

The Outlook for Youth in the 1980's

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THE OUTLOOK FOR YOUTH IN THE 1980's

Prepared for

U. S. Department of Justice

The Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention

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FOREWORD

Our society is changing at a rate never before experienced. Demographic, economic, social, cultural, and educational trends are forcing changes in our families and society. Our youth, having experienced less of the past, are most susceptible to these trends. Their attitudes, values and behaviors are changing as a result.

As practitioners committed to assisting and guiding youth we must understand these changes. Our effectiveness depends upon it. We must design our courts, corrections, and community service programs based on an understanding of youth. Our everyday efforts to reintegrate troubled youth into a productive society succeed or fail depending upon the breadth of our understanding. And the future is fast upon us. We must anticipate the effect that changing society will have on our youth. Service providers, governors, legislators, and agency administrator must make decision now on how best to respond to tomorrow's troubled youth.

This document is meant to assist decision-makers, planners, and practitioners focus on-going activities and design new efforts to assist youth. It presents trends in seven areas which will effect youth attitudes, values, and behaviors. It is offered in the hope that anticipating tomorrow's problems today will make our efforts more effective and assist our next generation to be the most productive of all.

Sincerely,

David D. West
David West

Director, Formula Grants
and Technical Assistance Division

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THE OUTLOOK FOR YOUTH IN THE 1980's

OVERVIEW

This document deals with the key trends affecting youth in the 1980s and their potential public policy implications. It focuses on the 14-24 age group, although many of the trends described will have major impacts on the entire U.S. population.

We began by identifying several dozen major and minor forces affecting youth and grouped them together to select "key driving forces" -- those issues most critical to the future of the 1980s youth population. These include:

- Demographics
- Youth employment
- Role of schools/education
- Family structure and culture
- Youth life-styles
- Income distribution
- Education and technology

The next step was to prepare an "issue paper" on each of the key driving forces. The heart of each issue paper is a description of "base case" trends and possible alternative trends. The base case outlook for each issue is a possible and plausible evolution of current conditions -- it is not meant to be a hard and fast forecast of the only possible future. Indeed, there are many possible, though perhaps less plausible, alternatives for each key driving force, and some of these also are described in each issue paper.

The issue papers also include "wild cards" and linkages. Wild cards are isolated, discontinuous events which could dramatically alter the direction of the trends described (the 1973 OPEC oil linkage was a "wild card" that upset the careful plans of every public and private entity in the U.S.). We list linkages because the key driving forces are not independent of each other. If we assume that one of the alternatives for a particular driving force should, in fact, be the base case, corresponding changes will have to be made in the other base case trends.

Each of the key driving forces is described against a background of no significant changes from current conditions. Specifically:

- U.S. economic growth will average 2-2.5% per year, with continued growth of the "information economy" and decline of traditional basic industries;
- there will be no significant energy or other resource constraints;
- there will be no radical changes in form of government, social values, or population structure; and
- technology will not radically alter the way we live.

After we defined these key issues affecting youth, we began to enumerate their implications for major public policy areas. The approach here was to state the generally accepted outlook in each area of public policy and then to suggest ways in which the base case trends might alter the common wisdom.

The purpose of this work has been to suggest how and why the environment of youth in the 1980's may change and potential public policy decisions that may be required as a consequence. What we have done is only the beginning.

DEMOGRAPHICS

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- What are the demographic characteristics of the 1980's youth generation?
- What will be the primary differences between the "baby bust" youth of the 1980's and the "baby boom" youth of the 1960's and 1970's?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends


- Today's youth (ages 14-24) were born between 1959 and 1969. The oldest members of this group were born during the tail end of the baby boom which peaked in 1957 and "officially" ended in 1964. By the end of the decade, the entire youth population will consist of members of the baby bust group.
- Much of what is written about the baby boom generation -- their affluence, life-styles, and influence on popular culture -- concerns the older members of this generation, the people now in their late 20's and 30's. The "late boomers," now in their late teens and early 20's, represent a different set of values and behaviors. It is the older group that believes it has a right to self-fulfillment and the ability to achieve it. The younger boomers are the ones who believe in the "ideology of scarcity" -- nothing is guaranteed and the future is more likely to be worse than better.
- The most striking change in the youth population in the past decade has been the sharp increase in the share of minority youth. The share of the youth population identified as white was 88% in 1960, 87% in 1970, and 81% in 1980. Relatively higher birth rates accounted for a gradual increase in the share of black youth. The most significant change in the decade of the 1970's was the dramatic increase (from only 1% to 6%) in the share of "other" -- primarily Asian. This, in turn, reflects both increased immigration and a change in immigration patterns. More than one-third of all (legal) immigrants in the 1970's were from Asia, versus only 10% during the 1960's.

- The other significant demographic trends of the 1970's pertain to the population as a whole:
 - the actual birth rate was some 17% lower than the lowest of four "standard" projections made in the 1960's
 - average life expectancy rose by 3.4 years versus a projection of 0.5 years
 - the average household size in 1980 (2.76 persons) was below the lowest of eight alternative projections
 - the regional shift to the south and west occurred more rapidly than expected
 - there was a revival of rural and small town population growth
 - illegal and refugee immigration grew in importance.

III. Base Case Trends

- The youth of the 1980's have already been born, so there are no major demographic surprises in the offing. As shown in the following chart, the absolute size of the youth population will decrease substantially and the increase in the share of minority youth will continue. In fact, the chart understates the proportion of minority youth because it excludes immigration after 1980.
- It is estimated that the U.S. will continue to accept some 500,000 legal immigrants a year, with at least the same number of illegal immigrants. The vast majority of these immigrants will be Hispanic and Asian, and some 20-25% of them will fall into the "youth" age bracket.
- The trend to increase racial segregation in central cities will continue, due at least as much to relative differences in ethnic group birth rates as "white flight". In many major metropolitan school districts, minorities are now the majority.

**THE YOUTH POPULATION:
(ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS AGED 15-24)**



* ALSO INCLUDED IN WHITE, BLACK, OR OTHER
NOTE: BASED ON 1980 CENSUS DATA — EXCLUDES IMMIGRATION

- Despite predictions of a "baby boom echo," the birth rate will remain low; however, the number of births will increase because of the increase in potential mothers. Births to both very young and very old (by traditional standards) mothers will account for a larger share of total births.
- The "demography is destiny" theory holds that generation size is one of the major determinants of economic well-being -- members of large generations are relatively less well off than members of small generations. In fact, many 1980's youth will fare better than baby boomers despite a currently pessimistic outlook about income and employment options. However, media and government attention will continue to focus on the baby boomers throughout their lives, simply because of the sheer size of this group.

IV. Alternative Trends

The only significant area of alternatives is the level and composition of immigration.

- High unemployment may lead to strict limits on legal immigration and stepped up measures to control illegal immigration -- increased border patrols, identity cards, employer sanctions, etc. This would increase the number of jobs available for unskilled youth.
- Continued deterioration of the Mexican economy may change the nature of illegal immigration and, thus, the composition of the youth population. In the past, the majority of illegal immigrants have been men who come to the U.S. to work for a short time and then return home to their families. It has recently been reported that many more illegals are bringing their families with them, intending to stay permanently.

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- Will there be enough jobs to absorb the young people entering the labor force in the 1980's?
- What kinds of jobs will there be, and what skills and training will be required to fill them?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- Throughout the 1970's and early 1980's, young people aged 16-24 accounted for almost one-quarter of the U.S. labor force and roughly one-half of the unemployed.
- The total youth unemployment rate has averaged about twice the rate for the total labor force. Teenagers (16-19) experience about 50% more unemployment than those aged 20-24, and the unemployment rate for minority teenagers has not fallen below 30% the last decade.
- It has increasingly been recognized that while some youth unemployment, particularly among teenagers, is transitional in nature--that is, people seeking a limited number of after-school or summer jobs -- much of it is structural. This structural unemployment is due to, among other things, dropouts and even high school (and occasionally college) graduates without the functional skills necessary to perform or even find a job, changes in the structure of the labor market that result in fewer and fewer opportunities for those with limited education, and the movement of manufacturing jobs from central cities to suburbs.
- Competition for entry level jobs has been intensified by the influx of married women into the labor force and into non-traditional jobs. During the 1970's, the overall female labor force participation rate increased by more than eight percentage points while the male rate fell by more than two.
- In the midst of these problems and widespread pessimism about future economic/job opportunities for today's youth, there are some entry level

workers who receive dozens of job offers at fabulous salaries because they possess the currently "hot" degrees -- currently, computer science and electrical engineering; a few years ago, petroleum geology and business administration.

- Despite continued media attention, youth unemployment has not been getting worse relative to total unemployment. In fact, their relationship has not changed significantly despite large increases in youth labor force participation. To a large degree, the concern over youth unemployment reflects a widening gap between white and minority youth rates.

III. Base Case Trends

- Underlying demographics point to improving prospects for aggregate youth employment throughout the 1980s.
 - The number of people turning 18 will decline in almost every year of the decade. There will be some 900,000 fewer 18-year-olds in 1990 than in 1980.
 - Both business and military manpower planners have become increasingly aware of and concerned about the anticipated youth shortage.
 - The rate and number of married women reentering the labor force will slow from the level of the 1970's.
- Despite this generally optimistic aggregate employment outlook, the structural problems of the 1970's will continue and, in fact, be intensified, increasing the stratification of the youth labor force into three groups:
 - generally easily employable, well paid, well educated, professional and technical workers
 - generally moderately employable (i.e., subject to periodic layoff and replacement) poorly paid, adequately educated, clerical and service workers

- generally unemployable, poorly educated, and predominantly inner city youth without job skills or training.

- Underlying economic forces will exacerbate this stratification.

- Continued shift toward an "information/service economy" requiring college or technical training for "good" jobs.

- Ongoing loss of traditional, union-dominated heavy industry jobs which historically provided opportunities and relatively high incomes for lower-middle-class youth.

- Increasing automation and "deskilling" of clerical and service jobs, reducing both skill requirements and wage levels (e.g., a MacDonald's clerk need not be able to handle numbers and make change -- he merely pushes buttons with pictures of the items ordered and the automated register computes price and change due the customer).

- Growing "location mismatch" at the lower end of the labor market. The largest share of less skilled youth will live in central cities, but more and more of the available jobs (light manufacturing and large clerical operations) will be located in the suburbs.

- While there will be less competition for jobs within the youth population, there will be increasing competition with older age groups.

- Competition with new immigrants (legal and illegal) for unskilled, low-wage jobs.

- Competition with "displaced" manufacturing workers for the better (i.e., well paid) unskilled or semi-skilled jobs (and also for places in public and private job training programs).

- Competition with retired people seeking part-time employment in all job categories.
- Employers will become more involved in training entry-level employees, either directly or through local school systems.
 - "Remedial" language and math training for new clerical employees.
 - Developing programs for teaching technical skills directly related to specific jobs with high schools and community colleges.
- At the upper end of the job market, the mix of opportunities will continue to shift toward math, science, and computers. At least through the mid-1980's, the "hot" post graduate fields of recent years -- business, law, medicine -- will be oversupplied with baby boomers willing to take jobs usually held by beginners. Teaching will make a comeback, driven by a growing number of grade school-aged children and financial and non-financial incentives to improve teacher quality.
- "Telecommuting" and other novel job arrangements will not have a significant effect on youth employment.
 - Companies will be most willing to offer these options to longer-term, trusted employees.
 - Increasing automation of administrative and clerical jobs will produce greater segmentation and "routinization," tying workers more closely to standardized work places and schedules.
- Minority youth unemployment will continue to be an "issue," but it will get more press than action.
 - Generally more conservative political climate.
 - Recognition that structural unemployment cannot be addressed with short-term programs.

- Unemployment among "displaced" industrial workers will generally be perceived as a more pressing problem and will receive first priority in funding.

IV. Alternative Trends

- Creation of a universal National Youth Service Program. All young people turning 18 would be required to spend one or two years in some form of national service, with options to choose the military, Peace Corps, VISTA, youth conservation corps, or similar programs. Younger teenagers (school leavers) could enter the program at 16 or 17, but high school graduates would routinely be expected to complete their service before starting college. Program participants would be paid (with wages set according to manpower requirements of the various elements) and would receive housing, training, and G.I. Bill-type education benefits. In this alternative, "youth unemployment" disappears almost overnight, and the training, education, and greater mobility provided by the program gradually narrow the gap between white and minority youth employment prospects.
- All-out pursuit of "reindustrialization," characterized by government-directed subsidies and programs to preserve and increase manufacturing employment, particularly in industries important to "national security," "target jobs credits," investment tax credits, "enterprise zones," etc. The resulting growth in manufacturing jobs will provide entry-level opportunities for youth without professional/technical skills. However, workers in these jobs will suffer periodic unemployment (last hired, first fired), and ultimately permanent loss of their jobs. (Trends in the several European countries that have attempted to shore up declining manufacturing industries suggests that this is at best a short-term proposition.) Under this alternative, young workers may ultimately be worse off than in the base case, since the overall economy would be weaker and individuals would have passed up alternative training and career opportunities.
- The "Coming Boom" alternative. In Herman Kahn's optimistic scenario, a revitalized American economy will grow at 3% or more per year during the 1980's,

with cyclical recovery, low inflation, rapid growth and leadership in a broad spectrum of high technology industries, and a long-term capital boom. Under this alternative, there will be much more concern over the youth shortage than youth unemployment. Large corporations will be willing to invest large amounts of time and money (perhaps as much as one year) in training entry workers simply to ensure that they have enough competent people to fill jobs. Smaller businesses will support youth training through cooperative programs at local schools. Income levels will rise for all workers, but young workers will be relatively better off than the baby boomers because there are fewer of them to go around.

V. Wild Cards

- Establishment of a "youth sub-minimum wage," yielding jobs for young workers at the expense of older ones.
- Reestablishment of a military draft.
- Minority youth hiring quotas for large corporations.
- A technology breakthrough that eliminates millions of service/clerical jobs -- speech recognition, word processors, widespread shop-at-home systems, acceptance of teleconferencing in place of business travel.
- Revival of Depression era attitudes toward work -- any job is a good job.

VI. Linkages to Other Key Issues

Youth employment is closely tied to:

- The role of schools/education (i.e., functional literacy, job training, and credentialing).
- Family structure and the expectation that most married women will work outside the home.
- Income distribution.
- Education technology.
- Demographics, particularly levels of immigration.

ROLE OF SCHOOLS/EDUCATION

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- What will be the principle mission(s) of schools and colleges in the 1980's:
 - education/training for jobs and citizenship
 - transmission of values
 - furthering public policy/social goals?
- How/to what extent will public education be supported?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- From the mid-1960's to the late 1970's, public schools were charged with implementing programs to provide greater social equality for numerous "disadvantaged" groups:
 - desegregation -- busing, magnet schools, etc.
 - "mainstreaming" the physically and learning disabled
 - bilingual education
 - social promotion.
- During the same period, the baby boomers, with a value system based on self-fulfillment, put pressure on schools and colleges to change structures and curricula:
 - fewer requirements, more electives
 - "relevance"
 - move away from traditional academic disciplines
 - "grade inflation."
- In the past few years, education structure and curriculum have begun to swing back to the "basics," driven by:
 - well-publicized declines in standardized test scores

- reports that high schools, and even colleges, are graduating functional or total illiterates
- perceived declines in teacher quality
- employer complaints about the need to provide remedial training for new employees.
- At the same time, students are redefining the role of colleges:
 - away from traditional liberal education -- the educated/literate citizen
 - increased emphasis on "vocational" studies and short-term career development in preparation for a first job.

III. Base Case Trends

- Current trends toward basics, vocationalism, and functional literacy will continue, driven by the needs of the job market. "Functional literacy," the skills needed to work and function adequately in society, will be redefined to include computer skills and "keyboarding."
- There will be revival of "Sputnik fever," with increasing emphasis on math and science (including heavier math and science requirements for students at all levels) and greater willingness to devote resources to smart, "gifted" students, probably at the expense of some "special needs" programs.
- There will be increasing emphasis on "performance measurement" of students, teachers, and schools:
 - public schools will adopt "promotion gate" tests and will generally stop promoting and graduating students who do not meet minimum standards
 - at least some states will move toward competency testing for teachers, and will begin to challenge teacher tenure and

seniority guarantees. Teacher unions will be immobilized by conflicts within their memberships -- seniority vs. performance, pay differentials by discipline, job security vs. income.

- Colleges will continue to be regarded as sources of "vocational training" rather than education for its own sake, with growing emphasis on more cost-effective ways to accomplish this task:
 - computer-aided instruction
 - external degree programs
 - community colleges
 - work/study options.

- By the end of the 1980's, there may well be a backlash against "back to basics" and minimum competency tests because they focus the total education effort on learning "facts." The new direction would recognize the reality of "lifelong learning" and the need to retool job skills several times in one's working life. Its focus would be "life skills" -- learning how to learn, problem solving techniques -- with much less emphasis on facts. (The new direction will probably originate in the private schools and gradually move into the public school systems.)

- There will be growing resistance to spending money on public schools, particularly if the money comes from such visible sources as property taxes:
 - perception that the schools are not doing their job

 - fewer voters with children in the public schools (only about 20% today, down from 60% in the early 1950's)

 - increasing percentage of minority students, particularly in city schools.

- By the late 1980's, the "saving the schools" issue will be receiving the level of attention that saving Social Security is getting today. Debate will center on the implications for American democracy of

the collapse of a nearly universal public education system that transmitted a common body of information, experience, and values.

IV. Alternative Trends

- The "post-literacy" alternative. Awareness grows that the traditional "Three R's" are less and less useful or relevant in an "information economy." Arithmetic tasks are easily accomplished by computers, and writing and reading are less important when most information (personal and business) is transmitted in verbal or visual form. Reading and, particularly, writing at more than basic functional levels are increasingly perceived as optional skills for the well educated, much as Latin is today. Students bound for professional and technical careers will take "advanced" reading and writing. Others will focus on "computer literacy" and a variety of work/study programs. Under this alternative, the role of the schools will be to grope toward a new definition of literacy -- the skills and knowledge necessary to participate in society.
- The autonomous learner alternative. Driven by such things as the rising costs of traditional schools and colleges, a lack of enough truly good teachers, and the proliferation of computer-aided instruction technology, first colleges, then high schools, and finally grade schools change the definition of "school" from a place to an activity. Using such concepts as individualized instruction and "mastery learning," education programs are redesigned to be brought to the student rather than to have the student come to them (via cable television, personal computers, etc.). Students work at their own pace, and receive credits for units successfully mastered. Interactive technology allows students to question teachers, submit "papers, " and thus go beyond simple "right/wrong" computer teaching. Community computer centers ensure that all students have access to learning technology and provide "babysitting" for young children of working parents.

V. Wild Cards

- National or state-level adoption of education vouchers.
- Change in perceptions, leading to a return to the public schools.

- Downgrading of the value of a college degree as an employment credential.
- Legislation requiring private schools to take in their "fair share" of disadvantaged, problem, or minority pupils.

VI. Linkages to Other Key Issues

The role of education is linked to:

- Youth employment and career prospects.
- Use of technology in schools and technology training.
- Youth life styles.

FAMILY STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- How is the family and its function in society changing?
- How are the roles of men, women, and children within the family changing?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- Facts and statistics show that the "traditional nuclear family" is far from the norm today:
 - divorce, remarriage, and "blended families"
 - working mothers and househusbands
 - mothers who choose not to marry and single-parent adoptions
 - couples who remain childless by choice
 - "living together"
 - openly homosexual couples
 - communal living arrangements
- Acceptance of these alternatives to the traditional family has come more slowly than the reality, but the trend has been toward greater tolerance and the recognition that it is not possible to return to a society peopled by "Leave It to Beaver" families. More and more, a "family" is defined as a group of people who consider themselves a family.
- The majority of new families are being formed by members of the "baby boom" generation who typically have non-traditional attitudes toward family roles.
 - Both men and women express a desire for "egalitarian" marriages -- sharing everything from household chores to financial decisions equally.
 - Men are expected to be active fathers and to share child care tasks and responsibility (although women and men frequently have

different perceptions of just what constitutes an equal role in child care or housework).

- Parents don't expect to live for or through their children -- parents have rights, too.
- Children are being given more responsibility for contributing to the family at earlier ages.
 - Even in middle- and upper-income families, teenagers are expected to work to pay for entertainment, clothes, and cars and to contribute to their college education. (This trend also reflects the awareness that such work experience provides an "edge" in seeking full-time work later.)
 - Pre-teens whose mothers work outside the home, as is more often than not the case, are expected to take on more of the household chores -- shopping, cleaning, cooking, and caring for younger children.
- A combination of economic trends, more frequent divorces, and life-style expectations has led millions of adult children to return home to live with their parents.

III. Base Case Trends

- Because the proliferation of different types of families will continue, the trend will be to focus more and more on the individual, rather than the family, as the basic unit of society.
- Most people will marry, and remarry after divorce. As this "serial monogamy" becomes more common, children will have an easier time dealing with the effects of divorce -- children in single-parent homes will no longer be peculiar or singled out and embarrassed by such events as father-son dinners or schools texts that show nothing but middle-class, two-parent, two-child families. (Grade school children today appear to find nothing unusual in comparing the toys or food or furniture at "Daddy and Sue's" and "Mom and Ed's.")

- The choice not to have children will become increasingly common and more acceptable (except perhaps to prospective grandparents). It is estimated that as many as 25% of the women now in their 20s will never have children.
- The typical middle-class family will frequently be portrayed in the media as two attractive, active parents with interesting careers and one or, at most, two carefully planned, much loved children. At the same time, it is estimated that half of all children will spend at least part of their lives in homes with only one parent. The current situation -- that the majority of these one-parent families are headed by women and that women generally earn less than men -- will not change rapidly, implying that many children will spend at least part of their childhood in relatively poor circumstances.
- Despite efforts to bring children up without traditional perceptions of male and female sex roles, most will experience the reality that women still have primary responsibility for home and children. Today's teenaged girls appear to believe that they will ultimately have to choose between a career and a family. It may be that these girls are discouraged by seeing their mothers under tremendous pressure from a combination of very unglamorous "pink collar" jobs and attempts to live up to the "perfect housewife" standards they were taught.
- One of the consequences of the focus on individuals rather than families will be the greater willingness of outsiders to interfere in matters one considered the sole province of the family:
 - laws requiring or encouraging teachers to report suspected cases of child abuse
 - corporate programs that offer assistance to employees with personal problems (alcoholism, etc.) and may force workers to accept treatment as a condition of continued employment

- greater willingness by the courts to take new approaches in family matters -- giving fathers equal treatment in custody cases, ruling on grandparents' visitation rights, awarding "palimony" to unmarried partners, upholding children's rights, etc. In the future, there will be more litigation in areas treated as curiosities in the 1970's -- restitution for inadequate education, wrongful birth, parental malpractice, etc. State or national legislation may well follow a series of court cases.
- As the decade progresses, "family" and child advocates will have less influence on government and less claim on public funds.
 - Children, and families with children, will represent a decreasing share of total population.
 - As fewer households have children, more people will express the opinion that people who cannot afford to take care of children shouldn't have them.
 - An increasingly older population will be less tolerant of children and demand that parents enforce discipline and take responsibility for their children's actions.
 - While it will rarely be discussed openly, part of the reluctance to fund children's and family programs will be the fact that a greater and greater share of all children are numbers of minority groups, primarily Black and Hispanic.

IV. Alternative Trends

- The government involvement alternative. Based on the realization that there are relatively fewer children in the population (and, as noted above, significantly fewer white children), a national consensus is reached that the government should make it easier for families to have and raise children.

The program ultimately enacted is modeled on Scandinavian patterns and includes such things as much larger tax deductions and credits for families with children, universal maternity benefits, legislated maternity and paternity leaves, funding for workplace and community daycare centers, and extensions of "rights" to equal housing, employment, etc., to people with children. At the same time, since the objective of this program is the protection and support of children, the consensus will also support a greater willingness to remove children from "unfit" homes and generally closer scrutiny of family relationships. This environment also is likely to support such heretofore unacceptable actions as sterilization of "welfare mothers," mandatory counseling for abusive parents, restrictions on pregnant women's ability to work, and taking infants away from unwed teenage mothers.

- The traditional family alternative. The next cycle in social values produces a return to what is thought of as the "traditional family" -- child-centered; two, three, or four children; where it is okay, if not preferable, for the mother to stay at home with the children, at least until they are all in school. This reversal of current trends might be brought about by growing disillusionment of women with the financial and personal rewards of working outside the home, particularly in traditional female jobs, or by solid evidence that children of working mothers lag behind others in social or intellectual development. This alternative would generally be favorable for young people entering the labor force, but also require that both young men and young women rethink their career and life goals.

V. Wild Cards

- Parent "licensing".
- Trends for women to have children before beginning "serious" careers (in response to high rate of infertility among older parents).
- Legal means for parents and children to "divorce" each other -- emancipation of minors.
- Government penalties for large families (viz. Singapore).
- Relaxation of child labor laws or, conversely, greater restrictions on minors' ability to work.

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- Relaxation of child labor laws or, conversely, greater restrictions on minors' ability to work.

VI. Linkages to Other Key Issues

Family structure is linked to:

- youth employment
- demographic trends
- income distribution
- youth life-style

YOUTH LIFE-STYLES

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- What will be the dominant values and attitudes of youth in the 1980's?
- How will these values and attitudes affect youth life-styles in the areas of sex, drug use, and participation in the work force?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- The dominant value of the baby boom youth of the 1960's and 1970's was "entitlement to self-fulfillment." This group grew up in affluence and was the focus of all sorts of attention simply because of its size. With basic needs met, the baby boomers were free to focus on "relevance," fulfillment, self-expression, and social change, leading to the "sexual revolution," the counter-culture, "doing your own thing," and the "me generation."
- The youth of the 1980's have, in general, been brought up to believe in the "ideology of scarcity" -- energy crisis, inflation, recession, unemployment, government cutbacks, and the expectation that they will never be as well off as their parents. The result has been a tremendous sense of pessimism about the future -- in fact, many teenagers today are much more pessimistic than warranted by current conditions.
- This generally bleak outlook has led to many of the trends being observed in today's youth:
 - apparent political conservatism
 - almost fanatical pursuit of career education
 - a belief among teenage girls that they will have to choose between family and career
 - the nihilism and "anti-ness" expressed in punk rock

- young teenagers deliberately choosing to become pregnant and keep their babies to "have someone who loves me"
 - rising rates of youth suicide
 - less overall drug use, but many more cases of problem drug and alcohol use among very young teenagers.
- Despite the public outcry about teenage sex and pregnancy, birth rates declined for all age groups, including teenagers, during the 1970's. However, the birth rate for unmarried women has increased, due almost totally to the increased birth rate among unmarried women aged 15-19. In addition, like youth unemployment, teenage pregnancy is characterized by major differences along racial lines -- fewer than 10% of white births (in all age groups) are to unmarried mothers compared to almost 50% of minority births.

III. Base Case Trends

- The trend of increasing stratification in education and employment carries through into life-styles. Despite a generally pessimistic outlook, there are many young people who are very optimistic about their own personal prospects. These are the ones who are pursuing degrees and part-time jobs with single-minded attention to future careers and income. At the other end of the spectrum are those who have given up. They believe that "they" or "the system" have taken away the good life they had been promised, so why bother to try. These attitudes are not simply determined by current family situations. There are innumerable cases of children from upper-middle class families who are among the hopeless and inner-city minority children who have every expectation of achieving a good future.
- These 1980's youth will continue to be much less socially and politically active than the baby boomers. Those in the "hopeful" group believe that they must focus their attention and efforts on issues and activities that concern them directly. The "hopeless" believe that they are powerless to change anything. What has frequently been

interpreted as rising conservatism in young people is more likely a different perspective on the usefulness and efficacy of trying to change the world.

- Problem use of drugs and alcohol will increase, fueled by feelings that school is irrelevant to the real world, available jobs are boring and mechanical, and things aren't going to get any better. Virtually all teenagers will try common drugs and alcohol at least a few times, but the separation between heavy and casual users will widen.
- There will be no significant reversal of the trend of sexual activity among teenagers. However, there is likely to be a "mini-trend" toward saying no, prompted not by traditional moral sanctions but by greater awareness of venereal disease and the condition of older girls who had children while still in their teens. Over time, adults will accept (or at least become resigned to) the prevalence of teenage sex and increase efforts to improve sex education and use of birth control (i.e., if you can't be good, be careful).
- It is just possible that the children of baby boom parents, who themselves pioneered the sexual revolution and drug culture, will decide that flagrant pursuit of sex and drugs is an inappropriate expression of adolescent rebellion. It has frequently been observed that each generation has more in common with its grandparents than its parents, and it may be that the 1980's youth will express their rebellion by becoming neat, conservative, and conformist. (There is already a television comedy based on this premise.)
- Barring a technological breakthrough that would dramatically increase use of contraceptives, unmarried teenage girls will continue to become pregnant and have children. However, the number of potential teenage mothers will decline significantly, and there is no reason to believe that the teenage birth rate will increase (in fact, with improved educational efforts, it may well decrease). Therefore, the absolute number of pregnant teenagers, and the number of births to unmarried teenage mothers will decline. Births to teenage mothers will also decline as a percent of total births. Nonetheless, despite reduced numbers,

the essence of the problem will be the same -- the bleak future prospects -- economic and social -- for these mothers and their children.

- Despite these specific trends, youth life-styles will, in essence, remain what they have always been -- rebellion, fads, experimentation, and trying out different views of the future.

IV. Alternative Trends

- Return to optimism alternative. A few years of good news -- falling energy prices, disinflation, reports of labor shortages and rising wages, new technological breakthroughs -- restore faith in the future and progress. With this revival of hope, the 1980's youth will behave much like the 1960s group -- both groups have been taught to want the same things; the differences in behavior reflect the fact that the 1980's generation believe they will never be able to have those things. Young people no longer worried about securing their own futures will return to trying to effect social change. However, the experience of the last few years will cause them to work from within "the system," unlike the anti-establishment forces of the 1960's. The model for youth values under this alternative might be the Greens party in Germany, who have not only held demonstrations against nuclear weapons and pollution, but have also made a serious effort to make their point via the political process.
- The nihilist alternative. This alternative is the obverse of the one described above. As noted, many teenagers today are personally quite hopeful despite general pessimism. However, continued bad news, brought about by a combination of bad luck and bad management, could disillusion all but the most optimistic, leading to a general sense of alienation and powerlessness to affect either society or their own futures. There are two potential responses to this condition -- apathy or violence -- and both will occur to some degree.

V. Wild Cards

- Legislation to force "traditional moral values" on teenagers -- e.g., jail sentences for drug use, bans

on prescribing or selling contraceptives to unmarried individuals. (Don't laugh -- this was the law in Massachusetts in the late 1960's.)

- New, long-term contraceptive technology (e.g., long-term implants) routinely administered to girls in school (like polio shots in the 1950's).
- Decriminalization of certain (or all) drugs.
- Relaxation of laws/practices to protect children from exposure to sex/violence in the media.

VI. Primary Linkages to Other Key Issues

Youth life-styles will depend heavily on:

- Youth employment
- Family structure and culture
- Underlying demographics.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- What is the outlook for sources and levels of family income?
- What is the outlook for government income maintenance/transfer programs?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- Real median family income did not increase significantly during the 1970's. Moreover, what increase did occur was due to the increased labor force participation of married women. In these two-earner families, the wife contributes an average of 25% of total income.
- A small but growing share of these two-earner families form what has been called the "superclass." Two percent of baby boom families had incomes exceeding \$75,000 in 1980. By 1990, 7% of these families are expected to be in this category.
- At the other end of the spectrum, the share of population with incomes below the "official" poverty level has remained fairly constant at 12%, and it is no secret that most of these people are women and children. More than one-third of all people living in female-headed households are below the poverty line, as are 17% of all children under 15.
- Transfer payments account for a growing share of personal income (now about 13%), but the growth is due almost exclusively to Social Security, not welfare.
- For many people, there is a widening gap between income expectations and reality. Areas when this is particularly true are heavy industry union members, college graduates without "vocational training" (one-quarter of the entire labor force now have college degrees), and even some younger professionals (especially lawyers).

III. Base Case Trends

- First and foremost, despite serious and painful dislocations, there will be no change in the relationship between work and income. Work will be the primary means for distributing income, and there will be no significant deviation from current practices of wage-setting (e.g., "comparable worth" standards).
- Overall per capita income will rise moderately, but its distribution will become more rather than less stratified. Outside of professional and technical fields, wage rates will become more equal -- incomes of semi-skilled manufacturing workers will fall in relative terms, while those of many service/clerical workers will rise somewhat, possibly through use of traditional union tactics.
- There will continue to be a strong bias against all forms of welfare, exacerbated by conflicts between transfers for the elderly (Social Security) and transfers for young people (AFDC, student grants, etc.). The elderly will almost always be the winners.
- More people will take advantage of non-cash income (fringe benefits, barter) and "underground" economic activity, not only to avoid taxes, but also to maintain or improve real standards of living. This will continue to distort official measures of economic well-being.
- Continued high unemployment (by historical standards), displacement of industrial workers, and life-style expectations will support a small but vocal movement to guarantee income "rights" through a negative income tax or some similar measure. The only area in which such a movement is likely to be effective is in improving unemployment benefits and perhaps training programs.
- Children will be seen by many as an economic liability. Precisely because fewer families will have children in them, employers will be wary about providing benefits that favor parents disproportionately (e.g., fully paid health insurance for dependents, company day care, etc.). These options will increasingly become part of "cafeteria" plans that offer greater equity to childless employees.

- Households will need multiple earners to achieve "the good life." The growing numbers of single-parent (usually the mother) families with children will continue to make up the bulk of poor people.

IV. Alternative Trends

- The guaranteed income alternative. The realization grows that millions of good, solid, hard-working people are without jobs through no fault of their own and have no prospects for finding new jobs. A consensus is reached that something must be done to allow these people (typically men in their 40's and 50's) to support their families, and a WPA-type program is started that guarantees a modest but adequate income in return for "socially useful" work. (Neither taxpayers nor the unemployed are willing to accept a "welfare" type program that pays people who don't/won't work.)
- Family support alternative. As suggested under "Family Structure and Culture," it is possible that the government will take steps to make it easier for families to have and raise children. This might encompass a renewed focus on family rather than individual income. A system of tax credits, subsidies, and perhaps even direct payments would be targeted to workers whose jobs did not provide sufficient income to meet defined family support standards. In direct contrast to the equal employment opportunity guidelines of the 1960's and 1970's, employers will be permitted, if not encouraged, to take family status into account in hiring, lay-offs, and setting salaries. This alternative would generally be detrimental to the employment and income prospects of young people entering the labor force.

V. Wild Cards

- Enactment of "comparable worth" legislation.
- Major changes in the tax system -- flat rate, consumption tax, etc.
- Separation of the "annuity" and "welfare" portions of Social Security.
- General decline in standards of living.

VI. Primary Linkages to Other Key Issues

Income distribution is most closely tied to employment and education.

EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY

I. Key Questions to be Addressed

- What is the outlook for the use of technology in education?
- What is the outlook for education about technology?

II. Current Situation/Recent Historical Trends

- The potential for using computers and related technology as educational tools is widely recognized, but wide use of computers has been slow in coming:
 - limited hardware budgets
 - limited educational software (known, unfortunately, as "courseware")
 - teacher unfamiliarity with and sometimes resistance to computers.
- It is also widely recognized that "computer literacy" is rapidly becoming an indispensable skill.
 - At least one college now requires all entering freshmen to purchase a personal computer.
 - Upper-middle-class parents are sending their children to computer camp and buying home computers for them.
 - Recent surveys show that as many as one-quarter of executives and much larger numbers of technical and clerical workers routinely use word processors, computers, or similar equipment in their jobs.
 - Time Magazine chose the computer as its man of the year.

- Technological advances are making computers increasingly accessible to people without programming or engineering backgrounds. However, this requires increasingly more sophisticated programming and engineering.

III. Base Case Trends

- Various forms of computer-aided education will play an increasing role in college, vocational, business, and military training. Development and use of specific and detailed training software will become increasingly cost-effective.
- It will take a relatively long time for computers to be generally and widely used in grade school education, due almost equally to costs and teacher resistance.
- Efforts will be made to bring computer-aided education into the public schools specifically to help handicapped, learning disabled, and other "special needs" students. This will heat up the argument between those who believe in "mainstreaming" for social reasons and those who believe that special, separate programs better allow handicapped students to reach their "full potential."
- Schools and employers will increasingly require that applicants demonstrate "computer literacy". Developments in hardware and software will repeatedly shift the definition of computer literacy, with the result that these requirements may call for skills that are no longer necessary (e.g., "keyboarding").
- There will be two major public debates on computers and education:
 - the conflict between computer skills and traditional liberal education. The perception that computers are mechanical, mathematical, and "insensitive" will provoke a backlash demand for more "human and humane" education.

- equal access to computers. There is already concern that wealthy school districts can afford to put a computer into each classroom, while inner-city schools may only be able to afford one computer per school. If computer literacy becomes a requirement for employment, there will be growing demands to ensure each child's right to adequate computer education.

IV. Alternative Trends

- Social backlash against computers. Increasing emphasis on computers in schools prompts a backlash among adults who feel threatened both by the possibility that they will lose their jobs to automation and by the fact that their children know so much more than they do about the technology. They demand that schools return to the traditional "three R's" and values, reasoning that new training technology will allow students to learn everything they need to know about computers when they start work or college. This alternative might be part of a larger move to protect manufacturing and clerical jobs for older workers.
- New technology alternative. Advances in artificial intelligence technology lead to the wide availability of low-cost computer teachers. Each family or household would have its own personal computer tutor programmed to teach both "basics" and any subject of interest to a given individual. Once the technology becomes widely available, schools will be closed and children and workers would pursue their schooling and training at home.

V. Wild Cards

- A neo-Luddite revolution.
- Restriction on computer access and training because of skyrocketing computer crime.

VI. Primary Linkages to Other Key Issues

Education and technology are most closely related to:

- Youth employment
- The mission of the schools.

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The future trends explored earlier suggest a number of policy implications for public institutions. The implications discussed below are not exhaustive, merely, they represent the types of issues and questions that are likely to arise as the 1980's progress. The following discussion primarily is grounded in the base case trends; many of the alternative trends implied public policy options. The public policy implications are discussed within the context of the following areas:

- Criminal and juvenile justice
- Education
- Health
- Social services
- Military
- Employment
- Political institutions

CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE

I. Common Assumption:

Demographic trends indicate that the youth population "at risk" in terms of crime and delinquency will decline in the 1980's and thereafter. This assumes that delinquency is largely age linked.

II. Issues:

- The values of youth are an important determinant of opposition toward crime and delinquency.
 - Youth in the 80's are disillusioned and disenfranchised. Growing older won't necessarily turn them into law abiding citizens.
- Minority youth, who continue to comprise a significant proportion of delinquents, will increase in proportion to white youth.
 - Immigration will reinforce this trend.
 - Criminal and juvenile justice problems and policies increasingly will vary by region.
- The change in the economic structure of society will increase competition for jobs.
 - Youth will compete with displaced workers as well as new immigrants to the U.S., particularly for the lower skilled service jobs.
 - Employment oriented delinquency prevention programs supported by the government will be more difficult to establish.
- Changes may occur in the types of crimes committed.
 - Workers displaced by the changing economy and competition for jobs from youth may turn increasingly to sophisticated white collar criminal activities.
 - Computer crimes perpetrated by "high tech kids" (as well as displaced workers) may become more prevalent resulting in a redefinition of "serious crime."
 - Detection of sophisticated crimes will become a major law enforcement problem requiring reallocation of resources.

- Punishment for these types of crimes will elicit a reassessment of possible responses; e.g., incarceration vs. restitution vs community service.
- Youth increasingly will be viewed as responsible for their own behavior as society becomes less tolerant of youth crimes.
 - Parents also will be held accountable (e.g., paying the cost of their children's incarceration).
 - The smaller proportion of families having children will reinforce these lower tolerance levels.
 - The trends toward lowering the age at which youth can be tried as adults and increased remands to adult court will continue.
- Juvenile rights will increase in conjunction with juvenile responsibilities.
 - The juvenile court system will become increasingly adversarial.
 - Less emphasis will be placed on "family problems" (e.g., status offenders) by the justice system.

EDUCATION

I. Common Assumption:

The quality of public education is declining. This requires a return to the Basics.

II. Other considerations:

- Declining birth rates will result in declining support for public schools.
- The school system as we know it will become less egalitarian.
 - Families that can afford it will send their children to private schools reinforcing the decline of public education.
 - More affluent areas will establish local initiative to improve schools through foundations and fund raising.
 - The state and federal governments will be expected to play an increased role in inner city and core suburban schools which serve the poor and minority youth populations.
 - Strong minority political constituencies will focus on federal government intervention.
- The "Basics" will be redefined as the changing structure of the economy places less emphasis on the traditional three R's.
- The "mission" of education may vary among specific schools.
 - Magnet schools may become the rule as opposed to the exception; e.g., New York's school system.
 - As a result, public school systems may begin to focus on metropolitan areas as opposed to individual school districts.
- Questions will be raised about the value of compulsory education.
 - Truancy will continue to be a problem primarily in inner city schools.
 - The value of education for lower skilled jobs will become less evident to youth.
 - Expanded company training programs will be viewed as a viable alternative to traditional education.

- The computer will play a more important role in both elementary and high schools, but primarily in those public and private schools which can afford to provide such equipment and training.
- The federal government will be embroiled in the right to computer access debate.

HEALTH

I. Common Assumptions:

There should be less government support of health care and more private involvement.

II. Issues:

- The government role will be increasingly limited to catastrophic vs. ordinary illnesses.
- Home care increasingly will be prevalent as cheaper alternatives are sought.
- As the government tightens Medicare and health-oriented programs, hospitals and other health care agencies will be less likely to accept Medicare patients.
- People, particularly the poor and the elderly, will be less likely to seek preventive medical care.

SOCIAL SERVICES

I. Assumption:

Everyone should have an adequate standard of living but they should work for it.

II. Issues:

- The government will further restrict eligibility for welfare, but private sector involvement will not replace previous government programs.
 - A national youth service program will be examined as a means for providing needed social services.
- Structural unemployment will increase the numbers of needy individuals.
 - This "new" needy population will have different psychological and physical needs than the traditional welfare recipient.
- Despite the strong elderly lobby, Social Security will no longer provide full support for the retired due to competing claims for limited resources and the fact that the number of recipients will be greater than the contributors.
 - Youth will become increasingly resistant to skyrocketing Social Security taxes, perceiving that they will never receive the benefits.
- Demand for expanded government support/subsidy of day care will become an increasingly important issue within the "women's vote".
 - Stringent licensing requirements may be lowered.
 - Tax credits may be increased.

MILITARY

I. Assumption:

The military will face a labor crisis because fewer young men will be available to serve in the military as the number of youth decline.

II. Issues:

- Due to structural employment, many less skilled and minority youth will turn to the military for short-term jobs as well as careers.
- The military increasingly will compete with the private sector, particularly for "high quality" personnel. The following options will be debated.
 - As a result, the military significantly will increase the attractiveness of the service in terms of pay and benefits.
 - Reestablish the draft.
 - Expand the proportion of women as well as the job classifications for which they are eligible.

EMPLOYMENT

I. Assumption:

Future employment is contingent upon computer literacy.

II. Additional Considerations:

- The expansion of the service economy will not be based on computer literacy. In fact, the deskilling phenomenon will make jobs easier for less skilled workers.
 - Within this context, there will be little demand for training.
- Displaced workers rather than youth will claim the lion's share of government money and attention.
 - To the extent that this involves training demands, the government is more likely to support industry programs rather than the creation of CETA type government programs.
 - The problem of youth unemployment will encourage serious discussion of a national youth service program.
- Structural unemployment will defy attempts at short term fixes, such as job programs.
 - There will be increasing recognition that public work programs are temporary solutions but are preferable to welfare, both in the public's perception and in terms of the recipient's psychological well-being.
- There will be increasing calls for tighter immigration policies, as well as protectionism, although neither of these will solve the structural unemployment problems.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

I. Common Assumptions:

Despite optimistic predictions of increased political participation through technology, (e.g., voting by T.V.) nothing will really change.

II. Issues:

- Concern over the possible collapse of the public school system will focus extensive debate on the question: Can you have a democratic society without public education?
- The baby boom generation, which consists of 72 million people, or a third of the population, will continue to drive the political issues.
- Youth will feel powerless at national levels and will be more likely to be involved in local participation.
- Many of the "easy" political problems will have been addressed leaving the tougher and most controversial problems to be solved.

-- There will be increased divisiveness over public policy and political issues -- young versus old, white versus minority, north versus south versus west regionalism.

YOUTH IN THE 1980's: ATTITUDES

The following section includes a series of graphs depicting the attitudes of the American public on a range of moral, social and political issues. For purposes of comparison, the respondents to this 1980 survey have been divided into three categories:

- 80's youth (ages 14-20)
- 70's youth (ages 21-24)
- 60's youth (ages 25-34)


These data were compiled from The Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80's; The Impact on Belief. The survey, conducted in 1980 by Research and Forecasts, Inc., involved hour long interviews with 2,018 members of the general public. Of these, 1,610 individuals were selected randomly from the general population. Blacks, senior citizens, (age 65 or over) and youths (age 14-20) were oversampled to allow statistically reliable conclusions regarding differences from and similarities to the general population. The responses of these groups were then weighted downward to correspond with their actual distribution in the U.S. population.

The graphs were divided into the following four major areas:

- The family;
- Moral issues;
- Political issues; and
- Participation.


THE FAMILY: SATISFACTION FROM FAMILY

HOW MUCH SATISFACTION DO YOU RECEIVE FROM YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY COMPARED WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF YOUR LIFE?




**THE FAMILY:
FAMILY ACTIVITIES TOGETHER**

HOW IMPORTANT TO YOU IS DOING THINGS AS A FAMILY GROUP?




**THE FAMILY:
MARITAL LIFESTYLE**

IDEALLY, WHICH OF THE FOUR LIFESTYLES WOULD YOU PREFER?



**THE FAMILY:
RELATIONSHIP WITH SPOUSE OR PARTNER**


HOW MUCH SATISFACTION DO YOU RECEIVE FROM YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR SPOUSE OR INTIMATE COMPANION COMPARED WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF YOUR LIFE?




SOURCE: *The Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80's: The Impact of Belief*

THE FAMILY: WORKING WOMEN

DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF A WOMAN EARNING MONEY IF SHE HAS A HUSBAND WHO IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING HER?




**THE FAMILY:
WILLINGNESS TO RECONCILE MARRIAGE
IF YOU WERE UNHAPPILY MARRIED, WOULD YOU:**



TRY TO RECONCILE THE PROBLEM AT ALL COSTS;
 TRY TO WORK IT OUT BUT BE PREPARED TO SEEK A DIVORCE IF YOU DID NOT SUCCEED


THE FAMILY: DIVORCE

SHOULD DIVORCE IN THIS COUNTRY BE EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN THAN IT IS NOW?




THE FAMILY: WORKING MOTHERS

A WOMAN WITH YOUNG CHILDREN SHOULD NOT WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME UNLESS IT IS FINANCIALLY NECESSARY.




THE FAMILY: STAYING TOGETHER

DO YOU FEEL THAT AN UNHAPPILY MARRIED COUPLE SHOULD STAY TOGETHER IF THEY HAVE YOUNG CHILDREN?



**MORAL ISSUES:
LEVELS OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT**



* RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO ANSWER "FREQUENTLY, OCCASIONALLY OR NEVER" TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES/EXPERIENCES:


- FEEL THAT GOD LOVES YOU
- ENGAGE IN PRAYER
- ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES
- READ THE BIBLE
- HAVING SOMETHING YOU CALL A RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
- PARTICIPATE IN A CHURCH SOCIAL ACTIVITY
- ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO TURN TO RELIGION
- LISTEN TO RELIGIOUS BROADCAST

THE SCALE OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT CATEGORIZED THE NUMBER OF "FREQUENTLY" RESPONSES AS FOLLOWS:

- "HIGHEST": 7-8 ITEMS
- "HIGH": 5-6 ITEMS
- "MODERATE": 3-4 ITEMS
- "LOW": 1-2 ITEMS
- "LOWEST": 0 ITEMS


**MORAL ISSUES:
SEX**

**DO YOU BELIEVE SEX BETWEEN TWO SINGLE PEOPLE IS MORALLY
WRONG, OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?**




**MORAL ISSUES:
LIVING WITH SOMEONE**

DO YOU BELIEVE LIVING WITH SOMEONE OF THE OPPOSITE SEX WITHOUT BEING MARRIED IS MORALLY WRONG, OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?




MORAL ISSUES: SEX BEFORE 16

DO YOU BELIEVE SEX BEFORE THE AGE OF 16 IS MORALLY WRONG,
OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?




**MORAL ISSUES:
PORNOGRAPHIC MOVIES**

**DO YOU BELIEVE PORNOGRAPHIC MOVIES ARE MORALLY WRONG, OR
ARE THEY NOT A MORAL ISSUE?**



MORAL ISSUES: ADULTERY


DO YOU BELIEVE IT IS MORALLY WRONG FOR A MARRIED PERSON TO HAVE SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH SOMEONE OTHER THAN THEIR SPOUSE, OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?



■ MORALLY WRONG
□ NOT A MORAL ISSUE


MORAL ISSUES: HOMOSEXUALITY

DO YOU BELIEVE HOMOSEXUALITY IS MORALLY WRONG OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?




**MORAL ISSUES:
ABORTION.**

**DO YOU BELIEVE ABORTION IS MORALLY WRONG, OR IS IT NOT
A MORAL ISSUE?**




**MORAL ISSUES:
SMOKING MARIJUANA**

**DO YOU BELIEVE SMOKING MARIJUANA IS MORALLY WRONG,
OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?**




MORAL ISSUES: USING HARD DRUGS

DO YOU BELIEVE THE USE OF HARD DRUGS IS MORALLY WRONG,
OR IS IT NOT A MORAL ISSUE?




POLITICAL ISSUES: BIG GOVERNMENT

THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOO MUCH POWER OVER THE LIVES OF AVERAGE CITIZENS




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLITICS**

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEMS, SUCH AS ENERGY, INFLATION AND CRIME, CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLITICS?




POLITICAL ISSUES: LEADERS

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON PUBLIC ISSUES
ARE BEST LEFT IN THE HANDS OF OUR LEADERS?




POLITICAL ISSUES: VOTING

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE WAY PEOPLE VOTE IS THE MAIN
THING THAT DECIDES THE WAY THINGS ARE RUN IN THIS COUNTRY?




POLITICAL ISSUES: POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION

THE GOVERNMENT RUNS BEST WHEN IT LISTENS TO PUBLIC OPINION
ON MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUES.




POLITICAL ISSUES: REFUGEES

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN TOO WILLING TO ACCEPT
REFUGEES FROM CUBA AND SOUTH VIETNAM.




POLITICAL ISSUES: PROTECTIONISM

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROTECT AMERICAN INDUSTRY FROM FOREIGN COMPETITION BY LIMITING IMPORTS FROM SUCH COUNTRIES AS JAPAN?




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES**

**DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES
SHOULD BE INCREASED IF NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
INCOME FOR OLD PEOPLE?**




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
RIGHTS OF CRIMINALS**

**DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THERE IS TOO MUCH CONCERN
IN THE COURTS FOR THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINALS?**




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
ENSURING AN ADEQUATE LIVING STANDARD**

**DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO MAKE SURE
EVERYONE HAS A GOOD STANDARD OF LIVING?**




POLITICAL ISSUES: STRONG MILITARY

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR AMERICA TO HAVE THE STRONGEST MILITARY
FORCE IN THE WORLD, NO MATTER WHAT THE COST.




POLITICAL ISSUES: VIETNAM WAR

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR
WAS UNJUSTIFIED?




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
MALE DRAFT**

**DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PEACETIME
DRAFT FOR MEN?**




**POLITICAL ISSUES:
FEMALE DRAFT**

**DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DRAFT FOR
WOMEN FOR COMBAT DUTY?**




POLITICAL ISSUES: WOMEN'S RIGHTS

DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THIS COUNTRY?



POLITICAL ISSUES: NUCLEAR POWER


DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR POWER ARE GREATER THAN THE RISKS INVOLVED?



SOURCE: *The Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80's: The Impact of Belief*


PARTICIPATION: BELONGING TO A COMMUNITY

HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU FEEL YOU BELONG TO A COMMUNITY?




PARTICIPATION: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

WOULD YOU LIKE TO PARTICIPATE MORE IN MAKING YOUR COMMUNITY
A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE?




**PARTICIPATION:
RUNNING THE COMMUNITY**

**DO YOU FEEL YOU CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE WAY
YOUR COMMUNITY IS RUN?**



PARTICIPATION: VOLUNTEER WORK

HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU DO VOLUNTEER WORK AT OR FOR A LOCAL ORGANIZATION?



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