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**DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL SUPERVISION
ON NARCOTIC ADDICT BEHAVIOR***

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ABSTRACT

While literature evaluating the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment is well established, the effectiveness of different types of legal supervision on the behavior of narcotic addict offenders has not received sufficient attention. This article examines the effect of different intensities of legal supervision, defined as probation or parole, both with and without urine testing, and outpatient status (OPS, or intensive parole supervision) from the California Civil Addict Program, on the addiction and criminal careers of narcotic addicts. Narcotics addicts admitted to methadone maintenance programs in Southern California between the years 1971 and 1973 were interviewed in 1978. The results indicate that legal supervision with urine testing was the most effective form of legal supervision in reducing the percentage of time in daily narcotics use and criminal behavior.

INTRODUCTION

The link between narcotics use and criminality guarantees the visibility of the narcotic addict to the criminal justice system (CJS). Efforts to control the criminal behavior of the narcotic addict offender include incarceration, probation and parole supervision, civil commitment and drug treatment programs, including methadone maintenance and therapeutic communities. Although research exists which evaluates the effectiveness of specific programs (e.g., Treatment Outcome Prospective Study, or TOPS, and Drug Abuse Reporting Program, or DARP), the effectiveness of general parole and probation, both with and without urine testing or other conditions, has rarely been assessed. Furthermore, the differential effectiveness of these various forms of legal supervision on different categories of narcotics addicts has not been assessed in existing research literature. This paper represents an initial approach to the investigation of variations in levels of responsiveness shown by different categories of addicts, as distinguished by ethnicity, to different categories of legal supervision.

Evaluations of the effectiveness of treatment programs for narcotic addicts have generally been more positive than evaluations of the criminal justice system in controlling criminal behavior. Both TOPS and DARP have reported that methadone maintenance treatment, outpatient drug free programs and therapeutic community programs are effective in reducing drug use and crime by narcotic addicts (Collins and Allison, 1983; Hubbard, Allison, Bray, Craddock, Rachal and Ginzburg, 1983; Simpson and Sells, 1982). On the other hand, there is continued controversy over the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in controlling crime. Whereas Martinson (1974) suggested that "nothing works", Murray and Cox (1979) found "getting tough works", citing the observation that the Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS)

suppressed chronic juvenile criminal behavior. Maltz, however, (1984) argues that the results shown by Murray and Cox could be due to a selection artifact, specifically that those in the program had inflated arrest rates before intervention.

Other observers (Sechrest, White and Brown, 1979) have questioned not only the intensity or duration and integrity of the criminal justice system interventions, but have also pointed to numerous flaws in the research designs of studies evaluating correctional treatments. Moreover, the appropriateness of evaluating correctional programs using recidivism as a measure of success has been questioned by Maltz (1984) who notes that "variations in parole organization, policies, and practice, as well as variations in the types of releasees followed up, will be reflected in variations in the observed rates of recidivism" (p. 53). He suggests that success should be measured in terms of employment and family situation. The continuing controversy over the effectiveness of rehabilitation has led some criminologists to suggest that parole and probation should be based upon a "justice model" with goals of just desert, retribution and deterrence (Clear and O'Leary, 1983; McAnany, Thomson, and Fogel, 1984). Others have suggested different methods of controlling offenders, such as intensive probation supervision (IPS). There has also been increasing emphasis on selective incapacitation (Greenwood, 1982).

Other studies evaluating criminal justice system interventions have shown disappointing results. For example, in a 40-month follow-up study of probationers in Los Angeles and Alameda counties, Petersilia, Turner, Kahan and Peterson (1985) found that 65% of their respondents were re-arrested and 51% were subsequently convicted. Property offenders had higher recidivism rates than drug or violent offenders. Petersilia et al. concluded that few offenders in prison would be good candidates for probation, and also stated

that routine probation is generally inappropriate for most felons. Using a hypothetical model to assess the effect of intensive supervision, Petersilia et al. showed that IPS would result in a 38% reduction in the traditional probation caseload. They suggest, however, that neither intensive supervision probation nor traditional probation are appropriate for "violent predators", offenders who rob, assault and have the highest drug dealing rates.

In a different study of matched samples of probationers and prisoners, Petersilia, Turner and Peterson (1986) found that discharged prisoners had higher recidivism rates in a 24 month follow-up study than did probationers. Again, property crime offenders (both prisoners and probationers), had higher rates than drug or violent offenders. Longer prison sentences, however, served to decrease recidivism, particularly for drug offenders. Petersilia et al. (1986) point out that while many prisoners have no supervision after the first year of release, probationers are often supervised for up to three years. The difference in recidivism rates, therefore, may be due to the failure of the criminal justice system to sufficiently supervise prisoners after release.

Recent evaluations of IPS have been fairly positive. For example, drug offenders in Georgia did better under IPS than under regular probation supervision (Erwin, 1986). A lower percentage of IPS subjects were convicted of serious new crimes against persons than either a regular probation or an incarcerated sample. In New Jersey an evaluation of the IPS program showed a high employment rate (96%) and a lower recidivism rate (BJA, 1987). These results occurred despite the development of IPS not to improve probation, but to decrease prison overcrowding (McCarthy, 1987). IPS is at present a broadly defined program. For example, as shown by Bennett (1987), intensive supervision may not be significantly different from regular supervision.

Prior research has shown that legal supervision with urine monitoring is effective in reducing property crime and daily narcotic use (McGlothlin, Anglin and Wilson, 1977; Muthen and Speckart, 1983, 1985). Another significant effect of parole supervision is to interrupt addiction "runs" associated with high rates of criminal behavior, in particular, property crime (Anglin, McGlothlin, and Speckart, 1981). Other findings suggest that the effects of legal supervision are immediate and, for some addicts, persist after discharge (Anglin, Deschenes, and Speckart, 1988). For the subset of addicts for whom successive periods of legal supervision are necessary, there also appears to be a cumulative effect. For this group daily narcotics use and criminal behavior at subsequent legal supervision episodes are suppressed to levels lower than those during the earlier legal supervision periods. Although these findings demonstrate the general effects of successive legal supervision periods, important questions remain concerning the type of legal supervision which produces optimal suppression of daily narcotic use and criminal behavior. Such questions will be addressed in part in the forthcoming analysis.

The real question, according to Bennett is "how powerful an intervention has to be in order that there might be a reasonable chance that it will have an impact" (p. 130). Thus, a critical question regarding narcotic addict offenders pertains to their differential responsiveness to legal supervision and urine testing in terms of the amount of crime which is deterred (prevented or suppressed) by such supervision and testing. Another question concerns the optimal intensity of legal supervision, where intensity may be defined as the level of urine testing and the amount of contact between those under supervision and their parole or probation officers.

The present study examines the effects of various levels of legal supervision, both with and without urine testing, on narcotics use and criminal behavior over the addiction career (first daily use to last daily use of narcotics). It is hypothesized that (1) periods of any supervision will show lower levels of narcotics use and crime than periods without supervision, (2) periods of legal supervision with urine testing will show lower levels of narcotics use and crime than periods without urine testing, (3) intensive legal supervision as part of outpatient status from the California Civil Addict Program (CAP), a specialized program within the Department of Corrections, will be more effective than regular supervision (e.g. probation or parole) in reducing narcotics use and criminal behavior, and (4) periods of legal supervision with more frequent or high levels of urine testing will also be associated with lower levels of narcotics use and crime than those with lower levels of testing.

METHOD

SAMPLE

Respondents were 297 male first admissions to Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Orange County methadone maintenance programs between the years of 1971 and 1973. Those men were interviewed in 1978 or 1979 to collect retrospective longitudinal data concerning narcotics use and criminal involvement histories. The characteristics of these men and the interview procedure are discussed elsewhere (Deschenes, Anglin, and Speckart, 1988).

MEASURES

Independent Variables: For purposes of the present study, legal supervision was defined as any type of supervision within the criminal justice system, including probation, parole or outpatient status (a term for intensive parole supervision with urine testing used by the California Civil Addict

Program) and abscondence from any of these statuses. In order to ensure sufficient sample size for analysis, all periods of legal supervision within the addict career (see Deschenes, Anglin, and Speckart, 1988) that were of the same type were aggregated on an individual basis into one measure. The different types of legal supervision compared in the analysis include: no supervision versus any supervision, supervision with urine testing versus supervision without urine testing, and outpatient status (OPS) supervision versus non-OPS supervision with testing. Those categories with testing were further subdivided into low and high levels of urine testing. Low testing was defined as once or twice per month and high testing was defined as three or more times per month.

Dependent variables: The dependent variables included in the analyses were: (1) drug use (percentage of nonincarcerated time of abstinent, weekly, and daily narcotics use, average number of fixes per month, and marijuana or alcohol use), (2) criminal behavior (percentage of nonincarcerated time per month involved in property crime, number of crime days per month, dollar income per month from property crime, and percentage of nonincarcerated time and dollar income per month from drug dealing), (3) social functioning (percentage of nonincarcerated time employed or on welfare, percentage of nonincarcerated time married or with a common law spouse, and dollar income from employment and welfare), and (4) a related intervention variable (percentage of nonincarcerated time on methadone maintenance). These variables are described in more detail in earlier articles (Deschenes, Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Anglin, Deschenes and Speckart, 1988).

ANALYSES

Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the effects of types of legal supervision on the dependent variables. Various

subsamples of addicts were used to compare periods with and without supervision, with and without urine testing, with and without OPS, and low versus high levels of urine testing for each of these categories. Only those respondents with both conditions were included in each pair of analyses. Consequently, the sample sizes vary for each pair of conditions since each addict has an unique history of use pattern and criminal justice system interventions. Because the number of addicts who had some of the conditions, such as OPS, was a small proportion of the original sample, sample sizes for individual analyses were smaller than the overall sample in each group of analyses. Data were analyzed separately for Chicanos and Whites¹. Data were also analyzed for the combined sample.

RESULTS

SUPERVISION VERSUS NO SUPERVISION

Differences in drug use, crime and other behavior during status periods on and off supervision are presented in Table 1. Legal supervision status made a significant difference in almost all of the behaviors. As expected, abstinence was significantly higher and correspondingly, daily narcotics use was significantly lower during supervision than non-supervision. For example, there was a 10% increase in percentage of time abstinent and an 18% decrease in percentage of time daily narcotics use. The number of "fixes" (injections) per month was also significantly lower when supervised for both Chicanos and whites. The percentage of time "high" from alcohol was higher for both Chicanos and whites during periods of supervision. This is not unexpected since Anglin, Almog, Fisher and Peters (1988) have identified a consistent

¹ See Anglin, Deschenes and Speckart (1988) for a discussion of the rationale for splitting the sample by ethnicity.

inverse relationship between alcohol and narcotics use; alcohol use generally increases during periods of reduced narcotics use.

Differences in criminal behavior, such as the percentage of time committing various crimes, the number of crimes, and the dollar profit from certain crimes, were expected to be influenced by supervision. As shown in Table 1, such legal status effects were significant for the percentage of time committing property crime, but when analyzed separately by race, there were no significant differences for whites between supervised and non-supervised periods, whereas there were significant differences for Chicanos. Supervision also affected the total number of crime days for Chicanos but not for whites. Dollar income from crime also had a similar pattern, with significant differences for Chicanos and no significant differences for whites.

Legal supervision appears to have had a significant impact on the percentage of time dealing drugs for both races. Dealing decreased 10% among Chicanos from 58% to 48%, and among whites from 45% to 36%. However, dealing drugs for profit showed no change.

Significant differences were also found as a function of supervision status for percentage of time working and for the percentage of time in methadone maintenance treatment. The percentage of time on methadone maintenance was higher while supervised. Although the percentage of time employed was higher overall while under supervision, when analyzed separately by race there was no significant difference for whites whereas there was an increase for Chicanos.

In general, the results of preliminary analyses of the effects of legal supervision on drug use, criminal behavior, and income sources have indicated that there are important racial variations. For both whites and Chicanos, narcotics use and dealing were lower during periods of supervision. However,

criminal behavior among Chicanos appears to have been influenced more by legal supervision than the criminal behavior of whites. The behavioral changes which occur when on supervision could be related either to supervision by itself, or could be affected by increases in the percentage of time spent in methadone maintenance while supervised. Since the levels in methadone maintenance while supervised were fairly low, it seems plausible to consider that most of the change can probably be attributed to variations in legal supervision.

Insert Table 1 about here.

TESTING VERSUS NO TESTING

The next set of analyses compared the same dependent variables for periods of legal supervision with and without urine testing. The sample size was smaller than the supervised versus not supervised comparison because only addicts who had supervision under both conditions can be used in these analyses.

Overall, similar results were found in these analyses as in the previous comparison of supervised versus non-supervised periods. In Table 2 the mean for the percentage of time abstinent is higher during the testing period than it was for at times when there was no urine testing, and correspondingly, the mean percentage of time spent in daily narcotics use and the number of fixes per month were significantly lower.

Whereas testing made a significant difference overall in the percentage of time committing property crime, when analyzed separately by race, the results were opposite to those found for the supervised versus non-supervised

comparison. The major difference was found in the percentage of time committing all property crime which was significant for whites but not for Chicanos. The addition of urine testing to supervision created greater differences in narcotics use than in criminal behavior or drug dealing.

The percentage of time in methadone maintenance treatment was significantly higher for those under supervision with testing, indicating a possible confounding of treatment and supervision effects. However, it is likely that legal supervision at least partially motivated entry into methadone maintenance (Anglin, Maddahian and Brecht, forthcoming).

These results indicate that for most of those narcotic addict offenders with periods of both testing and no testing, the addition of urine testing produced significant differences in behavior: daily narcotics use was significantly lower, and crime days and percent time committing property crime decreased. However, there were corresponding increases in percent time on methadone maintenance during periods of testing which may represent a confounding factor.

Insert Table 2 about here.

INTENSIVE VERSUS REGULAR SUPERVISION WITH TESTING (OPS VS. NON OPS)

There are few significant differences between subjects during periods of intensive supervision (OPS) and non-OPS supervision with testing is illustrated in Table 3. Nevertheless, the means of the variables show a trend for OPS to reduce daily narcotics use and increase abstinence to a greater degree. Property crime levels were significantly lower among both Chicanos and whites in comparison to levels for legal supervision in general.

Insert Table 3 about here.

FREQUENCY OF URINE TESTING

The effects of low (two times per month or less) versus high (three or more times per month) rates of urine testing were also analyzed. The effects of high and low levels of testing were more ambiguous to interpret because the number of tests per month are often determined by the parole or probation officer according to the need to control the subject. As can be seen in Table 4 there were significant status by race effects for almost all of the variables.

Insert Table 4 about here.

For example, for narcotics use the level of testing had the expected effect among Chicanos, but has the reverse effect among whites; there was a significant decrease in the percentage of time spent in daily narcotics use among Chicanos, whereas there was an increase among whites. There were also significant effects among whites in the percentage of time committing property crime, but it was opposite of that which was expected; levels of crime were higher among those who are being tested more often. It would appear that those whites at higher levels of testing have been identified as more criminally-involved addicts by the criminal justice system, thus needing greater supervision and more frequent testing.

The effects of low versus high testing were also measured separately for supervision periods with and without OPS. There were almost no significant

differences in levels of narcotics use and criminal behavior as a function of frequency of testing during periods of non-OPS supervision (see Table 5). During periods of intensive OPS supervision (see Table 6) the only significant differences were found with respect to narcotics use and number of "fixes" per month among Chicanos, during which there was a large increase in percent time abstinent and a large decrease in percent time daily use.

DISCUSSION

Comparisons of the effectiveness of different types of legal supervision over the addiction career show that, in general, legal supervision is effective in reducing the percentage of time of daily narcotics use and criminal behavior. Even greater suppression effects are found when urine testing is added as a condition of legal supervision. Furthermore, the lowest levels of daily narcotics use, drug dealing and property crime are concomitant with periods of OPS characterized by high levels of testing for Chicanos (see Figure 1). On the other hand, among whites, testing alone is sufficient to reduce percent time narcotics use and property crime (see Figure 2). This evidence further supports recent findings from studies of intensive parole supervision which indicate that such supervision is responsible for lower recidivism rates (McCarthy, 1987). One problem with these results, however, is the lack of statistically significant differences between periods with different types of legal supervision.

Although percent time committing property crime and number of crime days per month are generally reduced during periods of testing, these differences are not always statistically significant. Some factors which might account for the differences between Chicanos and whites are percent time on methadone maintenance and age. Perhaps whites are younger than Chicanos during legal

supervision and do not respond as well to supervision or abscond with greater frequency. Or, it may be that the response by Chicanos is actually due to the greater percent time on methadone maintenance.

Non-significant differences between periods of urine testing as opposed to periods of no testing may be a consequence of the fact that more recalcitrant or sociopathic addicts with greater criminal involvement may be supervised with higher rates of testing. As a result, the deterrent effects of higher testing that would otherwise be demonstrable may have become dampered by the many, short unsuccessful legal supervision periods of high testing imposed upon highly criminally-involved addicts who were unresponsive to such supervision. That is, if addicts were selected for assignment to the high supervision condition because they have very high levels of criminal activity and are therefore less responsive to any kind of supervision, the confounding of selection for mode of supervision (treatment) and the dependent measure of criminal activity might seem to "guarantee" that the effects of heightened supervision cannot be demonstrated in this kind of naturally-occurring experiment.

The issue of addict typologies, therefore, is a crucial factor in interpreting the present data. Previous research has indicated that white addicts display more psychopathology than Chicano addicts (Weisman, Anglin and Fisher, 1987). Since white addicts often show higher levels of crime during periods of higher testing (Table 4), the explanation for why higher levels of crime rather than lower levels of crime are apparent during such periods may be related to futile attempts to control criminal behavior by imposing higher testing among an extreme subset of unusually unresponsive addicts. Indeed, for all of the comparisons presented in the data, a subset of unresponsive addicts (which may in turn be comprised of a heterogeneous mixture of varying

addict typologies) may mitigate or even reverse the expected statistical differences between supervision and no supervision conditions in general.

Related to the issue of general unresponsiveness to supervision is that of abscondence. Periods of abscondence from legal supervision were included in the analyses as representative of legal supervision periods in general as a conservative measure to assess the effects of the imposition of legal supervision as an administrative decision rather than the effects of parole or probation officer contact per se. Since abscondence periods are known to be characterized by unusually high levels of crime and drug use (McGlothlin et al., 1978), they would be expected to bias the present results against the demonstration of deterrent effects attributable to legal supervision.

Conversely, many periods with no supervision may be characterized by abstinence, either due to "maturing out" (Winick, 1962), spontaneous remission from addiction from various social factors unrelated to the criminal justice system, or treatment episodes (methadone maintenance or therapeutic communities). Consequently, the present results would again be biased against the observation of significant differences in the expected direction between supervision versus non-supervision periods. Furthermore, low testing parole or probation conditions may be instituted because the parole or probation officer may be able to obtain test results from the subject's methadone clinic. As a result, low testing during legal supervision may actually be contiguous with improved client outcomes because the client is on methadone maintenance or because the client has "earned" lower testing by demonstrating compliance with conditions of probation or parole.

Thus, in view of the many confounding factors which tend to bias the present data in a direction counter to the previously stated hypotheses, it is encouraging to note that many of the expected effects are nonetheless

demonstrable. Future research will require more sophisticated multivariate techniques to assess the magnitudes of the confounding or suppressive effects of different addict typologies, treatment effects, and duration (or "successfulness") of legal supervision episodes.

Although legal supervision effectiveness appears to differ for Chicanos and whites according to level of legal supervision, our results have clearly shown that OPS with high urine testing is most effective in reducing narcotics and criminal behavior among Chicanos. Among whites the greatest changes occur with testing alone.

SOCIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Prior analyses have shown immediate and persistent effects of legal supervision in reducing narcotics use and crime (Deschenes, Anglin, and Speckart, 1988). The current analyses indicate that the type of legal supervision makes a difference in the level of deterrence from narcotics use and criminal behavior. Furthermore, the optimal type and level of legal supervision to produce decreases in criminal behavior and narcotics use may vary according to the individual. Supervision by itself produces lower levels of narcotics use than does no supervision at all, but the addition of urine testing, and especially a greater intensity of legal supervision (e.g. OPS) among Chicanos, achieves greater reductions in narcotics use. Unfortunately, when addicts are not closely monitored the level of narcotics use rebounds as does criminal behavior (See Deschenes, Anglin and Speckart, 1988). Our findings indicate that there is some specific deterrence of criminal behavior when daily narcotics use is decreased by intensive legal supervision. Earlier work also shows that rebound occurs once legal supervision ends; that is, there is only a concurrent effect (Speckart, Anglin and Deschenes, 1988). In summary, the present analyses confirm prior research indicating the

effectiveness of legal supervision, especially intensive supervision, in reducing narcotics use and criminal behavior. However, further research needs to determine whether types of offenders or narcotic addicts can be identified and linked to the appropriate level of supervision.

The present series of papers, in combination with results from our earlier research and findings from other research, have several important policy implications. Prior research has shown that community treatment, particularly methadone maintenance, produces both short-term and long-term improvements to a significant degree in levels of narcotics use and crime and to a lesser degree in the improvement of employment and social functioning (Anglin and McGlothlin, 1984). Furthermore, the addition of methadone maintenance is more effective than legal supervision alone (Anglin, McGlothlin and Speckart, 1981). The current interaction between legal supervision and community drug treatment is one by which imposed supervision encourages, or even coerces, criminal offenders with drug abuse problems into community treatment. To date, the type of interaction between legal supervision and community treatment, while beneficial, quite often has been haphazard and coincidental in the present system. Thus, social implications, by our current understanding, seem to be fairly straightforward: policy should be developed for the early detection of narcotics use and assessment should be made at the individual level for integrated system intervention utilizing either treatment approaches, criminal justice system intervention, or a combination of the two. For these chronic addict offenders, lengthy legal supervision with testing and intensive supervision should be imposed and individuals should be monitored for compliance. Furthermore all efforts should be made by the criminal justice system to involve offenders in community treatment.

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Table 1. Effects of Supervision on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=148)</u>				<u>White (N=104)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>NS</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>NS</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use</u> *														
Abstinent	10.3	18.5	16.8	0.0001	12.8	22.4	13.9	0.0003	2.5	0.1	30.6	0.0001	0.2	
One to Six Times/Week	12.8	20.3	11.0	0.001	12.6	18.7	8.1	0.005	0.2		17.6	0.0001	0.2	
Daily	74.8	57.4	31.9	0.0001	70.7	53.4	25.0	0.0001	2.0		54.9	0.0001	0.0	
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use</u> *														
Marijuana	8.0	5.7	2.7	0.1	12.2	12.1	0.0		3.7	0.06	1.3		1.2	
Alcohol	26.6	32.5	5.7	0.02	18.3	22.6	2.8	0.09	4.6	0.03	7.8	0.006	0.2	
<u>Number of fixes</u> *														
	76.9	53.3	34.8	0.0001	68.5	51.9	14.2	0.0003	1.4		44.4	0.0001	1.4	
<u>Percent Time Property Crime</u> *														
Robbery	4.2	1.2	8.4	0.004	3.1	3.6	0.1		0.3		2.1		4.2	0.04
Burglary	24.5	17.4	11.5	0.0009	22.3	25.2	1.0		0.6		1.4		8.1	0.005
Theft	29.7	25.5	2.7	0.1	21.9	18.6	1.7		4.1	0.04	4.1	0.04	0.1	
Total	43.9	35.2	10.6	0.001	41.2	41.7	0.0		0.2		3.8	0.05	4.6	0.03
<u>Number of Crime Days</u> *														
Robbery	0.4	0.1	5.6	0.02	0.3	0.2	0.6		0.0		4.4	0.04	0.9	
Burglary	3.6	2.4	14.9	0.0002	3.4	3.4	0.0		0.4		4.0	0.05	5.0	0.03
Theft	5.5	4.8	1.6		4.6	4.2	0.5		1.0		1.8		0.2	
Total	9.2	7.3	8.2	0.005	8.5	8.0	0.3		0.0		5.3	0.02	2.0	
<u>Crime Dollars</u> *														
Robbery	47	19	2.6	0.1	73	69	0.0		2.5	0.1	0.7		0.4	
Burglary	369	208	11.4	0.001	405	476	0.7		3.9	0.05	1.0		6.3	0.01
Theft	272	235	0.7		247	235	0.1		0.1		0.7		0.2	
Total	736	507	9.1	0.003	886	926	0.1		6.4	0.01	1.7		3.5	0.06

Table 1. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=148)</u>				<u>White (N=104)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>NS</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>NS</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	58.4	48.1	12.0	0.0007	44.8	36.1	7.4	0.008	11.2	0.0009	18.2	0.0001	0.1	
For Profit	20.5	18.7	0.6		16.8	15.2	0.4		1.5		0.0			
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	86	66	0.9		97	127	0.1		0.5		0.0		0.3	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	39.0	47.3	9.5	0.002	42.4	45.6	1.2		0.1		8.1	0.005	1.6	
Receiving Welfare	7.7	5.9	1.8		5.8	4.5	1.7		0.3		3.5	0.06	0.1	
On Methadone Maintenance	11.5	17.1	7.2	0.008	12.3	20.6	8.8	0.004	1.0		16.5	0.0001	0.6	
Married	43.2	39.9	1.2		25.9	28.2	0.6		11.3	0.0009	0.1		1.7	
Common Law Spouse	23.8	31.2	8.0	0.006	22.8	33.6	11.3	0.001	0.0		19.5	0.0001	0.7	
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	49	64	13.2	0.0004	61	73	4.6	0.03	2.5	0.1	15.6	0.0001	0.1	
Welfare *	23	17	2.4	0.1	20	13	1.5		0.2		3.8	0.05	0.0	

* per month

** per week

NS = Non-supervised

S = Supervised

Table 2. Effects of Supervision With and Without Urine Testing on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=76)</u>				<u>White (N=55)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>NT</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>NT</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use</u> *														
Abstinent	12.7	18.7	2.0		10.0	26.1	18.8	0.0001	0.5		13.6	0.0003	2.8	0.1
One to Six Times/Week	11.0	24.9	11.3	0.001	12.3	18.2	3.0	0.09	0.7		12.2	0.0007	2.0	
Daily	73.7	53.0	15.9	0.0002	73.3	48.2	25.0	0.0001	0.3		37.8	0.0001	0.4	
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use</u> *														
Marijuana	7.9	7.0	1.1		10.3	11.8	0.5		0.7		0.1		1.4	
Alcohol	26.4	31.5	1.8		22.5	26.0	0.7		0.6		2.3	0.1	0.1	
<u>Number of fixes</u> *														
	69.5	53.3	6.2	0.02	74.4	48.3	18.7	0.0001	0.0		21.0	0.0001	1.1	
<u>Percent Time Property Crime</u> *														
Robbery	3.1	2.0	0.4		2.2	2.2	0.0		0.1		0.2		0.2	
Burglary	26.4	18.6	3.3	0.07	25.7	18.9	1.9		0.0		5.0	0.03	0.0	
Theft	33.9	25.2	3.2	0.08	26.3	19.7	1.7		1.4		4.6	0.03	0.1	
Total	44.1	36.5	2.4	0.1	51.1	35.3	7.8	0.007	0.2		9.7	0.002	1.2	
<u>Number of Crime Days</u> *														
Robbery	0.1	0.2	0.4		0.0	0.2	1.1		0.0		1.7		0.6	
Burglary	3.4	3.0	0.3		2.7	3.0	0.1		0.2		0.0		0.4	
Theft	6.2	4.5	2.7	0.1	5.8	4.2	2.2	0.1	0.1		4.6	0.03	0.0	
Total	9.6	7.7	2.3	0.1	11.0	6.8	8.0	0.007	0.0		9.7	0.002	1.3	
<u>Crime Dollars</u> *														
Robbery	13	38	1.4		15	34	0.6		0.0		1.9		0.0	
Burglary	270	276	0.0		342	471	0.6		1.6		0.6		0.5	
Theft	369	182	3.9	0.05	375	267	1.7		0.3		5.0	0.03	0.4	
Total	683	542	0.9		1,027	861	0.8		3.6	0.06	1.7		0.0	

Table 2. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=76)</u>				<u>White (N=55)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>NT</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>NT</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	53.4	51.5	0.1		44.5	33.7	2.5	0.1	6.2	0.01	1.8		0.9	
For Profit	19.9	15.7	1.0		17.3	11.8	1.9		0.6		2.6	0.1	0.1	
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	40	57	0.8		38	202	1.0		1.0		1.6		1.0	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	37.4	40.8	0.5		39.0	49.8	4.5	0.04	1.0		4.2	0.04	1.1	
Receiving Welfare	4.9	6.7	0.6		3.0	3.6	0.1		1.0		0.6		0.2	
On Methadone Maintenance	4.9	21.9	21.4	0.0001	4.7	18.7	10.6	0.002	0.4		29.9	0.0001	0.3	
Married	29.8	42.2	8.8	0.004	17.8	31.4	6.3	0.02	3.5	0.06	14.9	0.0002	0.0	
Common Law Spouse	25.4	35.5	6.2	0.01	19.8	34.1	6.6	0.01	0.4		13.2	0.0004	0.4	
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	42	55	4.5	0.04	55	79	5.8	0.02	4.1	0.05	11.1	0.001	1.0	
Welfare *	11	19	1.3		9	9	0.0		0.8		0.7		0.7	

* per month

** per week

NT = No Testing

T = Testing

Table 3. Effects of Intensive Supervision on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=55)</u>				<u>White (N=48)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>REG</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>REG</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use*</u>														
Abstinent	14.2	18.2	0.6		21.3	18.4	0.4		0.9		0.0		0.9	
One to Six Times/Week	16.4	19.2	0.4		16.2	24.3	2.4	0.1	0.4		2.6	0.1	0.6	
Daily	68.6	59.1	1.8		57.7	54.3	0.2		2.2	0.1	1.7		0.4	
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use*</u>														
Marijuana	7.2	7.2	0.0		15.1	14.2	0.1		2.3	0.1	0.1		0.0	
Alcohol	20.6	27.5	1.9		22.1	24.2	0.2		0.0		1.6		0.4	
<u>Number of fixes*</u>														
	66.6	55.4	2.0		57.1	54.1	0.1		0.6		1.6		0.5	
<u>Percent Time Property Crime*</u>														
Robbery	0.9	0.4	0.5		4.9	4.1	0.1							
Burglary	30.4	20.3	2.9	0.09	32.8	30.7	0.1		1.1		2.1		0.9	
Theft	28.3	17.4	3.9	0.05	15.5	11.8	0.7		3.9	0.05	4.0	0.05	1.9	
Total	50.2	32.7	6.3	0.01	43.0	37.3	1.0		0.0		6.4	0.01	1.6	
<u>Number of Crime Days*</u>														
Robbery	0.0	0.0	0.7		0.1	0.1	0.1		2.0		0.5		0.0	
Burglary	5.1	3.2	2.2	0.1	4.9	4.6	0.1		0.2		1.7		1.0	
Theft	4.7	2.9	2.8	0.1	3.7	2.7	0.6		0.3		2.8	0.09	0.3	
Total	9.7	6.4	3.8	0.06	8.6	7.2	1.0		0.0		4.4	0.04	0.7	
<u>Crime Dollars*</u>														
Robbery	4	3	0.0		15	44	0.8		2.8	0.1	0.8		0.9	
Burglary	417	347	0.3		884	599	0.8		3.5	0.06	1.1		0.4	
Theft	191	165	0.3		273	151	1.0		0.2		1.4		0.6	
Total	764	557	1.2		1289	923	1.2		3.0	0.09	2.4	0.1	0.2	

Table 3. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=55)</u>				<u>White (N=48)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>REG</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>REG</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	53.6	55.6	0.1		39.8	38.4	0.1		5.2	0.02	0.0		0.2	
For Profit	20.5	18.9	0.1		15.8	16.2	0.0		0.6		0.0		0.1	
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	66	57	0.1		56	425	1.1		1.1		1.2		1.4	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	40.3	43.9	0.3		40.2	44.1	0.5		0.0		0.8		0.0	
Receiving Welfare	5.8	8.7	0.7		7.1	3.2	2.2	0.1	0.4		0.1		2.3	0.1
On Methadone Maintenance	13.1	23.1	3.6	0.06	19.1	13.0	1.1		0.4		0.2		4.2	0.04
Married	36.0	34.0	0.1		22.5	29.5	1.1		1.8		0.3		1.1	
Common Law Spouse	35.6	32.5	0.3		38.1	34.9	0.1		0.2		0.4		0.0	
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	53	63	1.1		57	69	2.4	0.1	0.2		2.9	0.09	0.0	
Welfare *	17	31	1.4		19	15	0.3		0.4		0.4		1.5	

* per month

REG = Non-OPS supervision with testing

** per week

OPS = Outpatient Status supervision

Table 4. Effects of Low versus High Testing on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=96)</u>				<u>White (N=71)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use*</u>														
Abstinent	11.7	18.2	3.2	0.08	23.3	19.1	0.9		4.3	0.04	0.2		3.5	0.06
One to Six Times/Week	18.0	25.7	3.6	0.06	20.2	14.4	0.6		2.1	0.1	0.09		4.8	0.03
Daily	67.6	52.2	8.04	0.006	51.7	63.7	4.3	0.04	0.3		0.2		11.6	0.0008
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use*</u>														
Marijuana	7.0	6.3	0.6		12.9	11.9	0.1		2.4	0.1	0.4		0.0	
Alcohol	27.5	28.7	0.1		20.8	19.4	0.1		2.2	0.1	0.0		0.2	
<u>Number of fixes*</u>														
	62.1	47.6	7.3	0.008	50.6	62.7	2.5	0.1	0.1		0.07		8.6	0.004
<u>Percent Time Property Crime*</u>														
Robbery	1.8	0.6	1.2		1.5	1.1	8.2		0.01		1.1		0.3	
Burglary	17.8	17.7	0.0		22.5	33.2	6.3	0.01	5.0	0.03	4.0	0.05	4.1	0.04
Theft	25.3	19.3	2.5	0.1	16.5	22.6	3.8	0.06	0.4		0.0		5.4	0.02
Total	38.3	31.5	2.7	0.1	34.6	47.7	9.4	0.003	1.5		1.1		10.7	0.001
<u>Number of Crime Days*</u>														
Robbery	0.1	0.0	1.5		0.1	0.0	1.3		0.2		2.5	0.1	0.0	
Burglary	2.9	3.2	0.2		4.0	5.3	1.9	3.5	0.1		1.8		0.7	
Theft	5.1	3.8	2.2	0.1	3.3	4.6	2.4	0.1	0.3		0.0		4.3	0.04
Total	8.2	6.9	1.3		7.6	9.3	2.6	0.1	0.5		0.1		3.4	0.07
<u>Crime Dollars*</u>														
Robbery	18	13	0.1		28	3	1.9		0.0		1.3		0.6	
Burglary	261	343	0.9		499	1013	5.0	0.03	6.9	0.01	7.2	0.008	3.8	0.05
Theft	242	212	0.2		167	253	1.3		0.05		0.3		1.1	
Total	583	583	0.0		846	1364	4.2	0.05	6.4	0.01	3.9	0.05	3.9	0.05

Table 4. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=96)</u>				<u>White (N=71)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	52.4	52.1	0.0		40.4	45.2	1.1		3.0	0.09	0.4		0.5	
For Profit	19.4	20.3	0.08		16.7	16.9	0.0		0.6		0.1		0.0	
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	48	53	0.1		203	60	1.0		1.5		1.2		1.4	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	39.3	39.2	0.0		43.4	39.4	0.8		0.2		0.4		0.4	
Receiving Welfare	7.6	7.1	0.1		4.4	4.7	0.0		1.0		0.0		0.1	
On Methadone Maintenance	20.4	18.5	0.2		20.0	13.0	2.3	0.1	0.9		1.9		0.7	
Married	35.9	39.3	1.0		29.7	26.7	0.4		2.5	0.1	0.0		1.3	
Common Law Spouse	40.3	33.1	4.0	0.05	35.7	34.3	0.1		0.1		2.5	0.1	1.1	
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	57	55	0.1		71	64	0.8		0.3		0.7		0.3	
Welfare *	18	19	0.0		13	15	0.0		0.1		0.3		1.8	

* per month

** per week

LOW = Low testing, i.e. 1 or 2 times per month

HIGH = High testing, i.e. 3,4 or more times per month

Table 5. Effects of Low versus High Testing Non-OPS Supervision on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=35)</u>				<u>White (N=29)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use</u> *														
Abstinent	10.4	10.6	0.0		22.0	24.8	0.2		7.4	0.008	0.1		0.1	
One to Six Times/Week	16.8	20.5	0.3		21.6	6.7	6.3	0.02	0.8		1.3		3.6	0.06
Daily	69.4	66.3	0.1		52.4	65.8	2.0		1.4		0.6		1.6	
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use</u> *														
Marijuana	8.6	5.5	1.2		13.8	10.9	0.2		0.8		0.7		0.0	
Alcohol	33.8	29.0	0.6		21.2	13.1	1.9		2.3	0.1	2.1		0.1	
<u>Number of fixes</u> *														
	70.2	63.2	0.4		53.3	62.1	0.6		0.9		0.0		1.0	
<u>Percent Time Property Crime</u> *														
Robbery	4.6	1.1	1.5		0.0	0.6	1.0		1.9		0.9		1.7	
Burglary	21.4	15.4	1.7		14.5	23.5	1.5		0.0		0.1		3.2	0.08
Theft	17.7	14.2	0.4		20.8	31.0	2.5	0.1	1.6		0.7		2.8	0.1
Total	33.2	25.8	1.9		36.9	47.5	1.7		1.9		0.1		3.6	0.06
<u>Number of Crime Days</u> *														
Robbery	0.3	0.1	1.6		0.0	0.0	1.0		2.1		1.1		1.6	
Burglary	4.0	3.7	0.1		3.5	4.5	0.3		0.0		0.1		0.4	
Theft	3.0	3.6	0.2		4.8	5.6	0.2		1.1		0.4		0.0	
Total	7.6	6.7	0.2		8.6	10.3	0.5		0.9		0.1		0.7	
<u>Crime Dollars</u> *														
Robbery	48	36	0.1		0	17	1.0		1.4		0.0		0.3	
Burglary	374	362	0.0		745	989	0.8		1.3		0.7		0.8	
Theft	89	121	0.5		245	255	0.0		2.7		0.2		0.1	
Total	526	521	0.0		1178	1378	0.4		2.7	0.1	0.3		0.4	

Table 5. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=35)</u>				<u>White (N=29)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	58.1	61.5	0.2		40.4	50.0	1.0		2.7		1.1		0.2	
For Profit	15.8	28.2	2.9	0.1	22.8	15.7	0.8		0.1		0.2		3.3	0.07
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	61	91	0.7		52	33	1.0		1.3		0.1		1.3	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	40.2	31.0	1.4		42.9	40.5	0.1		0.6		1.1		0.4	
Receiving Welfare	6.7	6.2	0.3		6.3	8.1	0.2		0.0		0.1		0.3	
On Methadone Maintenance	17.6	19.9	0.1		13.1	9.1	0.3		2.2	0.1	0.0		0.3	
Married	27.8	29.1	0.1		32.2	22.1	3.7		0.0		1.5		2.4	0.1
Common Law Spouse	49.7	45.3	0.5		41.3	53.1	2.7	0.1	0.0		0.6		2.8	0.1
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	60	43	1.5		60	63	0.1		0.4		0.4		1.0	
Welfare *	16	15	0.0		17	22	0.1		0.1		0.1		0.1	

* per month

** per week

LOW = Low testing, i.e. 1 or 2 times per month

HIGH = High testing, i.e. 3, 4 or more times per month

Table 6. Effects of Low versus High Testing during OPS Intensive Supervision on Drug Use, Crime and Self-Reported Behavior

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=62)</u>				<u>White (N=48)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Use</u> *														
Abstinent	11.8	20.4	3.3	0.07	16.0	15.8	0.0		0.0		1.4		1.6	
One to Six Times/Week	16.5	29.3	6.1	0.02	18.5	18.4	0.0		1.1		2.6	0.1	2.7	0.1
Daily	68.4	46.5	10.6	0.002	59.9	64.2	0.4		0.6		3.1	0.08	6.9	0.01
<u>Percent Time Other Drug Use</u> *														
Marijuana	4.9	6.4	0.9		13.1	12.8	0.0		2.6	0.1	0.1		0.2	
Alcohol	22.9	28.4	1.1		18.4	19.5	0.1		1.2		0.9		0.4	
<u>Number of fixes</u> *	58.9	42.9	7.7	0.008	57.0	61.6	0.2		1.8		1.1		3.4	0.07
<u>Percent Time Property Crime</u> *														
Robbery	0.9	0.3	0.5		2.2	0.6	2.4	0.1	1.0		2.9	0.09	0.7	
Burglary	13.6	16.9	0.6		30.0	34.8	0.7		9.2	0.003	1.3		0.0	
Theft	25.1	20.6	0.8		17.5	21.2	0.8		0.4		0.0		1.4	
Total	35.3	32.2	0.3		37.5	45.3	1.6		1.5		0.3		1.7	
<u>Number of Crime Days</u> *														
Robbery	0.0	0.0	0.9		0.1	0.0	1.5		1.9		2.3	0.1	1.6	
Burglary	2.4	2.8	0.2		4.8	5.4	0.2		5.5	0.02	0.4		0.0	
Theft	5.4	3.6	2.6	0.1	3.5	4.3	0.8		0.2		0.4		3.0	0.09
Total	7.9	6.4	1.0		8.2	8.7	0.2		0.6		0.2		0.9	
<u>Crime Dollars</u> *														
Robbery	3	0	1.9		26	1	1.9		2.0		3.0	0.09	1.8	
Burglary	239	331	0.6		503	938	2.1		5.3	0.02	3.2	0.08	1.4	
Theft	300	263	0.1		155	170	0.1		1.6		0.0		0.1	
Total	591	617	0.0		819	1185	1.1		3.1	0.08	1.1		0.9	

Table 6. Continued

	<u>Status Effects by Race</u>								<u>Race, Status and Status * Race Effects</u>					
	<u>Chicano (N=62)</u>				<u>White (N=48)</u>				<u>Race</u>		<u>Status</u>		<u>Status*Race</u>	
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>pr(F)</u>
<u>Percent Time Drug Dealing</u> *														
General	53.3	47.5	1.2		42.5	49.7	1.5		0.4		0.0		2.7	0.1
For Profit	21.7	18.7	0.5		13.5	20.8	2.9	0.09	0.3		0.5		2.9	0.09
<u>Drug Dealing Income</u> *	47	43	0.1		53	87	0.3		0.6		0.3		0.5	
<u>Percent time</u> *														
Employed	41.8	45.8	0.5		38.4	33.2	0.7		1.6		0.0		1.2	
Receiving Welfare	6.3	3.6	1.0		4.6	4.8	0.0		0.0		0.3		0.4	
On Methadone Maintenance	20.3	18.4	0.1		18.7	16.1	0.2		0.2		0.4		0.0	
Married	40.6	38.8	0.2		25.9	25.5	0.0		3.6	0.06	0.1		0.0	
Common Law Spouse	33.7	31.1	0.5		30.2	25.2	0.9		0.4		1.4		0.1	
<u>Income</u>														
Employment **	64	65	0.0		68	56	1.7		0.0		0.8		1.0	
Welfare *	15	8	0.6		23	18	0.1		0.7		0.3		0.0	

* per month

** per week

LOW =


HIGH =

Low testing, i.e. 1 or 2 times per month

High testing, i.e. 3, 4 or more times per month

Figure 1

TYPE OF LEGAL SUPERVISION BY RACE



Supv = Probation or parole
 Test = Probation or parole with testing
 OPS = CAP Outpatient status, intensive supervision with testing





Figure 2

LEVEL OF LEGAL SUPERVISION BY RACE



Test = Probation or parole with testing
 No OPS = Probation or parole with testing, not OPS
 OPS = CAP Outpatient status, intensive supervision with testing

