COMMUNITY POLICING IN SEATTLE

A Descriptive Study of the South

Seattle Crime Reduction Project

May 1, 1991

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is the final report of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project Program. This research project, which was funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, was intended to be a "descriptive research project." As such, it would "document the Seattle experience in police/community partnerships" and provide useful and appropriate information to other programs around the nation.

The remainder of this introductory chapter discusses the background of the project, its scope, and the approach and methodology. The last section provides an overview of the entire report.

Background of the Project

The South Seattle Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC) was created through the effort of citizens in the area encompassed by the South Precinct of the Seattle Police Department (SPD). The citizens wanted to "reclaim" their neighborhood from the criminal element and the effects of urban decay, and formed the SSCPC to demonstrate their commitment to this objective. At the same time (approximately 1986-87), the command staff from the South Precinct was engaged in specific efforts to reduce crime. The major thrust was the organization of the Anticrime Team (ACT), which was to target drug-related crime in the area.

This seed of community activism, coupled with cooperation with the SPD, eventually led to a new direction in the provision of police services in all areas of the City of Seattle. The original group, initially part of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce and called the Crime Prevention League, began in late 1987. (The Crime Prevention League had existed since 1984, but was basically a "corporate shell" with little activity. This organizational name and structure was later used to get the SSCPC going.) Throughout 1988, the Inspectional Services Division of the SPD prepared a number of reports about the progress and activities of the Police/Community Crime Reduction Project.

In May 1988, a proposal initiated by the chief of police to formally evaluate the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project was submitted to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) as part of the NIJ research program on public safety and security. This proposal was prepared by the co-principal investigators in cooperation with the SPD, and was intended to analyze both program process and impact issues. The full proposal was not funded; however, funds were provided to conduct a descriptive research project. This effort began in early 1989, and the

issuance of this report constitutes the completion of the project.

Scope of the Project

As noted above, the initial proposal to evaluate the SSCPC was comprehensive in nature, but was reduced in scope at the request of NIJ staff. The resulting descriptive research project was intended to:

- Document the process by which the Seattle program came into being, including "how it was planned and implemented and how it is being maintained."
- Identify the factors which "promoted or constrained the development of this kind of citizen/police community anti-crime effort and what this approach suggests for other communities."
- The objective of this type of analysis was to focus on the lessons learned from the Seattle experience which would provide guidance to others.

In addition, included in the scope of this study was a review of other efforts around the country which were involved in similar police/community partnerships in an attempt to "reduce crime, disorder, and fear." In cooperation with NIJ staff, the following five cities were selected for study:

- Los Angeles, California
- Savannah, Georgia
- Portland, Oregon
- Minneapolis, Minnesota
- St. Louis, Missouri

On-site visits were made to each of these cities, and the information collected during these trips is included in this report.

With respect to the Seattle effort in police/community partnerships, this report begins with the early history (mid-1970s) of what was going on in both the community and the Seattle Police Department. Early progress and problems are documented and the report then goes on to explain how these early efforts coalesced to form a new direction for the department. The community/police partnership programs in other cities are also described in terms of their inception and current status, but not in the same day-to-day level of detail as the Seattle program.

The product of the analysis of the information gathered from Seattle and the other five sites is a series of recommendations. These recommendations cover two related but distinct components:

- The first section covers "lessons learned" which are appropriate to community/police partnership programs around the country, including Seattle's. These recommendations also cover suggestions which apply to the entire range of the program development life cycle from when partnership is first proposed to when such programs are fully operating.

- The second section discusses proposed research topics related to community/police partnerships. There are numerous unanswered questions which need to be looked at, and they are covered in the recommendations section.

Finally, despite the narrowing of the original scope of the project, some of the intended issues are addressed although not to the full extent initially planned. The issues of programmatic costs and the measurement of impacts are indirectly discussed in the findings and recommendations.

While the original intent was to evaluate the community/police partnership effort and programs in Seattle, the focus of the report and recommendations are generic and not specific to Seattle's situation. Seattle's experience with community policing is one example of many other programs currently in operation throughout the country. As such, recommendations should be used as guidelines and adapted as needed to other cities' situations.

Recommendations specific to Seattle were developed as part of the research project, however, and have been presented in a separate summary prepared for distribution to the city's government officials and departments and the community in general. The summary discusses the current community/police partnership programs operating throughout the SPD and the community. The summary also indicates that despite the lack of a comprehensive framework, these efforts aim to provide professional "quality-oriented" police services in cooperation with the citizens and other city agencies. The recommendations with respect to Seattle's community/police partnership efforts indicate that the changes in this direction are appropriate and should be continued and expanded.

Study Approach and Methodology

The approach of the researchers in this project was to collect information through personal interviews about the Seattle program and those in the other cities studied. While a comprehensive literature search was not the intent, many sources of related information were collected and reviewed. The primary information-gathering activities included:

- In-person interviews with community residents and interested business persons throughout the south Seattle area about their involvement with the partnership effort at its inception and events which took place over the last few years. This included attendance at SSCPC executive committee and targeting committee meetings.

- In-person interviews with SPD personnel at all ranks of the organization about how the partnership was initially conceived and its current direction.

- Observation of police activities, especially in the South Precinct of the SPD.

- In-person interviews with staff and officials from the City of Seattle about their involvement in the partnership efforts.

- On-site visits and interviews with police, government officials, and community people in the five other cities about the nature and current status of their community/police partnership programs.

This massive amount of information was then sifted and grouped into a number of categories, including:

- Issues, taken from both the literature and actual program operation, that might affect the start-up or operation of partnership efforts.

- Historical information about what transpired in the development of the Seattle program.

- Programmatic information about how the various locations designed their efforts and the different components included as part of a community/police partnership.

Once analyzed from these perspectives, this information was then combined and integrated into chapters of the final report. The purpose of this integration was to reflect what happened in the City of Seattle and other locations, and to present in a readable fashion the lessons learned about how to go about establishing a community/police partnership which the audience would find useful in their respective parts of the country. The sequence of the chapters is outlined in the following section.

Overview of the Report

The remainder of this final report includes the following chapters:

- Chapter II -- Executive Summary

  This chapter summarizes the entire report.

- Chapter III -- Discussion of Selected Issues

  This chapter discusses a number of issues drawn from the literature and the review of programs around the country. The purpose of this chapter is to alert the reader about some of the key issues that need to be addressed and their association with programs that were included in this study.

- Chapter IV -- History of Community/Police Interaction in South Seattle

  This chapter sets the stage for what happened in Seattle and provides demographic and other background information of the area. Historical information about the community and police activities is also presented in this chapter.

- Chapter V -- Development of the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council

  This chapter describes the events that led up to the beginning efforts of the SSCPC and what has taken shape throughout Seattle as a result of combined police and community cooperation.

- Chapter VI -- Program Components of the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council

  This chapter explains the various program components that were developed as part of the SSCPC and SPD partnership efforts.

- Chapter VII -- Other South Seattle Crime Prevention Council Activities

  This chapter covers activities which were not specific programmatic areas of the SSCPC but were important tasks within the scope of the partnership efforts. This includes such activities as expanding the representation of the community group and lobbying efforts. These activities also resulted in identification of issues that were not obvious from the literature, and are discussed in this chapter.

- Chapter VIII -- Community/Police Partnership Developments Throughout the City of Seattle

  This chapter discusses community-oriented programs that have been developed throughout other SPD organizational units and geographical areas of Seattle. These developments are also related to the issues introduced in earlier chapters.

- Chapter IX -- Community/Police Partnership Programs in Other Cities

  This chapter reviews the programs (and their various components) in other cities based on the five on-site visits conducted as part of this study.

- Chapter X -- Lessons Learned

  This chapter integrates the information from the literature and the program reviews, and presents the findings and conclusions from the analysis. The discussion covers programmatic implications for community-based efforts, police department considerations, and community/police partnerships from a citywide perspective.

- Chapter XI -- Recommendations

  This chapter describes the recommendations which result from all of the information collected and analyzed throughout the research project.

- Bibliography

- Appendices

CHAPTER II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This is the Executive Summary of the final report of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project. This research project, funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, was intended to "document the Seattle experience in police/community partnerships" and provide useful and appropriate information to other programs around the nation.

Background of the Project

The South Seattle Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC) was created through the effort of citizens in the area encompassed by the South Precinct of the Seattle Police Department (SPD). The citizens wanted to "reclaim" their neighborhood from the criminal element and the effects of urban decay, and formed the SSCPC to demonstrate their commitment to this objective. At the same time (approximately 1986-87), the command staff from the South Precinct was engaged in specific efforts to reduce crime. The major thrust was the organization of the Anticrime Team (ACT), which was to target drug-related crime in the area. This seed of community activism, coupled with cooperation with the SPD, eventually led to a new direction in the provision of police services in all areas of the City of Seattle.

In May 1988, a proposal to formally evaluate the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project was submitted by the SPD to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) as part of their national research program on public safety and security. NIJ provided the funding to conduct a "descriptive research project." The evaluation effort began in early 1989, and the issuance of the final report and this summary constitutes the completion of the project.

Scope of the Project

The descriptive research project was intended to:

- Document the process by which the Seattle program came into being, including "how it was planned and implemented and how it is being maintained."
- Identify the factors that "promoted or constrained the development of this kind of citizen/police community anti-crime effort and what this approach suggests for other communities."
- The objective of this type of analysis was to focus on the lessons learned from the Seattle experience that would provide guidance to others.

The project was not intended to be either an exhaustive review of all community-oriented programs or a complete literature search.

Included in the scope of this study was a review of other cities around the country involved in similar "police/community partnerships" in an attempt to "reduce crime, disorder, and fear." In cooperation with NIJ staff, five other cities were selected for study, including Los Angeles, California; Savannah, Georgia; Portland, Oregon; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and St. Louis, Missouri.

The complete final report provides a detailed account of the Seattle experience as well as the community-oriented programs in other cities. The recommendations in the final report are general in nature and are intended to provide guidance to interested police and government agencies throughout the country. Nevertheless, as with most evaluation projects, suggestions are made which apply to the city program under review. A separate summary report deals specifically with the Seattle experience and provides recommendations to improve the community policing program throughout the city.

The approach used in this study was to gather information about the police/community partnership programs in personal interviews with people throughout the city and the police department. Rather than numerous statistics, this report provides a story of what happened in Seattle and five other cities, and attempts to explain key issues and lessons learned from their experiences in this new community-oriented policing strategy.

Findings and Conclusions

This section begins with some historical information about "community policing," discusses some of the relevant issues of this new strategy, and presents findings and conclusions about Seattle's experience.

- Historical Perspective of Community Policing

  The initial ideas that served as the foundation of the community and problem-solving policing concepts come from a number of research articles about the need for a new perspective in policing (for example, Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Goldstein (1979), respectively published pieces on these subjects about ten years ago). These ideas appear to have influenced both citizens in Seattle and members of the SPD, as well as numerous others throughout the country. A more recent article by Kelling and Moore (1988) puts these concepts in a historical perspective. Introducing some of the key ideas from these researchers provides important background on the community policing approach and its development in Seattle.

In their article "Broken Windows," Wilson and Kelling introduced a number of ideas typically associated with the community/police model. These ideas included the perceived link between urban decay/civil disorder and crime, the fear of crime and its effect on people, and the results of experimental "foot patrol" programs. Goldstein discussed a problem-solving approach which consisted of a multi-step strategy for directing police resources to attack crime problems.

The Kelling and Moore article identified a number of historical periods of policing, including:

- The Political Era, prior to 1900 during which the police were controlled by local politicians. This situation had its strengths, including a neighborhood orientation and delivery of social services/order maintenance to citizens. However, this style of policing also led to abuse of immigrants' civil rights and was susceptible to widespread corruption.

- The Reform or Professional Era, which lasted from about 1900 to 1970, is best respresented by Sgt. Friday of television's "Dragnet" who wanted "only the facts" of the crime. During this period the police became very professional and dealt only with crimes -- other types of community problems were the responsibility of some other city agency. The police relied on new technology (radios and 911 emergency telephone systems) and rode around in cars responding to call after call for help from citizens.

- The current Community Problem-Solving Era, which began in the 1970s, has attempted to address some of the problems with the Professional Era style of policing. The traditional reactive rapid response to <u>all</u> 911 calls (regardless of their urgency) was a poor use of resources and there was little time for in-depth investigations to solve crimes. The police lost ties with citizens, who typically have the information needed to solve crimes, and relations with some minority communities were poor. Accordingly, based on research and field experiments (such as the use of foot patrols and problem-oriented policing projects), a new community-oriented focus began to develop. This strategy included decentralization of police services, the police working with other city agencies to resolve problems (such as the parks or utility departments), and the development of closer ties with community and neighborhood groups.

In many respects this new style of policing is similar to the new management approach used in private sector companies, which dictates that "the customer knows best" and that the more information known about the customer's needs

an organization has, the better the services will be. Also, the "partnership" aspect of the community and police working together is similar to current trends in education and medicine. Teachers are saying that they cannot educate children without help from parents, and physicians are saying that people must take responsibility for their health; the new community-oriented strategy for policing involves a concept of shared responsibility between the police and the citizens.

A sincere interest in working to improve their neighborhood and these new ideas apparently influenced south Seattle area residents as well as police personnel, and helped to set the stage for a variety of community policing programs in Seattle. This new strategy is still under development, and there are many unanswered questions which will need to be addressed. Some of these issues are discussed in the next section in the context of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project.

o Community/Police Partnership Issues

In the course of this research project a number of issues relevant to community/police partnerships were identified. The issues, which fall into three general categories, include:

ENVIRONMENTAL	ORGANIZATIONAL	PROGRAMMATIC
o The Police Function: Base of Authority/ Legitimacy	o The Role of Police Officers	o What is Community Policing?
o The Nature of the Relationship Among Decay/ Disorder, Crime, and Fear	o Links With other Government Agencies	o Definition of the Community
o The Role of the Community	o Organizational Configuration of the Police Department	o Evaluating Community Policing
o The Demand for Police Services	o Police Accountability	

An explanation of these issues, and their relevance to the SSCPC, is covered in the following sections. Many of these issues are interrelated and the discussion of some points overlaps with other sections. Also, it should be noted that current answers to many of the questions raised by these issues are lacking; additional research and/or coordinated planning will be needed in order to find workable solutions. However, this discussion of these issues is not intended as a barrier to exploring this new model for policing.

- What is Community Policing?

  As is typical with major policy shifts or changes in direction about management philosophies, there is currently a good deal of confusion about what community policing is. The terms community policing and problem-solving policing are often used interchangeably, and most of the new programs (regardless of their names) incorporate both ideas. Both terms have been used in scholarly articles over the past decade, and it appears that the emerging definition is as follows: Community policing is a philosophy or orientation towards the police task that stresses cooperative working relations among the residents of the area, the police who work there, and other governmental agencies as the optimal strategy to devise practical solutions to the problems of crime, fear, and disorder. Under this definition the problem-solving concepts are incorporated in the community policing approach.

  This perspective stresses:

  - an operating philosophy (values and attitudes) rather than specific tactics.

  - cooperation between the police, the community, and other government agencies.

  - a problem-solving approach to get at the underlying correctable causes of the situation.

  - a crime prevention orientation.

  - a proactive complement to the traditional (reactive) approach of answering emergency calls.

  The 15-Point Plan originally submitted to Chief Fitzsimons by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce (from which the SSCPC was organized) was revised in dialogue with the chief and SPD planners. The resulting document contained all of the above points and, as a statement for a new policy direction, was a comprehensive and well written

document. This "seed" of community-oriented policing set the stage for the subsequent development of many cooperative programs in Seattle over the last few years. Despite the general confusion about the most appropriate terminology for this new strategy of policing, it appears that this concept is well founded in management theory as well as practical application, and should be strengthened and encouraged throughout the city.

- Definition of the Community

  This issue is definitely a concern for sociologists and researchers, but does not seem to be much of a problem in an operational sense. There are legitimate questions about whether "the community" is a group of people with common interests or those from a particular neighborhood area. However, in reality every person in Seattle is a potential "citizen customer" for the police. Even people arrested for a crime are still citizens and fall into this category, and deserve to be treated with respect.

  In the course of looking at Seattle and other cities, it appears that in the case of community groups' relationships with police agencies there are several developmental stages through which groups pass. These stages begin with acrimonious behavior and progress through the formation of a core group of interested and committed people to a final setting where a stable coalition is able to work with the police in a mutually trusting manner. It appears that there are several things that the police or city can do to encourage community groups. These include having patience during the early stages, providing information about current programs and city resources, and, if possible, offering funds to handle basic administrative chores. Also, there are still some aspects of dealing with the community, such as how to foster community spirit in low income and/or minority neighborhoods and dealing with the inevitable "turf" battles and conflicting needs/objectives of different groups, that remain as problem areas and have no easy solutions.

- The Role of Police Officers/The Police Function

  The role of the police officer and the police function in the "profession model" of law enforcement was exactly that -- they were expected to enforce the law and their authority was based in statutory law. This was opposed to a role involving solving crime-related community problems in coordination with citizens or other government employees. Their legitimacy was founded in the law and this was their focus, including responding to emergency calls, investigating crimes, and arresting suspects.

As opposed to what might be expected under the community policing strategy, a community-oriented approach does not mean that officers "disregard" certain laws, turn into social service providers or that they adopt "softer" tactics. The programs visited in this study did not exhibit any signs of a decreasing emphasis on enforcing the law. In fact, some communities strongly supported aggressive police action to solve drug-related crime problems. It appears that there are no problems or inconsistencies in expecting police officers to continue to enforce the law at the same time that they adopt a more community-oriented approach.

- Evaluating Community Policing

A key question about the new community-oriented approach to policing is "does it work?". A closely related question is how to define what "success" means. The early foot patrol experiments revealed that although the citizens were more satisfied about police services, there were no noticeable effects on the crime rate. Most police agencies in the country are grappling with the evaluation issue, and to date there seem to be few answers.

There are a number of methodological problems in evaluating the new community-oriented strategy. Because most community/police programs use specialized units or operate in various parts of a city, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the effort. Another problem is that most programs are still in the developmental stages and it could reasonably be expected that the new approach will require some time before the results can be detected. Finally, it is possible that the community policing approach will help solve many of the urban decay/disorder problems that cause fear in citizens, but will not have a great impact on the serious crimes, many of which are impossible to prevent.

Nevertheless, in terms of evaluations, Seattle is doing as much or more than other community policing programs. The city council has requested a formal study of the SPD community/police teams that includes an analysis of specific projects (i.e., did the effort achieve its goals?) as well as tracking crime rates. The results of this evaluation will be available in the fall of 1991.

- The Relationship Among Decay/Disorder, Crime and Fear

The "Broken Windows" article noted above proposed that there is a link between deteriorating neighborhoods, crime, and fear. Whereas this idea intuitively seems to have merit, there is little research data to back this

up, and any cause and effect relationship is difficult to prove.

Despite the lack of knowledge about these factors, it appears that neighborhood clean-up efforts are valuable in their own right and have many benefits. Graffiti "paint-outs" and getting rid of abandoned cars generally increase the quality of life, enhance a sense of community control, and are often a beginning point in organizing a neighborhood group to address crime issues.

It also appears that there are some basic economic factors which must be considered. If housing prices are falling in a period of general economic recession, even the most intensive efforts to involve citizens in clean-up efforts as part of a community policing program may be difficult to get off the ground. However, it also appears that the potential financial rewards of either improving or maintaining the livability of neighborhoods is an important factor in citizens' interest in participating in community groups to attack urban decay and crime-related problems.

- Links with Other Government Agencies

A basic idea of the community policing approach is that crime-related and urban decay problems can best be addressed by a cooperative effort of the police working with other city agencies. Whereas this is certainly logical and is consistent with sound management theory about effective use of scarce resources and coordinated planning, there are a number of questions about how to put this idea into action.

The fact that police officers are "on the street" 24 hours a day makes them a handy contact for citizens in need of help. But the police are sometimes viewed as an "unfriendly" group by some community people. Also, for the police to act as the first point of contact for a wide variety of public services, it will require a coordinated city-wide plan to ensure that all departments of the city are involved and that efficient arrangements to handle such needs are agreed upon.

- Organization of the Police Department

The questions with regard to community policing in this issue relate to how officers are deployed under the new approach and the need for revised "command and control" structures. Officers can be deployed in certain geographical areas of a city, in special teams which cover the entire city (as in Seattle), or in other variations. The concerns about command and control revolve around officer safety and the ability to respond

to 911 calls and other emergencies. The extent to which the department should decentralize organizationally and geographically are also questions that require further analysis.

- Police Accountability

  This is a very important issue with the implementation of the community policing model. As police departments decentralize and encourage innovative problem-solving behavior and as officers on foot beats communicate with citizens about local needs, there is a risk of reverting back to the problems associated with the political era of policing. Potential problems include corruption, excessive use of force, and "bending" the rule of law in response to citizens' demands to stop crime.

  Because these are extremely important issues, it is imperative that police departments maintain high levels of accountability for all police personnel. Adequate levels and types of supervision need to be maintained, and policies and procedures must be kept current and responsive to the operational needs of the community policing approach. In the process of implementing community/police programs in Seattle, there were problems in accountability. A number of personnel actions resulted, and there appears to be lingering ill feelings in the community and within the department about perceived supervisory and procedural gaps. Because problems in this area can quickly erode years of progress in community/police partnerships, accountability safeguards will always be of concern to police agencies.

- Role of the Community

  Whereas the community's role in community policing might seem to be a simple question, there are a number of complex aspects of this issue. For example, the idea of "citizen patrols" involves a number of legal problems, including the notion that a "citizen arrest" is an option. In fact, the use of this procedure typically places the citizen at risk of being injured as well as being liable for a wide range of damages.

  There are also questions about the type of information that is appropriate for community groups to provide to the police. Likewise, the "micro-management" problem is related to the community's obvious interest in finding out the results of actions taken against suggested targets. The potential for political influence by various community groups is also a constant concern.

The community policing projects reviewed in this study revealed a tremendous range of community involvement. Seattle's targeting process is actually fairly innovative. Other types of citizen involvement ranged from common assistance with neighborhood clean-ups to the provision of crime prevention services by specific community groups. One critical factor in the effectiveness and acceptance of community groups is the constancy of their membership over time and their willingness to volunteer their time. It appears that the extent of involvement and the nature of the working relationships will differ in each locale, and will no doubt change over time.

- Demand for Police Services

  There is a basic concern that the demand for public safety and other governmental services always exceeds the resources available to provide the services. Also, it appears that the promise of the new community policing approach will possibly lead to inflated expectations about what can be achieved.

  To date, the community policing programs have generally resulted in more citizen interest and involvement, and demands for wider implementation of such programs. Despite the potential for an unquenchable increase in the work load, the benefits of the community policing approach (including the partnership with the public) appear to outweigh such drawbacks.

Conclusions/Lessons Learned

In Seattle and within the SPD, the community policing approach has become a vital and important part of the evolution toward an improved departmentwide, quality-oriented concept of providing professional police services. This evolution took place over approximately five years, and did not occur without dissension within the department itself and tension between the citizens and the department. In addition, as might be expected in the context of a pilot project such as the SSCPC, there was no comprehensive vision of how all the various components of the community policing concepts and the need for traditional police tactics would fit together.

A number of actions have taken place, not necessarily connected or even planned, that have resulted in what appears to be an extremely promising and comprehensive approach to the effective and efficient delivery of police services to the citizens of Seattle. These include:

o The formation by capable and dedicated citizens in the southeast Seattle area of a community group (the SSCPC) to

save their neighborhood from the ravishes of crime and decay. These people were "fed up" with crime problems and planted the seed of joint community/police problem-solving behavior. This group persevered through numerous meetings and early resistance by police personnel, and their efforts led to a commitment and openness to working with community groups throughout Seattle on solving problems related to crime, fear, and disorder.

- The publication and availability of articles on a number of issues related to effective policing, including the problem-solving concept, the fear-of-crime concerns, the connection with urban blight ("Broken Windows"), and the community policing approaches being implemented in other locations throughout the country and in other nations.

- SPD command staff and supervisors in the South Precinct who emphasized a problem-oriented approach to dealing with crime problems in the precinct's communities. However, in the process of developing appropriate procedures for prioritizing and dealing with problems, coordinating with the community, and ensuring officer accountability, there were numerous problems and differences of opinion which resulted from "working out the bugs" of the new problem-oriented methods. An important issue for the police was that the new programs would be conducted using existing resources. This resulted in key changes to the original 15-point plan. The new community-oriented programs subsequently took hold and were expanded.

- SPD's innovative efforts such as the Block Watch Crime Prevention Program, mountain bicycle patrol, foot patrol and other specialized units set the stage for additional contacts with the community to solve crime problems.

- The recommendations of two management studies indirectly contributed to the implementation of a professional quality-oriented concept in the SPD. The first was a comprehensive management study of the department that strongly supported the extension of the community/police teams to the other three precincts of the city (in addition to the effort in the South Precinct). The Public Safety Action Plan, a ballot measure for special funding for the SPD and other law and justice agencies, directly resulted from this management study's recommendations. This measure, which was approved by the citizens, provided some of the resources to meet the public's increasing demand for services. It also recommended additional supervisory staff at each precinct. Part of the funds approved for the police department led to the preparation of the department's long-range plan, which involves a detailed survey of community priorities and ideas for service needs.

The other study looked at the internal investigation and complaint-handling process, and resulted in adoption of a "quality assurance" approach to handling complaints from the public. This program, similar to what private sector corporations are implementing throughout the country, is based on "the customer knows best" idea. It draws on the notion that all information from customers is valuable and should be used to design the product better (or service in the case of public safety) or to add training or other management initiatives to address the identified problems.

- The need for additional training has been a priority issue for the department over the last few years. Staff recommendations from the mayor's office, city council and the Seattle Women's Commission, in addition to departmental initiatives, have resulted in not only increased levels of training but also several specific programs addressing cultural diversity. The objective of these training programs is to prepare all members of the department, civilian and sworn, to handle interactions with Seattle's myriad cultural and minority populations.

- The mayor's office conducted an internal study of how the city coordinates with the long-range strategic planning processes of all departments and the citizen involvement process. The conclusions focused on improving coordination of these efforts, and called for links among all city resource agencies to better serve the community. The report specifically noted the importance and success of the Community Crime Prevention Section of the SPD.

While the SSCPC was obviously not involved in some of the above activities, this group's initial and ongoing work (and the spin-off efforts of other groups) has helped to foster a positive atmosphere of cooperation among the police, the community, and other government officials. This atmosphere appears to have facilitated the growth of problem-solving behaviors between the police and citizens and provided an orientation to improved police services.

Regardless of how new community policing programs are defined or named (community policing or problem-oriented), the basis for these efforts is the application of sound management practices to the provision of public safety services. Being responsive to the customer (i.e., citizen), taking a planning perspective, and coordinating all police and other city resources to resolve problems are fundamental steps toward improved delivery of public safety services. The key to new programs should be the identification of a clear purpose with defined and measurable goals and objectives. Because the demand for ideas about new programs can come from a multitude of sources (other city departments, the law enforcement agency, or the community), following some basic guidelines concerning the definition of purpose will facilitate flexible and innovative programs.

The community-based and problem-solving approaches have provided the structure for the department to adopt a new, more decentralized style of organization that is open to multiple sources of input and capable of addressing numerous projects, missions, and assignments simultaneously. Tasks that need to be initiated to reflect this new organization and style of policing include:

- Development of new police accountability/command and control procedures.

- A management perspective that fosters innovative and creative programs linked to an ongoing assessment of needs (from community and departmental views) and rigorous evaluation standards.

- Recruitment of staff with a demonstrated set of skills, including the ability to operate more independently and professional sensitivity in dealing with a diverse public in a problem-oriented manner.

- A series of training programs will be needed to prepare recruits and current staff in the requirements of the new quality-oriented management approach.

The evolution of the community-oriented approach adds to the complexity of the traditional demand-for-service operations of the police department. The demand to respond to 911 calls-for-service and the needs of other types of crimes and crowd-control activities is somewhat predictable, and general trends can be identified. But, once the process of community input becomes ingrained throughout the department and community, the "demand" for a variety of services will probably increase dramatically. This surge, which is in addition to calls-for-service from the 911 emergency telephone system, typically comes from community hotlines and suggestions from community groups. And as opposed to discrete incident-based calls, this demand for service is often comprised of "projects," some of which can require significant resources over an extended time frame.

As the community policing and problem-solving concepts are being defined and implemented with respect to how police, the community, and other departments of Seattle work together, it is expected that there will be periods where the police receive too much input from the community and other city staff and elected officials. This phenomenon can result in two problems, as follows:

- The first problem is simply information overload, which creates a situation where the police department cannot handle all of the community/departmental ideas, suggestions, or crime-related problems. The end result is that almost

all parties are unhappy and frustrated, and the intended cooperation and problem-solving actions do not happen as desired.

- The second problem, which is from the police perspective, is that information overload can easily be construed as "micro-management" by people outside of the department. Police agencies are to a large extent reactive to emergency situations, and this basic responsibility cannot be overlooked. Even with the best intentions on the part of all parties, the burden of too much information and the related tasks of processing and reporting back to the providers on actions taken can result in the opposite effect than intended.

As the community policing and problem-solving concepts are implemented within the police department and throughout other city departments, organizational conflicts (i.e., turf battles) are almost inevitable. Numerous public service providers have obvious needs to deal directly with the citizens, but the "listening/helping" nature of police contacts under community policing can easily be perceived as attempting to take over the functions or impact the priorities of other departments.

Another common sense notion that certainly applies to all types of community policing efforts is that the new program should be tailored to meet the local conditions. Simply because a program, or specific tactic, has been used successfully in other locales, it is not safe to assume that it is the proper approach in a given city or neighborhood. It has been the case in Seattle that various sections of the city require completely different community-oriented programs to address the unique needs of the citizens or identified problems.

Recommendations

The recommendations, which are explained in detail in Chapter XI, are summarized in this section. The first group of recommendations pertains to operational areas; the second group suggests topics for further research. The operational recommendations roughly follow the environmental, organizational and programmatic categories noted in the previous discussion of partnership issues, and their order is not intended to reflect any priority.

- Operational Recommendations

  - The community policing approach should be considered by all police agencies and jurisdictions.

  - Police departments should be prepared to work with a wide variety of community and business groups.

- Police agencies and city officials should develop an extremely flexible, integrated, and comprehensive plan to coordinate the various components of the community-oriented and problem-solving concepts.

- Reasonable goals and time schedules should be developed for the establishment of departmentwide community/police programs.

- Secure the commitment of city and elected officials in the early stages of community-oriented police programs to the fundamental changes that occur.

- Develop community-oriented police service programs in coordination with other city departments and service delivery groups as appropriate.

- As part of the early planning with other departments, establish communications mechanisms with agency representatives.

- Police department human resource policies should be reviewed with respect to their impact on implementing the community and problem-oriented police services.

- As police resources (including facilities and staff) become more decentralized and act in a more independent problem-oriented manner, new command and control accountability procedures will be needed.

- Police departments or jurisdictions should invite other local and regional governmental and educational agencies to participate in the community policing program.

- The police and city officials should coordinate with local media to publicize the efforts and successes of community and business groups.

- Clearly define the goals and objectives of the community-oriented program components.

- The provision for program evaluation should be part of the initial planning.

- Cities should facilitate the formation of community and business crime prevention coalitions with the provision of technical assistance and seed funds for administrative purposes.

- Police agencies should work with community and business groups to develop issue/problem prioritization and tracking procedures.

- The police and community should work together to develop programs which are based on local needs and conditions.

o Research Recommendations

- The relationship between decay, disorder, fear, and crime needs addtional research attention.

- Improved evaluation methodologies are needed for community/police programs.

- The overall financial impact of the community-oriented approach to police departments and cities should be determined.

- The issue of displacement of crime as a result of community-oriented programs should be explored.

- Definitive guidelines and suggestions about facilitating community groups are needed.

- There are numerous questions related to the internal organizational structure and management style of police agencies which need to be addressed.

- The need for fundamental revisions in police human resources systems will need to be reviewed.

- The adoption of community policing concepts by small police departments should be researched.

- The use of and need for advanced technology under the community policing approach should be studied.

- The mechanisms and media for communication between the police and city agencies and community groups needs to be studied.

- The required coordination among the police and government departments in the delivery of services needs to be reviewed.

- The potential benefits and costs of police coordinating with private security services should be investigated.

- The partnership concept from the perspective of the community needs to be researched.

- The potential for increased levels of corruption or the abuse of power should be researched.

CHAPTER III

SELECTED ISSUES IN COMMUNITY/POLICE PARTNERSHIPS

Overview of Chapter

This chapter presents a number of issues that are important to the development and operation of community/police partnerships and programs. These issues were identified in the course of conducting background research for this project and as a result of documenting the events that occurred over the last decade when the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council came into being. The list of issues is not intended to be all encompassing and the discussion of these issues throughout this report is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, the issues included are those that were encountered in the course of looking at the community/police partnership programs in Seattle and other cities, and the discussion centers on their relevance to the development of these programs.

While these issues are pertinent to the discussion of community policing, they are not intended to present reasons that agencies should not investigate or proceed with this new model of policing. Furthermore, despite the fact that many of these issues point out questions without providing answers and appear to add to the confusion about what community policing is, they are not intended to be roadblocks to using these new management ideas.

As evidenced in Seattle and many other cities throughout the country, despite the lack of clear guidelines and agreements about this new model, extremely beneficial results have been achieved in the context of community/police partnerships. There are many ways to go about establishing such partnerships, and this report describes how Seattle accomplished and is continuing to strengthen this objective. These kinds of issues may or may not be relevant to other communities, and they are introduced in this report because they were encountered in the review of what happened in the city's South Precinct through of the efforts of the SSCPC.

The first section of this chapter describes the issues and outlines a conceptual framework for their application to community/police partnerships. Subsequent sections in this chapter discuss each issue in detail. These issues delineate the scope and depth of partnership programs developed in Seattle and in the other cities studied. They are referred to throughout the rest of this report, sometimes with corollaries based on the evolving nature of partnership efforts. And they are discussed again with respect to the recommendations that are based on the experiences of the city programs reviewed.

Conceptual Framework for Community/Police Partnership Issues

There are a wide range of issues related to community/police partnerships that are identified and discussed in this chapter. In an attempt to organize these issues into a framework that will facilitate their usefulness, the following categories appear appropriate:

- Environmental Issues -- this area involves the general situation in the community and historical imperatives, and would be present regardless of which approach was being used by law enforcement.

- Organizational Issues -- issues in this category pertain to intradepartmental organization and functional areas for the police, and interdepartmental coordination and responsibilities within the jurisdiction.

- Programmatic Issues -- these issues pertain to the community/police partnership programs and the various components that they contain.

Whereas this framework attempts to clarify the numerous issues encountered when looking at community/police programs, it should be noted that some issues cut across these categories. In addition, some issues will fall into different categories as they evolve over time; this is especially the case with the organizational and programmatic areas.

The framework and the various issues identified under each category are as follows:

ENVIRONMENTAL	ORGANIZATIONAL	PROGRAMMATIC
o The Police Function: Base of Authority/ Legitimacy	o The Role of Police Officers	o What is Community Policing?
o The Nature of the Relationship among Decay/ Disorder, Crime, and Fear	o Links with Other Government Agencies	o Definition of the Community
o The Role of the Community	o Organizational Configuration of the Police Department	o Evaluating Community Policing
o The Demand for Police Services	o Police Accountability	

These issues are described in the following sections, and are addressed in the order encountered in the project as opposed to how they fit into the above framework.

Historical Perspective of Community Policing

The initial ideas that served as the foundation of the community and problem-solving policing concepts come from a number of research articles about the need for a new perspective in policing (for example, Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Goldstein (1979), respectively published pieces on these subjects about ten years ago). These ideas appear to have influenced both citizens in Seattle and members of the SPD, as well as numerous others throughout the country. A more recent article by Kelling and Moore (1988) puts these concepts in a historical perspective. Introducing some of the key ideas from these researchers provides important background on the community policing approach and its development in Seattle.

In their article "Broken Windows," Wilson and Kelling introduced a number of ideas typically associated with the community/police model. These ideas included the perceived link between urban decay/civil disorder and crime, the fear of crime and its effect on people, and the results of experimental "foot patrol" programs. Goldstein discussed a problem-solving approach which consisted of a multi-step strategy for directing police resources to attack crime problems.

The Kelling and Moore article identified a number of historical periods of policing, including:

- The Political Era, prior to 1900 during which the police were controlled by local politicians. This situation had its strengths, including a neighborhood orientation and delivery of social services/order maintenance to citizens. However, this style of policing also led to abuse of immigrants' civil rights and was susceptible to widespread corruption.

- The Reform or Professional Era, which lasted from about 1900 to 1970, is best respresented by Sgt. Friday of television's "Dragnet" who wanted "only the facts" of the crime. During this period the police became very professional and dealt only with crimes -- other types of community problems were the responsibility of some other city agency. The police relied on new technology (radios and 911 emergency telephone systems) and rode around in cars responding to call after call for help from citizens.

- The current Community Problem-Solving Era, which began in the 1970s, has attempted to address some of the problems with the Professional Era style of policing. The traditional reactive rapid response to <u>all</u> 911 calls

(regardless of their urgency) was a poor use of resources and there was little time for in-depth investigations to solve crimes. The police lost ties with citizens, who typically have the information needed to solve crimes, and relations with some minority communities were poor. Accordingly, based on research and field experiments (such as the use of foot patrols and problem-oriented policing projects), a new community-oriented focus began to develop. This strategy included decentralization of police services, the police working with other city agencies to resolve problems (such as the parks or utility departments), and the development of closer ties with community and neighborhood groups.

The issues related to community/police partnerships are discussed in the next sections, and some refer to this historical overview.

What is Community Policing?

Perhaps the central issue in community/police partnerships, and one that is currently being debated throughout the country, is that no commonly accepted definition of "community policing" currently exists. Despite numerous attempts to provide a definition, no clear statement that expresses the "central nature" of community policing has been agreed on. In addition to not knowing what community policing is, there is no clear or accepted scheme to differentiate community policing from any other type of approach to policing. Rather, as Greene and Mastrofski (1988:XIII) point out, "Community policing means many things to many people. It is at once an ideology, an organizing framework for many police activities, and a set of individual programs."

A major source of conceptual confusion regarding community policing is the emphasis on problem-solving in most current definitions. This has led many to conclude that community policing is synonymous with problem-oriented policing (e.g., Sykes, 1990; Wilson and Kelling, 1989). It appears, however, that community policing and problem-oriented policing are two distinct models, albeit with conceptual overlap. The key distinction between the two policing models concerns the role that the community is envisioned to play. Community policing explicitly includes community members on an ongoing basis in solving problems and institutionalized community participation is a necessary component of this model. On the other hand, problem-oriented policing does not necessarily include community involvement. A brief review of problem-oriented policing should help to distinguish the two concepts.

In the seminal work on the topic, Goldstein (1979) describes problem-oriented policing in terms of a specific multi-step strategy for directing police operations. First, a problem more general than a specific incident is identified within an agency's

jurisdiction. Next, the problem is analyzed to identify the underlying causes of it. Third, possible solutions to the problem are devised and evaluated, culminating in the selection of a specific plan to be implemented. Fourth, the plan is put into action with periodic analysis of the work undertaken. Finally, when the plan has run its course, its success is assessed by some form of evaluation.

The above summary of problem-oriented policing indicates that community involvement is not a necessary component. Only when a department opts to include citizens in some phase of a problem-solving process will the community become involved with problem-oriented policing. Thus, the distinguishing characteristic between community policing and problem-oriented policing appears to be the role of citizens in community problem-solving efforts. To reiterate, institutionalized inclusion equals community-oriented policing; piecemeal inclusion equals problem-oriented policing. (See Eck and Spelman, 1987, for another brief yet more complete discussion of the distinctions between problem-oriented and community policing.)

Another impediment to understanding is that many problems considered to be within the rubric of community policing, and which are believed to be related to crime and fear, can be addressed without police involvement. These include such problems as potholes, garbage-strewn lots, alcohol abuse, and illiteracy. Citizens and non-police government entities can engage in problem-solving either on their own or in cooperative activities that exclude the police. Whether or not such practices constitute community policing depends on one's conception of what community policing is. If one's definition requires police department participation, then such activities clearly are not community policing. On the other hand, if one's definition does not require police department participation, then citizen and other government action against the above noted community problems (related to crime, fear, and public order) can be viewed as community policing.

A final impediment to devising a definition of community policing and implementing community/police programs is the community itself. The concept of community is also very difficult to define. Certain aspects of the community, such as a particular group's representativeness and the range of roles of the community in this new approach to policing, can also present serious barriers to the development of community/police partnerships.

It would seem prudent that an agreed upon definition ("a statement expressing the central nature of something," according to Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary), of community policing be articulated. This would allow all parties that are interested in improving the field of policing to share a common

understanding of this intriguing idea that is sweeping through America. However, although there is much diversity of opinion about what constitutes community policing, one perspective does seem to be emerging in the literatue. This perspective stresses:

- Philosophy - community policing is viewed as an operating philosophy or orientation (values and attitudes) of police work rather than a specific tactic or strategy.

- Cooperation - it is stressed that the police work closely with community members and others in government to devise and implement policing practices.

- Solving problems - the primary goal of community policing is to solve identifiable and discrete problems of crime, fear, and physical and social disorder in a community.

- Crime Prevention - community policing is a broader expression of traditional principles and techniques of crime prevention.

- Proactive - community policing involves a proactive complement to the traditional reactive operating stance of police responding to demands for services (the calls-for-service orientation).

By combining these aspects, a general description of community policing can be identified. The emerging description of community policing culled from the literature (see Bayley, 1988; Brown, 1989; Goldstein, 1987; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Wycoff, 1988) is as follows:

> Community policing is a philosophy or orientation toward the police task that stresses cooperative working relations among the residents and/or businesses of an area, the police who work there, and other governmental entities as the optimal strategy to devise practical solutions to problems of crime, fear, and disorder.

Whether this will become the accepted definition is impossible to predict; however, only when such common understanding arises can the tasks of sorting out past research and developing and exploring hypotheses about the utility of community policing begin.

Definition of the Community

Proponents of community policing often assume that the concept "community" represents something discrete, recognizable and indentifiable in the empirical world (Brown, 1989; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). These assumptions appear to be on shaky ground. Despite years of effort by social scientists to define

it, community has a rather vague meaning, denoting something related to the collective lives of individuals (Manning, 1988). Although at first glance it may seem an esoteric exercise to worry about the definition of the community (after all, community is "where I live"), it becomes vitally important when one considers that police departments must identify communities before they can work with them. Not knowing what one is looking for usually makes it hard to find. (See Greene, 1985 and Mastrofski, 1988 for further discussion of this point.)

To illustrate how the definitional issue translates into an operational problem in community policing, consider briefly a definition of community in terms of geography: A community is a collection of individuals populating a common geographic area. (For now ignore what constitutes an "area".) However, many areas are populated by people with diverse involvements in community life. In a community, who is it with whom the police are to work? Those who make a home in the area? The homeless? Property owners? Managers and owners of the businesses in the area? Individuals who work but do not live in the area?

Another key question in this regard concerns the required moral and legal character of the citizens who participate in community policing. One noted advocate of community policing and his co-author argue that only "law abiding" citizens (whatever that means) should be allowed to work with the police (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:6). Goldstein, (1990:26) takes exception to this position, asserting that "'community' is not synonomous with 'law abiding'." According to him the police should work with any citizens who have an interest in a given community problem, regardless of lifestyle. To buttress this argument, Goldstein points out that cooperative efforts with "skid-road" denizens and prostitutes may reduce the crimes that traditionally occur where such people congregate.

Others (Greenberg and Rohe, 1986; Mastrofski, 1988) have made explicit what is implicit above--in many communities there are diverse concepts of what constitutes a proper and desirable social order. Promoting cooperative work among individuals and groups with differential involvement in social life and varied notions of order is no simple feat. Compounding this challenge to community policing is evidence that those areas with the most extensive problems are frequently those with the least cohesion and greatest amount of conflict (see Goldstein, 1990; Mastrofski, 1988).

In areas of low consensus, the police must work with and manage various concepts of what constitutes a community problem. This situation can, in turn, lead to further conflict among community members and between the citizens and the police. For example, some in a community may think that youngsters "hanging out" in public (not dealing drugs, not engaging in gang activity, just "hanging out") are a problem. These individuals may call for some form of police action to get the kids to stop "hanging out."

The juveniles who are hanging out and others in the community, however, will likely not define their behavior as a problem (even when their behavior could be described as incivility and might result in calls to the police). If the police do take action against the kids, this will likely please the complaining adults but upset the youngsters and other residents who are on the side of the youth. If the police don't move against the youngsters, they will most likely alienate the complaining adults. (See Mastrofski, 1988, for a more dramatic discussion of this issue.)

Even when citizens are in agreement about the problems, the police must often contend with competing notions of how problems should be solved. Wilson addressed this problem over 20 years ago stating, "It is one thing to decide that something should be done about crime in the streets and quite another thing to decide exactly what it is that should be done" (1968:229). His point holds true today. For example, two groups may agree that persistent street drug dealing in their community is a problem, but have conflicting views on what the police should do about it. Group A may be concerned with only the visible dealing that encroaches on commercial activity, while Group B may be more concerned with the hideous toll that drug consumption is causing area youth. Based on their concerns, Group A might call for a push to drive the dealers from public view, but Group B would likely vehemently oppose this tactic as it would only move the location of dealing, not rid the area of drugs or solve the drug abuse problem among youngsters.

The Role of Police Officers

In the "professional model" which has dominated policing in America over the past several decades, officers are expected to perform a basic set of tasks that include enforcing traffic laws, answering calls for service, investigating crimes, and arresting suspects. (See Kelling and Moore, 1988, for a review of the professional model.) There is widespread agreement in community policing circles that these "means-based" tasks should be supplanted by a single overarching task--solving community problems related to crime, fear, and disorder. In contrast, there is a deep fissure in the community policing movement over the posture that the police should adopt to accomplish this task. Two versions of how the police should operate lie on either side of this chasm. Mastrofski (1988) identifies them as the "community service" and "aggressive order maintenance" strategies.

In the community service model, officers work in harmony with citizens or groups to solve identified problems. Police officers are compassionate, service-minded souls interested in helping the community in a variety of non-traditional ways. Officers work out of storefronts, patrol on foot, and engage in other practices to maximize relaxed, non-confrontational interactions with citizens that allow officers to learn about the concerns of their

civilian peers. They work with citizens cleaning-up trash-strewn lots, counseling youth about drug abuse, and assisting the community in various ways to reduce crime, fear, and decay. In short, police officers are nice men and women who help the community by engaging in cooperative activities to produce vital, vibrant, and safe environments in which to live.

In the agressive order maintenance model, the police work to control uncivil behavior. Police officers are aggressive, enforcement-minded agents of social control interested in imposing order in communities. How officers are deployed is of little concern as long as they can proactively intervene when sources of disorder appear. They exercise their prerogative to use coercive force rather freely against those thought to cause crime and fear, and whose very presence in public constitutes decay--the panhandlers, inebriates, rowdy youth, and others who populate the streets of our fractured communities. All that is required from the community at large is information about problems and support for police action. In short, police officers are "no-nonsense" men and women who help the community by keeping the peace.

Although the above characterizations of each perspective are overdrawn, they do not overstate the differences between the two. The literature supports this assertion. For example, Sykes (1990) argues that community service and order maintenance are more than mere strategies; they are in fact distinct types of policing. In a similar vein, though from a different perspective, Goldstein suggests that aggressive order maintenance practices can be used in tandem with community policing if carefully planned and clearly justified given the situation. The need for balance can be seen when he states that "A department could not long tolerate a situation in which officers in a residential area go out of their way to demonstrate that they are caring, service-oriented individuals while other officers assigned to a roving task force make wholesale sweeps of loitering juveniles in that community" (1987:12,13).

Proponents of community policing are sure that the police role as articulated in the traditional means-driven model must be supplanted. They are, however, not sure about what should replace it. Community service and aggressive order maintenance have both been offered. Another consideration is that both the community service and the agressive order maintenance orientations could be used when appropriate by the same police agency. It remains to be seen whether either of these or some not yet articulated alternative will win out.

The Police Function: Base of Authority/Legitimacy

The "professional model" of policing claims that police authority is based in statutory law (Brown, 1981; Kelling and Moore, 1988). Authority based in law provided insulation from the corrupting

influence of local politics that plagued American policing during its intial decades (Fogelson, 1977; Kelling and Moore, 1988). As Greene and Mastrofski (1988) point out, though, numerous writers claim that the move to police professionalism had a major downside; it estranged the police from the community. Proponents of community policing argue that one key to solving community problems is to mobilize the vast community resources presently unavailable to the police because of this estrangement. They propose that this can be accomplished only if the chasm between the police and the "policed" can be bridged. In order to secure this rapprochement, it appears that a shift in the basis of police authority from law to the community itself must occur. With legitimacy derived from the consent of those whom they police, officers can mobilize community assets to solve problems and thus improve the quality of life for their constituents (e.g., Brown, 1987 and 1989; Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990).

The idea that the police should shift their basis of authority away from the law, however, is problematic. If the police truly derive their legitimacy from the community (provided one can be identified), they then will be obliged to respond to the dictates of the community just as they are currently obliged to respond to the dictates of law. However, citizen expectations regarding social control are at times at odds with the provisions of law with which the police must conform, particularly regarding procedural due process (Walker, 1980; Sykes, 1986). In a system where authority is derived from the community, police officers would at times find themselves in the untenable position of having to violate the law to retain the support of their community. This situation presents obvious problems. (See Bayley, 1988:232; Goldstein, 1987:25 and especially Mastrofski 1988:48-53 for further discussion of this point.)

An equally grave problem is presented by communities with a high degree of consensus against the presence of police, i.e., those where the prevailing attitude is that the police should simply stay out. In such communities there is little basis for police legitimacy, and little possibility for the police to derive authority from the consent of the governed. Adhering to community wishes in such areas would require the police to vacate the area. This situation is also folly. (See Baldwin, 1962, for a description of such an area.)

It is possible, however, that the merging of the professional model (based in law) and the community-oriented approach (which needs community support) resolves the apparent inconsistencies of this "either-or" dilemma. Each model of policing is appropriate given certain situations in a community or neighborhood. The police need the option to use the appropriate tactic and the citizens demand effective action. Also, there are some indications that community-oriented officers are accepted by most communities, despite their reputation of suspicion about police activities and/or motives.

Evaluating Community Policing

Most versions of community policing deemphasize the use of arrests, citations, and responding to calls as the preferred work tactics of police officers. Rather, officers are encouraged to spend more time in face-to-face interactions with the citizens in their beats attempting to solve community problems of crime, fear, and decay (Brown, 1987 and 1989; Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990). With this shift away from the so-called "thief taking" emphasis of the professional model, these standards of evaluation become moot. A critical question then is how to evaluate the work of officers in community/police systems.

Any evaluation system that quantifies community work will likely lead to officers simply putting in their time at whatever is identified as community work, with little attention to the purpose of such activities. As numerous writers have observed, the police are not immune from the problem of goal displacement that plagues the operation of most formal organizations (Goldstein 1979; Manning, 1978; Skolnick, 1966). Means can quickly become ends because "police officers do what police administrations count" (Vernon, 1990). This problem arose in the Neighborhood Oriented Policing program in Houston. A major component of the system used to evaluate officers in this program was the number of contacts officers had with citizens. Not surprisingly, many officers logged numerous community contacts but did little community problem-solving (Watson, 1989).

There is a more fundamental problem inherent in evaluating community policing problems. It is difficult to assess them because the community problems of crime, fear, and decay are subject to influences and changes from numerous sources besides police action and because the relationships among these three phenomena are not altogether clear (this issue is discussed in the next section). These difficulties are currently inhibiting the development of clearly interpretable evaluation techniques. The situation, however, has not stopped proponents of community policing from heralding its success based on specious evaluations, for example, the bold assertion that foot patrols caused a reduction in crime in Flint, Michigan (Trojanowicz and Belknap, 1986).

Realizing the problems inherent in using crime rates to evaluate community/police programs, others have turned to community surveys. However, the utility of this technique is not clear; in designing and interpreting many of these surveys, the researchers have clearly sought to produce positive assessments of community/police programs rather than evaluate them fairly (Manning, 1988). Perhaps the most remarkable example of this practice is a finding that increased acquisition of arms among the citizens of Newark, New Jersey was viewed as an indicator of success for a community policing program in that city (Police Foundation, 1981).

Community/police partnerships will need to be evaluated in order to determine their effectiveness. While many factors pertinent to a rigorous evaluation need to be resolved (not the least of which is a clear definition of community policing), it also appears that real and measurable effects on crimes will need to be achieved if the new approaches to policing are to survive.

The Nature of the Relationship among Decay/Disorder, Crime, and Fear

One reason evaluation is so difficult is that the linkages among crime, fear, and disorder that community policing is supposed to address are not well understood. Despite this dearth of knowledge, one perspective on their interrelationships is widely accepted in community policing circles; the "Broken Windows" thesis of by Wilson and Kelling (1982 and 1989).

The "Broken Windows" perspective views crime, fear, and decay as separate dimensions--phenomena with different causes and consequences--linked in a particular causal chain. The presumption in this perspective, stated in its most basic form, is that a dynamic process operates in communities wherein increasing human and physical decay leads to increasing fear, which leads in turn to increasing crime. Based on this understanding of the causal linkages between decay, crime and fear, champions of the "Broken Windows" perspective argue that if steps are taken to improve decayed areas, fear of crime will be reduced which will lead to a reduction in crime as community residents and business people reclaim their neighborhoods. They call for joint police/community efforts to improve the disordered conditions of dangerous neighborhoods, the "Broken Windows" of urban decay, in order to create safe ones.

The actual relationships among crime, fear, and decay, however, may not conform to the assertions of the "Broken Windows" hypotheses. Numerous alternative explanations exist. For example, crime, fear, and decay may be indicators of a single dimension such as economic decline; they may be spuriously correlated dimensions; or these factors may be related in a non-recursive manner or in a different causal order. Because rival plausible hypotheses exist, the claims of the "Broken Windows" thesis should be subjected to strict empirical evaluation.

The lack of empirical evidence regarding the leading perspective on the relationship between crime, fear, and decay raises questions about the state of knowledge about the problems facing communities and the potential for success of the preferred strategies for attacking them. Without a sound understanding about the cause(s) of criminal activity, fear of crime, and decay, it is questionable that we know what must be done to improve community life. (See Bayley, 1988 and Greene and Taylor, 1988 for further discussion of this point.)

Links with other Government Agencies

A basic tenet of the community policing philosphy is that many times problems of crime, fear, and decay can best be addressed by cooperative work among the full range of government entities. The police are typically expected to play a central role in such cooperative efforts, coordinating the work of other agencies and serving as liaison between the community and other agencies (e.g., Brown, 1987; Goldstein, 1987; Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990). Although it appears to make sense that the police take the lead in this type of community policing effort (because of the crime-reduction goal orientation), it may not make practical sense in many situations. Nonpolice entities may be equally or better suited for either the community liaison function or coordinating the work of government entities, or both.

A common argument in support of the police liaison role is that citizens will report problems to the police because of their wide availability (i.e., around the clock operations and the 911 emergency telephone number) and because they possess unique authority in government (Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990, make this argument most forcefully). That the police are generally more available than other entities cannot be seriously disputed; their suitability as the link to some communities, however, can be. It is highly probable that in some circumstances, the authority that the police possess hinders rather than helps the flow of information about problems from citizens to government. Two examples highlight this point.

First, it is unlikely that many undocumented aliens would report their concerns to police officers, the visible representative of the government whose law they are, by definition, violating. It makes little sense to insist that the police are the agency best suited to obtain knowledge about problems in a community populated by individuals who fear deportation. In some communities the police are, to put it mildly, not welcome. James Baldwin vividly described the status of the police in one such community during the early 1960s: "Their very presence is an insult, and it would be even if they spent their entire day feeding gum drops to children" (1962:65). Though Baldwin wrote almost 30 years ago, his words ring true today in many communities. There are areas of our nation where the police are viewed as an occupying army. It makes little sense to insist that the police are the proper agency for obtaining knowledge about problems in communities in which they are abhorred. As noted, however, the community policing orientation of police departments is having a positive effect on this situation. Second, with respect to the role of coordinator in cooperative undertakings with other government agencies, the police may well be the least likely agency to lead such an effort. Police departments generally possess more political power and command a larger portion of fiscal and human resources than most other municipal agencies. Jealousy might motivate other agencies to sabotage problem-solving efforts simply because this would make

the police look bad. Numerous authors have noted that attempts to sabotage the work of other entities are common in "cooperative" efforts between organizations (e.g., Warren, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). Jealousy of police power appears to invite this practice.

Assuming that the police can overcome community and political enmity, other problems remain. Foremost among them is how to structure the operation of cooperative community problem-solving efforts. Any number of organizational designs could be used to facilitate the process of obtaining and disseminating information, using the information to develop problem-solving strategies, and implementing the strategies. Discussed below are two basic problems of inter-organizational coordination in municipal governments that illustrate the difficulty inherent in coordinating community problem-solving activities.

- In larger municipalities, the geographic boundaries delineating police patrol districts or beats (or other relevant areas of operation) often do not match those of other government entities or municipal political boundaries. This seemingly minor problem can create havoc in the process of coordinating activities. For example, if the sanitation department boundaries do not jibe with those of police districts, the district administrator in each agency will have at least two counterparts in the other agency. Such a situation requires that some arrangement be made to coordinate the work of at least three people (and that of their subordinates), which is clearly more difficult than coordination between two individuals, (which itself is often difficult).

- The exchange of information among involved parties is also problematic. Models of cooperative problem-solving typically proffered include a flow chart of the communications process (either implicit or explicit) from the street level, i.e., beat cops and citizens, in the police department and other agencies (e.g., Brown, 1989; Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990). In community/police programs of this sort, the smooth and timely transmission of information is a prerequisite to success. Much of the literature, however, suggests that the anticipated flow of information in organizations is rarely, if ever, realized in practice (e.g., Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Galbraith, 1973). Community policing practitioners have major hurdles to overcome before the smooth flow of information can be realized.

Organizational Configuration of Police Department

There are two broad issues concerning the organizational configuration of police agencies in the community model. One issue concerns the deployment of personnel and the other concerns command and control structures.

There are two aspects of deployment in community policing: geography and human resources. Community policing can operate throughout an entire jurisdiction or in subsections of it. Either all line officers can do community/police work or community/police activities can be conducted by some portion of police officers, with the remainder of the officers engaging in traditional policing. These two possibilities concerning geography and personnel yield four possible organizational configurations of community policing, including:

- Community policing operates departmentwide with all officers involved.
- Community policing operates departmentwide with specialist community officers.
- All officers in some geographical subsections of a department are community officers.
- Specialist community officers do community policing in some geographical subsections of a department.

Although the particular organizational forms community policing programs can take are numerous, all can be identified as one of these four basic types. Each of the four possibilities has its proponents and current police operations have been designed within each category. At this point in the evolution of community policing, it appears that the more salient aspect of deployment concerns the involvement of personnel.

Each of the two models of personnel deployment--all officers involved or only some--offers benefits and drawbacks to the concept of community problem-solving. A primary benefit of including all officers in a community policing effort is that all of the department's human resources can be continuously involved in the efforts to solve community problems. The primary detriment of this strategy is that traditional tasks of policing, such as handling calls-for-service, impinge on the time available to engage in community problem-solving. The use of specialist community officers who do not have to respond to calls-for-service allows a group of officers to work full time on community problem-solving, skirting this difficulty.

The use of specialist officers, however, creates other problems. Specialist officers are dependent on their generalist peers for much of the information required to engage in successful community problem-solving. The advent of specialist units

commonly leads to less efficient communication within an organization. Inefficient communication arises primarily from two sources:

- First, for a variety of reasons (e.g., different operational philosophies, competition for resources, or status differentials), animosity can arise between the specialists and the generalists. Enmity between the specialists and the generalists strains communications because there is little incentive to provide information that is helpful to an adversary. Goldstein has noted the problems inherent in having specialist community officers, stating that, "unless extraordinary measures are taken, officers assigned to perform community policing are likely to be ostracized and isolated" (1987:11). [On the positive side, Goldstein highlights reports on Baltimore County (Tarf, 1986) and Houston (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986) which suggest that animosities can indeed be reduced through sound management practices. As animosities are reduced communication should improve.]

- A less nefarious impediment to the flow of information between generalists and specialists is that each typically belongs to a different division or unit in an organization. Whenever a layer of bureaucracy (or a separate group on the same level) is added to an organization, communication suffers (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Galbraith, 1973). (Inefficient communication arising from organizational differentiation may also be alleviated somewhat by skillful management and work tactics. However, it is highly likely that significant communication problems will exist in any community policing system using specialist officers.)

Concerning command and control, community policing proponents argue that the heterogeneous nature of American municipalities requires organizational flexibility so that police services can be tailored to the specific needs of individual communities. However, the call for flexibility of police response to community problems contains a rigid set of guidelines about how departments should organize to accomplish this. For example, police departments are directed to decentralize operations to the neighborhood level, assigning officers on a permanent basis to given neighborhoods. The officers are then to be in charge of problem-solving in their neighborhood. Their sergeant, lieutenant, and all ranks above exist to assist the beat cop with his or her efforts to solve community problems (e.g., Brown, 1987 and 1989, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990).

However, decentralization of command and neighborhood deployment may not be the optimal deployment strategy to attack problems in many cases. The nature of specific communities and their problems may indicate that other types of deployment be used. Many problems do not match neighborhood boundaries well. This indicates that, in many situations it may be appropriate for a

department to address community needs with a problem-solving approach at a higher level than the neighborhood. For example, a precinct, bureau or even a departmentwide anti-gang unit may be better able to deal with youth gangs (whose activities are not circumscribed by neighborhood boundaries) than can numerous neighborhood officers whose attention to the gang problem would have to be split among many other problems. If a department has problems at the neighborhood and broader levels, then neighborhood deployment coupled with higher level units may be appropriate. In other circumstances, regular rotation of officers through a number of patrol beats might be best. This would allow for the inclusion of diverse perspectives in a shared problem-solving program. Finally, there may well be some neighborhoods (the numerous "sleepy hollows" that dot our nation's landscape) where no special attention is needed or warranted. Providing neighborhoods of this sort with an officer of their own would be hard to justify.

It seems that in each of the above examples, decentralization and neighborhood deployment contain drawbacks. The sound reason to call for a reorganization of police agencies is based on the need for more flexibility. Agencies should be encouraged to be innovative. However, the rigidity inherent in the centralized professional/bureaucratic model of policing should not be supplanted by a new rigidity in the decentralized community model. In sum, it appears that the nature of community problems should guide deployment practices rather than a given organizational philosphy. As noted in the section about evaluation of community policing, the means (in this case a given organizational structure) should not become an end in itself.

Police Accountability

Decentralization of command and permanent deployment in order to enhance police responsiveness to the particular needs of various communities raises other questions besides efficacy. Although decentralization and proximity with community members might provide the framework needed to tailor police services, they also provide the medium for abuse of police discretion. Police officers operating in cloisters, without clear guidelines and with minimal oversight, are particularly susceptible to three abuses of their discretionary powers: 1) corruption, 2) excessive use of force, and 3) bending the central principles of the rule of law.

The history of police officers taking pay-offs in some regions of our country is widely known. Lack of administrative oversight and a high degree of community contact are two factors that have been identified as central to such scandals (e.g., Bayley, 1988; Fogelson, 1977; Walker, 1977). Deploying officers on a neighborhood basis and decentralizing command provides the setting for both of these factors. Unfortunately, corruption is a very real problem that must be considered when contemplating a

move towards neighborhood deployment. Recognizing this, Wycoff (1988) suggests that community policing may not be appropriate in areas with a history of corruption.

Proponents of permanent neighborhood deployment strategies argue that the practice will encourage officers to "own" their beat, providing enhanced motivation for work (e.g., Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990; Brown, 1987 and 1989). However, the apparent tendency for humans to fiercely defend what they own, using any and all means available, calls into question the appropriateness of this bond. This issue is particularly salient regarding the use of coercion. The Constitution, federal and state statutes, and typical departmental policies all clearly direct officers to use verbal threats and physical force only in limited circumstances and for limited purposes. Telling officers they "own" a beat after equipping them with guns, batons, and other martial implements simply invites the use of extra-legal verbal and physical tactics.

It is possible officers may also be tempted to use other extra-legal means to solve problems. While the possibilities are legion, an officer's efforts to promote "vigilante" action presents a particularly disturbing scenario. If officers understand that it is inappropriate to put in some "stick time" to rid an area of undesirables, it may not be so clear that using mercenaries recruited from the community to do the dirty work is equally unacceptable. (After all, the mandate is to be flexible and work with the community!) This practice has occurred in at least one circumstance. Weisburd and McElroy (1988) report that New York community police officers allowed a group of beer-drinking males to continue to violate drinking-in-public laws in exchange for ridding a local park of drug dealers. This practice raises many questions. Prominent among them is that once the young toughs of the neighborhood have the "O.K." to clear out the drug pushers, who will they "police" next? It is a steep and slippery slope to situations like Bensonhurst and Howard Beach (examples of vigilante criminal actions) if such attitudes are not strongly condemned by the police or other government representatives.

The Role of the Community

The above example of how the rule of law may be compromised in a community policing program speaks to another issue--the role of citizens in the community policing model. The story of enlisting young male beer drinkers to rid a park of drug dealers is an extreme example of the most direct type of community involvement, which involves citizens policing their communities. This practice usually takes less dramatic forms where citizens simply walk or drive through their neighborhoods looking for suspicious or overtly criminal activities.

No matter what form they take, citizen patrols of their neighborhoods raises some delicate questions. Among them are:

- How much interaction should citizens have with suspected malefactors? (Face-to-face confrontations may lead to violence.)

- What constitutes "suspicious" or "criminal" activity worthy of concern? (Statutory and case law provide guidance for police in this area, but no legal guidelines exist for citizens.)

- How should the police coordinate their activities with the patrols? (At the very least, coordination will cost some police resources. Whether the benefits accrued by community patrols exceed the costs is an open question.)

The problems of over-aggressive citizen actions can be put into perspective by looking at the issue of "citizen arrests." While a large percentage of the general population appear to be aware of this option, the actual application of the citizen arrest power puts the user at considerable risk. Despite the apparent widespread awareness of this tactic, there is no clear legal foundation for this approach to law enforcement. Also, while police officers are protected from liability by law (under the concept of having "probable cause" that a crime has been committed), the ordinary citizen is not. Accordingly, it is possible that the "law abiding" citizen could be the person charged with any number of crimes (which might include false imprisonment, physical assault, or defamation of character) in the course of attempting to make a citizen arrest. Finally, the citizen runs the risk of making the situation worse or sustaining personal injury if the incident is escalated into a more serious matter. This range of potential problems indicates why most police agencies discourage the use of the citizen arrest technique, and instead advise citizens to use the 911 emergency telephone number to request help.

Another issue is the role of the community in the selection of problems to be addressed and the tactics to be used against them. How much say should citizens have in picking targets? When entities engage in partnerships, at some point the lesser partner invariably petitions for fuller participation in decision-making. As police departments enter into partnerships with communities to solve problems, private citizens and coalitions of interested groups will likely want to exercise power in the selection of problems to be targeted and the techniques to be employed against them. Managing this may be problematic, particularly given the conceptual foundation which asserts that the authority for community policing properly arises from the citizenry. (The nature of the problems being addressed, tactics to be used, and the people/coalitions asking for action is a dynamic situation; this constant change can also create difficulties for all parties.) Police managers will have to develop Janus-like

skills, "selling" community members on the incompatible propositions that although the consent of citizens provides police legitimacy, citizens' requests for attention to specific matters and modes of addressing them are subordinate to police wishes.

A related issue regarding community participation is the specter of attempted "micro-management" of police operations by citizens. The close, cooperative efforts advocated in the community policing model may create a situation where citizens attempt to exert control over police operations. Those citizens more closely involved with the police could come to expect the police to bow to their wishes. This could arise in at least three forms. For example, some citizens may view preferential service as quid pro quo for the assistance they rendered to the police. The leadership of a group that raised money to purchase pagers for officers to carry may believe that their requests now deserve higher priority than those of others. Other citizens working closely with the police may innocently believe that the police should pay them special attention out of friendship. Finally, close police community ties will possibly lead to inflated egos on the part of some community leaders. These people lead the citizens council and know the problems of the community intimately; why shouldn't they lead the police, too? (It should be noted that the reverse is also possible. The police may at times manipulate citizens and/or community groups via micro-management techniques or selective information release.)

The first two possibilities are variations on the problem of corruption encountered in the early years of policing, i.e., the practice of providing preferential treatment out of political obligations. The last situation is simply the problem of dealing with human foibles. Attempted micro-management of any sort, regardless of well-meaning intentions, is an attempt to usurp police prerogatives. This can create major problems for community policing programs, such as enraging both line and management officers, turning them against the citizens with whom they work, and creating enmity within and among citizen groups. Attempts by citizens to micro-manage operations present a serious challenge for even the most skilled police managers.

The Demand for Police Services

Proponents of community policing argue that it will improve police service and thus increase the level of citizen satisfaction with their police department (e.g., Brown, 1989; Trojanowicz and Burqueroux, 1990). This assumption overlooks a general historical trend about the nature of the relationship between municipal government services and the citizens' desires for them. Citizens most often view municipal government services inadequate. One authority on the delivery of municipal services eloquently stated this truth thusly: "The demand for services tends to increase to meet supply; if additional services are made

available, demand will increase to consume them. If more resources are made available, pressures for additional services utilizing those resources will be forthcoming" (Lipsky, 1980:33).

Lipsky (1980) argues further that citizens' expectations are invariably raised to a level that outstrips the new, expanded capacity of the agency. When the citizens realize this, they often respond with hostility and feel that the agency isn't doing all it can to provide services. Thus, in the short term, extra services may actually drive citizen satisfaction down. After a while, the citizens realize that the agency cannot handle everything and downwardly adjust their expectations. For some community members, this may be a return to their previous level of satisfaction but for others it may mean a reduction. The agency has once again failed to deliver on services promised and the citizens become cynical.

Mastrofski (1988) and Bayley (1988) have argued that, as they presently exist, community policing programs cannot possibly achieve all they promise, and will eventually lead to citizen dissatisfaction. Their arguments are structured on the premise that community policing is presently more "rhetoric than reality," and they call for improvements that will make this approach more real. Lipsky's analysis of street-level bureaucracies, however, suggests that community policing will never be able to produce a satisfied citizenry because the dynamic process of municipal supply and demand precludes the possibility that community policing can ever become a reality.

The unquenchable demand for service has frustrated many ambitious government initiatives. There is no evidence to suggest that community policing will somehow manage to avoid this problem. Despite this, proponents of community policing dangle before citizens the prospect of greatly improved police services, typically with no mention of the inherent limitations on service delivery. As a result, citizens have no realistic basis on which to gauge their expectations. If they believe the abundant rhetoric, citizens will be inclined to expect that they will be able to have more than is really possible; this in turn will lead to their ultimate dissatisfaction when community policing reaches the ceiling of resource constraints. When this occurs, it will be up to police managers to find ways to adjust or restructure community policing programs in accordance with real world opportunities and service demands. The phrase "working smarter with existing resources" is often applied to this situation.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF COMMUNITY/POLICE INTERACTION IN SOUTHEAST SEATTLE

Overview of Chapter

In this chapter, three major topics are discussed. The first section describes the general setting in which the SSCPC developed and covers the economic, geographic, and social situation in southeast Seattle. The second section covers the history of community and police interactions from the mid-1970s to 1983. The third section covers community and police interactions after 1983.

Also described in the second and third sections are the initial incubation period for the SSCPC and early cooperative efforts. The subsequent growth of the SSCPC and all its various components are described in detail in Chapters V and VI. (Expansion of the community/police partnership concepts to the entire SPD and other departments of the City of Seattle is covered in Chapter VIII.)

The City of Seattle Setting

The population of Seattle is about 500,000 and the city is in the center of a metropolitan area of about 1,483,000 people. The main economic basis of the area includes the Boeing Company, the Port of Seattle, the fishing industry, the University of Washington, and the lumber industry; Seattle is the regional headquarters for a variety of firms. The area has been growing economically over the past ten years, a trend that has accelerated in the past year or two. Surrounded by Puget Sound, lakes, and mountains, the city contains many cultural and recreational facilities and consistently receives high ratings for livability when compared with other cities. The average family income in 1980 was $24,730; of the 35 largest metropolitan areas in the country, Seattle ranked second in per capita income. The median number of years of school completed is 13 (1980 data), with 21.6 percent of the population having attended college for one to three years and 28.1 percent for four or more years. The population is 67 percent White, 10 percent African-American, 9 percent Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 percent Hispanic, and 1.4 percent Native American, (based on 1987 data). The Asian population has increased in the last decade through the influx of Southeast Asian peoples, although the Chinese and the Japanese communities are long-standing. The racial atmosphere is generally good, as indicated by the recent election of a Black mayor despite Blacks making up a relatively small proportion of the population.

The SSCPC covered the southeast part of the city, loosely referred to as the Rainier Valley. On the East, this area is bounded by Lake Washington; on the south, by the city limits; on the west by an area which is heavily industrial and contains working class residents; and on the North by the Interstate 90 freeway and the rest of Seattle. **Exhibit 1** displays a map of the city with the southeast area highlighted. The area bordering Rainier Valley to the north is commonly called the Central Area and has a mix of Black and White residents. Within these bounds, the Rainier Valley runs north-south with two main commercial thoroughfares, Rainier Avenue and Martin Luther King Way. The businesses in this area are mostly oriented to lower middle class and working class people. These businesses are loosely clustered in a series of groups, especially along Rainier Avenue, roughly corresponding to neighborhoods. Many of these clusters or neighborhoods have local business or residential organizations, and some are seen as distinct neighborhoods.

The residents on both sides of the valley are a mix of Black, Asian, and White ethnic groups. To the east, on the ridge overlooking both the valley and the lake are middle-class homes, populated mainly by Whites. Still farther east, the homes along the lake are quite expensive and reflect the upper middle class income group living there. To the west of the valley is another ridge, where most of the Japanese and Chinese Americans live in lower middle class neighborhoods. The heterogeneity of southeast Seattle is reflected in the range of racial composition (40 percent White, 30 percent African American, 5 percent Hispanic, and 25 percent Asian and other minorities), and income levels compared to the entire city, (**See Exhibit 2**).

This area constitutes about two-thirds of the South Precinct, one of four precincts of the Seattle Police Department. The other one-third of the South Precinct encompasses a geographically distinct area called West Seattle, which lies to the west of the industrialized valley (and serves as the western boundary of southeast Seattle). West Seattle is connected to the rest of the city mostly by causeways and bridges. The precinct station, however, is located in southeast Seattle across the street from a public housing project.

History from the 1970s to 1983

Southeast Seattle did not always present the picture just described. Up to World War II, the proportion of minorities in the area was smaller and the general economic level of the residents and the businesses was better. After the war, two large public housing projects were established in southeast Seattle called Holly Park and Rainier Vista. These housing projects, combined with an influx of Black residents from the Central Area just north of southeast Seattle, led to an increase in the proportion of low income minority people. Many of the new

Exhibit 1

City of Seattle

(SSCPC Program Area Highlighted)

SSCPC Target Area



Area of detail within
State of Washington



Exhibit 2

Income Distribution
by Census Tracts

City of Seattle



residents moved into the Rainier Valley, concentrating along both sides of the two main thoroughfares. The number of minorities, (Black, Asian, and Hispanic) has increased steadily since that time.

During the past two decades, southeast Seattle has also declined economically. The number of new businesses has not kept pace with the growth of the rest of the city, the amount of new construction has declined and sales of new homes have not increased. In fact, there has been a marked increase in the proportion of apartment houses and other multi-dwelling buildings as compared to the number of single family residences. Few of these multi-family dwellings are condominiums.

During the 70s, some of the local residents, especially those in the business community, suffered from what was perceived by them to be a crime wave. In fact, a meeting of several hundred people was held in the basement of a Catholic church to express their frustration to city and county officials who were present, including the chief criminal prosecutor. At that time and for years following, the rise in the crime rate continued to be viewed by many of the local business people as one of the causes of the economic decline of southeast Seattle. The Rainier Valley area had the reputation of having a high crime rate and therefore was not perceived as a place in which to invest. There was some suspicion of red lining by local banks.

Regardless of the cause of crime in the southeast section of the city, this area was (and is) experiencing a generally higher incidence of crime than other parts of Seattle. **Exhibit 3** shows that a good portion of the Rainier Valley has a higher than average crime rate.

One outcome of the meeting described above was increased attention in the community to other parts of the criminal justice system besides the police. A prominent local realtor organized a "Court Watch" program in which citizens attended court primarily to observe the decisions of the judges, because some of them were perceived to be partly responsible for the failure to incarcerate offenders or otherwise not impose "warranted sentences." This Court Watch effort was partly responsible for the defeat at the polls of two judges who were viewed as being too lax on offenders. Thus, the community in southeast Seattle had a taste of political effectiveness vis-a-vis the criminal justice system, and was beginning to earn a reputation for having some political clout. This success no doubt strengthened the informal community network of activists. These grassroots political efforts were not suprising because, southeast Seattle had a history of powerful state legislators, including one who had a building named for him in the state capitol. (The prominent realtor would subsequently become the first president of the SSCPC.)

Exhibit 3

Geographic Distribution
of Crimes

(Part I Offenses - 1988)



One of the attendees of the meeting mentioned above was the commander of the South Precinct. He was a strong advocate of team policing, which was a reform in policing that was being attempted in several cities throughout the country. He established a form of team policing in the South Precinct, which included an emphasis on greater cooperation with local community groups. He encouraged the watch commanders, sergeants and officers to attend community meetings and in other ways to take the initiative in working with residents in the area. He organized a succesful seminar on door locks for local business people. Some of the officers worked with an informal group of mothers to try to have speed bumps put in by the city's engineering department. And, quite significantly, he discussed the concepts of team policing with some local civic leaders. A local realtor (who organized the Court Watch program) had also learned about team policing from a friend who secured copies of revelant Department of Justice publications. However, the team policing program in the South Precinct was terminated by the police chief before it was fully developed. In any case, team policing ideas which focused on the close ties between police officers and the community were introduced both conceptually and materially into the southeast Seattle community.

In 1979, the new mayor of Seattle, Charles Royer, who had been in office since January 1978 and had close personal ties to southeast Seattle, had the city's Department of Community Development establish the Economic Renewal Task Force of the Rainier Valley. This task force involved a broad range of community groups. The goal of the task force was to develop programs to reverse the perceived decline of the community. The Task Force included a subgroup to work on problems of crime. One conclusion of this subgroup was that southeast Seattle's reputation as having a high crime rate was not justified because of the great variation of rates in different parts of the area.

The precinct commander at that time (the second during this era) participated in the effort with the support of the new police chief, Patrick S. Fitzsimons, and encouraged the establishment of a police/community committee with a broad range of groups participating. (Some of the community participants later became leaders of the SSCPC.) This in turn led to an increased degree of interaction between the police and the community, which had declined since the tenure of the previous precinct commander. The new (or second) precinct commander and/or his subordinates attended community meetings throughout the area, including tenant association meetings in the Holly Park housing project. This housing project was blessed with the stable leadership of a resident who later became part of the SSCPC. Juvenile-oriented programs were set up in Holly Park and elsewhere. In his contacts with the community, the precinct commander attempted to bring the social action and business groups together. Thus, the direct links to the community were strengthened throughout the period, and subsequent precinct commanders continued to cement

these ties by attending meetings and encouraging their subordinates to do so.

This sustained interaction between the police and the community occurred alongside another development involving the community in the effort to fight crime. This was the Neighborhood Block Watch program, which was instituted in Seattle by the Office of the Mayor in 1973. Most of the early efforts of the Neighborhood Block Watch focused on southeast Seattle, where much of its success in reducing residential burglaries occurred. Neighborhood Block Watch was also involved in the work of the Economic Renewal Task Force. When Mayor Royer appointed Patrick Fitzsimons as police chief, the Neighborhood Block Watch program was transfered to the Crime Prevention Division of the Seattle Police Department (although it continued to be staffed primarily by civilians). During discussions regarding the crime prevention work of the task force, suggestions were made to encourage the development of a Neighborhood Block Watch in the apartment houses in southeast Seattle; this would extend the program, which to date had concentrated on single family residences. However, the effort in the apartment houses was not notably successful.

Nevertheless, the Neighborhood Block Watch program continued to be active among single family residences in southeast Seattle; as a result, additional advisory groups were established in that area to help citizens on target hardening. This Neighborhood Block Watch effort, however, continued to function independently from the local precinct up until the late 1980s, although at community meetings the police encouraged citizens to participate in the program.

At the same time, the SPD established a special program for local business communities. A social activist and former minister who had considerable experience in community organizing was hired by the Commercial Security Unit, a subunit of the police department's Crime Prevention Division, to organize the businesses. Clusters of retail businesses were designated as targets of such organizing. The business organizer started with Columbia City, one of the oldest established districts in southeast Seattle, and developed a "Business Watch" program (believed to have been the first in the United States).

Business Watch involved working with local business associations to develop a directory of local businesses to facilitate mutual help and communication. This program encouraged merchants to have security checks, helped them with target hardening, contacted victimized businesses to help them try to prevent a repeat victimization, and facilitated the organization of local business communities. The business organizer worked with the "informal" mayor of the Columbia City area, who had deep personal and business roots in the southeast community and who had already participated in the task force, the Neighborhood Block Watch, and in the Court Watch program. This staffer went on to organize several other clusters of merchants in southeast Seattle along

the two main thoroughfares, working with local chambers of commerce or merchants' associations when possible. He then expanded the program to other parts of Seattle. Research on the Business Watch program showed that it was very effective in reducing business victimization, in southeast Seattle and in other parts of the city. Again, the history of at least minimally successful cooperation between the police and the community continued, especially with the business community. This collaboration also involved persons who later became leaders in the SSCPC.

Shortly after the Economic Renewal Task Force completed its work (about 1984), the business community in southeast Seattle established its own private crime fighting agency--the Crime Prevention League--with a paid staff of one. Although this person apparently worked very hard, the organization was viewed as unsuccesful, too reactive and not aware of police department operations. The league faded due to a lack of funds. Nevertheless, its nonprofit corporate shell was maintained for several years by a state representative from the area. By changing the corporate name, this charter was later used as the legal basis for the SSCPC.

The (second) precinct commander was replaced in 1980. The new precinct commander, a woman, was well acquainted with many of the community leaders in the South Precinct and worked with community groups like the Crime Prevention League, the residents' organization in Holly Park, local banks, and the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. She supported the Neighborhood Block Watch program of the department's Crime Prevention Division. It is not clear, however, how much she involved the precinct's lieutenants, sergeants, and patrol officers in these cooperative efforts.

Several key factors which occurred during the period from the mid-70s to the mid-80s seem to have facilitated the later development of the SSCPC and its collaboration with the police. These include:

- The original griping orientation was replaced by several results-oriented groups interested in "constructive assistance."

- The collective community history included a series of minimally effective cooperative efforts with the police department, at the precinct and headquarters levels.

- The leaders in the community had developed some political skill and clout through efforts separate from their direct work with the police department.

- A group of leaders began to learn a new set of skills and develop networks of collaborators and followers.

These factors are directly related to several of the issues discussed in Chapter III, specifically to the role of community in cooperative efforts with the police. Also, the constructive efforts evolved out of a long series of citizen-only and joint community/police anticrime meetings. The intensity and extent of these developments provided the underpinnings and sustaining fuel for the subsequent partnership efforts.

The implications of these factors are that the city and the police need to take a long-term view of the partnership development process, and view even small efforts (that do not appear to have any immediate payoff) as appropriate for their support. Related to this is the significance of encouraging community leaders and organizations through successful collaborations, even when the particular projects may be seemingly insignificant or have only a limited anticrime effect.

Finally, it appears that the "seed" of the community/police partnership was developing without the police articulating any theory of problem-oriented or community policing. The SPD, especially the South Precinct, was in fact shifting away from the traditional patrol-oriented "professional" law enforcement model to one of "problem-oriented" policing involving close ties with the community. In addition, this shift appears to have been occurring without any organization-wide master plan or schedule.

History after 1983

Beginning in 1983, the crime situation in southeast Seattle changed in ways parallel to changes in the rest of the city, state, and nation. Crack cocaine began to invade the various areas especially the minority areas, such as the housing projects. The total Part II narcotics violations in Seattle increased from 582 in 1983 to 4850 in 1989 (including bookings, citations, and summons for court appearances). Fortressed houses from which crack cocaine was dealt were discovered by officers. Street gang activity started to appear in parking lots, parks, and other public and private areas.

The developing tradition of having community-oriented commanders in the South Precinct continued with the appointment of the fourth precinct commander. Early in his tenure, he started to meet regularly with community leaders and diverse groups, including community councils and chambers of commerce. He strongly encouraged these groups to maintain and improve the appearance of their areas, especially in the Rainier Valley. He pointed out that this was a community responsibility, not a police responsibility, even though such improvements in the community would help keep crime in check. He also encouraged antigraffiti and community clean-up programs, and suggested that citizens call the precinct rather than 911 for help with non-emergency problems.

The community began to respond to the increased problems of drugs and gangs in the area after 1983. About that time, one citizen single-handedly organized an antigraffiti "paint-out" program in reaction to the increasing amount of graffiti (whch reflected, in part, the increasing gang presence). The Rainier Valley Chamber of Commerce, which included many of the people who had been active in the previous community anticrime efforts, sponsored a clean-up program and antigraffiti campaign which mobilized youth, local citizens, and local businesses. This effort is still going on and has been highly successful. The police cooperated with this campaign by assigning one patrol car to respond to calls made on a graffiti hotline located in a citizen's car which patrolled Rainier Avenue. Although only one legitimate call was made on this line, the idea of using citizens as the eyes and ears of the police via a hotline was established in the community.

Another area of growing police/community cooperation concerned the two large housing projects in the area. A Black activist was appointed to be security officer for the housing project. His father had been a police officer. He began to actively seek out and identify crack houses in the projects by establishing close ties with the residents and doing some surveillance himself. He reported regularly to the South Precinct, which then used the information to execute search warrants. He also began to work with the administation of the housing projects to have drug dealing tenants evicted. Although some Seattle Housing Authority staff had problems with his reporting directly to the top administrator, the residents and the police were very appreciative of his efforts. (However, after he retired and was not replaced, the newly-formed SSCPC protested the situation but was told that all the managers in the housing projects would be responsible for security. The Seattle Housing Authority has been closely tied to the SSCPC since it was founded and has in fact continued to work hard against drug-related crime.)

In response to the increasing drug activity in southeast Seattle, several tactical approaches were developed within the South Precinct during this period. One new approach was a problem identification scheme in which precinct officers prepared Narcotic Activity Reports (NARs). These NARs were sent to the central headquarters narcotics detectives for action. The precinct captain believed narcotics activity within buildings was the province of the detectives. However, the latter group had become so overwhelmed with such reports they could not react to them effectively. The basic strategy of the narcotics unit, like that of most others at that time, was to attempt to dismantle the organization which supplied the narcotics. This strategy was enunciated by the city council when it cut personnel from the narcotics squad a few years earlier. This strategy in the South Precinct had the unintended effect of abandoning the streets, the neighborhoods, the commercial districts, and the parks and school grounds to the drug dealers. This philosphy in the South Precinct, combined with the highly publicized activities of the

Anti-crime Team (explained in more detail later in this section), and coupled with the overwhelming demands on the Narcotics Squad, also discouraged patrol officers in this area of Seattle from actively fighting drugs at the "retail-distribution" level.

Another example of a new tactic involved an approach developed by staff from the Rainier Chamber of Commerce and the newly appointed precinct commander (the fourth, appointed in 1983). In cooperation with the Business Watch Coordinator and others, they jointly initiated a "Criminal Trespass Agreement" program. The managers or owners of a piece of property (which often included a parking lot) signed agreements with the SPD giving police officers permission to enter their properly posted property at any time to confront or even arrest anyone suspected of trespassing. This would avoid the necessity of giving police permission to enter the property each time there was a suspicious person. With the help of the crime analyst assigned to the South Precinct and the watch commanders and sergeants, the precinct commander assembled a list of high crime locations, or "hotspots" in two of the three Southeast Seattle patrol sectors under his command. The South Precinct crime analyst made a favorably received presentation of the "hotspot" analysis to the police chief, and the precinct commander encouraged the watch commanders and sergeants to concentrate their patrol officers on these hotspots. To facilitate the aggressiveness of the officers dealing with these problems, the precinct commander researched the possibility of allowing police officers to use a more lenient guideline than the more demanding standard of probable cause for stopping people on the street. (The precinct commander wanted to use a standard he termed "totality of the circumstances" to justify police actions such as stopping people on the street or entering and searching a building. The courts in Washington State are more restrictive than federal law pertaining to this issue.)

It also appears that at this time the full extent of the drug problem was not being acknowledged. (Until the "crack" cocaine problem appeared on the scene, many people in the general community, the medical profession, and even some in the law enforcement community did not see drugs as a priority problem.) This situation adversely affected the morale of patrol officers. In any case, the increased drug problem and the attendant rise in property crimes created some serious problems between the police and the community with respect to how the SPD reacted to community concerns about drug-related crime. There was no indication that any of the new tactics were producing the intended benefits, and several of the new approaches had not been fully implemented due to potential problems with the accountability of funds used in drug-related arrests and other concerns about lack of adherence to department procedures.

In April 1986, this impasse led the South Precinct commander to establish an Anticrime Team (ACT) which consisted of a sergeant, a detective, and two uniformed police officers (who could spend

part of their time working in the team). The ACT was authorized to perform a very specific mission, which was to improve communications and information flow between detectives and the uniformed officers in order to increase their effectiveness and productivity. The ACT nominally reported to a watch commander, but in actuality worked directly with the precinct captain. The watch commander, in reality, exercised no control over this new unit. Although its original mission was to gather and analyze street information, i.e., intelligence regarding drug trafficking and other crimes and coordinate activities throughout the precinct, most of the team's efforts went into driving drug dealers from crack houses in the neighborhoods. The sergeant would gain entry into a house (typically without the use of search warrants) by announcing at the door that he was a police officer and would like to be admitted to discuss the drug deals which he had reason to believe occurred in the premises. (There have been some questions about the legality of some of the entries that were made in this fashion. In fact, there was an unsigned, undated memorandum in the South Precinct which presented a justification for entries, based on the notion that all civil liberties are both constitutionally guaranteed and limited in some form, and that, accordingly, health and housing inspectors can enter residences without consent of the owners when they believe a violation is occurring. The memo argued that this right be extended to the police). When the sergeant talked his way into a residence, he would request cooperation from all present, seize any drugs, guns, or other contraband which he saw, and any property which obviously had been fenced and whose possession could not be explained by the occupants (such as multiple TV sets). He might ask obvious traffickers in drugs to leave the premise. He also gained considerable knowledge of the drug trafficking network in the course of these entries and discussions with the occupants.

The ACT's objectives were to disrupt and/or destroy the drug traffic in a given neighborhood, not to make arrests. This community-oriented objective, in contrast to an arrest orientation, was part of the ethos of team policing to which the sergeant had been exposed when he was a patrol officer in the South Precinct. As a consequence of this tactic and how it was carried out, normal departmental procedures and policies concerning record-keeping, accounting for evidence, and other legal issues were allegedly being disregarded and/or circumvented.

While there was anecdotal evidence that these "search and seizure" tactics were working (such as decreased burglaries and an increase in officer-initiated "on-view" activity), there was no hard data to indicate that this was the case. Despite the lack of such clean evidence, the local community apparently viewed this tactic as a success and was basically supportive of the ACT's operations.

After several months of operation, a review and audit of the ACT was ordered by the chief of police in July of 1986. By September, the ACT was suspended. The audit found that there was little accountability at the precinct-level for ACT activities, and noted problems in documentation of arrests, house entries, and searches and seizures. The sergeant who originally headed the ACT was subsequently transferred from street duty, which was unanimously recommended by a SPD hearing panel. He ultimately left the department. The local community apparently felt that this police officer was unfairly treated by the department and was unhappy that a "successful" tactic against drugs was no longer being used. Feelings of anger and resentment between various segments of the community and the Seattle Police Department still exist as a result of this incident.

In March of 1987, a new ACT headed by another sergeant was established under guidelines which required strict adherence to department standard operating procedures. For example, new procedures dictated that if crack dealing was suspected in a residence by the police or the public, a confidential informant or undercover police officer was to make a buy in the residence and, if possible, a search warrant was to be secured and executed. This new team, like the original one, was established without any additional resources for the community policing program despite the chief's requests for such funding.

This new team was extremely active, making 422 arrests in ten months. It solicited information from patrol officers regarding suspected crack houses. The team was supported and encouraged by the chief of police who visited it regularly, and it also received support from the city council. In addition, Chief Fitzsimons created a street narcotics team (within the Narcotics Unit) to move the fight against drugs into the streets. This had the effect of replacing detective positions cut from the section a number of years previously during budget cutbacks.

The picture that emerges from these developments in the South Precinct is that there was an ongoing general movement toward problem-oriented policing and away from established policy that was based solely on response to 911 calls-for-service and preventative patrolling. (The SPD did not abandon their efforts to respond to calls-for-service, and in accordance with existing goals maintained this key function.) The concern about hotspots, the development of criminal trespass agreements, and the activities of both Anticrime Teams were all part of the movement. These problem-solving efforts had their origin in the local precinct, and were done independently of any departmentwide effort. This ad hoc effort eventually resulted in the need for additional officers. However, the formal departmental community/police partnership efforts continued to use only existing personnel resources. The hotspot orientation was done at the initiative of precinct personnel. Some legal and advisory support was given to the development of the criminal trespass agreements; however, the initiative appears to have been mostly

at the precinct level. This focus of the effort speaks to the issue of centralization versus decentralization (organizational configuration) mentioned in the previous chapter.

The administration and supervision of the problem-oriented approach at the precinct level was not sufficiently effective, at least not initially. In addition to the growing demand to respond to 911 calls, most precinct personnel were not directly involved because (as noted previously) the precinct commander worked directly with the ACT and bypassed the watch commander and normal chain of command. The patrol officers did not focus on the "hotspots" as much as the precinct commander would have liked. Subsequent internal analysis indicated the need for the development of detailed procedures (accountability of officers) and for program evaluation. Furthermore, the community began to be involved in the management of the police department in that they strongly and publicly supported the original ACT sergeant in his difficulties with the Police Department. The issue of the community micro-managing the police department surfaced here as well.

On the other hand, this problem-solving activity sometimes approached (and possibly moved beyond) the limits of lawful behavior by the police. The motivation behind these activities may have resulted from the support which the police felt they had from the residents and business people. This potential problem is also relevant to the issues raised in the previous chapter (i.e., the role of police officers and the nature of police legitimacy) about community pressure encouraging the police to act at (or beyond) the limits of the law. It is very notable that the command staff of the police department reacted to the danger of police infractions by adjusting the operational guidelines of the special unit to accomplish the same goals and objectives as the first ACT, but to do so within the limits of the law. It appears that the reconstituted ACT team had a much greater effect than the first team in ridding the area of drug dealing, but it used arrests as a prime tool (in line with traditional policing). Thus, problem-oriented policing in this setting included a traditional approach (arrests) as a major tool.

The next chapter covers the actual establishment of the SSCPC in much more detail and, in part, overlaps some of the timeframe reviewed in this chapter. The program components of the SSCPC are also identified and discussed.

CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH SEATTLE CRIME REDUCTION PROJECT

Overview of the Chapter

This chapter describes the events leading up to the negotiations between the community group and the Seattle Police Department, the negotiations themselves, and their culmination in the actual agreement between the community and the department. This description is pertinent to a number of the issues set forth in Chapter III. Perhaps the most important issue concerns factors that led to the establishment of a close, synergistic working relationship between the community organization and the police. This is related to how "community" is defined, and the notion that there are stages of development that these citizen groups go through. Next is the issue of power sharing between the community and the police in the operation of the department (i.e., the issue of micro-management of the police). The issue of decentralization of police department functioning is also addressed.

Development of the 15-Point Plan

Within the context of the developments in the South Precinct and in the community described in the previous chapter, the sequence of events that ultimately led to the agreement between the SSCPC and the police department started with an informal meeting in the spring of 1987 of a small group of people associated with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. This was the predominant business organization in the area of the project, and many of the people who had been involved in the anticrime and clean-up programs of the previous decade were associated with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. However, the meeting was called by the editor and publisher of the South District Journal which covered the south Seattle area. He had very close ties with members of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce as well as with the police officers in the South Precinct and throughout the department.

The immediate reason for the meeting at that time was the rise in commercial burglaries in the area. The repeated burglaries at a well known men's clothing store symbolized this trend, but it was also documented by commercial burglary statistics that the editor had obtained through his contacts in the Seattle Police Department. However, there were additional, longer term reasons for calling the meeting. Participants in the meetings believed that patrol officers in the South Precinct were not highly motivated to help solve the community's problems. They saw that the continued economic decline of the Rainier Valley (several major retail chain stores had left) was in part a result of the general belief that crime was a serious problem in the area. Since many of the participants had business interests in the area

(and most also lived in the area), both the general economic decline and the rise of commercial burglaries were considered serious matters.

After their initial meeting, the group began to meet frequently to probe into the problem of crime. They contacted the precinct commander (the fourth incumbent) with whom they had a good relationship and who became a frequent attendee of the meetings. From him and other sources they learned of the apparent linkage between commercial burglary and the rise of crack houses and drug use in the area. In March, they decided that the problem of crime, drugs, and gangs was serious enough to take to the mayor and demand more response by the police and others. This approach to dealing with the mayor was consistent with their previous political experience. The mayor met with members of the group who presented a program as follows:

- Establish a community review committee to aid in setting priorities for reduction of crime in Rainier Valley.

- Develop a plan for better communication within the police department to achieve more productive working conditions and a cooperative relationship with other city departments, and to advise this community on the plan.

- Assure the southeast community that a proactive response will be continually encouraged at the precinct level, and that this attitude will be both expected and appreciated.

- Establish standards of achievement to aggressively reduce crime with accountability from the chief on down.

- Procedures for reporting and accountability to the community were proposed to help assure that progress was being made.

However, the mayor was not persuaded about the gravity of the situation, and he did not immediately expand the fight against drugs and crime. The mayor maintained that the problems were not as serious as the community representatives had argued and that emphasizing them might give the area and the city a bad reputation. Nevertheless, he was impressed by the figures indicating a rise in commercial burglaries. He also said that his police chief, in whom he had full confidence, was a strong person who essentially ran his own show. One outcome of the meeting was that the police chief directed the line supervisors from his headquarters to meet regularly with the community group to inform them of police capabilities and limitations.

Over the next few months, the group met with various police commanders and staff, from the South Precinct commander to the chief himself. The precinct commander acted as the coordinator for the meetings with police personnel. Nevertheless, the community people were very discouraged by the presentations because they emphasized the legal, administrative, and budgetary

restraints on the police department. It appears that without the previous years of successful problem-solving and cooperation with the police, the group probably would have dissolved at this point. Instead, they concluded that the "vision and imagination" needed to solve these problems would have to be developed by themselves.

Throughout this period, the police chief argued accurately and vigorously in many public statements that the Seattle Police Department was doing its share in the fight against crime and drugs by making many more arrests then they had made in previous years. Although the workload of the department had increased, without additional resources he had established ACTs in two precincts and a special citywide street team to work on gangs, drugs, and other problems. He also argued that the courts and the correctional system had not incarcerated enough of the arrestees for sufficient periods of time. In addition, he pointed out that the problem was a national one, and that local law enforcement could have only limited effectiveness. His arguments did not, however, convince the citizen group that the crime problems in their community were being solved or that additional resources/approaches were not warranted.

Despite the discouragement felt by the group, there were a number of positive by-products of about 34 meetings which occurred. First, the police hierarchy was greatly impressed by the persistence and seriousness of the group. The command staff realized that these people were not just "complainers," but were honestly dedicated to solving their community's problems. Their dedication, as well as their effectiveness, was also manifest in the obvious and well-publicized success of their antigraffiti program.

Second, the police learned that the group was not interested only in the solution of a given crime problem, but in broad-based generic solutions to the problem of crime. The key players in the group had apparently learned over the years that they could successfully collaborate with the police on given crime problems. But they also discovered that because of the repetitive nature of these problems and their recent escalation, they needed solutions which were more basic, long term, and deep (within society and the neighborhood). They were the only community group in the South Precinct which had worked with the police on particular problems in an attempt to develop a broader, more systematic approach to the problem of crime.

Third, the police developed increasing trust in the group. They saw that the information provided to the citizens was not used against them. In fact, the group and its parent, the Rainier Chamber of Commerce, lobbied before both the city council and the state legislature for the police and for issues they supported. These activities included supporting legislation to facilitate narcotics investigations and arguing for more funds for the Seattle Police Department. In another context, their support was

indicated by their donating a needed computer printer to the South Precinct. The lobbying effort not only developed trust, but also demonstrated to the police department and the city the political astuteness and effectiveness of the group.

When the community group began to act on their recognition that they would have to provide the initiative to solve problems in the area, they split these problems into two broad categories and set up subgroups for each. The first subgroup was expected to deal with the issue of general community improvement in the educational, physical, and social areas. The second subgroup was concerned more directly with crime and the police, and was chaired by the same realtor who had been active in the community for numerous years. This subgroup took on the particular task of working with the police in an attempt to develop workable and lasting solutions to the problems in their neighborhoods. (The police, on the other hand, still viewed the problem from the perspective of equitable resource allocation and the effective use of existing personnel.)

The ideas for the vision that the crime subgroup developed came, to a substantial degree, from the local newspaper editor. He had learned much from his years of close contact with the department. He was aware of research on theories of policing in addition to many of the developments which were occurring throughout the South Precinct. In what appears to be another instance of serendipitous planning, one day during the summer of 1987, the realtor (on sudden inspiration) wrote a proposal for the South Precinct to have its own police department and presented it to her subgroup. They surprised her by taking the idea seriously. The subgroup then embarked on a process of writing what developed into the 15-Point Plan for improvements in policing in the Robert and Sam sectors of the South Precinct, which covered the southeast Seattle area. Because the groundwork had been established through a series of meetings with the police staff and the knowledge and contributions that the members had acquired over the years, this program was developed in a two-week period. The original 15-Point Plan is contained in Appendix A.

These 15 points emphasized close collaborative relationships between the South Precinct and the community; decentralizing the police department, especially the detective functions; more aggressive work by the police officers; and more dedication to the community and its organizations. The original plan also called for a substantial increase in the uniformed personnel (at least fifteen sworn staff) resources allocated to the South Precinct. On the other hand, the community organization was to develop a broader base within the community as well as coordinate the efforts of local social service agencies.

Formal Community/Police Agreement

The crime subgroup had been meeting on their own through the spring and summer of 1987. After they formulated the 15 points, they met with their parent organization (the Rainier Chamber of Commerce). After a careful review, the chamber decided to endorse the program and formally designated the group as its anticrime committee. The halftime staff person for the chamber took on the additional responsibility of working with the anti-crime committee. She had already been heavily involved in the community clean-up programs supported or sponsored by the chamber. In addition, the president of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce took a major interest in pushing the program, which turned out to be important because of her personal ties with the mayor's office. Thus, the group was able to mobilize considerable political strength in the Rainier Valley.

The 15-Point Plan was unveiled in early September in a meeting with the mayor and his staff (rather than solely to the chief). By presenting it to the mayor and not to the city council, the community group was attempting to avoid involvement in an adversarial relationship between the mayor and the police chief on the one side and the council on the other. Some members of the council had been attacking the police department for inadequate responses to the drug and crime problems. The mayor's staff reacted ambivalently to the program. On the one hand, they recognized the group's dedication, its constructive orientation, and its absence of animosity to the chief as well as its political clout and stature in the community. The neighborhood orientation of the program also fit the mayor's ideology. Yet, it was perceived that public acceptance would have given undue emphasis to the problem of drugs and gangs in the city. Furthermore, they felt, rightly or wrongly, that the police chief would not view such a proposal warmly, although some members of the committee reported that they felt the chief was positive to the program.

The crime committee did not receive a reply from the mayor's office for several weeks. Growing impatient, and after much discussion of alternatives, the committee sent a letter to the mayor on October 7, 1987. It stated that, on October 14, they would hold a press conference at which they would announce that they had submitted a program to the mayor. They invited the mayor or anyone he would designate to attend that conference. Two days before the scheduled press conference, the police chief called the chairperson of the crime committee to ask for a meeting with her group. They met the next day in her home along with the chairperson of the other subgroup (who had also been involved for many years). Although the chief substantially agreed to the program, he was insistent that the program be mounted with no additional personnel resources being given to the South Precinct. However, he recognized that additional overtime would be necessary as well as support from specialized units under central control, such as the Traffic Unit. At the press

conference, while the crime committee stayed in the background, the chief announced the agreement with the south Seattle community group. He also announced that negotiations about the details of the program would begin at once, and that the program would commence on January 1, 1988.

Subsequent negotiations were conducted by the major who commanded the Inspectional Services Division of the Seattle Police Department (part of the chief's office). He met regularly with the community group, with occasional participation by the chief and other police staff. The issue of additional resources was a prime consideration from the point of view of the police department, possibly because the South Precinct commander had been regularly requesting additional patrol officers for some time. These requests had not been perceived by the command staff to be justified; this belief was based on the need for an equitable allocation of resources to the other precincts in the city. For its part, the community did not insist on having two-person cars throughout the precinct, recognizing the problem of lack of personnel (and the potential adverse impact on response time). The community also recognized that resources were not available to have the two narcotics detectives physically headquartered in the South Precinct station house. The police pointed out that greater use could be made of the burglary and juvenile detectives already located in the South Precinct station, although not under precinct command. In addition, the department emphasized the increased use of the Telephone Reporting Program to free staff for other assignments. On the accountability issue, the department objected to being held to any fixed goals of reducing crime because they felt there were many factors outside the control of the police which could influence the crime rate.

The issue of the role of the community in advising the police with respect to "targets" on which to work did not cause many problems during the negotiations, although the police were seriously concerned about the potential loss of operational control as a result of the program. Nevertheless, both sides apparently felt that there would be little disagreement about targets. Community members felt that the term "Advisory" in the agreement (i.e., Community Advisory Committee) was actually a euphemism for partnership. The issue of how disagreements were to be handled was not addressed in any depth. Thus, the most remarkable part of the program--active citizen involvement in directions given to patrol officers as to where to patrol, i.e., their proactivity--was left ambiguous. As it turned out, the optimism of both sides about the feasibility of cooperating on this sensitive issue was justified.

During the negotiations, it appears that both sides recognized each other's "power" (the police having legal power, the committee having power to go to the press), but neither party threatened to use this power in any dysfunctional way. Nevertheless, the negotiations were not a completely smooth sail.

It was not uncommon for verbal agreements made at one meeting to appear differently when presented in writing at a subsequent meeting. The committee became alert to this problem. The committee still continued to receive complaints from the police department about the handicaps they were under, but the citizens tended to reject or ignore these complaints.

At the same time that the negotiations were taking place, the chief testified before the city council to acclaim the program, suggesting that parts of the program might be established elsewhere in the city. He also pointed out that the department had been very active against the drug problem without additional resources. The chief reported that he had made organizational changes to increase coordination in the fight against drugs and that the incoming South Precinct commander was very experienced, lived in the South Precinct area, and would be in the commander assignment for a period long enough to design and carry out effective programs. He also pointed out that even before the formal inauguration of the program, efforts were being made to work with the managers of several apartment houses to help them get rid of drug trafficking. The city council's response was very positive to the program, especially since some of its members had openly supported community-based policing concepts. The negotiations culminated in an announcement at a well-publicized public meeting on December 3, 1987, that the program was finalized and accepted by all parties, and that it would get underway on January 1, 1988. The public meeting was attended by about 100 citizens, and was relatively benign, with little outcry against the police. There apparently was a degree of hope and trust in the air. Also, in the South Precinct, the precinct commander talked about the program with the police officers.

Discussion of Issues

The community and the police department encountered a number of important issues during the process of forming the partnership. These issues are discussed in the following sections.

- "Micro-management" of the police by the community.

  It is obvious that the agreement entailed a great deal of community intrusion into the operations of the police department. A major issue, as indicated in Chapter III, concerns the limits of this external influence on police management. Several times during the period of the development, acceptance, and finalizing of the 15-Point Plan, there were tests of the limits of this intrusion. Public controversy over the fate of the original ACT sergeant raged throughout this time. Although there were some protests, the crime committee generally tried to stay out of this controversy (even though some of their ideas came indirectly from him). The local newspaper editor, a public advocate for the ACT sergeant, dropped out of the

negotiations because he saw that his participation would detract from achieving workable solutions.

After the October (1987) meeting at which the agreement was made public, the chief announced that all four of his precinct commanders were to be replaced as part of a four year rotation policy. People in southeast Seattle and the city council viewed this rotation as a cover for transferring the precinct commander out of the South Precinct. General public comments attributed the motives for this transfer to his tacit protection of the ACT sergeant, his cooperation with the community, and what was perceived to be his general administrative difficulties with his supervisors. The minority community was also involved in the protest against the transfer, possibly because the precinct commander was himself a member of a minority group. Although some members of the community group also expressed misgivings at losing the precinct commander who had helped them, the group backed down from a confrontation on this matter. It was pointed out by the chairperson of the crime committee that if the police were to be responsible for carrying out their part of the program, they needed to have the authority to manage their own affairs. (This concern about losing an advocate of close ties with the community soon became academic, with the new (fifth) precinct commander continuing to foster a cooperative working relationship with the public.) Thus, in two instances the group members restrained themselves from excessive intrusion into police matters, but the decision to do so had not been easy.

- Definition and Legitimacy of the Community

As mentioned in the previous chapter and implied above, the leadership of the citizen group that eventually became the SSCPC came primarily from the business community. Although the business people were also residents in the area, they were not perceived to be tied to the residential community. This business orientation partly lay behind the inclusion of point #2 in the 15-Point Plan, which required that the committee make a constructive effort to involve a cross-section of the population of Southeast Seattle to represent the "socio-economic diversity of the area."

The absence of publicly perceived close ties between the police and the residents of Southeast Seattle partly led to the development of another group called Neighbors Against Drugs (NAD) in mid-1988. This group was in the Rainier Beach area, a primarily White residential neighborhood in transition. The organizers of this group felt that they were "forced" to be involved in anti-crime activity because of the rise of crack houses in their neighborhood. They called a public meeting, and to their surprise it was well attended and led to the formation of NAD. They became

proficient at conducting public meetings which were well publicized, and often involved some politicians and the police chief. Anti-drug protest meetings (some in the streets) were held throughout this period. However, their basic agenda was to protest police department activities, and they advocated removal of the police chief (who they felt was negligent with respect to the drug and crime problems). NAD supported the original ACT sergeant (some NAD leaders had strong personal ties with this person) and they prepared a document supporting his ideas and testified before the city council. This group also attacked the Rainier Chamber of Commerce as being soley business-oriented, as representing landlords, as ignoring residents, as collaborators with their enemy ("the Police Chief"), and as not representing minorities. (NAD had only one minority in its leadership and most members were White.)

At this point of time, NAD was at the same stage of development as the people who attended the meeting at the Catholic church years before; the Rainier Chamber of Commerce was obviously more seasoned and was dealing directly with the police. NAD and other groups of citizens continued to attack the police chief and the Rainier Chamber of Commerce throughout this period, and were supported by some city council members in their attacks. In fact, one NAD member suggested that the council investigate the Narcotics Section of the Seattle Police Department.

Thus, with respect to the issue of defining the community, the decision by the police to negotiate with the group associated with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce initially defined the community. Others in the community were left out and protested vigorously and publicly which created problems for the police department as well as the SSCPC. While the partnership that started with the chamber of commerce group (i.e., the SSCPC) has grown to include diverse citizens, there are undoubtedly people in Seattle who continue to feel underrepresented. In addition, it is impossible to predict what the outcome might have been had the police department and/or the city attempted to work with a more representative group at the early stages of the community/police partnership effort.

- The Role of the Community

The question can be asked, "What helped the group develop the positive characteristics that enabled it to successfully carry out its far-reaching goals?" There are a number of possible answers. First, the members of the group continued to feel that they were part of a politically effective group (as they had been in the past) because of the mayor's meeting with them and the agreement of cooperation by the police department. Second, there was a history of anticrime projects and community improvement efforts successfully

completed in cooperation with the police. This level of successful cooperation continued because of the willingness of the "police brass" to discuss police issues at the meetings. The continued success encouraged the members' involvment in the group and its efforts.

Third, through the long history of joint efforts with the police and as a result of discussions with police officers, the group had learned that the police department simply could not and should not be expected to solve all the community's crime and related problems by themselves. They realized that cooperative efforts were needed and the community had special responsibilities. In short, they had gone beyond the view that "we pay our taxes, so the police have the job of fighting crime."

Fourth, members of the group had come to know each other for a long time, had worked together in successful projects, and were part of the network of business people involved in the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. Fifth, some of the members of this group had considerable leadership skills which were honed in their years of working together.

And finally, the members had strong ties to the area. These ties were based on economic and personal commitments. Many of the members of the group had deep business roots in the community which made the option of moving their businesses difficult (although not impossible). Furthermore, most of them lived in the area. Some had parents and grandparents who were early pioneers and developers of the area. Members of the group remarked in interviews that those who did not care about the "Valley" had left long ago. They appeared to take considerable pride in their own dedication to the area. In fact, one of their common and bitter complaints was that patrol officers would sometimes say to people in the community (when the officers were responding to a call), "What do you expect if you live here?"

These factors, which appear to be the foundation of the persistence and dedication of the group, also help to explain the continued hard work and commitment exhibited during the subsequent negotiations with the police department and the actual functioning of the SSCPC over the years.

CHAPTER VI

PROGRAMS AND COMPONENTS OF THE SOUTH SEATTLE CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL

Overview of Chapter

This chapter describes the various components or programs which were developed and operated as part of the SSCPC. After the SSCPC was formally established, there were still numerous unresolved issues related to program scope and operational procedures. The 15-Point Plan encouraged cooperation between the police and the community, but did not identify specific programs or types of cooperation that should occur (or not occur for that matter). The resulting programs and their developmental processes are explained and discussed in relation to the issues introduced in Chapter III.

Description of the South Precinct

The SSCPC program focused on the South Precinct, one of four in the City of Seattle. **Exhibit 4** displays a map of the SPD precincts. The South Precinct encompasses an area of approximately 30 square miles with a population of about 133,000. It is divided into three districts or "sergeant sectors" with five police car beats in each sector, served in its entirety by approximately 120 officers. In addition, there was an Anti-crime Team, composed of a sergeant and five officers (who do not answer emergency 911 calls). The ACT's mission was dictated by the precinct captain, and was adjusted from time to time depending upon the changing nature of crime problems. The SSCPC's activities were concentrated in the general Rainier Valley area which included parts of the "S" (Sam) and "R" (Robert) sectors of the South Precinct.

Initial SSCPC Organization and Structure

In January of 1988 (as specified in the agreement), the core group of community people who had been associated with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce became the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council. This was accomplished by using the corporate shell of the functionally defunct but legally viable Crime Prevention League and changing the name to the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council. Funds for a halftime staff person, supplies, etc., were secured from a variety of sources, including private donations and fundraisers, a Block Grant from the city and local business people, especially banks. The SSCPC was designed as a council of organizations and community representatives, not as an open-membership organization. Membership was by invitation only, and the regular meetings were not widely publicized. The regular meetings were attended only

Exhibit 4

PATROL CAR DISTRICTS



North Precinct
(B, N, U Sectors)

Area - 32.50 Sq. Mi.
Population - 209,722

East Precinct
(E, C, G Sectors

Area - 11.83 Sq. Mi.
Population - 88,110

West Precinct
(Q, D, K Sectors)

Area - 9.89 Sq. Mi.
Population - 63,607

South Precinct
(W, R, S Sectors)

Area - 29.78 Sq. Mi.
Population - 132,561

by the approximately 17 members (whose attendance record was around 80 percent) and by a small number of specially invited guests, who were introduced at the beginning of each meeting when the nature of their interests was explained. (As will be explained later, this restriction on attendance facilitated the development of trust with the police department.) The captain or a lieutenant from the South Precinct was always present at the regular meetings and was a full participating member of the SSCPC. Twice a year, open public meetings were held to report back to the community as implicitly required by the 15-Point Plan. The halftime staffer of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce added the halftime job of staffing the SSCPC (as executive director) to her duties.

From the outset of the new arrangement between the community and the police, there was a "problem orientation" to their cooperation. A number of programs or components were established as part of the SSCPC, including:

- Targeting
- Narcotics Activity Reports (NARS)
- Criminal Trespass Program
- Pay Telephone Program
- Owner Notification Program (Abatement Process)
- Antigraffiti
- Hotline
- Garden Police Car

These components are described in the following sections.

Targeting

One of the most unique forms of collaboration between the SSCPC and the SPD was the program of setting targets (that is, public safety and crime problems) which the police were to address.

The initial, informal approach to targeting was introduced at the first meeting called by the SSCPC on December 30, 1987, just prior to the formal start of the program. Invitations to this meeting were sent to core members of the SSCPC and other selected community organizations. At that meeting, attended by the precinct captain and a lieutenant, there was some informal discussion of targets, such as rock houses or certain taverns. However, because the meeting lacked a quorum, no formal targets were designated. Thus, by implication, it was the consensus that the targets were to be formally designated at meetings of the SSCPC; that is, the decision as to where police were to concentrate their efforts was to be made at an official meeting of a community organization with no formal governmental status, a truly radical step in American policing.

At the next meeting a week later, also attended by some precinct command staff, a quorum was present. Seven targets were agreed

on; these targets were, for the most part, those that the police had fairly well determined were the major hot spots in southeast Seattle. The SSCPC agreed with this selection of targets. (The issue of "power" or "control" as compared to "advice" or "suggestions" did not have to be directly addressed because there was no controversy. The participants' concerns about the problems and their agreement as to specific hotspots was so great that concern about formal power was apparently not an issue.) The seven targets were presented to the precinct commander in the form of a memo, despite the fact that the decision was really a joint one between the police and the SSCPC.

As indicated above, the major initiative in selecting the targets came from the police. The targets covered both specific locations (including offenses and the times of their occurrences) as well as general problems, such as abandoned cars and prostitution in a long stretch of a main thoroughfare. The designation of abandoned cars is especially striking because this was done at the captain's initiative even before the input from the hotline (another component explained in a following section) was available indicating that the population of southeast Seattle shared the view that abandoned cars were a significant problem. The captain's primary concern was with the use of the cars for drug dealing purposes more than the poor appearance they made, while the citizens' reasons were more concerned with the latter. Nevertheless, the citizenry agreed with the captain even though the members of the SSCPC had not indicated that abandoned cars were one of their prime concerns.

As part of the targeting program, the police activities directed at the targets were to be carefully and fully documented. Each officer was to make a special log entry each time he or she went to a target, with an expectation that at least twice per shift the assigned target (problem) would be addressed. Thus, the officers were not asked to do other than what they normally would do if they were patrolling aggressively. They were not asked to do walking beats or contact the law-abiding citizenry, as was done in some forms of community-oriented policing. In interviews, the officers did not indicate that going to the targets was in any way objectionable, since a large chunk of their time would normally have been spent answering calls or patrolling. Thus, they remained professional officers (and perhaps even more so with respect to the assigned targets).

The SSCPC met weekly over the next month or so, dealing with targeting at all meetings. The targets were added by formal parliamentary motions at these meetings, apparently as suggested by the police and the SSCPC. No serious disagreements appear in the minutes or other records, although some police felt that some targets were too broadly defined (such as abandoned cars). There also was agreement that certain targets had been "resolved." This too was done by formal motion. Later, some targets were classified as "pending" rather than as active or resolved. The pending targets would be monitored regularly, but the officers

were not required to visit them twice during a watch. This was done because some targets appeared to be resolved, but possibly only temporarily, such as a playing field to which drug traffickers might return in better weather. Because of the limitation of resources, it was generally understood that the number of active targets needed to be limited, although no fixed ceiling was set.

At each meeting, the police reported in detail the criminal and disorderly behavior at the targets. Reported actions included such items as the number of field interrogations and other citizen contacts, the number of arrests of various types, and the actions of special units at the targets (such as ACT, Traffic, Vice, or Special Patrol Units). These actions by the police were discussed in great detail; planned police actions were also discussed in a general way by the captain, evidently with full confidence in the security of the information presented to the group. Confidentiality apparently was assured because few outsiders attended these early meetings.

The SSCPC members also reported on their own observations of criminal and other behavior at the targets. They would report on improvements in the area, such as a dispersion of street dealing or the greater use of bus stops by citizens no longer afraid of being accosted by drug traffickers, and on any decreases in graffiti and prostitution. On a weekly basis at first, and then monthly, these targets were discussed at the joint police/community meetings and their status was changed depending on the current activity. (The SPD requested monthly meetings because the paperwork burden on the precinct sergeants was becoming too great with weekly meetings; the SSCPC accepted this change.)

In addition, any rock house reports coming through the hotline were reviewed by the police; if confirmed, the address was added to the target list. At the end of the year, there were 19 targets that had been worked on by the police and 20 rock houses that had been reported through the hotline for a total of 39 targets. Of these, 21 had been categorized as completed, six as pending and twelve remained on the current list. Most of the targets that were current at the beginning of the year were rated as completed by the end of the year except for some having to do with prostitution and abandoned cars. The effort against rock houses identified through the telephone hotline was viewed as successful, since most of them had been closed down. (The nature of rock houses is that once a house in one location is closed under the civil abatement process (explained in a later section), it may reappear in another area; thus the community and the police had to maintain their efforts to permanently drive rock houses out of an area. Some "maintenance" policing of such locations was intended to keep them from reappearing.)

Through interviews with supervisors (lieutenants and sergeants), it was clear that one of the main benefits of the targeting

procedure was the opportunity for the police to interact with the community around specific public safety issues, and to discuss responses and tactics that the police employ against them. Some supervisors felt that this effort on the part of the police could have been labeled "public relations," but in fact it had some specific benefits both to the police and to the community. For example, community members realized that often when drug dealers were arrested, they quickly reappeared on the streets. This occurred because even though the police arrested them, the rest of the criminal justice system allowed the dealer to reappear on the streets without much delay.

Another benefit of formally identifying targets was related to the ability of the community to put pressure on landlords who would not cooperate in the civil abatement process when some of their tenants were dealing drugs. The community's assistance helped to encourage the officer's efforts--the connection between the community's pressure and a suddenly cooperative landlord was clear to all of the officers concerned. The targets also focused the attention of the officers away from responding to call after call and onto a broader view of their district in terms of the problems that it had. In addition, the targeting process provided officers from different watches with a common basis for viewing the problems in their own districts; this is in opposition to the normal state of affairs where there is relatively poor communication between watches regarding ongoing efforts that need to be coordinated on a 24-hour basis.

On the negative side, some supervisors felt that officers should have input into selecting targets, and that it should not be a task accomplished solely by the precinct command and the community. This way the officers would have more control and ownership of their own districts. It also seemed that some targets stayed on the active list too long; from their perspective, the target problem had been solved and all that was required was a smaller maintenance effort. Officers felt that they had to pay attention to some targets on a daily basis (e.g., drive by it and take some police action related to that target) even though the nature of the problem did not deserve it.

On balance, however, the supervisors interviewed felt that the targeting procedure was successful, and that it resolved the problems at hand by either displacing them or by ending the illegal activity that was going on at the target. They felt that, despite the administrative problems, the targeting procedure was successful and worthy of being continued. They overwhelmingly felt, however, that the paperwork required for record keeping was too onerous, and should have been done by a clerk. Officers and supervisors should not have been required to write target reports on a daily basis.

Narcotics Activity Reports

Narcotics Activity Reports (NARs) are complaints received from citizens concerning narcotics trafficking and use in the community. These complaints were received in person, by mail or telphone, by a police officer in the street, or at the precinct. In addition, they could be received through the hotline set up by the community. Each NAR was recorded on a special form and then forwarded to the Narcotics Division, where it was numbered and dated. The narcotics unit then decided to assign it for follow-up investigation by patrol, the ACT, the Narcotics Street Team or narcotics detectives. If the activity was not substantiated by follow-up investigation, an officer or sergeant would then contact the complainant and provide feedback about their findings regarding the narcotics activity. Usually a precinct officer in the area where the narcotics activity was reported would provide follow-up investigation to substantiate the activity. If that activity was substantiated and required further action, the officer would then provide that information to the ACT, narcotics team or other detectives for followup.

Fairly typical 3-month statistics for the South Precinct can be gleaned from what occurred in the fourth quarter of 1988. During this quarter, 331 NARs were received. Of these complaints:

- 11 were settled by search warrants and/or arrest.
- 48 were cleared when the suspect was evicted, moved out, or the house was vacant by the time of the follow-up investigation.
- 44 were judged inactive because no narcotic activity was observed during follow-up.
- 47 were retained in the central narcotics unit or assigned to the Anti-crime Team or Streets Narcotics Team for attempts to make a buy or further investigation.
- 24 of them fell within a current target area and were used as further evidence that a target area was active and required more police intervention.
- 144 were unresolved and considered pending at the end of the year.
- 8 were determined to be unfounded, or officers were unable to locate the address.
- 5 were outside of the South Precinct, and therefore were referred to other precincts.

During the entire year, the NAR program processed 1219 complaints that were reviewed and on which follow-up activity was taken and feedback given to the community and to the SSCPC.

The interviews with the patrol supervisors led to a number of comments about the NAR procedures. Some supervisors felt that having follow-up surveillance done by patrol officers with marked cars was not appropriate, since very little narcotics activity would take place with a marked patrol car within sight. Other supervisors felt that direct referral of these NARs to undercover officers would have been much more productive. Supervisors also felt that many of these NARs were unfounded for a variety of reasons, including incomplete or incorrect information and reports of incidents that were unfounded or simply misinterpreted by the observer. In a few instances, NARs may have been used by neighbors as a way to get back at each other.

While some supervisors thought it might be possible to provide more specific instructions to people preparing NARs, others felt that if too much was demanded of the citizens, the number of calls received would be a sharply reducted. The paperwork, however, was an issue that all supervisors complained about. Because NARs were not received equally in all car districts, some officers were far more burdened than others in having to followup on these activities (particularly since they had to respond to their own calls in addition to the surveillance of the NAR addresses).

Information on the NARs, including its adjudication, was reported back to the community through the joint police/community meetings. (There was a good deal of pressure from the community to get feedback on the actions taken.) This proved to be very demanding on the time of both patrol officers and supervisors in terms of keeping track of all the activities that were performed on a particular address. It was suggested that if only those NARs that contained sufficient information for followup were assigned to patrol officers for surveillance, then a more effective, less burdensome use of officer time could be achieved. Also, the idea of having a patrol officer followup on narcotic activity reports during his or her "free time" did not work in practice. It was determined that most officers did not have sufficient time to make "useful" contacts on an address to try to ascertain the reliability of the NAR.

One problem with the NARs system was that the reports first went to the Narcotics Section located in downtown Seattle. The Narcotics Section would enter the NARs them into a computer on a data base program that allowed them to not only keep statistics on complaints, but also log the number of complaints per address over a period of time. The Narcotics Section then decided whether the NARs would be sent back to the Patrol Division in the South Precinct or would be acted upon directly by their unit. This processing of the NARs delayed direct action for several days, which some supervisors felt was too slow. Other supervisors felt that the NARs, as incomplete as some may have been, were an excellent intelligence source and helped in providing justification for civil abatements against a particular property.

Criminal Trespass Program

The criminal trespass program was originally initiated by the SSCPC prior to the group's formal incorporation. The program consisted of agreements between private property owners and the police department, giving police officers the right to enter portions of private property (particularly parking lots and exterior stairs and lobbies) in order to question individuals who may have been unwanted trespassers. Once an agreement between the police and the landlord was obtained, the officers then had a new tool to cite and arrest individuals who may have been engaging in loitering for the purposes of drug transactions (even though the actual drug transaction may not have been observed, i.e., only suspected). The trespass program required that an individual be first warned that trespassing is illegal; this was accomplished either in person (by the officer) or by posting signs throughout the property that trespassing is illegal and violators will be cited.

At the end of the first year of the project, over 100 businesses had signed up and were participating in the program. These agreements allowed officers to cite 1,044 individuals for criminal trespass during that year. Individuals who were cited could then be prosecuted by the city law department (prosecuting attorney's office) on misdemeanor violations, and the officers would then testify at the trial regarding both the warning and the ordinance violation itself.

All the police supervisors interviewed felt that the trespass ordinance and the program of signing up landlords for this program were very effective. It allowed the prevention of loitering around private property and it effectively provided the police with a tool to proactively address street narcotic sales on private property. Some supervisors pointed out that the criminal trespass program might violate the rights of citizens who had legitimate business or were visiting persons who lived in the apartment property. It meant that officers had to engage in extensive observation of people loitering around the private property to establish that they were not there on legitimate business. In addition, the warning that had been given previously to the individual had to be recorded and filed on a 3 x 5 card, and kept at the precinct with the date, the person's name, and the trespass warning. This meant additional paper work.

In addition, some supervisors pointed out that the community and the police strongly emphasized signing up the property managers to participate in the trespass program. This pressure on owners and managers may have led in some instances to increased vacancies, since managers were trying to avoid renting to known drug traffickers. As vacancies increase in apartment buildings, economic pressure swings the pendulum toward managers accepting tenants with less screening, thereby potentially increasing the

drug problem in their building. A fine balance was required (and sometimes difficult to achieve) in the operation of this program.

Pay Telephone Program

The pay telephone program involved eliminating the ability to receive phone calls at a standard pay telephone location. This was accomplished by the police department placing a request directly to the telephone company and describing the situation wherein drug dealers are using a particular telephone to arrange drug deliveries to buyers. The program has been selectively implemented in areas where drug dealing was being carried out primarily over the telephone; it has successfully frustrated the efforts of individual drug dealers conducting illegal drug transactions. During 1988, 13 phones were converted to function on a "call-out" basis only. In other cases, the telephone was simply removed.

Owner Notification Program (Drug Trafficking Civil Abatement Program)

The owner notification program was originally started by the police department as a way of warning a property owner that illegal activity was being carried out on the premises. The Department would send a letter to the owner after a warrant had been served that would notify the owner that drugs were being traded or stored on the premises. This notification program was incorporated into the administration of the Abatement Law during 1988, and it is now called the Drug Trafficking Civil Abatement program. As presently administered, two warnings are given to the owner of the property where narcotics activity has been observed and documented through search warrants. If a second search warrant is served without the problem being corrected, a final abatement notice (signed by the chief of police and the city attorney) is mailed, and abatement procedings are then initiated through the city law department.

The City of Seattle currently has an "expedited eviction" law that allows landlords to "speedily" evict tenants for a variety of reasons, including any type of illegal activity such as drug-related crimes. However, this law allows the tenant to postpone eviction if a bond is posted; the Drug Trafficking Civil Abatement program does not allow for the posting of a bond to delay an eviction notice.

This formal notification procedure is typically preceded by numerous contacts by both precinct personnel and representatives of the SSCPC. The large majority of owners (approximately 90 percent) have been responsive to the informal contacts or to the formal written notifications, and only a minority of premises actually go through the entire abatement process.

The results of the abatement process, which has been applied to individual houses as well as apartment buildings, have included actions ranging from requests to the owners to take proper security measures (e.g., locked doors, a policy of restrictive key issuance, and participating in the criminal trepass program with SPD), to hiring a resident manager, to actual eviction and "closing down" of the residence. From January 1987 until March 1990, over 700 individual addresses have been involved in some aspect of the abatement process.

Some of the comments from the police supervisors indicate that while the civil abatement process is working very well, there have been some cases where bad tenants were difficult to evict despite substantial improvements brought about by the abatement law. In some cases, the abatement law puts the landlord in the difficult position of being unable to evict a tenant in spite of significant efforts, while also having to deal with the city law department proceedings due to the failure to speedily evict the tenant or take other stipulated actions. The abatement procedure should take into account an owner's difficulties in evicting a tenant and/or accomplishing other specified changes. Also, because the types of houses and or apartments which are usually involved in drug trafficking are "low income", the closing of such residences reduces the available supply of affordable places to live. (Closing such residences is not the goal of the program, however. The intent is to make the owners aware of the situation and inform them of their responsibilities.) This type of housing stock is typically in short supply in most urban areas, and the abatement program might work at cross-purposes to other city programs aimed at increasing the availability of low income housing.

Another component of this abatement program, which was usually used prior to (and sometimes concurrently with) the official notification steps, involved a "landlord education" process. While the strong real estate ties of leaders of the SSCPC tended to be an obstacle to the SSCPC's efforts to develop a broader base in the community (as noted previously), in some respects, the "real estate linkage" proved to be an asset. Because the SSCPC could reach into the network of owners and operators of apartment houses and private rental homes which were the base of operations of drug activity, the problem could sometimes be addressed as an educational process. (Since the proportion of residents in Southeast Seattle who are renters is quite high, a large section of the area was involved.)

The SSCPC sponsored a series of training sessions for apartment owners and managers on how to keep their property drug-free. Interest in these meetings was generated partly by the general desire of many of the apartment owners and managers to have drug-free rental property. This issue was especially important since the drug dealers began to operate more from apartments and other residences as the police succeeded in driving them from the

street by enhanced enforcement, especially through the use of the criminal trespass ordinance.

At the educational meetings, the owners and managers received information from the SSCPC and the South Precinct captain with respect to the abatement law, including:

- The degree to which they could legally screen renters for previous drug involvement.
- The legality of checking on previous credit references.
- The ways in which they could make maintaining a drug-free apartment a condition for renting it.
- The ways in which the eviction of drug traffickers could be expedited under a new state law (the Drug Trafficking Civil Abatement Program).
- The ways in which they could cooperate with the police by signing criminal trepass agreements and then letting their tenants know about those agreements.
- The use of housing code violations as a way of pressuring some tenants and giving the police keys to the main entrances to apartment complexes.
- The ways in which the police could help during actual evictions.

As part of the orientation, an owner who had maintained a drug-free apartment house described in detail how he successfully managed his property. The owners and managers were told at these meetings that they could call either the precinct captain or the SSCPC for further help. The captain reported that 80 percent of the criminal trespass agreements were negotiated by the SSCPC. During the second year of the program, a group of distraught apartment house owners asked the SSCPC to conduct a training session for them.

Of course, for a variety of reasons, not all of the owners and managers were motivated to cooperate. Some found that drug traffickers could fill otherwise unoccupied apartments, or provide rental money to poor single mothers whose apartments they "shared" or took over. Some of the absentee owners were unaware of the seriousness of the drug problem on their property. Other managers who were new to the United States did not understand the concern with fighting drugs, and saw the drug problem as strictly a police matter for which they had no responsibility. (One owner who attended one of the meetings was suspected of actively condoning drug trafficking and of coming to the meeting to learn how to deal with the police. At the next meeting of the SSCPC, questions were raised about how he came to be invited.)

The SSCPC was instrumental in assisting the police and dealing with these reluctant managers. When the police found it difficult to find the owner of a piece of property, the SSCPC members who were realtors made their computer data bases available. (Later, title insurance companies voluntarily helped the city attorneys find true owners.) They informally arranged to find new buyers or managers for some property. The police, especially the precinct captain, became conduits for information about owners and managers, and in some instances put informal pressure on some managers to cooperate in this effort. In all of these efforts there was a great deal of informal communication between the police and the SSCPC; occasionally the police were better informed about some real estate transactions than the SSCPC.

Antigraffiti Program

This was a program started entirely by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. Initially, members of the community would gather on weekends and some weekdays and engage in a graffiti paint-out program (with either purchased or donated paint) throughout the South Precinct. The theory was that by constantly repainting over graffiti, in time there would be fewer and fewer structures marred by it. At the beginning of the partnership program, some police officers participated by physically helping with the paint-outs and spending time looking for and citing individuals painting the graffiti. The Rainier Chamber of Commerce has continued to maintain graffiti-free streets (arterials) throughout the South Precinct through purely volunteer efforts. The chamber not only successfully organized graffiti paint-outs on Saturdays, but also was able to effectively involve business owners in clean-up and paint-outs of their own business districts.

The SSCPC had developed an information packet regarding activities of the council, but in particular the clean-up program was stressed. This packet was sent to many organizations including volunteer and for-profit businesses in South Seattle. As volunteers were signing up for the clean-up committee, the graffiti paint-out campaign was emphasized to them.

Clean-up volunteers were organized for Saturday "paint-out" parties which occurred about two times per month (in good weather) during 1988. Paint and supplies would be provided by chamber funds. The paint-out efforts concentrated on arterials and a few side streets; after the initial paint-out, a group of volunteers would then "own" a wall or a street, and return to repaint that area as soon as the graffiti reappeared. Eventually, it took longer and longer for the repainted graffiti walls to be defaced again.

In 1989, the Seattle Engineering Department received funding for a full time antigraffiti coordinator on a city-wide basis. Paint

and supplies were then provided free of charge by the city, thus making it much easier to coordinate the paint-out projects. In addition, owners with the worst problems gave permission for the volunteers to continue repainting as often as necessary to keep the graffiti off the walls or building.

In the summer of 1989, the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council was also able to obtain city assistance from the Summer Youth Employment program (a supervisor and seven staff), and this help was used to target graffiti and litter along the arterials and side streets. This assistance was welcomed and enabled the program to be expanded over and above the initial effort that the community had accomplished on its own. Also in 1989, a graffiti hotline was established by a central area citizen, and calls were relayed to the engineering department coordinator for follow-up.

Telephone Hotline

The telephone hotline idea was intended to serve two purposes: the first was to simply provide a mechanism to collect target/problem information from the community and the second to serve as another avenue of outreach to other community areas and groups. Information gathered from the hotlines (more than one was in operation much of the time) would be passed on to South Precinct staff and used to determine targets or take specific action as appropriate.

The hotline was quickly put into action after the establishment of the SSCPC. A lieutenant from the South Precinct (with experience in the communications area) was assigned to work as liaison with the SSCPC and helped the staff members to set up the hotline program. Assistance included preparing forms and developing the procedures about how the information was to be sent to the South Precinct. The hotline then received a great deal of publicity in the South District Journal, on the radio, and in handouts at public places. People were invited to call in about any public safety problems which were not emergencies; the 9-1-1 emergency telephone number was to be used for emergencies. The volunteers who staffed the phone for a few hours each day assured the callers that the calls were anonymous. However, if they wanted feedback on what was done with the information they gave, they could leave their names and numbers. They were asked for as much details as possible in their reports.

Much to the surprise of the SSCPC and to some of the police, 40 percent of the calls concerned abandoned cars. Residents were disturbed by the poor appearance in the neighborhood which was caused by abandoned cars (many of them being deteriorated wrecks). In many cases, these vehicles were used by drug traffickers.

As noted in the section on targeting, abandoned cars throughout southeast Seattle were made an official South Precinct target for

patrol officers. They arranged for the removal of so many cars that the towing company ran out of space to store them. A two week suspension of the program allowed the company time to find more space. The public visibility and obvious success of the program helped encourage the citizenry to call more frequently more regarding other problems. As the problem of abandoned cars was steadily solved over the next few months, the proportion of calls regarding abandoned cars declined.

At first, approximately 40 percent of the calls concerned narcotics (street activity as well as crack houses). Then, the proportion of calls dealing with drugs, especially crack houses, greatly increased over the months. This increase could have resulted from an increase in publicity of the hotline, an increase in the number of crack houses, or the perceived effectiveness of the police in ridding the area of crack houses (primarily through the efforts of the ACT). This influx of hotline reports of drug dealing coincided with an increase in drug information that was being received directly by the South Precinct through telephone calls, letters, walk-ins, or directly from patrol officers. This overwhelming amount of information led to changes in the ways in which cases were processed by the police department.

The remaining calls were diverse: street prostitution, abandoned or deteriorating houses, garbage problems, etc. All of this information was sent to the South Precinct for action. Some people called for information only.

It was apparent that the hotline did not replace 911 calls. An inspection of the records showed that very few of the hotline calls were emergency. Thus, even though some callers were upset and discouraged, the public appeared to recognize the difference from the beginning. In fact, the number of calls to both the hotline and to the 911 emergency telephone number increased over this period of the program. The telephone operators and SSCPC members report that people called the hotline in preference to 911 for a number of reasons. First, the problems they had were not emergencies. Second, they wanted the protection of the anonymity of the hotline. This was especially the case if they were reporting crack houses; the hotline allowed them to get "involved" but not in a public way. Some felt that 911 operators would "probe them" for personal information. (Seattle uses an E911 emergency telephone system which is equipped with Automatic Location Identification (ALI) and Automatic Number Identification (ANI) to provide the operators with a callers address and telephone number.) Third, some felt their information was not sufficiently specific or complete to justify a call to 911. Others called back just to say that the problem had been solved, which was rarely the case with the 911 number.

An attempt was made to have the hotline telephone staffed by volunteers in the SSCPC headquarters. These volunteers were trained using a manual developed by the South Precinct

lieutenant. However, long periods of time during which there were no calls led to boredom and a decrease in the number of volunteers. An answering machine had been installed to take after hour calls, but it gradually came to be the main way in which calls were received. The voice on the machine said, "You have reached the "CLUE" line of the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council. Please tell us all you can about your community problem. Thank you." (The brevity of the message was due to the limited message storage capacity of the machine being used.)

Once a week, a volunteer listened to the accumulated recordings and typed out a report on each call. These were then picked up by another volunteer who summarized the time and nature of the call. The summary and the copies of all narcotics and prostitution reports were taken to the South Precinct office. The SSCPC staff kept a running list of crack houses that had been reported and tried to detect addresses with repeat calls. The SSCPC attempted to get feedback from the South Precinct on the police action taken with respect to each of these reports. Initially, it was planned to report this information back to the original callers, but fewer than five percent left their names and numbers. This procedure was dropped six months after the opening of the hotline. The fact that the hotline proved to be quite popular suggests that people in Southeast Seattle did not require much formal feedback from the SSCPC and the police, possibly because they were able to directly observe the effectiveness of their calls.

The hotline became so well known among leaders in the Seattle community that it was copied in the West Seattle section of the South Precinct, in the East Precinct, and in a part of the North Precinct. However, despite the success of the hotline, a number of problems were encountered. First, despite the great efforts that the SSCPC and its staff made to publicize the hotline, there was a general feeling that it was not widely enough known or used. The original publicity had emphasized problems of crime, but the public needed to know that it could also be used to report such problems as deteriorating buildings and accummulating garbage. There was discussion about advertising the number, including passing out flyers in apartment houses (especially those with a high turnover of residents), churches, schools, and shopping districts. Staff subsequently dropped off flyers at all apartment houses.

Second, the use of the answering machine created problems. An unknown (but considerable) number of people hung up on the machine, because they were led to expect to be able to speak to a person. This disappointment was aired publicly in a local radio talk show, causing much indignation in the SSCPC; no doubt this further discouraged callers. The information given by the callers to the machines was often far too skimpy for the police department to use. Details like subject descriptions, addresses, car descriptions, or times of activity were often omitted.

Volunteer telephone operators obtained this information in much greater detail with gentle probing. Sometimes the operators asked the callers to call back with further information (which many apparently did). Having a person answer the phone is especially important for callers who are not adept at giving complete or specific answers to questions. Furthermore, the volunteers can inform the callers about what will be done with the information they give.

Consideration was given to using a callforwarding telephone feature, but this was never put into service. Thought was also given to finding additional work for the volunteers to do while waiting for calls, such as being part of a telephone tree to notify Neighborhood Block Watch captains of crime problems in their areas. However, this idea was never developed. One of the suggested solutions to the problem was to get an answering machine with greater capacity so that details about what information was needed could be explained to the callers. This was done, and the machine then said, "You have reached 723-CLUE, the confidential, non-emergency reporting line. Tell us all about the crime or suspicious activity you have seen. We need addresses, date, and time of incident. All other details will be useful. Please start speaking at the tone." Nevertheless, SSCPC members agreed that having a person answer the phone was the best procedure.

Another problem was that of timeliness. Because the reports were delivered once a week, seven days might elapse between a call-in and police notification. The slowness of this procedure only added to the delays inevitable in the system for processing information inside the Seattle Police Department. This sluggishness often led to the reports being quite "cold" and out of date by the time the police received them.

Garden Police Car Program

As part of the effort to cooperate with the community, special attention was paid to the public housing projects located in the South Precinct area. (Additional discussion of coordination with the Seattle Housing Authority, which operates the housing facilities, is contained in a subsequent chapter.) This program involved the assignment of a special two-officer patrol car to concentrate on the problems in the two housing areas. The Garden Police Car was assigned to work in the housing projects, and was not responsible for responding to any but extreme emergency radio calls. These officers acted as conventional neighborhood-oriented police (although the layout of the project did not encourage a walking beat), checked on drug activity, and made arrests when needed. Apparently, rapport with the tenants was such that some of the residents felt they "owned" the garden car. For the most part, the same two officers were routinely assigned to the garden car. Occasionally when the housing projects appeared somewhat quiet and the demands on patrol increased

elsewhere, the garden car assignment was suspended; but, when criminal activity in the projects increased, it was reassigned. Part of the reason for the occasional suspension appeared to be that the number of arrests was considered to be too low. (This speaks to issues of evaluating a community-oriented program.) Aside from the Garden Car Program, the precinct sergeants and other officers cooperated with both the management of the housing projects and the residents with respect to clean-up, keeping unwanted "guests" out, reporting drug activity, and "standing by" during evictions.

CHAPTER VII

OTHER SOUTH SEATTLE CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL ACTIVITIES

Overview of Chapter

In addition to the numerous components of the SSCPC which are discussed in the previous chapter, there were other activities which became part of the community/police partnership. As with the development of specific programs, there was no mandate or prohibition covering the activities of the SSCPC in its relationship with the police or other community and governmental groups. This chapter reviews, some of the initial activities of the SSCPC, which involved outreach (in an attempt to broaden their representation) and lobbying efforts. These activities and operational functions which evolved over time are discussed in the following sections.

Outreach Activities

Implicit in the agreement with the SPD was the expectation that the SSCPC was to expand its base in the community by seeking representation from all segments of southeast Seattle (including geographical, ethnic, and economic). Accordingly, the SSCPC sent out letters inviting numerous organizations to participate. This formal effort to reach out into the community was only minimally successful. At the same time, efforts were being made to recruit representatives from specific groups through personal contacts of members of the SSCPC. These efforts were more fruitful, and a "full" council of 17 members was soon formed. Most members represented organizations, groups or institutions, including the school system, the tenants of public housing, a "middle class" community council, and a local merchants' group. Three Blacks and two Asians were among the representatives. (The SSCPC also had indirect representation with NAD. A semiretired Black woman banker who had participated in NAD accepted the invitation to join the SSCPC because she felt that NAD's street meetings and orientation were less constructive than the efforts of the SSCPC. During the month prior to the launching of the SSCPC, NAD had written to the realtor (who had been instrumental in the formation of the Crime Prevention League) to argue for more neighborhood representatives on the future council. One of the leaders of NAD temporarily joined with the SSCPC, apparently to work on its neighborhood clean-up program, but dropped out shortly thereafter.)

An unsuccessful effort was made to include a high school student to represent youth. Also, the idea of having a special "advisory committee" separate from the SSCPC was considered as a way to increase the range of community representation. However, once the SSCPC got underway and involved in its many anticrime efforts, there was little time and energy left to develop a

separate advisory committee, and the idea was shelved in favor of having periodic public meetings. Another reason for dropping the idea of an advisory board was that confidential police matters, such as the designation of targets and police activities regarding them, could not be discussed in detail with an advisory board because of the perceived threat to security. Furthermore, there was concern that such an advisory group would turn into a forum for complaints against the police, instead of contributing constructively to solving problems. About a month after the program began, a letter was sent to leaders of community groups asking for their general participation, but making it clear that there would not be any formal advisory group.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the early efforts at outreach were not more successful. There are several possible reasons why the groups first approached did not respond, including:

- The image of the program as being in the bailiwick of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce.
- The invitation by mail rather than face-to-face contact.
- The absence of a consensus in their geographic areas about a crime problem.
- Concern among these groups about the residential burglary problem, which was not a prime focus of the SSCPC.

The core leadership of the SSCPC was dominated by the group associated with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce. They were, as we have seen, powerful and very conspicuously successful in dealing with the Seattle Police Department and with city government in general. The predominance of the business community in the leadership of the SSCPC made it difficult for them to convey a public image that reflected the diversity of their actual membership. The change of public image was also impeded by the location of the office of the SSCPC, which was on a main thoroughfare and shared a storefront office (and staff) with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce.

At first, there were a few Black members of the council (businessmen in their neighborhoods, a minister, and a manager of a local branch of a national bank), most of whom were middleclass. Periodically, throughout the year the SSCPC was studied, the issue of race was brought up by the Black members. While condemning the criminal actions of Black "gangsters," they tried to communicate the social, economic, and psychological predicaments of Black youth and of the need for the SSCPC to address some of these problems (which it did as will be seen in the following sections.) Furthermore, issues of possible racist actions by the police were discussed at council meetings, especially by the semiretired banker with NAD connections who appeared to be the only one who had close rapport with the street

scene. (As will be described in a subsequent section, she initiated an investigation of two officers accused of racism. She also expressed anger about the SSCPC ignoring a major racially-oriented controversy which occurred in another part of the department.)

In fact, two months after the partnership with the police began, a private meeting of Black community leaders was held to consider issues of racism. The Black SSCPC members mentioned above led that meeting and reported their concern about racism to the council at large. Shortly afterwards, the Black minister stopped attending the SSCPC because of conflicting obligations. He had mentioned when he first joined that he had little time to devote to the council because of the pressures of other duties, and remained a strong advocate of the council's work. In addition, one of the two Asians on the council also dropped out.

Because of this obvious racial imbalance in the fall of 1988, the SSCPC delegated two of its members, both White, to seek out additional black representation. However, they found that there were few Black organizations headquartered in southeast Seattle despite the high percentage of minorities in the area. This lack of organizations and leaders in southeast Seattle probably reflects the fact that Black organizations and churches tend not to be geographically based. The prominent Black churches are located in the Central Area just north of the South Precinct. They draw their congregations from the whole city, including southeast Seattle. It appears that the SSCPC had difficulty identifying Black leadership in the community. Also, Black businessmen did not generally join the Rainier Chamber of Commerce, but were members of a citywide Black businessmen's organization. Thus, cooperation with the local Black business community was impeded.

Finally, during its first year and a half of functioning, while the SSCPC leadership was aware of the problem of racial discrepancies, it was dedicated to getting numerous programs underway and to a major lobbying effort. The resources and time were insufficient to address the representation issue more forcefully.

These factors may have contributed to the chronic difficulties the SSCPC and the police had in developing close and stable ties in a business and residential district of southeast Seattle called Rainier Beach. This area had a relatively large number of Black-owned businesses, some of which were victimized by gangs. It was was also a center of NAD's activity, possibly because the neighborhood had a complex and deep-rooted problem of drug-dealing groups. Rainier Beach is next to a major high school and a recreational center. The SSCPC felt it could not do any organizing of their own in the area, and had to depend on

existing organizations for liaison with the community. Relations with the business and residential organizations in Rainier Beach remained tentative. Even when the organizations in the area became stronger and apparently more viable, relations between them and the SSCPC remained strained.

Over the year the council was being studied, the situation changed remarkably for the better. The SSCPC made a decision to again reach out into the community. At a large middle-class neighborhood meeting held in the precinct station, a great deal of anger was expressed because of a rash of burglaries. This group had not heard of the SSCPC (which had sent members to attend the meeting). A council member undertook organizing a follow-up meeting in that neighborhood. One of the incensed participants was recruited for the council on-the-spot by another SSCPC member (who button-holed him in the hallway, a speed record for transforming a protestor into a constructive activist). The next task in broadening the representation of the SSCPC was telephoning close to 200 community organizations and inviting them to one of the SSCPC public meetings. A substantial number of these organizations were minority. This public meeting was held at the precinct station and was attended by about 200 people (including 20 to 25 percent Black people, who were active and constructive participants in the floor discussion). Despite the misgivings that were expressed prior to the meeting about the role of volunteers on some new and existing committees of the SSCPC, many of the attendees at the meeting were recruited for these assignments. These included a committee to work with the scouts in southeast Seattle headed by a Black Boy Scout official.

Also during this period, the leadership of the SSCPC began to personally and systematically seek out representation from various groups in south Seattle's unrepresentated neighborhoods, and to strengthen the relationship with other groups. A Black businessman was recruited to represent the chamber of commerce of a substantially Asian neighborhood. An important neighborhood group, Hillman City, that had been torn by dissension involving NAD instead established good working relationships with the SSCPC. (A leader of that group initiated a citizens' mobile car patrol in which he and a colleague would park their car some distance from a group of drug traffickers. He threatened to take pictures of them by displaying a camera on his dashboard. The police, the SSCPC, and some members of his neighborhood group were skeptical of this practice, but he persisted and formed his own group just to operate a mobile patrol. For his efforts, the windows of his car were thoroughly smashed during daylight hours while he stopped to call 911 to report some drug trafficking. Irrespective of the degree of caution this person showed, his efforts reflected the feeling of empowerment in the community.) Two other neighborhoods (South Park and Georgetown) also sent representatives. The inclusion of these neighborhoods greatly

expanded the geographical outreach of the SSCPC. In addition, a committee was established to recruit more clergy, many of whom were minority. One of the Black ministers who had dropped out of the SSCPC in its early days rejoined and actively participated.

This developing breadth of representation resulted from not only the active outreach of the SSCPC council members, but more basically, from the atmosphere of empowerment and self respect which the SSCPC inspired in the community. The success of its partnership with the police showed what was possible. Furthermore, groups of people who were motivated to act against crime, but felt alone and without guidelines or support, could turn to the SSCPC. For example, a Black minister whose congregation was outside the city lived right next to a small park which was drug infested and "lost" to the neighborhood children as well as adult residents. This working class neighborhood had no special social organization and had missed much of the publicity regarding the SSCPC and the hotline. The minister worked with NAD to sponsor an antidrug vigil one night in the park (which was attended by some local politicians), but the vigil did not lead to further constructive action. By accident, the minister found out about the SSCPC and contacted it. The staff of the SSCPC asked him to lead a meeting in a church adjacent to the park. With the help of the SPD crime prevention staff and student volunteers, the meeting was well publicized (and attended). Despite some expression of deep criticism of the police chief and the Seattle Police Department in general, the meeting was transformed into a constructive one. The South Precinct captain was invited to the next meeting and he assigned the bicycle patrol to assist the community. This action basically cleared out the park of drug activities, and it has remained safe. Subsequently, a permanent community organization was formed in the neighborhood, again with the help of the SSCPC and SPD. The membership was substantially Black, and the person elected to be vicechair was already a member of the SSCPC. This was a "textbook" problem-solving performance by all involved.

The SSCPC leadership currently believes that it has good relations with all geographic segments of the southeast Seattle community. With the exception of helping to organize the Brighton Community Council, the SSCPC policy has not been to create or organize new community councils, but to develop ties with existing groups. There are obvious benefits to this policy, but it runs the risk of missing representation from unorganized and poorly organized areas as well as being very vulnerable to active resistance from unfriendly groups.

The issue of community representation, at least in terms of how it evolved in southeast Seattle, appears to present a paradox for the police in working effectively with an organization that is not fully representative of the community. It appears that such an organization can reach out and develop relationships with

other anticrime groups which represent other segments of the community and can help such groups or individuals get organized. In addition, it can inspire the development of such groups by its example of effective work with the police department.

The first objective of the SSCPC was to make some progress on urgent crime problems. A secondary objective was to ensure representation of all parties and to enlarge the group. This was seen as the pragmatic way to approach the problem. The efforts of the SSCPC to reach out to other segments of the community were always on the agenda (on the 15-Point Plan) and were also probably generated by a number of factors, including:

- Criticism from important entities in the community, and the commitment to do so in the agreement with the police department.
- The influence of the minority members who were already on the SSCPC.
- Recognition of the importance of closing the representation gap in the community for reasons of principle and pragmatism.

Moreover, some of the programs directly undertaken by the SSCPC involved other groups (such as lobbying for strong antidrug legislation). Cooperative lobbying, no doubt, facilitated further joint efforts with other community groups. Also, when new groups developed on their own and had contact with the South Precinct commander, he would urge them to coordinate with the SSCPC.

In addition to these quite direct effects of the SSCPC in reaching out into the community, the SSCPC's well-publicized record of working effectively with the police to reduce crime and improve the community in other ways no doubt increased the feeling of empowerment in the community. More people experienced some hope that problems could be solved. For example, a well-organized middle-class neighborhood council with close ties to the SSCPC hired its own anticrime staffer, who often attended SSCPC meetings along with other representatives from the neighborhood council.

All of this tends to indicate that, when undertaking a program involving the community, the police do not need to deal only (or even primarily) with organizations which are representative of the total community. (While always an objective, representation was not initially the highest priority of the SSCPC. As noted, dealing with urgent problems was also important, and lack of staff and resources initially precluded outreach activities during early operations.) Such representation may evolve, although some coaxing by the police may be necessary to encourage the group with which it works effectively to reach out into the community. The police also need to be alert to the development

of new groups and to the possibility of cooperating more with preexisting organizations, which may move from their previous orientation toward an anticrime and order maintenance focus.

The recruitment of new members to the SSCPC raised the question of how they could fit into the ongoing activities. By the time the new members were recruited, the organization had become fairly well institutionalized. The procedures, rules, and responsibilities of members had been established so well that the new member could fit in easily. In fact, new members received training from the staff. The trust between the police and the SSCPC had been so well established that issues of confidentiality (of data) simply were not raised, and the new members knew of the track record of the SSCPC and the police. Accordingly, in the case of this organized group, its expansion in size and increased community representation has not presented any problem.

On the other hand, some problems remain. Some segments of the community may simply not have access to organizations. The example given above of the SSCPC's successful efforts to organize the residents around a drug-infested park indicated that with assistance with community organizing techniques, and in some cases simply the knowledge of successful community-based groups, citizens were willing to take action to solve problems in their neighborhoods. The middle-class group that met in the precinct station to protest a rash of burglaries also had not heard of the SSCPC. Council members were well aware of this problem, and suggested many ways of publicizing the SSCPC and the hotline, including wide distribution of flyers (door-to-door, in shopping malls, and churches) as well as newspaper advertisements.

Another problem stems from the fact that some segments of the community may have group or institutional affiliations which are located outside the precinct. It may be necessary for the police to disregard the precinct boundaries to develop some kind of relationship with the leaders of external organizations, such as churches. Obviously, this type of outreach would have to recognize the protocol of working in another precinct, but the issue of turf might be dealt with by involving police command staff in other precincts, and by dealing with the leadership of these organizations only on matters directly related to the precinct in question.

Program Publicity

From the inception of the program, the SSCPC and its activities were widely publicized in southeast Seattle. The newsletter of neighborhood councils carried reports about the SSCPC, in part because members of the SSCPC were also involved in their neighborhood councils. The South District Journal carried regular, and mostly positive, reports. It began to publish a monthly column written by a member of the SSCPC about its activities. The column was also published in other community

weekly newspapers in neighborhoods adjoining the project area. The two citywide newspapers also carried positive reports. In fact, when one of the newspapers published a somewhat ambivalent report, the SSCPC president wrote a letter requesting that the papers give the fledgling program a chance to grow and develop. The program has also achieved national notoriety. The "Drug Czar," William Bennett, visited the SSCPC on a tour of the country, which was cited in national press coverage. In addition, the SSCPC has received inquiries for information from other parts of the country.

Seattle Housing Authority Programs

As mentioned above, the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) maintains two large housing projects in the South Precinct area. After the SHA security officer retired and was not replaced, the responsiblity for controlling crime in the two projects was delegated to the on-site managers. Some Neighborhood Block Watches were organized to control crime. In one of the housing projects, some leadership was provided by a woman who collaborated closely with the police on a personal basis and who was also a member of the SSCPC. Nevertheless, consistent leadership that covered the bulk of the projects did not develop.

The SHA itself developed a very tough policy of evicting anyone who was found with drugs, even before the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sanctioned such evictions. Photographs were taken of all renters to help identify evicted drug traffickers who tried to move into other apartments under new names. The SHA attempted to continue the close cooperation that had been established with the police. The second-ranking official of the SHA carried out this policy, and attended most of the SSCPC meetings. Furthermore, parts of both of these housing projects became official targets of the South Precinct (although they were not on the initial list of targets, a fact that disturbed some patrol officers who felt that ignoring the projects reflected the business and ethnic background of the SSCPC). The SSCPC did maintain links with the housing area staffs and the SHA, although the president of the SSCPC occasionally criticized the SHA. Issues of concern were the lack of resident managers and the number of renters subsidized by the SHA who lived in southeast Seattle (even though the SHA could not legally direct them to live in a particular district of the city). The SSCPC felt these renters were especially vulnerable to pressure from drug traffickers. The SHA, for example, did not feel it was necessary for the owners and managers with subsidized membership to attend the meetings sponsored by the SSCPC.

The SHA eventually became an advocate of increased resident and manager participation in SSCPC-sponsored activities and programs. This has included assistance with drug-related crime problems and

emphasis on more on-site control, as well as participation in other community clean-up programs. This advocacy appears to be the result of direct pressure and encouragement from the SSCPC over a period of time.

Lobbying and Political Pressure

Another form of outreach by the SSCPC was toward the government, and took the form of lobbying legislative branches and the non-police divisions of city government. These efforts had two types of goals: those directly in support of the police in terms of resources and those in which the police and the SSCPC shared common goals. This collaboration between the SSCPC and the police was not done on an explicit quid pro quo, but as a joint effort to help each other achieve common goals. Furthermore, the lobbying did have the effect of enhancing the trust and openness with which the police and the community related to each other. In some of the lobbying efforts for common goals, the SSCPC not only joined with the police but also with other activists in nonpolitical groups in southeast Seattle and the city at large (assisted by the Neighborhood Crime and Justice Center, which is discussed in the next chapter), thus increasing its outreach into the larger community.

The SSCPC lobbied the city council on a number of issues of general interest, including:

- For recriminalization of possession of marijuana, which had been made a civil offense.
- For the hiring of more officers.
- For an increased use by judges of the Stay Out of Area Prostitution Program (SOAP) in sentencing prostitutes allowed judges to issue orders to keep prostitutes out of certain areas of the city or face arrest.
- For permitting police officers to secretly record their face-to-face conversations in drug investigations. (Washington is one of the few states that does not allow one party to record their own conversations without the consent of the other party.)
- For authority from the state legislature to allow the police to destroy (rather than auction) weapons that were seized in the course of their work.

The mayor thanked the SSCPC in writing for its support of this last measure. The SSCPC also developed antidrug traffic loitering legislation and subsequently lobbied the city council for the ordinance to be used against drug dealers, as did the

South Precinct commander. (The proposed ordinance was jointly reviewed by the King County's prosecuting attorney and the city law department. This ordinance was later approved by the city council and mayor.)

Early in the contacts between the South Precinct and the SSCPC, the police mentioned their interest in new antidrug legislation which was to be considered by the state legislature. In a major undertaking, the SSCPC was the lead organization in the city to mount a powerful and successful lobbying effort to strengthen the antidrug laws in the State of Washington, and to provide funds for education and rehabilitation. All of the top commanders in the Seattle Police Department personally joined in the lobby. This lobbying effort also involved many other city organizations. In fact, after a state legislative committee had cut funds for a community-based antidrug program, the president of the SSCPC testified so vigorously in favor of restoring the funds that the chair of the committee followed the members out of the meeting to tell them the funds in question would be restored.

The SSCPC also applied pressure on other parts of the "Criminal Justice System." For example, letters were sent to the local prosecutor's office arguing that drug traffickers should be charged with the most serious crime legally possible.

The SSCPC also directed some of its pressure to secure cooperation from other branches of the city government to solve specific community public safety problems. At times, South Precinct staff were unable to gain cooperation from the liaison personnel in the city government and the SSCPC would assist through its efforts. For example, the precinct captain might mention that the parks department had not responded expeditiously to a request to have some lighting changed in a park (to enable his officers to observe activities better); the SSCPC voluntarily undertook to contact the parks department and got results. These efforts were not made at the explicit request of the captain, but reports of his difficulties in solving community problems gave the SSCPC the cues to act.

Sometimes these actions were taken in conjunction with specific efforts to solve the problems of official targets in southeast Seattle. The most salient example is the effort to shut down two taverns which were notorious "drug bazaars." One of the tactics used was to pressure the State Liquor Board to withdraw licenses from these premises. The police typically made a large number of arrests in the "problem" taverns, and the SSCPC lobbied to include this data (e.g., a high number of nonliquor crimes on the premises) as a reason for denying a renewal of a license. The SSCPC sent a letter to the board documenting the many criminal violations the police found on the premises. SSCPC members would also testify during public hearings about the problems; this is usually a stressful activity often involving a confrontational atmosphere with tavern owners. The SSCPC put pressure on the city Business Licensing Board to do the same. The SSCPC also

attempted to get these boards to consider owners' prior criminal records and possible adverse impacts on neighborhoods in considering liquor license renewals.

On the other hand, the SSCPC sometimes took action independent of the police. They successfully fought off attempts to establish additional correctional facilities in their area of the city. In this case, the SSCPC argued that facilities should be distributed more equally throughout the city.

SSCPC-Police Liaison

In addition to the increased links with the police generated by the hotline program and the parallel political efforts, the SSCPC also attempted to establish direct ties with all levels of the South Precinct. Soon after he was appointed in November of 1987, the new precinct captain met with the SSCPC and established himself as someone who was dedicated to working with the community and who understood the 15-Point Plan completely. His frankness and energy level impressed SSCPC members, and rapport was quickly established (despite the misgivings they originally had because of their loyalty to the previous captain). This precinct commander's strong feel for street policing was indicated when he told the group, "In essence, what you are doing is asking us to do what I used to do as a young officer 20 years ago. You're asking us to come out to the neighborhoods and get to know the people."

The captain's enthusiasm for the program and respect for the SSCPC led his lieutenants to feel the same way. The positive results of SSCPC activities and subsequent publicity also helped to enhance these positive feelings. His dedication to the community was manifested in many ways. He talked about changing the image of the community to keep the "druggers" out; examples of his actions included:

- When potential investors and buyers called him, he would point out the decreasing crime problem and its confinement to certain areas.
- He was shown in a news photo, out of uniform, helping in a graffiti paint-out.
- He repeatedly pointed out that he lived in and was raised in south Seattle.
- He attended innumerable community meetings.

The captain and other command staff attended all SSCPC meetings. Sometimes, because of special problems, a sector sergeant would accompany them. This high level of commitment by the police department, as well as their participation in efforts as full members of the SSCPC, demonstrated to both sides the significance

of the program and of their relationship to each other. Also, as described in the section on targeting, the police participated fully in the discussions whenever appropriate--they did not need special permission to speak up. Furthermore, there was a great deal of informal communication between the captain and the leaders and staff of the SSCPC outside of the actual meetings. During the second year of the program, the SSCPC honored the captain at a banquet which was attended by about 200 people. The police chief attended to honor the precinct captain and personnel.

However, at the lower ranks, communications with the SSCPC were not as open or frequent. The second and third watch commanders came from time to time, but the first watch commander never came. The participation by sergeants was even less, and patrol officers rarely came. In fact, there was little ongoing contact between the patrol officers and the SSCPC on a systematic, regular basis.

Four representatives of the SSCPC participated (for a half hour session) in the two-hour training program for all precinct staff conducted in January 1988, shortly after the program began. The participants described some aspects of the program and assisted the captain in explaining the overall program. The Narcotics Division sent detectives to the training, who also helped the officers with respect to narcotics enforcement. This training was repeated once again during the first year of the program, but overtime costs precluded its being done more frequently.

Another way in which the SSCPC members attempted to communicate directly with the police officers was to accept suggestions from the police supervisors to establish an "officer of the month" award. The nominations were made by sergeants to watch commanders and to the captain, who ultimately made the choices. Each awardee was honored at a luncheon hosted by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce rather than directly by the SSCPC. The sponsorship by the former group may have reinforced the officers' view of the SSCPC as strictly a business-oriented group.

Despite these efforts, the relationships between the SSCPC and the sergeants and patrol officers never achieved the same closeness as with the captain and lieutenants. In fact, during the first year of the program, the SSCPC conducted a questionnaire survey of the officers in collaboration with the Inspectional Services Division of the SPD. The replies indicated that patrol officers, and possibly the sergeants, needed more "training" with respect to the program because many of them did not appear to understand the program, the SSCPC, or proactive policing. This perception of the gap between the SSCPC and the patrol officers is consistent with other findings which showed that patrol officers had unclear ideas about the nature of the program or were antagonistic to the SSCPC.

There were probably several reasons for this gap. First, the collaboration between the police and the SSCPC took place primarily at the precinct command level. This was true with respect to the final decisions made about target selection, political lobbying, the training of apartment managers and owners to resist drug dealers, and the operation of the hotline. The precinct as an entity was involved with the SSCPC, not the officers in cars or on bicycles. They were affected by the program, particularly by the NAR program and the targeting program, but the directives as to how to participate in the program came down through the chain of command.

Second, the training for the program was limited to a two-hour session with a quarter of it being done by the SSCPC. Because of logistical problems and cost, not all the officers assigned to the South Precinct could be reached by the training program. Futhermore, there was no ongoing training program for new officers and sergeants that were rotated into the South Precinct, Some of them had heard about the program before they came (perhaps in a misleading way), but there was no time to explain the full parameters and rationale of the program to them once they arrived for duty.

Third, the impression of the SSCPC that was presented at the first training session was not altogether positive. One of the representatives had some difficulties with the police in previous contacts. But more basically, the presentation did not change the impression among some of the officers that they were people who had vested economic interests in the area. Some of the officers felt that they were being used by a segment of the population instead of being responsible to the total population and to the law in general. This perception was most likely enhanced by the location of the office of the SSCPC (which shared space with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce) and the sponsorship of the officer of the month luncheons by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce, and was difficult to overcome.

On the other hand, members of the SSCPC also made presentations at a training session during the second year of the program. Not only did they describe the SSCPC and the program, but also expressed their gratefulness for the decreasing crime rate and general improvement of the area. The next day several officers dropped into the SSCPC office to express their appreciation for the feedback.

The gap between the lower ranks of the South Precinct and the SSCPC did not cause major difficulties for the operation of the program because the actual cooperation with the community took place primarily at the precinct level. The vehicle for implementing the cooperation was directives from the captain, rather than direct communication between patrol officers and the SSCPC.

Development of Shared Management Arrangements

In many ways the acceptance of the community-oriented program by the SPD was an acceptance of SSCPC management "directives or suggestions" for the South Precinct, although some in the department felt that the SSCPC had been given too much power. These directives covered the targeting procedure, acceptance of hotline input and reporting back to the community; the assignment of two narcotics detectives to work closely with the South Precinct; and the assignment of officers with a proactive, procommunity outlook. For the most part, these policies and procedures concerned general management, not day-to-day operations. After some ambivalence, the SSCPC stayed away from issues involving personnel assignments. The focus of the SSCPC effort was primarily in keeping with the provisions contained in the 15-Point Plan which encouraged "community participation."

In fact, the SSCPC was very sensitive to any deviation from the various provisions in the agreement. When the original two narcotics detectives assigned to work with the South Precinct were transferred to work with a federal Drug Enforcement Agency task force, the SSCPC protested strongly in writing and in a meeting with the commander of the central Narcotics squad. The council felt that it should have been alerted to, or even consulted on, the transfer. The explanation SSCPC received from the department indicated that the two detectives would still be working on drug problems in southeast Seattle, and that they would be replaced by other detectives. However, this did not satisfy the SSCPC. It is noteworthy that this "alleged" violation of the agreement orignated at the central headquarters level, not at the precinct level. In any case, the police reaction to the SSCPC was to try to explain its reasons for the actions, and not to question the propriety of the request for an explanation. In the meeting at which the transfer was discussed, the SSCPC members raised questions about communication between the narcotics detectives and patrol officers, and the Narcotics Unit commander discussed the change in narcotics enforcement policy toward greater concern with the streets. As the SSCPC became more conversant with police procedures and policies, the members would occasionally raise questions that went beyond the agreement (such as "complaining" in writing about the unavailability of detectives between 3:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.). Such questions were treated by the SPD as proper issues for inquiry.

After reviewing the results of the joint Inspectional Services Division/SSCPC survey of officers (which was discussed earlier in this chapter), the SSCPC became more concerned about what they saw as poor communication within the department. A delegation met with the top patrol and narcotics commanders to discuss the communications problems; these questions were evidently treated as proper by the commanders. They also communicated their judgement that the police had not received proper training regarding gangs. As part of this issue, during the second year

of operations, the police funded a visit by the executive director of the SSCPC to the Los Angeles Police Department to study the problem of gangs (the Youth Gangs Seminar).

On the other hand, a number of instances of attempted "micro-management" of the South Precinct occurred in which the police (especially at the patrol officer and sergeant level) questioned or challenged the legitimacy of the SSCPC's efforts. These incidents concerned particular operations or personnel. In one, the president of the SSCPC was reported to have called the precinct for an immediate response to a crime situation which she was observing. In another case, a sergeant, who knew nothing about a noninjury shooting through the window of a senior center which had occurred the day before (and which was being investigated by another sergeant), was criticized severely over the telephone for not informing the center staff about the progress of the investigation. In still another incident, a two-officer partnership was informally (and privately) accused by a Black member of the SSCPC of being racist in their actions on the street. This criticism was relayed to their supervisor which led to a splitting up of the partnership, the counseling of at least one of the officers, and to an internal investigation. This investigation cleared the officers of charges of racism, although they were admonished to be more "correct" in their communication with suspects. Nevertheless, the potential influence that the SSCPC had on the professional fate of the officers generated widespread suspicion of the council. Furthermore, the particular incident raised questions about the real support that the Seattle Police Department would give to officers who were proactive. (Such proactivity was perceived as an obvious key to the program.) These incidents increased the schism between the SSCPC and the patrol officers and sergeants, which was mentioned in the previous section.

Accordingly, it appears that implicit guidelines evolved concerning acceptable involvement by the community in the actions of the SPD. The police, after initial skeptical attitudes, grew to accept citizen input on targeting, patrol priorities, and special programs (i.e., administrative and organizational policies and procedures). In contrast, involvement in any matters related to personnel assignments was seen as illegitimate intrusions on SPD prerogatives and was resisted at all levels of the department. Attempts (very few actual instances) to influence personnel assignments caused especially negative reactions at the sergeant and police officer levels, where possible adverse impacts on the careers of particular officers was a serious concern.

Relations with the Crime Prevention Division of the Seattle Police Department

The Crime Prevention Division of the SPD, staffed mostly by civilians, has the responsibility of supporting Neighborhood

Block Watch programs throughout the city and to provide assistance to the Business Watch program whose operations were described earlier in this report. Although it might be thought that these functions would have led to their participation in the negotiations between the department and the Rainier Chamber of Commerce subcommittee, they were not involved. The community-oriented program (i.e., the SSCPC) did not include any role for the Crime Prevention Division.

Good rapport had never been well established in southeast Seattle between the Rainier Chamber of Commerce and the Crime Prevention Division. Although the Business Watch program had been continually active and strong in the Rainier Valley (and had much support from the merchants), the Neighborhood Block Watch program had been publicly criticized by the leader of the chamber's crime committee for being slow in responding to rashes of burglaries and for not having developed a complete organization of Neighborhood Block Watches (especially in apartment complexes). This public criticism continued into the second year of the program.

In the summer of 1988 after the program got underway, the crime prevention staff conducted a questionnaire survey of block watch captains in southeast Seattle. When the responses of the Block Watch captains from the SSCPC program area were informally compared to the information from a middle-class area some distance away, the former groups expressed somewhat less concern about crime than the middle-class groups. It appeared that the former group was less interested in crime than those living more distant from this SSCPC's area of concern. This might explain the lack of interest in starting Neighborhood Block Watch programs in the general Rainier Valley area.

This gap between the SSCPC and the Crime Prevention Division began to close when the crime prevention function was reorganized at the beginning of 1989 (the second year of the program). Previous to that time, the field organizers would work in a specific area, get Neighborhood Block Watches started, and then move to another area of the city. The reorganization consisted of assigning organizers more or less permanently to given areas. The reorganization facilitated cooperation with the SSCPC as well as with the South Precinct. The assigned organizers attended SSCPC meetings, including some executive committee meetings, and reported on their activities in the area. In addition, crime prevention personnel attended the target committee meetings held in the precinct and shared information about specific targets. This participation in the meetings became increasingly active. Furthermore, the SSCPC was able to mobilize volunteers to help the Crime Prevention Division warn a given neighborhood about a serial rapist. The Crime Prevention Division collaborated with the SSCPC in helping to set up the community meeting at which the Brighton Community Council was organized. Plans were developed for the volunteers operating the hotline to be available to telephone block watch captains to warn them about crime waves.

This plan was expected solve the problem of sluggish response to crimes in given neighborhood areas, for which the SSCPC had criticized the Crime Prevention Division in the past. (This telephoning job was also seen as a way to solve the problem of staff boredom in the staffing of the hotline.) In addition, at the suggestion of the precinct captain, a crime prevention supervisor joined the committee of the SSCPC working on a community antidrug problem. The crime prevention organizers began to stop into the South Precinct station more often than they had before.

Once the reorganization of the Crime Prevention Division was completed, the existence and functioning of the SSCPC appeared to facilitate and strengthen crime prevention activities in the community. There was less criticism of the Neighborhood Block Watch program and more direct communication. Thus, the SSCPC program and activities had an indirect as well as direct effect on the functioning of the anticrime efforts in southeast Seattle, and also appeared to enhance communication between the local precinct and the Crime Prevention Division. The atmosphere of hope and cooperation began to permeate southeast Seattle.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNITY/POLICE PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF SEATTLE

Overview of Chapter

This chapter describes the developments that occurred throughout Seattle from 1988 to 1990. The discussion centers around developments primarily in the East and West Precincts of the police department and significant legislative events that were supported by community groups. It also describes a major funding initiative passed by the City of Seattle in 1989, which changed the structure of community policing in the city and added major funding to the police department.

East Precinct Developments

After the SSCPC was formally established (in January 1988) and the first quarter crime statistics were published showing substantial improvement, requests began coming in from other precincts (particularly the East Precinct) to help create a similar program. In May of 1988, the members of a loosely formed group in the East Precinct approached the SSCPC with a request for help in organizing a similar organization. The SSCPC supported the formation of a crime prevention coalition and had ongoing meetings regarding graffiti removal, clean-ups, apartment management education, and the successful trespass ordinance that was adopted as part of the SSCPC's initiatives. In addition, the bylaws of the South Seattle group were shared and guidance given regarding group organization. The need for awareness of police budgetary issues and limits of resources were also discussed at meetings. In partnership with the Neighborhood Business Council (a citywide organization funded through the block grant process), a grant was submitted to the city to fund a half time position which allowed a key person from the SSCPC to be hired to work with the East Precinct Crime Prevention Coalition (EPCPC). This grant was approved in October of 1988.

Soon thereafter, the East Precinct coalition adopted bylaws that were loosely patterned after the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council, and a board of directors and a new president were elected. Initially the problems that interested the membership (and that occupied the monthly meetings of the board of directors) included very broad social issues such as problems of youth, teenage pregnancies, substance abuse prevention, and problems of housing. Only at the end of 1988 did the board of directors sift through a number of issues and decide to concentrate on criminal justice problems facing the East Precinct area.

During most of 1989, the group was fairly divided, not very well organized, and not very committed to regularly attending board meetings. The main issues that the leadership tried to address were:

- Tracking problems from month to month so that a sense of continuity could be developed.

- Regular attendance at board meetings.

- Ability to work with the police department's East Precinct personnel, and get past the "yelling" stage where the attendees felt that their only role was to articulate their problems and demand police action. Coalition members began to see the limits of police capabilities and the positive role that the community could play.

- Getting used to establishing and following an agenda for each meeting.

Because of the basic effort to move the community group toward a sense of unity and mission, and the work to attain some organizational effectiveness, few actual projects were accomplished during 1989. However, the group did manage to raise funds to purchase a computer, which was donated to the East Precinct and used to create a database where Narcotics Activity Report data was stored. In addition, a hotline similar to the one in the South Precinct was established; and although initially an answering machine received all calls, the availability and existence of this hotline was widely advertised. Another important project accomplished in 1989 involved drawing up position statements to be signed by the citizen groups and sent to the state legislature in support of the Omnibus Drug Bill (which was passed by the state legislature during 1989). Coalition members sent letters and made phone calls to all key lawmakers in support of this bill. The EPCPC also devoted time to analysis of the report of the management study of the SPD, and supported the Public Safety Action Plan (discussed later in this chapter).

The remainder of that year was spent working on internal organizational issues of the EPCPC. Issues of recruitment were discussed, put before the board, and a committee formed to address this task. Also discussed was the general issue of what subcomittees to form besides the hotline committee and the legislative committees. Detailed presentations were made to the group regarding the civil abatement process that was successfully used in the South Precinct. The possibility of restricting or cancelling the liquor licenses of businesses that were violating provisions of their licenses (by selling to minors or selling to intoxicated individuals) was reviewed by the EPCPC. The East Precinct group, at the outset, did not want to interfere in any way with business or liquor licenses, and thus the issue was tabled during 1989.

During this period, the East Precinct captain was engaged in setting up targets on a much broader scope than in the South Precinct. This action was based on the idea that pinpointing a target by address was not as useful as concentrating on a broader area. At the monthly EPCPC general membership meetings, there was not much interest in refining and collecting information on targets regarding which the police would be asked for feedback. Some of the members gathered information on the addresses of known rock houses and provided statements to the police regarding descriptions of illegal behavior around these premises. The East Precinct coalition provided these addresses directly to the precinct captain. While there was interest on the part of the EPCPC members and board to receive feedback from the police on what action was taken to address the problems in each of the specific locations given to the police, the amount of information provided was limited due to the "paperwork" burden.

The EPCPC Board members, however, were extremely interested in tracking the results of action taken about specific targets and anticrime programs. Feedback on targets included monthly "bust reports," community police team activity reports, and address-specific data. Information on programs, such as the Criminal Tresspass program, support for additional crime prevention coordinators, legislative packages (lobbying), and precinct boundary changes, was also important to the coalition's board members.

West Precinct Developments

The West Precinct is mostly composed of the downtown Seattle area encompassing the central business core. The downtown is an area with a concentration of social service agencies ranging from work release centers for parolees (typically from state institutions), various missions that provide food and shelter for street people, shelters for battered women, alcohol and drug treatment centers, and various facilities to help runaway or abandoned youth. It also includes some residential areas including low-income housing as well as a growing number of luxury condominiums. There are no public schools in the central business core, although there are some on the fringes of the precinct in residential areas. There are two areas on the periphery of the core downtown which are popular tourist attractions. These are the Pike Place Market and the Pioneer Square area.

Downtown Seattle, as is the case in most downtown cities throughout the United States, has its share of street people who use doorways and heating grates as places to sleep, and parks and alleys as places to spend their days. It includes areas of prostitution, areas where youth congregate, and cabarets and adult entertainment facilities. Also found are some of the more important tourist attractions in Seattle and one of the main

sports facilities, the Kingdome, which is where national league football and baseball games, and other national sporting shows take place.

The most obvious problems of the downtown area which affect businesses, residents, government staffers and tourists include:

- Chronically inebriated individuals found asleep or unconscious in streets, parks, and alleys.

- Homeless people.

- Young, aggressive predators who mostly victimize street people (but occasionally also tourists, business people, and shoppers) in the downtown area. The main problem created by aggressive panhandling is that it sometimes makes shopping and walking through downtown an unpleasant experience.

- A congregation of illegal aliens who sell and distribute drugs. (See comments about this federal level problem on page 109.)

- There are a number of halfway houses or work release centers for state parolees. In the last two years there have been at least two widely publicized murders traced to these work release probationers. This caused a public outcry demanding that work release centers be distributed throughout the city, and that the probationers be more tightly supervised.

- Problems with the parks, which are used by street people and the homeless as a place of shelter and as a place to consume alcoholic beverages.

The downtown area also has a number of small business organizations composed of business owners who have known each other for a number of years, and who are well organized and well versed in the issues confronting the community. The Pioneer Square Business Association, for example, has been very active in lobbying for specific issues. This group holds formal meetings with the police (typically the precinct captain), and it also strives to develop informal relationships with the police, with the press, and with the city council. The Pike Place Market also had an association of concerned citizens. The Pioneer Square and Pike Place Market groups had separate leadership and operated independently but worked collaboratively on issues of mutual concern. In fact, both of these groups were founded prior to the SSCPC, but the "successful" atmosphere created by the effort in the South Precinct provided encouragement and tended to strengthen their resolve to promote positive change.

In addition, there is an organization called the Downtown Seattle Association (DSA), which is composed of many businesses in the downtown area. This is a well-organized group with a board of directors and holds regular meetings with specific agendas that

are tracked from month to month. Police department representatives attend these meetings and provide information that serves to formulate the agenda of the group. The DSA organizes some of the most effective lobbying in the city, typically in favor of police budgets and the land use decisions of city council, and regarding business and occupational tax issues.

While the representatives of the small business groups like the Pioneer Square Business Association attend the meetings of the larger Downtown Seattle Association, lobbying efforts are usually not formally coordinated and tend to occur on an issue-by-issue basis. An important example that illustrates the interworkings of these associations relates to a well-publicized murder of a young female that worked in this area (and who was victimized by a work release probationer assigned to a downtown halfway house).

The Pioneer Square Business Association was key in organizing a very strong lobbying effort to develop better controls for the work release probationers, and to initiate the necessary process to disperse these facitities throughout the city and not concentrate them in the downtown area. Through the closely knit network of business owners, an advertising agency provided the necessary resources free of charge to publicize a mass rally in support of solutions to problems felt to be contributing to the location of the halfway houses in the downtown area. Approximately 300 to 400 people attended this rally, including the mayor and representatives from the police department. At this meeting, the groundwork was laid for a city initiative in which more accountability was demanded from the Department of Corrections, including a process where names would be provided to the Seattle Police Department so that these probationers could be tracked more closely. In addition, it was decided that a more equitable process for dispersing the halfway houses throughout Seattle would be initiated.

The business associations have also been key in promoting controls over fortified wine sales in the downtown area, including an attempt to prohibit the sale of fortified wine. This effort was opposed by neighboring citizen and business organizations, since they felt that those seeking to buy fortified wine would simply obtain it from their neighboring areas if they couldn't get it downtown. The lobbying effort nevertheless succeeded in obtaining more forceful enforcement of the liquor laws against premises selling to intoxicated individuals.

This group of citizens also was successful in obtaining an administrative ruling by the city attorney (Law Department) to allow police officers to pour the wine out of bottles found in the possession of individuals who were drinking in public or who were in possession of an open bottle. Previously, the prohibition against drinking in public was ignored simply because an officer would have to personally observe an individual

drinking in public before a citation could be written. In addition, the offending bottle had to be taken as evidence and stored until a trial occurred. This requirement was very burdensome and it interfered with the ability of the police to enforce the downtown no-drinking ordinance. The ordinance itself was also changed to prohibit the possession of open liquor bottles, not just drinking in public. The business associations also mounted a substantial lobbying effort at the state and local levels to provide more funding to social agencies, which allowed them to expand their services and provide more beds and more shelter space for homeless people.

The business groups were also successful in directing attention to the issue of illegal aliens dealing drugs, and the apparent inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to take stronger enforcement action against individuals found dealing in illegal substances. The groups were instrumental in lobbying U.S. Senators and Congressmen in order to increase the responsiveness of the INS to rid the area of individuals who could be deported. (A similar program was successfully established in the City of Tacoma, which is about an hour south of Seattle.)

One of the more effective efforts mounted by the business groups was lobbying city and police officials to increase and maintain footbeats in the central business district, especially around parks and areas where street people congregated. The downtown area also received other resources effective in dealing with specific "downtown" problems. An example is the Bicycle Patrol, which involves a detachment of officers who ride mountain bikes and are very effective in maneuvering rapidly in congested areas. Their use started in the downtown area but has now spread to other precincts as well. (The Bicycle Patrol is thought to be one of the first formally established units in the U.S. to use this approach, and has received national press attention over the last couple of years.)

Office of Neighborhoods

In addition, the growing interest in community problems during this period led to the establishment of the Office of Neighborhoods by the mayor and city council (in late 1987). The office initially spent a substantial amount of time establishing districts and respective planning councils (District Planning Councils) on a citywide basis. These districts were basically composed of groups of neighborhoods that perceived themselves as similar with shared concern for a common set of problems.

The kinds of issues that the Office of Neighborhoods addressed were land use planning, development of school play yards, establishment of traffic circles in residential neighborhoods, and planning for growth. To date, there have been no crime prevention issues on the agenda of the Office of Neighborhoods.

Although various neighborhood crime prevention council representatives attend the meetings of the District Planning Councils, they do not participate in setting the agenda. The membership of the crime prevention councils and that of the District Planning Councils are not overlapping, and they do not address the same issues.

During 1990, however, some of the District Planning Councils have tangentially taken up crime prevention initiatives or activities, including possible establishment and funding of hotlines. In addition, the neighborhood of West Seattle, when it initiated its crime prevention council, approached the Office of Neighborhoods to obtain help in printing pamphlets advertising the council's existence. The Office of Neighborhoods agreed and did the initial printing for these leaflets. In most respects, however, the work of the Office of Neighborhoods and the crime prevention councils remains separate and distinct, with an intermingling of their memberships. In 1991 the Office of Neighborhoods became a department of the City of Seattle.

Initial Citywide Coordination

Interestingly, the relationships between the community groups in various parts of the city are ad hoc rather than formal. There is mutual support on lobbying when the issues cross jurisdictional lines and affect all groups. Otherwise, relationships among the precinct groups are based mostly on networking between the people who are active in crime prevention or criminal justice issues. There is not, at present, a formally organized effort aimed at unifying efforts.

However, an important new development occurred in 1990, in which the newly formed and previously established crime prevention councils (approximately seven in total) met as a group and adopted the name of the Crime Prevention Council Citywide Roundtable. This meeting was sponsored by the Neighborhood Crime and Justice Center. They met for the first time in March of 1990 under the auspices of the mayor's staff in charge of studying the reorganization of the city's agencies. This first meeting was viewed by the participants as very productive because information regarding programs and achievements was shared by all the council representatives. It was agreed at that time that the roundtable would meet on a quarterly basis.

One of the issues discussed at the roundtable was the possibility of establishing a citywide legislative committee so that issues of importance to all of the councils could be supported on a citywide basis. It was not envisioned that all legislation would be of equal importance to all the councils in the city. It was clear that problems varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. In the downtown neighborhood, for example, one of the pressing problems is the issue of street people, public drinking, and the location of work release facilities. These issues were not as

important or vital for the East, North or South Precincts, where drug-free zones around schools were a far more important issue.

Funding of Community Groups

The various community groups received limited funding during their early years of operation. In late 1988, city Block Grant funds were provided to form the Neighborhood Crime and Justice Center (NCJC); approximately $45,000 was provided at that time. (The Neighborhood Crime and Justice Center was the new name for the Neighborhood Crime Center which had been organized in late 1988.)

The NCJC was later awarded additional funding under Proposition 1, which was passed in 1989 and is described below. This funding then allowed the NCJC to provide staff support for the East and North Precinct Crime Prevention Councils, and similar groups in the West Seattle area. In addition, the NCJC provided such services as postage, grant writing, training and educational materials, copying, and general staff support necessary to carry on the efforts of the crime prevention councils.

An additional source of funds was provided by the State Omnibus Drug Bill passed during 1989, in which the state legislature made funds available to each county to organize around the concept of "drug-free zones." This concept defined a 1,000-foot radius around schools and bus stops where the penalties for transacting illegal drugs are doubled. An individual who was apprehended in that area would receive a much stiffer sentence than if apprehended elsewhere. In 1990, with active lobbying by the East Precinct citizens' groups, that bill was enhanced so that the drug-free zone would also include public parks and public transit shelter stations.

The South Seattle and the East Precinct councils also received some funds through grant appplications, with the money targeted for organizing the citizens that were residing around these drug-free zones. The actual funding from these sources began in April of 1990. The portion of the work that's located in the City of Seattle is handled by the Crime Prevention Division of the Seattle Police Department. This division took the lead in organizing the citizens around these drug free zones. The Neighborhood Block Watch organizing section of the Crime Prevention Division also agreed to concentrate on neighborhoods that abut school zones.

The Public Safety Action Plan (Proposition 1)

In the spring of 1989, a comprehensive study of the SPD was conducted by a management consulting firm brought in by the city and the police department. Two representative members of the community were part of the steering committee for this study, and

the consultants collected comments and suggestions from the public in the course of the study. While the study concluded that the SPD was "recognized nationally as a very progressive police department," there were some significant public safety issues and specific problems which needed to be addressed. The study produced almost 100 recommendations, and the most significant called for an additional 147 sworn and civilian positions to be added to the department. The study noted the efforts of the SSCPC and identified "significant dividends for the department and the community." It also encouraged the decentralization of SPD units and creation of "precinct advisory councils" to further police and community communications and cooperation.

As a direct result of the recommendations from the study of the SPD, the city proposed a public safety ballot measure for increased funding of the police in the November 1989 general election. This measure was the Public Safety Action Plan (PSAP), Proposition 1; it passed overwhelmingly.

Of specific interest to this project, this measure provided for the addition of police personnel in each precinct assigned fulltime to community/police duties. Their job descriptions specifically excluded responsibility for responding to 911 calls. There was also formal funding of some existing community organizations. The following are the most important items funded by the PSAP for community policing in Seattle.

- Community Crime Councils

  The city council allotted $95,000 per year to increase citizen involvement in precinct work. The program acknowledged that citizens cannot rely strictly on the criminal justice system for solutions to neighborhood crime-related problems. The idea was that residents, businesses, and government social service providers could work jointly toward solutions to maximize the resources of local government. The measure also acknowledged that neighborhood volunteers have limited resources to coordinate activities and to develop programmatic responses to neighborhood crime-related problems. The proposal expanded the limited funding that was provided in 1989 to support the NCJC and the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council of the South Precinct. These funds were to be used for such things as record keeping, mailing list development and maintenance, committee and board support, and general research of criminal justice issues.

- Police Department Advisory Panels

  The police management study recommended that the police department expand the South Precinct partnership program. Recommendations included that citizen-based advisory councils be developed in all precincts and that they play a

strong role in advising the precinct commanders on community issues. The consultant's report also recommended that a city-wide citizens' group representing the new precinct councils be created to advise the department on broader issues.

The proposed precinct advisory councils could be groups that already existed, groups that were newly created, or a combination of the two approaches. It was proposed that the precinct commanders have input into board member selection, setting agendas, and group meetings. These latter aspects were viewed as critical to ensuring that the precinct advisory councils were not controlled by any single interest group.

It was also the intent of this funding package that a central advisory panel be created to advise the chief of police on the implementation of public safety action programs. Membership of this panel was to include the chair and vice chair of each of the precinct advisory councils.

- New funding for Community/Police Teams (CPTs)

  A community/police team composed of five officers and one sergeant was added to each precinct. A lieutenant was also added to each precinct who would be personally in charge of the new CPTs and would also serve as a deputy or assistant to the precinct commander. The East and South Precincts actually implemented these teams in November of 1989, ahead of the funding package. This served to test the concept and provided some evidence of the potential start-up problems and issues that might arise when these teams were officially implemented.

- Youth Intervention Programs

  Approximately $725,000 of the PSAP was earmarked for a program to prevent youth from getting involved in gangs and intervene with youth already at high risk of gang involvement. This program was to be composed of a youth antigang action plan, including a geographically targeted system to provide intervention, diversion and support for youth identified as being at risk of continued involvement in criminal activity. Activities would include youth/family intervention, case management, counseling, tutoring, motivational training, referral to substance abuse and after-care as well as referral to job training and other support services. This program was to be planned and developed jointly by the police, the Department of Human Resources, the schools, and community agencies.

  A joint Parks Department-Police Guild (the police union) recreation program was also part of this funding package; this component addressed the need for access to healthy and

safe recreational opportunities, particularly for older youth during the evening hours. The Police Guild was eager to cooperate with the Parks Department in developing an organized recreational program for youth which used police officers as volunteers. This program enhanced the current array of recreational services, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods, and provided for positive interactions between police officer volunteers and at-risk youth.

Discussion of Issues Related to the Formalization of the Police/Community Partnership

There was a tremendous momentum building with respect to the overall community/police partnership concept from 1988 to 1990, and a significant increase in the specific programs and resources devoted to this policing approach throughout the department, the city, and the community. As the CPTs were formed and community groups came to life throughout the city, a number of new issues (and variations of issues introduced in previous chapters) were identified, and are discussed in the following sections.

- Differences in neighborhoods and communities within the city and within a single precinct

  As can be seen from the descriptions of the development of community groups in the East and West Precincts, these two areas differed in the nature of the residents, businesses, and public safety problems that each neighborhood faced. Some problems in the West Precinct were unique to the central business district and the core community organizations were structured accordingly. The East and South Precincts were probably more similar, but the form of organization of the community and their interaction with the police were dissimilar.

  The issue here is generalization, i.e., the extent to which a successful community organization and its relationship with the police and other departments can be exported to various neighborhoods, precincts, and other cities. Given the natural variability observed in Seattle, it appears that it is not desirable to attempt a single organizational model. Community policing efforts should not be forced to adhere to one form of organization. Also, specific organizational strategies on the part of the community do not appear to make any difference in the effectiveness of community action in solving public safety problems. (As noted in a later chapter, it appears that groups proceed through a series of developmental stages; effectiveness seems to hinge on achieving a certain stage as opposed to dealing with specific issues or implementing a specific organizational model.)

- There appears to be a number of factors that can make a difference between effective and ineffective community groups. These factors include:

  - The existence of a core group of citizens in a neighborhood willing to volunteer time to meet and identify both the problems and potential solutions. In Seattle (and other cities), it became clear that the existence of an initially small group of people who were persistent in their determination to have an effect constituted one of the more important ingredients in the formation of an effective community group. A community group formed by individuals who "sometimes come to meetings and sometimes do not," never became an effective organization.

  - The ability and willingness of the group to track issues from meeting to meeting and from month to month. This trait appears to ensure not only a continuity of attendees, but a continuity of energy concentrated on a specific set of issues.

  - The ability to develop an ongoing working relationship with police supervisors. Success of this endeavor depended in part on the group's success with the previous factors. When individuals started to regularly attend meetings, and when they established and formulated a number of public safety issues that they wished to pursue, it then became possible to form an effective relationship with the police department (and other city agencies). These relationships then allowed the group to focus on the issues and problems that could be tracked over time.

  - The ability to organize a lobbying effort, either through a community group or informally through the efforts of a few individuals in the community. The experience in Seattle showed that in the South, West, and East Precincts, successful lobbying of city and state agencies was carried out formally through the endorsement of community groups, and informally through the efforts of individuals who had developed ties with city and state bureaucracies.

  - The ability to mobilize individuals and business owners in the pursuit of a common lobbying effort. This factor is closely related to the one mentioned above, and refers to the fact that there is strength in numbers. An effort supported by a number of businesses or individuals was typically stronger than one that was mounted by a few scattered individuals.

  - The experience of success. In community policing as in other fields, it appears that successfully solving a

specific problem that was tracked on an ongoing basis breeded more success. It showed everyone involved, from the participants in the community group to the police and other agencies, that a community group could mobilize sufficient energy to succeed on a single problem. The foundation formed by this success could then be used effectively for further activities in pursuit of a public safety platform.

Relationships between community groups of various precincts may not develop into a citywide effort; in fact, such development might not even be desirable. In Seattle, each precinct faced unique problems and each community perceived these problems differently and organized in a different fashion. Only when problems overlapped from one community to the next did common efforts emerge, generally as a lobbying effort aimed at City Hall and state agencies. The citywide roundtable described earlier in this chapter was envisioned by its participants as an information-sharing device, and not as an amalgamation of community crime prevention councils. Community participation in public safety was viewed by active participants as a "grassroots" effort, viable at the neighborhood level but not necessarily at a citywide level.

This development is not surprising because most community policing literature indicates that it should be based on local problems, which generally occur at the block level. It is in this regard that the Crime Prevention Division's program is now the focus of further community organizing to take advantage of the "drug-free zones" legislation around schools, parks, and bus stops. These localized foci of the community (around specific problems, occurring on a block-by-block basis) have been observed in other cities, notably Los Angeles, Portland, and Savannah.

o Community/Police Teams (CPTs)

The research team was invited to participate in discussions on the formation, training, and deployment of community/police teams and was asked to brief the chief of police on potential benefits and problems associated with their deployment. Meetings were also held between the research team and the four operational lieutenants in charge of the CPTs and between the supervisory personnel (sergeants) and the police officers involved in the effort.

During these meetings, several issues were discussed that impacted the deployment of the CPTs. One of the issues discussed was the fact that the new teams represented a departure from the model developed in the South Precinct; the new CPTs represented a different approach in which a specialized unit was charged with doing community policing. These teams, by virtue of their specialization, could run

the danger of being viewed as having a "cushy job"--not "real" police work. This perception could hamper communication between regular patrol officers and the CPTs. In order to counteract this possibility, the lieutenants planned to rotate the officers regularly and encouraged communication by having CPT members attend common roll calls (thereby providing opportunities for the patrol officers and the CPTs to actually engage in discussions of problems that occurred in their common beats). The possibility that the new teams would be viewed by both the community and other officers as only doing public relations work was also discussed. This potential problem was addressed through the initial selection of community issues which could be expected to be resolved successfully in coordination with the community. These successes, if properly publicized within the SPD, were expected to do more to indicate the nature of the work that these teams would be doing than memoranda, standard operating procedures, or roll call briefings.

The issue of establishing standard operating procedures for the CPTs was also discussed. There were clear differences between precincts and neighborhoods, and the kinds of problems likely to arise and become important to communities were expected to differ from precinct to precinct and from neighborhood to neighborhood. There were also differences between daytime problems and those occurring at night. Therefore, it was difficult to establish a priori tactics or approaches that the problem-oriented policing teams should develop. This meant that the goals and objectives of each team would by necessity differ, thereby making it unwise to establish a set of operating procedures that were common to all teams.

An additional thorny issue that both commanders and supervisors were concerned about was how to evaluate the performance and achievements of the CPTs. It was perceived that standard measures such as response time, number of arrests, and number of ordinance violations written would not work. A method was needed so that the officers and the program itself could be evaluated on the basis of goals and objectives achieved and problems solved. In some cases, this might include objectives or goals that were achieved by the community and not by the CPTs. No immediate solutions came to mind during these initial meetings.

The training of the CPTs was also a subject of discussion and concern. It was felt that many of the necessary skills required to successfully carry out community policing duties were those already found in an experienced productive officer. There was substantial discussion about departures from traditional policing that the community-oriented model implied, specifically that officers needed some special training in problem-solving methodology (so that they would

be able to define a problem and then break it down into components that require individual solutions). A related topic was the need to train officers in the kinds of community resources that are available outside of the normal agencies that a police officer comes in contact with (e.g., parks, the utilities, the building department, and the health department). The NCJC conducted several presentations to familiarize CPT members with agencies and programs (e.g., the Criminal Trespass program).

The expansion of the community/police partnership programs throughout the city and its relationship to the basic issues surrounding this new model are discussed further in the chapter on "Lessons Learned."

CHAPTER IX

COMMUNITY/POLICE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS IN OTHER CITIES

Overview of Chapter

This chapter provides an overview of the community policing programs in the cities visited in connection with the Seattle research project. The first section of the chapter describes the various components used in the partnership programs visited in the other cities. The last section describes each program in terms of its organizational and operational scope. This information is intended to highlight the manner in which the various programs are structured and managed, and to indicate unique attributes as well as commonalities.

A separate report was prepared for each city visited, and these detailed descriptions are contained in Appendix B. These reports document the program components which were operational at the times of the on-site visits, and it should be noted that many of the cities have undoubtedly expanded their community/police partnerships since that time. In most locations, the community policing programs were, and still are, in an evolutionary phase undergoing almost constant change.

Summary of Program Components

Exhibit 5 displays each city and identifies the program components in their respective community policing efforts. Although most of the cities visited had some program components in common, such as efforts to remove abandoned automobiles, efforts to close abandoned buildings used for illegal purposes (i.e. abatement programs), clean-up efforts, and antigraffiti efforts, there were a number of unique features. Portland and St. Louis are unique, with several program components that are not duplicated elsewhere. Portland has used the National Guard in support of the police bureau, has citizens ride as observers during patrol actions, and has community groups perform the traditional crime prevention function that most police departments are charged with. In St. Louis, in a historical development dating back to the Civil War, the police chief reports directly to the governor, not the mayor of the city. The governor, in turn, appoints a four-member commission that has day-to-day oversight duties relative to the police department and the community policing program. A unique program in St. Louis allows citizens to monitor police arrests in cooperation with the local precinct. Based on these arrest records, landlords are notified that their tenants have been arrested for illegal activities. This is an unusual practice; typically arrest records are not available to the public, and only conviction records can be released to the public in most other jurisdictions.

Exhibit 5

PROGRAM COMPONENTS BY CITY

Community Policing Program Component	Seattle	Portland	Minneapolis	St. Louis	Los Angeles	Savannah
Location (Property) Abatement	South Seattle Program	Specified Crime Prop Ordinance: Patrol	RECAP Unit	COPS/ConServ	South Bureau Abatement Team	
Civil Gang Abatement					South Bureau Abatement Team & city attny	
Abandoned Autos	South Seattle Program	Bureau of Buildings/P.D. Parking Unit	RECAP/SAFE	ConServ & PD "Derelict auto ordinance"	P.A.C.E.	Mini-Station Officers at start of program and patrol during showcase sweeps
Decayed/ Abandoned Building Abatement	South Seattle Program	Bureau of Buildings	RECAP/SAFE	COPS/ConServ	P.A.C.E.	By special unit on regular basis and by patrol on regular basis
Citizen Patrols		Foot patrol in N. Precinct working with patrol officer	Bicycle patrol working w/SAFE officers in some areas	Motorized patrol working w/patrol officers	Foot patrol w/S.L.O. in Rampart	
Curfew Sweeps (Juveniles)		Patrol with Citizen Observation				

Exhibit 5

Program Component	Seattle	Portland	Minneapolis	St. Louis	Los Angeles	Savannah
National Guard		Support Police for curfew sweeps, drug raids and prisoner transportation				
Formal Community Survey	As component of long-range plan development		City-wide for long range planning		Area-wide mailings to inform prior to street barrier program	Neighborhood-wide for Showcase program
Labor from community service sentences					In North Hollywood and Rampart to work on anti-graffiti prog.	
Telephone Hotline	South Seattle East Precinct					

Exhibit 5

Program Component	Seattle	Portland	Minneapolis	St. Louis	Los Angeles	Savannah
Pay Phone Removal/alter	South Seattle program (no incoming)		SAFE officer has phones removed			
Targeting	South Seattle program via command staff		RECAP via varied input analysis		South Bureau abatement via varied input and computer analysis	
"Indirect" abatement contact w/drug dealers	South Seattle program with NARs			C.O.P.S. on patrol		
Community Group re-development			Whittier Alliance	DeSales Corp. Fox Park		Showcase: public work
Foot Patrol as part of C.P.	S. Seattle program Park and walk		RECAP/SAFE infrequently	C.O.P.S. officers	Regular deployment in N. Hlwd from overtime budget in Newton	Mini-station part of Showcase sweeps
Citizens monitor arrests & notify landlords				Fox Park N-Hood Association in cooperation with precinct		
Citizens accompanying cops		On patrol task force and Nat. Guard curfew sweeps				

Exhibit 5

Community Policing Program Component	Seattle	Portland	Minneapolis	St. Louis	Los Angeles	Savannah
Clean-up Efforts	Led by Ctzns, infrequent officer participation	"Fire wall" program	Done by Dept. of Sanitation at behest of SAFE cops, cops provide security	Done by ConServ on own accord w/cops providing security	In N. Hood done by ctzns in coordination w/police Dept. In Rampart done by Sanitation at behest of S.L.O.	In Showcase program
Anti-Graffiti Program	Citizens run	Office of Neigh. Assoc.			In N. Hood, run by P.A.C.E officer. In Rampart, run by S.L.O.'s	
Saturation Patrol as part of community policing program	Coordinated effort by traffic and other specialty units	Ad hoc: interstate area	By patrol and RECAP at behest of RECAP		In Newton and Rampart in coordination w/ street barriers	In Showcase program
Mini-Stations	Mobile mini-precinct vans				In one project in South Bureau	In three Housing Projects
Street Barricades					2 Divisions, along with saturation patrols	
Youth Programs	Cooperative police and community				Hollenbeck Youth Center	Run by mini-station cops

Los Angeles has established some unique community policing components, including street barricades to temporarily close streets for the purpose of controlling drive-by shootings and drug sales. It also has instituted a program in coordination with the city attorney to employ civil procedures for addressing the gang problem. The North Hollywood and the Rampart Divisions are able to draw laborers from a pool of individuals sentenced to community service for the purpose of clean-ups and antigraffiti paint-outs.

Seattle also has a number of components not found in other cities, such as the telephone hotline that allows citizens to call a dedicated telephone number and anonymously provide information about criminal activities covering vehicles, residences that may be engaging in the sale of drugs, and descriptions of individuals suspected of illegal activities. Seattle's targeting program component is also unique, and involves citizen representatives and the South Precinct command staff who jointly identify program targets. In other cities with a targeting component, such as Minneapolis and Los Angeles, the police choose targets without any input from the community.

Description of Specific Program Components

The various program components are discussed in the following sections.

- Citizen Patrols

  Citizen patrols are used in four of the six cities compared. The cities that organized these patrols with strict non-intervention rules fared better; officers supported these efforts, and on at least two occasions the citizen patrols were credited with providing information on major crack houses that were subsequently raided. Theoretically, while citizen patrols trained by the police department may raise a substantial liability question, this was not an issue of concern to the police supervisors interviewed.

- Community Surveys

  Surveys of the community, and communication with citizens in general, occurred in most cities as part of meetings with the police. In Minneapolis, there was a citywide effort to mail questionnaires to property owners for the purpose of long-range planning in community policing issues; in Los Angeles, the police engage in neighborhoodwide door-to-door visits to inform citizens of and to gain information prior to police action; in Savannah, residents of specific neighborhoods filled out questionnaires that were subsequently used in the Showcase programs. Seattle is incorporating an annual citizens' questionnaire as part of the long-range plan development process. This survey is

distributed to community and business groups and individual citizens throughout Seattle (random samples are taken and the questionnaire is available in all city libraries).

- Telephone Removal

  Removing pay telephones in order to prevent drug dealers or loitering juveniles from using the phones as a base of operations occurs formally in Seattle and Minneapolis. This tactic appears to serve its purposes quite well, and usually immediately disrupts the illegal behavior.

- Community Redevelopment

  Community redevelopment programs are usually efforts to obtain funds for the purpose of renovating decaying housing. Both Minneapolis and St. Louis have programs in two of their neighorhoods to perform this function. Although a livability issue, it is clear that this component cannot occur successfully without some basic economic demand for the rehabilitated housing. Also, without an initial capital base that is replenished with funds as properties are sold, such a program is typically short-lived. This appears to be a program component that could be generalized to other jurisdictions given a source of funds for seed capital.

- Neighborhood Clean-ups

  Clean-up efforts, a common element of community policing, were found in all of the cities visited. The typical arrangement is for citizens to organize a work party, with officers generally providing security. Typically, the sanitation department provides the necessary dumpster equipment to haul away the trash gathered. The clean-up of parks also proceeds in the same fashion, but oftentimes the parks departments have their own equipment for removal of the accumulated trash.

- Antigraffiti Programs

  The antigraffiti effort, also a component in most programs, appears to be organized similarly in most jurisdictions. Citizens or police obtain donated paint and supplies and then organize a "paint-out party" during appointed days. In Seattle, the organizing function has been absorbed by the engineering department; in Los Angeles, a paint sprayer was donated to the police department, and officers mounted it on a trailer and transported it to the locales where the paint-outs were to occur. On occasion, Los Angeles officers provided the necessary labor for operating the sprayer.

- Saturation Tactics

  Saturation patrols are also a program component used in most cities, and it is typically a patrol tactic used as an adjunct to a community policing initiative. This technique is used to rid a particular neighborhood or area of a crime problem. In Los Angeles, for example, saturation patrols have been used in the Newton and Rampart Divisions in coordination with street barriers to successfully decrease the rate of drive-by shootings and drug street deals. In Savannah, it has been used in conjunction with the Showcase program, where periodic saturation patrols were used to control drug dealing. In Portland, it has been employed as part of concentrated efforts in the "interstate" area. In Seattle this tactic has been activated as part of specific target abatement efforts.

- Ministations

  Ministations are a component found only in Los Angeles and Savannah. In both cities the main purpose of this program was to reduce rampant criminal activity and restore community security. While only one ministation had been implemented in Los Angeles, in Savannah ministations have been set up in three housing projects. The specific aim of these facilities is to reach out and influence the children and teenagers of these housing projects.

  It should be noted that in Seattle a variation of the concept of ministations is used in the form of mobile vans. These vans are equipped with communications gear, desks for report writing, and a temporary holding cell, and are typically parked in certain high crime areas. They then serve as a temporary ministation for either a shift or for a period of days. This tactic has been very popular in downtown city locations where drug dealing is prevalent, and the business community continuously requests that the vans be used in their areas.

- Programs for Youths

  Full-fledged youth programs were observed in Los Angeles and Savannah. In Los Angeles, a number of officers devoted considerable time to the Hollenbeck Youth Center, with duties ranging from serving as coaches in various sports to organizing fundraising efforts in support of the youth center. In Savannah, the ministation officers engaged in a variety of unique activities such as tutoring children, supervising homework sessions, taking children to movies and various outings, and even on occasion providing family and substance abuse counseling.

  Other cities, including Seattle, have police working with youth as part of their normal operations. These efforts

include the "Officer Friendly" program, the D.A.R.E. program, and liaison activities with other city departments about youth-oriented recreation needs.

Organizational and Operational Scope of Programs

Exhibit 6 summarizes the principal organizational and operational features of the community policing programs visited. The various categories are discussed in the following sections.

o Program Management

The management of the community/police partnership programs varied across the cities. In Seattle, the program was managed by the police department, and all officers assigned to the community/police teams in the south Seattle program reported through the chain of command in the department. In Minneapolis, this was not the case, as the officers assigned to the SAFE program actually reported to a civilian agency head who in turn reported to the mayor and the city council; the RECAP program, however, was managed by the police department. Los Angeles, Savannah and Portland managed the program through the police department (similar to Seattle and RECAP in Minneapolis). Portland, however, represented a unique situation in which community groups actually devised and proposed community policing initiatives; the police department, the state patrol, and other law enforcement agencies were recruited to participate when law enforcement issues were identified. St. Louis was also unique because of the organizational reporting lines of the community/police officers; the officers assigned to the C.O.P.S. program reported directly to the district captain, bypassing the typical chain of command involving a sergeant and a lieutenant.

o Program Scope

The comprehensiveness of the programs also varied from city to city. In Seattle, the initial program involved all patrol officers in one of four precincts; in 1990, funding was obtained to add a six-person specialty unit (the CPTs) in each precinct, dedicated on a full time basis to community/police duties. In Portland, at the time of the grant visit, the community policing function was performed on an ad hoc basis by patrol officers with the support of specialty units. The number of patrol officers involved, and the units backing up these officers, was decided on a problem-by-problem basis.

In Minneapolis, the organization of the community/police program involved two specialty units, "RECAP", and "SAFE"; both operated on a citywide basis, but differed in the source of information used to identify targets. Requests

Exhibit 6

Organizational Features of Community Policing Programs

Feature	Seattle	Portland	Minneapolis	St. Louis	Los Angeles	Savannah
Management Administration	Police Dept.	Police Dept.; Community Group	Police Dept.; Mayor; council influence	Police Commissioner appt. by Governor	Police Dept.; Council influence	City Manager; Police Dept.
How Widespread	All patrol officers in S. Precinct; CPT in each precinct	Problem-specific, city-wide patrol officers	Two specialty units, city-wide	One specialty unit, in neighborhoods	All districts: part-time officers and specialty unit	Specific neighborhoods: part-time patrol & special unit
Nature of links with agencies	In S. Precinct by Mayoral directive; others: officer contacts	Supervisory & officer contacts; comm. groups.	Specialty units contact agency; council facilities	Civilian agency coordinates other agencies	Supervisory & officer contacts; council facilities C.E.R. forms	Supervisor/ officer contacts; city manager direction; Office of Neighborhoods
Agencies Participating	Housing Auth. Parks Dept. Health Dept. Bldg. Dept. Engineering Licensing City Attorney City Light	Housing Auth. Natl. Guard Governor's Office, Sanitation Dept. Building Dept.	Housing Auth. Fire Dept. Health Dpet. Sanitation Housing Dept.	Housing Auth. ConServ Office Bldg. Dept.	Housing Auth. City Attorney Probation Dept Sanitation Bldg. Dept. Health Dept.	Housing Auth. Public Works Dept., Office of Neighborhoods
Nature of Planning Process for C.P. Programs	Comm. Group initially; police now manage; CPT's: problem-oriented	Comm. Groups started; now, formal, 2-yr process; Capt. commands C.P. section	Problem-oriented; no formal plan	Problem-oriented; no formal plan	Problem-Oriented, Div-wide; patrol officer authorized formal proposed plan	City Manager directs; Office of Neighborhoods Coordinates; no formal plan
Citizen Participation	Citizen Crime Prevention councils; block watch; targeting in S. Precinct; problem-orient input to P.D.	Office of Neighborhood Association; Planning process; problem oriented input to P.D.	Neighborhood organizations; direct contact to RECAP, SAFE city council	Officers attend block watch, Neigh. organizes; direct calls to officers via pager	Officers attend block watch; problem oriented comm. meetings, surveys	Surveys Block watch

for SAFE action on problems came directly from citizens, from the city council, or from observations by officers themselves. Computer analysis of calls-for-service initially served as the source of data for RECAP. The RECAP unit also referred requests to the SAFE unit, particularly those that appeared to be outside its expertise or ability to respond due to time commitments. Both SAFE and RECAP are citywide units, but SAFE was organized along the lines corresponding to the election districts of each city council member.

In St. Louis, the COPS program was implemented in a single neighborhood, with a single specialty unit responding and prioritizing problems in that community. Los Angeles had a variety of organizational schemes, with the officers who were active in community policing generally assigned at the divisional level but occasionally at the bureau level. In Savannah, the community policing programs were assigned to a specialty unit that was also reponsible for a substantial number of other duties, such as emergency tactical response and special drug abatement duties. This unit also coordinated its efforts with patrol officers who provided their services on a part-time basis to the community/police actions during periodic sweeps.

- Agency Links

The nature of links with other agencies indicated the manner in which resources and expertise of other organizational units was brought to bear on the community policing program. In Seattle, with the community policing effort in the South Precinct, the mayor issued a directive that appointed representatives from more than ten departments or agencies to work together with the police and periodically hold meetings to review strategies. The South Precinct commander chaired this group of agencies, and developed a list of contacts regarding various problems. As the program in the South Precinct progressed, each of these agency contacts was involved as needed, and the regular formal meetings were not continued. Contacts from a large number of agencies were identified, including the bus transit security (METRO), Seattle City Light, School Bus Transit Company, Housing Authority Security, Health Department, Engineering Department, Water Department, Seattle Public Schools, the Department of Administrative Services, liaison office between the public schools and the Seattle Police Department, Department of Construction and Land Use, Law Department (criminal division), Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs, Seattle Municipal Court, Fire Department, and the Mayor's Office. As CPTs were developed in the other precincts, the same contact individuals from various departments were shared, but there was no formal chairmanship of the group by the precinct captains; each CPT and its sergeant would contact agencies as needed.

In Portland, the individuals making contacts and links with other agencies were officers and their supervisors. The community groups and the Office of Neighborhoods directly contacted other agencies as needed, particularly involving initiatives that did not include the police.

In Minneapolis, contacts with agencies were handled by the two specialty units (RECAP and SAFE) that operated on a citywide basis. These contacts were informal in nature, and developed by each officer and supervisor as the need required. The sanitation, health, building, and fire departments appeared to be the most active agencies in Minneapolis.

In St. Louis, operation ConServ was the funnel through which other agencies were brought to bear on housing problems; under this arrangement, a police officer contacted his or her ConServ counterpart who in turn alerted and coordinated with the resources of other agencies. On other problems not under ConServ's jurisdiction, the officers established direct contacts.

In Los Angeles, it was the officers (or their supervisors) actually involved in the community policing initiative who contacted agencies to mobilize their resources. In many cases, police personnel developed a relationship with their counterparts in other agencies, which expedited the requests. More commonly, officers filled out special work requests (Community Enhancement Requests, or CERs) which were forwarded to the agency in question (with a copy kept in police records). In some instances the officers or the community representatives would call the appropriate city council representative, who on occasion would intervene in the request for other agencies to participate. These interventions generally substantially hastened the desired response from other departments.

In Savannah, the city manager provided the initial push on the program by issuing a directive similar to the one in Seattle, under which the city agencies were to cooperate in the community policing initiatives in the Showcase program. The Office of Neighborhoods in Savannah also played a pivotal role by planning and carrying out a comprehensive survey of many neighborhoods. The resulting analysis of the survey data showing a weighted rank order of each of the priorities as expressed by the residents of that neighborhood. Those priorities ranged from reduction of crime to basic improvement in public works, including fixing roads and sidewalks, and planting trees. The noncriminal aspects of the priorities were managed and coordinated by the Office of Neighborhoods directly with the city agencies affected.

o Participating Agencies

The next organizational feature on Table 2 lists the agencies that participated most often in the community policing programs in each of the cities. Several of these agencies were common to all cities, like the housing authority, the health department, the building department, and the city attorney's office. There are also some notable examples of agencies that participated only in Portland's programs, such as the National Guard and the Governor's Office.

o The Planning Process

The nature of the planning process for community policing programs also varied substantially. In Seattle, the initial planning process was spearheaded by the community group in South Seattle and was adopted and expanded upon by the police department. Separately and prior to funding the new community/police teams, the city council later requested that a planning document be prepared discussing how these new units were to be deployed, their expected duties, how they were to be trained, and how they were to be evaluated. Planning for community policing efforts is an evolving process and takes into account the results of the work now being performed by the CPTs (such as new programs being developed) and the findings related to evaluations of early efforts. In addition, the operational scope of the CPTs are being integrated into the departmentwide long-range planning process.

In Portland, the community policing programs were given impetus by the community groups, particularly through the funding provided by the Office of Neighborhoods. This pressure, along with some of the projects and initiatives that were requested by the police department, served as the springboard for a broad, comprehensive, two-year planning process for the implementation of community policing. This planning process is being headed by a police manager (rank of captain) who commands the community policing section and is in charge of planning for the implementation of community policing initiatives on a citywide basis.

In Minneapolis, the RECAP unit began as part of a research project that showed that a relatively small number of locations generate a large proportion of calls-for-service. The police department created this unit to address the problems generated by these relatively few locations. A separate initiative by the city council funded the SAFE program, which was charged with community policing on a citywide basis. While these two units refer work to one another, there is no comprehensive plan for the way that they are to interact or the manner in which they will be evaluated.

In St. Louis, the ConServ and C.O.P.S. programs developed slowly, more or less as an experiment to improve livability in some of the city's neighborhoods. ConServ was a city council initiative, and at present there is no formal plan for the expansion or evaluation of community policing in St. Louis.

In Los Angeles, there were a large number of different programs that can be termed community policing initiatives, some dating back many years; others have been initiated and implemented quite recently. The individual divisions in Los Angeles were given broad decentralized authority to configure community policing programs according to their individual resources and constraints. Consequently, with the exception of the South Bureau, the vast majority of the program planning and implementation occurred at the division level and involved the analysis of specific problems. Implementation of solutions which included other police units and resources from other city agencies was coordinated as needed. Typically, however, a patrol officer who had community/police duties was charged with formulating a plan to solve a specific problem and carry out its implementation. A South Bureau officer had authored a planning document for community policing operations involving senior lead officers (SLOs), intended for use by all divisions. At the time of the site visit, the document was proceeding through review channels.

In Savannah, the initial impetus came from the city manager's office to do the necessary planning for the Office of Neighborhoods to implement its survey of the Showcase neighborhoods, and to involve other agencies and the police in the prioritization of needed actions. It was also a developing effort, and as the city manager's office collected information about the programs and their effectiveness, this data was taken into consideration for the formulation of new initiatives. Evaluation of and planning for community policing programs was coordinated to configure new tactics based on the results of current operations.

- Citizen Participation

Citizen participation--by definition part of all community policing programs--varied across the cities visited in terms of the means by which it occurred and the level of citizen involvement. The block watch organizations in each city provided a common base through which the citizens of particular neighborhoods met and discussed specific problems with the police. There was substantial variability, however, in the degree to which block watch was actually effective in raising and assuring citizen participation. It

appeared to be more effective in Portland, St. Louis, and Los Angeles as compared to Savannah and (initially) Seattle.

In Seattle, the SSCPC in the South Precinct was the initial vehicle for citizen participation in the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project. Since that time, the SSCPC model has been adopted in a number of other neighborhoods and representatives from these councils attend precinct advisory meetings. Currently, the Crime Prevention Division has been very active in utilizing its block watch program to facilitate citizen participation in the community policing program.

In Portland, the Office of Neighborhood Associations and the community groups that it funds provided the primary avenue for citizen participation. The police citywide planning process for community policing also included community representatives. In addition, there were a number of ad hoc community groups that had been formed to work with the police and other city departments on specific problems.

In Minneapolis, the RECAP unit worked with citizens and businesses to resolve specific problems; the SAFE program also worked with citizens, businesses, and property owners on a problem-by-problem basis. Overall, the block watch program did not provide the kind of route for citizen participation that existed in other cities.

In St. Louis, officers provided special phone and pager numbers to citizens of the targeted neighborhoods so that the officers could be contacted by the citizens regarding specific problems. In Fox Park, the ConServ officer and the police officers working with him often attended block watch meetings. This kind of forum was an important vehicle for citizen participation and communication with both police and ConServ officers, and was a key component for the prioritization of problems in these communities. In addition, citizen participation occurred on a problem-by-problem basis.

In Los Angeles, officers assigned to community/police duties also attended block watch meetings, and that forum became the primary method for citizen participation. In addition, on some occasions there were neighborhood-related polls and surveys carried out by the police department that were also designed to gather citizen opinions on planned police actions. On a neighborhood by neighborhood basis, the block watch effort gave rise to groups of citizens who met with officers and supervisors (including division captains), to discuss ad hoc problems and specific solutions.

In Savannah, citizen participation was obtained partly through block watch, although that effort did not (at least at the time of the site visit) have substantial impact in

the community policing initiatives in the city. The more important vehicle for citizen participation was through the Office of Neighborhood Services, particularly through the surveys that they have performed of selected neighborhoods.

CHAPTER X

LESSONS LEARNED

Overview of Chapter

A number of issues relevant to community policing were introduced and discussed in Chapter III, and this chapter again addresses these topics. In addition to an expanded discussion based on the analysis of the community/police partnership programs in Seattle and other cities visited (covering startup and operational issues), other related findings and conclusions are also identified and described. These issues are covered in basically the same order as introduced in Chapter III.

The last section of this chapter deals with findings and conclusions specific to the City of Seattle. As the main focus of the research project, this discussion provides closure to the community/police partnership activities that occurred in Seattle over the past decade (which have been described throughout this report). As noted in the Introduction, a separate management summary has been prepared for local distribution, and it contains more specific findings and recommendations about the Seattle effort.

Definition of Community Policing

The current need for a clear, accepted definition of community policing, as discussed earlier, has not been satisfied based on the review of various community/police partnerships around the country. There was no set pattern for how these programs operate, and each contained a wide range of components or activities. Exhibit 7 reflects the three major groups or participants and the various combinations of activities that are possible. As this model displays, the three groups include agencies (local and state governmental agencies as well as nonprofit and private associations), the police, and the community, which can also include a wide variety of types of organizations.

The overlap of the community and police components (CP) and the (ACP) area (incorporating the agencies) covers what most of the literature labels as "community policing programs." Examples of these types of efforts include antigraffiti clean-up efforts, RECAP programs, the COPS program in St. Louis, the PACE and SLOs in Los Angeles, all of which fall in these two areas. Other examples include the "firewall" concept in Portland, as well as their initiative involving the National Guard and the police; the Portland curfew sweeps (where citizens ride along with police) also fits in this area labeled CP.

Combinations and Participants in Community Problem-Solving



Participants

A = Agencies
C = Community
P = Police

Combinations

CP = Community + Police
PA = Police + Agencies
CA = Community + Agencies

The community and agency combination (AC) involves cooperation without participation by the police. Operation Brightside and the DeSales Housing Corporation efforts in St. Louis both belong in this category in that citizens worked directly with agencies to solve community problems without involvement from the police department. A number of examples of programs falling in this category exist in most cities: parks departments have established recreation programs in consultation with the community; schools involving parents can also be viewed as belonging in this area of an agency working directly with residents of a community. Also, over the last 20 years throughout the United States, zoning and land use developments have drawn tremendous participation from citizens and residents of neighborhoods working together with building department agencies in an effort to improve their communities.

The area labeled "AP" includes programs where the police department and other city, local, or state agencies act together without any necessary or required input or participation from the community. The SAFE program in Minneapolis and the ConServ program in St. Louis fit here because they were essentially initiated by the Mayors, with police either reporting directly to a civilian agency head or working daily with individuals from other agencies. In most cities, it is fairly common to find examples where the police work with human resource departments in order to resolve drug abuse problems, or with the health department in order to uphold public health laws and develop programs for the homeless. All of these programs or initiatives are situations in which the police and other agencies work together to resolve community problems without participation from the community in the planning, operation, or evaluation phases. (Even though this area is included in the community problem-solving model, as noted, there is not actual community participation.)

As the above discussion reveals, attempting to categorize the participants involved in community policing efforts adds little clarity to the quest for a definition. Referring back to the perspective on a definition introduced in Chapter III (which includes the notion of a philosophy or orientation of police work, cooperation, solving problems, an extension of the crime prevention approach, and a proactive nature), any of the combinations of action/cooperation in the above model appear to meet most, if not all, of the aspects included in the attempt to formulate a definition. Also, the most commonly used goals of the myriad types of community policing programs, which are to solve problems related to "crime, fear, and disorder," allow for a wide range of activities to be included.

Another part of the problem is that the terms "community policing" and "team policing" are considered by some to be "old wine in new bottles" based on experience in the 1960s and 70s. Programs such as New York City's Team Policing, the Los Angeles Police Department's Basic Car Plan, and numerous other similar

efforts sought to create greater responsibility, autonomy, and authority for community relations and problem-solving at the police officer level. These programs generally failed for numerous practical resons, including limited resources, the need for communication between different police units, and the lack of accountability. Also, many currently active and viable police/community programs in crime prevention, victim assistance, and those dealing with youth and schools have been effective community/police partnership efforts and fit into almost any definition of this new approach.

All of these factors continue to point out the difficulty in identifying a clear definition for community policing. However, one trait that appears to be present in most situations is the cooperative approach to working with citizens and other agencies. The new approach to policing involves the police in a "partnership arrangement" with other participants and fosters an atmosphere or environment for creative and logical problem-solving behavior.

It also might help to put the quest for a definition of community policing into a historical and contemporary context with respect to how new management theories are defined and named. (It should be pointed out that even the term "management," which has evolved through numerous theories and usage variations over the past century, is still defined in numerous ways in the literature.) For example:

- In the 1880s, the scientific or traditional school of management got its beginning. The label appears to have been introduced by Fredrick Taylor with his book the Principals of Scientific Management in 1911. The key notion of this management orientation was use of a logical approach and job simplification. The next major shift came in the 1930s and was the "human relations school of management;" this was in fact an attempt to investigate how to improve working conditions as part of the scientific management approach, i.e., the "Hawthorne Studies." (The Hawthorne research was actually conducted in the 1920s.) Both of these shifts changed the fundamental nature of management theory, and it is doubtful that there was widespread agreement on the definition and especially the name for these theories until many years after their initial appearance on the scene. As seems to be the case with different approaches to management, over the years an accepted name and definition must await academic discourse to develop a commonly accepted term. From a practical standpoint, changes in the workplace were made regardless of whether a common term or definition was available or not. Finally, in this context, the names for "strategies" of policing introduced in the Kelling and Moore article (1988),

although appropriate and accurate, were not apparently used or needed until an evolutionary step was detected (i.e. the shift to community policing).

- Currently, within the private sector, another evolutionary step involving management theory or strategy is taking place. This new orientation is loosely referred to as "quality management" (however, there are numerous terms applied to the new approach including total quality system, customer-oriented management, and customer focus), and appears to have come about in part as a result of a corporate approach to management developed in Japan. The basic notion is that companies should start designing their products (or services in the case of governmental entities) with the customers' needs in mind and for the highest quality possible (zero defects). All types of information from the customer (again, citizens in the case of governmental services) are welcomed and, in fact, actively collected through marketing studies. This includes complaints about products or services that are used to define needed product improvements or training requirements.

  This new management approach is gaining in popularity and appears to be well founded in common sense and basic management principles. This is analogous to the current status of the community policing concepts. Both of these theories or strategies are being studied and put into operation without the benefit of a widely-accepted definition or easy-to-use term.

Accordingly, with the possible exception of how cooperative programs are categorized for funding requests or for publicity purposes (the term "community policing" appears to be widely recognized in newspaper articles and the literature), it does not appear warranted that municipalities or police agencies delay implementation of community-oriented or problem-solving approach because of definitional uncertainty. The key to new programs should be the identification of a clear purpose with measurable goals and objectives. Because ideas for new programs can come from a multitude of sources (the law enforcement agency, other city departments, or the community), following some basic guidelines concerning a clear purpose will facilitate flexible and innovative programs, regardless of their names.

Definition of the Community

The theoretical debate on defining the community that the police are to work with has largely been an issue confined to the literature. As Goldstein (1990) argues, the practical reality is that police departments tend to work with residents that are impacted by a given problem and are willing and able to participate in the solution of the problem (by investing time and effort). Further observations in the course of this study

support previous assertions (Goldstein, 1987, Mastrofski; 1988) that the areas with the greatest demand for police services are also often those where community participation is the hardest to organize. In neighborhoods with low social cohesion where residents are recruited to participate, there is often high turnover and spotty attendance at meetings. This makes it difficult from a practical standpoint to achieve any progress in these meetings, and to have the necessary stability over time for work to be undertaken on meaningful agenda items.

The Seattle experience, corroborated by information gathered in some of the other cities visited, indicates that there are some specific identifiable stages which the community and the police traverse in order to form a successful partnership, explained below.

- The first stage involves meetings between the community and the police, is characterized by high turnover of the participating community members, and is dominated by vociferous criticism of police methods, tactics and instances of perceived abuse of power. This may be termed the "acrimonious/venting" stage, wherein the community airs its frustrations about crime wherein general and specific police actions are perceived to be "too little, too late." Some community members take the point of view that they do their part by paying taxes, and it is their right to expect that the police will do their part to provide safety. In this stage, the police are relegated to a more or less defensive role in which they explain the effects of limited resources and the limits of police power.

- The second stage appears to be one in which community members start to predictably attend meetings and where group members and the police begin seeing some stability (the same faces meeting after meeting). The police and the community agree to "play ball" during this stage. This joint commitment to work constructively sets the stage for future stability. In this "organizational stage," a low-turnover group is formed. This group provides the basis for the establishment of a stable organization that begins to actually work on issues on which the community can have an impact, and for the development of a climate where the police and community can agree on an agenda of problems that face a given neighborhood. Personal or political agendas are viewed as roadblocks to progress by the group at this stage.

- The next stage appears to be the formation of a stable relationship, where both the police and the community commit to taking action; these acts are accomplished and then discussed/critiqued in subsequent meetings. These instances of actual performance of agenda items that were previously agreed on breed more success, and appear to be the key ingredient in the formation of the track record needed for

the development of a mutually trusting relationship between the police and the community. This success also helps the group to eventually enable and facilitate turnover in its membership, in both the police and the community, with no loss in the ability of the group to work closely. This phase might be called the "successes stage."

- The final stage involves achieving a long-term and stable level of operations. This includes the ability to mount continuous efforts to resolve problems as well as to recruit a wider representation of community residents that can be brought into the group (and smoothly integrated into the ongoing process between police and residents). This might be termed the "long-term stability stage."

In addition to within newly-formed groups (going through the stages noted above), good working relationships have been observed in cases where crime issues are included on the agendas of existing long-lasting and durable community associations. In these cases, the community group is already functioning for other purposes and agrees to add community policing issues. In Seattle, for example, the Rainier Chamber of Commerce was the initial host agency for the formation of the group that added community policing to its agenda; in Portland, it was a group that had received funding from the city's Office of Neighborhoods and administered the Portland Crime Prevention program; in Los Angeles, the police worked with an established business association at the youth center in Hollenbeck. In most programs visited, ad hoc citizen groups were available to work with the police department on specific problems affecting them; once these problems abated, however, the intensity of the group's activities diminished substantially.

Another aspect of defining the community is that there are numerous problems to address, and various community/business associations often have different or conflicting purposes for being. Regardless of the range of interests, all groups should have equal access to the police in terms of expressing their concerns about current public safety services and needs. In this context, it is not uncommon that there will be competition among the various groups. This applies to the provision of information about priority needs/problems as well as for any funding which might be available. This situation is not unlike the expected "turf battles" within various departments of the city; there are numerous and complex issues within the community and business sectors, and no one group represents all of the viewpoints. In Seattle, the SSCPC was not representative of many neighborhoods in the South Precinct and the goal to become more so (as expressed in the 15-Point Plan) was not completely successful. However, others in the community saw their overall success and used the SSCPC as a model.

The Role of Police Officers

Goldstein (1987) argues that eventually, the role of officers assigned to the 911 emergency-response patrol function will be in support of the community/police teams, a situation that will essentially become the reverse of the current arrangement. This may take place because "traditional" police methods are not considered compatible with a community policing approach. Although Goldstein indicates that traditional police methods may, in fact, be appropriate in many situations, it appears that many of these tactics are incompatible with the new community policing model; even if appropriate, they may be difficult to implement and include in the training curriculum.

The programs visited did not exhibit any signs of this dichotomy. In Portland, for example, all officers started to vigorously enforce a curfew law as part of the community policing efforts. The twist here was that the community leaders had asked for this vigorous enforcement. The police department agreed, but requested that members of the community accompany them on ride-alongs while performing these sweeps. This same process was evident in other cities such as Los Angeles, Seattle, and St. Louis, where old-fashioned, traditional police methods were applied in a community policing situation, with the community vigorously approving.

The point here is that the use of force and other traditional tactics by patrol are not necessarily incompatible with community policing. Community policing is not only a joint problem-solving process, but also involves, where necessary, arrest-oriented police action. The difference is that within the community policing model, the "tough" police action is not a surprise to the law-abiding community; in fact, it may be requested by residents and citizens working with the police. Police actions aimed at reducing crime and control of the criminal element still appear to involve traditional tactics, but now these tactics involve a process of community participation. This involves "coproduction" in the selection of tactics, and in the community's observation of and sometimes monitoring of their implementation.

In Los Angeles, the fear of crime was reduced after the police implemented some old-fashioned tactics including traditional sweeps, street closures, and other concentrated efforts to drive out the criminal element. The community was alerted ahead of time. Even though the presence of police was increased and street closures took place, residents applauded these efforts and brought flowers and food to the same officers that ten years ago were viewed as an occupying arm and pelted with eggs, bottles, and rocks. In Los Angeles, an interesting example arose wherein a group of nonresidents came to protest against the unconstitutionality of street closures by the police; they were promptly confronted by residents of the area and asked to leave and mind their own business. It was obvious that the community

porting the police, but making sure that their would not be derailed from the intended purpose. Seattle having difficulty blending the traditional pecti e with the new community-oriented approach. The specially organized CPTs work in tandem with regular patrol operations to handle the full range of public safety problems as they are encountered. In Seattle, the chief insisted that the new resources be designated as Community/Police Teams to lock in the idea that it takes both groups working together to make progress and solve problems. The other point he made with his command and management staff was that the creation of a new specialty unit did not relieve regular patrol officers and detectives of their community policing responsibilities. In fact, they became the 24-hours-per-day support for this new approach to policing throughout the city.

Officers and supervisors can also play a substantial role in helping community groups develop into viable working partners. Particularly when working with newly-formed groups, the initial stages in the group's organization may be difficult to traverse. The police representatives can help by trying to focus meetings toward a problem-solving orientation, and by helping to select problems that are achievable within the resources of group and city agencies. Initially, as noted above, the police and other city agencies can expect a stage of acrimony where community members may vent pent-up feelings of frustration with the perceived lack of services or slow response. As citizens become more familiar with the limits of police power and resources, a more productive relationship can be reached between the community and the police.

Within the community/police partnership strategy, officers and supervisors can often become a bridge between the community and other agencies. This occurs when officers request and coordinate the resources of other agencies to be applied in the solution of a neighborhood problem. The observations in the cities visited suggest that leaving this coordination role to officers can lead to unreliable responses. This issue is discussed in more detail in a subsequent section (Links with Other Government Agencies).

Evaluating Community Policing

All of the programs formally reviewed, as well as most other partnership efforts around the country, are currently grappling with the program evaluation issue. Program evaluations covering process objectives are fairly straightforward, and most departments are tracking the development of programs and activities in accordance with established time schedules. Most of the programs visited had a data collection system in place to enable them to perform process evaluation tasks on either some or all of their program components.

The data collection efforts of some programs were comprehensive and often based on the types of problems or targets dealt with. In Seattle, for example, statistics are kept on the number of minor calls or actions completed; in the case of major targets, however, a complete file is initiated. Standard reporting formats have been developed for weekly summary reports, and special forms are used to initiate long-term complex projects. These forms indicate the nature of the problem, who is assigned, the tactics or approaches used to solve the problem, citizen contacts, and an estimated completion date.

In terms of impact assessments, most of the programs visited have not yet begun to use formal evaluations. In order to carry out impact evaluations of community/police initiatives, it is necessary that goals and objectives be established that would provide measurement guideposts. Goldstein (1987) argues that new performance standards appropriate to community policing must be established; traditional standards and current means of police productivity measures only communicate to community police officers that "not much has changed." For example, academic advocates suggest that crime rates and calls to 911 are obsolete. This gives rise to a police reaction that correctly notes that the public expects and deserves less crime--not just less fear because they feel closer to the police--and also expect that the police will both protect and serve them when they call 911. Most police departments visited have certainly gotten the point that the arrests, citations, field interrogation reports, weapons confiscated, and cases handled are not meaningful standards for evaluating community/police officers. But, as yet, no new standards have emerged. Consequently, in some cities visited, community/police officers still talk about their "stats" being as high or higher than those of regular patrol officers.

As mentioned above, most programs keep exhaustive data about operations. Most also use a "case management" approach (sometimes informally) for monitoring the activities of community/police officers. In this approach, officers document their activities on each assigned problem; analogous to the "management-by-objectives" concept, success can then be judged according to the accomplishment of the situational solutions to each target/problem addressed. This is one of the planned components of the CPT evaluation program in Seattle, but few other departments appear to be embracing this concept of evaluation. Part of the inherent difficulty is that this approach is labor intensive and involves a fair amount of subjective judgment in the review of each case.

Many departments are taking steps to evaluate their community/police programs, however. A common approach is what could be termed "informal" data gathering where, in one form or another, the community has been asked to comment on their attitudes and perceptions regarding the community policing initiative. This was evident in Los Angeles where, before a

particularly intense police deployment aimed at street drug dealing, the residents of the affected neighborhood were asked to comment and to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the tactics about to be implemented. (Since this was done before the program, the data would be useful for evaluation only if a post-survey were performed. As gathered, the data provided input for planning and implementation rather than evaluation.) In Seattle, first in the South Precinct and then in the East and West Precincts, the precinct commanders and supervisors met periodically with the community groups in order to discuss the program's progress. These feedback meetings covered not only targeting and the results of the previous period's police initiatives, but also included information about how the community regarded progress in working together. In St. Louis and Portland, the research team was also made aware of periodic meetings that provided opportunities for the community to let the police know how they felt about the success of cooperative programs.

It seems apparent, however, that the impact evaluation question that will need to be addressed in the near future. In Seattle, the formal evaluation of the community/police partnership programs will include a review of traditional measures of crime statistics and arrests. Whereas there is no need to dwell on the inability to determine casual factors for changes in most statistics, it does seem warranted that after some period of time there should be a noticeable decrease or displacement in criminal activity.

There is a second type of evaluation that will also need to be addressed in terms of the new community police program activities. The department's entire human resource management program should be reviewed in the context of the community policing strategy. For example, personnel performance reports will need to be screened to ensure that the process is consistent with the new set of expectations being applied to police officers and supervisors.

There was no evidence that a systematic review of the performance evaluation issue has taken place in any of the cities visited. More often, evaluation of the performance of "community police officers" was carried out on the basis of the supervisor's opinion of the officer's ability to do what was required of a community police officer. In some of the large cities visited, supervisors provided us with examples of officers that had to be transferred out of the community/police duties because, in their opinion, these officers did not seem suited for the job. For example, they required too much direction about the nature of the new strategy, could not think independently, and could not come up with the appropriate steps for solving problems. So at least informally, some supervisors had a clear idea of the kinds of behavior that were required of an adept community police officer. But unless these requirements are standardized and used in training curricula (discussed below), charges of unfairness may

be levied against a department that requires officers to possess skills and behaviors for which they were not trained. Another related problem could arise if pay differentials were involved based on assignments to a special community/police team or unit.

The recruitment and selection process will also need to be reviewed to ensure that the advertising and testing procedures identify appropriate candidates. This review will be difficult because there are no guidelines that can be used to predict what type of officer (i.e., skills or traits) will excel under the community policing scheme of operations. For example, some proponents of this new approach believe that there is really nothing different in community policing, and that good police officers have used a problem-solving approach and have had a desire to get to know the community all along (i.e., the old foot beat idea). Others seem to think that new skills are needed, including a broader approach to helping with community problems and a knack for dealing with government bureaucracy in order to marshall the needed resources. It appears that further research is needed in order to validate the appropriate mix of traits and skills needed in the community/police management approach.

The training program is another area that will need to be consistent with the new management and organizational structure. A wide range of training might be needed to prepare both new officers and existing personnel throughout the department for the demands of community policing, including problem-solving skills, communications and cultural-diversity instruction, and supervisory courses to address the more decentralized independent nature of operations.

Although it appears that there is little argument that the human resource program might need to be adjusted to fit the community policing approach, there currently remains a significant potential stumbling block before this can be accomplished. Goldstein (1987, p. 13) points out that the success or failure of community policing programs will depend on the standards used for recruiting and training of new officers and the expectations of their supervisors in the field ("the manner in which productivity is measured, and the criteria for making rewards and promotions"). These admonishments indicate that unless goals and objectives for community/police programs are well laid out, management will not know what to select for, what to train for, what to evaluate in an officer's performance, or how to reward or promote police personnel. The problem, of course, is that no one is quite sure at this time what the goals and objectives of community policing should be.

The Nature of the Relationship Among Decay/Disorder, Crime, and Fear

Whatever the empirical link between crime, decay, and fear of crime, it is clear that in the programs studied, members of most

police departments, municipal agencies, and the community believe that these factors are linked in the manner outlined by Wilson and Kelling. Decreases in decay and increases in livability of a neighborhood appear to be good for their own sake, regardless of how they are linked with crime. The antigraffiti campaigns and clean-up programs do appear to unite the community, and send a message that the residents care about what happens in their neighborhood. It is also clear, however, that the removal of "bad actors" from the neighborhoods is what most encouraged the residents to retake their own streets and feel safer. This can be seen in Savannah, when, after the ministations officers cleaned up the neighborhood, children were again allowed by parents to play in the streets and around the buildings. It can be seen in Los Angeles, where, after drug dealers were no longer plying their trade with impunity, the attendance of local schools increased because pupils were less afraid of walking between their homes and the school grounds. Seattle is another example where one of the earliest successes of the CPT in the East Precinct was to clean up a park and the outlying streets from drug transactions, thereby returning the park to the neighborhood. The reduction of the criminal element translated into a reduced fear of crime and allowed neighborhood residents to reclaim the parks and streets.

The effects of the reduction of decay, although intuitively appealing, are less empirically visible. It has been argued that the removal of graffiti makes people feel better. Graffiti made residents feel that the gangs were active in their very midst, and removal of the graffiti was perceived by residents as linked with the removal of the gang members as well. To the extent that gang members also viewed graffiti as "signage" that allowed them to claim a particular territory, then the removal of graffiti may also have been a sign to them that their territory was no longer theirs. As plausible as all these linkages are, none of them have actually been specifically demonstrated through research. The same set of linkages were assumed to operate when it came to cleaning up the neighborhoods. The assumptions were that cleaning up alleys, picking up refuse and garbage from front and backyards, and cleaning up parks all sent the message to the criminal element that the residents cared and were watching, and therefore criminal activity would no longer pass unnoticed. In a well-kept neighborhood, the assumption was that the neighbors were mindful and if any criminal activity took place, the police would arrive in very short notice.

Less decay, less graffiti, and a cleaner neighborhood have much inherent merit regardless of their links to actual crime, fear of crime, and the effects they have on the criminals. Other things being equal, a clean, well-kept neighborhood has higher property values than one in which the opposite is the case. These appear to be worthy goals that any municipal leader will support readily, whether or not these actions reduce crime.

However, despite the intuitive benefits of reductions in decay and disorder, the casual relationship is still unclear. Also, the order in which these related factors occur is not obvious, and one condition might be a prerequisite for setting the stage for others to begin. It seems that fear needs to be addressed initially by the police, and that "safer streets" provide the incentive for residents to begin clean-up efforts. However, this certainly was not the sequence of events in Seattle. The community's actions were the first steps, which persuaded the police that a renewed effort was warranted.

There also appear to be basic economic factors at work in this relationship that are seldom discussed in the literature. St. Louis, for example, has lost about half its population in the last decade in a wholesale flight to the suburbs. The economic downturn following this shift explained much of the abandoned housing in decaying neighborhoods; without a demand for housing in the inner city, attention to clean-ups, graffiti, and renovation was not likely to bring residents back from the suburbs. Without a change in these basic economic factors regarding demand for housing, decay probably cannot be stopped in spite of the best efforts of the police, municipal agencies, and the community.

To be sure, economic cycles change, and nothing appears to be quite as powerful as an inflationary spiral in the price of housing to bring previously decayed and abandoned areas into full bloom. Suddenly there will be beautification, clean up, painting, and remodeling in a neighborhood that previously was on a decaying cycle. Accordingly, it is possible that economic factors affect the relationship between reduction in decay and a reduction in crime, and may be a prerequisite for other community action. Specifically, the relationship between improvements in liveability factors and reduction in crime may be strong during an upward economic cycle, and weak or nonexistent in a decaying neighborhood in a downward cycle. Again, this does not appear to have been the case in southeast Seattle, but this particular factor was not studied as part of this project.

Links With Other Government Agencies

As the community policing and problem-solving concepts are implemented within the police department and throughout the rest of a city's departments, organizational conflicts (i.e., turf battles) are almost inevitable. Numerous public service providers have obvious needs to deal directly with the citizens, and the "listening/helping" nature of police contacts under the rubric of community policing can easily be perceived as attempting to co-opt the functions of other departments. This perceived (and sometimes actual) encroachment by the police on other departmental service areas can result in a contentious budget preparation process; however, even if funding availability

is not a concern, there are valid organizational issues concerning how best to structure the various city departments in an attempt to maximize the delivery of services to the public. (This situation is somewhat analogous to the police concerns about micro-management by the community, except that now other departments are concerned about it happening to them.)

While it appears on the surface that the police can or should play a pivotal role in cooperative efforts with the citizens, numerous practical problems crop up almost immediately. The observations made in the cities visited indicated a number of problems in this model of the "police as leaders or coordinators" of municipal services. The contact to initiate coordination between the police and other agencies in most cities was based on the observations of the police officers (reports of citizens to the officers either formally in meetings or informally on a one-to-one basis). The officer then notified a particular agency, typically by filling out a form preprinted for that purpose. In most programs, the service requests submitted by the police became simply one more work demand that went into the "in basket" and were treated no differently than normal requests by citizen. In some instances, enterprising officers developed personal relationships and contacts with their counterparts in other city agencies, and when need for that agency's resources arose, the officer called that individual. In a few such cases, because of the personal relationship between the police officer and his or her agency counterpart, the requests were given a higher priority.

At best, leaving this coordination role with police officers seems to result in unpredictable responses. At worst, this "in-between" role, where citizens' requests to agencies are coordinated by officers, can lead to problems. For example, in one city studied, when the agency did not respond, the citizen group took the officers to task for the agency's lack of response even though the officers had tried repeatedly to mobilize the needed resources.

The grant team interviewed representatives from agencies charged with receiving requests from the police. A common response was that, initially most agencies were not prepared for the substantial increase in workload that officers caused. For most agencies, these direct requests from the police were a new experience, and something that they were generally not prepared to cope with. In some cities, planning for a special referral process was initiated by the mayor or city council in these cases, most of the agencies' personnel were forewarned and willing participants in this community policing scheme. In most cities visited, however, the actual response from the agencies was very spotty; in some cases, the response to police requests for service occurred, but in others it was very slow or never took place. Moreover, some agencies had to follow a very slow and careful process such as those dealing with substandard structures violating building codes. Typically the owner of a

particular structure had multiple appeal rights, time elapsed between an officer or a citizen filing a complaint, and "something happening" was measured in months as opposed to days or weeks. Officers in various cities frequently reported that they felt they were submitting these forms to various agencies as an exercise, and they never saw what happened as a result of their action.

It was also often observed that, if responses from the agencies were required on short notice, intervention by an influential community group leader (a phone call to a person from the council or mayor's office) produced the desired action much faster than direct requests from police officers. This political nature of relationships between the police and the agencies was potentially a double-edged sword. On one hand, officers were in a position to mobilize some action by the community in order to produce a response by the agency; on the other hand, if the agency increasingly perceived and became aware of this role by police officers, interagency conflict could reasonably be expected.

In theory, an increasing workload due to community policing efforts meant that some agencies were forced to revamp their work priorities. In reality, it was not uncommon for the agency to attempt to politically protect itself and "fight" the increased workload coming from a new source. While many of these glitches were possibly the result of a new program and might have worked themselves out given enough time, it is more likely that community policing and the workload that it implied for other agencies did in fact suggest that a new way for municipal agencies to operate was warranted. This new approach may be based on the citizens and the police analyzing the problems of the community, and thereby acting in unison to influence the priorities of other government agencies. Theoretically, there are no municipal agency resources or services that could not be included as part of a bonafide community policing issue. However, this implies a radical change in the way that most municipal agencies function, and in the source of the authority for prioritizing their work schedules.

Organizational Configuration of the Police Department

Regardless of how new community policing programs are defined or named, the basis for these efforts is the application of sound management practices to the provision of public safety services. Being responsive to the customer (i.e., citizen), taking a planning perspective and linking plans to budget requests, and coordinating all police and other city resources to resolve problems are fundamental steps toward improved delivery of public safety services.

The community policing strategy is forcing departments to adopt a new, more decentralized style of organization that is open to multiple sources of input and capable of addressing numerous

projects, missions, and assignments simultaneously. Tasks that need to be initiated to reflect this new organization and style of policing include:

- Development of new police accountability/command and control procedures.

- A management perspective which fosters innovative and creative programs linked to ongoing assessment of needs (from both a community and departmental view) and rigorous evaluation standards.

As discussed in Chapter III, four different modes of community policing are theoretically possible: two modes departmentwide, and two modes in geographical subsections of the department. The site visits did not show evidence of departmentwide deployment of all patrol officers performing community/police duties (although Portland and Seattle view community policing as a departmentwide program). The closest example of this mode of deployment occurred early in the South Seattle program, where all the officers of the precinct were expected to perform "limited" community policing duties (involving attention to specific targets) in the time available to them between responding to calls. This arrangement had the drawback that officers only spent time on solving problems as allowed between calls. (This procedure did not allow for the kind of extended attention that community problems often require. However, the increased police presence was viewed by the community very favorably and is considered another "success step" in the police/community partnership effort.)

A more common organizational configuration was in the from of specialty units that dedicated their entire work shift to community policing, and did not respond to 911 calls. Another common arrangement was to have patrol officers relieved of their duties for a variable period of time during the week to concentrate on problem-oriented policing.

One of the problems with specialty units in general is that they become isolated from other units and from patrol, and thereby experience a reduction in their effectiveness to the extent that they no longer obtain needed information from patrol officers who work the same area. Departments visited were generally aware of this potential problem, and took steps to remedy it. In Los Angeles, for example, officers in a division assigned full time to community policing duties made a point of attending roll calls and backing up officers in the field when they had the opportunity to do so. Other cities established procedures by which the officers conducted standard patrol duties at fixed intervals. In Savannah, the ministation officers made it a policy to respond to 911 calls in their areas whenever possible, acting as the primary or the back-up officers. While the research team was in Savannah visiting the ministations, it was evident that patrol officers would stop by the ministations,

share information, and include the ministation officer in police activities in that area. The ministation officers were in the loop regarding police actions in given geographical areas. Also, patrol officers took advantage of the fact that the ministation officers generally had far better knowledge regarding specific calls or locations than was possible for them to develop on their own.

Nevertheless, it appears that the typical goal is to have the whole police department involved in the community policing strategy. Although getting the program(s) going with specialized teams (such as Seattle's Community/Police Teams) or initially testing the program in certain parts of the city are often prudent and necessary first steps, the whole department needs to be brought on board as local conditions and constraints permit. The departmentwide adoption of the community policing and problem-oriented approach needs to be planned and scheduled in concert with the development of new training programs, recruitment efforts, and organizational adjustments.

One of the most important reasons to take a departmentwide perspective on the community policing approach is the simple need for consistency in dealing with the public and other government agencies. It is easy to see how dealing with one police officer trained in problem-solving techniques and communication skills would be different from dealing with a "traditional" model of policing (e.g., the officer indicates that if no crime has been committed, the citizen needs to call some other city department), and how this would be confusing to everyone involved.

Another important issue is that the community-based problem-solving approach draws on sound management/organizational principles, and appears to be a promising approach for improving public safety services. As such, the concepts should be expanded departmentwide. As the concepts are refined and customized to the myriad and changing needs of the department and the community, effective programs should be expanded and those not proving useful should be redefined or dropped. The evaluation of "what works and what doesn't" will be an ongoing process.

A third reason for the departmentwide orientation is for internal organizational consistency. After all personnel have been trained in the new concepts, it will be confusing to them (at all levels of the organization) if part of the time they are expected to solve problems but at other times to operate differently. Accordingly, the implementation of this more independent, decentralized style of policing needs to be carefully planned and orchestrated; police work is still a very dangerous occupation, and command and control procedures are vital to successful operations and for officer safety.

In addition to questions of organizational structure, the adoption of the community policing approach also involves adjustments to communication within a department and with outside

agencies. The literature addresses this issue at some length (e.g., Goldstein, 1987, pp. 6-30), alluding to the fact that problems in the coordination between patrol and community policing units existed in programs in Flint, in Houston and Baltimore County. Although some of the programs visited exhibited varying degrees of this problem, it appears to be a normal developmental event that may improve and work itself out as the community/police units mature and progress into results-oriented outfits. In Minneapolis this was already visible in the case of RECAP units that were having an effect on reducing patrol call loads.

Accordingly, a number of changes in the ways that the police departments as organizations handle communications will probably need to be considered. These include a variety of communication channels:

- Internal - within the organization (among the various specialized units and major patrol division), there is a heightened need for the exchange of information about the nature of problems and the manner in which they are being solved. This is the case between not only departmental units/divisions but also between shift-based units (i.e., patrol). This need to share information will probably be made more difficult because of the additional paperwork and turf battles between various units.

- External - in relation to general public, there is a need for a more "open" organization that welcomes citizen input in a variety of forms and from a wide range of sources.

- External - within the city's departments and in relation to executive/city council officials, new avenues of communications need to be explored and established. These intra-governmental communications networks are needed in order to provide responsive and flexible services to public safety-related problems. The intra-governmental sphere of organizations will often extend to schools and other nonprofit community and business groups.

Police Accountability

The sense in which accountability is discussed in the literature refers to the fact that community policing involves flexibility and independence for police officers to take whatever legal and permissible action is necessary to solve a problem. The literature suggests that these may also be the ingredients sufficient for the appearance of corruption, excessive use of force, and ignoring the rule of law. In addition to quasi-military hierarchical levels of supervision, modern policing employs rotation as one of the tools to keep these abuses from occurring.

The assumption is that when officers are rotated at frequent intervals, corruption and officer misconduct are kept at a minimum. Rotation also serves other organizational purposes such as cross training of individuals, better communication between units, and appropriate training necessary for promotional requirements. Community policing works on different assumptions. An officer is encouraged to get to know the community in order to develop open lines of communication, and so that he or she can become more aware of the dynamics of a particular neighborhood. All of this takes time. In keeping with these goals, it is counter-productive to rotate an officer as often as in normal patrol duties. Also, community policing involves working on livability problems that may take an extended period of time to analyze and resolve. It would not seem appropriate to rotate an officer in the middle of some critical aspect of the implementation of various solutions to problems.

In practice, the cities and departments visited did not appear to be concerned with this issue. Fighting crime, as mentioned earlier, did not appear to be any different in the application of police tactics under commmunity/policing than under the traditional approach. Supervisors did not appear to be more concerned in a community policing environment about excessive use of force and violating court-mandated police restraints.

Another aspect of community policing, that of target selection, did not lend itself to the possibility of corruption to any extent. Again, in some of the cities visited, the community, in an organized fashion, participated in the identification of problems and the implementation of solutions. In this context, supervisors did not appear too concerned regarding the possibility of payoffs and corruption; there was far less opportunity for these problems to occur when an officer was dealing with an organized group of neighborhood citizens.

The Role of the Community

As mentioned in Chapter III, there are a number of issues regarding what the role of the community should be. Most significant among them are the issues surrounding citizen patrols, selecting what the police department strategies should be regarding problems in the neighborhood, the potential problem of citizens seeking preferential service and treatment in return for the assistance or cooperation that they might render to the police, and the concern about micro-management by the community.

The programs and cities visited exhibited a tremendous variety of citizen participation in community policing, substantially beyond those issues described in the literature. In Portland, for example, the traditional crime prevention function of police departments was actually vested in a community group. This group obtained funding from the city through the Office of Neighborhoods, and they performed the standard functions of

carrying out block watches, security surveys, and target hardening seminars for homeowners. This group was able to use the economic bases provided by city funding and expanded it to achieve other purposes in line with the philosophy of community policing. In Minneapolis, the Whittier group not only established its own anticrime program, but they successfully applied for funding to purchase and rehabilitate housing stock in decaying neighborhoods. In Minneapolis, St. Louis, and Portland, the citizens established their own security patrols with training and assistance from the police department. These patrols have met with mixed success, however, and in at least one instance (as described in the city reports), had to be temporarily discontinued.

One of the more evident and successful roles that communities have taken has been the support of traditional police tactics aimed at specific problems in their neighborhoods. In Portland, for example, the community demanded and obtained the enforcement of an existing curfew law and participated in police ride-alongs in order to monitor the law's enforcement. The community also lobbied and obtained an unprecedented deployment of National Guard troops in support of the Portland Police Bureau. In Los Angeles, the citizens of a particularly drug-ridden neighborhood supported, and provided legitimacy to, a fairly drastic police program that involved temporary barricades across neighborhood streets in order to drive away the drug-dealing element.

In Seattle, as described in previous chapters, the community participated in selecting targets for police action. In addition, the community lobbied and testified for the passage of laws and ordinances that provided the police with better and more forceful tools, particularly in combating drug loitering on private property. Also in Seattle, the community mounted substantial and effective efforts to lobby the state legislature for the passage of stiffer sentences, and for ordinances against loitering in areas near schools and parks. In cases where particularly recalcitrant private property owners have refused to cooperate with the police and the antitrespassing campaign, the community has been known to lobby specific licensing authorities, and even to organize informal pressure tactics against these specific businesses. Some of these activities have been controversial.

In some of the cities, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, and St. Louis, community representatives helped the police mobilize the resources of other city and county agencies. This role tended to be somewhat political in that some community people achieved their means by contacting city council members, who in turn placed phone calls to agency heads or deputies. (The issue of politicizing actions will be covered in a later section of this chapter.)

A traditional role that the community typically played, which was witnessed in some of the cities visited, was to provide the actual labor for clean-ups and for antigraffiti paint-outs. In these instances, the police and the community coordinated with an agency to provide a large dumpster truck to meet the community on the appointed day and haul away the refuse gathered by the clean-up effort. In the case of antigraffiti work, in Los Angeles, officers actually painted alongside the community and operated a donated sprayer mounted on the back of a trailer. In other cities the police helped organize the graffiti paint-out, but did not actually contribute their own labor to the effort.

Another role that the community continued to play was serving as the traditional "eyes and ears" of the police. In Seattle, a hotline was established to provide a telephone link for citizens who wished to report suspicious circumstances (with members of the community volunteering to staff the telephones and coordinate with the police department). In some instances, with the aid of the police, citizens were trained in gathering detailed information including license plate numbers, descriptions of individuals, and descriptions of houses and vehicles used for suspicious activities. In Seattle, this information was generally gathered over a period of days or weeks, and then presented to the police precinct at previously agreed-upon times during the month.

Last but not least, the community served a very important role in providing feedback to the police department regarding their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the actions taken and progress accomplished. In Seattle, for example, the community went a step beyond mere feedback, to organize dinners and special events where officers and supervisors (and often community members) were formally thanked for work well done. These special occasions for the purpose of recognizing the achievement of common goals were a unique departure from more traditional policing, where the community had no formal vehicle (other than thank you letters) for recognizing the police.

Another aspect of the community's role is the politicalizing of the community policing approach. This was not mentioned as a major issue (in Chapter III), and was only seldom discussed in the literature (e.g., Green and Mastrofski, 1988, p. 116). Nevertheless, it was a potential issue present in one form or another in every program visited. Politicalizing of a community policing program simply cannot be avoided; because the demand for police services will in all likelihood outstrip existing resources, there will be competition between various community groups. This situation generally means that not only police management are lobbied, but also the city council and the mayor's office. Among the cities studied, this situation typically resulted in the need to prioritize resources so that the presence of police services in one community or neighborhood could be explained in a logical manner.

In some cases, the entire community policing function was detached from the police department and reported to a different agency. This was the case in Minneapolis, where the unit reported to a civilian supervisor, who in turn reported to the mayor. Each of the areas for which an officer was responsible corresponded exactly to council district boundaries. In effect, the city council/member set the priorities on which the officer was to spend his or her time, thereby increasing the probability that political influence would become the driving force behind these services. This arrangement facilitated situational intervention on the part of the city council member in the resolution of community problems.

Nevertheless, there were no indications of any abuses related to politicizing the community policing programs in any of the cities visited. The structure of traditional policing methods (i.e., incident-based responses to 911 emergency calls) provides more protection against political pressures than the more flexible, independent problem-solving operations associated with community policing. Even without this built-in protection, it appears that most departments have maintained sufficient supervisory procedures to handle the community-oriented operations. As noted above, however, most departments are still only partially involved in the community policing strategy. As the whole department makes the transition to this new style of policing, the need for new supervisory procedures should be reviewed.

The Demand for Police Services

The success of community policing initiatives has generally resulted in an increase in citizen interest, involvement, and demand for wider implementation of programs. This increased demand can easily and rapidly outstrip the capacity of police and other agencies to respond. Although this is no different than the situation faced by other municipal services, such as park services and road repair, the key difference appears to be citizen involvement. When a successful community policing program was implemented in a neighborhood, very soon other neighborhood groups organized and demanded similar services. Initially, plans to respond to competing neighborhood requests did not exist, and the method for prioritization of resources was unclear; often the best organized community mustered the most effort in support of its demands and received the highest priority.

In theory, a situation can arise where a number of neighborhoods have well-organized community policing efforts and each proposes a variety of initiatives that quickly overwhelms a police department's ability to respond. In the cities visited, there was already evidence that successful programs in a neighborhood were generating additional requests that could not be granted due to a lack of resources. In interviews with citizens, it became clear that the ability to interact with officers regarding

neighborhood problems proved to be a new and hopeful experience for them; up to that point, they were used to the 911, incident-based format of police contact. It was also clear that there were increased expectations for more services, followed by dissatisfaction when the expectations could not be met.

Police departments were not unaware of these dynamics. In some cities, like Portland, a formal effort at planning for citywide community policing was undertaken, specifically taking into account the need to prioritize and phase in initiatives over time. A citywide planning effort was initiated in order to clarify the timing of the implementation of programs, and thereby minimize unrealistic citizen expectations. Although Seattle does not have the extensive planning framework established in Portland, the annual long-range plan includes a large citizen input component. Information about criminal activity and neighborhood problems, services needed, and overall satisfaction with the department is gathered and integrated into the budget process. The planning surveys are sent to community and business groups, block watch members, and a random sample of Seattle citizens.

Seattle Community/Police Partnership Findings and Conclusions

In Seattle and within the SPD the community policing approach has become a vital and important part of the evolution toward an improved departmentwide professional quality-oriented concept of providing police services. This evolution took place over approximately five years, and did not occur without dissension within the department itself and tension between the citizens and the department. In addition, as might be expected in the context of a "pilot" project such as the SSCPC, there was no comprehensive vision of how all the various components of the community policing concepts and the need for traditional police tactics would fit together.

A number of actions, not necessarily connected or even planned, took place which have resulted in what appears to be an extremely promising and comprehensive approach to the effective and efficient delivery of police services to the citizens of Seattle. These include:

- The formation, by a group of capable and dedicated citizens in the Southeast Seattle area, of a community group (the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council) to save their neighborhood from the ravishes of crime and decay. These people were "fed up" with crime problems and "planted the seed" of joint community/police problem-solving behavior.

  This group perservered through numerous meetings and early resistance by police personnel, and their efforts led to a commitment and openness to working with community groups

throughout Seattle on solving problems related to crime, fear and disorder.

- The publication and availability of articles on a number of issues related to effective policing, including the problem-solving concept, the fear-of-crime concerns, the connection with urban blight ("Broken Windows"), and the community policing approaches being implemented in other locations throughout the country and in other nations.

- SPD command staff and supervisors in the South Precinct who emphasized a "problem-oriented" approach to dealing with crime problems in the precinct's communities. However, in the process of developing appropriate procedures for prioritizing and dealing with problems, coordinating with the community, and for ensuring officer accountability, there were numerous problems and differences of opinion which were the result of "working out the bugs" of the new problem-oriented methods. An important issue for the police was that the new programs would be conducted using existing resources. This resulted in key changes to the original 15-Point Plan. The new community-oriented programs subsequently took hold and were expanded.

- SPD's innovative efforts such as the Block Watch Crime Prevention Program, mountain bicycle patrol, foot patrol and other specialized units set the stage for additional contacts with the community to solve crime problems.

- The recommendations of two management consultant studies indirectly contributed to the implementation of a professional quality-oriented concept in SPD. The first was a comprehensive management study of the department which strongly supported the extension of the "community/police teams" to the other three precincts of the city (in addition to the effort in the South Precinct). The Public Safety Action Plan (ballot measure for special funding for SPD and other law and justice agencies) was a direct result of this management study's recommendations. This measure, which was approved by the citizens, provided some of the resources to meet the public's increasing demand for services. Part of the funds approved for the police department led to the preparation of the department's long-range plan, which involves a detailed survey of community priorities and ideas for service needs.

  The other study involved the internal investigation and complaint-handling process, and resulted in adoption of a "quality assurance" approach to handling complaints from the public. This program, similar to what private sector corporations are implementing throughout the country, is based on "the customer knows best" idea, and the notion that all information from customers is valuable and should be used to design the product (or service in the case of public

safety) better and/or add training or other management initiatives to address the identified problem.

- The need for additional training has been a priority issue for the Department over the last few years. Staff recommendations from the Mayor's Office, City Council and the Seattle Womens' Commission, in addition to departmental initiatives, have culminated into not only increased levels of training but also several specific programs in the cultural diversity area. The objective of these training programs is to prepare all members of the department, both civilian and sworn, to handle interactions with Seattle's myriad cultural and minority populations.

- The Mayor's Office conducted an internal study of how the city coordinates with the long-range strategic planning process among all of the departments and the citizen involvement process. The conclusions focused on improving coordination of these efforts, and called for links among all city resource agencies to better serve the community. The report specifically noted the importance and success of the Community Crime Prevention Section of SPD.

All of these factors have combined to provide the needed atmosphere for the growth of a department-wide approach to the implementation of the community policing strategy in Seattle. While the SSCPC was obviously not involved in some of the above activities, this group's initial and ongoing work (and the subsequent efforts of additional groups, such as other community crime prevention councils and coalitions) has helped to foster a positive atmosphere of cooperation among the police, the community, and other governmental officials. This atmosphere appears to have facilitated the growth of committed problem-solving behavior between the police and citizens and an orientation for improvement in police services.

Crime Statistics

With respect to the impact of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project on the crime rate, there are no definitive conclusions that can be noted at this time for the southeast Seattle area as a whole. However, there are very positive results in a key area within the South Precinct (i.e., the Rainier Valley) with respect to decreases in crime. The difficulties encountered in evaluating community policing programs have been referred to throughout this report, and despite the problems with determining the casual factors of any specific program or series of events, it appears appropriate to review the patterns of crimes in the target areas as compared to other areas of the city.

Exhibit 8 indicates that the calls-for-service (CFS) in the South Precinct have continued to increase while the CFS in the other three precincts have declined since the beginning of 1988. Exhibit 9 indicates that Part I Offenses declined for all four

CALLS FOR SERVICE *

SEATTLE POLICE PRECINCTS: 1980-1989



*Includes all on-views/calls for service

** Citywide Total CFS 1989 = 429,960

PART ONE OFFENSES
SOUTH PRECINCT SGT. SECTORS: 1980-1989



* 1981 data based on incomplete list of Part One offenses

**South Pct. Offense Total 1989 = 13,719

precincts beginning in 1987 - 1988. Exhibit 10 shows the sectors within the South Precinct and the two areas where the SSCPC was active (Robert and Sam), both of which experienced decreases in crimes beginning in 1987. The William Sector increased in 1988. Exhibit 11 shows the individual car beats within each sector in the precinct. The main focus of the SSCPC was in the R4, R5, and S4 beats (the Rainier Valley area). All of these beats showed reductions in reported crime at the same time that there were slight increases in crime in other beats of the same sectors.

As noted on Exhibit 3 in Chapter IV, historically the Rainier Valley area has an above average crime rate. This situation, combined with the increasing calls-for-service in the South Precinct, indicates that the SSCPC effort had some positive effects in the overall target area in southeast Seattle. Within the geographic area covered by the most intensive SSCPC activities (i.e., the R4, R5 and S4 patrol beats) there is clear evidence that the crime reduction programs had a positive effect. A problem with any definitive conclusion as to programmatic effect for the overall target area (southeast Seattle) is that it simply might take longer for the new community policing approach to take effect. SPD will continue to analyze crime data in order to discern any specific effects of this new approach.

PART ONE OFFENSES *
SEATTLE POLICE PRECINCTS: 1980 - 1989



* 1981 data based on incomplete list of Part One offenses

** Citywide Offense Total 1989 = 66,157

Exhibit 11
South Precinct Sectors/Beats
Part One Offenses

SAM SECTOR/BEATS: 1987-1989



ROBERT SECTOR/BEATS: 1987-1989



WILLIAM SECTOR/BEATS: 1987-1989



CHAPTER XI

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview of Chapter

This final chapter presents the recommendations that have been developed based on the information and materials gathered throughout the course of of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project. The recommendations are separated into two categories, which include those that pertain to operational issues related to community/police programs and those that are suggestions for future research.

The recommendations that involve operational concerns cover a wide range of topics, and to some extent flow from the environmental, organizational and programmatic issues introduced in Chapter III. These recommendations cover the process involved in the formation and development of the SSCPC. Also, as can be gleaned from the previous chapter covering lessons learned, some aspects of community/police programs are simply "givens" that do not lend themselves to any recommended action. For example, there is no assurance that a community group can achieve an early "success" upon which to build and strengthen its efforts. Likewise, the membership of community groups typically cannot be hand-picked to ensure broad representation or the needed mix of organizational skills--the police must work with all citizens.

Accordingly, the recommendations are intended to provide a set of guidelines. As such, they can be applied and modified as needed to fit the myriad situations encountered in the community/police programs throughout the country. Another caveat, which is covered in the suggested research topics, is that although many of the recommendations apply regardless of the size of the community or the law enforcement agency, others will not be applicable in many situations. Seattle and the other cities visited as part of this project have medium or large police agencies; most of the police departments in the country are smaller.

The second category of recommendations covers areas in need of further research. As with the operational recommendations, these suggestions are not meant to be inclusive. As opposed to being derived from an exhaustive literature search, the questions are based on the issues or problems confronted in the course of the descriptive analyses of the various community/police efforts. And as with the operational recommendations, some of the research areas may not be applicable in many situations.

Finally, as noted in the introduction to this report, there are a number of recommendations specific to the community/police programs in the City of Seattle and within the SPD. The thrust of these recommendations is that the community/police program

concept should be expanded and strengthened throughout the department and that coordination with other city departments needs to be established because of the interdependence of resource allocation to solve complex public safety and quality-of-life problems. These conclusions were covered briefly at the end of Chapter X, and accompanying recommendations will be incorporated in a separate summary publication that specifically deals with the Seattle situation and its future direction.

Community/Police Operational Recommendations

Recommendations related to the operational and process issues of community/police programs are presented in this section.

- The community policing approach should be considered by all police agencies and jurisdictions.

  Based on the experience in the City of Seattle and the Seattle Police Department, it appears that the community policing approach deserves consideration as a way to improve the delivery of public safety services. Seattle is one example of the many developing community/police partnerships, and should be viewed as an illustration of what is possible in the context of this new policing model.

  There are still many unanswered questions about community policing and its overall effectiveness. However, the model is flexible enough to accommodate the needs of different police agencies in most types of settings. And while not explicitly mentioned in the literature, some of the basic principles of the new approach incorporate good management practices. Despite how community policing is defined, open communication with the citizens (customer orientation) and trying to solve problems (efficient and innovative use of resources to achieve a given objective) are appropriate management strategies for almost every organization.

  In addition, there appear to be no obvious reasons why the community policing approach should be seen as an "all or nothing" substitute for the "professional" model used over the last few decades. Situations will undoubtedly occur when aggressive order maintenance tactics are not only needed but are appropriate considering the circumstances. In one sense, the community policing model is simply saying that there is another option to the rigid behavior exemplified in the professional model. Having the full range of options available for the provision of police services appears to be appropriate and should interest all police officers and government officials.

  Finally, the community policing model is more than a new management label. The effort to work with citizens in order to identify and solve problems will require fundamental

changes in the organizational structure and training programs of most police agencies (and their respective cities). This process has not always gone smoothly in Seattle, and will likely require a substantial amount of work in most jurisdictions. In Seattle, the results have been well worth the effort.

- Police departments should be prepared to work with a wide variety of community/business groups.

Whether new groups form or established associations expand their scope to address crime and problems of decay and fear, there is no way to predict or control the type or make-up of the groups. Also, as noted in the discussion of the developmental stages, the possibility of frustration and anger is very real. Accordingly, allow sufficient time for working out the organizational and procedural "bugs" regarding how best to deal with each group. Also develop flexible approaches to establishing liaisons with different types of groups. This may require the assignment of different staff (with public relations or speaking skills) to handle various relationship-building tasks depending on their unique skills.

It also appears that single-purpose organizations, where the intent is to concentrate on crime issues, typically do not last long and quickly lose interest and steam. The block watch organizations are examples of single-purpose groups aimed at reducing both commercial and residential burglary. In many instances it is difficult to keep a block watch effort alive unless there is a rash of burglaries or other crimes that are occurring in an area. The block watch group usually gains interest in the situation and meeting attendance increases, but only until the problem is resolved or addressed in some way. It is important, therefore, that a community policing or community problem-solving group add to its agenda other issues that have to do with the quality of life in the neighborhood. These other objectives could include such activities as clean-up, improvements in the parks, youth issues, substance abuse prevention, improvement in lighting, and legislative alerts.

In fact, one of the most effective ways of initially starting a group and holding members' interest is to invite various representatives of city agencies to speak on their particular areas of expertise. For example, the health department can be invited to speak about issues of interest to the group, such as abandoned refuse, hypodermic needles litter in alleys, or the types of actions that the department can take to abate a crack house. Similar invitations can be addressed to the fire department, parks department, city attorney's office, and probation department. The local housing authority can be invited to

talk about their problems and situations related to public housing in the area, particularly if the local community group views housing projects as one of its problems.

Another example of a group that might be part of community/police programs in the future is private security guards. In the past, this industry has not been considered as a resource to the police (at least in some locales); but in many areas of the country, a relationship has been established that is beneficial to the provision of public safety services. However, care must be taken to ensure that a specific commercial service (i.e., private security agency) is not viewed by the public as being endorsed or favored by virtue of their participation with police activities. Procedures for coordination with private security guards will need to be developed. In addition, safeguards will need to be developed to ensure that privileged department information (e.g., incident files and victims' names and addresses) will remain confidential.

- The "partnership" nature of the community-oriented police services approach should be established in the early stages of working with community and business groups.

It should be clearly stated from the beginning that all parties involved in the communitywide quality-oriented programs have responsibilities. The police and city have the responsibility to provide quality and effective services to meet the needs of the different community and business groups; however, the citizens also have the responsibility to contribute to the resolution of problems.

In numerous cities, it appears that there is no need to "convince" anyone of the need for shared responsibility, and the community takes the lead in supporting police actions. For example, in Los Angeles, the residents of drug-impacted areas supported the police in the use of street barricades for the purpose of halting open drug dealing. In Portland, the unprecedented use of the National Guard was debated, and the community essentially clamored for the cooperation between the National Guard and the Portland Police Bureau. Portland's energetic enforcement of a long-dormant curfew law against 14 to 20 year old youths was also preceded by strong community approval. Community leaders even rode in police cars as observers, thus spreading the message that the curfew action was requested and supported by respected community leaders.

These examples of direct and unequivocal support of police department initiatives are important. They not only send a message to law breakers, but also send a strong message to police officers that they are performing actions strongly supported by the community. In Los Angeles, when the street curfews and street closures provided residents some respite

from constant drug dealing in their streets, neighbors would bring food and beverages to the officers on duty, communicating their thanks as well as their approval. Most police officers interviewed mentioned these tangible and intangible signs of community approval as one of the most important components and outcomes of the community policing initiative. Feedback to police and to other agencies when a job is well done is a sometimes-forgotten key ingredient of community problem-solving efforts.

Another important role the community performs is testifying before municipal councils and state legislatures for the passage of ordinances and laws helpful in controlling and abating criminal activity. It can be done through personal testimony and letters or phone calls to legislators. In Seattle and Los Angeles, passage of various anticrime bills have substantially improved the tools available to the police, and has been a key activity of community groups. The distribution of local and state resources for fighting crime, for treatment programs, and for youth activity programs has been credited in large measure to the activism of community groups.

Despite these examples of community support for police action and enthusiastic assistance by citizen groups, there is no escaping the fact that community/police programs in many cities will result in a reprioritization of services. This could mean policies for different responses to low-priority calls-for-service, more responsibility on the part of citizens for completing crime reports for minor incidents, or less attention to alarms set off at unoccupied homes or businesses (typically a false-alarm problem). While reprioritizing most types of services will likely fall into the "working smarter with the same resources" category, myths about the effectiveness of rapid response and other police services will need to be addressed. This educational process will need to be carried out within the police department and city government, as well as throughout the community and business sectors.

Any decision to reduce police services to the community with respect to responding to calls-for-service (from 911) should have formal approval of city officials. However, cities and police agencies must realize that the relations between the police and the community, and community satisfaction with the police, may be negatively impacted over the long term. For example, when foot patrol was viewed by researchers as the most effective and least efficient form of officer deployment, the qualities that make this tactic in great demand today were overlooked. It was not until years later that the full value and effectiveness of foot patrols were recognized and adopted by numerous departments.

- Police agencies and city officials should develop an extremely flexible, integrated, and comprehensive plan to coordinate the various components of the community-oriented and problem-solving concepts.

Despite the apparent contradiction between flexibility and comprehensiveness, both ingredients are important to community/police programs. Flexibility is needed for a number of reasons, especially early in the developmental process, including:

- the evolving nature of what community/police programs are all about,
- the wide range of community groups, program components, and complex problems that might be encountered,
- the typical need to develop "custom-made" programs to fit into the unique local environment,
- the lack of a track-record and a body of empirical research about what does and does not work in a given situation, and
- the need to give those who will be expected to do the work a stake in the planning of the programs.

While these are valid reasons not to expect much (or to attempt to apply much) structure to the early stages of cooperative efforts, there is a definite need to prepare plans for certain actions if the community/police programs are expected to work for any length of time. For example, the adoption of these new concepts and approaches requires a carefully planned and integrated effort that will need to include a review of the department's operations and organization, and, in some cases, a similar analysis of how other city agencies provide services to the public. Also, training is an important area which needs to be addressed early in the life cycle of new programs. Accordingly, while plans definitely need to be prepared, it appears that flexibility should be built-in (possibly through numerous progress review points) and constant readjustment expected.

- Reasonable goals and time schedules should be developed for the establishment of departmentwide community/police programs.

This is a corollary of the above recommendation about the need for flexibility in planning. Despite the urgency and importance of improving police services and the promise of these new concepts, reasonable goals and objectives and time schedules are vital to the overall success of the effort. Identifying and implementing a new direction for almost any

organization, especially one of the most important and highly visible organizations in the community, by definition requires careful planning and a great deal of work. Pushing the process too fast introduces a large degree of risk to the total effort.

- Secure the commitment of city and elected officials in the early stages of community-oriented police programs.

Because the nature of the departmentwide community-oriented programs often sets a new direction for the department (which will typically include the need to establish links and develop procedures for coordination with other city/county agencies), the commitment of top management and elected officials is vital. Unless other departmental managers view the overall program and its goals as legitimate, they will be wary of cooperating. This commitment will also help the community to realize that the city is supporting the overall effort in a planned and coordinated manner.

The experience in Seattle and other cities visited, and from literature about the new community-oriented programs, did not provide any obvious indication that this recommendation was needed. In fact, in many locations there appears to be a high level of departmental cooperation within the overall governmental jurisdiction. In Seattle, for example, other city departments (e.g., parks and electrical utilities) have worked very cooperatively and supportively with the police in shifting personnel and resources to address quality-of-life and disorder problems.

The need for such a recommendation, however, appears warranted when the potential impact of "mature" community/police programs becomes apparent to city officials and managers. To date, few cities have implemented community-oriented policing concepts throughout the whole department. The result is that the full impact on other departments, in terms of resource demands as well as the need for coordination, has not yet been felt. Once community policing expands beyond special sectors in a jurisdiction, or special squads of officers, unexpected changes could overwhelm other city departments that are vital to the success of the overall program. Accordingly, it appears prudent that interdepartmental cooperation among city management and officials be accomplished as early as possible.

- Develop community-oriented police service programs in coordination with other city departments and service delivery groups as appropriate.

Because the need to coordinate a variety of services is basic to the problem-oriented nature of a community/police

program, it is important that the management personnel of the various types of resources needed be involved in the early planning stages. This will help to reduce confusion over how best to deliver services and identify where there are staff or resource gaps.

The degree to which city, county, state and even some federal agencies cooperated or lent their resources in solving community problems varied substantially throughout the jurisdictions visited. In Portland, a gang task force was established that included not only the community and the Portland police, but also the county and even state patrol; the National Guard also provided back-up to the Portland Police Department. In Los Angeles, probation officers accompanied LAPD officers to identify and arrest parole violators in areas that were targeted for antigang efforts. In Seattle, officers completed forms that were forwarded to inspectors for action on housing and zoning code violations. Another example of cooperative efforts among various city agencies is the antigraffiti programs. Such programs often involved the contribution of paint (for painting over graffiti) and assistance with scheduling work groups in the neighborhood areas.

In addition to joint planning to increase the chances of having a successful program, early coordination is often helpful in setting the stage for who gets credit for the "success." Conflict over the sponsorship, ownership, or control of community/police program components is a potential problem in most cities.

The SAFE program in Minneapolis, for example, was not extended to one of the city's neighborhoods. The community did not want it because they desired more autonomy and local control over its crime prevention initiatives. In Seattle, the police department's Crime Prevention Division oversees the block watch program (and all crime prevention programs in the City of Seattle, including Officer Friendly and the DARE program) and is very active in any neighborhood that experiences a rash of criminal activity. The initiation of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Program initially did not include input from or participation with the Crime Prevention Division. As the efforts of the south Seattle group became well known and well publicized, other groups contacted them (instead of the Crime Prevention Division) in order to implement similar programs in their neighborhoods. Although at the present time the Crime Prevention Division is fully coordinating its efforts with the community groups, the initial lack of participation created some problems over "turf." Also, in the past, the Crime Prevention Division felt that many of its duties were being usurped by the NCJC, the organization formed to encourage and support citizen coalitions throughout the city.

- As part of the early planning with other departments, establish communications mechanisms.

  This is related to the above recommendation, and is an aspect of cooperative planning within a jurisdiction. The need for clear channels of communication among all relevant departments is important. This may require special task forces or simply procedural agreements among the various parties. The departmental representatives, however, need to be at a high enough level in each department so that they have a departmentwide perspective and are authorized to commit resources to the overall effort (or have access to the departmental director for the needed decisions).

- Police department human resource policies should be reviewed with respect to their impact on implementing the community and problem-oriented police services.

  A variety of human resource policies will need to be reviewed in order to identify possible changes with respect to the objectives of the community/police programs. These include areas such as performance evaluations, recruitment and selection procedures, and the policy of periodically rotating officers within precincts and job assignments.

  For example, the training program for a police department, including the basic courses for new recruits as well as ongoing training for all members of the organization, needs to be developed based on the skills and services required to successfully carry out the community-oriented approach. This not only includes instruction in problem-solving methods and communication skills, but also in how to deal with change. In the context of this new approach to policing, this means dealing with the constantly changing situations in the community and with the types of crimes police officers typically face. It also applies to a changing organizational structure based on the need to be flexible to new conditions, and a changing perspective on exactly what the citizens and other city staff expect of the police department. As with other aspects of this new approach, the training programs will need to be carefully developed, implemented over a reasonable timeframe, and evaluated for effectiveness.

- As police resources (including facilities and staff) become more decentralized and act in a more independent problem-oriented manner, new command and control accountability procedures will be needed.

  By definition, the new community-oriented problem-solving approach requires more independence and flexibility on the part of police personnel. However, the power vested in police officers in terms of enforcing the law and the constant concern about officer safety absolutely requires

that command and control be maintained during the transition to, and as part of, the new organizational structures and operational procedures.

The need to maintain both supervisory and programmatic accountability cannot be overstated. The need to safeguard against possible abuses of police authority and power is absolutely vital. The experience in Seattle is a prime example of how well-intentioned activities can easily get out-of-hand. Within the intuitive appeal and "obvious" beneficial nature of the problem-solving community-oriented approach, it appears easy to justify marginal activities. Potential abuses of police power are especially a problem in the community-oriented environment because such tactics often produce the desired results (i.e., closing down crack houses and getting "undesirables" off the street) and officers receive strong backing from the community for their successful actions. "Bending" established policies and procedures to achieve the desired results simply cannot be tolerated, and is often the first step to other types of abuses. Accordingly, the establishment of rigorous accountability standards and procedures for police personnel and the types of community-oriented programs they participate in is an important factor in this new approach to policing.

- Police departments or jurisdictions should invite other local and regional governmental and educational agencies to participate in the community policing program.

In addition to the need to have such groups alerted to what the city is doing to resolve crime-related problems, oftentimes the nature of the problem dictates a multi-jurisdictional approach. The involvement of all agencies, with the full range of resources available to apply to a given problem, should be an objective of the quality-oriented program. This need for regional planning and coordination in the law and safety area is not new, and many jurisdictions currently cooperate with new programs and information-sharing requirements. The community-oriented concepts reinforce the need for such cooperation among service agencies.

- The police and city officials should coordinate with local media to publicize the efforts and successes of community and business groups.

Keeping the public informed about the ongoing efforts of the police and other city departments to work with the community will be a continuous effort. In addition to providing a public service by alerting citizens of the opportunity to join such efforts, highlighting the successful problem-solving work is expected to strengthen the groups and recognize them for their hard work. The need to educate the

public on the transition to a new approach to policing and its merits should not be overlooked.

- Clearly define the goals and objectives of the community-oriented program components.

  The various components or individual programs (such as setting up hotlines, advisory groups, ministations, civil abatement procedures, etc.) need to be clearly defined in terms of expected outcomes and in terms of the overall community/police program. This is needed for the evaluation process as well as to ensure that the overall program goals are not inconsistent. For example, the civil abatement program rids a neighborhood of a drug problem (e.g., a crack house) but can result in the closing down of low-income housing facilities; these are in short supply in most cities. Another example is a health department's "needle-exchange" program (to stop AIDS infections), in which there is a need to contact those in need of help, but most neighborhoods do not want this type of program in their areas. Coordination among all city departments about unforeseen impacts such as these is needed.

  As noted in several recommendations presented above, the definition of goals and objectives might need to be accomplished over a period of time when the new relationships between the police and community are being formed. Again, the flexibility to adjust agreements and expected outcomes as required will probably be needed in community/police programs. As with other recommendations, the intent is not to present barriers to working with any type of group or association. The objective is not to dictate what any group's goals should be; rather, whatever goals and objectives are adopted should simply be clearly explained.

- The provision for program evaluation should be part of the initial planning.

  There are no textbooks about how to establish the needed working relationships and communications links among the various community and business groups, and it is not unusual for extremely innovative programs to be proposed. Accordingly, it is important that provisions be established to evaluate the effectiveness and costs of these myriad efforts. Evaluation should be an ongoing component of community-oriented programs. The provision for early planning and ongoing program evaluation needs to be linked to the establishment of clearly defined goals and objectives (noted in the previous recommendations).

  Despite the need for ongoing and rigorous evaluation, most jurisdictions adopting community/police programs are experiencing trouble with this task. Most of the efforts

are focused on process factors (as opposed to "impact on outcome" indicators) and document how the programs are implemented and operated. One likely reason for the lack of outcome evaluations is the difficulty in defining expected outcomes and then measuring the changes. Some of the methodological problems, such as defining measures of success (decreased fear of crime or disorder in the community) and isolating the cause of the changes, are not trivial concerns. Also, conducting a rigorous evaluation can be an expensive undertaking.

The Seattle Police Department is using a management-by-objectives (MBO) approach on a case-by-case basis as part of its evaluation of community policing. Major projects are documented in terms of action(s) to be taken, the expected completion date(s), and what is expected to be achieved. A sample of the cases will be screened and reviewed to determine if they were handled appropriately. This approach still involves some subjective judgement and assessment, but attempts to analyze results.

The Seattle evaluation approach also involves gathering data on crime rates and calls-for-service. Despite the myriad problems associated with determining the causal factors of any changes in crime rates and service requests, it seems appropriate that, after a period of time, the community policing approach should produce noticeable effects on the occurrence and types of crimes being committed.

- Cities should facilitate the formation of community and business crime prevention coalitions with the provision of technical assistance and seed funds for administrative purposes.

With the exception of Portland, it appears that no community groups in other cities were initially funded. Other cities such as Seattle, St. Louis, and Minneapolis currently have funding from various sources including the county or city, grants from foundations, and some federal money. These funds, however, were obtained after the group was organized and functioning for some time. Community policing groups that include business representatives or are part of existing associations are often able to secure funds for basic operations, but this is often not an alternative for many citizens.

The funding issue ("seed money") should be addressed early in the planning of community-oriented programs. The jurisdiction will need a pool of such funds, and will not be able to wait for requests before preparing a budget request. The reason for the urgency of these types of funds is that they will facilitate the provision of such basic necessities as phone service, postage, duplicating facilities and services, answering machines, and the establishment of a

hotline that links the group to the community at large. Basically, it appears that seed money is needed to enable some community groups to get off the ground and take the necessary first steps. Without these basic components, it will be impossible to keep minutes of meetings, to keep records of initiatives taken, to publicize and distribute minutes of discussions, and to essentially keep track of progress made. It is possible, of course, that some of these services can be provided by city agencies, and initially this may be the only alternative. Nevertheless, the programs reviewed in other cities indicated that depending on city agencies for these basic resources caused substantial delays in the speed with which information was distributed and shared.

Some of the funding efforts associated with community policing programs extended well beyond these basic needs. As reviewed in the St. Louis report, the community groups were able to obtain funding for the purchase and refurbishing of blighted properties, and all profits earned from that effort were reinvested in additional properties. In Minneapolis, the Eisenhower Foundation provided a grant to the community group for staff support services; this blighted properties grant was initially applied for and obtained through the efforts of the community group. Another example of successful fund raising for a community policing initiative was in the Hollenbeck Division of Los Angeles, where four or five officers were assigned full time to the coordination and expansion of the Youth Services Center facility; their fund-raising efforts provided a large portion of the yearly budget for this youth athletic facility.

In Seattle, the city council funded the Neighborhood Crime and Justice Center, to provide support to crime prevention coalitions and community and business associations. This resource assists groups throughout the city with a variety of tasks, including education, organization, lobbying, research, and coalition building. The NCJC typically works with established groups in order to focus attention on law enforcement issues. It remains the task of the SPD's Community Crime Prevention Section and precinct personnel to organize neighborhood groups and broaden the representation of citizens from all areas of the city. Also, other city departments facilitate problem-solving by serving the community in a liaison capacity.

In all cases of funding assistance, which could range from the provision of seed money to ongoing support to the use of grant funds, some agency of the jurisdiction should ensure that procedures for financial accountability are in place and followed by the recipients of the funds. The purpose of the funding, and whether or not the objectives were achieved, should be part of the program evaluation tasks.

Other types of asssistance can also be provided by police and city agencies to facilitate the formation, growth, and stability of community groups. These approaches include:

- Staff from other departments should be invited to participate in community meetings in order to keep them informed about the nature of the problems (and potential solutions) being discussed and to benefit from their expertise in nonpolice programmatic areas.

- As community groups form out of frustration with crime problems, it is important to pick a problem which is relatively easy to resolve. This early success, which cannot be guaranteed, will help hold the group together and stengthen its commitment to continue. As the group becomes more effective and achieves stability, it can then take on long-term difficult problems.

- Community and business groups typically require constant attention in order to keep the level of interest high and maintain the needed dedication to their mission(s). In addition, the nature of the problems related to crime and urban decay change over time. Also, at some point in the developmental stages of groups working with police agencies, it will probably be appropriate to review policies and procedures for how best to coordinate and share information. An annual meeting aimed at taking a "step back" from normal business and looking at current conditions and needs provides an excellent opportunity for rejuvenation of the group. Each group will need to set its own agenda and schedule; however, these annual meetings might be coordinated with the yearly update of the police department's budget or long-range plan, or with the information collected from the public surveys. Any of these actions could serve as a discussion point for the reassessment of needs and priorities.

o <u>Police agencies should work with community and business groups to develop issue/problem priortization and tracking procedures.</u>

A typical issue involved in dealing with community and business groups is the "information overload" situation. Depending on the use of hotlines or other "problem identification" input sources, the police can simply be flooded with suggestions (or demands) for action. (Using hotlines or message machines can also produce incomplete or practically useless information unless formats are developed to obtain the details necessary for the police to efficiently respond to a complaint.) Given the limited resources that most jurisdictions possess, some competition and conflict between community groups for police or other

municipal resources may be unavoidable. These requests need to be listed, evaluated, prioritized, and then tracked to ensure that the proper action is taken. Finally, it is usually appropriate to provide some type of feedback to let the citizens know about the outcome. Procedures need to be developed to accomplish these tasks. These procedures will also serve as the basis for requesting additional resources; it is possible that existing staff will simply not be able to immediately handle the volume of requests for assistance. This situation, in turn, needs to be addressed in the yearly budget or long-range plan preparation process.

Political influence is typically a part of this equation. When a particular community (or members of the community group) has a long history of participating in city politics and election campaigns or has served on various citizen advisory boards, these individuals and groups will have more access to and knowledge of the city political decision-making process than other groups without that history or experience. In general, this previous exposure to the city's decision-makers will influence the prioritization and allocation of resources in ways that otherwise would not be possible. However, safeguards should be taken to minimize the potential influences of partisan politics. For example, the use of membership lists, staff resources, and equipment for political purposes should be avoided.

Another ingredient in the prioritization equation is that the control of the community policing program may vary. It may be administered by the police department and responsive to the department's chain of command; alternatively, it may be a program under the control of the mayor or the city council, with a chain of command outside the police agency.

The various organizational forms will typically result in a difference in the control of the program, and therefore the method and channel by which the community group can make its requests heard. When the police are in charge, the major channel for decision-making regarding community problems may be the local precinct commander or the supervisor of the squad or regional area. If the program is operated out of the mayor's or city council's office, a different channel will probably be in effect. At least in one instance, as was the case in Portland, the governor was also involved in particular city initiatives responding to the gang problem. The governor had assigned a contingent of state police to work with city and county governments in establishing a gang unit that, in turn, worked with the local community groups. In this case, the governor's interest in this problem provided ready-made access for community groups to obtain additional resources used in combating drugs and gangs. The governor also authorized the National Guard to be employed in the aid of civilian law enforcement duties, with apparently successful results.

- The police and community should work together to develop programs which are based on local needs and conditions.

  While it is certainly appropriate to look to existing programs for ideas, do not assume that they can simply be "plugged in" to any new setting. Each program component will need to be carefully analyzed in terms of the local culture, needs, and available resources in order to realistically design the program.

  While many of the cities and neighborhoods visited shared some program components in common, what was most salient were the differences. Even within a single city like Seattle, the south Seattle program was not and could not be generalized directly to other neighborhoods of the city without substantial changes. While ideas from other communities or cities can be very helpful in establishing useful models, it is clear that no two programs will be exactly alike. Departments vary in mission and organization, and not even police departments share enough specific commonalities that one program can be directly applied to another jurisdiction. Even though communities throughout the United States share similar problems--burglaries, drugs, crack houses, litter, and urban blight--local ordinances, departmental missions, and the availability of resources vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These differences mean that the solutions to specific problems need to be constructed and conceptualized according to local conditions.

Research Recommendations

The recommendations for research topics are presented in this section.

- The relationship between decay, disorder, fear, and crime needs additional research attention.

  It has been nine years since the Wilson and Kelling "Broken Windows" article, and answers to some of their key questions remain unclear. They indicated that "at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence." Although this linkage and the connection between disorderliness and fear continue to be intuitively acceptable to most people (with research to support the association of fear in this equation), further study appears warranted.

  One assumption in the literature is that reduction of decay and improved cleanliness and order in a neighborhood will eventually reduce crime. The relationship between these variables, nevertheless, may be subordinate to the operation of basic economic facts. If a city experiences a population

flight to the suburbs or a severe recession, then housing demand will generally decrease; without a demand for housing, such attention to clean-ups, graffiti removal, and renovation is unlikely to bring residents back from the suburbs without a change in the basic economic factors governing demand for housing. In such situations, decay probably cannot be stopped in spite of the best efforts of the police, municipal agencies, and the community. As economic cycles change, it is common to see previously decayed and abandoned neighborhoods rapidly improve through neighborhood clean-ups, remodeling, painting, and beautification.

It is possible, then, that the relationship between reduction in decay and crime is best understood in the context of these basic economic factors. The relationship between improvements in livability factors and reduction in crime may be stronger during an upward economic cycle, and weak or nonexistent in a downward cycle. It is possible that as a neighborhood enters an upward cycle in the price of housing, the neighbors might then become much more interested and less apathetic regarding what occurs in their front yards. Under this set of circumstances, less decay and graffiti and a cleaner neighborhood may have significant linkages to decreased crime and fear of crime. These linkages may be much weaker in a neighborhood where the prices of properties are actually decreasing, and where there may be a substantial population exodus, leading to widespread apathy.

The analysis of potential economic factors in this relationship addresses one of the key questions posed in the "Broken Windows" article; specifically, "how to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point." An analysis of economic indicators might result in a set of guidelines that police and city officials could use to screen for neighborhoods in need of special attention.

- Improved evaluation methodologies are needed for community/police programs.

Many jurisdictions are evaluating their community/police programs, but the rigor and scope of these efforts vary tremendously. Both process and outcome-oriented evaluations are important, but the focus of most efforts at this time is documenting the activities of the new programs. This case-management approach appears useful for program improvement as well as for supervisory needs. But there are many questions about what objectives to measure program success against and what indicators of success to measure. The use of pre- and post-questionnaires seems to be a needed component of outcome evaluations, but such surveys of citizens are extremely complex as well as being fairly expensive. The feasibility and usefulness of looking at the

effectiveness of community/police programs over the long-term and with respect to traditional measures (i.e., crime rates) also needs to be investigated. Research into the broad area of evaluation would probably be welcomed by agencies throughout the county.

- The overall financial impact of the community-oriented approach to police departments and cities should be determined.

  There are a number of questions about the overall cost of the community-oriented approach to policing, and of paramount interest is any need for additional operating staff. Despite the fact that a community orientation is (or should be) a basic component of police department management, and despite the potential of this approach for solving underlying problems over time, the incremental costs to police departments and cities need to be researched. Whereas the question of potential additional costs is undoubtedly a concern of most police and city administrators, this area is also related to the evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the community-oriented approach.

  The approach to implementing community-oriented policing could have a significant influence on the amount of additional costs incurred. If all department personnel are trained in the new approach, the costs will obviously be much less than if additional staff are hired because foot patrol officers (for example) are not able to handle the full range of calls-for-service expected of officers in cars. Also, should the cost of increased coordination among the police and a city's other departments be considered an increase in the public safety budget or an increased expense to the city as a whole for improved public service? Equipment costs, which could range from savings in patrol car expenses to increased amounts for radio/cellular phone communications gear, are also a component of the overall cost question.

- The issue of displacement of crime as a result of community-oriented programs should be explored.

  The displacement issue is not a question unique to just the community-oriented policing approach; almost all types of special enforcement efforts and emphasis programs can result in simply moving the problem to some other area. The community policing model, however, is not a temporary effort, but is intended to solve problems of an underlying nature. This difference might result in slower but more permanent displacement of crime problems. Also, as more neighborhoods (and larger sections of entire cities) are reclaimed from the crime/decay problem, it is possible that perpetrators will change their modus operandi. This

potential problem will obviously be of concern to police agencies.

- Definitive guidelines and suggestions about facilitating community groups are needed.

  In addition to the recommendation (in the operations section of this chapter) about the need to work with all types of groups and the absence of control over the dynamics of the groups, it appears that there are opportunities to facilitate their growth and stability. The observations in this project indicate that there are stages in the development of community groups, and that the relationship between these groups and the police and other government agencies follows some predictable stages. Further analysis of this process and more research describing successful examples of effective working relationships seems warranted (unsuccessful examples might also provide valuable lessons). It is possible that a useful set of guidelines might be developed from confirmation of the stages of growth hypothesis or from uncovering the variables responsible for successful groups.

- There are numerous questions related to the internal organizational structure and management style of police agencies which need to be addressed.

  If community-oriented policing concepts are implemented in accordance with the theories, by definition there will be basic and wide-ranging impacts on police departments. The potential strains on the organizational structure with respect to the flexibility needed for community policing programs and the additional accountability required for responding to the public (as well as to prevent abuse) should be identified. Another area that will need to be explored is the predominance of the patrol function and the burden of responding to 911 calls-for-service contrasted with the objectives of community-oriented programs.

  The approach to implementing community/police concepts throughout the department and whether or not to start with specialized units or a departmentwide focus is related to this overall issue. The extent of and mechanisms for involving the community in planning and assigning targets for tactical operations is another subject that needs to be researched. In many departments, such involvement may clash with the traditional style of policing. In addition, there are confidentiality, security, and liability issues that will need to be analyzed.

- The need for fundamental revisions in police human resources systems will need to be reviewed.

  The integration of the community policing concept probably requires profound changes in the personnel management systems in most departments. It appears that the selection criteria and the type of people being recruited, their training, and how they are judged and evaluated will quite likely require changes based on the way departments will be expected to function in the community/police model. Fundamental revisions to human resource systems will need to be carefully examined due to the departmentwide ramifications of such changes.

- The adoption of community policing concepts by small police departments should be researched.

  While the agencies studied in this project and many of the community-oriented programs reported in the literature are medium to large-sized departments, most of the police agencies in the country are smaller and are located in rural areas. Small agencies will face a radically different set of needs as well as constraints when considering implementation of these new concepts. It is also possible that many of the "new" ideas included under the community policing rubric (such as partnership with the community and problem-solving tactics) have always been practiced by smaller police agencies. (Some officers, even in large police agencies, feel that the new community policing style has always been their approach.) Whether due to the size of the community or out of operational necessity, police officers in small agencies typically are familiar with the residents and their problems.

  The extent to which smaller police agencies already employ community policing tactics needs to be determined, and the answer to this question will dictate additional areas of research. These typical small agencies might have a unique set of needs with respect to the adoption and enhancement of the community policing concepts within their organizations and neighborhoods.

- The use of and need for advanced technology under the community policing approach should be studied.

  The potential usefulness of a wide range of technology in connection with community-oriented programs should be of interest to most police administrators. On one end of the scale, the use of cellular telephones might provide a simple and effective way for officers to contact citizens and manage the large number of nonemergency 911 calls-for-service. At the other end of the scale, it is possible that third and fourth generation Computer-aided Dispatch (CAD) systems with automatic vehicle locators and information

management capabilities might be needed in order to operate under new command-and-control imperatives. Such advanced technology might be needed to efficiently manage emergency calls as well as to gather data about crime and quality-of-life problems for reports to the community and program evaluations.

Likewise, if communications and the sharing of information is vital to solving crimes and a wide variety of neighborhood problems, new technology might become an important ally in the future. Hand held Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs), computer networks, and more sophisticated (and reliable) residential/business alarms might change the traditional operational tactics in unforeseen and beneficial ways. The whole range of available and future technology needs to be reviewed in terms of how it can be applied to community policing concepts.

o The mechanisms and media for communication between the police and city agencies and community groups needs to be studied.

Two-way sharing of information between the police, other government agencies, and the citizens is a fundamental ingredient of the community-oriented approach. This basic component also results in a number of important questions, including:

- What is the best use or mix of media to accomplish the needed exchange of information?

- Should there be a hierarchy of community groups to transfer information up and down, or should all groups get all communiques and have equal access to police personnel?

- How should information be shared among the police and other government agencies; similarly, how should community groups share information about problems and successful programs among themselves?

- How often and how much communication is needed, and are regular opportunities for citizen input (e.g., annual long-range plans or citizen surveys) needed?

These communications issues are basic to the new community-oriented programs, but can become very complex and expensive (in terms of money and personnel time). All of these issues need to be studied.

- The required coordination among the police and government departments in the delivery of services needs to be reviewed.

  Similar to the questions about communications needs, there are numerous research topics about how to coordinate the delivery of services among the police and government departments. Questions about prioritizing neighborhood problems and maximizing the use of scarce resources can result in complex changes in how government agencies operate. These issues need to be investigated.

  The new research project funded by NIJ to analyze Neighborhood Network Centers is designed to look at how such coordination should be accomplished. An interesting component of this project examines the use of volunteers from the community, and the potential value of this resource.

- The potential benefits and costs of police coordinating with private security services should be investigated.

  It is estimated that there will be three times as many private security guards as police in the U.S. by the year 2000. This group has the potential to be a valuable resource to the police and the community. However, there are numerous questions about how best to use this resource and what costs might be expected. For example, there are questions about legal liability, training needs, communication equipment compatibility (i.e., radio frequencies), and restrictions on access to and use of police information (confidentiality and security issues). The administrative costs to police and cities of dealing with numerous private security companies in a fair manner could also be prohibitive. All of these issues need to be researched.

- The partnership concept from the perspective of the community needs to be researched.

  The partnership aspect of the community/police model indicates that the citizens have responsibilities. These activities can range from periodic clean-up efforts to ongoing commitments of time to attend meetings with other community people as well as the police. It appears that the various types of community responsibilities need to be identified. Once this is accomplished, the numerous types of assistance can be measured and their effectiveness evaluated within the context of community/police programs.

- The potential for increased levels of corruption or the abuse of power should be researched.

As noted in the operational recommendation about new command and control accountability procedures, it appears that increased vigilance will be needed in a decentralized community-oriented police organization. Research needs to be conducted to determine if this new approach and related organizational changes in fact have any effect on corrupt activities or officer misconduct and what safeguards might be appropriate to use to address this potential problem.

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APPENDICES

This report includes the following appendices:

Appendix A

Copy of the original 15-Point Plan proposed by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce; this proposal was modified during discussions with the SPD.

Appendix B

Description of the community/police partnership activities in the cities visited as part of this reserach project.

RAINIER CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
15 POINT PLAN FOR SOUTH SEATTLE

1) The South Precinct Commander shall head the project. This person must be proactive and community oriented, a motivator, creative and committed to community participation in the program. He/she must have total support from the Chief of Police, the Mayor and the Community Advisory Committee to effectively implement the Program.

2) A Community Advisory Committee shall be established to work directly with the South Precinct to develop community support and monitor the program and establish guidelines. This Advisory Committee shall work closely with the Precinct Commander on all aspects relative to the reduction of crime in Southeast Seattle, understanding, of course, the confidential nature of police work. Members of the committee shall be selected from a cross section of Southeast residents and business people. The committee shall be representative of the socio-economic diversity of the area.

3) Three lieutenants (watch commanders) shall be assigned to the Project at the South Precinct. These lieutenants must have a working knowledge of the Program, must be able to work closely with the community, and must be committed to the basic concepts of the Program. Six patrol sergeants (three Robert and three Sam sector sergeants for three shifts) shall be assigned. The sergeants should have the ability to motivate and aggressively lead officers in a pro-active effort.

4) These sectors shall be staffed with officers dedicated to the spirit of the Program.

5) Staffing: Eight patrol officers shall be reallocated from other police functions. This assignment is intended to increase the number of two-officer patrol units, directly accountable to the South Precinct Commander.

6) The staffing level of the anti-crime team shall be maintained. A clerk shall be assigned to the team.

7) The following staff shall be assigned to the South Precinct: Two detectives from the Narcotics Unit, one detective from the Commercial Unit, two juvenile detectives, two officers from the Special Patrol Unit (SPU), and an officer from the Crime Prevention Unit. All of these individuals shall be accountable to the Precinct Commander to be used as needed in this pilot project.

8) An incentive program shall be an option to be implemented at the South Precinct, at the discretion of the Captain.

9) Additional clerical assistance shall be provided from officers on limited duty, such as the CSO Unit, to free up, as possible, professional staff time from clerical duties.

10) Reasonable funds shall be committed for confidential informants and controlled narcotics buys.

11) The community will assist in recruiting "loaned" clerical workers, in purchasing equipment, and in locating space where the Police Department budget will not provide needed resources. This support activity will further include, but not be limited to, enlisting community support to work in and organize trouble areas as identified by police, secure office space if needed and be available, as needed, to coordinate with the Seattle Public Schools and local social services agencies.

12) Precinct personnel shall be trained to deal with selected problem areas in cooperation with the Community Advisory Committee to provide liaison between the community, the Committee, and the South Precinct.

13) A computer and software for tracking data from the two sectors, plus approximately $2,000 for miscellaneous equipment such as surveillance gear, shall be provided to the Program. If the Department has insufficient funds, the community shall undertake a fund-raising campaign to pay for this equipment.

14) A total commitment to this Program from the Mayor and the Chief of Police is CRITICAL to the Program's success.

15) A total commitment from the Southeast community throughout the term of the Program is also essential to the Program's success.

While this project calls for deployment of resources from other units, they are services which are already utilized locally. However, they are currently neither easily accessible nor coordinated with the South Precinct. Localization of all personnel, appropriate services and equipment is essential to streamline communications and produce results.

CONCLUSIONS

The Rainier Chamber of Commerce is committed to working with the City, local businesses and community groups to insure a significant reduction of crime in Southeast Seattle. Inherent in this Program is the assurance that the Southeast community will spend the time, locate the resources and mobilize the community to implement this program.

DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITY/POLICE PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED CITIES

This appendix contains the detailed reports prepared for each of the cities visited as part of this NIJ project. It should be pointed out that the programs have undoubtedly changed since the visits were completed by project staff (1989 to early 1990), and these reports do not reflect such changes.

The reports of each city vary in focus, and were not intended to be comprehensive descriptions of all community-oriented efforts in each location. Some reports highlight specific programs while others discuss community/police efforts from a neighborhood or regional perspective.

LOS ANGELES

The city of Los Angeles has a population of approximately 3.5 million and a police department of approximately 8,000 officers who work out of a downtown headquarters, four bureau headquarters, and 18 geographic districts/divisions. The divisions contain both patrol and detective functions. In addition, the LAPD has numerous specialty divisions such as the Air Support and Metropolitan Divisions and the department's citywide tactical unit. While the city of Los Angeles has many programs that could be considered community police initiatives, the cornerstone of community policing in Los Angeles is the Police Assisted Community Enhancement (PACE) program which has been rapidly evolving since its beginning in early 1989.

This report will focus on the PACE program with only limited reference to other community police initiatives in Los Angeles. Following a brief introduction to the development of the PACE program at the department level, a number of specific PACE initiatives and selected community police programs will be described.

PACE was developed to provide a citywide program that would improve the quality of life for the citizens of Los Angeles by improving the physical appearance of the city and thus reduce crime and the fear of crime. The driving ideas behind the development of the PACE program were drawn from the now famous "Broken Windows" article by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson. In fact, during the planning and development stages of the PACE program, it was widely referred to as the "Broken Windows Program".

One of the keys to implementing a program that would focus on livability issues was an effort to enlist the help of other city agencies that have responsibility for handling the various problems of blight. The nature of the problems in Los Angles and the city's organizational chart indicated that four city agencies were responsible for dealing with the vast majority of the livability problems related to public safety issues: The Department of Building and Safety, the Department of Public Works, the Department of Transportation, and the Sanitation Department. A division of labor was established whereby the police department, because of its large number of employees in the community, would identify and gather information about deteriorated conditions and inform the relevant city agency which would then take action to improve the situation.

In order to facilitate this process the police department created a "Community Enhancement Request Form" (CER) that officers can fill out when they observe or receive a report from a citizen about a problem for which one of the agencies is responsible. After these forms are processed within the police department, a copy is forwarded to the relevant agency for follow-up. The CER can also be used by patrol officers to request specialized police

attention to any problem that cannot be handled by the patrol officer except for narcotics and vice-related activities, which are reported on separate department forms. Interviews with police and other agencies indicated that there have been some delays with the program in terms of actually getting action taken on the CERs. It was reported that work requests flow to the other city agencies from many sources, such as city council offices, the mayor's office, businesses, and private citizens. The CERs are viewed as simply another request for action, and receive attention only when they get to the top of the work queue. Thus, it usually takes a good deal of time before action is taken on police department work requests.

The LAPD took advantage of two aspects of its existing organizational structure in designing the PACE program: the department's community relations program and the Basic Car Plan which is the deployment plan of its patrol force.

The department's community relations program is composed of a central community relations unit at the downtown headquarters, and subordinate units in each of the 18 geographic divisions. The divisional community relations units consist of a sergeant and a variable number of officers, under the command of the division's senior captain. The divisional community relations units have a great deal of autonomy to run their programs, with the downtown unit primarily providing support to the divisional units, setting only very broad guidelines. Thus, the LAPD has a highly decentralized community relations operation which affords the flexibility required to tailor efforts to local concerns.

For a number of years, the patrol function of the LAPD has been based on a deployment practice known as the Basic Car Plan. Each of the 18 divisions is broken down into a number of car beats, usually six to eight per division. One patrol unit is assigned to each car beat on each of the patrol watches, having primary responsibility for handling the calls-for-service in that beat during the patrol shift. In order to facilitate communication and coordination of the activities of the basic car across the three shifts, one officer is designated as the leader of operations of each basic car. His/her duties include supervising the training of new police officers assigned to the basic car. The leaders of each basic car are called Senior Lead Officers, (SLOs), and they receive a 5.5 percent pay increase for their added responsibilities. In addition to overseeing the patrol operations of the car, the SLOs play a major role in the department's efforts to build and maintain linkages with the residents of Los Angeles by coordinating the block watches in their basic car beat.

Because the SLOs are responsible for the operation of the basic car and provide the first line linkages between the police department and the community via block watches, the command staff believed that they could serve both to disseminate information from the police department to the citizens, and also to gather

information about problems in the community in the PACE program. From this point, the SLOs could forward the information along to the relevant city agency or police unit. Thus, the SLOs are viewed as being the linchpin of the PACE program, serving as a conduit between the community, the police department, and other city agencies.

The senior command staff of LAPD believes that if the PACE program is to be successful, it must be quite flexible--flexible enough to tailor its specific initiatives to the particular problems experienced in each neighborhood. To this end, the senior command staff has adopted a management style that provides leadership in the form of ideas, general guidelines, and support, but leaves the planning, development, and operations of specific initiatives to the various bureau and division command staffs. As will be evident in the brief reports on the various PACE programs, this "hands-off" approach has led to the development of diverse PACE initiatives that are tailored to the dynamics of specific problems in the neighborhoods, yet retains the centrality of the SLO and the divisional community relations offices as the primary links between the community and the city.

The command staff has encouraged the divisions to augment the CER activity by actively participating in efforts to clean up the communities they serve. To obtain the labor required to carry out clean-up programs, the police department successfully petitioned the courts to designate PACE as a community service program. As such, PACE clean-up efforts can draw labor from the pool of offenders sentenced to community service, and thus implement PACE initiatives that accrue minimal labor costs to the police department.

When the police department command staff proffered the idea of the PACE program to the leaders of the other agencies, a concern was voiced that the Community Enhancement Requests would overwhelm the limited resources of most city agencies. As a test, 1989 served as a trial run for the PACE program with only some of the 18 divisions participating. As 1989 drew to a close, the agencies involved reported that they thought they would be able to handle additional work; accordingly, PACE is now in the process of expanding citywide.

Rampart Division

Rampart Division, located immediately west of downtown L.A., was selected as the initial division in which to institute the PACE program. Rampart serves an ethnically diverse population of approximately 250,000, consisting of a variety of Asian and Hispanic nationalities, and Whites and Blacks. In line with the philosophy of using the existing organizational structure to implement PACE, the Rampart effort was built around the basic cars, the SLOs and the community relations office. The SLOs were selected to attempt to improve blighted locations in their basic

car areas. Because the SLOs already had the responsibility of handling calls for service and supervising the training of new police officers, they were given two days a week to work exclusively on the PACE program. It quite rapidly became apparent that the magnitude of the physical decay problems in Rampart was so great that two days a week afforded insufficient time. The SLOs were reassigned to work the PACE program on a full time basis, setting their work schedule to accommodate the problems they faced.

The SLOs are supervised by the division's community relations sergeant who answers directly to the senior captain, in this way removing them from patrol both by division of labor and organizationally. One of the disadvantages of this arrangement is that with the SLOs working full time out of the Community Relations Office, they have lost some contact with patrol. Therefore, much information relevant to community problems possessed by the patrol officers simply doesn't get to the SLOs, resulting in the loss of valuable information.

The SLOs spend most of their time on three specific activities: meeting with community residents and leaders, working to solve specific problems, and patrolling their basic car areas. In meetings with the community members, the SLOs focus on exchanging information about problem locations and what can be done to improve them. For example, one of the weak links in the early days of the program was getting other city agencies to take action against specific locations. The SLOs were able to explain to the residents how the system worked, and some citizens enlisted the city council member in their district to prod the agencies to action. With the added pressure from the city council, agencies became more responsive to work requests from the Rampart SLOs. In addition, the agencies were able to assign specific supervisors to work with the Rampart SLOs, thus providing a less formal and more effective linkage between the police department and the agencies.

The SLOs receive complaints about specific problem locations from a number of sources. Individual citizens contact them at community meetings, by telephone, or while they're on patrol; the city council offices call in complaints; the captain relays complaints he receives; the patrol officers generate complaints via the CER form; and finally, the SLOs can generate their own complaints.

The SLOs handle their efforts concerning problem locations on a case management basis; when they become aware of a specific problem location in their car beat, they start a case file in which they document the problems, include photos of the area/property, and outline a plan for dealing with them. All activities undertaken, and the outcome of their efforts are also recorded in the case file.

The SLOs use whatever resources appear to be appropriate for a given problem. For example, if a problem location is a single piece of private property with building code violations, the SLO will enlist the assistance of the Department of Building and Safety to enforce applicable code provisions. If the problem is common to a larger area, such as graffiti or garbage-strewn lots, the SLO will arrange for community service workers to paint out and clean up the area, and will actually supervise these efforts.

The most notable clean-up initiative for larger areas in Rampart is the graffiti paint-out program. Rampart gets paint donated by a recycling firm and has acquired an airless paint-sprayer mounted on a trailer. The SLOs regularly organize paint-out work parties where they schedule the community service workers, tow the sprayer to the location, and supervise the application of donated paint to areas covered with graffiti.

Because Rampart has so many calls for service, the basic cars can rarely do "routine" patrol in their areas. To ensure that the area gets some routine patrol, the SLOs usually spend several hours a week driving through their basic car area. During patrol time, they frequently stop and chat informally with residents to gather intelligence on individuals, addresses, and activities as well as on problem locations. They also engage in field interrogations of suspicious persons in the area, particularly of loiterers at narcotics activity locations. Finally, the SLOs also use this time to check on the status of problem locations on which they have been working.

In addition to the actions undertaken by the SLOs on an individual basis, Rampart Division has engaged in some coordinated, large-scale efforts against problems beyond the reach of a single SLO. The most dramatic example is the multi-faceted effort undertaken to battle a severe street drug and crime problem in a 27-square-block sector of the division known as the Pico-Union area. This area had been wracked by problems for quite some time and police efforts to improve the situation had proved ineffective. In February of 1989, an eleven year old child was fatally wounded when caught in the crossfire of a gun battle. This tragedy led to a community outcry for police action.

A plan to abate these problems was devised by the command staff of LAPD, the Rampart captain, and the SLOs. It included periodic saturation patrol of the area, the placing of signs at intersections leading into the sector declaring it off limits to nonresidents, and monitoring crime statistics in the area. Prior to launching the program, the SLOs conducted a poll/information exchange among area residents to inform the citizens of the proposed program and get their feedback on it. Over 80 percent of the residents expressed approval of the program (launched in April of 1989, after a broad information campaign).

In the first few days of April 1989, the area was saturated by uniformed patrol officers from the Metropolitan Division, the Rampart Special Problems Unit, Rampart patrol officers working overtime, and the SLOs. The signs, attached to four-by-four-feet road barricades declaring the area off limits to nonresidents, were erected at intersections leading into the area. The signs were attended by uniformed officers while the other officers engaged in proactive patrol (some in the form of foot beats), with a goal of arresting all persons in the area who were engaging in illegal activity in public. After a few days, the extra officers left the area, but the signs remained in place. Crime dropped significantly and stayed low for several weeks. When it began to rise in the late spring, the extra officers were redeployed and again crime dropped. This cycle was repeated a few more times until September, when the periodic saturation patrols were discontinued. About 8700 arrests were made in the area during the six months of the recurring saturation patrol. The signs have remained in place through 1990, so that although the extra patrol no longer occurs, the program remains in the limited form of barricades and added attention from the SLOs.

Two major effects appear to have been obtained on crime patterns in the targeted sector and its surrounding environs. First, as compared to the time prior to the advent of the program, crime dropped substantially in the targeted sector. Second, crime rose in surrounding areas, indicating that one effect of the program may have been to displace crime. The interesting aspect of the apparent displacement is not its occurrence but the form that it took. After some initial displacement to the areas immediately adjacent to the target sector, saturation patrol was expanded to include them. From that point on, crime did not increase in other adjacent areas within Rampart Division but in those divisions that abut Rampart. While it is impossible to say with any certainty why this pattern occurred, one possibility is that criminals knew that the program was a Rampart Division initiative so they stayed out of Rampart.

Community response to the program was overwhelmingly positive. Two instances of supportive community action are especially noteworthy. First, during the initial days of the program, numerous residents approached the officers at the barricades to thank them with gifts of flowers and food, creating ad hoc parties at some locations. Second, a short time after the program began, members of the Progressive Labor Party, (who did not live in the area) protested against the police barricades and proactive patrols on Constitutional grounds. A large contingent of area residents confronted the protestors, told them to mind their own business, and chased them away. The protesters did not return.

North Hollywood Division

North Hollywood Division, with a predominantly White population of approximately 175,000 is located in the San Fernando Valley northwest of downtown Los Angeles; it covers approximately 25 square miles. The PACE program in North Hollywood operates divisionwide in all six basic car beats. When the PACE program began in North Hollywood, each SLO was given three administrative days per month to work on livability problems in its basic car area. This method of time allocation proved to be somewhat inefficient as the SLOs were duplicating efforts and competing for resources. In an attempt to streamline operations, an officer who had been injured and was working light duty at the front desk was assigned to work the PACE program on a full time basis under the supervision of the North Hollywood community relations sergeant.

In this new organizational configuration, the SLOs are responsible for identifying specific problem locations in their car beats and forwarding the relevant information on to the full time PACE officer, formally via a CER form or informally by note or in person. The SLOs are also responsible for informing the citizens in their basic car beat about the PACE program and how they can contact the full time PACE officer with their work requests if they so desire. This occurs both at block watch meetings and during informal interactions with citizens. In addition, the division's community relations office disseminates information regarding PACE throughout the North Hollywood community. A substantial number of requests for assistance come to the PACE officer directly from the community, which indicates success in informing at least some members of the public about the program.

When information about a problem comes via a CER form, the PACE officer logs the request and forwards a copy of the CER to the relevant city agency or police department unit, depending on the nature of the problem. When a request is generated informally or when it comes from a citizen, the PACE officer simply makes a phone call to his contact in the relevant agency, outlines the problem to his contact, and requests assistance. Every problem reported, regardless of its source, is tracked on a case-by-case basis in a file that contains the requests for work, the efforts made to contact relevant agencies, work undertaken to address the problem, and the results of the work. This practice provides a framework that guides the work related to complaints/requests and it provides uniform documentation on what efforts were undertaken.

While the majority of the problems in North Hollywood require assistance from other entities and are forwarded to the relevant entity for action, the PACE officer handles two types of main problems: abandoned automobiles and graffiti.

Legally parked vehicles that appear to be abandoned on public streets can be towed away only after a notification of intent to tow the vehicle has been posted on the car for some number of days, depending on its value. The city Department of Transportation has the primary responsibility for ridding the streets of abandoned automobiles, so the PACE officer simply passes the abandoned auto work requests to the Department of Transportation. When the Department of Transportation is experiencing a backlog and fast action is required, the PACE officer will go out to the location and directly tag the vehicle(s) for removal.

The North Hollywood Division has developed a two-pronged anti-graffiti program: a paint-out component that physically paints over graffiti, and the use of covert surveillance to identify and arrest "graffiti artists." The North Hollywood PACE officer has primary responsibility for both aspects of this program.

The PACE officer is in charge of obtaining the paint and other required supplies, putting work crews together to do the painting, getting the crews to the locations, supervising them, and ensuring that the job is done effectively. The paint, poles, rollers, and other supplies are donated to the police department by businesses and individuals. As in Rampart, the vast majority of the labor for the graffiti paint-over program is provided by individuals who have been sentenced to do community service.

The City of Los Angeles has an ordinance that requires property owners to remove or paint over graffiti that is applied to their property. The PACE antigraffiti program does not charge for its services, so the vast majority of the property owners are quite willing to allow the work crews to paint over graffiti on their property. The graffiti paint-over program is well received in the North Hollywood area by residents and business owners not only because it makes the area look nicer, but because it's an inexpensive way to comply with the law.

The second component of the antigraffiti program is the use of hidden cameras to videotape "graffiti artists" at work. Many times after the work crews paint over graffiti, new graffiti is applied to the location within 24 hours. When it is believed that an area will be immediately defaced after repainting, the PACE officer arranges for a video camera to be hidden near the location to tape the vulnerable wall(s) during hours of darkness. Any graffiti artists who happen to ply their trade are caught on the video tape. Because the vast majority of graffiti is gang-related, officers who know the gangs view the tapes to identify the perpetrators. The criminals are then arrested and the tapes used as evidence in prosecutions.

The North Hollywood Division also coordinates a citizen volunteer clean-up program. Every few months, the North Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, in concert with the police, selects an area of approximately one square mile particularly overrun with graffiti,

garbage, abandoned cars, and the like, and organizes a one-day concentrated clean-up effort. The clean-up day is publicized throughout the North Hollywood area by the chamber of commerce, at block watch meetings, via flyers posted throughout the area, and by any other means possible. A local disposal company donates two large dumpsters, including dumping fees, to the effort. On the appointed day, the residents come out in force to paint-out the graffiti in the area and pick up the garbage (using the paint and equipment donated to the police department.) The police department assists in the efforts by supervising the graffiti paint-over, by tagging abandoned automobiles for later removal, and by providing security for the overall effort.

In addition to the PACE program and volunteer clean-up efforts, North Hollywood runs a foot beat program. There is an area of the division of approximately one square mile in size that has severe crime and disorder problems. The LAPD has allocated eight officers, five days a week to work foot beats in the North Hollywood Division. The North Hollywood command staff deploys all its foot beats in this area. The foot beat officers in this area spend a great deal of time talking with adult residents, and talking and interacting with the local youngsters. The command staff in North Hollywood reports that they have received a great deal of positive feedback about the foot beat program from both the community and the officers who walk the beats.

Newton Division

Newton Division, with a population of approximately 105,000 is located immediately south and east of downtown Los Angeles. It covers approximately 10 square miles, six of which are residential; the remaining four are part of the central commercial district of L.A. The population is approximately 70 percent Hispanic, mostly natives of Central American nations, and 30 percent Black. Newton has serious narcotics and prostitution problems along with a very high violent crime rate; it had 107 homicides in calendar year 1989. A special program, which began in February 1990, operates in an area of less than one square mile that has been particularly hard hit by violent crime, drugs, and prostitution. One major problem in this area is the remarkable number of assaults with firearms, particularly drive-by shootings. In 1989, there were 35 drive-by shootings where someone was struck by a bullet, at least 110 drive-bys where rounds struck an inhabited house, and an unknown number of drive-bys where no dwelling or person was struck.

In late 1989, Newton Division and department senior command staff decided that this area should receive special attention in the form of a concentrated police service program. A February 1, 1990 launch date for the program was set and the planning began.

The plan devised included three main components patterned on the Rampart model. First, signs declaring the area off-limits to

nonresidents would be erected at the street entrances to the area, and a few streets that had the highest rates of drive-by shootings would be closed off at one end; second, proactive police patrols would saturate the area; and, third, a clean-up campaign would be instituted to improve the physical appearance of the area.

A major freeway lies only several blocks west of the program area, providing drive-by shooters with an easy escape route from the area. The police department thought that if the west-bound egress from the area were blocked, that drive-by shootings could be reduced. To this end, three-feet-high concrete barriers would be placed at the west end of several of the street blocks that had the highest incidence of drive-by shootings. With the barriers in place, a U-turn would be required to do a drive-by on those blocks, thereby increasing the difficulty of the effective execution of such an assault. Because the placement of the barricades would close these streets at one end, the program in Newton was named "Operation Cul-De-Sac."

Prior to the actual implementation of the program, two initiatives were undertaken in the area. First, a community survey/information exchange was conducted by the SLOs, who contacted residents at each of 560 dwellings in the target area. The residents were asked about their public safety and livability concerns, told about the upcoming program, and asked their opinion about such a program. It was reported that over 99 percent of the persons contacted endorsed the plan. The second initiative was a saturation patrol of the area by dozens of officers from Metropolitan Division during the last week of January.

On February 1, 1990 the program was officially launched. The barricades were installed and the signs, in both English and Spanish, were erected. Forty officers per watch worked the area to do proactive patrol and identify particular problem locations. Animal control also worked the area, removing some 80 problem dogs.

After the launch date, the saturation patrols were reduced. At the time of our site visit, the saturation patrols were composed as follows: two extra officers worked the area from midnight to 0800 hours, four from 0800 to 1600, and 10 to 12 from 1600 to midnight. These officers worked a roving foot beat, driving to and from their various walking beats. The officers talked with area residents, stopped and questioned suspicious persons, and looked for locations with blight problems. These extra patrols were paid on an overtime basis.

Operation Cul-De-Sac is managed by a sergeant who reports directly to the senior captain in Newton Division. This sergeant has functional command of officers while they are working the overtime saturation patrol detail and, along with the SLO of the program area, oversees and manages actions taken to improve

quality-of-life issues. All of the reports on problem locations are funneled to the sergeant or the SLO; as in other divisions, they then begin a case file on the problem in which all actions related to the location are documented. The sergeant or the SLO then either sends a copy of the report to the relevant city agency or contacts a supervisor in the agency via telephone to make the work request.

In addition to overseeing the saturation patrols and managing the work requests, the PACE sergeant spends a lot of time in the community meeting with residents and city officials who work in the area. For example, he has met with members of the city parks department to discuss ways of cleaning up and otherwise improving area parks so that residents will feel that it is safe to use them. He has met with the principals of the area schools to discuss truancy and public school safety problems. He often attends church social functions and similar gatherings to meet with residents and discuss their public safety concerns, and then uses information obtained from these various interactions to help guide the efforts of the saturation patrol. In addition, during these interactions he often receives information on specific locations with blight problems, which is recorded on a PACE complaint form and forwarded to the relevant city agency.

During the planning stages of Operation Cul-De-Sac, the sergeant was given the job of procuring and installing the barricades and street signs, a seemingly simple task that became difficult when obtaining the hardware from the relevant city department to mount the signs on portable sawhorse platforms proved difficult. Only after some skilled bureaucratic maneuvering was the equipment given to the police department.

The concrete barricades proved to be more difficult yet. The city had no barricades, so the sergeant approached the California State Department of Transportation with a request to borrow some of their surplus barricade stock. After much lobbying, he was able to convince the state's transportation department to arrange for the agency to deliver the massive structures to the area. Then the operation snagged because they couldn't provide the crane required to lift them off the truck; no agency in the city was willing to provide the required crane. After much wasted effort trying to borrow a crane for a few hours, the city council representative for the targeted area was notified of the situation. The use of the crane was finally obtained through this channel in short order.

Because of the program's tender age, any true evaluation of its effectiveness is viewed as premature. One piece of information related to the impact of the program is, nevertheless, so striking that it must be reported. Within two weeks of the program's advent, the high school that serves the targeted area reported that, compared to the previous month, between 100 and 150 additional students per day were attending school. The principal reported that many of these new students were females

who said they now felt safe traversing the neighborhood to and from school. Although it is not possible to attribute this dramatic change unequivocally to the program, no rival plausible explanation is evident.

South Bureau

South Bureau is one of the L.A.P.D.'s four geographic bureaus encompassing four geographic divisions: Southwest, 77th, Southeast, and Harbor. The vast majority of the approximately 550,000 residents of the South Bureau area are Black. In South Bureau, the PACE program operates at the bureau level as opposed to the divisional level exhibited in Rampart, North Hollywood and Newton Divisions. The two central features of the PACE program in South Bureau are a senior lead officer program and an abatement team, both under the command of a senior sergeant who answers directly to the bureau commander.

In order to facilitate the bureauwide PACE program across the four geographical divisions, four new sergeant positions were created, one for each division. The senior South Bureau sergeant supervises these four sergeants who in turn have functional supervision of the SLOs in their divisions, but only regarding PACE-related activities. The SLOs remain under the line command of a division patrol sergeant for the rest of their duties. Thus, there are SLOs working in two chains-of-command.

This bifurcation of command has led to some difficulties because the division captains want the SLOs to work regular patrol as much as possible, but the bureau commander wants them to work PACE as much as possible. At the time of our site visit, the SLOs in South Bureau were working on the PACE program approximately two days a week, with the rest of the time spent on their regular patrol duties. While a compromise, this division of labor appears to satisfy neither the bureau commander nor the division captains.

The basic task of the SLOs regarding PACE duties is to gather information about the livability problems in their areas and either initiate some action on their own or fill out the Community Enhancement Request forms. Many times, the SLOs simply spot problem locations on their own. Information on problem locations also comes to the SLOs from other sources, including the citizens in their basic car areas, and other officers who work the cars. These CERs are forwarded to an officer in each divisional community relations office who logs the requests, passes them along to the relevant city agency, and tracks the work undertaken on the location.

In addition to the SLOs working split time in the basic car areas in South Bureau, one SLO is assigned full time to run a ministation, called an "outpost" in LAPD parlance, located in a housing project. Establishing the outpost was a difficult undertaking because some members of the criminal element in the

project vociferously objected to its presence. During the initial weeks of operation, the outpost was fire-bombed seven times. At present, these attacks have ceased and the outpost is now established as a permanent aspect of the housing project.

One notable example of trouble-shooting was accomplished in the housing project. For years, the project was plagued by garbage strewn about the grounds because it was the practice among gang members to overturn the small 40-gallon trash cans that each unit used to dispose of garbage. To prevent this practice, the city installed a large number of several hundred-gallon trash cans which are chained to steel pillars set in concrete. This effort has substantially reduced the amount of trash on the grounds of the project.

The city attorney's office has developed a program with the police department to take civil action against gangs and chronically troublesome locations throughout the city. This program takes the form of documenting the illegal activity of the gang members or the illegal activity occurring at a specific location, presenting the documentation to the court to obtain an injunction against the gang or location, and enforcing the court order.

In South Bureau, a four-officer abatement team under the command of the senior sergeant was created to use this abatement program to combat the illegal conduct of gang members and illegal activities occurring at problem locations. The team documents the illegal activity through department channels and forwards it to the city attorney who presents the case to the court. If an injunction order is secured, the team is then responsible for monitoring the gang/location to ensure compliance with the order.

Concerning efforts to abate gangs, the team works with the South Bureau gang unit to detail the illegal conduct in which gang members have engaged. The team then compiles a file that contains documentation of the gang's activity, such as statements from citizens and officers about the actions of the gangs, and arrest records of individual members. This case file is then forwarded through the police department's downtown Vice Division to the city attorney, who then presents it to the court. If the presiding judge finds that the gang is in fact a public nuisance, a civil injunction order is issued which makes it illegal for individuals identified as gang members to engage in prohibited activities such as wearing particular gang affiliated clothing, giving gang signs, carrying pagers, and being in public in groups of five or more.

In using the injunction statutes against gangs, there is a requirement that the gang against whom the injunction is issued be notified of the abatement order before enforcement action can be taken. To notify the gangs when an order is issued, the abatement team goes out to where the gang members are known to congregate and serves the gang members with injunction orders,

which is video taped for documentation purposes. Notices are also posted in convenience stores and storefronts in the area(s) frequented by that particular gang. After the notification process is completed, the abatement team informs the patrol officers in the division that an injunction order has been secured, and distributes information on the behaviors the order specifically forbids. The patrol officers are then responsible to enforce the court order and can arrest on sight with no further notice or warning.

Concerning the abatement of locations, the team receives most of its work requests from the SLOs, although others also come from patrol officers, city council offices, and even citizens. With some notable differences, the process of documenting illegal conduct in a case file; forwarding it to the city attorney for presentation to the court; notifying the property owner and other interested parties, such as business owners and managers; and enforcing the order is quite similar to the one used against gangs.

There are some noteworthy differences, however. The first step the abatement team takes upon receipt of a request to abate a location is to run a computer query concerning all arrests made and crimes reported at the location. If the computer run discloses that the location does not have a significant call or arrest history, no further action is taken. If the query indicates a history of significant criminal activity, a letter is sent to the owner of the property, and any other involved parties, that details the problems and asks the involved parties to contact the abatement team. When the owner contacts the team, the officers explain what must be done to alleviate the problem and offer strategies for doing so. The team leader reports that approximately 80 percent of the time, the owner takes action at this point and the problem subsides. If the location continues to be a problem after the notification, or if the initial inquiry shows that the location is clearly out of control, the move toward civil abatement begins with the establishment of a full case file. In addition to the documentation contained in gang abatement files, property abatement files include photographs of the location, a copy of the property's title report, and a description of the particular illegal conduct at the location (i.e., prostitution, narcotics, etc.) complete with crime and arrest reports. This packet is then forwarded to the city attorney via the downtown Vice Division for presentation to the court.

If an abatement order is issued, the city attorney notifies the owner and other involved parties of the order which provides for thirty days to eliminate the problems at the location. After the thirty days, the abatement team runs another computer query and does a site visit. If the problems have ceased, the case is closed. If the problems continue, the team can make arrests at the location and forward copies of the reports to the court via the city attorney. The court then fines the property owner for

violating the abatement order. If the fine is not paid, the court can order the property boarded up. However, as of mid-February 1990, there has been 100 percent compliance with court orders, so no properties in south Los Angeles have been boarded up for non-compliance with a court abatement order.

Hollenbeck Division

Hollenbeck Division, located immediately east of the downtown area, serves a primarily Hispanic population of some 175,000 people. Although the PACE program has not been operating in this division, other initiatives in the tradition of community policing are worthy of brief mention. Hollenbeck has a very different though no less community-oriented focus; the community policing efforts are aimed at the very broad problems of crime and disorder in the division, with the broad strategy of improving the life chances of the young people in the area.

The centerpiece of community policing is the Hollenbeck Police-Business Council. The goal of the council is to provide alternatives to boredom and crime for juveniles who reside in the division. The primary component of these efforts is the Hollenbeck Youth Center, a recreation facility located approximately one block from the police station. The youth center is staffed by both part-time volunteers and full time workers, and its budget comes from funds raised by the Police-Business Council. Many police officers do volunteer at the center in their off-duty hours. The staff and the volunteers supervise the recreational activities and provide counseling to the youngsters who use the facilities. In addition, both the staffers and the police officers who work there provide positive role models for the youth.

The operational link between the Police-Business Council and the police is the Hollenbeck Community Relations Office (CRO). The CRO in Hollenbeck is staffed by a sergeant and five police officers, who have the responsibility of overseeing the operation of the youth center, informing the public of its existence, encouraging young people to participate in the programs there, and coordinating revenue-raising activities to fund the center. Thus, the police personnel in the community relations office are responsible for handling the divisionwide community relations efforts which revolve around the Police-Business Council and its youth center.

The community relations efforts at the basic car level are handled by the SLOs through the block watch program. The SLOs in Hollenbeck usually work regular patrol four days a week and are provided one day a week to handle their administrative chores related to block watch. The SLOs are supervised by patrol sergeants, not the CRO sergeant. Hollenbeck, then, has two relatively independent entities doing community-relations work: the community relations office on a divisionwide basis and the SLOs in the individual car beats.

MINNEAPOLIS

Minneapolis has a population of approximately 365,000 and a police department of about 700 sworn officers who work out of a central headquarters and 4 patrol districts. The city has a number of programs that fall within the rubric of community or problem-oriented policing, particularly two specialized units that engage in problem-solving: RECAP and SAFE. In addition, there is a planning effort to design a more widespread community policing program that includes a pilot project linking a small group of officers with an existing community organization that has been involved in problem-solving for many years. This report will focus on the two specialized police units, describe the community group, explain the pilot project, and set forth the basic points of the departmentwide community police planning effort.

The grant team visited Minneapolis in October 1989, and therefore the programs and initiatives described will not reflect progress and changes made beyond that date.

RECAP

Repeat Call Program (RECAP) seeks to concentrate police attention in specific locations having a history of serious crime and related public order problems; typically, these locations also exhibit a high number of calls to the police department. The program began in 1987 as a cooperative research project of the Crime Control Institute (based in Washington, D.C.) and the police department to explore the utility of directing police attention to locations that had generated high numbers of calls for service. Via computer analysis, the 500 busiest locations in the city were identified and half were randomly selected to receive special police attention, while the other 250 simply received normal police service.

A five-officer team called the RECAP unit was formed to attempt to solve the underlying problem generating the large number of calls at the 250 locations in the experimental group. The officers selected to work in the RECAP unit were all veterans with at least 10 years of police experience. The team was given only minimal direction about how to address the problems at each location; they were simply told to do anything they could think of that was within budget and legal constraints.

The workload was spread among the five officers so that each one was assigned approximately 50 cases. Many times the scope of specific problems mandated that two or more officers work cooperatively on them, with one officer designated as having primary responsibility for heading the work undertaken against the locations. The primary officer was also responsible for documenting all relevant information, communications, and activities related to the location, and efforts to abate

problems. The RECAP unit utilized a case file system, creating a separate case file on each location. This practice provided a structure for RECAP's work and insured uniform documentation across locations.

The basic strategy that evolved in the RECAP unit was to use police, government, business, community, and any other resources they could muster to attack a given problem. To this end, the RECAP officers established contacts with those city, county, state, and federal government agencies that the officer's inquiries indicated could assist in their problem-solving efforts. The RECAP team also met with various community and business leaders to enlist the support of the citizens and the business people of the particular problem area.

Perhaps the most noteworthy example of cooperative problem-solving the RECAP unit undertook was the closing down of a notorious bar where drug dealing, fights, and many other problems were legion. After a thorough investigation and evaluation of the situation, the RECAP unit decided that the only way to alleviate the problems at this location was to shut it down. The effort would require that the property be condemned, and thus RECAP enlisted the assistance of numerous other entities. They arranged for the state liquor board and city health department to document liquor law and health code violations. They also worked with other units in the police department to run undercover operations at the bar and conduct uniformed sweeps of the parking lot and surrounding areas. When sweeps were planned, the press was invited to publicize the gravity of the problem. When these efforts led to the generation of large amounts of documentation of illegal activity and public support for an abatement action, the department petitioned the city council to condemn the property. The property was condemned, the bar closed, and eventually the entire structure was razed.

Another notable example of the RECAP unit's creative problem-solving was the use of a long-dormant curfew law against certain problem locations where crowds of juveniles were congregating in the late evening and early morning hours. The curfew law forbids youths younger than 14 to be in public past 2200 hours unaccompanied by an adult, and youths 14-18 years old aren't allowed out past midnight. The RECAP unit coordinated sweeps of the problem locations with patrol officers. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the sweeps, the RECAP officers discussed the problems and potential solutions with the merchants and residents in the problem areas. With the support of the local community, the curfew sweeps succeeded in removing the youths from the area, and calls for service at each of the locations dropped sharply following the sweeps.

The RECAP experiment with the Crime Control Institute ended in 1989. But the RECAP unit continues to operate, targeting high service call areas in much the same manner it did during the experimental phase. The primary difference between the

experimental phase and current operations is a shift in the process by which the problem locations are chosen. Once the experiment was over, the RECAP unit was no longer limited to working high-call locations assigned at random. RECAP devised a location selection process involving a revised use of computer analysis of calls for service as well as work requests from other police officers, city council members, and private citizens. That individuals from these three groups regularly make work requests indicates that the existence and operations of the RECAP unit have become widely known and enjoy a solid reputation in the police department, in city government, and at least some segments of the community.

When a work request is received, the RECAP officers conduct a brief computer query of calls for service and perform a visit to the location to determine whether or not the problem is of such magnitude that it merits their attention. When RECAP accepts a work request, they start a case file, devise a battle plan, and take action against the location. When work requests are turned down, the problem is referred to another entity in the city, county, or state government, and the requesting party is informed of the decision. Many of these work requests are forwarded to the SAFE program.

SAFE

SAFE (Safety for Everyone) is a program of the city's Community Crime Prevention Department that started in 1987. SAFE employs police officers and paid civilian community organizers to engage in community problem-solving throughout the city. The officers and civilians work in 12 two-person teams deployed on the basis of one team per city council district. The SAFE teams work in their respective communities to organize and educate citizens about public order matters and the resources available to address them; they also take action against public order problems. The civilian member of the team has primary responsibility for meeting with community members, and the police officer has primary responsibility for coordinating action against problem locations. Within these parameters, however, each team is free to modify the division of labor as conditions indicate so that, at times, the civilian workers assist with problem-solving and the officers often attend community meetings.

SAFE has a unique organizational structure. The police officers are supervised by a police sergeant, while the civilians report to a civilian supervisor; each team member answers to a different individual. The police sergeant and the civilian supervisor report directly to the civilian director of the Community Crime Prevention Department, who in turn reports directly to the mayor and city council. In this configuration, the police personnel assigned to SAFE are essentially detached from the police department, responding to the direction of the council and mayor as opposed to the chief of police.

The city is attempting to better integrate SAFE into police department operations by encouraging SAFE officers to interface with patrol on a regular basis, and by including an orientation to SAFE in the training of new police officers. The SAFE officers are directed to attend patrol roll calls on occasion and informally meet with patrol officers in the field. An instructional block on the SAFE program is taught at the Minneapolis Police Academy, and newly graduated officers work five days with SAFE officers during their field training program.

The majority of the problem-solving SAFE engages in is directed toward problems such as loitering, excessive noise and related disorder from loud parties, abandoned dwellings, and substandard housing stock. The SAFE teams learn about specific problems via a number of sources: community meetings, citizens' phone calls, citizens' complaints forwarded via city council and the mayor's office, direct observation of problems during routine patrol of their areas, and as previously mentioned, RECAP requests that are forwarded to SAFE.

The SAFE officers handle problems on a case management basis within the framework of a four-step problem-solving program; all work undertaken during each step is documented in a case file to facilitate uniformity across teams and continuity across diverse problem types. The first step is identifying problem through any of the above means. After a specific problem has been identified, the responsible SAFE officer conducts a preliminary investigation to document the status of the problem, gather information on relevant actors, and determine what, if any, action has been directed at the problem in the past. Based on the information gleaned during the investigative stage, the third step is designing a plan to abate the problem. The final step is the implementation of the plan that, hopefully, eliminates the problem. The nature of each situation dictates who in the SAFE unit participates in the planning stage and what entities will be included in the battle plan. Simple problems are handled by the individual SAFE teams, but more complex problems may require assistance from others in the SAFE unit or resources from other entities. In such cases, two or more SAFE officers may work together on a problem, outside resources may be tapped, or both may occur in unison.

One type of problem often handled by individual SAFE teams is noisy parties. There is a tradition in Minneapolis of organizing parties at private residences, open to the general public for a small cover fee, usually three to five dollars. These parties occur predominantly at single family rental properties and are usually quite noisy. They have led to so many complaints to the police that the city developed a party ordinance that allows for the eviction of renters who repeatedly host noisy parties. While the SAFE officers frequently use this ordinance to abate party problems, eviction takes time and the parties often continue until an eviction is final. In such cases, the SAFE officers may

work with patrol to enforce the city's loitering ordinance and curfew law in order to control the problem location in the interim.

Another type of problem that SAFE frequently addresses is sub-standard and dilapidated buildings. Because many times these dwellings have health code violations, the SAFE officers often work with the city's health and sanitation departments to abate such problems. Health inspectors can obtain a warrant to check the premises for health code violations with relative ease. Once a warrant has been secured, the SAFE officer accompanies the health inspector during the search to provide security. If the location is in violation of health codes, one of two procedures can be undertaken depending on the severity of the problem. If the location presents a severe health hazard, the health inspector can condemn the location immediately, giving the residents 24 hours to vacate the premises. If the location is not an immediate hazard, the residents are instructed to remedy the violation in a timely manner. In cases of failure to comply, sanitation workers are brought in to repair or clean the property and cart away all refuse. The cost of such clean-ups are assessed to the property's tax bill; if not paid, the property can be forfeited in a standard foreclosure proceeding.

SAFE operates in 80 of the city's 81 neighborhoods. The single area excluded from the SAFE program is the Whittier neighborhood, where community leaders have chosen not to participate in the SAFE program. This group apparently feels that their particular needs are better met by their locally controlled community group, the Whittier Alliance.

The Whittier Alliance

The Whittier neighborhood is located in the 5th police precinct near the geographic center of the city. It has a multiethnic, transient population with about 90 percent of the area's 13,000 residents living in rental housing. While the population base is unstable, business and cultural institutions (such as the Minneapolis Institute of Art) coupled with a powerful community organization, known as the Whittier Alliance, provide stability to the area. The Whittier Alliance has been in operation since 1978, and has an 18-seat board of directors that is elected by the residents at an annual meeting. Because only 80 to 100 community members participate in these elections, the board cannot be considered representative of the community in a democratic sense; however, its existence and the problems it addresses appear to receive wide support in the community. A major purpose of the Alliance is to improve the livability of the Whittier community by focusing their energies on problems of blight and crime.

As part of the program, the Alliance works to improve the housing stock of the area by targeting three blocks per year for

renovation. The housing aspect is funded primarily by funds obtained from the city's Multi-Family Rental and Cooperative Housing Program, which uses both city and federal dollars; the Alliance also acquires funding from a variety of private foundations and state programs. In 1989, the total amount of funds raised by the Alliance for housing renovation was approximately $500,000. These funds, together with finances acquired through loans, are used to purchase dilapidated multi-family apartments that are converted into less dense structures through extensive remodeling. In addition to improving the physical appearance of the block, this practice reduces the population density of the area. Because substandard housing stock and high population density are viewed as correlates of crime, it is hoped that the housing renovation will not just make Whittier more visually appealing, but will also reduce crime.

The Alliance administers a multifaceted anticrime program headed by a paid full time staff worker, and funded primarily by private institutions and city grants. This program, originally funded by the city, began in 1982. In late 1983, the Eisenhower Foundation awarded the Alliance a grant to develop a more comprehensive anticrime program for the neighborhood. The leaders of the Whittier community preferred to retain their autonomy and the capability of directing their own program, and resisted an initial attempt by the city to control the Eisenhower Funds. The Whittier community still directs their own anticrime efforts. Whittier is the only neighborhood in Minneapolis that does not participate in the SAFE program.

The initial anticrime program developed by the Alliance included neighborhood block and apartment watches, an antiprostitution initiative, and a personal safety program to teach people how to reduce the chances of being victimized by criminals. Over the years, the anticrime program has expanded substantially and currently includes a crime analysis effort, a program that monitors problem locations in the area, a youth program, and their targeting program described above.

In 1989, the Alliance hired one of the RECAP officers on a part-time basis to assist with their strategic planning. With this link to the police department, Whittier has access to up-to-date information on arrests, crimes, and calls for service in their community. The Whittier crime analysis assistant plots these activities on pin maps that are monitored to both guide and check other anticrime efforts of the Alliance. Whittier's crime analysis is also used by the officers who patrol the Whittier area.

When crime analysis discloses a particular problem, or when a resident complains about one, resources are mobilized against it. Because resources are frequently located in some government agency, the Alliance has built a network of contacts in local, state, and federal government agencies that amplify their ability to mobilize resources. For example, if a problem stems from the

residents of a dilapidated dwelling, a member of the Alliance may directly contact the health department and lobby for an immediate inspection. If the problem is more directly criminal, such as drug dealing, the Alliance will contact the RECAP unit, investigative divisions or the command staff of the 5th Precinct to ask for action. Personnel in the 5th Precinct stated that since Whittier has a long-established program well known to the department, officers try to respond whenever time and resources allow. With these ties, more often than not, Whittier can get quick action on their requests.

The history of cooperative anticrime efforts between the Alliance and the police department has led to the development of a small community policing project in the Whittier neighborhood. In September of 1988, members of the Alliance began to develop a plan for a community-based policing project to augment their anticrime programs; in the spring of 1989, eight members of the Minneapolis police department who had worked with the Alliance over the years joined the planning effort on a volunteer basis. In July, a completed proposal was submitted to the police department that was accepted and became operational in January 1990.

The core of the community police program will be a five-person work team consisting of the civilian anticrime director of the Whittier Alliance, a police sergeant, and three police officers. The civilian will have primary responsibility for garnering information from the community and serving as liaison to the rest of the Whittier Alliance. The sergeant will be the primary interface with other police units to both garner information and obtain assistance when required, and will supervise the three community police officers who are to work full time on abating problem locations in Whittier. The sergeant will report directly to the commanding officer of the 5th Precinct, who in turn reports directly to the chief of police. A civilian advisory committee will meet with the team every four to six weeks, providing an additional institutional link to the community. It is hoped that this organizational configuration will allow for adequate input from the community, and at the same time provide proper insulation of the police from undue community influence.

The guiding philosophy of the community police program is to cooperatively work to address problems of crime and livability in the Whittier community. This philosophy is operationalized in a three-step process developed to guide the team's work. The first step consists of identifying a particular problem or location from information that can come from the police team, other police personnel, members of the Whittier community, or statistical analysis. Next, the civilian anticrime program director and the police sergeant together review this information and select the problems the team will work on; the police team then coordinates police personnel, community members, and representatives of other city agencies to gather additional information on the problem and

design a plan to address it. Finally, the police team implements the plan against the targeted problem.

In addition to institutionalizing the long-standing cooperative efforts between the Minneapolis Police Department and the Whittier community, the community police team in Whittier will serve as a pilot project in the police department's long-range plan to establish community policing throughout Minneapolis.

Long-Range Plan for Community Policing

In July of 1989, the police department published a three-year Strategic Plan as part of the city's Comprehensive Law Enforcement Plan. The comprehensive plan includes input from the city planning department, the city attorney's office and the city budget office, as well as the police department. The department's Strategic Plan includes the broad overall goal of implementing community-oriented policing throughout the city, but specific details of this implementation have not yet been worked out.

The overall community policing strategy envisioned in the plan is one of shared responsibility. The police department, the city planning department, and members of the community will jointly indentify problems. The police department, other entities of the criminal justice system, and the community will then devise plans to address the problems and jointly implement them. Although the future community police system will stress cooperation and shared responsibility, the police department will serve a leadership role in problem-solving efforts and as a link among various services. The target date for implementation of this citywide community effort is the mid-1990s.

A six-step process to guide the move to community policing is outlined in the Strategic Plan. First, a task force consisting of representatives from the police department and the community will be formed to explore various models and examples of community-policing initiatives. Second, this task force will devise goals, criteria, and officer performance standards that will promote a successful community-oriented police program. Third, the department will hire expert(s) in community policing as consultant(s) to assist in the planning process. The consultant(s) will assess the police department to determine what aspects of community policing will work best in Minneapolis, assist the task force with their work, and evaluate community police pilot projects. Fourth, the police department will establish a number of pilot projects to be run at the precinct level; the plan recognizes that each pilot project may be unique due to the differing problems that each will be designed to address. Fifth, the task force will monitor the pilot projects to glean the best aspects of each for incorporation into a city-wide community policing system. The final step will be the

actual implementation of a community policing program in the mid-1990s.

PORTLAND

The City of Portland has a population of approximately 425,000 and a police department of approximately 745 officers who work out of a downtown headquarters and three patrol districts. The city is completing the second phase of a multistage planning process to implement community policing on a citywide basis by 1995. This process is being spearheaded by a recently created Community Policing Division in the police bureau commanded by a captain who reports to the chief of police.

During this second phase, the Community Policing Division is coordinating the efforts of a group of committees within the police bureau, each of which is responsible for developing recommendations on one component of community policing. The work of these committees will be used to guide the development of programs over both the short and long term. In the long term, these committees and their work products will serve as the organizational and intellectual platform upon which the bureau will reorganize to implement community policing. In the short term, the work of the committees will provide a menu of policy issues that must be addressed in future planning, a set of ideas about how the organizational transition should occur, and a group of community policing demonstration projects. The pilot projects, which the bureau hopes to launch in the spring of 1990, will serve both to formally introduce community policing to the city and as experiments to test the usefulness of various ideas in practice.

Many other city agencies are involved in the planning effort, providing the police bureau with input from other relevant city resources. The Community Police Division also solicits the input of private groups and individual citizens in the planning process because they believe the citizens of Portland have important information about the city and its needs relevant to community policing. In sum, by developing a partnership among the police bureau, other city agencies, business concerns, and the citizens of Portland, the city is attempting to reshape the manner in which it addresses public safety issues.

The City of Portland has identified four elements which they believe constitute community policing: community involvement, a problem-solving orientation, community-based deployment strategies, and increased police accountability to the citizens. As the city plans for the evolution to community policing, these four elements serve as both guideposts to direct these efforts and a framework around which they hope to build their community policing system.

In order to describe the Portland community policing experience with some structural form, the remainder of this report will provide an account of some of the highlights of Portland's recent past relevant to community policing, the planning efforts, and goals for the future.

The current policing climate in Portland has been partially shaped by a variety of problems experienced by the police bureau in the recent past. A major outgrowth of these problems has been a succession of six police chiefs with short tenure from 1980 through 1987, when a new chief took over. This history of short tenures, coupled with specific changes initiated by each of the successive chiefs, has contributed to a decrease in morale among line officers in the bureau, which could in turn impede the development of community policing. Because successful community policing appears to require motivated, hardworking line officers who believe in the concepts that undergird a community-based policing style, the community police planners will probably have to give increased attention to this area.

In addition to the historical baggage that would tend to work against community policing from the line officer's view, other past events may also come into play. As in many other municipalities in the U.S., the relationship between the police and the Black community has been marked by a number of specific incidents where officers were accused of either using force against black citizens unnecessarily or engaging in other behavior that was construed as racially motivated.

Countering the aforementioned organizational and community problems, other features of the police experience in Portland provide positive impetus to community policing efforts. As will be explained more fully below, over the years there has been a strong intellectual underpinning for community policing in Portland, and there have been successful cooperative efforts between the bureau and other entities. Also, a key component of the city's organizational structure for the delivery of many services to citizens is already based at the neighborhood level, a fact that could allow for a smooth transition to the delivery of police services.

The intellectual basis for community policing comes primarily from two sources. First, one of the most recent chiefs (Chief Baker) advocated the police working with the citizens on public order problems. He stressed that in order to effectively work together on specific problems, the general relationship between the police bureau and the community had to be sound. To this end, he encouraged his officers to build strong ties with the people in the area they policed. The supervisors and managers who are spearheading the planning for community policing had previously worked with the chief to apply this philosophy in the bureau's operations.

The second source springs from Lee Brown's tenure as Director of Public Safety in Multnomah County, the county in which Portland is located. Brown began his neighborhood-oriented police work while at Multnomah County, thus testing some of the ideas of neighborhood-oriented policing in Portland's back yard. In addition, several dozen Multnomah County deputies were laterally

transferred into the Portland bureau when the City of Portland annexed some county land in the late 1980s. Perhaps the most important contribution these officers can make is their knowledge about the problems encountered with neighborhood-oriented policing in Multnomah County; they could guide Portland away from some problems and help manage those that are unavoidable.

A second factor facilitating the development of departmentwide community policing in Portland is the fact that in the past few years, the police bureau has engaged in a number of innovative cooperative efforts to address specific public order problems. It appears that the movement to establish a citywide community policing program grew out of these individual efforts, each of which was spearheaded by the captain of the precinct in which it occurred. As these efforts showed signs of success, the community model of policing gained favor in many quarters of the city. A few of these efforts will be briefly detailed to provide some notion of how the bureau has worked with the community and other government entities in the recent past.

The first was an effort to reduce the public order problems in a particularly crime-prone locale known as the Interstate Area. Interstate Avenue is a strip commercial road in North Portland with many low-rent motels that parallels the main interstate highway bisecting the city. The area had been plagued by public order problems for about twenty years, particularly drug and vice activity with the attendant criminality that often accompanies them. In late 1987, a public forum was held by the residents of the area to highlight the problems and to demand that some action be taken against them. The police command staff and other city officials met with the business owners and community residents and devised a plan to clean up the area. The central features of the plan included new room occupancy rules for motels to discourage prostitution, better reporting of suspicious and illegal activity by residents and motel workers to the police, heightened police patrol presence, and monthly police inspections of the motels to ensure compliance with the new occupancy rules. Area residents reported a marked decrease in street drug and prostitution activity since the inception of the program, and police statistics indicated that reported crime had dropped substantially.

Another example of past efforts at community policing occurred at a local park in an area of the city where citizens would "hang out" after softball games and other recreational activities. Individuals would use and sell drugs, urinate in public, and carry on in myriad disruptive manners. In addition, other more serious crimes such as robbery also occurred. The bureau worked with local merchants, local residents and the parks department to ameliorate the problems. Signs restricting parking to certain hours were placed in the parking lots and the police bureau agreed to enforce these restrictions. The schedule of the recreation activities was changed so that they ended at 10:00 p.m. as opposed to the previous 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning. In

addition, the park's watering schedule was changed so that sprinklers would go on soon after 10:00 p.m., thus discouraging people from hanging out.

Another successful community policing initiative in the recent past was the drafting and use of the Specified Crime Property Ordinance. The ordinance allows the city to close down (for up to one year) any property that has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of a judge to be a location where illegal drug manufacturing or sales, gambling, or prostitution occur. The law requires that the police document use of a property for at least one of these activities before abatement. This can be used against any type of location, commercial or residential, that is causing problems for the community. The city has worked quite vigorously to inform citizens about the law and to urge them to report problem locations to the police. This is done primarily by explaining the law to citizens at local neighborhood meetings and by producing and distributing an explanatory pamphlet. When a location is reported to the bureau, officers investigate and document the problem for presentation to the court.

Perhaps the most striking example of a community policing effort in Portland grew out of requests from Black community leaders in North Portland for an increased law enforcement presence in their neighborhood. As with many municipalities, the Black community in Portland has been plagued with high rates of crime and violence, and in the late 1980s, the Black community experienced a sharp increase in drug-related crime and violence, partly resulting from the migration of Los Angeles area gangs. Increasingly, the members and leadership of the Black community came to believe that the drug and gang problems were getting out of hand and that more law enforcement resources were needed.

During the same time period, the police bureau was attempting to build better relations with the Black community. Two main efforts toward this were undertaken. First, more Black officers were assigned to work Black neighborhoods; second, members of the bureau's upper middle management worked very hard to cultivate sound relationships with the leaders of the Black community. Out of these efforts, the bureau was able to engender more confidence regarding their intentions and actions in the Black community and thus begin to mend the rift between themselves and Portland's Black residents.

In this setting of improved relations with the police bureau and a community feeling overrun by public order problems, requests from the Black community increased for assistance with battling the drug, crime, and gang violence problems. Because the Black leaders felt that a major cause of the problems was loitering youngsters, they requested that the bureau begin enforcing the city's curfew law, which forbids 14-18 year olds from being on the street past midnight and those younger than 14 years old past 10:00 p.m. The bureau was a bit concerned that such police action would counteract the improving relations, and thus they

came up with a novel solution to their predicament: they asked the Black community leaders to work with them in enforcing the curfew law by accompanying them on sweeps. The community was in effect asked to monitor police action so that false accusations of police impropriety could be quickly dismissed and, second, to demonstrate to the loitering youths that the sweeps weren't a unilateral police action, but that the elders of their community supported it.

After a few successful small-scale outings, the Black community asked for more curfew sweeps on a larger scale, as well as other proactive efforts such as drug raids. The bureau simply didn't have sufficient personnel to expand their efforts, and when this was explained to the Black leaders, they proposed that the National Guard be used to augment police resources. Although there were a number of practical and political questions, the bureau formulated a plan to work with the Guard on a short-term basis in the summer of 1989. Guardsmen worked with the bureau primarily in three ways. They assisted with curfew sweeps by providing a secondary perimeter line to prevent escapes; by providing personnel for exterior perimeters in drug raids, and by transporting arrestees to jail. Members of the Black community continued to accompany the police and guardsmen during curfew sweeps, thus monitoring the combined social control efforts.

In sum, from requests for increased law enforcement presence in the Black community to deal with public order problems came an innovative program that linked the Black community, the police, and the National Guard.

One footnote on the National Guard involvement is needed. During a community meeting where the idea of National Guard involvement was being discussed, a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union rose to speak in opposition to it, as a violation of constitutional provisions forbidding the use of the military in domestic law enforcement. She was shouted down by the crowd in short order with cries to mind her own business. This episode provides a measure of the strong community support for the bureau's work with the National Guard.

In addition to the combined police, National Guard, and community enforcement work against public order problems, other agencies and resources participated in a two-step process to attack crime, drug, and gang violence problems in the North Portland Black community. The first step was to build a "firewall" of services (both government and community) around areas that lacked the social cohesion to work together against crime. The philosophy behind this intense intervention was to prevent the spread of the problems to adjacent, less-affected areas by stabilizing them with the influx of concentrated services. After this objective was accomplished, the second step entailed the infusing of these same services into the now-isolated problem area to clean it out, improve it, and hopefully to decrease public safety problems to at least the level of the less-affected surrounding areas.

This program is operated from the Martin Luther King Service Center, a relatively small building adjacent to a school that houses a number of social service agencies. Among those relevant to the anticrime efforts in the "firewall" program are an anti-graffiti team and the Youth Gang Task Force (a civilian program). In addition to these and other non-law-enforcement organizations, the Portland Police Antigang Team and a small detachment of state police officers also participate in this program. There are monthly meetings where representatives of all participating entities gather to discuss the program's status. The presence of the local media at these meetings also serves to publicize the anticrime efforts.

The spirit of local activism, exemplified by the various community anticrime efforts just reviewed, is institutionalized at the city level in the Office of Neighborhood Associations. Portland is divided into 92 distinct neighborhoods which in turn are grouped into seven districts that consist of seven to twenty-two neighborhoods each. The Office of Neighborhood Associations serves as the formal link between the neighborhoods and the city government, both by providing a conduit through which citizens and groups can petition the city for redress of grievances, and by actually funding community groups to provide crime prevention services in various neighborhoods. In Portland, traditional crime prevention services such as block watch, security surveys, and target hardening demonstrations are not managed by the police department, but are organized and administered by neighborhood groups funded for this purpose by the Office of Neighborhoods. In addition, the district offices of the Office of Neighborhoods work closely with the crime prevention groups in a number of the community policing efforts previously discussed. For example, it was the Office of Neighborhoods' crime prevention workers who spearheaded the effort to inform the public about the Specified Crime Property Ordinance. Also, crime prevention workers have assisted in the efforts to stabilize the spread of public order problems in North Portland (through the "firewall" concept previously described) by helping to organize block watches and distributing crime prevention information.

This organizational scheme requires that the Office of Neighborhood Associations and the police bureau have some linkages so that each is aware of the efforts of the other; this need has led to an institutionalization of cooperation between the two agencies in the delivery of services to the citizens of Portland.

The planners designing the community policing program believe that this situation is going to be a boon to their efforts. Because the Office of Neighborhood Associations administers programs at the local neighborhood level, the police bureau will be able to "piggyback" or build upon this legacy to create a community policing organizational structure that reaches down to the neighborhood level. In addition, the Office of Neighborhood

Associations is viewed by both agencies as a sound referral agency for livability problems. It can serve as the primary broker between the citizens of Portland and relevant city service agencies on quality-of-life matters. The police bureau can then work with the Office of Neighborhood Associations by directing citizen complaints to them, and by referring information regarding problems that they themselves observe.

While the Community Police Division is leading the planning effort, it is by no means the private undertaking of this division; the effort also involves the mayor's office, the city council, officers from other units in the bureau, representatives of other city agencies, and private citizens.

Portland has an unusual form of municipal government. The city council consists of four commissioners and the mayor, each of whom have administrative responsibilities as commissioner over one or more city agencies. The mayor is currently the commissioner of the police bureau, and in this capacity he has directly approved the bureau's efforts to move toward community policing. The rest of the city council also appears to support this move to develop community policing. City council staff members attend the planning meetings and serve as a conduit between the council members and the Community Police Division. The council has approved a number of resolutions drafted in concert with the Community Policing Division, supporting the bureau's community policing initiative. The passage of these resolutions are marked by a good deal of media coverage which helps to disseminate the concept to the population at large.

Each of the committees engaged in the aforementioned second phase planning effort have police personnel from outside the Community Police Division as members, allowing influx of diverse police perspectives. The inclusion of other officers may also give the "regular cops" a feeling that they are participating in the development of community policing in Portland. This aspect of the planning operation may serve to overcome at least some of the resistance against new police initiatives that has arisen from the short tenure of chiefs in the recent past; as the rank and file contribute to the planning process, they may be more likely to support the programs that are developed.

A basic tenet of community policing is that other governmental entities often must work in concert with the police to address community problems. In an attempt to have sound working relations with other city agencies when the move to a community policing system occurs, the Community Police Division ensures that other city agencies contribute to the planning process. Representatives of other city agencies are both tapped for ideas and kept informed of planning developments at weekly meetings. Less formal work sessions between the police bureau and other city agencies also occur when the weekly meetings provide insufficient time to accomplish a given task. Particularly close ties have been developed between the police bureau and the Office

of Neighborhood Associations. As previously mentioned, the planners believe that the structure of the Office of Neighborhood Associations provides a preexisting framework through which to deliver those community policing services related to livability problems.

The weekly working meetings are not just a time for information exchange between the bureau and other city agencies. They also serve to keep all parties to the planning effort informed about the status of the undertaking, and they provide a regular conduit to and from the community via the members of the public who attend the meetings on a regular basis. By encouraging public participation in the planning process, the bureau has engendered a great deal of public support for their planned move to community policing.

A large proportion of the private citizens' participation in the planning efforts is by individuals with basic concern about the quality of life in their immediate environments. However, a good deal of the participation also comes from organizations with broader agendas. This aspect of community participation creates a bit of interest-group conflict, a common feature of most governmental undertakings.

Perhaps the most prominent conflict is between the leadership of the Black community in North Portland and the business community. As previously discussed, the Black community in North Portland has experienced a substantial increase in public order problems and community fear in their neighborhoods the last few years. However, North Portland is not the only area of the city where crime and the fear of crime have increased. In response to these broader problems, a number of business leaders came together and formed an organization known as the Citizens' Crime Commission. The group's agenda is to fight crime by assisting the criminal justice planning effort and by mobilizing residents and business owners to help improve the social conditions that they believe cause crime. Because the commission wants to be involved in criminal justice planning, it is very interested in the community police planning efforts, and members of the commission attend the weekly planning sessions. It also enjoys additional influence in the city because of its effective fund-raising capacity, as demonstrated by the $600,000 it raised in the first nine weeks of its existence to fund its operation.

The leadership of the commission felt that if community policing was going to succeed in Portland, some organizational changes needed to occur. In order to identify precisely what changes were required, the commission lobbied the city to perform a management review by an outside consulting firm. The city agreed in principle to such an audit, but when it balked at paying for it, the commission stepped forward with approximately $100,000 to cover the cost of the review.

Some leaders in the Black community viewed these events as potentially providing the commission with undue influence over a planning process that could lead to their obtaining a higher proportion of police resources. Even though the leadership of the commission dismissed this argument as unfounded, the fact remains that two groups with a good deal of political clout are in competition for scarce police resources. The Community Police Division has managed to successfully involve both groups in the planning process, despite their differences. Because both parties have been participating from the start, both have been able to express their respective concerns and argue their respective positions. While the inclusion of both groups cannot be expected to overcome all inherent political conflict, it appears that this strategy has worked quite well and the planning process has not been negatively impacted.

In order to implement the community police system, the bureau will need additional personnel. One of the planning committees has undertaken an extensive analysis of the bureau's workload to determine how many positions should be added. The recommendation from this committee is to add several hundred sworn officers by 1995; the city council has agreed to fund additional positions on an incremental basis, with the first increase of approximately 60 officers approved in early 1990.

Another major issue in the planning for community policing is how to introduce the concept and actually make the required changes in the bureau. A critical component is overcoming potential resistance among line officers to new programs; one way that community policing will be introduced to line personnel is in the training of the new officers. The planning group on training is currently designing a block of instruction on community policing that all Portland recruits must complete.

The first concrete step in implementing formal community policing is expected in May of 1990, when four pilot demonstration projects begin operations. These four projects will formally introduce community policing both to the neighborhoods and to the rank and file of the bureau, and will also serve as guideposts in the planning process. The program's effectiveness must be evaluated to provide useful feedback information to the planning process. At present, as with most community police undertakings, it is not clear how to evaluate these programs. Nevertheless, the planners feel that just as each problem requires a unique plan to solve it, so each problem also requires a unique means to evaluate its resolution. Each project will be evaluated on criteria devised by the participants in the project; involved area residents, police officers, and members from other city entities will determine the criteria for evaluation.

Each of the three patrol districts will have one of these pilot projects, and the fourth pilot project will be a joint effort of two districts. This configuration of projects will allow for a continuation of the way community policing has evolved to this

point in Portland, at the precinct level. While the Community Policing Division planners attempt to design a bureauwide community policing system, the precincts will continue to provide community-based police services as they have in the past. This may serve to incorporate the natural progression of community policing with the planned changes.

SAVANNAH

The City of Savannah has a population of approximately 160,000 and a police department of approximately 300 sworn officers. There are two types of initiatives in Savannah that fall under the rubric of community policing: ministations in three public housing projects, and the "Showcase" neighborhoods, in which the department participates in programs that provide concentrated government services to two areas of the city that are particularly blighted.

Ministations

The Savannah Housing Authority manages 12 properties with the capacity to house approximately 8,000 residents. Some of these projects have experienced very high crime rates and an increase in attendant livability problems. In order to attempt to control the environment in the housing projects, the city manager, the chief of police and the head of the housing authority agreed to create "a ministation" in the housing projects. Savannah took an incremental approach to implementing their ministation concept, starting with a single one in a housing project. Prior to opening the first ministation, the officer who was to staff it was sent to Detroit, Michigan to observe that department's ongoing ministation program. The first ministation became operational in 1987. When the grant team visited Savannah in January of 1990, there were three ministations operating.

The officers of the ministations perceive that their most important mission is working with the children and teenagers of the housing projects to influence them away from the prevalent drug culture. To this end, the ministations are operated during the daylight hours only, with some changes in hours depending on the circumstances.

When the first ministation was opened, the two most immediate problems were identified as abandoned cars and open drug dealing, with the resulting widespread intimidation of residents. The first action taken by the ministation officer was to tow all abandoned cars in the project; when this program first began, crowds would gather to heckle the officer and the tow-truck driver. As a countermeasure, the officers began to video-tape the towings and to point the camera at the crowds; almost immediately, the hecklers disappeared. An anti-loitering ordinance specific to the housing projects was instituted, and the ministation officers successfully used it to break up the drug dealing carried out by pedestrians. In addition, the officers ticketed cars that had stopped in the street in order to prevent illegal drug transactions.

Through these tactics, the daytime scene at the project was greatly improved; the officers gradually gained enough control of the streets and the grounds between buildings so that parents

would allow their children to again play outside after school. Similar tactics were used to clean up the other two projects when their ministations were opened.

Once the daytime environment was under control, the ministation officers embarked on a number of nontraditional initiatives aimed specifically at the children in the projects. Scout troops, overseen by the police officers, have been established for both boys and girls; the officers acquired tools and wood for the kids to build toys. Once a month, the officers pool their resources and take youngsters on a field trip. The officers regularly tutor school-aged kids in the ministation office as an after-school activity that is rewarded with donated candy. During Halloween, officers and children organize performances, such as one where McGruff successfully battles the "crack-man" and puts him in jail. Officers also organize athletic competitions between the housing projects.

The ministation officers also engage in a variety of traditional police activities. When they are on duty and 911 calls are dispatched to the projects, the ministation officers frequently serve as the primary or back-up officer on the call. The three officers often get together to do drug sweeps in the projects, even donning plain clothes on occasion to conceal their identities and sneak up on the dealers. While the ministation program appears to have had a major positive impact on the daytime quality of life in the projects, the officers point out that the projects are still plagued with problems in the evening and night hours. Discussions with residents who participated in block watch indicated that, after dark, the projects see substantial increases in drug dealing, vandalism, and burglary. Lack of resources has not permitted expansion of the program beyond the day shift.

Some of the activities that the officers perform are unusual from the point of view of the traditional policing model. Besides the activities enumerated earlier, a lot of counseling takes place. In one instance, an officer related an example in which a 14 year old youth was given "probation" when caught dealing drugs; the officers intent was to warn the youth that the next violation of drug possession would mean arrest. As officers get to know the youths in the area and their risk status, they can apply different techniques to the situation, ranging from warning and counseling to outright arrest. As the officers become more familiar with the residents and the families that live in the area, they become involved in providing services that may be unusual for police officers. They provide rides to hospitals and various social agencies, provide counseling sessions, hold job fairs, provide parental guidance, and the male officers, in coordination with mothers, knowingly provide a role model for children who are part of families headed by females. The officers report that these kinds of unusual activities also lead to unusual results. While the research team was visiting one of the ministations, a mother came in with a 13 year old who turned

in a .25 caliber semi-automatic weapon that the child "found". The officer responded by praising the child and registering the weapon into evidence. In another incident in which a teenager shot another youth, the responding police unit contacted the ministation officer who almost immediately knew who the suspect was. Upon visiting the home, the younger brother of the suspect led the ministation officer to the location of the crime weapon. The officers believe that increased familiarity and involvement with the residents of the project leads in turn to a greater reliance on and trust in "their" officer.

In general, the officers interviewed felt very motivated and felt that policing needed to expand into these nontraditional areas. The positive effects of this expansion they felt would be exhibited in the long-term through a change in the attitudes and behavior of the youngsters. They felt that the repeated rearrests for drug dealing simply turns into a "revolving-door" situation where the same individuals are recycled through a criminal justice system without enough judges or jail space; the arrest itself is often the only punishment for many young drug dealers who are immediately released back into the streets. At best, this situation is viewed as inadequate and at worst, corrupting. It generates cynicism and lack of respect for a system that holds minor consequences for illegal activities. The officers feel that the countering influence of a positive role model and the presence of law enforcement representatives encountered in the course of positive experiences will have far more impact on youth at risk.

Officers also felt, however, that not any officer should be assigned to the ministation duty; it requires working, engaging in imaginative problem-solving, being flexible, and being prepared for almost any eventuality that can occur in peoples lives. Citizens may ask officers to intervene in activities ranging from family and drug counseling to providing transportation to instances of family violence where the safety of the officer may actually be threatened.

Productivity, by traditional police measures, appears high. Because of the flexibility that the officers have and their ability to get together to perform drug raids and sting operations, the officers feel that they actually effect as many or more arrests and confiscate more drugs and more weapons than their colleagues in patrol. In spite of all the extra activities that they engage in, which constitute an unprecedented expansion of their police roles, the ministation officers feel that they are as productive, if not more so, than regular patrol officers.

Showcase Programs

In 1986, the city manager's office conducted a study of the distribution of crime in Savannah, which disclosed that serious crimes are more frequent in areas beset with blight. From this

information, the manager decided to develop a program to address the blight problems of the worst area under the assumption that concentrated government services could improve social conditions and reduce crime. This "Showcase" program was launched in the spring of 1987 in an area that contained approximately 860 households. In its original form, the Showcase program did not include police department involvement because it concentrated on street and sidewalk repair, clean-up campaigns, and other efforts to improve the physical environment. It soon became apparent that the police department could serve a valuable function in the program by helping to gain control of areas with chronic criminal activity, and maintaining control and facilitating the efforts of other city agencies. In the summer of 1988, the program was expanded to include another blighted crime-ridden area containing approximately 1500 households. The two program areas are now called Showcase I and II.

The two central features of the current efforts in Showcase I and II are the work of the Office of Neighborhood Services, aimed at improving the physical appearance of the areas, and the police department programs aimed at reducing and controlling crime. While all city agencies participate in the program, the Office of Neighborhood Services and the police department appear to be the key players in terms of attempts to provide linkages between the citizens of the Showcase areas and the city government. There are regular meetings organized by the Office of Neighborhood Services, where representatives of all city agencies meet with community members to exchange and discuss local problems. In addition, the police department and the Office of Neighborhood Services are in contact with the citizens on a regular basis between these meetings.

The Showcase programs attempt to establish a clear division of labor regarding responsibility for work on public versus private property, thus creating a working partnership between the city and the citizens. Officials believe that the city is responsible for maintaining public property that is in a state of disrepair, but in return, the residents of neighborhoods are responsible for taking care of their own dwellings and property, whether they rent or own. And both parties together are responsible for taking care of crime and disorder problems.

In terms of working together, city officials operate under the assumption that residents of the Showcase areas must keep them informed about their particular concerns. The Office of Neighborhood Services obtains information from citizens primarily in two ways. First, they have trained a number of community volunteers to conduct surveys in the neighborhoods that help identify problem locations. In addition, each city agency has one employee designated as the contact person for the residents in the Showcase areas, thus substantially streamlining communication. The Office of Neighborhood Services provides the names and numbers of these employees to the Showcase residents,

and serves as ombudsman and an information link between the city and these neighborhoods.

In addition to facilitating information flow, the Office of Neighborhood Services often works directly on problems. When a citizen complaint is received, a case file is initiated and information forwarded to the relevant city agency. All work undertaken to address the problem is documented in the case file to facilitate tracking all actions taken.

The needed efforts in the Showcase areas are identified by the patrol officers, and handled within traditional law enforcement responses. Two notable problems were abandoned cars and abandoned buildings, used by drug addicts as well as by prostitutes and their customers. Officers responded to the abandoned autos problem by issuing citations and eventually initiating impound procedures. Regarding abandoned buildings, officers began to enforce an abandoned property ordinance which requires that such structures be secured to prevent trespassing. If the owner fails to take action, the city takes steps to perform the work and bills the owner for it.

When officers note an unsecured abandoned building, they notify the Office of Neighborhood Services which then forwards the information to the department of Housing, which is responsible for the actual work. During our site visit, however, a number of experienced patrol officers reported being unaware of such a law and the department's efforts to abate abandoned buildings; it appears that the effort is not citywide, but rather is selectively applied as needed.

A special unit in the police department is charged with monitoring abandoned buildings that have been secured to ensure that they haven't been broken into. They receive a list of all such buildings and attempt to monitor them regularly, but due to a lack of resources and competing priorities, monitoring is performed on a more ad hoc basis. In the Showcase area, abandoned building inspections are conducted during quarterly emphasis patrols, which are led by the department's tactical unit. Every three months, the police department runs a 16-18-hour long police sweep through one of the Showcase areas. The neighborhood surveys conducted by the Office of Neighborhood Services are used in planning these sweeps. A typical emphasis patrol includes extra traffic officers, particularly for drunk driving enforcement; sweeps of known public drug bazaars; and searches and inspections of abandoned buildings. When trespassers are found in abandoned buildings that have been desecured, they are often arrested and the Office of Neighborhood Services is notified that the property needs to be resecured.
In the Showcase II area, one police officer is assigned to serve as a liaison between the residents and the city. During the first six months of this assignment, the officer spent nearly all of his time on this task, and was able to establish a series of contacts in the community and with the various city agencies to

get the program operating. After getting the program established, he reduced his time to approximately 25 percent.

The Showcase officer developed contacts with one person in each city agency who would be responsible for handling problems in the area. He also attended neighborhood watch meetings to establish contact with the various block watch captains, to inform them of each agency's responsibility regarding various community problems, and to disseminate the name of the contact person for each agency. The block captains were instructed to notify the relevant contact person when a problem arose, and to contact the officer if the problem hadn't been resolved.

Three primary problems have arisen in the operation of this aspect of the Showcase program. When the community's work requests are not acted upon, the citizens complain to the Showcase officer who then recontacts the agency. But there is no guarantee that the second request will provide a better response. Not only does the officer bear the wrath of the citizens when other agencies don't follow through, but he must then follow up with the agencies to generate their cooperation. As citizens directly contact the agencies, the Showcase officer doesn't know how many requests have been made, what they were, what was said, etc. He becomes involved only after an agency's initial failure to provide service, at a time when frustration may already be building on both sides, regarding a problem that he may know nothing about.

Finally, the Showcase officer is detached to a specific tactical unit in the department. This creates a situation where most of the time he is handling other responsibilities in his unit and is not available in the Showcase area. Because he works for a special unit, the Showcase officer has very limited opportunity to discuss problems with the officers who patrol the area on a regular basis. Consequently, ongoing information about the area's problems and potential solutions possessed by the area's patrol officers are generally not forwarded to the individual who is supposed to do problem-solving there.

The department's Crime Prevention Unit works tangentially with the community policing efforts in both the housing project ministations and in the Showcase areas. In Savannah, the Crime Prevention Unit handles the department's Neighborhood Block Watch programs; in both the Showcase areas and the ministations, the unit organizes and runs block watches, attends the regular Showcase meetings and meets with the staff of the Office of Neighborhood Services. The Crime Prevention Unit's efforts in both the Showcase and ministation areas have been met by mixed success, particularly efforts to organize block watches. Although block clubs with block captains do exist in the areas, many of them don't meet regularly and those that do have only a few participants.

The Crime Prevention Unit's efforts appear to be more productive in their work with the Office of Neighborhood Services. An officer meets with the Office of Neighborhood Services staff to discuss problems that come up in active block watch groups and work toward solutions. At these meetings, the officer also gathers information on other problem locations and the efforts being undertaken against them. Through this liaison, the Crime Prevention Unit keeps abreast of how the Office of Neighborhood Services is attempting to manage the problems in the Showcase areas.

The efforts to organize block watches in the projects with ministations have also proved minimally successful thus far. In fact, the only housing projects where block watches have been firmly established are two that exclusively house senior citizens. In the seven other projects without ministations, residents will occasionally meet with a crime prevention officer, but this occurs only after much prodding and usually only when the officer agrees to attend the meeting in plain clothes. Evidently the residents fear that the criminals in the area will retaliate for their attending a meeting with a uniformed officer.

As previously mentioned, the officers who work in the ministations have had a good deal of success cultivating sound relations with the residents. It would appear that the implementation of the ministations in selected projects overcame the roadblocks to institutionalizing a police presence. The fact that the residents work with the ministation officers, although ignoring block watch, indicates that the residents are much more accepting of the individual officers assigned to the ministations than they are of the police department in general or crime prevention in specific. It also means that a successful block watch program may be difficult to initiate in some neighborhoods, but that a tailored police presence can nevertheless succeed and be the necessary precursor to the eventual establishment of block watches in these areas.

ST. LOUIS

The City of St. Louis has a population of approximately 400,000 and a police department of approximately 1550 officers who work out of a downtown headquarters and nine patrol districts. St. Louis is divided into 74 recognized, discrete neighborhoods. Although there are many initiatives in the City of St. Louis that might fall under the rubric of community-oriented policing, it is within one of these 74 neighborhoods, Fox Park, that the best-developed program is in operation. This report will focus on the community policing programs in Fox Park, the central component of which is the Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS); other community oriented initiatives in the City of St. Louis will only be discussed briefly.

The police department has an unusual position in city government that evolved from the Civil War period, when the police department was placed under the overall control of the Governor of Missouri. The governor appoints a four-member police commission that is responsible for hiring the chief of police, who is then responsible for the operation of the department on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the commission. Thus, the St. Louis Police Department is actually a state agency in which the chief works for the governor, not the mayor of the city.

As generally defined, community policing requires cooperation between the various entities required to address a given problem. The unique organizational structure in St. Louis with state, not local, control of the central entity in community policing, would seem to invite interagency conflict. However, in the Fox Park area it appeared that such problems did not exist, nor did the unusual police organizational arrangement appear to impede police cooperation with the city's civilian-run neighborhood block watch and crime prevention programs.

Each of the nine police districts in St. Louis that provide the decentralized patrol across the city is commanded by a captain. Assigned to each of the nine districts is one public affairs officer under the command of a lieutenant whose office is in the downtown headquarters. The public affairs officers are responsible for attending community meetings, educating the citizens about public safety issues, and disseminating information on how to best work with the police department to reduce crime in their neighborhoods. Thus, the formal link between the police department and community groups runs through the downtown headquarters, not the local police district. This lack of direct authority over the public affairs officers could inhibit the ability of the district captains to interact with the community as they deem necessary.

The 3rd police district, in which Fox Park is located, provides basic police services for some 90,000 people. One feature of the social landscape of the 3rd Precinct is a number of public housing projects that have major problems of drugs and violence.

During the team's one-week site visit, a housing police lieutenant was fired at on three occasion, and one of his men received a gunshot wound in the hand during that week in a similar sniping incident. The lieutenant commented that such sniping occurs quite regularly and the housing police just take such risks as part of the job.

In addition to the housing projects, there are several other hot spots in the 3rd Precinct, though none so constantly violent. Thus, it is evident that within the police district in which Fox Park is located, there are also other areas that suffer from serious crime and disorder problems.

The captain of the 3rd Precinct indicated that he and his officers are quite attentive to information provided by citizens regarding specific crime problems. Much of this information is garnered by the attendance of the public affairs officer at block watch meetings and other community meetings throughout the district. The most common use of this information is to help guide buy or bust narcotics operations throughout the precinct. However, the citizens have no input in selecting where buy-bust operations will occur; their role is strictly to provide intelligence and not assist in target selection.

As is usually the case, sometimes the citizen-provided intelligence is wrong, as was reflected in a situation where a number of men were reportedly coming to and going from a woman's house. Some neighbors thought that this activity indicated that she was dealing crack cocaine. Upon investigation of the matter it turned out that she was not dealing crack; she just had numerous boyfriends. While the captain really appreciates input from the community, he feels that sometimes their eyes are improperly focused. The public affairs officer attempts to educate the citizens about what constitutes suspicious activity worthy of a call to the police. Through these efforts, the police in the 3rd Precinct are attempting to provide education that will allow citizens to provide better intelligence regarding criminal activity.

In addition to information on criminal activity, many citizens complain to the 3rd Precinct captain about uncollected garbage, youngsters loitering, unkempt residences, and other typical "Wilsonian" quality-of-life indicators, (the measures proposed by Wilson and Kelling in "Broken Windows"). The captain sees the big problems of the division as drugs, burglary, and auto theft. Thus, there exists a difference of opinion between the police commander and the citizens about the nature of the problems in the 3rd Precinct. As will be described below, both views were represented in the programs that were implemented in Fox Park.

Fox Park is located near the geographical center of St. Louis. It is an inner city neighborhood in transition from having a predominantly low-income White population to having a mixed racial and socioeconomic area. Many middle-class Whites have

moved into the area in recent years, renovating substandard housing. This gentrification process paralleled an influx of low-income minorities to the area.

This shift in the sociodemographic make-up of Fox Park has coincided with a 50 percent reduction in the population of St. Louis in the last decade, primarily from population flight to the suburbs. Evidently the movement of residents back into Fox Park is taken by city officials as a sign of a potential trend that could revitalize the city. From the city's point of view, the experiment in gentrification must succeed if St. Louis is to turn the tide against flight to the suburbs. Accordingly, city officials are willing to commit resources to the area to combat the crime and disorder problems that could jeopardize the move towards revitalization.

As the process evolved in the Fox Park area, many of the new residents perceived that major crime and livability problems plagued the area and that they needed to work together to reduce these problems; a number of the new residents formed the Fox Park neighborhood association to work to reduce crime and improve livability. The association has monthly formal meetings to discuss problems and plan strategies to address them; these meetings draw a fairly good turn out of up to 175 people. The 3rd Precinct public affairs officer attends these meetings to provide information on criminal activity and police action, as well as answer questions and obtain intelligence from the citizens. The three city alderman that have part of the Fox Park neighborhood in their districts also often attend. Thus, it appears that the Fox Park Neighborhood Association is well supported by the residents, the city government, and the police department. At present, the association has only minimal minority membership, far less than their numbers in the community would suggest. The leadership of the association reports that they have tried to recruit minorities, and will continue to do so.

An important ingredient present in the Fox Park neighborhood is the emphasis on improving housing stock and eliminating dilapidated dwellings. Several housing redevelopment organizations operate in the community; the primary strategy of the redevelopment effort in Fox Park is to purchase dilapidated dwellings, then sell them to contractors who refurbish the buildings for sale to homeowners. The City of St. Louis directly funds "community development associations" to buy problem properties and then apply for private or public funds to fix and sell the properties; any profits obtained from the sales are applied to new purchases. The preeminent redevelopment company appears to be the DeSales Community Housing Corporation which has worked in Fox Park for several years, and since 1982 has acquired more than 50 properties for renovation and resale. The individuals working for De Sales appear to be committed to the neighborhood as evidenced by the fact that three of the four employees live within its borders and they often attend the

meetings of the neighborhood association. In fact, over the years the DeSales workers have held leadership positions in the neighborhood association.

Four major programs operate in Fox Park to address livability issues: two of them are run by the neighborhood association with linkages to government entities and two are run by government entities with linkages to the community. The two community initiatives are a citizens' patrol (that was in a state of abeyance during our visit) and the tracking of arrestees in their neighborhood. The two government initiatives are a Community-Oriented Police Services team of two officers and a focus on livability problems by Operation Concentrated Services (ConServ).

The community program to track arrestees is operated by the neighborhood association in conjunction with the city. The city provides the association with a list of names and addresses of arrestees which is reviewed to identify who resides in rental properties in Fox Park. The association then sends out a form letter to the arrestee's landlord informing him or her that the tenant has been arrested along with a description of the alleged offense(s). The goal of this program is to get landlords to closely screen tenants, monitor activity at the dwelling, and if problems persist, terminate the lease of the alleged malefactor which would, hopefully, cause the individual to move from the area.

The second program of the neighborhood association was the initiation of a motorized citizen patrol modeled after the successful citizen patrol program that operates in the nearby Shaw neighborhood. The Shaw program was designed by the residents in close cooperation with the police department, and the Fox Park Citizens' Patrol adopted a program that already had the stamp of approval from the police department.

Unfortunately, the Fox Park Citizens' Patrol did not work as smoothly as expected, and created some friction between the neighborhood association and the police in the 3rd Precinct. At the start of the program, citizens on patrol called 911 to report incidents that they believed warranted police attention, but no police car was immediately sent. Evidently, in these cases the dispatchers determined that the incident reported wasn't critical, and they put the call on the low priority list. The association complained about this practice quite vigorously until the department began to dispatch officers to some of the situations reported by the citizens' patrol. This disturbed some police officers a great deal. Numerous officers expressed their dissatisfaction with the Fox Park program to their superiors. This and other problems led to the discontinuation of the citizens' patrol in Fox Park.

In order to understand what the Fox Park Citizens' Patrol had hoped to develop, a member of our research team met and rode with members of the patrol in the Shaw neighborhood.

In this program, citizens go out in two teams of two cars with two citizens each, convoy style. The cars are equipped with cellular phones so the citizens can notify the police department via 911 if they observe suspicious or overt criminal activity. The patrol program has some tight strictures regarding the level of interaction they are to have with those they suspect of wrongdoing; they are to avoid direct confrontation at all costs. Their primary patrol strategy is to track the movement of unfamiliar pedestrians, especially juveniles, through the neighborhood. Detailed notes of such tracking episodes are kept and turned over to the leader of the Shaw patrol; she reviews these notes with the district captain on a monthly basis.

On the evening that our grant team members accompanied the patrol, the practice of tracking pedestrians was observed firsthand. The patrollers saw a group of three male juveniles who were walking through the neighborhood and surreptitiously followed them for about 15 minutes. The citizens didn't notify the police because the juveniles gave no indication that they had, or were about to, break the law. What originally had drawn the attention of the citizens was that a youth was walking about two or three steps in front of two others that were following. The citizens thought that indicated a street robbery in-the-making. After a few minutes, their fears proved unfounded as the three appeared to be friends; even so, the patrol continued to follow the group until it exited the Shaw neighborhood.

The citizens' patrol also paid a great deal of attention to the physical status of the neighborhood by keeping a log on dilapidated dwellings and describing their physical condition, such as boarded-up, fire-damaged, etc. Changes denoting possible illegal activity could then be readily recognized. They also looked for unusual pedestrian and vehicular traffic patterns near occupied dwellings. This practice led to a major drug bust when the patrollers notified the police of a large volume of auto and pedestrian traffic in front of one residence. Investigation disclosed that the location was a major crack house, which led to a combined task force raid involving the St. Louis Police Department and the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration.

The first government program that can be considered a component of community policing is Operation ConServ, a program operational in 14 of the 74 neighborhoods in St. Louis. The mandate of Operation ConServ is to improve the appearance and livability of the neighborhoods they serve. The two primary targets of ConServ's efforts are abandoned cars and dilapidated buildings, but additional unsightly locations such as overgrown vacant lots may also be addressed. ConServ workers get information on problem locations primarily by attending meetings of the police, other city departments, and the community and by patrolling the neighborhood in their city vehicles.

ConServ works with the police department primarily on abandoned vehicles and substandard buildings. The police department and ConServ have established a procedure to work together on the enforcement of a "derelict automobile ordinance". When ConServ workers locate dilapidated vehicles that may be abandoned, they contact the police department with the relevant license or "vehicle identification" number. The police department then checks on the vehicle's registration status; those that are abandoned are towed.

The cooperative efforts regarding dilapidated buildings are not very efficient. The police department is interested in particular dilapidated dwellings because many of them are crack houses or locations where other illegal activity occurs. Formal linkages and procedures between the police department and ConServ to work against such properties have not been established; informal linkages exist, but they consist mostly of the ConServ workers providing information to the police department. When ConServ workers observe dilapidated dwellings or some other location where they suspect illegal activity such as drug dealing, they note the address and the particular problem. The next time they encounter a police officer in the district where the problem is located, they pass along the information. One particularly industrious ConServ worker who thinks that the police department should be notified regularly rather than on a hit-and-miss basis, has devised an innovative means to convey information to the department: when he notes a suspicious location while on patrol, he calls 911, tells the operator that he is a concerned citizen, provides a fictitious name, and gives the operator the relevant information on the location of concern. While this is a readily available way to provide information to the department, it would appear that more formal linkages would substantially improve efficiency.

Recently, attempts have been undertaken to improve the linkages between the police department and ConServ. The head of ConServ regularly attends meetings with the heads of other city departments, including the chief of police, to be able to exchange information at this level. In addition, the ConServ workers attempt to get to know the police officers in the various districts in which they are assigned so that they might do a better job of relating information about problem locations. Finally, ConServ has entered into a joint formal program with the police in the 3rd Precinct to work in the Fox Park neighborhood.

The formal community policing program in Fox Park, called Community Oriented Police Services (COPS), began as a two-month experimental department initiative that started in October 1989. The program is administered by a two-officer team that works exclusively in the Fox Park area. The program was initiated by a major on the department's command staff who concurred with the prevailing opinion in city government that Fox Park was a critical community for the continued viability of the City of St. Louis. Because a significant proportion of the complaints from

Fox Park residents were about livability issues, the major felt that the department should provide resources that could address the residents' concerns, and thus respond to both actual crime and the fear of crime.

Two experienced patrol officers with previous work experience in the Fox Park area were selected to be the COPS officers. They were freed from radio calls and instructed to spend their time working to reduce crime and the fear of crime by focusing on livability problems. The officers were instructed to meet with community members, learn about particular problems, and work with those government agencies having jurisdiction over these problems. In order to accomplish these dual tasks, the COPS team was instructed to spend approximately half of its time patrolling Fox Park and the other half problem-solving.

Because it would be quite cumbersome to administer this program from a command staff level, the 3rd Precinct captain has the primary responsibility of overseeing the operations of the COPS program. The officers write a weekly memo to him detailing the livability and crime problems in the area and the activities that they have undertaken to ameliorate them.

The goals agreed upon by all concerned were to improve the quality of life and to lower crime. However, as it was unclear how to evaluate the officers' work toward these goals, no evaluation criteria were developed. The traditional police measure of crime statistics was viewed as inappropriate because it was felt to be influenced by factors outside the control of the program. A survey of the community regarding fear of crime was considered, but dismissed because of concern that the community would react negatively to resources spent gathering information instead of actually addressing problems.

As the program began, then, no firm notion existed of how to evaluate the activities and the results contemplated by the COPS initiative. The officers were told at the outset that they were not going to be evaluated on arrests or other typical enforcement statistics, and thus, they had no expectation that they were to emphasize arrests, writing tickets, or taking any other enforcement action. Nevertheless, they were instructed to use enforcement action where appropriate.

In order to implement their mandate to build linkages with residents and learn about specific problems, the COPS officers employed a variety of strategies. They conducted extensive random motorized patrol to promote police visibility and thus engender a sense of police presence among residents. Although it was winter, they often walked short foot beats to promote more direct contact with the citizens. The officers carried pagers so that residents could contact them directly with information on livability problems and other nonemergency concerns. To promote knowledge about their availability via the pager, they distributed business cards with the pager number.

In an attempt to gain information about how to use other government entities and to build linkages, the COPS officers contacted a number of individuals. These included the Environmental Court Coordinator of the city's Department of Public Safety Building Division, from whom they acquired information regarding city building codes. The COPS officers felt that one of the big problems in the Fox Park area was substandard housing exhibiting code violations. They wanted to develop a better awareness of what the building code required and develop the capacity of the police department to utilize building code violations against locations that proved to be public order problems. They also learned more about landlord-tenant laws; they felt that it would allow them to do a better job of mediating disputes in the Fox Park area, where their workload included a high proportion of such problems.

They also met with a city court judge to get information regarding the viability of law enforcement officers engaging in building code enforcement. They discovered that enforcement action per se was not under their jurisdiction, but the information could be used by employees of the building division to take action. In addition to these efforts directed at problem-solving, the COPS officers undertook two direct anticrime efforts. They developed a burglary investigation program and anti-drug-dealing program.

Each morning when they came to work, they obtained a print-out of the previous day's burglaries and conducted follow-up investigations on those from Fox Park. These follow-ups consisted of contacting the victims and the neighbors to gather any additional personal information. They viewed these follow-ups as a critical component of their attempts to build sound relations with the members of the community. They felt that many times burglary victims were a low police priority because services were stretched thin; by doing these follow-ups, they were generating good criminal information, but also contributing to fear reduction and to more solid ties with the community.

COPS officers also paid extra attention to drug dealers who were hanging out on the streets, not by arresting them, but by doing lengthy field interrogations and taking their time questioning the dealer so that their customers would stay away. They would simply patrol in the immediate proximity of the drug dealers, and in this way prevent deals from being consummated. The rationale for field interrogations, as opposed to arrests, was that an arrest removed the officers from the field for a lengthy period while booking the suspect. Their superiors had decided that police presence in Fox Park was more crucial at the time, and thus the COPS officers developed the strategy of engaging in field interrogations of drug dealers as a response to their mandate.

In addition to these particular anticrime efforts, the COPS officers enhanced their ties with the regular patrol officers. They often handled calls for service in Fox Park, thus relieving patrol call load somewhat; they always responded as back-up patrol officers on high-priority calls, and they kept lines of communication open with patrol by asking for information regarding problems.

Because Operation ConServ has a mandate to work on livability problems, the COPS officers were instructed to develop a close working relationship with the Fox Park ConServ worker. This effort proved to be quite successful; the COPS officers and the ConServ worker often rode together through Fox Park looking for housing code violations and other unkempt property. Upon locating problems, they jointly devised plans to abate or improve them, which often included a site inspection or clean-up. In those situations where it was felt that the safety of the ConServ worker might be jeopardized, the COPS officers provided security.

An example of the combined COPS/ConServ work against a problem location was the eviction of a group of drug dealers from a substandard dwelling. Following citizens' complaints, the COPS officers and the ConServ officer worked together to document housing code violations and succeeded in getting the criminals evicted. However, they only moved about six blocks away, and now a new set of neighbors are angry because the group is still dealing drugs, stealing, and generally being poor neighbors. A repeat of the process will be organized to abate the new problem location. Although such displacement does not completely solve the problem, it can be viewed as a somewhat successful tactic because it substantially disrupts illegal activity.

During the two month experimental phase of the program, a number of properties were cleaned up with help from ConServ. These have stayed clean. While there are still a number of areas that they weren't able to abate, those areas where concentrated action took place have not returned to their former state of disrepair as of early spring 1990.

The experimental phase of the program ended with the close of calendar year 1989. As previously mentioned, at the start of the program there was uncertainty about how the police department should evaluate it. As it progressed, several evaluation criteria were developed: letters from citizens were received by the department with positive feedback about the efforts of the COPS officers; response time was also tracked, and during the time when the COPS officers were on patrol, they would respond to "hot calls" thereby favorably reducing response time; feedback from the aldermen was a third criterion because they were pleased with the clean-up and extra patrol. An additional evaluation criterion was feedback from the other officers in the district; the majority of the other officers reported that they supported the COPS program, particularly their involvement in burglary follow-ups and responding with back-up on hot calls.

During 1990, the COPS program has continued to operate in the Fox Park community in a modified form. It consists of the same two officers doing the same types of activities, but they are now also responsible for handling radio calls throughout the 3rd Precinct. The result is that they have less time to do their community policing work, but they are allowed to put themselves "off-the-air" to do proactive work, which they do quite regularly. They continue to employ off-the-air meetings with citizens to discuss community problems and get information on crime; they also continue to work with the ConServ officer identifying dilapidated buildings and unkempt vacant lots, and attempting to help get them cleaned up and repaired. Predictably, one problem that did surface was that other communities became aware of the special attention in Fox Park, and questioned the selection of neighborhoods for the program.

One footnote of importance concerns the pager that officers carried. There were funds in the budget to rent the pager only for the two-month pilot project. After the end of the pilot, one of the officers felt that the pager was so successful in terms of building linkages with the community and improving the level of service he could provide, that he now pays for the pager out of his own pocket, thus allowing the citizens in Fox Park to continue contacting the COPS team at their convenience.

The COPS officers continue to experience good rapport with the parole officers in the 3rd Precinct. This follows the trend that was established during the experimental phase of the program, when they remained active in a traditional police capacity by doing burglary follow-ups and responding to hot calls in support of patrol. In fact, in the modified program, patrol officers continue to give the COPS officers information about drug dealers, burglars, and thieves in the Fox Park area, knowing that the COPS officers will spend some of their off-air time working on these problems.

The City of St. Louis also has an ongoing program known as "Operation Brightside," whose mission is to beautify and improve the physical appearance of the city as a whole. Initiatives undertaken include promoting recycling, funding landscaping projects, reforestation and the planting of trees in various neighborhoods, and efforts aimed at neighborhood clean-up and removal of accumulated refuse. While the program sets its own priorities, it does appear to work fairly closely with other agencies and groups in attempting to concentrate multiple resources into specific target areas. Spokespersons reported that during 1989, the program had a budget of about two million dollars. Of this amount, only about $100,000 was provided by the city in the form of block grants; the rest was raised through other public and private grants, individual and corporate contributions, and various fund-raising efforts.