


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013912

ETHNIC SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME SUMMARY REPORT

By
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This project was supported by Grant No. 71-076, awarded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

December 1973

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the process of ethnic succession in organized crime syndicates. It develops a model of how new member groups organize themselves to achieve the goals shared by members and how these groups develop and enforce rules to maximize their criminal efforts. Results of the study include a documentation of the process of ethnic succession in organized crime, an analysis of patterns of social relationships in newly emerging criminal groups in relation to the society, the community and other groups, and the development of preliminary models of the functioning of newly formed organized criminal groups.

FOREWORD

Recent books and films have made the phrase "organized crime" synonymous with specific ethnic stereotypes. In reality, however, the racial and ethnic composition of American crime syndicates has varied from city to city and year to year. During this century, a succession of ethnic groups has dominated crime in many cities, with control passing from the Irish to the Jews to the Italians and, more recently, to blacks and Spanish-speaking groups.

In this report, Dr. Francis A. J. Ianni, an anthropologist at Columbia University, examines the process by which new ethnic groups assume control of illegal activities in major cities. Dr. Ianni's analysis portrays criminal organizations as social groupings arising out of local cultures and responding to social and cultural change.

The report describes the illegal activities of several criminal networks operating in Black and Puerto Rican communities in the New York City area. After exploring the relationships and rules which govern crime syndicates, Dr. Ianni concludes that efforts to reduce organized crime must recognize the social, economic, and political settings in which it flourishes.

Unless *communities* mobilize in support of programs to prevent organized crime, the efforts of criminal justice agencies will mean little. With a combined attack by entire communities—both the private and public sectors—organized criminals will lose the sheltered status they have enjoyed for too long.

GERALD M. CAPLAN
Director

*National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice*

I. INTRODUCTION

Part of the current debate over organized crime is concerned with whether or not Italian-Americans are controlling a national crime syndicate or confederation in America. On the one hand it is often asserted organized crime is controlled by "a nationwide alliance of at least 24 tightly knit mafia families"¹ and that the Italian syndicate is virtually coterminous with organized crime. On the other hand there are writers, among them Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School and his colleague, Gordon Hawkins, a visiting Australian criminologist, who scoff at the evidence and the figures writers like Cressey present and who, while readily admitting the presence of Italian-Americans in crime, doubt that a national, Italian-controlled crime syndicate exists.² But the most salient factor regarding organized crime as a way of life in America is lost in this debate. This factor is the complex but demonstrable relationship that exists between the structure of ethnic communities in urban society and organized crime. The historical roots of this relationship extend back over a period of fifty years or more.

Social scientists have analyzed the relationships among ethnic groups, organized crime and politics in American life. Daniel Bell has described how one group of immigrants after another has handed to each newly arriving immigrant group a "queer ladder of social mobility"³ which has organized crime as the first few rungs. The Irish were the first immigrant groups to become in-

¹ Donald R. Cressey, *Theft of the Nation*, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, p. x.

² Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

³ Daniel Bell, "The Myth of the Cosa Nostra," *The New Leader*, Vol. 46, December 23, 1963, pp. 12-15.

involved in organized criminal activity on a large scale in the United States, and early Irish gangsters began the climb up the social ladder. As more Irish came to American cities and as the Irish gangsters became successful in organized crime and therefore money began flowing into Irish-American communities, the Irish began to acquire political power. As they eventually came to control the political machinery of the large cities, the Irish won wealth, power and respectability by expanding their legitimate business interests and gaining control of construction, trucking, public utilities and the waterfront. The Irish were succeeded in organized crime by the Jews and the names of Arnold Rothstein, Lepke Buchalter and Gurrah Shapiro dominated gambling and labor racketeering for a decade. The Jews quickly moved into the world of business as a more legitimate means of gaining economic and social mobility. The Italians came last and did not get a commanding leg up the ladder until the late thirties. They were just beginning to find politics and business as routes out of crime and the ghetto and into wealth and respectability in the fifties when the Kefauver hearings took place.

The Kefauver hearings linked Italian-Americans and organized crime inextricably in the minds of the American people. The hearings were shown on the new and exciting medium of television, and the Kefauver hearings were the first governmental hearings to receive extensive television coverage. Seeing the hearings made Americans think of Italian-Americans when they thought of organized crime, and the association has continued to the present time.

While the process of "ethnic succession" in organized crime, where each new immigrant group uses organized crime as a means to attain wealth and power before gaining a foothold in legitimate business, has been known to criminologists and other social scientists for some period of time, it has not been systematically researched until recently. Knowledge of this process has not had any serious effect on social policy or on

planning for enforcement and for social programs dealing with organized crime. That is to say, we have until recently not stopped to ask the question: Which is the next group of ethnics that will replace the Italian-Americans—as the Italian-Americans replaced the Irish and Jews before them—in organized crime and how will this new group or groups organize itself to achieve its goals? The answer to the first part of the question is apparent to anyone who would look: Blacks, Puerto Ricans and to a lesser extent Cubans are in fact already pursuing these routes and it is clear Blacks are working their way into higher positions of power in urban politics and also in many cities both Blacks and Puerto Ricans are displacing Italian-Americans in organized crime. The evidence of this displacement is already visible. In New York City, for example, Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are now displacing Italian-Americans in the policy or numbers rackets.⁴ In some cases, particularly in East Harlem and in Brooklyn this is a peaceful succession as the Italian-American “families” literally lease the rackets on a concession basis. The “family” supplies the money and the protection, the Blacks or Puerto Ricans run the operation. In other cases we know of in Central and West Harlem, however, the transition is not so peaceful and the Italian syndicate members are actually being pushed out. Current estimates are that upward to one-fourth of the control and operation of the policy racket in New York has already changed hands. It is the second part of the question—how do Blacks and Puerto Ricans organize themselves to achieve shared goals in organized crime—that for so long remained unanswered and largely unasked; and it was to this question that we of the Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute addressed ourselves in 1971–72.

There are, we believe, a number of important implications for the criminal justice system that have emerged out of our study, and we will

⁴ See Francis A. J. Ianni, “The Mafia and the Web of Kinship,” *The Public Interest*. National Affairs, Inc. Number 22, Winter 1971.

consider these at greater length in a later section. However, at this time we will mention two of these implications. The first grows out of the research methods we used. This was our second major study of organized crime using anthropological field work techniques to research organized crime in the community where it operates. During the period 1967–1970, Francesco Cerase of the Institute of Social Research in the University of Rome, Elizabeth Reuss of the Institute for Social Analysis, and I conducted a comparative field study of criminal syndicates in the United States and Italy.⁵ Aside from this study, and from our present one, virtually all research on organized crime has been conducted by going to the files of government law enforcement agencies and drawing data from these files. Yet the focus of these files is necessarily on criminal intelligence and so they deal largely with activities of individual criminals rather than the nature of the organizations through which such activities occur. For this reason, most research has failed to ask the kinds of questions about organized crime that lead to an understanding of how and why it exists and persists. As a result of our two anthropologi-

⁵ The results of the study have been reported in the following:

Papers

- (1) “Some Suggested Affinities Between Sicilian Mafia and African Secret Societies,” *African Studies Association*, Los Angeles, 1969.
- (2) “Comments on Kinship and Organized Crime,” Invited paper at Conference on Organized Crime, University of Chicago Law School, 1970.
- (3) “A Comparative Study of Secret Criminal Societies in the South of Italy,” Invited paper, Annual Meeting of Italian-American Historical Association and in *Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal*.
- (4) “The Kinship Base of Sicilian Mafia and Italo-American Criminal Syndicates,” Annual Meetings, American Anthropological Association, San Diego, California, Nov., 1971.

Articles

- (1) “Mafia and the Web of Kinship,” *The Public Interest*, Winter, 1971.
- (2) “The Organization of an Italo-American Crime Family,” *University of Florida Law Review*, Fall, 1971.
- (3) “Authority, Power and Respect—The Interplay of Control Systems in an Organized Crime ‘Family,’” in *The Economics of Crime and Punishment*, Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973.

Books

- A Family Business; Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation-Basic Books, 1972.

cal studies, we are convinced that looking at organized crime as a *social system* is an important and promising approach to studying, understanding and eventually controlling organized crime in America. The second, and we think major, implication of our study for the criminal justice system complements this approach of fighting organized crime as an organizational entity which (as we were to discover) is symbiotically rather than parasitically associated with American society. Namely: we have come to believe that if we are to control and hopefully eradicate organized crime, there must be a reconnection between the community out of which that crime grows and the criminal justice system, and some attempt will have to be made to influence and refocus our social attitudes toward prevention of organized crime.

II. METHODS

The distinction between our approach and most previous research is critical to assessing the impact of this study. Criminal organization has previously been viewed as a type of formal organization—that is, as a social unit which has been deliberately designed and constructed to achieve a set of specified illicit goals. This approach views criminal organizations as rationally designed and constructed organizations with a hierarchy or organizational positions which can be diagrammed and then, perhaps, changed by recasting the organization chart. Our approach, on the other hand, is to view criminal organizations as social groupings contrived by culture and responsive to socio-cultural change and so to study them as social systems.

Moreover, we are assuming that organized criminal groups which persist over time are social systems which have the character and permanence of social institutions. Yet our usage of the term social institution deviates somewhat from the usual view, which we believe is excessively static and structural. Institutions in our usage are not

fixed, monolithic structures nor are they transmitted from one generation to another as structures. Institutions, for us, are the behavioral patterns, learned or first established by people seeking to maximize their shared values. What becomes institutionalized in this process is not a structure in the usual sense—a box containing action as it were—but a code of rules governing social action as a means of converting human energy and intelligence into a defined pattern of behaviors which are productively efficient in maximizing social gains. That the social goals of the ethnics involved in organized crime are defined as illegal and dysfunctional by the larger society does not negate the fact that to the ethnic criminal, his value reference group is the ethnic community and his own network in crime and it is not the larger society, and so the goals of his group are positively defined.

Our primary research strategy was to gather data on social relations in organized crime by using the traditional anthropological techniques of participant observation and by dealing with field work in precisely the same fashion as we would in any piece of field research. It is important to indicate here that our contacts and the field work in general grew out of natural social settings. Specifically, in this project we hired Black and Puerto Rican members of an association of former prisoners as field consultants to observe and record patterns of social action and behavior among Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime activities in East and Central Harlem, and Bedford Stuyvesant in New York and in Paterson, New Jersey. Our previous research among Italian-American “families” had given us contacts in each of these areas and especially in East Harlem where both Puerto Rican and Black numbers and bolita operations are carried out in conjunction and in some cases in direct cooperation with the Italian-American “family.” In addition, we used a number of field consultants who are also indigenous to the population being studied as primary data gatherers.

We proceeded to generate models of organized crime groups among Blacks and Puerto Ricans using the techniques of network analysis. Network analysis is an anthropological tool that is used to chart social interactions. A network chart is composed of a set of points representing people in a group, with lines between points representing interactions. The networks we mapped in this study were groups of Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime.

We analyzed three aspects of organized crime: (1) the social behavioral field, (2) person-to-person contracts and (3) social relations sets. Essentially this meant that through on-site observation of organized crime groups, we first described the total behavioral field involving the group of individuals we were observing in gambling activities, for example. Then through constant analysis and comparison of the data, we identified those person-to-person contracts—that is, those agreements on rights and obligations which existed between occupants of specific roles—which existed between various roles in that social field. In this way we did not describe a one dimensional structure for organization but rather describe roles in terms of what individual A owes and expects from individual B as a result of the mutuality of their roles. We then proceeded to combine these roles into social relations sets or sociograms of how various roles are related to each other. By extending this process, we then described the network of social relations which formed the specific organization. As part of the process of analysis we also considered such factors as regularity of interaction, closeness of ties, recruitment as one of the mechanisms in network formation, sub-networks such as power alliances within the network and between elements of the network and external forces such as the police or political world, and the nature and amount of interaction implied by the links.

III. NETWORKS

Our eight informants—six Blacks and two

Puerto Ricans—provided us with information about a number of criminal networks operating in the New York City area. We took these data and developed a number of network charts showing how people in a particular crime group relate to each other and how they function. While the full description of each network is not possible here, a brief description of each gives some notion of the base data from which the analyses and conclusions in this study were made.

Network A tells the story of a gang of neighborhood boys in the Bedford Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn who became involved in crime in their neighborhood as they grew up. The boys, who were all close friends, started their gang as a social club before they became involved in crime. Their crimes began with vandalism and burglary. Older criminals in the neighborhood soon began sizing up the youths, and using them for specific jobs. Eventually the simple web of friendship, in which all were equal partners, broke down; that is, one of the boys became a numbers controller, and two of the other boys became runners for him.

Network B tells about a number of criminal set-ups in Paterson, New Jersey. In the first of these, a self-made white immigrant businessman made a very profitable career by mixing legitimate business dealings with illegal activities. His illicit businesses included stolen cars, gambling, prostitution, the numbers, and the ghetto narcotics trade. His illegal activities employ mostly Blacks. He appears to have been exceptionally successful at paying off the police, thereby giving his illegal businesses almost as much stability as his legitimate ones. However, in a second Paterson setup we see how two consanguine Black brothers, one now dead, have built up an organization of "50 or 60" people which at times has been in competition with the white man's businesses, and which in time may displace them altogether.

Network C contains two very interesting stories. The first is the story of a Harlem pimp and

the prostitute whose concern and affection have made him the success he is. The second is a story about a small but legitimate Black businessman who owns several dry cleaning stores and laundromats, who almost inadvertently discovers the profits that can accrue to him from dealing in contraband. As a result, he goes on to develop a complex of criminal operations: the sale of stolen clothing, loan sharking, gambling, and an after-hours bar; and through his prosperity earns the respect of his neighborhood.

Network D describes an operation in which a number of fairly well-educated Black men had put together a complex of boutiques out of which they sell cocaine as well as clothing.

Network E describes three different heroin businesses operating in New York City. One is controlled by a Black man who had 40 people working under him in four boroughs and another concerns a Black and a Puerto Rican who contrary to the usual pattern of rivalry, conducted business dealings with each other. The third centers around a Black policeman who obtained his drugs through shakedowns.

Network F relates the story of a gang of East Harlem Puerto Rican youths and their efforts to break into the drug market in their own neighborhood. They committed many violent crimes along the way, yet, meeting stiff opposition, they were never very successful. This network also includes a numbers operator whose runners now use cassette tape recorders to take down bets and two stolen car rings operating out of the Bay Ridge section of Brooklyn who use the same professional craftsmen—locksmiths, car painters, etc.—whose services are available to thieves with the right connections.

Network G tells about the burgeoning gypsy cab business in New York, where legal, quasi-legal, and patently illegal activities all are combined in the operations of the industry.

And finally, Network H tells us about life in a New York State penitentiary and how Blacks and Puerto Ricans are recruited into organized crime.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

A. When we analyzed the data which we had gathered by observing these Black and Puerto Rican networks, several important features of the behavioral organization of these networks emerged. We found three major types of behavioral organizations which we could use to describe our networks or the action-sets within those networks. An action-set is a part of an organized crime network—it is a net representing a group with a leader who makes the decision for members to work together for a common goal. The first of these was the youthful gang, or youthful criminal partnership. In the youthful gang, Black or Puerto Rican youngsters growing up in the same neighborhood commit a number of crimes together. Subsequently, through the process of recruitment, gang members—who often remain friends into adulthood—may become involved in organized crime. It is important to point out, however, that at least during their early, youthful days, these gangs cannot be classed properly as "organized crime networks," since although they might occasionally participate in organized criminal activities, they are not organized primarily for participation in such activities. Rather, their existence is important as a beginning step, and as a source of recruitment for organized crime.

The second major type of behavioral organization which we found was the prison court, where individuals within prison band together along very strict racial lines. A prison court is a roped-off area of a prison yard which prison customs allot exclusively to the group of four men requesting it. The men use the court for relaxing outdoors. In addition to racial segregation, these prison courts are characterized by strong leadership and a sensitivity to being together under a coercive and authoritarian system which bands the individuals together. It is a major finding of this study that these prison courts are far more important in the formation of networks and action-sets in organized crime among Blacks and

Puerto Ricans than they ever were among Italian-Americans. One of our interviews in Central Harlem points both to the difference between Italian-Americans on the one hand and Blacks and Puerto Ricans on the other, and the importance of prison as a molding force among Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime.

What I learned when I went to prison was that there were more Blacks and Puerto Ricans than anything else there and I didn't see many Italians. What I did see were not big racket guys. Anybody among the Italian-Americans who was identified as a big racket guy always got special privileges and kept pretty much to himself. The word inside was that their families were being taken care of and that they could be sprung at any time if they wanted to. I also learned that they went to jail very little and that there weren't enough of them there to band together. Then, with the Blacks and Puerto Ricans, it is very different. The Puerto Ricans stepped together and the Blacks stepped together. When you went back from the court into your cells you went back with guys you could depend on and there was always somebody who would watch your back. When I got out of prison these were the guys that I knew and the ones that were from my neighborhood were closer to me. I knew these guys. I could trust them and they could trust me. I knew what they could do and they knew what I could do. We were the ones who always worked with each other. If I found something good I would cut them in on it because I knew they would do the same thing for me. When I got back to my neighborhood not all the guys I knew in the prison court were there, of course, but some of the guys in my neighborhood knew the guys in prison and I knew that I could depend upon them because their friends in prison had been friends of mine, too.

There are a number of reasons why the prison is so important in network organization among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Among Blacks, the sociological evidence reveals dramatically the instability of the family. While there is still some debate as to how unstable it is and how important this lack of stability is for developing personalities within the Black family, there is little question that the absence of the male figure and of the mother who is usually out working and not at

home, and the lack of a long tradition of family loyalty are characteristic of Black families. This lack of a strong sense of family loyalty certainly separates the Black criminals we studied from the Italian-Americans. Loyalty to the family is the Italian-American's first priority and it is so important that the Italian-American criminal recognizes no sense of responsibility to any social unit larger than the family. Blacks are very different. In the absence of strong family loyalty, the childhood gang or the prison court may well represent the first strong associational tie for the Black youngster as he matures, and may become the basis for his loyalties to other individuals.

Catholicism and the Latin ancestry of Puerto Ricans would suggest that among them, the family is a strong unit, and we did find kinship more important among them than it is among Blacks. But, at least among those individuals we studied in our networks, families are not *that* stable and strong, because of the importance of common law relationships and especially because of the rapid and frequent movement of the members of the family back and forth between Puerto Rico and the United States.

We believe the primary importance of prison in the formation of Black and Puerto Rican networks has been confirmed by our observations in each of the networks we have studied. In almost every case friendships among criminals were formed either in childhood gangs and subsequently validated in common prison experience, or individuals made contact with each other for the first time when they were in prison. In the prison court, as was true in the child-association, the relationships which are formed tend to be very personal and consequently tend to be lasting. They have the character of partnerships since they depend on mutual trust and responsibility as well as compatibility of the individuals.

The third type of behavioral organization which we observed in the action-sets and networks we studied was what we have called the criminal entrepreneurship model. In this type of

organization, individuals come together into an action-set or focused network in order to make profits and because their skills and abilities are mutually supportive. That is to say, in this type of activity a group of individuals who know each other because of their presence in the Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks will band together for a particular set of activities either on a permanent or temporary basis. This pattern of organization seems to be by far the most prevalent one and in fact, is the only true organized crime type of network that we have identified. The other two basic types, the childhood gang of friends and the prison court, seem to serve more as recruiting grounds for these types of networks. The entrepreneur model of the small illegal businessman with his employees and associates marks the current stage of development among Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime. Here, however, we must add the caution that our study is a preliminary one and it may well be that much more elaborate organizational structures already exist.

This lack of organizational development in Black and Puerto Rican criminal structures is due to both the newness of Blacks and Puerto Ricans in control positions in organized crime and the consequent lack of a long period of development, and the nature of the types of criminal activities which we discovered in these networks. Just as this newness has hindered any large-scale development, it has also tended to keep the networks and action-sets we observed fairly generalized rather than specialized in specific types of criminal activities. Throughout the networks there is a diversity of criminal activity involved both in the networks and in the action-sets which make them up. The combinations seem to be fairly stylized with prostitution and drugs, liquor, theft, and petty gambling, and numbers and narcotics being typical patterns. The gypsy cab network we described also is used in drug transactions and the numbers racket. In one network we found numbers, narcotics and prostitution operating

through the same mechanism: the sale of cocaine, hashish, pot and numbers coincident with business establishments; the picking up of numbers coincident with business establishments; the picking up of numbers slips and the cutting of dope done by individuals in the same network; and finally violence, found in numerous networks here.

But, since the beginning networks among Blacks and Puerto Ricans are still relatively small operations, they cannot specialize. Of course, it might also be argued that it is the lack of specialization which keeps them relatively small. There are, of course, always possibilities of enlargement and some of the activities which we observed seemed to be on their way to becoming large. What seems to be necessary for the beginning networks to expand into the large networks characteristic of Italian-American criminal organizations is, (a) greater control over sectors of organized crime and (b) better access to political power and the ability to corrupt it.

B. In addition to a typology of networks, we also developed a typology of linkages within the network. We found six types of relationships which form strong personal links within the networks and which define the action-sets we identified:

1. childhood friendship;
2. prison acquaintance;
3. the recruitment of younger men in the neighborhood into organized crime by an experienced criminal;
4. the use of women, particularly lovers. This use of women in criminal activities, sometimes in positions of authority, is a relationship we found only among Blacks and Puerto Ricans, and it seems to be missing among Italian-Americans and Cubans;
5. kinship, but primarily brother-brother and very little (if any) father-son;
6. the meeting of two men either firsthand or through intermediaries who establish a relationship for mutual profit in organized crime.

These linkages are important because they bring people together to participate in organized crime,

and because they serve as the sources of recruitment for organized crime in Black and Puerto Rican circles. An example, from one of our observed networks in East Harlem, points out the importance of these linkages:

You gotta have eyes to move up. In other words this has to be your goal and you have to make it known that you intend to make something of yourself and get other people to accept it. First of all you've got to have a knowledge of what you're gonna do and what you're able to do. You have to go and enlist the aid of somebody who's known to other people or you never get anywhere. Nobody gets somewhere without somebody and the people who help him either have to do it in a way that gives him some power or show that they are interested in him or look the other way, such as the police authorities. He has to grease them or have a contact who is able to grease them or he's got no chance. You've got to be flexible in all things except in your main concern and that's got to be making money, more money and getting more power. The power is going to come in several ways. One power is protection. You've got to have the power to pay off the police or you're dead. Another thing is somebody will sooner or later challenge your authority. First of all you have to have a reputation dating to the first time you ever entered into whatever you are doing. You probably got into it in a number of ways. You might have just been a kid and you might have just been lucky and have been noticed by the other bigger guys in the neighborhood. This is not always going to work though because you've got to do some things yourself. Somebody will come along sooner or later and will challenge that authority and unless you're strong enough or connected well enough you won't be able to maintain your position, even through force. You've got to be forceful and be willing to do things like putting your life out on the line because somebody just took \$10,000.00 from you. You also have to always be thinking about your business and what you're going to do with it. What happens to it depends on who comes along. Everything works on the basis that you are liked, either because you have qualities that are recognized, such as being a nice guy but still being a regular guy. Somebody that is good to be with or a bright kid. These things lead to your being discovered. These are the things that oldtimers look for. It is a tradition. We don't want nobody who is on drugs half the time taking on our business when we decide to retire and go to Florida. We don't want

somebody who will let somebody from another territory come in and take over. What we want is somebody we know and like and can talk to, somebody to manipulate, but somebody we can talk to. I can get you to do what I want to so that you are learning the business at the same time. If you are not a doer, whatever you are that is what you are going to be. Once they learn that you can do something, then they are willing to experiment on other things, bigger and better things because you have proved yourself. But if all you do is bring in a 100 dollars a day in the numbers they are not going to approach you with any kind of proposition like running this gambling joint that nets like 3,000 dollars a day. Once you have developed a reputation in a particular group of people you can't take that reputation and go out to some other area unless you have 'your man' in that other area. Most of it stays right in the neighborhood and once you move out of that neighborhood then you've got to have contacts or you are dead.

Still another interview relates the importance of friendships and mutual trust and responsibility in the establishment of networks:

You don't have to be a college professor to figure out that when a man gets himself into the business of narcotics, naturally he is going to put people around him he knows personally, people he deems trustful, the people who he deems in his heart as loyal, the kind of people who have the necessary sense to keep the business going and not working against the business but working for it. Therefore if organized crime is what this is, and by the way people in the ghetto do not call it organization but 'being down together,' then such a thing does exist in the narcotics traffic. It exists because the business runs much more smoothly when people who have something in common or people who have known each other for a long time, people who feel that they can trust each other working together towards an objective and that objective being money. Then such a thing as organization does exist in the narcotic traffic. In my travels over the last twenty years of hustling in the streets between Detroit and New York I find that in order for people to put the right kind of opportunities your way and in the streets there must be a mutual respect to people who are in those positions that can put you on a spot that will bring you great profits must have a certain kind of respect for your ability as a person or as a hustler or whatever. Without this certain kind of respect for you then there is a big chance that you will never be a

success in the hustling life, which is the reason why drug addicts are never really successful. They only experience marginal success. Some drug addicts are better hustlers than others. Some are much more respected than others. However, before a man can become successful in whatever field he is in in this town, he has a far better chance if he has not used narcotics himself. Naturally in a business of this kind where large amounts of money are being trusted into other people's hands sometimes there is trouble. Sometimes there have to be enforcers or what we call butches, guys who straighten out these things with a little bit of muscle, who make sure that a guy has paid the money that he owes. But except for this I would say that there is not a great deal of difference in the drug business from any other business; there must be people who can be trusted, people who remain loyal, people who will only talk about what they have been told to talk about, people who are on time, people who are dependable otherwise, people who must feel that they are a necessary link in a chain for the organization to reach its objective. So it is in the narcotic traffic it is clear that we have to have the same kind of organization to run our business.

C. In addition to types of networks and types of linkages, we also discovered nine kinds of criminal or substantive relationships which exist within the networks. These are the criminal activities that keep men working together:

1. employer-employee, which is identified only in the entrepreneurial model;
2. the partnership, which is found most frequently in prison courts and in childhood gangs, where a close relationship exists between two individuals to the extent that the other person is always known as "my man";
3. buyer and seller of goods;
4. buyer and seller of services;
5. the leader-follower relationship, which is found in the prison and youthful gangs but seems to be almost absent in the entrepreneurial models;
6. two employees working together in the same network which seldom seems to bring networks into existence but is then the basis of their success; here mutual trust seems to be quite important;
7. the grantor and grantee of a privilege where "connection" or "territory" are passed from one individual to another;

8. the relationship between the giver and recipient of a bribe or favor;
9. the relationship established when one man does violence to another; this seems to be quite an important way of obtaining services within these networks.

The operations of these various types of linkages are well described in the following interviews which were conducted in Central Harlem which illustrate how several linkages can exist in one network:

Therefore with the exception of the fact that the drug business is illegal as far as the law is concerned, I would say that there is not a great deal of difference in the drug business from any other business because in the drug business there must be people who can be trusted, people who will remain loyal, people who will talk about what they have been told to talk about, people who must feel that they are a necessary link in the chain for the organization or for the mob to reach its objective. So in the narcotic traffic, it is clear that we do not have the kind of organization to run the business per se. To give you an example of what I mean when I say being properly connected, I shall move to the 1965 drug panic and this too is in the summer of 1965. This happens to be a personal experience whereby I was able to phone a particular individual, who is now deceased, in his home and go there to his home and purchase narcotics where no one else in the streets at the time or in my particular neighborhood was able to buy dope. Therefore I was able to remain in Harlem and not have to go outside of Harlem to obtain my money to purchase narcotics but I was able to take advantage of the fact that I personally knew where this man lived and I was able personally to go to his house. It was somewhat of a privilege as a result of the mutual respect that we had for each other. In some cases there were people whom he had grown up with and people whom he had known all throughout his life as a result of being a native New Yorker, people whom he did not allow to come to his house. As a result of my knowing this man and the mutual respect we have for each other, I was granted this privilege and I in turn was able to keep my habit to an extent as well as to do favors for the other drug addicts in my neighborhood who were unable to buy their stuff. It happens that this particular man's connection he was no big time dope pusher but it just happened that the particular people this boy was

connected with and we shall call him C-4, happened to come up with some narcotics at the key time with dope and it happened to be good dope during the panic, or for the most part when no one else had any drugs and for the most part no one else who had drugs had good drugs. C-4's connection was able to come up with drugs and the man he had been doing business with 2, 3, or 4 years was able to come up with narcotics and gave it all to him to sell. This in turn enabled me to go to C-4 and to purchase narcotics for the people in my neighborhood who were unable to purchase drugs for themselves. Again I stress the point of making the right kind of friends, making the right kind of respect, carrying yourself in such a way that people will bestow a respect upon you as far as giving you their home addresses and their home phone numbers. Because it is a thing in New York, and it is a very definite thing that people in the streets just do not take you to their homes. This is a rule in New York and most people stick to it. Only on rare occasions or only after a man is very sure that he knows you very well, especially if he is involved in an illegal activity such as narcotics, will he bring you to his home, introduce you to his family and expose himself as far as you are concerned and if you should ever run afoul with the law it puts him in a position that you in turn can bring the police to his home. These things are just not done in New York. Maybe other cities but not New York City. People who are in the hustling life in New York City are just not hospitable in that light. In our discussion last Wednesday I think it was mentioned and the question was posed as to how the price of a bag of narcotics is determined. For the most part I would say supply and demand is the determining factor. Sometimes during the drug panic a bag which would cost \$5 in Harlem was raised to \$6 or for that matter those people who were not able to buy narcotics readily, people who do not know the people well enough to buy when they wanted to buy it, they had the money to pay as high as \$10 to \$12 a bag. In some cases, I have seen a bag purchased for as high as \$20 on the East side of New York. But for the most part the price of the bag is determined by the supply as well as the demand. Naturally, during the panic there is a short supply of narcotics. Those people who have it try to get the most money for it or if not those people who act as go between are responsible for raising the price so that they in turn can make as much money as those people to whom the narcotics belong to. On the other hand, during normal times when there is a lot of dope which is not necessarily good dope this for the most part

would come down. As the case when the panic did finally subside. In those places where the price of a bag had been raised, for the most part the price of the bag came down, a short time after the panic was officially over. By this I mean you could practically go to any corner you know to be a drug corner and purchase narcotics. As far as connections are concerned in the narcotic field, I think that in most instances, a man that deems himself a street pusher is able to go to one person, that is the person who gives him bulk narcotics. As far as the street pusher being able to go past this man to someone higher or past this man to the people who he would buy drugs from is very, very unlikely. It is only after a great length of time that the street pusher becomes so adept in pushing drugs on the street that someone on a higher level recognizes his abilities and thinks in terms of dealing with him directly which in turn would knock out the middle man who is more or less not doing anything but receiving percentages on the narcotics that he in turn is giving to the street pushers directly. Therefore it is a thing of being higher echelon or middle echelon or a lower realm or the actual man who does the hard to hand combat that is the man who does the pushing in the street. Until the man raises himself to that particular caliber of the middle man or until he comes to the sum of money to do business directly with the man on the high echelon there is no chance that he will ever meet the key connection. It is a long line of connections that you never really know how close you have gotten to the top. The only yardstick for a man to know how close he has gotten to the top as far as narcotic traffic is concerned is determined by the amount of narcotics that he is able to buy if he is able to come up with the money. In many instances when a man starts to thinking in terms of kilos it takes a little more for him to just have the money. He may have the money but still not know the people. He is still at a loss. It is only at rare occasions when the Federal agents are able to step in and purchase narcotics directly. It is only on these rare occasions when someone has become greedy that the police do step in and purchase narcotics directly. However I think there is a little bit more to the investigation that they conduct than meets the eye. Therefore I think it is easy to conclude that this network is a very difficult network for someone who is a stranger and for someone who has no hustler's background, no jail background.

D. Operative codes of rules.

By analyzing the behavior we observed in our various networks and action-sets, we uncovered

two distinct sets of rules operative in these networks. One set of rules is the set which seems to operate in prison and in the youthful partnerships or youth gangs. This set of rules describes the personal characteristics necessary for survival in these kinds of networks:

1. *Don't be a coward.* This rule, which is found in both the prison court and in the youthful networks, enjoins the individual to be a man, but has a more physical connotation than we found to be true among the Italian-Americans. Essentially, it indicates that the individual is always willing to fight for his own rights and safety and to a lesser extent for those of his colleagues in the network.

2. *Don't be disloyal.* Here again the injunction is less positive in terms of its relationship to the group than we found among the Italian-Americans. What is called for here is a feeling of membership in a group and a basic loyalty rather than the intensely socialized family membership code among the Italian-Americans. Loyalty in this context means acceptance of membership in a group with the consequent requirements that outsiders be rejected.

3. *Don't be a creep.* Here, the rule calls for a normalizing of behavioral relationships among members in the network. What this rule does is to exclude from membership aberrant individuals—those who are somewhat deficient or who cannot for some other reason enjoy full membership—and consequently establishes rules of behavior.

We found a different code of rules which operates as a behavioral guide in the entrepreneurial networks described earlier:

1. *Don't tell the police.* This rule actually stretches beyond the injunction not to tell the police. It also includes the caution against telling anyone who is likely to tell the police either through malice or weakness. While the rule is strongest within the networks themselves, we found that it reaches out beyond the networks to the community and that just as we found among the Italian-Americans, community people are very reluctant to discuss these activities. This is certainly the result of fear, but we feel certain that it also results from an antagonism toward the criminal justice system and the feeling of greater unity and identification on the part of the community members with their co-ethnics in the networks than with the police or other segments of the criminal justice system.

2. *Don't cheat your partner or other people in the network.* Individuals within any network must cooperate in a relationship of mutual trust. This rule lays the groundwork for cooperation with some degree of certainty. The rule places a highly "moral" standard on correct interpersonal behavior within the network but does not carry outside the group. Thus an individual is expected not to cheat with money inside the network but is not enjoined against doing it externally.

3. *Don't be incompetent at whatever you are supposed to be doing.* This rule sets standards of excellence. Within the network it again builds confidence among its members. What this rule suggests is that an individual—be him a thief, a numbers runner, a prostitute, a pimp, a locksmith, a dealer of stolen goods, a narcotics pusher, or a hijacker—should do his job well.

There are two interesting and important conclusions to be drawn from both these sets of rules and from the fact that there are indeed two distinct sets. The first conclusion has to do with the general nature of organized crime. Note that in both sets of rules, there are injunctions against disclosing information. Secrecy is, of course, a part of all business and certainly is part of most crime. In organized crime, however, the community within which the networks exists protects the secrecy of the operations and consequently becomes a part of the organization—a part which is very important in terms of both the development and persistence of organized crime activity. Quite simply, in the absence of such open public support for individuals involved in organized crime, they could not survive. Thus, changing the values of communities which support organized crime—either because of their antagonism towards the criminal justice system or because of the support of their co-ethnics in organized crime—is essential.

A second conclusion we draw from this body of rules and from its operation is that organized crime is indeed a social system and that it has all of the elements—a pattern of relationships with established rights and responsibilities, a normative pattern of rules of behavior, and a shared set of values and ends—which mark any other social system. This social system is of more than aca-

democratic interest. It suggests that in order to combat organized crime, it is necessary to develop strategies aimed at changing the rules of both that social system and the larger social system of which it is a part. That is to say, organized crime as a social system is functionally a part of the larger social system of American society and any attempt at change or remediation must involve changing the value system of both the social system itself and the larger society of which it is a part.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

As we stated at the outset, we are convinced that looking at organized crime as a *social system* is an important and promising approach to studying, understanding, and eventually controlling organized crime in America. There is also a beginning appreciation in the criminal justice system that interdiction and apprehension of individual organized crime figures is a necessary but insufficient method of organized crime control. Yet, both research and intelligence on organized crime remain unchanged, and there also remains an overemphasis on the guillotine approach; if we knock off the head, the rest of the organization will fall apart. Law enforcement agencies have committed a major portion of their organized crime efforts in this direction with little payoff, a fact that is not lost on the public in general and the ghetto dweller in particular. There is now abundant evidence that organizational intelligence and analysis (rather than individual case development) could dramatically improve the ability of the criminal justice system to identify the social, cultural, political and economic factors which allow organized crime to develop and prosper and that there exists within the behavioral sciences and metasciences such as systems analysis both the methodology and manpower to develop such an approach. We are not here suggesting

that surveillance, apprehension and incarceration of individual organized crime figures is not an important function of the criminal justice system but rather that even this task could be made immeasurably easier and more successful if we understood that organized crime is a feature of the social, economic and political structure of American society and that it can only be understood in those contexts. Once such an understanding is achieved, policies and practices for combating organized crime can be developed to attack the social problems which encourage the formation of organized crime groups. Just as important, strategies can be devised for destroying the organizational imperatives which bind such groups internally, to each other, and externally to the community in which they develop. It is, of course, necessary to do a great deal more research and development before we can even begin to develop the policies, practices and strategies we have described. Moreover, there must develop within the criminal justice system an appreciation for and a competence to utilize this approach to both the understanding and control of organized crime. This will require changes and adaptations at all levels of organized crime control planning and operations, from specialized training of personnel to reorganization of intelligence gathering, storage and retrieval, and analysis systems within local, state and Federal agencies. The fiscal and effort costs, however, will result in significant long-term gains.

Most of what we have said so far is equally applicable to street crime and to the more organized criminal activities we have described in this report. Organized crime, however, both because it is group activity and because it persists as a system, presents some particular problems. A major problem is that it is essentially an urban phenomenon, a fact which must be viewed in the perspective of American social trends for, by 1980, nine out of ten Americans will live in cities and after years of ominous previews, the problems of organized crime in the city will have become a

distinctive pattern of every American's life. Despite many attempts, no cure has emerged for this problem which now seems to be becoming endemic.

Thus, most attempts at comprehensive crime control fail because they attack new problems with old solutions. Our problems are urban, but our education, values and behavior are essentially agrarian. At best we struggle to adapt a rural tradition to apparent urban needs. The city dweller is a distinct breed and since the modern city is a distinct environment, new values shared by inhabitants must be discovered and examined. Only then can we develop programs which will be responsive to urban needs and begin an effective fight against urban ills. Our vision of the problem must be revised. This idea is obvious throughout our research and we propose a new approach to the control of organized crime and its relationship to the community.

First look at "organized crime" as it is presently defined. Criminologists use the term to distinguish professional from amateur in certain crimes. Organized crime is professional and structured by a cooperative association of criminals. Sutherland and Cressey's classic text *Principles of Criminology* defines organized crime as follows:

... (an) association of a small group of criminals for the execution of a certain type of crime, together with the development of plans by which detection may be avoided, the development of a fund of money and connections by means of which immunity or relative immunity may be secured in case of detection.⁶

Thus, any gang or group of criminals organized formally or informally to burgle, shoplift, steal automobiles or pick pockets is part of organized crime.

Governmental commissions and agencies, however, have tended to use a different definition which focuses upon the idea of a general conspir-

⁶ Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1955, p. 229.

acy. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice defines organized crime as

... a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their working government. It involves thousands of criminals working within structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are conspiracies, carried out over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits.⁷

Any illicit activity intended to gain control or amass profits fits the definition. Thus a variety of activities are equally defined—drug peddling and gambling, extortion and loan sharking. And thus the definition fails, for careful analysis of modern urban living shows drug peddling condemned by the same community in which gambling and loan sharking are condoned. Law enforcement officials and organized crime specialists link vices and crimes because they are manipulated by the same individuals. But the public, particularly those who patronize organized crime, make no such link. People who play the numbers condemn narcotic traffic; they consider gambling a minor vice providing entertainment and hope while hurting no one save the tax collector. Nowhere is this attitude more obvious than in urban ghettos.

Our data have exposed relationships between ethnicity and organized crime. They indicate with some clarity that every major ethnic group—the Irish, Jews, Italians and, most recently, the Blacks and Puerto Ricans—have faced the same basic dilemma: *How do you escape poverty through socially approved routes when such routes are often foreign to the ghetto life?* Crime resolves the dilemma because it provides a quick if perilous route out. Social history documents Irish, Jews and Italians following each other on this path. This research report presents evidence that the

⁷ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 187.

next group up will be the Blacks and Puerto Ricans as they displace Italians. Thomas Pettigrew, in an article entitled "Negro American Crime" has said, ". . . as with other minority groups who find discriminatory barriers blocking their path toward the mainstream of success-oriented America, many Negroes turn to crime. Crime may thus be utilized as a means of escape, ego-enhancement, expression of aggression, and upward mobility."⁸

Ethnic consciousness and ethnic solidarity are enhanced by organized crime since it pits the ethnic group against the establishment and reinforces the contra-culture. The successful organized criminal becomes a cultural hero equal to the successful politician and in many cases closely associated with him. Moreover, the shared ethnicity serves as the basis for the protection of the organized criminal and for the reluctance of his co-ethnics to inform. Like Chairman Mao's classic guerilla, the successful organized criminal requires a supportive sea of co-ethnics in order to survive. Thus the low level of social disapproval placed upon the major organized crime activity in the ghetto—gambling as contrasted to drugs—is not only reflected in the attitudes of the ghetto dwellers but the organized criminal receives a certain degree of acclaim from his co-ethnics. He provides a service demanded by his clients, one which cannot be found elsewhere and one which is further enhanced because he is becoming successful in spite of the social barriers.

In effect, if we view organized crime as a cultural phenomenon we must take one step beyond current theory in criminology which proceeded from earlier attention to individual deviant acts to the more recent focus on subcultures. Organized crime is not a subculture in American society, it is a functional part of the whole society and must be viewed as part of that social system. It is a form of illicit enterprise and differs from business activity sanctioned by the

⁸ Thomas Pettigrew, "Negro American Crime" in *A Profile of the Negro American*, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964, p. 156.

establishment in degree rather than in kind. This message is not lost on ghetto dwellers and should not be lost on us.

A Community Action Approach to Combatting Organized Crime

As we stated at the outset, if we are to control and hopefully eradicate organized crime, there must be a reconnection between the community and the criminal justice system and some attempt must be made to influence and refocus our social attitudes toward *prevention* of organized crime. Human society is dependent on a measure of consensus among its members—consensus about goals to be sought and the means of attaining them. Throughout our continuing research on organized crime, all of the evidence leads us to a basic conviction that America's best hope for controlling organized crime is to increase consensus at the national and local levels, in the criminal justice system and in the community and among all citizens that organized crime in any form is unacceptable because of its costs to society and to the individual. Consensus emerges through communication. It rests upon shared values and commonly accepted rules for behavior, but most fundamentally, it grows out of the sense of community that develops when numbers of people and groups work together in common cause. Consensus on combatting organized crime, however, has been impossible to achieve because of changing characteristics of communities and a sense of alienation between ethnic communities and the criminal justice system.

The term *community* has always denoted territoriality. It was a place. The community was where one lived and worked, where children were educated and where one went to church. Now, population increase and the new mobility often separate living from work and, especially in the megapolis, community has come to connote a shared sense of common interest—which may or may not coincide with where one lives. Community then has both a geographical and an issue

dimension and while each neighborhood has its own concerns with crime within its boundaries, it shares an interest in the issue with other neighborhoods in the city and, indeed, throughout the nation. In developing a community-based program to combat organized crime, both the territorial and the interest dimensions must be considered and every significant setting—whether neighborhood, village, suburb, city, metropolitan region, state or the nation—in which citizen action can be mobilized must serve as a locus of action.

Like the community, the criminal justice system is made up of several elements—the police, the courts, and the correction system—and, again like the community, these operate at the local, state and federal level. Americans are accustomed to think of communities as operating through two channels: (1) governmental or official, and (2) the private sector. We tend to think of the community as part of the "private" sector and the criminal justice system as wholly within the official sector. Traditionally, we have delegated the responsibility for crime, its consequences and its reduction to the "official" sector of government and very specifically to the criminal justice system, and certainly it must continue to play a vital role in prevention as well as apprehension and rehabilitation. The criminal justice system at all levels, however, is partner to the community and at each of its levels of jurisdiction it is critical that the two work together for the common goal of crime prevention and reduction. Where government and community are concepts in kind and are not joined, organized crime has its best environment.⁹ Thus, it is impossible to assign the locus of organized crime prevention exclusively to the official or private sector, and crime and its reduction can not be meaningfully addressed without wide public awareness and acceptance of this responsibility

⁹ Cf. Francis A. J. Ianni, *op cit.*, 1972, Chapter II.

and the acknowledgement that it cannot be delegated or abdicated to government.

While the community and the criminal justice system are similar, they are separate and distinct networks within the broader system of society. Since they are sub-systems within the same society, they share many values, attitudes and codes of rules for behavior, but they have differences as well. The various levels and jurisdictions of the criminal justice system are designed to enforce and protect the laws which have been established to regulate behavior in society. Ideally, these laws should also be coincident with the community values. Such, however, is not always the case, and nowhere is this more obvious than in community attitudes toward organized crime. We are a society made up of a number of sub-cultures which hold different values and attitudes toward proper behavior. These differences are sometimes significant and they mold the behavior of the individuals who make up the sub-cultures. This cultural pluralism produces many benefits for our society but it also makes the task of law enactment and enforcement a complex one. Where group attitudes and enacted law coincide, the disparity between the criminal justice system and the community is minimal; where they do not, the tension between the two is mutually dysfunctional. In both instances, however, the role of *community* crime prevention (as contrasted to current techniques) is to mediate between the developing attitudes of the community and the responsiveness of the criminal justice system. In modern America, it is increasingly obvious that there are problems in the present relationship between the criminal justice system and a number of sub-cultures and that some measure of the not-long-past social unrest and disenchantment with the "system" may be indicative of a growing awareness and concern for these problems on the part of a large segment of the public. It is at this point of intervention that a well-planned, carefully developed and mutually interactive strategy of change can be developed to reconnect the two networks.

Thus, a community-based program for organized crime prevention may best be defined as a *process* by which we re-assert the premise that the principal and direct responsibility for crime prevention rests with the total community, including private as well as official sectors, and that government and society must be joined in this effort. This joint effort can and should be addressed at all levels of society and can take many forms from providing viable alternatives to the criminal behavior we have described in our networks through the elimination of corrupt practices in both the private and official sectors, down to the level of physically reducing the opportunities to commit crime. The task is a monumental one but it can be accomplished if we establish a national ethic with respect to organized crime, if the total community is involved in providing the models for public trust and ethical concern and if we develop a common set of plans and a coordinate strategy for change.

Intervention in Social Processes as a Mechanism for Change

There are two basic approaches for introducing change in a system: replacement and adaptation methods. The replacement method is one in which attempts are made to replace inefficient or outmoded techniques with new, more efficient ones. The great technological advances which have resulted from scientific and engineering discoveries have revolutionized much of what we do in agriculture, industry and medicine. The second technique, adaptation, is more gradual and involves the redefinition or modification of existing practices. Certainly there are technological advances which can replace outmoded techniques in crime reduction and prevention but generally, it should be assumed that the major changes needed to provide an adequate and effective program to combat organized crime require adaptation, specifically changes in attitude and behavior on the part of both the community and the

criminal justice system. If permanent structural changes are to be brought about, public perspectives on organized crime must be mobilized to (1) introduce appropriate change in attitudes as well as behavior and (2) maintain support for the changes once they are introduced. The changes in attitudes we have described are essential but they will not be sustained unless the new ideas or techniques are incorporated in new social groups or become items on the agendas of established organizations.

In order to achieve both the necessary climate and to insure the institutionalization of changes in attitudes and behaviors in combating organized crime, two difficulties which have characterized previous attempts must be overcome. Past and present attempts to bring about enduring structural changes in the relationship between the community and crime in general have been uncoordinated. In both the private and public sectors, individuals and organizations have developed programs of crime prevention using a variety of ideas and techniques. Some have been successful at the local level and some have even achieved a degree of national notice but generally their effects have been noncumulative and, hence, ineffectual.

A second difficulty has been the tendency to develop programs which attempt to have a direct impact on the individual. Such programs fail because they do not build opportunities for change in the groups, structures and systems which influence and support the behavior of the individuals who are members. Thus, the individual may in fact be motivated to change his behavior but he is unable to find the necessary reinforcement and support. The cycle of recidivism which has troubled the courts, the correction system and society are testimony to the need for individuals to find some means of joining with others if attitudes and behaviors are to undergo structural change.

Thus, since gambling, loan sharking, prostitution and drug peddling are integral parts of

ghetto life, associated social problems must also be part of that life. All of our research evidence to date supports this position since we have been dramatically unsuccessful in stopping these activities by external intervention. The reason is obvious. While gambling, loan sharking, prostitution and drug peddling are all defined as criminal activities by authorities, people in the ghetto make a finer distinction. Not only are gambling and loan sharking relatively immune from public censure, they are valued positively because they provide services which cannot be obtained elsewhere and are considered a legitimate and even necessary part of social and economic life. This distinction added to the ghetto dweller's antagonism toward police has contributed to the failure of enforcement. Most educational programs fail also because they are presented by law enforcement authorities or educational institutions, neither of which is much trusted in the ghetto. Finally, as mentioned earlier, organized crime figures are folk heroes because they provide services while they seem to take on the establishment. This view, however, results from the failure of the ghetto resident to see organized crime as corrupting and few would believe there is any connection between gambling and drug pushing.

The dilemma persists: How do you develop an awareness in a population which is antagonistic toward those who possess the information and expertise to produce that awareness? A further

problem is that organized crime, unlike other social problems, has its own systematic organization and activity. Not only is the problem more difficult to see, it is also more difficult to solve.

The solution, we feel, is in community-based programs to prevent organized crime from developing and to halt its spread once it is established. If organized crime is a sub-cultural phenomenon then it is important that those people who understand that sub-culture form the basis of remediation programs. Thus, self-studies by ethnic communities of the social and individual cost of organized crime in their neighborhood is an important first step. The involvement of community members in the development of organized crime prevention and control programming is the next but still untaken step. This must be more than token "checking with the community," however, and should involve a realistic appraisal of the use of community residents in program planning and evaluation operations. Finally, but most fundamentally, it is critical that the community and the criminal justice system be brought together in an effort to control organized crime. Neither will be successful without the support of the other. The criminal justice system needs community support for the laws it protects and enforces; the community relies on the criminal justice system to enforce those laws it feels are important. Together, they can be a powerful force for eliminating organized crime.

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