

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Committee on the Judiciary  
Subcommittee on Investigations  
Committee on Governmental Affairs  
U.S. Senate

DRUG CONTROL

How Drug Controlling  
Groups Are Organized  
for the War on Drugs



126723

U.S. Department of Justice  
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this ~~copyrighted~~ material has been granted by  
Public Domain

U.S. General Accounting Office

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the ~~author~~ owner.

126723



United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and  
International Affairs Division

B-238557.2

June 4, 1990

The Honorable Sam Nunn  
Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on  
Investigations  
Committee on Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we obtain information on how European nations have organized their resources to fight drug trafficking. Specifically, you asked that we provide information on (1) the nature of the worldwide drug abuse and narcotics trafficking problem and (2) how United States and European policies, perspectives, and approaches differ in areas of organization and infrastructure, law enforcement, demand reduction, and strategies for international narcotics control. We reviewed the anti-narcotics activities of three European countries—Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy—for comparison with those in the United States.

## Results in Brief

Drug abuse has worsened worldwide. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) reports that growing areas are expanding; and, despite skyrocketing seizure figures, addict populations are increasing and overdose deaths are on the rise. Trafficking networks are global in scope; and production, processing, and marketing techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Although the United States and the European countries we visited share similar overall objectives in reducing the supply of drugs, some significant aspects of the United States' anti-narcotic policy are not shared by these European countries. For example, the United States has decided to use its military forces, extend the reach of interdiction beyond its borders, and tie foreign assistance to the cooperation of other countries in fighting drugs. Officials we interviewed in Europe did not believe these policies were necessary to implement their anti-narcotics strategy. Instead, their policy centers on demand and supply reduction activities largely at the domestic level, with an international strategy focused on U.N. delivery systems.

With the adoption of the U.N. drug trafficking convention in December 1988, all agree that stronger anti-trafficking measures are required.

---

However, the United States and the three countries we visited differ on what constitutes an illegal drug activity, what penalties should apply, and what law enforcement techniques should be used.

All of these countries, including the United States, share similar overall objectives in reducing the supply of drugs, but have adopted different strategies to achieve them. The United States focuses heavily on law enforcement assistance provided through direct bilateral relations with the producing countries, supplemented with economic assistance. None of the European countries have a bilateral assistance mechanism commensurate to the U.S. program administered by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics Matters. They, on the other hand, emphasize economic development assistance delivered through the multilateral U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and fund only a limited amount of enforcement activities overseas, all of it non-lethal. We found on both sides that traditional attitudes and policies are being revisited and greater efforts are going toward establishing compatible approaches to the drug problem.

---

## Worldwide Drug Abuse Worsens

The United States consumes about 65 percent of all illicit drugs consumed worldwide. Because of this, the world community had seen drug abuse as primarily an American problem; however, this perception is changing.

---

## European Market Growing

The United States' market for cocaine—the current drug of choice—is becoming saturated, and prices for cocaine are at all-time lows. This, coupled with the impact of U.S. enforcement operations, is encouraging cocaine traffickers to look to other markets. Cocaine prices in Western Europe are currently about three times that in the United States; consequently, Europe offers a high-profit market. Some European officials believe that this price differential may be creating a secondary market for smugglers moving cocaine from the United States to Europe. Latin American cocaine cartels are already establishing sophisticated marketing operations targeted at Europe.

Concerns over the spread of the cocaine market are already high in Western Europe even though heroin may still be their biggest drug threat. Interpol reports that cocaine seizures are up nearly 200 percent worldwide since 1986. Drug-related deaths, from all drugs, in Italy are three times greater now than in 1981, when 239 deaths were reported, and at an all-time high in Germany. European officials expect greater

amounts of drugs to enter their countries over the next few years. Nevertheless, while taking the drug problem very seriously, the European countries we visited do not consider it to be a threat to their national security.

### Further Growth Expected

By 1992, the 12-nation European Community plans to reduce barriers to the free movement of people, goods and money, and officials believe this will complicate future drug supply reduction efforts. European law enforcement officials told us that controlling drugs could become more difficult because one of their primary mechanisms to control the flow of drugs—immigration and customs operations—will be effectively eliminated. The need for greater cooperation and a coordinated regional apparatus to deal with the problem is already being addressed in Europe. Yet, these officials admit it is difficult to get 12 nations to agree on a common strategy. These officials say the European community is only in its first stages of working toward reducing differences in drug laws, gaining political acceptance of common approaches, and establishing a regional organization to coordinate drug interdiction, eradication, and education programs.

### The International Community Begins Uniting to Combat Drugs

The international community has agreed to better coordinate its anti-drug activities under United Nations auspices, and to develop more consistency in laws and approaches to the problem. In 1987, 138 nations participated in the United Nations International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (ICDAIT) and concluded that (1) the current international system of controls was inadequate, (2) differing laws and approaches among nations undermine cooperative efforts, and (3) increased international funding and coordination was needed. The conferees adopted a set of non-binding, strategic guidelines to improve these conditions, but monitoring compliance with these guidelines has not occurred.

A frequently heard criticism of international conventions is that, they are largely ineffective in reversing the growth of international narcotics trafficking because they lack enforcement mechanisms and are not uniformly interpreted by member nations. We found no evidence that the conditions cited in 1987 have significantly improved. For example, the United States stated its commitment to increased support of multilateral approaches to combat drugs, and to give greater consideration to economic assistance approaches to slow production. While the President's fiscal year 1991 budget provides \$175 million in additional economic

---

assistance to Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru as part of the Andean Initiative, the budget, as well as the 1989 and 1990 anti-drug strategies, still emphasize bilateral law enforcement approaches to the problem.

---

## Policy Differences Exist Among the United States and European Countries

---

### Use of the Military

The extent to which the U.S. military should be used in the drug war is still being debated; however, U.S. law enforcement officials see the military's participation as important. European officials we interviewed, however, did not believe their drug problem warrants the use of the military at home, and were wary of providing military advisers to other nations. According to West German officials, their laws prohibit the military's use in drug enforcement efforts, but no legal barrier exists in the United Kingdom or Italy, according to officials there.

---

### Conditions for Assistance

The United States conditions military and economic assistance on a presidential certification that the recipient country is cooperating in the war on drugs. Officials in the European countries we visited see the U.S. certification policy as counterproductive, in that it could counteract the positive effects of the economic and other support being provided. They also point out that drug producing nations may not have the political and enforcement ability to satisfy the certification conditions.

---

### Enforcement Outside Sovereign Borders

A significant aspect of the U.S. strategy is to interdict drugs outside its borders, and the United States routinely operates in international waters and airways. Europeans, and the international community in general, have not applied this approach and have expressed concern about the lack of international standards for identifying, seizing, and disposing of smugglers and their vessels. However, international cooperation appears to be increasing. For example, a 30-nation task force conducted an operation to interdict and suppress cocaine trafficking in Latin America, the United States, Canada, and Europe using cross-border operations with shared enforcement manpower and equipment. Also, according to State officials, Spain and Italy signed an agreement in March 1990, providing

---

for interdiction of crafts on the seas by each others law enforcement authorities.

---

## Differences in How Governments Manage Anti-Narcotics Program

The United States, for years, managed its anti-narcotics program through a large number of agencies and organizations with little central management or budgetary control. This was unsatisfactory, and in 1988, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) headed by a "drug czar," was created to develop the national strategy, oversee agency compliance with the strategy, and set budget priorities.

Because of cultural, political, and judicial differences, plus a difference in the perceived severity of the drug problems, European countries we visited have not found it necessary to use a centralized approach in organizing their drug war efforts. These countries have coordinating agencies to manage their anti-drug programs, but none with the range of responsibilities and authorities of the U.S. drug czar. Not all countries have written national anti-drug strategies. Also, while at the time of our visit the European community did not have a regional coordinating mechanism to oversee anti-drug operations, we were subsequently advised by ONDCP and State officials that such a coordinating mechanism has been established.

---

## Law Enforcement Differences

West German officials told us money laundering is not illegal in their country; and Italian officials said that possession of a small amount of drugs for personal use is legal in Italy. But, possession of large amounts with the intent to distribute is illegal. Criminal penalties for prohibited narcotics activities also vary by country. The United States' justice system provides for the death penalty for homicides committed in connection with a drug transaction, whereas West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy do not have a death penalty. While differing penalties raise concern about the European's willingness to extradite criminals to the United States, where death is a possible sentence, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) told us that this had been overcome in the past with certain concessions made by the U.S. Department of Justice.

---

## Use of Sting, Undercover, and Other Techniques

Law enforcement cooperation among the United States and the three countries we visited was good, but some techniques important in the United States cannot be used in those countries. For example, undercover, sting, and control delivery operations are restricted in the countries we visited. Yet, U.S. law enforcement authorities work well with their counterparts on a case-by-case basis, using these techniques as much as possible within the law.

Law enforcement agents in those countries have been prohibited from providing someone the opportunity to commit a crime. Sting operations, which require an officer to pose as a buyer or seller, are construed as provoking a crime. Controlled deliveries, where officers allow the passage of drugs to their ultimate destination to surface major players in the transaction, are also construed in some countries as provoking an illegal act. DEA informed us that subsequent to our fieldwork, Italian law was changed and now allows sting and similar operations to take place.

---

## Money Laundering Laws

Financial investigations are important to drug trafficking law enforcement. Various banking and tax laws in the United States allow enforcement agencies to investigate large dollar suspect transactions, and offenders' assets obtained through their drug activities can be seized. In the three countries we visited, we found differences in banking laws and other laws and practices that can interfere with international financial investigations.

In West Germany, for example, money laundering is not illegal. West German officials said that their laws authorize asset seizures, but the judicial processes make this so difficult that it is rarely done.

Italian officials said that money laundering is illegal there, but that legal requirements have not been established to track suspicious financial transactions. For example, banks are not required to report large or suspicious transactions, foreign earned income, or foreign exchange transactions.

We were told that money laundering is also illegal in the United Kingdom. However, as of March 1990, British customs officials have greater powers to deal with drug-related transactions and currency importation or exportation. Officials in all three countries said that laws are or have been under review for possible changes that could improve financial investigations. Also, a new group has been established in Interpol to work on financial transaction and money laundering issues.

---

## Intelligence Collection and Sharing

The U.S. national strategy and the ICDAIT call for better drug intelligence collection and dissemination to improve international law enforcement efforts. The United States routinely uses its national intelligence assets in the war on drugs. Officials in the countries we visited declined to discuss details of their intelligence networks, but they stated that they do not routinely use national intelligence assets in fighting drug trafficking.

Officials in the three countries stated that the spirit of cooperation is good in intelligence sharing, but the flow of information is sometimes disappointing. German and British officials said, for example, that the United States is sometimes slow in responding to requests for drug intelligence, possibly because of the large volume of requests received by U.S. agencies, problems with security classifications, and the low priority given to European requests. DEA told us, however, it is aware of only a few complaints in this regard.

According to DEA, Interpol responses to United States' requests normally take at least 6 months to receive. Consequently, the United States does not call upon Interpol too often. Interpol and other officials told us that developing multinational intelligence collection and dissemination systems for drug operations are inhibited by legal, technical, and other concerns. Interpol's information system is being upgraded, but will not be ready until at least 1992. It is also developing a tactical information system to provide rapid information on ongoing cases, but this will be hampered by inadequate communications equipment worldwide—25 to 30 African and Latin American countries still communicate in Morse Code. Also, countries are reluctant to share certain information among a large international audience because this could increase the risk of disclosure and violate countries' security laws.

---

## Demand Reduction Strategies Similar in the United States and Europe

Demand reduction strategies of the United States and the European countries we visited are conceptually alike—they use a combination of preventive education and addict treatment. However, all share the same problems—there are large gaps in knowledge of the causes of drug abuse and how to treat it, and programs are developed largely on a trial-and-error basis. All countries reported high recidivism rates, no solution to the problem of demand reduction, limited data on program results, and a general inability to measure accomplishments. Although governments share some drug abuse data, officials question its usefulness because of the differences in data collection procedures and the culturally specific nature of demand reduction programs. According to U.S.



---

Department of Health and Human Services sources, a U.N. program to improve data collection and reporting is underway.

---

## Education Programs

Preventive education programs in the United States and the countries we visited are largely locally operated without much central government input into the anti-drug message content. Opinion surveys indicate that attitudes against drug use may have been strengthened by such programs in some areas, but there are no proven means to accurately measure program effectiveness, or to establish causal relationships among attitude changes and the educational message.

## Drug Testing

In the countries we visited, workplace drug testing is not widely practiced because such testing is considered an unwarranted invasion of individual privacy. An example of how Europeans feel about workplace drug testing was the United Kingdom's objection to testing British employees who provide security and safety services to U.S. air carriers. In addition to their view that workplace drug testing is unwarranted, they also believed this would have been an extraterritorial application of U.S. law.

## Treatment Programs

As in the United States, addict treatment is a local responsibility in the European countries we visited. It is community based, tailored to individual addict needs, and largely provided on an outpatient basis. Central government involvement is primarily in coordination, research, technical assistance, and funding. Methadone maintenance treatments are used, except in West Germany where officials view methadone as merely another dependency. The countries we visited all reported residential treatment capacity problems, but it was unclear whether too few facilities were available or whether the treatment program mix was inappropriate. West German facilities could accommodate about 80 percent of the need, but had treatment delays of 3 to 4 months. British and Italian officials said that they also have long waiting periods for treatment. Officials in these countries generally did not know how well their treatment programs were working.

## Programs to Reduce Supply

The U.S. international supply reduction strategy emphasizes law enforcement assistance efforts delivered primarily through bilateral agreements with source countries. In contrast, the three European countries we visited work through multilateral organizations and emphasize

economic and humanitarian assistance to encourage supply reduction. While the United States and the Europeans do not fully agree on the most effective approach, none of the approaches used have significantly reduced the supply of drugs. The United States supports crop eradication programs in 14 countries and law enforcement in 70 countries, and about 91 percent of the funding for its overseas efforts is spent on enforcement. The remainder is spent on economic development and other activities. In 1988, the United States contributed \$3.4 million to UNFDAC.

Most drugs consumed in the United States are of foreign origin, and reducing the supply is an enormously complex and costly endeavor. Traffickers have been able to corrupt political officials, infiltrate the government, buy or attack the press, syndicate farms, buy armies, and finance public welfare programs to gain support and loyalty. National economies in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia are partially dependent on illicit drugs. Drug cultivation and processing provides large amounts of foreign exchange even though most money is not repatriated. Eliminating coca production would put an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 people out of work in Peru and Bolivia alone.

U.S. officials view multilateral assistance as complementary to its programs, but they believe that basically, bilateral assistance mechanisms provide the necessary controls over the political, strategic, and economic interests of the United States. Also, U.S. officials have stated that they have a better opportunity to influence countries using bilateral assistance.

Some U.S. officials told us that UNFDAC emphasizes economic assistance to the detriment of enforcement, executes programs too slowly, does not have enough field advisers to monitor and manage programs, and lacks specific program goals, performance measures, and criteria for funding decisions. Nonetheless, the Department of State did not believe its goals and those of UNFDAC were at odds, and cited examples of joint efforts, formal and informal informational exchanges, and instances where U.S. assistance was provided UNFDAC.

European officials stated that they believed enforcement assistance is appropriate only after the root causes of drug production are dealt with. These European officials generally expressed the view that, unless changes are made to the social and economic conditions in growing countries, law enforcement approaches alone will not work. However,

according to State officials, this perspective is changing as these countries realize that developing judicial capabilities has a place in long-term programs to reduce drug supplies. Furthermore, these officials broadly view U.S. and European approaches as mutually supportive.

The Europeans we met saw law enforcement as potentially creating political problems and as infringing on the sovereignty of other nations. They were especially skeptical of the U.S. certification program, because countries involved may not have the political or law enforcement capability to deal with the drug problem.

U.S. and European officials told us that while UNFDAC has some problems, it is taking steps to improve its planning, oversight and program management capabilities and to accelerate its funding of activities.

U.S. and European officials agree that U.S. and UNFDAC program integration and coordination has been inefficient and improvements are needed. The Department of State does not share all its plans with UNFDAC, but State officials told us that they were trying to improve coordination with UNFDAC, and encourage more UNFDAC consultation with the United States.

Appendixes I through IV provide a more detailed comparison of the specific anti-narcotics activities of the selected countries. Our scope and methodology are in appendix V.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, Director, Foreign Economic Assistance Issues. Other staff members responsible for this report are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Frank C. Conahan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "F" and "C".

Frank C. Conahan  
Assistant Comptroller General



---

# Contents

---

Letter		1
<hr/>		
Appendix I		14
Differences in Policy and Perspective		
	Drugs No Longer Just an American Problem	14
	International Cooperation Pledged	15
	Policy Differences Remain	16
	Organizational Differences	20
<hr/>		
Appendix II		23
National and International Law Enforcement		
	Drug Laws Differ	23
	Differences in Enforcement Philosophies and Techniques	25
	Intelligence-Gathering Capabilities Differ	29
<hr/>		
Appendix III		33
Approaches to Reduce Demand for Illicit Narcotics		
	Drug Prevention Through Education	33
	Drug Testing at the Workplace	36
	Addressing Drug Dependencies Through Treatment	37
	Sharing Information	39
<hr/>		
Appendix IV		41
International Strategies		
	Dealing With Drugs at Their Source	41
	U.S. And European Approaches to Production Control Are Different	42
	Integration of U.S. and U.N. Programs Lacking	50
<hr/>		
Appendix V		54
Scope and Methodology		
<hr/>		
Appendix VI		55
Major Contributors to This Report		
<hr/>		
Tables		
	Table IV.1: 1988 U.S. International Narcotics Control Funding, by Purpose	44

---

## Contents

---

Table IV.2: Growth in Worldwide Production of Coca, Opium, and Marijuana; 1985, 1987, and 1989	46
Table IV.3: Annual Donations to UNFDAC, 1982-88	48
Table IV.4: Comparison of UNFDAC Budgeted Amounts and Expenditures, 1985-88	49

---

## Abbreviations

AID	Agency for International Development
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EC	European Community
ICDAIT	International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
UNFDAC	United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control

# Differences in Policy and Perspective

---

World perspectives and policies on drug abuse appear to be changing. Once thought to be an American problem needing an American solution, countries in Europe and elsewhere, spurred by their own worsening drug problems, are now taking actions to fight international drug trafficking. International cooperation and corresponding increases in resource commitments by other nations is essential to the United States in accomplishing its strategic policy in the war on drugs.

---

## Drugs No Longer Just an American Problem

Drug abuse has worsened throughout the world. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), worldwide growing areas for narcotic crops are expanding, and despite skyrocketing seizure figures for cocaine, addict populations are increasing and overdose deaths are on the rise. Concerns about cocaine are high in Western Europe, where a large influx is attributed to the saturation of the American market, increased enforcement pressures in the United States, and the potentially high profits from a European cocaine market. Trafficking networks are global in scope, sophisticated in production, processing, marketing and distribution techniques; and if challenged, are able to adapt operations to changing environments. Interpol reports that the European market is extremely lucrative. Cocaine prices in Europe range between \$36,000 and \$100,000 per kilogram compared to that of between \$11,000 and \$34,000 in the United States. Not only is cocaine coming into Europe directly from Latin America, but the profit differentials has also resulted in transiting through the United States.

Interpol also reports that during the first 8 months of 1988, European seizures of cocaine increased 196 percent compared to 1986. Drug-related deaths from all drug sources in Italy have more than tripled since 1981, and have reached an all-time high in West Germany. Latin American-based criminal organizations are collaborating with the European criminal underworld to develop cocaine trafficking networks.

## International Cooperation Pledged

The international community has recognized since 1912 that no country can succeed against the narcotics problem alone. For years plenary sessions and conventions have been held<sup>1</sup> with participants pledging support for agreed upon principles. However, countries did not fully adhere to their assessments, and funding for anti-drug programs was not great. The Congressional Research Service reported in January 1990 that international conventions have been thus far largely ineffective, in part, because they lack strong enforcement mechanisms and are not uniformly interpreted by member nations.

In 1985, amid worsening worldwide problems, the U.N. Secretary General asserted that the time had come to expand current efforts into a truly worldwide effort, and, at the 1987, 138-nation International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (ICDAIT), the world community reaffirmed its collective responsibility. The Conference concluded that (1) the current system of international controls was inadequate to control the drug problem, (2) differing laws and approaches among nations can undermine cooperative efforts and provide loopholes for traffickers to evade prosecution, and (3) increased international funding and coordination were needed.

Following the Conference, 43 nations signed the Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that addresses all phases of illicit trafficking, from production and manufacture to distribution and money laundering. Its objective was to improve international coordination among customs, police and judicial bodies, and to provide them with advice on the legal measures that might be taken to more effectively interdict trafficking. In addition, guidelines entitled Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control were developed to promote coordinated action among nations to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking. All 138 nations adopted the guidelines that suggested, for example, that nations develop

<sup>1</sup>International treaties date back to the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, which established controls over the shipment of narcotic drugs for medical use. Subsequent conventions established a system of import and export authorizations, and a compulsory system for estimating the need for legal drugs. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs consolidated the earlier treaties, established the U.N. International Narcotics Control Board to simplify and streamline the U.N. control machinery, and extended the control system to include the cultivation of plants, such as the coca bush and cannabis grown as the raw material of natural narcotic drugs. The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances extended similar, but voluntary, control to a number of previously uncontrolled man-made substances such as amphetamines and hallucinogens.



- an infrastructure and strategy to ensure that anti-drug efforts are comprehensive and coordinated;
- harmonious law enforcement practices and policies, to the extent possible, to help provide a coordinated and comprehensive attack on traffickers and their financial assets;
- preventive education and treatment systems and programs to monitor and reduce demand; and
- economic and law enforcement assistance programs to help control the cultivation of illicit drugs in producing countries.

Adopting the guidelines did not legally bind a nation to comply, but instead was an expression of the political will of the ICDAIT participants. It is not clear how much progress has been made in implementing the strategic guidelines. Our review showed that the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany generally follow the guidelines; however, there was no information on whether other participants were following these guidelines.

The ICDAIT was followed by several actions that demonstrate an increased international commitment to fight drug abuse. For example, (1) contributions to U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)<sup>2</sup> have increased, (2) a 30-nation regional cocaine interdiction effort was carried out in 1988, (3) the European nations we visited are reviewing their anti-drug laws and approaches to coincide with the ICDAIT guidelines and a new U.N. Convention,<sup>3</sup> (4) demand reduction programs are receiving increased attention, and (5) more funding is being provided for supply reduction in source countries.

---

## Policy Differences Remain

Many experts stated that if individual nations' viewed the war on drugs similarly and approached the drug problem consistently from a policy level, they could work better together. How each country sees its drug problem, relative to other national priorities, helps define the scope and intensity of their individual responses to the problem. We found basic differences in this regard among the United States and the three European countries we visited.

---

<sup>2</sup>UNFDAC was created by U.N. resolution in 1970 to be an instrument for implementing multilateral demand reduction, law enforcement, and narcotics control programs in the source countries. It was to be funded by voluntary contributions from the international community, and its programs were to reflect the wishes of those donors.

<sup>3</sup>In 1988 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Drug Trafficking Convention that seeks to make basis laws regarding money laundering and access to financial records compatible.

---

## Drugs as a Threat to National Security

Drug abuse and trafficking is clearly an important priority in Europe. None of the countries we visited had formally declared the problem to be a threat to their national security as the United States has done.<sup>4</sup> British officials told us that they take the threat of drug abuse very seriously, but they do not find it necessary to make such a formal declaration. Italian officials stated that a new anti-drug law under development implicitly recognizes that the drug problem threatens and undermines the security of the nation, but does not formally declare this as the official government position. The West German position is that at present, illegal drugs do not constitute a threat to national security.

---

## Using the Military

The United States use of military forces in anti-narcotics efforts has traditionally been confined to providing support for the interdiction efforts of law enforcement agencies. This role has been strongly debated, but law enforcement agencies view the military's participation as vital in the overall effort.

The military's role is not unlimited. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) prohibits the Army and Air Force from executing U.S. laws. Under Department of Defense regulations, the military is precluded from (1) interdicting a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, (2) search and seizure, (3) arresting, stopping and frisking, or other similar activity, and (4) providing personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as informants, under cover agents, investigators, or interrogators. The Congress has recently directed that the Department of Defense take on a lead agency role in certain aspects of the fight against drugs. This would include aerial and maritime anti-drug surveillance, developing an effective, integrated communications network, and providing personnel and equipment to support domestic and foreign interdiction, and to support narcotic crop control efforts in the producing countries.

West German officials told us that article 87a of the West German Constitution limits the use of their military to national defense and, therefore, its military cannot be used in foreign or domestic drug control efforts. Officials in the United Kingdom and Italy told us there were no similar legal constraints in those countries. According to British Customs officials, section 11 of the Customs and Excise Management Act of 1979 states that, "It shall be the duty of every constable and every member of Her Majesty's armed forces or coast guard to assist in the enforcement of the law relating to any assigned matter." Thus, the British military

---

<sup>4</sup>This declaration was formalized in 1986 by National Security Decision Directive 221.

---

has been used on some occasions when the use of firearms is anticipated.

Similarly, Italian officials told us that their laws place no particular constraint on military participation in law enforcement and anti-drug work. For example, the Carabinieri, a paramilitary national police force under the Italian Defense Ministry, is used for civilian law enforcement. It has both search and seizure, and arrest authority.

Expanded military intervention in the drug war does not appear to be an option under consideration in the European countries we visited. Officials there believed that their drug problems were not severe enough to use the military. Furthermore, they had reservations about providing military advisers to support law enforcement efforts in drug-producing countries because they believe that using their military on another nation's soil could create foreign policy problems and undermine efforts to influence coca and poppy farmers to stop raising illicit crops.

---

### Anti-Drug Efforts Tied to Foreign Policy

The United States has linked its anti-drug efforts to its foreign policy objectives. Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2291), links certain U.S. foreign economic, military, and other assistance to cooperation in anti-drug efforts. If a country is determined by the President not to have cooperated, financial sanctions in the form of reduced aid may be, and have been, imposed. European countries we visited do not use "certification" or "conditionality" in determining which countries receive assistance. European officials told us that, in their view, to do so could undercut a country's willingness to cooperate, thus undoing any progress achieved with funds already spent. They also stated that certification or conditionality is difficult to implement, given the problems in objectively measuring the ability of certain countries to cooperate in anti-drug efforts.

---

### Interdiction Outside National Borders

The United States uses civilian and military resources to extend its drug interdiction coverage into international waters and airways, where smugglers can operate outside the reach of domestic law enforcement. The United States uses Navy and Coast Guard ships in the Caribbean, for example, to interdict smugglers, and law enforcement detachments of civilian Coast Guard personnel are used on these ships to conduct searches and seizures, or arrests of suspected offenders. U.S. Coast Guard ships also patrol "choke points" in international waters between the Caribbean islands. Although the European nations have used their

customs services to jointly interdict smugglers in areas such as the English Channel, they have not developed a program to extend interdiction beyond their territorial waters.

Italian officials told us, however, that according to one draft of a revised anti-drug law, Italian civilian authorities would be authorized to interdict ships in international waters. Also, we were told that Italy is negotiating with Spain on an agreement that would specifically allow the boarding of one another's ships in international waters. However, no such plans were in effect in other countries we visited.

While not part of its national policy, Italy did engage in one high seas drug interdiction effort. In March 1986, Italy's Customs officials seized the captain and crew of a Honduran ship with six tons of hashish aboard, in international waters off the Italian coast. Italian authorities considered the seizure lawful because they presumed that the ship had transited Italian territorial waters. Also, Italy had participated in the 1982 Montego Bay Treaty, whose signatories agreed to allow such seizures. However, we were told that in November 1988, the Italian court ruled that the interdiction was unlawful because it occurred in international waters, and because the Italian Parliament had not yet ratified the treaty.

European authorities with whom we spoke expressed concern about high seas interdictions, a concern shared at the ICDAIT. Officials point out that there are no international standards for the identification, seizure, and disposition of smugglers and their vessels in international waters.

Despite such concerns, international cooperation appears to be increasing. For example, a regional approach to interdiction, called the International Drug Enforcement Conference Initiative, was tested during the summer of 1988. A 30-nation task force, including the United States and European nations, conducted a month-long joint effort to interdict and suppress cocaine trafficking to demonstrate the feasibility of a regional approach to the drug problem.

The cross-border operations, in which two or more nations use one another's enforcement manpower and equipment, had seldom been tried and never before had this many nations conducted simultaneous operations. The operation seized over 11 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride and base, almost \$14 million in assets, and resulted in the arrest of over 1,200 violators.

---

## Organizational Differences

In the three European countries we visited, we obtained information on how each was organized at the national level. While Western Europe is viewed as a homogenous drug market by traffickers, there was no regional coordinating authority at the time of our visit. All European nations we visited have domestic coordinators, but none had responsibilities commensurate with the new U.S. drug czar. German and United Kingdom officials told us that the relatively small size of their countries makes interagency coordination easier, and that such management tools as a nationwide drug budget were not yet necessary.

---

### United Kingdom

Of the three countries we visited, the United Kingdom's coordinating mechanism more closely mirrored that of the United States. Central leadership is vested in the Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Drugs, a cabinet-level, interdepartmental working group of Ministers and anti-drug officials. Similar to the U.S. drug czar, the Group is responsible for developing an anti-drug strategy, and overseeing and coordinating its implementation. It also informally advises on priorities for allocating resources, but according to British officials, it has no authority to formally prioritize resources. In fact, we were told that they have no means for determining what is spent on anti-drug activities nationwide; however, they do not consider this important. The Group's anti-drug strategy, published in 1988, combines existing agency strategies and programs, but without precise and quantifiable objectives or measures of program effectiveness.

---

### Federal Republic of Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany nominally vests central coordination authority of its strategy in the Ministry of Youth, Families, Women and Health. It has policy coordination responsibilities, but actual strategy decisions are made by interministerial working groups and state level authorities. For example, the Conference of Interior Ministers makes policy and strategic decisions on drug enforcement matters involving both the federal and state police. West Germany also has no national drug budget, and the Health Ministry has no responsibility for prioritizing anti-drug resources. The West German anti-drug strategy entitled Federal Government Programme of Action on Drug Abuse Control was published in 1980. It has not been updated since then, but West German officials believed the plan was still valid.

---

## Italy

According to officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Italy has just begun to develop centralized anti-drug leadership. In July 1988, the Ministry was given responsibility for overall coordination of Italian strategy; however, it has no authority for budgetary prioritization or oversight of other agencies' compliance with the strategy. Its basic responsibility is for policy coordination. Local authorities are generally responsible for executing the strategy. We were told that a new law, which Italian officials expected to be passed in October 1989, would contain an overview of a national strategy.

---

## Regional Organization Called for

A regional approach to managing the pan-European drug problem has been called for by a council of nations involved with the planning for EC-1992.<sup>5</sup> Many European law enforcement officials we interviewed are concerned that the changes anticipated by EC-1992 will increase Europe's drug problem. For example, the lowering of customs and immigration controls, the primary element in European efforts to interdict drug smuggling routes, will result in a reduction in information and control over the movement of illegal drugs. European officials believe a more collaborative, centralized management approach to Europe's anti-drug efforts is needed, especially in view of its worsening problem with cocaine.

In December 1988, the Customs Cooperation Council held a symposium on Customs Co-Operation Within Europe Against Drug Trafficking, bringing customs officials from Eastern and Western Europe together for the first time to discuss ways to improve European cooperation and communication in fighting drug trafficking. The participants reached the following conclusions:

- Closer domestic cooperation between Customs and police, and a collective anti-drug strategy, needs to be developed. While Western Europe is viewed as a homogenous drug market, each country has different laws and approaches.
- Better information exchange and intelligence is needed. Europe has no regional anti-drug intelligence gathering mechanism. The lessening of customs border controls could reduce the ability of the various national

---

<sup>5</sup>In accordance with the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and a 1985 plan called the "Single European Act," the 12 members of the European Economic Community—Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and West Germany—have agreed to reduce many internal barriers to free transport, capital movement, and other public sectors. This plan is scheduled to be implemented in 1992, and is frequently referred to as "EC-1992."

intelligence systems to identify and track suspected smugglers, and integration of national systems with a centralized intelligence system will become more important if this happens, according to Interpol. As internal borders are dismantled, the Europeans will need to develop more effective external border controls.

- Improved cooperation is needed in tracing and confiscating the financial assets of traffickers, as called for in the 1988 U.N. Anti-Trafficking Convention. European banking centers are an important link in traffickers' money laundering operations, but European laws do not always provide the ability to trace and confiscate financial records, and drug investigations are sometimes terminated due to the lack of necessary legislation.

The Chief of Enforcement for the EC's European Commission stated that the Community is about to enter an era of coordinated regional action. However, a collective European anti-drug strategy has not been developed. According to this official, getting 12 nations to agree on a common strategy is a difficult and complex problem. We were told that the European Community is only at the first step of working toward harmonizing legal differences, and obtaining political acceptance of collaboration and common approaches. They are not yet at the point where regional coordinating organizations can be seriously discussed.

# National and International Law Enforcement

In June 1987, the 138 nations at the ICDAIT agreed that countering worldwide trafficking networks requires a well coordinated international law enforcement approach. To improve international capabilities to enforce domestic and international laws against illegal narcotics activities, they called for nations to develop more uniform law enforcement practices and policies to help provide a coordinated and comprehensive attack on traffickers and their financial assets.

The United States, European nations, and others are working together to find practical ways to improve their enforcement capabilities. In Europe, some laws are being reviewed to make them more consistent with internationally suggested practice, but law enforcement officials operating in Europe are unable to effectively use some important enforcement techniques such as "sting" operations, controlled deliveries, and general surveillance of financial transactions, because of legal and procedural impediments. Moreover, a needed multinational drug intelligence network is missing because of a reluctance to share information, incompatible telecommunications systems, and other problems.

## Drug Laws Differ

In the three countries we visited, some narcotics-related activities are not prohibited by law. These activities, now under review by officials in these countries to determine their propriety relative to the 1961, 1971, and 1988 U.N. anti-drug conventions, have affected past joint U.S. and European law enforcement operations and continue to have a potential impact on developing a multinational law enforcement capability. Also, while not identified as a major impediment to effective international law enforcement, differences exist on how severely to punish drug offenders. While we did not attempt to independently verify or otherwise interpret the anti-narcotics laws in the countries we visited, we did discuss their laws and the applicability to joint law enforcement operations with officials in the respective countries.

Although law enforcement operations aimed at the financial aspects of drug trafficking is vitally important to the U.S. anti-drug strategy, West German officials told us that money laundering is not yet illegal there. Furthermore, law enforcement authorities do not routinely seize assets of drug traffickers, because of impediments contained in West German law. For instance, we were told that (1) the prosecution must calculate the net proceeds from a criminal offense, and only the profit, less expenses, may be seized; (2) ownership of the asset to be seized must also be clearly attached to the offender—assets owned by third party



conspirators are only vulnerable under limited situations; and (3) a corresponding reduction of sentence is required if assets are seized. We were advised that, in accordance with the new 1988 U.N. Anti-Trafficking Convention, the West German government has drafted legislation to make money laundering illegal and to reform asset seizure statutes; however, as of October 1989, these measures had not been approved by the West German Parliament.

According to Italian officials, one can legally possess small amounts of drugs for personal use in Italy. Drug use is viewed as a personal decision of the user—a social problem rather than a criminal problem. We were told that under Italian constitutional law, users can be compelled to undergo treatment, but that this is rarely enforced. According to Italian officials, draft laws are currently under consideration that would make possession illegal, because the police have found that drug pushers exploit the law by carrying only small amounts with them to avoid prosecution. While Italian attitudes are changing on the legality of personal use, there are serious differences of opinion on the issue and it is unclear what new provisions will be enacted.

There was little consensus on the issue of appropriate penalties for traffickers. All countries we visited are strengthening their penalties, but generally maximum European penalties for drug-related violations appear less severe than in the United States. For example, U.S. laws set maximum permissible penalties, which, in the case of drug-related homicides, include death or life imprisonment without parole. European countries we visited do not impose the death penalty.

In our view, these differences are not major impediments to international cooperation in law enforcement. However, a potential consideration is the European attitude on the death penalty and its potential impact on extraditions. The European nations we visited generally cannot extradite a trafficker to the United States if the expected penalty is more than that provided by their laws. However, according to European officials, the death penalty would not prevent extradition if U.S. prosecutors provide assurances that it would not be imposed. DEA told us that this problem has been overcome in the past with certain concessions made by the U.S. Department of Justice.

---

## Differences in Enforcement Philosophies and Techniques

U.S. law enforcement and other government agencies interact extensively with their counterparts in the European countries we visited. Person-to-person contact of drug liaison officials, according to European and U.S. officials, is one of the most valuable tools to enhance international law enforcement cooperation. Cooperation between U.S. and European authorities has resulted in increased intelligence and a number of drug seizures, and arrests and convictions of trafficking organization members. But, our comparison of European and U.S. anti-drug law enforcement approaches and capabilities shows that not all jurisdictions can use the same investigative techniques because of varying limits on police authority and various nations' policies on individual privacy rights.

---

## U.S. Representation Overseas

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead U.S. agency for overseas drug enforcement issues. At the invitation of host countries, it currently has 68 overseas offices in 47 countries. Through its Foreign Cooperative Investigative program, DEA participated in over 1,200 cooperative arrests and seizures during 1988.

According to DEA, the United States has endorsed the "objective territorial" principle of jurisdiction that allows domestic law to apply to criminals acting outside a nation's territory, but whose actions are intended to produce detrimental effects within it. Nonetheless, U.S. law enforcement operations overseas are limited because U.S. agents may not use enforcement techniques that are illegal in the foreign country, even if legal in the United States. Also, the DEA is prohibited by the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2291(c)) from taking an active part in arrests, or from being present when host countries make arrests.

---

## Differences in Investigative Techniques

Undercover infiltrations of trafficking organizations, reverse undercover or "sting" operations, controlled deliveries, and the use of wiretaps and videotapes are all important investigative techniques frequently used in the United States by law enforcement agencies. We were told that the concept of "agent provocateur," generally interpreted to mean that law enforcement officials may not behave in a way that would induce a criminal act, limits the use of these techniques in Europe. Entrapment is a defense in the United States and in Europe; however, in the United States the opportunity for a person to commit a crime may be provided; whereas, we were told that in Europe it cannot. Also, West German and enforcement officials said that they have little discretion to delay arrest if they see a crime being committed, which

makes it difficult to conduct undercover operations. U.S. officials told us that Italian law has recently been revised to allow such activities.

“Sting” operations, in which law enforcement officers pose as sellers of drugs or as high-level members of criminal organizations, cannot be used in the United Kingdom and West Germany, according to officials there. They are construed as provoking a criminal act. In some cases, European law enforcement officers cannot perform basic undercover operations such as buying drugs or using confidential inside informants, since such actions are also subject to the agent provocateur concept.

Controlled deliveries, another investigative technique widely considered to be effective, was frequently mentioned as a problem under the agent provocateur concept. This technique involves knowingly allowing a delivery of illicit drugs to proceed under constant and secret surveillance to its ultimate destination. The object of the surveillance is to lead to the discovery and eventual arrest of the trafficking ringleaders. In Europe, such police involvement could be construed as provoking an illegal act.

Legal differences in the acceptability of controlled deliveries can undercut the cross-border use of this potentially important technique. For example, according to German Customs documents, in one case, the authorities in the country of destination declined to allow a delivery from West Germany because they could not agree on whether to prosecute the informant involved, who was working as a courier for the police. Another report described a case where illegal couriers were set free after being allowed to enter the country of destination because the courts in that country ruled that the drugs had been imported with the consent of the authorities.

---

## Differences in Financial Investigation Techniques

Some estimates put annual worldwide gross revenues from drug sales as high as \$500 billion. Because of these large cash profits, and fears of discovery if such profits are readily used, or the income they generate is reported to the government, the money is “laundered” to make it appear as if it came from a legitimate source. Currency collected through drug sales is consolidated and entered into local and international banking systems. Accounts are then converted into electronically transferable funds or other forms, which are then laundered by elaborate maneuvers through many participants in the international banking system.

The ability to trace such assets internationally and confiscate them is another important investigative technique in anti-drug law enforcement. But, such financial investigations are hampered by, among other things, differences in bank secrecy and other national laws and practices. Currently, there is no easy access to banking information through an internationally compatible financial investigation, asset seizure, and access to records system of laws.

The international community is beginning to respond through legislative and enforcement efforts. For example, the new U.N. Anti-Trafficking Convention is seeking to make basic laws regarding money laundering and access to financial records compatible. Also, the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act directed the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish an international currency control agency which has been done under the auspices of Interpol. However, many underlying laws and practices also need to be changed to ensure effective financial surveillance.

---

## U.S. Approach

Money laundering is illegal in the United States, and financial investigations of traffickers are conducted routinely. Trafficker finances are attacked through a variety of laws, such as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, and federal income tax laws. To help maintain surveillance over the tremendous volume of daily financial transactions in the United States, individuals and institutions are required to report the international transportation of negotiable monetary instruments. This includes currency of more than \$10,000, and financial institutions must report cash transactions of the same amount. Suspect transactions in the United States are investigated using these and other U.S. laws and if international cooperation can be obtained, it continues overseas. Federal law enforcement agencies can then seize and obtain forfeiture of the assets used in the commission of crimes or acquired with the proceeds from those crimes. The United States has seized over \$1.1 billion, and these funds are being used to finance various programs, including law enforcement and prison construction.

## Italy

According to Italian officials, money laundering is illegal in Italy and drug-related financial investigations are routinely conducted. We were told that Italian law requires names of depositors to be recorded if the transaction is 20 million Lire (about \$14,600, as of October 1989) or more, but banks are not required to report suspicious transactions to the police. The U.S. Embassy reports, however, that the requirement to record depositors names may not be strictly enforced. Also complicating

enforcement is the fact that foreign earnings of Italian citizens are not reportable for tax purposes, and there is no requirement to maintain records on citizen's foreign exchange transactions. Thus, while some records are available, it may be difficult to identify specific persons in the transactions. We were told by Italian officials that a new law expected to take effect in October 1989 would make no change to Italian bank secrecy laws; however, more substantial changes are being studied and may improve this situation.

We were advised that Italy also allows asset seizures under its 1982 anti-Mafia law, but there is some dispute regarding its application to non-Mafia traffickers. In any event, assets may not be frozen until after a trial, and this increases the possibility that assets may be hidden. Assets that are seized are put in a general treasury fund and not routinely provided to support law enforcement needs.

## United Kingdom

Officials in the United Kingdom told us that money laundering is illegal there. However, according to officials from the National Drug Intelligence Unit and Scotland Yard, there were no effective tools to combat it until the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986 was passed. This legislation, according to these officials, provided law enforcement authorities comprehensive new powers to trace, freeze, and confiscate traffickers' assets, and financial investigations are now routinely conducted.

We were told that banks in the United Kingdom are allowed, but not required, to report suspicious transactions and that there is no minimum value or specific criterion to help interpret what is "suspicious." According to U.S. Embassy officials, the United Kingdom has expressed concern over section 4702 of the U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Kerry Amendment, which allows the President to deny a country access to U.S. banks and other bank services if they do not keep track of large cash transactions, because this could be construed as impinging on sovereignty. While we were provided no statistical data, British authorities told us that bank cooperation with the voluntary reporting provision has been good.

Foreign earnings of British citizens are taxable, but until March 28, 1990, when United Kingdom customs was provided increased powers, officials in the United Kingdom had problems dealing with currency importation and exportation. While this may make it more difficult to get information on cash flows, British officials informed us that they do not view such requirements as effective in countering money laundering. In addition, we were told that such reporting requirements may not

be consistent with the free flow of trade concept embodied in the EC-1992.

## West Germany

West German officials told us that money laundering is not illegal in West Germany, nor are financial investigations routinely conducted; privacy laws prohibit general surveillance of financial transactions. We were told, for example, that while the West German central bank (Bundesbank) receives information on all deposits of 5,000 Deutch Marks (approximately \$2,950 in U.S. dollars), law enforcement officials cannot obtain this information for routine surveillance purposes. They may, however, obtain individual items of information on specific persons or organizations upon presentation of specific proof of suspicion.

According to the head of the national police's anti-drug division, foreign earnings of German citizens are not reportable under West German tax law, and stringent privacy laws and other legal constraints affect their investigations. However, a financial investigation group has been established, and some changes are being discussed to enable them to build a framework for financial investigations and asset seizures.

The extent to which such legal and policy differences have inhibited cross-border operations over the years is not measurable. However, according to both United States and European law enforcement officials, this problem interferes with cooperation and reduces prosecutions in the United States and elsewhere. The ICDAIT, the 1988 Customs Cooperation Council European Symposium, and the new 1988 Anti-Trafficking Convention clearly identify such differences as impeding more effective international law enforcement cooperation, and call for such differences to be eliminated where possible.

## Intelligence-Gathering Capabilities Differ

The 1989 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy called for expanded international intelligence-gathering, recognizing that much of the information needed to wage the fight against drugs must be acquired overseas. The United States and the European nations we visited actively exchange anti-drug information; however, intelligence exchange capabilities differ, and European officials complained that the United States is sometimes slow to respond to their requests for information. Interpol's role in developing a multilateral intelligence-gathering system has also been limited by a reluctance to share sensitive information.

---

## Europeans Limit Use of Intelligence Assets

While they provided few details, European law enforcement officials told us that they often do not receive assistance from their intelligence organizations or from national intelligence assets, because of legal constraints in their countries. German officials told us that their laws make it difficult to share information between the police and national intelligence organizations such as the Agency for Protection of the Constitution, the agency responsible for collection and evaluation of domestic intelligence information on extremist and security-threatening groups. The national police have also requested use of German satellites, but has not been granted permission. In Italy, according to officials from the Central Anti-Drug Service, there is also no routine linkage between Italy's drug intelligence mechanism and its national intelligence assets. United Kingdom officials declined to comment on the linkage between national intelligence assets and efforts to gather drug intelligence.

---

## Information-Sharing

Both U.S. and European officials generally believed that the spirit of cooperation among them is good, but officials in the United Kingdom and West Germany expressed concern over difficulties in getting timely information from U.S. law enforcement authorities. For example, in a January 1987 letter to President Reagan on U.S. anti-drug cooperation, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl cited the excellent bilateral cooperation in law enforcement between the two countries. However, his letter stated, "The flow of information from the United States to us...has been slow...An improvement in this important channel of information would therefore be welcome."

A West German Interior Ministry official told us that this problem has hurt some West German operations. For example, according to this official, while Germany does not routinely conduct operations outside its borders, it recently conducted a controlled delivery through Puerto Rico. Its courier could not readily obtain certain case-related information from the United States, and the major traffickers escaped. The German authorities had to settle for the arrest of a lesser figure in the trafficking organization.

DEA officials in Washington told us that they had not analyzed the timeliness of responses to inquiries from foreign governments, and they were unaware of any general problems in this area. DEA officials overseas, however, acknowledged that responses have been slow, and they, as well as West German and United Kingdom officials, indicated that they believe problems can arise because (1) DEA, and the El Paso Intelligence Center it manages, receives a large volume of requests for information;

(2) cases involving higher amounts of illicit drugs receive higher priority, and West German cases, as well as those of other European countries, may well involve smaller amounts of drugs; and (3) DEA must deny requests for information that the U.S. originating agency refuses to declassify under National Security Act regulations.

The new U.S. drug strategy calls for several improvements to the U.S. anti-drug information system to provide faster, better intelligence. For example, plans were announced for a new National Drug Intelligence Center to make better use of high quality computer technology, and provide more coordinated foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering and analysis.

---

## Multilateral Intelligence-Sharing

While much information is shared bilaterally between the United States and Europe and other countries, a worldwide tactical and operational criminal intelligence-sharing system does not exist. Interpol has a strategic intelligence system that provides unclassified worldwide information on seizures and other basic law enforcement activities, and Interpol officials told us that it is also upgrading its operational intelligence system. Interpol is in the early stages of developing a tactical information system to provide fast information on specific ongoing cases because its current system relies on a network of national central bureaus in each member country that interacts with domestic police. While some nations, such as the United States, have sophisticated systems that can readily respond to Interpol requests, others are hindered by old technology. For example, 25 to 30 countries in Africa and South America still communicate in Morse Code, thereby limiting the speed and amount of data transmitted.

However, according to Interpol officials and the Customs Cooperation Council's Secretary General, the development of such multilateral systems is limited by legal, technical, and other concerns. Furthermore, countries are reluctant to share certain information with such organizations because they are concerned about its security and prejudicing ongoing cases; sharing operational details among a large international audience could increase the risk of disclosure and violate security laws. Operational matters also need quick responses, but multilateral organizations are sometimes seen as cumbersome because of their hierarchical nature. The lack of an international telecommunications network further slows communication, and we were told that improvements in this



area, such as widespread use of compressed communications and development of an international computer language, could help reduce such problems.

U.S. and European officials echoed some of these concerns. For example, according to DEA officials, the United States does not use Interpol as much as the European countries because Interpol is considered to be primarily a European organization: the European countries supplement their annual dues to Interpol with a 20-percent "Eurostup" for their extra usage. DEA officials also felt that there has not been a strong need to use Interpol extensively because the United States already has a larger and faster telecommunications system. We were told it frequently takes up to 6 months to receive Interpol responses to U.S. requests for information. Finally, U.S. officials are concerned about the security of sensitive information provided to Interpol because it can be accessed by all member countries. Some of them, such as Libya and Iran, are countries with whom the United States may not want to share that kind of information.

# Approaches to Reduce Demand for Illicit Narcotics

Experts, worldwide, agree that more emphasis needs to be placed on programs to help reduce the demand for illicit drugs. Education and treatment programs in the United States and the three European countries we visited are conceptually and operationally similar. But, large gaps exist in knowledge about drug abuse and its social, economic, cultural and environmental causes, and how to deal with it in both a preventive and curative sense. The reasons people use drugs, and understanding what will work to get them off drugs are so complex that authorities are all engaged in a trial-and-error process to find the right education and treatment programs. Information is shared, but, because of cultural differences, experiences may not be transferable.

## Drug Prevention Through Education

In the United States and the European countries we visited, preventive education programs were generally focused on the young. These programs stressed a healthy lifestyle as an alternative to drugs, and were delivered through both school-based and mass media programs in all countries. Most programs were locally developed and operated with some federal government guidance. However, no country had developed specific guidelines on what the anti-drug messages should contain so that ineffective practices are not repeated. While opinion surveys indicate that the messages may be working, there are no reliable methods for measuring program results. Evaluation systems in all countries needed further development.

Past attempts to educate the young on the dangers of drug abuse have been criticized for failing to provide accurate, credible information. Another criticism is misinformation or glamorizing drug use by mass media imagemakers. The 1987 ICDAIT guidance on this subject suggested information should continue to stress the harmful consequences of drug abuse, but should avoid approaches that invoke curiosity or the desire to experiment. The message should be couched in terms of promoting a healthy, drug-free lifestyle, rather than emphasizing abstinence from drugs or the negative effects of drug abuse.

The West German government appears to be significantly involved in preventive education programs. All schools are staffed with teachers trained in drug dependencies, and the government is involved in preparing teaching aids that deviate from an information-oriented approach to promoting healthy lifestyles. Officials claim that they are stepping up their involvement in youth-oriented, preventive education programs and turning more to mass media efforts. We found no indication that West

Germany plans to provide anti-drug message guidelines to program administrators or to the media.

Italian officials told us that they are now expanding what has been traditionally a locally driven, preventive education program. For example, on the World Day Against Drug Abuse in 1988, the Italian government distributed, for the first time, a drug abuse pamphlet to all its schools in an effort to bring the problem out into the open and get everyone involved. Italy also has not established specific anti-drug guidelines for its media. The three state-controlled TV channels run anti-drug messages, as do private television stations, but each station provides the message from a different political viewpoint—Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist Socialist. According to Italian officials, the government has debated establishing guidelines, but public opinion is strongly against it.

In the United Kingdom, concern over the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) caused the government to become more involved in preventive education programs. Officials told us that they are just starting to direct their programs toward the more positive, healthy lifestyle message.

---

### Are Youth Attitudes on Drugs Changing?

In the three European countries we visited, most drug education programs were locally or regionally developed. Officials told us that the ability to measure the effectiveness of preventive education programs was just beginning to be developed. However, based on information available, it appeared that drug use is less acceptable among the young than in the past.

The United States monitors attitudes toward drug use through the High School Senior Survey and the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. The most recent High School Senior survey reported the percentage of seniors who perceived "great risk" in smoking marijuana increased from 35 percent in 1978 to 77 percent in 1988, and the percentage of students who disapproved of the use of cocaine increased from 82 percent in 1986 to 89 percent in 1988. The National Household survey reports overall drug use has begun to decline, except in the case of frequent cocaine and crack users.

Italy's basic monitoring systems are primarily directed at those already addicted. We found one study of two schools in Bologna, which showed that about 33 percent of those that used marijuana and 42 percent of

those who did not, believed that trying cocaine once or twice was a great risk. However, we could not identify other studies to indicate trends in attitudes.

In the United Kingdom, market research companies, using in-home interviews, found that between 1985 and 1988, the percentage of respondents that said they would definitely not try heroin if offered by a friend rose from 83 to 94 percent, but the research showed a relaxation of fears about crack.

In West Germany, the government has been measuring drug-related opinions since 1973. Its most recent study found that between 1979 and 1986, the percentage of respondents who said they would not use drugs, or probably would not try drugs, rose from 66 percent to 76 percent. Between 1973 and 1986 the percentage of adolescents who experiment occasionally with illegal drugs—primarily hashish—remained constant at about 18 percent.

Officials have not found a way to link changes in attitudes toward drugs with the effectiveness of anti-drug advertisement programs. Officials in all countries we visited told us that systems to evaluate programs are just developing. Italy is beginning to develop its preventive education programs, but because program management is decentralized at the local level few studies have been done to show the results. British officials told us that greater attention is being given to evaluations, but they recognize the difficulties involved. For example, one evaluation of the anti-drug campaign found that it could not attribute changes in attitudes to the campaign alone because it could not separate its effects from other influences. Germany has a central Permanent Working Committee Group of Federal and State Drug Coordinators, but officials stated that they do not have a sound basis for evaluating preventive education programs.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse reports that prevention research is still emerging as a scientific discipline in the United States, and that it recognizes the problem of separating the interplay among environmental, social, psychological, and genetic factors. Our December 1987 report<sup>1</sup> reached a similar conclusion, stating that (1) the extent to which local U.S. programs are using the healthy lifestyle, humanistic, and other

---

<sup>1</sup>Drug Abuse Prevention: Further Efforts Needed to Identify Programs That Work (GAO/HRD-88-26 Dec. 1987).

strategies is unknown; (2) most states have not been involved in monitoring or evaluating school-based drug abuse education programs, and only about one-third of the states collect information related to prevention; (3) few evaluations have been done, and those that were, were often found to be poorly designed; and (4) the Department of Education has not been providing specific evaluation guidance to the states.

---

## Drug Testing at the Workplace

The United States has targeted preventive education programs for the workplace as well as the classroom. In 1986, the President issued Executive Order 12564 requiring federal agencies to develop plans for drug-free workplaces. Although mandatory drug testing remains controversial, U.S. courts have upheld such testing for federal employees in a variety of job categories, such as those who have access to classified information, law enforcement officers, bus drivers, and military personnel. Drug testing programs have been instituted in the Department of Defense, the Customs Service, and the Federal Railway Administration. In addition, professional sports teams and several private corporations have instituted drug testing programs. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate that about four million job applicants were tested by private corporations in 1988, with nearly 12 percent testing positive.

The European countries we visited do not use drug testing to any significant extent. They consider it to be an invasion of individual privacy and do not consider the problem in their countries serious enough to warrant this. In the United Kingdom, professional sports are tested, but no formal program is available to help prevent drug abuse in the workplace. Also, the United Kingdom does not have drug testing in government agencies. Officials told us that evidence in the United Kingdom shows only a small problem in the workplace, and it is not yet severe enough to attempt to overcome the tradition of individual privacy rights. In fact, the United Kingdom and other nations objected to proposed 1988 U.S. rules, which were viewed as extending U.S. drug testing programs to include employees of British contractors providing safety and security services to U.S. air carriers. The government was sympathetic to U.S. concerns about ensuring the safety of public transportation, but objected on the basis of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws and regulations.

Italy does have some testing of military personnel, police, and customs officers, but it is strictly limited. West Germany does not have a program to help prevent drug abuse in the workplace, and it has no drug

---

testing program. Officials there said that its drug problem is not severe enough to warrant intruding on personal freedoms.

---

---

## Addressing Drug Dependencies Through Treatment

Medical experts believe that drug treatment programs should be community based and tailored to the needs of individual addicts. Treatment programs in both the United States and European countries we visited follow this approach, yet, given the complex causes of addiction, all experience high recidivism rates. No one thought they had found the optimum approach.

In the countries we visited, treatment responsibility was given to local communities, and many treatment programs were located within the community where the problem exists. According to United Nations data, nearly all countries have adopted the community based approach to demand reduction. Not only does this make sense from the proximity point of view, but community based programs offer the advantage of working with addicts in their own environment and having the ability to mobilize elements of that environment to support their resistance to drugs. While community based programs are largely locally controlled and operated, in all countries we visited, the central government provides some assistance in coordination, technical assistance, research, and funding.

Also, in these countries, drug treatment was tailored to individual needs, with self-help programs and outpatient clinics available to persons whose abuse resulted in only mild or moderate impairment and counseling and to support those who want to quit using drugs while they continue to function in the community. In the United States, about 85 percent of those treated are in outpatient programs. Similar information in the European countries we visited was unavailable, but we learned that it is increasingly becoming the preferred method of treatment in West Germany and the United Kingdom. Similarly, Italy is instituting "first reception clinics"<sup>2</sup> to identify abusers' needs.

Italy and the United Kingdom include maintenance programs in their treatment regimes. This treatment provides methadone and other substitute drugs to heroin addicts to help them continue to successfully function during treatment and to help slow the spread of the AIDS from

---

<sup>2</sup>First reception clinics are centers where drug users can go to have their problem assessed for referral to a treatment facility.

---

intravenous drug users. U.S. officials also believe that methadone maintenance helps reduce drug-related crimes.

In 1988, about 12,400 addicts were being treated with methadone in the United Kingdom. According to Italian officials, about 41 percent of the 43,200 addicts in treatment receive methadone. Considerable local variation exists in its use, ranging from 99 percent of all heroin addicts in treatment in some areas to 25 to 30 percent in others.

German officials believe that the abuse of one substance leads to excessive use of another. In their view, substitution programs simply switch one drug for another without finding a solution for addiction.

We found no overall statistics on treatment effectiveness, but limited studies in the United States and West Germany indicate that long-term individual treatment programs have shown that 30 to 50 percent are able to abstain from drugs following such treatment. Since evidence indicates that people are not "cured" of drug use, it is difficult to reach agreement on what constitutes a successful program.

Officials in the United Kingdom could not provide any data on the effectiveness of treatment. Like others, they cannot separate the effects of employment, personality, social relationships, peer pressure, experimentation, and rebellion on recidivism from program ineffectiveness. An Italian official told us that Italy has had difficulty in evaluating treatment programs, and recent attempts to establish treatment program effectiveness criteria have been unsuccessful because of the difficulty in building a consensus on what constitutes success.

---

## Treatment Availability

We did not find access to treatment to be a major problem in the European countries we visited. Much of the medical care is socialized, and drug addicts are less dependent upon private care than in the United States. However, as drug abuse increases, so will pressure on available treatment facilities. Any problems that do exist seem to lie in the residential treatment program for hard-core addicts that cannot be treated in community based programs.

The European countries we visited all provide extensive free medical services to all residents; therefore, access to treatment was not viewed as a significant problem. However, all countries reported problems with treatment capacity. For example, the German goal is to have long-term therapy beds for 7 percent of the addict population of 55,000, or about

---

3,850 beds; currently, they have about 3,000 beds and some addicts face a waiting period of 3 to 4 months for treatment at facilities. United Kingdom officials acknowledged its treatment programs are often overloaded and underfunded and that it has insufficient treatment capacity to accommodate the country's estimated 75,000 to 150,000 addicts. Added pressures are expected since the traditional focus of British treatment programs has been on heroin addiction, but emerging cocaine and amphetamine problems will require them to develop treatment programs and facilities with a broader focus. Similar to the United States, there have also been problems with gaining community acceptance for locating treatment centers in neighborhoods.

An Italian Health Ministry official told us that Italy lacks adequate facilities, and an estimated 150,000 to 180,000 addicts faced long waiting periods for treatment—particularly in private facilities, which are believed to be better than public treatment centers. However, first reception facilities being established in some communities to assess abusers' problems and direct them to proper treatment will help some.

---

## Sharing Information

Given the lack of knowledge about demand reduction approaches and the global problem, there is a recognized need for an international system to share experiences and collaborate on treatment program development. The countries we visited are all active in exchanging information on drug abuse. For example, in June 1988, European representatives met with U.S. National Institute for Drug Abuse's Community Epidemiology Work Group to exchange information on drug abuse in the United States and Western Europe. The 1988 meeting was co-sponsored by the Institute, the Council of Europe Pompidou Group, the Commission of the European Communities, and the Italian Ministry of Health.

At that time, they discussed, without resolution, the problem of comparing international data on drug abuse. They found it is virtually impossible to directly compare drug-related statistics among countries because of the differences in collection methods, complicated further by the general inability to measure success or to define it to everyone's satisfaction. Considering the state of the art of effectiveness measurement, it appears that it will be a long time before information sharing will become a meaningful tool for attacking the demand side of the drug problem. According to U.S. official, ICDAIT and the 1988 meeting on information exchange resulted in mandating the United Nations to develop



---

**Appendix III**  
**Approaches to Reduce Demand for**  
**Illicit Narcotics**

---

an internationally compatible system to collect data and report on addiction and treatment. This U.S.-funded and supervised program has produced a system that is now ready for field testing.

Sharing research and strategies is useful, and this takes place among practitioners in the United States and in Europe. However, it may be difficult to translate experiences in one country into practical application in another—what works in one country may not work in another.

# International Strategies

U.S. domestic law enforcement and demand reduction strategies are complemented by a strategy to control illicit narcotic production and trafficking in source countries. The United States and Europeans share similar overall objectives in reducing the supply of drugs, but practice different strategies to achieve them. The United States emphasizes law enforcement assistance delivered primarily through direct bilateral relations with producing countries, supplemented with some economic assistance efforts in order to make economic alternatives to illicit cultivation more attractive. Europeans emphasize economic development assistance delivered through the multilateral United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and fund only a limited amount of non-lethal enforcement activities overseas. In some cases, because the strategies of the United States and the European countries have not been fully and formally coordinated, U.S. and UNFDAC programs lack a unified focus and sometimes work at cross purposes.

There has been considerable debate among the Europeans and the United States about which approach—enforcement or developmental assistance—will work best. Proponents of both approaches now agree that a combination of both, with an appropriate balance, may be critical for success.

## Dealing With Drugs at Their Source

An estimated four-fifths of the narcotics consumed in the United States is of foreign origin. Controlling production overseas is considered by the United States as essential to its total strategy.

Coca is cultivated primarily in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. According to anti-drug trafficking experts, the traffickers that control production, processing, and shipping of drugs also manipulate the power structure in these countries by corrupting political officials, supporting insurgencies, infiltrating the government, attacking or buying the press, syndicating coca farms, enlisting labor union support, lobbying against U.S. anti-narcotics programs, buying armies to control trafficking, and financing public welfare projects to gain civilian support and loyalty. National economies and the attendant political considerations occupy national priorities in producing countries. Officials in those countries recognize that anti-narcotic programs will lead to unemployment, stress on the economy as a whole, reduction in foreign currency accumulation, and more popular sympathy for left-leaning political organizations.

It has been estimated that eradicating coca production would put 300,000 to 400,000 people in Bolivia and 200,000 in Peru involved in

cultivation, harvesting, processing, and distribution out of work. There is no available estimate for Colombia. Further, government officials face threats to their political and personal lives.

Although most drug money is not repatriated, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru each estimate that the drug trade brings in about \$600 million annually in foreign exchange into each of these countries. Approaches are needed that would strengthen countries' national economies and offset the political risks involved in production control. The solution is long-term and, to date, there has been a lot of discussion about what to do. However, most knowledgeable people agree that little has been accomplished to reduce drug trafficking, notwithstanding costly bilateral and multilateral efforts.

When compared to the estimated \$300-\$500 billion in revenues generated annually by illicit narcotics, the amounts being invested internationally to combat narcotic production, processing, and trafficking are indeed small. Worldwide spending data is not available, but the United States has budgeted about \$1.2 billion since 1982 and UNFDAC about \$236 million in 1988.

The United States, on a bilateral basis, plans to spend about \$2 billion over the next 5 years to combat cocaine trafficking from the Andean region. Draft UNFDAC planning documents outline an \$810-million program for 1989 through 1993. However, this is in jeopardy, since projected contributions total only \$306 million.

## U.S. And European Approaches to Production Control Are Different

Efforts are underway by both the United States and other countries to coordinate their diverse approaches to develop an effective global pattern of control. The Department of State cites the ICDAIT in June 1987, the completion of the U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in December 1988, and the recent Paris Summit Seven Communique as evidence of the changing international climate toward a more integrated, global response to the drug production problem.

For its part, the United States plans to increase its support to UNFDAC, and at the same time seek ways to balance law enforcement and economic development programs. On the European side, there has been a greater acceptance of the need to incorporate more law enforcement initiatives into their multilateral philosophy. Despite movement on both sides, the U.S. approach and that of the European countries we visited

are very different. There is no mechanism to ensure that U.S. programs are coordinated with, or complementary to, those of UNFDAC or the other countries.

## The U.S. Approach

The major components of the U.S. international program to reduce the supply of drugs entering the country are (1) law enforcement efforts, involving strengthening national judicial and police capabilities to curb drug trafficking and production; (2) interdiction and other enforcement support; (3) international cooperation through diplomacy and other means; (4) foreign aid sanctions; (5) crop eradication, where politically feasible; and (6) trade initiatives.

In 1988, the United States supported crop eradication programs in 14 countries. This included providing producer countries with herbicides, technical assistance, and specialized equipment and spray aircraft. In addition, the Agency for International Development (AID) provides funds for projects to develop alternative income sources for farmers who abandon narcotics production, and the U.S. Information Agency provides informational support. The United States provides interdiction and enforcement support to over 70 countries, including law enforcement training, equipment, direct investigative support, and suggestions to improve judicial systems. International cooperative efforts employ bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives to encourage countries to reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking in illicit drugs.

An element of the anti-narcotics strategy unique to the United States is that it ties international narcotics control strategy into its overall foreign policy goals. Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291), requires the President to certify that major narcotics producing, transiting, or money laundering countries are cooperating in anti-drug efforts. One measure of cooperation is the amount of illegal crops eradicated in a given year. If certification is denied, sanctions in the form of reduced economic, military, or other assistance may be imposed.

Table IV.1 shows how the United States spends its international anti-narcotics program money. In 1988, about 91 percent of the total U.S. international strategy funds were spent for enforcement-related purposes, such as crop eradication and interdiction, equipment and training, and other overseas operations and investigations. Economic development programs directly for anti-drug purposes receive about 7 percent of the available funds.

Table IV.1: 1988 U.S. International  
Narcotics Control Funding, by Purpose

Dollars in millions		
Funding Purpose	1988 Outlays	Percent of Total Outlays
Law Enforcement	\$185.7	91.0
State Department (eradication, interdiction, and training)	90.5	
DEA and Others	95.2	
Economic Development	13.2	6.5
AID (direct)	9.9	
State Department	3.3	
Demand Reduction	1.7	.8
State Department	1.7	
Other—(UNFDAC \$3.02 million)	3.4	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$204.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: National Drug Policy Board and State Department reports.

U.S. officials view multilateral assistance efforts as complementary to the U.S. bilateral approach. Sometimes the United States has used UNFDAC to assist its own efforts, particularly in countries where, for diplomatic reasons, the United States cannot operate. Generally, however, the U.S. approach has been to adapt multilateral efforts to its strategy rather than to fit U.S. efforts into a multilateral strategy. In 1988, the United States channeled only \$3.4 million, or 1.7 percent, of its total outlays for international anti-narcotics programs primarily through UNFDAC. The remainder was channeled through bilateral programs, such as the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters and AID programs and project assistance agreements.

The U.S. anti-drug strategy is that effective law enforcement is a corollary, and in some cases, such as Peru, a prerequisite to successful economic development programs. According to State's testimony during the fiscal year 1988 foreign assistance hearings, the least expensive way to keep drugs out of the United States is to eradicate the illicit crops.

The U.S. approach and the amount of funds spent to control production has been questioned by UNFDAC, the European countries we visited, and others who study the issue. We were told by officials that U.S. efforts have been too little, misdirected, unproductive, egocentric; and the problem has been characterized as too large for the United States to handle alone.

European officials and others we interviewed believe that until the United States views production as a socioeconomic problem, rather than a criminal one, no long-term solution can be expected. They suggest that the United States needs to balance its enforcement activities with efforts that deal with what Europeans view as root causes of production, such as economic underdevelopment. Crop eradication is considered by the Europeans and others with whom we spoke to be ineffective and potentially counterproductive. However, economic development requires more than simple crop substitution schemes—entire economic and marketing infrastructures must be improved. Narcotic traffickers have already solved all the marketing infrastructure problems for coca growers.

Despite these criticisms, data shows that neither the U.S. law enforcement based program nor the UNFDAC approach have significantly reduced the supply of drugs available. Despite millions of dollars in funding over the years, production continues to increase as shown in table IV.2.

U.S. officials believe strongly that, because of a variety of political, strategic, and economic interests, direct bilateral delivery mechanisms best meet U.S. needs. While State Department officials informed us that UNFDAC programs do not concentrate enough on enforcement and eradication, HHS officials told us the United States is trying to get UNFDAC to spend more effort on demand reduction. In addition, UNFDAC is viewed as a developing organization that (1) executes programs too slowly; (2) does not have sufficient numbers of field advisers to monitor programs and assist in their management; and (3) lacks specific program goals, performance measures, and clear criteria for funding decisions.

On the other hand, State does not believe that its bilateral programs and the multilateral programs of others are at odds.

Appendix IV  
International Strategies

Table IV.2: Growth in Worldwide Production of Coca, Opium, and Marijuana; 1985, 1987, and 1989

	Estimated Metric Tons		
	1985	1987	1989
<b>Coca</b>			
Peru	95,200	109,500	137,273
Bolivia	47,600	54,961	80,000
Colombia	12,400	20,000	33,500
Ecuador	3,710	677	360
<b>Total Coca</b>	<b>158,910</b>	<b>185,138</b>	<b>251,133</b>
<b>Opium</b>			
Afghanistan	450	600	585
Iran	300	300	300
Pakistan	55	225	157
Burma	490	1,015	2,625
Laos	100	225	375
Thailand	35	30	60
Mexico	75	75	85
<b>Total Opium</b>	<b>1,505</b>	<b>2,470</b>	<b>4,187</b>
<b>Marijuana</b>			
Mexico	6,450	9,900	47,590
Colombia	11,000	14,390	3,380
Jamaica	1,595	900	1,208
Belize	1,100	981	392
Others	900	1,500	3,500
<b>Total Marijuana</b>	<b>21,045</b>	<b>27,671</b>	<b>56,070</b>

Source: U.S. Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1989 and 1990.

For example, they cite formal and informal exchanges of ideas to shape UNFDAC efforts to correspond to U.S. priorities, as well as examples of joint programs in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, the Caribbean, Thailand, Pakistan, and Burma, and parallel efforts in the Andean region. While the United States is now looking for ways to increase UNFDAC funding, it is also reassessing what it wants UNFDAC and other multilateral and regional organizations to emphasize to advance U.S. anti-narcotics activities.

## European Approach

The European nations we visited support programs that they believe are aimed first at the socioeconomic problems in producing nations. They channel most of their assistance money through the United Nations, believing a multilateral organization offers more advantages for accomplishing their own anti-drug and foreign relations goals. However, State

officials point out that none of these countries have established a vehicle for international narcotics control bilateral programs nor do any of them have the international narcotics control expertise of the United States, and therefore must rely on UNFDAC.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, some 86 to 92 percent of projects funded since 1980 have been for economic development projects. In the United Kingdom, an estimated 53 percent of their projects are for economic development and demand reduction. Specific figures were not available for Italy, but officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that nearly all their assistance was for economic development and demand reduction programs. UNFDAC's strategy generally reflects the views of its major donors and 83 percent of its projects in 1988 emphasized economic development and demand reduction, with the remaining 17 percent emphasizing law enforcement projects.

We discussed differing philosophies on international approaches with officials in those countries we visited. They generally did not agree with the U.S. view that law enforcement is a key component to successful economic development programs. West German officials preferred to use law enforcement after all economic alternatives are in place and the other causes of production are removed. Until then, they felt it was unreasonable to expect the growers to give up producing illicit drugs. They support law enforcement assistance in the form of equipment and training, but not direct enforcement assistance that involves force, such as interdiction or some aspects of crop eradication. The Italians view too much law enforcement as direct involvement in another country's sovereign affairs that would create a backlash in producing nations, which would be counterproductive to overall anti-drug efforts.

The officials in the countries we visited viewed the U.S. crop eradication program as ineffective, stating that farmers will simply replant crops. United Kingdom officials, for example, told us that unless improvements can be made in the country's infrastructure to convince farmers that legal crops are attractive, this approach will not work. These officials were also concerned that the U.S. emphasis on enforcement and certification could undercut a nation's willingness to cooperate. The European countries we visited did not attach conditions to their anti-drug assistance. Officials in the United Kingdom stated that some countries simply do not have the physical capability or resources to comply with conditions. Table IV.3 shows total UNFDAC contributions from 1982 through 1988.



Appendix IV  
International Strategies

Table IV.3: Annual Donations to UNFDAC, 1982-88

In millions U.S. dollars

Donor	Contributions <sup>a</sup>							Total	Percentage
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988		
Italy <sup>b</sup>	\$0.1	\$41.1	\$0.3	\$10.3	\$4.6	\$11.3	\$114.2	\$118.9	61.7
United States	2.0	2.0	7.5	2.7	8.0	0.8	3.0	26.0	8.8
Federal Republic of Germany	2.2	2.2	0.8	1.9	3.8	3.1	3.8	17.8	6.0
United Kingdom	0.1	0.2	1.6	5.2	0.1	4.2	5.5	16.0	5.7
Sweden	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.4	1.6	11.2	0.6	16.2	5.5
Norway	0.2	0.7	0.7	2.5	8.3	1.1	•	13.5	4.6
Netherlands	•	•	•	•	0.1	3.7	0.1	3.9	1.3
Japan	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.6	3.6	1.2
Canada	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0	1.0	0.4	0.6	3.6	1.2
France	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.9	2.4	0.8
Other countries	0.6	0.7	1.2	0.9	1.6	1.7	1.1	7.8	2.6
European Community	•	•	•	•	•	0.6	0.6	1.2	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$6.5</b>	<b>\$48.2</b>	<b>\$14.0</b>	<b>\$25.5</b>	<b>\$30.4</b>	<b>\$39.2</b>	<b>\$131.0</b>	<b>\$294.8</b>	<b>99.8</b>

<sup>a</sup>Contributions recorded according to year of pledge, through December 31, 1988.

<sup>b</sup>In 1987, the Italian government informed UNFDAC that it would provide up to \$300 million in U.S. dollars to the Fund as an encouragement for other donors to do the same. The provision of funds is contingent upon concluding specific project agreements between the U.N. and Italy.

European officials told us that they support UNFDAC because it embodies the concept of international cooperation and presents a globally unified and coordinated front. They believe that some producing countries may also be more receptive to multilateral aid provided through UNFDAC, since its programs are generally viewed as humanitarian assistance without the implied quid pro quo of some bilateral aid. In addition, European officials felt that channeling assistance through UNFDAC (1) can insulate donor countries from issues that may be sensitive at home, and potential security problems associated with placing their own personnel in countries like Colombia; (2) can field programs in producing countries where diplomatic relations or other problems prevent direct bilateral assistance from being used; and (3) is less expensive for each donor than developing the expertise and project servicing system needed for individual bilateral programs. However, in the opinion of State Department officials, many resources have been spent with little tangible results; particularly in actual reductions in illicit cultivation.

Officials in the European countries we visited, and in the United States, acknowledged that UNFDAC is still maturing as an organization. According to West German officials, as the UNFDAC program has evolved, West

Germany has increasingly used UNFDAC as its major multilateral partner. West Germany wants to increase its contributions even more if UNFDAC's administrative capacity becomes strong enough to absorb additional funds. However, Italian officials told us that UNFDAC is a "result of the will of the participating governments" and the way to improve UNFDAC's management capability is to support it more. However, as shown in table IV.4, UNFDAC has been unable to spend the money that was available to it.

**Table IV.4: Comparison of UNFDAC  
Budgeted Amounts and Expenditures,  
1985-88**

In millions U.S. dollars			
Year	Budget	Expenditures	Expenditures as a percent of budget
1985	\$18.68	\$12.88	69
1986	21.46	17.98	84
1987	39.82	24.13	61
1988	60.40	33.00	55

UNFDAC officials told us that they are taking steps to improve UNFDAC's management capabilities and its ability to use donated funds. According to its Deputy Director, UNFDAC is hiring more staff to enable it to start more programs, which will help accelerate spending. It has hired five new field advisers since 1987 to improve project oversight.

UNFDAC is also trying to improve its planning. At the urging of donors, it is developing a medium-term plan that provides a more comprehensive, worldwide picture of its current efforts and over a longer period than is now available. However, no overall planning and coordination mechanism exists to blend all bilateral and multilateral projects together into a cohesive attack on production. Nor does this plan contain real cost estimates of funding outlays, except in very general terms.

UNFDAC prepares a "masterplan" for each country in which it has programs. The country's drug problem is analyzed, and all completed, ongoing, or planned anti-drug projects are assessed. However, according to UNFDAC staff, "plans" are essentially only a listing of planned and ongoing projects, with an overview of the country's anti-drug policies and goals. According to UNFDAC staff, the accompanying individual project agreement documents provide general goals and project objectives, as well as workplans that include suggested time frames for implementing the various project components; however, they do not contain specific milestones and performance measures. UNFDAC uses its field advisers to

oversee projects and the leverage provided by its representation of the world community to help ensure cooperation.

## Integration of U.S. and U.N. Programs Lacking

U.S. and European officials agree that program integration and coordination in recipient countries is imperative, but no formal mechanism exists for ensuring that U.S.- and U.N.-sponsored programs in a given country are integrated. Such was the case in Bolivia, where a lack of coordination and differences in fundamental approaches yielded counterproductive results.

In 1987, the United States' bilateral agreement with Bolivia resulted in a ban on cocoa cultivation in the Chapare region where U.S. programs were operating. But, according to Bolivian law, cultivation in certain areas of the Yungas region where UNFDAC had just begun a \$15-million program to control it, remained legal. UNFDAC officials told us that they did not find out about the new agreement until it had been presented publicly. By then, it was too late for UNFDAC to make adjustments to its program, and, according to the UNFDAC officials, the unilateral American action "cut the legs from under" them. UNFDAC felt that it should have been involved in the planning meetings so such problems could have been avoided. State Department officials told us that the United States did not deliberately exclude UNFDAC from these meetings, but that some confusion existed in U.S. communications at the time, and U.S. authorities did not ensure that UNFDAC clearly understood the plan.

Another case of counterproductive results involved the U.S. reduction of over \$18 million in economic and military assistance to Bolivia in 1986 and 1987, because of Bolivia's failure to meet eradication targets and to take other meaningful narcotics control actions. Since UNFDAC had not conditioned its aid to Bolivia, it did not support the U.S. action, and did not reduce its assistance during this period. State Department officials said that they had been urging UNFDAC to condition its aid to Bolivia for over a decade, and according to AID's Director of the Office of South American and Mexican Affairs, UNFDAC's lack of a certification program has hurt U.S. programs. The Director said that the communities that cooperate with the United States get political pressure from other Bolivians for their eradication activities, while those communities that do not cooperate with the United States get UNFDAC help anyway. That difference, U.S. officials said, undercut cooperation with American projects.

Coca production in Bolivia increased, but U.S. assistance was subsequently restored. However, the 1987 U.S. agreement with Bolivia also appears to have contravened a long-standing U.S./UNFDAC agreement not to pay coca farmers to eradicate their crops, since such crops are already illegal, and the payments can act as an incentive to increase cultivation. A State Department Official told us that the United States has not changed its agreement with UNFDAC, and does not pay the farmers directly. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), it is illegal for the United States to pay farmers to eradicate crops. The U.S. policy is to pay the labor costs to eradicate their crops voluntarily. The United States provides the Economic Support Fund and other monies to the Bolivian government which, in effect, frees Bolivian funds for the compensatory payments.

According to a UNFDAC official, the different programs are sending confusing messages to farmers. UNFDAC tells them that they are expected to destroy their crops without being reimbursed because they are illegal. However, the new U.S./Bolivian program tells them that even though the crops are illegal, they will be reimbursed for their loss.

Better integration, while not guaranteeing greater program successes in reducing the flow of drugs, could provide for greater program efficiencies. Improvements in coordination in specific countries would help integrate bilateral and multilateral programs. According to UNFDAC officials, host government representatives and individual donors meet to discuss their plans, but not collectively; therefore, all donors do not have the full picture of programs being implemented to ensure that resources are used efficiently and effectively. According to U.S. and international officials, recipient countries are not strongly motivated to ensure program integration and they use the lack of coordination to broker donors off against one another and to gain the most advantageous situation for their country. U.S., European, and U.N. officials stated that this has hindered efforts to integrate bilateral and multilateral narcotics control programs.

State and AID officials confirmed that the United States has no formal mechanism to coordinate its program planning with UNFDAC, and that the United States has not shared important planning documents with them. In each country, the U.S. mission prepares an annual Post Operating Plan that provides a detailed explanation of U.S. anti-drug projects, their objectives and milestones, and measures of performance. These plans, often classified and always sensitive according to ONDCP, are the key management tool for implementing U.S. narcotics control policy

goals and supporting program objectives. State officials told us, however, that the United States frequently discusses what it is doing with UNFDAC during meetings. UNFDAC officials confirmed that some documents, such as congressional submissions, annual training plans, and recipient country equipment needs, are received and U.S. plans are discussed, but they still feel this is insufficient.

U.S. officials told us that while there is no legal prohibition against sharing these or other plans, it is State's policy not to share them with UNFDAC. State does provide UNFDAC with budgetary data for U.S. programs and the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, but this information relates to previously made project decisions and does not help to integrate U.S. and UNFDAC planning prior to such decisions. However, both the United States and the European countries meet periodically with UNFDAC officials to review UNFDAC planning documents.

State told us that it is trying to improve coordination between U.S. and U.N. personnel, and personnel from other donor countries, at the field level. According to UNFDAC's Deputy Director, the United States is also beginning to provide more general information to the Fund through its Mission to the U.N. in Vienna, Austria. However, information-sharing is still insufficient to ensure that programs are not working at cross purposes or duplicating one another. We found no indication that the United States will begin sharing its program plans with UNFDAC.

While the United States is trying to improve integration, it appears that other countries' programs will continue to be considered complementary to its own. For example, it is now United States policy to integrate multi-lateral programs into the United States' international anti-drug strategy. Therefore, State is trying to (1) engage U.N. programs to complement and assist U.S. government bilateral anti-narcotics programs and (2) encourage donor involvement in U.S. projects so that the United States does not work alone. State is also studying how to best involve others in its Andean initiative.

There are indications that steps are being taken to more fully integrate various countries' and organizations' anti-narcotics programs. The United States' international strategy gives greater attention to the causes of illicit drug production than in the past, recognizing factors such as prevalent economic conditions, incentives for illicit production, and traditional and cultural differences. State's 1989 strategy report specifically cites cocaine control as not simply a law enforcement issue, but as a complex foreign policy and economic matter.

State is encouraged by (1) an increased willingness of the European community to identify programs and funding for overseas narcotics control, (2) Europeans using their ties to Latin America to enhance cooperation on narcotics control, and (3) increased U.N. recognition that law enforcement has a role in the total program. For example, while UNFDAC's 1988 Financial Report shows a drop in funding for law enforcement and laboratory services, from \$6.8 million in 1987 to \$5 million in 1988, UNFDAC's Deputy Executive Director stated that they are beginning to receive increased funding for law enforcement programs.

According to UNFDAC documents, it has been working to convince donors that there is an unavoidable link between development and enforcement and to overcome donor belief that law enforcement programs are incompatible with a development-oriented approach. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a gradual change in attitude among European donors, and more funding is becoming available for such programs. The United Kingdom recently earmarked about \$5 million for law enforcement efforts in India, and additional funds for such programs in Ecuador and Bolivia. We found no indication, however, that UNFDAC or European nations were moving toward programs that provided direct law enforcement support like U.S. programs.

Notwithstanding such advances, State acknowledges the need for a policy framework that respects the needs of donors, and is moving in that direction. State officials informed us that it is using the following three-pronged approach to achieve that objective:

- Define a more balanced U.S. strategy.
- Consult with European countries, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the UNFDAC to educate them on the inter-relationship between economic development and host country performance.
- Use field personnel more to identify program opportunities and potential trouble spots.

We were advised by a State Department official that the United States wants to better coordinate United States and UNFDAC mandates to allow implementation of programs identified as priority to both sides.

# Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the anti-narcotics activities of three European nations and compared them to the United States. We selected the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy because these countries are economically well developed and active in anti-drug programs, and they are also facing a cocaine problem just as the United States. Because of these countries' status as industrialized countries, their anti-drug strategies may not be representative of strategic development in less developed countries. Also, while we held extensive discussions with knowledgeable West German, United Kingdom, and Italian officials regarding anti-narcotic and enforcement related laws in their countries.

We also visited international organizations involved in administering global drug controls, such as the European Economic Commission, U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, Interpol, and the Customs Cooperation Council. We also contacted the following U.S. agencies: the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

We did not independently verify the information contained in the various strategic documents and reports provided by foreign governments, nor did we attempt to evaluate the relative effectiveness of one nation's approach over another's. International data on the effects of anti-drug efforts often lack precision and standardization. Because each country has its own unique context and sovereign perspective, implementation of similar strategic concepts may necessarily differ. The approaches discussed generally apply to the control of cannabis, heroin, amphetamines and other psychotropic drugs, as well as cocaine. However, because cocaine control is the priority in the United States, it is the primary focus of examples used in this report. We did not attempt to verify or otherwise interpret the meaning of or the application of foreign laws. Our statements about what activities are legal or illegal are based on discussions with host country officials.

We discussed our findings with officials from the governments and principal international and U.S. organizations discussed in this report. We also obtained informal comments from the ONDCP and State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, the DEA, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Their comments have been incorporated in the report as appropriate. Our original field work was done between September 1988 and August 1989, and updated in April 1990, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

---

# Major Contributors to This Report

---

National Security and  
International Affairs  
Division,  
Washington, D.C.

Donald L. Patton, Assistant Director

---

European Office

John W. Nelson, Evaluator-in-Charge  
Joseph F. Lenart, Jr., Evaluator



Reproduction of the original document is prohibited.

The General Accounting Office  
has the honor to acknowledge  
the receipt of your letter of the 10th

of the 10th of the 10th.

The enclosed report of the Committee on the Administration of the  
Department of the Interior is herewith submitted.

The report is being submitted to the Committee on the Administration of the  
Department of the Interior.

Very respectfully,  
The Secretary of the Interior.