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HOW WILL LAW ENFORCEMENT
REDUCE COMMUNITY FEAR OF CRIME IN
MAJOR URBAN AREAS BY THE YEAR 2000?

A study of fear of crime in the inner city including the "trepidation effect" produced by non-crime conditions. A model is developed to reduce community anxiety and to provide stability in urban centers.

BY

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SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. The purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Los Angeles Police Department or the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

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DEDICATION

To my three sons who patiently waited as I spent innumerable hours away from them to complete this research.

To my good friend and consultant, Sergeant Glenn Thrall, Los Angeles Police Department. His guidance and constructive advice made the difference between success and failure.

And especially to my gracious wife, Cheryl, who was my editor, counsellor and cheer leader through the project. Without her loving inspiration, I could not have completed this work.

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Abstract

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Abstract

The study examines municipal law enforcement's response to community fear of crime and other order maintenance issues not generally considered crime which provoke fear. An examination of five major municipal police departments and how the organizations have responded to community fear of crime is included in the study. Potential trends and events are developed including an increase in confrontational crime; and law enforcement's willingness to address an increasing range of issues. Scenarios are developed based on the trends and events. A strategic plan is generated from one selected scenario and applied to the Los Angeles Police Department using several analytic futurist tools. Selected policies evolve into a transitional management plan. The transition plan includes an identification of the critical mass to assist with the implementation; a management structure to facilitate the changes; and a discussion of support technologies which will aid in achieving the transition. The final product is a form of community-based policing utilizing increased presence of uniformed police officers to counter fear of crime.

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HOW WILL LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDLE COMMUNITY FEAR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

People in urban centers of major metropolitan cities live with a constant fear of crime. They are confronted with increased violence, active gangs roaming the streets and flagrant street sales of narcotics. The public and private business sectors are frustrated by the reluctance of employees to travel into the inner city because due to their perceptions of crime. Although, the presence of vagrants, panhandlers and street vendors is not always consistent with increased criminal activity many people are frightened by their activity. Simply, residents, business proprietors and visitors to the inner city need help to alleviate their fear of crime.

Police departments historically have targeted crime rates and levels of violence as the focus of their attention; and using that criteria, they proclaim success in combating crime. Yet, other environmental social conditions scare the public.

Some law enforcement agencies have successfully responded to citizens' anxiety. The methods used nationally have involved several variations to increase police-community contact. The contact appears to help inner city inhabitants to feel safer.

The futures study portion of this research examines trends and events projected for urban centers. The projections included law enforcement's willingness to address an increasing range of issues; confrontational crime increase; police service tailored to meet the needs of multi-ethnic communities; and communities' demand for community-based policing. Based on these forecasts scenarios were developed to "evaluate" the trends and events.

One scenario, a desired and attainable future, was selected to develop a strategic management plan. The purpose of the plan is to provide direction to law enforcement agencies for reduction of the public's anxiety provoked by crime and the "trepidation effect." The trepidation effect is fear of crime produced by social conditions which do not necessarily generate law violations, e.g., the presence of vagrants. Examples of the policies developed in the plan include redefine police service priorities; deploy increased

numbers of foot patrols; and pursue additional funding outside the city budgetary process. The management plan was developed using a number of analytic tools applied in futures research.

The implementation of a strategic management plan involves transitional management to assist the organization from the current to the desired state. The plan is developed for the Los Angeles Police Department for clarification purposes. The transition pattern includes an identification and analysis of a critical mass to assist with implementation; a transition management structure to facilitate the changes; and a discussion of the supporting technologies which will aid achieving the transition.

This study is not a solution for the ills plaguing urban residents and visitors. Some conditions, such as decay of structures and poverty, cannot be directly affected by law enforcement. But, many other conditions can be impacted. The key ingredient of an agency responsive to community needs is service orientation. This is the nature of a police department that assesses and reassesses the quality of service provided to the public, and changes the organization before conditions become irreversible.

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

A void exists in urban centers of major metropolitan cities. Simply, people are afraid. Law enforcement has not been successful in reducing that fear. More criminals than ever have been incarcerated and each year more narcotics are seized. Yet, crime conditions have worsened and violence has increased. Inhabitants of the inner city who do not have the alternative to move to the suburbs look to local government to solve these problems. Small businessmen as well as the corporate community are frustrated with increased security costs and the reluctance of their employees to travel to the city for work.

The purpose of this study is to identify future methods of deploying police officers in the inner city in order to reduce community fear. The basic premise of this research is that change will occur and a massive addition of police resources will not be available to assist metropolitan police departments. As a result, law enforcement will be required to look for new modes to use their current personnel and logistics in a more resourceful manner to alleviate community fear in the future.

This study examines pertinent historical data regarding successful inner city police departments and the results attained. Additionally, a perspective regarding fear of crime in urban centers is examined. Following this, a future study was conducted, followed by a transitional management plan to implement the proposed strategic plan.

The logical commencement of this endeavor is a review of background material to provide a perspective on the topic.

BACKGROUND

* According to the Gallup Organization, forty-eight percent of all Americans are afraid in their own neighborhood.¹

* In a nationwide study, seventy percent of those questioned stated that they were either highly fearful or moderately fearful of falling victim to a violent crime.²

* An eight city victimization survey revealed that forty-five percent of all respondents limited their activities as a result of their fear of crime.³

* In the United States fifty-nine percent of all men and forty-five percent of all women own guns in order to protect themselves and their homes.⁴

* This nation spends at least forty billion dollars a year on various forms of police protection and an additional twenty billion dollars on private security, (a total of almost \$6,850,000 an hour), yet nobody feels safe.^{5 6}

In recent years, fear of crime has reached epidemic proportions. While fear is clearly a logical reaction to criminal victimization, this particular phobia can have both constructive and destructive effects depending upon the levels of fear in society. When fear exists in small amounts as a general feeling of anxiety, it can bring cautious action among citizens, which in turn may reduce criminal opportunities, e.g., locking one's door when not home reduces the prospect of a burglary.

Moreover, normal apprehension of crime can have a beneficial impact on public welfare when it forces the community to accept some of the responsibility for crime control and prevention, thereby bringing

about the advent of citizens' patrols and increased participation in neighborhood watch programs. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in constructive directions, can be positive if they empower a community and motivate residents into collective action.

Nevertheless, even a small amount of fear -- despite its practical potential -- can adversely affect a community. When residents lock themselves behind closed doors and shuttered windows, they make their homes safer while making their neighborhoods more dangerous, with fewer people observing and intervening on the streets. When individuals invest in burglar alarms or private security guards rather than in public police forces, they may make themselves more secure, but others are left worse off because crime is deflected elsewhere.⁷

"Excessive" fear has extremely deleterious effects on society as it has the potential to paralyze individuals, tear apart social networks, and weaken community ties. Instead of luxuriating in the peace and safety of their homes, people feel vulnerable and isolated. Instead of enjoying the camaraderie of trips to school, to grocery stores, and to work, citizens feel anxious and afraid. With these less than happy conditions, fear produces an immediate loss in personal well-being.⁸ Taking individual losses in the aggregate, it becomes obvious that fear of crime reduces the quality of life in American society.

In the past, fear of crime was primarily viewed as caused by criminal victimization. Police managers and politicians alike believed that the enormous amount of fear in society was in response to the statistical discovery that "Part-I crimes were up." Hence, the principle strategy adopted by police for controlling fear was to reduce criminal victimization. Today, however, the relationship between an individual's fear of crime and propensity for victimization is less close than originally assumed.⁹ In fact, young men -- who are the most frequent victims of crime -- are generally the least fearful; while elderly women -- who are victimized with the least frequency -- suffer the greatest anguish over their proclivity to fall victim of a violent crime.

Fear, though a rather general concept, can be measured both directly and indirectly. The direct approach entails polling citizens to determine if they are frightened. It is possible to ask the public if they are afraid of going out at night or if they fear being raped or assaulted. Nevertheless, this tends to give a rather subjective response which depends heavily on individual personality traits.

The most direct and analytical means of quantifying fear of crime would be to study the behavior of citizens. By analyzing what people do in response to their anxiety about crime, it becomes possible to objectively measure and quantify this elusive concept. Certain protective measures reveal the levels of fear in our society:¹⁰

- *Seventy percent of all Americans keep their automobile doors locked while inside their cars in order to keep out intruders.

- *Sixty percent of the population will call a friend to advise them that they have arrived home safely.

- *Eighty-seven percent of all Americans always lock their doors when they leave

- *Eighty-six percent of people always identify visitors before letting them into their home.

- *Eighty-two percent of the public will have a neighbor watch their home if they are going away for the weekend.

Traditionally, law enforcement has dealt with citizens' fear in the same manner. Police departments believed that a reduction in violent crime would result in a reduction in the amount of fear in the community, and thus a corresponding increase in the quality of life. Consequently, police departments evolved elaborate means of dealing with crimes after they occurred in an attempt to positively impact citizen's lives. Over the years, modern crime fighting developed three fundamental tactics to deal with increased levels of crime and of fear: motorized patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.¹¹

However, the aforementioned approaches are merely reactive and time and time has shown that they have dubious effects on the prevention of crime, the reduction of fear and the improvement of the

quality of life within a community. The previously illustrated data clearly suggest that Americans are afraid of one another, and this fear, as presented above, can contribute to crime itself.

The question then must be posed: What can progressive police departments do to deal with fear in an overall effort to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in our cities? Yet, before police can effectively deal with this issue, they must first understand how the general public defines crime and which "crimes" they fear most.

When citizens are asked about the things that frighten them, there is little talk about "real crime" such as robbery, rape, and murder. Murder is no doubt the most serious crime, yet it ranks tenth in terms of fear. On the other hand, having strangers loiter in front of your home ranks higher, not because it is more dangerous, but because it is far more likely to occur.¹² When discussing people's concern with crime, there is frequent talk about other signs of physical decay and social disorganization, such as: junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, stripped and abandoned cars, bands of teenagers congregating on the street corners, street prostitution, panhandling, public drinking, verbal harassment of women, open gambling and drug use, and other forms of incivility.¹³ Hence, it becomes apparent that police can have the most positive impact on the quality of life and the greatest reduction in the amount of fear in a given neighborhood by dealing with issues of order maintenance.

Social psychologists tend to agree that disorder and crime are inextricably linked in a developmental sequence termed the "Broken Windows Concept."¹⁴ Thus, by dealing with the issue which concerns citizens most, i.e., order maintenance, police will not only be deemed responsive to the public's needs, but they also will ultimately decrease crime through prevention of the conditions which serve as a breeding ground for criminal activity. This task, could arguably be one of the foremost objectives of any professional police organization.

How then can police most easily and effectively attain this goal? Studies have shown that police programs which are designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between citizens and police are generally successful in reducing citizen's fear of crime.¹⁵ Subsequently, a "new and improved" version of community policing combined with foot patrol may hold the greatest hope of increasing the quality of life in our neighborhoods.

Research has shown that nine out of ten contacts between motor patrol officers and community residents can be characterized as adversarial. In comparison, nine out of ten contacts between foot patrol officers and citizens are non-adversarial.¹⁶ Given the number of sustained quality contacts between the citizens and foot patrol officers, it would seem logical to conclude that neighborhood-oriented foot patrol can have a significant effect on the amount of fear in an individual community. If community police foot patrol programs can work in less densely populated cities, and if they are worth the cost, remain valid questions.

Nevertheless, the experimental evidence clearly supports the hypothesis that fear is reduced among citizens exposed to community-oriented foot patrol. It should be emphasized, however, that this new paradigm of foot patrol is vastly different than previous attempts at the task. Today's community police officers must be better trained, more educated, and have superior technology at their disposal. While these officers may be either on foot or in a vehicle, they will do more than simply patrol. The same officers day after day will diagnose the beat area and develop a problem-solving approach to deal with situations which confront them and their community.

This problem-oriented approach to law enforcement is commonly referred to as community-oriented policing or neighborhood-oriented policing. Community-oriented patrol officers are full-fledged law enforcement officials who have the same training and responsibilities as "regular" police officers; however, in addition, community police officers also focus on so-called petty crimes and disorder.

Essentially, community-oriented policing is a form of decentralized proactive policing that fosters trust between the community and the community police officer.¹⁷

The introduction of neighborhood-oriented patrol officers specifically trained to deal with issues of crime and disorder in a neighborhood, promises to reduce the fear of crime and improve the quality of life in our cities. Many other professions have realized the importance of acting as compared with simply reacting to a problem. In medicine, for example, the discovery that malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes led not only to the development of new medicines for the benefit of those already infected, but also to the draining of swamps to prevent people who were still uninfected from coming into contact with the mosquitoes that cause the disease. In police terms, by reducing the amount of disorder in a given neighborhood, patrol officers diminish fear of crime and thus deter crime from occurring at its inception -- preventative medicine.

Police departments can reduce fear by changing their activities to include more frequent and sustained contacts with citizens. Ultimately, by integrating fear reduction as an important objective of policing, departments can transform their efforts into something that can help build strong social institutions and genuinely improve the quality of life for all citizens.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Relevant sociological and psychological research clearly demonstrates the close relationships between the fear of crime, community disorder, and crime itself. As Wesley Skogan, a Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, writes in Fear of Crime and Neighborhood Change:

Fear can work in conjunction with other factors to stimulate more rapid neighborhood decline. Together, the spread of fear combined with other local problems, provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime. These feedback processes include: 1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life; 2) a weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime and disorder; 3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of a neighborhood; 4) deteriorating business conditions; 5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance; and 6) the further dramatic change in the composition of the population which will ultimately result in demographic collapse.¹⁸

Skogan's observations that fear brings about disorder complement those of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. In their now famous "Broken Windows" article published in the March, 1982, issue of Atlantic Monthly, Wilson and Kelling revealed that disorder in a community leads to increases in crime. In their essay, the authors submit that if a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, the rest of the windows will soon be broken. The first unrepaired broken window acts as a beacon indicating that nobody in the neighborhood cares, and thus disorder flourishes:

...[when] a piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps on the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers...¹⁹

A community in such a level of disorder provides an appropriate foundation upon which more serious crime can abound. When a neighborhood begins sliding downhill, narcotics locations soon evolve and prostitution activity proliferates, thus the stage is set for an increase in robberies, burglaries, and even murder.

Serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is in effect the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.²⁰

Conditions such as these clearly have a negative effect on the quality of life in our neighborhoods. Yet, how can police departments positively impact fear, disorder, and crime to prevent the destruction of the social networks which keep communities together? In the past, when dealing with increased crime, police would frequently expand the amount of motorized patrol in a targeted area in order to ameliorate the situation.

In 1974, however, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment determined that citizens are not aware of increases or decreases of motorized patrol in their neighborhoods. The study further determined that citizens' fear of crime was not affected by fluctuations in the amount of motorized patrol.²¹ It appears that motorized patrol, the backbone of most American police departments, goes largely unnoticed by the general public.

Nevertheless, police have another approach available to effectively combat fear and disorder. Two field experiments have shown that citizens are aware of increases and decreases in levels of community-based foot patrol. Moreover, these studies demonstrate that neighborhood-oriented foot patrols play a significant role in the reduction of individual and community fear.

After analyzing surveys of citizens' assessments of crime problems in neighborhoods that had enhanced, constant, or reduced levels of foot patrol, the authors of the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment determined "person's living in areas where foot patrol was created perceived a notable decrease in the severity of crime-related problems."²² The trial program further established that "residents in beats where foot patrol was added considered the severity of crime problems to be diminishing in their neighborhoods at levels greater than in the other two [experimental] areas."²³

Similarly, an experiment in Flint, Michigan, found that:

Almost seventy percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Community Foot Patrol Program. Additionally, many qualified their response by saying that they felt especially safe when the foot patrol officer was well known and highly visible.²⁴

INTERVIEWS

Foot patrol programs are rapidly proliferating across the country. Currently, over two hundred and twenty police departments nationwide are employing some form of neighborhood policing to reduce the fear of crime and abate disorder.²⁵ Discussions with police officers, department managers, and academicians knowledgeable in the field were conducted, and serve as an indispensable component of this research project.

Dr. Robert Trojanowicz, of the National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, considered one of the foremost authorities on the relationship between fear, crime, and foot patrol programs, was interviewed. Also, James Q. Wilson, famed author of "Broken Windows," was contacted to address the issues of order maintenance and neighborhood-oriented policing.

In addition to the above dialogues, meetings with police officers who have significantly contributed to the development and implementation of community-oriented foot patrol programs were conducted.

Representatives from a myriad of police agencies were contacted and questioned, including personnel from the Police Departments of:

- * New York City, New York * Houston, Texas
- * Baltimore County, Maryland * Flint, Michigan
- * San Diego, California * Newark, New Jersey

These organizations were selected due to their leadership in the field of fear reduction, their efforts at community enhancement, and their deployment of foot patrols. Contact was made with a spokesperson from the above departments. Of the six aforementioned police departments, all responded to interviews except for the Police Department of Newark.

The involved agencies were questioned on their problem solving techniques in the area of fear reduction and order maintenance, as well as their efforts and endeavors to establish community-oriented police patrols in order to improve the quality of life. The responses of the organizations ranged from agency-wide involvement in problem oriented policing to acknowledgement of a need to reduce fear, but failure to meet the need due to fiscal restraints and lack of leadership, (see Appendixes A and B).

The interview results were used by the researcher (writer) to assist in the formulation of trends and events of this future study. The interviews were provided to a Nominal Group Panel for background information. The Panel consisted of experts in particular fields who evaluated topics and contributed to collective projections.

PART TWO: FUTURES STUDY

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUE

The first goal of this study is to explore, amplify, and analyze the central issue using futures methodologies. As a result of this process, three futures scenarios were developed based on the scanning of pertinent literature including a Futures File developed by the writer, research into historical information, conducting interviews with large metropolitan police departments, and engaging the use of the nominal group technique.

The central issue of this research is: How will law enforcement reduce community fear of crime in major urban areas by the year 2000? It is clear to members of the California Criminal Justice System that current parochial methodologies do not work in today's urban society of narcotics proliferation, increased violence, and gang warfare. Many residents and merchants are afraid and look to local government to assuage their fears. To fully appreciate the implications of this concern, it is critical to understand the development of the topic by understanding the peripheral sub-issues.

The most significant sub-issues identified in this study include:

1. How will occupants of urban areas react to increased crime and narcotics activity between now and the year 2000?
2. What specific tactics can be used by metropolitan police departments to relieve community anxiety without unnecessary harassment?
3. Can government and private sector support be developed to assist with the enhancement of the quality of life in urban areas?
4. How will alternative policing strategies be funded?
5. Where will additional officers be redeployed from if funding is unavailable?

As the sub-issues indicate, it is essential to meet the challenges confronting today's society to provide effective police services in the future. Fundamental in accepting this challenge is identifying information which can lead to solutions and ideas. The identification of those methods are explored in the next section of the study.

METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION

Several approaches were utilized to gather, develop, and decipher information pertaining to the central question in this study. Those strategies include:

1. Surveying the full spectrum of written literature, including books, periodicals, manuals, journals, and oral presentations which addressed the social, technological, economic, environmental, and political ramifications connected with community fear and the future.
2. Personal interviews with subject matter experts.
3. Interviews of representatives from six police departments and other law enforcement agencies, including two renowned experts in the field of neighborhood policing and community fear.
4. Personal contemplation and observations during 23 years of municipal law enforcement experience in the City of Los Angeles and travels throughout the world.
5. Use of the Nominal Group Technique (NGT). This technique allows for experts in a particular fields to evaluate a topic and contribute to collective projections. The purpose of the method is to define the most significant trends and events on the issue as well as evaluate the cross-impact of those trends and events on each other, i.e., evaluate the impact of each trend and event on the other. The group was composed of law enforcement street-level practitioners, a police captain, a president of a chamber of commerce, an urban planner, a neighborhood watch leader, and a representative of a local politician.

TRENDS AND EVENTS IDENTIFIED

A nominal group was developed to examine both community fear and municipal police procedures in order to better respond to needs in urban cities. The panel was assigned the task of identifying trends and events which would enlighten this study, in order to better anticipate the state of policing by the year 2000.

Initially, the committee was provided with the background material which preceded this section of the study. The NGT panel's responsibility was to identify a number of trends and events (Appendix C AND D) which would have an impact on the issue at hand. Subsequently, the group identified critical trends and events associated with the main issue of this research and developed the most critical items using discussions to gain consensus among the group (Appendix E).

TREND SELECTION

The NGT panel used a trend screen form to determine which five of the twenty-seven identified trends were most significant and had the greatest impact to the central issue. A trend is described as a pattern of occurrences over time which is significant to a particular issue.

The trends selected by the NGT panel were as follows:


1. Law enforcement's willingness to address community fear of crime. Included and central in this is the fear of crime; no longer will police departments rely solely upon crime statistics to determine their operational strategies.
2. Condition of the urban city's infrastructure.
3. Demographic changes in the inner city will result in a populace which is older and less White than in 1990.
4. Confrontational violent crime due to the proliferation of narcotics and powerful weapons. This problem will be exacerbated by the maturation of street gangs into more organized criminal entities.

5. Technology impact on law enforcement and society in general. These useful advances can have a positive effect on policing; nevertheless, they should not become a surrogate for solid "old-fashioned" police work and thinking, human police officers.

TREND FORECASTING

As the NGT panel developed and analyzed these trends (see Appendix F).

Trend No. 1: Law enforcement's willingness to address community fear of crime. No longer will police departments rely solely upon crime statistics to determine their operational strategies.



LAW ENFORCEMENT WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS COMMUNITY FEAR
Chart No. 1

Conventional police managers have become virtual slaves to the various police statistics reported. Law enforcement personnel are forever attempting to combat fluctuations in crime statistics by redeploying available

personnel, by accentuating the importance of response time, and by increasing the number of technological tools at their disposal. Current policing mentality frequently places a higher priority on "real police work" such as shootings, rapes, and robberies, than on "petty" issues such as vagrancy and vandalism.

There is no doubt that violent crimes must be dealt with, however, they by no means define law enforcement's role in the inner city. Across this nation, more and more police agencies are starting to deal with the root issues of neighborhood disorder and fear of crime, both of which paralyze many of our communities.

It has become very easy for police statisticians and managers to measure their productivity and efficacy through the analysis of their rates of "Part I Crimes" and their "repressibles." Repressible crimes are those crimes, e.g., burglary from motor vehicle, which law enforcement agencies believe can be impacted through directed enforcement and high uniform presence.

Part I Crimes are based upon reports of crime received from all law enforcement agencies across the nation. Various departments tabulate the number of Crime Index or Part I offenses brought to their attention each month. The crimes specifically reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and classified as Part I are criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.²⁶

Nevertheless, in spite of all the earnest past efforts to analyze, process, and act upon conventional data as a means of thwarting infractions of the law, crime still reigns unabated. The volume of calls for service has become so immense that many police departments are struggling to respond in a timely manner to emergency calls for service such as shootings and rapes in progress.


As a result of these developments, the NGT panel opined that past methods of reactive policing have been a dubious success. Rapid response to calls for service, detached analyses of doubtful statistics, and retrospective

investigations have not met society's need to feel safe and protected. Thus, police agencies in the future must be more responsive to the communities they service.

Since citizens more frequently fear crimes of disorder as opposed to "more serious" crimes, such as murder and robbery, police should concentrate their future efforts on order maintenance, fear reduction, and other forms of proactive policing. By working in conjunction with other municipal agencies in a structured program to abate conditions which lead to violent crime -- vagrancy, prostitution, flagrant narcotics violations, and graffiti -- law enforcement organizations will ultimately better serve their constituencies.

The average citizen does not regularly refer to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report in order to determine the level of crime in his neighborhood. Rather, he looks out his window and observes those conditions which appear to be leading to community decline. Thus, the NGT panel postulated that by addressing issues of community disorder, fear of crime, and quality of life in our neighborhoods, police would assuredly be perceived as more responsive to their community's needs. It is predicted that as citizens become more educated and more critically demanding of police services, law enforcement agencies will have to become more willing to address a wider array of community concerns. Departments which do not meet the challenge will be harshly judged and will ultimately face a more laborious and perhaps volatile future.

Trend No. 2: The condition of the urban city's infrastructure will continue to decline and become more severe as municipalities confront growing demands and diminishing resources. Commensurate with this degeneration will be an erosion in the quality of life.



CONDITION OF URBAN CITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Chart No. 2

The NGT panel predicted that our nation's urban infrastructure (fundamental systems and facilities such as: transportation, schools, housing, health, safety, and other municipal services) will continue to decline. Commensurate with this degeneration will be an erosion in the quality of life.

In cities all across this country, schools, streets, utilities, and public buildings and grounds are all beginning to deteriorate faster than can be repaired.²⁷ Facilities for solid waste disposal are becoming filled at an unprecedented rate. The quality of the water we drink and the air we breath continues to deteriorate.

The impending developments have affected the outlook of our citizens. In Los Angeles, a city traditionally thought to offer an above average quality of life, forty-three percent of those surveyed believed that the same quality of life in the city will worsen by the year 2000.²⁸

Given the prevailing sentiment of a pessimistic future for our inner cities, those with the economic means to do so, will flee and seek refuge in the surrounding suburbs. With increased crime and community fear, individuals and businesses able to leave a decaying social and physical infrastructure, will do so. In fact, a recent Time Magazine poll revealed that 60 percent of all New York City residents would move out of the city if they had the money to do so.²⁹

Unfortunately for the cities, as the wealthier citizens and businesses leave in search of a more secure environment, municipal tax bases will decrease. As fewer dollars are paid into the "system," central city areas will continue to become dilapidated, as structures age and infrastructure will be left unrepaired. Fiscal resources will be lacking due to an exodus of businesses, cultural organizations, and other economic generating entities.


The next conclusion drawn by the NGT panel was that the lack of resources required to maintain current community services would almost assuredly become aggravated as the population increased. At a time when fiscal demands on cities will be increasing in an attempt to correct the decline in infrastructure, the tax base will be simultaneously decreasing.

The above issues are particularly relevant to law enforcement. In the United States, public safety organizations consume almost fifty percent of the municipality's available budget in major cities. For example, in Los Angeles, police and fire services alone account for forty percent of the city's 1990-1991, \$3,500,000,000.00 fiscal year budget.³⁰ Since the Los Angeles Police Department has a larger financial allotment than any other

city entity, it could potentially lose the greatest amount of money, dollar for dollar, thus mandating very restrained future planning and expenditures.

If local government fails to pay to improve the city's infrastructure, these structures will continue to decline, bringing about an increase in community disorder. This disorder, as shown earlier, serves as a breeding ground for crime. Therefore, if we fail to spend the money to address the root causes of crime today, we will most certainly pay the price tomorrow. In medicine it is more prudent and wise to promote health and prevent disease than it is to treat illness once it occurs. In the realm of law enforcement it is more economical and judicious to prevent crime than it is to deal with it once it occurs.

Trend No. 3: Demographic and age changes in the inner city will result in a populace which is older and less White by the year 2000.



DEMOGRAPHICS CHANGE IN INNER CITIES
Chart No. 3

The NGT panel opined that changes in the average age and the ethnic constitution of our nation's largest cities would indubitably impact all facets of society, including law enforcement. Cities in the near future will likely continue the current pattern of becoming centers for the poor, including new immigrants, impoverished minorities, single mothers, unemployed adults, the elderly, and a growing number of children living in poverty.³¹ These are fragile populations, living on the fringes of the American dream, with few comforts, uncertain of their survival from one welfare, disability, or Social Security check to another.

In the decade of the 1980's, there was a twenty-three percent increase in the number of individuals over the age of sixty-five. In fact, there are more senior citizens alive in this country today than the total number of

Americans during the Civil War. These developments are not insignificant, especially for police departments. In certain neighborhoods, one can see the elderly becoming virtual prisoners of fear. In fact, it is this self-imposed imprisonment which accounts for lower rates of victimization for senior citizens. As previously stated, though the elderly have the lowest rates of victimization, they exhibit the highest rate of fear.

In order to assure the aged a secure future, police must make increased efforts to assuage their fears and to involve them in plans to combat disorder and reduce fear. By the year 2000, more and more people will live 20 or 30 years past their age at retirement. With the quantity of life increasing, so should the quality of life. Furthermore, many of the elderly suffer from what is called the "aging in place" phenomenon. These people were unable to get out in time before their home equity eroded as property values plummeted. Now these people find themselves living on Social Security or small pensions, unable to move to safer surroundings.

Community-oriented policing can serve as the vehicle required by our elderly citizens to regain their sense of security. By working closely with officers they know and trust, senior citizens will more likely express their concerns and consternation about disorder and crime in their community. Furthermore, as many elderly persons frequently stay in and around their homes and neighborhoods, they are in a position to observe those who through crime and disregard for the law, negatively affect the quality of life. Thus, senior citizens can provide vital intelligence on criminals to the community policing officer whom they know and trust.

The relationship between the police department and various minority, ethnic, and immigrant communities is also increasingly important. In many inner cities, de facto segregation persists and keeps many minorities trapped in crime and drug riddled neighborhoods. Although Blacks only constitute 12 percent of the total U.S. population, they make up clear majorities in this nation's major cities. In Washington, D.C., for example 70.3 percent of the city's population is Black. As previously illustrated, as a result of "White flight," urban centers are becoming increasingly more Black and Hispanic, while the surrounding suburbs remain predominantly White.

In 1989, a total of 643,000 new immigrants arrived in the United States, but their potential impact becomes obvious if we remember that would mean roughly 6.5 million new residents in just the next decade, even if immigration rates did not rise.³² The situation is clarified if we consider that many immigrants often cluster in the inner city. This makes their combined impact on certain communities far greater than if they were dispersed evenly nationwide.

When dealing with immigrant communities, police have a tremendous responsibility because first impressions matter; not only in terms of how new arrivals will see the police, but also as the most visible representatives of government. People from other nations will have to learn that the police here neither resort to torture, nor do they keep "secret" files on their activities.

The police community will be formidably challenged to gain the respect and trust of new immigrants, yet they have little choice to do otherwise. If a police officer works in an inner city neighborhood which is 85 percent Hispanic, Cambodian, Korean, or Haitian, he must gain the trust of the people he serves. Otherwise, he will be of little use.

Not only will there be criminals within each immigrant group, but there will also be victims. While police have to deal with hardened immigrant criminals such as the Asian drug gangs, Jamaican posses, and Cuban Marielitos, they will also have much a larger number of non-native victims. These immigrants will face disproportionate levels of victimization due to the high crime neighborhoods in which they generally settle, their fear of police, and their ignorance of the law.

The above difficulties will present high demands on law enforcement. These conditions may eventually alienate the police from their constituents, unless new ways to deal with these peoples are implemented and refined. According to a recent Los Angeles Times survey, eighty percent of the officers in a community with a high Southeast Asian population felt that these immigrants are more reluctant to report crimes than the


general population. Additionally, an astounding ninety-eight percent of the detectives in this community believed that crimes committed against Southeast Asian refugees by Asian suspects are more difficult to investigate than crimes committed by any other ethnic group.³³

Thus, the fundamental challenge to law enforcement will be to find ways to meet the needs of our inner city residents, while keeping in mind the changing demographics paying special attention to the racial, ethnic, generational, and religious diversity which will continue to confront police. The NGT panel theorized that the best hope law enforcement has to achieve this perplexing ambition is in neighborhood-oriented policing.

Police organizations must continually strive to maintain departments which are representative of the communities they serve. While the means by which these goals are met continue to be controversial, there is no doubt that in order to effectively police a culturally diverse city, one must have a culturally diverse department. The Los Angeles Police Department has been grappling with this issue for some time, and has made impressive headway. In 1989, twenty percent of new officers hired are Black, thirty-one percent are Hispanic, five percent are Asian, and twenty-three percent are female.

Furthermore, a community policing approach offers law enforcement unique flexibility in tailoring their response to meet local needs in ways which promote sensitivity and respect for the concerns of minority, immigrant, and elderly populations. This new philosophy and organizational strategy proposes that only by decentralizing and personalizing police service will law enforcement be able to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse society.

Trend No. 4: By the year 2000, violent crime of a confrontational nature will increase markedly due to a proliferation of narcotics and powerful weapons. This problem will be further exacerbated by the maturation of street gangs into more organized criminal activities.



CONFRONTATIONAL CRIME IN INNER CITIES
Chart No. 4

The NGT panel theorized that in the future, there will be a significant increase in violent face-to-face crimes against persons. During the 1980's, the level of violent crimes hit an unprecedented level. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Crime Clock," there is one aggressive crime against a person every 20 seconds. Appallingly, that means that in the United States there is a homicide every 25 minutes, a forcible rape every six minutes, a robbery every minute, and an aggravated assault every 35 seconds.³⁴

When the FBI recently announced that there had been a twenty-two percent increase in the homicide rate since 1985, Senator Joseph Biden remarked to the Senate Judiciary Committee, "We are seeing the result of the three

D's of violent crime: drugs, deadly weapons, and demographics."³⁵ Most disturbing about the considerable increase in the homicide rate is that no longer do murders appear to be restricted to acquaintances and family members. In the past, there was often a prior relationship of some sort between the murderer and his victim. Due to a massive increase in the amount of narcotics and the number of gangs on our streets, innocent bystanders are being killed at unprecedented rates.


The vast proliferation in narcotics sales becomes most apparent upon analysis of the amounts of drugs seized by police authorities in this country. For example, in the city of Los Angeles, police confiscated 10,610 pounds of cocaine in 1988. In 1989, however, the amount had increased to 49,197.65 pounds, with an estimated street value of \$8,364,402,841.00. This represents an increase of 364 percent in the quantity of cocaine seized in just one year! Also in 1989, the Los Angeles Police Department alone confiscated from narcotics dealers \$33,587,356 in cash and almost 2,500 guns, ranging from Saturday night specials to military assault weapons.³⁶

Clearly, narcotics use and violent confrontations are on the rise and it does not appear as if the problem will attenuate in the near future. Although enforcement of all applicable laws must be vigorously pursued, perhaps the greatest hope for the future is to prevent these social ills from occurring by teaching our children about the pernicious effects of gangs and narcotics.

Children are taught to restrain and redirect their appetites for drugs through educationally based programs such as DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education). Programs such as DARE, working in conjunction with neighborhood-oriented policing programs, perhaps hold the best hope for a more tranquil future. Unfortunately, it may take several years before the total positive effect of these programs will be realized.

In the interim, as narcotics and gang-related violence increase, so will the accompanying confrontational crimes, such as aggravated assaults, robberies, and criminal homicide.

Trend No. 5: Technology impact on law enforcement and society. These useful advances can have a positive effect on policing; nevertheless, they should not become a surrogate for critically thinking police officers.



AVAILABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY
Chart No. 5

Traditionally, law enforcement has looked to technology as a panacea for many of the enigmas in the Criminal Justice System. Whether the latest technological craze was motorized patrols, portable patrol radios, or mobile police computers, none of these developments has been without its problems.

In the early 1950's, in an attempt to deal with burgeoning suburban populations, municipal police departments began to increasingly deploy motorized patrols in order to deal more "efficiently" with crime. At the time it was believed that motorized patrols would provide rapid response to calls for service, increased accountability to police management, and an increase in police visibility.

While motorized patrol did meet some of these goals, the accomplishments have not come without a cost. Police cars, which shield officers from the public, create a sense of distance. They permit officers to drive from one large area to another without knowing any particular area intimately, as did the foot patrol officer. It encourages reactive policing in which officers do not get out of their vehicles to "snoop around" in an attempt to uncover misconduct and criminal offenses; rather, it promotes police driving to radio calls, merely reacting on an incident driven basis.

Recently, developments such as Mobile Digital Terminals (MDTs), have given officers access to large amounts of information through a computer terminal located inside the patrol vehicle. Officers can now check license plates, criminal records, and stolen property without ever contacting their dispatch center. While this technological accomplishment offers many benefits to the officers on the street, it is not a system without its problems.

As law enforcement personnel become more and more dependent on computer generated information, they appear to lose a healthy sense of critical thinking which all competent officers should possess. Rather than initiating traffic stops on cars that appear suspicious, checking vehicle identification numbers, or questioning the driver of the car, today's officers are more apt to rely upon a rapid computer check of the license plate to determine whether the car is stolen or wanted in a crime. While it is fortunate that this option exists for today's police officer, it by no means provides a complete and reliable investigation unto itself.

Future advances in DNA technology, computer assisted fingerprint analysis, and video and radio advances, will promise officers even more efficient means of policing society; however, there exists a great danger in losing the personal touch which is vital to police-community relations. Just as patients consistently cite bedside manner as an important characteristic of a physician, so will society want officers who effectively and intelligently deal with people.

As Chief Owens of the Idaho State Police recently commented when speaking about the latest addition to his troopers' arsenal, dashboard-mounted video equipment for recording drunken-driving stops, "All of the various electronic tools that are at our disposal are finding their way into the patrol car. The greatest problem we have right now is finding room for the officer!"³⁷ Clearly the situation can easily get out of control.

The NGT panel opined that technological advances, with their potential merits, should not be thought of as a remedy to increases in crime. The panel further agreed that effective community policing rests on the belief that no technology can surpass what creative human beings can achieve by working together.

By continually deploying their most innovative, self-disciplined, and self-motivated officers as community problem solvers, police departments in the future will assure themselves of the community's trust and respect. Only by freeing these new community policing officers from the isolation of their patrol cars, enabling them to interact with people face to face in the same areas every day, can departments develop the support and trust necessary to encourage residents to become active in the process of policing themselves.

EVENT SELECTION

Prior to the NGT panel's analysis, a tentative list of events was prepared during the background phase of the study's preparation. An event is defined as a single act or occurrence which can later be determined to have occurred or not occurred. During the implementation of the NGT process, a total of twenty-one potential events were identified (Appendix D). At the conclusion of the meeting, five specific milestone occurrences were predicted.

The events which were selected by the NGT panel are:

1. Completion of expanded rapid transit systems in urban centers.
2. Adoption of status crime laws prohibiting vagrancy, gang membership, and sleeping in public.
3. Adoption of a police policy to target confrontational crime.

4. Government enactment of Community Based Policing due to fear of crime.
5. Enactment of laws to mandate that police agencies tailor services to meet multi-ethnic community needs.

EVENT FORECASTING

The individual events were selected based on their collective impact on the emerging issue of response to community fear in urban areas by the police department. The Nominal Group panel examined the five projected events estimating the probabilities. The probabilities included when the event would exceed zero probability and the probabilities of each event at five and ten years from now (Appendix G). Additionally, the panel estimated the impact of each event on the issue itself, on community fear, and on police response. The information is useful in evaluation future events and trends (Appendix E).

Event No. 1: Completion of mass rapid transportation in urban centers. Future urban living will be complicated by increased traffic, population, lack of fossil fuels and a mandate to reduce pollution in our cities. As a result mass transportation will be developed to move greater numbers of people for reduced costs. Added public mobility will no doubt benefit the environment and commerce. Nevertheless, these positive developments will also have negative side effects.

While mobility for lawful endeavors will increase the quality of life for many, it will also add greater flexibility to the efforts to law violators. Instead of an arduous bus trip to more affluent neighborhoods, rapid transportation will empower criminal types to travel greater distances in a shorter period of time. Public transportation such as the New York City subway will provide a haven for law breakers and predator criminals to target others. Historically, in most inner city environments, crime problems were localized, with criminals who reside in the area committing crimes in the vicinity of their residence.

Event No. 2: Adoption of status crime laws prohibiting vagrancy, gang membership, and sleeping in public.

Status laws are related to specific law violator behavior. The trend in the past fifteen to twenty years has been to eliminate such enforcement because of the possibility that a group would unnecessarily receive law enforcement's attention, absent any criminal activity. Recently, with the advent of increased street narcotics sales and gang violence, the reinstatement of such laws has occurred. Two graphic examples include: 1) The California STEP Act (Street Terrorism Enforcement Program), which allows service of warnings to gang members and in turn provides criminal penalties for members who continue gang membership and activities after the warning is made; and 2) A change in the City of San Francisco Municipal Code which prohibits sleeping in public parks. The implementation of Section 3.13 of the Municipal Code was brought about in an attempt to address the proliferation of homeless sleeping in public throughout the city.

The Nominal Group panel opined that many of the fear producing conditions that give way to apprehension in the community, but pose no lethal threat to life and liberty, would once again be outlawed. They concluded that such conditions will be impacted as a result of community pressure to alleviate such conditions and the response by lawmakers to reduce constituent complaints and illegal activity in their communities.

Event No. 3: Adoption of a police policy to target confrontational crime. Confrontational crimes are those incidents of law violation where a face-to-face meeting occurs between at least one criminal perpetrator and a victim. This category of crime is usually referred to as "Crimes Against Persons." Crimes of this nature generally consist of robbery, rape, and various types of assault.

In the opinion of the panel, as crime increases in inner cities, property crimes must become less of a priority due to the lack of police personnel resources. For example, many of the 18 geographical policing Areas of the Los Angeles Police Department experience nearly 100 murders per year. This represents a 22 percent increase in the homicide rate from 1988 to 1989.

Given these developments, the sheer work load mandates that Los Angeles must prioritize service to protect lives and must address confrontational crime before the occurrences of property crimes (e.g., automobile theft, burglary, and burglary and theft from motor vehicle) can be addressed. Many major cities in the United States will have to face the same dilemma in the next ten years.

It is projected that confrontational crime will increase so markedly that this category will be the major concern of urban police departments.

Event No. 4: City and county government enactment of Community Based Policing due to fear of crime.

Motorized patrols are the backbone of American police departments. As cities grow upward rather than expanding geographically, motorized patrols will become less and less productive. Radio cars are primarily a reactive tool for law enforcement which work well to quell major incidents and critical events, but the radio car mode isolates officers from solid and perhaps more positive interactions with the public. Several large cities, including New York, Baltimore, and Houston, have heard and responded to the public's demand for officers to interact directly with the community.

This method includes officers working in the same geographical area regularly, often as foot patrols. The officers assist with mobilization of the public and private sector resources to stop crime and enhance the quality of life in the inner city. The NGT panel projected that significant pressure will be exerted by the public to demand community-oriented policing in urban areas. The demand will originate from fear of social conditions which are not always a crime threat, e.g., vagrants, decayed buildings, and dirty streets. As a result, government will demand that police agencies deploy officers in urban areas in the Community-Based Policing mode to reduce fear and restore the confidence of city residents.

Event No. 5: Enactment of laws to mandate that police agencies tailor services to meet the needs of multi-ethnic communities. Most major cities in the United States have large immigrant populations. This multi-ethnic environment creates several challenges to law enforcement including language and cultural differences.

Often, even the most subtle variations from mainstream society can create a chasm between public service agencies and the community.

For example, many Pacific Rim and South and Central American immigrants fear all police because of abuses in their native country. Polls suggest that although Southeast Asian immigrants are more concerned about crime than any other segment of American society, they are the least likely to cooperate with the Criminal Justice System, thereby frustrating law enforcement agencies across the nation.³⁸

Without the proper nurturing of a dialogue and relationship with law enforcement, these individuals will not report crime or assist as witnesses. It is essential that a cooperative atmosphere be created to provide communication and assistance to each ethnic group. The Nominal Group opined that law enforcement will compartmentalize their efforts to police multi-ethnic communities in the manner best for the individual community in order to facilitate cooperation and communication with the citizenry. Failure to respond to this situation will lead to disgruntled city residents, merchants, and public agencies, especially police, who cannot not communicate and serve the community in the manner they deserve.

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

A cross-impact analysis was employed to view the effect each of events on the other events and trends (Appendix E). The results of the analysis are useful in the development of the scenarios which are discussed in this research. Some of the more significant findings in this exercise included:

1. Event 4, enactment of Community Based Policing, and Event 5, mandated tailoring of police services to meet multi-ethnic community needs were the events which impacted the most trends and events. It is the opinion of this writer that this is the case because both events bring the police and the community together. As a result of the more frequent contact with the police, the community is less fearful.

2. Three trends were the most impacted: law enforcement's willingness to address fear of crime; condition of the city's infrastructure; and, confrontational crime increase. It is concluded that these trends will be influenced the most frequently due to the needs which exist currently, i.e., fear of crime.
3. The second most impacted events and trend are: completion of expanded rapid transit; adoption on laws mandating police to address confrontational crime; and, the tailoring of police services to meet multi-ethnic communities. The rapid transportation does influence mobility of society, both as a crime victim or as a suspect. Fear of some type of assault or violence is predominant in the inner city. The public, very likely, will pressure politicians to provide police service to mute that fear. Many large cities are also experiencing an increased population of new arrivals to the United States. It will be essential for police agencies to reach out to this populace.

After a detailed examination of the implications of the cross-impact analysis, three futures scenarios were generated.

FUTURES SCENARIOS

Three scenarios were developed in this study to exercise the projections which were made by the Nominal Group. Scenarios are useful in applying forecasts and relationships into graphic examples. In turn, the examples can be used to develop strategic plans. One, Scenario No. 1, of the three scenarios developed in this research was used as the basis for the future planning in this study.

NO. 1 - DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO

Normative Mode: "Desired and Attainable"

January 1, 2000

As the result of the efforts of many people, great progress has been made in reducing community fear of crime in urban centers in the United States. This was accomplished by the diligence of future-oriented law enforcement executives, progressive politicians and a committed private sector. Currently, urban dwellers feel

secure in their homes; merchants perceive the inner city environment as more conducive to receiving a positive return on their investments; young people have confidence to reject gang violence, narcotics use, and the perception that police officers are their enemies; school administrators sense they have the positive environment needed to nurture learning; new immigrants to the inner city and the United States do not feel intimidated by the presence of government officials in their presence, especially uniformed police officers; and municipal police officers have joined a sense of community in metropolitan areas, observing the positive influence which their regular presence has created in reducing fear.

Conditions were not so idyllic in the 1990's. That was the end of an era where human life in urban centers was not so valued. Many cities, including Los Angeles, New York City, and Chicago, experienced nearly 1000 murders per year. Narcotics proliferation was evident in the inner city. Drugs were sold openly on street corners and in rock houses, and covertly in dark allies. The combination of the high violence rate and narcotics trade was most visible on streets claimed by gangs. The nurf street gangs claimed were ruled by a violent few. These groups of unruly thugs terrorized the law-biding population with extortion, noise and violence. Innumerable arrests were made, with little or no effect on the reduction of crime and fear. The only result was crowded jails and a clogged court system.

Elderly people considered themselves hostages in their own homes and apartments. They were afraid to go out in the public at night. Their doors and windows were fortified to prevent the omnipresent real or perceived crime suspect from accosting them.

It is significant to note that conditions which the police considered relatively unimportant to crime reduction contributed to urban dwellers fear of crime. These circumstances included the presence of beggars or panhandlers accosting passers-by, graffiti on walls, deteriorating buildings, unkept yards, and street vendors selling a multitude of items.

You may ask yourself, "How did urban centers transform from the battlefield and the fear hub they were 10 years ago?" The answer was diligent work and vision by public officials, private merchants, property owners, and investors. It was evident that legitimate businesses were contemplating leaving the inner city due to traffic congestion, pollution, crime, and lack of government services. The politicians panicked at the thought that their tax base would dwindle. They looked for solutions beyond the concerns of the special interest groups which supported re-election campaigns. In that search a small nucleus of law enforcement executives spawned an idea that community fear was not always the direct result of crimes of violence. Instead, the presence of beggars and homeless, and deteriorating conditions of the inner city set conditions of "trepidation effect." It was also obvious that arrests of volumes of law violators did not reduce crime. Consequently, it was postulated that uniformed police presence in a community-oriented police mode combined with city services and the private sector working to enhance the appearance of the city would reduce fear.

Initially, the concept was accepted by few. Politicians feared requests for increased public safety personnel; the business community population did not want increased fees and taxes; and the greatest resistance came from the rank and file police officers, as well as police executives. They vigorously protested, stating, "We need our patrol cars. We never did it this way before. We are not social workers. Putting bad guys in jail is the only way to reduce crime."

Initially, police services were evaluated by a committee police administrators and line police officers to prioritize and to eliminate many services which were "nice to have", but were services which did not reduce fear. Examples of the changes included victims of non-violent crimes submitting reports telephonically and police officers responding to crimes of violence only. The result of the reprioritization of services was more officers available for non-radio car assignments.

The concept was eventually developed using uniformed officers on foot patrols working out of several local substations. Officers were given long-term assignments in specific neighborhoods to become a part of "their

community" and become friends with residents and merchants in the community. An essential component of the program was the mission to act as a change agent for conditions which other public agencies were not aware of or would not respond to. For example, if an officer observed that graffiti needed removal and it remained for a certain time, he would be expected to contact the municipal organization responsible for the removal. Or, if a group of residents needed counsel on methods to organize a community crime prevention association, the officer would advise the citizens regarding resources available for such an gathering and refer them to the appropriate public and private support groups.

Also important as an ingredient in this mode was the presence of uniformed officers as a deterrent to unlawful activity. Insufficient jail and courtroom space mandated that crimes be discouraged before they occurred. This procedure was most successful in the inner city, where population density and diversity is evident. People of all ages and walks of life mingled with officers. Officers were not stereotyped as oppressive and brutal, as they might have in 1990. An unexpected result of the new mode developed when foot patrol officers could more adeptly apprehend predators criminal who were "crime centers" in their own right.

As crime reduction successes occurred, more and more police officers and police managers concurred that the new style of policing did reduce crime and enhance community harmony. Local and county politicians observed that their constituent complaints had been markedly reduced. Commercial enterprises experienced thriving business and they remained in the city. Most importantly, fear was reduced and inhabitants of densely populated urban areas had a greater sense of security due to reduced fear.

NO 2. - BEST CASE SCENARIO

It is Wednesday, March 19, 2001. The scene is a typical roll call in the Los Angeles Police Department.

Officers have just been briefed on the latest developments in their precinct. Some officers walk a beat, some ride a bicycle, and others take a police car. Regardless of the method of transportation, all realize they exist for one purpose: to serve the community to the best of their ability.

Over the past ten years the department has undertaken massive training efforts in the area of neighborhood-oriented policing. All of the 10,000 police officers in the City of Los Angeles have undergone at least 30 hours of instruction in community policing and neighborhood problem solving. Recruits joining the department are no longer there just to "catch bad guys;" rather, each understands that he has the opportunity to significantly and positively affect the community in which he actually lives. In fact, unlike the police department of ten or fifteen years ago, now eighty percent of the sworn personnel are residents of the city.

These officers live in a city which has undergone substantial refurbishment during the last decade. No longer do people cower in fear at the prospect of becoming the victim of a violent crime. Instead, they freely enjoy the high quality of life our inner cities have to offer. Museums, library, schools, and hospitals have all replaced crack houses in formerly decaying neighborhoods.

The police department, through its effective use of neighborhood-oriented policing, has built a solid relationship with the community it serves. In fact, the municipal police force now involves the community in all policing activities which directly impact the quality of community life. Department policies have effectively structured service delivery in a manner which reinforces the strengths of the city's neighborhoods.

Furthermore, citizens have gained input into the development of policies which ultimately affect them.

Although all of this mutual planning between the police department and the community has brought about much closer ties, it must be understood that these ties are based upon a solid foundation of personal relationships between individual citizens and individual police officers. Neighborhoods, in conjunction with law enforcement, have developed "Adopt-a-Cop" programs through which the same officers are patrolling the same streets year after year. Citizens have come to recognize their neighborhood police officer as their own, which has in turn has fostered mutual respect and cooperation where previously there had been none.

Community police officers who work the same beat day after day have demonstrated an enormous increase in job satisfaction. Patrol work is now considered a viable career path, and the average street patrol officer has approximately ten years experience. This increased job fulfillment has significantly diminished the high turnover rate. Patrol officers enjoy their work more, and genuinely appreciate the opportunity to serve as problem solvers.

These officers work as neighborhood ombudsmen, acting as a liaison between all city agencies and the areas these officers represent. Patrol officers regularly meet with members of the building and planning departments, the department of transportation, the department of social services, the departments of parole and probation, the city council. Consequently, they are better able to mobilize municipal services acting as a catalyst for positive change in the districts they serve.

Through this monumental amount of collaboration between police and citizens, neighborhoods which were former havens for drug dealers, gang members, and violent criminals have been reclaimed en masse. During the past decade, respectable citizens have been able to improve the quality of life in the inner city by building bridges with their local police departments.

Drug use in all levels of society has diminished profoundly. Violent crime has fallen to levels reminiscent of the 1950's.

The police department has emerged with a more positive image than it has ever had. Citizens hold these highly trained law enforcement professionals in high esteem. A recently created National Police Cadet Corps has an abundance of qualified candidates all of whom seek to positively affect society through meaningful work as an officer of the law. The past decade has seen great changes in the diversity of our police personnel so as to produce a department which very closely mirrors the ethnic, religious, and sexual diversity of the community it serves. Officers of all backgrounds work together to achieve common goals. These achievements have served

as a positive symbol to the community at large, and perhaps has been responsible for a blanket of racial harmony across the city. Though the effective implementation of community-oriented policing, law enforcement, working in conjunction with the community, has been able to insure a greater quality of life for all residents of the inner city.

NO. 3 - WORST CASE SCENARIO

It is February 23, 2001, and officers of the Los Angeles Police Department are about to begin patrol in the Rampart Area of the city. Each officer take approximately 20 minutes to don his uniform, complete with bullet proof vests, pants, and helmets. The enormous increase in violence has necessitated armor plated police cars, and many officers are leaving the "profession" out of sheer terror. Not only must these police personnel deal with criminals on a daily basis, but they also must sustain frequent negative contacts with a hostile citizenry.

During the past decade police-citizen relations have plummeted to an all time low. The community at large is irate with the department's inability to protect them. The murder rate has soared to almost two-thousand five hundred per year. Furthermore, due to an inefficient criminal justice system which is severely lacking in resources, only about 3 percent of the homicides are solved.

The quality of life in inner cities has tumbled into a deep chasm of disrepair. Most businesses have fled in a mass exodus, citing uncontrollable crime and decreasing profits. The number of homeless has soared, and affordable housing has become almost non-existent. In neighborhoods throughout the city, buildings crumble as owners refuse to make repairs. No new construction has occurred as a result of archaic urban planning policies which provide no incentive to the private sector to revitalize dilapidated neighborhoods.

The eroding tax base has brought about an unprecedented decline in the city's infrastructure. Schools are overcrowded and the high school drop out rate has approached sixty-five percent in some areas. Public roads and highways have decayed. Mass transportation has been so plagued by violent crime that ridership is down

to a trickle. People fear getting on the subway system as it most assuredly means that they will be subjected to a violent confrontational crime.

Since city revenues are down, police departments have not expanded at the same pace as the inner city population it had once hoped to serve. Officers have no time to act in a proactive mode to prevent crime; rather, they must react to incident after incident without time to pause. Violent crime has increased to such an extent, that many departments no longer will dispatch an officer for property crimes such as burglary and theft. Disputes between families and neighbors go unanswered as officers are too busy responding to shootings and rapes in progress. In fact, the community now finds itself in such dire straits that there are ten to fifteen minute delays in responding to the aforementioned emergency calls for help.

Narcotics use has become so widespread that officers routinely ignore the blatant use of and sale of drugs in our streets. No longer are arrests made for mere possession of narcotics. In order to have felony narcotics cases filed with the district attorney, amounts must exceed at least five ounces of cocaine or heroine, and at least ten pounds of marijuana.

The fear of crime has become so widespread that a new subspecialty of psychology has been developed solely to deal with the predicament. Currently, psychologists treat hundreds of cases of I.C.T.S (Inner City Trauma Syndrome). A manifestation of this disorder can be seen in certain neighborhoods in Los Angeles which appear to be battle fortified army bases. It is not uncommon to observe at least five or six different locks on a citizen's front door. Almost all windows are barred with iron gates. Residents are afraid to leave their home, and many try to do work over the telephone to avoid going out in public.

The friction between the police and community is representative of the discord between the various ethnic groups which comprise the city's population. Racial tensions have reached an all time high, and inter-racial violence is common. Blacks, Hispanics, Whites, and Asians openly fight each other in the street. Each

community economically and socially boycotts the other. Police make no attempt to quell the violence associated with the problem viewing it solely as a political problem of the Mayor. Nevertheless, the police department has developed riot squads who react to the commonplace violent riots which occur as a result of the burning unrest across the city.

As crime increases, the prison population swells. No longer is there room in our jails to house misdemeanant. Widespread prison release programs are initiated due to the fiscal crisis. As a result, 10 percent of the inner city population of Los Angeles is either on active parole or probation. Fear of these violent offenders has reached such high levels that many previously law abiding citizens are now acting as vigilantes, citing dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system as the reason for taking the law into their own hands.

The unfortunate and terrible aforementioned plunge in the quality of life in our cities resulted from many different factors. In the area of crime, violence, and drugs the police department had a vital role to play; nonetheless, it failed deplorably in its efforts to protect and serve our inner city neighborhoods. A report by the President's Commission on Crime recently concluded "The entire collapse of the city infrastructure and enormous proliferation of violence were almost certainly avoidable. If only law enforcement had placed a greater emphasis on proactive policing rather than merely reacting to incidents once they had occurred, much of the current situation which plagues our cities could have been averted." The Commission also cited a lack of on-going police-community dialogue during the past decade has a determinant factor in the current quagmire.

PART THREE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

This portion of the research project develops a strategic management plan to provide direction for law enforcement agencies to reduce fear in the inner city. It is evident that violent and non-violent crime both lead to insecurity among urban residents, visitors and merchants. The strategic plan is based on the scenario in previous section which is a "desired and attainable" future state. The scenario discussed positive results which are achievable by the year 2000. The achievements included an overall feeling of security by city residents, merchants eager to conduct commerce, young people who reject gang violence, immigrants who did not feel intimidated by the presence of police officers, etc.

A strategy is a balanced process using logic to combine resources in an environment which lacks direction. At the conclusion of the process, a clearly defined design should exist to move today's organization into tomorrow's future. It is the intent of this project to facilitate achievement of the scenario's end result: reduced fear among inner city inhabitants and consequent reduction of the "Trepidation Effect."

This plan will provide a situation analysis of the external and internal environment, alternate strategy development, and placement of responsibility charting.

For the purposes of clarification of this study, the application will be made to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The LAPD is a metropolitan police department responsible for police services to over three million residents across four hundred and sixty four square miles. Approximately eight thousand and four hundred sworn officers and three thousand civilian employees are answerable to the Chief of Police. The Police Department is divided into three sections which are referred to as "Offices" (Offices of Operations, Special Services, and Administrative Services). Each Office is commanded by a "Director" (Assistant Chief). The Office of Operations is the entity which is responsible for providing line uniformed police officer and detective services. This Office is comprised of eighty percent of the Police Department's sworn personnel. The

City of Los Angeles is divided into eighteen geographical "Areas." commonly referred to as precincts. Each Area has an Area Commanding Officer responsible for managing a Patrol Division, a Detective Division, a Vice Unit, and a Crime Prevention Unit.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Essential to the development of a strategic plan is the analysis of an organization's capabilities and the impact projected future trends and events will have on the agency. One methodology to conduct such an examination is the WOTS-UP Analysis. WOTS-UP, an acronym for Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, Strengths and the Underlying Planning, offers a model for the situation examination. The procedure provides an assessment and documentation of an organization's strategic strengths and weaknesses (Appendix H and I). A group of five individuals developed the review of the LAPD relative to the central issue.

The analysis resulted in the below conclusions:

1. Weaknesses: The LAPD has many strengths, including a proven structure, solid line personnel, and an overall positive image with the community. But, as with any organization, there are obstacles. Foremost is that the LAPD is understaffed in officer positions to the point that insufficient radio cars are fielded to adequately respond to emergency situations. Also, an inadequate number of support personnel exists to provide officers with services in jails, records, criminalistics, and general clerical assistance. Among the more critical situations is the agency's lack of sufficient personnel with language speaking ability and multi-cultural skills to deal with the diversity of Los Angeles's population, though positive steps have been accomplished through an active recruitment of minorities. An inadequate amount of equipment and supplies is apparent, including police vehicles, radios, computer software and hardware, and office supplies. The organization is reactive and prone to be creative only when directed to comply with the law and other executive directives. Parochial solutions to complex social issues are commonly the norm within the Department.

An enormous contributing factor to the above conditions is the limited public safety budget and the associated under budgeted overtime funding.

2. Opportunities: The LAPD is appreciated by the community at large. Unfortunately, the volume of narcotics street sales, gang violence, and crime has caused great frustration and disdain by the public. The community is looking for answers which other public and private service agencies cannot provide. This is a unique opportunity for the agency to exercise initiative and respond to the community's concern about fear. Additionally, it is evident that additional police officers and resources will not be available to respond to the City's many policing needs. The Department again has the opportunity to reprioritize the organization's goals and procedures to better meet the city's plea for solutions. Solutions will no doubt lead to removing the obstacle of political banter and pressure on the Department. The LAPD has the opportunity to nurture positive relationships with the City Council and the Mayor. Both should receive encouraging feedback from their constituents if the Police Department alters service to better meet the needs of the city.

3. Threats: Overall, serious crime volume has increased in Los Angeles in the past five years. Public confidence is declining. Potentially, the threat of lack of confidence in the Police Department is looming over the city. Part of the citizenry's anxiety is connected with "order maintenance" issues. The public has apprehension regarding the presence of homeless, graffiti, vendors, panhandlers, and deteriorating buildings and parks. The department has an opportunity to maximize leadership to reduce these concerns with action. The quantity of work facing individual officers and managers has increased markedly. The prevailing attitude is that the job of repressing crime and making the City a safe place to live can be accomplished with positive morale. But, on the horizon is the potential that Police Department employees will feel overwhelmed with the conditions they face and their inability to influence the symptoms. Along with that potential is the recent challenge to the Chief of Police and the Police Department by the City Council and the Mayor regarding

allegations of Department inefficiency. There is a direct threat that a proposed audit will be used for other than altruistic purposes.

4. Strengths: The agency structure is time tested to provide the decentralized decision-making authority to the lowest level which interacts with the public. The LAPD extends great effort to train officers, supervisors, and managers appropriately. There is emphasis on complying with legal training requirements as well as ensuring that the Police Department serves the community appropriately. The executive level officers are well educated and possess the capacity to work creatively. Traditionally, line police officers and first level supervisors are flexible and willing to adjust to change if leadership is provided. The flexibility is best exhibited by the Department's overall positive morale. The combination of decentralized police services, well trained personnel, flexibility of line personnel, and positive morale has created a general positive image of the Police Department and the people they serve.

STRATEGIC ASSUMPTION SURFACING TECHNIQUE

Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (SAST) identifies stakeholders related to the issue being addressed.

The principle intent of SAST is the concept that the organization does not operate in a vacuum, that its policies have implications outside the organization, and that the outsiders can impact both policy choices and implementation. The SAST procedure involves:

1) identification of stakeholders, 2) assignment of assumptions to each stakeholder, and 3) plotting the assumptions on a SAST map for a graphic representation of the assumptions.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

A stakeholder is an individual or group who might be affected by or who might attempt to influence the issues.

A snaildarter is a stakeholder who might cause a serious problem with the implementation of any phase of a program.³⁹

These individuals and groups are from both inside and outside the Los Angeles Police Department, and have a vested interest in the central issue and its resolution.⁴⁰ Stakeholders will affect or be affected by the methods used to reduce community fear of crime in the City of Los Angeles by the year 2000.

The most significant stakeholders are (see below for specific definition of stakeholders):

1. Business Community
2. Chief of Police
3. City Council
4. CHIRLA (Snaildarter)
5. Department Employees
6. Mayor
7. Neighborhood Watch Groups
8. Police Command Officers
9. Police Protective League (Snaildarter)
10. Police Service Users
11. Special Interest Groups

STAKEHOLDER ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions were made pertaining to the stakeholders and their potential actions regarding the central issue of this study:

1. Business Community (including private entrepreneurs, profit and non-profit corporate organizations, and property developers and owners)

- * Desires increased commerce
- * Fearful of social and crime conditions observed in urban areas
- * Experiences reluctance by employees traveling from suburbs
- * Disfavors tax or City fee increases, unless they increase can be directly correlated to increased commerce, provided the enhanced public service which the increases have funded

2. Chief of Police

- * Supports concepts which will reduce crime and develop community support of the LAPD
- * Willing to use innovative programs if crime and response time to emergency calls do not increase

- * Reacts to pressure from politicians and special interest groups to provide individualized service to each community within the City

3. City Council

- * Changes their individual and City policy based on their constituent complaints
- * Fearful of the Chief of Police's powerbase within the community
- * Supports Police Department attempts to enhance the quality of life in the City
- * Struggles with dilemmas created by City departments competing for limited fiscal resources, and will not provide the Police Department with additional fiscal resources to implement new programs

4. Department Employees (line officers, detectives and support personnel)

- * Supports most changes within the Department if leadership is provided
- * Frustrated with current crime and social conditions and their inability to effect a change and assist the public
- * Provide creative solutions to problems or methods to implement programs if they are asked

5. Mayor

- * Motivated by desire for re-election and pressure constituents
- * Does not regularly support the Police Department due to personal rivalry with the Chief of Police
- * Attempts to control the Police Department using the Police Commission policy and budgetary constraints

6. Neighborhood Watch Groups

- * Motivated by desire for safety and are fearful of conditions which they observe around them
- * Supports the Police Department if a program or tactic is explained to them
- * Pressure City Council members and the Mayor if it is felt that the Police Department has insufficient resources or support

7. Police Command Officers

- * Reluctant to initiate creative programs due to competing resources and directions given from the executive level
- * Possess the potential to implement programs if given the opportunity
- * Frustrated with their inability to provide the level of policing necessary to positively serve the public
- * Will aggressively implement programs within the Department if empowered to do so

8. Police Service Users (residents, business proprietors, and visitors to the City)

- * Less concerned with radio call response time than feeling safe
- * Complain about street conditions which are generally not connected to crime in terms that the conditions are crime provoking
- * Criticize police service if officers are discourteous
- * Want high police visibility
- * Fear current crime conditions and feel unlawful elements have taken over the streets
- * Do not want additional taxation unless directly correlated to additional public safety programs, thereby reducing their danger
- * Support almost any Police Department program that reduces crime
- * See public order social conditions, e.g., homeless and panhandlers as a crime condition

10. Special Interest Groups (property owners, community activists, civil rights advocates, economic development organizations, etc.

- * Unpredictable depending on the impact on their cause
- * Not hesitant to use political pressure and legal action to get their objective

SNAILDARTERS

1. Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles


- * Disfavor public programs which subject undocumented aliens to any contact with the Criminal Justice System or the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- * Suspicious of LAPD's attempts to become closer with minority communities, alleging coercion by police
- * Will attempt to use any political pressure necessary to undermine police efforts if they do not agree with the tactics or proposal

2. Police Protective League

- * Desires to be involved in the Department's policy, management decisions and the implementation of programs
- * Will be an obstacle for the implementation of a program which affects working conditions if not consulted
- * Support tactics and procedures which will enhance the officers' image with the public
- * Not politically wise, but considers itself to be

STAKEHOLDER ASSUMPTION SURFACING

This process is a graphic representation pertaining to the key issue by evaluating each stakeholder. The evaluation judges the importance of the stakeholder to the key issue and the degree of certainty that the assumption is correct.



- Stakeholders:
1. Business Community
 2. Chief of Police
 3. City Council
 4. Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles
 5. Department employees
 6. Mayor
 7. Neighborhood Watch Groups
 8. Police Command Officers
 9. Police Protective League
 10. Police Service Users
 11. Special Interest Groups

As illustrated regarding Special Interest Groups, there is uncertainty involve. Consequently, active liaison and communication with these groups should be conducted to better understand their potential for action.

MISSION STATEMENT

A mission statement formalizes the broad objectives of an organization. It provides purpose and direction for the agency. It expresses values, guides behavior, defines goals, and very importantly, pledges consistency. The "macro-mission" is the broadest form of mission statement providing overall direction, whereas the "micro-mission" addresses a central issue. The below mission statements apply to the proposed Strategic Management Plan.

MACRO-MISSION STATEMENT

1. Overall Statement: The mission of the Los Angeles Police Department is "To Protect and To Serve" with excellence. The primary objective of LAPD is to as closely as possible achieve the ideal of a large urban society free from crime and disorder.
2. Prevention of Crime: Crime is a symptom of ills within society which are not the responsibility of the Department to cure. Albeit, the LAPD is responsible for interacting with the community to generate mutual understanding so that there may be public support for crime prevention.
3. Deterrence of Crime: In deploying patrol forces to deter crime and to inspire public confidence, the Police Department must strike a balance between the desirable deterrent effect of visible patrol and any undesirable appearance of oppression.
4. Public Service: Saving lives, aiding the injured, locating lost persons, keeping the peace, and providing for many other miscellaneous needs are basic services provided by LAPD. To satisfy these requests, the Police Department responds to calls for service and renders such aid or advice as is necessitated or indicated by the situation.

MICRO-MISSION STATEMENT

1. Reduction of Fear:

The LAPD has a responsibility to reduce fear and provide for the peaceful existence of the city's inhabitants. To achieve that end, elimination of the trepidation effect is a priority.

2. Community-Oriented Policing:

It is also the mission of the LAPD to direct officers to participate community enhancement programs including acting as change agents if necessary. Additionally, the rapid response to radio calls for service continues to be a priority which is essential in providing service to the community

3. Return Uniformed Officers to Foot Patrols:

Deploying foot patrols as a supplement to radio cars is an exigent priority for LAPD. The combination of increased population, diversity of people, high rise construction, and crime demands that officers are a visible symbol of reassurance and readily available to the public.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

A key component in the development of a strategic plan is the identification of policy alternatives with a discussion of pros and cons. This procedure was conducted for the project using a modified policy delphi process with the participation of five law enforcement practitioners of different ranks. The process itself is designed to examine policy issues. The objective is to develop alternate strategies, designed to address the central issue. The group's task was to generate, evaluate, and choose policy alternatives that would assist the LAPD in managing the methods used to reduce community fear of crime by the year 2000. They were provided information on this central issue, the forecasted trends and events and the "desired and attainable" future scenario.

The policy alternatives generated were evaluated for feasibility and desirability. After additional discussion, the group evaluated the top scoring policy alternatives on the same criteria and selected five options which received the highest desirability and feasibility appraisal. The policy alternatives were:

1. To redefine police service priorities regarding the types of incidents which radio cars respond to.
2. To deploy increased numbers of foot patrols in inner city neighborhoods.
3. To develop a City strategy to mobilize public agencies that can assist with community enhancement programs.
4. To coordinate Neighborhood Watch groups' efforts to enhance their own neighborhoods.
5. To pursue additional funding outside of the City budgetary process for supplementing efforts to neutralize the trepidation effect.

ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTED POLICIES ALTERNATIVES

The modified delphi process produced considerable discussion regarding the selected policy alternatives.

Following is a review of the most significant dialogue regarding the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative.

1. Redefining police service priorities: Currently, insufficient Los Angeles Police Officers and support personnel are employed by the City to provide adequate service. This includes many tasks which the Department has performed which serve very little purpose other than recording of events. Overall, the Department has resisted any role definition changes and cleaves to the traditional services that have been provide for years. In this era when the Police Department is understaffed and ill-equipped, it is apparent that efforts have not been effective in making the public feel safer.

Several surveys have indicated that City residents of the suburbs of Los Angeles perceive the pressure of crime. Understandably, inner city visitors and residents feel the tension even more intensely as the level of violence accelerates. Clearly, no additional personnel and resources will be offered the Police Department. Also evident

is the fact that fear conditions have increased exponentially. It is reasonable to conclude that conditions must change. The only reasonable alternative is to reassess the Department's priorities before an outside entity such as the City Council mandates such action.

The public could be repulsed by a reduction of historic services the changes were not explained.

Misunderstanding of the situation could result in unneeded political pressure. On the other hand, the situation is a unique opportunity for the Department to define changes in terms of the inner city's safety. If the public understands those efforts, resistance will be minimal and the community would want to become involved in the change.

Remodeling of police roles could be rejected by the executive level officers in the Police Department. This level has a propensity to reject methods which alter from the parochial type police service which have been provided for many years. To meet that resistance a concisely defined program would needed to be "sold" to the hierarchy.

2. Deployment of increased numbers of foot patrols: Confidence in the LAPD's ability to adequately respond to the crime and social conditions has been questioned. Visitors and residents frequently ask, "How did the City get so bad?" There are many reasons. It is apparent that the time tested mode of police officers reacting to radio calls and targeting specific crime acts cannot handle the volume as it did years ago. The entire Criminal Justice System is overwhelmed with the numbers of arrestees. It is also obvious that these arrests do not always reduce fear in the community. For example, in 1989 an experiment was conducted in Los Angeles' Rampart Area. Over 1000 arrests for the sales of narcotics and related charges were made within a one square mile area during a three month period.⁴¹ The conditions which the residents and merchants complained about, including homeless, graffiti, narcotics sales, etc., persisted. It was with the regular deployment of foot beats along with selected arrests and the creation community beautification programs that reduced fear.

The deployment of uniformed officers within an established perimeter accomplishes a sense of well-being within a neighborhood. Additionally, the factors which contribute to the trepidation effect are immediately impacted. Homeless, panhandlers, narcotic addicts, etc., have a tendency to depart vigorously from the presence of uniformed officers. Foot patrols add to the Police Department's ability to know a neighborhood and the occupants and merchants of a neighborhood. This knowledge is vital to crime prevention, apprehension of criminals, police-community relations and the maintenance of an overall sense of well-being for those who see and have contact with the officers. An extra benefit is that the officers' presence will assist with community enhancement programs aimed at youth, and the reduction of factors often cited as contributors to deteriorating inner city environs.

The assignment of foot patrols does have negative issues involved. Among the most visible is the appearance of a repressive force in the community. Individuals from other cultures and even mainstream America are sometimes fearful of police officers' uniforms. Cost is also a continuing issue with foot beat assignments. Foot patrols are labor intensive. Officers assigned to foot patrols are restricted from travelling more than a few blocks each day. As a result, more officers would be needed than in a radio car configuration of deployment. Within current fiscal constraints, the only reasonable method to obtain personnel for the foot patrols will be reducing the responsibilities of radio car officers and allowing more personnel to be assigned to foot patrols. Retraining of officers to accept a less aggressive posture than has been historic for the LAPD would be necessary. Officers would have to be convinced that their presence is more significant than bookings. The training should include community mobilization tactics, inner city enhancement programs, interaction with other public agencies, and a detailed explanation of the trepidation effect.

3. Development of a City strategy to mobilize public agencies:

An important component of community based policing and foot patrols is the support of the Police Department by the outside agencies. The agencies represent a myriad of interests including the Department of Recreation and Parks for youth programs and the beautification of parks; local councilmanic offices for community

mobilization and representation for the funding of programs; Department of Public works for lighting, reduction of graffiti and trash, and repair to public buildings and roadways; etc.

Often the interaction with public agencies is difficult and cumbersome due to bureaucratic controls. A part of this action would be an interagency committed to streamline providing resources to the community and the Police Department. The Department should assume the leadership role as the "change agent." Additionally, attention will have to be directed to those bureaucrats who avoid responsibility by failing to take action in their respective areas of responsibility.

4. Coordination of Neighborhood Watch groups involvement:

The introduction of community-oriented patrol officers in a given neighborhood specifically trained to deal with issues of crime and disorder promises to reduce the fear of crime and improve the quality of life in our cities. By reducing the amount of disorder in a neighborhood, patrol officers further diminish fear and thus deter crime from occurring at its inception. By integrating fear reduction as an important objective of policing, the Police Department can not only reduce fear, but also transform their efforts into something that helps build strong social institutions and genuinely improve the quality of life for all citizens.

The Neighborhood Watch Program (NWP) is the building block of the LAPD's police-community relationship. NWP has been in existence in Los Angeles since the late 1960s. The Program has been useful in maintaining contact with the cares and concerns of the public. Many locations in urban Los Angeles areas have well organized groups that address their own problems, including graffiti removal and youth programs. This building block will be helpful in redefining the roles of police officers involved in foot patrols.

On the other hand, some difficulty is anticipated with NWP leaders who will be reluctant to allow foot beat officers more input into the local NWP activities. This obstacle can be overcome with interpersonal skills

taught in the initial training program and by showing citizens that the officers will produce positive results for the neighborhood. Ready access to police officers "on the block" will be an incentive for the public.

Additionally, the association between officers and new immigrants will erase preconceived stereotypes of both. Within time, it is anticipated that the officers will have an acceptable level of credibility that they are in the locale to assist, not hinder. Obviously, in the same situation there will be language and cultural communication inconveniences. It was anticipated that officers without necessary language skills will take the initiative to learn the speech of "their" beat and community volunteers will donate their time to assist the Police Department.

5. Pursuit of funding for police programs outside the City budgetary process: The city of Los Angeles faces a revenue shortage this and future fiscal years. It is obvious that funding for additional personnel or programs at any Citywide level is unrealistic. As a result new creative avenues must be sought to undertake the expansion of the Police Department staff and resources to conduct community-oriented policing. One viable source is the grant process at the state and federal levels for crime prevention and gang violence reduction programs. An example of using this source occurred in Newton Street Area, LAPD, in the "cul-de-sac" project.⁴² Grants do not come without demands, however. Oftentimes grant money acceptance either relinquishes aspects of control or mandates particular provisions with which the recipient organization must comply. A close examination of those issues must accompany any decision to accept grant monies. Usually, Chief of Police concurrence will be necessary prior to the final acceptance of a grant, especially if extraordinary requests are involved in the process.

A secondary source of funding is the private sector from both non-profit and for profit sources. These organizations have a vested interest in the community, whether it is philanthropic or pecuniary. Programs could be funded ethically if careful controls were established to ensure that particular segments of the community were not receiving enhanced policing for donations. Controls should include independent auditing

of the funds. Successful endeavors in this realm have been police booster organizations who contribute to police administered youth explorer groups, athletic programs, and contributions given to refurbish parks.

Thirdly, a source which has had little exploration in Los Angeles is user fees: charging particular segments of the community who require a specific police service. In a limited capacity Los Angeles is using this procedure to charge businesses and individuals who initiate false burglary alarm calls. A particular difficulty with this procedure is retaining the fees within the Department budget and not allowing the moneys to join the City's general budget.

It is anticipated that grants, private funding and user fees will assist with the funding of the additional foot patrol officers needed.

STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS ON POLICY ALTERNATIVES

"Negotiating is a process by which you know what you want to get, what you are willing to give up, and when to do it. The challenge lies in anticipating, understanding and reacting to human behavior."⁴³ Negotiating requires an understanding of the stakeholders position on each strategy. It is critical that each stakeholder is recognized for its support, or opposition, lack of interest, or desire to modify it. Additionally, a key ingredient in the negotiation is to identify the stakeholder best able to implement the policy as well as a workable time frame. The discussion below will assist the reader in a better understanding of the human behavior and political ramifications of the policies. (Information for this segment was derived from Appendix J.)

POLICY NO. 1: REDEFINING POLICE SERVICE PRIORITIES

This policy is supported overall and faces no direct opposition. Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles is a disinterested party, ignoring the issue. The greatest concern is the group of individuals who desire to provide input or modification of the reprioritization process.

Supporters of this policy include the Police Protective League, who desire the rank and file to be closer to the public; Department employees, both sworn and non-sworn, who wish to serve the community in the best manner possible; and the Neighborhood Watch Groups, who always desire better police service to the public.

It is apparent that the public, the politicians and the police executive personnel have the greatest concern with this policy. Understandably, politicians, City Council persons and the Mayor want to be re-elected and are concerned with constituent happiness with police service. This group would be willing to support the modification to service if they are given the opportunity to provide input and are allowed the input of their voters. Allowing citizens, business persons and other residents of the City into this dialogue would assist with concern about the reduction of services which they deem essential to preserve their safety.

The Chief of Police is the critical stakeholder in this policy. He is held accountable for providing appropriate service to the citizenry. He would be ill-advised to implement a change of police priorities without feedback from his executive officers, which is another group who will seek modification of the policy. He should also use the results of the surveys conducted for the public which will be forwarded by the City Council. Additionally, the Chief should use caution and have public discussions of the proposed changes in the context of survey results and the recommendations from within the Department and from politicians.

Responsibility: Chief of Police

Implementation Time:

- a. Survey and politician input - one month
- b. Discussion with police executives, review of community survey and conducting community meetings - three months following Item a.
- c. Actual changes in service priorities - five months

POLICY NO. 2: DEPLOYMENT OF INCREASED FOOT PATROLS

This policy has the overwhelming support of seventy-five percent of the stakeholders. The deployment of uniformed officers within an established perimeter accomplishes a sense of well-being within a neighborhood. Additionally, the factors which contribute to the trepidation effect are immediately impacted. Homeless, panhandlers, narcotic addicts, etc. have a tendency to depart vigorously from the presence of uniformed

officers. Foot patrols add to the Police Department's ability to know a neighborhood and its occupants and merchants. This knowledge is vital to crime prevention, the apprehension of criminals, police-community relations and the overall sense of well-being for those who have contact with the officers. Also important is that the officers' presence will assist with community enhancement programs aimed at youth and the reduction of those factors often deteriorating inner city environs.

Two of the stakeholders, Department employees and Special Interest Groups, would desire modification of the policy. The employees would be most interested in the manner in which the change of deployment will affect their job. The Groups involved in the modification depend on how the foot beats would assist or hinder "their cause."

A unique Special Interest Group is Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles. This groups desires to minimize the contact which aliens, especially undocumented, have with law enforcement. They suffer from the misconception that the LAPD is interested in the deportation of all undocumented aliens even when criminal behavior is not involved. There is little or no room to negotiate with this group.

The critical stakeholders are the Police Command Officers. These are the individuals who must deploy the foot patrols and ensure that the integrity of the policy is maintained. However, they will not be empowered to do so unless the redefining of police services (Policy No. 1) is accomplished. Only with that change will command officers have the personnel to implement this policy.

Responsibility: Police Command Officers

Implementation Time: After Policy No. 1 is implemented - six months total time from the inception of surveys

POLICY NO. 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A CITY STRATEGY TO MOBILIZE PUBLIC AGENCIES

The stakeholder's position on this policy is mixed with more in support than in opposition. An important component of community based policing and foot patrols is the support of the Police Department by outside

agencies. The supporters of this concept include the Chief of Police, the Command Officers, the public and Neighborhood Watch Groups. These supporters have a vested interest in seeing that the police are assisted by outside agencies to free them from occupying themselves with non-police matters. The politicians and Special Interest Groups would be interested in modifying the policy to mobilize agencies based on the policy impact on their own agendas. It is likely that some of the requests by the Police Department might detract from their desires for the limited public resources.

Again, Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles is the only expected opponent to this policy with their preoccupation that the alien population would receive less than their "share" of public resources. The fallacy in this argument is that all of the resources which assist the Police Department will go directly to the police. The fact of the matter is that the benefits derived from the resources will go to the public.

Although the interaction of the Chief of Police is essential. The key stakeholders in this policy will be the Mayor and City Council. They have the City and County-wide leverage to influence other agencies' compliance.

Responsibility: Mayor and City Council

Implementation Time: six months

POLICY NO. 4: COORDINATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH GROUPS INVOLVEMENT

More frequent sustained contacts by police officers with citizens and joint planning with Neighborhood Watch Groups can transform avenues of fear into strong social institutions and improve the quality of life for all citizens. This policy was supported and subjected to modification by the same numbers of stakeholders. The opposing faction was Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles and ignoring group was the business community.

The equal number of groups wishing modification indicates that the politicians desire discussion regarding this issue. It is likely that they see this approach as a threat to their stability with constituents and enhancement of the Chief of Police position as a potential candidate as Mayor. It is understandable that the Neighborhood Watch Groups prefer to modify the policy, considering they would observe this action as a potential threat to their autonomy. The Police Department employee's want to have a voice in their interaction with the public.

The key stakeholders in this policy are the Department employees, sworn and non-sworn, and the Neighborhood Watch Groups. The mutual cooperation of both groups will accomplish the goal of working closer with the community to reduce fear and crime activity.

Responsibility: Department Employees and Neighborhood Watch Groups

Implementation Time: three months

POLICY NO. 5: PURSUIT OF FUNDING FOR POLICE PROGRAMS OUTSIDE OF THE CITY BUDGETARY PROCESS

Supporters of this policy outnumber its single opponent, Coalition for Humane Rights of Los Angeles.

The backing for the procurement outside fiscal resources is supported by the business community, City Council, Police Command Officers, Police Protective League, and the general public. Each of these groups sees this as a viable method in obtaining the additional resources which the Police Department needs. One might speculate about business not wishing to contribute. On the contrary, the Business Community is quite willing to do their part if they see a direct public safety benefit. The City Council formed the opinion that this funding is a technique to overcome dwindling tax monies which face Los Angeles.

Of concern here is the desire by the Chief of Police to modify the procurement of outside funds. This concern is derived from the desire not to relinquish control of the Department to the influence of funding agencies. The potential of corrupt influences mandating the priorities of the Department is also of major concern. With effort, these potentials can be protected by restricting the entering of contracts and grants. The Chief should have the prerogative to select funding which will not adversely affect the Department.

Additionally, the Mayor desires modification of the policy for two reasons: to restrain the Chief of Police from unlimited power which he is cautious of and to retain control of City projects which grants would alter.

The key stakeholders are the Mayor, who has overall responsibility for the budget, and the Chief of Police, who has a vested interest in obtaining additional resources to supplement the already insufficient resources.

Responsibility: Chief of Police and Mayor

Implementation Time: One month initially and continuously thereafter

STRATEGY SUMMARY

In the Strategic Management Plan section, a situation analysis was conducted using the WOTS-UP methodology. The analysis displayed the weaknesses, opportunities, threats and strengths of the LAPD. Following that section was the stakeholders analysis using the SAST procedure to view the most significant stakeholders and assumptions about them. Subsequently, a mission statement was developed defining the macro and micro-missions for the LAPD regarding reduction of fear in the inner city. The policy alternatives were then discussed in depth to provide the reader with the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed policy. The last section concluded with a discussion of the stakeholders position for each policy.

With this information as a foundation, the next segment in implementing the policies is Part IV, which will discuss the transition management to achieve the selected policies.

PART FOUR: TRANSITIONAL MANAGEMENT PLAN

The next goal is the development of a transitional management plan to implement the identified policies regarding the reduction of community fear in a major urban area, i.e. Los Angeles. The transition should lead to the desired future state and proper implementation without unnecessary damage to the organization.

Transition in an organization is characterized by energy which needs to be redirected. Key leaders must become very visible and important role models. Proactive and guidance giving leadership should be exerted. Conflict management needs to be a priority for management.

In this section a number of methods will be used to develop a transition plan which will be viable and realistic. The techniques used include:

1. Identification and analysis of the "critical mass" to achieve the Strategic Plan policies.
2. Estimation of the readiness and capability of the key actors to enact the needed changes.
3. Evaluation of the levels of commitment necessary by the critical mass, Commitment Planning charting.
3. Development of responsibilities for the key operatives in the plan, using Responsibility Chart.
4. Following the above processes, a management structure to provide for the transition is identified and explained.
5. Amplification of the support technologies to initiate the Strategic Plan.

COMMITMENT PLAN

IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRITICAL MASS

The critical mass (CM) are those people or groups, who if actively in support of the change, ensure that the change will take place. Conversely, if the CM is against the change it will fail. Commitment by this group is necessary to fulfill the Strategic Plan. The CM in this research were identified as follows:

1. Chief of Police: The Chief of Police supports any reasonable means to reducing community fear. He is the Department's most visible spokesman. His leadership can unquestionably move all of the CM members except the City Council and the Mayor. Without his support the program will fail. He is currently looking for resolutions to Los Angeles' increases in the crime, especially the murder rate.
2. City Council: The Los Angeles City Council is feeling pressure by constituents to make them feel safer. Additionally, business concerns are exerting pressure for enhanced working environments to attract and retain employees. Without City Council support, possible future funding would not be available. The Council's support is critical.
3. Department Employees: The employees, sworn and non-sworn, want to effect the best possible performance. They are frustrated with the crime increase and carnage which they observe every day. Without their support the initiation of foot patrols or any other endeavor is doomed. The employees are also moderately powerful politically, with the Mayor and City Council using their unions. Union support will make implementation easier.
4. Mayor: The Mayor, although retired from the Police Department, is a rival to the Police. He has the potential to exert unnecessary pressure through the Police Commission and the media which would cause the Plan to fail. Consequently, his support is essential because he can mold public opinion. He is interested in being re-elected like most politicians. As a result he will support most public safety measures if they do not initially cost money.
5. Neighborhood Watch Groups: Neighborhood Watch Groups (NWG) are the Department's most avid supporter. They have a vested interest in the reduction of crime and related issues in the community. They also have a great interest in the coordination of NWGs as articulated in the Strategic Policy. Their support will be essential.
6. Police Command Officers: Command Officers will be responsible for implementation of the strategy. Their effort and executive skill will be needed to provide the leadership necessary for success. If the Command Officers are themselves provided with the leadership needed, they will ensure success within the City Council,

Neighborhood Watch Groups, the Public and Department employees. Because Command Officers have historically been responsible to the Chief of Police, no resistance to change is expected.

7. Police Protective League: The Police Protective League (PPL) is the police officer's union, for lieutenants and below ranks. They have moderate political influence. It is important that the Police Department meet and confer with PPL to obtain their endorsement. Philosophically PPL will not have difficulty with adopting the changes proposed. But, without meeting and conferring, the Chief could find excess delay and resistance to the proposals.

8. Public: The public's reaction and understanding of the changes is critical. Next to the Police Command Officers, the public can persuade politicians and others in the CM not to support the Strategic Plan. The best method of obtaining their compliance is with information. Once the public understands that the changes will make their environment safer, they will be supportive.

ESTIMATION OF READINESS AND CAPABILITY

Once the Critical Mass members were identified, then a readiness and capability analysis was conducted (Appendix K). As the table indicates, most of the CM have a high capability of assisting the strategic goals with the exception of the Mayor, City Council and the Police Protective League. The readiness for change varies among each member. The City Council and the Neighborhood Watch Groups are the most amenable; the Mayor and Police Protective League the least.

COMMITMENT PLANNING

Commitment planning is a strategy that will secure the support of the CM members. A portion of that process is understanding where the members stand. The Commitment Planning table (Appendix M) illustrates the present level of commitment and the level of commitment needed by the CM. Specifically, the table describes where each CM member should be to best facilitate the transition process.

1. The Chief of Police is currently willing to let the changes happen if implementation of the plan will reduce crime and enhance his position within the community. He must take the initiative in becoming actively involved with modifying the Department's priorities to enhance achievement of the Strategic Plan.

2. The City Council historically will allow the Police Department to change service providing the action will not adversely affect their relationship with the electorate. Currently, the "electorate" are unhappy and fearful. Consequently, the City Council must assist with the changes.
3. Department Employees are not prone to support changes in service priorities unless they are provided information and leadership. The leadership should explain the rationale that the reduction of fear could make their assignments more fulfilling.
4. A potential adversary to the Police Department is the Mayor. He could block any changes proposed policies if he is not persuaded that the citizens demand them. If he recognizes this fact and the reality that his constituents will not re-elect him if they are dissatisfied, then he should help to implement the changes.
5. The major catalyst for the successful implementation of the service changes is the Neighborhood Watch Groups. To avoid any unnecessary confrontations, efforts must be extended to use NWG's powerbase.
6. While Police Command Officers will let the change occur, that mode will not assist with implementation. Command Officers are building blocks of the change process. It will be their action, holding subordinates accountable, which will make change happen. subordinates accountable for change.
7. Lastly, the Police Protective League can block change by appealing to their constituents, police officers, and using litigation if the Department fails to confer with them. On the other hand, it is in the Department's best interests to keep the PPL apprised of developments and consult with them regarding assistance to achieve implementation.

TRANSITIONING

The final aim of the strategic plan is the transition of the Los Angeles Police Department to reduce community fear of crime by the year 2000. Achieving this goal requires the creation of a management structure to affix responsibilities, Responsibility Charting, and to implement the transition.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Within the Police Department, a task force (TF) should be set up under the leadership of a police commander, who will be the project manager. This person should have a staff of a diagonal slice of ranks from throughout the Department, including patrol officers who recently worked in the field. The TF leader will have the support of Planning and Research Division for analytical studies as well as secretarial support.

The TF should survey current services provided to the public by the Department, including investigations, reports and the response to radio calls. Recommendations will be generated to suggest changes in service delivery, with a mind to provide more uniformed officers for the next phase of the plan. Specific recommendations will be developed regarding the new implementation of foot patrols which interact with the public. A part of this research will be interviews with the Police Protective League, Neighborhood Watch Groups, City Council members, etc.

Next, the recommendations will be submitted to the Chief of Police and his general staff officers of the rank of Commander, Deputy Chief and Assistant Chief for discussion. The Chief of Police will then meet with the TF Commander and the Assistant Chiefs to make the final policy decisions regarding the deletion and changes in service. Those decisions will be discussed with the Police Protective League in the meet and confer process.

Following the above actions, the TF Commander will redirect personnel to develop a training program to be administered at the Area level under the direction of the Area Commanding Officer. The Area Commanding Officer will ensure that training personnel are trained and provisions for the program are implemented. Subsequently, the Patrol and Detective Commanding Officers will be directed to implement the service changes as well as enlighten and interact with the public and Neighborhood Watch Group.

Additionally, the Chief of Police through his general staff will be responsible for meeting with each of the City Council members to discuss Department changes and to gain their support. The Chief himself will have the

responsibility to meet with the Mayor to explain the final changes. Also, the Police Protective League will need to be consulted with the final changes. A designee of the Chief of Police can be selected for this mission.

Following this procedure, the Police Department must work with the Mayor and City Council offices to mobilize public agencies. This mobilization will consist of enhancement of the urban environment such as parks, increased social services such as opportunities for the unemployed, etc. A Deputy Chief who reports directly to the Chief of Police will be responsible for coordinating the Police Department's interaction with these agencies.

Additionally, the quest for outside funding of police funding should be coordinated by a specific executive within the general staff of the Chief of Police. The Director of the Office of Administrative Services, an Assistant Chief, will have the responsibility of directing the search for grants and funding for police programs. The Director will have to work with the Mayor's office and the Director of the Office of Special Services, another Assistant Chief. This relationship is necessary because the Director, Office of Special Services (OSS) has the overall Department responsibility of ensuring that the integrity of Department fund raising activity is maintained.

RESPONSIBILITY CHARTING

Responsibility charting is a useful tool to establish the transition accomplishments of an organization. The charting delineates the different roles and affixes responsibility to accomplish them. The chart in Appendix L depicts an overall picture of the transitional tasks needed in order to effect the changes.

SUPPORT TECHNOLOGIES

Change in an organization is characterized by high uncertainty and low stability, high emotional stress on people, high undirected energy, increased intergroup conflict, and high levels of disharmony. Controlling the organization and the human factor during this period is critical. If applied appropriately specified technologies can alleviate these differences.

The following technologies should be implemented to facilitate the transition period:

1. Dissemination of a newsletter to Police Department personnel and Neighborhood Watch Groups will be done on a regular basis. The newsletter will be used to communicate developments and decisions in the prioritization of police field duties and the development of the community-oriented foot patrols and other topics within the Strategic Plan.
2. Regular meetings will be conducted by the Task Force commander with commanding officers to receive unfiltered feedback from personnel and the public. This information will be used in the program modification and the results will be communicated in the newsletter to provide a feedback loop.
3. Training sessions will be conducted for first-level supervisors and Senior Lead Officers (usually peer group leaders) to discuss the program development and changes which are anticipated. This information exchange will be critical in obtaining the line officers' support of the changes.
4. Periodic meetings involving the Chief of Police and his general staff with the City Council and the Mayor. The meetings should regularly discuss service changes, liaison with other public agencies and an update on obtaining fiscal assistance from outside sources. Of critical importance is the status of perceived fear in the community. This information is necessary to generate sustained support and to ensure that cooperation is not restricted by lack of information.
5. Monitoring of the transition progress by the task force commander. The information would be communicated to the Chief of Police and the general staff in reports. At important junctures of the transition, direct meetings between the project manager and the Chief should transpire. Among the many important tasks performed by this project manager, sharing to the project's vision is paramount. The manager must be available to talk with groups and training sessions.
6. Initiation of a public survey at six and twelve month intervals is indicated to verify the public's fear reduction or perception of the changed modes. If the survey verifies success, then the results need to be widely published. If the results determine that the progress in not reducing fear, then the programs should be modified until verification is received that residents, visitors and business proprietors feel safer.

SUMMARY OF TRANSITION PLAN

This transition plan is offered to assist with the adoption of the Strategic Plan. If applied correctly, the transition management of the change will be less traumatic on the organization, employees and the public. It is a model for future development.

PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study is to explore the methods used by law enforcement to reduce community fear of crime by the year 2000. The Introduction provides a historical assessment of this issue including a review of community fear and the debilitating effect it has the public's quality of life.

A future study was then conducted. The study used a number of tools presented in the POST Command College. The Nominal Group Technique was used with the participation of law enforcement practitioners, community activists and politician representatives. Several trends and events were projected and scenarios were developed to "test" the projections.

Based on one scenario, the desired and attainable, a strategic plan was developed. The Plan was applied to the Los Angeles Police Department for clarification purposes. In this section the strategic plan was developed including a mission statement, analysis of stakeholders and a series of policy statements in order to initiate the desired state of policing. The mission developed included "back to basics" policing which includes a review of current service to redefine radio car priorities, placement of officers in increased foot patrols to suppress crime, development of a city strategy to mobilize public agencies to support the community, coordination of neighborhood watch groups to enhance interaction with the police department, and pursue funding for police programs outside the city budgetary process.

In Part Four a transitional management plan was developed to move the Los Angeles Police Department from the present into the future. The management plan identified the critical people and groups who would successfully implement the strategic plan. Each of the group were then evaluated for their role in the

transition. Then, responsibilities were defined and a management structure was developed to implement the change including support technologies which will be needed.

This writer recognizes that the study is not a panacea for the ills plaguing urban residents and visitors. Some of the conditions, such as decay of structures and poverty, cannot be affected by law enforcement. But, many other conditions such as reduction of fear provoking circumstances can be impacted by a law enforcement agency. The key ingredient of an agency responsive to community needs is service orientation and return to basic police strategies. This is the nature of a police department that assesses and reassesses the quality of service provided, and changes the organization before conditions become horrific and irreversible. The following information discusses recommendations for urban law enforcement agencies to better achieve the ideal of service orientation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are directed primarily to metropolitan police departments, but can be applicable to suburban departments:

1. Police departments should conduct an active assessment of their constituents perception of fear. The assessment should include identification of factors which are not necessarily "crime" conditions, but those which give the public the feeling they are in jeopardy. Generally, a survey is the best method of accomplishing this task.
2. An examination of services provided to the public should be regularly conducted and revised when necessary. Traditional police services should be modified to meet today's needs considering resource scarcity, not tradition.

3. Police Department executives must have an ongoing dialogue with politicians, community activists and police officer association representatives. The dialogue will facilitate change when needed and will provide the executives with necessary feedback.
4. When change is incumbent within a police agency, initiation of the change should be conducted in a methodical manner. Subject matter experts should be used to facilitate the change. Also, the counsel of parties potentially affected by the change should be sought.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Aside from the central issue contemplated in this study, other important implications were identified. Future research projects could have a significant impact on these issues. Those issues include:

1. Community involvement by police departments: A detailed examination should be conducted regarding the modes of involvement which positively impact the police department's ability to better serve and inform the public. In other words, are the programs truly effective or are they a matter of habit?
2. Planning for the future: Law enforcement occupies the position of being a community change agent in many cities. Often, conditions become so dire in the inner city that the police are the only hope for restoring tranquility. Given this, it is imperative that departments conduct continuing strategic planning for the future.
3. Role of the police in the 21st century: This research disclosed that change is occurring in our communities and the public is seeking police leadership. It is clearly apparent that citizens desire to be involved in determining the mode of policing on their street, and they desire more direct contact with "officers on the street." Additional analysis of this subject is needed in order to better police our communities.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. When did your department first implement a neighborhood oriented foot patrol program?
2. Did your agency involve the community in the planning and deployment of these officers?
3. Was the fear of crime specifically addressed as an issue dealt with by your organization?
4. How effective have these approaches been at the reduction of fear of crime in the targeted areas?
5. What specific training has been established to teach your foot patrol officers the goals and philosophies of community oriented policing?
6. What future events are likely to shape the operation of your department's neighborhood-oriented policing program by the year 2000?
7. How have your officers dealt with the issue of order maintenance as it is related to fear of crime?
8. What problems has your department encountered in the establishment of these programs and how were these problems surmounted?
9. What specific actions has your department taken to work with other municipal agencies to improve the quality of life in your city?
10. What methodology did your organization use to measure the levels of fear of crime in your community before and after the implementation of the neighborhood foot patrol program?

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEWS

AGENCY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS RESPONSES

The responses given to the questions posed are presented below:

When did your department first implement a neighborhood-oriented foot patrol program?

New York City Police Department: In June 1984, the New York City Police Department, assisted by the Vera Institute of Justice, implemented a pilot Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) in Brooklyn's 72nd Precinct. In January, 1985, the Police Department embarked on an expansion program which resulted in the program being implemented in thirty additional precincts between January 3rd and November 2nd, 1985. The rapid expansion of CPOP, coupled with the implementation of additional foot and motorized Quality of Life patrols, evinced a determination by the Department to mount a sustained effort to deal effectively with quality of life conditions, and localized crime problems in the City of New York.

Baltimore County Police Department: The Baltimore County Police Department established Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement unit in 1982. The COPE unit was first implemented in the Department's Central, West, and East Districts. Each unit consisted of fifteen police officers and was directed by a lieutenant. COPE seeks to use community-oriented policing to more adequately address issues of fear of crime and of disorder.

San Diego Police Department: In April 1988, Nancy McPherson, the Police Executive Research Forum's technical assistant to the San Diego Police Department, started work on developing community based problem oriented policing (POP) at this agency. She began by riding frequently with officers to gain beat knowledge and develop rapport with the officers, by meeting with a wide variety of police and City officials, public agency heads and community members to discuss POP and to engage support and interest in the program. Initially she trained a small group of uniformed drug enforcement officers in a specialized unit known as "WECAN," (the Walking Enforcement Campaign Against Narcotics) to use community based problem oriented policing. These officers were

chosen because of their unique involvement with reducing narcotics activity and the lack of time restraints placed on them by radio calls.

Houston Police Department: In April 1982, Lee P. Brown was appointed chief of the Houston Police Department. At that time an assessment of services was conducted which concluded that police officers were viewed primarily as being apart from the community, rather than a part of the community. In order to overcome this perception, several department initiatives were undertaken. In 1983, the Department established the Directed Area Responsibility Team, (DART), to deal with issues of neighborhood-oriented policing. DART has been the Houston Police Department's most substantial effort in the area of community policing and has had among its goals the decentralization of police operations so as to better serve the public.

The Flint Police Department: In January 1979 the Flint Police Department's Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program was established in response to two problems: a lack of comprehensive neighborhood organization and the lack of personal contact and interaction between city police officers and the community. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation granted \$2.6 million to the City of Flint for the experimental implementation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in fourteen neighborhoods. The selection of neighborhoods was based primarily on two factors: population density and incidence of crime.

Did your agency involve the community in the planning and deployment of these officers?

New York City Police Department: Yes. One of the goals of CPOP is to increase community involvement in policing activities through special programs, meetings and the permanent assignment of police officers to neighborhood beats.

Baltimore County Police Department: The community's perception of crime and level of fear dictate whether COPE is assigned to a given area. We use community surveys to ascertain their feelings. Foot patrol posts as well as the Stop, Walk, and Talk Program were both initiated because of the citizen's desire for more police attention.

San Diego Police Department: Yes, the Department actively met with and sought advice from community leaders in its efforts to effectively deploy community problem oriented police officers.

Houston Police Department: Before the DART program was introduced, extensive community-police dialogue occurred. Ultimately, by planning, developing, implementing and understanding the benefits of these programs, the department has gained valuable insight into the personal and professional advantages of developing a close working relationship with the community.

Flint Police Department: The residents of Flint participated in program planning and officer deployment throughout the program. At neighborhood meetings attended by police, residents, and city officials, the residents were asked if they wanted a neighborhood foot patrol and where they wanted that patrol. Once targeted areas were identified, the residents of those areas expressed their special needs and problems. The residents also decided the location of the neighborhood based police station.

Was fear of crime specifically addressed as an issue to be dealt with by your organization?

New York City Police Department: Yes. The stated goals of the CPOP program are as follows: to reduce the fear of crime in the community and increase the individual citizen's sense of personal safety; to increase community awareness of crime problems and foster the development of community based crime prevention efforts; to decrease the amount of actual or perceived criminal activity in the target neighborhood; to develop strategies for tactical operations which respond to specific community based problems and needs; and to increase community involvement in policing activities through specific programs, meetings, and the permanent assignment of police officers to neighborhood beats.

Baltimore County Police Department: Early in the 1980's, the Baltimore County Police Department decided to take a different approach to crime: it would look at fear as a phenomenon distinct from crime, as a thing in itself, and fight it directly. At the outset, neither Chief Cornelius Behan, whose idea this was, nor anyone else in the

department really knew how to go about it. Over some five years, the COPE unit would struggle with its new charges: the problem of defining and assessing fear, the failure of traditional police tactics to assuage fear, and various new approaches created expressly for the new task. In fact, one of COPE's primary missions has become the identification and reduction of community fear.

San Diego Police Department: This issue was not addressed in the San Diego Police Department's response.

Houston Police Department: Yes, as an adjunct to the DART program, the Fear Reduction Project was implemented. This project consisted of a year-long study of two large metropolitan police departments initiated by the Police Foundation, and funded by the National Institute of Justice. The Newark, New Jersey police Department was the other participant in the study. The study was designed to test, in a controlled situation the ability of various policing strategies to reduce citizen's fear of crime, and to improve citizen's overall satisfaction with living in the target area, and to improve the image of the police in the target area.

The Flint Police Department: Yes, three of the ten basic goals of Flint's Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program are to increase citizens' perception of personal safety, to decrease actual or perceived fear, and to decrease actual or perceived criminal activity.

How effective have these approaches been at the reduction of fear of crime in the targeted areas?

New York City Police Department: CPOP has demonstrated its ability to not only deal effectively with a wide variety of quality of life issues of concern to neighborhood residents, but also to significantly impact the fear of crime. Thus, by actually alleviating quality of life problems at the neighborhood level, we have been able not only to reduce citizen fear, but also reduce the actual volume of crime in the streets.

Baltimore County Police Department: COPE has been recognized as a successful fear reduction program, (Dr. Gary Cordner, 1985). Yet, it is difficult to say exactly what percentage of the reduction of fear in the community is directly related to COPE, though we believe it to be significant.

San Diego Police Department: This issue was not addressed in the San Diego Police Department's response.

Houston Police Department: The fear reduction project, which was done under the auspices of the National Institute of Justice, proved a valuable tool in the reduction of the fear of crime. In Houston, where the population is growing rapidly, densities are low, and neighborhoods are new, opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the formation of a neighborhood organizations where none had existed helps to reduce the fear of crime and even helps to reduce the actual level of victimization.

Flint Police Department: According to Michigan State University studies, the Flint police department has been very effective in reducing the fear of crime, and the perception of crime in targeted areas. Almost seventy percent of the residents interviewed during the final year of our study felt safer because of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program. Also, many qualified their response by saying they felt especially safe when the neighborhood patrol officers were well known and highly visible.

What specific training has been established to teach your patrol officers the goals and philosophies of community-oriented policing?

New York City Police Department: The current CPOP training program is administered in four phases. The first phase consists of four days of centralized training, developed and presented by the program development team and administered at John Jay College, and focuses on orienting officers in the new role as Community Patrol Officers. It exposes them to some of the resources which are available through the Department and other public and private agencies to assist them in dealing with problems encountered within their beat areas. The centralized training is

interspersed with community police officer patrol, two days during the first week of program operations, and one day in each of the second and third weeks.

The second phase of the instruction involves three days of on-the-job training. Each new CPO is assigned to perform three days of patrol with an experienced CPO in one of the operating precincts, and provides the new CPOs with the opportunity to observe the manner in which the education provided in the training program is translated into action on the streets.

The third phase includes two days of training at the Department's Crime Prevention School where the officers are provided with instruction on conducting residential security inspections. The final phase concludes with three days of training at the precinct level, organized and administered by the CPOP unit supervisor.

Baltimore County Police Department: Community-oriented Policing has been taught in both our Entrance Level and In-Service Training Programs. Seasoned officers who request the training also are assigned to COPE and receive on the job training from peers and supervisors.

San Diego Police Department: In 1988 the first nine officers from the Southeast Command participated in an eight hour community-oriented problem solving training program. These officers were then asked to concentrate their efforts in the approximately 1/2 square mile target location. Soon other officers on the Southeast Command began to ask for similar training. The number of requests for training grew to such an extent that the Command decided to train every officer, sergeant, lieutenant and investigator at the Division in the use of community based problem oriented policing. In early 1989, training was completed and the program began to expand to all uniformed divisions. Now, as a result of this training, officers are searching on a daily basis for new problems to which they might apply their recently acquired techniques.

The original eight hour training course has been shorted to a two and one half hour training program using group instruction and case studies to facilitate the application of a simple problem solving community model to real life

scenarios. Overtime and time out-of-service were minimized when the training was reduced and feedback from training participants demonstrated that POP principles are understood and practiced equally well in the abbreviated course.

Flint Police Department: Officers received training in public speaking, relations with senior citizens, dealing with teenage pregnancies, preparation of community newsletters, and crime watch organizational methods. Training sessions are held twice a year. Despite the training, there is a strong consensus among officers that their practical police experience has been the most effective preparation for community-oriented foot patrol work. The next most effective preparation was the specific training given by the Community Foot Patrol Program coordinators. Training has been on-going, and has been spaced out over a three year period to take full advantage of the new information that is constantly being developed by the researchers. Throughout the program, the director of the Michigan State University research team has been allowed to provide continuing technical assistance.

What future events are likely to shape the operation of your department's neighborhood-oriented police program by the year 2000?

New York City Police Department: This issue was not addressed in the New York City Police Department's response.

Baltimore County Police Department: In the future, it is expected that increasing urbanization, decreasing assets and increasing demand for service from the public will affect neighborhood-oriented policing in Baltimore County. It's too early to know exactly how our new approaches to police work will shape up by the year 2000, nor can we be certain how county government will handle competing demands on its limited resources.

San Diego Police Department: Our program has shown great promise, but our experience has taught us that community based problem oriented policing is not a one-time goal to reach, but rather an ongoing process of education, training, and resource development. While we are uncertain what forces may affect this program in

Police Department: Order maintenance and fear of crime are decidedly linked. By using community problem oriented policing, San Diego police officers can decrease the amount of fear in their commands. Community is supportive of the program as demonstrated by requests from individuals and groups to make neighborhood problems POP projects.

Police Department: Through the implementation of the Fear Reduction project strategies, we learned that city disorder significantly impacts fear of crime. In order for neighborhood-oriented policing to be successful, the department must begin to develop expertise in order maintenance so as to decrease fear in our city. At the same time, the department's managers must work with their officers and be supportive of their efforts.

Police Department: Order maintenance has been achieved through a combination of high visibility, directed and surveillance. By focussing our attention on those factors which create disorder, we have in many cases been able to attack crime before it occurs, thus reducing fear in our city.

specific actions has your department taken to work with other municipal agencies to improve the quality of your city?

New York City Police Department: A joint training session is conducted by the Precinct CPOP sergeant and the Community Board District Manager, during which time the CPOs meet the representatives of the various city agencies which deal with the Board, (e.g., Sanitation Department, Human Resources, Neighborhood Stabilization, and establish the ground rules for the working relationship. As a supplement, CPOs participate in institutional sessions in which the officers visit a minimum of two service providing agencies so as to determine the services needed, and to establish liaison with intake personnel. In the past, these city departments have included the New York City Department of Aging, the Vera Institute of Justice, the Victim Services Agency, Citizens Committee for New York, The Manhattan Bowery Project, and the New York City Office of Housing Preservation and Development.

San Diego Police Department: Order maintenance and fear of crime are decidedly linked. By using community based problem oriented policing, San Diego police officers can decrease the amount of fear in their commands. The community is supportive of the program as demonstrated by requests from individuals and groups to make specific neighborhood problems POP projects.

Houston Police Department: Through the implementation of the Fear Reduction project strategies, we learned that community disorder significantly impacts fear of crime. In order for neighborhood-oriented policing to be successful, the department must begin to develop expertise in order maintenance so as to decrease fear in our city. At the same time, the department's managers must work with their officers and be supportive of their efforts.

Flint Police Department: Order maintenance has been achieved through a combination of high visibility, directed patrol, and surveillance. By focussing our attention on those factors which create disorder, we have in many respects been able to attack crime before it occurs, thus reducing fear in our city.

What specific actions has your department taken to work with other municipal agencies to improve the quality of life in your city?

New York City Police Department: A joint training session is conducted by the Precinct CPOP sergeant and the local Community Board District Manager, during which time the CPOs meet the representatives of the various city agencies which deal with the Board, (e.g., Sanitation Department, Human Resources, Neighborhood Stabilization, etc.) and establish the ground rules for the working relationship. As a supplement, CPOs participate in institutional tours in which the officers visit a minimum of two service providing agencies so as to determine the services offered, and to establish liaison with intake personnel. In the past, these city departments have included the New York City Department of Aging, the Vera Institute of Justice, the Victim Services Agency, Citizens Committee for New York, The Manhattan Bowery Project, and the New York City Office of Housing Preservation and Development.

Baltimore County Police Department: Our chief met with heads of the other county agencies. Additionally, he obtained a commitment from our County Executive Officer to have other departments participate in COPE. Through this agreement we have worked with the Fire Department, County Works, Building Department as well as many private social service agencies to make Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement work in Baltimore County.

San Diego Police Department: To encourage community problem solving, a monthly meeting is held on the second Thursday of each month with the first 30 minutes set aside for a representative of an outside agency to explain how that agency can cooperate and assist officers in solving problems in their neighborhoods. Guest agencies have included State Parole, County Probation, Adult Protective Services, Welfare Investigations, Shore Patrol, the Housing Commission, Code Enforcement from the City Attorney's Office, and San Diego Gas & Electric Special Investigations. The relationships developed with these other organizations has proven to be one of the largest success of our program.

Houston Police Department: The Houston Police Department has established the Positive Interaction Program (PIP) to facilitate an exchange of information between beat officers, neighborhood residents, and other city agencies. The program contains a variety of program goals one of which is building more meaningful communication linkages between the public, members of this department, and ancillary city departments such as Code Enforcement, Public Works, and local community organizations.

Flint Police Department: One of the purposes of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program is to increase the amount of interface between community foot patrol officers and other units of the Flint Police Department, in addition to referrals to other agencies. Combined efforts by officers of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program and other city departments yielded very positive results. The other agencies and services organizations included the Community council, the Flint Institute of Health, the Police Athletic League, the City Planning Department and the YMCA.

INTERVIEW: JAMES Q. WILSON

The following interview occurred at the Graduate School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles on October 1, 1990, (Dr. Wilson's answers are paraphrased):

What do you see as the future of community policing?

Wilson is unsure about the best method to organize police service. He admitted that some success has been achieved with community-oriented policing. But, the technique requires genuine commitment from all members of a police department to make it work.

What events by the year 2000 are likely to influence and shape the pace at which community policing is implemented?

Dr. Wilson observed that another baby boom is occurring in our nation and an accompanying "increase in numbers of single men on street corners." These events will polarize our society, yielding to social upheaval. As a result community-oriented policing if implemented would avoid the "abysmal police-community relations of the 1960s."

How does the unique geographical situation in Los Angeles afford officers the ability to bridge the community policing gap?

Community policing does not necessarily have to involve foot patrols. He opined that a "chasm" exists between the community and the police department. The void has occurred because the police and the community are not partners. The police in Los Angeles have a "stand-offish" association with the citizens they serve. Before the police department contemplates community-oriented policing, leaders must address the demeanor of the officers.

How have things changed since you wrote the "Broken Windows" article?

In some places things have changed enormously in others areas, the status quo still reigns. In Milwaukee, for example, there has been significant progress. Also, changes have occurred in New York City and Houston.

How do you think the fear of crime impacts the quality of life?

Specifically, what are your impressions of a recent Time Magazine

which states that sixty percent of New York City residents opined they would move out of the city if they had the opportunity?

Urban planning and individual layout of a city play an enormous role in explaining the differences in collective consciousness between New York and Los Angeles. Los Angeles is a very spread-out city. New York is small with an intense population. Los Angeles residents can escape their environment and those of New York are virtually trapped. There is no place for New Yorkers to go. Consequently, they have built a much stronger collective consciousness as a city and as a people. In New York feelings quickly get around and become a collective response to a given problem. When there is a feeling that crime is a problem, it spreads like wild fire and permeates all levels of society. Wilson's answer to address crime is "start one block at a time."

If you were the Chief of Police of Los Angeles, what would you do differently:

Dr. Wilson opined that he would do a complete managerial follow-up on many programs and policies implemented by the Department. For example, "Hammer" task forces are conducted. In Wilson's opinion the effectiveness of these task forces are not assessed. He stated that "if the LAPD were a corporation, it would be bankrupt a long time ago. Wilson stated that LAPD is not the organization it used to be due to the Department's inability to learn from successes achieved by other police organizations.

Why do cities in the east have police to citizen ratios of approximately 3.4 per 1000 whereas the Los Angeles Police Departments ratio is approximately 1.5 per 1000?

Wilson opined that many of the other organizations are over staffed. For example, in New York City only 1400 officers are assigned to uniform street duty out of 28,000 sworn police officers. He feels that LAPD is understaffed by one-half. He concluded that an increase in police organizations takes political pressure which the LAPD does not have. The community must be involved to achieve a significant increase in officers.

How can you make time for order maintenance issues, when you are backed-up 10 to 20 radio calls for service?

It takes a conscious decision by a police manager with courage to decide that order maintenance will be the priority. Once community dialogue is started, citizens can be informed about the type of delays to expect when requesting police service. When community disorder is addressed, eventually calls for service will drop as officers begin to impact those situations which originate radio calls in the first place.

APPENDIX C

TRENDS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NOMINAL GROUP

1. Increase in the amounts of narcotics related violence.
2. Movement with police agencies to emphasize uniformed presence in lieu of enforcement.
3. Police agencies will have to accurately assess fear.
4. Law enforcement's willingness to address community fear of crime.*
5. Increase in the number of homeless.
6. Decrease in inner city residents' income.
7. Condition of the city's infrastructure.*
8. Flight and fight by inner city residents.
9. Change in laws to encourage vigilantism.
10. Demographic and aging changes will result in a populace which is older and less White.*
11. Decrease in the funding of public programs.
12. More accountability of government to the public.
13. Increased in the amount of technology, its impact on crime and life style in general.
14. Increased privatization of governmental services.
15. Confrontational crime due to the proliferation of narcotics and powerful weapons.*
16. Cooperative public/private sector ventures will be encouraged.
17. Maturation of gang members, possibly bring about an increase in organized and more sophisticated crime.
18. Weakening of Counties in general due to the lack of tax base.
19. Less jails and prison space.

20. An increase in the number of victim rights laws.
21. Greater segregation of different peoples and ethnic groups.
22. Decrease in the number of English speaking persons, and the desire/need to learn English.
23. Decline in the amount of housing units.
24. Increase in local resource demands bringing about alienation of other cities.
25. Increase in the number of high rise buildings.
26. Expansion in the number of auxiliary and specialized police forces.
27. Heavy traffic congestion and increase of traffic related crime.
28. Technology impact on law enforcement and society in general.*

* designates Trends used for research project.

APPENDIX D

EVENTS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NOMINAL GROUP

1. Return to radical civil disobedience.
2. A large natural disaster, probably an earthquake.
3. Completion and opening of the mass rapid transit.*
4. Return to conservative criminal courts.
5. A cure for AIDS along with saturation of the inner city with AIDS victims.
6. Large cities will divide into smaller cities.
7. More female arrestees will be apprehended proportionately to males.
8. A major economic recession.
9. Election of Hispanic city officials.
10. Open hiring of gays in law enforcement.
11. Increase in White activism among officers to counter increased non-Whites.
12. Increased economic development in the Pacific Rim which will positively effect Western United States.
13. Water wars between geographical areas.
14. Mandatory hiring of bilingual police officers.
15. Defacto narcotics legalization due to selective arrests.
16. Adoption of status crime laws prohibiting vagrancy, gang membership and sleeping in public.*
17. Reinstatement of vagrancy laws.
18. Adoption of a policy to target confrontational crime.*
19. Non-felony traffic situations will no longer be handled by police departments.

20. City and county government enactment of Community Based Policing due to fear of crime.*

21. Legitimate inner city businesses will relocated due to fear of crime and inability to recruit employees into the city.

22. Multi-language problems will lead to a breakdown between police departments and the public.

23. Enactment of a law to mandate that police agencies tailor services to meet multi-ethnic community needs.*

* designates Events used for research project.

APPENDIX E
CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

| ** | PANEL MEDIANS | | | | | | | | | | | "IMPACT" TOTALS" |
|----|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|---------------------|
| | E1 | E2 | E3 | E4 | E5 | T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | T5 | | |
| E1 | X | +80% | +50% | 0 | 0 | +10% | -20% | 0 | +50% | -20% | E1 | 6 |
| E2 | 0 | X | +30% | +40% | 0 | +80% | -40% | 0 | -60% | 0 | E2 | 5 |
| E3 | +30% | -20% | X | +20% | 0 | +75% | -30% | 0 | -95% | -50% | E3 | 7 |
| E4 | 0 | +35% | -20% | X | +40% | +90% | +30 | -30% | -70% | -60% | E4 | 8 |
| E5 | 0 | +40% | +60% | +90% | X | +95% | -50% | -40% | -65% | -30% | E5 | 8 |

| "IMPACTED" TOTALS | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--|
| E1 | E2 | E3 | E4 | E5 | T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | T5 | |
| 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | |

** Legend

- E1 Completion of expanded of mass rapid transportation.
 - E2 Adoption of status crime laws.
 - E3 Police emphasis on confrontational crime enforcement.
 - E4 Communities will demand Community Based Policing due to fear of crime.
 - E5 Police service will be tailored to meet the needs of multi-ethnic communities.
-
- T1 Law enforcement willingness to addresses community fear of crime.
 - T2 Condition of the urban city's infrastructure.
 - T3 Demographic and aging changes in the inner city will result in a populace which is older and less White than in 1990.
 - T4 Confrontational crime due to narcotics and weapons.
 - T5 Technology impact on law enforcement and society.

APPENDIX F

TREND EVALUATION

| TREND STATEMENT | | LEVEL OF THE TREND ** Ratio: (Today = 100) | | | |
|-----------------|--|---|-------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | Five Years Ago | Today | Five Years From Now | Ten Years From Now |
| # | | | | | |
| 1 | Law enforcement willingness to address fear of crime | 50 | 100 | 125 / / /200 | 150 / / /250 |
| 2 | Condition of city infrastructure | 75 | 100 | 125 / / /75 | 200 / / /50 |
| 3 | Demographics change: older and non-White | 60 | 100 | 200 / / /130 | 300 / / /120 |
| 4 | Confrontational crime | 50 | 100 | 200 / / /70 | 250 / / /50 |
| 5 | Technology impact on law enforcement and society | 20 | 100 | 200 / / /300 | 300 / / /400 |

** Panel Medians
N = 9

"will be" /
/"should
/ be"

APPENDIX G

EVENT EVALUATION

| EVENT STATEMENT | | PROBABILITY | | | Impact on the issue area if the event occurred | |
|-----------------|--|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--|------|
| | | Years Until Probability Exceeds Zero | Five Years From Now 0-100% | Ten Years From Now 0-100% | | |
| | | | | | + | - |
| # | | | | | 0-10 | 0-10 |
| 1 | Completion and opening mass rapid transportation | 0 | 75 | 100 | +5 | -5 |
| 2 | Adoption of status crime laws | 2 | 30 | 50 | +8 | 0 |
| 3 | Police emphasis on confrontational crime enforcement | 2 | 60 | 75 | +2 | -8 |
| 4 | Community Based Policing mandated | 0 | 40 | 70 | +8 | -2 |
| 5 | Police service is tailored to needs of multi-ethnic populace | 5 | 60 | 100 | +7 | -3 |

APPENDIX H

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS (WOTS UP)

Strategic Need Area:

General police capabilities with emphasis on reduction of urban community fear using community-oriented foot patrols in the inner city.

Each item was evaluated on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good. Not bad.
- IV Problems here. Not good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action.

The noted ratings reflect the median value established by the evaluating group.

| Category: | I | II | III | IV | V |
|-------------------------------------|---|----|-----|----|---|
| Personnel | | | | X | |
| Technology | | | | | |
| Equipment | | | X | | |
| Supplies | | | | X | |
| Money | | | X | | |
| Cash overtime money for exigencies | | | | X | |
| Management skill | | X | | | |
| Management flexibility | | | X | | |
| Supervisory skills | | X | | | |
| Police officer skills | | | | | X |
| Training | X | | | | |
| Attitudes | | X | | | |
| Image | | X | | | |
| Morale | | X | | | |
| Calls for service and response time | | | X | | |
| Specialty service and assignments | | | X | | |
| Sworn/non-Sworn ratio | | | | X | |
| Traffic Index | | | X | | |
| Pay scale | | | X | | |
| Benefits | | X | | | |
| Sick leave rates | | X | | | |
| Turnover | | X | | | |
| Mayor support | | | | X | |
| City Council support | | | X | | |
| Criminal justice system support | | | X | | |
| Community support | X | | | | |

APPENDIX I

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS (WOTS UP)

Strategic Need Area:

Top management and organizational capability with emphasis on reduction of community fear using community-oriented foot patrols in the inner city.

Each item was evaluated for the type of activity it encouraged.

- I Custodial - rejects change
- II Production - adapts to minor changes
- III Marketing - seeks familiar change
- IV Strategic - seeks related change
- V Flexible - seeks novel change

| Category: | I | II | III | IV | V |
|-----------|---|----|-----|----|---|
|-----------|---|----|-----|----|---|

TOP MANAGERS:

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|--|--|---|---|--|
| Mental Personality | | | X | | |
| Skills/Talents | | | X | | |
| Knowledge/Education | | | | X | |

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|--|--|--|
| Cultural/Norms | | X | | | |
| Rewards/Incentives | | X | | | |
| Power Structure | X | | | | |

ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETENCE:

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|--|--|
| Structure | X | | | | |
| Resources | X | | | | |
| Middle Management | | X | | | |
| Line Personnel | | | X | | |

APPENDIX J

STAKEHOLDERS POSITION ON POLICY ALTERNATIVES

| Stakeholder | Policy | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Business Community | S | S | I | I | S |
| Chief of Police | M | S | S | S | M |
| City Council | M | S | M | M | S |
| CHIRLA | I | O | O | O | O |
| Department Employees | S | M | I | M | I |
| Mayor | M | S | M | M | M |
| Neighborhood Watch Groups | S | S | S | M | I |
| Police Command Officers | M | S | S | S | S |
| Police Protective League | S | S | I | S | S |
| Police Service Users | M | S | S | S | I |
| Public | M | S | S | S | S |
| Special Interest Groups | M | M | M | M | M |

Policy 1 Reprioritization of police service priorities
 Policy 2 Deployment of increased numbers of foot patrols
 Policy 3 Development of a City strategy to mobilize public agencies
 Policy 4 Coordination of Neighborhood Watch groups involvement
 Policy 5 Pursuit of funding for police programs outside the City budgetary process
 S = Support M = Modify O = oppose I = ignore

Support: Encourage the development of the policy.
 Modify: Exert influence or input to alter the policy.
 Oppose: Work to negate the implementation of the policy.
 Ignore: No involvement interest or involvement with the policy.

APPENDIX K

CRITICAL MASS READINESS/CAPABILITY

| <u>Members</u> | Readiness | | | Capability | | |
|---------------------------|-----------|--------|-----|------------|--------|-----|
| | High | Medium | Low | High | Medium | Low |
| Critical Mass | | | | | | |
| Chief of Police | | X | | X | | |
| City Council | X | | | | X | |
| Department Employees | | X | | X | | |
| Mayor | | | X | | | X |
| Neighborhood Watch Groups | X | | | X | | |
| Police Command Officers | | X | | X | | |
| Police Protective League | | | X | | X | |

APPENDIX L RESPONSIBILITY CHARTING

r = responsibility (not necessarily the authority)
 a = approval (right to veto)
 s = support (put resources towards)
 i = inform (to be consulted)
 - = irrelevant to this item

| Decision | ACTORS | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
| 1. | a r | s | s | - | s | s | - | - | s | s |
| 2. | a | s | s | s | s | s | r | s | s | s |
| 3. | - | - | - | - | a | - | r | s | s | - |
| 4. | i | i | i | s | i | i | a | r | i | i |
| 5. | i | - | - | - | i | i | r | s | i | a |
| 6. | a | s | s | - | - | - | r | s | - | i |
| 7. | a | - | - | - | i | i | r | s | i | i |
| 8. | a | - | - | - | s | s | r | i | i | s |
| 9. | a r | s | s | i | i | i | s | s | i | i |
| 10. | i | i | i | - | i | i | r | s | i | a |
| 11. | s | r | s | s | i | i | a | - | i | s |
| 12. | i | r | s | s | i | i | s | s | i | a |
| 13. | - | - | r | s | - | - | s | s | - | a |
| 14. | a r | i | i | i | s | s | s | i | s | s |
| 15. | a r | i | i | i | i | i | s | i | i | i |
| 16. | a | i | i | i | s | s | s | i | i | r |
| 17. | a | - | - | - | r | i | s | s | s | i |
| 18. | i | - | - | - | r | i | s | s | s | i |
| 19. | a | - | - | - | r | s | i | i | s | i |
| 20. | i | s | s | s | i | i | a | r | i | i |

Description of this chart is on the next page.

APPENDIX L continued

Components of the Responsibility Charting

Actors:

- A. Chief of Police
- B. Area Command Officers
- C. Patrol and Detective Command Officers
- D. Department employees
- E. Director, Office of Administrative Services
- F. Director, Office of Special Services
- G. Task Force Commander
- H. Task Force members
- I. General Staff
- J. Director, Office of Operations

Decisions and tasks needed to perform:

- 1. Appoint task force leader
- 2. Select task force members
- 3. Coordinate with Planning and Research Division
- 4. Survey current Department services
- 5. Generate recommended service changes
- 6. Develop specific duties for foot patrols
- 7. Decision on final recommendations to be developed
- 8. Final recommendation decision for implementation
- 9. Conduct meet and confer process with the Police Protective League
- 10. Development of training program for foot patrols
- 11. Training of Area officers to implement patrols and other policies
- 12. Implementation of new service changes
- 13. Interaction with the public and Neighborhood Watch Groups to discuss the new strategies
- 14. Establish contact with the City Council to discuss new provisions and strategy implementation
- 15. Meeting with the Mayor to convince him regarding the rationality of the changes
- 16. Conduct the final meeting with the Police Protective League
- 17. Contact City Council and Mayor's offices to mobilize public agencies.
- 18. Maintain liaison with the public agencies in an on-going dialogue and operational mode.
- 19. Coordination of outside funding activities
- 20. Monitor the Program

APPENDIX M
COMMITMENT PLANNING

| Members | Type Of Commitment Needed For Strategic Plan | | | |
|--|--|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Block Change | Let Change Happen | Help Change Happen | Make Change Happen |
| Critical Mass | | | | |
| Chief of Police | | | X-----> | O |
| City Council | | X-----> | | O |
| Department Employees | X-----> | | | O |
| Mayor | X-----> | | | O |
| Neighborhood Watch Groups | X-----> | | | O |
| Police Command Officers | | X-----> | | O |
| Police Protective League | X-----> | | | O |
| X = Current State O = Desired State | | | | |

The table indicates that there is work to be done to obtain the necessary commitments to implement the proposed change.

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31. Trojanowicz, R., and M. Steele, "Community Policing, A Taxpayer's Perspective," The National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, (Flint, MI: 1986) p. 22.

32. United State Department of Justice, The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1980), p. 7.

33. "Crime and the Sound of Silence: Victimization of Southeast Asian Immigrants," The Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1990, p. A28.

34. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report 1988, (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, August 1989).

35. As reported by the Associated Press, October 22, 1990.

36. Los Angeles Police Department, Report on Narcotics Arrests and Seizures, 1989, Narcotics Division.

37. Law Enforcement News, Volume XVI, No. 321, September 30, 1990.

38. "Crime and the Sound of Silence: Victimization of Southeast Asian Immigrants," The Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1990, p. A28.

39. Esensten, Tom, Independent Study Project notes, POST Command College, Class No. 11, May 22, 1990.

40. The Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners was deleted from consideration as a stakeholder. The group opined that although the Police Commission is officially designated as the policy making body of LAPD, in actuality the Commission had little or no impact on the key issue.

41. Rampart Neighborhood Rescue Operation, also known as the Orchard Task Force, was initiated in Rampart Area, Los Angeles Police Department in April 1989. The Operation concluded in March of 1990.

42. Newton Street Area commenced a street closure program in late 1989. The result was a drastic reduction of repressible crime, enhanced police-community relations, and a marked increase in attendance at the local high school.

43. Capriellian, Edward, Ph.D., POST Command College, Strategic Planning Session, December 14, 1989.

GLOSSARY

CHIRLA (Coalition for Humane Immigrants Rights of Los Angeles): A consortium of civil rights advocates connected with the American Civil Liberties Union which monitors public sector issues affecting immigrants.

Citizens: Inhabitants of a city or unincorporated area, whether residents, visitors or business people. The term is not used to denote government "citizenship" or allegiance to the United States.

City Infrastructure: Those fundamental systems and facilities which serve cities and counties including transportation, schools, health, safety, and other municipal services.

Community Based Policing (Neighborhood-oriented Policing): An interactive process between police officers assigned to specific areas and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and concerns.

Confrontational Crime: Those incidents of law violation where a violent face-to-face meeting occurs between at least one criminal perpetrator and a victim. This category of crime generally consists of all violations against an individual's person including robbery, rape, and aggravated assault.

Ethnic Group: A group of people of the same race or nationality who share a common and distinctive culture and linguistic tradition.

Event: Something that happens or is regarded as happening, an occurrence, especially one of some importance.

Futures scenarios: Scenarios are integrating mechanisms designed to present complex forecasts and relationships in an organized and readable form. They provide a picture and illustration of the future for strategic planning purposes.

Inner City: Generally an older part of a city, densely populated, and usually deteriorating, inhabited by mainly poor, often minority groups.

Line uniformed officer: Uniformed police officers responsible for answering radio calls and apprehending criminal suspects.

Los Angeles Police Protective League: The Police Officer's Association for the lieutenants' and below bargaining unit in the Los Angeles Police Department.

Mass Transit: A system of large scale public transportation in a given metropolitan area, typically composed of buses, subways, and elevated trains.

Neighborhood Watch Groups: Community groups of residents and business proprietors joined for the purpose of reducing crime and enhancing the level of police service to the public.

Part-I Crimes: Based upon records of all reports of crime received from victims, officers, or other sources, law enforcement agencies across the country tabulate the number of Crime Index or Part I offenses brought to their attention during each month and forward these statistics to the Department of Justice. Specifically the crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and classified as Part-I are: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

Opportunities (WOTS-UP): An opportunity is any favorable situation in an organization's environment often a trend or change of some kind or an overlooked need, that supports the demand for a product or service and permits the firm to enhance its position.

People groups: Groups of people of the same race or nationality who share a common and distinctive culture and linguistic tradition.

Quality of Life: Those characteristics, properties, and attributes which in the aggregate represent and contribute to the ideal condition of living, including the right to self determination, freedom from physical harm and subjugation, and the liberty to pursue happiness.

Segregation: The act of separation or setting apart from others or from the main group; the deed of isolation for any reason including race, religion, or ethnicity.

Status Crimes: These violations refer to the standing of a person before the law based upon a personal state or conditions of affairs. These crimes in general refer to a particular behavior or conduct, as opposed to any particular violent crime. Examples include membership in a gang, vagrancy, and curfew violations.

STEP Act: This law is the California Street Terrorism Enforcement Program. It serves to inform gang members that their participation in gang activities is illegal, and that further association with the gang will result in arrest. Thus, it imposes criminal penalties merely for being a member of a gang.

Strengths (WOTS-UP): A strength is a resource or capacity an organization can use effectively to achieve its objectives.

Threats (WOTS-UP): A threat is any unfavorable situation in an organization's environment that is potentially damaging to the organization and its strategy. It may be a barrier, a constraint, or anything that might inflict problems, damages, or injury to the organization.

Trepidation effect: The condition of provoking great fear among inner city residents. As a result the residents develop a siege mentality, clinging to their residences as a safe fortress. Conditions which develop this effect include the presence of beggars, vendors, graffiti and the deterioration of structures in addition to violent crime.

Trend: A general course or prevailing tendency; a widespread inclination, a pattern of occurrences over time which has a significance to a particular issue.

Weaknesses (WOTS-UP): A limitation, fault, or defect in an organization that will keep it from achieving its objectives