementation for minimum generation of conflict and adversity from police and fire personnel. Active and open solicitation of

both police and fire association ideas and concerns should help move their positions from "let it happen" to "help it happen."

The fact that the employee associations are supportive of the plan will be of tremendous advantage when interacting and conferring with both the city manager and the city council.

The support of the city manager is necessary, which really should go without saying, and can best be obtained by a cooperative approach by both chiefs. Successful movement of the chief executives to the "let it happen" position is, in effect, the strategy for "buy-in" from the city manager. The city manager likes innovation and, with a one-year review clause added to the plan, he should, without further concerted effort, move from a position of "let it happen" to "help it happen."

The final element of the "critical mass" is the city council. The council is extremely responsive to both police and fire department needs and is interested in improving departmental effectiveness, efficiency, and coordination. Their position would be one of "let it happen." Strategically, this is also where they should remain. With the support of the other "critical mass" stakeholders, the plan can be expected to receive city council support and approval.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Developing a plan for the drawing together of work elements of police and fire organizations that have been

operating within a climate of comfort requires the cooperation and involvement of both chiefs and both city employee associations. To best accomplish this, the formation of a task force management structure is recommended. The task force will be composed of 12 members obtained from a diagonal slice throughout both public safety departments. This design encourages participation and generates diversity of ideas. Selection of task force members will be accomplished by submission of three members from each chief and each association. Selection of a facilitator, who will also be designated as "project manager" will be accomplished by both chiefs. If the effort to select a single individual as project manager/facilitator from within public safety ranks is unsuccessful, then selection of and contract with an independent, private consultant will be accomplished.

The task force will be assigned the responsibility of developing a comprehensive written plan for consolidation of the targeted police and fire functions. This report will cover such concerns as:

- * Timetable or milestone charting
- * Target implementation date
- * Staffing considerations and recommendations
both sworn and non-sworn
- * Policy and procedural recommendations

- * Organizational factors (i.e., where to place the unit, reallocation of personnel and support needs).

Within six months, the task force will submit their final document to the city manager for review and approval. Upon acceptance of the report and recommendations, necessary "meet and confer" negotiations will be initiated with the concerned employee associations. These negotiations will continue until agreement is reached for submission to the city council for final approval. The "meet and confer" negotiation process will involve representation of all "critical mass" components and final agreement will result in implementation of the functional consolidation plan.

During the six-month study period, the task force will meet regularly for discussion and individual member task assignments. These meetings will also serve as "confrontation" sessions in an effort to surface hidden agendas or negative feelings. Throughout the task force process, roles and values will be clarified and individual support sought to address the continuous need for follow-up and feedback.

TRANSITION TECHNOLOGIES

In an effort to ensure that all employees of both public safety departments are kept abreast of the task force's efforts, periodic status reporting meetings will be convened. These meetings will allow for individual input and questions.

Present during these open meetings will be both public safety chief executives and the city manager to express their support of the plan and task force process.

Upon acceptance of the task force final report, a general information meeting, open to all interested parties, will be held for clarification and direction. This will not be an open-discussion meeting, but it will seek to clarify and move forward on implementation.

During the first year of implementation, regular and frequent action and review meetings between administrative staffs and association representatives will be held. After the first year of operation, an independent analysis by a private consultant is recommended. Total review of the plan, considering this analysis, will then be undertaken for determination by city council whether to continue with the plan or return to pre-consolidation operations.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A transition plan to implement the strategic plan for police-fire consolidation has been presented in this chapter. Development of this transition plan involved the identification of the "critical mass"; recommendation of a management structure; and supporting methods and technologies for plan implementation.

Present commitment of each member of the "critical mass" was charted and the desired commitment necessary for the

success of the plan was identified. Moving these key stakeholders from the "present" to the "desired" commitment categories is viewed as essential to make the transition to a consolidated Public Safety Community and Prevention Services Division.

Chapter IX will present conclusions and recommendations regarding this independent study project.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An examination of the study data indicates that police-fire consolidation in California has found limited success and acceptance. Fourteen agencies have been identified as presently operating police and fire services under one of the five defined consolidation types. Only three of these, Sunnyvale, Rohnert Park, and Marina, can be considered fully consolidated departments with public safety officers cross-trained in both disciplines. This type of consolidation results in the most dramatic organizational changes and any plan at implementation usually experiences strong, organized opposition.

Tradition is firmly established as a dominant pattern in California urban areas. Separation of police and fire departments is such a tradition. Any consolidation effort that moves to change the long-held customs, attitudes, and interests of a community will be a difficult one over the next decade. The larger the agency, the more convincing the arguments for change will have to be. This is due primarily to larger and better organized police and fire associations, who can be expected to be powerful forces of opposition. While successful implementation of the public safety officer concept is not seen as impossible over the next decade, it is seen as unlikely. The future identified by this

study simply does not appear traumatic enough to result in the wide acceptance of the public safety officer concept.

The consolidation type that has found the greatest interest among California agencies is "nominal consolidation." Presently, there are nine agencies categorized as Departments of Public Safety. Under this concept, both police and fire services retain their individual and distinct operational and administrative identities. Both departments report to one chief executive usually identified as the Director of Public Safety. Nominal consolidation is normally selected to facilitate administrative reporting processes by eliminating one chief executive position. Research indicates that this concept has been implemented many times for political reasons, usually the result of a falling out between the police or fire chief and the city manager. It is the writer's opinion that this concept should not be considered as a consolidation type. It is simply too prone to whimsicalness.

The third type of consolidation found among California agencies is "functional consolidation." Each of the identified cities have implemented different functional design concepts. However, all have resulted in the consolidation of administrative functions, rather than operational functions. Indications are that this has resulted in improved coordination of the concerned work elements and, in most cases, the elimination of effort

duplication. Police and fire disciplines, operationally, continue to function separately without concern for cross-training. Agencies with this type of consolidation found little opposition to implementation.

Only one California city with a population of over 100,000 has been identified as a consolidated agency. That city is Sunnyvale, and when it consolidated in 1950, its population was only 9,200. Consolidation has not occurred often among cities with populations over 100,000. Durham, North Carolina, with a population of 105,000, consolidated separate police and fire departments in 1973. In 1985, the concept was abandoned with Durham returning to the traditional design of separate police and fire departments. The effort to reverse consolidation in Durham came from the firefighters who, after several years, were finally successful.

Literature review indicates that every California agency that has ever implemented a type of consolidation had a population of less than 100,000 at the time. From this, it can be inferred that larger agencies are less likely to consider consolidation than are smaller agencies.

Of the 14 agencies presently consolidated, only four of them can be considered located in urban areas. Considering the writer's previously stated belief that "nominal consolidation" really should not be typed as consolidation, the number of urban area cities drops to two, Sunnyvale and

Alhambra. Sunnyvale is fully consolidated, while Alhambra is categorized as having both functional and nominal consolidation. From this, it can be deduced that, among California cities who are located within urban areas, consolidation has not been widely pursued. Over the next decade, urban areas can be expected to experience an increased interest in functional consolidation. Fiscal constraints and disaster-planning efforts are expected to increase the need for cities to find ways of improving police and fire effectiveness, efficiency, and coordination. This type of consolidation can provide this improvement, while not affecting traditional police and fire operations. Of course, any effort at implementing a functional design cannot expect to be welcomed with open arms. Forces of opposition should be expected as the future unfolds. Each city will be affected uniquely; therefore, the future incidence of functional consolidation actually is not predictable. However, the writer expects to see more urban area cities operating under this type of consolidation by 1999.

The strategic plan developed in this study can be categorized as a "functional consolidation" concept. The work elements involved are primarily administrative in nature, and actual plan implementation would have little, if any, effect upon present police and fire operation units.

The plan is seen as resulting in improved coordination of the involved work elements; however, it is difficult to say whether improved effectiveness and efficiency will be realized. While the intention of this study was to develop a plan for implementation and a transition plan to facilitate its success, it is the writer's belief that united opposition from both the police association and the fire association will make actual implementation extremely difficult. Whether the future will traumatize the environment sufficiently by 1999 for plan acceptance, or whether the opposition can be overcome, remains to be seen.

While union resistance has been identified as a specific problem concerning the immediate study project's strategic plan, there are others that are frequently encountered in the effort to consolidate. These include: legal provisions (e.g., pension regulations, civil service regulations) of state statutes, city charters, and ordinances that need to be thoroughly researched; the need to secure proper leadership; cross-training of present and future personnel; personnel management (e.g., recruitment, classification, compensation) after consolidation; adaptation of facilities and equipment to meet the needs of consolidated services; and financial aspects of police-fire integration.

The study data shows that many factors determine the success or failure of a public safety program. Some of these factors are outside the control of city administration,

while others can be controlled by careful planning. Throughout the planning stages, and during the initial implementation process of any type of police-fire consolidation effort, the support of many individuals and groups (stakeholders) within the community is essential. Municipal officials, civic leaders, administrative personnel, and all members of the police and fire departments must be made fully aware of any study conducted, with particular care being taken to develop their positive interest in the inquiry and repeatedly allowing them to express their views and opinions. This is most necessary with respect to police and fire associations, or unions, since their members will be the most directly involved in any change as a result of consolidation.

It appears that individual, social, and economic factors are of little importance regarding how the stakeholder population perceives consolidation. The writer believes that significant suspicion, on the part of concerned stakeholders, regarding the concept exists to override the impacts of these factors on the issue. The term "consolidation" invariably brings to mind visions of large organizations merging to form even larger organizations. The larger the city, the more this word association may raise questions associated with large bureaucracies and whether large organizations improve effectiveness, efficiency, and/or coordination.

Bureaucracy and participation are two key concepts that directly relate to the organizational design of a consolidated agency. The basic bureaucratic format conforms to that of a pyramid--the typical organization of almost every industrial, governmental, religious, and military organization. Specifically, bureaucracy refers to the degree of development of specialized agencies to handle local government functions.

In California, the majority of the population view police and fire services as specialized agencies having distinctly different duties and functions. Specialization among both disciplines is expected to continue, and technological advancements may occur at a geometric rate over the next decade. With these trends apparent, consolidation is viewed as a hindrance to organization effectiveness. No change regarding the high level of respect and trust among the two public safety services and the stakeholder population is anticipated through 1999. These factors seem to strengthen opposition to the issue in general.

Participation, the second key concept relating directly to the organizational design of a consolidated agency, refers to the extent to which individuals and groups have an effect on the decision-making process. The relationship here deals with the concept of "local control" and the idea that local citizenry can continuously shape the scope and actions of local government. With

social problems increasing within the urban environment, residents are expected to increase their demands for service and programs over the next decade. Consolidation may be seen as another bureaucratic attempt to insulate decision makers from outside influences. It is the writer's belief that, while citizens may appreciate the extensive services available through a larger agency, they still seem to enjoy having a voice in the policy formulation which may be associated with separate police and fire departments.

While it is essential that elected and public officials responsible for fiscal administration of state, county, and local governments review ways of cutting costs, any review must be open, comprehensive, and thorough.

Public safety services touch and concern the lives of all citizens, and changes must be dealt with cautiously. Although many communities have found consolidation of police and fire services beneficial, other have found the concept unacceptable.

Prior to presenting one of the types of unified protective services to the urban community stakeholders, the public safety problems specific to that community should be analyzed in minute detail. There is no assurance that the consolidation of police and fire fighting services will solve the future problems of high costs and greater demands for police and fire protection.

It is apparent that successful unification in communities has proven to be the result of careful planning and implementation. Serious consideration should be given to geographic, demographic, political, economic, and social characteristics of each community. The decision to implement some degree of coordinated police-fire service must be made with the acknowledgement that a parallel is not expected. Of prime importance in obtaining this goal is the detailed study of the specific community prior to actual implementation.

The consolidation of police and fire services is not a cure-all; it cannot be considered as a simplified solution to the public safety problems that may face California urban communities over the next decade.

As More has stated:

The successful implementation of one of the types of combined protective services represents a method whereby a community can deal with the hazards of life and property that have increasingly occurred in communal living, while simultaneously furnishing a means of more effectively utilizing public safety personnel. Consolidation provides a community with the long-range opportunities of reducing expenditures when compared to budgetary support required for two separate

protective services. It is a design whereby, in selected municipalities and with a reasonable expenditure of municipal funds, the public can be provided with effective and efficient public safety services.⁸

Since no two cities are alike, the exact type or degree of police-fire consolidation is dependent upon characteristics unique to each. For any plan of consolidation to find success, each city must tailor its program to fit its individual needs.

NOTES

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- 2 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime in the United States, 1965.
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are Opposed to Consolidation of Fire
and Police Departments", 4th Edition,
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

NGT FORECAST OF RELATIVE TRENDS

1. Increasing concern for civil disaster planning and emergency preparedness.
2. Decreasing employment pool of acceptable entry level law enforcement candidates.
3. Increasing use of initiative process to control local governments' fiscal policies.
4. Increasing incidence of traditional public safety functions being contracted with private sector.
5. Increasing population and density.
6. Increasing use of technological advancements by police and fire departments.
7. Increasing specialization of public safety.
8. Work ethics, career commitment declining.
9. Increasing number of women in work force.
10. Increasing social pressures and control upon law enforcement.
11. Increasing managerial concern for improved effectiveness and efficiency.
12. Increasing administrative sophistication.
13. Increasing property redevelopment and stricter building codes.

14. Increasing public demands for service response and programs.
15. Use of "Employee Obligation Contracts" for law enforcement candidates increasing.
16. Decreasing influence of federal government.
17. Increasing interest in "local control" and resistance to change.
18. Declining general education level.
19. Continuing civilianization of law enforcement functions.
20. Continuing search for incarceration alternatives sought due to jail/prison overcrowding.
21. Decreasing level of confidence in government and authority structures.

APPENDIX II

NGT FORECAST OF RELEVANT EVENTS

1. Prolonged major civil disorder.
2. Economic system collapses due to AIDS costs.
3. Revolution in Mexico.
4. Re-institution of mandatory draft leading to immediate service.
5. Civil judgement in excess of local governments' ability to pay.
6. Public Employees' Retirement System goes bankrupt.
7. Unable to purchase affordable public insurance.
8. Critical energy crisis affecting transportation.
9. Major local earthquake in urban area.
10. Legislative/judicial mandate outlawing public safety officer concept.
11. Law passed allowing unrestricted immigration.
12. Major taxpayer revolt.
13. Major change in sales tax allocation in favor of state government.
14. Critical and sustained water shortage throughout California.
15. Significant technological breakthroughs regarding fire fighting and prevention.
16. Depression.

17. Major budget cutback in federal military defense/aerospace contracts.
18. Laws passed allowing user fees for public safety services performed.
19. Mandatory public safety binding arbitration law passed.
20. Passage of law gives public safety personnel the right to strike.

APPENDIX III

RELATIVE STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Chief of Police | 16. Private Consultants |
| 2. Homeowner Associations | 17. Public Employee Associations |
| 3. Chamber of Commerce | 18. School Officials |
| 4. Criminals | 19. Insurance Companies |
| 5. Real Estate Developers | 20. Safety Employees |
| 6. Realtors | 21. Legal Professionals |
| 7. California Taxpayers | 22. News Media |
| 8. Elected Public Officials | 23. State Fire Marshal |
| 9. City Residents | 24. Religious Groups |
| 10. Federal Occupation Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA) | 25. Water Suppliers |
| 11. Peace Officer Standards &
Training Commission (P.O.S.T.) | 26. Police Reserve Officers |
| 12. City Administrators | 27. Public Employee Family
Members |
| 13. Fire Chief | 28. Private Security Agencies |
| 14. Minority Rights Groups | 29. National Public Safety
Legislative Groups |
| 15. County Government | 30. State Public Safety
Legislative Groups |